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DeBriefed 29 May 2026: Europe’s ‘mind-boggling’ May | Indian heat deaths | Nigeria’s solar mini-grids
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
‘MIND-BOGGLING’ MAY: The UK and continental Europe have set “mind-boggingly crazy” temperature records for May amid a deadly heatwave, reported the Financial Times. According to the Associated Press, the UK “smashed a century-old temperature record for the second time in 24 hours on Tuesday”. The newswire added that records “also fell in France, where temperatures reached 36C on Monday in the country’s south-west”. On Wednesday, Portugal hit a record May temperature of 40.3C, said BBC News.
‘BRUTAL REMINDER’: In parts of Italy, the heatwave triggered blackouts, reported Reuters. The heatwave has also been linked to more than a dozen deaths in the UK and France, including from people drowning and suffering heat-related deaths while competing in sporting events, said ABC News. Simon Stiell, the executive secretary of UN Climate Change, said the intense heatwaves were a “brutal reminder” of the cost of global warming, reported Politico. Carbon Brief has in-depth coverage of the record-shattering heatwave.
INDIA’S DEADLY HEAT: In the southern Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, more than 100 people died within three days following an intense heatwave, reported the Khaleej Times. The publication noted that authorities urged people to stay indoors and avoid direct exposure to the heat. Meanwhile, some parts of India are “grappling with power cuts as record-breaking heat has pushed electricity demand to an all-time high”, reported Reuters.
- CRUDE DIPS: The International Energy Agency (IEA) said global investments in oil projects will fall below $500bn in 2026, continuing a three-year decline, reported Bloomberg. Carbon Brief’s analysis of the data shows the US’s “data-centre boom” means it is now investing more in fossil-fuel power than China.
- DODGING NET-ZERO: The world’s biggest miner, Australian giant BHP, has backtracked on climate action by halting or delaying projects to cut “vast” amounts of emissions, according to a Guardian investigation.
- SOLAR SLIP: China’s new solar installations dropped for a fourth straight month, reflecting weakening domestic demand, said Bloomberg.
- NO LOGGING: Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon fell last year to its lowest level since 2019, according to a new report, said Agence France-Presse.
- EXECUTIVE ACTION: Puerto Rico’s governor announced a state of emergency to fight a surge in coastal erosion, citing the need to protect natural resources and vulnerable communities, reported the Associated Press.
The number of homes in the UK with air conditioning, double the figure from three years ago, reported the Guardian. There are 29m households in the UK.
Latest climate research- Carbon Brief will soon be launching a new fortnightly newsletter focused on climate research. Sign up for free today.
- LGBTQ+ households in the US are “significantly more likely” to face energy poverty and insecurity than the general population | Energy Research & Social Science
- Global rice-paddy greenhouse gas emissions have doubled over the past six decades | Nature Food
- Vegetation greening and human-caused warming are the “main drivers” of a surge in flash floods over the last decade | Science Advances
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
CapturedA Carbon Brief investigation has shed light on the impact of weather-related flooding on National Health Service (NHS) facilities across the UK. At least 67 NHS hospital wards, departments and other sites have been forced to temporarily close or relocate due to weather-related flooding. The chart above shows sites of weather-related flooding incidents at NHS facilities. The size of the circles indicates the number of incidents reported at each site.
Spotlight How solar mini-grids can ‘help boost’ Nigeria’s economyThis week, Carbon Brief covers a new report on Nigeria’s solar mini-grid industry.
Amid the impact of the US-Iran war on the Nigerian economy, a new report has argued that solar-mini grids can help to reduce the country’s reliance on fossil fuels and create more than 200,000 jobs.
In Nigeria, Africa’s third-largest economy, the war has led to an increase in energy prices and a decrease in petrol consumption. Petrol is one of the country’s main sources of transport and household fuel. According to one estimate, prices have surged by up to 40% since the conflict commenced in February.
Although the Nigerian treasury has benefited from rising crude oil prices – the country is a major exporter of oil and gas – the impact has been most visible on the wider population.
Rising energy prices “have affected the purchasing power of workers”, Agnes Funmi Sessi, a labour union leader in Lagos, told Carbon Brief.
However, scaling the deployment of solar “mini-grids” could help the country move away from fossil fuels, stimulate rural economies and improve livelihoods, according to the new report authored by the thinktank, the Africa Policy Research Institute.
“We estimate that, by deploying over 10,000 mini-grids, the sector could create 212,688 direct full-time informal and productive-use jobs across the off-grid and under-grid market segments,” the report said.
A nascent industrySolar “mini-grids” are small-scale, localised electricity generation and distribution systems powered by solar panels.
The report positioned Nigeria’s mini-grid sector as one of the fastest-growing in Africa, with the country having just 11 mini-grids in 2015 and 155 by 2024, along with at least 42 active developers.
Many of the companies within the sector are young and apply novel local techniques in their deployment of solar technology, the report said.
However, access to finance remains a huge barrier. According to the report, the sector may require up to $8bn to connect 35.4 million people to mini-grids.
“Most Nigerians want solar power in their homes, but it is a capital intensive business for vendors and customers,” Dr Ben Iheagwara, a renewable energy entrepreneur and policy analyst, told Carbon Brief.
The report urged the Nigerian government and its international partners to “attract private capital by de-risking investments and ensuring regulatory clarity and long-term planning”.
Other key recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders include investment in skills development and paying attention to the gender gap.
Powering rural communitiesMany rural communities, which make up about 37% of the country, are disconnected from the national grid system, so often have to generate their own electricity through mini-grid systems.
According to Nigeria’s electricity regulator, NERC, a mini-grid is defined as a power generating system with an installed capacity of up to 10 megawatts.
A mini-grid can be powered by fossil fuels such as diesel or petrol, but solar power is now considered a cheaper and cleaner source.
With more than 80 million people lacking access to electricity in Nigeria, solar mini-grids are increasingly viewed as the lowest-cost electrification solution, the report said.
Watch, read, listenMOVING FORWARD: The Energy Transition Show dug into electricity reform in South Africa, discussing the country’s coal legacy and the role of renewables.
ENERGY POVERTY: In an opinion article for Project Syndicate, executive director of the African Climate Foundation, Saliem Fakir, argued that the energy transition in emerging and developing economies is driven by economics and security rather than emissions targets.
VANISHING CITY: BBC News reported on a coastal community in Nigeria where the ocean has “already swallowed more than half of the town”.
- 31 May: Colombia presidential elections
- 31 May-5 June: Global Environment Facility council meeting, Samarkand, Uzbekistan
- 2-5 June: The Venice Agreement for Peatlands workshop, Kisumu, Kenya
- National Oceanography Centre, engagement assistant (external communications) | Salary: £28,254. Location: Southampton, UK
- Dangote Industries, decarbonisation specialist | Salary: Unknown. Location: Lagos, Nigeria
- City of New York, chief decarbonization officer | Salary: $261,469. Location: New York City
- Climate Central, writer and associate editor | Salary: $72,000-$75,000. Location: US (Remote)
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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DeBriefed 22 May 2026: UN adopts landmark resolution | Trump takes on ‘RCP8.5’ | Climate migration
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AI boom means US is now ‘investing more’ in fossil-fuel power than China
The “data-centre boom” is driving a surge in gas investment in the US, pushing its fossil-power spending ahead of China, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
A rapid expansion of data centres across the nation is at the heart of the US tech sector’s plans to continue “dominat[ing]” the global artificial intelligence (AI) industry.
High demand for electricity to power these data centres has led to companies rushing to build new gas-fired power plants across the country.
This trend, combined with “soaring” gas-turbine prices, drove a threefold increase in US gas‑power investment in 2025 – and the IEA expects this to continue throughout 2026.
As the chart below shows, Chinese investment in coal- and gas-fired power is expected to drop this year, amid domestic policy changes and the Iran war sending gas prices spiralling.
Together, these trends mean the IEA expects US investment in fossil-fuelled power plants to overtake China’s in 2026.
Annual investment in fossil-fuel power in China and the US, $bn. The figure for 2026 is an IEA estimate, based on current trends. Source: IEA.The IEA’s latest world energy investment report shows that spending on renewables and electricity grids continues to dominate at the global scale.
In the US, Trump administration policies such as the phase-out of tax credits for renewables has led to the IEA revising its forecast for new wind and solar power downwards.
At the same time, US electricity demand is expected to rise by an average of 2% per year from 2026 to 2030, with data centres contributing half of the overall increase.
This is leading to what the IEA calls an “AI-driven push” to build new gas-power plants in the US, the world’s largest data-centre market and largest gas producer.
Globally, orders for new gas-power plants increased to 130 gigawatts (GW) in 2025 – a 25-year high – and US demand was a “major factor” in this, according to the IEA.
Much of the demand is coming from tech companies in the US seeking to bypass grid connection queues by building “captive” gas-power plants.
As the chart below shows, since the start of 2025 these US captive data centres alone have signed off on more investment in new gas turbines than any country in the world – aside from the US itself.
Total value of new gas generation final investment decisions by country, region or use-case, between 2025 and the first quarter of 2026, $bn. Source: IEA.Overall, investment in grid upgrades, power equipment and electricity generation to support the buildout of data-centre infrastructure around the world hit $105bn in 2025, according to the IEA.
This is more than the total invested in the energy sector across the whole of Africa – a continent where more than 600 million people do not have access to electricity.
The IEA notes that strong demand for gas-power plants for data centres in the US – and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East – is “limiting the availability of turbines for near-term deployment elsewhere in the world”.
The agency also points out that as the tech sector becomes a “major energy investor”, accounting for around 40% of all corporate power-purchase agreements, it is also “underpinning momentum” for emerging clean technologies, such as small modular nuclear reactors and advanced geothermal.
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EM-DAT: Trump aid cuts could close database storing ‘world’s memory of disasters’
The world’s most comprehensive disaster database – relied on by thousands of climate scientists and policymakers – is at risk of closing as a result of cuts to US foreign aid by the Trump administration.
The “emergency events” database (EM-DAT) has for 30 years provided free-to-use information on the size and impact of extreme weather events and other disasters around the world.
Its data underpins a vast range of scientific research, government policymaking, humanitarian response efforts and environmental investigations.
However, Trump’s dismantling of the federal Agency for International Development (USAid) – which provided 90% of the funding for EM-DAT – has left the future of the database in jeopardy, scientists tell Carbon Brief.
An open letter coordinated by climate scientists and signed by more than 4,000 academics and students is calling on governments, multilateral development banks and philanthropy to step in to stop the database from closing.
‘World’s memory of disasters’For the past three decades, a small team of researchers at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain in Belgium have maintained EM-DAT.
It is the world’s most comprehensive database of extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, floods and tropical storms, along with other disasters. It offers information such as the timing and length of an event, how many people were killed or displaced and the economic cost.
Since 1988, this continuous record has been free to use and independently verified by the researchers at CRED.
When considered in its entirety, the database provides more than just a list of disasters – it acts as a “memory” of how extreme weather events and their impacts on people are changing, says Prof Niko Speybroeck, an epidemiologist and director of EM-DAT. He tells Carbon Brief:
“EM-DAT can be considered the world’s memory of disasters. It contains more than 27,000 natural and technological disasters. It’s not just a database. It makes it possible to know who was affected, when, where and with what consequences.”
The database is frequently used by climate scientists. It is often cited in research papers and underpinned analysis in the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on the impacts of climate change.
It is also used by government officials and environmental organisations.
The database is particularly important for global-south nations, which are less likely to have comprehensive national or regional records of disasters than those in the global north.
For example, the Indonesian government used EM-DAT to develop a national strategy against disasters, says Speybroeck.
The database has also been used to document the “disproportionate climate burden” borne by small-island nations, he adds, which “prompted the UN to release more funding” for these states.
EM-DAT is of critical importance to national and multinational initiatives tracking extreme weather in Africa, says Prof Dewald van Niekerk, head of the African Centre for Disaster Studies at North-West University in South Africa. Van Niekerk was one of the climate scientists who authored the open letter calling for EM-DAT to be protected from closure. He tells Carbon Brief:
“We use it on various levels, from sub-national straight up to continental level.”
Since 2018, van Niekerk has utilised EM-DAT to prepare reports on extreme weather events in Africa for the African Union. These efforts are to meet goals agreed under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, a voluntary international agreement to prevent disasters from upending development.
Without EM-DAT, it would not be possible to conduct such analyses, he says:
“Not all [African] governments can compile these databases. Where they do, they are extremely fragmented. You can’t compare apples with apples.”
(Carbon Brief has also used EM-DAT data to investigate the impact of extreme weather on Africa, finding that such events killed at least 15,000 people on the continent in 2023.)
Uncertain futureDespite having a global impact, EM-DAT’s small team of researchers require just €300,000 ($350,000) a year to maintain operations.
For decades, EM-DAT obtained 90% of this funding from USAid, the US’s federal agency for foreign aid, says Speybroeck:
“[USAid] allowed us to work in an independent and neutral way, so we were not influenced by any politics. That was one of the strengths of the database. They only asked for us to leave it open access, meaning that anyone can use it.”
USAid was dismantled by Donald Trump after he became US president for the second time in January 2025. By July, the agency officially closed its doors.
Speybroeck received a letter in February 2025 informing him that his team were to lose their funding.
“I decided for a long time to keep silent,” he tells Carbon Brief. However, by the end of 2025, he chose to start speaking out about the impact of USAid cuts on EM-DAT.
Learning of the threats to the database, four leading climate scientists published an open letter in March calling for other governments, multilateral development banks and philanthropy to step in to stop the database from closing. It has attracted more than 4,000 signatures.
One of the letter authors, Prof Gabriele Messori, director of the Swedish Centre for Impacts of Climate Extremes at Uppsala University in Sweden, tells Carbon Brief:
“It’s very worrying that a long-term dataset that has become a reference for many different sectors, when looking at the impacts of a wide range of natural and technological events on society and the economy, could be suddenly interrupted.”
(The cuts to EM-DAT’s funding come as the Trump administration has laid off thousands of scientists and frozen research grants worth billions of dollars in the US. For more on how these actions are impacting climate science, see Carbon Brief’s explainer on how Trump is threatening polar research.)
Since going public about EM-DAT’s funding crisis, Speybroeck says he has had some “positive signals” from potential new funders, but “there is nothing on paper yet”.
Another letter author, Prof Dewald van Niekerk, says he hopes to see EM-DAT move towards a model of using multiple funding sources, to create a “more robust structure” where “no one can just pull the plug” on its work.
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Skeptical Science New Research for Week #22 2026
Climate Change Communication in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Schäfer et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Chang
Artificial intelligence (AI), and especially generative AI (GenAI), is rapidly reshaping climate change communication (CCC). Once dominated by news coverage and public campaigns, CCC now extends across scientists, NGOs, corporations, journalists, influencers, and citizens—all increasingly encountering and adopting AI tools. This article provides a comprehensive review of scholarship on the nexus of AI and CCC, synthesizing insights scattered across disciplines from social and computer science, and interdisciplinary fields like environmental and science studies. It identifies robust patterns alongside significant gaps, highlighting areas where future research is needed. Based on existing evidence, it shows that AI—as of now—functions less as a disruptive replacement of established communication and information-seeking practices rather than as an assistive layer in CCC: accelerating routine newsroom tasks, enabling personalized and multilingual outreach, and generating new textual, visual, and multimodal representations of climate change. Stakeholders use AI to monitor discourse, expose greenwashing, and broaden access to climate information, though systematic research on uptake and effects remains limited. Journalists experiment cautiously with AI, emphasizing human oversight, while influencers and content creators are understudied despite their growing role. The potential of AI-driven systems for fact-checking, policy analysis, and creative engagement has been explored, yet studies remain heavily English-centric and focused on text. Citizen studies reveal promises and risks: generative dialogues can reduce skepticism and foster engagement, but biases, misinformation, and equity concerns persist. Advancing the field requires comparative and interdisciplinary agendas that integrate computational and traditional methods, foreground transparency and inclusion, and address how AI can equitably support awareness, trust, and climate action.
Vacuuming the Sky? Metaphorical Framing in News Coverage of Carbon Dioxide Removal Methods, Bruggen et al., Environmental Communication
Discussions of proposed climate solutions, such as carbon dioxide removal (CDR), are multi-layered and contested. This study examines the role that metaphors play as frame devices in news coverage (2018–2024) about CDR. Using critical metaphor analysis, we examined 257 articles from major UK, US, and Canadian news outlets to identify and interpret contrasting metaphorical expressions from journalists and their sources, including industry, science, and civil society. We find that a wide range of source domains, including references to, e.g. historical events, household objects, crime, religion, and medical analogies, is used to metaphorically frame CDR. These metaphors reflect actors’ competing ideologies and interests, rooted in hopeful rational-optimist and socio-ecological visions. We also discuss how metaphor use could influence public engagement and policy and reflect on how language might oversimplify or obscure critical aspects of the technology.
Consensus Messaging Shifts Beliefs About Climate Change in a Field Experiment, Rode et al., Science Communication
Previous research on climate change consensus messaging has mostly taken place in controlled lab settings. In this field experiment, we engaged U.S. residents (N = 158) in brief doorstep conversations on climate change. Research assistants read a script about the scientific consensus (treatment) or basic facts about climate change (control) and then provided participants with a magnet containing the same information. The consensus message had a significant positive effect on consensus estimates (β = 0.45) and belief in climate change (β = 0.41), but not on other downstream attitudes or behavior. These results mostly align with theory and have implications for consensus messaging.
From this week's government/NGO section:24/7 renewables. The economics of Firm Solar and Wind, Dardour et al., The International Renewable Energy Agency
The authors show that the cost of firm renewable electricity has declined rapidly across all major technologies and markets. In high-quality solar and wind resource regions, co-located hybrid systems can already deliver round-the-clock electricity at costs competitive with - and in many cases below - those of new fossil-fuel generation. China currently defines the global cost floor, while costs in Brazil, India, South Africa, Australia, and the Gulf region are declining rapidly towards fossil-fuel cost parity. The authors identify key drivers of firm renewable costs – technology performance, resource quality and system configuration – and examine the policy levers that are proving decisive in translating cost competitiveness into deployment at scale. They conclude that the technologies are maturing, the costs are falling and the commercial demand is growing. The pace at which firm renewable electricity is deployed will be among the most consequential determinants of the global energy transition in the decade ahead.Climate Promises, Industry Handouts. Canada’s Fossil Fuel Funding in 2025, Environmental Defence Canada
The Government of Canada has provided at least $10.2 billion in fossil fuel subsidies and public financing in 2025. Since Environmental Defence began tracking fossil fuel subsidies in 2020, the federal government has provided at least $85.2 billion in subsidies to the fossil fuel industry. This figure includes government direct spending as well as public financing through Crown corporations, such as Export Development Canada. In addition to fossil fuel subsidies, the Government of Canada provided at least $405.53 million dollars in subsidies for carbon capture and fossil fuel hydrogen projects in 2025. These technologies have failed to deliver on their promises to reduce emissions and have instead locked in further fossil fuel production. Furthermore, this figure excludes the estimated cost of the carbon capture investment tax credit, which is estimated to cost Canadians up to $5.7 billion by 2028, and up to $12.4 billion by 2035. The changes introduced in the Budget 2025 could increase the cost to Canadians by an additional $3.75 billion. In 2025, the cost of pollution from oil and gas companies operating in Canada was an estimated $56.4 billion. This figure was calculated by taking the most recent oil and gas emissions figures and multiplying with the social cost of carbon. Climate pollution created by oil and gas companies has massive costs, including health costs, property damage from extreme weather events, and decreased agricultural productivity due to changing weather patterns. The social cost of carbon helps to estimate what those costs to society are. 76 articles in 46 journals by 755 contributing authorsPhysical science of climate change, effects
Intensified Stratosphere–Troposphere Ozone Transport over Asia under a High-End Climate Trajectory, Luo et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0426.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global aviation contrail climate effects from 2019 to 2021, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-6071-2024 68 cites.
Observations of climate change, effects
Abrupt stream acidification and metal mobilization from permafrost degradation, Skierszkan et al., Science 10.1126/science.aea2898
Increasing exposure to compound heatwave and drought events in China during 1961–2020, Qin et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109099
Two decades of urban heat intensification and exposure across 1400 cities, Naserikia et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03665-y
Wildfire Hazard in Poland in a Warming Climate: Past and Future Impact of Extreme Weather, Pi?skwar et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70439
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Multivariate extremes in lakes, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49012-7 29 cites.
Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
Assessing winter climate change using cumulative sub-zero temperatures, HE et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.008
Critical dependence of global ocean heat monitoring on the ocean observing system, Zhu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02661-6
Increasing Power When Controlling Multiple Hypothesis Testing with Climate Data via Covariate Smoothing, McEvoy & McKinnon, Journal of Agricultural Biological and Environmental Statistics Open Access 10.1007/s13253-026-00738-5
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biogeographic patterns of daily wildfire spread and extremes across North America, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1355361 19 cites.
Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects
Evolution of Compound Drought and Extreme Precipitation Events on the Tibetan Plateau, Sun et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0306.1
Statistical-dynamical downscaling of EURO-CORDEX projections to 50 m resolution: characteristic days for Baden-Württemberg under climate change, Kermarrec et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1778467
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Central-Pacific El Niño-Southern Oscillation less predictable under greenhouse warming, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48804-1 14 cites.
Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection
Epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty quantification in weather and climate models, Mansfield & Christensen, Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society Open Access 10.1002/qj.70219
Evaluating Nex-GDDP CMIP6 Models for Extreme Wet and Dry Events Over Indonesia, Kurniadi et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70437
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Is Bias Correction in Dynamical Downscaling Defensible?, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2023gl105979 24 cites.
Cryosphere & climate change
An Extreme Antarctic Event; 2025 Was Record Low Seasonal Sea Ice and Record High Iceberg Scouring, Barnes et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70938
Abrupt stream acidification and metal mobilization from permafrost degradation, Skierszkan et al., Science 10.1126/science.aea2898
Constrained simulation of permafrost thermal changes from 1980 to 2018 on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, Ji et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105542
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Widespread seawater intrusions beneath the grounded ice of Thwaites Glacier, West Antarctica, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2404766121 52 cites.
Sea level & climate change
Estimating the cost of sea level rise, Sugiyama et al., DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Open Access pdf pmh:oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/38529
Improved closure of the global mean sea level budget from observational advances since 1960, Zheng et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aea0652
Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
Diminished Ross Ice Shelf and West Antarctic Ice Sheet during Last Interglacial warming, Carter et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01988-1
Multi-model assessment of the deglacial climatic evolution at high southern latitudes, Obase et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-21-1443-2025
Biology & climate change, related geochemistry
Acute temperature effects on cilia beating increase coral deoxygenation, Pacherres et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeg0950
An Extreme Antarctic Event; 2025 Was Record Low Seasonal Sea Ice and Record High Iceberg Scouring, Barnes et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70938
Climate and land use change potentially drives southern range contraction and latitudinal shift in Caucasian Lynx, Shahsavarzadeh et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-54072-4
Climate change accelerates global forest deadwood dynamics, Edelmann et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03651-4
Climate-driven vegetation vulnerability in a monsoon-dominated dryland: a dual-index (kNDVI–VHI) assessment for Pakistan, Mehmood et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1745938
Flood events from climate extremes drastically shift prey energy densities, Nitschke et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108136
Hot days increase the risk of heat-stress-related deaths in endangered koala populations, Mella et al., Biology Letters Open Access 10.1098/rsbl.2026.0117
Resilient nekton composition in the face of climate-driven foundation species shifts, Leavitt et al., Ecology Open Access 10.1002/ecy.70397
Taxonomic and functional diversity of benthic foraminifera as a promising proxy for tidewater glacier retreat, Fossile et al., Boreas Open Access 10.1111/bor.70068
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Asymmetrical Impact of Daytime and Nighttime Warming on the Interannual Variation of Urban Spring Vegetation Phenology, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef004127 20 cites.
GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry
An Upper Bound on Carbon Emissions of Drained Peat Soil Grasslands From Satellite Radar Interferometry, Conroy & Hanssen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl115732
Forest carbon protocols underestimate climate-driven carbon loss risks, Wu et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10571-y
Lowland tropical forests remain a methane sink under warming and long-term hurricane disturbance recovery, Conte et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111225
Machine-learning-based estimates of global natural vegetated wetland methane emissions (2000–2025), Li et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-3507-2026
Reduction of tropical cyclone-induced ocean carbon outgassing since 1993, Ye et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01985-4
Widespread peat carbon losses driven by the 2025 Scottish megafire, Schoenecker et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01994-3
Winter Mixing Controls Carbon Sequestration by the Biological Pump in the Subpolar North Atlantic, Fogaren et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023822
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Whole-soil warming leads to substantial soil carbon emission in an alpine grassland, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48736-w 65 cites.
CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
Concerns and Questions About Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies, Luczak, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70063
Determinants community involvement in a forest carbon sequestration initiative: a study case in Indonesia, Triana et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1770765
Economic costs of global forest protection may be overstated, Nepal et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73569-0
Impact on oysters in first-of-its-kind field trial of marine Enhanced Rock Weathering (mERW) with olivine as carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategy, Jankowska et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1851765
Vacuuming the Sky? Metaphorical Framing in News Coverage of Carbon Dioxide Removal Methods, Bruggen et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.1080/17524032.2026.2673348
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Taking stock of carbon dioxide removal policy in emerging economies: developments in Brazil, China, and India, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2353148 14 cites.
Decarbonization
An energy scenario for Japan towards 2040: Focused on efficiency improvements and renewable energy, Takase et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115398
Averting the steel carbon lock-in through strategic green investments, Bachorz et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access 10.1038/s41558-026-02635-8
High-impact weather effects on wind and solar power systems under future climate scenarios in China, Sun et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73427-z
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biological fermentation pilot-scale systems and evaluation for commercial viability towards sustainable biohydrogen production, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48790-4 68 cites.
Geoengineering climate
Artificial Flooding Leads to Thicker and Brighter Arctic Sea Ice, Blanchard?Wrigglesworth et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007894
Contrasting Changes in Rainfall Structure Between Monsoon and Adjacent Dry Regions Under Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, Jiang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046329
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rethinking the Susceptibility?Based Strategy for Marine Cloud Brightening Climate Intervention: Experiment With CESM2 and Its Implications, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108860 13 cites.
Black carbon
Sediment records reveal elevated black carbon emissions potentially amplifying Arctic snowmelt, Gong et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03654-1
Aerosols
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Constraining effects of aerosol-cloud interaction by accounting for coupling between cloud and land surface, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adl5044 25 cites.
Climate change communications & cognition
Climate Change Communication in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Schäfer et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70073
Consensus Messaging Shifts Beliefs About Climate Change in a Field Experiment, Rode et al., Science Communication Open Access 10.1177/10755470261442409
From cognition to action: climate risk perception and corporate capital structure optimization, Fu et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1826872
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Trust in climate science and climate scientists: A narrative review, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000400 34 cites.
Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change
Assessing rainfall and temperature trends to guide agricultural adaptation, Msangi & Deus, Discover Agriculture Open Access pdf 10.1007/s44279-026-00607-2
Contextualizing the marginal returns of regenerative agriculture on maize performance under climate change in Nigeria, Kolapo & Sieber, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1767448
Dolomite in conjunction with straw application increased straw-derived CO2 emission while depressed soil organic carbon mineralization in two acidic paddy soils, Xu et al., Biology and Fertility of Soils 10.1007/s00374-026-02017-4
Effect of organic mulches in vineyards: CH4 and N2O emissions and their contribution to the GWP and carbon balance, Rodrigo et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1846259
Evaluating the Intercropping Systems in the Context of Agroecological Resilience in the Current Era of the Changing Climate: A Scenario of Scientific Analysis of Last Decade Data, Maitra et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access 10.1002/cli2.70050
Nonlinear temperature change responses shape soil organic carbon loss-gain transitions in global Mollisol croplands, Meng et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73759-w
Uncertainties in global hydrological and climate models challenge future estimates of crop water use and sustainability, Sun et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03621-w
Viral mediation of anaerobic methane oxidation to carbon sequestration in paddy soil, Tong et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01998-z
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate-resilient agricultural ploys can improve livelihood and food security in Eastern India, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-023-03176-2 21 cites.
Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change
Decoupling Between Heavy Precipitation Expansion and Population Exposure in a Warming World, Zhou et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007771
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Widespread societal and ecological impacts from projected Tibetan Plateau lake expansion, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01446-w 131 cites.
Climate change economics
Achieving climate justice: climate finance and income inequality in developing countries, Li et al., Open MIND Open Access pmh:10.6084/m9.figshare.31389871
Estimating the cost of sea level rise, Sugiyama et al., DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Open Access pdf pmh:oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/38529
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Has climate change promoted the high-quality development of financial enterprises? Evidence from China, Frontiers in Environmental Science, 10.3389/fenvs.2024.1332748 1 citation.
Climate change and the circular economy Climate change mitigation public policy research
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Integrated assessment modeling of a zero-emissions global transportation sector, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48424-9 99 cites.
Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research
An institutional perspective on integrating climate and societal challenges in urban areas, Wöhler et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100829
Reframing climate adaptation and societal collapse: governance pathways for systemic risk in the Anthropocene, Granberg & Glover, Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1825767
The public mandate for equitable climate adaptation: Evidence from Aotearoa New Zealand, Parsons et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104398
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Multi-Scalar Inequities of Climate Adaptation Finance: A Critical Review, Current Climate Change Reports, 10.1007/s40641-024-00195-7 29 cites.
Climate change impacts on human health
Associations between climatic variables and dengue incidence in high-burden countries: a systematic review and meta-analysis, James et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1804553
Climate Change Elevates the Risk of Antibiotic Resistance in Global Surface Ocean, Yuan et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70929
Differentiated associations of daytime and nighttime heatwaves with long-term survival: A nationwide population-based cohort in China, Liu et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.009
Eroding heat resilience in South Asian cities under observed warming trends, Yadav et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-55172-x
Health Impact of Climate Change on Older Adults Living With Dementia: A Scoping Review, Gurung et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change 10.1002/wcc.70071
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate Change, Environment, and Health: The implementation and initial evaluation of a longitudinal, integrated curricular theme and novel competency framework at Harvard Medical School, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000412 23 cites.
Climate change & geopolitics
Climate Legislation and Global Green Development Transition: The Role of International Environmental Engagement and Government Readiness, Liu & FENG, Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0140.1
Climate change impacts on human culture Other
Northern Hemisphere Wintertime Stratospheric Circulation Response to Smoke Injection From a Regional Nuclear Conflict, Yook et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122395
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Increasing frequency and lengthening season of western disturbances is linked to increasing strength and delayed northward migration of the subtropical jet, , 10.5194/egusphere-2023-1778 1 citation.
Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives
The subnational wedge in Paris-aligned pathways, Hsu et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000921
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
‘Mind the Gap’—reforestation needs vs. reforestation capacity in the western United States, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1402124 28 cites.
Book reviews
Book Review: Loss and Damage in Climate Politics, Tirivangasi, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2677325
Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate ChangeData Centers in California, Mark Specht and Vivian Yang, Union of Concerned Scientists
California already has many large data centers, and the state is expecting to see a surge of new data centers over the next decade. While data centers and the proliferation of AI pose a wide range of potential effects on the economy, the environment, and society, the authors focus specifically on the effects on the state’s electricity system and its ratepayers, along with policy solutions to mitigate those effects. If left unaddressed, data center growth could undermine grid reliability, slow the clean energy transition, and raise costs for ratepayers. Policymakers should require data centers to provide more transparency into their operations and pay their fair share of electricity costs. The state should additionally implement guardrails to minimize the harmful air quality effects from data center backup generation and ensure the growth of data centers does not stall clean energy progress or threaten grid reliability.2026 State of the Market. Corporate Demand, Market Evolution, and Buyer Leadership, Corporate Energy Buyers Association
Corporate energy buyers continue to play a defining role in the evolution of clean energy markets. Despite higher power purchase agreement (PPA) and energy prices, reliability risks, and growing complexity, corporate demand for clean energy reached new heights in 2025 and early 2026. Since CEBA’s tracking began in 2014, corporate buyers have announced more than 143 gigawatts (GW) of new large-scale clean energy capacity in the United States, with back-to-back record-setting years in 2024 and 2025. Corporate buyers are no longer simply participating in the energy transition — they are shaping it.Powering Canada Strong: A National Strategy for an Electrified Canadian Economy, Natural Resources Canada, Government of Canada
The national strategy will enable Canada to meet two initial challenges including building new infrastructure to double Canada’s electricity supply by 2050 and meet growing demand; and, accelerating electrification across the economy to support competitiveness and address climate change.Boom and Bust Coal 2026. Tracking the global coal plant pipeline, Shearer et al., Global Energy Monitor
Boom and Bust Coal is an annual survey of the global coal fleet by Global Energy Monitor and partners. The authors analyze key trends in coal power capacity and track various stages of capacity development including planned retirements. This provides key insights into the status of the global phaseout of coal power and evaluates progress towards the world’s climate targets and commitments. The data come from GEM’s Global Coal Plant Tracker, an online database updated biannually that identifies and maps every known coal-fired generating unit and every new unit proposed since January 1, 2010 (30 MW and larger). In 2025, the world built more coal and used it less. New coal power capacity additions increased by 3.5% to reach one of the highest levels on record, even as coal-fired electricity generation declined by 0.6%. This gap was particularly pronounced in China and India, where wind and solar met most or all new demand, driving down coal generation even as coal plant commissioning reached decade highs. Coal capacity is increasingly maintained not as a primary source of generation, but as a form of system insurance. The U.S. stood out as the only major economy in 2025 to increase coal generation, and the total number of countries pursuing new coal development is shrinking. The central challenge heading into 2026 is not the availability of alternatives to coal, but the persistence of policy frameworks that continue to treat coal as necessary even as power systems move increasingly beyond it.Proposed Amendments to the Cap-and-Invest Program, Legislative Analysts Office, California State Legislature
California has established statutory goals for reducing statewide GHG emissions—down to at least 40 percent below the 1990 level by 2030, and to at least 85 percent below the 1990 level by 2045. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) sets a declining, aggregate cap on the amount of GHGs allowed to be emitted under the program. CARB issues a set number of allowances each year equal to the annual cap. Entities covered by the program can comply with the program by (1) reducing their emissions, (2) purchasing allowances, or (3) purchasing offsets. Each allowance is essentially a permit to emit one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. In September 2025, the Legislature extended and made various changes to the cap-and-invest program. These changes: (1) modified the program’s design features and allowance allocations; (2) changed the allocation of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund revenues; and (3) added reporting, evaluation, and oversight provisions. April proposed amendments include establishing the total number of allowances through 2045, including removing 118 Million allowances through 2030, but adds back up to 118 million allowances above the cap for a larger and broader Manufacturing Decarbonization Incentive.Build Here: How Targeted State Investment in Geothermal Can Fill California’s Clean Firm Gap, Wilson Ricks and Ann Garth, Clean Air Task Force
The authors found that next-generation geothermal energy could dramatically reduce the cost of achieving California’s clean energy goals, but only if the state acts now to remove critical development barriers. The authors call on California to fund an in-field testbed program to explore and map the subsurface across high-potential geologic regions, generating the data needed to unlock large-scale private investment in next-generation geothermal development. The authors point to a proven model for unlocking next-gen development: the U.S. Department of Energy’s Utah FORGE testbed drilled a series of wells in rural Utah and publicly released the resulting subsurface data. Billions of dollars in private investment followed, including the world’s first commercial-scale enhanced geothermal systems facility, Fervo Energy’s Cape Station project, located directly adjacent to the Utah FORGE site. California now imports that zero-emission power to satisfy its own electricity demand but does not receive the economic advantages. California has the opportunity, and the geology, to direct development inside the state.From Paper to Practice : A Practical Guide to Formulating and Institutionalizing Long-term Climate Strategies (World Bank), Sutherland et al., World Bank
This guidance note is designed to equip governments and practitioners with implementable insights and a practical how-to framework for formulating and institutionalizing long-term strategy. It focuses on formulating technically sound LTSs and addresses their institutional integration, which involves embedding long-term low-emission, climate-resilient pathways in planning, budgeting, and decision-making processes across the government so that they can be operationalized through existing policy and fiscal instruments.Climate Promises, Industry Handouts. Canada’s Fossil Fuel Funding in 2025, Environmental Defence Canada
The Government of Canada has provided at least $10.2 billion in fossil fuel subsidies and public financing in 2025. Since Environmental Defence began tracking fossil fuel subsidies in 2020, the federal government has provided at least $85.2 billion in subsidies to the fossil fuel industry. This figure includes government direct spending as well as public financing through Crown corporations, such as Export Development Canada. In addition to fossil fuel subsidies, the Government of Canada provided at least $405.53 million dollars in subsidies for carbon capture and fossil fuel hydrogen projects in 2025. These technologies have failed to deliver on their promises to reduce emissions and have instead locked in further fossil fuel production. Furthermore, this figure excludes the estimated cost of the carbon capture investment tax credit, which is estimated to cost Canadians up to $5.7 billion by 2028, and up to $12.4 billion by 2035. The changes introduced in the Budget 2025 could increase the cost to Canadians by an additional $3.75 billion. In 2025, the cost of pollution from oil and gas companies operating in Canada was an estimated $56.4 billion. This figure was calculated by taking the most recent oil and gas emissions figures and multiplying with the social cost of carbon. Climate pollution created by oil and gas companies has massive costs, including health costs, property damage from extreme weather events, and decreased agricultural productivity due to changing weather patterns. The social cost of carbon helps to estimate what those costs to society are.Building Europe’s alternative fuels industry for military resilience, Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop, The Hague Center for Strategic Studies
Europe’s military readiness is increasingly tied to the resilience of its fuel supply chains. The authors warn that Europe risks replacing one strategic dependency with another unless it scales up domestic production of alternative fuels for defense. The authors examine how the 2026 Middle East oil disruption exposed Europe’s vulnerability to fuel supply shocks. Around half of the EU’s jet fuel imports originate from the Middle East, while military operations remain heavily dependent on liquid fuels such as jet fuel and diesel. The authors argue that “drop-in” fuels such as sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), hydrotreated vegetable oil (HVO), e-SAF and e-diesel offer the most viable pathway to strengthen resilience in the short to medium term because they can be integrated into existing military infrastructure without technical modifications. However, the study finds that current production levels remain far too limited to support military needs during crisis scenarios. Existing civilian-driven expansion plans would cover only a fraction of potential wartime demand, leaving armed forces exposed to shortages and competition with civilian consumers. The authors identify three priorities for policymakers including developing a coordinated civil-military strategy for alternative fuel scale-up; treating alternative fuel plants as dual-use strategic infrastructure eligible for defense and EU funding; and establishing minimum domestic production benchmarks for fuels critical to defense readiness.Climate change makes Arctic operations ever more complex, Lin Alexandra Mortensgaard, Danish Institute for International Studies
Climate change is already making Arctic planning and operations more complex. The notion that climate change multiplies existing threats increasingly falls short when it comes to understanding the scale, processes and the unknowns of climate change. Drawing on ongoing knowledge exchange with climate scientists, security actors could instead practice thinking in terms of types of change to avoid assuming foresight of operational and infrastructural consequences based on existing, known threats.Built to Endure. A Smart Guide for US Cities To Build Resilient Infrastructure That Lasts, Losos et al., Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability, Duke University
Resilience is needed for every community to thrive in a world at increased risk of natural disasters. But small and medium-sized communities do not need expensive analyses or teams of people to get started. Resilience is achievable—even for lean municipal teams—when people, sound governance, and systems thinking are supported by increasingly accessible digital tools that help inform decisions and strengthen community outcomes. The authors offer practical, step-by-step advice for small and midsized communities to integrate resilience into their infrastructure systems. Featuring eight case studies from cities in the United States and abroad, the guidebook is meant for immediate use in the real world. The guidebook also includes a separate section—Getting Started: Practical Entry Points for Local Governments—that will jump-start the systems thinking needed to truly achieve resilience.24/7 renewables. The economics of Firm Solar and Wind, Dardour et al., The International Renewable Energy Agency
The authors show that the cost of firm renewable electricity has declined rapidly across all major technologies and markets. In high-quality solar and wind resource regions, co-located hybrid systems can already deliver round-the-clock electricity at costs competitive with - and in many cases below - those of new fossil-fuel generation. China currently defines the global cost floor, while costs in Brazil, India, South Africa, Australia, and the Gulf region are declining rapidly towards fossil-fuel cost parity. The authors identify key drivers of firm renewable costs – technology performance, resource quality and system configuration – and examine the policy levers that are proving decisive in translating cost competitiveness into deployment at scale. They conclude that the technologies are maturing, the costs are falling and the commercial demand is growing. The pace at which firm renewable electricity is deployed will be among the most consequential determinants of the global energy transition in the decade ahead.The AI Data Center Race and Big Tech Monopoly Power. A Policy Framework for Community Self-Determination and Democratic Accountability, Stacy Mitchell and John Farrell, The Institute for Local Self-Reliance
To consolidate control over generative AI and deepen their monopoly power, dominant tech firms are driving a wave of hyperscale data center construction that is colliding with communities nationwide. In response, the authors developed a policy framework to help communities reassert public authority, curb monopoly power, prevent public cost-shifting, and ensure digital infrastructure is developed transparently and in the public interest.A Water Renaissance for California, Restore the Delta et al., Restore the Delta et al
California must create a new urban water renaissance: a new approach to prioritize local water and local communities in developing the reliable water supplies needed for the future. To accomplish this, California must choose to invest in local water supplies, reject sending billions of ratepayer dollars to take an ever-diminishing supply of water from the San Francisco Bay and Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay-Delta (Bay-Delta) and the Colorado River, and ensure adequate water to restore the Bay-Delta ecosystem and protect water quality. Following these improvements, interested parties must be brought together to work towards solutions to repair the aging levees in the Delta and the aging infrastructure of the State Water Project (SWP). Southern California and the Bay-Delta must move from conflict to collaboration to create a sustainable and reliable water supply for people and the environment. Create local drought-resistant water supplies and create resiliency. Reject costly new imported water projects. Local water supplies provide numerous benefits.Rethinking insects as alternative protein, Verkuijl et al., Stockholm Environment Institute
Insect farming often falls short of its environmental promise. Greenhouse gas emissions generated per kilogram of protein from insect production in temperate climates vary, but they can approach those of chicken and pork, and exceed those of soymeal and fishmeal. Favorable environmental results depend on conditions rarely met in practice. Low-emission insect farming requires organic waste as feed, minimal heating and renewable energy – a combination seldom achieved in temperate countries. Insect farming reinforces conventional animal agriculture rather than replacing it. A substantial proportion of insects are farmed for feed for farmed animals and aquaculture, not to substitute for meat in human diets. The sector poses underexamined risks. Insect farming introduces potential biodiversity threats from accidental releases and emerging animal welfare concerns, given growing evidence that at least some insect species may be capable of suffering. Investment in insect farming carries opportunity costs. To date, major companies, accounting for more than a third of total investment, have failed or have entered restructuring. Resources directed towards insect protein may divert funding, policy attention, and public goodwill from plant-based, fermentation-derived, and cultivated proteins: alternatives that may offer clearer sustainability benefits, with fewer drawbacks. About New ResearchClick here for the why and how of Skeptical Science New Research.
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China Briefing 28 May 2026: Deadly rains | China pushes back | Examining China’s carbon intensity metric
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.
China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments Several dead as record rainfall hit several provincesDEADLY DOWNPOUR: Multiple rounds of heavy rainfall have hit central and eastern China, with Agence France-Presse reporting that at least 25 people were killed in the first round, which affected provinces including Guangxi, Guizhou, Hunan and Hubei. Shortly afterwards, nine people died in south-western Chongqing province, reported finance news outlet Caixin, after receiving “nearly 300mm of rain in just two hours, a deluge local residents described as the worst in more than 60 years”. The government has dedicated 280m yuan ($41m) to support affected provinces, reported state news agency Xinhua. The Communist party-backed newspaper China Youth Daily reported that more than 20 provinces have been affected so far, with rains expected to continue throughout June.
CLIMATE CONTRIBUTION: National rainfall over 11-23 May was 46% higher than the seasonal norm, said Xinhua. Nearly 500 weather stations nationwide have logged record rainfall levels, according to state-sponsored newspaper Guangming Daily. The rains were described as “quite unusual”, according to Xinhua, with the National Climate Centre’s chief forecaster Gao Hui telling the agency that the heavy rains were caused by a combination of factors. These included a convergence of several climate systems carrying in strong flows of moisture from nearby marine regions, as well as “rapid global warming, compounded by a fast-developing El Niño” increasing the atmosphere’s moisture content.
The EU ‘overcapacity’ debate‘CONCERNS’ REGISTERED: The EU will debate proposals in June to “step up efforts” to reduce economic reliance on China and protect its industries, including “safeguard investigations” for at-risk sectors and an “overcapacity instrument”, reported Politico. Finance news outlet Yicai said China in turn has registered its “concerns” with the World Trade Organization over the EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which includes local content requirements for industries including clean-energy technologies.
上微信关注《碳简报》PATIENCE ‘WEARING THIN’: A report by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post cited “some observers” as saying a trade war characterised by the EU “clos[ing] its market down to Chinese imports” may be the “only” way in which the EU can get China to fully engage with its concerns. A China Daily editorial states that China’s “patience” over the EU’s “politicisation and over-securitisation of trade and economic issues” is “wearing thin”. An editorial in the state-supporting Global Times says “erecting higher trade barriers” against Chinese cleantech is “clearly unwise”, given the Iran conflict, adding: “China will never sit idly by while the EU unreasonably suppresses Chinese companies.”
MISSING AGREEMENTS: Meanwhile, Bloomberg covered US president Donald Trump’s claims that his counterpart Xi Jinping “likes the idea of buying more US oil”, following Trump’s state visit to China. [None of the Chinese government readouts or press briefings covering trade outcomes have mentioned any energy agreements so far.] Similarly, the “Kremlin said…a general understanding” had been reached on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline following Russian president Vladimir Putin’s visit to China, according to Reuters, but that there was “no mention of any oil and gas deals among documents signed” during his meeting with Xi. A joint statement published by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said China and Russia will “deepen” cooperation around oil and gas, coal, nuclear and renewable energy, adding that they will “strengthen cooperation in addressing climate change”.
Coal-power generation rose in April‘INFLEXIBLE’ COAL: Thermal power generation in China “grew for a fourth straight month in April”, rising 3.1% year-on-year in the face of reduced wind and nuclear generation, reported Bloomberg. “Unfavorable weather” was not the only reason for weaker clean-energy generation, wrote Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air lead analyst Lauri Myllyvirta on Bluesky, with “grid congestion due to inflexible operation of coal plants and transmission lines” also a factor. Separately, research by Global Energy Monitor found that Chinese coal-plant developers “requested approval for 51 gigawatts (GW)” of new capacity in January-March 2026, reported Bloomberg.
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SOLAR SLOWDOWN: Total power demand grew 6% year-on-year in April, according to Xinhua. Total capacity rose 14% by the end of April, reported energy news outlet International Energy Net, with China’s total solar-power capacity now exceeding 1,250 gigawatts (GW) and wind reaching 661GW, while thermal capacity rose 7% to 1,556GW. However, the growth rate of new solar installations continued to fall for a “fourth straight month”, said Bloomberg, with 9.5GW added in April 2026 compared to 45.2GW the year before.
POLICY EXPANDS: Meanwhile, the government has expanded its renewable power “direct connection” policy to allow clean-energy generators to supply multiple users directly “through dedicated [power] lines”, rather than just one consumer, reported finance news outlet Caixin. It cited a government official saying the policy is “intended to support cleaner energy use in industrial parks…and other large energy-consuming facilities”, which comprise more than two-thirds of total energy demand. Economic news outlet Jiemian quotes an expert saying the policy enables both “lower electricity prices” and “higher utilisation rates” for renewables, “reducing curtailment rates”.
More China news- ‘SOLIDARITY AND RESOLVE’: China voted in favour of a UN general assembly resolution to back the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) landmark 2025 opinion on states’ legal obligations to tackle climate change. The Chinese embassy to Vanuatu said on Facebook this displayed its “solidarity and collective resolve”.
- BOND DISCLOSURE: According to a disclosure report by China’s finance ministry, the country raised 6bn yuan in “green sovereign bonds” in 2025, said finance news outlet EastMoney ($884m), of which 700m ($103m) was spent on clean-energy retrofitting.
- WAR ON SAND: The central government has pledged to “improve” and expand its ecological compensation mechanism, including to now provide compensation for building solar farms in desertified areas, said power news outlet BJX News.
- SPACE-BASED SOLAR: Chinese scientists have begun “initial experiments” in a project to “collect [solar] energy in orbit and beam it wirelessly to Earth”, said PV Magazine.
- MINERAL STRATEGY: China has pledged to “accelerate the construction of strategic mineral-reserve sites”, reported Reuters. It will also work with the US on “reasonable” concerns around its rare-earth export controls, Reuters also reported.
Hydrogen in China continues to be mostly produced from coal, according to a National Energy Administration report. A new Carbon Brief article explored how a series of new policies in China could help scale hydrogen, particularly “green” hydrogen made with renewable power.
Spotlight China’s new carbon metric leaves Germany-sized gap in its emissionsA major change in the way that China measures its core climate goal has effectively halved the growth in the country’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions over the past five years.
The revised measure of “carbon intensity” implies that China’s emissions have only gone up by 7% from 2020-2025, just half of the 14% rise indicated by previous official statistics.
This spotlight is an excerpt of an analysis explaining how the metric appears to have shifted and its implications for China’s climate goals. The full article can be found on the Carbon Brief website.
Germany-sized gapReducing carbon intensity – CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – has been China’s key climate commitment since the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009.
Neither China’s international climate pledges nor other official documents have ever set out a definition of carbon intensity.
However, until this year, it was possible to closely reproduce the reported numbers, based on a straightforward interpretation of what carbon intensity means – combining official GDP data with estimates of emissions from the use of fossil fuels.
Now, the types of emissions that are included in the carbon-intensity metric have changed.
The previous carbon-intensity measure apparently included emissions from the use of fossil fuels to generate energy and as chemical feedstocks, so-called “non-energy uses”. It did not include non-fossil fuel CO2 emissions from industrial processes, such as the production of cement.
Based on reported progress against this old scope, China’s carbon intensity had fallen by 12.4% from 2020-2025, well short of its 18% target under the 14th five-year plan.
Yet the 15th five-year plan reported that China had cut its carbon intensity by 17.7% over the same period, indicating a major shift in which types of emissions are included.
A footnote in China’s latest statistical communique indicates that carbon intensity now includes industrial process emissions and excludes non-energy uses of fossil fuels.
The shift has implications for estimates of the country’s emissions.
China’s total emissions were 11.2bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2020. Based on the original methodology, its fossil-fuel CO2 emissions had grown 14% by 2024, an increase of 1,430m tonnes (MtCO2).
In contrast, the newly reported carbon-intensity figures imply that China’s CO2 emissions only grew by 7% between 2020 and 2025, up just 690MtCO2.
The gap between these figures amounts to 730MtCO2, equivalent to the annual emissions of Germany or South Korea.
Decoding the new methodologyThe methodology change could have significant implications, making it important to understand how it is being calculated.
The new scope includes industrial-process emissions. One of the largest sources of these emissions, the cement industry, has been contracting, helping explain the improvement to carbon intensity under the new scope.
In addition, the new scope excludes non-energy use of fossil fuels – largely relating to the chemicals industry – which have seen rapid growth in the past five years.
One way to make the numbers add up would be to assume that the amount of carbon embedded in chemical-industry products has increased by the equivalent of 500MtCO2.
However, the reported output of major chemical-industry products cannot account for this level of embedded carbon.
Neither the change in scope of the carbon-intensity calculation, nor the change in the amount of carbon retained in products, can explain the size of the revision in the newly reported numbers. There must be another explanation.
Either the new scope broadly aligns with the explanation outlined above, but also excludes a subset of the CO2 emissions. Or the scope does not exclude any of the CO2, but there are gaps in the monitoring of some energy or industrial-process emissions.
Either explanation would mean China is not accounting for some of its CO2 emissions.
Implications for China’s targetsThis change has the effect of weakening China’s climate targets and introducing more uncertainty into tracking progress.
The new numbers means it will require less effort to hit the 2030 carbon-intensity target in its Paris pledge. This target can now be met even if emissions rise, whereas the previous metric would have required a reduction.
It will also require less effort to hit the carbon-intensity target in China’s 15th five-year plan.
In addition, China would be able to officially meet its target to peak emissions by 2030, even if its overall CO2 emissions do not actually peak. The change could also affect delivery of China’s targets to cut emissions by 2035.
While China may use any definition it wants for carbon intensity under the UN climate framework, retrospective changes or inconsistent accounting could erode the value of its commitments.
Moreover, it will ultimately have to close any gaps in its emissions data and reporting, under the transparency rules of the Paris Agreement.
This spotlight is adapted from an article by Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air lead analyst Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.
Watch, read, listenMINING ACCIDENT: A column in Bloomberg argued that “continuing to veer…toward cleaner [energy] development” could avoid coal-mine accidents such as the one that claimed 82 lives in Shanxi province.
INDONESIAN NICKEL: The European Guanxi Podcast recorded a discussion with Ember’s Dr Muyi Yang about the role China plays in Indonesia’s coal-reliant nickel industry.
INDUSTRIAL HURDLES: A new article in Yicai investigated the reasons why companies are holding back on relocating to zero-carbon industrial parks.
NEGATIVE PRICES: The Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily published a widely-read article on how the emergence of “negative electricity prices” signals a need for a more “coordinated” buildout of clean energy.
In billion tonnes, the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) that China could avoid between 2025-2060 by transitioning to clean energy, according to a new study published by several leading academic institutions in Nature Reviews Earth & Environment. Scientists estimate that the remaining global budget for keeping temperatures below 1.5C is 130bn tonnes of CO2.
New science- Population exposure to heatwave-drought events “increased markedly” across China during between 1961-90 and 1991-2020, driven by a combination of population growth and more frequent heatwave-drought events | Atmospheric Research
- Fossil-fired power generation accounts for three-quarters of China’s total water consumption for energy production | Mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change
China Briefing is written by Anika Patel, with contributions from Lekai Liu, and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
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Media reaction: UK and Europe’s ‘mind-boggling’ May heat and climate change
Europe has been hit by a searing heatwave, which has shattered temperature records across France, Spain and the UK.
In London, for example, the mercury hit a record high for May of 35.1C at Kew Gardens on Tuesday 26 May, breaking the former record-high May temperature by more than 2C.
Multiple people have died as a result of the high temperatures, including 14 people across the UK and France who drowned.
