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Russia continues to present its nuclear sector as a pillar of strength—at home, abroad, and even in war. But a closer look at developments in our March Nuclear Digest tell a different story: one of political improvisation, slipping timelines, and growing constraints. 

Three cases from our latest digest—Ukraine, Turkey, and the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant II—show a strategy that is still moving forward, but increasingly under strain. 

Ukraine: Licensing reality into existence 

Nowhere is that strain more visible than at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, occupied by Russian troops since early in the invasion. Earlier this year, Russia’s nuclear regulator announced it had issued long-term licenses for two reactors at the besieged plant. On paper, Rosatom wishes to indicate progress. In practice, it’s something else entirely. 

There is no real license today that would allow these units to be put into operation—let alone operated for 10 years, writes Bellona expert Alexander Nikitin. 

Under normal conditions, reactor licenses are the final step in a long process of construction, testing, and safety validation. None of that has happened at Zaporizhzhia. The reactors remain in cold shutdown, dependent on fragile external power lines that continue to be disrupted by nearby fighting.  

So what are these licenses for? According to Nikitin, they are less about engineering than optics: “a forced step taken under pressure to legitimize Russian control over the station.”  

That effort may already be working. Subtle changes in how international organizations refer to the plant—dropping explicit mention of Ukraine—suggest that language is beginning to shift alongside reality. But the risks to the plant remain unchanged. Military activity continues near nuclear facilities, power supply remains unstable, and safety margins are thin. 

Even beyond Zaporizhzhia, the long shadow of war is growing. Repairs to the damaged confinement structure at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant—which was struck by a Russian drone—are expected to cost €500 million. But for now, those plans may be more aspirational than practical. 

“There is no real threat from these facilities today—and no resources to carry out such work during the war,” Nikitin notes. In other words: even nuclear safety is being triaged. 

Turkey: The Limits of Export Power 

If Ukraine shows how Russia uses nuclear tools politically, Turkey shows where the limits of that strategy begin. The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant—Rosatom’s flagship export project—is now years behind schedule. Its first reactor was supposed to be running by 2025, but it’s not. 

Rosatom blames sanctions. Its CEO, Alexey Likhachev, has described the project as stuck in a “sanctions meat grinder.” But the consequences go deeper than delays. 

The delays are not just technical—they have legal and economic implications, writes Bellona analyst Dmitry Gorchakov.  

Akkuyu is built under a model that leaves Rosatom carrying most of the financial risk while relying on long-term electricity purchase agreements to make the numbers work. The longer the delays, the weaker Rosatom’s bargaining position becomes. 

Turkey is clearly taking note. In March, Ankara moved forward with talks on alternative nuclear technologies, including a deal with Canada’s Candu Energy. Negotiations are also ongoing with South Korea and China. What was once expected to be Rosatom’s next big win in Turkey—the Sinop project—is no longer a given. 

As Gorchakov puts it, “Sinop is now effectively an open project, without any obligations toward Rosatom.”  

Kursk II: When Dates Don’t Line Up 

Back in Russia, the story is less about geopolitics and more about transparency. 

At the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant II, the first unit has reached full power—a milestone the industry likes to highlight. At the same time, international databases list the start of construction on Unit 3 as January 31, 2026. 

But Bellona’s analysis suggests that date may not be accurate. Evidence from regional sources and site imagery indicates the “first concrete” milestone likely occurred weeks earlier, in late December 2025. That discrepancy may seem minor. But in nuclear construction, it’s not. 

“This case shows that information about the construction of Kursk-II units is being deliberately concealed,” Gorchakov writes. 

The start of construction is one of the most closely tracked benchmarks in the nuclear industry. Moving it—even by a few weeks—can obscure delays, reshape narratives, and complicate oversight. And it raises a broader question: if even basic milestones are unclear, what else is? 

Read our full article on the strange data from Kursk II here.  

The Bigger Picture 

Taken together, these cases point to a nuclear strategy that is still active—but increasingly reactive. In Ukraine, Russia is trying to regulate its way into legitimacy. In Turkey, it is losing ground in a market it once seemed to dominate. And at home, it is struggling to maintain transparency even on its own projects. 

