I. Climate Science

In April 2026, Colombia and the Netherlands will bring together a “coalition of the willing” governments and partners in Santa Marta to advance a roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels. Carbon Tracker is contributing through the associated Global Science & Policy Conference, an academic convening immediately before the governmental conference that translates current research and ideas on transition pathways into roadmap options and evidence for the main intergovernmental discussions. 

What is the Santa Marta Process?

The Santa Marta Process is intended to move the fossil fuel phase-out debate from general commitments to practical pathways which can inform an overall roadmap to phase out fossil fuels. It will focus on the real-world challenges: supply and demand, economic and fiscal vulnerabilities, the role of state-owned enterprises, pathways to diversify and decarbonise, the key enabling condition of finance. The process links political decision-making with expert and civil society inputs so that the roadmap reflects both climate objectives and economic realities. 

Why it matters

The Santa Marta conference in April is unprecedented – the first time that a strong group of countries have come together actively to discuss how to transition away from fossil fuels, to meet the goals of the Paris agreement to limit warming. This conference marks the start of an ongoing Santa Marta Process to progress real-world transition, with a second conference envisaged for later this year. The challenge of the transition raises important questions that sit with finance ministries, economic planners, regulators and investors: fiscal reliance on fossil revenues, balance-of-payments exposure, sovereign credit dynamics, and the enabling conditions required to mobilise investment at scale. The Santa Marta Process provides a collaborative forum to address these constraints directly and to test policy and financing approaches against real-world geo-political and economic conditions. 

How Carbon Tracker is contributing

Carbon Tracker is a co-convener of the Global Science & Policy Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels hosted by the Universidad del Magdalena in Santa Marta on 24-25 April 2026. Carbon Tracker will work with universities and partner organisations to provide cutting-edge research and analysis that will inform the decisions governments and finance actors need to make. The purpose of this expert convening is to develop policy-relevant outputs – grounded in evidence – that can inform the roadmap discussions and strengthen the quality of the political decisions. 

What Carbon Tracker brings to the table

Carbon Tracker works at the intersection of the energy transition and capital markets. Our contribution will focus on three areas: 

• Managed decline through a finance and economics lens – Analysis of how different fossil fuel phase-out pathways may affect sovereign credit, fiscal resilience and market pricing of transition risk, including implications for sovereign borrowing costs and access to investors’ capital. 
• Diversification and transition finance enabling conditions – Evidence on the policy and investment conditions that support diversification and mobilise capital to fund clean energy infrastructure at scale, with a focus on the questions typically led by finance ministries, economic planners and regulators. 
• Data and decision support – Scenario-based work (drawing on the Global Registry of Fossil Fuels as a policy tool) to help compare decline pathways. These scenarios are intended to demonstrate the implications of various routes to decabonisation and transition trade-offs, not to prescribe outcomes. 

About the Global Science & Academic Pre-Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels 

The Science Pre-Conference convenes scholars, think tanks and practitioners across economics, political science, law, sociology and related disciplines. It includes outcome-focused workstreams: self-organised workshops designed to produce practical outputs which will feed into the inter-governmental conference proper. Workstreams include central banking, fossil methane, roadmap architecture, labour transition and regional economic diversification, economics and data, and state-owned enterprises, among others. Co-conveners are Universidad del Magdalena; University of British Columbia; University of Sussex; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology Guangzhou; Carbon Tracker Initiative; Climate Strategies; IISD; and LINGO. 

Explore Carbon Tracker key resources relevant to the Santa Marta roadmap 

PetroStates of Decline: oil and gas producers face growing fiscal risks as the energy transition unfolds – fiscal exposure and sovereign risk
https://carbontracker.org/reports/petrostates-of-decline/ 

Switching to battery powered electric vehicles will save the Global South over $100 billion annually – demand-side disruption and oil demand implications
https://carbontracker.org/reports/electric-vehicles-in-the-global-south/ 

Tracking Emissions to Source – methodology underpinning the Global Registry of Fossil Fuels
https://carbontracker.org/reports/tracking-emissions-to-source/ 

Global Registry of Fossil Fuels – overview of the tool and how it is used
https://carbontracker.org/finally-we-have-a-global-registry-of-fossil-fuels/ 

 

For more information, contact the policy team financialpolicy@tracker-group.org  

The post Charting credible pathways to phase out fossil fuels – Santa Marta 2026 appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week Landmark ruling repealed

DANGER DANGER: The Trump administration formally repealed the US’s landmark “endangerment finding” this week, reported the Financial Times. The 2009 Obama-era finding concluded that greenhouse gases pose a threat to public health and has provided a legal basis for their regulation over the past two decades, said the New York Times. 

RACE TO COURT: Multiple environmental groups have already threatened to sue over the administration’s decision, reported the Guardian. The fate of the ruling is likely to ultimately be decided by the Conservative-majority Supreme Court, explained the New York Times. 

‘BEAUTIFUL CLEAN COAL’: Separately, Donald Trump signed an executive order requiring the Pentagon to buy coal-fired power, a move aimed to “revive a fuel source in sharp decline”, reported the Los Angeles Times. Despite his efforts, Trump has overseen more retirements of coal-fired power stations than any other US president, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

Around the world

• CLIMATE TALKS: UN climate chief Simon Stiell said in a speech on Thursday that climate action can deliver stability in the face of a “new world disorder“ while on a visit to Turkey, which will host the COP31 climate summit later this year, reported BusinessGreen. 
• IBERIAN CATASTROPHE: A succession of storms that hit Spain and Portugal in recent weeks have caused millions of euros worth of damage to farmlands and required more than 11,000 people to leave their homes in Spain’s southern Andalusia region, said Reuters.
• RISKY BUSINESS: The “undervaluing” of nature by businesses is fuelling its decline and putting the global economy at risk, according to a new report by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), covered by Carbon Brief. Carbon Brief interviewed IPBES chair Dr David Obura at the report’s launch in Manchester.
• CORAL BLEACHING: A study covered by Agence France-Presse found that more than half of the world’s coral reefs were bleached over a three-year period from 2014-17 during Earth’s third “global bleaching event”. The world has since entered a fourth bleaching event, starting in 2023, a scientist told AFP. 
• ‘HELLISH HOTHOUSE EARTH’: In a commentary paper, scientists argued that the world is closer than thought to a “point of no return”, which could plunge Earth into a “hellish hothouse” state, reported the Guardian. 

7.4 gigawatts

The record amount of solar, onshore wind and tidal power secured in the latest auction for new renewable capacity in the UK, reported Carbon Brief.

Latest climate research

• Human-caused climate change made the hot, dry and windy weather in Chile and Argentina three times more likely | World Weather Attribution (Carbon Brief also covered the study) 
• “Early-life” exposure to extreme heat “increases risk” of neurodevelopmental delay in preschool children | Nature Climate Change
• Climate change, urbanisation and species characteristics shape European butterfly population trends | Global Ecology and Biogeography

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

China’s carbon dioxide emissions have “now been flat or falling for 21 months”, analysis for Carbon Brief has found. The trend began in March 2024 and has lasted almost two years, due in particular to falling emissions in major sectors, including transport, power and cement, said the analysis. The analysis has been covered widely in global media, including Agence France-Presse, Bloomberg, New York Times, BBC World Service and Channel 4 News. 

Spotlight UK’s ‘relentless rain’

This week, Carbon Brief takes a deep dive into the recent relentless rain and floods in the UK and explores how they could be linked to climate change.

It is no secret that it can rain a lot in the UK. But, in some parts of the country, it has rained every day of the year so far, according to Met Office data released this week.

In total, 26 stations set new monthly rainfall records for January. Northern Ireland experienced its wettest January for 149 years and Plymouth, in the south-west of England, experienced its wettest January day in 104 years.

Areas witnessing long periods of rain included Bodmin Moor in Cornwall, which has seen 41 consecutive days of rain “and counting”, reported the Guardian. The University of Reading found that its home town had its longest period of consecutive rain – 25 days – since its records for the city began in 1908. 

The relentless rainfall has caused flooding in many parts of the country, particularly in rural areas.

There were more than 200 active flood alerts in place across England and Wales at the weekend, with flood warnings clustered around Gloucester and Worcester in the West Midlands, as well as Devon and Hampshire in southern England. A flood “alert” means that there is a possibility of flooding, while a “warning” means flooding is expected. 

“Growing up, the road to my school never flooded. But the school has already had to close three times this year because of flooding,” Jess Powell, a local resident of a small village in Shropshire, told Carbon Brief. 

Burst river bank of the river Severn in Shrewsbury, Shropshire. Credit: Alice Vernat-Davies Climate link

While there has not yet been a formal analysis into the role of climate change in the UK’s current lengthy period of rain and flooding, it is known that human-caused warming can play a role in wet weather extremes, explained Dr Jess Neumann, a flooding researcher from the University of Reading. She told Carbon Brief:

“Warmer air can hold more moisture – about 7% more for every 1C of warming, increasing the chance of more frequent and at times, intense rainfall.”

The UK owes its rainy climate in large part due to the jet stream, which brings strong winds from west to east and pushes low-pressure weather systems across the Atlantic.

Scientists have said that one of the factors behind the UK’s relentless rain is the “blocking” of the jet stream, which occurs when winds slow, causing rainy weather patterns to get stuck.    

The impact of climate change on the jet stream is complex, involving a lot of different factors. One theory, still subject to debate among scientists, is that Arctic warming could play a role, explained Neumann:

“As the Arctic warms faster than the tropics, the temperature gradient that fuels the jet stream weakens, causing it to become slower and wavier. Blocking patterns develop that can cause weather conditions to get stuck over the UK, increasing the likelihood of extreme rainfall and flooding.”

Adaptation needs 

Long periods of rain saturate the ground and can have adverse impacts on agriculture and wildlife.

Prof Richard Betts, a leading climate scientist at the Met Office and the University of Exeter, said that these impacts can have harmful effects in rural areas: 

“The climate change-driven increase in flood risk is impacting food production in the UK. In 2024, the production of wheat, barley, oats and oilseed rape shrunk by 13% due to widespread flooding of farmland.

“Assistance with recovery after flooding is increasingly important – obviously, financial help via insurance and reinsurance is vital, but also action to reduce impacts on mental health is increasingly important. It’s very stressful dealing with the impacts of flooding and this is often not recognised.”

One key adaptation for floods in the UK could be to “integrate natural flood management, including sustainable urban drainage, with more traditional hard engineering techniques”, added Neumann:

“Most importantly, we need to improve our communication of flood risk to help individuals and communities know how to prepare. We need to shift our thinking from ‘keeping water out’ to ‘living with water’, if we want to adapt better to a future of flooding.”

Watch, read, listen

‘IRREVERSIBLE TREND?’: The Guardian explored how Romania’s emissions have fallen by 75% since the 1990s and have been decoupled from the country’s economic growth.

UNDER THE SEA: An article in BioGraphic explored whether the skeletons of dead corals “help or hinder recovery” on bleached reefs. 

SPEEDING UP: Through dynamic charts, the Washington Post showed how climate change is accelerating. 

Coming up

• 16-19 February: Sixth meeting of the subsidiary body on implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Rome, Italy 
• 20 February: Webinar on the key findings from the International Energy Agency policy brief: the value of demand flexibility: benefits beyond balancing
• 20 February: UN day of social justice
• 22-27 February: Ocean Sciences Meeting, Glasgow, UK

Pick of the jobs

• UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), national senior climate change expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Dhaka, Bangladesh 
• British Antarctic Survey, marine biologist | Salary: £31,183. Location: Antarctica 
• Green Climate Fund, regional lead for resource mobilisation – Europe | Salary: $109,000. Location: Seoul, South Korea 
• Scientific American, documentary film proposals | Up to $80,000 per commissioned film

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

DeBriefed 6 February 2026: US secret climate panel ‘unlawful’ | China’s clean energy boon | Can humans reverse nature loss?

DeBriefed

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06.02.26

DeBriefed 30 January 2026:  Fire and ice; US formally exits Paris; Climate image faux pas

DeBriefed

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30.01.26

DeBriefed 23 January 2026: Trump’s Davos tirade; EU wind and solar milestone; High seas hope

DeBriefed

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23.01.26

DeBriefed 16 January 2026: Three years of record heat; China and India coal milestone; Beijing’s 2026 climate outlook

DeBriefed

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16.01.26

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The post DeBriefed 13 February 2026: Trump repeals landmark ‘endangerment finding’ | China’s emissions flatlining | UK’s ‘relentless rain’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Open access notables

Shifting baselines alter trends and emergence of climate extremes across Africa, Taguela & Akinsanola, Atmospheric Research

World Meteorological Organization baselines used to identify climate extremes are routinely updated to reflect recent climate conditions. Yet the implications of these updates for the characterization, trends, and detectability of climate extremes remain poorly understood, particularly in data-sparse and highly vulnerable regions such as Africa. Here, we quantify how updating the reference period from 1981–2010 to 1991–2020 systematically alters the characterization of temperature and precipitation extremes across the continent. Using multiple observational and reanalysis datasets (BEST, ERA5, MERRA-2, CHIRPS), we assess the sensitivity of percentile-based thresholds, long-term trends, and the Time of Emergence (ToE) to changes in the reference period. ToE is employed here as a diagnostic of detectability rather than a definitive marker of anthropogenic signal onset. Our results show that the updated baseline leads to higher temperature thresholds, resulting in a reduced frequency and slower trends for warm extremes (TX90p, TN90p), and a concurrent increase in cold extremes (TX10p, TN10p). Precipitation extremes exhibit more heterogeneous and dataset-dependent responses: trends in extreme precipitation totals (R95pTOT, R99pTOT) generally weaken, whereas intensity-based metrics (R95pINT, R99pINT) often strengthen, particularly in MERRA-2. Moreover, the choice of baseline strongly influences the estimated ToE. Warm extremes emerge 2–8 years later under the newer baseline, while cold extremes emerge earlier (by up to 15 years) due to enhanced signal-to-noise ratios. For precipitation, ToE responses vary widely across datasets and regions. In CHIRPS, the ToE of intense rainfall events is delayed, whereas in MERRA-2 it advances by over 2 decades in some regions. These results indicate that ToE estimates derived from recent decades are highly sensitive to baseline selection. By explicitly isolating the effect of baseline choice, this study provides a critical framework for interpreting extremes, reconciling dataset discrepancies, and improving the robustness of climate monitoring and risk communication across Africa.

[The same innocently mindless yet deceptive baseline updates pertain in other domains.]

Enhanced weather persistence due to amplified Arctic warming, Graversen et al., Communications Earth & Environment

Changing weather is an aspect of global warming potentially constituting a major challenge for humanity in the coming decades. Some climate models indicate that, due to global warming, future weather will become more persistent, with surface-air temperature anomalies lasting longer. However, to date, an observed change in weather persistence has not been robustly confirmed. Here we show that weather persistence in terms of temperature anomalies, across all weather types and seasons, has increased during recent decades in the Northern Hemisphere mid-latitudes. This persistence increase is linked to Arctic temperature amplification – the Arctic warming faster than the global average – and hence global warming. Persistent weather may lead to extreme weather, and for many plants such as crops, weather persistence can be devastating, as these plants often depend on weather variations. Hence, our results call for further investigation of weather-persistence impact on extreme weather, biodiversity, and the global food supply.

Northward shift of boreal tree cover confirmed by satellite record, Feng et al., Biogeosciences

The boreal forest has experienced the fastest warming of any forested biome in recent decades. While vegetation–climate models predict a northward migration of boreal tree cover, the long-term studies required to test the hypothesis have been confined to regional analyses, general indices of vegetation productivity, and data calibrated to other ecoregions. Here we report a comprehensive test of the magnitude, direction, and significance of changes in the distribution of the boreal forest based on the longest and highest-resolution time-series of calibrated satellite maps of tree cover to date. From 1985 to 2020, boreal tree cover expanded by 0.844 million km2, a 12 % relative increase since 1985, and shifted northward by 0.29° mean and 0.43° median latitude. Gains were concentrated between 64–68° N and exceeded losses at southern margins, despite stable disturbance rates across most latitudes. Forest age distributions reveal that young stands (up to 36 years) now comprise 15.4 % of forest area and hold 1.1–5.9 Pg of aboveground biomass carbon, with the potential to sequester an additional 2.3–3.8 Pg C if allowed to mature. These findings confirm the northward advance of the boreal forest and implicate the future importance of the region's greening to the global carbon budget.

Securing the past for the future – why climate proxy archives should be protected, Bebchuk & Büntgen, Boreas

Glaciers, corals, speleothems, peatlands, trees and other natural proxy archives are essential for global climate change research, but their scarcity and fragility are not equally recognised. Here, we introduce a rapidly disappearing source of palaeoclimatic, environmental and archaeological evidence from some 5000 years ago in the Fenland of eastern England to argue for the protection of natural proxy archives. We describe the region's exceptional, yet neglected subfossil wood sources, discuss its multifaceted value for scholarship and society, and outline a prototype for sustainable proxy preservation. Finally, we emphasise the urgency and complexity of conservation strategies that must balance academic, public and economic interests across different spatiotemporal scales.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Poll Shows GOP Voters Support Solar Energy, American-Made Solar, Fabrizio, Lee & Associates, First Solar

A national poll by the authors found widespread support for solar energy among Republicans, Republican-leaning Independents, and voters who supported President Donald J. Trump. The poll of 800 GOP+ voters found that they are in favor of the use of utility-scale solar by a more than 20-point margin, with 51% in favor; if the panels used for solar energy are American made with no ties to China, support for solar energy soars higher. Those in favor jump to 70%, while only 19% are opposed; 68% agree that the United States needs all forms of electricity generation, including utility solar, to be built for lowering electricity costs, compared to 22% who disagreed; 79% agree that the government should allow all forms of electricity generation, including utility-scale solar, to compete on their own merits and without political interference, versus 11% who disagreed; a clear majority (52%) of GOP+ voters are more likely to support a Congressional candidate if they support an all-of-the-above energy agenda, including the use of solar; and 51% are more likely to vote for a candidate who supported an American company building a solar panel manufacturing plant in the US.

Hot stuff: geothermal energy in Europe, Tatiana Mindeková and Gianluca Geneletti, Ember

Advances in drilling and reservoir engineering are unlocking geothermal electricity across much wider parts of Europe, at a time when the power system needs firm, low-carbon supply and reduced reliance on fossil fuels. Once limited to a few favorable locations, geothermal is now positioned to scale. Around 43 GW of enhanced geothermal capacity in the European Union could be developed at costs below 100 €/MWh today, comparable to coal and gas electricity. The largest potential is concentrated in Hungary, followed by Poland, Germany and France. While representing only a fraction of Europe’s total geothermal potential, the identified EU-level deployment could deliver around 301 TWh of electricity per year, reflecting geothermal’s high capacity factor. This is equivalent to about 42% of coal- and gas-fired generation in the EU in 2025. 178 articles in 67 journals by 1224 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Amplifying Variability of the Southern Annular Mode in the Past and Future, Ma et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119214

An Analytical Model of the Lifecycle of Tropical Anvil Cloud Radiative Effects, Lutsko et al., Open Access pdf 10.22541/essoar.175492939.96377329/v1

Causes and consequences of Arctic amplification elucidated by coordinated multimodel experiments, Screen et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-03052-z

Enhanced Adiabatic Heating Drives Faster Warming of Early Summer Hot Extremes in North China, Fang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gl120396

Evolution of Temperature Extremes During the Holocene: From the Modeling Perspective, Dou & Shi, Open Access pdf 10.22541/au.175329652.23512823/v1

Recent Tropical Cyclone Outer Size Increases in the Western North Atlantic, Balaguru et al., Earth's Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007162

What Factors Explain the Current Arctic Albedo and Its Future Change?, Kim & Taylor, Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jd044070

Observations of climate change, effects

A Climatology of Heatwaves Over Greece for the Period 1960–2022, Ioannidis et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70204

Amplifying Variability of the Southern Annular Mode in the Past and Future, Ma et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119214

Climate change and fires drive mire development in central Siberian permafrost areas over the past century, Babeshko et al., The Holocene 10.1177/09596836251407585

Climate change has increased global evaporative demand except in South Asia, Karimzadeh et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-02959-x

Enhanced weather persistence due to amplified Arctic warming, Graversen et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-03050-1

Increased contributions of climate-driven wildfires to nitrogen deposition in the United States, Campbell et al., Open Access pdf 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6673143/v1

Long-term spatiotemporal analysis of variation in soil moisture over Iran, Darand & Tashan, Journal of Atmospheric and Solar 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106727

Northward shift of boreal tree cover confirmed by satellite record, Feng et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-1089-2026

Record-Breaking Summertime Terrestrial and Marine Heat Waves in Southeast Asia Driven by Internal Variability during 2020–22, Wang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0202.1

Resolving the changing pace of Arctic rivers, Geyman & Lamb, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02512-w

Shifting cyclone travel speed and its impact on global mangrove ecosystems, Mo et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adx6799

Stratopause trends observed by satellite limb instruments, Dubé et al., Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-2161-2026

Strongly Heterogeneous Surface-Water Warming Trends in High Mountain Asia, Smith & Bookhagen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119418

“Vulnerabilities and compound risks of escalating climate disasters in the Brazilian Amazon”, Pinho et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-025-66603-0

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A database of databases for Common Era paleoclimate applications, Evans et al., Earth System Science Data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-1185-2026

Exploring Clear-Sky Longwave Radiative Closure in the Arctic: A Downwelling Case Study, Mosselmans et al., Atmospheric Science Letters Open Access 10.1002/asl.70000

Learning From Natural Experiments to Accelerate Demographic Research on Climate-Related Threats to Human Populations, Fussell et al., WIREs Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70031

Sea Surface Temperature and Directional Wave Spectra During the 2023 Marine Heatwave in the North Atlantic, Peláez-Zapata et al., Scientific Data Open Access 10.1038/s41597-025-06268-y

Securing the past for the future – why climate proxy archives should be protected, Bebchuk & Büntgen, Boreas Open Access pdf 10.1111/bor.70039

Shifting baselines alter trends and emergence of climate extremes across Africa, Taguela & Akinsanola, Atmospheric Research Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.108839

Time irreversibility as an indicator of approaching tipping points in Earth subsystems, Kooloth et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-03165-5

Where to place? Strategic siting of urban climate monitoring stations using Local Climate Zones and city-scale PALM modeling, Schneider et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102782

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

ENSO's Impacts on Southeastern Australia's Future Rainfall Risk, Huang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gl118673

Future Intensification of Compound Heatwaves and Socioeconomic Exposure in Africa, Bobde et al., Earth's Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007022

Increased Streamflow Intermittence in Europe Due To Climate Change Projected by Combining Global Hydrological Modeling and Machine Learning, Abbasi et al., 10.22541/essoar.173557434.40176318/v1

Mesoscale Convective Systems over South America: Representation in Kilometer-Scale Met Office Unified Model Climate Simulations, Gilmour et al., Journal of Climate Open Access 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0754.1

More Frequent and Intense Tropical Cyclone-Heat Wave Compound Extremes Over the Coastal Regions of China in a Warmer Climate, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd044509

Multiple Fire Index Examination of Future Climate Change Affecting Wildfire Seasonality and Extremes in the Contiguous United States, Kessenich et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-24-0230.1

Spatiotemporal prioritization of soil erosion risk using the RUSLE model and CMIP6 projections under future climate scenarios in a Mediterranean watershed, ?pek & Kahya, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1760569

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Climate Models Tend to Underestimate Scaling of UK Mean Winter Precipitation With Temperature, Carruthers et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gl118201

High-resolution forecasting of soil thermal regimes using different deep learning frameworks under climate change, Saeidinia et al., Open Access pdf 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7642696/v1

Performance Evaluation of CMIP6 Models on the Arctic-Siberian Plain Teleconnection Affecting the East Asian Heat Waves, Kim et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100867

Runoff evaluation in an Earth System Land Model for permafrost regions in Alaska, Huang et al., Geoscientific Model Development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-1193-2026

Significance of Atlantic sea surface temperature anomalies to Arctic sea ice variability revealed by deep learning, Li et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01347-2

Temperature variability projections remain uncertain after constraining them to best performing Large Ensembles of individual Climate Models, & , Open Access pmh:oai:www.research-collection.ethz.ch:20.500.11850/792982

The ACCESS-AM2 climate model underestimates aerosol concentration in the Southern Ocean; improving aerosol representation could be problematic for the global energy balance, Fiddes et al., Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-25-16451-2025

The representation of climate impacts in the FRIDAv2.1 Integrated Assessment Model, Wells et al., Open Access 10.5194/egusphere-2025-2756

Understanding CMIP6 Multi-Model Ensemble Projected Pacific Warming Pattern Variability, McGregor et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118815

Unveiling the dominant control of the systematic cooling bias in CMIP6 models: quantification and corrective strategies, Zhang et al., Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-2175-2026

What Factors Explain the Current Arctic Albedo and Its Future Change?, Kim & Taylor, Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jd044070

Cryosphere & climate change

Circulation and ocean–ice shelf interaction beneath the Denman and Shackleton Ice Shelves, Rintoul et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adx1024

Evaluating the effectiveness of artificial covering in reducing glacier melt, LIU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.01.011

Glacier surging and surge-related hazards in a changing climate, et al., pmh:oai:durham-repository.worktribe.com:4929395

Melting glaciers as symbols of tourism paradoxes, Salim et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02544-2

Melting ice and transforming beliefs, Allison et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02551-3

Negligible global but substantial regional effect of vegetation greening on the 21st century permafrost, Ran et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2025.12.012

Northward shift of boreal tree cover confirmed by satellite record, Feng et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-1089-2026

Recent and projected changes in rain-on-snow event characteristics across Svalbard, Vickers et al., The Cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-19-6907-2025

Record-breaking Greenland ice sheet melt events under recent and future climate, Bonsoms et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-69543-5

Spatially variable response of Antarctica’s ice sheets to orbital forcing during the Pliocene, Patterson et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-025-01840-y

Stabilizing feedbacks allow for multiple states of the Greenland Ice Sheet in a fully coupled Earth System – Ice Sheet Model, Andernach et al., Open Access pdf 10.5194/egusphere-2025-4736

The impact of 75?years of climate change on Mediterranean glacier mass balance, Wang et al., Global and Planetary Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105370

Sea level & climate change

Estimates of Future Sea Levels Under Sea-Level Rise: A Novel Hybrid Block Bootstrapping Approach and Australian Case Study, Hague et al., 10.22541/essoar.174835238.88076315/v3

Feedback-based sea level rise impact modelling for integrated assessment models with FRISIAv1.0, Ramme et al., Open Access pdf 10.5194/egusphere-2025-1875

Observation-based quantification of physical processes that impact sea level, Groeskamp, Ocean Science Open Access 10.5194/os-22-501-2026

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

An unpredictable body size response to the Permo-Triassic climate crisis, , Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.18380698