The heatwave was driven by a “heat dome”, in which warm air moving up from northern Africa has become trapped under a high-pressure system over western Europe.
Experts have been quick to point out the link between extreme heat and global warming, with one saying it was “beyond a shadow of a doubt” that climate change was making such events “more likely and more severe”.
In this article, Carbon Brief examines the impacts of the heatwave and the role of climate change.
- What is happening with the May heatwave in Europe?
- What is driving the record-shattering heat?
- What are the impacts of the extreme heat?
- How has the media responded?
Europe has been hit by “mind-bogglingly crazy” temperature records in May, according to the Financial Times, quoting Peter Thorne, director of the ICARUS Climate Research Centre at Maynooth University in Ireland.
In London, on Tuesday 26 May, temperatures hit a record high for May of 35.1C at Kew Gardens – breaking the previous record of 34.8C, set just the day before.
This was more than 2C above the previous May temperature high of 32.8C recorded in 1922 and again in 1944, reported the Times.
The Associated Press added that the UK capital also recorded a rare “tropical night”, when temperatures did not fall below 20C overnight.
The Daily Telegraph reported that Wales and Northern Ireland also saw record-high temperatures, of 27.4C in Cardiff and 23.4C in Armagh, on Sunday.
As with the UK record, these were quickly surpassed. BBC News reported that temperatures hit 32.9C in Bute Park, Cardiff and 24.5C in Thomastown, County Fermanagh, on Tuesday.
BBC News quoted a spokesperson from the Met Office, who said:
“This heat would be exceptional in the UK even in mid-summer, let alone in May.”
The broadcaster added that the average temperature in the UK at the end of May is usually 14-20C.
The Associated Press reported that temperature records have also fallen across Europe.
This includes in France, where temperatures reached 36C on Monday in the country’s south-west and remained above 20C at night across much of the country. The newspaper Libération declared that “it has never been so hot, so early, in France”.
The Guardian reported that the weather agency Météo France said the heatwave could last through the week and bring temperatures as high as 39C in some areas in the country.
As well as the UK and France, other nations have been seeing temperatures soar. France24 reported that temperatures in Spain were expected to reach 38C, with Italy also facing high temperatures.
The Irish Times reported that the May high-temperature record was broken twice in Ireland on the same day, with 29.7C recorded in Carlow and then 30.5C at Shannon Airport on Tuesday.
Le Monde explained that a “heat dome” of warm air from northern Africa is behind the high temperatures across Europe. (See: What is driving the record-breaking heat?)
The Financial Times quoted ICARUS’s Thorne saying that the records being set in Europe, “particularly in the UK and France, are mind-bogglingly crazy”. He added:
“We have more than 100 years of observational records. To break the all-time May record by more than 2C…is hard to comprehend.”
What is driving the record-shattering heat?The immediate driver of the extreme heat seen over Europe this week is a “heat dome”, according to Politico.
The outlet explained that the phenomenon is driven by “warm air moving up from northern Africa [that] has become trapped under a high-pressure system over western Europe”. It added:
“The effect is similar to that of a lid on a pot, with warm air forced downward and baking affected regions with prolonged, blistering heat.”
Spain’s El Correo explained that the phenomenon is “not a simple heatwave”, adding that such “high-pressure systems trapped over Europe are not usually seen before summer”.
However, many publications have linked the severity of the extreme heat to climate change. The Associated Press quoted ICARUS’s Thorne, who said:
“We know beyond a shadow of a doubt that heatwave events such as this have been made more likely and more severe due to climate change arising from our emissions of heat-trapping greenhouse gases.”
The Guardian quoted Dr Chloe Brimicombe, a researcher at the University of Oxford, who said:
“The record-breaking heat is a reminder of how climate change is impacting our lives in the UK. It highlights the urgency of recent calls for heat adaptation.”
France’s Le Figaro described the event as an “unequivocal sign of global warming”.
The Independent reported that the heatwave “has the fingerprints of climate change all over it”. Other outlets, including Inside Climate News and Scientific American, also covered the links between extreme heat and climate change.
BBC News noted that over the last 30 years, Europe has been warming by 0.56C per decade – more than twice the global average.
The outlet quoted Prof Erich Fischer, professor at the Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science at ETH Zurich in Switzerland, who compared the record-breaking temperatures to setting a new record in sports.
He explained that “if someone beats a world record in high jump, you would expect them to beat it by one centimetre and not suddenly by 20, 30 centimetres”. Similarly, he said that in the case of temperature, you would expect new records to be broken by a fraction of a degree, rather than 2 or 3C.
However, the broadcaster explained that “when a relatively rare weather system, such as this week’s heat dome, comes around in a warming climate, the margin of record can be huge”.
Simon Stiell, the executive secretary of UN Climate Change, called the heatwave a “brutal reminder of the cost of global warming”, according to Politico.
The Guardian also quotes Stiell, who said:
“The science is clear that human-induced climate change is making these heatwaves more frequent and extreme”.
What are the impacts of the extreme heat?The heatwave has already been linked to multiple deaths.
This included seven people in France, five of whom died by drowning and two who suffered heat-related deaths while competing in sporting events, said the Guardian.
Separately, the Guardian reported that at least nine people have died in the UK from “water-related incidents” during the heatwave.
France24 reported that “restrictions on outdoor work were imposed in parts of Italy” and that “farmers reported accelerated harvests as temperatures went beyond 30C across [south-west France]”.
The Guardian reported that tennis players at the French Open were “forced to adjust their games while trying to find their best level through obvious discomfort”, amid 33C temperatures in Boulogne-Billancourt, Paris, on Monday.
CNN added that, in the UK, “a wildfire broke out near Arthur’s Seat, a hill in Edinburgh, Scotland, and hundreds of properties in south-east England were left without water as demand spiked”.
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }BBC News reported on a warning from a chief nurse that hospitals in the south-west of England were busier than usual amid the heatwave.
BBC News reported that the UK saw a surge in emergency calls on Tuesday. The Daily Telegraph added that “Britain’s roads started melting and rail commuters were left stranded for hours”.
Meanwhile, the Guardian reported on a warning from climate campaigners that the government “urgently” needs to start installing air conditioning units in schools and care homes.
The extreme heat has also affected Europe’s renewable energy generation. Bloomberg said that “the heat dome has blocked clouds and fueled booming solar generation”, but added that “by clearing clouds and calming the atmosphere, the heat dome has had the opposite effect on wind speeds”.
The unseasonably high temperatures have caught the attention of news outlets in the UK, France and other affected nations.
Often, news stories were accompanied by photos of people relaxing at the beach, eating ice cream and swimming in the sea.
Such images of “fun in the sun” have often drawn criticism from climate researchers for “misrepresenting” the risks of heatwaves.
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }This choice of imagery – and the way right-leaning newspapers in the UK tend to focus on the positive aspects of hot weather – was highlighted by journalist and media critic Mic Wright in a Substack post. He wrote:
“Most British newspapers write about extremely hot weather with the tone of a frog in a boiling pot pretending it’s a jacuzzi.”
Despite blanket news coverage of the record heat in media outlets across western Europe, there has been relatively little commentary from their opinion pages.
No major UK newspapers have published editorials about the heat and there has been no space dedicated to it in the comment sections of the largest French and Spanish newspapers.
One exception in UK media was the Daily Mail’s climate-sceptic columnist Richard Littlejohn writing an article mocking heat-safety measures and warnings issued by the Met Office and the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA).
In contrast, the Guardian published an article by Bill McGuire, professor emeritus of geophysical and climate hazards at University College London, warning of the dangers facing the UK as extreme heat becomes “the norm”. He wrote:
“We need, then, to face the fact that life in the 2050s is going to be very different from today, and act now. The sooner we recognise this and begin – as a nation – to prepare and adapt accordingly, the better we will be able to meet these enormous challenges to our everyday lives.”
Oliver Duff, editor-in-chief of the i newspaper, wrote that the UK is “emotionally underprepared”, as a nation, for the heat:
“Worries about climate change are forgotten in the giddy determination to enjoy our brief, unreliable summers, whichever month of the year they deign to visit.”
Writing in the Independent, journalist Kat Brown reflected on the Climate Change Committee’s recent advice to the UK government on adapting to climate change. She stressed the need to “take heatwaves seriously”.
James Wallace, chief executive of the charity River Action, was given a guest column in the Daily Express in which he wrote: “As the nation swelters in record-breaking temperatures, England is sleepwalking into a water crisis.”
In reference to water shortages and increasingly extreme weather, Wallace also emphasised that “this is climate breakdown in real time”.
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The next era of Atlantic hurricanes could be far more destructive
This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters
In brief:
- Scientists expect dramatic swings between active and inactive hurricane seasons in the future.
- The risk of back-to-back hurricanes is growing.
- Hurricanes are expected to get more damaging and deadly.
Wild year-to-year swings — from punishing hyperactive seasons to quiet years with little activity — could well become the norm for future Atlantic hurricane seasons, according to recent climate change research.
The latest science paints a complex but alarming future, as the unprecedented amount of heat that humans are supplying to the climate system disrupts the fundamental atmospheric circulation pattern in which we designed our civilization.
During the coming busy seasons, death and destruction from unprecedented hurricane catastrophes will probably grow much more commonplace, because even as risks grow, people have continued to build in risky flood-prone regions. But eventually, the coming hurricane catastrophes will pose an increasing threat to the viability of living in many coastal areas, particularly in the Caribbean.
Hurricane seasons will likely grow more erraticThe year-to-year variability of Atlantic basin hurricane activity already is the largest of any of the globe’s tropical cyclone basins. And climate change will make extreme swings between active and inactive hurricane seasons the norm, according to a 2024 paper, Projected increase in the frequency of extremely active Atlantic hurricane seasons.
The high-resolution climate models used in the study projected a 36% increase by 2050 in the variance of Atlantic tropical cyclone activity. The main causes: an increase in the variability of wind shear (strong upper-level winds that tend to tear a storm apart), and major swings in how stable the atmosphere is in the tropical Atlantic. One good thing is that the study found that the increased activity during hyperactive seasons would be focused farther from land over the eastern and central Atlantic, with less activity over the Caribbean.
A 2022 study, Extreme Atlantic hurricane seasons made twice as likely by ocean warming, found that ocean warming from 1982 to 2020 doubled the probability of extremely active hurricane seasons over that time period. However, the authors did not clearly separate out how much of that change resulted from increased heat-trapping greenhouse gases and how much was caused by a reduction in planet-cooling air pollution particles called aerosols. These particles are not likely to change much in the future, while greenhouse gases will be increasing, so it is important to know their relative impacts on ocean warming.
More double whammies: back-to-back hurricane threats are increasingThe worst sequential hurricane disaster on record for the Atlantic occurred in 2020 in Nicaragua and Honduras.
Hurricane Eta made landfall in northern Nicaragua on Nov. 3, 2020, as a Category 4 storm. Moving slowly at landfall, Eta lingered for three days over Central America and the adjacent waters, dropping catastrophic amounts of rain.
Just two weeks later, Hurricane Iota made landfall as a Category 4 storm in Nicaragua only 15 miles from where Eta hit. Iota brought torrential rains that inundated flooded regions still struggling to recover from Eta, with the combined tolls from the two storms exceeding 300 people dead or missing.
There was no precedent in the Atlantic for two such powerful hurricanes to make landfall so close together in space and time. The combined impact of the two hurricanes on Nicaragua was estimated at $738 million – about 6% of that nation’s GDP.
But the twin Category 4 hurricanes left behind an even more extreme catastrophe in Honduras. The U.N. estimated that total damages from Hurricane Eta and Hurricane Iota in Honduras exceeded $2 billion – 8% of the poverty-stricken nation’s GDP.
In the future, an increase in hyperactive hurricane seasons will boost the threat of two hurricanes striking the same place within a few weeks of each other. Overlapping disasters could threaten the Gulf of Mexico region with a cycle of “perpetual disaster recovery” — making communities vulnerable to worse outcomes with every subsequent event, researchers at the National Academies wrote in a 2024 report.
A 2022 paper, Increasing sequential tropical cyclone hazards along the US East and Gulf coasts, found that in the current climate, two named storms hitting the same location within 15 days along the U.S. East and Gulf coasts and bringing significant hazards (strong winds, heavy rainfall and storm surges) could be expected to occur once every 10 to 92 years. But under a moderate emissions scenario, this return period could be expected to shrink to just one to three years because of sea-level rise and a change in storm climatology. The odds of a Katrina-like hurricane and a Harvey-like hurricane impacting the U.S. within 15 days of each other — which was non-existent in the historical period they simulated — was projected to have a one-in-650-year return period (or a 5% chance over 30 years) by the end of the century.
A massive 633% increase in hurricane damages to come?It is widely acknowledged that higher weather disaster losses result primarily from an increase in exposure: more people with more stuff moving into vulnerable places, including those at risk of floods.
Martin Bertogg, Swiss Re’s head of catastrophic peril, said in a 2022 AP interview that two-thirds, perhaps more, of the recent rise in weather-related disaster losses — including from hurricanes — is the result of more people and things in harm’s way.
But this balance will likely shift in the coming decades. For example, a 2025 study led by Avantika Gori of Rice University, Sensitivity of tropical cyclone risk across the US to changes in storm climatology and socioeconomic growth, looked at how damages from wind, rainfall, and storm surge would change under a moderate global warming scenario. The study found that the fraction of increased hurricane damages because of climate change would grow by the end of the century to be roughly equal to the increased damages from higher exposure (assuming a 2% annual growth in GDP). The combined increased costs for hurricane damage for the future (2070-2100) period compared to the historical (1980-2005) period would be truly extraordinary, if no additional adaptation measures are taken: a 633% increase, the paper said.
Gori’s prediction is by no means a worst-case outcome, because the study assumed a moderate global warming scenario. Even in a best-case scenario — which I’ll explore in a future post — development is going to continue in flood-prone places. And there are at least four ways that hurricane scientists are very confident that climate change will make hurricanes worse:
- The strongest hurricanes will get stronger.
- Hurricanes will rapidly intensify more quickly and more often.
- Hurricanes will dump more rain.
- Storm surge damage will rise because of rising sea levels.
Expect hurricanes to get more deadly
Accompanying the shocking increases in hurricane damages in our future will likely be sharply increased risks of high death tolls. Stronger, wetter, slower-moving storms will dump more rain, causing increased flood risk. Higher sea levels and stronger hurricanes will bring more dangerous storm surges and compound flood events. Post-storm power outages will coincide with heat waves more frequently, increasing heat mortality. More hurricanes will rapidly intensify just before landfall, leaving vulnerable populations unprepared, further increasing mortality risk.
Read: ‘Deadliest in generations’: The Texas floods are the latest in a disturbing pattern
Fortunately, steadily improving hurricane forecasts over the past 20 years have significantly lowered the risk of death, and the recent emergence of AI forecast models has been an exciting step forward. In some places, improved building codes have also reduced the hurricane damage and presumably, mortality risk. Nevertheless, it is concerning that the U.S. has suffered five hurricanes since 2005 that were deadlier than any hurricane since 1972.
A staggering indirect death toll from hurricanes: as high as 5% of the U.S. population?In a stunning paper released in 2024, Mortality caused by tropical cyclones in the United States, Rachel Young and Solomon Tsiang found that the average U.S. hurricane that made landfall between 1930 and 2015 caused 24 direct deaths.
However, they observed an increase in excess deaths – mortality beyond what would otherwise be expected in that period – that lingered for 15 years, totaling 7,000-11,000 excess deaths per storm. This burden is 300-480 times greater than government estimates of direct deaths and was equivalent to an astounding 3.2-5.1% of all deaths across the contiguous United States.
The largest single category of deaths was from cardiovascular disease (36%), while 12% of the deaths were from cancer, “consistent with some evidence of stress from extreme weather affecting long-run health,” the authors wrote. Between 1950 and 1995, monthly excess tropical cyclone deaths ranged from 4,500 to 6,000, then rose to about 7,500 per month by 2003. In 2004, an onslaught of landfalling hurricanes brought a sharp rise in the death rate, which peaked at approximately 13,000 per month in 2013.
Read: The hidden health toll of hurricanes
a). Total incidence of tropical cyclone excess mortality in the contiguous U.S by month. Bar height is sum of average maximum wind speeds for all state-by-storm events. Colors correspond to decades. b) Stacked overlapping excess mortality responses to each storm for all of the contiguous U.S. Outline colors correspond to the decade when the storm occurred. The upper envelope is the total estimated mortality burden resulting from all tropical cyclones occurring during the prior 172 months (14.3 years). c) Official direct tropical cyclone deaths by month according to NOAA. The y-axis scale is the same for b and c. (image credit: Young, R., Hsiang, S. Mortality caused by tropical cyclones in the United States. Nature 635, 121–128 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07945-5, open access)
Young and Tsiang hypothesized five ways that hurricanes may have triggered excess mortality:
- Economic disruption might change household economic decisions, eventually translating into worsened health outcomes. For example, a person who loses a job might lose health insurance, too. Or retirement savings could be drawn down to repair property damage, both of which could reduce future spending on health care.
- Social network changes could affect future health. For example, working-age people might move away, changing the social support for older people who remain behind.
- Fiscal adjustments by state or local governments in response to the disaster may impact future health outcomes. For example, restructuring budgets to support recovery might reduce spending on healthcare infrastructure.
- Heightened physical and mental stress may alter health in the long term.
- Changes in the natural environment could harm health — for example, ecological changes could redistribute disease vectors, or flooding may expose populations to harmful chemicals.
Many of these factors can be expected to grow worse in the future, resulting in higher hurricane excess mortality.
Q&A: Can China turn hydrogen into its next clean-energy industry?
China has said that hydrogen is a key “future industry”, important to both its energy transition and its industrial policy.
Hydrogen frequently goes through hype cycles, most recently driven by rising oil and gas prices due to the conflict in the Middle East.
Yet, even in China, the world’s largest producer and consumer of the fuel, hydrogen remains expensive and inefficient to produce.
This is especially the case for “green” hydrogen derived from renewables.
Moreover, there is limited supporting infrastructure and there is little incentive to use hydrogen over other energy sources.
As a result, uptake in China of hydrogen as an alternative fuel remains low.
Nevertheless, these challenges echo the early circumstances of another key clean-energy technology – electric vehicles (EVs).
In China, EVs benefited from a policy environment that included consistent signals of support, financial aid and the development of supporting infrastructure.
Many similar policies are now being deployed – and in some cases improved upon – to support the development of China’s hydrogen industry.
This article examines China’s approach to developing hydrogen and how its evolving industrial policy could make the fuel viable.
How is China using hydrogen and where does it come from?Electrification and rising installations of solar and wind power have been the biggest drivers of China’s decarbonisation story so far. However, how China will address the more energy-intensive, hard-to-electrify segments of its economy remains an open question.
Hydrogen is seen by some in China as a potential solution for reducing emissions in a range of “hard-to-abate” industries, from steel and chemicals to aviation and shipping.
The country is the world’s foremost producer and consumer of hydrogen. It produced 36.5m tonnes of the gas in 2024, with maximum production capacity standing at 50m tonnes that year.
It also consumed nearly a third of the world’s hydrogen in 2024, as shown below.
Share of global hydrogen consumption in select regions in 2024, %. Source: IEA.Most of China’s production capacity is in regions with potential for high demand, such as Shandong, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Shanxi and other provinces with significant heavy industry.
In 2024, the vast majority of China’s hydrogen – around 78% – was produced using fossil fuels, predominantly coal and gas, as shown in the figure below.
Another 21% was produced as an industrial by-product, while only 1% – just 320,000 tonnes – was derived from renewable-powered electrolysis of water.
Production of hydrogen in China by energy source in 2024, %. Source: National Energy Administration.One study found that, for every kilogram of hydrogen produced, 38.6kg of carbon dioxide (CO2) is emitted if the hydrogen is produced using coal-fired power. Hydrogen made through coal gasification results in 28.5kg of CO2 for every kilogram of hydrogen, while gas-based hydrogen creates 13kg of emissions.
By contrast, one kilogram of renewables-based hydrogen results in 0.5kg of CO2.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) calculates that hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels could help China avoid close to 16bn tonnes of CO2 cumulatively by 2060 – but only if it comes from low-carbon sources.
The biggest reductions, it adds, would come from heavy industry, particularly chemicals and steel, with the maritime and shipping sectors also seeing some benefit.
Currently, around half of the hydrogen produced in China is used in synthetic ammonia and methanol production.
Ammonia is primarily used to manufacture fertiliser and is seen as a possible fuel technology for shipping. Methanol is used as a fuel for the transport industry, as well as for heating.
Another quarter of China’s current hydrogen usage is consumed by the oil refining and coal-to-chemical sectors. The remaining amount is used in other industries, including transport, heating and metallurgy.
What are the barriers to scaling up hydrogen?Although China is the largest producer and consumer of hydrogen globally, the industry faces several barriers to becoming a viable clean-energy technology.
Agora Energiewende, a thinktank focused on the energy sector, says that, in order to make hydrogen a practical clean-energy solution, China would need to expand the scale and range of its application, as well as improving the conversion efficiency of production and use.
Both BloombergNEF and the IEA highlight the importance of China creating demand for hydrogen, such as through quotas for industrial usage.
Hydrogen “suffers from a relatively large efficiency loss during various conversion processes”, adds Agora. For example, it notes that only around 22% of the energy put into hydrogen fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) is converted into motion, compared to 73% for battery electric vehicles. Producing hydrogen with renewable energy is also less efficient than coal-to-hydrogen processes.
Cui Chuansheng, technical director at East China Engineering Science and Technology, tells state news agency Xinhua that the variability of wind and solar power often leads to low utilisation of electrolysers, resulting in “efficiency losses”.
Meanwhile, the cost of producing hydrogen – particularly green hydrogen – remains high.
One study placed the cost of hydrogen produced through alkaline water electrolysis (AWE), the most common method for producing green hydrogen in China, at $4-6 per kilogram, compared with $1.20-2.50/kg for steam methane reforming and $1.30-2 for coal gasification.
In some specific cases, such as blending hydrogen with gas, researchers find that hydrogen prices would need to fall to one-third of gas prices to incentivise uptake.
These constraints are all “interdependent”, Kevin Tu, managing director of Agora Energy China, tells Carbon Brief, with the need to ensure “bankable demand” while also reducing costs and developing infrastructure. He adds:
“Without credible offtake in the right sectors, costs will not fall; without lower costs and better logistics, downstream users will not commit.”
The IEA says that green hydrogen “could become cost-competitive by the end of this decade due to low technology costs and cost of capital”.
For now, however, the China Hydrogen Bulletin Substack reports that China’s four listed hydrogen equipment manufacturers all reported significant losses in 2025.
Meanwhile, a senior executive at a Chinese hydrogen company told economic news outlet Jiemian that he expected 40% of companies in the sector to have closed down by the end of 2026, with surviving companies only turning a profit in 2029 at the earliest.
The industry also lacks refueling and pipeline infrastructure. China’s development of a pipeline network for hydrogen remains in its early stages, with around 400km of pipelines currently in operation. By contrast, its long-distance gas network stands at 128,000km. Similarly, storage remains expensive and inefficient, creating a further obstacle to wider uptake.
How is China supporting hydrogen development?China began considering the use of hydrogen as an energy source in earnest in the early 2000s, to address concerns around pollution and dependence on imported oil for the transport sector.
A clearer signal of its importance came in 2015, when the State Council included the technology in a 10-year national industrial strategy known as the “Made in China” initiative. This pitched hydrogen as a way to contribute to electrification of China’s road-transport system through the development of FCEVs.
Yuki Yu, founder of research firm Energy Iceberg, tells Carbon Brief that, from 2018-2021, hydrogen was treated as a “FCEV and manufacturing technology challenge”.
This has since evolved, she says, given that battery electric vehicles have emerged as the more popular technology.
Shen Xinyi, senior advisor at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), agrees, telling Carbon Brief that recent policy documents suggest the aim is now for hydrogen to be targeted at areas where direct electrification is harder, such as hydrogen-based chemicals, hydrogen metallurgy and some heavy-duty transport applications.
This is in line with the “hydrogen ladder”, an analysis of how likely different possibilities for applying hydrogen as a clean alternative are to become significant. The ladder sees significant future use of hydrogen in these hard-to-electrify areas as much more likely than for light vehicles.
Notable policy moves are being made in “three layers”, says Agora’s Tu, which are combining to improve the technology’s chances of scaling up. These are: the “legal and institutional” layer; “application-oriented” policies; and targeted measures to address “practical bottlenecks” at the local level.
One of the documents underpinning this pivot was the “medium- and long-term plan for the development of the hydrogen energy industry (2021-2035)”, issued in March 2022.
According to a report by the National Energy Administration (NEA), the plan is an attempt to develop an “industrial ecosystem” for hydrogen that features “diverse stakeholders, coordinated innovation and clustered development”.
The plan was the first government document to “lay out a long-term vision for China’s hydrogen economy”, unifying a previously disparate policy push into one document, according to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, a UK-based thinktank.
Following on from the 2022 plan, the importance of hydrogen as a broad clean-energy solution has been emphasised in a number of policies. These include its classification being changed from a hazardous chemical to an energy carrier in China’s Energy Law, a 2024 action plan to “accelerate” the use of low-carbon hydrogen in industry and a new pilot scheme offering subsidies for projects that achieve specific targets.
The table below sets out the timeline and content of China’s hydrogen-related policies over the past 25 years.
PolicyYear publishedKey features 10th five-year plan (2001–2005)2001Calls for “actively developing” low-emission vehicles, understood to include hydrogen vehicles Made in China 20252015Pledges to “continue to support” development of fuel cell vehicles and “master core technologies” for low-carbon vehicles Notice on implementation of demonstration projects for fuel cell vehicles2020Creates a dedicated subsidy programme for finding breakthroughs in FCEV core technologies and industrial applications 14th five-year plan (2021-2025)2021Hydrogen listed as a future industry Medium- and long-term plan for the development of the hydrogen energy industry (2021–2035)2022Aims to reach 100,000-200,000 tonnes of green hydrogen production [this target has been met]. Also aims to get 50,000 FCEVs on the road by 2025, leading to a “diversified” hydrogen industry by 2035 Opinions on accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development2024Promotes further development of hydrogen production, transport, storage and applications Implementation plan for accelerating the application of clean and low-carbon hydrogen in the industrial sector2025Outlines tasks to promote use of low-carbon hydrogen to reduce emissions in heavy industries, such as steel and chemicals Energy law2025Sees hydrogen included in national legislation for the first time, re-classifies it from a hazardous chemical to an energy carrier 15th five-year plan (2026-2030)2026Again lists as a future industry, and calls for the development of green fuels derived from green hydrogen Notice on the implementation of pilot projects for the comprehensive application of hydrogen energy2026Provides subsidies to projects to reduce hydrogen costs to 15-25 yuan/kilogram ($2.20-3.67/kg) and help develop a fleet of 100,000 FCEVs Key policies in the development of China’s hydrogen sector.In addition, the NEA said in 2025 that local governments across China had issued more than 560 hydrogen-related energy policies by the end of 2024.
Tu notes that these local policies cover everything from permitting reforms and pipeline planning to exempting FCEVs from paying road toll.
Different provinces across China adopt distinct strategies for developing hydrogen industries, based on local conditions, says the US-based Center on Global Energy Policy, such as energy mix, availability of coal and industrial needs.
However, these local policies and targets are frequently more ambitious than the “conservative” national-level targets, it adds.
