I. Climate Science

Ottawa’s August announcement of its intention to fast-track the West Coast pipeline proposal marks the latest in a series of interventions designed to facilitate oil and gas expansion in Canada. Paired with its recent push for major pension funds to invest in new oil and gas infrastructure, the establishment of the Canada Strong Fund, and other measures, Canada’s federal government is elevating oil and gas expansion as a nation-building endeavour. More than winning residual demand for oil and gas, the country appears to be betting on demand growth in key Asian markets, encouraged by extraordinary market conditions today.

Yet, a fundamental question remains: is oil and gas expansion in the best interest of financial stakeholders? Beneath rhetoric of energy exceptionalism and oil and gas demand growth, the numbers tell a different story.

The same energy crisis that makes Canadian supply look attractive today risks accelerating a market shift away from fossil fuel imports.

Through a short-term lens, oil and gas expansion in Canada may appear lucrative. With the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, producers operating outside of the Persian Gulf are reaping steep windfalls as global supply tightens. However, the fundamentals of new projects fall short in the face of long-term headwinds.

Oil and gas expansion requires significant upfront capital expenditure to be economically viable, supported by sufficient market demand and prices decades from now. The oil and gas growth narrative in Canada assumes Asian markets, in particular, will absorb long-term export growth.

The accelerating rollout of cheaper and more secure alternatives to oil and gas imports turns this assumption on its head. Asia is electrifying five times faster than the West, while ramping up renewable energy capacity faster than the rest of the world (see Figure 1)[1] – undermining demand for oil and gas in the process. Globally, a range of energy scenarios see demand for oil and gas peaking by 2030 and the mid-2030s, respectively. Reflecting this, investment in clean energy systems already roughly doubles that in fossil fuels.[2] The rise of consolidation among oil and gas majors globally suggests many companies are waking up to the immense transformation of the energy system underway.[3]

Figure 1: Asia is running ahead of the rest of the world on electrotech.

Source: Ember (2026)

Crucially, the current Middle East conflict — while increasing the relative attractiveness of Canadian producers today – may undercut the long-term market demand for Canadian hydrocarbons.

Geopolitical tensions appear to be accelerating Asia’s rapid electrification and renewables buildout, as price-sensitive consumers, businesses, and policymakers confront energy affordability and availability challenges stemming from the region’s high dependence on fossil fuel imports. Across Asia, the doubling of China’s solar PV exports in March 2026, the cancellation of certain LNG-related projects, the fast-tracking of renewable and electricity storage systems, and the restarting of nuclear reactors illustrate this shift.[4]

For LNG specifically, a wave of new projects further threatens to compress prices – compounding the energy transition risk of oil and gas demand destruction. With ~254 million tonnes of LNG expected to come online by 2030, futures markets are seeing LNG prices of $10/MMBtu and below as soon as 2028.[5] At this price, our analysis suggests under-construction and proposed LNG projects in Canada may fail to compete. Simultaneously, LNG price volatility is likely to deter importers from sinking significant capex into regasification infrastructure.

Market uncertainty in coming decades casts doubt on the value-add of potential new oil and gas projects in Canada…

Structural market uncertainty matters to companies and their investors. Investment decisions made today lock oil and gas companies – and their financiers – into projects whose economics depend largely on oil and gas prices decades into the future. Findings from CTI’s Fading Fortunes suggest the extent of this exposure varies: certain Canadian producers face relatively greater risk of value destruction from new projects than others, depending on how cost-competitive their project portfolios are.

Figure 2 summarises the impact of different investment strategies on the upstream oil and gas value of 10 of Canada’s largest producers. The analysis assesses whether investment in new projects adds or destroys value by comparing two growth investment cases against a Depletion case in which no new projects are developed. The “High” investment case (red) reflects business-as-usual “BAU” investment in new projects; the “Managed” investment case (orange) restricts new investment to lower-cost options.

The analysis tests these investment cases under a fast, moderate, and slow transition scenario. The commodity prices tied to these scenarios – while lower than the elevated prices of the 2026 energy crisis – reflect potential long-term prices in the 2030s as markets normalise and oil and gas demand substitution continues.

Figure 2: NPV impact of High and Managed investment relative to Depletion, by Canadian O&G companies under a range of commodity price scenarios.

Sources: Rystad Energy, CTI analysis

Across these 10 companies, downside risk exposure under a fast transition scenario is approximately double the upside potential under a slow transition scenario. Downside risk exposure is particularly pronounced for companies reliant on new gas projects to drive future production.

…yet, financial stakeholders are making long-duration capital bets based on market conditions today.

Canada is continuing to commit capital to assets with multi-decade lives, based on expectations of Asian demand growth for oil and gas imports – precisely as Asia expands clean and homegrown alternatives. Capital decisions are being made based on the extraordinary oil and gas market of 2026, when the financed infrastructure must withstand markets that may look very different through the 2030s and 2040s.

An examination of Canada’s banking system illustrates how this bet is being financed. Canada’s Big Five banks (comprising  Royal Bank of Canada “RBC”, Toronto-Dominion Bank “TD”, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce “CIBC”, Bank of Montreal “BMO”, and Scotiabank) remain among the top financiers globally in terms of lending and underwriting of debt and equity issuances in the oil and gas sector.[6] This financing is often well above average relative to the banks’ size,  compared to their peers. Moreover, the rollback of oil and gas financing policies and emissions targets at several of the Big Five suggests a growing appetite to continue financing oil and gas expansion well into the future.

At a high level, Canada’s Big Five banks appear to have diverged sharply in their response to transition risk exposure from oil and gas financing in recent years. RBC and Scotiabank dropped their 2030 emission reduction targets (and the latter dropped its 2050 net-zero target); simultaneously, they increased their financing of oil and gas expansion companies by  ~8% and ~2%, respectively, from 2024 to 2025. In contrast, CIBC, TD, and BMO Financial Group decreased such financing by ~9%, 7%, and 20%, respectively, over this period.

However, these headline figures do not capture more granular shifts in financing. A CTI analysis of data from the Banking on Climate Chaos Coalition shows upstream expansion financing for nine of Canada’s largest upstream producers in 2024 and 2025, broken down by bank (Figure 3).[7]

Figure 3: Big Five and other bank financing of oil and gas expansion across large oil and gas companies in Canada (2024-2025).

Sources: Banking on Climate Chaos Coalition, CTI analysis

Viewing upstream expansion-related bank financing (Figure 3) alongside the risk profile of upstream project portfolios (Figure 2), it is evident that all of the Big Five have increased upstream expansion financing for certain companies with high-risk upstream project portfolios.

Among Canadian oil and gas companies assessed by CTI, Big Five financing increased most sharply for ARC Resources. Each bank increased its upstream expansion financing for ARC by between 80% to 670%, contrasting sharply with the ~60% reduction in financing by non-Big Five banks. CTI analysis suggests a high level of downside risk exposure within ARC’s upstream project portfolio: under a fast-paced transition scenario, ARC’s potential new upstream projects risk reducing upstream value by ~60%, relative to a scenario in which the company invests in no new projects. Big Five financing also increased for Strathcona and Whitecap, despite the significant downside risk exposure of their project portfolios.

Risk from upstream oil and gas expansion exposes a broad range of stakeholders, with cascading effects.

The financial risk exposure of oil and gas expansion in Canada extends well beyond oil and gas companies and their financiers. The same commodity price assumptions that expose bank financing to risk also expose equity investments and government revenues.

Ultimately, value at risk from new upstream projects puts pressure on the credit quality of Canadian oil and gas companies, with potential implications for national financial stability and lending to the broader Canadian economy.

Risk of asset stranding within the upstream oil and gas sector also exposes midstream oil and gas assets – including pipelines – to lower-than-expected throughput volumes and revenues. This risk within midstream activities undermines the financial viability of proposed new pipelines, which may cost Canadian taxpayers tens of billions of dollars.[8]

Continued dependence on the oil and gas sector for economic growth also exposes certain provinces to fiscal risk. Findings from CTI’s Petro-Provinces at Risk suggest a moderate-paced energy transition could eliminate over 80% of Canadian provincial governments’ expected revenue from upstream oil and gas over the next decade. Export Development Canada’s potentially growing exposure to major projects puts federal tax dollars at risk as well.

What does this mean for Canadian stakeholders?

• For policymakers and regulators: Ottawa and Alberta’s push for oil and gas expansion appears disconnected from the economic reality facing the sector. Expanding the oil and gas system is very different from – and riskier than – continuing to operate existing assets alone. Consider whether the national strategy reflects a realistic set of assumptions around long-term market conditions, and what role the country could play in an emerging electrotech system. Further diversification of the economy could reduce exposure to transition risk from the oil and gas sector while offering opportunities to lead in a new energy landscape.
• For banks: As key markets rapidly transform, can lending portfolios withstand a faster-than-anticipated energy transition? Consider how to adjust financing to a future where demand for oil and gas may be significantly lower than today.
• For investors: Asset managers should assess and make investment decisions based on a realistic range of long-term demand scenarios. Pension funds are particularly exposed to transition-related financial risks from oil and gas portfolio companies, due to the decades-long time horizon of their investment portfolios.

Conclusion

The oil and gas sector has played an important economic role in Canada for many years. But the revenues and jobs it generated in the past are not guaranteed in the future. As technology changes exponentially, fossil fuel expansion in Canada leaves oil and gas companies and their financial stakeholders exposed to a growing risk of value destruction. Prime Minister Carney and financial stakeholders must decide whether they are willing to bet Canada’s fortunes on static assumptions, and what role Canada will play in an emerging energy system of the future.

 

________________________

[1] Ember, Electric Asia (June 2026) pp. 12, 15.

[2] IEA, World Energy Investment 2026 (2026), p. 202.

[3] CTI, The Quiet Retreat: Why the oil and gas industry is implementing its own decline, even as the IEA resurrects an old growth scenario (November 2025).

[4] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), The current state of LNG in Canada (July 2026).

[5] IEEFA, The current state of LNG in Canada (July 2026).

[6] Banking on Climate Chaos Coalition, Banking on Climate Chaos 2026 (May 2026), p. 25.

[7] Analysis excludes Imperial Oil due to lack of available data on financing.

[8] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reports that Canadian taxpayers may potentially cover 90% of the estimated $35.2-$43.7bn cost of a new crude oil pipeline.

 

 

The post What energy world is Canada betting on? appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

by David Spratt

A super El Niño could intensify heat, drought, fire and crop losses across Australia and Asia, while fertiliser shortages raise the risk of a wider food crisis.

The world is heading into a burst of global heating with a developing El Niño that is unprecedented in the observational record. Scientists were shocked when global average warming exceeded 1.5°C in 2024, but now they are estimating 2027 could be around 1.7°C, and a single month in the next year may reach 2°C.

 Figure 1: Global average warming is projected to be 1.76°C in 2027 as the full impact 
of the El Niño is experienced -The Climate Brink

This is extraordinary, with profound impacts for Australia and the region. An El Niño shifts jet streams, alters rainfall and raises global temperatures, and a ‘super’ event would sharply disrupt global weather, increasing the risk of extreme heat, droughts and flooding, and reducing crop yields. And all this is exacerbated by the ongoing war on Iran, which has cut fertiliser use and production, driving down crop yields.

Even before the full El Niño effect takes hold, food production in Europe has been battered by drought and a series of record-breaking extreme heatwaves. In the USA, the wheat acreage harvested will be the lowest in 149 years. In Korea, potatoes ‘boil’ in the ground as record heatwaves sweep across swathes of Asia. Coffee and cocoa futures have increased by up to 40 per cent as investors anticipate crop damage from Brazil to West Africa and South-East Asia.

Economists say the El Niño could cause a global food price shock lasting into 2028, and push 50 million people into acute hunger before the end of 2027. Máximo Torero, the chief economist at the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, says his big concerns are durum wheat and rice, due to the combination of El Niño and lower fertiliser usage; in Australia, a major wheat grower, and India, the world’s biggest rice producer, yields are threatened.

As well, there is a severe water crisis in Puerto Rico, the Rhine and Po rivers in Europe are at record low levels, the Colorado River is in crisis and reservoirs have shrunk to their lowest levels since they were constructed.

So what exactly is a ‘super’ El Niño? An El Niño was formally declared by US climate agencies on 11 June 2026.

The El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is an irregular pattern of change in sea-surface temperatures (SSTs) and winds over the tropical Pacific Ocean. In its warm, El Niño phase, increased westerly winds (weaker easterly trade winds) drive warmer tropical water east towards the Americas and reduce ocean upwelling of cooler deep water, and a positive feedback reinforces this weakening of the trade winds and surface warming. The central and eastern tropical Pacific experiences a marine heatwave.

An indicator of the state of the ENSO is the variation in short-term SSTs along the central-eastern Pacific equator in a zone known as Niño3.4. Negative (cooler) SST readings indicate a La Niña; positive (warmer) readings indicate a developing El Niño. The strongest recent El Niños were in 1997-8 and 2015-6, when SST Niño3.4 warming did not exceed 2.8°C.

Currently, projections based on all models show 4°C warming in Niño3.4 sea-surface temperatures between October and December 2026. It is an understatement to say this is a scientific shock, and constitutes a coming ‘super’ El Niño, far above recent events. This would be more intense than an epochal El Niño in 1877, whose devastating consequences were called a ‘Late Victorian Holocaust’ by the historian Mike Davis.

Figure 2: The red streak across the eastern Pacific shows the current hot sea-surface temperatures 
in the Niño3.4 band (ECMWF)

Climate change has already made extreme heatwaves more intense and persistent, as Europe, North Africa and the Middle East are experiencing right now, and they are likely to worsen during an El Niño, which adds a layer of heat on top of the trend global warming of 1.5°C. An El Niño brings persistent high-pressure weather systems and hotter and drier conditions to eastern Australia and South-East Asia, particularly Indonesia, and southern Africa. But it also increases rain and flooding in East Africa, parts of South America, and east China. El Niños generally peak between November and February.

A recent study concluded that ‘super’ El Niños are not just passing weather events, but drive ‘climate regime shifts’ that can push parts of the Earth system into new, hotter states, and could shift some regional patterns for decades, including unprecedented marine heatwaves.

El Niño impacts on most of Australia generally include these marine heatwaves, less rainfall and less cooling cloud cover, higher temperatures over land, and more extreme heatwaves, and all leading to higher evaporation rates and more intense bushfires. This super El Niño will likely destroy swathes of the Great Barrier Reef and produce record-breaking heatwaves and severe fire risk, drought and lower crop yields, heat stress for people, domestic livestock and nature, and damage to infrastructure.

In Southeast and South Asia, the El Niño will intensify heat conditions and may weaken or delay the monsoon, affecting staples such as rice and palm oil, pushing up food prices and threatening food security for lower-income households. In Indonesia, a tough dry season is forecast, with a high risk of drought and wildfires.

Crop yields decrease with global warming. For staple crops such as maize and wheat, yields have declined by 7.5 per cent and 6.0 per cent per 1°C of warming and are projected to decline by up to an additional 10 per cent for every 1°C of warming in the future.

An upper optimum during reproduction and crop yield formation of around 30°C is common for many important agricultural crops (e.g. maize, soy, cotton). Other major crops show damaging sensitivities at lower temperatures during their reproductive period (e.g. barley, beans, wheat and potatoes). As well, higher concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are already having a serious effect on the nutritional quality of most of the world’s major crops – grains, soya, corn and rice.

Rice is the main source of calories for half the global population and supplies 20 per cent of the global dietary energy. In India, for example, 70 per cent of the caloric intake comes from rice. Summer monsoon rainfall provides up to 80 per cent of the annual precipitation in India.

And even without accounting for all the simultaneous hazards including the fertiliser crisis, scientists say that global average 2°C of warming around 2040 will reduce per capita crop production by one-third in Southeast Asia.

In a recent report, the Australian Security Leaders Climate Group offered this plausible scenario for the next year:

The confluence of the super El Niño and the fertiliser crisis [may] trigger a food crisis in Asia in particular, but also around the world. The energy crisis has increased fuel costs for farmers. Reduced yields lead to higher prices. There will be food shortages, panic buying, price shocks. Many vulnerable countries are poorly prepared for disruptions to food supplies, which can hit hardest in regional and remote areas.

The combined effect of many months of unaffordably high fuel prices and a food crisis across Asia, together with almost unliveable heatwaves, leads to social unrest and conflict in vulnerable countries, much as the global wheat crisis became a trigger of the Arab Spring. Rationing of food essentials is introduced in some countries, but poor administration and corruption lead to riots. Insurgency movements and malicious non-state actors including criminal syndicates utilise the opportunity.

Are we prepared as a nation for this hotter world with a peak El Niño?

 

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• The plan would increase UK emissions
• The plan would slow electrification
• Gas prices are unlikely to remain low and stable
• The plan assumes gas plants are cheap to build
• Nuclear faces high costs and delivery challenges
• The report’s high network cost estimates do not ‘add up’
• The system integration costs are ‘far out of line with mainstream thinking’
• The proposed changes could undermine investor confidence
• Carbon market ‘savings’ are ‘just rearranging things on a spreadsheet’
• The report ‘grossly simplifies’ long-duration energy storage

In a new report, the opposition Conservatives argue that UK electricity prices are too high and that it would be better for the climate to have cheap electricity, even if that means using more gas.

The idea is that cheap power would encourage people to use more electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps, leading to higher electrification of the economy and lower emissions.

This is at the heart of a Conservative push to abandon the UK’s net-zero by 2050 target and various climate policies, which the party says are “bankrupting” the country.

Now, the party is using a report by centre-right thinktank Onward to advance this argument, claiming that the UK could save “over £320bn” by scrapping net-zero policies.

In the report foreword, shadow energy secretary Claire Coutinho says this approach would make electrification “more attractive”, ensuring both “prosperity and a better environment”.

However, the report fails on these terms, as its alternative scenario ends up with less electrification of heat and transport and an extra 524m tonnes of carbon dioxide (MtCO2) emissions by 2050.

Moreover, the report relies on a series of questionable assumptions to claim that gas and nuclear will be cheaper than renewables – including the idea that gas prices will be low and stable.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that with credible assumptions, the report’s conclusions would be flipped on their head, such that renewables – not gas and nuclear – would bring the “lowest total costs”.

Iain Staffell, an associate professor of sustainable energy at Imperial College London, tells Carbon Brief that while the report “tells a good story”, the modelling underpinning it “has more holes than a Swiss cheese”.

In this factcheck, Carbon Brief speaks to experts and identifies flaws in the report, explaining why they undermine the anti-net-zero rhetoric of the Conservatives and their supporters.

• The plan would increase UK emissions
• The plan would slow electrification
• Gas prices are unlikely to remain low and stable
• The plan assumes gas plants are cheap to build
• Nuclear faces high costs and delivery challenges
• The report’s high network cost estimates do not ‘add up’
• The system integration costs are ‘far out of line with mainstream thinking’
• The proposed changes could undermine investor confidence
• Carbon market ‘savings’ are ‘just rearranging things on a spreadsheet’
• The report ‘grossly simplifies’ long-duration energy storage

The plan would increase UK emissions

The report by Onward is based on modelling by advisory firm Transira Energy, which compares two pathways out to 2050.

One is a “business-as-usual” scenario based on current “net-zero” policies. (Nevertheless, this only achieves a clean power system by 2045 – far short of the 2030 Labour target.)

The other is an “alternative policy pathway” (APP), developed by Onward, which assumes the UK’s 2050 economy-wide net-zero target is abandoned after the next election in 2029.

The latter says it places “greater emphasis on reducing the cost of electricity”, which includes fewer renewables, no electrification goals and more gas and nuclear power capacity.  

This mirrors the policy platform set out by the Conservatives, who argue that “net-zero” drives up energy costs and that climate change can be tackled without such targets.

In fact, the Conservatives say their “common sense” approach would make it easier to cut emissions, as shadow energy secretary Claire Coutinho states in the report foreword:

“If we want those emissions to fall, then we need people to want to use electric cars and electric heating – then our priority should be to make electricity cheap.”

Yet, this argument is firmly contradicted by the report itself. 

The APP results in an extra 524MtCO2 being emitted between 2030 and 2050 – equivalent to the annual emissions of South Africa.

The Transira Energy analysts say this is “explained by an increased share of unabated gas-fired capacity”.

Finally, it is worth noting that the UK’s net-zero target is based on the fact that the planet will continue warming until global emissions reach net-zero. Without such targets, climate change – and its impacts – will get worse.

The plan would slow electrification

Contrary to Conservative claims, uptake of heat pumps and electric vehicles is actually expected to be slower in the alternative scenario, “despite lower electricity costs”.

This is due to the removal of supportive government subsidies and mandates, such as the boiler upgrade scheme and the 2030 ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars.

Overall electricity consumption is 7% lower in the APP, compared to the current pathway. 

Daniela Quiroga, a senior associate at Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, questions this reliance on lower electricity demand in the APP, telling Carbon Brief:

“While this is an interesting scenario to explore, it overlooks potentially important feedback effects – mainly, as electricity prices and the capital costs of electrification technologies fall, uptake would be expected to increase.”

A related point was made in a LinkedIn post by Tara Singh, chief executive of trade body RenewableUK, who noted:

“APP makes the electricity system cheaper partly by electrifying Britain less – while leaving the fuel costs that replace electricity outside the model.”

For example, Singh estimates that the extra petrol and diesel fuel expenditure to replace the missing electric vehicles (EVs) on the road could be around £65-95bn over two decades. These costs are not included in the APP scenario.

The only sector that sees increased power demand is data centres, due to policy support to “prioritise” new grid connections for these facilities.

Quiroga notes that the costs of accelerating data centre connections “are not mentioned at all” in the report. 

In short, the proposed pathway involves removing grants that help households buy EVs and heat pumps, while providing more policy support for the AI industry.

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Finally, Onward stresses the UK’s “high spark gap” – referring to the electricity-to-gas price ratio. This makes switching from gas boilers to heat pumps less appealing for consumers, given the relatively high price of electricity, compared to gas.

However, Matt Elliott, lead economic analyst at the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), says the analysis does not indicate this gap would substantially change in the proposed APP. He tells Carbon Brief:

“The report claims that electrification would happen even without specific policies, simply due to lower retail electricity prices driving consumer choice. However, its own modelling indicates that the gas-electricity price ratio would actually rise in the early years and end up only marginally lower than today by 2050.”

In other words, in the APP the price of electricity compared to gas would not fall sufficiently to drive consumers towards heat pumps without subsidies or other incentives.

Rather than scrapping net-zero policies, analysts have suggested shifting tax and policy levies from electricity to gas, or breaking the link between wholesale gas prices and electricity, as more effective ways to reduce the spark gap. 

Gas prices are unlikely to remain low and stable

The “alternative” scenario pushed by the Conservatives continues to rely heavily on gas for both electricity generation and heating.

This includes constructing new gas power plants in a bid to lower electricity prices, despite the fact that gas is the main driver of high electricity prices in the UK.

In recent years, the largest spikes in energy prices have been triggered by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, which have disrupted fossil-fuel supplies and sent gas prices spiralling.

(Indeed, the report was published on the same day the Office for National Statistics announced that inflation had jumped to its highest rate in four months, due to energy costs surging because of the impact of the Iran war on global oil and gas supply chains.) 

Despite this, the scenario set out by Onward assumes that gas prices drop to pre-conflict levels and remain that way for the next two decades.

Ashutosh Padelkar, research lead at Aurora Energy Research, tells Carbon Brief that the gas price assumptions are “hard to fathom” and significantly at odds with future expectations, from both Aurora and other market analysts. 

Analysis by E3G and ECIU in 2025 concluded that four years of energy spikes caused by the post-pandemic demand surge and Russia-Ukraine war had cost the UK £183bn.

The Onward report acknowledges that the new scenario is “more exposed to a future gas price shock” than the current net-zero scenario. It suggests that a new spike could increase fuel costs in the gas-reliant scenario by another £6bn in 2040.

However, Onward argues that the impact of gas price spikes on consumers would be “significantly smaller” than the shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is owing to existing renewable energy contracts and future nuclear power construction in the APP.

In the press release accompanying the new report, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch is clear that “our plan means using our own oil and gas in the North Sea”.

This mirrors rhetoric that has been widespread on the right of UK politics, stressing the importance of expanding North Sea drilling as a way to cut energy bills.

However, given the relatively small volumes remaining in the North Sea, the UK will likely remain reliant on gas imported from the US and the Middle East. 

Gas prices will still be set globally and remain subject to geopolitical turmoil, no matter where the UK sources its supplies.

Given this, Johnny Gowdy, director of the thinktank Regen, tells Carbon Brief that the scenario presented by the Conservatives is “a call to rely on imported gas, with global gas prices”.

The plan assumes gas plants are cheap to build

The Conservative plan involves building new gas power plants, in order to meet part of the nation’s growing electricity demand without relying on renewables.

Onward states that the UK “has lost firm generation capacity” – such as gas and nuclear plants – and replaced it with “intermittent”, or variable, power in the form of wind and solar. 

To remedy this, its alternative pathway involves building an extra 21 gigawatts (GW) of gas power plants by 2050 – equivalent to around 20 new facilities. This is roughly a 70% increase from the UK’s current capacity.

However, the small print in the accompanying Transira Energy report explains that it assumes capital expenditure – the cost of building the power plants – is £650 per kilowatt (kW).

This is considerably lower than other recent analyses, which tend to cite capital expenditure figures that are more than double this estimate.

For example, a 2025 GridLab report notes that new US gas power plants set for completion in 2026 and 2027 had a cost range of $1,116/kW (£819/kW) to $1,427/kW (£1046kW).

However, it adds that more recent projects are “routinely reporting” costs of $2,000/kW (£1467/kW) or more. Other sources have reported up to $2,800/kW (£2054/kW).

Gas power plant costs have increased significantly in recent years – a trend that has been attributed to a tight supply of gas turbines worldwide.

This, in turn, is the result of increased demand for gas turbines to power data centres and countries transitioning from coal to gas. 

The International Energy Agency (IEA) says data-centre demand in the US is “limiting the availability of turbines for near-term deployment elsewhere in the world”.

Nuclear faces high costs and delivery challenges

The Onward report champions a substantial increase in nuclear power capacity. 

However, it fails to explain how this could be facilitated or why its cost assumptions are lower than the most recent nuclear projects in the UK. 

Within the report’s net-zero scenario, there is 13.3GW of nuclear power by 2050, roughly double the current capacity. It notes that this will be financed under the regulated asset base (RAB) model – a government-backed funding approach announced in 2022.   

Under the APP scenario, nuclear power capacity more than triples from current levels to 20GW by the middle of the century, all backed by the RAB model. 