Ocean heat forced West Antarctic Ice Sheet retreat after the Last Glacial Maximum, Mawbey et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-68949-5

Spatially variable response of Antarctica’s ice sheets to orbital forcing during the Pliocene, Patterson et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-025-01840-y

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Applying invasion biology frameworks to predict the impacts of range-expanding predators, Beshai et al., Ecology 10.1002/ecy.70315

Blue carbon ecosystems and coral reefs as coupled nature-based climate solutions, Fakhraee, Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01768-0

Climate-driven reproductive decline in Southern right whales, Charlton et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-36897-1

Conserving key coastal areas for mangrove expansion and eco-tourism secures ecosystem services under sea-level rise, Stamoulis et al., npj Ocean Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1038/s44183-025-00170-1

Contrasting drought responses in two grassland plant–microbe systems under climate change, Yang et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access 10.1111/1365-2745.70251

Coral reefs in the Mahafaly Seascape (SW Madagascar) as potential climate refugia following the 2024 mass bleaching event, Randrianarivo et al., PeerJ Open Access pdf 10.7717/peerj.20319

Critical snowpack thresholds and escalating risks for extreme decreases in vegetation productivity across Northern Hemisphere ecosystems, et al., Open Access pmh:oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/394060

Ecological Niche Modeling Reveals Historical Population Dynamics and Future Climate Response of the Carnivorous Plant Nepenthes mirabilis in Southeast Asia, Huang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.72707

Future diversity and lifespan of metazoans under global warming and oxygen depletion, Kaiho, Open Access pdf 10.5194/egusphere-2025-1853

Genomics of rafting crustaceans reveals adaptation to climate change in tropical oceans,Liu et al., Nature Communications , Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.29614727

Heat wave impacts on tree growth and recovery in temperate forests depend on leaf phenology, Bonfanti et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111020

Impact of Climate Change on the Multiple Facets of Forest Bird Diversity in a Biodiversity Hotspot Within the Atlantic Forest, Mota et al., Diversity and Distributions, Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.c.7614515.v1

Impacts of Climate Change on the Distribution of Suitable Habitat for Invasive Coreopsis Species in China, Jia et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73073

Mitigating and adapting to climate change: the role of nature-based solutions in sustaining vegetation health in the Isiukhu River Basin, Tela et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1721489

Mountains magnify mechanisms in climate change biology, de la Fuente et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02549-x

Oaks and Climate Change: Contrasting Range Responses of Mediterranean and Temperate Quercus Species in the Western Palearctic, Ülker & Tav?ano?lu, Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.73055

Over a century of global decline in the growth performance of marine fishes, Yan et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-69416-x

Predicted Effects of Climate Change on Future Distributions of Ectomycorrhizal Fungi, Qi et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.72743

Severe and widespread coral reef damage during the 2014-2017 Global Coral Bleaching Event, Eakin et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-025-67506-w

Significant Increase in Summer Vegetation Growth (NDVI) in Eastern Siberia in the Mid-1990s: Combined Effects of Summer North Atlantic SST and May Land–Atmosphere Interaction, Tian et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0535.1

Stronger Sensitivity of Plant Photosynthesis to Rising CO2 in High Elevation Ecosystems, , 10.1111/ele.70328/v1/review3

The Evolution of Southern Ocean Net Primary Production in a Changing Climate: Challenges and Opportunities, Tagliabue et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.70653

Tree Regeneration After Unprecedented Forest Disturbances in Central Europe Is Robust but Maladapted to Future Climate Change, et al., Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.18449661

Warmer climate disrupts the trade-off between post-fire loss and recovery of grassland GPP, Cui et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105363

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

An anthropogenically induced gradient in net carbon exchange of a temperate mangrove forest in South Australia, Yang et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2025.1720464

Discrepancies in national inventories reveal a large emissions gap in the wastewater sector, , Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.17715043

Dissolved Organic Matter Composition in the Laurentian Great Lakes Ice and Its Contribution to Spring Melt, Arsenault et al., Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jg009367

Elucidating the Role of Marine Benthic Carbon in a Changing World, Schultz et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2025gb008643

Empirical Parameterization of Organic Matter Reactivity in Subsea Permafrost and Implications for Greenhouse Gas Fluxes From a Warming Arctic Shelf, Arndt et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2025gb008712

High-efficiency methane consumption by atmospheric methanotrophs in subsurface karst caves: The irrefutable methane sink, Liu et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.ady5942

How can we trust TROPOMI based methane emissions estimation: calculating emissions over unidentified source regions, Zheng et al., Open Access 10.5194/egusphere-2025-1446

Impact of Land Use Change and Drought on the Net Emissions of Carbon Dioxide and Methane From Tropical Peatlands in Southeast Asia, Hirano et al., AGU Advances Open Access 10.1029/2025av001861

Inhibition of Arctic Soil Dissolved Organic Carbon Export by the Retention Capacity of Thawing Permafrost, He et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gl120418

Mature riparian alder forest acts as a strong and consistent carbon sink, Krasnova et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-22-7089-2025

Patterns and drivers of African carbon recovery after disturbance, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111061

Reducing the Discrepancy in Quantifying the Temperature Dependence of Global Wetland Methane Emission, Hu et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70748

Revegetation induces asynchronous changes of deep soil carbon and nitrogen stocks in the Loess Plateau of China, Wang et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1754187

Seasonal Controls of Biogenic Uptake and Anthropogenic Emissions on Carbon Dynamics in a Post-Industrial Shrinking City, Hwang & Papuga, Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences 10.1029/2025jg008867

Standardising research on marine biological carbon pathways required to estimate sequestration at Polar and sub-Polar latitudes, Morley et al., Earth Open Access 10.1016/j.earscirev.2025.105372

Substantial contribution of trees outside forests to above-ground carbon across China, Su et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-025-03150-y

Super-sniffer aeroplane finds oil fields’ hidden emissions, , Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-00335-z

The impact of warming on peak-season ecosystem carbon uptake is influenced by dominant species in warmer sites, Brinkhoff et al., Open Access 10.5194/egusphere-egu25-245

The ocean’s biological carbon pump under pressure, Middelburg, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aef3182

Unlocking the Impact of Temperature and Salinity on Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Estuarine Salt Marsh Soils, Sang et al., Earth's Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef006912

What is causing the methane surge?, Nisbet & Manning, Science 10.1126/science.aee6226

Why methane surged in the atmosphere during the early 2020s, Ciais et al., Science 10.1126/science.adx8262

CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Afforestation-Related Fertilisation Quickly Turns Barren Cutaway Peatland Into a Carbon Dioxide Sink, Buzacott et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.70644

Careful land allocation for carbon dioxide removal is critical for safeguarding biodiversity, , Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02567-3

Clarifying what is meant by greenhouse gas ‘removals’ and categorising types of ‘removal-related activities’, Brander et al., Carbon Management Open Access 10.1080/17583004.2026.2625956

Decarbonization

A perspective on carbon footprint of decentralized manufacturing of lithium-ion cells industrialization, Jayadevan et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1630913

Cost competitiveness and carbon reduction of battery-electric vehicle and battery-swapping electric vehicle with incentive policy in China, Li et al., Energy for Sustainable Development Open Access 10.1016/j.esd.2026.101938

Evidence of a cascading positive tipping point towards electric vehicles, Mercure et al., Open Access pdf 10.21203/rs.3.rs-3979270/v1

Next-gen geothermal could bring clean power to much more of the planet, Battersby, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2601712123

Quantifying land-use metrics for solar photovoltaic projects in the western United States, Hu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-02862-5

Racing against the clock: Modeling the global transition to renewable energy technologies, Bessi et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104541

Study on phased strategies for sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) industrialization based on a tripartite evolutionary game, Zhou et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2025.1731253

Timely deployment of best-in-class technologies to enable development and decarbonise construction, Dunant et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-025-67489-8

Geoengineering climate

Injection near the stratopause mitigates the stratospheric side effects of sulfur-based climate intervention, Yu et al., Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-25-18449-2025

Climate change communications & cognition

(Not) all in this together? Viewing climate change as a question of (in)justice rather than common fate increases collective action, Hartwich et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102944

A call for robust evaluations of the impacts of serious games for climate change mitigation: The Climate Fresk as a global case study, Hognon et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102942

Beyond ownership structures: Oil company climate discourses in authoritarian Russia and Kazakhstan, Martus et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104582

Can neighbourhood interventions strengthen collective climate action?, Klöckner et al., Open Access pdf 10.31223/x5741b

Differences within global movements: insights from FFF climate protests in Western and Eastern Europe, Buzogány et al., Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2623726

From anxiety to hope: Do climate change-related emotions influence actual environmental behaviour?, Schwarz et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102939

When climate action meets low efficacy: Rethinking the mental health consequences of pro-environmental engagement, Heriansyah, Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102951

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Determinants of climate change adaptation strategies’ adoption among maize farming households: evidence from Malawi, Nkhoma et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1743868

Exploring the influence of cognitive differences on farmers’ participation in forestry carbon sequestration projects: evidence from China, Zhu et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1746843

Future viability of European vineyards using bioclimatic climate analogues, Allaman et al., Open Access 10.2139/ssrn.5344049

Net ecosystem carbon balance and greenhouse gas budget of a canola-wheat cropping system in the northern prairies, Ferland et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111044

Promote or inhibit: how climate policy uncertainty may shape extreme weather’s impact on grain production, Zhang et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.3389/fevo.2026.1753076

Study on the Suitable Area of Ratoon Rice in China Under Climate Change, Luo et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.72724

Synergies in environmental and agricultural water availability under climate change, Lester et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-025-01720-8

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Australian Rainfall Projections Associated with ENSO Diversity in a Warming Climate: Insights from CMIP6 Large Ensembles, Li et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0218.1

Changes in the Frequency of Flood Events Across the United States Detectable by the Middle of This Century, Kim et al., Earth's Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef006677

ENSO's Impacts on Southeastern Australia's Future Rainfall Risk, Huang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gl118673

Global Warming Enhances Tropical Cyclone–Induced Extreme Precipitation in the Arabian Sea: Insights From Convection-Permitting Model Experiments, Pathaikara et al., Earth's Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007294

Long-term spatiotemporal analysis of variation in soil moisture over Iran, Darand & Tashan, Journal of Atmospheric and Solar 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106727

Multidimensional Flood Risk Analysis of High-Speed Rail Systems Under Future Climate Change, Liu et al., Risk Analysis 10.1111/risa.70184

Recent and projected changes in rain-on-snow event characteristics across Svalbard, Vickers et al., The Cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-19-6907-2025

Renewability of fossil groundwaters affected by present-day climate conditions, Ferguson et al., Nature Geoscience pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-01923-4

Climate change economics

Climate Change and Economic Sustainability: Empirical Evidence on the Dynamics of Adjusted Net Savings in Benin's Regions, Logozo & Kougblenou Menou, Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1002/cli2.70026

Climate Shocks and the Poor: A Review of the Literature, Triyana et al., 10.1596/1813-9450-10742

Compound dry-and-hot extremes exacerbate income inequality and poverty in Europe, Schleypen et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2025.103106

How Temperature Drives Health Insurance Demand?, Chen et al., Risk Analysis 10.1111/risa.70181

Increasingly frequent compound climate events worsen economic disparities in China's urban agglomerations, He et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102824

Modelling decarbonisation pathways in Europe: Balancing ambition and economic feasibility, Chyong & Schmidt, Open Access 10.2139/ssrn.5293284

Climate change mitigation public policy research

A multi-stakeholder assessment of the implications of non-energy policies on renewable energy development in the Philippines, Benitez & Dhakal, Energy for Sustainable Development 10.1016/j.esd.2025.101919

Advancing representations of equity and justice in climate mitigation futures, Pachauri et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000763

Determinants of firms’ acceptability of carbon taxation: a systematic literature review, Mwang'Onda et al., Climate Policy Open Access 10.1080/14693062.2026.2627746

EU policy on forest carbon sinks revisited, Kallio & Garvik, Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104332

Global governance complex for climate change: a bibliometric analysis, Li & Yaakop, Discover Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1007/s43621-025-02089-6

Ireland's carbon emission trends and degrowth opportunities: Based on modified Tapio - LMDI model, Zhao et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2025.114943

Mapping organized interests across arenas in Australian climate policy, Downie & Halpin, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2025.2597645

Navigating carbon neutrality: policy pathways and consistency on industrial decarbonization in China, Zhou et al., Carbon Balance and Management Open Access 10.1186/s13021-025-00356-7

Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals in Asia requires ambitious climate targets combined with sustainability-focused measures, Zhang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-02970-2

Taking climate justice to court, Schack, Environmental Sociology Open Access 10.1080/23251042.2026.2627448

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

A method for tracking national progress towards climate change adaptation, Brullo et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100800

Climate change adaptation status of Turkish local governments: A comparative analysis, Küçük Horasan & Özerol, Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102815

Enabling democratic shifts through climate adaptation: the climate adaptation democracy framework, Comelli et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2624955

Exclusionary Environmentalism: Exploring Gender and Antifeminism in Far-Right Ecologisms, Brodtmann, Environmental Communication Open Access 10.1080/17524032.2025.2596614

Expert agreement on key elements of transformational adaptation to climate risks, Biesbroek et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02548-y

Exploring the coherence of urban heat adaptation plans, Tuomimaa et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2025.1741647

Integrating value systems and place-based characteristics in climate risk assessments, Reveco et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2025.1719404

Persistent vulnerability and precarious futures: the limits of adaptation in ‘climate migrant’ informal settlements of coastal Bangladesh, et al., Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.31300234.v1

Resource mapping amid climate crisis for protection of hunter gatherer community livelihoods in Northern Tanzania, Bwagalilo, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2025.1691766

Climate change impacts on human health

Assessing children’s vulnerability to climate change in Small Island Developing States – A case study from Saint Kitts and Nevis, Ashorn et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000789

Climate Change and Disparities in Extreme Heat Exposure for Socially Vulnerable Areas in the Contiguous United States, Parsons et al., Open Access pdf 10.22541/essoar.174139309.92730243/v1

Early-life heat exposure increases risk of neurodevelopmental delay in preschool children, Cai et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02560-w

Expanding compound heat and ultraviolet radiation stress amplifies exposure risks for elderly populations, , Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.17568494

Overlooked toll of climate change on migrant children in the Americas, Pintea et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02525-5

The True Cost of Heat: Evaluating Heat-Related Mortality Estimation Methods in Texas, Rutt & Dessler, Open Access pdf 10.22541/essoar.175376679.98846268/v1

Other

Experimenting for impact: Combining research with advocacy for climate stability, Suter et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000837

Mapping the epistemic geography of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (1995–2022), Bau Larsen et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2025.104291

The influence of incidental emotion on novice Pilots’ approach Decision-Making under uncertainty in the context of climate Challenges, Wang et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2025.100754

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Can the clean-energy revolution save us from climate catastrophe?, Tollefson, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-00332-2

Securing the past for the future – why climate proxy archives should be protected, Bebchuk & Büntgen, Boreas Open Access pdf 10.1111/bor.70039

Support people and their livelihoods rather than fossil-fuel industries, , Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-00382-6

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Beyond Power Demand: How AI-Driven Metals Inflation Is Testing Utility Regulation, Shi et al., Morningstar/DBRS

Accelerating demand and material cost inflation result in a widening mismatch: utilities are being asked to expand their networks faster at precisely the moment when the unit cost of doing so is structurally higher. Utilities are faced with the impact of both cyclical and structural inflation on their capital planning and requirements. Regulatory and political constraints will determine whether cost recovery occurs quickly enough and broadly enough to align with accelerating capital requirements.

Poll Shows GOP Voters Support Solar Energy, American-Made Solar, Fabrizio, Lee & Associates, First Solar

A national poll by the authors found widespread support for solar energy among Republicans, Republican-leaning Independents, and voters who supported President Donald J. Trump. The poll of 800 GOP+ voters found that they are in favor of the use of utility-scale solar by a more than 20-point margin, with 51% in favor; if the panels used for solar energy are American made with no ties to China, support for solar energy soars higher. Those in favor jump to 70%, while only 19% are opposed; 68% agree that the United States needs all forms of electricity generation, including utility solar, to be built for lowering electricity costs, compared to 22% who disagreed; 79% agree that the government should allow all forms of electricity generation, including utility-scale solar, to compete on their own merits and without political interference, versus 11% who disagreed; a clear majority (52%) of GOP+ voters are more likely to support a Congressional candidate if they support an all-of-the-above energy agenda, including the use of solar; and 51% are more likely to vote for a candidate who supported an American company building a solar panel manufacturing plant in the US.

New England’s Offshore Wind Solution. The Region Can Ride Through Cold-Weather Demand Surges with Local Renewable Energy, Susan Muller, Union of Concerned Scientists

Wind energy off the New England coast can powerfully reinforce the reliability of the region's electric grid, particularly during winter when the system is most vulnerable to energy shortages. Combined with the energy available from onshore wind and solar resources, an offshore wind fleet can support a shift toward local solutions for winter reliability in New England, bringing consumers much-needed relief from high seasonal electricity bills. The authors' analysis of winter 2024–2025 wind speed data shows that the energy delivered by just two offshore wind projects, totaling 1,500 megawatts (MW) of capacity, would have lowered the risk of power outages, based on a key reliability metric, by 55 percent over the course of the season. A larger fleet of 3,500 MW would have reduced the risk of outages by 75 percent. In either case, the scale of energy delivered by an offshore wind fleet would have increased the total winter energy supply from local renewable resources above the energy supply from imported liquified natural gas.

South Sudan. Country Climate and Development Report, Ling et al., World Bank Group

South Sudan has fallen into a vicious cycle of fragility, conflict, and climate vulnerability, with climate change acting as a threat multiplier, exacerbating displacement, food insecurity, social dislocation, resource conflict, and grievance. Already one of the fastest-warming countries, 80 percent of South Sudan’s population depends on climate-vulnerable livelihoods. More than half of the population is chronically food insecure, due to a combination of conflict and climate factors. The devastating floods of recent years are likely to become the new normal, and will be joined by increasing climate stress on labor productivity, agrifood systems, and human health. The authors identify priority investments to strengthen resilience in flood risk management, resilient rural livelihoods, sustainable natural resource use, and sustainable energy access. These require substantial fiscal resources, but the public finance system is under severe strain, and external support is set to decline sharply. Domestic revenue mobilization— particularly more targeted and effective use of existing government revenues and more efficient, transparent spending—is therefore essential to promote adaptation. Core governance reforms also need to support private sector development and climate action.

2025 Transmission Planning and Development Report Card, Zimmerman et al., Americans for a Clean Energy Grid

The authors provide an updated assessment of U.S. transmission planning and development across 10 regions. Overall, there was incremental improvement in transmission planning across most of the regions, driven largely by reforms to regional planning. However, many regions continue to fall well short of best practices, and progress remains uneven relative to the scale and urgency of today’s transmission needs. Accelerating electricity demand — driven by data centers, manufacturing growth, and electrification — is increasing the importance of forward-looking transmission planning, compressing planning timelines, and raising the stakes for regions that continue to rely on incremental or reactive approaches.

Clean Economy Works: December 2025 Analysis, Michael Timberlake, E2-Ecopnomy and Environment

At the end of 2025, the U.S. clean energy economy reached a clear inflection point. While companies continued to announce new investments—albeit fewer and with less capital per project that recent years—the pace and scale of cancellations, closures, and downsizes accelerated dramatically. The result was the largest annual reversal of clean energy investment since E2 began tracking in 2022. The data show not simply a slowdown, but a fundamental imbalance: for the first time, project losses far outpaced project gains, particularly in manufacturing sectors that had driven much of the post-IRA investment surge. This imbalance was felt across regions, industries, and political boundaries. For example, three dollars abandoned for every dollar announced: In 2025, clean energy cancellations and downsizes totaled $34.8 billion, nearly three times the $12.3 billion in new investment announced—producing a sharply negative return on clean energy investment activity; 38,031 manufacturing jobs eliminated: Project reversals and factory closures wiped out more clean energy jobs in 2025 than in all prior tracked years combined, resulting in a net loss of more than 15,000 jobs; $30.2 billion in manufacturing losses: Manufacturing facilities accounted for nearly all cancelled investment and job losses, underscoring the vulnerability of capital-intensive domestic clean energy supply chains.

Global wind and solar 2025: The G7 gap, Diren Kocaku?ak and Mengqi Zhang, Global Energy Monitor

The global clean power pipeline surged in 2025. Announced and in-progress wind and utility-scale solar projects expanded by 11%, increasing from 4.4 terawatts (TW) to almost 5 TW worldwide. Globally, utility-scale solar led the expansion of the pipeline. The utility-scale solar pipeline grew by 17% and passed 2.2 TW, while the wind pipeline grew by 7%. The world’s richest economies are not driving that growth. The G7 countries, despite controlling roughly half of global wealth, account for 11% of the world’s prospective wind and utility-scale solar capacity additions. The center of gravity for new clean power has shifted decisively toward emerging and developing economies. China crossed a historic threshold. Its combined operating wind, utility-scale solar, and distributed solar capacity surpassed 1.6 TW in 2025, triple the combined capacity of its closest peers, the United States and India. Distributed solar is a pillar of the clean energy transition, but it is not evenly spread. While it represents about 42% of all existing and prospective solar capacity worldwide, deployment remains heavily concentrated in a small number of countries, leaving significant room to expand.

Aspen National Water Strategy, Watson et al., Aspen Institute and the Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability

Building on the insights and relationships developed through the Aspen-Nicholas Water Forum, the Aspen National Water Strategy Initiative advances a coordinated vision for U.S. water governance. Developed through 18 months of collaboration among water leaders from across sectors, regions, and backgrounds, the Aspen National Water Strategy identifies six interconnected strategies essential to securing water for America’s communities, economies, and ecosystems including elevating water security as a cornerstone of the nation’s economy; reforming water governance to establish clear structures and standards while enabling flexible, locally appropriate implementation; investing in rural water resources and services to strengthen rural communities and regional water security; equipping communities to adapt to rising water-related climate risks; modernizing water infrastructure while renewing existing assets; and accelerating the adoption of innovative water solutions at scale.

Hot stuff: geothermal energy in Europe, Tatiana Mindeková and Gianluca Geneletti, Ember

Advances in drilling and reservoir engineering are unlocking geothermal electricity across much wider parts of Europe, at a time when the power system needs firm, low-carbon supply and reduced reliance on fossil fuels. Once limited to a few favorable locations, geothermal is now positioned to scale. Around 43 GW of enhanced geothermal capacity in the European Union could be developed at costs below 100 €/MWh today, comparable to coal and gas electricity. The largest potential is concentrated in Hungary, followed by Poland, Germany and France. While representing only a fraction of Europe’s total geothermal potential, the identified EU-level deployment could deliver around 301 TWh of electricity per year, reflecting geothermal’s high capacity factor. This is equivalent to about 42% of coal- and gas-fired generation in the EU in 2025.

Cost Analysis of Heavy-Duty Vehicle Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell Stationary Power Plants, Reznicek et al., National Laboratory of the Rockies/National Renewable Energy Lab

Heavy-duty proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cells could be a low-cost, low emission alternative to combustion turbines for re-electrifying hydrogen if used as part of a long duration grid energy storage systems. Many studies expect heavy duty PEM fuel cell production costs to reduce as manufacturing volumes ramp up and their expected durability of 25,000-30,000 hours aligns well with a 30-year life for hydrogen seasonal energy storage plants that would likely operate less than 10% of the year. The labor, material, and equipment costs associated with installing PEM fuel cells and their required balance of plant for stationary applications have not been thoroughly explored, however. This study performs a detailed design and cost analysis of a 100 MW stationary PEM fuel cell power plant, capturing costs such as cooling, power electronics, pipes, valves, fittings, cabling, conduit, concrete foundations, buildings, and land. It employs methods consistent with NLR's solar PV benchmarking cost analysis and annual technology baseline to derive the total installed costs of stationary PEM fuel cell plants that utilize heavy duty PEM fuel cells. The anticipated total cost of building a stationary PEM fuel cell plant with today's technology is $954/kW. This cost could reduce to $567/kW - $754/kW by 2050, depending on potential cost reductions in fuel cells, inverters, and transformers. Both the estimated current cost and potential future costs are on the lower end if not less than estimated costs associated with natural gas combustion turbines, which range from $900/kW to $1,500/kW according to the EIA. Because PEM fuel cells do not produce pollutants such as NOx and SOx and can have much higher efficiencies than combustion turbines while still maintaining adequate start-up times and dynamic capabilities, this suggests that stationary PEM fuel cells could outperform combustion turbines for hydrogen long duration grid storage applications on the grounds of capital cost, operating costs, and emissions. About New Research

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Donald Trump has overseen more retirements of coal-fired power stations than any other US president, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

His administration’s latest efforts to roll back US climate policy have been presented by interior secretary Doug Burgum as an opportunity to revive “clean, beautiful, American coal”.

The administration is in the process of attempting to repeal the 2009 “endangerment” finding, which is the legal underpinning of many federal climate regulations.

On 11 February, the White House issued an executive order on “America’s beautiful clean coal power generation fleet”, calling for government contracts and subsidies to keep plants open.

On the same day, Trump was presented with a trophy by coal-mining executives declaring him to be the “undisputed champion of beautiful clean coal”.

These words are in sharp contrast to Trump’s record in office, with more coal-fired power plants having retired under his leadership than any other president, as shown in the figure below.

This is because coal plants have been uneconomic to operate compared with cheaper gas and renewables – and because most of the US coal fleet is extremely old.

Capacity of coal-fired power plants retiring under recent US presidents, gigawatts (GW). Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from Global Energy Monitor.

In total, some 57 gigawatts (GW) of coal capacity has already been retired during Trump’s first and second terms in office, compared with 48GW under Obama’s two full terms and 41GW under Biden’s single term.

Even in relative terms, the US has lost a larger proportion of its remaining coal fleet for each year of Trump’s presidencies than for either of his recent predecessors.

Trump’s record hints at the many practical and economic factors that have driven US coal closures, regardless of the preferences of the president of the day.

Indeed, Trump made variousefforts to prop up coal power during his first term in office. These were ultimatelyunsuccessful, as the figure below illustrates.

Coal-fired power capacity in the US, GW. Source: Global Energy Monitor.

Coal plants have been retiring in large numbers over the past 20 years because they were uneconomic relative to cheaper sources of electricity, including renewables and gas.

These unfavourable market conditions, alongside air pollution regulations unrelated to climate change, have resulted in a steady parade of coal closures under successive presidents.

By 2024, wind and solar were generating more electricity in the US than coal.

More recently, analysis from the US Energy Information Administration shows that surging power prices have improved the economics of both coal and gas-fired power plants.

These rising prices have been driven by increasing demand, including from data centres, and by higher gas prices, due to increasing exports at liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals.

These factors saw coal-power output increase by 13% year-on-year in 2025, only the second rise in a decade of steady decline for the fuel, according to the Rhodium Group.