Could a new pilot programme boost hydrogen’s prospects?A new pilot programme, announced in March 2026, aims to commercialise the country’s hydrogen industry by funding projects to reduce the cost of the fuel to 15-25 yuan/kilogram ($2.20-3.67/kg) by 2030, as well as other targets.
Unlike the 2020 subsidies, which focused on FCEVs, the new programme reaffirms China’s interest in a broader series of sectoral applications for hydrogen, including in clean heating, production of low-carbon iron and steel, and production of “green fuels” and other chemicals.
This new pilot is the “strongest financial instrument ever released for China’s green hydrogen application” in terms of creating a comprehensive hydrogen policy that covers a broad swathe of the economy, supporting it with financial backing and targeting application scenarios, Yu says.
However, she argues that strict grant caps – 240m yuan ($35m) per project and 1.6bn yuan ($235m) per selected region across only five regions – limited the overall funding scale available to the industry.
Energy Iceberg has calculated that only around 60-70 projects nationally could receive funding under the current rules, out of more than 670 active green hydrogen proposals in China.
Shen agrees that the pilot programme is significant and that it will expand the use of hydrogen in China’s climate strategy, particularly green hydrogen.
She notes a provision that “explicitly states that coal-based ammonia and methanol projects cannot be labelled as ‘green’ ammonia or methanol”, suggesting that policymakers are increasingly paying attention to the “integrity” of definitions for hydrogen and hydrogen-derived fuel.
The “real value” of the pilot scheme, says Tu, is that it focuses on developing “integrated city-cluster ecosystems linking supply, transport, infrastructure and end-use demand”, rather than only supporting individual projects.
This “should help identify viable business models, accelerate cost discovery and concentrate support on applications with stronger scale potential”, as well as boost investor confidence, adds Tu.
However, he continues that the broader effect it will have on boosting production of hydrogen will “depend on how quickly the selected clusters can translate the programme into real offtake and lower delivered hydrogen prices”.
How does this compare to China’s EV policy push?The debate around the viability of hydrogen is reminiscent of critiques of EVs.
Until recently, EVs were seen as too expensive for consumers, inefficient and challenging to use without supporting infrastructure. As a result, many western automakers chose to temper their focus on EVs, while continuing to develop internal combustion engines.
However, China has managed to develop a competitive EV industry with products that top global sales.
Part of the playbook that spurred China’s success on EVs included consistent policy signalling in favour of the technology, including mentions in high-level documents and committing resources to building charging infrastructure.
“The defining features of China’s industrial-policy success are its persistence and adaptability,” says Kyle Chan, fellow at the Brookings Institution, adding that “long before the technology and economics of EVs and batteries were proven, China was making long-term investments and policy bets [in the sectors]”.
More tangible measures included direct and indirect subsidies and policy support in the shape of favourable loan rates and low-cost land. One estimate by US-based thinktank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) pegs the amount of support allocated to the EV industry between 2009-2023 at $230.9bn.
This coupled with the success of private Chinese manufacturers in creating innovative, nimble companies that “forc[ed] policymakers to adapt”, as well as growing links between the automotive and information technology industries, according to a separate CSIS report.
But this progress on EVs also reportedly came with significant fraud. In 2016, one investigation found that 33 companies were involved in subsidy fraud totalling 9.2bn yuan ($1.3bn).
(It should also be noted that profitability in the industry lags far behind the average for downstream industrial sectors, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, which says that “only a handful” of nearly 50 EV makers have reported profits.)
Being the subject of an industrial policy push alone does not guarantee success, states CSIS. It says the strength of the EV industry “was neither inevitable nor the result of a single master plan” and that China’s aims to develop globally-competitive industries in areas such as commercial aviation remain unaccomplished.
China’s approach to hydrogen has been markedly different.
Instead of offering blanket subsidies, the fuel cell demonstration programme it established in 2020 focused on performance-based rewards.
To avoid the subsidy issues seen in the solar and EV industries, the ministry of finance deliberately chose this indirect funding model, says Yu.
However, Yu argues, the programme did not work as well as hoped, due to the funding ceiling and the siloed attempts made by different regional governments to develop hydrogen ecosystems .
But Chinese policy thinking is becoming more selective and pragmatic for hydrogen compared with EVs, says Shen. She says:
“Electrification remains the primary decarbonisation pathway [for road transport], while hydrogen is increasingly positioned for applications where direct electrification is more difficult.”
Tu echoes this, adding that China is “clearly moving toward a more supportive policy environment for hydrogen”.
But its approach is “unlikely to replicate the EV story one-for-one”, he adds.
China’s concerted hydrogen push is also unlikely to echo the EV story at a global level, according to the IEA.
In terms of green hydrogen, around 60% of global electrolyser manufacturing capacity is currently in China, prompting concerns from the EU about a repeat of China’s global dominance in the solar and EV sectors.
However, the IEA says, electrolysers made in China “might not supply other markets at scale in the short term”, due to difficulties transporting the bulky technology globally, expectations that costs will only fall gradually, uncertainty around global demand and questions over how well Chinese electrolysers perform against global alternatives.
China’s industrial focus on hydrogen is centred more on domestic use, Shen argues. “It is less about near-term export competitiveness and more about building domestic industrial ecosystems,” she says.
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LCAW 2026: From Santa Marta to Crisis in the Middle East: Fossil Fuel Phaseout, Energy Transition and Implications for Investors
24 June | London | Online
Carbon Tracker and Confluence Philanthropy welcome you:Join us during London Climate Action Week for a timely discussion on the global shift away from fossil fuels – and what it means for investors navigating an increasingly volatile energy landscape.
Investors are at a critical inflection point. Recent geopolitical tensions and market shocks have underscored the fragility of the global fossil fuel system. At the same time, clean energy and electrification are scaling rapidly, reshaping long-term oil and gas demand. International climate dialogues, including those from the recent Santa Marta process, are also sending increasingly clear signals about the direction and pace of fossil fuel phaseout.
The session will explore how shifting demand and global policy alignment are reshaping fossil fuel markets and redefining risk, returns and capital allocation.
Limited space in person, join us online
This session will unpack:- Key takeaways from the Santa Marta process and what they signal for policy and capital markets
- Official conference takeaways can be found here
- The latest evidence on the global scaling of clean energy
- How Middle Eastern stakeholders are navigating the transition and what this means for global supply, pricing and risk
- What structural shifts in fossil fuel demand mean for investors and capital allocation
Opening Welcome: Dana Lanza, Confluence Philanthropy
Speakers:- Sandrine Dixson-Declève, Club of Rome
- Jules Kortenhorst, Energy Transitions Commission
- Mark Campanale, Carbon Tracker Initiative
- [Additional speaker TBC]
The post LCAW 2026: From Santa Marta to Crisis in the Middle East: Fossil Fuel Phaseout, Energy Transition and Implications for Investors appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.
On the death of RCP8.5
This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Zeke Hausfather, Glen Peters, and Piers Forster
With the release of the new van Vuuren et al 2026 paper on the emissions scenarios that will be used in the upcoming IPCC 7th Assessment Report, the internet has been abuzz with debate over the implications of the formal retirement of the RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 scenario. The president of the United States even weighed in over the weekend in his own unique style, posting that “the United Nations TOP Climate Committee just admitted that its own projections (RCP8.5) were WRONG! WRONG! WRONG!”.
van Vuuren et al justify this move by noting that “the CMIP6 high emission levels (quantified by SSP5-8.5) have become implausible, based on trends in the costs of renewables, the emergence of climate policy and recent emission trends,” citing the paper that we published in Nature back in 2020.
Actual global CO2 emissions (black) compared to different generations of emissions scenarios featured in IPCC reports. Updated by Glen Peters through 2025.Others have pointed out that RCP8.5 was never particularly plausible, and have criticized claims that the move away from using these scenarios reflects actual progress on reducing emissions.
So what actually happened here? It turns out that two things can be true at the same time:
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RCP8.5 (and its successor SSP5-8.5) were designed to be a worst case emissions scenario, not the most likely outcome even in a world that did nothing to address climate change. We were probably never headed to a tripling of global emissions by 2100 (to say nothing of a five-fold increase in coal use), even in the absence of climate policy.
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Rapid declines in clean energy costs have bent the curve of future emissions downward, with new scenarios designed to reflect current policies notably lower than most baseline scenarios in the literature. The 21st century is now unlikely to see a continued expansion of fossil fuel use globally, with current policy scenarios reflecting relatively flat global emissions going forward.
Emissions scenarios can broadly be categorized as “baseline” scenarios or “mitigation” scenarios. Baselines represent worlds where there are no additional efforts to address climate change (or in some cases turn back the clock to some earlier period and assume no policy after that point), while mitigation scenarios explore concerted efforts to reduce global emissions.
When RCP8.5 was first published global emissions were skyrocketing, having increased 30% in just the past decade. Clean energy sources were quite expensive, electric vehicles largely non-existent, and the idea that we would continue to increase our use of coal, oil, and gas through the end of the century was not seen as far-fetched.
Even in that context, RCP8.5 was chosen to represent the high end of the baseline scenario range available to the researchers at the time – around the 90th percentile. It was never a likely outcome even in a world that did not address climate change; rather it was always intended to represent a worst case scenario that pushed fossil fuel expansion to the max.
There are many other baseline scenarios with lower emissions, which were equally plausible as RCP8.5, even in the absence of climate policy. The original article that published the baselines, shows total CO2 emissions can be as low as RCP4.5 depending on the socioeconomic assumptions and the model used.
However, in part due to a breakdown in communication between the energy modeling community that develops the scenarios and the climate science community that uses them, RCP8.5 came to be incorrectly portrayed by many as the most likely “business as usual” scenario.
Around a decade ago the scenario started to garner more criticism. Justin Ritchie and Hadi Dowlatabadi published a paper in 2017 questioning whether the extremely high use of coal in RCP8.5 – which envisioned things like turning coal to oil for vehicles when oil reserves ran dry later in the century – was even possible given the world’s recoverable coal reserves. Ritchie and I (Zeke) wrote in 2019 that a 3C world was now “business as usual”, reflecting that:
Our business-as-usual projection of 3C of warming – rather than 4 or 5C – is a testament to the progress in global decarbonization over the last few decades. It also reflects the fact that rapid growth in coal use during the 2000s was not necessarily characteristic of longer-term energy use trends. The world has taken concrete steps to move away from coal in the past decade, and this progress should be reflected in our assessment of likely emissions pathways – and their resulting climate impacts – going forward.
In 2020 we published our Nature piece, arguing that we should “stop using the worst-case scenario for climate warming as the most likely outcome”, and that outcomes like RCP8.5 had become increasingly implausible with every passing year as clean energy costs fell and coal use plateaued.
Identifying real progressSo if we were likely never heading for a world of RCP8.5, with its tripling of global CO2 emissions by 2100 (and five-fold increase in coal use), where were we actually headed? How much has the energy transition to-date (which has grown to over $2 trillion annual global spending) actually changed our future trajectories?
This is an impossible question to precisely answer given that it relies on an inherently unknowable counterfactual scenario. It is not correct to state or assume that RCP8.5 was the baseline; we simply do not know the baseline and can only estimate it. But one way to approach the question is to look at where the scenario literature thought we were headed – what the actual range of baseline scenarios were.
The figure below show the CO2 emissions between 2000 and 2100 in the old RCP8.5 scenario, the full range of baseline scenarios published in the IPCC AR6 WG3 scenario database,1 and the new CMIP7 medium illustrative scenario published by van Vuuren et al 2026.2
Global CO2 emissions (left) and 2100 warming relative to preindustrial (right) for RCP8.5, the range of IPCC AR6 WG3 baseline scenarios, and the new CMIP7 medium illustrative scenario from van Vuuren et al. Future warming ranges based on FaIR model calculations.We don’t actually know where in the baseline range (or outside of it!) we might have been heading in this counterfactual world. But the average of the baseline range – with its approximately 3.5C warming by 2100 – is a much more justifiable counterfactual than the high-end RCP8.5 baseline. This suggests that progress on policy and technology has reduced expected 2100 warming by around 0.7C, rather than the full 1.7C difference between RCP8.5 and the new medium scenario. A plausible reduction of ~0.7C warming represents enormous progress and a large reduction in future damages, even as a 2.8C world under current policies remains far from acceptable.
The mid-range of the baseline scenarios back in the late 2010s when most of those scenarios were developed is roughly analogous with the CMIP7 high illustrative scenario today (~3.3C), which envisions a roll back of policies that have been enacted over the past decade as well as slower technological progress on clean energy going forward.
The mid-range baseline scenario warming is also consistent with baseline warming estimates published by both the IEA (3.5C) and Climate Action Tracker (3.6C) prior to the signing of the Paris Agreement. Climate Action Tracker has also tracked the changes in its “policies and action” scenario over time, which has declined from 3.6C in 2015 to 2.6C in 2026, finding a similar ~1C decline in expected future warming.
Climate Action Tracker’s evolution of 2100 warming projections under different policy assumptions between 2009 and 2025.It is hard to gauge the “impact of the Paris Agreement” or any other specific climate policy intervention in isolation. In a world without Paris we would still likely have seen a reduction of future emissions projections associated with continued cost declines of clean energy technologies. Similarly, even if coal use did continue to grow, it is not at all obvious it would have grown at the scale and rate as in RCP8.5. But this does not mean that these declines are divorced from other policy decisions made by countries over the past few decades.
Technology is, after all, not exogenous; it does not arise solely from spontaneous innovations. Rather, it reflects an interplay between the government and the private sector over cycles of research and development, early stage deployment, and eventual economies of scale.
Let’s take the example of solar energy, which is covered in depth in Greg Nemet’s excellent book “How Solar Energy Became Cheap”. Here formative R&D work done by Bell Labs in the 1950s and by the US DOE in the 1970s helped develop and commercialize the technology, while subsidies in Germany and Japan helped drive down costs with larger scale deployments in the 1990s and 2000s. More recently, dramatic cost declines have been driven at least in part by enormous investments in both domestic and export markets by China.
High warming outcomes can still occurWhen we try to estimate how much the world will warm this century and beyond, we run into three fundamental uncertainties: our future emissions, the sensitivity of the climate to increasing forcings, and the carbon cycle feedbacks that determine the portion of our emissions that remain in the atmosphere.
While we tend to give the central estimate of future warming in 2100 associated with a given emissions scenario (e.g. 2.8C), this single number hides a pretty wide range of actual possible climate responses. For example, the figure below shows probability of reaching different temperature outcomes under the CMIP7 medium illustrative scenario. While the median is 2.8C, the 5th to 95th percentiles span 2.1C to 3.7C, and there is even a small (~2%) chance of 4C or more warming.
Likelihood of different 2100 warming outcomes in the CMIP7 medium illustrative scenario based on 841 different FaIR climate model runs that include both climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedback uncertainties.The new medium scenario is designed to be in-line to current policy scenarios in the literature. But current policies represent neither a ceiling nor a floor on future emissions. Future emissions are in society’s hands. Indeed, it is ironic to see President Trump criticizing climate science for its past use of high emissions scenarios when his administration actively supports a roll back of existing climate policy, the restriction of new clean energy development, and mandating that coal plants remain operating despite their high costs.
The new CMIP7 scenarios include a “High” emissions scenario that explores a more Trumpian future where current policy is rolled back and clean energy deployment slows. The high illustrative scenario finds 2100 warming of closer to 3.3C (with a range of 2.5C to 4.4C).
It is important to emphasize that the world doesn’t end in 2100, even if many of our past emissions scenarios and climate model simulations did. One of the major advances in the IPCC AR7 is a plan to extend scenarios through 2150, since 2100 is not nearly as far away as it used to be.
Illustrative CMIP7 emissions scenarios and modeled 33rd-67th percentile of warming outcomes, 2000-2150, from van Vuuren et al 2026.The brutal math of climate change is this: as long as CO2 emissions remain above zero, the world will continue to warm. The medium scenario ends up closer to 3.7C by 2150, while the high scenario ends up more or less matching the warming in the old RCP8.5 scenario despite an assumption of flattening or modestly declining emissions after 2100.
It is also wrong to say that the worst predictions of climate impacts this century can now be ruled out by this revision. High-end temperature projections for the end of the century are reduced compared to earlier IPCC assessments. Yet, the IPCC WGII report found that risks across the five “reasons for concern” it examines have all risen for a given level of global warming. So, even if the high-end emissions in RCP8.5 won’t materialize, the damages projected in these earlier climate simulations remain very much in play.
A tripling of global CO2 emissions by 2100 may never have been particularly plausible even back in 2011 when RCP8.5 was originally published. But a 21st century of increasing fossil fuel use leading to a doubling of emissions was within the realm of the possible. The fact that we are no longer heading toward that is a sign of progress, rather than somehow undermining the edifice of all of climate science as both President Trump and some overly excited internet pundits claim. And of course, we still have a long way to go to get emissions down to (net) zero and stabilize global temperatures.
After all, as we wrote back in 2020, “This admission does not make climate action less urgent. The need to limit warming to [well below 2C]3… does not depend on having a 5C counterpoint.”
1. This will likely slightly underestimate emissions in baseline scenarios when the RCPs were published in 2011, as the WG3 scenario database was published in 2022 (though many of the scenarios were run much earlier, with the SSP baselines dating back to before 2017) and at least some clean energy cost declines since 2011 are baked in.
2. Note that these are illustrative placeholder scenarios; the final CMIP7 emissions scenarios will be published in September 2026 (and we will have much more discussion of them then!). That being said, van Vuuren et al are clear in the paper that “the final emission trajectories will depend on the finalized IAM runs but are expected to be roughly consistent with the illustrations provided here.”
3. We had originally said “limit warming to 1.5C”, but that ship has unfortunately sailed. In addition to lowering the high emissions scenarios, the new van Vuuren et al paper also more or less eliminates scenarios that keep warming to 1.5C without overshoot and subsequent drawdown.
Analysis: China’s new carbon metric leaves Germany-sized gap in its emissions
A major change in the way that China measures its core climate goal has effectively halved the growth in the country’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions over the past five years.
The revised measure of “carbon intensity”, the amount of CO2 per unit of economic output, implies that China’s emissions have only gone up by 7% from 2020-2025.
This is just half of the 14% rise indicated by previous official statistics.
On paper, the revision creates a gap of 700m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) per year, equivalent to the total emissions of Germany or South Korea.
While China has never officially defined how it measures carbon intensity, it has now made what appears to be a retrospective change, with the effect of making targets easier to meet.
The shift means that China officially came close to meeting its carbon-intensity target for 2020-2025, whereas official statistics had previously pointed towards falling well short.
The new definition of carbon intensity has not been made public, but plausible approaches to calculating the metric do not seem to be sufficient to explain the Germany-sized gap.
The apparent gaps or inconsistencies in China’s new carbon accounting also mean that China could meet its international climate pledges for 2030, even if its emissions go up, whereas the previous measure would have required them to fall.
This article explains how the metric appears to have shifted, what changes might potentially explain the revision and what the revised measure implies for China’s climate goals.
Measuring carbon intensityReducing carbon intensity – CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – has been China’s key climate commitment since the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009.
At that time, the country pledged to cut its carbon intensity to 48% below 2005 levels by 2020. This was followed up by a 2030 target of a 60-65% reduction, announced in 2014, which was then upgraded to more than 65% in 2021.
Since carbon intensity was made a key progress indicator in China’s 14th five-year plan for 2021-25, the country has reported reductions in carbon intensity every year in its statistical communique, issued at the end of February.
Neither China’s international climate pledges (its nationally determined contributions, NDCs) nor other official documents have ever set out a definition of carbon intensity, despite it being a cornerstone of the country’s climate commitments.
However, until this year, it was possible to closely reproduce the reported numbers, based on a straightforward interpretation of what carbon intensity means.
But the types of emissions that are included in the carbon-intensity metric have now changed.
Previously, it was possible to reproduce the reported carbon-intensity data by combining official GDP data with estimates of emissions from the use of fossil fuels. The latter could be estimated based on the officially reported consumption of coal, oil and gas, multiplied by China’s official emissions factors for the CO2 per unit of energy from each fuel.
The previous carbon-intensity measure apparently included emissions from the use of fossil fuels to generate energy, as well as their use as chemical feedstocks, so-called “non-energy uses”. However, it did not include non-fossil fuel CO2 emissions from industrial processes, such as the production of cement, as shown by the “old scope” in the figure below left.
Old and new scopes of China’s CO2 emission reporting from fossil-fuel use and industrial processes. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta. See “about the data” for further details.Based on the annually reported progress against this old scope, China’s carbon intensity had fallen by a total of 12.4% from 2020-2025.
This was well short of the 18% target set for these years under the 14th five-year plan.
In September 2025, Huang Runqiu, head of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, acknowledged this gap, saying that meeting China’s carbon-intensity targets had become “more challenging” due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and trade tensions.
Yet the 15th five-year plan, published in March 2026, reported that China had cut its carbon intensity by 17.7% over the same period – just shy of the 18% target.
As such, it is clear that there has been a major shift in the way that China measures its carbon intensity, specifically in terms of which types of emissions are included.
Moreover, the revised numbers imply that – rather than missing it by a large margin – China officially came close to meeting its carbon-intensity target for the 14th five-year plan.
A footnote in China’s latest statistical communique offers a brief description of carbon intensity as relating to the CO2 emissions from “energy activities and industrial production”.
This indicates that the carbon-intensity calculation now includes industrial process emissions and excludes non-energy uses of fossil fuels, shown by the “new scope” in the figure above.
In comments sought by Carbon Brief, Ryna Cui, associate research professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, who was not involved in the analysis, agrees that the changes to the carbon-intensity methodology are “unclear”. However, she notes that “limited data” makes it challenging to fully verify the nature and impact of the changes.
The revision mirrors a recent change made to the way that China measures its “energy intensity”, the energy use per unit of economic output. In 2024, energy intensity was changed to exclude non-energy use of fossil fuels and energy use from non-fossil fuels.
This exclusion also created a major incentive for expanding the chemical industry and the non-energy use of fossil fuels.
As for the change in carbon-intensity metric, this follows the highly energy-intensive pattern of economic growth during and after the Covid-19 pandemic and China’s “zero-Covid” policy.
Germany-sized gapThe shift in the way that China is measuring its carbon intensity has implications for estimates of the country’s emissions, which are only reported officially some years later.
Changes in carbon intensity and GDP are reported far more quickly – and can be used to estimate changes in China’s CO2 emissions.
China’s total emissions from energy and industrial processes were 11.2bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2020. Based on the originally reported changes in carbon intensity and GDP, its fossil-fuel CO2 emissions had grown 14% by 2024, an increase of 1,430m tonnes (MtCO2).
In contrast, the newly reported carbon-intensity figures imply that China’s CO2 emissions only grew by 7% between 2020 and 2025, up just 690MtCO2, as shown by the figure below.
The gap between these figures amounts to 730m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2), equivalent to the annual emissions of Germany or South Korea.
Estimated annual changes in China’s CO2 emissions, relative to 2020=100. Blue line: Estimate based on originally reported changes in carbon intensity. Red: Based on changes reported in 2026. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta. See “about the data” for further details.On paper, therefore, the change in the carbon-intensity metric effectively halves the rate of growth in China’s CO2 emissions over the past five years.
Decoding the new carbon-intensity methodologyThe change in the carbon-intensity metric could have other significant implications, explored below, making it important to understand how it is being calculated.
Yet, while there are some indications of what the new approach entails, these changes do not seem to account for the magnitude of the revision.
The new scope includes industrial-process emissions. One of the largest sources of these emissions, the cement industry, has been contracting due to a slowdown in real estate and infrastructure construction.
This reduction in emissions is one reason why China’s carbon intensity has improved more quickly under the new scope than under the old one.
In addition, the new scope excludes non-energy use of fossil fuels – largely relating to the chemicals industry – where there has been rapid growth over the past five years.
This is another factor in carbon intensity improving faster under the new scope.
Indeed, China’s chemicals industry drove more than half of the growth in its total fossil-fuel use in the past five years, including 40% of coal use and all of oil use. As a result, non-energy use reached 13% of the total consumption of fossil fuels in 2025, up from 7% in 2020, after growing at an average annual rate of 13%.
The figure below illustrates the impact of these changes in scope. It shows the change in China’s emissions from 2020-2025 due to the use of fossil fuels for energy, its industrial-process emissions and non-energy use of fossil fuels.
The first few rows show changes based on the consumption of fossil fuels overall, amounting to a combined 1,430MtCO2 rise in emissions.
This compares with the 690MtCO2 rise implied by the new carbon-intensity metric, leaving that Germany-sized 730MtcO2 gap in emissions. The new scope explains some of this gap.
In terms of industrial processes, the 30% fall in cement production could account for a 300MtCO2 fall in China’s CO2 emissions. In addition, the amount of carbon stored in products, such as plastics, asphalt and rubber, could account for an estimated 100MtCO2 fall in emissions.
On the other hand, emissions from the incineration of plastics increased by an estimated 40% and from metals industry processes by 10%, with aluminium production having expanded by 21%. Together, these would have increased emissions by an estimated 60MtCO2.
In total, the changes in emissions from fossil-fuel use, industrial processes, carbon retained in products and waste incineration add up to a combined 1,070MtCO2 rise from 2020-2025, shown in the penultimate row of the figure below.
Again, this revised total – based on the change in scope of the carbon-intensity metric – goes some way to explaining the Germany-sized gap in China’s CO2 emissions.
However, the new carbon-intensity figures imply that China’s CO2 emissions only increased by 690MtCO2, as shown in the final row of the figure below. This leaves a residual gap of around 380MtCO2, which does not appear to be accounted for by the data available.
Changes in China’s emissions by source from 2020-2025, MtCO2. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta. See “about the data” for further details.One way to make the numbers add up would be to assume that the amount of carbon embedded in chemical-industry products has increased by the equivalent of 500MtCO2.
However, the reported output of major chemical-industry products cannot account for this level of embedded carbon. The figure below shows that the increase in output of major chemical products only explains around a 110MtCO2 increase in retained carbon.
Much of the increase in the production of plastics was cancelled out by a contraction in the use of bitumen for asphalt, due to lower road-building activity.
The amount of carbon retained in products from 2005-2025, MtCO2. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta. See “about the data” for further details.Furthermore, the 14th five-year plan for 2021-25 had a target of raising the share of waste incineration to 65% of urban residential waste treatment capacity, up from 45% in 2020.
So, while plastics production did go up, resulting in increased amounts of retained carbon, a larger share of this retained carbon was being incinerated, meaning its carbon would quickly be released back into the atmosphere.
One reason why carbon retained in products has grown more slowly than the amount of fossil fuels used in chemicals production is that the fastest growth has been in the coal-based chemicals industry.
Coal-based processes have a much lower conversion efficiency than oil- and gas-based production, with process emissions that are typically multiple times as high.
For example, these emissions are 10 times as high for the production of olefins – a key plastics feedstock – from coal as compared with oil or gas. The process is reported to require 3.75 tonnes of standard coal per tonne of product. This implies that only 30% of the carbon in the coal is retained in the product, with the other 70% being emitted in the process.
There are also chemical processes that use fossil fuels as a feedstock, but where the end product does not contain carbon. One example is ammonia, a key building block for fertiliser, where production grew by 52% from 2020 to 2025.
Neither the change in scope of the carbon-intensity calculation, nor the change in the amount of carbon retained in products, is sufficient to explain the size of the revision in the newly reported numbers. There must be another explanation.