The report adds: 

“Reducing nuclear construction costs and timelines becomes the core energy priority of the UK government, with measures to improve the availability of sites and grid connections.” 

The report acknowledges that the APP scenario “faces significant cost headwinds from expensive nuclear capacity”. 

However, it suggests that large-scale nuclear power stations built in the 2040s could cost £122-£138 per megawatt hour (MWh) in 2025 terms.

Hinkley Point C – which in 2018 became the first new nuclear power plant to begin construction in the UK since the 1980s – has a “strike price” of £138/MWh for 2030. (This is the fixed price for the electricity it will generate, guaranteed by the power plant’s contracts for difference agreement.)

This price is at the top end of Onward’s forecast range for “levelised cost of electricity” (LCOE) – the average total cost of building and operating an asset over its lifetime. 

Hinkley Point nuclear power station. Credit: Rory Hailes / Alamy Stock Photo

As such, the report suggests, on average, costs will fall over the course of the decade from 2030, but provides little detail as to how this would happen. 

As Richard Howard, global research director at Aurora, wrote on LinkedIn, the cost assumptions for nuclear are “optimistic”. He adds: 

“It assumes that the LCOE of nuclear will fall 10-20% below the *original* cost of Hinkley Point C, when we know that nuclear costs escalated massively since the HPC deal was struck. The UK does not have a great track record of managing down the costs of nuclear.”

In fact, Sizewell C – a replica of Hinkley Point C in the early stages of construction in Suffolk, which received a final investment decision in 2025 – has a considerably higher strike price of £150/MWh in 2039. 

Hinkley Point C is the first new nuclear power plant to be built in 30 years in the UK. It has been beset by delays and nearly doubled in cost since it was originally approved.

A footnote in the Transira Energy report adds that its calculations for the cost of nuclear include expected capital expenditure for new large-scale plants ranging from £10,000/kW to £12,500/kW.

While the 3.26GW Hinkley Point C was originally supposed to have a price tag of £18bn, which would equate to £5,521/kWh, costs have repeatedly increased. More recent estimates from developer EDF suggest a figure of £10,736/kW, closer to Onward’s figure.

However, if this is adjusted for inflation for 2026, this jumps closer to £14,724/kW. 

As such, the upfront cost of new nuclear is already around £2,500 more per kilowatt than the assumptions in the report for 10 years from now. 

The report provides limited information about how these costs would fall so substantially. 

It suggests that the recommendations from the 2025 Fingleton review should be implemented in full to cut the cost of the technology.

The Fingleton report – a full review of the UK’s nuclear sector by the Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce, led by John Fingleton – found an “overly complex” and “bureaucratic” system was holding back the nuclear industry. It advocated for “smarter regulation”, as an overhaul of the planning regime. 

In March 2026, the Labour government committed to full implementation of the Fingleton review by the end of 2027. Despite this, the Onward report includes the implementation of the Fingleton review in the APP scenario, but not the net-zero scenario. 

The report’s high network cost estimates do not ‘add up’

The biggest drop in costs outlined in the Onward APP scenario comes from a reduction in network costs, but experts have said that this “just doesn’t add up”.

Network costs are broadly made up of the price of building, maintaining and operating the transmission and distribution systems. 

A reduction in network spending accounts for £137bn of the £320bn in “savings”, compared to the net-zero scenario that sees significant network expansion to help facilitate more renewables on the grid. 

This drop is “thanks to a higher utilisation of firm power system with supply located closer to demand”, the report says.  

In particular, the report points to discrepancy between the “best wind resources” being located in the north of Scotland, while the major centres of demand are in the southeast of England. As such, currently grid expansion is needed to avoid constraints or the requirement to curtail generation in windy periods with low demand. 

By avoiding the connection of geographically dispersed generation assets, such as 78GW of generation, storage and interconnectors, the APP scenario can reduce total network costs by 43%, according to the report. 

Staffell tells Carbon Brief that the £137bn saving has “a convincing story to it – if we build more fossil and nuclear capacity we can utilise the system better”.

However, he adds that Onward gives “so little detail about how this works that it’s hard to comment”.

The Transira Energy report notes that the APP still includes £19bn in investment for the electricity network, covering the cost to maintain the existing system and connect new gas and nuclear generation.

However, this 86% drop in new transmission investment compared to the BAU scenario leans on “flawed logic”, according to Tara Singh from RenewableUK.

On LinkedIn, she explained that it “rests on an extraordinarily aggressive assumption about how little grid Britain will need”, adding: 

“Onward assumes £137bn of new transmission assets under BAU between 2030 and 2050, but only £19bn under their plan, even though by 2050 it still has 32m EVs/hybrids, more than 6m additional heat pumps, 45GW gas, 20GW nuclear and – particularly strikingly – 62 terawatt hour (TWh) a year of datacentre demand. Is this grid figure credible…?”

Beyond this, the report also attributes a significant portion of the proposed savings to cuts in “balancing costs”. These are the costs to the system operator of balancing electricity supply and demand. 

It claims that having more firm generation located closer to demand and existing transmission infrastructure will “save billions of expenditure on network expansion and balancing costs”. 

Onward suggests that under the APP scenario, the cost of keeping generation and demand balanced would fall by £67bn. 

However, claiming savings by both cutting network expansion and balancing costs amounts to “double counting” and “just doesn’t add up”, according to Aurora’s Padelkar.

He tells Carbon Brief that including both high capital expenditure for the electricity network and high balancing costs in the BAU scenario is “difficult to reconcile”. 

Expanding the electricity network would reduce constraints, reducing the need for constraint management. Such a move would lower balancing costs. 

As noted by the National Energy System Operator (Neso), retaining the current transmission network into 2030, with no expansion, would mean constraint costs could reach around £12.7bn a year. But building new network capacity could cut costs by as much as 75%.  

Padelkar says: 

“They’re saying ‘we continue to invest in the network’…But somehow the network [balancing] costs just don’t come down…This is basically saying ‘we’re paying both to fix the problem and to have the problem’. You can have one of the two, but you can’t have both.”

Despite the claim that the APP approach will lead to the cheapest electricity, Padelkar says that the report does not present a “consistent picture” as to how the system would operate, pointing to the approach to network and balancing costs. He adds: 

“Overall, we would expect that once these figures are correctly accounted for, that renewable energy would remain the cheapest form of a form of decarbonisation. I would even further flip the argument around, to say that decarbonisation is not a prerogative [on] its own, but because it also achieves lowest total costs.”

The system integration costs are ‘far out of line with mainstream thinking’

A central argument in the Onward report is that the costs of renewables are higher than often claimed by proponents, due to the wider system costs of having a large amount of “intermittent” generation. 

As such, it proposes pulling back support for wind and solar, and instead putting focus on “firm generation” sources, particularly gas and nuclear power. 

This relies heavily on the claim that “system integration costs” for wind and solar are much higher than is being “properly revealed” in either contracts for difference (CfD) auctions or levelised costs estimates. 

(CfD’s are power contracts between generators and the government, which work as the UK’s main method for supporting the development of renewables by providing long-term price certainty to developers.)

Therefore, when assessing the overall cost of renewable energy, the cumulative network investment, balancing and ancillary services system costs necessary to manage such variable generation must be considered, it suggests.

The existence of integration costs is not widely understood, but the scale of their impact is disputed.

The report continues that if these costs are taken into account, the “marginal system integration costs” of renewables are “much higher than their individual levelised costs”.

Onward suggests that the cost to integrate additional offshore wind, onshore wind and solar onto the electricity system is £125/MWh. This is far higher than the cost of generating electricity from these sources in the first place.

The figure has been challenged by a number of commentators, with Staffell telling Carbon Brief that this is “very far out of line with mainstream thinking”. 

Analysis published in Nature suggests that if 80% of the electricity mix comes from renewables, the system integration cost is around €30/MWh (£26/MWh). 

Elsewhere, engineering firm Afry put the total cost of electricity at around £55-75/MWh in a high-renewable system. This is “less than [Onward’s] integration cost alone”, Staffell adds.

The high price tag of the £128/MWh marginal integration “is derived by apportioning additional balancing and transmission costs solely to 60GW of new wind and solar deployed from 2030 onwards”, explains Callum MacIver, research fellow at the University of Strathclyde and the UK Energy Research Centre. 

He adds:

“[This figure] only looks at the cost side and there is not enough published detail on where the renewables are deployed and the transmission upgrades it triggers to critique the scale of the numbers presented. 

“It also excludes potential wider system benefits of further renewables deployment, including reduced wholesale prices, avoided fuel and carbon costs and reduced exposure to future external gas price shocks, which are properly examined by looking at overall system costs and testing various sensitivities including different gas price futures.”

Writing on LinkedIn, Adam Bell – a partner at consultancy Stonehaven – suggests that the £125/MWh system costs are “really egregious”. He explains: 

“The ‘system costs’ of renewables…rests on assuming that all additional network upgrades and balancing costs for a net-zero system after 2029 are attributable to additional renewables deployed in that net-zero system. 

“Many of those costs relate to existing renewables as well as nuclear, so this likely overstates system costs by an order of magnitude [roughly 10-fold].”

Furthermore, the system costs for the APP scenario are not fully accounted for in the report. Regardless of the technology mix, old network and generation assets will need replacing, adding additional costs to the system. 

The proposed changes could undermine investor confidence

The APP scenario involves stripping back all support for renewables going forward.

It calls for the CfD scheme to end in 2030. Pre-existing CfD contracts would continue under APP, but after this decade, all further support would “exclusively” be for nuclear power.

Additionally, the renewable obligation (RO) payments for existing wind and solar would end from 2033. These are legacy contracts signed ahead of the scheme closing to new applicants in 2017. Payments are expected to continue until 2037.

(Onward makes an exception for the large-scale biomass power plant owned by Drax, which already has a contract with the UK government to switch from an RO to a low-carbon “dispatchable CfD”. This switch is included under both the net-zero and APP scenarios, in recognition of the “importance of its contribution to generation and to system stability”.)

Both the CfD and RO schemes have contributed significantly to the expansion of the renewable energy sector in the UK. For example, despite coming to an end in 2017, nearly 30% of current electricity supplies are still covered by RO contracts.

It is unclear from the report what the 10GW of capacity currently expected to receive the RO would do beyond 2033. 

Writing on Bluesky, Tom Haddon, senior economist at Arup, says that if, as the APP scenario proposes, the UK “bin[s the] RO”, this could force 10GW of renewable capacity still on the system to simply shut down after 2033.  

Such a dramatic change to a longstanding support system could have an impact on investor confidence. 

Padelkar tells Carbon Brief that energy investors are often involved in numerous technologies. He adds: 

“You wouldn’t be able to say ‘yeah, not going to continue honouring this contract [for renewables], but I expect you to sign this new one for me [to build new nuclear]’. That just wouldn’t work.”

As such, there is no guarantee that investors would agree to enter into government-backed RAB contracts to develop nuclear power plants, having just seen government-backed RO contracts being reneged on four years early.

Carbon market ‘savings’ are ‘just rearranging things on a spreadsheet’

One of the large chunks of “savings” identified to bring down electricity prices in the Onward report is £94bn from “lower wholesale prices, thanks to the removal of carbon taxes”.

This refers to removing power plants from the UK emissions trading scheme (UK ETS) from 2031. 

Onward argues that this reduces the cost of gas power plants, which frequently set wholesale power prices under the marginal pricing system.

Staffell tells Carbon Brief that this is a “concern” when considering the report’s findings:

“That is £94bn no longer going into the government coffers, so it’s not saving the country any money; it’s just rearranging things on a spreadsheet. This lowers electricity bills, but does that get compensated for by higher taxes elsewhere, or do we have to take on a larger national deficit, or does it go hand-in-hand with cutting public services?”

Tom Edwards, a consultant at Cornwall Insight, wrote on Bluesky that it would be “madness” to simply remove the UK ETS and “expect things to remain stable”.

The UK currently sources around a tenth of its electricity via interconnectors that link its grid up with Ireland and parts of mainland Europe. It also exports electricity to other European countries when it has surplus supply.

These relationships would be complicated if the UK abandoned its carbon price on electricity altogether. 

The UK and EU have been negotiating over linking their carbon pricing systems, which would involve the UK navigating the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM).

Alongside ending support for renewables, the new Onward scenario also removes subsidies for new interconnectors, although it says “existing interconnectors will continue”. 

The Transira Energy analysis says there would be “new cross-border trading arrangements” from 2031. Such “arrangements” would, presumably, need to be negotiated from scratch with the EU.

Specifically, the report proposes a “carbon reference price” for electricity sold to the EU to “prevent carbon leakage and the distortion of cross-border electricity flows”.

Adam Berman, policy director at Energy UK, pointed out that the post-Brexit trade and cooperation agreement between the UK and the EU includes a legal commitment by the UK to maintain a carbon price on electricity. He wrote that the Onward proposal “would run contrary to that agreement”.

The report ‘grossly simplifies’ long-duration energy storage

The Onward report states that it would cancel support for long-duration energy storage (LDES), such as large batteries and pumped hydropower.  

This follows the government recently launching a “cap-and-floor scheme” to support the technology. In June 2026, the nation’s energy regulator Ofgem identified 16 LDES that it is “minded to” support under the new scheme. 

LDES can store power across days, weeks or even seasons, helping to boost electricity system security. Analysis by analytics company LCP Delta suggests that rolling out LDES technologies could cut energy system costs in the UK by more than £24bn between 2030 and 2050.

Onward lists support for storage systems – including LDES, as well as smaller batteries, which are only briefly mentioned in the report – as one of the “costs of an intermittent-first, low-carbon electricity system”. 

As such, alongside cuts to support for renewable energy technology, the APP scenario includes ending the cap-and-floor scheme for LDES. (See: The proposed changes could undermine investor confidence)

The report suggests that even if all 16 of the projects shortlisted by Ofgem were built, the total would only provide around five and a half hours of generation. 

It adds: “This is not enough to make it through a winter spell of low wind and sun”. 

This assertion is based on the total storage capacity of all the projects being 136GWh. 

However, the report “grossly simplifies the operation of LDES”, explains Padelkar. He adds: 

“This assumes a rate of discharge that the fleet doesn’t have. Further, this LDES capacity would play a key role in reducing the balancing and ancillary costs, even in the early 2030s, by helping absorb cheap wind generation in Scotland in constrained periods and then discharging it when the transmission from Scotland to the south of Great Britain is not constrained.”

The role of LDES is more complex than simply all projects providing the entire electricity demand for the nation in one go. The projects are designed to act together with other assets to absorb excess supply, smooth out peaks in demand and step in to provide cheaper power when prices spike. 

Related Q&A: What is ‘long-duration energy storage’ – and why does the UK need it? 19.08.2026 Electricity Analysis: Weaker EV targets could cost UK consumers £3bn a year by 2030 12.08.2026 Policy Q&A: Does the world need ‘carbon capture and storage’ to reach net-zero? 03.08.2026 Technology UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo  15.07.2026 Nature

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The UK is pioneering the use of “super batteries” that can store energy for long periods, smoothing the output from wind and solar power as the country moves towards net-zero.

It is aiming to build “long-duration energy storage” (LDES) that fills up when supplies are plentiful, to help cover the gaps when the wind does not blow and the sun does not shine.

These periods can last for days or even weeks – sometimes referred to as “dunkelflaute”, a German word meaning “dark doldrums” – whereas the current batteries on the electricity system only last a matter of hours.

The nation’s energy regulator Ofgem has now identified 16 LDES projects that it is “minded to” support under a new “cap-and-floor scheme”. 

The technologies selected can be used to store energy for long periods in the form of gravity, chemical processes or electrical charge.

These include pumped hydro, which has dominated long-term storage in the past, through to large lithium-ion batteries, “flow batteries” with novel chemistry and compressed-air storage.

The use of these technologies is expected to cut energy system costs in the UK by more than £24bn between 2030 and 2050.

This Q&A looks at what LDES means and where it can come from, why it is needed and what the UK and others are doing to support its use.

• What is LDES?
• What types of LDES are available?
• How much LDES will the UK need?
• Which types of LDES is the UK planning to use?
• How could LDES impact energy bills?

Article Contents Expand menu

• What is LDES?
• What types of LDES are available?
• How much LDES will the UK need?
• Which types of LDES is the UK planning to use?
• How could LDES impact energy bills?

What is LDES?

LDES is a broad category of technologies, with some variation in definition. 

The UK government defines it as technologies that can store energy for anywhere from four hours up to years. Ofgem uses a slightly different threshold of eight hours and upwards. 

Sir Chris Llewellyn Smith, emeritus professor of physics at the University of Oxford and lead author of a Royal Society report on large-scale electricity storage, tells Carbon Brief: 

“[The Department of Energy Storage and Net-Zero] (DESNZ) seems to describe it as including things which we would regard as some short duration or medium duration [storage]. It’s a big confusion…For us, long duration is stuff that can last not just into seasons, but into years and into decades.”

LDES can be used to support several different aspects of the electricity system, including the integration of variable renewable energy. 

Currently in the UK, there is 2.8 gigawatts (GW) of LDES, made up of four pumped-hydro energy storage assets in Scotland and Wales.

(This article refers to the UK throughout, but strictly relates to the island of Great Britain made up of England, Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland is part of the separate all-Ireland electricity system.)

The largest of these existing sites is the Dinorwig power station in North Wales, sometimes referred to as the “electric mountain”. This is a 1,728 megawatt (MW) station opened in the 1980s, which is used to manage short-term surges in electricity demand. 

Turbine hall in Dinorwig hydroelectric power station, Wales. Credit: Clynt Garnham Environmental / Alamy Stock Photo

For example, during England’s football World Cup match against the Democratic Republic of Congo on 1 July 2026, electricity demand rose by around 1.2GW at half-time and 1.7GW at full-time. This is equivalent to the total electricity demand for the cities of Glasgow and Leeds, combined.

Pumped storage, alongside batteries, has been used to keep the electricity system balanced during such moments by providing enough electricity to keep the system secure very quickly. 

As the UK’s electricity system becomes increasingly dominated by variable renewables, however, the need for LDES to manage peaks and troughs of generation is growing.

George Martin, principal for power system modelling at analytics company LCP Delta, tells Carbon Brief that wind power creates a particular need for LDES. He says:

“[LDES is] really important for the system, particularly in a wind-driven system. You get more peaks and troughs in your renewable output and, [while] short duration [storage] can obviously help with that, with things like ‘dunkelflaute’, long-duration storage is what is needed.”

As such, the UK is working to expand the capacity and duration of storage available through LDES, as well as the range of technologies this system is based on. 

For example, in May 2026 the UK’s largest vanadium “flow battery” site opened, co-located with a 3MW solar farm in Uckfield, East Sussex. (A flow battery stores energy in liquid chemical mixtures that are pumped between tanks, via an electrochemical cell.)

The Uckfield site consists of 90 vanadium flow batteries, which can be used to store 21 megawatt-hours (MWh) of electricity. This is equivalent to seven hours of peak output from the attached solar farm and is roughly enough electricity to power 3,000 homes for a day. 

The batteries can be used to store surplus daytime solar generation, which can then be used in the evening and overnight.

Other LDES technologies with a longer storage capacity could be used to similarly help manage power supply and demand, but over weeks, months or seasons. This could include compressed-air energy storage, hydrogen storage and others.

The diversity of LDES technologies reflects the range of roles it is expected to play in the electricity system in the UK. This could be meeting short-term surges, helping to utilise surplus renewable energy generation or providing longer-term flexibility. 

What types of LDES are available?

There are numerous types of energy storage technology, although most fall into four main categories: mechanical; thermal; chemical; and electrochemical. 

For example, a pumped-hydro project uses surplus energy to pump water uphill to a reservoir. The mechanical energy is released when the water flows down through a turbine.

Thermal storage could be a tank of gravel that is heated up, then later used to warm up water. Electrochemical storage is familiar in the form of batteries.

Finally, chemical storage relates to energy stored in molecular bonds, for example, making hydrogen from water. (Similarly, the energy in fossil fuels, which is ultimately derived from the sun, is a form of chemical storage.)

A key consideration for each LDES technology is the amount of energy it can store, measured in watt-hours (Wh). For example, a 1MW battery with four hours of storage contains 4MWh of electricity. It can therefore be used to deliver 1MW continuously for up to four hours.

Another consideration is whether the energy can be stored for long periods before use – and whether it is economic to do so.

In recent years in the UK, battery energy storage – predominantly lithium-ion batteries with a duration of one to four hours – has dominated the storage sector. The lithium battery sector in the UK has grown from almost nothing in 2015 to more than 6GW today.  

However, as lithium-ion batteries have only tended to hold a few hours of storage, they cannot help support the grid during longer periods of low renewable energy generation. 

Technologies such as vanadium-redox flow batteries, compressed-air energy storage or hydrogen salt-cavern storage could potentially help manage supply and demand over days, weeks or even years. 

A range of LDES technology options are shown in the table below.

TechnologyTypeDurationHow does it work?Gravity storageMechanicalHoursA heavy object is lifted, storing kinetic energy that can be turned back into electrical energy by a generator.Lithium-ion batteriesElectrochemicalHoursLithium ions move between a negative anode and a positive cathode through an electrolyte within the battery.Liquid airMechanicalHours to daysAir is compressed and cooled until it becomes a liquid. When the air becomes a gas again, it drives a turbine.Vanadium flowElectrochemicalHours to daysLiquid chemical mixtures are pumped between tanks, via an electrochemical cell.Compressed airMechanicalHours to daysAir is compressed to a high pressure and stored in underground geological formations, such as salt caverns or disused oil and gas wells.Pumped hydroMechanicalHours to daysWater is pumped up a hill to a reservoir and then released to drive a turbine.Hydrogen salt cavern storageChemicalSeasonsSurplus energy is used to make hydrogen from water. The hydrogen is then stored in underground salt caverns, before being burned as fuel.Thermal energy storageThermalSeasonsA material such as gravel is heated with surplus energy and kept in an insulated store, before being used to warm water.

Each option has specific advantages and disadvantages; for example, while pumped hydro storage has a high upfront cost, it has a long lifespan of over 50 years. As such, its capital cost per kilowatt hour (kWh) is lower than many other storage options over time. 

(Pumped hydro is the most established LDES technology in the world, but no new projects have been built in the UK since the 1980s.)

While it has historically been a short-duration form of storage, some lithium-ion batteries can now store power for much longer chunks of time. 

Lithium-based grid batteries now often offer 8-12 hours of storage and – as shown in the table above – even longer durations are possible

As Ed Porter, director for Europe at data company Modo Energy, quipped on LinkedIn following the cap-and-floor scheme results: 

“Lithium [is] going far beyond 8 hours; that debate must surely be dead now.”

While even 12 hours is of limited use for gaps in generation of days, weeks or seasons, there are numerous benefits to lithium-ion batteries in comparison to other LDES technologies. For example, the cost of these batteries has fallen by an average of 20% per year over the last decade. 

Given the variation in technologies – including scale, lifespan, commercial readiness and aspects such as necessary geography – comparing the costs of each technology is challenging. 

However, utilising a diverse set of storage technologies is expected to be particularly beneficial for electricity systems, according to experts. 

Julia Souder, CEO of industry group the LDES Council, tells Carbon Brief: 

“The UK is leading the charge on technology diversity. We’re witnessing matching different LDES solutions to the real differences in market structure and country needs.

“But make no mistake: a handful of LDES technologies will do the heavy lifting over the next decade. We’re seeing that play out in which technologies are winning through the UK government’s new cap-and-floor mechanism for long duration storage.”

How much LDES will the UK need?

LDES is expected to be a key component of the UK’s electricity system in the future, particularly as it moves away from easily stored and dispatched fossil fuels such as gas. 

The government has set a target of “clean power by 2030”, in the lead-up to the wider net-zero by 2050 goal. 

In 2024, the Labour administration set out an “action plan” for reaching the 2030 target, which included substantial increases to electricity generation technologies. 

This included setting widely discussed targets to double offshore wind, triple onshore wind and quadruple solar capacity by 2030, alongside rebuilding the UK’s nuclear fleet. 

But the action plan also set a less well-known target for 4-6GW of LDES, to help balance this renewables-dominated electricity mix. This is in addition to 23-27GW of short-duration battery energy storage, new interconnectors and a big push to develop consumer-led flexibility. 

There is also a major expansion of LDES to 3.8-5.3GW by 2030 in the most recent “future energy scenarios” report from the National Electricity System Operator (Neso), as shown in the chart below. 

Neso’s pathways show LDES rising to between 16.6GW and 13.2GW by 2050, mainly dependent on how hydrogen is used in the electricity system. 

The Neso report notes that few LDES schemes are likely to come online before 2030, due to the long project development and planning times, as well as high capital expenditures.

Which types of LDES is the UK planning to use?

While the UK is pursuing a diverse range of LDES, certain technologies are likely to make up the bulk of LDES in the next decade or so. 

This is evident in the technologies that have bid successfully into the UK government’s new “cap-and-floor” mechanism for LDES. 

The scheme was first announced in 2024 and is designed to guarantee a minimum level of revenue for energy storage operators – the “floor” – as well as to put a limit on profits via the “cap”. 

(The mechanism will be funded through electricity bills. However, Ofgem expects it to be broadly cost-neutral over time.)

Similar mechanisms have been used to support the development of other technologies in the UK, in particular those with high upfront costs, such as interconnectors. Ultimately, it minimises the risk for developers by guaranteeing a certain level of future revenue. 

In 2025, 171 LDES projects with a total capacity of 52.6GW applied to enter the cap and floor scheme, which is administered by Ofgem. Of these, 77 projects (28.7GW) were deemed eligible to enter a second “assessment” phase. 

These were made up of nine different technologies, as shown in the figure below. However, lithium-ion batteries dominated the process, making up more than 20GW of the 29GW total. 

No pure vanadium-flow batteries, liquid-air energy storage, iron-air batteries, sodium-sulphur batteries or hydrogen batteries were deemed eligible for the second phase. 

(Conventional hydrogen storage was not eligible to bid into the process either, but could be supported through other means. The government is expected to release an updated hydrogen strategy later in 2026.)

Ultimately, Ofgem announced in June 2026 that it was “minded to” support 7.6GW of LDES capacity, spread across 16 projects. Of this total, 4GW is expected to be online by the end of the decade, at the bottom end of the range said to be required for the clean power 2030 target. 

The 16 projects are listed in the table below. They comprise four technologies: pumped storage hydro (3.9GW); lithium batteries (3.6GW); one vanadium-zinc flow battery (65MW); and one compressed- air energy storage site (50MW).