Nevertheless, many utilities have still been looking to shutter their ageing coal-fired power plants.

The vast majority of US coal plants are nearing retirement. Three-quarters of US coal capacity is more than four decades old and only 14% is less than 20 years old, as shown in the figure below.

Capacity of US coal plants by age group, GW. Source: Global Energy Monitor.

In response, the Trump administration has recently invoked legislation designed for wartime emergencies to force a number of uneconomic coal plants to remain open.

Despite Trump’s efforts, clean energy made up 96% of the new electricity generation capacity added to the US grid in 2025. None of the new capacity came from coal power.

Analysis: Coal power drops in China and India for first time in 52 years after clean-energy records

China energy

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13.01.26

IEA: Declining coal demand in China set to outweigh Trump’s pro-coal policies

Coal

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17.12.25

Guest post: China and India account for 87% of new coal-power capacity so far in 2025

China energy

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27.08.25

Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop

China energy

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12.08.25

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The post Analysis: Trump has overseen more coal retirements than any other US president appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the final quarter of 2025, likely securing a decline of 0.3% for the full year as a whole.

This extends a “flat or falling” trend in China’s CO2 emissions that began in March 2024 and has now lasted for nearly two years.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that, in 2025, emissions from fossil fuels increased by an estimated 0.1%, but this was more than offset by a 7% decline in CO2 from cement.

Other key findings include:

• CO2 emissions fell year-on-year in almost all major sectors in 2025, including transport (3%), power (1.5%) and building materials (7%).
• The key exception was the chemicals industry, where emissions grew 12%.
• Solar power output increased by 43% year-on-year, wind by 14% and nuclear 8%, helping push down coal generation by 1.9%.
• Energy storage capacity grew by a record 75 gigawatts (GW), well ahead of the rise in peak demand of 55GW.
• This means that growth in energy storage capacity and clean-power output topped the increases in peak and total electricity demand, respectively.

The CO2 numbers imply that China’s carbon intensity – its fossil-fuel emissions per unit of GDP – fell by 4.7% in 2025 and by 12% during 2020-25.

This is well short of the 18% target set for that period by the 14th five-year plan.

Moreover, China would now need to cut its carbon intensity by around 23% over the next five years in order to meet one of its key climate commitments under the Paris Agreement.

Whether Chinese policymakers remain committed to this target is a key open question ahead of the publication of the 15th five-year plan in March.

This will help determine if China’s emissions have already passed their peak, or if they will rise once again and only peak much closer to the officially targeted date of “before 2030”.

‘Flat or falling’

The latest analysis shows China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 21 months, starting in March 2024. This trend continued in the final quarter of 2025, when emissions fell by 1% year-on-year.

The picture continues to be finely balanced, with emissions falling in all major sectors – including transport, power, cement and metals – but rising in the chemicals industry.

This combination of factors means that emissions continue to plateau at levels slightly below the peak reached in early 2024, as shown in the figure below.

China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals until September 2025. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec.

Power sector emissions fell by 1.5% year-on-year in 2025, with coal use falling 1.7% and gas use increasing 6%. Emissions from transportation fell 3% and from the production of cement and other building materials by 7%, while emissions from the metal industry fell 3%.

These declines are shown in the figure below. They were partially offset by rising coal and oil use in the chemical industry, up 15% and 10% respectively, which pushed up the sector’s CO2 emissions by 12% overall.

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period January-September 2025, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec. 

In other sectors – largely other industrial areas and building heat – gas use increased by 2%, more than offsetting the reduction in emissions from a 3% drop in their coal consumption.

Clean power covers electricity demand growth

In the power sector, which is China’s largest emitter by far, electricity demand grew by 520 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2025.

At the same time, power generation from solar increased by 43% and wind power generation by 14%, delivering 360TWh and 130TWh of additional clean electricity. Nuclear power generation grew 8%, supplying another 40TWh. The increased generation from these three sources – some 530TWh – therefore met all of the growth in demand.

Hydropower generation also increased by 3% and bioenergy by 3%, helping push power generation from fossil fuels down by 1%. Gas-fired power generation increased by 6% and, as a result, power generation from coal fell by 1.9%.

Furthermore, the surge in additions of new wind and solar capacity at the end of 2025 will only show up as increased clean-power generation in 2026.

On the other hand, the growth in solar and wind power generation has fallen short of the growth in capacity, implying a fall in capacity utilisation – a measure of actual output relative to the maximum possible. This is highly likely due to increased, unreported curtailment, where wind and solar sites are switched off because the electricity grid is congested.

If these grid issues are resolved over the next few years, then generation from existing wind and solar capacity will increase over time.

Developments in 2025 extended the trend of clean-power generation growing faster than power demand overall, as shown in the top figure below. This trend started in 2023 and is the key reason why China’s emissions have been stable or falling since early 2024.

In addition, 2025 saw another potential inflection point, shown in the bottom figure below. It was the first year ever that energy storage capacity – mainly batteries – grew faster than peak electricity demand in 2025 and faster than the average growth in the past decade.

Top columns: Year-on-year change in annual electricity generation from clean energy excluding hydro, terawatt hours. Left solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in total electricity generation, TWh. Bottom columns: Year-on-year change in energy storage capacity, gigawatts. Right solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in peak electricity demand. Sources: Power generation and demand from Ember; peak loads from China Electric Power News since 2020; peak loads until 2019 and pumped hydro capacity from Wind Financial Terminal; battery storage capacity from China Energy Storage Alliance; analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta.

China’s energy storage capacity increased by 75GW year-on-year in 2025, while peak demand only increased by 55GW. The rise in storage capacity in 2025 is also larger than the three-year average increase in peak loads, some 72GW per year.

Peak demand growth matters, because power systems have to be designed to reliably provide enough electricity supply at the moment of highest demand.

Moreover, the increase in peak loads is a key driver of continued additions of coal and gas-fired power plants, which reached the highest level in a decade in 2025.

The growth in energy storage could provide China with an alternative way to meet peak loads without relying on increased fossil fuel-based capacity.

The growth in storage capacity is set to continue after a new policy issued by China’s top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in January.

This policy means energy storage sites will be supported by so-called “capacity payments”, which to date have only been available to coal- and gas-fired power plants and pumped hydro storage.

Concerns about having sufficient “firm” power capacity in the grid – that which can be turned on at will – led the government to promote new coal and gas-fired power projects in recent years, leading to the largest fossil-fuel based capacity additions in a decade in 2025, with another 290GW of coal-fired capacity still under construction.

Reforming the power system and increasing storage capacity would enable the grid to accommodate much higher shares of solar and wind, while reducing the need for new coal or gas capacity to meet rising peaks in demand.

This would both unlock more clean-power generation from existing capacity and improve the economics and risk profiles of new projects, stimulating more growth in capacity.

Peaking power CO2 requires more clean-energy growth

China’s key climate commitments for the next five-year period until 2030 are to peak CO2 emissions and to reduce carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels. The latter target requires limiting CO2 emissions at or below their 2025 level in 2030.

The record clean-energy additions in 2023-25 have barely sufficed to stabilise power-sector emissions, showing that if rapid growth in power demand continues, meeting the 2030 targets requires keeping clean-energy additions close to 2025 levels over the next five years.

China’s central government continues to telegraph a much lower level of ambition, with the NDRC setting a target of “around” 30% of power generation in 2030 coming from solar and wind, up from around 22% in 2025.

If electricity demand grows in line with the State Grid forecast of 5.6% per year, then limiting the share of wind and solar to 30% would leave space for fossil-fuel generation to grow at 3% per year from 2025 to 2030, even after increases from nuclear and hydropower.

Such an increase would mean missing China’s Paris commitments for 2030.

Alternatively, in order to meet the forecast increase in electricity demand without increasing generation from fossil fuels would require wind and solar’s share to reach 37% in 2030.

Similarly, China’s target of a non-fossil energy share of 25% in 2030 will not be sufficient to meet its carbon-intensity reduction commitment for 2030, unless energy demand growth slows down sharply.

This target is unlikely to be upgraded, since it is already enshrined in China’s Paris Agreement pledge, so in practice the target would need to be substantially overachieved if the country is to meet its other commitments.

If energy demand growth continues at the 2025 rate and the share of non-fossil energy only rises from 22% in 2025 to 25% in 2030, then the consumption of fossil fuels would increase by 3% per year, with a similar rise in CO2 emissions.

Still, another recent sign that clean-energy growth could keep exceeding government targets came in early February when the China Electricity Council projected solar and wind capacity additions of more than 300GW in 2026 – well beyond the government goal of “over 200GW”.

Chemical industry

The only significant source of growth in CO2 emissions in 2025 was the chemical industry, with sharp increases in the consumption of both coal and oil.

This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates how CO2 emissions appear to have peaked from cement production, transport, the power sector and others, whereas the chemicals industry is posting strong increases.

Sectoral emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Even though chemical-industry emissions are small relative to other sectors – at roughly 13% of China’s total – the pace of expansion is creating an outsize impact.

Without the increase from the chemicals sector, China’s total CO2 emissions would have fallen by an estimated 2%, instead of the 0.3% reported here.

Without changes to policy, emission growth is set to continue, as the coal-to-chemicals industry is planning major increases in capacity.

Whether these expansion plans receive backing in the upcoming five-year plan for 2026-30 will have a major impact on China’s emission trends.

Another key factor is the development of oil and gas prices. Production in the coal-based chemical industry is only profitable when coal is significantly cheaper than crude oil.

The current coal-to-chemicals capacity in China is dominated by plants producing higher-value – and therefore less price-sensitive – chemicals such as olefins and aromatics, as feedstocks for the production of plastics.

In contrast, the planned expansion of the sector is expected to be largely driven by plants producing oil products and synthetic gas to be used for energy. For these products, electrification and clean-electricity generation provide a direct alternative, meaning they are even more sensitive to low oil and gas prices than chemicals production.

Outlook for China’s emissions

This is the latest analysis for Carbon Brief to show that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable or falling for seven quarters or 21 months, marking the first such streak on record that has not been associated with a slowdown in energy demand growth.

Notably, while emissions have stabilised or begun a slow decline, there has not yet been a substantial reduction from the level reached in early 2024. This means that a small jump in emissions could see them exceed the previous peak level.

China’s official plans only call for peaking emissions shortly before 2030, which would allow for a rebound from the current plateau before the ultimate emissions peak.

If China is to meet its 2030 carbon intensity commitment – a 65% reduction on 2005 levels – then emissions would have to fall from the peak back to current levels by 2030.

Whether China’s policymakers are still committed to meeting this carbon intensity pledge, after the setbacks during the previous five-year period, is a key open question. The 2030 energy targets set to date have fallen short of what would be required.

The most important signal will be whether the top-level five-year plan for 2026-30, due in March, sets a carbon intensity target aligned with the 2030 Paris commitment.

Officially, China is sticking to the timeline of peaking CO2 emissions “before 2030”, which was announced by president Xi Jinping in 2020.

According to an authoritative explainer on the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the upcoming five-year plan, published by state-backed news agency Xinhua, coal consumption should “reach its peak and enter a plateau” from 2027.

It says that continued increases in demand for coal from electricity generators and the chemicals industry would be offset by reductions elsewhere. This is despite the fact that China’s coal consumption overall has already been falling for close to two years.

The reference to a “plateau” in coal consumption indicates that in official plans, meaningful absolute reductions in emissions would have to wait until after 2030. Any increase in coal consumption from 2025 to 2027, before the targeted plateau, would need to be offset by reductions in oil consumption, to meet the carbon intensity target.

Moreover, allowing coal consumption in the power sector to grow beyond the peak of overall coal use and emissions implies slowing down China’s clean-energy boom. So far, the boom has continued to exceed official targets by a wide margin.

In addition, the explainer’s expectation of further growth in coal use by the chemicals industry indicates a green light for at least a part of its sizable expansion plans.

The Xinhua article recognises that oil product consumption has already peaked, but says that oil use in the chemicals industry has kept growing. It adds that overall oil consumption should peak in 2026.

Elsewhere, the article speaks of “vigorously” developing non-fossil energy and “actively” developing “distributed” solar, which has slowed down due to recent pricing policies.

Yet it also calls for “high-quality development” of fossil fuels and increased efforts in domestic oil and gas production, suggesting that China continues to take an “all of the above” approach to energy policy.

The outcome of all this depends on how things turn out in reality. The past few years show it is possible that clean energy will continue to overperform its targets, preventing growth in energy consumption from fossil fuels despite this policy support.

The key role of the clean-energy boom in driving GDP growth and investments is one key motivator for policymakers to keep the boom going, even when central targets would allow for a slowdown. It is also possible that the five-year plans of provinces and state-owned enterprises could play a key role in raising ambition, as they did in 2022.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.

Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data. 

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.

For oil, apparent consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is taken from Sinopec quarterly results, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use.

Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated from refinery throughput, with the production of the transport fuels and the net exports of other oil products subtracted. Fossil-fuel consumption includes non-energy use such as plastics, as most products are short-lived and incineration is the dominant disposal method.

分析：清洁能源2025年为中国GDP增长贡献超过三分之一

China energy

|

05.02.26

Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025

China energy

|

05.02.26

‘Rush’ for new coal in China hits record high in 2025 as climate deadline looms

China energy

|

03.02.26

Explainer: Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy

China energy

|

22.01.26

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The post Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been ‘flat or falling’ for 21 months appeared first on Carbon Brief.

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Sarah Wesseler

Want to lower your carbon footprint? Consider ditching your car. 

In a 2025 study, researchers at the World Resources Institute found that going car-free is the most effective step individuals can take to lower their personal emissions. In fact, it has a bigger impact than adding a home solar system and going vegan combined, they wrote, and 78 times more effective than composting.

But in much of the U.S., getting around without a car is difficult, if not impossible, due to overwhelmingly car-centric infrastructure. However, while going car-free may be hard for many Americans to imagine, this could change. As cities like Amsterdam and Paris have shown, when governments take decisive action to reduce car dependency, the results can be dramatic.

Moreover, the remedies for car dependency are well understood, at least at a high level. Decades’ worth of research from universities, government agencies, nonprofits, and design firms has created a significant body of knowledge about how to reduce reliance on cars.

Susan Handy, who leads the National Center for Sustainable Transportation at the University of California at Davis, said the main takeaways of this research are clear and compelling. 

“When people live in more compact communities where they’re in closer proximity to the places they need to go, and when they have good alternatives to driving – meaning good bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure and decent transit service – they will, in fact, drive less,” she said.

(Image credit: Tejvan Pettinger / CC BY 2.0)

Must-haves for reducing reliance on cars

In 2025, Kostas Mouratidis, a professor at the University of Copenhagen, published a peer-reviewed study identifying seven strategies that have successfully reduced car dependency in Western European cities.

Two of these strategies – raising awareness about the benefits of reducing car dependency and supporting compact cities through policy – are prerequisites for the others to succeed, he wrote.

Awareness-raising is vital to creating buy-in and shaping public behavior. This can take many forms, including open streets events, which temporarily close roads to vehicles and open them to other uses. Found everywhere from Bogotá to Tucson, these events demonstrate how space currently devoted to cars could be used for things like cycling, walking, and entertainment. In London, Mayor Sadiq Khan has used open streets days to build support for permanent pedestrianization.

Governments can also use information and incentives to raise awareness about alternatives to driving. In Portland, Oregon, households moving into some multifamily buildings receive a welcome packet from the municipality containing several hundred dollars’ worth of credits for bikeshare and public transportation, along with advice for navigating the area without a car. 

This and similar initiatives take advantage of the fact that people are more likely to change their transportation habits when their lives are already in flux, said Stefanie Seskin, the director of policy and practice at the National Association of City Transportation Officials. 

“Because you’re already moving and you’re changing your patterns, it’s a great time to try riding a bike, to try walking places, to try taking TriMet, [Portland’s] transit system,” she said.

Policies that make communities denser by locating buildings and amenities closer together are also critical for sustainable transportation to flourish. 

“Without a relatively compact urban form, you cannot expect people to be able to walk or cycle to destinations that they need to cover their daily needs,” Mouratidis said.

One vital mechanism for achieving this is zoning. In many American communities, zoning regulations make it illegal to build anything other than single-family homes on 75% of residential land. Changing this policy allows apartment buildings and small businesses to pop up in areas where they have historically been prohibited, allowing more people to walk or cycle to amenities close to their homes. 

Zoning changes can also lower the number of off-street parking spots developers are required to build for different building types, freeing up space that allows structures to be built closer to one another. Since parking is expensive to build, parking reform can also make neighborhoods more affordable.

Limiting private vehicles and investing in alternatives

Once communities reach sufficient levels of public buy-in and urban density, five additional strategies can successfully help people shift away from their cars, Mouratidis said. (Governments don’t need to wait to implement them until they’ve fully attained these goals, however, he stresses.) 

These strategies are:

• Investing in public transportation
• Improving pedestrian and bicycle infrastructure
• Restricting car use
• Supporting shared mobility (such as car-sharing services)
• Facilitating virtual mobility (such as teleconferencing and online shopping). 

These categories encompass a wide variety of actions. To restrict car use, some cities turn to congestion pricing programs in which drivers must pay to enter designated areas. Building on successful programs in Singapore, London, and Stockholm, New York City became the first U.S. city to implement congestion pricing in early 2025, charging cars $9 to enter Manhattan south of 60th Street during peak hours. In the program’s first year, 27 million fewer vehicles entered the affected area.

Investments in public transportation, pedestrian infrastructure, and bike lanes are also critical to reducing car dependency. Although many U.S. cities are struggling to fund existing public transit systems, some have found ways to not only maintain current services but also expand and improve them. In New York City, congestion pricing proceeds are being used to maintain and upgrade the city’s subways, buses, and commuter trains. In Virginia, the state government has dramatically increased its investment in public transportation as well as pedestrian and bicycle infrastructure in the past decade.

Illinois offers another promising model for supporting financially vulnerable public transportation systems. A law signed by Governor JB Pritzker in late 2025 designated $1.5 billion dollars annually for mass transit in Chicago and elsewhere in the state, with part of the funding coming from gas sales taxes that were diverted away from road construction. 

This represents a “groundbreaking, transformational investment in Illinois’s transit system,” said Kevin X. Shen, a transportation policy analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “It’s not only filling the fiscal cliff gap they faced that was threatening service cuts, but also going over that hump to increase transit service in ways that are needed for communities across the state.”

Big cities aren’t the only ones investing in alternatives to the car. In Dublin, Ohio, a suburb of Columbus that’s home to approximately 50,000 people, the local government is helping extend existing bus lines, upgrading bus stops, working with regional partners to introduce bus rapid transit service, upgrading its bicycle infrastructure, working with companies that provide bike- and scooter-share programs, and partnering with developers and designers to build walkable neighborhoods. 

Obstacles to reducing car dependency

Despite these and other success stories, reliance on cars is growing around the world, Mouratidis said. 

“Car ownership is increasing, the sales of cars are increasing, and overall, little is done towards reducing car dependence,” he said. “Globally, we have some cities that are quite pioneering in reducing car dependence. But besides those, there is little that is done.”

One challenge is that although government officials may understand the high-level solutions, many aren’t sure how to implement them on the ground. 

“Anybody going through a master’s of city planning program now is probably familiar with the research about how the built environment affects car dependence,” Handy said. “[But] even if the planners and the public officials know something about that research and believe that this is what they should be trying to do, they don’t necessarily know how to do it.”

Moreover, governments often lack the support and resources they need to make progress on this issue. Opposition from NIMBY (which stands for “not in my backyard”) groups and others can block progress. 

“There’s definitely a solid base of knowledge of what works,” Seskin said. “That doesn’t necessarily mean that what works is initially popular, though. And I think that’s where things get tricky.” 

The private sector also plays a vital role in determining how this issue plays out. Many businesses and other organizations take steps that reduce car dependency. For example, employer-run programs to shift people from cars to other modes of transportation are the most common and popular initiatives of this type in the country, Seskin said. 

But other private-sector actions are less beneficial. For example, developers and financiers often slow attempts to make communities more compact, since they, not governments, ultimately determine exactly what gets built where. 

“There’s a lot of inertia and risk aversion in the development community, so that’s why we keep getting the same stuff that we always get – because that’s what the private sector knows how to do,” Handy said.

Groups with economic interests in maintaining the status quo are another major barrier to progress, said Shen, who was the lead author of a 2024 report about car dependence in the U.S. 

“We found that the oil, auto, and roadbuilding industries receive more than 80% of the over $2 trillion in yearly public and private transportation spending,” he said. “And if you look through our history, they’ve lobbied for decades to prioritize cars over a more complete or affordable set of transportation options.”

“Our transportation system isn’t just a blank slate where people are vying for the best technical solution,” he said. “There are industries with real financial interests in shaping how we get around.”

We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter. Subscribe for free here. This is the last edition of Cropped for 2025. The newsletter will return on 14 January 2026.

Key developments Economic risks from nature loss

RISKY BUSINESS: The “undervaluing” of nature by businesses is fuelling its decline and putting the global economy at risk, according to a new report covered by Carbon Brief. The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) “business and biodiversity” report “urg[ed] companies to act now or potentially face extinction themselves”, Reuters wrote. 

BUSINESS ACTION: The report was agreed at an IPBES meeting in Manchester last week. Speaking to Carbon Brief at the meeting, IPBES chair, Dr David Obura, said the findings showed that “all sectors” of business “need to respond to biodiversity loss and minimise their impacts”. Bloomberg quoted Prof Stephen Polasky, co-chair of the report, as saying: “Too often, at present, what’s good for business is bad for nature and vice-versa.” 

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JAPAN’S TAKEOFF: Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, announced on 2 February that the country became the first in the world to extract rare earths from the deep seabed after successful retrievals near Minamitori Island, in the central Pacific Ocean, according to Asia Financial. The country hailed the move as a “first step toward industrialisation of domestically produced rare earth” metals, Takaichi said. 

URGENT CALL: On 5 February, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) secretary general, Leticia Reis de Carvalho, called on EU officials to “quickly agree on an international rule book on the extraction of critical minerals in international waters”, due to be finalised later this year, Euractiv reported. The bloc has supported a proposed moratorium on deep-sea mining. However, the US has “taken the opposite approach”, fast-tracking a single permit for exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, and “might be pushing the EU – and others” to follow suit, the outlet added.

CAUTIONARY COMMENT: In the Inter Press Service, the former president of the Seychelles and a Swiss philanthropist highlighted the important role of African leadership in global ocean governance. It called for a precautionary pause on deep-sea mining due to the potential harmful effects of this extractive activity on biodiversity, food security and the economy. They wrote: “The accelerating push for deep-sea mining activities also raises concerns about repeating historic patterns seen in other extractive sectors across Africa.”

News and views

• ARGENTINE AUSTERITY: The Argentinian government’s response to the worst wildfires to hit Patagonia “in decades” has been hindered by president Javier Milei’s “gutting” of the country’s fire-management agency, the Associated Press reported. Carbon Brief covered a new rapid-attribution analysis of the fires, which found that climate change made the hot, dry conditions that preceded the fires more than twice as likely.
• CRISIS IN SOMALIA: The Somali government has begun “emergency talks” to address the drought that is gripping much of the country, according to Shabelle Media. The outlet wrote that the “crisis has reached a critical stage” amid “worsening shortages of water, food and pasture threatening both human life and livestock”.
• FOOD PRICES FALL: The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s “food price index” – a measure of the costs of key food commodities around the world – fell in January for the fifth month in a row. The fall was driven by decreases in the price of dairy, meat and sugar, which “more than offset” increasing prices of cereals and vegetable oil, according to the FAO.
• HIGH STANDARDS: The Greenhouse Gas Protocol launched a new standard for companies to measure emissions and carbon removals from land use and emerging technologies. BusinessGreen said that the standard is “expected to provide a boost to the expanding carbon removals and carbon credit sectors by providing an agreed measurement protocol”.
• RUNNING OUT OF TIME: Negotiators from the seven US states that share the Colorado River basin met in Washington DC ahead of a 14 February deadline for agreeing a joint plan for managing the basin’s reservoirs. The Colorado Sun wrote: “The next agreement will impact growing cities, massive agricultural industries, hydroelectric power supplies and endangered species for years to come.” 
• CORAL COVER: Malaysia has lost around 20% of its coral reefs since 2022, “with reef conditions continuing to deteriorate nationwide”, the Star – a Malaysian online news outlet – reported. The ongoing decline has many drivers, it added, including a global bleaching event in 2024, pollution and unsustainable tourism and development.

Spotlight Aftershocks of US exiting major nature-science body

This week, Carbon Brief reports on the impacts of the US withdrawal from the global nature-science panel, IPBES.

The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw the US from the world’s main expert panel that advises policymakers on biodiversity and ecosystem science “harms everybody, including themselves”.

That’s according to Dr David Obura, chair of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, or IPBES.  

IPBES is among the dozens of international organisations dealing with the fallout from the US government’s announcement last month. 

The panel’s chief executive, Dr Luthando Dziba, told Carbon Brief that the exit impacts both the panel’s finances and the involvement of important scientists. He said: 

“The US was one of the founding members of IPBES…A lot of US experts contribute to our assessments and they’ve led our assessments in various capacities. They’ve also served in various official bodies of the platform.”

Obura told Carbon Brief that “it’s very important to try and keep pushing through with the knowledge and keep doing the work that we’re doing”. He said he hopes the US will rejoin in future. 

Carbon Brief attended the first IPBES meeting since Trump’s announcement, held last week in Manchester. At the meeting, countries finalised a new “business and biodiversity” report. 

For the first time in the 14-year history of IPBES, there was no US government delegation present at the meeting, although some US scientists attended in other roles. 

Cashflow impacts

Dziba is still waiting for official confirmation of the US withdrawal, but impacts were being felt even before last month’s announcement. 

Budget information [pdf] from last October shows that the US contributed the most money to IPBES of any country in 2024 – around $1.2m. In 2025, when Trump took office, it sent $0, as of October. 

Despite this, IPBES actually received around $1.2m extra funding from countries in 2025, compared to 2024, as other nations filled the gap. 

The UK, for example, increased its contribution from around $367,000 in 2024 to more than $1.7m in 2025. The EU, which did not contribute in 2024 but tends to make multi-year payments, paid around $2.7m last year. These two payments made up the bulk of the increase in overall funding. 

Wider effects of US exit 

Dziba said IPBES is looking at other ways of boosting funds in future, but noted that lost income is not the only concern: 

“For us, the withdrawal of the US is actually much larger than just the budgetary implications, because you can find somebody who can come in and increase the contribution and close that gap. 

“The US has got thousands of leading experts in the fields where we undertake assessments. We know that some of them work for [the] government and maybe [for] those it will be more challenging for them to continue…But there are many other experts that we hope, in some way, will still be able to contribute to the work of the platform.” 

One person trying to keep US scientists involved is Prof Pam McElwee, a professor of human ecology at Rutgers University. She told Carbon Brief that “there are still a tonne of American scientists and other civil society organisations that want to stand up”. 