There are two options. Either the new scope broadly aligns with what is outlined above, but also excludes a subset of the CO2 emissions. Or the scope does not exclude any of the CO2, but there are gaps in the monitoring of some energy or industrial-process emissions.
Either explanation would mean that China is not accounting for some of its CO2 emissions. It would also mean that the improvement in carbon intensity for 2020-2025 is over-reported.
China’s latest officially reported emissions inventories reinforce the second of the two options above, namely, that there are gaps in emissions reporting from the chemical industry.
From 2018 to 2021, the latest year for which China has reported on its emissions, the CO2 output of chemical-industry processes only increased by 13%. Over the same period, non-energy use of fossil fuels increased by 29%, according to data reported to the International Energy Agency by the Chinese government.
One factor in these apparent gaps could be that China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is required to publish data on carbon intensity very quickly, since it is a key indicator in the country’s five-year plans.
On the other hand, detailed greenhouse gas emissions inventories and energy statistics are only published years later, by the environment ministry and NBS, respectively.
What the change means for China’s targetsThe change in the definition of carbon intensity has the effect of weakening China’s climate targets and introducing more uncertainty into tracking progress.
On the basis of China’s new numbers, it will require less effort to hit the 2030 target for a 65% reduction in carbon intensity on 2005 levels, as per China’s Paris pledge.
This target can now be met even if CO2 emissions go up between 2025 and 2030, whereas the previous metric would have required a reduction.
It will also require less effort to hit the 17% target in the 15th five-year plan.
The apparent gaps in the CO2 emissions numbers for 2025 could affect the delivery of China’s other key climate pledges, such as the commitment to peak CO2 emissions before 2030. They could also allow the chemical industry’s CO2 emissions to continue climbing rapidly, while still officially meeting the 2030 goals for CO2 intensity.
Moreover, the apparent gaps or inconsistencies in China’s new carbon accounting also mean that China would be able to officially meet its target to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030, even if its overall CO2 emissions do not actually reach a peak.
The apparent gaps could also affect the delivery of China’s newer target to cut its greenhouse gas emissions to 7-10% below peak levels by 2035 and beyond.
Nevertheless, researchers and analysts can still monitor progress by calculating China’s CO2 emissions independently.
China’s reporting on fossil-fuel consumption, the output of plastics and other carbon-containing products, as well as manufacturing of commodities with substantial process emissions, provides a basis for tracking emissions under the new scope.
While under the UN’s climate framework China is free to use any definition it wants to meet its own nationally determined climate pledges, retrospective changes to methodology or inconsistent accounting could erode the value of the country’s commitments.
Moreover, it will, ultimately, have to close any gaps in its emissions data and reporting, under the transparency rules of the Paris Agreement.
China’s next transparency report to the UN, due by the end of this year, should also provide more clarity on the methodology and data underlying the revised numbers.
This underscores the importance of monitoring, reporting and verification for industrial process emissions. “Mass balances” based on fossil-fuel consumption and product output could be used as a check on CO2 emissions reporting. Finally, China’s emissions data could also be made more granular and clearly defined.
Carbon Brief has approached the National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Ecology and Environment for comment.
The University of Maryland’s Cui tells Carbon Brief that in general, China’s climate goals are “improv[ing]” in terms of their coverage and scope. However, she adds:
“The issue is…the ambiguity and inconsistency in the coverage, definition and method between target setting and progress tracking, which can lead to large uncertainties and room for manipulation. It highlights the importance of transparency in national climate targets, following the UNFCCC’s international transparency framework, which should also be applied as best practices for domestic targets.”
About the dataThe calculations in this analysis are based on China’s total coal, oil and gas consumption from energy statistical yearbooks covering the years until 2023, with data for 2024 and 2025 taken from the latest statistical communiques.
“Originally reported” CO2 emissions were back-calculated from carbon-intensity reductions and GDP growth given in annual statistical communiques. The revised emissions for 2020, 2024 and 2025 are similarly back-calculated from the reductions in carbon intensity from 2020 to 2025 and from 2024 to 2025, as reported in the 15th five-year plan outline and the 2025 statistical communique, respectively, combined with annually reported GDP growth.
Cement process emissions up to 2024 are from Robbie Andrews’ estimates, scaled to 2025 based on year-on-year change in total cement output.
Process emissions from the metals industry are based on calculating emissions for aluminium, silicon, lead, zinc and crude steel from the bottom-up, using industrial output data and IPCC default emission factors scaled to the reported total in 2021. For steel, the calculations are based on typical quicklime use in basic-oxygen and electric-arc furnaces.
Emissions from the incineration of plastics are based on a peer-reviewed estimate of plastics incineration in 2022, combined with growth rates in the overall power generation from waste-to-energy plants. The analysis assumes that the share of plastics in the energy content of the incinerated waste stayed constant over this period, which is a conservative assumption given the rapid rise in plastics production.
Total non-energy use of fossil fuels in 2020, 2024 and 2025 is available from an NEA data release, with data for 2021-2023 found in the China energy statistical yearbook 2025.
The mix of coal, oil and gas within non-energy use is based on the energy statistical yearbook data up to 2023, with the increase in coal in 2024 and 2025 based on Wind Financial Terminal data on coal consumption in the chemical industry. Gas use, which is relatively minor, is assumed to have grown on trend and oil is calculated as the residual.
Primary plastics, rubber, and urea output data are from NBS industrial statistics. The production of solvents, lubricants and waxes, as well as the use of bitumen in construction, is from energy statistical yearbooks. The analysis assumes no change in output from 2023 to 2025, given the lack of clear trends.
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RCP8.5 Update
This is a re-post from And Then There's Physics
If you’ve been paying attention to the climate debate on social media you might have noticed the RCP8.5 debate rearing it’s ugly head again. This is because a new set of emission/concentration projections have been developed for the climate modelling community (CMIP7). These new projections no longer include an RCP8.5-like projection and so all of those who have been critical of its use are now crowing about this proving them right.
I’ve written about RCP8.5 numerous times before. My views have probably evolve somewhat over time, but my previous posts are probably a reasonably good reflection of them. So, if you do want to know them, you could read some of these earlier post. I don’t want to delve too much into the re-invigorated “debate” but instead thought I’d post links to other posts/articles that I think explain the situation pretty well. If you want to read alternative takes, they’re not all that difficult to find. You can probably guess the authors.
I will, though, repeat the sub-heading of Gavin’s Realclimate post:
The fantasy version of the normal updating of scenarios for a new round of CMIP simulations doing the rounds is bad faith BS.
Links to other posts:
Scenarios, Schemarios – Gavin Schmidt at Realclimate.
On the death of RCP8.5 – Zeke Hausfather, Glen Peters and Piers Foster at Climate Brink.
Factcheck: Trump’s false claims about the IPCC and ‘RCP8.5’ climate scenario – multiple authors at Carbon Brief.
IPCC does not create scenarios – Reto Knutti at Linkedin
Sorry, climate change is still dangerous, no matter what nonsense Trump emits – Bulletin article by Genevieve Guenther
Revealed: Floods have forced at least 67 closures at NHS hospitals since 2021
At least 67 NHS hospital wards, departments and other sites across the UK have been forced to temporarily close or relocate due to weather-related flooding over the past five years, a Carbon Brief investigation reveals.
Maternity centres, surgical theatres, a neonatal intensive-care unit and even entire hospital buildings have been disrupted by heavy rainfall or encroaching floodwaters.
Carbon Brief submitted freedom-of-information (FOI) requests to 162 NHS trusts, which show that while many flood-related shutdowns were brief, some lasted for weeks or months.
In total, 148 trusts responded to these requests with reports of 67 flood-related shutdowns, giving detailed data for 30 incidents that resulted in a total of 3,000 days of closures.
Reports of flooding at NHS sites have been on the rise, according to NHS England data.
This comes as the UK experiences wetter winters, with periods of extreme rainfall that are increasingly linked to human-caused climate change.
These floods can exacerbate existing problems in a healthcare system that is already struggling with insufficient funding, old hospital buildings and a backlog of maintenance work.
Indeed, while there have been efforts to make UK hospitals more resilient to extreme weather, one expert tells Carbon Brief that such measures are difficult to implement when these institutions are struggling to keep their “heads above water”.
Rising floodsFloods pose a threat to people’s health, but they also threaten the UK’s healthcare infrastructure. Water can enter hospitals, paralyse ambulance services and damage equipment, placing strain on an already stretched NHS.
NHS records show that the number of flood incidents “caused by external weather events” in facilities across England has doubled since 2021, reaching nearly 400 in 2024-25.
Equivalent data is not available for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, although there have been reports of floods disrupting services across the whole UK.
As global temperatures rise and the atmosphere holds more moisture, UK winters are getting wetter. Attribution studies show climate change has increased the severity of recent rainfall and flooding events – including Storm Eunice in 2022 and Storm Babet in 2023.
There is also a risk of increased flooding when heavy rain hits after periods of intense drought, of the kind seen in recent years.
Environment Agency modelling suggests that a rising share of medical facilities in England will be at risk of flooding due to climate change. It says the share of sites at risk will increase from a quarter in 2024 to a third by the middle of the century.
Despite this apparent threat facing the UK’s healthcare system, there is limited information about the extent to which these floods are already disrupting NHS services.
Closed servicesTo build a fuller picture of NHS-wide flooding, Carbon Brief sent FOI requests to 162 trusts and health boards – the organisations in charge of health services – across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
They were asked for details of wards, departments or services that had been temporarily or permanently closed due to weather-related flooding, such as river floods or heavy rainfall, between 2021-22 and the start of 2026.
In total, 148 of these bodies responded with details of 67 incidents in which weather-related floods have triggered closures. The map below shows where these incidents were located, from hospital wards in Scotland to an eye unit on the south coast of England.
Sites of weather-related flooding incidents at NHS facilities. The size of the circles indicates the number of incidents reported at each site. Source: NHS trust FOI responses to Carbon Brief.The 67 flooding-related disruptions reported by NHS trusts and health boards is likely an underestimate. Many trusts told Carbon Brief they did not record such detailed information or that collating it would be too time-consuming.
Nevertheless, the results provide an insight into the kind of risks facing NHS services as weather gets more extreme.
Among the closures were 13 accident and emergency (A&E) departments, urgent treatment centres and minor injuries units. There were also 10 hospital wards, 10 surgical theatres, five maternity units and a neonatal intensive-care unit affected by flooding.
Many trusts did not provide information about how long each closure lasted. However, the 30 incidents where timespans were provided add up to the equivalent of more than 3,000 days – or eight years – of closures across NHS sites.
The infographic below provides a snapshot of some notable closures from the dataset.
Notable incidents of weather-related flooding at NHS facilities. Source: FOI responses to Carbon Brief. Notable incidents of weather-related flooding at NHS facilities. Source: FOI responses to Carbon Brief. .cb-mobile{ display:none; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-mobile{ display:inherit; } .cb-desktop{ display:none } }The entire Buckland Hospital site in Dover closed for two days in 2025 amid “exceptional rainfall” and flash floods. People seeking radiology, maternity and urgent-care services were told not to visit over the weekend and various clinical services were delayed or cancelled.
The NHS declared a “major incident” in 2021 when flood waters “caused power outages impacting multiple areas” at Whipps Cross Hospital in north-east London – including its maternity service – for four days. Neighbouring hospitals also flooded.
Some closures lasted far longer. In Stroud General Hospital, a surgical theatre was closed for two weeks and an X-ray facility for around two months after storm water overflowed into the building in 2023.
Several NHS trusts stressed that the flooding incidents they reported were localised – often resulting from roof leaks exacerbated by heavy rain – and resulted in minimal disruption. Sometimes, as with a cardiology suite in Cannock Chase Hospital, the service was moved and the trust says patient care was not disrupted.
However, the responses also showed the breadth of damage such events can cause, including rainwater “pouring onto expensive equipment” and floods triggering the long-term relocation of services.
For example, Orchard Cottage, a site that provided care for adults with learning disabilities in Derbyshire, experienced major flooding during Storm Babet in 2023 and was permanently shut down as a result.
Adaptation needsThe UK Health Alliance on Climate Change, a group of UK health organisations, concluded in a report in 2025 that, with flood risks projected to grow, there is an “urgent need for adaptation measures” across the nation’s healthcare facilities.
Government advisors at the Climate Change Committee have highlighted the need for flood resilience in UK hospitals, including flood barriers, waterproofed electricals and built-in redundancy for critical areas, such as theatres, labs and IT equipment.
There have been various measures at both government and NHS level intended to improve the resilience of medical facilities to climate-related hazards.
The UK’s national adaptation programme sets out expectations for NHS England to “adapt NHS infrastructure to extreme weather events”. All trusts must have “green plans” in place, which require climate change to be factored into infrastructure decisions, for example, through the creation of drainage systems or green spaces.
Yet, as it stands, three-quarters of UK doctors say their workplaces are not prepared for the impact of extreme weather and nearly half of healthcare workers report that extreme weather has disrupted NHS services in the past five years.
Many hospitals have outdated infrastructure – often predating the founding of the NHS – which was not designed to cope with climate change. Prof Hugh Montgomery, chair of intensive-care medicine at University College London, tells Carbon Brief:
“The hospitals themselves weren’t built for this weather any more than anything else is really – and of course it’s going to get worse, in an exponential function.”
Many of the FOI responses provided to Carbon Brief identified specific building defects, such as roof leaks, which led to the flooding incidents during periods of heavy rainfall. There is a huge – and growing – backlog of maintenance work at NHS hospitals that was estimated in 2024-25 to need repairs costing £15.9bn.
Chris Naylor, a senior fellow at the King’s Fund, a thinktank focusing on health policy, tells Carbon Brief:
“Dealing with some of the backlog maintenance would probably help with climate adaptation as well, because of leaky roofs and all the rest of it. But we do also need to be thinking specifically about climate adaptation within the NHS and making sure there is funding for that.”
Montgomery points out that with trusts “mostly bankrupt” and most hospitals running a deficit, the question remains how to fund such interventions. “They’re struggling to keep their heads above water and they’re losing money,” he says.
Dr Mark Harber, a consultant nephrologist and special adviser on climate change at the Royal College of Physicians, tells Carbon Brief that hospitals at least need to make plans for extreme weather. This is particularly important for patients in need of time-dependent and life-saving treatments, such as kidney dialysis and chemotherapy.
Harber notes that hospitals, supply chains and transport could all be disrupted by floods:
“You have to have plans in place to deal with that, even if the NHS can’t deal with the flooding risk per se.”
Carbon Brief asked NHS England – which is responsible for the majority of the trusts that reported flooding disruption – for comment, but had not received a response at the time of publication.
MethodologyThe list of incidents reported by trusts can be viewed here.
Carbon Brief sent FOI requests to 120 English NHS trusts that have reported any incidents of flooding since 2021 in NHS England’s Estates Returns Information Collection (ERIC) dataset. This covers around 60% of all English NHS trusts.
Carbon Brief also filed FOI requests with all 42 of the health boards and trusts in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which are equivalent to English NHS trusts.
All trusts and health boards were asked for details of wards, departments or services that have been temporarily or permanently closed due to weather-related flooding, such as river flooding or heavy rainfall.
This matches the wording used to describe a flooding event in the ERIC system, which requires the reporting of all flood events “caused by external weather events” that trigger a risk assessment by staff. Such external events are distinct from floods caused by other issues that are not related to the weather, such as burst pipes.
In total, 14 trusts did not respond and many more said they did not hold the data requested. Some trusts provided data, but on further questioning stated that the data they provided covered all flooding events and it was not possible to say which were related to weather conditions. These cases have not been included in the final dataset.
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2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #21
Climate Policy and Politics (6 articles)
- What the US Would Lose If It Eliminates the National Center for Atmospheric Research 'I think there's a great loss for the wrong reasons. There's no good reason for dismantling this or tearing it down,'' a former NASA chief scientist says. Inside Climate News, Interview by Steve Curwood, Living on Earth, May 16, 2026.
- `Green card for the planet`? Fifa`s World Cup is on pace to be a climate catastrophe The 2022 World Cup failed to deliver on its environmental promises. From air travel emissions to heat-related dangers, the 2026 edition will be even worse The Guardian, Jules Boykoff, May 17, 2026.
- EPA claims `overwhelming rejection` of EVs as it moves to loosen air pollution rules Administration creates conditions to slow EV adoption and then uses the results to promote fossil fuel consumption. Inside Climate News, Anika Jane Beamer, May 19, 2026.
- Trump Officials, Billionaires and the Quiet Reshaping of America`s Public Lands A controversial land swap orchestrated by the megarich could be “a harbinger of what’s to come” for public lands under Trump. Inside Climate News, Evan Simon and Ames Alexander, May 21, 2026.
- Colombia`s climate crossroads: Trumpism casts shadow over presidential battle Colombia is a global leader in climate activism. Could US influence drag country to a future of mining and fracking? The Guardian, Jonathan Watts, May 21, 2026.
- The network watching the world`s oceans is under pressure - just when it`s needed most The Conversation, Kevin Trenberth, May 22, 2026.
Climate Change Impacts (5 articles)
- Wild Blueberry Farms Across Maine Suffer as Climate Change Upends Growing Seasons Like lobster rolls, wild blueberries are iconic in Maine. But heat and drought have set the plants back to a point where many small farmers are struggling against reduced yields and increased costs for mulch and irrigation. Inside Climate News, Sydney Cromwell, May 11, 2026.
- Scientists warn that the world`s rivers are running out of oxygen Rivers around the world are quietly running out of oxygen — and climate change is emerging as the main culprit. ScienceDaily, CAS press release, May 17, 2026.
- `It`s no longer exceptional`: Karachi struggles under brutal new reality of extreme heat Experts say the unseasonably hot weather across south Asia shows the impact of the climate crisis. The Guardian, Asad Mumtaz Rid, May 17, 2026.
- Global warming is accelerating 5,000 times faster than rice can evolve Climate change is pushing rice-growing regions into temperatures beyond those at which rice has been cultivated in the past 9,000 years of human history. Live Science, Stephani Pappas, May 19, 2026.
- The outlook for a climate-regulating ocean current is…not good A key ocean current that warms Europe is weakening, spurring a controversial megadam proposal Science News, Carolyn Gramling, May 20, 2026.
Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (4 articles)
- Factcheck: Trump`s false claims about the IPCC and `RCP8.5` climate scenario Among a flurry of posts on social media last weekend, US president Donald Trump declared “good riddance” to a specific emissions scenario used in global climate projections. Carbon Brief, Carbon Brief Staff, May 19, 2026.
- Climate Denier Group Pushes States to Embrace Coal Power for Data Centers The Heartland Institute used the American Legislative Exchange Council’s 2025 annual meeting to spread climate disinformation and tout coal to power AI. Desmog, Sharon Kelly, May 20, 2026.
- Scenarios, schmenarios… The fantasy version of the normal updating of scenarios for a new round of CMIP simulations doing the rounds is bad faith BS. RealClimate, Gavin Schmidt, May 20, 2026.
- Climate Scientists Were Wrong... That's a good thing Climate Adam on Youtube, Adam Levy, May 21, 2026.
Climate Law and Justice (3 articles)
- New Zealand Moves to Ban Tort Liability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Damage New Zealand’s government has announced that it plans to amend the country’s signature climate law to prohibit liability arising from climate change damages, a controversial move that critics say would shield polluters from climate lawsuits and undermine the rule of law. Inside Climate News, Dana Drugmand, May 19, 2026.
- A Youth-Led Campaign Claims a Win For Climate Justice A new U.N. resolution reinforces a landmark court opinion tying fossil fuel use to human rights abuses and legal responsibility for climate change. Inside Climate News, Bob Berwyn, May 22, 2026.
- As Communities Warn of Health Risks, New York Will Weaken Its Landmark Climate Law As part of ongoing budget negotiations, New York Gov. Kathy Hochul is pushing to delay emissions-reduction targets established in the state’s climate law. Inside Climate News, Lauren Dalban, May 23, 2026.
Climate Science and Research (3 articles)
- The Mediterranean sea is capable of generating hurricanes and climate change will make them worse Unsurprisingly and in keeping with hurricanes occurring in other larger oceanic basins, cyclonic storms in the Mediterranean known as ''medicanes'' present increasing threats as sea surface temperature rises. English, Emmanouil Flaounas & Davide Feranda, May 16, 2026.
- On the death of RCP8.5 We should celebrate progress, but not overstate it The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Glen Peters, and Piers Forster, May 18, 2026.
- Sea Level Rise is Accelerating, Scientists Confirm New research has helped close the ''sea level rise budget gap''' by including more recent sea level observations, reconciling measurements by different instruments, and integrating recent estimates of sea level rise and its components. Eos, Kimberly M. S. Cartier, May 20, 2026.
Health Aspects of Climate Change (2 articles)
- Declare Climate Change a Public Health Emergency, EU Experts The World Health Organization (WHO) should declare climate change a “public health emergency of international concern” to recognize the “catastrophic threat” it poses to human health, experts from the Pan-European Commission on Climate and Health (PECCH) have said. Medscape Medical News Headlines, Sophie Cousins, May 20, 2026.
- Climate change could make picking tobacco even more dangerous Farmworkers, including kids, can suffer from nicotine poisoning when they handle tobacco leaves – a threat that’s growing in a warming climate. Yale Climate Connections, YCC Team, May 21, 2026.
Miscellaneous (2 articles)
- A detailed look at offshore wind in the US and globally AP News, Jennifer McDermott, May 17, 2026.
- 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #20 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, May 10, 2026 thru Sat, May 16, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, May 17, 2026.
Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (1 article)
- The Pennine hills are full of holes - here`s how they`re helping fight climate change Thousands of holes are appearing in the Pennine hills, as part of efforts to improve carbon storage by restoring damaged peatland. The Conversation, Adam Johnston, May 18, 2026.
International Climate Conferences and Agreements (1 article)
- DeBriefed 22 May 2026: UN adopts landmark resolution | Trump takes on `RCP8.5` | Climate migration UN vote produces a peculiar and seemingly transactional result on legal obligation to address climate change, with the US, Israel, Iran, Russia, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Liberia voting ''no.'' Carbon Brief, Ayesha Tandon, May 22, 2026.
Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 article)
- Does electromagnetic radiation from wind turbines pose a threat to human health? No - Electromagnetic fields (EMFs) from wind turbines are well below international exposure safety limits. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, May 19, 2026.
DeBriefed 22 May 2026: UN adopts landmark resolution | Trump takes on ‘RCP8.5’ | Climate migration
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
ICJ OPINION: The UN has adopted a resolution backing a landmark world court opinion stating that countries have a legal obligation to address climate change, reported the Guardian. Some 141 countries voted in favour of the resolution, while only eight voted against: the US; Israel; Iran; Russia; Belarus; Saudi Arabia; Yemen; and Liberia. There were also 28 absentations, including India and Turkey, the host of COP31.
‘DETERMINED’: The text adopted by the UN general assembly “stresses” that “climate change is an unprecedented challenge of civilizational proportions” and says the assembly is “determined” to “translate the court’s findings into enhanced multilateral cooperation and accelerated climate action at all levels, consistent with international law”. The text “urges” states to implement measures including “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems”. It also “requests” the next UN secretary general to report on progress in 2027 and adds a formal follow-up to the agenda of the UN general assembly in 2028.
AMENDMENTS REJECTED: A UN press summary detailed how countries rejected four proposed amendments to the text by a group of largely Arab nations. These amendments would have undercut the world court’s legal advice on countries’ climate obligations by saying its views should only be taken into account “as appropriate”. They also would have added a reference to 2C, instead of focusing on 1.5C alone, got rid of the formal follow-up process in 2028 and added a reference to the role of carbon capture and storage.
Scenario sceptic‘GOOD RIDDANCE’: US president Donald Trump declared “good riddance” to a very high emissions modelling scenario in a Truth Social post on Saturday, misleadingly stating that “the United Nations TOP Climate Committee just admitted that its own projections (RCP8.5) were WRONG! WRONG! WRONG!” The post was quickly picked up by right-leaning media, including Fox News, the New York Post and the Australian.
NEW SCENARIOS: Trump’s claim follows the publication of a new set of emissions scenarios that will underpin research cited in the next set of reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In a guest post for Carbon Brief, scientists explained that the very high emissions scenario has “become implausible, based on trends in the costs of renewables, the emergence of climate policy and recent emission trends”.
TRUMP FACTCHECKED:Carbon Brief published a factcheck of Trump’s claims. It noted that the IPCC does not develop, control or own climate scenarios and has not published anything stating that any climate scenario is “wrong”. It added: “Projections suggest that the world is still on course for between 2.5C and 3C of warming…previously described as ‘catastrophic’ by the UN.”
- ADAPTATION NEEDED: The UK’s Climate Change Committee outlined how investing in adaptation now could produce “long-term savings”, Carbon Brief reported. UK ministers are preparing to accept a CCC recommendation to “set a legally binding goal of cutting emissions 87% by 2040”, reported the Times.
- ELECTRIFY EVERYTHING: COP31 president-designate Murat Kurum told the Copenhagen climate ministerial that countries should be “decarbonising the way we generate electricity, but also expanding electrification into every sphere of life”, according to Climate Home News.
- STAFF CUT: Australia’s national science agency, CSIRO, is preparing to fire one-third of the team working on the national climate model that provides future projections, reported the Guardian.
- TARGET MISSED: An independent body has warned that Germany is expected to miss its 2030 climate goals and emit more CO2 than previously forecast, reported Reuters. According to Deutsche Welle, the country could breach its goal by up to 100m tonnes of CO2.
- PEAK POWER: India’s peak power demand “smashed all records” on Tuesday, after the country’s ongoing heatwave drove a “sharp rise” in electricity consumption, according to the Economic Times. The record fell again on Thursday, said Reuters.
The number of countries in the world that have net-zero targets.
2Major emitters that do not have a net-zero target – a group comprising Iran and the US, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Latest climate research- Global warming above 4C is projected to cause large decreases in “climate connectivity” between habitats for land animals | Nature Climate Change
- Around 6% of respiratory deaths in Brazil from 2010-20 were attributable to “non-optimal temperatures”, accounting for more than 66,000 excess deaths | PLOS Climate
- Fungi that cause diseases in plants will approximately double in abundance around the Antarctic Peninsula by 2100 under a moderate emissions scenario | Global Change Biology
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
CapturedThe world added nearly 100 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-power capacity in 2025 – the equivalent of roughly 100 large coal plants – according to the latest annual report from Global Energy Monitor (GEM). This is a ten-year high, according to Carbon Brief’s coverage, which noted that the world’s coal plants nevertheless generated less electricity. The chart above shows that 95% of the new coal plants were built in India and China last year.
Spotlight Climate migrationThis week, Carbon Brief speaks to experts at a conference on migration and climate change in London about what their research could mean for how people move around the world in the future.
Prof Kerilyn Schewel, assistant professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel HillWe have moved beyond a ‘push factor’ narrative – that climate change is coming and uprooting communities – to a more nuanced perspective that recognises that people are already moving for all kinds of reasons… [For example] the more that young people are accessing formal education, the more they want to leave – particularly rural communities. We have to be very careful not to assume that when people want to leave, it is always driven by climate change. There are other developmental factors that are also shaping desires to move. This is a research frontier – seeing how environmental factors intersect with these other social or developmental outcomes.
Dr Aromar Revi, founding director of the Indian Institute for Human SettlementsThe future of mobility is much more certain than [climate change is]. People have been mobile for a very long time. That’s been an important part of the transformation of societies and economies for centuries…mobility is part of the solution [to climate change]. It is not the full solution, but it’s part of the solution. People are voting with their feet and with their aspirations to make a change.