NameTechnologyRegionCapacity (MW)Duration (hours)Storage capacity (MWh)Earba PSHPumped storage hydroNorth Scotland1,8001527,000Coire GlasPumped storage hydroNorth Scotland1,4403246,100Loch Kemp StoragePumped storage hydroNorth Scotland6602214,500East Claydon StorageLithium batteryEast England500126,000Sundon StorageLithium batteryEast England50084,000Field NethertonLithium batteryNorth Scotland400166,400Field New DeerLithium batteryNorth Scotland400187,200Field Lond StrattonLithium batteryEast England400166,400SpringwellLithium batteryEast Midlands400114,400Drakelow (Innova)Lithium batteryWest Midlands38593,500Field RigifaLithium batteryNorth Scotland200183,600Field FyrishLithium batteryNorth Scotland200173,400Ocker Hill BESSLithium batteryWest Midlands14581,200Thornton BESS 2Lithium batteryEast Midlands100111,100Frontier LegacyVanadium-zinc flow batteryNorth Wales658500TeesCAESCompressed airNorth-east England50301,500

Welcoming Ofgem’s initial decision on the cap-and-floor mechanism, energy minister Michael Shanks said in a statement: 

“Forty years after the country’s last pumped storage facility, this government is getting Britain building again… 

“We are [going] further and faster in delivering the clean-power mission by rolling out a new generation of pumped-hydro storage and state-of-the-art batteries – making more of the clean, homegrown power we already produce, cutting waste, lowering bills and strengthening our energy security.”

Collectively, the provisionally successful projects can provide between eight and 32 hours’ worth of electricity storage. The top ten projects in terms of duration that applied for the mechanism – those with at least 12 hours’ worth of storage – all moved forward.

Following Ofgem’s “minded-to” decision, the regulator launched a consultation that ended on  7 August 2026. It will now make a final decision on the projects that will be supported through the “cap and floor” mechanism. 

Martin tells Carbon Brief that “it’s not over” yet, with Ofgem likely to face scrutiny over the methodology it used to determine these final results. He adds: 

“There’s going to be a lot of activity and a lot of responses to that consultation. I don’t expect the overall amount of capacity that’s been awarded to change, although they could increase it – it could only go up, probably.

“But there might be some change in what projects end up getting approved as a result, or maybe they end up making some changes for the next window [of applications for LDES support].”

Alongside the cap-and-floor process being run by Ofgem, the government introduced legislation via the Planning and Infrastructure Act to support the introduction of the scheme. 

Additionally, in August 2026, Innovate UK – the UK’s national innovation agency – announced new funding for “ultra-long” duration battery energy storage. 

Up to £3m will be invested in demonstration projects as part of the first phase of the funding, with £10m available in the sector to support the development of technologies capable of storing and discharging at least 100 continuous hours of electricity. 

In a statement responding to the new funding, Dr Jamie Speirs of the University of Strathclyde and co-director of the UK Energy Research Centre, said achieving the UK’s low-carbon ambitions will rely on “unlocking” LDES to support a highly renewable system. He added:

“By providing flexibility across hours, days and even seasons, LDES could enable a resilient, low-carbon electricity system – reducing curtailment, strengthening security of supply and ensuring that intermittent renewables can maximise their contribution to the grid in all conditions. 

“Investing in innovation opportunities such as this call to support market deployment of LDES technologies is a key way to support these technologies to market, giving us the best chance to meet our net zero targets.”

Phase one of the funding is open for applications until 30 September, with grants of between £350,000 and £700,000 available for the successful projects.

Seamus Garvey, professor of dynamics at the University of Nottingham, welcomes the new funding. However, he cautions that more needs to be done to ensure the future markets for medium- and long- duration storage are not compromised by early commitments to storage at shorter timescales. He tells Carbon Brief:

“Energy storage will be required over many timescales and as we decarbonise further and further, the requirements for longer durations grow and grow. 

“One key problem in my opinion is that because we are tending to buy into lots of short-duration stores now, we are actually removing pieces of market that could be accessible by longer duration stores and that is making the (already-difficult) problem of financing these stores ever more difficult.” 

How could LDES impact energy bills?

The rollout of LDES technologies is widely expected to help reduce energy bills as the UK transitions to a clean-energy system.

There is still a significant amount of uncertainty over the development of LDES, due to the wide range of options, nascent stages of development and lack of market maturity. Nevertheless, most research agrees that it will cut electricity system costs by the middle of the century, relative to a world where LDES is not used. 

For example, adding 20GW of LDES could reduce electricity system costs by £16-51bn between 2030 and 2050, compared with a scenario that has limited flexible capacity, according to analysis for the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), by thinktank Regen and LCP Delta. The analysis, published in 2023, found that 20GW of LDES could reduce costs by around £26bn. 

Analysis by LCP Delta in 2025 found that building 20GW of established medium-sized LDES technologies – pumped hydro with a capacity of 8-12 hours – by 2050 would have a system benefit of more than £10bn. 

LDES could reduce total UK electricity system costs by £7-13bn annually by 2040-2050, according to a report from the Transition Finance Council – a public-private body launched by the City of London Corporation and the UK government – citing a range of other studies. 

Windfarm in Cornwall, UK. Credit: David Noton Photography / Alamy Stock Photo

The council says this would predominantly be by avoiding “curtailment”, where some generators are paid to switch off because the electricity grid cannot accommodate their output. It says that LDES would defer the need for additional grid investment and would reduce balancing costs, including curtailment.

(In the financial year 2024-25, balancing costs reached £2.7bn, adding around £40 to the average household electricity bill. Some £1.9bn of this – £28 per household – related to constraints, where wind is “curtailed” and gas plants are switched on elsewhere.)

Curtailment is a particular issue in Scotland, where much of the UK’s wind capacity sits behind congested sections of the national electricity network. Porter notes on LinkedIn that this helps explain why 79% of the LDES projects by storage capacity are located in northern Scotland. 

Martin says LDES will allow the UK to “use our renewable fleet more efficiently”. He adds: 

“[LDES] is able to increase renewable energy and then decrease gas generation during high-demand periods, and that brings all sorts of benefits to the system.

“It reduces emissions, it reduces the overall cost of the system, it can help reduce bills for consumers. So those are the types of benefits that we’ll see as a result of [more] LDES being [on the system].”

The Transition Finance Council report adds that despite the upfront cost, LDES quickly pays for itself. It estimates that each gigawatt of long-duration flexibility on the system requires around £2-2.5bn in investment, but yields annual system savings of £0.5-1bn once operational. 

As such, even accounting for the upfront cost of developing LDES, the technologies would provide £30-60bn of electricity system savings over 25 years, the council says. It adds that this means LDES “will repay itself several times over”. 

related CCC: Faster electrification of UK will ‘put money back into people’s pockets’ 24.06.2026 Electricity Analysis: UK’s EV drivers are now saving £1,100 each a year – and £3bn in total 15.06.2026 Electricity Q&A: Can China turn hydrogen into its next clean-energy industry? 27.05.2026 Electricity Q&A: How the UK government aims to ‘break link between gas and electricity prices’ 21.04.2026 Electricity

The post Q&A: What is ‘long-duration energy storage’ – and why does the UK need it? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

The world is currently experiencing what is expected to become the strongest El Niño on record – dubbed a “super El Niño” by many.

El Niño is the warm phase of a recurring climate pattern in the tropical Pacific that releases heat from the ocean into the atmosphere.

This temporarily raises global temperatures and reshapes rainfall and extreme weather around the world – impacting the lives of billions of people.

The current El Niño event began in June and is expected to last into 2027.

El Niño is part of a wider climate pattern called the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle.

The ENSO cycle also has a cool phase, known as La Niña, as well as a “neutral” phase. El Niño and La Niña events typically last between nine and 12 months, but can go on longer.

Below, Carbon Brief explains how the ENSO cycle works, its impacts on extreme weather and global temperatures and why this El Niño event is projected to be the most intense since records began.

The post Explainer: How the ‘super El Niño’ will reshape the world’s weather appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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The second-largest reservoir in the US reached a record-low water height on Saturday – just days after the country’s largest reservoir broke its own record. 

Both Lake Mead and Lake Powell are located on the Colorado River. 

They provide water for populations across seven US states in the south-western US, with around 40 million people getting some or all of their municipal water from the Colorado River.

The river also provides water for around 5.5m acres (22,258 square kilometres) of farmland across Colorado, Arizona, California and the other states in the river basin.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that climate change, population growth and over-consumption are all contributing to the current record-low levels of the reservoirs.

Record lows

At full capacity, Lakes Mead and Powell can hold a combined 68 cubic kilometres of water – enough to supply all household consumption in the contiguous US for nearly 1.5 years. However, the water level in both reservoirs has been declining for decades.

The chart below shows the water level of Lake Mead, in metres above mean sea level. The reservoir, which began to fill in 1935 following the construction of the Hoover Dam, has a “full pool” maximum capacity of 347.60 metres. The water level in Lake Mead reached a record low of 317.11 metres on 7 August. 

The following chart shows the water level of Lake Powell, in metres above mean sea level. Lake Powell’s full-pool level is 1,127.76 metres. 

While the reservoir reached its maximum capacity several times in the 1980s, it has not done so since. On 15 August, the water level in Lake Powell was recorded at a new record-low of 1,072.87 metres.

Both reservoirs have continued to decline in the days since breaking their respective records. The downward trend will largely continue in both lakes until next spring, when the snowpack in the mountains of the Upper Colorado River Basin begins to melt, says Dr Jack Schmidt, a senior research scientist at Utah State University’s Center for Colorado River Studies. He tells Carbon Brief:

“The big dilemma of the moment is that we’re only in the middle of August, and we have no assurance of what the coming winter will be. The only thing we can be sure of is that we will be depleting overall total basin reservoir storage from now until, roughly, early April.” 

Compounding factors

The record lows across the two reservoirs are the result of several compounding factors, experts tell Carbon Brief. 

Since the turn of the 20th century, the amount of water flowing along the Upper Colorado River has declined by about 20%. Research suggests that half of this decline can be attributed to human-induced climate change. 

Most of the river’s streamflow comes from the snowpack of the Upper Colorado River Basin, which stretches across five western US states but is primarily located in Colorado and Utah. 

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This region has been gripped by a historic “megadrought” for more than a quarter of a century. Nearly half of the megadrought’s intensity over 2000-18 is attributable to climate change, according to a 2020 study.

At the same time, the increasing population in the US south-west has put added pressure on the Colorado River’s water supply. The number of people obtaining some or all of their water from the Colorado system has grown by 15 million (around 60%) since 1992. 

Schmidt tells Carbon Brief:

“There’s an ultimate cause of the present water crisis, and there’s a proximate cause. The ultimate cause is a warming climate, a warming planet and a pretty clear correlation between warming conditions and decreased runoff in the Colorado River Basin.

“The proximate cause is that in this messy democratic republic of ours, big policy decisions that match the variability of the climate occur painfully slowly – with intense political negotiations – and only incrementally.”

On 31 July, the US Bureau of Reclamation, which manages water resources in the western US, released an environmental impact statement on its proposed post-2026 strategy for managing Lakes Powell and Mead. The strategy itself has not been released yet.

Schmidt notes that the statement does appear to give the Bureau flexibility to “respond to crisis” by reducing the delivery of water to several states. However, he adds:

“They acknowledge it won’t work if we just stay critically dry, and of course every climate model for the 21st century, especially with a continually warming planet, says that that’s exactly what’s going to happen.”

Related Mapped: How climate change affects extreme weather around the world 19.03.2026 Attribution Guest post: Is climate change making UK droughts worse? 26.08.2025 Drought Global soil moisture in ‘permanent’ decline due to climate change 27.03.2025 Drought West Africa’s deadly rainfall in 2022 made ‘80 times more likely’ by climate change 16.11.2022 Attribution

The post Analysis: The two largest reservoirs in the US have hit record-low levels appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Emissions from land-use change – including deforestation, loss of peatland and forest degradation – have been falling over the course of the 21st century.

The latest Global Carbon Budget report, formally published in May in the journal Earth System Science Data, notes a “statistically significant decrease” in land-use change emissions since the late 1990s.

The 21st-century decline in land-use emissions has accelerated in recent years, with the report highlighting a “steep drop” after 2015.

Writing for Carbon Brief in November 2025, climate scientists Dr Zeke Hausfather and Prof Pierre Friedlingstein noted that land-use emissions in 2025 had decreased by “around 32% compared to their average in the 2000s”. 

Via six charts, Carbon Brief explores how – and why – land-use emissions have fallen over the past quarter of a century as fossil-fuel emissions have continued to climb.

• How have land-use emissions changed?
• Why have land-use emissions fallen?
• Which countries are behind falling land-use emissions?
• Which countries are leading on forest regrowth?
• Why are estimates of land-use emissions uncertain?

Article Contents Expand menu

• How have land-use emissions changed?
• Why have land-use emissions fallen?
• Which countries are behind falling land-use emissions?
• Which countries are leading on forest regrowth?
• Why are estimates of land-use emissions uncertain?

How have land-use emissions changed?

Deforestation, forest degradation, loss of peatlands and harvesting trees for wood all release carbon into the atmosphere.

Collectively, these emissions are known as land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) emissions, referred to here as land-use emissions. 

Each year, global land-use emission trends are analysed in the Global Carbon Budget report. The report, produced by dozens of scientists, documents how human-caused greenhouse gas emissions are changing over time.

Key findings from the annual report are released each year in the autumn, before being published formally in an academic journal the following year following a peer-review process.

(For more on the findings of the 2025 report, read Carbon Brief’s summary.)

The latest edition of the Global Carbon Budget report notes that, in the four decades to 1999, net CO2 emissions from land-use change remained “relatively constant”, sitting at around 6.6bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) per year.

However, since the late 1990s, global land-use emissions have been falling. 

The 2025 report estimates that land-use emissions over 2015-24 averaged at 5GtCO2 a year. This is around 23% lower than the average over 1995-2004 and 19% lower than 2005-14, it says.

In contrast, global emissions from fossil fuels and cement have increased every decade since 1959, rising from an average of 11GtCO2 in the 1960s to 35.9GtCO2 over 2015-24, it says. 

“Preliminary data” included in the report suggests that land-use emissions in 2025 clocked in lower than their 2014-25 average, at 4.1GtCO2, as fossil-fuel and cement emissions reached a new high of 38.1GtCO2. 

(For more on how land-use emissions are calculated, see: Why are estimates of land-use emissions uncertain?)

The chart below shows how land-use emissions have been falling in the 21st century and have helped to temper the overall rise of human-caused emissions.

Global CO2 emissions separated out into fossil and land-use change components between 1980-2025. Data from Friedlingstein et al (2026). Chart by Carbon Brief. Why have land-use emissions fallen?

The Global Carbon Budget attributes falling land-use emissions since the late 1990s to decreasing emissions from deforestation, in particular “permanent deforestation”. 

Permanent deforestation refers to the complete removal of trees for the conversion of forest to another land use, such as agriculture, mining or the construction of towns and cities. This sets it apart from other forms of deforestation, such as logging and rotational farming, where the canopy is removed on a more temporary basis.

The Global Carbon Budget also points to “increasing [CO2] removals” from forest regrowth as a reason for falling land-use emissions since the turn of the century.

(For more on the countries and policies that have driven these changes, see: Which countries are behind falling land-use emissions? and: Which countries are leading on forest regrowth?) 

Looking at more recent trends, the report attributes a “steep drop” in land-use emissions in the decade since 2015 to the “combined effect” of a “peak” in peat fire emissions in 2015, as well as a “long-term decline” in deforestation emissions in many countries over 2010-20.

The chart below shows how deforestation and forest growth have been responsible for the bulk of change to land-use emissions over the 21st century.

Global deforestation and forest growth, 1980-2020, split into emissions from deforestation, including permanent deforestation and deforestation in shifting cultivation cycles; emissions from peat drainage and peat fires; removals from forest growth, including afforestation, reforestation and shifting cultivation cycles; fluxes from wood harvest and other forest management; and, finally, emissions and removals related to other land-use transitions. Data from Friedlingstein et al (2026). Chart by Carbon Brief.

Over 2015-24, the sequestration of CO2 through reforestation and afforestation efforts offset two-thirds of deforestation emissions, according to the Global Carbon Budget report.

Specifically, it notes that deforestation was responsible for an average of 6.96GtCO2 of emissions each year over 2015-24. Forest growth, on the other hand, removed 4.76GtCO2 a year. 

Just under half – 2.2GtCO2 – of carbon removals over 2015-24 was from afforestation and reforestation efforts and the remaining 2.56GtCO2 were driven by forest regrowth from shifting cultivation cycles, it says. 

Forest regrowth from shifting cultivation refers to the recovery of a forest after a plot has been farmed for a short period and then abandoned.

This is shown in the chart below below, which shows how carbon removals from forest regrowth have offset emissions from deforestation. 

Global deforestation and forest regrowth, 1980-2020, split into four sub-components. Data from Friedlingstein et al (2026). Chart by Carbon Brief.

In the near-term, the Global Carbon Budget attributes its projection of a drop in land-use emissions between 2024 and 2025 to the “end of El Niño conditions”. 

(The naturally occurring weather phenomenon typically leads to the drying out of peatlands in the tropics and causes more planned deforestation fires to burn out of control.)

Prof Pierre Friedlingstein, director of the Global Carbon Budget office and a professor at the University of Exeter, tells Carbon Brief there is “no indication” of what might happen in the future, but adds that land-use emissions trends over the 21st century are “going in the right direction”. He says:

“If you are optimistic, you hope the trend will not reverse and start increasing again. But we don’t know for sure. The assumption, given current land policies across the world, is that deforestation should continue to decline.”

Which countries are behind falling land-use emissions?

The countries that contributed the most to land-use emissions over 2015-24 were Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Indonesia, according to the Global Carbon Budget.

It notes that these three countries together contributed more than half – 57% – of global land-use emissions. 

Over the first quarter of the 21st century, falling land-use emissions in Brazil and Indonesia have combined with increased afforestation and reforestation in China to drive down overall land-use emissions, according to the Global Carbon Budget.

This is illustrated in the chart below, which shows how China’s land-use emissions have dropped below zero, as Brazil and Indonesia’s emissions have declined.

Land-use emissions by country, 1980-2025. Data from Friedlingstein et al (2026). Chart by Carbon Brief.

Friedlingstein says that the decline in land-use emissions since the 2000s has been “primarily driven by a decline in deforestation in Brazil”.

He tells Carbon Brief that tree clearance in the South American country rose in the 1990s then started to fall after a peak in the 2000s:

“There was a bit of up and down – mainly due to politics and who was in charge in Brazil – [whether the president] was [Luiz Inácio] Lula [da Silva] or [Jair] Bolsonaro. But the long-term trend in Brazil is a decline in deforestation due to forest protection policies.”

Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s “legal Amazon” states of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins, as well as more than half of Maranhão. Data from INPE / PRODES (TerraBrasilis). Chart by Carbon Brief.

These policies included a 2004 “action plan” for the prevention and control of deforestation in the Amazon, a 2006 soy moratorium, which banned the purchasing and financing of soya produced in deforested areas of the Amazon, as well as the expansion of protected areas across Brazil during the second half of the 2000s.

Prof Julia Pongratz, a professor of physical geography and land-use systems at the University of Munich and contributor to the Global Carbon Budget, says Brazil is the “single most important contributor to the early-2000s global land-use change emissions peak and subsequent decline”.

She says that the largest contributor to an “acceleration” in the decline of global land-use emissions in the past decade has been Indonesia, which she notes has “rewetted more peatland area since 2017 alone than Europe in its entire history”. 

Around the world, peatlands are exploited and damaged by humans for a range of purposes, including converting the land for agriculture and peat extraction for horticulture and fuel. Peatland wetting refers to the process of restoring water levels in drained peatlands in order to return them to their natural, waterlogged conditions, which allows for peat formation and carbon storage. 

Another reason for Indonesia’s downward trend in land-use emissions is that there have been fewer spikes in emissions caused by fires related to human land-use activities over the last decade, says Pongratz.

Emissions from ecosystem fires are not always counted towards national and regional land-use emissions budgets, which estimate the sum of human-caused emissions. Deforestation fires and those related to peatland drainage are included, whereas fires caused by droughts and heatwaves are not. 

Pongratz says it is “hard to separate natural and land-use drivers completely”, given that deforestation and peatland fires often “get out of control and cause spikes in emissions” during dry El Niño conditions. 

(For more on uncertainties in land-use emissions data, see: Why are estimates of land-use emissions uncertain?)

Pongratz notes that international trade regulations that have helped to drive down land-use emissions in Brazil and Indonesia have had a lesser effect in the DRC, where the root drivers of deforestation are different:

“Emissions in the DRC have increased, then stayed high in the last two decades. This is partly related to population growth and expanding smallholder and subsistence farming. 

“The picture is different in Brazil and Indonesia, which are much more driven by export; international regulations aiming at curbing deforestation thus have larger effects in these countries.”

Which countries are leading on forest regrowth?

Reforestation and afforestation schemes that draw down carbon from the atmosphere have helped to reduce the overall emissions from land-use change over the course of the 21st century.

As noted above, the 2025 Global Carbon Budget report highlights how the removal of carbon from forests offset two-thirds of deforestation emissions over 2015-24. 

The report says that China, the EU and US account for the highest levels of carbon sequestration from reforestation and afforestation, collectively drawing 1.1GtCO2 per year over the 2015-24 period. 

This, it says, is “partly related to expanding forest area as a consequence of the forest transition in the 19th and 20th centuries and subsequent regrowth of forest”.

The chart below, which draws from the latest edition of the “state of carbon dioxide removal” report, shows how carbon uptake by forests has increased over the last 20 years in a number of countries, most notably in China.

Current levels of carbon dioxide removal from afforestation and reforestation
by country, 2005-24. Data from 3rd “state of carbon dioxide removal” report (2026). Chart by Carbon Brief.

In China, a raft of reforestation and improved land management policies were introduced in the 1990s which have led to the rehabilitation of tens of millions of hectares of forests. Research has shown the schemes have significantly increased the country’s uptake of carbon and switched its land from a carbon source to a carbon sink. 

The Global Carbon Budget highlights that substantial carbon removal from reforestation and afforestation occurred in other regions, such as Brazil, Russia and Indonesia. However, in these regions, emissions from deforestation and other land-use changes “dominate”, it says.

Why are estimates of land-use emissions uncertain?

Tallying the world’s emission from land-use change is complex.

The Global Carbon Budget estimates an uncertainty range of 2.6GtCO2 per year for its average annual global land-use emissions figure for 2015-24 – more than half the overall figure of 5GtCO2.

To calculate overall land-use emissions for the annual Global Carbon Budget report, researchers create an average from three land-use models: BLUE, OSCAR and LUCE.

These models combine satellite and statistical information on land cover and land-use changes from global and regional datasets.

Pongratz, who is involved in the LUCE model, explains that scientists can measure the exchange of CO2 between land and atmosphere, but are not able to determine whether CO2 is being released or sequestered from a managed area as a result of human activities or other climate or environmental factors. She continues: 

“For this, you need to turn to modelling, where you can isolate drivers – and, again, models are uncertain and the land-use input imperfect. This is why we use all available model estimates – three at the moment.”

The Global Carbon Budget highlights that its three different models treat different components of the land-use emissions “budget” differently. 

While models agree “relatively well” about emissions from permanent deforestation, they take different approaches in their approach to shifting cultivation patterns, which increases both emissions and removals, as well as wood harvesting, it says.

Moreover, it notes that land-use emissions and removals occur on different timelines. While carbon removals generated by forest growth and soil recovery are “slow”, there is an “instantaneous component” to emissions from deforestation, it says.

(For more on the challenges in analysing changes to the global carbon cycle, see Carbon Brief’s recent in-depth interview with Prof Philippe Ciais, one of the world’s leading experts on land-use emissions.)

The Global Carbon Budget notes that its confidence in its 2025 projection for overall land-use emissions remains “low” given that the figure is based on deforestation, degradation and peat fire emissions, which are “only a proxy” for land-use change.

The report notes that 2023 is the final year in which it calculates land-use emissions directly from land-use statistics across all three bookkeeping models. For more recent years, full statistics are not yet available across the models and scientists instead turn to short-term proxies.

related Factcheck: No, Europe is not having its ‘quietest’ year for wildfires 30.07.2026 Extreme weather World falling short on 22 of 23 nature targets for 2030, says draft UN report 29.07.2026 International policy Analysis: 84% of nations miss deadline to identify ‘nature-harming’ subsidies by 2025  28.07.2026 International policy COP30: Could Brazil’s ‘Tropical Forest Forever’ fund help tackle climate change? 05.11.2025 COP30 Belém

The post Why land-use emissions have fallen by a third this century – in six charts appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.

The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030. 

This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.

Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.

However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.

It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.

But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.

Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry. 

Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.

Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.

• What does the plan say about peaking coal?
• What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
• What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
• How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?

Article Contents Expand menu

• What does the plan say about peaking coal?
• What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
• What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
• How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?

What does the plan say about peaking coal?

Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.

The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy. 

Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.

The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:

“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”

However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.

The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.

Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region. 

Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions. 

But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.

The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy. 

Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.

In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.

It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”. 

The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.

The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.

The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:

• Peaking coal consumption;
• “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
• Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
• Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
• “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
• Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
• Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
• Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.

The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.

“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”. 

A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”. 

This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy” 

However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption. 

State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.

“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.

While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.

Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.

“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.

What does the plan say about China’s coal production?

The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.

The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.

The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.

Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”. 

Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024. 

“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.

Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.

It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.

This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.

New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.

This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.

The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented. 

Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.

What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?

The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.

The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption. 

Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.

In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.

It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.

This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.

Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.

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Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.

China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.

Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.

It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]

The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.

At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.

In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.

Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively. 

In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.

However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”. 

She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.

How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?

Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.

As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.

Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.

A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.

But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.

China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.

The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”

The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions. 

Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.

As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.  

Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds: 

“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”

related Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change? 06.08.2026 China policy Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change? 29.07.2026 China policy Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’ 09.07.2026 China policy Q&A: What do China’s provincial five-year plans say about climate and energy? 18.06.2026 China policy

The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Open access notables

Methane Emissions From Wildfires: Trends and Anomalies, Zhu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 

Wildfires emit smoke particles and trace gases including greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, impacting the environment and leading to detrimental impacts on human health and economy. The estimation of spatially and temporally resolved methane emissions from biomass burning (BB) provides critical information in developing measurement-informed methane inventories. The use of satellite active fire products (fire radiative power) is an effective pathway to investigate wildfire emissions around the world. In this study, the Global BB Emissions Product-eXtended algorithm is employed to estimate long-term temporal variation and geographic distribution of methane emissions from BB using satellite observations from the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer and the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite. Globally, on average about 19 Megatonnes of BB methane are released to the atmosphere every year, nearly half of it originating from Africa, where BB represents a significant proportion of the total methane emissions. Our findings show that methane emissions from wildfires are substantial and can exceed other source sectors during extreme wildfire events, negating gains from years of emission reductions from anthropogenic sources. The contribution of fires to the methane budget is significant for regions with intense fire activities. Effective wildfire prevention and management could be beneficial to rapidly reduce methane emissions from BB.