McElwee and others have looked at ways for US scientists to access funding to continue working with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which the US has also withdrawn from. She said they will try and do the same at IPBES, adding: 

“It’s basically a bottom-up initiative…to make the message clear that scientists in the US still support these institutions and we still are part of them.

“Climate science is what it is and we can’t deny or withdraw from it. So we’ll just keep trying to represent it as best we can.” 

Watch, read, listen

UNDER THE SEA: An article in bioGraphic explored whether the skeletons of dead corals “help or hinder recovery” on bleached reefs. 

MOSSY MOORS: BBC News covered how “extinct moss” is being reintroduced in some English moors in an effort to “create diverse habitats for wildlife”. 

RIBBIT: Scientists are “racing” to map out Ecuador’s “unique biological heritage of more than 700 frog species”, reported Dialogue Earth. 

MEAT COMEBACK: Grist examined the rise and fall of vegan fine dining.  

New science

• Areas suitable for grazing animals could shrink by 36-50% by 2100 due to continued climate change, with areas of extreme poverty and political fragility experiencing the highest losses | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
• The body condition of Svalbard polar bears increased after 2000, in a period of rapid loss of ice cover | Scientific Reports
• Studies projecting the possibility of reversing biodiversity loss are scarce and most do not account for additional drivers of loss, such as climate change, according to a meta-analysis of more than 55 papers | Science Advances

In the diary

• 9-12 February: Climate and cryosphere open science conference | Wellington, New Zealand
• 18 February: International conservation technology conference | Lima, Peru
• 22-27 February: American Geophysical Union’s ocean sciences meeting | Glasgow, UK

Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz.  Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org

Cropped 28 January 2026: Ocean biodiversity boost; Nature and national security; Mangrove defence

Cropped

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28.01.26

Cropped 14 January 2026: Wildfires scorch three continents; EU trade; Food and nature in 2026

Cropped

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14.01.26

Cropped 17 December 2025: ‘Deadly’ Asia floods; Boosting London’s water birds; UN headwinds

Cropped

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17.12.25

Cropped 3 December 2025: Extreme weather in Africa; COP30 roundup; Saudi minister interview

Cropped

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03.12.25

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The UK government has secured a record 7.4 gigawatts (GW) of solar, onshore wind and tidal power in its latest auction for new renewable capacity.

It is the second and final part of the seventh auction round for “contracts for difference” (CfDs), known as AR7a.

In the first part, held in January 2026, the government agreed contracts for a record 8.4GW of new offshore wind capacity.

This makes AR7 the UK’s single-largest auction round overall, with its 14.7GW of new renewable capacity being 50% larger than the previous record set by AR6 in 2024.

In AR7a, 157 solar projects secured contracts to supply electricity for £65 per megawatt hour (MWh) and 28 onshore wind projects were contracted at £72/MWh. 

This means they will help cut consumer bills, according to multiple analysts.

Energy secretary Ed Miliband welcomed the outcome of the auction, saying in a statement that the new projects would be “50% cheaper” than new gas:

“These results show once again that clean British power is the right choice for our country, agreeing a price for new onshore wind and solar that is over 50% cheaper than the cost of building and operating new gas”.

In addition to cutting costs, the new projects will help reduce gas imports.

In total, AR7 will cut UK gas demand by around 95 terawatt hours (TWh) per year, enough to cut liquified natural gas (LNG) imports by three-quarters, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

Below, Carbon Brief looks at the seventh auction results for onshore wind, solar and tidal, what they mean energy for bills and the impact of the UK’s target of “clean power by 2030”. 

• What happened in the latest UK renewable auction?
• What does the solar and onshore wind auction mean for bills?
• What does it mean for energy security, jobs and investment?
• What does the auction mean for clean power by 2030?

What happened in the latest UK renewable auction?

The latest UK government auction for new renewable capacity is the second and final part of the seventh auction round, known as AR7a.

It secured a record 4.9GW of new solar capacity across 157 projects, as shown in the figure below, as well as 1.3GW of onshore wind across 28 projects. 

In addition, four tidal energy projects totalling 21 megawatts (MW) secured contracts, included within “other” in the figure below.

Capacity of solar, onshore wind and other technologies (including tidal) secured at each CfD auction in megawatts. Source: Department of Energy Security and Net Zero.

Most of the solar that secured a contract has a capacity of less than 50MW. This is the cut-off point for projects to be approved by the local council. Larger schemes must instead go through the “nationally significant infrastructure project” (NSIP) process, subject to approval by the secretary of state for energy.

For the first time, one 480MW solar project – approved via this NSIP process – won a CfD in AR7a. The West Burton Solar NSIP is being developed in Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire by Island Green Power. It is named after the grid connection it will use, freed up by the shuttering of the coal-powered West Burton plant. 

However, Nick Civetta, project leader at Aurora Energy Research notes on LinkedIn that this site was only one of four eligible solar NSIPs to secure a contract. 

Civetta adds that “wrangling these large projects into fruition is proving more painful than expected”.

Solar projects secured a “strike price” of £65/MWh in 2024 prices, some 7% cheaper than the £70/MWh agreed in the previous auction round.

In previous auction rounds CfD contracts were expressed in 2012 prices. For comparison, AR6 and AR7a solar contracts stand at £50/MWh and £47/MWh in 2012 prices, respectively.)

Alongside solar, 28 onshore wind projects secured contracts in the latest CfD auction, with a total capacity of 1.3GW.

This includes the Imerys windfarm in Cornwall, which at nearly 20MW is the largest onshore wind farm in England to secure a contract in a decade.

(Shortly after taking office in 2024, the current Labour government lifted a decade-long de facto ban on onshore wind in England.)

Overall, Scotland still dominated the auction for onshore wind, with 1,093MW of projects in the country in comparison to 38MW in England and 185MW in Wales.

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This includes the Sanquhar II windfarm in Dumfries and Galloway in Scotland, which will become the fourth-largest onshore wind farm in the UK at 269MW.

In total, Wales secured contracts for 20 renewables projects in AR7a, with a capacity of more than 530MW. This is the largest ever number of Welsh projects to get backing in a CfD auction, according to a statement from the Welsh government.

Onshore wind secured a strike price of £72/MWh, up slightly from £71/MWh in the previous auction in 2024. 

The prices for solar and onshore wind were 13% and 21% below the price cap set by Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) for the auction, respectively.

In its press release announcing the results, the government noted that the results for solar and onshore wind were less than half of the £147/MWh cost of building and operating new gas power stations.

Finally, four tidal energy projects secured contracts with a total capacity of 21MW at a strike price of £265/MWh, up from £240/MWh in 2024. 

In total, taken together with the 8.4GW of offshore wind secured in the first part of the auction, AR7 secured a total of 14.7GW of new clean power, as shown in the chart below.

This is enough to power the equivalent of 16 million homes, according to the government. It also makes AR7 the single-largest auction round by far, at more than 50% larger than the previous record set by AR6 in 2024.

This means that the two auction rounds held since the Labour government took office in July 2024 – AR6 and AR7 – have secured a total of 24GW of new renewable capacity. This is more than the 22GW from all previous auction rounds put together.

New onshore wind, offshore wind, solar PV and other technologies’ capacity secured in each CfD auction, in megawatts. Source: DESNZ.

However, several analysts noted that the AR7a results did not include any old onshore windfarms looking to replace their ageing turbines with new equipment – so-called “repowering projects” – despite the auction being open to them for the first time.

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What does the solar and onshore wind auction mean for bills?

Onshore wind and solar are widely recognised as the cheapest sources of new electricity generation in almost every part of the world.

The latest auction shows that the UK is no exception, despite its northerly location.

The prices for onshore wind and solar in the latest auction, at £72/MWh and £65/MWh respectively, are comfortably below recent wholesale power prices, which averaged £81/MWh in 2025 and £92/MWh in January 2026.

This means that the new projects will cut costs for UK electricity consumers, according to multiple analysts commenting on the auction outcome.

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The government lauded the results of AR7a for securing “homegrown energy at good value for billpayers – once again proving that clean power is the right choice for energy security and to meet rising electricity demand”.

In a statement, Miliband added:  

“By backing solar and onshore wind at scale, we’re driving bills down for good and protecting families, businesses, and our country from the fossil fuel rollercoaster controlled by petrostates and dictators. This is how we take back control of our energy and deliver a new era of energy abundance and independence.”

As noted in Carbon Brief’s coverage of the offshore wind results under AR7 in January, electricity demand is starting to rise as the economy electrifies and many of the UK’s existing power plants are nearing the end of their lives.

Therefore, new sources of electricity generation will be needed, whether from renewables, gas-fired power stations or from other sources.

In his statement, quoted above, Miliband said that the prices for onshore wind and solar were less than half the £147/MWh cost of electricity from new gas-fired power stations.

(This is based on recently published government estimates and assumes that gas plants would only be operating during 30% of hours each year, in line with the current UK fleet.)

Trade association RenewableUK also pointed to the cost of new gas, as well as the £124/MWh cost of the Hinkley C new nuclear plant, in its response to the auction results. 

In a statement, Dr Doug Parr, policy director for Greenpeace UK, said: 

“These new onshore wind and solar projects will supply energy at less than half the cost of new gas plants. Together with the new offshore wind contracts agreed last month, these cheaper renewables will lower energy bills as they come online.”

Strike prices for solar dropped by 6% compared to last year and while onshore wind prices rose, this was by less than 2% despite a “difficult environment for wind generation”, according to Bertalan Gyenes, consultant at LCP Delta.

In a post on LinkedIn, he noted that “extending the contract length [for onshore wind projects] by five years seems to have helped keep this increase low”.

The January offshore wind round secured 8.4 GW at £91/MWh, as such, the onshore and solar projects are 25% cheaper per unit of generation.

(The offshore wind projects secured in January are nevertheless expected to cut consumer bills relative to the alternative, or at worst to be cost neutral.)

Parr added that while the AR7a auction results “show we’re getting up to speed” ahead of the clean power 2030 target (see below), “an even faster way for the government to make a really big dent in bills would be to change the system that allows gas to set the overall energy price in this country”. He adds: 

“That would allow us to unshackle our bills from unreliable petrostates and get off the rollercoaster of volatile gas markets once and for all.”

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What does it mean for energy security, jobs and investment?

The onshore wind and solar projects secured in the latest auction round will generate an estimated 9 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

This is equivalent to roughly 3% of current UK electricity demand.

Combined with the estimated 37TWh from offshore wind secured during the first part of the auction, AR7 projects will be able to generate 46TWh of electricity, 14% of current demand.

If this electricity were to be generated by gas-fired power plants, then it would require around 95TWh of fuel, because much of the energy in the gas is lost during combustion.

This is several times more than the 25TWh of extra gas that could be produced in 2030 if new drilling licenses are issued, according to thinktank the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU). As such, AR7 will significantly cut UK gas imports, ECIU says, reducing exposure to volatile international gas markets.

Furthermore, ECIU says that the impact of renewables in driving down gas demand – and subsequently electricity prices – is already being seen in the UK. 

Five years ago, gas was setting the wholesale price of power in the UK 98% of the time due to the way the electricity market operates. 

This price-setting dominance is being eroded by renewables, with recent analysis from the UK Energy Research Centre showing that gas set power prices 90% of the time in 2025.

A further effect of new renewables is that they push the most expensive gas-fired power plants out of the system, reducing prices. This is known as the “merit-order effect”.

Recent analysis from ECIU found that large windfarms cut wholesale electricity prices by a third in 2025.

Lucy Dolton, renewable generation lead at Cornwall Insight, said in a statement that the AR7a results will provide a “surge in momentum as [the UK] pushes toward secure, homegrown energy”, adding:

“These investments ultimately strengthen the UK’s position against volatile gas markets. If the past few years have shown us anything, it’s that remaining tied to international energy markets comes with consequences.”

The projects that secured CfDs will help the UK avoid burning significant quantities of gas, “the bulk of which would have been imported at a cost which the UK cannot control”, said RenewableUK in its statement.

Together with previous CfD auction rounds, the latest new renewable projects are expected to generate some 153TWh of electricity once they are all operating, according to Carbon Brief analysis. This is around half of current UK demand.

Generating the same electricity from gas would require some 311TWh of fuel, which is similar to the 339TWh of gas produced by the UK’s North Sea operations in the most recent 12-month period for which data is available. This figure can also be compared with the 130TWh of gas that was imported by ship as liquified natural gas (LNG) in the same period.

The government added that the AR7a projects will support up to 10,000 jobs and bring £5bn in private investment to the UK.

(In total, the new projects secured via AR7 are expected to bring investments worth around £20-23bn to the UK, according to Aurora.) 

Additionally, the onshore wind projects are expected to generate over £6.5m in “community benefit” funds for people living near them, according to RenewableUK. 

The AR7a results were released alongside the publication of the Local Power Plan by the government and Great British Energy. 

This is designed to provide £1bn in funding for communities to own and control their own clean energy projects across the UK. 

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What does the auction mean for clean power by 2030?

The AR7a results put the UK “on track for its 2030 clean power target”, according to the government. 

Over AR6 and AR7, several changes have been made to the CfD process to help facilitate more projects to secure contracts.

A total of 24GW has been secured over the last two auction rounds – which have taken place under the current Labour government – compared to 22GW across the five auction rounds previously.

As part of its goal for clean power to meet 100% of electricity demand by 2030 and to account for at least 95% of electricity generation, the UK government is aiming for 27-29GW of onshore wind and 45-47GW of solar by the end of the decade. 

As of September 2025, the UK had 16.3GW of installed onshore wind capacity and more than 21GW of solar capacity. Taken together, the onshore technologies therefore need to double in operational capacity over the next four years to reach the 2030 targets.

Analysis by RenewableUK suggests that the government will need to procure between 3.85GW to 4.85GW of onshore wind in the next two auctions for the 2030 goal to remain possible.

Writing on LinkedIn, Aurora’s Civetta said that the onshore clean power 2030 targets “remain a long way off”. 

He continued that the gap for solar to reach its 45-47GW target is still a “whopping 18GW”, but added that there may be other ways for new capacity to be secured, beyond the CfD auctions.

He said these included a growing market for corporate “power purchase agreements” (PPAs), economic incentives for homes and businesses to install solar and the government’s recently released “warm homes plan”, all of which “should drive further procurement”.

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Dolton from Cornwall Insight adds that “the challenge now is delivery”, continuing:

“2.5GW of the winners have a delivery year of 2027/28, and over half – 3.7GW – have a delivery year of 2028/29, which brings them very close to the government’s 2030 clean power target. 

“Historically, renewable projects in the UK have faced delays, often due to grid connection backlogs and planning holdups. With AR7 and some of AR8 representing the only realistic pipeline for pre-2030 capacity, keeping to schedule will be essential.”

When built, the projects announced today will help to bring the total capacity of CfD-supported wind and solar to 50.6GW, according to Ember.

While solar and onshore wind are expected to play an important role in decarbonising the electricity system, offshore wind is set to be the “backbone”. 

The government is targeting 43-50GW of offshore wind by 2030, up from around 17GW of installed capacity today.

This leaves a gap of 27-34GW to the government’s target range. 

Prior to the AR7 auction, a further 10GW had already secured CfD contracts, excluding the cancelled Hornsea 4 project. 

The 8.4GW secured in January brings the gap to reach the minimum of 43GW over the four years to just 7GW.

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The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw the US from the intergovernmental science panel for nature “harms everybody, including them”, according to its chair.

Dr David Obura is a leading coral reef ecologist from Kenya and chair of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), the world’s authority on the science of nature decline.

In January, Donald Trump announced intentions to withdraw the US from IPBES, along with 65 other international organisations, including the UN climate science panel and its climate treaty.

In an interview with Carbon Brief, Obura says the warming that humans have already caused means “coral reefs are very likely at a tipping point” and that it is now inevitable that Earth “will lose what we have called coral reefs”.

A global goal to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030 will not be possible to achieve for every ecosystem, he continues, noting that a lack of action from countries means “we won’t be able to do it fast enough at this point”.

Despite this, it is still possible to reverse the “enabling drivers” of biodiversity decline within the next four years, he adds, warning that leaders must act as “our economies and societies fully depend on nature”.

The interview was conducted at the sidelines of an IPBES meeting in Manchester, UK, where governments agreed to a new report detailing how the “undervaluing” of nature by businesses is fuelling biodiversity decline and putting the global economy at risk.

• On US leaving IPBES: “Any major country not being part of it harms everybody, including themselves.”
• On reversing nature loss by 2030: “We won’t be able to do it fast enough at this point.”
• On the value of biodiversity: “Nature is really the life support system for people. Our economies and societies fully depend on nature.”
• On coral reefs: “We will lose what we have called coral reefs up until this point.”
• On nature justice: “The places that are most vulnerable don’t have the income, or the assets, to conserve biodiversity.”
• On IPBES’s latest report: “One of the key findings is all businesses have impacts and dependencies on nature.”
• On the next UN nature summit: “We need acceleration of activities and impact and effectiveness, more than anything else.”

Carbon Brief: Last month Trump announced plans for the US to exit IPBES and dozens of other global organisations. You described this at the time as “deeply disappointing”. What are your thoughts on the decision now and what will be the main impacts of the US leaving IPBES?

David Obura: Well, part of the reason that I’ve come to IPBES is because, of course, I believe in the multilateral process, because we bring 150 countries together, we’re part of the UN and the multilateral system and we’re based on knowledge [that provides] inputs to policymaking. We have a conceptual framework that looks from the bottom up on how people depend on nature. I’m also doing a lot of science on Earth systems at the planetary level, how our footprint is exceeding the scale of the planet. We have to make decisions together. We need the multilateral system to work to help facilitate that. It has never been perfect. Of course, I come from a region [Africa] that hasn’t been, you know, powerful in the multilateral process.

But we need countries to come together, so any major country not being part of it harms everybody, including themselves. It’s very important to try and keep pushing through with the knowledge and keep doing the work that we’re doing, so that, over time, hopefully [the US will] rejoin. Because, in the end, we will really need that to happen.

CB: This is the first IPBES meeting since Trump made the announcement. Has it had an impact so far on these proceedings and is there any kind of US presence here?

DO: This plenary is like every plenary that we have had. The current members are here. Some members are not. And, of course, we have some states here as observers working out if they’re going to join or not. And then we have a lot of private sector observers and universities and so on. The impact of a country leaving – the US in this case – has no impact on the plenary itself, because they’re not here making decisions on the things that we do. 

We, of course, don’t have US government members attending in technical areas, but we do have institutions and universities and academics here attending as they have in the past. So, in that sense, the plenary goes on as it goes on – the science and the knowledge is the same. The decision-making processes we have here are the same. And, as I said earlier, what has an impact is the actual action that takes place afterwards, because a lot of the recommendations that we make are based on enabling conditions that governments put in place, to bring in place sustainability actions and so on. When governments are not doing that, especially major economic drivers, then the whole system suffers.

CB: When you were appointed as chair of IPBES more than two years ago, you said that your aim was to strengthen cohesion and impact and also get the findings of IPBES in front of more people. So how would you rate your progress on this now that it’s been about a couple of years?

DO: Well, like any intergovernmental process, we have a certain amount of inertia in what we do and it takes a few years to consult on topics for assessments and then to do them and to improve them and get them out. 

One of the main things we’re discussing right now is we have had a rolling work programme from when IPBES started until 2030 and we need to decide on the last few deliverables and how we work in that period. We are asking for a mandate to spend the next year really considering the multiple options that we have in proposing a way forward for the last few years of this work programme. I feel that the countries are very aligned. We have done a lot of work, produced a lot of outputs. It is challenging for governments and other stakeholders to read our assessments and reach into them to find what’s useful to them. They make constant calls for more support, in uptake, in capacity building and in policy support.

The second global assessment in 2028 will be our 17th assessment [overall]. We would like to focus on really bringing all this knowledge together across assessments in ways that are relevant to different governments, different stakeholder groups, different networks to help them reach into the knowledge that’s in the assessments. And I think the governments, of course, want that as well, because many of them are calling for it. Many of the governments that support us financially, of course, want to see a return of investment on the money that they have put in.

CB: Nations agreed to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. Back in 2023 we had a conversation for Carbon Brief and you said that you were “highly doubtful” this goal could be achieved for every ecosystem by that date. Where do you stand on this now?

DO: I work on coral reefs and part of the reason I’ve come to IPBES platform is because the amount of climate change we’re committed to with current fossil fuel emissions and the focus on economic growth means that corals will continue to decline 20, 30, 40 years into the future. I think of that there’s no real doubt. The question is how soon we put in place the right actions to halt climate change. That will then have a lag on how long it takes for corals to cope with that amount of climate change.

We can’t halt and reverse the decline of every ecosystem. But we can try and bend the curve to halt and reverse the drivers of decline. So, that’s some of the economic drivers that we talk about in the nexus and transformative change assessment, the indirect drivers and the value shifts we need to have. What the Global Biodiversity Framework [GBF, a global nature agreement made in 2022] aspires to do in terms of halting and reversing biodiversity decline – we absolutely need to do that. We can do it and we can put in place the enabling conditions for that by 2030 for sure. But we won’t be able to do it fast enough at this point to halt [the loss of] all ecosystems. 

We’re now in 2026, so this is three years plus after the GBF was adopted. We still need greater action from all countries and all stakeholders and businesses and so on. That’s what we’re really pushing for in our assessments.

CB: Biodiversity loss has historically been underappreciated by world leaders. As the world continues to be gripped by geopolitical uncertainty, conflict and financial pressures, what are your thoughts on the chances of leaders addressing the issue of biodiversity loss in a meaningful way?

DO: What are the chances of addressing biodiversity loss? I mean, we have to do it. It’s really our life support system and if we only focus on immediate crises and threats and don’t pay attention to the long-term threats and crises, that only creates more short-term crises down the line, we make it harder and harder to do that. I hope that what I’m hoping we get to understand better through IPBES science, as well as others, is that we’re not just reporting on the state of biodiversity because it’s nice to have it, but it’s [because] diversity of nature is really the life support system for people. Our economies and societies fully depend on nature. If we want them to prosper and be secure into the long-term future, we have to learn how to bring the impact and dependencies of business, which is a focus of this assessment, in line with nature. And until we do that, we will just continue to magnify the potential for future crises and their impacts.

CB: You mentioned already that your expertise is in coral reefs. A report last year warned that the world has reached its first climate tipping point, that of widespread dying of warm water coral reefs. Do you agree with that statement and can you discuss the wider state of coral reefs across the world at this present moment?

DO: The report that came out last year in 2025 was a global tipping point report and it’s actually in 2023 the first one of those [was published]. I was involved in that one and we basically took what the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] has produced, which [is] compiled from the [scientific] literature [which said] that 1.5-2C was the critical range for coral reefs, where you go from losing 70-90% to 90-99% of coral reefs around the world. [It is] a bit hard to say exactly what that means. What we did was we actually reduced that range from 1.5C-2C to 1-1.5C, based on observations we’ve already made about loss of corals. In 2024, the world was 1.5C above historical conditions for one year. The IPCC number requires a 20-year average [for 1.5C to be crossed]. So, we’re not quite at the IPCC limit, but we’re very close. Also, with not putting in place fast enough emission reductions, warming will continue.

Coral reefs are very likely at a tipping point. And, so, I do agree with the statement. It means that we lose the fully connected regional, global system that coral reefs have been in the past. There will still be some coral reefs in places that have some natural protection mechanisms, whether it’s oceanographic or some levels of sedimentation in green water from rivers can help. And there’s resilience of corals as well. Some corals will be able to adapt somewhat, but not all – and not all the other species too. We will lose what we have called coral reefs up until this point. We’ll still continue to have simpler coral ecosystems into the future, but they won’t be quite the same. 

It is a crisis point and my hope is that, in coming out from the coral reef world, I can communicate that this is, this has been a crisis for coral reefs. It’s a very important ecosystem, but we don’t want it to happen to more and more and more ecosystems that support more [than] hundreds of millions and billions of people as well. Because, if we let things go that far, then, of course, we have much bigger crises on our hands.

CB: Something else you’ve spoken about before is around equity being one of the big challenges when it comes to responding to biodiversity loss. Can you explain why you think that biodiversity loss should be seen as a justice issue?

DO: Well, biodiversity loss is a justice issue because we are a part of biodiversity and – just like the loss of ecosystems and habitats and species – people live locally as well. People experience biodiversity loss in their surroundings.

The places that are most vulnerable and don’t have the income, or the assets, to either conserve biodiversity, or need to rely on it too much so they degrade it – they feel the impacts of that loss much more directly than those who do have more assets. Also, the more assets you have, the more you can import biodiversity products and benefits from somewhere else. 

So, it’s very much a justice issue, both from local levels experiencing it directly, but then also at global levels. We are part of it [biodiversity], we don’t own it. It’s a global good, or a common public good, so we need to be preserving it for all people on the planet. In that sense, there are many, many justice issues that are involved in both loss of biodiversity and how you deal with that as well.

CB: How would you say IPBES is working towards achieving greater equity in biodiversity science?

DO: One of the headline findings of our values assessment in 2022, which looked at multiple values different cultures have and different worldviews around the planet, [was that] by accommodating or considering different worldviews and different perspectives, you achieve greater equity because you’re already considering other worldviews in making decisions. 

So, that’s an important first step – just making it much more apparent and upfront that we can’t just make decisions, especially global ones, from a single worldview and the dominant one is the market economic worldview that we have. That’s very important. 

But, then, also in how we do our assessments and the knowledge systems that are incorporated in them. We integrate different knowledge systems together and try and juxtapose – or if they can be integrated, we do that, sometimes you can’t – but you just need to illustrate different worldviews and perspectives on the common issue of biodiversity loss or livelihoods or something like that. 

We hope that our conceptual framework and our values framework really help bring in this awareness of multiple cultures and multiple perspectives in the multilateral system.

CB: When this interview is published, IPBES will have released its report on business and biodiversity. What are some of the key takeaways from this?

DO: Our assessments integrate so much information that the key messages are actually, in retrospect, quite obvious in a way. One of the key findings it will say is that all businesses have impacts and dependencies on nature. 

Of course, when you think about it, of course they do. We often think, “oh, well ecotourism is dependent on nature”, but even a supermarket is dependent on nature because a lot of the produce comes from a natural system somewhere, maybe in a greenhouse or enhanced by fertiliser, but it still comes from natural systems. Any other business will have either impacts on the nature around it, or it needs tree shade outside so people can walk in and things like that. 

So, that’s one of the main findings. It’s not just certain sectors that need to respond to biodiversity loss and minimise their impacts. All sectors need to. Another finding, of course, is that it’s very differentiated depending on the type of business and type of sector. 

It’s also very differentiated in different parts of the world in terms of responsibilities and also capabilities. So small businesses, of course, have much less leeway, perhaps, to change what they’re doing, whereas big businesses do and they have more assets, so they can deal with shifts and changes much better. 