Prof Nitya Rao, a professor of gender and development at the University of East AngliaThere are many things that the system can do to welcome migrants and be more sensitive to different types of migrants and their needs… In the short term, [migrants] need piped water, a proper home, care for young children…In the longer term, we have to address structural inequality. There are still barriers to people accessing resources – especially productive assets such as land, capital and livestock…And these barriers are split by gender, class, ethnicity and so on. These need to be addressed, I think, to really make migration a case of [climate] adaptation and not just survival.
Prof Jon Barnett, professor in the school of geography, earth and atmospheric sciences at the University of MelbourneIn the Pacific islands, international migration isn’t driven by climate change. It’s enabled by the capacity of people to cross borders, so it’s all about migration agreements. As climate change amplifies pressures on people’s livelihoods, we may end up with a whole series of transnational populations that are kind of constantly in churn – where they’re not just living on the island, but also in Australia, New Zealand, the US.
Dr Maria Franco Gavonel, lecturer in global social policy and international development at the University of YorkThe migration response towards almost any climate event is short lived and short distance, so it will mostly affect internal movement rather than international…So all these narratives about climate refugees – like human rights related to international migration – are overstating the extent to which this is going to happen.
Dr Benoy Peter, the executive director of the Centre for Migration and Inclusive Development in IndiaEvery one of us, including you and me, have benefited from migration. Migration is the fastest way for intergenerational upward social mobility for people from socially and economically disadvantaged populations. So I see migration as a [climate] solution.
Cecilia Keating also contributed to this spotlight. Read more of Carbon Brief’s coverage of the conference.
Watch, read, listenTICE QUESTIONED: The Bloomberg Zero podcast interviewed Richard Tice, the deputy leader of the hard-right Reform UK party, who exposed his rejection of climate science and support for the oil and gas industry.
‘CLIMATE CROSSROADS’: The Guardian examined how Colombia’s upcoming election could leave the major oil-and-gas producer at a “climate crossroads”.
LAND GRAB: A Floodlight investigation for Inside Climate News examined “Trump officials, billionaires and the quiet reshaping of America’s public lands”.
Coming up- 24 May: Cyprus elections
- 28-29 May: Blue economy and finance forum, Monaco
- 28 May: International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Investment 2026 report launch
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The post DeBriefed 22 May 2026: UN adopts landmark resolution | Trump takes on ‘RCP8.5’ | Climate migration appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Experts: Why migration is ‘not a failure of adaptation’ in a warming world
Hundreds of scientists gathered in London this week to discuss the role of migration as a way for communities to adapt to climate change.
The impacts of a warming world, such as sea level rise and worsening extremes, are pushing many people around the world to leave their homes.
As a form of climate adaptation, a decision to migrate involves an array of different factors, such as politics, conflict and economic opportunity.
The conference unpacked these topics, as well as the impacts of climate change on livelihoods, relocation and gender norms across Africa and Asia.
The event had a strong focus on urban areas, with one co-convenor stating that “half of the world’s population now lives in the cities…A lot of the battles of climate adaptation will be won and lost in cities.”
Another co-convenor told Carbon Brief that the conference’s “focus really is on the climate change adaptation community, showing that migration is not a failure of adaptation – it is part of adaptation”.
Carbon Brief attended the conference to report on the sessions and speak to world-leading experts on climate-driven migration.
- Migration as adaptation
- Cities and livelihoods
- Immobility and relocation
- Legal pathways
- Changing narratives
The two-day conference on “mobility in adaptation to climate change” was held at Wellcome’s headquarters in London. It gathered more than 100 leading experts in migration, adaptation and climate change from countries across Europe, Africa and Asia.
On day one of the conference, co-convenor Prof Neil Adger, a professor from the University of Exeter, told Carbon Brief:
“Our focus really is on the climate change adaptation community, showing that migration is not a failure of adaptation – it is part of adaptation.”
In his opening address, Adger highlighted that there were still many unknowns on climate migration – such as how and when it is an appropriate way to adapt to climate change, and who benefits and loses in these situations.
Prof Neil Adger from the University of Exeter, opening the conference. Credit: Hemant Kumar from the IIHS Media Lab.Dr Manuela Di Mauro – the head of climate-adaptation research at the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office – took to the stage next. She told attendees that mobility has always been a part of human life, stating:
“We are all migrants. We are all part of the same history.”
She urged the scientific community to “learn the language and the political perspective” needed to support and engage with policymakers about climate-driven migration.
Conference co-convenor Dr Chandni Singh from the Indian Institute for Human Settlements (IIHS) then delivered the first in-depth talk of the conference, outlining the current state of knowledge on climate change and migration.
She explained that cross-border migration is “emotionally and economically arduous” adding “under a changing climate, people choose to move within national borders first”. (Estimates suggest that around three-quarters of total global migration is internal.)
Singh emphasised that “mobility choices are extremely complex and nuanced, based on one’s aspirations and capabilities, social norms and asset bases”. She continued:
“Some [people] are forced to move or are displaced, others are relocated preemptively to move people out of harm’s way and others choose to stay despite escalating risk – or because resilience-building measures allow people to stay.”
She stressed that people need resources to migrate, so the poorest people are often unable to move – leaving them in a state of “immobility”. However, she also noted that most people do not want to leave their homes, stressing the “visceral reality of place attachment”.
Singh explained that many families “live dual lives”, in which family members work in the city to save money for a life back in their village. This dynamic of living across two locations is often referred to as “translocality”.
For example, Singh shared the story of residents from the Indian village of Kolar, who travel more than 100km to and from Bangalore for work every day, or else live there in informal settlements.
These workers send the money they earn back home, where it is often used to dig bore wells to access water. However, Singh warned that climate change and poor water management mean these wells often fail year after year, trapping people in this cycle of travelling to Bangalore to earn more money.
Singh also stressed the prevalence of rural-to-urban migration. She cited UN estimates (that do not explicitly include climate-driven migration), which find that around 2.5 billion people are expected to migrate from rural to urban areas by 2050. It adds that 90% of the change occurring in Africa and Asia.
Singh added:
“Half of the world’s population now lives in the cities…A lot of the battles of climate adaptation will be won and lost in cities.”
She noted that although migration “helps to manage risks”, it also has “significant financial, personal and social costs”.
Singh went on to discuss the global goal on adaptation – a set of 59 indicators to measure global progress on adaptation. Singh said that “migration and mobility are completely invisible…and therefore completely overlooked” in the goals.
She concluded by discussing the importance of new narratives on climate change and migration, saying:
“It’s the narratives and stories we tell of this moment that can help us first acknowledge what is happening, help subvert misinformation and untruths, and really demand accountability.”
Cities and livelihoodsMigration from villages to cities was a central theme of the conference.
On day two of the conference, Dr Aromar Revi, founding director of the IIHS, told delegates that the “root cause of the climate emergency is maldevelopment” and emphasised the importance of pursuing adaptation, mitigation and development goals together.
Dr Aromar Revi, founding director of the IIHS, addressing conference attendees. Credit: Hemant Kumar from the IIHS Media Lab.He noted that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is currently working on a special report on climate change and cities and argued that “cities will play a decisive role in shaping global climate futures”.
He continued:
“Cities concentrate opportunities, but they also concentrate poverty, inequality and risk. And that’s something that we really don’t know how to understand, especially in a changing climate.”
Throughout the conference, many of the delegates presented nuanced stories of rural-to-urban migration from individual communities. These case studies highlighted the complex, interlinking factors that drive a person’s decision to move and the wide range of outcomes.
Dr Aysha Jennath from the IIHS presented the results from her research, which unpacks the experiences of migrants who have moved from rural to urban areas, for a range of reasons including the changing climate and for better livelihoods.
Jennath and her colleagues interviewed thousands of migrants living in informal settlements, or working in informal jobs, in large cities in Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. The researchers’ questions aimed to understand the migrants’ “wellbeing, adaptive capacity and precarity”.
Overall, Jennath found that migrants in large cities are vulnerable to poor housing, unsafe working conditions and a lack of basic social services.
Dr Binaya Pasakhala and Dr Sabarnee Tuladhar from the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, presented initial results from the Climate Adaptation and Resilience (CLARE) project, in which researchers interviewed households across Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal about migration patterns.
They conducted hundreds of surveys to identify how households are adapting to the changing climate and grouped responses into a series of “pathways” describing the impacts of rural-to-urban migration on their livelihoods.
Dr Binaya Pasakhala and Dr Sabarnee Tuladhar from the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development and Halvard Buhaug Peace Research Institute Oslo answering questions in a panel discussion. Credit: Hemant Kumar from the IIHS Media Lab.For example, Tuladhar noted that in Bhutan, there is a huge emphasis on education, which has “changed the aspirations of the community – especially the youth”. This drives “huge depopulation” from rural areas as young, educated people migrate to urban areas or internationally, she said.
This mass movement into the cities provides opportunities for young people. It also provides money for the families back home – a type of finance known as remittances.
However, it also “weakened resilience” in the villages through “gungtong” – a phrase which translates literally to “empty houses”.
However, they also described the case of Nepal’s Baragon mountain community, where remittances from people who moved to urban centres has allowed communities in the villages to shift livelihoods away from subsidence farming towards commercialised farming and tourism. In this case, “migration has actually strengthened the resilience of the community”, Tuladhar said.
Prof Nitya Rao is a researcher in gender and development at the University of East Anglia (UEA), also presented research funded by CLARE.
She told the conference that when men are forced to leave for work, due to a lack of other options, a lot of their earnings go towards “survival” and less is saved. On the other hand, “mixed migration” – such as the movement of a father and son – is often “aspirational”. It typically yields higher remittances and improves adaptive capacity back home, according to Rao.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Rao argued that in order to “make migration a case of adaptation and not just survival in the short term”, destination cities need to do more to welcome migrants.
Prof Nitya Rao addressing conference attendees. Credit: Hemant Kumar from the IIHS Media Lab.Dr Maria Franco Gavonel, a lecturer at the University of York and Prof Mumuni Abu, a senior lecturer from the University of Ghana, explored the concept of “social tipping points” in migration decision-making.
They suggested that as a drought intensifies, there may be a threshold at which households decide to leave. The authors compared drought indices to immigration patterns across communities in Ghana, Mali, Kenya and Ethiopia, but did not find evidence of a social tipping point.
This could be because households anticipate severe droughts and leave before they hit, the speakers suggested. They also noted that there are many government-led policy responses to drought that could affect a household’s decision to stay or leave.
For example, Kenya has a livestock-insurance policy to help families who lose animals during drought. Similarly the African Union uses satellite data to assess the severity of droughts and provide compensation to affected households.
In the final session of the conference, Dr Kasia Paprocki, an associate professor of environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science, provided a counterpoint to the idea that the vast majority of villagers want to abandon farming and move to the city.
She argued that people are often displaced from rural communities and unable to live farming lifestyles, even if they want to, adding:
“I have found that agrarian dispossession is being intensified through development interventions that are today being referred to as climate change adaptation.”
She argued for the need to “reorganise economies” to enable people to stay “if they would like to”, adding:
“Climate change adaptation and climate migration without meaningful agrarian reform will not produce climate justice.”
Immobility and relocationMovement from rural to urban areas was not the only migration pattern discussed in the conference. Experts also discussed movement patterns including planned relocation and immobility.
The graphic below – adapted from the 2021 Groundswell report and originally published in Carbon Brief’s 2024 explainer on climate-driven migration – shows different categories of mobility and immobility due to climate change.
Different categories of human mobility and immobility due to climate change. Source: Adapted from the Groundswell report (2021).Dr Roman Hoffmann from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis’s migration and sustainable development research group opened a session on “immobility” by presenting a way of defining and measuring the phenomenon.
He told Carbon Brief that immobility is “basically the absence of movement”, adding:
“The are different types of immobility. We have voluntary and involuntary immobility – and sometimes these different forms are not so clearly distinguishable, but there’s more sort of a continuum. Basically, the question is whether people are able to realise their aspirations to move or to stay.”
In his talk, Hoffman noted that media narratives around migration often focus on large movements of people, while the topic of immobility “falls between the cracks”.
Immobility is often seen as a problem experienced by the poorest and most vulnerable members of society – for example, because people cannot find or afford the resources they need, such as food or transportation, because they are not healthy enough to move or because they do not have the social network they require to make such a big change.
However, Dr Joyce Soo from the Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies, explained that there are also instances when “wealth enables immobility”.
Soo explained that in coastal regions of Sweden that are exposed to extreme events, many residents there choose to stay, as there is “strong trust in government protection”, such as coastal defences. She explained that in this instance “immobility is linked to identity and status”.
A separate session at the conference focused on planned relocation – the organised movement of a group of people away from a site that is highly vulnerable to climate extremes.
Dr Ricardo Safra de Campos, a senior lecturer in human geography at the University of Exeter, told the delegates that planned relocation is “arguably the most controversial aspect of mobility as a response to climate change” and is usually implemented when “all other forms of in-situ adaptation have failed”.
Safra de Campos and Nihal Ranjit, a senior research associate at IIHS, worked with a team of researchers to interview people who underwent planned relocation programmes in India and Bangladesh.
They told delegates that planned relocation is often implemented when people feel unsafe – for example due to climate extremes – resulting in an “erosion of habitability”.
However, Ranjit explained “safety alone doesn’t make relocation successful”. He argued that the most important aspect of planned relocation is to ensure that migrants do not lose their livelihoods.
He presented the example of Ramayapatnam – a fishing village in India where houses were slowly being lost to coastal erosion. Ranjit explained that a planned relocation programme was set up to move people away from the coast, but that many people refused to move, as doing so would mean losing their only means of earning money.
He also noted the many Indian citizens hold a deep mistrust of the government and question the authorities’ intentions.
Relocation must be “rights-based, participatory, livelihood-centred and attentive to culture, community and long-term wellbeing”, Ranjit said.
Meanwhile, Dr Annah Pigott-McKellar, a human geographer at the Queensland University of Technology, compared two case studies of relocation in Australia.
When devastating flash floods hit Queensland in January 2011, a relocation programme led by the local government was set up to move people. The first houses were built within a year, and people were moved in “extremely fast”, Pigott-McKellar said. She explained that the goal was to keep the town together and “keep some level of social continuity”.
Conference attendees asking questions to the panel. Credit: Hemant Kumar from the IIHS Media Lab.Conversely, when northern New South Wales faced severe flooding in 2022, the response was slow, according to Pigott-McKellar. She explained that different members of the community were offered varying levels of assistance by the state. For example, some households offered buybacks for their lost properties, while others were not.
The result was a “fragmented and dispersed mobility pathway” that saw the community split up and mistrust in the government grow.
Pigott-McKellar emphasised the importance of follow-through and continuity in relocation, stating:
“Relocation isn’t a moment in time. It is a process that unfolds over months or years”.
Legal pathwaysMost human migration happens within borders. However, conference delegates also discussed cases in which people move to other countries, with a focus on the possible legal pathways.
Prof Jon Barnett, professor in the school of geography, Earth and atmospheric sciences at the University of Melbourne, explained migration patterns in the south Pacific islands.
He told delegates that climate change is causing “significant social impacts” across the islands, adding:
“While we can’t say that climate change is a major factor in migration decisions…there is a “fingerprint of climate change in [all] migration decisions.”
Barnett outlined legal migration routes for Pacific islanders, such as Fiji’s climate relocation trust fund, which has already had more than 2,000 requests, or seasonal worker schemes to New Zealand, which have already issued 137,000 visas.
However, he noted that there is a “massive burden” for the women who stay on the Pacific islands when their husbands leave. He explained that not only do women substitute for the labour of the men, but climate change can also amplify their workload by making farming more difficult and illnesses more widespread.
He concluded:
“Migration cannot be the only adaptation strategy we offer to the Pacific Islands. It’s got to be one strategy in the portfolio.”
Speaking separately to Carbon Brief, he said:
“As climate change amplifies pressures on people’s livelihoods, we may end up with a whole series of transnational populations that are kind of constantly in churn – where they’re not just living on the island, but also in Australia, New Zealand, the US.
“That’s not necessarily a bad thing, I think, so long as people still have a right to return to their islands and can do so – and are making informed choices…to manage their climate risk.”
Demographer Prof Raya Muttarak, from the University of Bologna, told delegates that Italy is the only EU country with explicit legislation for climate-related protection.
This six-month residence permit was introduced in 2018, for people who are found to have faced a “contingent and exceptional calamity”. However, she noted that there are flaws in the evidence base for making these claims, which can make it difficult for people to obtain the permits.
Changing narrativesMany speakers discussed the framing of climate change and migration in their talks. There was also a workshop on how to develop and promote “new narratives” around migration as an adaptation response to a changing climate on the first day of the conference.
Workshop on “new narratives”. Credit: Hemant Kumar from the IIHS Media Lab.Dr Reetika Subramanian, a senior research associate at UEA who helped to organise the conference, told Carbon Brief that many media narratives around migration are “alarmist” and “crisis-based”, with a focus on people from poorer countries illegally entering wealthier countries.
However, explained that the conference convenors wanted to begin work on developing a new framing for migration – both in response to climate change and more generally – focusing on its “adaptive aspects”.
Dr Benoy Peter, the executive director of the Centre for Migration and Inclusive Development, told Carbon Brief that “far right” media and politics often “leverage” migration to present a negative framing.
However, he said that he sees migration as a “solution”, describing it as the “fastest way for intergenerational upward social mobility for people from socially and economically disadvantaged populations”.
Prof Kerilyn Schewel, assistant professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, told Carbon Brief that the migration community has “moved beyond a ‘push factor’ narrative – that climate change is coming and uprooting communities – to a more nuanced perspective that recognises that people are already moving for all kinds of reasons”.
She said the new “research frontier” is “seeing how environmental factors intersect with these other social or developmental outcomes”, such as education.
Liby Johnson, the executive director of development organisation Gram Vikas, told the conference his reason for hope:
Attendees of the “mobility in adaptation to climate change” conference. Credit: Hemant Kumar from the IIHS Media Lab.“Communities are figuring this out. They are not rejecting mobility – they are asking for mobility that is safer, fairer and more dignified. Communities affected by climate uncertainty are not simply enduring crises – they are actively using mobility to diversify risk, protect dignity and build better futures.”
Revi, from the IIHS, told Carbon Brief:
“The future of mobility is much more certain than the climate futures are. People have been mobile for a very long time. That’s been an important part of the transformation of societies and economies for centuries…Mobility is part of the solution. It is not the full solution, but it’s part of the solution. People are voting with their feet and with their aspirations to make a change.”
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Guest post: How CMIP7 will shape the next wave of climate science
Hundreds of scientists in dozens of institutions are embarking on the next phase of the world’s largest coordinated climate-modelling effort.
Climate-modelling groups use supercomputers to run climate models that simulate the physics, chemistry and biology of the Earth’s atmosphere, land and oceans.
These models play a crucial role in helping scientists understand how the climate is responding as greenhouse gases build up in the atmosphere.
For four decades, the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) has guided the work of the climate-modelling community by providing a framework that allows for millions of results to be collected together and compared.
The resulting projections are used extensively in climate science and policy and underpin the landmark reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Now, the seventh phase of CMIP – CMIP7 – is underway, with more than 30 climate-modelling centres expected to contribute more than five million gigabytes of data – so much that downloading it using a fast internet connection would take two and a half years.
Here, we look at what is new for CMIP7, including its model experiments, updated emissions scenarios and “assessment fast track” process.
What is CMIP?Around the world, climate models are developed by different institutions and groups, known as modelling centres.
Each model is built differently and, therefore, produces slightly different results.
To better understand these differences, CMIP coordinates a common set of climate-model experiments.
These are simulations that use the same inputs and conditions, allowing scientists to compare the results and see where models agree or differ.
The figure below shows the countries that have either produced or published CMIP simulations.
Countries that have contributed modelling or data infrastructure for CMIP. Credit: CMIPDuring this time, scientists use new and improved models to run experiments from previous CMIP phases for consistency, as well as new experiments to investigate fresh scientific questions.
These simulations produce a trove of data, in the form of variables – such as temperature, rainfall, winds, sea ice extent and ocean currents. This information helps scientists study past, present and future climate change.
As scientific understanding and technical capabilities improve, models are refined. As a result, each CMIP phase incorporates higher spatial resolutions, larger ensembles, improved representations of key processes and more efficient model designs.
CMIP7 objectivesEach CMIP phase has an “experimental design” that outlines which climate-model experiments should be run and their technical specifications, including the time period the models should simulate.
The CMIP7 experimental design has several components.
As in CMIP6, for a modelling centre to contribute, they are asked to produce a suite of experiments that maintain continuity across past and future CMIP phases.
This suite of experiments is known as the “diagnostic, evaluation and characterisation of klima” (DECK) and is used to understand how their model “behaves” under simple, standard conditions. These experiments are designed and requested directly by CMIP’s scientific governing panel.
Alongside the DECK, CMIP also incorporates experiments developed by model intercomparison projects (MIPs) run by different research communities. For example, experiments exploring what the climate could look like under different levels of emissions or those that explore how sea ice might have changed between the last two ice-ages.
Currently, CMIP is working with 40 MIPs. These groups investigate specific scientific questions at their own pace, rather than on timelines prescribed by CMIP.
Running a large number of simulations can take modelling centres a long time. To speed up the process, CMIP7 has launched the “assessment fast track”.
This is a small subset of CMIP7 experiments, drawn from past and present community MIPs, identified through community consultation as being critical for scientific and policy assessments.
Data from the assessment fast track will be used in the reports that will together form the seventh assessment (AR7) of the IPCC.
It will also be used as an input by other groups that create climate information, including organisations involved in regional downscaling and modelling climate impacts and ice-sheet changes.
The figure below shows the different components of CMIP7. It shows how a subset of CMIP7 experiments will be delivered on an accelerated timeline, while the majority of experiments will be led by MIPs.
The different components of CMIP7. Credit: CMIP CMIP7 experimentsThere are three categories of experiments set to take place in CMIP7:
- Historical experiments, which are designed to improve scientific understanding of past climates. Model runs exploring the recent historical period also allow scientists to evaluate the performance of models by checking how well they replicate real-world observations.
- Prediction and projection experiments, which allow scientists to analyse what different climates could look like under varying levels of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as near-term (10-year) prediction experiments.
- Process understanding experiments, which are designed to better understand specific processes and isolate cause-and-effect relationships. For example, a set of experiments might change the emissions of one greenhouse gas at a time to see how much each pollutant contributes to warming or cooling the climate.
Modelling centres typically produce and publish their data for the historical and projection experiments first.
CMIP expects the first datasets to be available by this summer, with broader publication recommended by the end of the year, in time to be assessed by IPCC AR7 authors.
Drafting of the reports of AR7 is currently underway. However, countries are yet to agree on the timeline for when they will be published. This presents a challenge for the climate-modelling community, given the difficulties of working with a moving deadline.
(For more on the ongoing standoff between countries around the timing of publication of the reports, read Carbon Brief’s explainer.)
New emissions scenariosScientists use emissions scenarios to simulate the future climate according to how global energy systems and land use might change over the next century.
Crucially, these scenarios – also known as “pathways” – are not forecasts or predictions of the future.
The group tasked with designing the scenarios for CMIP phases, as well as producing the “input files” for climate models, is the “scenario model intercomparison project”, or ScenarioMIP.
In a new paper, the group has set out the new set of scenarios for CMIP7:
- High (H): Emissions grow to as high as deemed plausibly possible, consistent with a rollback of current climate policies. This scenario will result in strong warming.
- High-to-low (HL): Emissions rise as in the high scenario at first, but are cut sharply in the second half of the century to reach net-zero by 2100.
- Medium (M): Emissions consistent with current policies, frozen as of 2025, leading to a moderate level of warming.
- Medium-to-low (ML): Emissions are slowly reduced, eventually reaching net-zero emissions by the end of the century.
- Low (L): Emissions consistent with likely keeping warming below 2C and not returning to 1.5C before the end of the century.
- Very low (VL): Emissions are cut to keep temperatures “as low as plausible”, according to the paper. This scenario limits warming to close to 1.5C by the end of the century, with limited overshoot beforehand.
- Low-to-negative (LN): Emissions fall slightly slower than in the VL scenario, with temperatures just rising above 1.5C. Emissions then rapidly drop to negative to bring warming back down.
The figures below show the emissions (left) and the estimated global temperature changes (right) under the seven new scenarios for CMIP7, from the low-to-negative emissions scenario (turquoise) to a high-emissions scenario (brown).
The greenhouse gas emissions for each of the CMIP7 climate scenarios (left) and the associated estimated average temperature change from 1850-1900 (right) using the FaIR emulator. Source: Adapted from Van Vuuren et al. (2026)As a set, the ScenarioMIP scenarios “cover plausible outcomes ranging from a high level of climate change (in the case of policy failure) to low levels of climate change resulting from stringent policies”, the paper says.
Compared to the scenarios in CMIP6, the range in future emissions they cover is now narrower, the authors say:
“On the high-end of the range, the CMIP6 high emission levels (quantified by SSP5-8.5) have become implausible, based on trends in the costs of renewables, the emergence of climate policy and recent emission trends…At the low end, many CMIP6 emission trajectories have become inconsistent with observed trends during the 2020-30 period.”
Put simply, progress on climate policies and cheaper renewable technologies means that scenarios of very high emissions have now been ruled out.
However, this progress has not been sufficient to keep society on track for the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C goal. The paper notes that, “at this point of time, some overshoot of the 1.5C seems unavoidable”.
[The change to the high end of the scenarios has sparked misleading commentary in the media and on social media – even from US president Donald Trump. A Carbon Brief factcheck unpacks the debate.]
Also notable in the new scenarios is the “low-to-negative” pathway, which has the explicit feature of emissions becoming “net-negative”. In other words, through carbon dioxide removal (CDR) techniques, society reaches the point at which more carbon is being taken out of the atmosphere than is being added through greenhouse gas emissions.
Reaching net-negative emissions is fundamental to “overshoot scenarios”, where global warming passes a target and then is brought back down by large-scale CDR.
Overshoot scenarios allow scientists and policymakers to investigate the impacts of a delay to emissions reductions and better understand how the world might respond to passing a warming target. This includes the question of whether some impacts of climate change, such as ice sheet melt, are reversible.
CMIP has encouraged modelling centres to run simulations using the “high” and “very low” scenarios first to ensure downstream users of the data – including groups working on regional climate projections (CORDEX), climate impacts modelling (ISIMIP) and ice-sheet modelling (ISMIP) – have enough time to produce their data for IPCC reports.
These two scenarios were selected as they sit at opposite ends of the spectrum of climate outcomes. The high scenario will demonstrate how models behave under high emissions, while the very low scenario will demonstrate how models behave when emissions are rapidly reduced.
CMIP has recommended that modelling centres then run the “medium” and “high-to-low” scenarios. The remaining scenarios should then follow and no official recommendation has been made yet on their production order.
Other new featuresIn addition to the assessment fast track and new scenarios, CMIP7 has a number of other new developments.
Updated data for simulationsClimate models use input datasets to define the set of external drivers – or “forcings” – that have caused the global warming observed so far. These drivers include greenhouse gases, changes to incoming solar radiation and volcanic eruptions.
CMIP recommends modelling groups use the same input datasets, as this makes it easier to compare model results.
In CMIP7, the historical forcing datasets available for modelling groups to use have been improved to better represent real-world changes and extended closer to the present day. The historical simulations will be able to simulate the past climate from 1850 through to the end of 2021, whereas CMIP6 only simulated the past climate through to 2014.