None of this means Rosatom is in retreat. Its global footprint remains large, and its projects continue to move forward. But the corporation’s narrative of steady expansion is becoming harder to sustain. Read this and more in the new digest.  

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Russia’s Arctic energy ambitions depend on a delicate balance: stable production, predictable shipping routes, and a logistics network that can withstand both harsh conditions and geopolitical pressure. Developments in March suggest that balance is becoming harder to maintain.

Two events highlighted in Bellona’s latest Arctic Digest—the disabling of the LNG tanker Arctic Metagas and a series of tanker detentions in European waters—underscore growing vulnerabilities in how Russia moves its Arctic oil and gas to market.

Explosion on the Arctic Metagas shadow tanker

On March 3, the LNG carrier Arctic Metagas was disabled by an explosion in the Mediterranean Sea, leaving it adrift with liquefied natural gas and heavy fuel on board. While the immediate impact was logistical, the incident also exposed a serious risk: the environmental fragility of Russia’s Arctic energy model.

A drifting LNG tanker is not just a shipping problem—it is a potential environmental emergency. Although no major spill was reported, the presence of fuel oil and LNG aboard a disabled vessel highlights what could happen if a similar incident occurred closer to Arctic waters. In such conditions, containment and cleanup operations would be far more difficult, if not impossible.

Bellona analysts have repeatedly warned that Russia lacks the capacity to respond effectively to oil spills in harsh, ice-covered environments. The Arctic Metagas incident serves as a reminder that accidents involving Arctic energy shipments are not hypothetical—they are already happening.

At the same time, the disruption triggered a chain reaction across the Northern Sea Route. Tankers rerouted away from the Mediterranean, cargo accumulated in Arctic storage, and vessels idled at sea waiting to unload.

For Bellona, this combination of logistical fragility and environmental risk is telling.

“This highlights the vulnerability of logistics for sanctioned Russian gas,” our analysts note. “Any incident involving a shadow LNG tanker can significantly slow down or halt shipments.”

But beyond logistics, the implication is broader: the expansion of Arctic LNG exports is happening in a context where both infrastructure and emergency response systems remain inadequate. In a region already under pressure from climate change, even a single accident could have outsized and long-lasting consequences.

Tanker Detentions: Pressure at Sea

At the same time, Russia’s oil exports are facing growing friction in international waters. In March, France detained the tanker Deyna, which was carrying Arctic oil from Murmansk under what authorities suspect was a falsified flag. The vessel is now under investigation, marking the second such case in recent months.

The UK has gone further, authorizing its military to inspect and detain Russian shadow fleet vessels passing through its waters, effectively raising the risks for any tanker attempting to transit key maritime chokepoints.

Bellona analysts see this as a turning point.

“There were signs of real progress toward countering the Russian shadow fleet,” we note. “If this practice becomes established and scaled up, it could significantly hinder the illegal transportation of Russian oil.”

The mechanism is simple but effective. Many of these tankers operate with questionable documentation—unclear ownership, false flags, or manipulated tracking data. Inspections and detentions introduce delays, and delays undermine the economics of Russian oil.

“Any delay disrupts deliveries, making the supplier significantly less attractive to buyers,” we point out, even when prices are low.

There is also an environmental dimension. Rather than targeting oil infrastructure directly—risking spills in fragile Arctic ecosystems—detaining vessels at sea offers a lower-risk way to constrain exports.

A System Under Strain

Taken together, the disruption of Arctic Metagas and the tightening net around shadow tankers point to a common theme: Russia’s Arctic energy model is increasingly exposed at the level of logistics.

Production continues. Icebreakers still escort vessels. Cargo still moves. But the system is becoming less predictable, less efficient, and more vulnerable to disruption—whether from a single strike in the Mediterranean or a document check in European waters.

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Kursk II is one of Rosatom’s most important nuclear construction projects within Russia. Four of the most advanced and powerful units in Rosatom’s history—VVER-TOI reactors with capacities of up to 1,250 MW each—are being built there.

But this site is also the Russian nuclear power plant closest to the border with Ukraine. Likely for this reason, Rosatom is carrying out construction under conditions of limited transparency—either not publicly disclosing key construction milestones or doing so with significant delays and inconsistencies. This has led to confusion even at the level of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

To read the rest of this article, click here.

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