It’s a methodological assessment, rather than assessing the state of businesses, or the state of nature in relation to businesses [and] they pull together a huge list of methodologies and tools and things that businesses can access and do to understand their impacts and dependencies and act on them. Then [there is] also guidance and advice for governments on how to enable businesses to do that with the right incentives and regulations and so on. In that sense, it helps bring knowledge together into a single place. 

It has been fantastic to see the parallel programme that the UK government has organised [at the IPBES meeting in Manchester]. It has brought together a huge range of British businesses and consultancies and so on that help businesses understand their impacts on nature. There’s a huge thirst. 

To some extent, I would have thought, with so much capacity already in some of these organisations, what would they learn from our assessments? But they’re really hungry to see the integration. They really want to see that this really does make a big difference, that others will do the same, that the government will really support moving in these directions. There’s a huge amount of effort in the findings coming out and I’m sure that that will be felt all around the world and in different countries in different ways.

CB: As we’re speaking now, you’re still in the midst of figuring out exactly what the report will say and going through line-by-line to figure this out. Something we’ve seen at other negotiations…has been these entrenched views from countries on certain key issues. And one thing I did notice in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin discussion of yesterday’s [4 February] negotiations was that it said that some delegations wanted to remove mentions of climate change from the report. Has this been a key sticking point here or have there been any difficulties from countries during these negotiations?

DO: The nature of these multilateral negotiations is that the science is, in a way, a central body of work that is built through consensus of bringing all this knowledge together. It’s almost like a centralising process. And, yes, different countries have different perspectives on what their priorities are and the messages they want to see or not. 

We still, of course, deal with different positions from countries. What we hope to do is to be able to convene it so that we see that we serve the countries best by having the most unbiased reporting of what the science is saying in language that is accessible to and useful to policymakers, rather than not having language or not having mention of things in in the agreed text.

How it’ll work out, I don’t know. Each time is different from the others. I think one of the key things that’s really important for us is that you do have different governance tracks on different aspects of the world we deal in. So, the [UN] Sustainable Development Goals, as well [as negotiations] on climate change – the UNFCCC, the climate convention, is the governing body for that. There’s two goals on nature – the Convention on Biological Diversity and other multilateral agreements are the institutions that govern that part. 

We have come from a nature-based perspective, with nature’s contributions to a good quality of life for people…We start in the nature goals, but we actually have content that relates to all the other goals. We need to consider climate impacts on nature, or climate impacts on people that affect how they use nature. The nexus assessment was, in a way, a mini SDG report. It looked at six different Sustainable Development Goals. 

We try and make sure that while on the institutional mechanisms, certain countries may try and want us to report within our mandate on nature, we do have findings that relate to climate change that relate to income and poverty and food production and health systems [and] that we need to report [outwardly] so that people are aware of those and they can use those in decision-making contexts. 

That’s a difficult discussion and every time it comes out a little bit differently. But we hope we move the agenda further towards 2030 in the SDGs. We have an indivisible system that we need to report on.

CB: The next UN biodiversity summit COP17 is taking place later this year. What are the main outcomes you’re hoping to see at that summit?

DO: The main outcomes I would hope to see from the biodiversity summit is greater alignment across the countries. We really need to move forward on delivering on the GBF as part of the sustainable development agenda as well. So there will be a review of progress. We need acceleration of activities and impact and effectiveness, more than anything else. 

That means, of course, addressing all of the targets in the GBF. Not equally, necessarily, but they all need progress to support one another in the whole.  We work to provide the science inputs that can help deliver that through the CBD [Convention on Biological Diversity] mechanisms as well. We hope they use our assessments to the fullest and that we see good progress coming out.

CB: Great, thank you very much for your time. 

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The hot, dry and windy weather preceding the wildfires that tore through Chile and Argentina last month was made around three times more likely due to human-caused climate change. 

This is according to a rapid attribution study by the World Weather Attribution (WWA) service.

Devastating wildfires hit multiple parts of South America throughout January. 

The fires claimed the lives of 23 people in Chile and displaced thousands of people and destroyed vast areas of native forests and grasslands in both Chile and Argentina.

The authors find that the hot, dry and windy conditions that drove the “high fire danger” are expected to occur once every five years, but that these conditions would have been “rarer” in a world without climate change.

In today’s climate, rainfall intensity during the “fire season” is around 20-25% lower in the areas covered by the study than it would be in a world without human-caused emissions, the study adds.

Study author Prof Friederike Otto, professor of climate science at Imperial College London, told a press briefing:

“We’re confident in saying that the main driver of this increased fire risk is human-caused warming. These trends are projected to continue in the future as long as we continue to burn fossil fuels.”

‘Significant’ damage

The recent wildfires in Chile and Argentina have been “one of the most significant and damaging events in the region”, the report says. 

In the lead-up to the fires, both countries were gripped by intense heatwaves and droughts.

The authors analysed two regions – one in central Chile and the other in Argentine Patagonia, along the border between Argentina and Chile.

For example, in Argentina’s northern Patagonian Andes, the last recorded rainfall was in mid-November of 2025, according to the report. It adds that in early January, the region recorded 11 consecutive days of “extreme maximum temperatures”, marking the “second-longest warm spell in the past 65 years”.

Dr Juan Antonio Rivera, a researcher at the Argentine Institute of Snow Science, Glaciology and Environmental Sciences, told a WWA press briefing that these weather conditions dried out vegetation and decreased soil moisture, which meant that the fires “found abundant fuel to continue over time”.

In the northern Patagonian Andes of Argentina, wildfires started on 6 January in Puerto Patriada and spread over two national parks of Los Alerces and Lago Puelo and nearby regions. These fires remained active into the first week of February.

The fires engulfed more than 45,000 hectares of native and planted forest, shrublands and grasslands, including 75% of native forests in the village of Epuyén, notes the study.

At least 47 homes were burned, according to El País. La Nación reported that many families evacuated themselves to prevent any damage.

In south-central Chile, wildfires occurred from 17 to 19 January, affecting the Biobío, Ñuble and Araucanía regions. 

They started near Concepción city, the capital of the Biobío region, where maximum temperatures reached 26C. In the nearby city of Chillán, temperatures reached 37C. 

From there, the fires spread southwards to the coastal towns of Penco-Lirquen and Punta Parra, in the Biobío region.

The event left 23 people dead, 52,000 people displaced and more than 1,000 homes destroyed in the country, according to the study.

Inhabitants of Lirquen, in Chile, walk through the homes consumed by the flames in January 2026. Credit: UNAR Photo / Alamy Stock Photo.

These wildfires burnt more than 40,000 hectares of forests, “tripling the amount of land burned in 2025” across the country, reported La Tercera.

The study adds that more than 20,000 hectares of non-native forest plantations, including Monterey pine and Eucalyptus trees, were consumed by the blaze and critical infrastructure was affected.

A WWA press release points out that the expansion of non-native pines and invasive species “has created highly flammable landscapes in Chile”.

Hot, dry and windy

Wildfires are complex events that are influenced by a wide range of factors, such as atmospheric moisture, wind speed and fuel availability.

To assess the impact of climate change on wildfires, the authors chose a “fire weather” metric called the “hot dry windy index” (HDWI). This combines maximum temperature, relative humidity and wind speed. 

While this metric does not include every component that could contribute to intense wildfires, such as land-use change and fuel load data, study author Dr Claire Barnes from Imperial College London told a press briefing that HDWI is “a very good predictor of short-term, extreme, dry, fire-prone conditions”. 

The authors chose to analyse two separate regions. The first lies along the coast and the foothills of the Andes around the Ñuble, Biobío and La Araucanía regions in central Chile. The second sits across the Chilean and Argentine border in Patagonia. 

These regions are shown on the map below, where red circles indicate the wildfires recorded in January 2026 and pink boxes represent the study areas.

Location of forest fires in Chile and Argentina in January 2026 (red circles) and the study areas (pink boxes). Source: WWA (2026).

The authors also selected different time periods for the two study regions, to reflect the “different lengths of peak wildfire activity associated with the fires in each region”.

For the central Chilean study area, the authors focus their analysis on the two most severe days of HDWI, 17-18 January. For the Patagonian region, they focus on the most severe five-day period, which took place over 2-6 January.

To put the wildfire into its historical context, the authors analyse data on temperature, wind and rainfall to assess how HDWI over the two regions has changed since the year 1980.

They find that in both study regions, the high HWDI recorded in January is not “particularly extreme” in today’s climate and would typically be expected roughly once every five years. However, they add that the event would have been “rarer” in a world without climate change, in which average global temperatures are 1.3C cooler. 

The authors also use a combination of observations and climate models to carry out an “attribution” analysis, comparing the world as it is today to a “counterfactual” world without human-caused climate change.

They find that climate change made the high HDWI three-times more likely in the central Chilean region and 2.5-times more likely in the Patagonian region.

The authors also conduct analysis focused solely on November-January rainfall.

Both study regions experienced “very low rainfall” in the months leading up to the fires, the authors say. They find that fire-season rainfall intensity is around 25% lower in the central Chilean region and 20% lower in the Patagonia region in today’s climate than it would have been in a world without climate change.

Finally, the authors considered the influence of climatic cycles such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a naturally occurring phenomenon that affects global temperatures and regional weather patterns. 

They find that a combination of La Niña – the “cool” phase of ENSO – combined with another natural cycle called the Southern Annular Mode, led to atmospheric circulation patterns that “favoured the hot and dry conditions that enhanced fire persistence and severity in parts of the region”.

However, they add that this has a comparably small effect on the overall intensity of the wildfires, with climate change standing out as the main driver.

(These findings are yet to be published in a peer-reviewed journal. However, the methods used in the analysis have been published in previous attribution studies.)

Vulnerable communities

The wildfires affected native forests, national parks and small rural and tourist communities in both countries.

A 2025 study conducted in Chile, cited in the WWA analysis, found that 74% of survey respondents did not have appropriate education and awareness on wildfires. 

This suggests that insufficient preparedness on early warning signs, response measures and prevention can “exacerbate the severity and frequency of these events”, the WWA authors say.

Aynur Kadihasanoglu, senior urban specialist at the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Center, said in the WWA press release that many settlements in Chile are close to flammable pine plantations, which “puts lives and livelihoods at risk”.

Additionally, the head of Chile’s National Forest Corporation pointed to “structural shortcomings” in fire prevention, such as lack of regulation in lands without management plans, reported BioBioChile.

In Argentina, the response to the fires has been hampered by large budget cuts and reductions in forest rangers, according to the WWA press release. Experts have criticised Argentina’s self-styled “liberal-libertarian” president Javier Milei for the cuts and the delay to declaring a state of emergency in Patagonia. 

According to the Associated Press, “Milei slashed spending on the National Fire Management Service by 80% in 2024 compared to the previous year”. The service “faces another 71% reduction in funds” in its 2026 budget, the newswire adds.

Argentinian native forests and grasslands are experiencing “intense pressure” from wildfires, according to the study. Many vulnerable native animal species, such as the huemul and the pudú, are losing critical habitat, while birds, such as the Patagonian black woodpecker, are losing nesting sites.

Huemul deer in Argentine Patagonia, one of the vulnerable animal species to wildfires in the region. Credit: Bernardo Galmarini / Alamy Stock Photo.

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Skeptical Science is partnering with Gigafact to produce fact briefs — bite-sized fact checks of trending claims. You can submit claims you think need checking via the tipline.

Can nearby solar farms reduce property values?

Property values can decline from close proximity with utility-scale solar farms, but the losses are modest and less than from nearby fossil fuel plants.

One 2023 study of 1.8 million homes found minor impacts on property values. Homes within 0.5 miles of solar farms experienced around 1.5% price reductions; homes more than one mile away received no significant effects.

Another study of 400,000 transactions found an average value decrease of 1.7% within one mile of a solar farm. Most recently, 2025 research indicated a slightly higher decrease of 4.8% for residential property within three miles of utility-scale solar projects.

Declines largely occur in suburban areas with greater population density and thus competition for space; rural communities experience little comparable impact.

In comparison, a study of 92 plants found property value decreases of up to 7% within two miles of a fossil fuel plant.

Go to full rebuttal on Skeptical Science or to the fact brief on Gigafact

This fact brief is responsive to quotes such as this one.

Sources

Energy Policy Journal Shedding light on large-scale solar impacts: An analysis of property values and proximity to photovoltaics across six U.S. states

MIT Review of Economics and Statistics The Effect of Power Plants on Local Housing Values and Rents

Kirkland Appraisals Grandy Solar Impact Survey

University of Rhode Island PROPERTY VALUE IMPACTS OF COMMERCIAL-SCALE SOLAR ENERGY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND RHODE ISLAND

The University of Texas at Austin An Exploration of Property-Value Impacts Near Utility-Scale Solar Installations

CohnReznick Property Value Impact Study Proposed Solar Farm McLean County, IL

National Academy of Sciences Economic Sciences Journal Impact of large-scale solar on property values in the United States: Diverse effects and causal mechanisms

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The G7 major economies “f[e]ll notably behind China and the rest of the world” in 2025 as the amount of wind and solar power being developed reached a new high, according to Global Energy Monitor (GEM).

A new report from the analysts says that the amount of wind and large-scale solar capacity being built or planned around the world reached a record 4,900 gigawatts (GW) in 2025.

This “pipeline” of projects has grown by 500GW (11%) since 2024, GEM says, with the increase “predominantly” coming from developing countries. 

China alone has a pipeline of more than 1,500GW, equivalent to that of the next six countries combined: Brazil (401GW); Australia (368GW); India (234GW); the US (226GW); Spain (165GW); and the Philippines (146GW). 

In contrast, GEM says that G7 countries – the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan – represent just 520GW (11%) of the wind and solar pipeline, despite accounting for around half of global wealth.

Diren Kocakuşak, research analyst for GEM, said in a statement that G7 countries risk “ced[ing] leadership” in what is a “booming growth sector”. He added:  

“The centre of gravity for new clean power has shifted decisively toward emerging and developing economies. [In 2025] G7 countries, despite their wealth, fell notably behind China and the rest of the world in year-over-year prospective capacity growth.”

Moreover, while others have surged ahead, wind and solar plans in the G7 have remained largely unchanged since 2023, as shown in the chart below. 

Amount of wind and large-scale solar capacity being built or planned in the G7 major economies, China and the rest of the world, gigawatts, 2022-2025. Source: Global Energy Monitor.

Of the 4,900GW of projects being built or planned and tracked by GEM, 2,700GW is wind and 2,200GW is large-scale solar.

However, the rate of expansion of the global pipeline for new wind and solar has slowed from 22% in 2024 to 11% last year, GEM says, with a more pronounced drop for wind projects. It adds that this was due to political barriers and a string of failed auctions. 

For example, offshore wind subsidy auctions in Germany and the Netherlands in 2025 did not attract any bids, while an auction in Denmark was officially cancelled last year after there were no bidders at the end of 2024. 

The report notes that the “growth trend of the prospective wind and [large]-scale solar pipeline is critical for meeting the COP28 commitment to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030, as the world enters the final five years of the implementation period”.

At COP28 in 2023, countries committed to tripling renewable energy capacity globally by 2030 from an unspecified baseline, generally assumed to be 2022.

According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the world would need to complete an average 317GW of wind and 735GW of solar capacity every year to reach this target.

Some 758GW of wind and large-scale solar was under construction in 2025, GEM says, with around three-quarters of this in China and India. 

Both countries saw a reduction in the amount of electricity generated from coal last year, according to a separate recent analysis for Carbon Brief.

Note that GEM’s report predominantly uses data from its Global Solar Power Tracker and the Global Wind Power Tracker, the first of which only includes solar projects with a capacity of 1 megawatt (MW) and the latter with a capacity of 10MW or more.

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This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Daisy Simmons

When Jessica Fujii was in kindergarten, she drew a picture of her future. In a “What do you want to be when you grow up?” booklet, she skipped ballerina and veterinarian and wrote down something else entirely: sea otter biologist, complete with cartoon-like otters in the great tide pool at the Monterey Bay Aquarium.

Fujii grew up in California’s Bay Area, and trips to Monterey and its aquarium became a regular part of her childhood. She remembers paddling alongside her dad in a kayak on Monterey Bay, watching wild otters float on their backs as they cracked open crabs and let the shells sink. Back then, she mostly took their presence for granted.

Today, as a sea otter researcher and program manager at the aquarium, she knows how close California came to losing them – and how much now depends on the fragile population that remains. Along Northern California’s coasts, sea otters help habitats endure climate impacts like warming oceans, shifting predator ranges, and harmful algal blooms by keeping underwater plant life healthy and supporting resilient ecosystems.

Fujii is still focused on individual sea otters, but she’s also tracking a bigger picture of these important creatures over time. 

A comeback story with a twist

From Fujii’s vantage point on Monterey Bay, southern sea otters – the subspecies that lives along the central California coast – are both a conservation success story and a reminder of what’s been lost.

Once hunted to near extinction for their fur, they survived off the coast of California thanks to a tiny remnant population and, later, federal protections and hands?on conservation work. These days, there are only about 3,000 southern sea otters in California, and their geographical range has shrunk to roughly 13% of the coastline they historically occupied. Their numbers have been relatively steady for years, but their range hasn’t meaningfully expanded in about two decades.

Globally, sea otters live in coastal waters from Alaska across the North Pacific to Russia, but the southern sea otter is the only population found in California – and it’s the one scientists have studied most closely for its role in kelp forests, sea grass meadows, and coastal wetlands. And over the past several decades, scientists have learned that these animals punch far above their weight, especially along the nearshore strip where land and ocean meet.

From cuddly to keystone predator

It’s easy to see why sea otters are often treated like stuffed animals brought to life. Fujii describes a tiny, five?pound pup as “basically a furball … it’s kind of like holding a kitten” before their teeth and jaws develop.

(Image credit: Courtesy Monterey Bay Aquarium)

But the illusion only lasts so long. One longtime aquarium volunteer said he “wouldn’t want to be stuck in a pool with an adult otter.” It’s a good reminder that beneath the fluff is a muscular predator built to crush crabs and urchins.

Ecologists describe sea otters as a classic keystone species, an animal whose presence has much bigger impacts on its surroundings than its numbers alone would suggest. Unlike many other marine mammals, sea otters don’t have a thick layer of blubber to keep them warm. Instead, they rely on extremely dense fur and a very high metabolic rate. 

“It’s about two times higher than similarly sized terrestrial mammals,” Fujii said, and because they can’t store energy as blubber, they need to be consuming those calories every single day.

That constant need to eat – up to a quarter of their body weight daily – helps explain why their foraging makes them major players in nearshore ecosystems. What, and how much, they eat ripples outward through food webs, shaping whether the coast is dominated by thick underwater forests and meadows, or by stripped-down, degraded seafloors that are more vulnerable to climate pressures.

Keeping kelp forests alive in a warming ocean

In recent years, a prolonged bout of unusually warm ocean conditions – made more likely and more intense by climate change – has caused kelp forests to crash along much of California, leaving behind vast “urchin barrens” where little grows besides hungry purple urchins. Around Monterey Bay, though, researchers found that sea otters ramped up their urchin eating in the remaining kelp beds, allowing those last patches of forest to hang on.

Left unchecked, urchins can mow down kelp beds and turn lush underwater forests into places where urchins have grazed away almost all the kelp. When otters are present and hunting, they thin out those urchins, giving kelp a chance to grow taller and thicker and to shelter a wide range of fish, invertebrates, and other marine life.

“Across much of their range, when sea otters consume urchins, they keep that population under control and limit how much grazing the urchins are doing on the kelp,” Fujii said. “That allows the kelp to flourish and be more abundant and provide homes for many other species.”

A recent study stitched together more than a century of kelp data along the California coast using old maps and satellite images. The analysis found steep losses in the floating kelp canopy in southern and northern regions where otters remain absent, but notable long?term growth in kelp along the Central Coast – exactly where sea otter populations have rebounded.

Healthy kelp forests, in turn, absorb wave energy and soften the punch of storms that are projected to grow more intense with climate change, reducing erosion along vulnerable shorelines. Scientists are still debating how much long?term carbon storage kelp forests actually provide, said Fujii, since much of that kelp washes ashore and decomposes.

But when otters keep kelp alive, they also maintain rich, complex coastal ecosystems that are better able to absorb climate shocks than bare seafloors.

In Elkhorn Slough, cleaning up blue carbon habitats

The otter’s climate story doesn’t end in the open?coast kelp forests. As the ocean absorbs more than 90% of the excess heat from climate warming pollution and loses oxygen, many marine animals are struggling to cope with warmer, more acidic, less hospitable water. Coastal plants and algae – kelp, eelgrass, and other seaweeds – are emerging as unlikely allies, drawing down carbon, buffering waves, and giving stressed species places to hide and feed.

In sheltered estuaries like Elkhorn Slough, a coastal inlet where freshwater meets seawater just inland from Monterey Bay, researchers have found that sea otters can help keep underwater sea grass meadows and nearby marshes intact. Around a hundred otters now make their home in the slough, one of California’s last great coastal wetlands and a hot spot for birds, fish, and other marine life.

The connection runs through the food web: Otters eat crabs. When crab numbers drop, tiny grazers like sea slugs survive and multiply. These grazers don’t eat the sea grass; instead, they scrape away algae that builds up on the grass blades. That keeps the meadows healthy even in estuaries loaded with pollution from fertilizers and other runoff.

The marsh connection works differently. When shore crab numbers explode, the crabs burrow into marsh banks and chew on plant roots. That destabilizes shorelines and speeds up erosion. By eating those crabs, otters slow the loss of marsh edges that protect nearby communities from flooding and storm surge.

All of this matters for climate because sea grass beds and adjacent marshes are “blue carbon” habitats – coastal ecosystems that soak up and lock away carbon in plants and underlying sediments while also stabilizing shorelines and supporting fish and birds. California’s latest climate adaptation strategy explicitly calls out eelgrass as a blue?carbon tool, part of a broader push to protect and restore coastal ecosystems that both store carbon and buffer people from rising seas.

(Image credit: Courtesy Monterey Bay Aquarium)

Climate’s double edge: Ally and victim

Despite all the ways otters support coastal ecosystems, they’re not immune to the forces reshaping those places. Fujii and her colleagues have documented a sharp rise in sea otters injured or killed by white sharks – often juveniles that deliver a single, exploratory bite and don’t even eat the animal. Research she worked on has linked those juvenile sharks’ northward shift to warmer waters, a trend expected to continue as the ocean heats up. Aquarium researchers have also found that otters are more likely to be bitten in areas where the kelp canopy has thinned, potentially leaving them more exposed as they rest and forage near the surface.

At the same time, says Fujii, sea otters are increasingly exposed to harmful algal blooms that produce domoic acid, a harmful toxin. In otters, heavy exposure can cause sudden, fatal strandings, while lower?level, chronic doses can quietly damage their hearts over time, leading to lethal heart disease years after an initial bloom has passed. Fujii also worries about more frequent and intense storms, which can separate moms and pups and leave tiny, still?dependent otters stranded on beaches.

The species is bolstering coastal ecosystems against climate pressures, while facing mounting climate threats of its own.

Why protecting sea otters matters for everyone

In 2023, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service decided southern sea otters would retain protection under the Endangered Species Act, reflecting how vulnerable the population still is. Unlike many other listed species, though, they still don’t have an officially designated “critical habitat,” even though their nearshore environment is clearly central to their survival.

Without more room to grow or formal habitat protections, even a seemingly stable population can be vulnerable. 

“As we continue to see the impacts of climate change, the stress on this population will continue to pile on,” Fujii said.

Even if they were immune to the impacts of climate change, sea otters clearly won’t solve the climate crisis on their own. They won’t erase emissions or single-handedly save the coast. But research over the past several decades has shown that they can shift the balance in the places they still inhabit, keeping kelp forests from collapsing into urchin barrens, maintaining sea grass meadows and salt marshes, and shoring up natural defenses that coastal communities will increasingly rely on as seas rise and storms intensify.

All this makes them more than just a charismatic species in need of saving. 

“The hope is that by focusing on the recovery of this species, we can inspire protection of other animals and their habitats, and recognize the benefits people get when we protect those places,” Fujji said. “Basically, everyone wins when we protect otters.”

In a century defined by hard climate trade-offs, sea otters offer a reminder that some choices still deliver genuine win – wins: safeguard a beloved predator, and you safeguard the coastal habitats – and human communities – that depend on the same resilient, living shorelines.

The “undervaluing” of nature by businesses is fuelling its decline and putting the global economy at risk, according to a major new report.

An assessment from the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) outlines more than 100 actions for measuring and reducing impacts on nature across business, government, financial institutions and civil society. 

A co-chair of the assessment says that nature loss is one of the most “serious threats” to businesses, but the “twisted reality is that it often seems more profitable to businesses to degrade biodiversity than to protect it”. 

The “business and biodiversity” report says that global “finance flows” of more than $7tn (£5.1tn) had “direct negative impacts on nature” in 2023. 

The new findings were put together by 79 experts from around the world over the course of three years, in what IPBES described as a “fast-track” assessment. 

IPBES is an independent body that gives scientific advice to policymakers about biodiversity and ecosystems. 

This is the “first report of its kind” to provide guidance on how businesses can contribute to 2030 nature goals, says IPBES executive secretary Dr Luthando Dziba in a statement. 

Below, Carbon Brief explains four key findings from the “summary for policymakers” (SPM), which outlines the main messages of the report.

The full report is due to be released in the coming months after final edits are made. 

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1. Businesses both depend on, and harm, nature
2. Current practices ‘do not support’ efforts to halt and reverse biodiversity loss
3. Businesses can act now to address their impacts on nature
4. Government policies can drive a ‘just and sustainable future’ for nature and people

1. Businesses both depend on, and harm, nature

Businesses of all sizes rely on nature in one way or another, says the report. 

The SPM outlines that biodiversity provides many of the goods and services businesses need, such as raw materials from the environment or controlled water flows to reduce flooding during wet seasons and provide water in dry seasons. 

Biodiversity also “underpins genetic diversity” that informs the development of products in many industries, including pharmaceuticals and cosmetics.

Individual businesses often do not address their impacts and dependencies on nature, “in part due to their lack of awareness”, the SPM says. 

They also often do not have the data or knowledge to “quantify their impacts on dependencies on biodiversity and much of the relevant scientific literature is not written for a business audience”, the report claims. It adds: 

“Lack of transparency across value chains, including of the risks and opportunities related to the sustainability of resource extraction, use, reuse and waste management, is a further barrier to action.” 

The report says it is well established that businesses depend on biodiversity, but also that the actions of businesses “continue to drive declines in biodiversity and nature’s contributions to people”. 

(IPBES says it uses terms such as well established to express “how assured experts are about the findings”. Well established findings, the highest level of confidence, have significant evidence and high agreement behind them. The three other terms used in IPBES reports are: unresolved (a lot of evidence but low agreement), established but incomplete (limited evidence but good agreement) and inconclusive (limited or no evidence and little agreement).)