CMIP is also planning to extend these historical datasets through to 2025 and maybe further throughout the course of CMIP7.
Emissions-driven simulationsCMIP7 introduces a new focus on CO2 emissions-driven simulations, providing a more realistic representation of how the climate responds to changes in emissions.
In older generations of climate models, atmospheric levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gas concentrations have been needed as an input to the model. These levels would be produced by running scenarios of CO2 emissions through separate carbon cycle models. The resulting climate-model runs were known as “concentration-driven simulations”.
However, many of the latest generation of models are now able to run in “emissions-driven mode”. This means that they receive CO2 emissions as an input and the model itself simulates the carbon cycle and the resulting levels of CO2 in the atmosphere.
This development is important, as climate policies are typically defined in terms of emissions, rather than overall atmospheric concentrations.
This new development in modelling will enable a more realistic representation of the carbon cycle and a better understanding of how it might change under different levels of warming.
Enhanced model documentation and evaluationAll CMIP7 models will be required to supply standardised model documentation that ensures consistency across model descriptions and makes it easier for end users to understand the data.
Additionally, CMIP scientists have developed a new open-access tool that dramatically speeds up the evaluation of climate models.
This “rapid evaluation framework” allows researchers to compare model outputs with real-world observations, providing immediate insight into model performance.
.shadeBg{ background: rgba(0,0,0,0.2); }Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts
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|Meeting 1.5C warming limit hinges on governments more than technology, study says
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Skeptical Science New Research for Week #21 2026
Attribution of UK Temperature Changes to Anthropogenic and Natural Factors, Amos et al., Atmospheric Science Letters
Understanding the extent to which human activities have influenced regional climate is a key scientific and policy challenge. The UK is one of the world's best observed regions climatically, with a long and reliable temperature record that makes it an important test case for regional detection and attribution. Here, for the first time, we apply optimal fingerprinting to UK mean 2-m air temperature changes using the Estimating Equations method, HadUK-Grid observations, and CMIP6 simulations. We assess the extent to which observed UK temperature changes can be explained by natural internal variability, anthropogenic forcings, and natural external forcings. We detect a significant anthropogenic influence on warming in recent decades and identify greenhouse gases as the main driver. We also detect a cooling contribution from other anthropogenic influences in the mid-twentieth century, likely dominated by sulphate aerosols. These results update earlier UK-focused work and demonstrate that human influences, both warming and cooling, are detectable even at the national scale.
Sustained deoxygenation in global flowing waters under climate warming, Guan et al., Science Advances
Dissolved oxygen (DO), as a vital material sustaining aquatic ecosystems, has declined markedly in oceans, lakes, and coastal waters, yet unbiased understandings of changing DO concentrations in each individual river segment globally remain a challenge. Here, we estimate DO concentrations in 21,439 rivers globally between 1985 and 2023, based on Landsat observations and climatic data, and examine their patterns and trends. We find sustained deoxygenation in global rivers, at a rate of −0.045 mg liter−1 decade−1, with 78.8% experiencing fluvial deoxygenation, driven mainly by oxygen solubility and temperature. Moreover, short-term heatwaves and dam impoundment exert non-neglecting influence on these changes. Future projections demonstrate that global fluvial DO concentrations decline by 1.1% ± 1.6% under SSP1–2.6 and 4.7% ± 2.7% under SSP5–8.5 throughout the 21st century. Our study provides an unbiased baseline for escalating deoxygenation in global fluvial ecosystems that underscores targeted measures to mitigate deoxygenation threats and protect ecosystem health.
Emergent constraints on future methane emissions from global wetlands, Zhang et al., Nature Geoscience
Future methane (CH4) emissions from natural wetlands are predicted to increase due to global warming, leading to positive feedback on climate change. However, the magnitude of this increase remains highly uncertain. Here we present novel ensemble simulations of seven state-of-the-art terrestrial biosphere models to estimate wetland CH4 emissions (eCH4) during the twenty-first century. Our estimates suggest that for every 1 °C increase in global land surface temperature, there is a 24 ± 10 Tg CH4 yr−1 increase in eCH4. We also identify an emergent relationship between contemporary temperature dependence and projected eCH4. When constrained by 163 site-year eddy-covariance measurements of eCH4, we show that wetland emissions can increase by 50–60% by the 2090s relative to the 2010s under a high-warming scenario. The projected decadal increase in eCH4 from the 2010–2019 baseline to the 2030s would very likely (90% probability) offset an amount equivalent in scale to 8–10% of anthropogenic eCH4 at the 2020 level, comparable to the reductions committed under the Global Methane Pledge. However, the constraint is dominated by mid- and high-latitude observations, with limited tropical coverage, and uncertainties in projected wetland inundation contribute substantially to uncertainty in eCH4. Our findings reduce the uncertainty in projected wetland methane–climate feedback and highlight its potential impacts on methane mitigation efforts to slow global warming.
Challenges and opportunities of the full phase-out of fossil fuels under the 1.5 °C goal, Mori et al., Nature Communications
The COP28 decision called for transitioning away from fossil fuels, sparking a growing interest in their full phase-out. However, energy system transformation pathways towards a phase-out of fossil fuels, which may reduce the reliance on carbon dioxide removal to meet the 1.5 °C goal, remain unclear. Here, we employ two global energy system models to explore energy system transformations and the challenges and opportunities associated with attaining a full phase-out of fossil fuels. We found that phasing out fossil fuels by 2050 would require accelerating direct and indirect electrification, involving 1.6–1.8-fold increases in power generation compared to the conventional cost-effective 1.5 °C pathways. This transition from cost-effective to fossil fuel phase-out pathways would increase energy supply investments by up to 34% over this century and require accelerated deployment of solar and wind power, as well as electrolysers. Despite opportunities including lower reliance on carbon dioxide removal and increasing probability of returning to 1.5 °C after temperature overshoot, these additional requirements imply that international society must approach the transition towards zero-fossil energy systems with strong determination.
Scientific authority cues increase the spread of misinformation, Harrando et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Misinformation continues to circulate on social media, often because people unintentionally share posts without verifying their accuracy. We show that references to scientific entities, what we call Scientific Authority Cues, play an important role in this problem. Analyzing 8.7 million posts on Twitter (X), we find that these cues are associated with an increase in sharing, especially when sharing low veracity content, and when users lean politically to the right. A preregistered experiment with U.S. adults shows that attributing claims to scientific entities increases people’s willingness to share them by making claims seem more accurate. These findings reveal an important tension: Signals of scientific authority can also make misinformation more credible and thus easier to spread.
From this week's government/NGO section:The AI Climate Hoax: Behind the Curtain of How Big Tech Greenwashes Impacts, Ketan Joshi, Beyond Fossil Fuels, Standearth, Climate Action Against Disinformation et al
The analysis collected the most prominent AI climate claims and determined a) what types of AI were referred to and b) what evidence was presented to back up those claims. The author found that 1. Most claims of climate benefit relate to ‘traditional’ AI, which has a much lower environmental impact than consumer generative AI tools. Even if these benefits are real, they are unrelated to - and dwarfed by - the massive expansion of energy use from the generative AI industry. 2. Where claims of traditional AI climate benefits are made, they tend to rely on weaker forms of evidence, such as corporate websites, rather than published academic research. Only 26% cited published academic research while 36% did not cite any evidence at all. This analysis shows that to bring the deployment of digital services in bounds with the physical limits of the planet, tech companies investing in AI should implement actual sustainability measures rather than masking ever-worsening damage to the climate and environment with vague terms and weak evidence.Survey: U.S. and Canadian Business Confidence in Climate Action Remains Strong, Melissa Fifield, BMO Climate Institute
The fourth edition of the BMO Climate Institute Business Leaders Survey was conducted in January 2026 and included 741 respondents, including 370 in Canada and 371 in the U.S. Survey respondents include individuals in a senior role at their company (e.g. C-suite, President, Vice-President, Executive Director or General Manager) and who consider themselves to be senior decision makers. Companies range from those with at least five employees to more than 500 employees. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents say they have or are developing plans to address climate-related risks, up from 69% in 2025. Extreme and unpredictable weather is a top concern for business leaders considering the impact of climate-related risks on their companies. Competitive pressure, customer expectations, and regulatory change are expected to drive further climate action. Three?fifths of respondents say AI is already used in daily operations or climate planning. Costs remain the most frequently cited obstacle to developing an effective climate plan. 101 articles in 48 journals by 751 contributing authorsPhysical science of climate change, effects
Future changes of upscale ocean kinetic energy transfer under greenhouse warming, Wang et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01429-1
Mean State Change-Induced Differential Responses Between Strong Positive and Negative Events Reduce Indian Ocean Dipole Asymmetry Under Greenhouse Warming, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045190
Transitions of the Atlantic Ocean circulation, Castellana et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-019-56435-6
Variable Sensitivity of Lake Surface Temperatures to Short- and Long-Term Atmospheric Warming, Chen et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122409
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A likely role for stratification in long-term changes of the global ocean tides, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01432-5 15 cites.
Observations of climate change, effects
2024 global temperature record is consistent with model-predicted warming, Mann et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2600021123
Attribution of Recent Change in the Stratospheric Temperature and Its Application to Future Projection, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120757
Attribution of UK Temperature Changes to Anthropogenic and Natural Factors, Amos et al., Atmospheric Science Letters Open Access 10.1002/asl2.70040
Nighttime warming amplifies the synergistic effects of snowmelt and rain on floods in arid northwestern China, ZHU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.003
Sustained deoxygenation in global flowing waters under climate warming, Guan et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aef3132
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Steady threefold Arctic amplification of externally forced warming masked by natural variability, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01441-1 79 cites.
Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
Anthropogenic radionuclides as tracers of climate change in the Pacific Ocean, Povinec et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03639-0
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
GloUTCI-M: a global monthly 1 km Universal Thermal Climate Index dataset from 2000 to 2022, Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-2407-2024 34 cites.
Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects
Diagnosis of the Contribution of Internal Climate Variability to Global Surface Temperature Projection Under Future Warming, Oh et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122593
Dual Regimes of North American Heatwaves and Their Future Change, Yeo et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100912
Extreme Climate Events in Morocco: Historical Analysis and Future Projections Based on CMIP6 Simulations, Hakam et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70433
Future Change in the Moist Wave Activity and Its Potential Impact on Local Extreme Precipitation Under a Warming Climate, Xue et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd044844
Future Changes to Rainfall Extremes Over Puerto Rico in a Convection-Permitting Model, Dougherty et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007833
Projected Evolution of Climatic Aridity in Spain: Robust Signals and Model Uncertainties, Trullenque?Blanco et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70316
Quantifying Uncertainty in the Perceived Risk of Unprecedented Rainfall, Sigid et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008121
Quantifying Very Extreme Precipitation and Temperature Using Huge Ensembles Generated by Machine Learning–Based Climate Model Emulators, Paciorek & Cooley, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0178.1
Robust intensification of projected regional precipitation extremes over Africa, Akinsanola et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73246-2
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rising risks of hydroclimatic swings: A large ensemble study of dry and wet spell transitions in North America, Global and Planetary Change, 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2024.104476 21 cites.
Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection
Attribution of Recent Change in the Stratospheric Temperature and Its Application to Future Projection, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120757
Diagnosing Error Sources in Historical CMIP5 and CMIP6 Simulations of Surface Air Temperature and Precipitation, Seo et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122096
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Why Do CO2 Quadrupling Simulations Warm More Than Twice as Much as CO2 Doubling Simulations in CMIP6?, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2023gl107320 3 cites.
Cryosphere & climate change
Antarctic ice-shelf basal melt shaped by competing feedbacks, Youngs et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01975-6
How temperature seasonality drives interglacial permafrost dynamics: implications for paleo reconstructions and future thaw trajectories, Nitzbon et al., Climate of the past Open Access 10.5194/cp-22-377-2026
Modeled Greenland Ice Sheet evolution constrained by ice-core-derived Holocene elevation histories, Lauritzen et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-19-3599-2025
Topography-albedo feedback reinforces the transition to a younger Arctic ice pack, Gluckman et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03636-3
Winter seal-based observations reveal glacial meltwater surfacing in the southeastern Amundsen Sea, Zheng et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-021-00111-z
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
CMIP6 Models Rarely Simulate Antarctic Winter Sea?Ice Anomalies as Large as Observed in 2023, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl109265 34 cites.
Sea level & climate change
Adapting to sea level rise and storms, Young et al., EGUGA mag:3022614940
Antarctic ice-shelf basal melt shaped by competing feedbacks, Youngs et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01975-6
Future changes in seasonal sea-level variability could reshape coastal ecosystems, Hermans et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02631-y
Projecting extreme sea levels for Northwest Ireland under future climate scenarios, Ahmed et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1745732
Sea-level-driven land conversion amplified by coastal agriculture, Molino et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access 10.1038/s41893-026-01835-6
Subpolar North Atlantic heat flux drives projected U.S. East Coast sea-level trend in a climate model, Wang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03632-7
Subsidence more than doubles sea-level rise today along densely populated coasts, Oelsmann et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72293-z
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Establishing flood thresholds for sea level rise impact communication, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48545-1 20 cites.
Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
Past warming climates promoted expansion of seagrasses to high latitudes, Tuya et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03647-0
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Temperature of the Deep Ocean Is a Robust Proxy for Global Mean Surface Temperature During the Cenozoic, Paleoceanography and Paleoclimatology, 10.1029/2023pa004788 16 cites.
Biology & climate change, related geochemistry
Alpine Grasslands Are Not Moving Upslope Despite Strong Warming Trends Across the Tibetan Plateau, Vanneste, Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70921
Decoding hotter-drought impacts on canopy activity and tree growth to diagnose forest die-off, Camarero et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111238
Extensive Alpine Shrubification Revealed by Systematic Resampling Across Europe, Elmendorf & Criado, Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70922
Fresh Phytoplankton Bloom Growth in the Fall and Its Control on Ocean Heating in the Pacific Arctic Region, Gaffey et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc022895
Functional Traits Mediate the Interactive Effects of Climate and Human Disturbance on Non-Native Plant Diversity, Liu & Li, Diversity and Distributions Open Access 10.1111/ddi.70180
Increased climatic seasonality promotes coupling between NDVI and tree rings in seasonally dry tropical forests, Aragão et al., Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126533
Limiting future warming reduces drought exposure for terrestrial vertebrates, He et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73229-3
Macroalgal community transformation during successive marine heatwaves in southern California kelp forests, Michaud et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03599-5
Morphological responses to climate change, Hardiman et al., Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 10.1002/qj.2258
Neotropical ants are at greater risk from global warming in savanna than in adjacent forest, Zuanon et al., Ecology Open Access 10.1002/ecy.70413
Overwinter Warming Effects of Shrub Expansion in Arctic Permafrost Region, Li et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008573
Regional dynamics drive differences in future heat stress and reveal where Hawaiian corals are most likely to persist, Feloy et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-47781-3
Spatiotemporal Distribution Patterns and Conservation Priorities of Castanopsis eyrei in China Under Climate Change, Xiang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73681
Warming erodes climate connectivity for terrestrial vertebrates, Wu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02658-1
Wind stilling shapes grassland water use efficiency by enhancing soil moisture retention, Wu et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aee4995
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global plant responses to intensified fire regimes, Global Ecology and Biogeography, 10.1111/geb.13858 51 cites.
GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry
Autogenic Shoreline Migration and Its Effect on the Storage of Carbon in Marginal Marine Successions, Silvestre et al., AGU Advances Open Access 10.1029/2025av002067
Drivers of Extreme Carbon Sources and Sinks Across Diverse Ecosystems in the Western USA, York et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70926
Emergent constraints on future methane emissions from global wetlands, Zhang et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01987-2
Global patterns of stabilized soil organic carbon and their potential implications for climate mitigation, LI et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03634-5
Greenhouse Gas Dynamics From Created Wetlands of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia (Canada), Plant et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2025jg009321
Groundwater depletion contributes to an increase in global carbon emissions, Sun et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73521-2
Increasing atmospheric dryness and storms accelerates biomass turnover in Amazonian forests, Wu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02639-4
Inorganic carbon fixation by deep prokaryotes as an unaccounted-for CO2 sink in Antarctic waters, Celussi et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03610-z
Multi-Decadal Dynamics of Wetland Methane Emissions Revealed by Knowledge-Guided Machine Learning, Zhu et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70899
Role of Earth system processes in the relationship between climate change and cumulative carbon emissions, Liddicoat et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72930-7
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biodiversity loss reduces global terrestrial carbon storage, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-47872-7 136 cites.
CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
East Asian summer rainfall changes in carbon dioxide removal scenarios simulated by nine Carbon Dioxide Removal Model Comparison Project (CDRMIP) models, DONG et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.001
More Pronounced El Niño–like Warming in Boreal Autumn and Winter under CO2 Removal Scenario, Huo et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0406.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Carbon storage through China’s planted forest expansion, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48546-0 133 cites.
Decarbonization
A multilayered framework for advancing rapid and cost-effective electric power system decarbonization, Shi et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag139
Challenges and opportunities of the full phase-out of fossil fuels under the 1.5 °C goal, Mori et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72841-7
Coal plants persist as a large barrier to the global solar energy transition, Song et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access 10.1038/s41893-026-01836-5
Decarbonizing global steel production, Wang et al., Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 10.1016/j.rser.2022.112367
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Bandgap-universal passivation enables stable perovskite solar cells with low photovoltage loss, Science, 10.1126/science.ado2302 159 cites.
Geoengineering climate
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Public engagement for inclusive and sustainable governance of climate interventions, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48510-y 66 cites.
Aerosols
Large Particle Size and Thick Coating Influence Pyrocumulonimbus Smoke Radiative Forcing and Stratospheric Warming: Insights From the 2019–2020 Australian Megafires, Chen et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119099
Climate change communications & cognition
Climate Change Communication in Pakistan: Analyzing Media Frames on Social Media Platform, Ali & Ali, Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2674235
Climate change judged more harmful for future generations than for oneself: Cross-cultural evidence from 110 countries, Milfont & Klebl, Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103079
Personal experiences matter for climate action, Wong-Parodi, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02640-x
Scientific authority cues increase the spread of misinformation, Harrando et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2535823123
Understanding and reducing the intention–behaviour gap in climate action, Fielding & Hornsey, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02630-z
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Eco-anxiety and climate-anxiety linked to indirect exposure: A scoping review of empirical research, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 10.1016/j.jenvp.2024.102326 31 cites.
Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change
Continental-Scale Evidence of Farm Management Impacts on Soil Carbon, Helfenstein et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70913
Field data challenge predictions of universal crop pest proliferation under warming, Lippey et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 10.1073/pnas.2606726123
Funding options for climate change adaptation in forestry: a five-country expert survey in Southern Africa, Nikodemus et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1820808
Global potential of fishery–photovoltaic integration for sustainable energy and climate mitigation, Ding et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03606-9
Sea-level-driven land conversion amplified by coastal agriculture, Molino et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access 10.1038/s41893-026-01835-6
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Effects of alternate wetting and drying irrigation on yield, water-saving, and emission reduction in rice fields: A global meta-analysis, Agricultural and Forest Meteorology, 10.1016/j.agrformet.2024.110075 58 cites.
Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change
Accelerated Himalayan river meandering and dynamics due to climate change, Lin et al., Science 10.1126/science.adg8401
Anthropogenic global warming increases the risk of record-breaking extreme precipitation events in low-income countries, Nguyen et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03649-y
Future Change in the Moist Wave Activity and Its Potential Impact on Local Extreme Precipitation Under a Warming Climate, Xue et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd044844
Long-Term Regional Hydroclimate Modeling for Communities and Decision-Makers across Alaska and Northwestern Canada, Newman et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-24-0131.1
More concentrated precipitation decreases terrestrial water storage, Lesk & Mankin, Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10487-7
More unpredictable river floods at the most glacierized Third Pole basin, Liu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03623-8
Nighttime warming amplifies the synergistic effects of snowmelt and rain on floods in arid northwestern China, ZHU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.003
Nighttime warming amplifies the synergistic effects of snowmelt and rain on floods in arid northwestern China, ZHU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.003
River dynamics in a warming climate, Hollingsworth et al., Canadian Journal of Forest Research 10.1139/x10-094
Robust intensification of projected regional precipitation extremes over Africa, Akinsanola et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73246-2
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Characteristics and changes of glacial lakes and outburst floods, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00554-w 102 cites.
Climate change economics
Understanding loss and damage in West African climate policies: a comparative analysis of national approaches in five countries, Okunola & Ekoh, Climate Policy Open Access 10.1080/14693062.2026.2675272
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Estimation of useful-stage energy returns on investment for fossil fuels and implications for renewable energy systems, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01518-6 111 cites.
Climate change and the circular economy
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Economic and carbon emission assessment of compostable plastics as a substitute for petrochemical plastics: a case study in Yunnan Province, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-024-05000-x 2 cites.
Climate change mitigation public policy research
Synergistic action on mitigation and adaptation pilot policies to enhance low-carbon transition of Chinese cities, Zeng, Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102942
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Systematic review and meta-analysis of ex-post evaluations on the effectiveness of carbon pricing, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48512-w 123 cites.
Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research
Adapting to sea level rise and storms, Young et al., EGUGA mag:3022614940
Applying a climate information distillation framework to support a climate resilient hydropower sector in Nepal, Oakes et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1789662
Empowering policymakers decision making through navigating IPCC AR6 insights, Tomassi et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100825
Future Changes in Power Grid Exposure to Urban Flooding Over Eastern Coastal China, Luo et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007502
Indigenous climate mobilities governance: The case of the Vaitupu-Kioa international migration route, Kitara et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104394
Urban heatscapes and environmental injustice: Structural drivers and governance pathways for equitable climate adaptation – A scoping review, Lyra et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104399
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Beyond carbon: Unveiling vulnerabilities of the transportation fuel system for climate resilience, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103585 8 cites.
Climate change impacts on human health
Accessing sexual and reproductive health services during climate change-related environmental disruptions in coastal Ghana: a privilege or human right for young women with disabilities?, Gbagbo et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1762744
Climate change and social health, Sellers et al., Environmental Health Perspectives Open Access pdf 10.1289/ehp4534
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Severe drought exposure in utero associates to children’s epigenetic age acceleration in a global climate change hot spot, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48426-7 10 cites.
Climate change & geopolitics
Water in COP processes and future climate action through the Baku water declaration, Antwi, Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100826
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Conflict mitigation as a means of climate change adaptation: Lessons for policy and development practice, Environment and Security, 10.1177/27538796241246409 7 cites.
Other
Accounting for Extremes in Modeling the Size and Likelihood of Large Fires in the United States, Asadian et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007485
Climate change exacerbates disparities of energy resilience in New York City, Xu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73247-1
Educational policies can strengthen climate coalitions, Bradley et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2533821123
Global and regional climate modes modulate armed conflict risk, Bagwell et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2532935123
Regional inequity in top-tier climate change research, Sharma et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03585-x
Revisiting ENSO Regime Shift Around 2000: A Perspective From Recharge Oscillator-Based Linear Inverse Model, Sun et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121498
“We don't have other options”: Academic air travel practices in southern Taiwan, Cheng et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104757
Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The 2024 Europe report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: unprecedented warming demands unprecedented action, The Lancet Public Health, 10.1016/s2468-2667(24)00055-0 247 cites.
Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change
The State of Renewable Energy Dashboard, Johanna Neumann and Tony Dutzik, Environment America Research & Policy Center
Wind, solar and geothermal accounted for 21.4% of national retail electricity sales in 2025, a jump from 8% in 2016. South Dakota once again led all states by producing the equivalent of 95% of its retail electricity sales from wind, solar or geothermal. More states than ever – 32 in total – now get 10% or more of their electricity from renewables. South Dakota, Iowa, Wyoming, Kansas and New Mexico were the top five states for total renewable electricity generation as a percentage of retail sales in 2025. America had 77 times as much utility-scale battery storage in 2025 as it did in 2016, with a 58% increase in 2025. There were more than 4.5 million electric vehicles on American roads at the end of 2024 – a 15-fold increase from 2016. America produced enough solar energy to power 36 million homes in 2025 – seven times as much as in 2016, largely thanks to a 28% increase in 2025.A Reliable Grid for an Electric Future (update), The National Electrical Manufacturers Association
The authors project U.S. electricity demand will rise more than 55% by 2050 – with the steepest growth concentrated in the current decade. Data centers alone are projected to account for 38% of net electricity consumption through 2037, driven by aggressive hyperscaler capital expenditure and the accelerating energy intensity of artificial intelligence workloads. Electric mobility electricity consumption is projected to grow 2,000% through 2050, and electricity’s overall share of final energy delivered is expected to grow from 18% to 28% over the same period.Climate Change Big Player at FIFA World Cup 2026, World Weather Attribution
The 2026 FIFA World Cup will be played from 11 June to 19 July 2026 across three host countries: the United States of America (USA), Canada, and Mexico, with matches spread over 16 cities and the final to be held in New York on the 19th of July. In this study we approximate wet bulb globe temperature (WBGT) using temperature and humidity – which means results apply best to a sheltered and shaded area, without the heating effect of direct sunlight or the cooling effect of wind. Guidance from the global players’ union (FIFPRO) recommends that when WBGT reaches 26°C or higher, heat strain becomes a real risk and therefore matches must include cooling breaks. At 28°C WBGT and above, FIFPRO says it is unsafe for play and postponement is advised. This contrasts with current governing body regulations for the FIFA World Cup, which only consider postponement at WBGT levels exceeding 32°C, indicating a far higher threshold for intervention under official rules. Using a statistical model applied to observations the authors say that in this year’s World Cup 26 games would be expected to take place in conditions of at least 26°C WBGT, of which 9 are in stadiums without cooling. In 1994 it was expected that 21 games occurred under these conditions, and only 6 without cooling.The Geothermal Supply Chain Is America’s to Gain — or Lose, Feshback et al., RMI
Next-generation geothermal energy shows growing promise as a source of firm, reliable power. Investment in the sector has grown a hundredfold in seven years from $22 million in 2018 to $2.2 billion in 2025; pilot projects are successfully delivering electricity; and the first phase of a large-scale commercial plant, a 500 MW project in Utah, will come online this year. A growing body of evidence suggests that the geothermal opportunity is particularly large for the United States, which holds the world’s largest technical resource and much of the expertise needed to unlock it. There is growing recognition that, at least in the United States, the sector’s long-term viability depends heavily on progress achieved through the early 2030s, technology transfer from oil and gas, and equipment standardization. These factors make understanding supply-chain readiness, both domestic and global, crucial.ELECTROTECH MONEYBALL: An Industrial Strategy for Ranking Risk and Opportunity in Energy & AI Supply Chains, Benich et al., Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy & Technology
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) dominates much of what many experts call the “electrotech stack”—the integrated set of hardware and software components central to this buildout that are transforming electricity from a physical flow into something that also can be digitally generated, stored, and directed. That dependence is not only creating a supply vulnerability, but also threatening to undermine the very security advantages that a modernized grid is supposed to deliver.Germany’s battery opportunity, Petrovich et al., Ember
A long-awaited package will determine whether Germany’s electricity backup power is secured entirely by new fossil gas power plants or whether clean flexibility solutions, such as batteries, are allowed to compete on an equal footing. Germany has a strong grid-scale battery pipeline, but the lack of an ambitious clean flexibility strategy and the preferential treatment of gas in forthcoming auctions risk slowing deployment, causing the country to forego the benefits of batteries and remain locked into gas import dependency for decades.Role of Climate Change on Infectious Diseases, Almagro-Moreno et al., American Society for Microbiology and the American Geophysical Union
Anthropogenic climate change is a fundamental threat to human health. Altered temperature and precipitation levels, sea level rise and more frequent and intense weather and climate events associated with climate change can negatively affect human health and health systems, especially with respect to infectious diseases. These changes impact the ecology, evolution, distribution and prevalence of infectious disease reservoirs, hosts, vectors and pathogens in ways that lead to the emergence of disease. Understanding and quantifying the relationship between climate change and infectious diseases are crucial for informing mitigation and adaptation strategies that strengthen public health responses. The report is based on the deliberations of experts in epidemiology, microbial ecology and evolution, infectious diseases and climate science who participated in a colloquium on Oct. 9-10, 2025, organized by the American Academy of Microbiology, the honorific leadership group and think tank within ASM, and the American Geophysical Union (AGU). These experts came from diverse disciplines and sectors to articulate opportunities to build on climate, microbial and attribution science to promote proactive public health preparedness and response. The participants highlighted the need for long-term attribution studies, proactive workforce training, development of novel diagnostics and treatments, and improved surveillance systems so that health systems are capable of rapidly responding to a changing infectious disease landscape.Impacts of Large Loads on Electricity Rates: A Primer, Lam et al., Energy Systems Integration Group and Brattle
The authors identify five key determinants that most often drive whether large load additions increase or decrease rates for existing customers. These determinants are (1) when sufficient available capacity exists, a new large customer can be served with minimal incremental capital investment; rates for existing customers fall when revenue from new large customers exceeds the incremental infrastructure cost, and rise when it does not; new large loads can increase capacity prices in tight markets, with customers without long-term price protection bearing the impact; existing customers may bear the cost of underused or stranded assets if expected large load growth does not materialize; and requirements such as take-or-pay, minimum bills, contribution-in-aid-of-construction, reservation charges, collateral, and exit fees can reduce cost shifts and stranded-cost risk.The State of Clean Energy Manufacturing in Q1 2026, Tom Taylor and Katherine Shok, Atlas Public Policy
In Q1 2026, manufacturers canceled four facilities, resulting in a loss of $1.4 billion in previously announced investment. Several facilities announced pauses in manufacturing resulting in reductions in labor demand that contributed to a loss of almost 8,100 jobs. However, across 12 states, 12 companies announced $2.5 billion in investment and 2,200 jobs tied to 21 projects. Altogether, companies announced a net $1.1 billion increase in investment and net loss of 5,900 jobs in Q1 2026. Electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers continue to face challenges. EVs have seen the greatest proportion of canceled investments at 15 percent of announced investments, followed by batteries (12 percent).A world on the edge. Priorities for a pandemic-resilient future, Global Preparedness Monitoring Board
The authors found that as infectious disease outbreaks become more frequent they are also becoming more damaging, with widening health, economic, political and social impacts, and less capacity to recover from them. This report uses the GPMB Monitoring Framework to assess how the impacts of the six new Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEICs) of the past decade have evolved and identifies the areas where they are now most acute. To rebuild trust and advance equity, the world requires independent pandemic risk monitoring, equitable access to countermeasures, and sustainable financing, enabled by sustained political attention.Full assessment. 2026 National Climate Change Risk Assessment for Aotearoa New Zealand, He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission
The authors of the assessment identify the most significant risks to Aotearoa New Zealand's economy, society, environment, and ecology. They assess the nature of the risks, their severity, and the need for coordinated actions to respond to them. This will help inform the government's next national adaptation plan, due in 2028.A Plan for American Electricity Affordability, Center for American Progress
The authors propose an American Electricity Affordability Plan to expand the supply of energy by building more capacity to generate electricity and by building better grid infrastructure to ensure the American people can afford to heat and cool their homes. This includes major reforms to break down permitting and siting barriers that obstruct or slow good decision-making, boost public and private investment, and realign incentives for utilities to build the most cost-effective projects rather than the costliest. Three new policy approaches are needed including (1) a program to expand supply by building a better, bigger power system, including reforms to accelerate permitting of new transmission and generation capacity, align utility incentives for lowering costs, and make public investments in manufacturing and construction of both clean energy and grid infrastructure; (2) a rate relief fund to provide public funding for cost-effective electricity system improvements to states that choose to freeze or lower residential electricity rates for four years, immediately taking the cost pressure off households while the better, bigger power system is built; and (3) a national AI data center fair share policy that sets standard rules for all data centers to pay their fair share of the costs of the energy and grid infrastructure they impose on the electricity system and makes sure residential consumers do not foot the bill while avoiding creating an incentive for data centers to be built off-grid.2026 Summer Reliability Assessment (Final), The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
The 2026 Summer Reliability Assessment (SRA) identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American bulk power system (BPS) for the upcoming summer season. In addition, the SRA presents peak electricity demand and supply changes and highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might affect the reliability of the BPS. As electricity demand continues to rise and the resource mix changes, the North American grid is being called on to adapt in real time. The 2026 Summer Reliability Assessment finds that record resource additions have strengthened readiness for the summer season, even as elevated risks remain in some areas.Global Status Report for Buildings and Construction 2025-2026, UNEP and the Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction, United Nations Environment Programme
The authors review the status of construction/building policies, finance, technologies and solutions to monitor alignment with the Paris Agreement goals. The authors benchmark progress through the Global Buildings Climate Tracker across emissions, building energy codes, renewable energy, green building certification, and investment in energy efficiency, covering climate resilience, housing affordability, and the 2050 Buildings Breakthrough and Déclaration de Chaillot. Despite a decade of progress, the sector remains off track, accounting for 37 per cent of global emissions and nearly 50 per cent of global material extraction, as decarbonization stalls and construction outpaces climate action.Survey: U.S. and Canadian Business Confidence in Climate Action Remains Strong, Melissa Fifield, BMO Climate Institute
The fourth edition of the BMO Climate Institute Business Leaders Survey was conducted in January 2026 and included 741 respondents, including 370 in Canada and 371 in the U.S. Survey respondents include individuals in a senior role at their company (e.g. C-suite, President, Vice-President, Executive Director or General Manager) and who consider themselves to be senior decision makers. Companies range from those with at least five employees to more than 500 employees. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents say they have or are developing plans to address climate-related risks, up from 69% in 2025. Extreme and unpredictable weather is a top concern for business leaders considering the impact of climate-related risks on their companies. Competitive pressure, customer expectations, and regulatory change are expected to drive further climate action. Three?fifths of respondents say AI is already used in daily operations or climate planning. Costs remain the most frequently cited obstacle to developing an effective climate plan.The AI Climate Hoax: Behind the Curtain of How Big Tech Greenwashes Impacts, Ketan Joshi, Beyond Fossil Fuels, Standearth, Climate Action Against Disinformation et al
The analysis collected the most prominent AI climate claims and determined a) what types of AI were referred to and b) what evidence was presented to back up those claims. The author found that 1. Most claims of climate benefit relate to ‘traditional’ AI, which has a much lower environmental impact than consumer generative AI tools. Even if these benefits are real, they are unrelated to - and dwarfed by - the massive expansion of energy use from the generative AI industry. 2. Where claims of traditional AI climate benefits are made, they tend to rely on weaker forms of evidence, such as corporate websites, rather than published academic research. Only 26% cited published academic research while 36% did not cite any evidence at all. This analysis shows that to bring the deployment of digital services in bounds with the physical limits of the planet, tech companies investing in AI should implement actual sustainability measures rather than masking ever-worsening damage to the climate and environment with vague terms and weak evidence. About New ResearchClick here for the why and how of Skeptical Science New Research.
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New coal plants hit ‘10-year’ global high in 2025 – but power output still fell
The number of new coal-fired power plants built around the world hit a “10-year high” in 2025, even as the global coal fleet generated less electricity, amid a “widening disconnect” in the sector.
That is according to the latest annual report from Global Energy Monitor (GEM), which finds that the world added nearly 100 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-power capacity in 2025, the equivalent of roughly 100 large coal plants.
It adds that 95% of the new coal plants were built in India and China.
Yet GEM says that the amount of electricity generated with coal fell by 0.6% in 2025 – with sharp drops in both China and India – as the fuel was displaced by record wind and solar output, among other factors.
The report notes that there have been previous dips in output from coal power and there could still be ups – as well as downs – in the near term.
For example, nearly 70% of the coal-fired units scheduled to retire globally in 2025 did not do so, due to postponements triggered by the 2022 energy crisis and policy shifts in the US.
However, GEM says that the underlying dynamics for coal power have now fundamentally shifted, as the cost of renewables has fallen and low usage hits coal profitability.
China and India dominate growthIn 2025, coal-capacity growth hit a 10-year high, with 97 gigawatts (GW) of new power plants being added, according to GEM.
(Capacity refers to the potential maximum power output, as measured in GW, whereas generation refers to power actually generated by the assets over a period of time, measured in gigawatt hours, GWh.)
This is the highest level since 2015 when 107GW began operating, as shown in the chart below. This makes 2025 the second-highest level of additions on record.
Coal-fired power capacity that began operation each year from 2000 to 2025, GW. Source: Global Energy Monitor.The majority of this growth came from China and India, which added 78GW and 10GW, respectively, against 9GW from all other countries.
Yet GEM points out that, even as coal capacity in China grew by 6%, the output from coal-fired power plants actually fell 1.2%. This means that each power plant would have been running less often, eroding its profitability. Similarly, capacity in India grew by 3.8%, while generation fell by 2.9%.
China and India had accounted for 87% of new coal-power capacity that came into operation in the first half of 2025. The shift up to 95% in the year as a whole highlights how increasingly just those two countries dominate the sector, GEM says.
Christine Shearer, project manager of GEM’s global coal plant tracker, said in a statement:
“In 2025, the world built more coal and used it less. Development has grown more concentrated, too – 95% of coal plant construction is now in China and India, and even they are building solar and wind fast enough to displace it.”
Both China and India saw solar and wind meet most or all of the growth in electricity demand last year.
Analysis for Carbon Brief last year showed that, in the first six months of 2025 alone, a record 212GW of solar was added in China, helping to make it the nation’s single-largest source of clean-power generation, for example.
However, the country continues to propose new coal plants. In 2025, a record 162GW of capacity was newly proposed for development or reactivated, according to GEM. This brought the overall capacity under development in the country to more than 500GW.
China’s 15th “five-year plan”, covering 2026-2030, had pledged to “promote the peaking” of coal use, while a more recent pair of policies introduced stricter controls on local governments’ coal use.
For its part, in India some 28GW of new coal capacity was newly proposed or reactivated last year, bringing the total under development to 107.3GW and under-construction capacity to 23.5GW.
The Indian government is planning to complete 85GW of new coal capacity in the next seven years, even as clean-energy expansion reaches levels that could cover all of the growth in electricity demand.
Outside of China and India, GEM says that just 32 countries have new coal plants under construction or under development, down from 38 in 2024.
Countries that have dropped plans for new coal in 2025 include South Korea, Brazil and Honduras, it says. GEM notes that the latter two mean that Latin America is now free from any new coal-power proposals.
This means that both electricity generation from coal and the construction of new coal-fired power plants are increasingly concentrated in just a few countries, as the chart below shows.
Top 10 countries for total operating coal power-plant capacity (left) and for newly added capacity (right), GW. Source: Global Energy Monitor.Indonesia’s coal fleet grew by 7% in 2025 to 61GW, with a quarter of the new capacity tied to nickel and aluminium processing, according to GEM.
Turkey – which is gearing up to host the COP31 international climate summit in November – has just one coal-plant proposal remaining, down from 70 in 2015.
The amount of new coal capacity that started to operate in south-east Asia fell for the third year in a row in 2025, according to GEM.
Countries in south Asia that rely on imported energy are increasingly looking to other technologies to protect themselves from fossil-fuel shocks, such as Pakistan, which is rapidly deploying solar, states the GEM report.
In Africa, plans for new coal capacity are concentrated in Zimbabwe and Zambia, the report shows, with the two countries accounting for two-thirds of planned development in the region.
‘Persistence of policies’While new coal plants are still being built and even more are under development, GEM notes that the global electricity system is undergoing rapid changes.
Crucially, the growth of cheap renewable energy means that new coal plants do not automatically translate into higher electricity generation from coal.
Without rising output from coal power, building new plants simply results in the coal fleet running less often, further eroding its economics relative to wind and solar power.
Indeed, GEM notes that electricity generation from coal fell globally in 2025. Moreover, a recent report by thinktank Ember found that renewable energy overtook coal in 2025 to become the world’s largest source of electricity.
GEM notes that coal generation may fluctuate in the near term, in particular due to potential increases in demand driven by higher gas prices.
It adds that gas price shocks, such as the one triggered by the Iran war, can cause temporary reversals in the longer-term shift away from coal.
According to Carbon Brief analysis, at least eight countries announced plans to either increase their coal use or review plans to transition away from coal in the first month of the Iran war. However, a much-discussed “return to coal” is expected to be limited.
GEM’s report highlights that global fossil-fuel shocks can have an impact on the phase out of coal capacity over several years.
In the EU, for example, 69% of planned retirements did not take place in 2025, due to postponements that began in the 2022-23 energy crisis triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, according to the report. Countries across the bloc chose to retain their coal capacity amid gas supply disruptions and concerns about energy security.
Yet coal-fired power generation in the bloc is now more than 40% below 2022 levels. Again, this highlights that coal capacity does not necessarily translate into electricity generation from coal, with its associated CO2 emissions.
Overall, GEM notes that “repeated exposure to fossil-fuel price volatility is as likely to accelerate the shift toward clean energy as it is to delay it”.
GEM’s Shearer says in a statement:
“The central challenge heading into 2026 is not the availability of alternatives, but the persistence of policies that treat coal as necessary even as power systems move increasingly beyond it.”
In the US, 59% of planned retirements in 2025 did not happen, according to GEM. This was due to government intervention to keep ageing coal plants online.
Five coal-power plants have been told to remain online through federal “emergency” orders, for example, even as the coal fleet continues to face declining competitiveness.
Keeping these plants online has cost hundreds of millions of dollars and helped drive an annual increase in the average US household electricity prices of 7%, according to GEM.
Despite such measures, Trump has overseen a larger fall in coal-fired power capacity than any other US president, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Meanwhile, according to new figures from the US Energy Information Administration, solar and wind both set new records for energy production in 2025.
Despite challenges with policy and wider fossil-fuel impacts, the underlying dynamic has shifted, says GEM, as “clean energy becomes more competitive and widely deployed” around the world.
It adds that this raises the prospect of “a more sustained decoupling between coal-capacity growth and generation, particularly if clean-energy deployment continues at current rates”.
Analysis: Trump has overseen larger coal decline than any other US president
Coal
|Analysis: Coal power drops in China and India for first time in 52 years after clean-energy records
China energy
|IEA: Declining coal demand in China set to outweigh Trump’s pro-coal policies
Coal
|Guest post: China and India account for 87% of new coal-power capacity so far in 2025
China energy
| jQuery(document).ready(function() { jQuery('.block-related-articles-slider-block_6bf27e867b7b6a742135442872019748 .mh').matchHeight({ byRow: false }); });The post New coal plants hit ‘10-year’ global high in 2025 – but power output still fell appeared first on Carbon Brief.
What’s a ‘super El Niño’? And other El Niño questions, answered
This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Bob Henson
The odds are in El Niño’s favor right now.
This natural weather phenomenon, part of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, or ENSO, occurs when warmer-than-average water extends throughout most of the equatorial Pacific Ocean just below the surface. That’s happening now. And powerful bursts of westerly wind have pushed immense amounts of warm water eastward, toward the Niño3.4 region where sea surface temperature, along with other atmospheric conditions, is used to assess the state of ENSO.
On May 14, in its monthly ENSO outlook, the NOAA/National Weather Service Climate Prediction Center gave an 82% chance that El Niño will be in place for the period May through July, which implies that it’ll be here within weeks.
How do experts know when El Niño has arrived?El Niño conditions are declared when the atmosphere and ocean are in sync and the Niño3.4 sea surface temperature is at least 0.5 degrees Celsius (0.9°F) warmer than the seasonal average.
But just as hurricanes can and do stray from the “cone of uncertainty” at times, it’s vital to remember that El Niño can do much the same. Preparing for the prototypical outcomes is a smart move, as long as you keep in mind that forecasting the El Niño-Southern Oscillation is more a matter of probabilities than certainties.
NOAA now uses a Relative Oceanic Niño Index, or RONI, in which the Niño3.4 value is adjusted relative to the world’s tropical oceans as a whole; the goal is to keep global warming from smudging the signal of El Niño and La Niña events themselves.
Read: A new and better way to keep tabs on El Niño and La Niña
Nearly all seasonal forecast ensembles used to predict ENSO at agencies around the world now concur that the imminent event is likely to bring Niño3.4 warming of at least 1.5°C, which would push it into the “strong” category. And some of the ensemble averages are now going well above 2°C, even for the adjusted RONI index. That would put it in the ballpark of the biggest El Niño events in the NOAA database going back to 1950.
Individual ensemble members still cover a fairly broad range, with outcomes varying from a weak event to a record-stomping one, but as shown below, they’re about as close to being unanimous on a significant El Niño as you’re likely to see. (This output is mainly using the traditional pre-RONI index, which tends to run slightly hotter on recent El Niño events.)
What’s a ‘super El Niño’ – and will we get one?Back in 2003, a group of researchers from Australia’s national science agency, CSIRO, invoked the term “super El Niño” in a Monthly Weather Review paper. They used it to describe events where the Niño3.4 departure from average was at least 3°C. The phrase has since been used more loosely around the world, especially in news articles and social media, but it’s not part of the toolbox of most professional ENSO forecasters.
“While ‘Super El Niño’ is sometimes used informally, it is not a scientific term,” said senior climatologist Felicity Gamble in a statement from Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology, which avoids the “super” moniker in its products.
The same is true of NOAA, which is going with “weak,” “moderate,” “strong,” and “very strong.” NOAA’s monthly ENSO outlooks now include month-by-month odds that a predicted El Niño event will fall into each of these four brackets. The odds of a “very strong” event peak at 37% in the November-to-January period.
Summing these categories, the odds that we will have El Niño at any strength are now greater than 90% from this summer through winter 2026-27, according to NOAA.
Figure 1. Probabilities from NOAA’s May 14 outlook that the expected El Niño event of 2026-27 will fall into various strength categories during each overlapping three-month period through December-February. El Niño events typically build in northern summer and fall, peak in the winter, and fade by spring. Unlike La Niña, El Niño rarely persists or recurs for two or more years in a row, though that occasionally happens. (Image credit: NOAA/NWS/CPC)
Jan Null of Golden Gate Weather Services, a California-based forensic meteorologist and former National Weather Service forecaster, began using “very strong” when the 2015-16 event arrived, so he’s happy to see NOAA doing the same. As Null puts it, “Everyone sees a forecast plume that looks like the liftoff of Artemis and goes crazy, and somehow early on attached the ‘super’ superlative to it.”
Does a stronger El Niño event lead to more extreme impacts?Whether it’s super, very strong, mega, whiz-bang, or something else, the approaching El Niño could certainly land in the uppermost tier of what we’ve seen in recent decades. So does that mean the impacts would be correspondingly intense?
Alas, it’s not that simple.
“A strong El Niño event doesn’t always mean stronger impacts on our weather,” the Australian climatologist Felicia Gamble said in a statement released by that nation’s Bureau of Meteorology. “Sometimes a weak El Niño can lead to significant impacts on Australia’s rainfall and temperature, while a stronger event may have less noticeable impacts.”
ENSO expert Nathaniel Johnson, a meteorologist at NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, noted in an email that a stronger El Niño event does raise the odds of the most prototypical outcomes. However, it’s not the only thing involved.
“In any given season and region, there are many large-scale patterns that help to shape our local weather,” said Johnson. “El Niño is just one of those factors, but it happens to be the most predictable on timescales of months to seasons. If the El Niño event is very strong, then it is more likely that the El Niño influence will dominate over those other, less seasonally predictable factors.”
That said, there are places where a strong El Niño event can lead to distinctly different outcomes than a weak or moderate one. In the eastern tropical Pacific, for example, surface waters – normally chilled by upwelling – are often too cool to support showers and thunderstorms even in moderately strong El Niño conditions. Beyond a certain threshold of strength, though, the normally dry eastern tropical Pacific will warm up enough to support heavy rainfall, Johnson said: “This would essentially indicate a shift of the entire tropical Pacific warm pool to the eastern Pacific, which would immediately impact regions like coastal Ecuador and Peru.”
The very name El Niño, which means the Christ child in Spanish, came from Peruvian fishers who noticed that their anchovy catches – typically some of the world’s largest – took severe hits from unusually warm water during certain years around Christmas. (Earlier this year, Peru’s anchovy fisheries called for a proactive early start to get ahead of the possible El Niño.)
The Galápagos archipelago and its distinctive food chain are also highly vulnerable to the heavy rains and warm waters of a strong El Niño event.
What might we expect with this El Niño event, and where?El Niño’s impacts occur as the global atmospheric circulation is rearranged by the massive zone of rising, warm air (often as large as the United States) that develops over the eastern tropical Pacific. These impacts can be remarkably far-flung, but they’re typically strongest across the tropics – from the Indian and Pacific Oceans to the Atlantic and into Africa – and over the midlatitudes of North and South America, the land masses closest to the Niño3.4 region.
Read: Five things you need to know about El Niño’s likely comeback
In a nutshell, El Niño tends to bring dry (and often hot) conditions in and around Southeast Asia, parts of Africa, and the Amazon and Central America, while relatively cool and wet conditions often prevail over East Africa and the southern tier of the United States. The timing of these common repercussions (called teleconnections) varies a bit. For example, North American impacts are triggered largely by interactions with the midlatitude jet stream, so they’re normally strongest toward winter, when the jet stream is more active. On a global scale, the heat transferred from ocean to atmosphere during El Niño tends to cause record-warm years in our human-warmed climate.
Figure 2. Typical El Niño influences, or teleconnections, on precipitation. (Image credit: NOAA)
In some parts of the world, the El Niño playbook is higher-confidence than elsewhere. One of those is the northern tier of the United States and much of adjacent Canada, where El Niño reliably delivers warmer-than-average winter weather. Emily Becker and Michael Tippett analyzed this connection as part of their deep dive into North American temperature responses to ENSO in a 2024 paper published in the Journal of Climate. This region sits hundreds of miles poleward from the broader-scale warming and drying that afflicts much of the tropics, but it’s part of the same web of El Niño teleconnections.
El Niño’s blunting of the usual big swings in winter temperatures across this region is noteworthy. “Not only does this warm zone experience many mild days during El Niño, but it also gets fewer cold snaps,” said Tippett (Columbia University). And while La Niña winters in the northern U.S. and Canada can be either warmer or colder than average, El Niño is more consistently on the warm side, Becker and Tippett found.
Sometimes, even a fairly dependable seasonal-scale tendency driven by El Niño can hide important smaller-scale details. The Indian monsoon tends to be drier than average during El Niño, but a 2025 analysis in Science found that amid these drier-than-usual monsoons, the occasional rainfalls that do occur seem to be turbocharged, dropping more extreme short-term rains than usual.
Likewise, hurricane activity tends to decrease in the Atlantic and ramp up in the Pacific during El Niño events. This may well pan out in 2026, based on sea surface temperatures and other ocean and atmosphere signals already showing up in seasonal models. But even in an otherwise quiet year, there could be periods of atmospheric alignment when dangerous Atlantic hurricanes still emerge.
One bright spot with El Niño is that it tends to suppress U.S. tornado activity during the winter and subsequent spring (see Figure 3 below). La Niña events sometimes but not always lead to major spring tornado outbreaks, whereas the suppressive effect of El Niño appears to be a bit more reliable. The big exception is in and around Florida: Some of the state’s worst tornado outbreaks on record outside of tropical cyclones occurred near the tail end of the powerful El Niño events of 1982-83 (on March 16-17), 1997-98 (on February 22-23), and 2015-16 (on February 23-24).
Figure 3. Seasonal tornado activity (height on the vertical axis) for each February-April from 1979 through 2023 versus the state of ENSO (La Niña on the left, El Niño on the right) based on the Relative Oceanic Niño Index. (Image credit: NOAA Climate.gov graphic, adapted from original by Kelsey Malloy, now at the University of Delaware.)
Very strong El Niño events are rare enough birds on their own, so it’s tough to assess how these events, and their impacts, will evolve as human-caused warming continues to grow.
Not that long ago, the 2023-24 El Niño event was expected to cause major global repercussions. And indeed, on the “traditional” Oceanic Niño Index, or ONI, it ended up in the “very strong” range, peaking at 2.1. However, the impacts didn’t play out as expected, especially in midlatitudes, where the connections to El Niño were unusually weak. As it happens, record heat was swaddling much of the world at the time, including tropical oceans, and that appears to have blunted the effects of El Niño.
In a 2025 Journal of Climate paper, a team led by Clara Deser, a senior scientist at the National Science Foundation National Center for Atmospheric Research, carried out a set of model experiments showing that long-term warming in the Indian and Atlantic tropical oceans, together with long-term cooling in the eastern tropical Pacific, can lead to a counteracting large-scale circulation that almost completely negates the effects of an El Niño event.
As Deser and colleagues wrote, “historical precedent may no longer be a reliable guide to ENSO teleconnections as anthropogenic warming patterns intensify.”
In a recent New York Times roundup of potential El Niño impacts, Deser said: “We are now in a different baseline climate.”
In a similar vein, Australia’s Felicity Gamble said: “The increasing warmth in our oceans, both globally and in the Australian region, mean that history is now a poorer guide for seasonal prediction.”
The 2023-24 event helped turn attention toward using the Relative Oceanic Niño Index, with the idea that RONI might work better than ONI in factoring out periods of intense tropics-wide heat (such as 2023-24) from the assessment of El Niño. Sure enough, the 2023-24 event reached the strong range in RONI, topping out at 1.5 (borderline strong) rather than landing in the more rarefied very-strong range on the traditional scale.
“The weakened impacts of the 2023-24 El Niño compared to expectations can be reconciled, at least in large part, by its substantially weaker amplitude based on RONI instead of the traditional ONI,” said NOAA’s Johnson.
If there’s a poster child for counterintuitive El Niño behavior, it’s the bizarre dryness that plagued Southern California during the winter of 2015-16, one of the strongest El Niño events on record. El Niño is often wet across much of California, but there’s ample variability, as documented by Jan Null. In a website post, Null described the 2015-16 case as the “poster child for ‘All El Niños are not the same!’ ”
Michelle L’Heureux, a physical scientist who leads the ENSO team at the NOAA/NWS Climate Prediction Center, encourages thinking of El Niño as shifting the odds of various seasonal outcomes (e.g., wetter, drier, hotter, cooler). If those odds are expressed as a bell curve, then the stronger the event, the further El Niño pushes that curve to one side.
L’Heureux points to the 2015-16 California case as a cautionary tale on how El Niño forecasts should be treated as guidance rather than a guarantee.
“This doesn’t mean a major El Niño didn’t happen or it did not have a considerable influence on the global circulation (it did). It means that, in southern California, even a very strong El Niño was not able to nudge the distribution over enough to the point where drier outcomes were impossible.”
Looking ahead, L’Heureux added: “In 2026-27, I am confident we will see at least some locations in the U.S. that will not align with the expected El Niño impact.”
Jeff Masters contributed to this post.
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