Diurnal asymmetry in heat stress intensification across Bangladesh, 1985–2024: Accelerated nighttime warming and emerging urban risk, Kamruzzaman et al., PLOS Climate

Bangladesh’s rapidly growing cities are becoming hotter, but how heat stress is changing over the day–night cycle has remained unclear. Using 40 years (1985–2024) of hourly Universal Thermal Climate Index (UTCI) data from ERA5-HEAT, we examined long-term changes in physiologically relevant heat stress across Bangladesh and its major cities. Results show a clear day–night imbalance in warming: nighttime heat stress (UTCI???) is rising faster than daytime extremes. National trends indicate increases of +0.03 °C per decade for UTCI???, +0.02 °C for daily mean UTCI, and +0.01 °C for UTCI???, with the strongest warming occurring in the early morning hours. These national spatially averaged trends reflect the mean across all 194 grid cells; individual grid cells show local trends of +0.1 to +0.4°C per decade, and the cumulative nighttime warming over the full 40-year period reaches approximately 1.0–1.7°C across most of the country. This signals a steady loss of nighttime cooling that people rely on for physical recovery. The most pronounced nighttime warming occurs in western and southern Bangladesh. Major cities—including Dhaka, Rajshahi, Khulna, Chattogram, and Sylhet—show additional intensification consistent with, but not directly attributed to, urban heat-island dynamics at the spatial scale of this analysis. The number of very strong heat stress days (UTCI > 38 °C) has increased by 4–15 days per decade, and cities such as Rajshahi and Dhaka now experience more than 150 such days annually. Together, these findings indicate a transition from occasional heat extremes to persistent, 24-hour heat stress, increasing risks to health, labor productivity, and urban resilience. By identifying when heat stress is rising fastest and where it is concentrated, this study provides evidence to support city-specific heat-action plans, early-warning systems, and climate-responsive urban design in rapidly warming regions.

Significant soil warming across Alaska permafrost and non-permafrost regions from 1997 to 2023, Oliver & Phillips, Frontiers in Climate

Air temperatures in Alaska are increasing at twice the rate of the contiguous United States. Soil temperatures have been shown to be increasing across various landscapes but have overall received less attention. No comprehensive studies have been conducted in Alaska looking at soil temperature trends on a broad scale. In this paper we synthesized soil and air temperature data from 43 weather stations across Alaska spanning a 27-year period (1997-2023). Stations were divided into three regions based on permafrost extent (continuous, discontinuous, and no permafrost). Soil temperature trends were calculated at 5, 20, and 50 cm depth in all three permafrost regions, and additionally at 70, 95, and 120 cm depth for the continuous permafrost region only. Annual average soil temperatures increased significantly across all regions with the fastest warming rates occurring at the highest latitudes. Whole profile warming averaged 0.64, 0.37, and 0.35°C dec-1 in the continuous, discontinuous, and no permafrost regions, respectively. Warming was not slowed by increasing soil depth. Air temperatures warmed faster than soil (p < 0.05) in the continuous permafrost region (1.15°C dec-1) but were not significantly different from soil in the discontinuous and no permafrost regions (p > 0.1). Seasonally, soils in the continuous and discontinuous regions warmed fastest in the winter months, whereas in the no permafrost region soils warmed fastest in the summer months.

Optimizing the Rainwater Harvesting and Roof Sprinkling System to Adapt to Urban Extreme Heat, Yu et al., Earth s Future

Roof watering is a novel strategy for reducing air conditioning energy consumption and mitigating excess urban heat, yet its application is often constrained by water availability. To address this challenge, we propose an adaptation strategy that integrates rainwater harvesting tank with roof sprinkling to strengthen urban heat resilience. We develop a new module implemented in the Community Land Model Urban (CLMU) to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed strategy, whose parameters were further determined by a framework using multi-objective optimization combined with a transformer-based tabular foundation model. This integrated modeling framework enables the optimization of the proposed strategy and provides insights into its impacts on air conditioning energy consumption and its co-benefits on the urban thermal environment. Results show that the temperature threshold for triggering sprinkling is a more important parameter than rainwater tank size or sprinkling intensity. The optimal strategies effectively reduce cooling energy demand, lower extreme temperatures, and decrease heatwave days. However, a trade-off exists between rainwater tank size and the reduction in cooling energy consumption and heatwave days. Additionally, the energy saving is more pronounced under higher atmospheric temperatures. The implementation of the rainwater harvesting and roof sprinkling system in CLMU provides valuable insights for improving urban resilience and can be further coupled into Earth system model for large-scale studies.

From this week's government/NGO section:

State of the Climate in 2025, Blunden et al., American Meteorological Society

The authors provide a comprehensive, observation-based assessment of Earth’s climate system that not only documents what happened during a given year (e.g., 2025), but also how that year compares to previous years in the observational record. Thus, it is critical to have continuous, long-term observations of various components of the Earth system to document variability and change over time. Many of these observations, both current and historical, are also assimilated into various reanalysis products (e.g., ERA5 and MERRA-2), which are physically constrained representations of the Earth system and are used extensively throughout the State of the Climate report. Reanalyzes are particularly useful in regions where in situ and satellite observations are sparse.

Built for backup, contracted to run: China’s coal support system risks crowding out clean power, Qin et al., The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and Global Energy Monitor

New coal power plants entering operation in China reached the highest first-half year level since 2016, with 10 GW entering operation for every 1 GW retired, despite a policy shift towards tighter control of new project approvals. China commissioned 30 GW of new coal power, up 43% from last year, while retiring only 2.7 GW. Another 25.4 GW started construction; Coal power generation rebounded 3.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, reversing the 2025 decline. The rapid expansion of coal power capacity led to worsening oversupply, reflected both in the increase of wasted wind and solar generation and in falling utilization of coal power plants; The rebound was not evidence of a broad return to coal following LNG shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. China’s combined domestic coal production and imports in fact fell by 1.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, rather than expanding in response to the external energy shock. Growth in clean energy supply and electrification helped offset the fall in oil supply and limit increases in fossil fuel consumption; Estimated wind and solar curtailment, including both reported and unreported curtailment, reached 360 TWh in H1 2026, up 49% year-on-year. Had this electricity been absorbed, the additional power supply could have met all demand growth and allowed coal power generation to fall. 132 articles in 58 journals by 1667 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Regime shifts of AMOC-sea surface temperature relationship, Fan et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76149-4

Trends in the Seasonal Cycle of the Equatorial Pacific Cold Tongue, Jiang et al., Journal of Climate Open Access pdf 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0049.1

Observations of climate change, effects

Diurnal asymmetry in heat stress intensification across Bangladesh, 1985–2024: Accelerated nighttime warming and emerging urban risk, Kamruzzaman et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000848

Globally and intergenerationally unequal exposure to hourly heat extremes, Liao et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02724-8

Recent History of Surface Ocean Acidification Extremes That Compound Marine Heatwaves, Gregor & Gruber, AGU Advances Open Access 10.1029/2025av002112

Significant soil warming across Alaska permafrost and non-permafrost regions from 1997 to 2023, Oliver & Phillips, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1887902

Spatiotemporal Patterns of Drought and Flood Abrupt Alternation and Their Driving Factors in China from 1951 to 2020, Li et al., Journal of Hydrometeorology Open Access pdf 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0187.1

State of the Climate in 2025, Zhao et al., Atmospheric and Oceanic Science Letters Open Access 10.1016/j.aosl.2026.100897

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

The rise of AI in weather and climate information and its impact on global inequality, Mozaffari et al., npj Climate Action Open Access pdf 10.1038/s44168-026-00412-z

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Intensification of the North Pacific Storm Track in the Mid-1980s: Internal Variability Versus External Forcing, Yang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124032

Machine learning-based projection of China's ski resort suitability under CMIP6 scenarios, ZHAO et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.08.002

Projections of Earth's Hottest Surface Temperatures in CMIP6, Wilson et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122540

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Advances in regional climate science in South America and Central America during the CORDEX Era, Bettolli et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001015

Global fully coupled climate-aerosol CMA-CPSv4 – Part 1: Aerosol simulation performance, Zheng et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-7279-2026

Impact of mesoscale eddy parameterization on Arctic Atlantic Water circulation and heat transport in the eddy-permitting grey zone, Pemberton et al., Ocean science Open Access 10.5194/os-22-2375-2026

Statistical Downscaling of Daily Temperature and Precipitation From Regional Climate Models in Complex Mountain Terrain, Matiu et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70545

Underestimated Arctic “Radiator Fin” Effect in Climate Model Simulations, Huang & Huang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122725

Cryosphere & climate change

A nine-year record of slush on the Greenland Ice Sheet, Glen et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-4345-2026

A State-Space Model for Monitoring Greenland Ice Sheet Surface Elevation Change from CryoSat-2, Andersen et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-4327-2026

Arctic sea ice loss amplifies local evaporation influence on water vapor isotopes: insights from cruise observations, Zhang et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-11189-2026

Destabilization of seasonal snow cover under climate warming: Mechanisms and implications from four decades of satellite observations across mainland China, Wu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105644

Future climate change will intensify snow drought in the high-latitude water tower, Changbai Mountain, Xu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105646

Glacier mass balance response to extreme precipitation events in the Western Himalaya, India, Kumar et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105643

Glacier surges on James Ross Island, Antarctica, and their relationship with climate, Davison et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-4293-2026

Snow-eater heat waves of the western United States, Rhoades et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb3361

Synchronous Holocene thinning of Pine Island Glacier and its tributaries influenced by ice-shelf unpinning, Johnson et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76244-6

Sea level & climate change

Diverse response of extreme sea levels amplification and more vulnerable deltas/islands in the northern South China Sea by the end of the 21st century, Chen et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.021

Increasing Frequency of Coastal Erosion Indicated by a Hindcast Model of Storm-Driven Forcing Calibrated With Beach Stratigraphy, Schmelz et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007482

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Planetary energy budget during abrupt glacial climate events set by Atlantic Ocean heat valve, Buizert et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02070-6

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Abalone Mortality Associated With Hypoxia in Tidepools During a Summer Heatwave, Gagnon et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74126

Arctic sea-ice variability is linked to long-term changes in bowhead whale foraging, Teixeira et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108344

Beyond temperature: The environmental constraints of high-mountain microrefugia, Vrábel et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access 10.1111/1365-2745.70422

Blue rings in Scots pine indicate cooling in the early and late growing season at the northern treeline, ?ermák et al., Dendrochronologia Open Access 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126592

Climate Warming Is Causing an Increasing Dominance of Smaller Moth Species, Ellis et al., Global Ecology and Biogeography Open Access 10.1111/geb.70294

Continental-Scale Biodiversity Predictions Are Influenced by Climatic Variability and Extreme Weather, Cohen et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71028

Coupling Climate Downscaling With Species Distribution Models to Identify Potential Climate Refugia for Giant Panda Forage Bamboos, Shang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74162

Denning Phenology Mediates Sea-Ice Loss Impacts on Early Reproductive Success in Polar Bears, Naciri et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71042

Evaluation and Forecasting of Habitat Suitability and Thermal Growth Responses in the Mud Clam Geloina coaxans under Climate Change, Liu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108337

Future NDVI projections and ensemble strategy comparison in Inner Mongolia under CMIP6 scenarios, Li et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.3389/fevo.2026.1921058

Global threat exposure of islands in a changing world, Marino et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2534106123

Hydraulic traits govern opposing range shifts of montane trees under warming, Zhang et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02726-6

Metabolic Responses of Mammals to Temperature Anomalies Vary Across Climates, Rubalcaba & Correas-Araus, Global Ecology and Biogeography 10.1111/geb.70293

Oxygen Deprivation Implicated in Rapid Coral Mortality Under Acute Heating Events, Dhillon et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71030

Projecting the impact of climate change on the lipid profile of the hydrocoral Millepora alcicornis: Relative lipid homeostasis under warming and ocean acidification, Marrero et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108349

Resident and Migratory Falcons' Breeding Phenology and Productivity Respond Differently to Weather and Climate Change Across the Arctic, Gulotta et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71022

The Impact of Climate Change and Human Habitation on Long-Term Ecological Stability, Staples et al., Global Ecology and Biogeography Open Access 10.1111/geb.70296

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Accelerating biomass loss from forest disturbances across Europe, Kowalski et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-02032-y

Carbon dioxide fluxes of two differently managed sites in a former Scots pine plantation in response to widespread drought mortality, Sulzer et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111398

Decadal doubling of Siberian methane emissions due to warming-induced fires and methanogenesis, Zhu et al., Science Open Access 10.1126/science.aea5828

Global Change Impacts on Mineral-Associated Organic Matter: Consequences for Soil Carbon Persistence, Jia & Feng, Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71037

Global methane emissions from rice paddies are now increasingly quantifiable, Mehla et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03902-4

Mechanical thresholds constrain global peatland carbon accumulation, Mahdiyasa et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-66259-w

Methane Emissions From Wildfires: Trends and Anomalies, Zhu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2026jd046687

Persistence of Arctic Ocean acidification under negative emissions, Köhn et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02715-9

Snow depth shifts greenhouse gas balance during freeze–thaw periods in grasslands, Luo et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70421

The impact of artificial intelligence on carbon emission intensity: evidence for an early-stage inverted U-shaped relationship, Wang, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1756431

Decarbonization

A policy-navigation framework for exploring hydrogen integration pathways in Great Britain towards net zero, Abuella et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115535

Charging infrastructure network expansion for electric vehicles in Norway from a grid perspective: Barriers and solutions, Hjelkrem & Flataker, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115528

CO2 mitigation potential of biomass-derived charcoal in Indian iron and steel industry: A case study from Karnataka, Tikadar et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102093

Decarbonization potential and limits of e-fuel policies in the EU, Campos-Rodríguez et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115529

Evidence of predation events by marine mammals at offshore wind farms, Bicknell et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-65167-3

Impact of renewable energy communities on the Italian day-ahead electricity market: A scenario analysis, Koltunov et al., Energy Policy pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115518

Linking photovoltaic development with energy storage: A review of solar-to-battery integration pathways, Kashyap et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102096

Geoengineering climate

Assessing combinations of regional MCB designed to target multiple climate response objectives, Mason et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-10861-2026

Middle atmosphere chemical and dynamical effects in the CCMI-2022 stratospheric aerosol injection scenario, Jörimann et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-11207-2026

Aerosols

A global model of dust mineralogy: Impacts on aerosol absorption, radiative balance and climate, Liu et al., Atmospheric Environment 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122263

Effects of East Asian Anthropogenic Aerosol Emissions Reduction on Summer Extreme Heat Events in Eastern China, Shu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045994

Global fully coupled climate-aerosol CMA-CPSv4 – Part 1: Aerosol simulation performance, Zheng et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-7279-2026

Climate change communications & cognition

Beyond the Greenwash: Understanding and Mitigating the Impact of Misleading Native Advertisements from Fossil Fuel Companies, Krishna et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2714124

Climate imagination. Dispatches from hopeful futures, Blanchard, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2709209

Delay Means Death: Development of a Scale to Measure Public Support or Rejection of Climate Delay Discourses, Wójcik et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103168

Discourses on the roots and resilience of climate misinformation: perspectives from the Canadian agri-food sector, Kabir & Chowdhury, Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2713878

IPCC experts as passeurs actors: A new typology of international experts in domestic science-policy interfaces, Gaveau et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104464

National Survey Explores Associations between Climate Knowledge, Visual Interpretation, Sociodemographics, and Flood Risk Perceptions in U.S. Adults, Ruckert et al., Weather Climate and Society Open Access pdf 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0216.1

Transportation and Climate Behaviors: Comparing Difficulty of Transportation-related Behaviors Across Different Populations, Naseri et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103173

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

A Machine Learning Framework for Rice Yield Prediction under Heat Stress: Enhancing Model Training through Crop-Simulation-Based Scenario Generation, R et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-25-0201.1

Cover crops for soil carbon sequestration and sustainable agroecosystem: a review of ecological processes, Demissie et al., Ecological Processes Open Access 10.1186/s13717-026-00738-w

Designing farmer-centered extension programmes for low-carbon agriculture: evidence from a discrete choice experiment in China, Jiang et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.33204022.v1

Global methane emissions from rice paddies are now increasingly quantifiable, Mehla et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03902-4

Impacts of Future Oil Palm Expansion on Carbon and Hydrological Fluxes Across the Tropics, Xu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120846

Long-Term Analysis of Winter Wheat Yield and Climatic Influences in Ukraine, Grabovska et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70524

The possibility of growing winter crops in the face of global warming; variation in seed yield and phytochemistry of selected fenugreek (Trigonella foenum-graecum L.) genotypes, Yaldiz & Camlica, Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-66442-z

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Changes in tropical cyclone size over the western North Pacific, Feng et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100946

Climate change impacts on streamflow in a dam-regulated Mountain Watershed in South Korea using SWAT and CMIP6 projections, Sadiqi et al., Arabian Journal of Geosciences 10.1007/s12517-026-12568-3

Climate extremes expose groundwater risks, Wei & Cao, Science 10.1126/science.aek2112

Future climate change will intensify snow drought in the high-latitude water tower, Changbai Mountain, Xu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105646

Global River Discharge Projections From a Large Multi-Model Ensemble of CMIP6 and ISIMIP3b Simulations, Seubert et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007982

Periodic extreme rainfall in a warmer climate due to stronger convectively coupled waves, Quan et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed1634

Record-Breaking Atmospheric River Drives April 2024 Extreme Precipitation in the United Arab Emirates and the Surrounding Gulf Region, Massoud et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-26-0052.1

Climate change economics

Beyond the mean: the macroeconomic consequences of shifting temperature anomaly distributions, Winter et al., Climatic Change 10.1007/s10584-026-04257-7

Geopolitical fragmentation, climate risk, and crude oil price dynamics: Evidence from TVP-VAR-SV and causal forest models, Aloui et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115531

The political feasibility of Degrowth and the Green New Deal: Swedish politicians on the relation between economic growth and climate policy, Sellbjer, Environmental Sociology Open Access 10.1080/23251042.2026.2712609

Climate change mitigation public policy research

Climate-friendly food advertising and procurement in English local authorities: A systematic scoping review of policy ambition, Sermin-Reed et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000971

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Advancing a justice-centred approach to climate (un)inhabitability through transformative adaptation, [] et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2714547

Assessing the integration of older adults’ vulnerability in climate adaptation policies in a developing country, Opoku et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2714549

Climate adaptation among transnationally connected households in Coastal Havana Province, Cuba, Bernasconi, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1812869

Climate adaptation investment planning: insights from applications in developing countries, Watkiss et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2689995

Climate change and efficiency losses in combined heat and power plants: Evidence from China, Xiao et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115546

Non-linear urban overheating increments under climate change: Evidence from UKCP18 nighttime temperatures, Zhang et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103082

Optimizing the Rainwater Harvesting and Roof Sprinkling System to Adapt to Urban Extreme Heat, Yu et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008876

Putting children at the heart of climate change adaptation policies via Allyship, Bias Recognition and Child Centeredness: A global qualitative interview study, Zangerl et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001025

Climate change impacts on human health

Aedes albopictus and Dengue Transmission Risk in France Over the 21st Century, Radici et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.21281650

Diurnal asymmetry in heat stress intensification across Bangladesh, 1985–2024: Accelerated nighttime warming and emerging urban risk, Kamruzzaman et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000848

Globally and intergenerationally unequal exposure to hourly heat extremes, Liao et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02724-8

Public perceptions of extreme heat: A review, Howarth & Bedenk-Smith, Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104457

Spatial Heterogeneity in Heat-Related Mortality in the Valencian Region: Implications for Climate Adaptation Beyond Administrative Boundaries, Paredes-Fortuny et al., GeoHealth Open Access 10.1029/2025gh001699

Climate change & geopolitics

The geopolitics of decarbonization: How changing international relations reshape the European Union's sustainability transition, Kiefer, Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104910

Other

Climate change may increase landslide frequency despite generally drier conditions in the Mediterranean area, Quintero et al., Natural hazards and earth system sciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/nhess-26-3723-2026

Landscape context constrains climate regulation recovery in Amazonian secondary forests, Oliveira et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2426400123

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Climate change means extreme fire seasons in Canada are here to stay, Keeping et al., World Weather Attribution

At the time of writing, Ontario and the Northwest Territories have been especially affected regions in Canada’s 2026 wildfire season, with hundreds of active fires, many of them out of control. Scientists from Canada, the U.S., the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom collaborated to assess to what extent human-induced climate change altered the likelihood and intensity of the weather conditions at the time of the fires, and how the conditions will be affected with further warming. To assess the role of human-induced climate change the authors combine the observation-based assessments with climate models. In both regions and for both event definitions the climate models show a much smaller increase in likelihood and intensity. Combining models and observations gives an increase in likelihood of about a factor of 5 in the Northwest Territories for DSR7 and a factor 2 for DSR30 and in Ontario of about 2 for both event definitions.

Most Americans have been affected by extreme heat this year, AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research

Adults are increasingly likely to say extreme heat in the past year has impacted their electricity bills, outdoor plans, and other routines. At the same time, the public has become slightly less inclined to believe that climate change is happening. About half of adults say extreme heat has had a major impact on their electricity bills, while 3 in 10 say the same about their outdoor activities. Fewer report major impacts on their exercise routines, sleep, pets, travel or vacation plans, the timing of events like weddings or reunions, or their job or commute. Ninety percent of adults say extreme heat has had at least a minor impact on their lives, up from 83% two years ago.

Built for backup, contracted to run: China’s coal support system risks crowding out clean power, Qin et al., The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and Global Energy Monitor

New coal power plants entering operation in China reached the highest first-half year level since 2016, with 10 GW entering operation for every 1 GW retired, despite a policy shift towards tighter control of new project approvals. China commissioned 30 GW of new coal power, up 43% from last year, while retiring only 2.7 GW. Another 25.4 GW started construction; Coal power generation rebounded 3.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, reversing the 2025 decline. The rapid expansion of coal power capacity led to worsening oversupply, reflected both in the increase of wasted wind and solar generation and in falling utilization of coal power plants; The rebound was not evidence of a broad return to coal following LNG shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. China’s combined domestic coal production and imports in fact fell by 1.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, rather than expanding in response to the external energy shock. Growth in clean energy supply and electrification helped offset the fall in oil supply and limit increases in fossil fuel consumption; Estimated wind and solar curtailment, including both reported and unreported curtailment, reached 360 TWh in H1 2026, up 49% year-on-year. Had this electricity been absorbed, the additional power supply could have met all demand growth and allowed coal power generation to fall.

State of the Climate in 2025, Blunden et al., American Meteorological Society

The authors provide a comprehensive, observation-based assessment of Earth’s climate system that not only documents what happened during a given year (e.g., 2025), but also how that year compares to previous years in the observational record. Thus, it is critical to have continuous, long-term observations of various components of the Earth system to document variability and change over time. Many of these observations, both current and historical, are also assimilated into various reanalysis products (e.g., ERA5 and MERRA-2), which are physically constrained representations of the Earth system and are used extensively throughout the State of the Climate report. Reanalyzes are particularly useful in regions where in situ and satellite observations are sparse.

2026 Progress report: National adaptation plan (New Zealand), He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission

The author's assessment of progress found that adaptation is not keeping pace with escalating climate risks in Aotearoa New Zealand, and in some cases is slipping further behind. This reflects their 2024 finding, that the work underway is not enough to make the country resilient to current pressures, let alone into future decades. The progress made since 2024 has been uneven and serious gaps remain. This matters, critically. As climate effects intensify, weaknesses in the country’s response increase in consequence – as harm and costs experienced by families, communities, workers and businesses across the motu. Aotearoa New Zealand is – too often – paying to react and recover after damage occurs, rather than preparing ahead of time.

Opposition to Local Data Centers Rises Sharply, The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania

The survey was conducted among a nationally representative sample of 1,320 U.S. adult citizens from June 16-July 19, 2026. The authors found that three in five Americans (61%) now somewhat or strongly oppose the construction of new data centers in their area, up from 49% in the survey ending in March; majorities of Democrats (69%), Republicans (54%) and independents (53%) oppose new local data centers. Opposition is highest among young adults under 30 (70%) and declines to 57% among those 65 and older, the inverse of what one might expect for a new technology; 39% expect AI’s effect on the United States to be negative over the next decade, against 18% who expect it to be positive, unchanged from the spring. Two-thirds (68%) say the government has done “too little” to regulate AI; and across 13 areas, only medical research and discoveries draws a net-positive assessment (+41 points) in which the anticipated benefits of AI outweigh the expected negatives. The most negative areas are personal privacy and data security (-63 points), children’s safety online (-50 points), and employment and jobs (-46 points). About New Research

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 by Adm. Chris Barrie (Rtd), first published at The Diplomat 

We live in a rapidly evolving risk landscape. The conflict in the Middle East has not resolved and its effects will last for months, if not years. The Iran-U.S. clashes have transformed into something that strains supply chains, reduces crop yields, rewrites regional politics, and concentrates attention on near-term stability at the expense of the big global challenges.

The decisions by the Trump administration to retreat from the commitments and frameworks of global climate action have created a leadership void that is felt most acutely not in Washington or Brussels, but in the low-lying islands of the Pacific, in the Australian communities already contending with extreme fire seasons and more intense floods and cyclones, and in every boardroom and cabinet room where 30-year infrastructure decisions are being made in the face of deepening uncertainty.

The decline of America as a global leader represents a startling shift in the security space Australia has occupied. The Trump administration’s attack on international conventions and relationships, and its rejection of values that many Australians hold dear, requires Australia to rethink how it exercises leadership and influence in our region.

As someone who has spent over two decades arguing – from inside defense and intelligence institutions as much as outside them – that climate disruption is the most significant strategic threat Australia faces, this is a moment for clear-eyed reckoning.

The world has become more dangerous, and climate disruption adds to the danger. The too-slow pace of the energy transition and faster-than-forecast climate impacts are escalating risks. 

For the better part of my career in uniform, climate change was treated as a secondary issue in defense planning – something that belonged to the environment portfolio, not to the strategic one.