The report notes that the size of a business “does not always reflect the magnitude of its impacts”, with companies in sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, electricity, energy and mining having “relatively high” direct impacts on nature.

A “failure” to account for nature as the economy has expanded over the past two centuries has “led to its degradation and unprecedented rates of biodiversity loss”, the SPM says. It adds:  

“The decline in biodiversity and nature’s contributions to people has become a critical systemic risk threatening the economy, financial stability and human wellbeing with implications for human rights.”

It is well established that nature loss as a result of “unsustainable use” threatens the “ability of businesses, local economies and whole sectors to function”, the report details. 

These risks and others – such as extreme weather events and critical changes to Earth systems – are “among the highest-ranked global risks over the next 10 years”, it adds. 

The SPM notes further that it is well established that risks around climate change and biodiversity loss “may interact to amplify social and economic impacts”. 

These risks have “disproportionate impacts on developing countries whose economies are more reliant on biodiversity and have more limited technical and financial capacity to absorb shocks”, the report adds. 

2. Current practices ‘do not support’ efforts to halt and reverse biodiversity loss

The SPM says that it is well established that current political and economic practices “perpetuate business as usual and do not support the transformative change required to halt and reverse biodiversity loss”.

These practices have “commonly ignored or undervalued biodiversity, creating tension between business actions and the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity”, the report continues.

For example, the report says there is established but incomplete evidence that “time pressures on decision-making and timescales for investment returns and reporting by businesses – with an emphasis on quarterly earnings or annual reporting – are shorter than many ecological cycles”.

This prevents businesses from “adequately” considering nature loss in decision-making, says the SPM.

There is well established evidence that businesses fail to assign adequate value to “biodiversity and many of nature’s contributions to people, such as filtration of pollutants, climate regulation and pollination”, it continues.

As a result, “businesses bear little or no financial cost for negative impacts and may not generate revenue from positive impacts on biodiversity”, leading to “insufficient incentives for businesses to act to conserve, restore or sustainably use biodiversity”.

Prof Stephen Polasky, co-chair of the assessment and a professor of ecological and environmental economics at the University of Minnesota, said in a statement:

“The loss of biodiversity is among the most serious threats to business. Yet the twisted reality is that it often seems more profitable to businesses to degrade biodiversity than to protect it. Business as usual may once have seemed profitable in the short term, but impacts across multiple businesses can have cumulative effects, aggregating to global impacts, which can cross ecological tipping points.”

It is well established that policies from governments can “further accelerate biodiversity decline”, the SPM says.

It notes that, in 2023, global public and private financial spending with direct negative impacts on nature was estimated at $7.3tn.

This figure includes public subsidies that are harmful to nature (around $2.4tn) and private investment in high-impact sectors ($4.9tn), says the report.

Industries harmful to nature include fossil-fuel extraction, mining, deforestation and large-scale meat farming and fishing.

In contrast, just $220bn in public and private finance was directed to activities that contribute to protecting and sustainably using nature in 2023, adds the report.

(In recognition of the need to address public spending on activities that are destructive to nature, countries agreed to reduce biodiversity-harming subsidies by at least $500bn by 2030 as part of a global pact made in 2022.)

There are additional “barriers to action” facing businesses, ranging from challenging social norms to a lack of capacity, data or technology. These are summarised in the table below. 

Barriers preventing businesses from taking action on biodiversity loss. Credit: SPM.4, IPBES (2026)

“These barriers do not affect all actors equally and may disproportionately affect small and medium-sized businesses and financial institutions in developing countries,” adds the report.

3. Businesses can act now to address their impacts on nature  

The SPM says it is well established that the “transformative change” required to halt and reverse biodiversity loss requires action from “all businesses”. 

However, the report continues that it is also well established that the current level of business action is “insufficient” to deliver this “transformative change”. This is, in part, because the “enabling environment is missing”, it says.

IPBES says all businesses have a responsibility to act, even if this responsibility is not shared “evenly”.

“Priority actions” that businesses should take differ depending on the size of the firm, the sector in which it operates in, as well as the company structure and its “relationship with biodiversity”, the report notes. 

The exact actions businesses should pursue also depends on companies’ “degree of control and influence over stakeholders”, it says.

According to the report, firms can act across four “decision-making levels” – corporate, operations, value chain and portfolio – to measure and address impacts on biodiversity. 

(“Corporate” refers to decisions focused on overarching strategy, governance and direction of the business; “operations” to day-to-day activities; “value chain” to the system and resources required to move a product or service from supplier to customer; and “portfolio” to investments and business assets).

The SPM sets out a series of examples for how businesses can act across all four levels. These are summarised in the table below.

Actions that businesses can take now to address their impacts and dependencies. Credit: SPM.2, IPBES (2026).

At a corporate level, the report notes that firms can establish ambitious governance and frameworks that can then have a ripple effect across the other levels, according to the report. This includes the integration of biodiversity commitments and targets into corporate strategy.

The SPM says that corporate biodiversity targets are “most effective” when they are aligned with “national and global biodiversity objectives” and “take into consideration a business’s impacts and dependencies on biodiversity and nature’s contributions to people”. 

At an operations level, businesses should focus on ensuring that their operations are located and managed in a way that benefits biodiversity, IPBES says. Environmental and social impact assessments and management plans that are supported by “credible monitoring of both actions and biodiversity outcomes” can underpin this effort, the SPM notes. 

It says it is well established that using the “mitigation hierarchy” framework can help businesses deliver “lasting outcomes on the ground”. (The framework guides users towards limiting as far as possible the negative impacts on biodiversity from development projects by first avoiding, then minimising, restoring and offsetting impacts.)

Next, the report notes there are actions businesses can take to drive change within its broader spheres of influence, including suppliers, retailers, consumers and peers within industry. This is important, the SPM notes, as significant impacts and dependencies on biodiversity and nature “accrue” across the lifecycle of products or services, especially those that rely on raw materials. 

The report notes there is established but incomplete evidence that efforts to “map” company value chains and improve traceability by linking products and materials to suppliers, locations and impacts can help “identify risks and prioritise actions”. 

While noting that “mapping” beyond direct suppliers “often remains challenging” for businesses, the report adds:

“Examples at the corporate and value chain levels exist, such as companies in the chocolate industry that have made advances in recording biodiversity dependencies to improve business decisions through full traceability of materials and improved supplier control mechanisms.”

Elsewhere, the SPM notes that there is also established but incomplete evidence that consumer-focused measures – such as product labelling, education and incentives – can “shape behaviour and improve transparency”. However, it cautions that the effectiveness of these strategies is “constrained by consumer scepticism, certification costs and business models reliant on unsustainable consumption”.

The SPM also highlights that, at a “portfolio” level, financial institutions can shift finance away from harmful activities – for instance, companies whose products drive deforestation – and towards business activities with positive impacts for biodiversity and nature.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Matt Jones, co-chair of the report, explains the rationale behind including options for how businesses can address biodiversity impacts in the document:

“Businesses and governments in different countries are coming at this from a very different perspective. So we can’t present a set of really prescriptive ‘how tos’…but we can present a huge number of options for action that businesses, governments, financial institutions and civil society and other actors can all take.”

Elsewhere, the report says it is well established that “robust, transparent and credible reporting of actions and outcomes” is required to “inspire others”.

4. Government policies can drive a ‘just and sustainable future’ for nature and people

Both governments and financial institutions can set policies and create incentives to protect biodiversity and stem its decline, says the SPM.

According to the report, the types of policies that governments can put in place that have an influence over business include:

• Fiscal policies, such as subsidies and taxes.
• Land use or marine spatial planning and zoning, such as designating new national parks or areas protected for nature.
• Permitting for business activities that affect nature – for example, by requiring environmental impact assessments.
• Public procurement policy (rules for how governments purchase goods and services).
• Controls on advertising and the creation of standards to prevent “greenwashing”.

Governments can also promote action through paying for ecosystem services, creating environmental markets and through “multilateral benefit-sharing mechanisms”, which set out rules for ensuring profits from nature are shared equally, says the SPM.

It says this includes the Cali Fund, a fund that businesses can voluntarily pay into after reaping benefits from genetic resources found in biodiverse countries.

(The fund was agreed in 2024 with expectations that it could generate up to billions of dollars for conservation, but it has so far only attracted $1,000.)

Governments could also promote action by phasing out or reforming subsidies that are harmful for nature, as well as fostering positive incentives, according to the report.

Overall, governments can work with other actors to create an “enabling environment” to “incentivise actions that are beneficial for businesses, biodiversity and society for a just and sustainable future”, says the SPM. It adds:

“Creation of an enabling environment that provides incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and nature’s contributions to people could align what is profitable with what is good for biodiversity and society.

“Creating this enabling environment would result in businesses and financial institutions being positive agents of change in transforming to a just and sustainable economic system, by addressing their impacts on biodiversity loss, climate change and pollution, which are all interconnected.”

Cropped 28 January 2026: Ocean biodiversity boost; Nature and national security; Mangrove defence

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Climate emergency briefing: Impacts, risks and key actions 
for Australia in the age of authoritarianism 
is published today by the Breakthrough 
National Centre for Climate Restoration. 

by David Spratt, first published at Pearls&Irritations

The global rise of authoritarianism is weakening climate governance just as warming accelerates and tipping points draw near. This failure now poses a direct threat to our future.

Authoritarianism is stalking nations and global institutions, often allied with climate scepticism and denial. This has weakened climate governance, most notably in the United States. In Russia and the Middle East oil and gas producers, climate denial-and-delay and authoritarianism co-mingle.  And climate barely rated a mention at Davos this year.

China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, is a complex contradiction. China produces over 80 per cent of the world’s solar panels, 60-70 per cent of wind turbines, and three-quarters of energy storage batteries, and accounted for approximately 60 per cent of all new global renewable energy capacity installed globally in 2024.

Last year, China added more new capacity across all energy technologies than India’s total capacity as of the end of 2024, and the generation capacity China has added since the end of 2021 is larger than the entire US energy system. Renewables lead the growth in energy supply in China, but 78 gigawatts of new coal was also added in 2025. Oil production is projected to be flat to 2050, but gas will increase more than 60 per cent from 2020 to 2050, while coal use will remain high till 2030 then decline sharply to about 30-40 per cent of current levels by 2050.

Thirty-two fossil fuel companies were responsible for half of the global carbon dioxide emissions in 2024 and state-owned fossil fuel producers made up 17 of the top 20 emitters. All 17 are controlled by countries, in the main authoritarian, that oppose a proposed fossil-fuel phaseout.

All of this is very challenging and has direct implications for climate action. Yet the rise of authoritarianism means the globalisation cargo cult is on the wane. The World Trade Organization was no match for Trump’s tariff assault. These abrupt changes open up some possibilities.

The era of neo-liberalism and economic globalisation has eroded democratic politics. Now, the rise in nationalist politics has brought down the curtain on unfettered globalisation and the illusions that global institutions (such as the IMF, World Bank and UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, for example) have delivered on their promises. There have been 30 global climate policy-making COP conferences since 1995 – where petrostates have veto power – and the rate of warming has just accelerated by half.

Many nations had abandoned the right to determine their economic future and handed huge power to global corporations, facilitated tax avoidance structures, failed to regulate the finance sector and enabled institutions such as the World Trade Organization.

Global governance organisations have been hypocritical and selective in wielding power. Neo-liberalism’s fetish with market efficiency, deregulation and lower taxes has weakened the role of governments, and produced an unprecedented redistribution of wealth to the elites at the expense of everyone else. This has been the major breeding ground for political resentment amongst the working poor, and for the rise of authoritarianism.

It is now clear that, as bankers and economists such as Ross Garnaut and Nicholas Stern and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney have recognised, the inability of markets to fully assess the risks of, and respond adequately to, the threat of climate collapse is the greatest market failure in history. Governments must take the lead in correcting this huge economic distortion. There is an opportunity for governments to assert the right, and necessity, of their role in defending our future by courageous leadership and incisive interventions, before it is too late.

By abandoning failed global mechanisms and coercive controls, there is a new chance for nations to forge bilateral and regional agreements on climate action and other issues that reflect much higher ambition, rather than lowest-common-denominator compromises. The Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney referred directly to this moment for middle powers in his Davos speech.

Like-minded countries can make real progress on climate mitigation by putting a climate focus on trade and security arrangements. Actions such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism in Europe, and proposals for a climate-first foreign policy, as proposed by the Australian Security Leaders Climate Group (ASLCG), are examples. So, too, is the growing movement for a high-ambition fossil-fuel phase-out alliance amongst like-minded nations, which sprung from the failure of COP30.

The ASLCG has proposed a climate-first foreign policy grounded in an emergency response, with a “commitment to deep cooperation with nations that prioritise climate disruption risks, with climate-focused agreements on tax, trade, technology, finance, equity and the like” and “diplomatic leadership in high-ambition alliances, such as agreements to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and international financing, to phase out the fossil fuel economy, and for economic climate mobilisation."

Global heating is accelerating, with the past three years averaging above 1.5°C, driven by a reduction in sulfate aerosol emissions due to clean-air policies, and a related cloud feedback. The Earth’s climate could be more sensitive to greenhouse gases than the central estimates, and warming is currently tracking the highest-emissions scenario. This would bring 2°C well before 2050 and 3°C around 2070. On this path, 4°C by 2100 is feasible.

Many extreme events and their impacts have been underestimated in climate models. Risks include climate-driven inflation and big economic shocks, and mass displacement and death.

We are in the danger zone where multiple climate tipping points are being triggered, some of which accelerate warming and worsen impacts. Thus there is a point of no return, after which it may be impossible to stabilise the climate close to conditions in which human society can be maintained. This risk is now, and requires immediate action to avoid it.

The nature and the proximity of catastrophic impacts, tipping points and abrupt and cascading changes constitute the climate emergency. This requires governments to make actions to prevent climate breakdown the first priority of economics and politics.

There is a new opportunity for middle powers to step up, and for governments to lead, in the face of climate threats of a scale that now makes civilisational collapse a realistic scenario.

When societies face existential threats, they can act fast – as we see in wartime mobilisation, disaster recovery, pandemics and economic reconstruction. In democratic nations, these responses often harness public institutions, cross-party mandates, and mass civic participation not only to speed action, but to preserve legitimacy and fairness under pressure.

In these moments, governments have suspended normal timelines, restructured economies, and coordinated resources at massive scale to achieve national objectives.

Emergency mobilisation is not about panic but about priority and activating all available capacities toward a common goal, removing bottlenecks and bypassing market failure. Emergency mode is a shift in governance, mindset, and tempo. It replaces fragmented reform with coordinated transformation.

The tools exist. The capacity exists.

What has been missing is the decision to act.

Climate emergency briefing: Impacts, risks and key actions for Australia in the age of authoritarianism is published today by the Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration. 

 

A listing of 29 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, February 1, 2026 thru Sat, February 7, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Policy and Politics (11 articles)

• Flawed economic models mean climate crisis could crash global economy, experts warn "States and financial bodies using modelling that ignores shocks from extreme weather and climate tipping points" The Guardian, Damian Carrington, Feb 4, 2025.
• ‘That ends now’: German court ruling raises pressure to fix stalled climate plans "The ruling ends a nearly two-year long legal battle and requires the German government to act." euronews, Craig Saueurs, Jan 30, 2026.
• A Secret Panel to Question Climate Science Was Unlawful, Judge Rules "The researchers produced a report that was central in a Trump administration effort to stop regulating climate pollution." The New York Times, Lisa Friedman, Jan 30, 2026.
• The future of NCAR remains highly uncertain "Members of the American Meteorological Society were briefed Wednesday (Jan 28) about ongoing developments on the future of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, which the White House has said it will break up." Yale Climate Connections, Bob Henson, Jan 30, 2026.
• Fossil fuel firms may have to pay for climate damage under proposed UN tax "Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation could also force ultra-rich to pay global wealth tax" The Guardian, Fiona Harvey & Heather Stewart, Feb 1, 2026.
• Trump’s climate policy rollback plan relies on EPA rescinding its 2009 endangerment finding – but will courts allow it? The Conversation US, Gary W. Yohe, Feb 2, 2026.
• Trump claims blue states have less-reliable, more expensive electricity. Here’s the reality CNN, Ella Nilsen, Feb 2, 2026.
• DOE scientists blasted climate report ordered up by boss "Secretary Chris Wright handpicked five climate contrarians to write about global warming. Department experts pushed back on the findings." E&E News by Politico, Scott Waldman, Feb 2, 2026.
• More Coal Won't Solve US Energy Woes World Resources Institute (WRI), Lori Bird, David Widawsky & Alex Smith , Feb 2, 2026.
• ‘It’s sick’: Trump administration uses mascot called ‘Coalie’ to push dirtiest fossil fuel "Cartoon lump of coal with giant eyes was spotlighted by US interior secretary in X post saying: ‘Mine, Baby, Mine!’ " The Guardian, Oliver Milman, Feb 3, 2026.
• Michigan accuses big oil of being ‘cartel’ that fuels climate crisis and high energy costs "In first-of-its-kind complaint, state accused four fossil fuel majors and US oil lobbying group of climate disinformation" The Guardian, Dharna Noor, Feb 5, 2026.

Climate Change Impacts (5 articles)

• Something Dark Is Growing on Greenland’s Ice. And Melting It Faster. "New studies show how algae grows on ice and snow, creating “dark zones” that exacerbate melting in the consequential region." The New York Times, Sachi Kitajima Mulkey, Jan 3, 2026.
• Why do we still get major snowstorms in a warming world? "A huge US winter storm has reignited confusion about the polar vortex, the jet stream and what climate change really means for winter weather" BBC Science Focus, Tom Howarth, Jan 29, 2026.
• Extreme heat, cold and rainfall make January a month of extremes. "The importance of accurate and timely forecasts and investment in early warning systems has once again been highlighted by extreme weather which wreaked a heavy economic, environmental and human toll throughout January 2026." World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Staff, Jan 30, 2026.
• Why this US cold snap feels bone-shattering when it’s not record-shattering Seth Borenstein & AP News, Seth Borenstein & E.K. Wildeman, Feb 3, 2026.
• Climate ‘fingerprints’ mark human activity from the top of the atmosphere to the bottom of the ocean The Conversation (Europe), Ed Hawkins and Ric Williams, Feb 3, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (5 articles)

• AI Is Making The Climate Crisis Worse. It Could Also Help Fix It. "The data-center boom is driving new emissions while straining energy and water resources. But scientists say AI can also be a massive asset in facing the climate emergency head-on." Atmos, Jake Hall, Jan 26, 2026.
• The accidental climate scientist who uncovered an unexpected force of global warming CNN, Katie Hunt, Jan 29, 2026.
• Unexpected Climate Feedback Links Antarctic Ice Sheet With Reduced Carbon Uptake "New study reveals surprising link between West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) retreat and algae growth over the past 500,000 years." Columbia Climate School, Staff, Feb 2, 2026.
• A new and better way to keep tabs on El Niño and La Niña "Developed in response to a warming world, NOAA’s revised scale more precisely identifies which episodes are likely to have the biggest impacts." Yale Climate Connections, Bob Henson, Feb 5, 2026.
• MethaneSAT Releases First Global Assessment of Oil and Gas Climate Pollution "Nearly a year after the Environmental Defense Fund lost contact with an $88 million satellite, data from the spacecraft reveal higher-than-expected methane emissions from the oil and gas industry." Inside Climate News, Martha Pskowski, & Phil McKenna, Feb 6, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 articles)

• ‘Doomsday Glacier’ is melting faster than we thought. Can a 150-metre wall stop it flooding Earth? "The ‘Doomsday Glacier’ already contributes four per cent of annual sea level rise, but can the consequences of climate change be barricaded off?" euronews, Liam Gilliver, Feb 4, 2026.
• Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025 "Solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment."Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025 Carbon Brief, Lauri Myllyvirta & Belinda Schaepe, Feb 5, 2026.

International Climate Conferences and Agreements (2 articles)

• Amazon deforestation may rise 30% as major traders exit historic soy pact Mongabay, Fernanda Wenzel, Feb 2, 2026.
• Exclusive: EU rethinks climate diplomacy after bruising COP30 summit, document shows Reuters, Kate Abnett, Feb 4, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #05 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, January 25, 2026 thru Sat, January 31, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler, John Hartz and Doug Bostrom, Feb 01, 2026.
• This Week in Climate News (February 2026, Week 1) Earth.org, Staff, Feb 6, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

• ‘Emotional traps’ and fake experts: How to spot climate disinformation in 2026 "As the threat of climate change accelerates, the EU has strengthened its commitment to fight disinformation." euronews, Liam Gilliver, Jan 30, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 article)

• Fact brief - Can solar projects improve biodiversity? Yes - Solar projects do not inherently reduce biodiversity, and when designed with best practices, they can sustain or even increase local wildlife and plant diversity. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, Feb 03, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week Secrets and layoffs

UNLAWFUL PANEL: A federal judge ruled that the US energy department “violated the law when secretary Chris Wright handpicked five researchers who rejected the scientific consensus on climate change to work in secret on a sweeping government report on global warming”, reported the New York Times. The newspaper explained that a 1972 law “does not allow agencies to recruit or rely on secret groups for the purposes of policymaking”. A Carbon Brief factcheck found more than 100 false or misleading claims in the report. 

DARKNESS DESCENDS: The Washington Post reportedly sent layoff notices to “at least 14” of its climate journalists, as part of a wider move from the newspaper’s billionaire owner, Jeff Bezos, to eliminate 300 jobs at the publication, claimed Climate Colored Goggles. After the layoffs, the newspaper will have five journalists left on its award-winning climate desk, according to the substack run by a former climate reporter at the Los Angeles Times. It comes after CBS News laid off most of its climate team in October, it added.

WIND UNBLOCKED: Elsewhere, a separate federal ruling said that a wind project off the coast of New York state can continue, which now means that “all five offshore wind projects halted by the Trump administration in December can resume construction”, said Reuters. Bloomberg added that “Ørsted said it has spent $7bn on the development, which is 45% complete”.  

Around the world

• CHANGING TIDES: The EU is “mulling a new strategy” in climate diplomacy after struggling to gather support for “faster, more ambitious action to cut planet-heating emissions” at last year’s UN climate summit COP30, reported Reuters.
• FINANCE ‘CUT’: The UK government is planning to cut climate finance by more than a fifth, from £11.6bn over the past five years to £9bn in the next five, according to the Guardian.  
• BIG PLANS: India’s 2026 budget included a new $2.2bn funding push for carbon capture technologies, reported Carbon Brief. The budget also outlined support for renewables and the mining and processing of critical minerals.
• MOROCCO FLOODS: More than 140,000 people have been evacuated in Morocco as “heavy rainfall and water releases from overfilled dams led to flooding”, reported the Associated Press.
• CASHFLOW: “Flawed” economic models used by governments and financial bodies “ignor[e] shocks from extreme weather and climate tipping points”, posing the risk of a “global financial crash”, according to a Carbon Tracker report covered by the Guardian. 
• HEATING UP: The International Olympic Committee is discussing options to hold future winter games earlier in the year “because of the effects of warmer temperatures”, said the Associated Press. 

54%

The increase in new solar capacity installed in Africa over 2024-25 – the continent’s fastest growth on record, according to a Global Solar Council report covered by Bloomberg. 

Latest climate research

• Arctic warming significantly postpones the retreat of the Afro-Asian summer monsoon, worsening autumn rainfall | Environmental Research Letters
• “Positive” images of heatwaves reduce the impact of messages about extreme heat, according to a survey of 4,000 US adults | Environmental Communication
• Greenland’s “peripheral” glaciers are projected to lose nearly one-fifth of their total area and almost one-third of their total volume by 2100 under a low-emissions scenario | The Cryosphere

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

Solar power, electric vehicles and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment, according to new analysis for Carbon Brief (shown in blue above). Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) – comparable to the economies of Brazil or Canada, the analysis said.

Spotlight Can humans reverse nature decline?

This week, Carbon Brief travelled to a UN event in Manchester, UK to speak to biodiversity scientists about the chances of reversing nature loss.

Officials from more than 150 countries arrived in Manchester this week to approve a new UN report on how nature underpins economic prosperity.

The meeting comes just four years before nations are due to meet a global target to halt and reverse biodiversity loss, agreed in 2022 under the landmark “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF).

At the sidelines of the meeting, Carbon Brief spoke to a range of scientists about humanity’s chances of meeting the 2030 goal. Their answers have been edited for length and clarity.

Dr David Obura, ecologist and chair of Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)

We can’t halt and reverse the decline of every ecosystem. But we can try to “bend the curve” or halt and reverse the drivers of decline. That’s the economic drivers, the indirect drivers and the values shifts we need to have. What the GBF aspires to do, in terms of halting and reversing biodiversity loss, we can put in place the enabling drivers for that by 2030, but we won’t be able to do it fast enough at this point to halt [the loss] of all ecosystems.

Dr Luthando Dziba, executive secretary of IPBES 

Countries are due to report on progress by the end of February this year on their national strategies to the Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD]. Once we get that, coupled with a process that is ongoing within the CBD, which is called the global stocktake, I think that’s going to give insights on progress as to whether this is possible to achieve by 2030…Are we on the right trajectory? I think we are and hopefully we will continue to move towards the final destination of having halted biodiversity loss, but also of living in harmony with nature. 

Prof Laura Pereira, scientist at the Global Change Institute at Wits University, South Africa

At the global level, I think it’s very unlikely that we’re going to achieve the overall goal of halting biodiversity loss by 2030. That being said, I think we will make substantial inroads towards achieving our longer term targets. There is a lot of hope, but we’ve also got to be very aware that we have not necessarily seen the transformative changes that are going to be needed to really reverse the impacts on biodiversity.

Dr David Cooper, chair of the UK’s Joint Nature Conservation Committee and former executive secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity 

It’s important to look at the GBF as a whole…I think it is possible to achieve those targets, or at least most of them, and to make substantial progress towards them. It is possible, still, to take action to put nature on a path to recovery. We’ll have to increasingly look at the drivers.

Prof Andrew Gonzalez, McGill University professor and co-chair of an IPBES biodiversity monitoring assessment 

I think for many of the 23 targets across the GBF, it’s going to be challenging to hit those by 2030. I think we’re looking at a process that’s starting now in earnest as countries [implement steps and measure progress]…You have to align efforts for conserving nature, the economics of protecting nature [and] the social dimensions of that, and who benefits, whose rights are preserved and protected.

Neville Ash, director of the UN Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre

The ambitions in the 2030 targets are very high, so it’s going to be a stretch for many governments to make the actions necessary to achieve those targets, but even if we make all the actions in the next four years, it doesn’t mean we halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. It means we put the action in place to enable that to happen in the future…The important thing at this stage is the urgent action to address the loss of biodiversity, with the result of that finding its way through by the ambition of 2050 of living in harmony with nature.  