We now have more than two decades of analyses – from defense and intelligence agencies in Australia and across allied nations, from the Australian Security Leaders Climate Group, and from the assessments of Australia’s Treasury department and Productivity Commission – all pointing to the same conclusion. The risks of climate disruption are not linear, but compounding and cascading. When one system fails – whether that is a power grid, a water catchment, an agricultural region, or a community’s capacity for self-recovery – it puts pressure on every connected system.

We must redesign critical systems to make those systems more resilient, more sovereign, and less vulnerable to the shocks that are coming.

The choices Australia makes in the next five years about the pace and shape of the energy transition will determine not only our electricity prices, but our strategic position – our credibility in the region, our leverage in international coalitions, and our capacity to lead rather than follow. That is why I no longer think of the energy transition primarily as climate mitigation policy but as nation-building.

Australia’s energy transition broke records in 2025. Renewables generated almost half our electricity. Battery storage capacity tripled. This performance is a genuine achievement.

The pipeline of projects is real, but the delivery gap between ambition and projects on the ground remains large.

Policy consistency cannot stop at renewable energy. A nation cannot simultaneously ask this industry to build the clean-energy economy of the future, while continuing to expand the industries driving climate disruption.

Renewables are half the story, but phasing out fossil fuels is the other, and from that standpoint Australian policy is contradictory, perhaps even delusional.

The Australian government has a clear policy of talking about and championing renewable energy, while avoiding, wherever possible, any discussion of climate impacts and how Australian coal and gas, including new licenses, are helping drive the world toward an unliveable planet.

Our climate minister, Chris Bowen, has said Australia will not use its role as president of the negotiations at the 2026 COP31 climate summit to facilitate an agreement to curtail coal or gas exports, declaring in a recent media interview that it is “not on the agenda” under his leadership.

The Australian Security Leaders Climate Group previously documented how the government has found confronting climate impacts and their security consequences simply “too hot to handle.”

Whatever short-term income fossil fuel exports generate is overwhelmed by the deaths, destruction, and decline in human security caused by accelerating climate disruption. These costs will continue accumulating for decades and be borne by communities, governments and future generations.

The World Health Organization’s estimate that extreme heat has claimed more than 200,000 lives in Europe since 2022, with millions more affected physically and mentally, is an example of the human consequences already unfolding.

It is a consistent government practice to avoid discussion of the science, the impacts, and Australia’s outsized contribution to them.

We see a similar pattern in the United States, where a faction of Congressional Democrats have embraced what has been called “climate hushing” – scaling back discussion of climate change and shifting the conversation toward energy affordability.

In times of crisis, especially when the future security of the nation is at stake, leadership means confronting the hardest problems head on, as Australia has done during times of war and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Taking difficult issues off the agenda does not demonstrate leadership. It demonstrates hesitation. Sweeping problems under the carpet exhibits weakness. And outright denial looks like cowardice to me, wherever it comes from. 

We cannot credibly claim to be addressing the climate emergency while simultaneously increasing the very emissions driving it. Australia’s fossil fuel export trajectory is like trying to empty a bathtub while leaving the tap running. Every new fossil fuel project and every expansion in exports cancels out part of the global progress being delivered by the clean energy industry. 

We are not short of technology. We are increasingly not short of public support. What we are short of is institutions willing to hold the line once the smoke clears and the cameras move on.

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

AI energy use is a huge and controversial topic at the moment. Credible estimates have AI data centers accounting for around 12% US electricity use by 2030. But at the same time consumers have been given reassuringly small numbers about the impact of their own AI use, numbers that seem on their face somewhat inconsistent with the staggering size of their aggregate usage.

In 2025 Google published an article calculating that median Gemini text prompt used only 0.24 watt-hours (Wh), less energy than “watching nine seconds of television”. Around the same time, Sam Altman said that an average ChatGPT query uses about 0.34 Wh, and Epoch AI came out with similar numbers. Writers like Andy Masley and Hannah Ritchie have shown that at these rates an individual using chatbots has a pretty negligible impact, with one prompt only amounting to roughly 1/150,000th of an average American’s daily emissions.

Those numbers are basically right. They are also increasingly divorced from how AI is actually being used today.

The fastest-growing way that software engineers and scientists actually use AI is not typing questions into a chat box. Rather, we use AI agents through tools like Claude Code and Codex that plan, write code, run it, read the results, and iterate on their own. These agents make dozens of model calls per human prompt, and engage in complex reasoning chains that involve attempting and evaluating multiple answers to the same question.

I work for a company in Silicon Valley (Stripe) and admittedly use the latest AI tools more than most people. But I thought it would be instructive to take a deep dive into my own AI use over the past 8 weeks and calculate the actual energy use I was responsible for.

Over the past 8 weeks I typed 1,138 prompts into Claude Code. Those prompts triggered more than 14,000 model calls that processed 3.2 billion tokens. My best estimate is that this used around 170 kWh of data center electricity (with an uncertainty range of roughly 70 to 330 kWh across methods and assumptions). That works out to around 150 Wh per prompt (60 to 290 Wh), which is roughly 600 times (250 to 1,200) the energy of a median chat prompt. A “prompt” is ultimately not a unit of AI use any more than “trips” is a measurement of driving; it’s how far you go that matters.

Agents supercharge AI usage

Part of the impetus for this post is the publication of a new white paper from Watershed (Bistline et al. 2026) proposing a standardized framework for corporate AI emissions accounting. It is the most careful treatment I have seen of why published per-query numbers differ by orders of magnitude (system boundaries, mostly), and it contains a figure that should reframe the whole discussion: electricity per AI task spans more than five orders of magnitude, from thousandths of a watt-hour for text classification to 50-500 Wh for an agentic workflow making 5-50 frontier model calls. As they put it, emissions attributed to one “interaction” may understate the compute actually consumed “by an order of magnitude or more.”

Other researchers have found similar results. Bai et al. (2026) measured coding agents on real software tasks and found they consume roughly 1,000 times the tokens of an ordinary chatbot interaction. And these sort of agents tasks represent the most rapid driver of increased AI usage; Anthropic’s Economic Index found that 97% of their API usage now show “automation-dominant” patterns associated with agents.

To put these values in perspective, the figure below compares published per-prompt and task estimates (blue) with what I measured from my Claude Code use (orange) as well as common benchmarks for energy use (running a microwave, a fridge, or a whole home):

Electricity consumption per AI task, including published estimates (blue) and values computed from my own Claude Code session logs (orange). Measured token counts converted using Bistline (2026) activity-tier energy factors; orange ranges span cache-read energy assumptions of 1% to 25%.

My median Claude Code session uses around 0.6 kWh (0.25 to 1.2 kWh), which is at the top end of Watershed’s generic agentic usage estimate, and fifty times the energy used to charge a cellphone. My average day of Claude Code (3.0 kWh, range 1.2 to 5.9 kWh) uses more electricity than running two refrigerators.

Measuring my own footprint

Claude Code keeps complete local transcripts of every session, including the exact token counts the API reports for every model call.1 This lets me precisely know how much AI usage I was responsible for rather than simply extrapolating it from published benchmarks; its only the step to convert tokens used to energy that requires assumptions.

The first thing I found is that the gap between “prompts” and reality is massive: my 1,138 typed prompts resulted in just over 14,000 distinct model calls (12 per prompt), and each prompt consumed on average 2.9 million tokens. For comparison, typical web-based AI chat exchanges with no reasoning or web searches only use around a thousand tokens.

Over the past the 8 weeks, my Claude Code used 3.2 billion tokens. These overwhelmingly came from the agent re-reading its own working memory. Every time an agent takes a step (e.g. runs a command, reads a file, or calls a tool), the model re-processes its entire accumulated context. The figure below shows the breakdown of how tokens were used and their share of total electricity use.

Token and estimated electricity composition of my Claude Code usage, May 31 to July 25, 2026. “Cache reads” are previously processed context re-read from the key-value cache on each model call; “cache writes” are new context being processed and stored; “output” is text and code generated by the model. Electricity shares use Bistline (2026) factors with cache reads at 10% of the fresh-input energy rate.

The text I actually see (e.g. the model’s output) is only around 0.4% of total tokens processed. Some 96% of the tokens are cache reads where the agent re-reads its own context at each of those 14,000 steps. This matters enormously for the energy estimate, because a cached token is much cheaper to re-read than a fresh one is to process. AI companies charge about 10% of the price for cache reads compared with fresh content, and I use that ratio as my central energy assumption, with 1% and 25% as bounds.2

Since nobody outside of the labs actually knows the true per-token energy of a frontier model (Anthropic has published no per-prompt or per-token figures, something the Watershed paper politely but firmly flags as the field’s biggest data gap), I ran my measured token counts through three independent published methodologies: Watershed’s activity-tier factors, the per-token factors Simon Couch’s estimates derived from Epoch AI’s work, and the claude-carbon tool’s pricing-inferred coefficients.

Estimated electricity consumption for the 3.2 billion tokens I used under three published methodologies: Watershed activity-tier factors under three cache read assumptions, Couch (2026) per-token factors, and claude-carbon per-model coefficients.

Every one of these methodologies gives an answer between roughly 70 and 330 kilowatt-hours over 8 weeks. The estimate is genuinely uncertain, by a factor of ~2 in either direction. But the broader conclusion is not: counting my 1,138 prompts at published per-chat-prompt rates would have suggested about 0.3 kWh, while the reality is 150 to 1,200 times that.

My daily pattern of energy use is shown in the figure below. The day to day variability is huge: my heaviest day (11 kWh central estimate) involved multiple parallel agents churning through a large geospatial analysis, and used more than a third of the total daily electricity of an average US home. This reflects that fact that even within the category of agentic usage, the complexity of the task and the number of simultaneous sub-agents used will greatly influence the resulting energy use.

Estimated daily electricity consumption of my Claude Code usage(bars: cache reads at 10% of input energy; whiskers: 1% to 25%). Reference lines show typical daily electricity use of a refrigerator and of an average US household.

My numbers are a bit higher than some of the other published estimates of agentic use, and it is worth digging in a bit to determine why. Couch estimated that a median Claude Code session uses around 41 Wh, involving 24 model calls and 592k tokens. Andy Masley’s June 2026 calculator puts a 100k-token Claude Opus agent session at ~459 Wh. My median session is ~600 Wh, involving a hundred-plus calls and around ten million tokens including numerous subagents for large data analyses projects. Hannah Ritchie’s hypothetical heavy user (24 agentic queries a day) came out at 2.4 kWh/day, while I measured a central estimate of 3.0 kWh/day (1.2 to 5.9 kWh) for my actual usage.

None of these estimates are necessarily wrong, they just reflect a wide range of actual usage assumptions. Software engineers, researchers, and data analysts (e.g. folks like me) probably lie pretty far down the tail of the usage distribution. At the same time, usage will likely grow over time as more complex agentic tools increasingly become the norm.

What a year of this looks like

If we assume that these 8 weeks are fairly typical, we can estimate that a full year of my agentic Claude Code use would consume roughly 1.1 MWh of data center electricity (0.4 to 2.2 MWh), which is about a tenth of what an average US household uses. Applying the US-average grid intensity, that is roughly 370 kgCO2e per year (150 to 730 kgCO2e).3

Annual emissions of common activities compared with my annualized Claude Code usage. Car: EPA typical passenger vehicle (22.2 mpg, 11,500 mi/yr). EV: 11,500 mi/yr at 0.30 kWh/mi on the California grid. Flight: ICAO-method economy round trip, CO2 only. Home electricity: EIA average US household on the US-average grid. Dryer: typical electric clothes dryer at ~770 kWh/yr (DOE) on the US-average grid.

My personal and professional AI usage now emits a bit more per year than running an electric clothes dryer, and about half as much as driving an electric car 11,500 miles in California or taking one San Francisco to New York round-trip flight in economy.4 It is about 8% of the annual emissions of a typical American gasoline car, and roughly 2% of the average American’s ~18-ton annual greenhouse gas footprint.

This is simultaneously a large emissions source and a relatively modest part of my total carbon footprint. I typically take a round trip flight from San Francisco to the East Coast twice a year to visit my aging parents (not to mention work travel), and I generally don’t lose sleep over that choice. It is also fundamentally a much easier-to-decarbonize end-use than aviation (more on that below). But this also represents a net new source of emissions, at a time when global temperatures are skyrocketing and our emissions reduction goals are increasingly off track.

So what do we do about it?

Having spent most of this post arguing that agentic AI use is hundreds of times more energy intensive than the chatbot numbers suggest, let me be clear that I don’t think the answer is guilt or abstinence. But there are real levers here that we can use to shape the trajectory of AI energy use and emissions going forward.

On the personal side we can try and not be frivolous with agentic tools. There is a real difference between pointing five parallel agents at a hard research problem and doing the same to settle a bar bet (or, in my case, making axolotl-themed games with my daughter). What models you use matters too: sending simple tasks to smaller models uses perhaps 5 to 7 times less energy per token than defaulting to a frontier model,5 and it is what I increasingly do for searches and mechanical work. That said, I don’t want to oversell this. My entire annual AI footprint is a few hundred kilograms of CO2; personal restraint by the small population of heavy users is not going to bend any curves.

The technology lever is more powerful, and it is genuinely impressive. The figure below shows the energy efficiency of NVIDIA’s data center chips over the past decade. The amount of math an AI chip can do per joule of energy has grown roughly 150-fold since 2016, doubling about every two years, per Epoch AI. The latest B300 chips running at their lowest supported precision use about a quarter of the energy per operation of the 2022-era H100s that trained today’s frontier models. This represents a 3.8-fold improvement in energy efficiency in three years. Software gains can make this even faster: Google reports the energy of a median Gemini prompt fell 33-fold in a single year through a combination of better models, better tools, and better hardware.

Peak dense tensor throughput per watt of rated chip power for NVIDIA data center GPUs, by release year and numeric precision. Dashed line shows Epoch AI’s trend of energy efficiency doubling every two years for leading ML hardware.

But if 150-fold efficiency gains were going to reduce AI’s energy use, they would have done it by now. This is the Jevons paradox in action: making compute cheaper per token in turn tends to lead to greater levels of AI use. Efficiency is why my agentic habit costs 170 kWh rather than the 950 kWh it would have used with 2020-era hardware. But efficiency only determines how much intelligence we get per unit of energy, but so far it has so far shown no sign of determining AI’s total energy use.

Which is why the lever that actually matters most is the carbon intensity of the electricity. Every number in this post assumed the US-average grid; run the same workload on largely clean power and my footprint falls by roughly 90%. Unlike aviation, this is an end-use we already know how to decarbonize.

The problem is that we are moving in the wrong direction today: a sizable portion of planned US data center capacity intends to build its own behind-the-meter generation, and nearly three quarters of that is natural gas. AI companies with genuine climate commitments need to do better at finding alternatives: solar plus storage (which I helped lead a study about in 2024), next-generation nuclear and restarts of retired reactors, enhanced geothermal, and siting data centers in regions where both the average and the marginal generation is low-carbon).

There is also a silver linings version of this story where AI demand becomes an asset for decarbonization. Getting to net-zero emissions requires roughly tripling electricity generation by mid-century as we replace nearly all the current uses of fossil fuels with clean electricity. The barriers are mostly not technological, but rather things like interconnection queues, permitting, transmission. The AI buildout is a preview of that world of rapidly increasing electricity demand, backed by companies with enormous capital and unusual urgency. If that money and impatience gets spent speed-running the elimination of those barriers (buying firm clean power, funding transmission, absorbing the early costs of advanced nuclear and geothermal the way early corporate buyers did for wind and solar), the AI boom could leave the grid cleaner than it found it. If it gets spent on behind-the-meter gas turbines, it won’t. That choice is being made right now, and it will matter far more than how many prompts any of us type.

In the interest of full disclosure: the python code underlying the analysis and figures in this post were, naturally, built with the help of Claude Code, but the writing is all mine.6

1 Claude Code records API usage including the amount of uncached input tokens, cache-creation tokens, cache-read tokens, and output tokens, per model call, with model IDs and timestamps. One logging subtlety matters a lot: each API response is written to the log as one line per content block, with every line repeating the message’s full usage object, so a naive line-by-line sum double-counts tokens by a factor of ~2.2. All numbers here count each API message once, deduplicated by message ID.

2 A cache read retrieves already-computed attention states from memory rather than recomputing them, so it is much cheaper than inputting fresh data, but its not free. Cache reads context still makes each output token more expensive to generate at long context. Anthropic prices cache reads at 10% of fresh input, and the claude-carbon and Couch methodologies both adopt ~10% as an energy ratio. Watershed flags cache handling as a known gap in per-token accounting; my 1%-25% band is intended to span the plausible range.

3 Using the eGRID 2024 US-average 341 gCO2e/kWh, since Anthropic does not disclose where their data centers are located and what electricity sources they use. Market-based emissions (counting providers’ clean power purchases) would probably be lower, potentially much lower. This estimate excludes my laptop, which at ~50 W is negligible against 3.0 kWh/day of data center load.

4 Note that the flight estimate here only includes direct CO2 emissions from aviation; including contrails and other secondary factors would probably increase flight emissions by at least 50%.

5 Based on inferring energy use through token pricing, claude-carbon gives ~0.3 J/token for Haiku-class vs ~2 J/token for Opus-class models.

6 In a good example of why you always need to double check work done with AI coding tools, Claude accidentally doubled its original estimate of my token use as all the relevant files were stored twice and it simply added them all up. I only caught it because the numbers seemed too high!

 

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An upcoming UK government consultation on weakening targets for electric vehicles (EVs) could cost consumers as much as £3bn a year by 2030, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

It could require the UK to import an extra 17m barrels of oil in 2030, raising expected net imports by 8%, as well as adding 2.5% to national emissions that year, the analysis shows.

After years of fierce lobbying by parts of the car industry – and despite the significant savings on offer for EV drivers – media reports suggest that EV targets could be “watered down”.

Under current rules, battery EVs – BEVs, those which run only on electricity – must make up a rising share of new car sales in the UK.

This policy, known as the “zero-emission vehicles” (ZEV) mandate, was introduced by the previous Conservative government and sets a goal for 33% BEV sales in 2026, rising to 80% in 2030.

(Carmakers are able to use “flexibilities” to help meet their targets, which reduces the effective target under the ZEV mandate to an estimated 25% of sales in 2026.)

Now, the government under new Labour prime minister Andy Burnham is reported to be considering a cut in the BEV target for 2030 to just 50% of new car sales, alongside options for 60% or 70%.

Carbon Brief understands that a consultation on weakening the ZEV mandate is being reviewed by the prime minister’s office in Number 10, ahead of being formally released.

If the mandate is weakened to 50% by 2030 – and if carmakers make more use of “flexibilities” – there could be up to 3m fewer BEVs on UK roads by 2030, according to the NGO T&E.

Previous Carbon Brief analysis found that BEVs are around £1,100 cheaper to run per year than a petrol car, thanks to far lower fuel costs.

Overall, BEVs are more than £1,000 per year cheaper to own than either petrol cars or plug-in hybrids (PHEVs, which can run on petrol or electricity).

This is according to analysis of the “total cost of ownership” by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), including purchase price, fuel costs, insurance and proposed pay-per-mile charges.

In total, Carbon Brief analysis shows that UK drivers could be hit with an extra £3bn in annual ownership costs by 2030, if the ZEV mandate is weakened, as shown below.

A weaker ZEV mandate could “put billions of pounds of committed investments at risk”, reports BusinessGreen, including in the EV charging network and battery supply chains.

Industry group Energy UK says that the mandate is “working in the way it was designed to work” and that it is the “single biggest driver of emissions reductions” in government climate plans.

However, Carbon Brief analysis shows that a weaker ZEV mandate could result in an extra 7.4m tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions (MtCO2) in 2030. This would add the equivalent of 2.5% to national emissions in 2030, under the UK’s international climate goal for that year.

In addition, a weaker ZEV mandate could result in the UK needing to import an extra 17m barrels of oil in 2030, equivalent to 8% of projected net imports that year.

Energy UK says that shifting to EVs will help to reduce household energy bills “for everyone”. This is not only through direct cost-of-ownership savings for EV drivers, but also by spreading the costs of upgrading the electricity system across a wider user base.

Car industry group the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders claims that its members are spending “blilions…on discounts, finance incentives and marketing support” and that “natural” EV demand is below the level required to meet the current ZEV mandate. Its claims are disputed.

related Q&A: Does the world need ‘carbon capture and storage’ to reach net-zero? 03.08.2026 Technology UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo  15.07.2026 Nature 28 quotes from new UK leader Andy Burnham on climate, net-zero and fossil fuels 14.07.2026 Policy Analysis: UK newspapers have already printed 63 editorials in 2026 backing North Sea drilling  01.07.2026 Oil and gas

The post Analysis: Weaker EV targets could cost UK consumers £3bn a year by 2030 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Are there enough minerals for solar power expansion to help mitigate climate change?

Global mineral supplies are large enough to support solar development for climate change mitigation.

A 2023 analysis of 75 emissions-reduction scenarios found that projected median mineral demand largely remains within known geological resources. Projected median demand for silver was about 68,000 metric tons, compared to 530,000 tons of estimated reserves; cadmium demand was 38,000 tons against 500,000 tons of reserves.

Tellurium may constrain cadmium-telluride panels, a minority of the global solar market, but research suggests improved refining and material efficiency could substantially reduce this strain.

Recycling can further reduce demand for newly mined minerals by recovering silver, copper, silicon, and other components for reuse in future panels. Recent innovations are improving recycling cost-effectiveness, while federal programs continue to support domestic mineral supply chains and recycling research. 

The main challenge lies in expanding production and supply chains, not mineral shortages.

Go to full rebuttal on Skeptical Science or to the fact brief on Gigafact

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Sources

AP News Study: Enough rare earth minerals to fuel green energy shift

Joule Future demand for electricity generation materials under different climate mitigation scenarios

USGS Byproduct Mineral Commodities Used for the Production of Photovoltaic Cells

Yale School of the Environment As Millions of Solar Panels Age Out, Recyclers Hope to Cash In

Resources, Conservation and Recycling Innovating the recycling of silicon-based solar panels with an eco-friendly alkaline leaching process

MIT Climate Can solar panels be recycled?

U.S. Department of Energy End-of-Life Management for Solar Photovoltaics

The White House Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Delegates Defense Production Act Authority with Respect to Recoverable Critical Minerals and Materials That Are Essential to Our National Defense

Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

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This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters

When a weak 45-mph tropical storm named Harvey moved through the Lesser Antilles Islands in August 2017 and then petered out in the central Caribbean Sea, no one could have suspected that the meager clump of clouds that remained would go on to become the second-costliest weather disaster in world history. But after crossing Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula into the Gulf of Mexico, Harvey was rejuvenated, rapidly intensifying into a ferocious Category 4 hurricane that hit Texas just north of Corpus Christi.

Harvey's true mischief came after it stalled inland as a tropical storm for two days, dumping at least 40 inches of rain across a gigantic area from Houston to Port Arthur — larger than the entire state of Delaware. The storm total of 60.58 inches (1,534 mm) at Nederland, Texas, was the heaviest single amount ever recorded from a tropical cyclone or its remnants in the U.S. With damages of $164 billion (2026 USD) — mostly from flooding, Harvey became a historical catastrophe exceeded only by Hurricane Katrina of 2005.

When all of Harvey’s rainfall runoff rushed toward the ocean, it encountered the blocking influence of seawater being pushed inland by the persistent onshore winds of the tropical storm, creating a significant compound flood event — coastal flooding that resulted from a combination of storm surge and river runoff unable to drain into the ocean because of the storm surge waters piled up against the coast.

A similar setup could cause an even worse catastrophe in the future. Climate change is causing more intense, slower-moving hurricanes, increased rainfall, and higher sea levels. But traditional risk assessment methods typically consider one hazard at a time — ignoring compound flood events — leading to an underestimation of the danger. If we include all the ways climate change will likely increase flooding, the future flood risk along significant portions of the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic coasts is nearly certain to make them unlivable by late this century, even under a moderate global warming scenario.

How climate change worsens the danger

A 2023 study looking at the flooding from Harvey near Port Arthur, Texas, found that 19% of the flood area occurred because of compound flooding. Under a global warming scenario where a repeat of Harvey hits with an additional sea level rise of 0.57 meters (1.9 feet), accompanied by 18% more total rainfall — plausible in 2050 — this area would increase to 33%. A potential sea level rise of 1.6 meters (5.2 feet) and an additional 50% in total rainfall, plausible by 2100, would cause the compound flooding area to rise to 46%, increasing the number of structures impacted by about a factor of 23 compared to 2017, causing tens of billions in additional damage.

Figure 1. Storm-total rainfall from Hurricane Harvey, August 24-31, 2017. Harvey dumped over 40 inches (yellow colors) in Houston, with isolated amounts over 50 inches (pink colors) south of Houston and northwest of Port Arthur. Image credit: NOAA.

There are three main ways climate change can increase flood risk along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts:

1. An increase in the frequency of more intense hurricanes and ones moving more slowly at landfall, which will dump more rain
2. Increased heavy rainfall because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor
3. Sea level rise

The relative importance of these three factors in a future warmer climate will vary depending upon the location, according to a 2022 study. This study found that across the Gulf of Mexico and Florida coastlines, the increase in rainfall was expected to be the largest driver. For parts of the Southeast and mid-Atlantic, the increase in the number of intense or slow-moving hurricanes would predominate. And along the upper mid-Atlantic and New England coastlines, sea level rise will dominate the future compound flood risk.

Figure 2. The main driver of compound flooding on the U.S. coast. Across the Gulf of Mexico and Florida coastlines, the increase in rainfall is the largest driver (yellow colors), while the increase in storm frequency (of more intense, slow-moving storms) has the largest impact for parts of the Southeast and mid-Atlantic (blue). Along the upper mid-Atlantic and New England coastlines, sea level rise causes the most impact (green). Locations with no clear main driver are labeled NA (gray). (Image credit: Gori et al., Tropical cyclone climatology change greatly exacerbates US extreme rainfall–surge hazard, Nat. Clim. Chang. 12, 171–178 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01272-7, open access)

Sea level rise has already led to a massive increase in flood risk

Sea level rise from all causes – for example, human-caused climate change, natural tectonic processes, and subsidence from groundwater pumping — has already led to a massive increase in the risk of damaging coastal flooding from storm surges alone, according to a 2026 study, Human-driven sea-level rise has quadrupled the frequency of coastal sea-level extremes since 1900. Relative sea level rise from all causes made a 100-year coastal flood in 1900 into a one-in-five-year flood or less by 2005 in Key West, Jacksonville, Atlantic City, and Maine. Because sea level rise is accelerating, the odds of coastal flooding will increase even faster than the increases already observed since 1900.