Prof Pam McElwee, Rutgers University professor and co-chair of an IPBES “nexus assessment” report 

If you look at all of the available evidence, it’s pretty clear that we’re going to keep experiencing biodiversity decline. I mean, it’s fairly similar to the 1.5C climate target. We are not going to meet that either. But that doesn’t mean that you slow down the ambition…even though you recognise that we probably won’t meet that specific timebound target, that’s all the more reason to continue to do what we’re doing and, in fact, accelerate action.

Watch, read, listen

OIL IMPACTS: Gas flaring has risen in the Niger Delta since oil and gas major Shell sold its assets in the Nigerian “oil hub”, a Climate Home News investigation found. 

LOW SNOW: The Washington Post explored how “climate change is making the Winter Olympics harder to host”. 

CULTURE WARS: A Media Confidential podcast examined when climate coverage in the UK became “part of the culture wars”.

Coming up

• 2-8 February: 12th session of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), Manchester, UK
• 8 February: Japanese general election
• 8 February: Portugal presidential election
• 11 February: Barbados general election
• 11-12 February: UN climate chief Simon Stiell due to speak in Istanbul, Turkey

Pick of the jobs

• UK Met Office, senior climate science communicator | Salary: £43,081-£46,728. Location: Exeter, UK
• Canadian Red Cross, programme officer, Indigenous operations – disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation | Salary: $56,520-$60,053. Location: Manitoba, Canada
• Aldersgate Group, policy officer | Salary: £33,949-£39,253. Location: London (hybrid)

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

DeBriefed 30 January 2026:  Fire and ice; US formally exits Paris; Climate image faux pas

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30.01.26

DeBriefed 23 January 2026: Trump’s Davos tirade; EU wind and solar milestone; High seas hope

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23.01.26

DeBriefed 16 January 2026: Three years of record heat; China and India coal milestone; Beijing’s 2026 climate outlook

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16.01.26

DeBriefed 9 January 2026: US to exit global climate treaty; Venezuelan oil ‘uncertainty’; ‘Hardest truth’ for Africa’s energy transition

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09.01.26

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The post DeBriefed 6 February 2026: US secret climate panel ‘unlawful’ | China’s clean energy boon | Can humans reverse nature loss? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Open access notables

Risk perception and response to changing wildfire hazards: family forest owners in the western US Pacific Northwest, Fischer et al., Climate Risk Management

Climate models predict future increases in the frequency, magnitude, and duration of natural hazard events, including heat waves, droughts, and wildfires. People may be aware of these natural hazards but unfamiliar with new patterns expected under climate change. Ideally, people would take action to protect themselves from natural hazard events—even those with which they have limited prior experience. Doing so would likely reduce the public costs of later assisting individuals impacted by events when they occur. Although a large body of research has examined how people perceive and protect themselves from the risks of natural hazards, fewer studies have focused on risk behavior in the context of changing hazard conditions. In such contexts, people’s past experiences may not be indicative of the future so they may rely more on their beliefs and information gained through their social networks when making decisions. Focusing on the western Pacific Northwest, USA–where a growing number of wildfires, including extreme wildfires, may signal changing hazard conditions–we examined the influence of wildfire hazard experiences, beliefs about environmental change, and information networks on family forest owners’ wildfire risk perceptions and risk mitigation intentions. We found strong correlations between family forest owners’ wildfire experiences and their wildfire risk perceptions. We also found strong correlations between owners’ risk perceptions and their beliefs about environmental change and information networks.

The Role of Industrial Excess Heat for the Transformation of the Energy System, Hammer et al., BHM Berg

In Austria, heat supply accounts for more than half of the country’s final energy consumption, with low-temperature heat below 100?°C for space heating and domestic hot water making up around 61% of that. Approximately 47% of total heat consumption is still covered by fossil energy sources. In the energy-intensive industrial sector in particular, previously unused excess heat is available for cascading use. This publication presents industrial excess-heat potentials identified through individual case studies and a nationwide survey. According to the comparison of figures, in an ideal scenario roughly 65% of private space heating consumption could be covered by excess heat. In addition to conventional district-heating systems, which represent the current state of the art, new options are emerging for distributing excess heat, including supra-national district-heating networks for longer transport distances. For challenges associated with predominantly low temperatures, mature and proven solutions exist through the combination of heat pumps and anergy networks. Increasing the integration of excess heat is absolutely essential in order to raise the efficiency of industry and further decarbonize the heating sector.

Editorial: Climate change impacts on arctic ecosystems and associated climate feedbacks, Christensen et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science

The Arctic Council has, through its report to Ministers in 2019, acknowledged that climate change will affect ecosystems and ecosystem services and that this is key to human livelihoods in the Arctic. As a follow up on this the Arctic Council, through its working groups Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) and Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), decided to initiate an assessment and a process with a focus on how climate change affects Arctic ecosystems and feedbacks and inform strategies for adaptation and resiliency. Forming part of this assessment process this Research Topic investigated the complex dynamics of Arctic ecosystems, focusing on marine, terrestrial, and atmosphere-ecosystem interactions. As sea ice diminishes and temperatures increase, the equilibrium of these ecosystems is disrupted, resulting in significant alterations in biodiversity, species distribution, and ecological processes. This Research Topic of studies elucidates the critical role of ice algae in marine food webs, the intricate feedback loops between tundra ecosystems and the climate, and the importance of methane emissions in global climate feedback mechanisms. 

Rewiring climate modeling with machine learning emulators, Van Katwyk et al., Communications Earth & Environment

Earth system models, or simulators, are foundational for projecting climate change impacts, but their computational expense limits the number and diversity of simulations available. Machine learning-based emulators, statistical surrogates trained on simulator outputs, can replicate components of climate models at orders-of-magnitude lower cost, enabling ensembles and interpolation across scenarios. We argue that the next phase of climate modeling hinges on closer collaboration between simulator and emulator communities. We outline three priorities: (1) co-design of simulators and emulators so that experimental design, diagnostics, and data products support training, evaluation, and targeted simulation; (2) shared, machine learning-ready benchmarks with data partitions and metrics that emphasize physical fidelity; and (3) treating emulators as reliable software components with interfaces, documentation, and deployment pathways for sensitivity analyses, scenario exploration, and uncertainty decomposition. This perspective envisions emulators not as statistical shortcuts, but core tools that accelerate the pace of climate science.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Utility Bills are Rising: 2025 Review, PowerLines

The authors present a comprehensive review of utility bill trends and the state of energy affordability in 2025. In 2025, electric and gas utilities requested nearly $31 billion in rate increases, more than double the $15 billion in rate increases requested by ut These rate increases will affect 81 million Americans, contributing to rising financial anxiety for American consumers at a time when cost-of-living concerns are reaching a boiling point. Since 2021, electricity prices have increased by nearly 40 percent, with residential retail electricity prices increasing by 7 percent and piped gas prices increasing by 11 percent in 2025 alone. Electricity and gas prices are not only outpacing inflation, but are now the fastest drivers of inflation, surpassing other expenses including groceries, gasoline, vehicles, and medicine. Utility bills are poised to be a defining issue in the 2026 midterms, with 4 in 5 Americans feeling powerless over these costs and 3 in 4 Americans concerned about rising utility bills.

Consumer Cost Implications of Offshore Wind Stop Work Orders, American Clean Power

Wholesale electricity prices would rise significantly during evening peaks and winter hours – including intense winter storms like Fern. Power systems would rely more heavily on non-renewable sources and leave customers more exposed to price volatility. Grids would lose access to low-cost, winter-peaking clean energy that helps stabilize prices during periods of high demand. Over the next 10 years, customers along the East Coast will see an estimated $45 billion in additional cost as a result of the canceling and/or delaying of five offshore wind projects. Without these experience higher wholesale power prices, a greater reliance on fuel-constrained generation, and the loss of low-cost, winter-peaking energy. 143 articles in 65 journals by 976 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Storm Activity Using Machine Learning, Hadas & Kaspi, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118496

The Atmosphere as a Heat Engine Operating at Maximum Power, Roe et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0507.1

The expanding Indo-Pacific freshwater pool and changing freshwater pathway in the South Indian Ocean, Chen et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02553-1

Thermodynamically primed Atmospheric River Rapid as the driver of the December 2023 Thoothukudi extreme rainfall, Sivachitralakshmi & Chitra, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2025.1750461

Observations of climate change, effects

Anthropogenic climate change drives rising global heat stress and its spatial inequality, Peng et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-69164-y

Anthropogenically-driven escalating impact of soil-based compound dry-hot extremes on vegetation productivity, Liang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-68878-3

Latitudinal gradients in runoff dynamics across undisturbed Eurasian permafrost rivers under accelerating climate change, Qin et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.01.002

Pronounced warming and wetting of climate in the Qilian Mountains during 1961–2022, BAHADUR et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.01.008

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

0.5° × 0.625° gridded daily soil temperature at four depths in Ethiopia during 1993–2023, Kobe et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2025.1756263

An Automatic Procedure for the Attribution of Extreme Events at the Global Scale: A Proof of Concept for Heat Waves, Qasmi et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-24-0265.1

Comparative Performance of Global Datasets and Ground-Based Precipitation and Temperature Products in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin: The Case of Türkiye, Keserci, International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70276

Global gridded dataset of heating and cooling degree days under climate change scenarios, Lizana et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access 10.1038/s41893-025-01754-y

Has the Fire Weather Index Emerged? Insights from Global and Regional Climate Models, Nogherotto et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100861

How well can we quantify when 1.5 °C of global warming has been exceeded?, Thorne et al., Open Access 10.5194/essd-2025-825

Long-wavelength steric sea level and heat storage anomaly maps to 2000 m by combining Argo temperature and salinity profiles with satellite altimetry and gravimetry, Chambers & Reinelt, Earth System Science Data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-741-2026

New climate dataset from Mazovia (Central Poland) from the late 19th century as a basis for estimating the urban effect in multi-year trends in air temperature in Poland, Jarzyna et al., Theoretical and Applied Climatology 10.1007/s00704-026-06023-2

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

A CMIP6 LUMIP analysis of historical and projected climate impacts of land use and land cover changes in the United States, Lin et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1699725

Has the Fire Weather Index Emerged? Insights from Global and Regional Climate Models, Nogherotto et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100861

Surface air temperature change on the Tibetan Plateau under global net-zero emission scenarios, WANG et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.01.007

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

A new index used to characterise the extent of Antarctic marine coastal winds in climate projections, Cable et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/wcd-7-247-2026

Deep Learning Atmospheric Models Reliably Simulate Out-of-Sample Land Heat and Cold Wave Frequencies, Meng et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl117990

Rewiring climate modeling with machine learning emulators, Van Katwyk et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03238-z

Robustness of Euro-Mediterranean Synoptic Circulation Types and Sensitivity to Member Selection in CMIP6 Models, Olmo et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0545.1

Cryosphere & climate change

A climate data record of sea ice age using Lagrangian advection of a triangular mesh, Korosov et al., Earth System Science Data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-721-2026

Anatomy of Arctic and Antarctic sea ice lows in an ocean–sea ice model, Richaud et al., Open Access pdf 10.5194/egusphere-2025-886

Approximating 3D bedrock deformation in an Antarctic ice-sheet model for projections, van Calcar et al., The Cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-757-2026

Atmospheric rivers and winter sea ice drive recent reversal in Antarctic ice mass loss, Kolbe et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03242-3

Latitudinal gradients in runoff dynamics across undisturbed Eurasian permafrost rivers under accelerating climate change, Qin et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.01.002

Mechanisms and Atmospheric Drivers of Arctic Multiyear Sea Ice Loss, Hu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd044859

Sea level & climate change

Coastal Water Level Trends and ENSO-Related Variability in the Northeastern Mekong Delta (1979–2024), Vinh et al., Dynamics of Atmospheres and Oceans 10.1016/j.dynatmoce.2026.101648

Forcing of Subannual-to-Decadal Sea Level Variability and the Recent Rapid Rise Along the U.S. Gulf Coast, Delman et al., Open Access pdf 10.22541/essoar.175336987.78307881/v1

Thresholds of Wave Forcing: Implications for Atoll Reef Dynamics Under Sea Level Rise, Lindhart et al., Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jc023063

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Paleoclimate pattern effects help constrain climate sensitivity and 21st-century warming, Cooper et al., Open Access pdf 10.31223/x5rm9v

Simulated Changes and Future Analogy Extent of Ocean Heat Content During the Mid-Pliocene Warm Period, Grosvenor et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118840

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Anthropogenically-driven escalating impact of soil-based compound dry-hot extremes on vegetation productivity, Liang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-68878-3

Bat Migration Intensifies Cave Fish Richness Loss Under Climate Change in China, Bai et al., Diversity and Distributions Open Access pdf 10.1111/ddi.70148

Body condition among Svalbard Polar bears Ursus maritimus during a period of rapid loss of sea ice, Aars et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-025-33227-9

Carbon concentration mechanisms in Canary Islands macroalgae and their implications for future benthic community structure under ocean acidification, Hernández et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107898

Climate and species traits give rise to complex phenological dynamics, Reis et al., Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecy.70297

Coral species from another ocean may be the only way to save Caribbean reefs, Camacho et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 10.1073/pnas.2521543123

Defending endangered trees against climate change and hungry goats, Nuwer, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-00248-x

Editorial: Climate change impacts on arctic ecosystems and associated climate feedbacks, Christensen et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1776354

Enhanced effect of warming on the leaf-onset date of boreal deciduous broadleaf forest, Li et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02528-2

Environmental contexts mediate the dual impacts of snow cover on vegetation green-up: A key challenge of phenological prediction under climate change, Dong et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105354

Ephemeropteran and Trichopteran Assemblages Vary Across a Subtropical Rainforest Altitudinal Gradient: Useful Indicators for Climate Change, Pagotto et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73003

Evolutionary and environmental determinants of heat tolerance and acclimation capacity in herpetofauna, Sun et al., Conservation Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/cobi.70127

Global tree slenderness under climate change, Tian et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1111/1365-2745.70248

Impacts of Climate Change and Human Activities on Global Mountain Grasslands: Insights Into the Last Two Decades and Future Climate Scenarios, Na et al., Earth's Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006419

Pantropical moist forests are converging towards a middle leaf longevity, Xue et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-68989-x

Phylogenetic relationships and climate-driven range shifts of Lemnaceae in South Africa, Ndou et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.3389/fevo.2025.1715912

Potential Range Shifts of Two Sympatric Fagus Species, Chen et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.72979

Potential Trade-Off Between Temperature and Tissue Loss Resistance in Corals Associating With Algal Symbionts in the Genus Durusdinium, Chan et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70641

Predator response diversity to warming enables ecosystem resilience in the Galápagos, Chico-Ortiz et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000652

Projected Impacts of Climate Change on the Spatial Distribution and Habitat Preference of Tropical Tuna in the Pacific Ocean, Wu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107868

Response of Early Life-Stages of Forest-Forming Seaweeds From Warm-Edge and Central Populations to Marine Heatwaves, Musrri et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.72998

Responses of South Caspian coastal foraminifera to warming: spatial patterns and assemblage shifts, Bagheri & Taheri, Open Access pdf 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7499422/v1

The 4th global coral bleaching event: ushering in an era of near-annual bleaching, Spady et al., Open Access pdf 10.31223/x5dx6q

The Genetic and Morphological Basis of Local Adaptation to Elevational Extremes in an Alpine Finch, Robertson et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.72962

The Geography of Mediterranean Benthic Communities Under Climate Change, Baldan et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.70725

Two Critical Radii Dominate Phytoplankton Response to Marine Heatwaves in the South China Sea, Liu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans 10.1029/2025jc023657

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Annual carbon emissions from land-use change in China from 1000 to 2019, Yang et al., Open Access 10.5194/essd-2025-36

Carbon Dynamics in Artificial Aquatic Ecosystems: Comparing Greenhouse Gases and DOM in Stormwater and Natural Ponds, Goeckner et al., Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jg009374

Carbon sequestration along a gradient of tidal marsh degradation in response to sea level rise, Huyzentruyt et al., Open Access 10.5194/egusphere-2025-3293

Climate change intensifies carbon emissions from the Earth's Third Pole: Projected trajectories of soil and ecosystem respiration, Shen et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105359

Editorial: Soil carbon sequestration and microbial energy metabolism, Jing et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1765491

Geological regulation of nitrous oxide emission risks in rivers globally, Qi et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03250-3

How much of the forest sink is passive? Case of the United States, Davis et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2513588123

Losing a Hidden Ally: The Shrinking Capacity of Upland Soils to Remove Atmospheric Methane, Yang et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70741

Marsh Migration Into Forests and Farms: Effects on Soil Biogeochemistry Along the Salinity Gradients, Fettrow et al., Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences 10.1029/2025jg009149

Quantifying the time of emergence of the anthropogenic signal in the global land carbon sink, Li et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-767-2026

Quantitative impacts and patterns of greenhouse gas emission trends: implications for global change and policy, Afuye & Tolios, Carbon Management Open Access 10.1080/17583004.2026.2622340

Seasonality in Marine Organic Carbon Export and Sequestration Pathways, Li et al., Open Access pdf 10.22541/essoar.174966610.08215013/v1

Solar radiation differences drive karst sun and shade leaf carbon sink contribution shifts, Du et al., Carbon Balance and Management Open Access 10.1186/s13021-025-00365-6

South Pacific carbon uptake controlled by West Antarctic Ice Sheet dynamics, Struve et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-025-01911-0

The global extent of the grassland biome and implications for the terrestrial carbon sink, MacDougall et al., Nature Ecology & Evolution pdf 10.1038/s41559-025-02955-6

Triple-isotopic analyses pinpoint microbial methane release from subsea permafrost in the inner Laptev Sea, Brussee et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03222-7

Uptake and Release—What Is Driving Change in the Net Carbon Budget in Forest Soils?, Parker & Subke, Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.70729

Water Availability Weakens the Forest Litter Carbon Sink, Zhao et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gb008731

CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

A review on geochemical carbon dioxide removal potential of mafic and ultramafic rocks in India, Katre et al., Earth 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105419

Biodiversity implications of land-intensive carbon dioxide removal, Prütz et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02557-5

Human-induced biospheric carbon sink: Impact from the Taklamakan Afforestation Project, Noor et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2523388123

Legal guardrails on states’ dependence on carbon dioxide removal to meet climate targets, Rajamani et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2025.2599861

Decarbonization

Conflicted about building decarbonization: Contested climate justice imaginaries in expert visions of low-carbon and net-zero buildings, Sovacool et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102806

Fairing the energy transition: A policy framework for integrating stakeholder concerns in solar energy development, Rielli & Wang, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2025.104511

Fossil energy minimum viable scale, Lappen & Grubert, Science 10.1126/science.aea0972

Maximising environmental savings from silicon photovoltaics manufacturing to 2035, Willis et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-69165-x

Nuclear reactors are too expensive and slow to build, Ramana, Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-025-01934-2

Sectoral Cost-Benefit Analysis for Clean Technology Demonstrators: Insights for Decarbonizing Hard-to-Abate Industries, Sadighi et al., Environmental and Resource Economics Open Access pdf 10.1007/s10640-025-01051-4

Seizing the green hydrogen opportunity? Comparing strategies for industrial transformation in latecomer countries, Bacil et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115111

Technology and policy options for achieving net zero steel manufacturing in the United States, Li et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115124

The Role of Industrial Excess Heat for the Transformation of the Energy System, Hammer et al., BHM Berg Open Access pdf 10.1007/s00501-026-01702-z

Aerosols

Trend of North African Dust Storms and Potential Link to Climate Change, Yeo et al., Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jd043630

Climate change communications & cognition

A decade of weather anomalies and natural disasters and their influence on environmental beliefs and actions across Australia, Ghasemi et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102932

Activists Preserving the (Multi-Platform) Environment: Advocacy Coalitions of #Lützerath Climate Protests, Meyer et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.1080/17524032.2026.2617507

Adaptation versus Mitigation: Does Goal-Framing Influence the Appeal of Climate-Relevant Behaviors?, Herziger et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102934

Far-right fossil fuel ignorance: the nostalgia of national-industrial modernity, Vowles, Environmental Politics Open Access 10.1080/09644016.2026.2620920

How advertising matters: Outdoor media strategies for increased engagement with creative climate change messages, Boykoff et al., Open Access pdf 10.31223/x5fm92

Risk perception and response to changing wildfire hazards: family forest owners in the western US Pacific Northwest, Fischer et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100795

What Determines One’s Information Seeking Intention: Integrating Information Seeking Theories in the Context of Climate Change with Korean Sample, Jang & Kim, Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102941

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Beyond Climate Change: The Role of Integrated Soil Fertility Management for Sustaining Future Maize Yield in Sub-Saharan Africa, et al., Open Access 10.18167/dvn1/egjxvl

Challenges and opportunities for integrating climate action into school feeding: Insights from the Global Survey of School Meal Programs, Gharge & Wineman, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000797

Communicating weather and climate information to smallholder farmers in resource-poor climate-vulnerable southern Somalia: a social science inquiry, Anderson et al., Climate and Development Open Access 10.1080/17565529.2026.2620539

Current and projected impacts of extreme climate events on winter wheat yield in Northern China, Zeng et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-025-02954-2

Effect of type of farming practices on the soil carbon sequestration and yield of some crops, Khater et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-35230-0

Estimating the economic damage caused by climate change to Korean aquaculture, Kim et al., npj Ocean Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1038/s44183-025-00161-2

From past exceptional extremes to frequent future risks: How climate change shapes the fate of common wheat in France, Aubry et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111054

Governing black soils for food and climate security, Liao et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-69018-7

Grapevine-chronology: Annual growth ring analysis for climate adaptation and vineyard management – A review, Roig-Puscama & Roig, Dendrochronologia Open Access 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126481

Leveraging public-private partnerships for climate finance: advancing climate-smart agriculture for NDC implementation in Kenya and Senegal, Sow Badji & Gathu, Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2616965

Reevaluating carbon storage and emissions in California’s harvested wood products: implications for alternative waste parameters, Lucey et al., Carbon Balance and Management Open Access 10.1186/s13021-026-00407-7

Smallholder farmers’ adaptation at the climate–conflict nexus: a systematic review, et al., Open Access 10.17632/shm4fz8hfn.1

Thiamin addition to soil increases potato tuber thiamin content under greenhouse conditions, Goyer et al., PeerJ Open Access 10.7717/peerj.20684

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Anthropogenic Forcings Intensify Droughts More Severely in Drylands than in Humid Regions, Zhang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jd044821

Drying Soil Moisture Dominates Enhancing Summer Soil Moisture-Temperature Coupling Under Climate Change, Zhang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119826

Human interventions and climate change trigger water crisis in the Tigris and Euphrates Basin, Darvishi Boloorani et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2025.104300

Is daily extreme rainfall increasing in the Mediterranean basin? A critical review of the evidence, González-Hidalgo & Beguería, Earth 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105409

Latitudinal gradients in runoff dynamics across undisturbed Eurasian permafrost rivers under accelerating climate change, Qin et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.01.002

Climate change economics

Climate change risk index and municipal bond disclosures of United States drinking water utilities, Lyle et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-03044-z

From Debt Burden to Climate Burden: A Historical Look at Debt and Climate Change, Mohan, WIREs Climate Change 10.1002/wcc.70042

Climate change mitigation public policy research

A new approach to assess individual contributions to energy transition goals, Sanz-Cuadrado et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2025.115055

Balancing social attitudes and ecological conservation in Taiwan’s wind power development under climate change, Chen, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1714136

Carbon emission reduction requires attention to the contribution of natural gas use: Combustion and leakage, Chen et al., Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-1359-2026

Climate change and thermal stress in cattle: Global projections with high temporal resolution, Neira et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000761

Driving decarbonization? Corporate responses to the Paris climate agreement in the global automotive sector, Bare et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104549

Effective climate policies for ‘all seasons’: novel evidence from 40 countries, Fernández-i-Marín et al., Climate Policy Open Access 10.1080/14693062.2025.2598684

From miners to markets: discursive struggle in Romania’s coal phase-out, Koretsky & Turnheim, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2025.2610543

Legal guardrails on states’ dependence on carbon dioxide removal to meet climate targets, Rajamani et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2025.2599861

Quantitative impacts and patterns of greenhouse gas emission trends: implications for global change and policy, Afuye & Tolios, Carbon Management Open Access 10.1080/17583004.2026.2622340

Spatial patterns and drivers of carbon emissions in metropolitan peripheries, Kailin et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2025.1662797

What accelerates the arrival of the peak carbon dioxide emissions turning point in tourism? Empirical evidence from China, Liu, Carbon Management Open Access 10.1080/17583004.2026.2622337

When energy transitions drive polarization: Narratives of green energy and mitigation strategies by proponents and opponents of geothermal energy developments in Indonesia, Smith et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115080

Why carbon offsets may fail in complex systems: A causal inference perspective, Rana et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104325

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

A framework for assessing climate resilience of informal settlements: the case of Eswatini, Ndlangamandla & Du Plessis, Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2620538

Challenges and opportunities in scaling climate-resilient housing solutions in the United States, Seeteram et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-68595-x

Climate change demands coordinated adaptation strategies of drinking water treatment, Usman et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02547-z

Climate-adaptive transportation infrastructure: Cross-regional solutions for urban resilience and emergency response, Tong et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102780

On the applicability of knowledge sources in climate-based design: Thermal-spatial micro-spaces in historical gardens versus contemporary outdoor design strategies, Nouri-Horzvili et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2025.102713

Planning for just relocations in Europe in times of climate change: a comparative study, Calliari et al., Regional Environmental Change Open Access pdf 10.1007/s10113-026-02523-z

Structural Accommodation as a Coastal Adaptation Response to Sea-Level Rise: Lessons From Europe, Pasquier et al., Open Access pdf 10.22541/essoar.175105651.11502498/v1

The Rapid Progress of Climate Change Requires Effective Concepts for Protecting People Indoors, Salthammer & Morawska, Open Access pdf 10.31223/x5gt7p

Using news media to identify gaps in climate change adaptation research: Insights from the Philippines, Bartelet et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100793

Climate change impacts on human health

A Regionally Determined Climate-Informed West Nile Virus Forecast Technique, Harp et al., Open Access pdf 10.1101/2025.03.27.25324789

Anthropogenic climate change drives rising global heat stress and its spatial inequality, Peng et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-69164-y

Escalating labor risks from sequential extreme precipitation?heatwave events in China under a warming future, JU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.01.006

What competencies physical activity professionals should possess to better integrate climate change related issues into their practice: A Delphi study, Hozhabri et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000812

Other

The effectiveness of environmental technologies in combating climate change: a cross National Analysis, Christiansen et al., Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2620212

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Exceeding 1.5 °C requires rethinking accountability in climate policy, Ganti et al., Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-00247-y 

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Long-Term Reliability Assessment, North American Electric Reliability Corporation

The authors independently evaluate the long-term reliability of the North American bulk power system (BPS) while identifying trends, emerging issues, and potential risks during the upcoming 10-year assessment period. The overall resource adequacy outlook for the N Projections for resource and transmission growth lag what is needed to support new data centers and other large loads that drive escalating demand forecasts. Most new resources in development to come on-line in the next five years consist of battery storage and solar photovoltaic (PV), which are inverter-based and weather-dependen operating a reliable grid. Meanwhile, more fossil-fired generator retirements loom in the next five years, reducing the amount of generation that has fuel on site and impacting the system’s ability to respond to spikes in demand. The continuing shift in the resource mix toward weather-dependent resources and less fuel diversity in Planners, market operators, and regulators grapple with steep increases in demand and swelling resource queues, they face more uncertainty, adding to the already-complex endeavor of planning for resource adequacy during this period of rapid grid transformation. To ensure there are sufficient resources for supplying electricity in North Americans, industry, regulators, and policymakers need to be vigilant for shifting projections, keep plans for deactivating existing generators flexible, expedite system development, and perform robust adequacy assessments of future scenarios. In addition, careful planning and broad cross-sector coordination will be needed to navigate a period of potentially strained electricity resources.

Improvements Needed for Tracking and Reducing State Energy Consumption; BGS Overstated Savings in a Selection of Energy Efficiency Projects, Pritchard et al., Vermont State Auditor

The authors evaluate how Vermont is measuring state government’s progress in meeting the State Agency Energy Plan (SAEP) goals, determine whether the Department of Buildings and General Services (BGS) Energy Office selects the most cost-efficient energy savings projects for buildings, and determine whether the BGS Energy Office assessed the outcomes of energy savings projects for buildings.

Impact Report 2025, Climate Cardinals

At the heart of Climate Cardinals is a simple idea: when people understand the science of climate change in their own language, they can act on it. Climate Cardinals prioritized translation partners with a clear theory of change, strengthened the Fellows Program with a new 14-module curriculum, and improved chapter onboarding with better tools and operational support. Surveys showed strong personal and professional growth, with the community going on to launch companies, win national fellowships, and earn UN appointments—as well as launch major initiatives such as Climate Calling and Ambassadors.

Consumer Cost Implications of Offshore Wind Stop Work Orders, American Clean Power

Wholesale electricity prices would rise significantly during evening peaks and winter hours – including intense winter storms like Fern. Power systems would rely more heavily on non-renewable sources and leave customers more exposed to price volatility. Grids would lose access to low-cost, winter-peaking clean energy that helps stabilize prices during periods of high demand. Over the next 10 years, customers along the East Coast will see an estimated $45 billion in additional cost as a result of the canceling and/or delaying of five offshore wind projects. Without these experience higher wholesale power prices, a greater reliance on fuel-constrained generation, and the loss of low-cost, winter-peaking energy.

Offshore wind stop-work orders are costing consumers, delaying needed electricity, January 28, 2026 Seth Feaster and Dennis Wamsted, Institue for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis

Efforts to stop five large offshore wind projects under construction along the Atlantic Coast could cost consumers billions of dollars and keep much-needed new electricity off the grid. Delaying these projects only raises costs for electricity consumers and keeps needed new generation capacity off the grid. A three-week Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW) stoppage cost more than $5 million a day, with further delay to lead to “far greater harm to the project.” Already, $8.9 billion already has been invested in CVOW, which has a total projected cost of $11.2 billion. The costs will not disappear if the project is cancelled. New England was already setting new wind power records with the help of the 800 MW Vineyard Wind 1 project. On Dec. 12, 2025, wind generated 37,310 megawatt-hours (MWh) of electricity, or 10.8% of the region’s power demand.

La Niña, Climate change, high exposure and vulnerability combined led to devastating floods in parts of Southern Africa, Pinto et al., World Weather Attribution

Since late December 2025, severe flooding has affected large parts of Mozambique, Eswatini, northeastern South Africa and Zimbabwe, killing more than 200 people, destroying more than 173,000 acres of crops and causing further widespread humanitarian and socioeconomic impacts in the affected countries. The flooding was caused by exceptionally heavy and persistent rainfall across a large region in southeastern Africa starting on December 26th and intensifying from early January, with some areas recording more than 200 mm of rain within 24 hours. Researchers from Mozambique, South Africa, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, the United States, and the United Kingdom collaborated to assess the extent to which human-induced climate change altered the likelihood and intensity of the heavy rainfall event. To estimate if human induced climate change influenced heavy rainfall over the region the authors first determined if there is a trend in observations in the heaviest 10-day rainfall, finding that while the event is with a return period of about 50 years, relatively rare, even in today’s climate that has warmed by 1.3°C, it would have been much rarer in a 1.3°C colder climate. Similarly, all observational datasets show that extreme rainfall spells are becoming more intense, by about 40%. The authors cannot confidently attribute the magnitude of the observed change to climate change. However, they have confidence that climate change has increased both the likelihood and the intensity of the 10-day rainfall, based on the observed signal, physical understanding and existing literature.

North Carolina Solar Land Use and Agriculture Study – 2025 Update, Jerry Carey and Daniel Pate, North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association

Utility-scale solar (USS) development has grown significantly in North Carolina, increasing from 3 total systems in 2009 to currently more than 773. To better understand the amount of land these installations occupy, the authors conducted a land use analysis using solar installation data from the organization’s Renewable Energy Database (REDB) and land use data from the National Land Cover Database (NLCD). This analysis serves as an update to the report iteration carried out in 2022. Based on NCSEA’s analysis, only 0.31% of total agricultural land is currently used for USS development.

Europeau Electricity Review 2026, Beatrice Petrovich, Ember

The author analyses full-year electricity generation and demand data for 2025 in all EU-27 countries to understand the region’s progress in transitioning from fossil fuels to clean electricity. Wind and solar generated a record 30% of EU electricity, higher than fossil power for the first time on record. EU solar generation reached a record 369 TWh in 2025, 20% higher than last year. In 2025 wind and solar generated more electricity than fossil fuels in 14 of the 27 EU countries.

Heat Tabletop Exercises: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and National Integrated Heat Health Information System

From 2022-2025, the National Integrated Heat Health Information System (NIHHIS) has supported and funded extreme heat tabletop exercises (TTXs) in communities across the United States. This authors summarize the outcomes, themes, and lessons learned from these communities. They focus on the strengths and gaps identified, as well as best practices for hosting future TTXs. Throughout discussions, participants identified critical gaps in their current heat work. Participants noted that overcoming these key barriers is important to heat mitigation and resilience efforts.

Utility Bills are Rising: 2025 Review, PowerLines

The authors present a comprehensive review of utility bill trends and the state of energy affordability in 2025. In 2025, electric and gas utilities requested nearly $31 billion in rate increases, more than double the $15 billion in rate increases requested by ut These rate increases will affect 81 million Americans, contributing to rising financial anxiety for American consumers at a time when cost-of-living concerns are reaching a boiling point. Since 2021, electricity prices have increased by nearly 40 percent, with residential retail electricity prices increasing by 7 percent and piped gas prices increasing by 11 percent in 2025 alone. Electricity and gas prices are not only outpacing inflation, but are now the fastest drivers of inflation, surpassing other expenses including groceries, gasoline, vehicles, and medicine. Utility bills are poised to be a defining issue in the 2026 midterms, with 4 in 5 Americans feeling powerless over these costs and 3 in 4 Americans concerned about rising utility bills.

Right-Sizing Reactors: Balancing trade-offs between economies of scale and volume, Jessica Lovering, Nuclear Innovation Alliance

if a country wants to build a lot of nuclear power fast, should the industry follow the mantra of bigger is better, or shift to focus on small modular reactors, or even microreactors, to follow the promise of factory fabrication? The author explores this question through economics literature and original analysis. The author concludes that there absolutely is evidence for economies of scale with nuclear reactors, but there is also a history of significant cost overruns due to the challenges of megaproject management. When other energy technologies are small and modular, we see numerous benefits including steeper cost reduction curves, faster deployment, and lower financial risk. But there are some potential obstacles to nuclear energy benefiting from the same attributes as these other so-called “granular” technologies (small and modular), particularly uncertainty around scaling regulations.

Energy Efficiency Can Address Surging Electricity Needs at Half the Cost of Gas Plants, Mike Specian and Alex Aquino, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy

Energy efficiency and load flexibility have enough untapped potential nationally to significantly offset the unprecedented forecasted load growth (i.e., electricity consumption and peak demand). The analysis of the nation’s largest utility programs shows that energy efficiency (~$21/ MWh) and load flexibility (<$40/kW-year) are currently the lowest-cost resources for reducing electricity consumption and peak demand. Yet, despite an energy affordability crisis, many jurisdictions are responding to load growth by approving additional gas generation. Demand-side measures are quicker to implement and provide a cleaner alternative to building new generation. They offer a “no-regrets” approach to managing load growth uncertainty and protecting ratepayers from adverse impacts. Business-as-usual approaches are not delivering efficiency and load flexibility at the scale required to meet projected load growth. Legislators, utilities, utility regulators, and large load customers (e.g., data centers) must act now to accelerate demand-side solutions while accounting for the large regional variations shaping where and how load growth occurs.

The Next Decade in PJM A Path to Reliability and Affordability, Resor et al., Advanced Energy United

Reliability and affordability are of paramount importance for PJM. Two paths lie ahead for the region: One in which primarily gas resources are deployed to meet rising load, and one in which policy change enables higher deployment of advanced energy resources (wind, solar and storage, demand flexibility resources, and advanced transmission technologies). The authors analyze these pathways from a reliability and cost perspective and finds that the difference for the 67 million people living within PJM is stark. Increased deployment of advanced energy technologies in PJM reduces the expected frequency of outages in 2030 by 97 percent. Increased deployment of advanced energy technologies in PJM reduces the number of customers affected by outages by 87 percent. From 2025–2035, higher deployment of advanced energy technologies offers a cumulative cost savings of $178 billion, or 20 percent, relative to the Status Quo scenario (primarily gas resources). To assess the reliability of both resource portfolios over the next decade, the authors conducted advance power sector capacity expansion and resource adequacy modeling. The reliability analysis focuses on bulk power system reliability. About New Research

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments Solar and wind eclipsed coal

‘FIRST TIME IN HISTORY’: China’s total power capacity reached 3,890 gigawatts (GW) in 2025, according to a National Energy Administration (NEA) data release covered by industry news outlet International Energy Net. Of this, it said, solar capacity rose 35% to 1,200GW and wind capacity was up 23% to 640GW, while thermal capacity – which is mostly coal – grew 6% to just over 1,500GW. This marks the “first time in history” that wind and solar capacity has outranked coal capacity in China’s power mix, reported the state-run newspaper China Daily. China’s grid-related energy storage capacity exceeded 213GW in 2025, said state news agency Xinhua. Meanwhile, clean-energy industries “drove more than 90%” of investment growth and more than half of GDP growth last year, said the Guardian in its coverage of new analysis for Carbon Brief. (See more in the spotlight below.)

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DAWN FOR SOLAR: Solar power capacity alone may outpace coal in 2026, according to projections by the China Electricity Council (CEC), reported business news outlet 21st Century Business Herald. It added that non-fossil sources could account for 63% of the power mix this year, with coal falling to 31%. Separately, the China Renewable Energy Society said that annual wind-power additions could grow by between 600-980GW over the next five years, with annual additions of 120GW expected until 2028, said industry news outlet China Energy Net. China Energy Net also published the full CEC report.

STATE MEDIA VOICE: Xinhua published several energy- and climate-related articles in a series on the 15th five-year plan. One said that becoming a low-carbon energy “powerhouse” will support decarbonisation efforts, strengthen industrial innovation and improve China’s “global competitive edge and standing”. Another stated that coal consumption is “expected” to peak around 2027, with continued “growth” in the power and chemicals sector, while oil has already peaked. A third noted that distributed energy systems better matched the “characteristics of renewable energy” than centralised ones, but warned against “blind” expansion and insufficient supporting infrastructure. Others in the series discussed biodiversity and environmental protection and recycling of clean-energy technology. Meanwhile, the communist party-affiliated People’s Daily said that oil will continue to play a “vital role” in China, even after demand peaks. 

Starmer and Xi endorsed clean-energy cooperation

CLIMATE PARTNERSHIP: UK prime minister Keir Starmer and Chinese president Xi Jinping pledged in Beijing to deepen cooperation on “green energy”, reported finance news outlet Caixin. They also agreed to establish a “China-UK high-level climate and nature partnership”, said China Daily. Xi told Starmer that the two countries should “carry out joint research and industrial transformation” in new energy and low-carbon technologies, according to Xinhua. It also cited Xi as saying China “hopes” the UK will provide a “fair” business environment for Chinese companies. 

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OCTOPUS OVERSEAS: During the visit, UK power-trading company Octopus Energy and Chinese energy services firm PCG Power announced they would be starting a new joint venture in China, named Bitong Energy, reported industry news outlet PV Magazine. The move “marks a notable direct entry” of a foreign company into China’s “tightly regulated electricity market”, said Caixin. 

PUSH AND PULL: UK policymakers also visited Chinese clean-energy technology manufacturer Envision in Shanghai, reported finance news outlet Yicai. It quoted UK business secretary Peter Kyle emphasising that partnering with companies “like Envision” on sustainability is a “really important part of our future”, particularly in terms of job creation in the UK. Trade minister Chris Bryant told Radio Scotland Breakfast that the government will decide on Chinese wind turbine manufacturer Mingyang’s plans for a Scotland factory “soon”. Researchers at the thinktank Oxford Institute for Energy Studies wrote in a guest post for Carbon Brief that greater Chinese competition in Europe’s wind market could “help spur competition in Europe”, if localisation rules and “other guardrails” are applied.

More China news

• LIFE SUPPORT: China will update its coal capacity payment mechanism, which will raise thresholds for coal-fired power plants and expand to cover gas-fired power and pumped and new-energy storage, reported current affairs outlet China News.
• FRONTIER TECH: The world’s “largest compressed-air power storage plant” has begun operating in China, said Bloomberg.
• PARTNERSHIP A ‘MISTAKE’: The EU launched a “foreign subsidies” probe into Chinese wind turbine company Goldwind, said the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. EU climate chief Wopke Hoekstra said the bloc must resist China’s pull in clean technologies, according to Bloomberg.
• TRADE SPAT: The World Trade Organization “backed a complaint by China” that the US Inflation Reduction Act “discriminated against” Chinese cleantech exports, said Reuters.
• NEW RULES: China has set “new regulations” for the Waliguan Baseline Observatory, which provides “key scientific references for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, said the People’s Daily.

Captured

New or reactivated proposals for coal-fired power plants in China totalled 161GW in 2025, according to a new report covered by Carbon Brief. 

Spotlight  Clean energy drove China’s economic growth in 2025

New analysis for Carbon Brief finds that clean-energy sectors contributed the equivalent of $2.1tn to China’s economy last year, making it a key driver of growth. However, headwinds in 2026 could restrict growth going forward – especially for the solar sector.

Below is an excerpt from the article, which can be read in full on Carbon Brief’s website.

Solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment.

Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP)

Analysis shows that China’s clean-energy sectors nearly doubled in real value between 2022-25 and – if they were a country – would now be the 8th-largest economy in the world.

These investments in clean-energy manufacturing represent a large bet on the energy transition in China and overseas, creating an incentive for the government and enterprises to keep the boom going.

However, there is uncertainty about what will happen this year and beyond, particularly due to a new pricing system, worsening industrial “overcapacity” and trade tensions.

Outperforming the wider economy

China’s clean-energy economy continues to grow far more quickly than the wider economy,  making an outsized contribution to annual growth.

Without these sectors, China’s GDP would have expanded by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%, missing the target of “around 5%” growth by a wide margin.

Clean energy made a crucial contribution during a challenging year, when promoting economic growth was the foremost aim for policymakers.

In 2024, EVs and solar had been the largest growth drivers. In 2025, it was EVs and batteries, which delivered 44% of the economic impact and more than half of the growth of the clean-energy industries.

The next largest subsector was clean-power generation, transmission and storage, which made up 40% of the contribution to GDP and 30% of the growth in 2025.

Within the electricity sector, the largest drivers were growth in investment in wind and solar power generation capacity, along with growth in power output from solar and wind, followed by the exports of solar-power equipment and materials.

But investment in solar-panel supply chains, a major growth driver in 2022-23, continued to fall for the second year, as the government made efforts to rein in overcapacity and “irrational” price competition.

Headwinds for solar

Ongoing investment of hundreds of billions of dollars represents a gigantic bet on a continuing global energy transition. 

However, developments next year and beyond are unclear, particularly for solar. A new pricing system for renewable power is creating uncertainty, while central government targets have been set far below current rates of clean-electricity additions.

Investment in solar-power generation and solar manufacturing declined in the second half of the year.

The reduction in the prices of clean-energy technology has been so dramatic that when the prices for GDP statistics are updated, the sectors’ contribution to real GDP – adjusted for inflation or, in this case deflation – will be revised down.

Nevertheless, the key economic role of the industry creates a strong motivation to keep the clean-energy boom going. A slowdown in the domestic market could also undermine efforts to stem overcapacity and inflame trade tensions by increasing pressure on exports to absorb supply.

Local governments and state-owned enterprises will also influence the outlook for the sector. 

Provincial governments have a lot of leeway in implementing the new electricity markets and contracting systems for renewable power generation. The new five-year plans, to be published this year, will, therefore, be of major importance. 

This spotlight was written for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), and Belinda Schaepe, China policy analyst at CREA. CREA China analysts Qi Qin and Chengcheng Qiu contributed research.

Watch, read, listen

PROVINCE INFLUENCE: The Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, a Beijing-based thinktank, published a report examining the climate-related statements in provincial recommendations for the 15th five-year plan.

‘PIVOT’?: The Outrage + Optimism podcast spoke with the University of Bath’s Dr Yixian Sun about whether China sees itself as a climate leader and what its role in climate negotiations could be going forward. 

COOKING FOR CLEAN-TECH: Caixin covered rising demand for China’s “gutter oil” as companies “scramble” to decarbonise. 

DON’T GO IT ALONE: China News broadcast the Chinese foreign ministry’s response to the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement, with spokeswoman Mao Ning saying “no country can remain unaffected” by climate change.

$6.8tn

The current size of China’s green-finance economy, including loans, bonds and equity, according to Dr Ma Jun, the Institute of Finance and Sustainability’s president,in a report launch event attended by Carbon Brief. Dr Ma added that “green loans” make up 16% of all loans in China, with some areas seeing them take a 34% share. 

New science 

• China’s official emissions inventories have overestimated its hydrofluorocarbon emissions by an average of 117m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (mtCO2e) every year since 2017 | Nature Geoscience
• “Intensified forest management efforts” in China from 2010 onwards have been linked to an acceleration in carbon absorption by plants and soils | Communications Earth and Environment

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China Briefing is written by Anika Patel and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

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New report shows how closer alignment between scientific estimates and economic modeling of physical risks is possible, as world moves towards 2°C

London, 5 February 2026 – Economic models used by governments, central banks, and investors are increasingly understating physical climate risk because they rely on assumptions that break down as the world moves toward higher levels of warming, according to a new report from University of Exeter and Carbon Tracker published today. 

The report Recalibrating Climate Risk – drawing on expert judgment from more than 60 climate scientists – finds that many economic models are failing to capture the extreme events, compounding shocks, and rising uncertainty likely to dominate impacts in a hotter world.  

Jesse Abrams, lead author and Senior Impact Fellow at Green Futures Solutions, University of Exeter, said: “Our expert elicitation reveals a fundamental disconnect: climate scientists understand that beyond 2°C, we’re not dealing with manageable economic adjustments. The climate scientists we surveyed were unambiguous: current economic models systematically underestimate climate damages because they can’t capture what matters most – the cascading failures, threshold effects, and compounding shocks that define climate risk in a warmer world and could undermine the very foundations of economic growth.  

“For financial institutions and policymakers relying on these models, this isn’t a technical problem – it’s a fundamental misreading of the risks we face, which current models miss entirely because they assume the future will behave like the past, even as we push the climate system into uncharted territory.” 

The flaws in economic modelling have drawn attention in recent years, with influential models criticised by UK actuaries and scientists for understating climate impacts that many scientists now anticipate. Following the recent withdrawal of the ‘Economic Commitment of Climate Change’, the report sets out to close that gap – by establishing early consensus on how to best improve those estimates and calling for closer collaboration between climate scientists and economists. 

The result is an assessment that examines – in detail – how uncertainty is treated, how far GDP-based estimates remain meaningful, and what this means for financial regulators and investors as the world moves toward 2°C. 

Key findings include: 

• Climate damages are structural and compounding – not marginal. At higher levels of warming, climate impacts are increasingly likely to disrupt multiple sectors at once, as physical risks cascade across trade, finance, migration. These non-linear, structural impacts are likely to increasingly reshape entire economies and undermine the necessary conditions for economic growth. This undercuts against a core assumption in many economic models, which assume that economic growth continues indefinitely, merely at reduced rates. 
• Extremes, not averages, define the future of climate damages.  
• While economic modelling has traditionally linked damages to changes in global mean temperature, societies and markets experience climate change through local and regional extremes, such as heatwaves, floods and droughts, which drive the bulk of economic and financial disruption while often barely registering in global averages. 
• Similarly, experts find that gross domestic product (GDP) can mask full harms by failing to account for impacts on mortality and morbidity, inequality, ecosystem loss and social disruption – all factors that undermine societal, human and economic health. As these risks rise, continuing to rely on GDP-based assessments can give policymakers and financial institutions a false sense of resilience even as underlying vulnerability increases (e.g., recovery spending that spikes GDP after a climate-related disaster, masking welfare losses entirely). 
• Uncertainty rises sharply with warming. With temperatures trending towards a 2°C future, experts stress that impacts become increasingly unpredictable, as tipping points and tail risks increase. Even as models continue to produce precise-looking point estimates, climate risks will likely undermine the assumptions of continuous growth fundamental to many economic models. Policymakers should be wary of climate scenarios extending beyond certain temperature levels and take a ‘broad spectrum’ approach to tail risks. 

The report provides recommendations to financial regulators and central banks, to institutional investors and pension funds, and to financial advisors and scenario providers.  

• From a prudential perspective, the objective should not be to price climate risk with precision, but to ensure the financial system’s resilience against destabilising outcomes. This includes supervisory practices that place greater emphasis on extremes, compounding effects, tail risks, and systemic vulnerability. 
• For long-horizon investors, the report challenges the assumption that climate risk can be adequately measured through conventional financial metrics and managed through portfolio diversification approaches, warning that portfolios may appear resilient under standard macroeconomic indicators while experiencing rising exposure to physical disruption, correlated shocks, and systemic vulnerabilities. 
• For scenario providers and users, the report challenges the practice of presenting single “best-estimate” projections as a basis for policy planning, and warns that climate scenarios should support risk management under deep uncertainty, rather than optimisation around a single ‘best estimate’ trajectory. 

The report also introduces new approaches to improve damage modelling – reflecting expert judgement that beyond certain warming levels, economic modelling can appear precise while no longer describing real-world outcomes – and outlines a clear research agenda.  

It also stresses that the appropriate response is not to wait for perfect models – but to recalibrate governance toward precaution, robustness, and transparency. 

Mark Campanale, Founder and CEO, Carbon Tracker Initiative: “The net result of flawed economic advice is widespread complacency amongst investors and policy makers, with many investors viewing climate scenario analysis as a tick-box disclosure exercise. Until the gap between scientists and economists’ expectations of future climate damages is closed and Government bodies act to ensure the integrity of advice upon which investment decisions are made, financial institutions will continue to chronically under-price climate risks – meaning that pension funds and taxpayers will remain dangerously exposed.” 

Laurie Laybourn, Executive Director of Strategic Climate Risks Initiative and Board Member, Carbon Tracker Initiative: “As the UK government’s landmark security assessment of ecosystem collapse showed last week, we are currently living through a paradigm shift in the speed, scale, and severity of risks driven by the climate-nature crisis. Yet, beyond this report, there has not been a corresponding paradigm shift in how regulators and government as a whole assess these risks. Instead, they’re routinely underestimated if not missed entirely, meaning many regulations and government action are dangerously out of touch with reality. This threatens disaster when that reality catches up with us. So, it’s critical that policymakers change course, providing clear signals and guidance to markets that these risks should be priced accordingly, rather than downplayed.”  

Hetal Patel, Head of Sustainable Investment Research at Phoenix Group said:  

“Phoenix supports the report’s call for a more robust and co-ordinated approach to climate‑risk modelling. Underestimating physical risk doesn’t just distort financial analysis and investment decisions, it underplays the real‑world consequences that will ultimately affect customer outcomes and society as a whole. As one of the UK’s largest asset owners, we urge policymakers to act decisively on the systemic risks identified in this research and to set clear expectations for financial sector users” 

 

ENDS 

 

Contacts 

Ben Dickenson Bampton, Communications Lead, Green Futures Solutions – University of Exeter 

Tel: 07840194274 

Email: b.dickenson-bampton@exeter.ac.uk 

Joel Benjamin, Communications Manager, Carbon Tracker Initiative 

Tel: 07429637423 

Email: joel.benjamin@carbontracker.org  

 

Notes to Editors 

The Recalibrating Climate Risk report was led by the University of Exeter’s Green Futures Solutions team, in partnership with Carbon Tracker Initiative and funding from the Aurora Trust. The report was authored by Dr Jesse F Abrams (lead author), Dr Sam Xiaocheng Hu, and Ben Dickenson Bampton. 

The report synthesises expert judgement from 68 climate scientists, who were consulted through a combination of survey and workshop approaches. Together, they represent universities, research institutions, and government agencies from 12 counties (USA, UK, Germany, Australia, France, China, Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Canada, Austria and Sweden). As standard for expert elicitation exercises, the results were collected anonymously. 

The full report will publish here: https://greenfuturessolutions.com/news/recalibrating-climate-risk/ 

 

About the University of Exeter 

The University of Exeter is home to over 1,500 climate and environmental experts (including many of the world’s most influential climate scientists), over 30 specialist institutes, and world-leading initiatives – such as Global Tipping Points Report and Global Carbon Budget. Through Green Futures Solutions, we help organisations access this expertise and navigate their exposure to climate risks, develop resilient solutions, and drive transformative change in their sector. Each year, we partner with a wide range of organisations – including the National Trust, Met Office and – to deliver collaborative reports, consultancy, and informed solutions for a sustainable future. Learn more about our work here. 

 

About Carbon Tracker Initiative 

The Carbon Tracker Initiative is a not-for-profit financial think tank that seeks to promote a climate-secure global energy market by aligning capital markets with climate reality. Our research on the carbon bubble, unburnable carbon, and stranded assets has begun a new debate on aligning the financial system with the energy transition to a low-carbon future. www.carbontracker.org 

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