Flood risks are growing

Charleston, South Carolina: What was a one-in-10-year coastal flood in 1901 occurred 17 times in 2025.
Galveston, Texas: What was a one-in-10-year flood in 1904 occurred nine times in 2024.
Atlantic City, New Jersey: What was a one-in-10-year coastal flood in 1911 occurred 10 times in 2024.
Miami, Florida: What was a one-in-10-year coastal flood in 1931 occurred 14 consecutive days during the "king tides" of October 2025.
Key West, Florida: What was a one-in-10-year coastal flood in 1913 occurred an astonishing 26 out of 27 days during the "king tides" of October 2025; what was a one-in-100-year flood in 1913 has occurred three times in the past 10 years.

Data: NOAA

Dramatic rises in compound flood risk are coming

A return period refers to how often we can expect a weather event of a given severity to occur. For example, we use rainfall statistics from NOAA to compute how often a flood with a 1% chance of occurring in a given year will recur — which is defined as a one-in-100-year storm, with a return period of 100 years.

A 2022 paper, Tropical cyclone climatology change greatly exacerbates US extreme rainfall-surge hazard, studied the odds of a truly extreme compound flood event — a one-in-100-year storm surge occurring at the same time as a one-in-100-year rainfall event. Historically, the return period of such an event was about once every 200-500 years along the coastlines of the Gulf of Mexico and southeast Atlantic (up to the Chesapeake Bay), shifting to once every 1,000 years or even less frequently along the New England coastline.

But under an extreme global warming scenario for the year 2100, these odds would generally (with some exceptions, see Fig. 4) increase by seven- to 36-fold in the South and 30- to 195-fold to the north — a massive rise in extreme flood risk. Although this result was for an extreme global warming scenario, the strong signal found implies that a significant increase in extreme flood risk would occur even in a moderate global warming scenario.

Figure 3. The return period in years in 2005 for what was a one-in-100-year flood in 1900 because of relative sea level rise. Data is plotted from the 2026 paper, Human-driven sea-level rise has quadrupled the frequency of coastal sea-level extremes since 1900. For example, a 100-year coastal flood in 1900 in Jacksonville, Florida, and Atlantic City, New Jersey, was a one-in-two-year flood by 2005 (red circles with the number "2" in them). This change in flood risk is for sea level rise alone — additional increases in flood risk because of changes in precipitation are not included.

The greatest rises in risk were to the north, because climate change is expected to bring greater increases in extreme precipitation closer to the poles. This was also the finding of a 2020 study, More meteorological events that drive compound coastal flooding are projected under climate change, which predicted that the greatest increases in compound flood threat should occur north of 40°N latitude.

Figure 4. The change in return period for an extreme compound flood, defined as a one-in-100-year storm surge occurring at the same time as a one-in-100-year rainfall event, under an extreme global warming scenario. Left side of table: the return period in the historical climate (1980-2005). Right side: return period in the 2070-2100 period under an extreme global warming scenario, using the median value from eight different climate models. The return period increases by a factor of 14 to 265 for these nine cities. Data taken from the supplemental materials in: Gori et al., Tropical cyclone climatology change greatly exacerbates US extreme rainfall–surge hazard, Nat. Clim. Chang. 12, 171–178 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01272-7.

Main cause of future increased compound coastal flood risk: more intense and slower-moving hurricanes

The model used in the 2022 study projected that the top 10% of most intense hurricanes would, along the majority of the U.S. coast, increase in intensity by 15-30% and move 20-30% slower in the future compared to the historical period. “The increase in storm intensity coupled with the decrease in translation speed drives an increased likelihood to observe both extreme rainfall and extreme storm tide in the future,” the authors wrote. 

A substantial inland compound flood risk along the Gulf of Mexico coast

Rivers draining into the Gulf of Mexico have seen large increases in their maximum streamflow in recent decades (commonly 20-40% increases), making them susceptible to increased compound flooding. A 2021 paper found long-term increases in the frequency of compound storm surge and heavy rainfall flooding along the rivers of the northeastern Gulf of Mexico. Surprisingly, these compound flood events were largest a good distance inland, near the limit of where tidal influences stopped — not at the coast where compound events are usually expected. A 2026 study focused on North and South Carolina also found a considerable expansion of the threat of compound flooding inland in a future warmer climate.

A Hurricane Sandy-like compound flood event: five times more likely by 2100?

Hurricane Sandy in October 2012 caused devastating surge-driven flooding across heavily populated coastal areas in New York City, resulting in more than $91 billion (2026 USD) in damages. A 2024 paper, Climate Change Contributions to Increasing Compound Flooding Risk in New York City, found that a Sandy-like event can be expected about once every 150 years in the present climate. But climate change — through sea level rise and an increase in hurricane strength and rainfall — can be expected to make a similar storm about a one-in-65-year event by 2050, and a one-in-30-year event by 2100, under an emissions scenario slightly higher than the trajectory humanity is currently on.

Increased compound flood threat from hurricanes earlier in the season

A 2022 paper, Earlier onset of North Atlantic hurricane season with warming oceans, found that initial threshold dates of continental U.S. named storm landfalls have trended earlier by two days per decade since 1900. Modeling work suggests that the length of hurricane season will continue to increase because of climate change. A 2017 study found that a hurricane season that was two months longer (May-December) would increase the number of flood-risk days by 28-180% along rivers in four Southeast U.S river basins.

Figure 5. Predicted water levels at the Carrollton gage on the Mississippi River in New Orleans as of July 10, 2019. The river was running high, at 16 feet above sea level, and the city’s levees protect the city to a height of 20 feet. The storm surge from Hurricane Barry was predicted to reach that level on July 13. The last time water levels that high were observed at this point on the Mississippi was in the Great Flood of 1927. Image credit: NOAA.

As I wrote in a 2019 post, New Orleans’ Achilles Heel: A Hurricane Storm Surge During a Mississippi River Flood?, a trend toward earlier hurricanes increases the risk of storm surge moving up the Mississippi River that could overwhelm the levees in New Orleans, since the river tends to run high in late spring and early summer. This situation was feared in July 2019, when Hurricane Barry sent a storm surge up the river when the river was already running high from early-summer runoff (Fig. 5). Fortunately, Barry ended up delaying its intensification into a hurricane until after it passed the mouth of the Mississippi, resulting in a storm surge that was not as high as initially forecast.

Other compound hurricane threats

Climate change is likely to make two other types of compound hurricane threats more severe. One of these was covered in my previous post, The emerging danger of post-hurricane heat waves (2026). In addition, more intense hurricanes with higher winds and heavier rains have the potential to create a double-whammy of high-end wind damage and extreme inland flooding simultaneously, overwhelming infrastructure and emergency preparedness and response efforts that could have handled one of these hazards alone, but not both together.

A preprint of a 2026 paper that has not yet undergone peer review, Global Warming Amplifies Inland Compound Risks From Tropical Cyclones, found that when comparing the recent climate (1981-2020) with an extreme climate-change projection for later this century (2061-2100), the annual probability of compound wind and precipitation extreme hazards ranking in the 99th percentile globally increases by 61-115% within 100 kilometers of the coast, and further escalates by 92-204% in areas 100-500 kilometers inland. This inland amplification is driven by more intense landfalling hurricanes and the increased moisture available caused by the 7% increase in water vapor holding capacity of the air per degree Celsius of warming. Hurricane Helene’s impact in 2024 in western North Carolina can be regarded as a harbinger storm in this regard.

Coastal areas becoming unlivable

A 2020 paper, Sea-level rise exponentially increases coastal flood frequency, found that for the most susceptible sites around the U.S., the odds of a one-in-50-year coastal flood “are likely to double approximately every five years into the foreseeable future.” This finding took into account not just storm surges from hurricanes but also from more common coastal storms such as Nor'easters. According to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, most coastal engineering works in the U.S. are designed for return periods of 50 to 100 years, so the increase in flood risk at so many sites represents a drastic increase in vulnerability. And if high-end sea-level rise projections of one meter (3.28 feet) by 2100 come true, sea-level rise will likely cause "once-in-a-lifetime" coastal flooding events to occur nearly every day before 2100. (NOAA's 2022 sea level rise forecast gives 50% odds that sea level rise along the contiguous U.S. coast by 2100 will exceed 0.7 meters.)

Figure 6. The return period in years in 2050 for what was a one-in-100-year flood in 2005 because of relative sea level rise. Data is plotted using data from the 2020 paper, Sea-level rise exponentially increases coastal flood frequency, in combination with observed and predicted sea level rise from The Virginia Institute of Marine Science annual Sea Level Rise Report Cards. For example, a one-in-100-year coastal flood in 2005 in Key West, Florida, is predicted to recur every 0.04 years (two weeks) by 2050 (red circle with the number "0.04" in it). This change in flood risk is for sea level rise alone — additional increases in flood risk because of changes in precipitation are not included. The forecasts out to 2050 are generated using the observed acceleration trend fitted with a quadratic curve (since sea level rise is increasing exponentially, and a straight-line linear fit is not appropriate). Note that these forecasts are not based on a climate model and may be underestimated.

If we now add in the massive additional increase in flood risk resulting from compound flooding, good luck trying to insure your home. The huge increase in climate change-induced flood risk from sea level rise, heavier rainfall, and stronger/slower-moving hurricanes is nearly certain to force abandonment of portions of the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic coasts by late this century, even under a moderate global warming scenario. A 2026 study, The Growth Effects of Natural Disasters: Evidence From A Novel Global Dataset Over 1970-2023, found that a one-in-100-year flood reduces GDP by about 0.5%, so it is easy to see how the coast could quickly become unlivable if once-in-a-lifetime floods are occurring nearly yearly in low-lying regions. Indeed, hurricane flooding has already led to the unofficial abandonment of several U.S. communities, and a number of others are already at significant risk, which I will detail in a series of future posts (spoiler alert: Barrier islands are high on the list).

https://bsky.app/profile/drjeffmasters.bsky.social/post/3mnhxhqjjtc2g

The only recourse we will have is to spend vast amounts of money to defend the most important places and retreat from or abandon the rest. A society-shaking mass migration of millions of Americans away from the coast is inevitable in future decades because of increased climate change-induced flood risk. The trigger for the beginning of this exodus may be only a few years away. To understand what’s coming, I recommend reading my 2024 post, When will climate change turn life in the U.S. upside down?

Related posts on sea level rise

• Book review: “On the Move” is a must-read account of U.S. climate migration (2024)
• Book review: “The Great Displacement” is a must-read (2023)
• Part one of my three-part sea level rise series: How fast are the seas rising? (2023)
• Part two of my three-part sea level rise series: Eight excellent books on sea level rise risk for U.S. cities (2023)
• Part three of my three-part sea level rise series: 30 great tools to determine your flood risk in the U.S. (2023)
• Bubble trouble: Climate change is creating a huge and growing U.S. real estate bubble (2023)
• How sea level rise contributes to billions in extra damage during hurricanes (2022)

Bob Henson contributed to this post.

This article first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

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by David Spratt, first published at Safe Climate Australia

The claim that four billion people could die in a 3°C warmer world has become a powerful climate narrative. But what does the science actually support, and where does evidence end and speculation begin?

The proposition that four billion people or more would be dead if — and more likely, when — global warming reaches 3 degrees Celsius (°C) has gained some currency, mainly due to the 4DB (four billion dead) website and associated activities.

Now, that is half the current global population, and on current warming trends of 0.3-0.35°C/decade, the world will hit 3°C around 50 years from now, perhaps earlier, in part because there is little prospect of a rapid decline in fossil fuel emissions.  So that’s a mind-blowing average of 80 million people a year dying due to climate impacts every year from now to 2075? Is that realistic?

The number of greater than four billion dead at 3°C first appeared in a 2025 report on Planetary Insolvency: Finding our balance with nature, published by the UK Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) and the University of Exeter.ing our balance with nature, published by the UK Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and the University of Exeter.

The number appears in Figure 12: Planetary solvency risk impact and likelihood definitions (illustrative) on page 32 of the report.  In this figure, the scale of impacts listed for 2°C of warming include mortality of “>2 billion deaths” and GDP losses of 25%, as well as “>4 billion deaths” and GDP of 50% for 3°C of warming (Figure 1).

Figure 1:  Planetary solvency risk impact and likelihood definitions   (Planetary Insolvency) 

The 2°C estimate is even more startling, because Earth has already hit 1.5°C for all practical purposes, with the average for 2023-25 above 1.5°C, and a strong El Nino likely on the way for later this year which could push annual warming towards 1.7°C for 2026-27. At the current, accelerated warming rate, the Earth will reach 2°C around 2040, just fifteen years from now.

So the figure of two billion dead at 2°C would mean an average of 130 million people a year dying every year from now till 2040 due to climate change?  To my mind, that is simply not credible, and nothing I have read tells me that is a remotely-likely estimate.

Likewise, the risk matrix gives a figure of 1-5% dead (80 to 400 million deaths) for 1.5°C, a level of warming Earth has already reached. Estimates of actual mortality are difficult due to the direct and second- and third-order impacts, such as: hotter-climate > drought > food-shortage > displacement > conflict > mortality, and so on. The 2025 report of the Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change estimated heat-related mortality has increased to an average 546,000 deaths per year, though not all are specifically related to climate heating, and that is only one element of the story.

So it is important to understand what these numbers are, and are not, and where they came from.

There is no qualitative indication in the report as to their source. On page 27, the report acknowledges that “very limited research has been carried out on the potential for large-scale loss of life in relation to these interconnected risks on which to base an assessment”.

I asked a colleague in the UK who had worked with the authors of the report, and he was told that the figures came from the Climate Endgame paper. But its author, Luke Kemp, said this was not the case, and “he confirmed that he does not make any forecasts about mortality in the paper” (emphasis added).

As the caption to Figure 12 says, it is a risk assessment matrix that illustrates general levels of risk. I was told that the authors have now privately clarified that the mortality numbers “are absolutely NOT forecasts or predictions and we don’t use them as such” (emphasis added). But this is now the way that sites like 4BD are using it.

One interpretation would be that the risk matrix was simply indicating orders of magnitude rather than specific projections. So either it was too subtle in its distinctions, and/or it was a bit of a stuff-up in that it was assumed that the four billion figure came from somewhere, but it did not. So there is still a question of how the four billion figure was derived.

I understand there have been suggestions that a correction or clarification be issued, at least saying that the figures “are absolutely NOT forecasts or predictions”. And I had conversations with people working on the 4BD project outlining the story above and why some nuance was necessary in using such numbers, but the die had been cast.

So how can we think about this? One guess is the table was saying that at 3°C, an expert elicitation would find that mortality would likely be in the billions, rather than tens or hundreds of millions. Or alternatively, this was a plausible worst-case scenario, but not derived from models.  As discussed below, that is a reasonable proposition based on other literature. As for two billion dead at 2°C, I can see almost no credible evidence that is even in the ballpark, just half a degree warmer than at present.

Another, likely interpretation is that Figure 12 had used some numbers for GDP loss (in column 1) and had simply applied the same number for mortality (in column 2), so 50% loss in GDP equals 50% mortality. This in itself is a brave assumption: in one case, during the Great Depression — when, for example, US GDP fell 30% between 1929 and 1933 — mortality rates did not increase, and in some cases improved, though there were later adverse outcomes for children born at that time.

So there is no mortality analysis in the table at all, and no epidemiology; it simply flows from GDP impacts.

So where did the 50% decrease in GDP at 3°C come from? An earlier IFoA report in 2023, The Emperor’s New Climate Scenarios, whilst recognising that “climate change is complex, nuanced and characterised by deep uncertainty”, provided a chart of damage functions relating temperature and GDP loss (Figure 9, page 25), and asks “at what point do we expect 50% GDP destruction – somewhere between 2070 and 2090 depending on how you parameterise the distribution”, and that’s around 3°C. Depending on assumptions about when GDP hits zero (called the ruin parameter), the figures could be higher (80%) or lower (30%) because these are abstract models of possible damage functions. So it looks like a 50% loss of GDP was a figure of choice.

So what is the basis of the damage functions? The Emperor’s New Climate Scenarios says that  “Insurance leaders have unequivocally stated that if climate change raises average temperatures to 4˚C above pre-industrial levels most assets will be uninsurable”, and that “without insurance, investment, finance, business slow to a halt – we will no longer have an economy.” (page 27). I find this assumption highly problematic. As insurance premiums rise right now, in some cases dramatically due to extreme climate impacts, many households and small businesses are making decisions to continue to operate without asset insurance.

The only footnote to these statements is a view by one insurance CEO, Thomas Buberl of AXA at a Davos panel, reported by Bloomberg, that at 3-4°C “it’s not insurable anymore”, but what he said was much more specific: he was talking about basement retail premises in New York and Mumbai and that is what the headline said: “Climate change could make your basement uninsurable within a decade”. That is a very narrow and specific base on which to draw a global conclusion.

Now, how much of an economy would be left at 3, 4 or 5°C is a good question, but the method used here is far too narrow. I remember a long time ago James Lovelock saying at 4 or 5°C there may be 500 million people left eking out a miserable existence at the poles, or words to that effect.

To reiterate, it is almost impossible to put specific numbers on such future impacts, due to the radical uncertainty about the social impacts of a physical system that itself is non-linear in many important aspects, characterised by abrupt changes whose specific human consequences are somewhere between difficult and impossible to model, and where quantifying social impacts is of limited efficacy.

Vulnerability and adaptation

Even if future (non-linear) physical changes are well known, mapping their human impacts involves several more degrees of difficulty because the risk (potential damage) varies with exposure and vulnerability. There are three factors:

• Hazard: the physical changes in a climate system subject to abrupt change;
• Exposure: the presence of people, livelihoods and ecosystems in that physical space; and
• Vulnerability: the propensity of these human systems to be negatively impacted due to their sensitivity and/or limited adaptive capacity.

In the uber-rich, low-rainfall Gulf states, for example, whilst unlivable heat is becoming the norm, adaptation paid for by stupendous oil and gas revenue — desalination, 24/7 air conditioning, using flood-lit beaches at night rather than during the day, irrigating date palms, importing almost all the food and most of the labour — reduces vulnerability, even though the whole project seems a bit crazy.

So mortality in a hotter climate will be affected a great deal by adaptation capacities to reduce vulnerability, and that is largely a product of national income, and international assistance.

But there are also hard boundaries that cannot be easily adapted to, for example rice yields diminish once temperatures exceed 35°C at the time of flowering, and by 37°C the damage becomes critical.  By 2050, between one-quarter and two-thirds of rice production capacity will be subject to high or extreme heat stress risk (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Percentage of Rice production 
capacity exposed to heat stress risk 
(PWC: Climate risks to nine key commodities)

Smart adaptation would include moving to a plant-based diet to free a great deal of agricultural land now used to grow livestock and grow feed for livestock, and to reduce methane emissions. A well-planned and managed retreat from low-lying coastal land would also help, rather than just waiting for the inevitable to happen.  And it depends on the nature of international politics. A coordinated global mobilisation to face the coming crisis would yield a very different result from states pretending that climate collapse was simply not on the agenda. Will states cooperate in the face of unprecedented adversity, or close borders and go to war?

The timeline

Another unresolved issue is the time frame. Many impacts do not manifest immediately once a certain temperature level is reached. For example, climate history teaches us that every one degree of warming will likely result in 10-to-20 metres of sea-level rise in the longer term, over many centuries. The fastest rises in the paleoclimate record are three-to-five metres in a century, so the full sea-level rise from 3°C of warming could take a thousand years to manifest, perhaps less and perhaps a good deal more.

So when the figure of “4 billion dead” is raised, is that when the thermometer ticks past the figure “3°C” later this century, or over a thousand years as coastlines, agriculturally-rich deltas and low-lying states drown?  My hunch is that it would be the latter.

A similar issue is the collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation. Whilst a number of recent research papers conclude this tipping point is close at hand, models suggest the process is likely to take 100 years, so once again the exposure increases over that time, and so does the opportunity to reduce vulnerability with adaptive measures, though only up to a point.

Many other system-level changes have similar characteristics.

The world at 3°C

In a 3°C hotter world, large parts of the tropics will suffer “near-unlivable” extreme heat conditions, there will be less rainfall over significant parts of the dry subtropics, and this combined with increased evaporation rates will lead to drying out and desertification across the dry subtropics. New extremes — of rainfall and heat, flooding and drought — beyond human experience and beyond model expectations will occur. And a committed sea-level rise of many metres will be in the slow process of inundating coastal cities and deltas.

Some research, which is contested, suggests 3°C could cut global GDP by half. Last year, Australian researchers concluded that at 3°C, by the end of the century, the estimated harm to the global economy would be 40%, which “could devastate livelihoods in large parts of the world”.  Coral reef systems would be gone, and that alone means coastal ecosystems would only be able to provide 20–50% of the fish protein that they do today for half a billion people around the world.

In 2021, the Australian Academy of Science published a report co-authored by David Karoly on Risks to Australia of a 3-degree warmer world. Amongst other things, it said that at 3°C, heatwaves would happen as often as seven times a year, with events lasting 16 days on average, “fire risk (driven by record heat, dryness and fuel) will increase by 30 per cent or more in south-eastern Australia”, and yields of key crops would reduce “by between 5 and 50%, depending on crop and location”.  Other research estimates that “beyond 2°C warming, the declines in suitable areas for the 30 crops [analysed] become more pronounced – in some cases approaching and passing 50%”.  That in itself would cause global chaos.

A 2020 study on extreme heat found that at 2.7°C, up to 3.5 billion people will be exposed to temperatures outside the “human niche”, that is, the climate conditions that have served humanity well over the past 6000 years. Further research published in 2023 described a zone of near unlivable heat, “a situation found in the present climate only in 0.8% of the global land surface, mostly concentrated in the Sahara, but in 2070 projected to cover 19% of the global land” (Figure 3). Prof. Marten Scheffer said those pushed outside the climate niche might consider migrating to cooler places: “Not just migration of tens of millions of people but it might be a billion or so.” 

Figure 3: Projected zone of heat of “near-unliveable conditions” at 2.7°C global average warming (“Quantifying the human cost of global warming”)

And at 2.7°C, scientists say that  the Arctic would be “transformed beyond contemporary recognition: the Arctic Ocean would be essentially ice free for several months in summer, the area of Greenland that reaches melting temperatures for at least a month would roughly quadruple, and the area of permafrost would be roughly half of what it was in preindustrial times.”

Potsdam Institute Director Prof. Johan Rockstrom says that such a level of warming is “something that humanity has absolutely no evidence that we can cope with… Push ourselves to 2.5°C – we’re in unknown terrain. It would lead to a complete melting of the big ice sheets, which would be a 10-metre sea level rise… There would be a collapse of all the big biomes on planet Earth – the rainforest, many of the temperate forests – abrupt thawing of permafrost, we will have complete collapse of marine biology, we will have a shift of large parts of the habitability on Earth.”

Twenty years ago, a group of US security analysts constructed a 3°C scenario:

“Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to massive nonlinear societal events. In this scenario, nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervour to outright chaos. In this scenario, climate change provokes a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature’ (emphasis added).”

So how many would die, and how many would survive in this 3°C world?

Displacement and mortality 

The “human niche” papers on near-unliveable heat found that these extremes are projected to envelop 1.2 billion people in India, 485 million in Nigeria and more than 100 million in each of Pakistan, Indonesia and Sudan. Many would be forced to move to a more liveable climate. Another study from the same year of 2020 concluded that warming of 2°C could provide more than 500 million people additional incentive to emigrate, whilst warming of 3°C could provide additional incentive-to-emigrate to well over a billion people.

The idea that a billion people may be displaced may seem fanciful, but the UN also agrees with this figure: “Unless we change the way we manage our land, in the next 30 years we may leave a billion or more vulnerable poor people with little choice but to fight or flee.”

The figures may be much, much higher than this, but there are so many variables, so many social unknowns, that any figure can only be a guesstimate by social scientists and security analysts, based on a scientifically-credible scenario.

Climate disruption kills people in many ways, including by direct physical impacts (heat stress, floods, cyclones and other extreme events), by severe food insecurity, through displacement and conflict, by increased disease and poorer health outcomes, and so on.

The 2025 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change reported a 63% increase in heat-related deaths since the 1990s, reaching an estimated 546,000 yearly deaths on average in 2012–21. The higher number of heatwave days and drought months in 2023 compared with 1981–2010 was associated with 123.7 million more people experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity in 124 countries analysed. As hotter and drier weather increases the risk of wildfires, 2024 had a record-high 154,000 deaths from wildfire smoke-derived small particulate matter (PM2·5) air pollution.

What about future mortality rates? Joshua Pearce of the University of Western Ontario says if warming reaches or exceeds 2°C, it is likely that mainly richer humans will be responsible for the death of roughly one billion mainly poorer humans over the next century. This is based on a review of the literature by Pearce and Parncutt, which found mortality costs of carbon emissions converged on the “1,000-ton rule”: an estimate that one future premature death is caused every time approximately 1,000 tons of fossil carbon are burned. Their best- and worst-case figures were 300 million and three billion for 2°C.

By this logic, the mortality range at 3°C would be in the range of 450 million to 4.5 billion.  Of course, this assumes a linear relationship between emissions and mortality, but that assumption is based on observed conditions that are far different from those humans will face in the second half of the century.

It should also be noted that in 2019, Rockström told The Guardian that in a 4°C-warmer world: “It’s difficult to see how we could accommodate eight billion people or maybe even half of that. There will be a rich minority of people who survive with modern lifestyles, no doubt, but it will be a turbulent, conflict-ridden world.”

So four billion dead at 3°C? Immediately or when the full physical and social impacts are realised over many centuries?  Depending on deeply uncertain adaptation and other political responses? Between expert estimates of degrees of magnitude and worse-case conjecture, it’s anybody’s educated guess.

 

 

 

 

A listing of 29 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, August 2, 2026 thru Sat, August 8, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (11 articles)

• El Niño and climate change are affecting rice crops in weird ways Researchers explain how El Niño and global warming are combining to create "the haves and the have-nots." Grist, Tik Root & Frida Garza, July 31, 2026.
• Heatwaves and raging fires mark Europe’s ‘dystopian’ summer This article about the recent record-breaking heat and wildfires in Europe dives into the science about the causes, quoting several experts. ABC News, Romy Stephens, Alex Lim and Fran Rimrod, Aug 1, 2026.
• Climate shocks hit hydropower in Southern Africa, reviving interest in coal The Daily Climate, Chisapi Kumbutso, Aug 02, 2026.
• Climate change could dramatically reduce water flowing from the West's headwaters Phys.org, Northern Arizona University, Aug 02, 2026.
• Washington`s wildfires are a warning for the entire U.S. Dry conditions and climate change are putting forests across the country at risk for disaster Scientific American, Mary Randolph, Aug 03, 2026.
• Factcheck: How nuclear, gas, wind and solar power are affected during heatwaves Carbon Brief, Molly Lempriere, Aug 04, 2026.
• French wildfires are turning animals’ homes into ‘a desert of ashes’ The catastrophic fires have potential to do long-term damage to many wild animal populations, but a toad species could be the most affected. National Geographic, Melissa Hobson, Aug 4, 2026.
• Butterflies are on the move as the planet warms: new research A comprehensive survey indicates that one in ten known butterfly species have already shifted in range. The Conversation, Shawan Chowdhury, Aug 05, 2026.
• Summer of wildfires sees catastrophe bonds approach new record Wildfires raging across the U.S. and Europe this summer are pushing more and more insurers into slashing their risk by issuing catastrophe bonds to investors, and the so-called CAT bonds on the market are already nearing levels from all of last year. Callaway Climate Insights, David Callaway, Aug 06, 2026.
• Climate change created conditions for Canada fires, scientists say, as Trump blames mismanagement A new study calculates that human-caused climate change doubled the likelihood of the tinderbox weather conditions that sparked Canada’s massive summer wildfires. The Okaloosa Herald, EHN Curators, Aug 06, 2026.
• Heatwaves have killed millions. Here’s how scientists tally lives lost Two very different methods are used to estimate the human toll of heatwaves such as those now hitting parts of Asia and Europe. Nature, Kaia Glickman, Aug 6, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (6 articles)

• ECB official warns climate crisis poses growing threat to `core financial stability` Exclusive: As wildfires rage, Frank Elderson says more work needed to assess risk from collapse of ecosystem services The Guardian, Richard Partington, Aug 01, 2026.
• Climate Hushing Strategy May Cost Democrats At The Polls Argued from a foundation of ample research evidence, this colorfully written op-ed criticizing ''climate hushing'' suggests that tip-toeing around climate change isn't grounded in facts, and that addressing public concerns about climate change can be part of a winning electoral package. CleanTechnica, Steve Hanley, Aug 03, 2026.
• Opinion: Why local action is key to surviving America's climate crisis 'The current administration in Washington denies that climate change is even real,'' starkly reminding us that meaningful climate change mitigation is a political matter and begins with voting. Politico, William S Becker, Aug 03, 2026.
• Appeals Court Says E.P.A. Cannot Block Billions in Climate Grants The funds have been frozen since early in President Trump’s second term. New York Times, Claire Brown, Aug 04, 2026.
• Q&A: What is in China`s new five-year plan for climate change? The new plan does not include any major new targets, instead consolidating and reaffirming existing policies, but does include significant signals on key policy areas, such as non-carbon dioxide (CO2) greenhouse gases, global climate governance and carbon markets. Carbon Brief, Carbon Brief Staff, Aug 06, 2026.
• Trump Administration to Pay RWE to Cancel Wind Leases It was the fifth such deal struck by the administration to get companies to drop offshore wind projects. NYT, Brad Plumer, Aug 06, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (4 articles)

• Why is gaining citizen support for climate policies so difficult? Phys.org, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Jul 31, 2026.
• A majority of Americans don`t actually fit either climate camp An analysis of 20 years of polling data shows how age, education and income—in addition to political affiliation—shape views on climate policy Anthropocene, Sarah DeWeerdt, Aug 04, 2026.
• Climate Trunk - The Persuadable Majority Progress on climate depends on speaking to the movable middle. Climate Trunk, John Lang, Aug 5, 2026.
• Extreme heat impact on travel, family increasingly felt by Americans: poll Americans are increasingly feeling a personal impact from extreme heat, according to a new poll from The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. AP News, Alexa St. John and Linley Sanders, Aug 06, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (3 articles)

• Climate adaptation at its limits, says one scientist A climate scientist says Earth is "passing the limits of adaptation" when it comes to withstanding the effects of climate change. NPR, Michelle Aslam, Jul 31, 2026.
• Q&A: Does the world need `carbon capture and storage` to reach net-zero? Carbon capture and storage is an expedience for the fossil fuel industry and frequently the target of emotionally overheated and shallow criticism, but also stands as a poster child for ''nothing is simple," as illustrated in this excellent explanation. Carbon Brief, Josh Gabbatiss, Aug 03, 2026.
• `The obsession with endless growth can only end in tears`: your questions on extreme weather this summer answered 'Every fraction of a degree of warming that we can prevent will help millions of people and billions of other forms of life,'' which pretty much answers why Skeptical Science exists and what each of us can help to achieve; we can do better or worse by fractions of degrees, and we choose better. The Guardian, Jonathan Watts and Ajit Niranjan, Aug 03, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #31 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 26, 2026 thru Sat, August 1, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Aug 02, 2026.
• 15 new books for five new takes on climate change Recent years have seen a boom in books on climate change. This collection spans from techno-optimism to philosophical pessimism. Yale Climate Connections, Michael Svoboda, Aug 06, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

• Supreme Court sets date for blockbuster climate case The case, Suncor v. Boulder, has spurred calls for two of the justices to recuse themselves as they weigh whether federal law or the Constitution bars local governments from suing fossil fuel companies over the costs of addressing climate change. Politico E&E News, Lesley Clark, Aug 05, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (1 article)

• A Short History of Climate Science #17 of the ClimateTrunk graphics published ClimateTrunk, John Lang, July 15, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

• Fixing one of climate`s worst plots The 1930s were hot over the U.S. Midwest, but not that hot The Climate Brink, Andrew Dessler, Aug 03, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

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China has released a five-year plan dedicated to addressing climate change. 

The 15th five-year plan for a national response to climate change is the latest in a series to outline in-depth climate and energy targets for the 2026-2030 period. 

These include five-year plans for “building a Beautiful China”, developing a “new-type energy system” and developing renewable energy. 

There are also separate “action plans” for the 2026-2030 period, such as for peaking carbon emissions. 

China has pledged to peak its emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality before 2060.

The new plan does not include any major new targets, instead consolidating and reaffirming existing policies.

Nevertheless, it includes significant signals on key policy areas, such as non-carbon dioxide (CO2) greenhouse gases, global climate governance and carbon markets.  

Below, Carbon Brief examines some of the notable elements in the latest five-year plan and what it reveals about China’s policy direction through to 2030.

• What does the climate plan cover?
• What does the plan say about non-CO2 GHGs?
• What does the plan say about global climate governance?

What does the climate plan cover?

The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) released the plan in late July, in unison with 18 other government departments. These include the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planning agency, and the National Energy Administration.

The document covers a range of topics, including CO2 emissions, other greenhouse gases (non-CO2 GHGs), carbon markets, carbon footprints, climate adaptation and international cooperation on climate change. 

For the first time at the five-year plan level, the plan creates a comprehensive target system covering all areas of climate policy, say officials in a MEE Q&A. 

They describe it as “the main policy instrument” for advancing China’s climate action during 2026-2030.

China rarely issues high-level multi-year policies dedicated to “responding to climate change”. In 2014, the NDRC published a plan on the topic running through to 2020, but this was not linked to a five-year plan period. 

Qin Yan, principal analyst at ClearBlue Markets, tells Carbon Brief that the plan  shows that China’s climate governance has reached “an unprecedented strategic level”.

She adds that the plan creates an “all-encompassing target system” to support China’s Paris Agreement climate pledges for 2030 and 2035.

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In its 2030 pledge, China aimed to peak emissions “before 2030” and reduce carbon intensity – its emissions per unit of GDP – by more than 65% from 2005 levels. 

Last year, president Xi Jinping personally announced China’s 2035 pledge to cut China’s greenhouse gas emissions to 7-10% below peak levels by 2035, while “striving to do better”. 

The five-year plan marks a new phase in China’s climate policy, according to researchers at CIB Research, an economic research body affiliated with the  Industrial Bank, whose largest shareholder is the Fujian provincial government.

Their analysis adds that the plan represents a broad effort to strengthen China’s climate-governance system, implementation mechanisms and underlying capacity. 

Nevertheless, several headline targets and policies in the document simply reiterate already established plans.

These include:

• Cutting carbon intensity by 17% across the five years
• Reducing carbon intensity per product in industries under China’s carbon market by 3%
• Substituting fossil fuels with renewables
• Strengthening climate adaptation
• Supporting the “free flow” of cleantech

What does the plan say about non-CO2 GHGs?

The plan also goes into detail on China’s approach to non-CO2 GHGs. This includes reaffirming a target of an emissions “reduction capacity” from these gases totalling 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) by 2030, although the baseline is unclear.

The target previously appeared in the overarching five-year plan, as well as the plan for building a “Beautiful China”.

The goal refers to emissions reductions, which can be realised through implementing current non-CO2 emissions reduction policies and projects, says Chen Meian, programme director and senior analyst at the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress (iGDP). 

She adds that it is “relatively achievable”, with sources including increasing the number of coal-mine methane utilisation projects. 

She points to an MEE explanatory note for a draft methodology under the China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) scheme, China’s voluntary carbon-credit market. Chen says the note suggests that projects using ventilation air methane and coal-mine methane with concentrations below 8% alone could deliver around 20MtCO2e of reduction by 2030. 

The note states that, currently, such projects are estimated to be able to “generate annual emission reductions of approximately 4.5MtCO2e”. 

In addition, Chen says, measures targeting industrial nitrous oxide (N2O) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) could help make up the remainder needed to meet the target.

According to iGDP analysis of biennial reports submitted by China to the UNFCCC, China emitted around 14,000MtCO2e of GHGs in 2021, excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF).

Non-CO2 GHGs accounted for around 2,700MtCO2e, or 19%, of the total, the majority of which was methane, as shown in the figure below.

iGDP analysis of China’s first Biennial Transparency Report and fourth Biennial Update Report.

China’s plans to curb these super-pollutants in the five-year period include coal-mine methane utilisation projects, end-of-pipe destruction technologies for HFCs and guidance on the use of catalysts to reduce N2O emissions.

The plan also calls for the recovery and replacement of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) in power equipment.

For Chen, the plan’s focus on SF6 control is particularly noteworthy. She says the gas is “finally receiving policy attention” and that proactive action is “timely and will help avoid future emissions growth” as China’s power system expands.

What does the plan say about global climate governance? 

One of the plan’s clearest objectives for international cooperation is for China to play a more active role in global climate governance.

By 2030, it says China should markedly increase its “influence, guiding power, shaping power and moral appeal” in this area. 

It says China’s climate action could also feed into the Global Governance Initiative, a policy initiative aimed at reforming the global governance system.

China will also aim to “build a new narrative on climate governance”, it adds.

Prof Thomas Hale, a professor in public policy at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, writes on LinkedIn that the plan “marks a major rhetorical shift” towards China being increasingly willing to “lead and shape” global climate action.

Another clear focal point for international cooperation is in carbon markets. 

The plan calls for China to expand the global influence of its carbon market, such as through international rule-setting, cooperation on standards and by hosting the China Carbon Market Conference.

Qin says China’s more active role in global carbon pricing is already evident in the launch of the open coalition on compliance carbon markets with the EU and Brazil. This coalition is expected to adopt a work plan at the China Carbon Market Conference in September.

Qin also notes that China “could become the world’s largest [carbon] offset buyer” as its energy transition progresses. 

The country would, therefore, “benefit from helping shape global rules under the Article 6 framework [for carbon trading under the Paris Agreement]”, she adds. 

Related Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’ 09.07.2026 China policy Q&A: What do China’s provincial five-year plans say about climate and energy? 18.06.2026 China policy Analysis: China’s new carbon metric leaves Germany-sized gap in its emissions 26.05.2026 China policy Q&A: China’s leadership calls for ‘strict control’ of fossil fuels 24.04.2026 China policy

The post Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Open access notables

‘Towards electric vehicle misinformation communities: Shared narratives, networked validation, and reassurance among Australian consumers, McEwen et al., Energy Research & Social Science

Electric vehicles (EVs) provide a pathway to sustainable transport systems. Yet public understanding of EVs is shaped by contested information environments in which misinformation circulates alongside facts. Existing EV misinformation research has largely focused on individual EV beliefs, attitudes, and information deficits. However, less is known about how EV misinformation becomes socially meaningful in everyday life. Drawing on qualitative ethnographic data from 122 Australian consumers, we introduce the concept of EV misinformation communities to help interpret how participants share narratives and engage in social interactions and everyday sense-making practices relating to misinformation about EVs across online and offline settings. Our analysis explores how EV misinformation becomes socially meaningful through symbolic framing, networked validation, and reassurance. We suggest that countering EV misinformation requires socio-cultural understanding of people's ideologies, dispositions and circumstances, and recognition of the value and sense of shared experiences that misinformation provides. Policy and programme interventions to accelerate the transition to EVs should seek to foster community through opportunities for creating positive value and shared experiences in addition to the provision of information.

Managing climate overshoot: a risk-based strategy for climate stabilisation, Taylor et al., Frontiers in Climate

Global warming is accelerating, yet current climate strategies centred on emissions reduction and carbon removal are unlikely to prevent temperatures from crossing dangerous tipping points. Although essential, these approaches operate too slowly to counter near-term warming driven by Earth’s growing energy imbalance, weakening carbon sinks, and amplifying climate feedbacks. This mismatch reflects systemic shortcomings in climate risk assessment that underestimate nonlinear risks and the escalating costs of delay. We argue that climate stabilisation should be treated as a risk-management challenge rather than an incremental policy process. This requires explicit comparison of intervention risks with those of continued warming. We outline a comparative risk–risk framework that integrates mitigation, carbon removal, and cooling interventions, and suggests that a viable strategy may require combining rapid decarbonisation and expanded carbon removal with carefully governed cooling interventions to limit near-term warming. Without aligning response timelines with accelerating climate threats, the likelihood of irreversible Earth-system disruption will continue to grow.

Ecological Transformations of Coastal Wetlands of the Conterminous United States in Response to Contemporaneous Sea-Level Rise, Neville et al., Earth s Future

Coastal wetlands are among the most important ecosystems on the planet but are increasingly imperiled by accelerating sea-level rise (SLR). In the past, biogeomorphic feedbacks have allowed coastal wetlands to adjust vertically and persist through periods of accelerated SLR. Recent rates of SLR are faster than any in recent geologic history, making the fate of coastal wetlands highly uncertain. Here, we synthesize surface elevation table marker-horizon data from 442 stations in coastal wetlands across the conterminous United States to evaluate if they are largely persisting in the face of accelerated SLR, or if they are undergoing ecological transformations of submergence and/or migration. Across the conterminous United States, 11% of coastal wetlands in this sample are on a trajectory of submergence whereas 73% of sites are lagging SLR, but may be able to migrate upslope, and 16% of sites are gaining elevation at rates which exceed SLR indicating persistence and an ability to migrate seaward. Vulnerability of these systems to ecological transformation varies across the three coasts of the conterminous United States which, span large biogeomorphic gradients. These results serve as one of the first national syntheses of coastal wetland elevation trends and may help focus conservation and restoration efforts in a rapidly changing future.

Long-Term Trends in the Ionospheric Equivalent Slab Thickness as a Proxy of Climate Change in the Ionosphere, Pignalberi & Alberti, Geophysical Research Letters

Anthropogenic greenhouse emissions do not affect all parts of Earth's atmosphere in the same way. While the lower atmosphere warms, the upper atmosphere is expected to cool and contract, and this may also change the ionosphere, the region containing charged particles (plasma). In this study, we analyzed nearly three decades of observations from three stations spanning equatorial to high latitudes. We focused on ionospheric equivalent slab thickness, a quantity that measures how broadly plasma is distributed around the main ionospheric peak. We found that slab thickness generally decreases over time, although the strength of the decrease is neither spatially uniform nor equally detectable at all latitudes. We then linked these changes to the plasma scale height, which controls how fast plasma density decreases with altitude. The results show that the ionospheric profile is becoming narrower with time, especially at middle and high latitudes. This suggests that long-term climate-related changes in the upper atmosphere are also affecting the vertical structure of ionospheric plasma. 

Disrupted Skies: How Offshore Wind Farms Alter Flight Behavior of Breeding Seabirds, Liang et al., Ecology and Evolution

Offshore wind farms are expanding rapidly as part of global climate mitigation efforts, but their effects on seabird movement behavior remain incompletely understood. While collision risk has received substantial attention, less is known about how turbines may alter flight routes through evasive behavior and meso-avoidance, particularly near breeding colonies where repeated commuting flights may accumulate energetic costs. We investigated flight responses of breeding Bridled Terns (Onychoprion anaethetus) to offshore wind turbines near their colony using high-resolution satellite tracking data collected at 1-s intervals and lower-resolution data collected at 1-h intervals. We quantified within-trajectory flight traits, including mean redirection, number of turns, flight speed, and flight altitude, in relation to turbine exposure. We assessed avoidance using both proximity-based and direction-sensitive metrics. At the near-colony scale, we tested whether flight behavior changed with increasing alignment between the trajectory bearing and turbine bearing from the colony. At the broader breeding-range scale, we tested whether behavior differed inside and outside wind farms or with distance to turbines, while accounting for colony distance, wind, and landscape variables. Bridled Terns showed increased mean redirection and lower flight altitude when trajectories were more closely aligned with turbine directions from the colony, suggesting localized route alteration in obstacle-facing directions. However, flight behavior was not significantly associated with turbine proximity, nor did it differ significantly inside and outside wind farms. These findings suggest that offshore wind farms may influence seabird movement through localized, direction-dependent route alteration rather than simple distance-dependent responses, highlighting the value of movement-context metrics and within-trajectory traits in wind farm impact assessments.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Interim heat mortality monitoring report, England: May and June 2026, UK Health Security Agency

During the May and June 2026 heat events there were an estimated total of 2,877 heat-associated deaths, an estimated 753 heat-associated deaths occurred during the May heat episode; an estimated 2,124 heat-associated deaths occurred during the June heat episode, and the mortality burden is already close to the highest annual totals previously recorded by UKHSA. Although these estimates remain provisional and are subject to revision as more complete mortality data becomes available, the magnitude of the impact is already comparable with some of the highest annual heat-associated mortality estimates previously reported through UKHSA’s heat mortality monitoring programme. For context, UKHSA estimated 2,295 heat-associated deaths during the whole of summer 2023, 1,311 during summer 2024 and 1,504 during summer 2025. The highest annual estimate recorded to date remains summer 2022, when 2,985 heat-associated deaths were observed across 5 heat episodes.

Climate change increases likelihood of compounding drivers of severe wildfire conditions in France and Spain, World Weather Attribution

The authors perform a super rapid analysis of trends in fire-conducive weather conditions in the two affected areas in France and Spain, analyzing observations only. In both study regions observations show strong trends of increasing likelihood and severity with global warming. 99 articles in 50 journals by 827 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Climate modes synergistically influence marine heatwaves in the North Sea, Lin et al., Ocean science Open Access pdf 10.5194/os-22-2287-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Uncertainties too large to predict tipping times of major Earth system components from historical data, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adl4841 40 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

Climate warming and atmospheric deposition jointly accelerate the Antarctic Peninsula atmosphere–glacier–land–ocean mercury loop, Zhou et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2613472123

Climate warming preconditions Himalayan slopes for post-earthquake cascading hazards, Gao et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03885-2

Impact attribution of anthropogenic forcing on lake surface temperature, Wang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76221-z

Long-term observed changes in air temperature extremes over Romania (1901-2023), Amihesei et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100941

Long-Term Trends in the Ionospheric Equivalent Slab Thickness as a Proxy of Climate Change in the Ionosphere, Pignalberi & Alberti, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123868

Pan-tropical ocean warming drives record-breaking rainfall in South China in April 2024, Xing et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03894-1

Threefold increase in atmospheric–riverine compound heatwaves under climate change, Zhou et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-02040-y

Understanding the Climatology and Characteristics of Arctic Moisture Intrusions, Woods et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd044159

Winter warm spells in the pyrenees: synoptic drivers and snowmelt impacts (1960–2024), Bonsoms & Serrano-Notivoli, Atmospheric Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109245

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Summer Monsoon Drying Accelerates India's Groundwater Depletion Under Climate Change, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004516 38 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

Enhanced detectability of forced signal in monthly precipitation changes, Duan et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03684-9

GLBD-FED: a global first-hand in-situ daily temperature dataset preferentially with a 00:00–24:00 UTC 24 h window (1981–2024), Yang et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-5739-2026

Post-Season Review of Rapid Attribution of 2025 Summer Extreme Heat in China, Sun et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.014

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The ERA5 global reanalysis from 1940 to 2022, Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, 10.1002/qj.4803 290 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Climatic Impacts of a Warmer Mediterranean Sea Simulated by the Fully Coupled Community Earth System Model, Version 2 (CESM2), Toker et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0540.1

Compound climate hazards revealed by global modeling of drought, heatwaves, and land degradation, Liu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105637

Intensifying Short-Interval Heatwave-To-Rainfall Compound Extremes and Associated Exposure in the Indus Basin, Wen et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70534

Multi-model ensemble mean shows accelerating global below-ground warming, Ju et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111382

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The radiative feedback continuum from Snowball Earth to an ice-free hothouse, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50406-w 14 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Advective, adiabatic and diabatic contributions to heat extremes simulated with the Community Earth System Model version 2, Röthlisberger et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/wcd-7-1363-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Accurate assessment of land–atmosphere coupling in climate models requires high-frequency data output, Geoscientific model development, 10.5194/gmd-17-1869-2024 32 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

Delayed freeze-up in the western Arctic Ocean fueled by subsurface heat release, ZHOU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.018

The Modèle Atmosphérique Régional – Intelligence Artificielle (MAR-IA): surface meltwater over Greenland, Tedesco et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-4235-2026

The recent enhancement of the surface melt over the Antarctic Peninsula dictated by thermodynamics, Zhang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76310-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Recent tropical Andean glacier retreat is unprecedented in the Holocene, Science, 10.1126/science.adg7546 27 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

Coastal Flood Risk Governance in Newfoundland, Canada: A Multidimensional Analysis of Assessment, Management, and Communication, Parvez & Akter, Risk Analysis 10.1111/risa.70327

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The influence of realistic 3D mantle viscosity on Antarctica’s contribution to future global sea levels, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adn1470 23 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Calcium isotopes link ocean acidification to Aptian–Albian foraminiferal extinctions, Chen et al., Science 10.1126/science.aed9359

New classes of climate model emulators to improve paleoclimate reconstructions, Gaudin & Khodri, Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-7135-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Plant, insect, and fungi fossils under the center of Greenland’s ice sheet are evidence of ice-free times, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2407465121 6 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Climate Change Predicted to Trigger an Upward Altitudinal Range Shift and Boost the Abundance of a Montane Rock Face Specialist, the Wallcreeper (Tichodroma muraria), Luisier et al., Open Access CRIS of the University of Bern Open Access 10.48620/99848

Declining coccolithophore blooms in the North Atlantic and Western Barents Sea, Yu et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adw5268

Distribution of suitable habitats and bloom risk assessment for Sargassum horneri in the China Seas under global climate change, Mo et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108325

Ecological Transformations of Coastal Wetlands of the Conterminous United States in Response to Contemporaneous Sea-Level Rise, Neville et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006836

Sustained transpiration masks weakened canopy cooling and emerging carbon constraints during heatwaves in a riparian poplar plantation, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111390

The synoptic meteorology of coral reef high water temperature events in the Gulf of Eilat (Aqaba), Israel, McGowan et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-65507-3

Underestimated climate contributions: Dynamic attribution of vegetation changes in China incorporating soil moisture and vapor pressure deficit, Zheng et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111395

Warming associated with forest integrity loss in global wildland-urban interfaces, Huang et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100569

Warming Drives Large-Scale Shifts in Post-Disturbance Vegetation Dynamics and Expansion of Deciduous Trees in the Boreal Forest in a Dynamic Vegetation Model, Layritz et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009176

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
High heat tolerance, evaporative cooling, and stomatal decoupling regulate canopy temperature and their safety margins in three European oak species, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17439 46 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Climate Constraints on the Methane-Carbon Efficiency of Global Wetlands: Spatiotemporal Drivers and Future Projections, Zhu et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef008003

Communicating Climate Change in Africa: Role Perception and Role Shifting among Environmental Journalists in Nigeria, Oduolowu et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2711229

Compound Effects of Warming and Wetting Enhance Soil Respiration on the Earth's Third Pole, Shen et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2026gb009376

Detection and quantification of agricultural methane plumes using MethaneAIR through targeted scene selection, wavelet denoising, and divergence-integral analysis, Smale et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-10661-2026

Drought stress on the global vegetation carbon sink: Capacity decline in nearly 70% of regions, LIU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.020

Ecological Transformations of Coastal Wetlands of the Conterminous United States in Response to Contemporaneous Sea-Level Rise, Neville et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006836

Elevated Spring Methane Emissions in a Sub-Arctic Peatland Fen, Montemayor et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2026jg009699

Estimating carbon storage and flux in sea urchin barrens following kelp forest collapse, Rogers-Bennett et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108297

Quantifying Methane Emissions From a Rich Fen With Uncrewed Aircraft Systems in Boreal Alaska, Tomlin et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046424

Quantifying national, state, and oil/gas field methane emissions and trends in the US (2019–2024) through high resolution inversion of satellite observations, Estrada et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-10629-2026

Responses of Riverine Dissolved Organic Carbon to Global Warming and Permafrost Thaw on the Tibetan Plateau, Pan et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2026gb009157

Urban CO2 flux characteristics observed at an eddy-covariance tower in northeastern Seoul, An et al., Atmospheric Environment 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122252

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Towards an ecosystem capacity to stabilise organic carbon in soils, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17453 55 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The politics of carbon management in Austria: Emerging fault lines on carbon capture, storage, utilization and removal, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103697 6 cites.

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Decarbonization

Assessing strategies to decarbonise embodied carbon impacts of residential buildings in Indian cities: case of Ahmedabad, Trivedi et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1088/2634-4505/ae87c7

Disrupted Skies: How Offshore Wind Farms Alter Flight Behavior of Breeding Seabirds, Liang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74089

Hydrogen supply chains across Chinese provinces for production and transportation, Bi et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03869-2

Peak coal electricity under rapid electricity demand growth conditions: A case study of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, Dzikrurrokhim et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115532

Sceptical, pragmatic, and innovative teleworkers: Exploring commuting carbon footprints and subjective well-being, Vu et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104894

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Integration of Renewable Energy in Microgrids and Smart Grids in Deregulated Power Systems: A Comparative Exploration, Advanced Energy and Sustainability Research, 10.1002/aesr.202400088 88 cites.

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Geoengineering climate

Climate benefit and ecological cost trade-offs for ocean iron fertilization, Yu et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10795-y

Aerosols

Heatwaves and particulate matter increases: An Italian case study, Faggi et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122246

Invisible Ship Tracks Produce Mean-State Cloud Microphysics Perturbation in Tropical Trade Cumulus, Wright, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20076712

Climate change communications & cognition

Challenges and next steps in climate disaster communication, Houston & First, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02714-w

Finding Gaia: exploring climate change through gamification, Gargiulo et al., Geoscience Communication Open Access pdf 10.5194/gc-9-331-2026

Local stories in climate change communication, Cheng, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02694-x

Psychological barriers to improving carbon competence, Herberz et al., Open MIND Open Access pmh:10.17605/osf.io/qp76t

Psychological inoculation against climate doom, O'Boyle et al., Open MIND pmh:10.17605/osf.io/74cgf

Social influence shapes climate attitudes and action, Hampton et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02711-z

Untrustworthy sources on Facebook and Instagram in 2020: Concentrated exposure but no attitudinal effects, Bergeron-Boutin et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz6502

‘Towards electric vehicle misinformation communities: Shared narratives, networked validation, and reassurance among Australian consumers, McEwen et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104902

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change engagement of scientists, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02091-2 45 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Climate Change Shows Inverse Effects on Grain Yield and Protein Concentration in West Africa, Abigaba et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008409

Discovery of a covalent FGFR2-selective inhibitor overcoming clinically-acquired resistance mutations, Huang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76339-0

Engaging farmers with climate projections: integrating long-term climate risk into farm business resilience planning, Malakar et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100859

Food system contributions to future planetary boundary transgressions: a multiscale modelling assessment of scenarios, Luchtenbelt et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101492

Halochromic modulation of amorphous calcium carbonate crystallization driven by pH-responsive bioinspired pigments, Sardhalia et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75888-8

Leveraging climate-smart agriculture for improved resource-use efficiency: evidence from rice farmers in Kwara State, Nigeria, Ajiboye et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1878309

Relearning with the Land: Intergenerational food literacy pathways for resilience in a changing climate, Adelodun et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104462

Vulnerability to high temperature shapes global warming impacts on rice yield, Jian et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed9226

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The centennial legacy of land-use change on organic carbon stocks of German agricultural soils, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17444 26 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Greenhouse warming exacerbates El Niño-induced Indian monsoon droughts, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76049-7

Improving Daily Streamflow Forecasting under Nonstationarity with a Physics-Informed, Decomposition-Enhanced Deep Learning Model, Jiang et al., Journal of Hydrometeorology 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0166.1

Reservoir Drought Resilience Under Future Warming Scenarios: Regional Disparities Across Heavily Regulated US Basins, Eldardiry et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007984

Understanding the Climatology and Characteristics of Arctic Moisture Intrusions, Woods et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd044159

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Understanding Climate Change and Anthropogenic Impacts on the Salinization of Low-Lying Coastal Groundwater Systems, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004737 20 cites.

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Climate change economics

Global trade-offs between consumption, carbon prices and equity, Li et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75815-x

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Estimating economic losses from perceived heat stress in a global south country, Bangladesh, Urban Climate, 10.1016/j.uclim.2024.102072 11 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Environmental taxation and biofuel production in the EU: Heterogeneous effects across producer scales, Auteri, Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115525

From corporate net-zero pledges to credible climate action, Gudipudi et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01908-6

From project participants to policy shapers: How communities influence renewable energy governance, Eitan, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104906

Pathways towards social license for offshore wind energy: Modelling strategies to reduce conflict and increase acceptability, Condie et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115523

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Renewable energy transition and regional integration: Energizing the pathway to sustainable development, Energy Policy, 10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114270 65 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Aspirations in a warming world: Modeling migration and education decisions under climate risk in Senegal, Choquette-Levy et al., Global Environmental Change 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103215

Back to the future: A mixed-methods approach for developing event-based participatory storylines to advance climate risk assessments, Casartelli et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100865

Climate-resilient infrastructure and the future of the SDGs, Zaqout et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1088/2634-4505/ae900b

Coastal Flood Risk Governance in Newfoundland, Canada: A Multidimensional Analysis of Assessment, Management, and Communication, Parvez & Akter, Risk Analysis 10.1111/risa.70327

Global vulnerability assessment of mobile telecommunications infrastructure to climate hazards using crowdsourced open data, Oughton et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76197-w

Traditional, indigenous and local knowledge for climate adaptation: trends, themes and governance implications (2000–2025), Zhang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.019

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rare and highly destructive wildfires drive human migration in the U.S., Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50630-4 28 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Rapid Increase in Tropical Humid Heat Stress and Its Predictability in a Warming World, Saha et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046437

The GHEMMS checklist: design, conduct, and reporting guidance for studies modelling climate mitigation actions and their health cobenefits, Reynolds et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101474

The past and future impact of climate change on childhood malaria in Africa, Carlson et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10840-w

Welcome to the Calentón: How Puerto Rican Community Leaders Respond to Extreme Heat, López et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2711233

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change could fuel urinary schistosomiasis transmission in Africa and Europe, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17434 19 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics

Energy transition and climate vulnerability: Energy policy in an era of geopolitical fragmentation, Chen et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115536

The immediate impact of crises on energy transitions: Policy responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in Finland, Germany, and Poland, Haukkala et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104881

 

Other

Coupled air–sea interactions drove and sustained the 2013–2016 North Pacific marine heatwave, Jiang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76096-0

Mid-2000s reversal of North Atlantic warming pattern reshapes hemispheric circulation and Eurasian cold extremes, Wu et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01492-8

The cooling paradox: Rising air conditioner adoption in Bangladesh as a driver of energy insecurity and compounding climate risk, Rahman et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104886

Unveiling Future Individual and Compound Heat and Air Pollution Extremes in China: Insights for Mitigation, Zhang & Gao, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0333.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Expansive learning of climate scientists towards transdisciplinarity, Climate Risk Management, 10.1016/j.crm.2024.100642 3 cites.

buffer/OTHR

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Managing climate overshoot: a risk-based strategy for climate stabilisation, Taylor et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1872846

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions critical to limit climate tipping risks, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49863-0 71 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Groundwater Supply East of Interstate 95 (Virginia), Virginia Department of Environmental Quality

As directed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 25, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) completed a study of the groundwater supply in the Commonwealth east of Interstate 95 (I-95). This area generally encompasses the Virginia Coastal Plain (VCP) aquifer system. Under current conditions, the VCP aquifer system has limited capacity for significant new withdrawals. The estimated capacity for new withdrawals varies by region, from a maximum of 360,000 gallons per day in the eastern Northern Neck to less than 30,000 gallons per day in some western regions near I-95. Only the upper end of this range would support a significant new withdrawal for industrial use. The confined Potomac aquifer is the largest and deepest in the VCP, accounting for 70% of total reported and estimated groundwater withdrawals in the Eastern Virginia Groundwater Management Area. The confined Yorktown-Eastover aquifer system accounts for 95% of total reported and estimated groundwater withdrawals in the Eastern Shore Groundwater Management Area. Combining the two regulated areas, the major uses of groundwater are industrial (35% of total), private domestic (34%), and public water supply (26%).

California New Car Dealers Association Releases Q2 2026 Auto Outlook. Q2 2026 CA Auto Outlook: Hybrid Market Share Climbs to Highest Level on Record in California, California New Car Dealers Association

Hybrid vehicles accounted for 22.1 percent of California’s new vehicle market through June, the highest share in the report’s data series and up from 19.5 percent for all of 2025. Hybrid share has now increased in each of the past four years. Quarterly share climbed from 20.9 percent in the first quarter to 23.2 percent in the second. Hybrid registrations totaled 191,000 units in the first half of the year, and every one of those vehicles was sold through a franchised new car dealership. Franchised dealerships accounted for 75.7 percent of combined hybrid, ZEV, and plug-in hybrid registrations statewide. Gas powered vehicles remained the largest single segment of the market at 57.6 percent of registrations, up from 54.0 percent in 2025.

Characterization and Screening-Level Risk Evaluation Report. Vicinity of Moss Landing Power Plant, Moss Landing, California, Terraphase Engineering, Vistra Corporation

On January 16, 2025, a lithium-ion battery fire occurred within ML300 at the Moss Landing Power Plant (MLPP). The fire was confined to the ML300 structure and did not spread to other on-site facilities. Emergency response actions were implemented promptly, including precautionary evacuations that were lifted the following day based on air monitoring results. The authors evaluate whether releases associated with the fire event pose a potential threat to human health or the environment and whether additional investigation or response actions are warranted. Chemicals measured in the sampled off-site soil, sediment, and surface water do not indicate lasting conditions expected to pose an unacceptable risk to people or ecological receptors. For purposes of the risk evaluation, health-protective assumptions and treated measured chemical concentrations are considered as if they were related to the fire. Some nickel concentrations in sediment exceeded ecological screening levels in Hester Marsh and the Mosquito Abatement Observation Area. The authors attributed these results to natural variability and marsh conditions rather than lasting fire-related impacts. No further human-health or ecological-risk evaluation, off-site investigation, or response action is warranted at this time for the sampled locations and environmental media.

Colorado River Basin Water Security Survey, Morning Consult, Walton Family Foundation

Nearly 9-in-10 voters across key states are very concerned about wildfire risks, threats to clean drinking water, and lowering water levels in the Colorado River Basin. Four-in-five voters across all seven states and in the Colorado River Basin counties say addressing the drought effects from the Colorado River is an important priority to them personally and the majority say it is important for the federal government or their state government to make addressing water security a priority this year. Nine-in-ten voters support restoring wetlands to help protect communities from fires, increasing agricultural efficiency to reduce water use, boosting municipal water conservation, and managing forests to limit wildfire damage. Support is broad across the political spectrum, ranging from more than eight-in-ten Republicans and Independents to more than nine-in-ten Democrats. Similar shares say each approach is an important priority, with more than half saying forest management and boosting municipal conservation should be a top priority. About half of voters across the seven states prefer strategies to address water conservation that are both long-term and short-term, to help manage the drought into the future. Ensuring reliable water supply is a top priority for voters.

Thirsty Power. Coal and gas will leave us high and dry, Sonoda et al., Sierra Club, Wisconsin Chapter

Wisconsin’s current dirty energy power fleet– including coal, gas, and nuclear plants– withdraws 1.34 trillion gallons of water annually. This is more than 7 times all of the municipalities in Wisconsin combined, and 18 times more than agricultural irrigation. Meanwhile, solar and wind use so little water that the U.S. Energy Information Administration does not even track their use. Five new gas plants, known or assumed to be proposed for data centers, would use 142 million gallons of water a year on average– the equivalent of the annual drinking water for 284 million people– and the majority of which would be needed during summer months when energy and water use has been strained by drought and heat.

The 50 States of Solar: Q2 2026 Quarterly Report, North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center

This report series focuses on cataloging and describing important proposed and adopted policy changes affecting solar customer-generators of investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and large publicly owned or nonprofit utilities, i.e., those serving at least 100,000 customers. In the second quarter of 2026, 45 states plus Washington, DC and Puerto Rico took a total of 284 actions related to distributed solar policy and rate design. Of the 284 actions cataloged, the most common were related to distributed generation compensation rules (53), followed by community solar (48), and residential fixed charge or minimum bill increases (45).

Interim heat mortality monitoring report, England: May and June 2026, UK Health Security Agency

Suring the May and June 2026 heat events there were an estimated total of 2,877 heat-associated deaths, an estimated 753 heat-associated deaths occurred during the May heat episode; an estimated 2,124 heat-associated deaths occurred during the June heat episode, and the mortality burden is already close to the highest annual totals previously recorded by UKHSA. Although these estimates remain provisional and are subject to revision as more complete mortality data becomes available, the magnitude of the impact is already comparable with some of the highest annual heat-associated mortality estimates previously reported through UKHSA’s heat mortality monitoring programme. For context, UKHSA estimated 2,295 heat-associated deaths during the whole of summer 2023, 1,311 during summer 2024 and 1,504 during summer 2025. The highest annual estimate recorded to date remains summer 2022, when 2,985 heat-associated deaths were observed across 5 heat episodes.

Climate change increases likelihood of compounding drivers of severe wildfire conditions in France and Spain, World Weather Attribution

The authors perform a super rapid analysis of trends in fire-conducive weather conditions in the two affected areas in France and Spain, analyzing observations only. In both study regions observations show strong trends of increasing likelihood and severity with global warming.

Risks of Lithium-ion Battery Facilities to Workers and Communities in Reno, Nevada - A Case Study Supporting Community Right-to-Know, Moon et al., GAIA

The authors report examines the environmental and health implications of lithium-ion battery recycling in Nevada’s rapidly expanding “Lithium Loop” and is designed not only to document current conditions but to equip communities, policymakers, and other stakeholders with the information and frameworks needed to strengthen transparency and accountability across the sector. This case study marks the launch of GAIA’s Community Right-to-Know Initiative for Battery Recycling, a multi-year effort to establish industry-wide transparency and accountability benchmarks among battery recyclers regarding transition mineral claims; support frontline communities in accessing, interpreting, and acting on environmental data; and align battery supply chain stakeholders, policymakers, researchers, and advocates, in Nevada and throughout the US, around enforceable disclosure standards.

The Pace of Solar Progress: How Preexisting Land Use Shapes Permitting Timelines for Utility-Scale Solar in California, Johnson et al., The Nature Conservancy

California’s future hinges on its ability to rapidly and responsibly develop significant amounts of utility-scale solar. Yet the pace of deployment is increasingly constrained by permitting complexity. In a first-of-its-kind analysis, the authors examine over 15 years of permitting data and includes interviews with county officials, a state agency, and solar developers to understand the drivers of permitting timelines and to identify how California can accelerate clean energy deployment while protecting important landscapes.

Annual Report to the Legislature on California Climate Investments Using Cap-and-Invest Auction Proceeds, California Air Resources Board

The California Air Resources Board released a new report showing the state’s Cap-and-Invest program has generated $36.2 billion for climate investments, $15.5 billion of which have been implemented through over 600,000 projects. With billions yet to be implemented and $8 billion in additional proceeds estimated through 2030, these funds are expected to continue reducing emissions and supporting jobs across the state for years to come. 36.2 billion generated by Cap-and-Invest auctions. $15.5 billion implemented across 122 programs into over 600,000 projects delivering cleaner air, stronger communities, and more affordable options for Californians. Of that money, $11.4 billion, or 76%, is benefiting disadvantaged and low-income communities. 130.5 million metric tons of carbon-dioxide equivalent of estimated greenhouse gas reductions over project lifetimes, equivalent to avoiding the consumption of over 12.6 billion gallons of gasoline. 16,386 affordable homes under contract, helping address California’s housing needs. $44.4 billion in expected cost savings from reduced fuel use, lower transportation costs, and lower household energy bills. 143,000+ jobs supported across the economy through project spending, supply chain activity, and induced economic activity over project lifetimes.

How Important is Clean Energy to Utahns?, Elizabeth Brunner and Stacia Ryder, Utah State University

Data from the 2024/25 Utah People and Environment Poll estimates that a majority of Utahns support carbon-free energy. Over half of Utahns are willing to pay more for clean energy. Nuclear and geothermal energy sources draw the most consistent support across rural, transitioning, and urban communities Rural, transitioning, and urban communities are most divided on support for natural gas, coal, solar, and wind energy sources. The Utah Office of Energy’s Strategic Energy Plan may not prioritize clean energy in the same way its residents do. Future research should explore the links between Utahns’ views of energy and data center development.

Energy Transition Monitor: Momentum Is Still Insufficient for the Expansion of Renewables, Electrification, and Storage, Von Wolf-Peter Schill, DIW Weekly Report

The expansion of solar and wind energy is progressing, but it is not fast enough to meet the 2030 statutory targets. The heating transition is stalling: Heat pumps make up half of all newly sold heating systems, yet many fossil-fuel heaters are still being installed. Electric vehicles are gaining ground in all categories, but internal combustion engines continue to dominate new registrations. Electricity price trends show that the flexibility of the power system is growing more slowly than electricity generation from renewables. The expansion of large-scale battery storage is gaining momentum, nearly doubling in the first half of 2026.

China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2026 H1, Christoph Nedopil, The University of Queensland Business School, Brisbane, Australia in collaboration with the Green Finance & Development Center (GFDC) at FISF, PR. China

China’s energy related engagement in 2026 H1 reached record levels with about USD36.3 billion – almost double the energy engagement in any first half year since 2013 except 2025. 56% of China’s energy engagement was green – a new record both in absolute and in relative terms. More than USD20 billion in H1 2026, same level as green energy engagement in all 2025. More than 20 GW of green electricity projects confirmed through investment and construction – more than in all of 2025.

Organizations and Climate Action. Accelerating Climate Solutions Through Organizational Change, Amel et al., American Psychological Association & ecoAmerica

The escalating effects of climate change are already reshaping lives, livelihoods, and communities. A large majority of people recognize this reality and express concern. Yet awareness alone has not translated into the scale of action the moment demands. The authors address that gap by examining one of the most powerful and underutilized levers for climate action: organizations. Drawing on peer-reviewed research from organizational psychology, behavioral science, and sustainability studies, this report presents an evidence-based case for why organizations — understood as structured collectives of people — are uniquely positioned to accelerate climate solutions. Although much of the research reviewed in this report is based on workplace settings, the principles it identifies are broadly applicable across diverse organizational contexts, from corporations, associations, and nonprofits to educational institutions and places of worship. At its core, any collective is shaped by universal human dynamics: culture, leadership, and motivation. The authors examine the cultural and behavioral foundations of organizational change and offer practical, role-specific recommendations for advancing climate action.

Communities Centered: Frontline Perspectives on Hyperscale Data Centers in Washington State, Mengal et al., Front and Centered

Hyperscale data centers represent an emerging threat to climate and environmental justice. New articles or reports are constantly being released detailing the negative health, environmental, energy and economic effects of data centers on communities across the nation, and too often it is frontline communities who bear the brunt of these effects. As a coalition of frontline community-based organizations advancing climate and environmental justice in Washington State, we know that our communities are continually overlooked in conversations about how to address data centers and their impacts, despite holding distinct and multiple forms of expertise and lived experiences. The authors provide the first statewide report to combine original geographic analysis with interviews from frontline organizations to examine how the growth of AI data centers is affecting communities across Washington. In addition to documenting community concerns, the authors outline a series of policy recommendations, including passing a statewide moratorium on new data centers and the expansion of existing hyperscale facilities. About New Research

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This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Karin Kirk

It’s hot. Fans and air conditioners are humming in homes, offices, commercial buildings, and factories. July is the most electricity-intensive time of year in the U.S., and the grid is working hard to keep up.

In many places, high electricity demand equals high pollution. That used to be true in New Mexico, but the state’s electricity supply flipped from majority climate-warming fossil fuels to majority renewables in just five years. Spurred by an ambitious clean energy law called the Energy Transition Act, utilities have been busy building solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and transmission lines. A major coal plant was retired and demolished. Solar panels proliferated on homes, schools, and businesses.

And even while New Mexico was building out its clean energy future, electricity prices remained cheaper than average.

A case study in cleaner electricity

New Mexico’s largest utility is the Public Service Company of New Mexico, or PNM. Only five years ago, most of PNM’s cooling needs were met by coal and gas, which made up 83% of its electricity generation in July 2021.

But the state’s abundant sunshine now provides much of the region’s electricity.

The golden line on the graph below shows grid-scale solar energy production in PNM’s territory every day for a week. The sun generated 41% of the total electricity the week of July 6, when I did this analysis.

Batteries deliver stored sunshine in the evening

The next graph shows electricity stored and generated by utility-scale batteries. During the daytime, the line dips below zero when the batteries are pulling electricity off the grid to charge up.

In the Southwestern U.S., electricity is cheap during sunny days because everyone’s solar panels are cranking out electrons at the same time. The utility could try to sell excess solar energy to other regions, but it’s not worth much. It’s far better to store it for later.

Summer evenings are hot, even as the sun eases toward the horizon and solar production wanes. That’s when PNM’s battery fleet comes to life, delivering the solar energy stored a few hours earlier. The green line spikes upward as the batteries kick into gear.

By around midnight, the batteries are discharged. But metaphorically speaking, so are most people. Electricity demand drops off as everyone heads to bed and temperatures cool off for the night.

Bring on the wind

Sunshine and batteries aren’t quite enough to power everything 24/7. The next big player is wind, shown with the blue line on the graph below. Note how the wind blows strongest in the evening – it’s the perfect complement to solar in this region. Wind accounted for 20% of electricity generation during the week shown below.

New Mexico’s evening wind is also helping out Arizona and California as a result of the recently completed SunZia project. Located in central New Mexico, the project’s 916 wind turbines generate electricity and a 550-mile, high-voltage transmission line carries it westward.

Still some fossil fuels – but a lot less

Only five years ago, fossil fuels were the main characters in PNM’s electricity generation. Now they’re the supporting cast.

The brown line on the graph below shows electricity generated from natural gas, a fossil fuel composed primarily of climate-warming methane. Little gas is needed during the day, thanks to solar energy. In the evening, gas generation picks up, though it’s still generating less than batteries and wind.

The steady black line shows coal generation. Coal plants run best when operated at a constant pace, because frequent ramping up and down causes them to run less efficiently and can lead to more fatigue on aging equipment.

All told, coal and gas made up 38% of the electricity supply the week of July 6, with renewables generating 62%.

It’s worth noting that July’s heat drives the highest rates of fossil fuel use for PNM. About half the days in the past year saw renewables generating 70% or more of the daily electricity need, and in late spring of this year, renewables routinely met more than 80% of demand.

A transformation in just five years

Compare the chart above to the one below from 2021, when coal and gas power plants generated nearly 80% of the total electricity. Every day, the utility ramped up gas power plants to meet the evening peak in electricity demand. Solar and wind were relatively small contributors, totaling just over 20% between them.

So how did this transformation happen? The answer is in part two of this story, coming Monday.

A note on data

The data comes from the Energy Information Administration’s Hourly Grid Monitor. Note that not all of the electricity shown in these graphs is used by PNM. Some of it is exported to other regions, and PNM also imports some electricity into its service territory. Nevertheless, the data paints a picture of how different sources of electricity generation blend together to provide power through the day and night.

This article first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

//

This is a re-post from By the Numbers by Hannah Ritchie

Over the last week, this chart of wildfire burn in Europe has been doing the rounds on social media and traditional media outlets. Carbon Brief goes through some of this coverage here.

The underlying narrative is that Europe is having its lowest wildfire year on record, which is quite at odds with the huge wildfires we see from France and Spain on the news.

But this data and the media headlines are not as contradictory as they first appear.

The wildfire data we present on Our World in Data comes from the Global Wildfire Information System (GWIS). This uses satellite imagery, which doesn’t distinguish, for example, between forest fires and large-scale burning of agricultural land, grasslands, or savannah.

Its aggregate category “Europe” includes Russia. On OWID, we also have predefined regions across our datasets, and Russia falls under “Europe”.

Russia, as a country, is split between Europe and Asia. Most of its landmass lies in Asia, but most of its population is on the European side. Since most of our datasets, from poverty and inequality, to health, education, energy consumption and access to resources, are about human activity and outcomes, assigning Russia to Europe usually makes more sense. That’s not so much the case for the few metrics — like wildfires — that concern land mass.

As Russia is big, the European numbers are heavily influenced by what’s happening there. This is something that’s true of aggregate wildfire data more broadly. The global numbers are heavily influenced by what’s happening in Africa, for example.

It can be true that the world is having a low wildfire year, while Europe is having a high one. Or that Europe is having a low wildfire year, and particular countries within Europe are battling huge outbreaks. There is no inconsistency there.

To provide more regional insight, we added an entity called “Europe (excluding Russia)” and already had one for the “European Union (27)”.

What does the European data look like if we remove Russia?

It’s no longer the lowest wildfire year on record, but still fairly quiet for this time of year. Russia is not the only explanation.

What if we look at the European Union?

It is higher again, with a particular uptick in the last week. It’s around 40% higher than the median year since 2012, and the 5th highest in that record.

At Our World in Data we use GWIS as our main source, since we want the global picture. But Europe also has the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS). It stretches back to 2006, and tries to filter out agricultural burning to focus on forest fires.

Its data has the EU running at its 2nd highest level for this time of year.

Underneath this trend from either source is a stark regional split. Many countries in Western Europe are having a bad wildfire year. Those in the Balkans and Southern Europe, a comparatively quiet one.1

The bar chart below shows how wildfire burn at this stage of the year compares to the median over the past 15 years. A figure of 2 means it’s twice as high as the median; 0.3 means wildfire burn is around one-third.

Countries such as France, Spain, Germany, and Portugal are well above the average for this time of year. But countries such as Romania, Greece, and Croatia are well below.

For France, it’s not just that wildfire burn is higher than usual. It’s seeing record-breaking fires for this time of the year. You can see this in the panel chart below.

Compare that to Greece, where wildfires are tracking for their lowest levels since 2012.

This matters for the aggregate European, or EU, figures.

Let’s take that same chart, but make the y-axis scale the same across all countries. Some countries simply contribute far more to the total than others. France is breaking records — which obviously matters a lot for its national figures — but it doesn’t have a huge impact on the region’s overall numbers. A really big year in Portugal, Italy, Romania or Spain does make a big difference. But the relatively high year in Spain is “offset” by a low year for Romania.

That’s really the point: some countries are having really severe wildfire outbreaks, affecting huge population centres and landscapes. That France is struggling this summer is not a lie or just media hype. It can also be true that others offset this with quiet years in the regional totals.

The anomaly in France this year is even clearer when we look at the weekly wildfire burn. The spike you see in the chart below was far higher than any other week in France’s record since 2012. The speed and intensity of wildfire outbreaks is arguably more important for the impact on communities than just the total area burned.

What about global wildfires this year?

What if we zoom out to look at data across all regions?

Here they are, with the y-axis scales the same. It really is a low year for wildfires globally. Most of that is explained by low wildfire burn in Africa. A lot of Africa’s wildfires are about agricultural burning, and fires on grasslands and savannahs. South America is also having a quiet year, so far.

Europe and North America, in particular, have little bearing on the global total, simply because they’re so small. Europe without Russia has even less so.

 

1 Much of the burning in the Balkans is related to agricultural land practices, which differ from how people think about forest fires.