Bellona.org

We welcome the publication of both documents and the associated recognition of the relevance of CCS as a component of climate action in industry. The integration of CCS is of central importance for reducing process emissions. Together with the ETS1 and the end of certificate allocation, CCS sets a standard for profound emission reductions in emission-intensive industries. CCS is just one component of many in the climate protection portfolio — measures to avoid emissions must continue to have priority.

From our perspective, four points are particularly relevant:

• To not neglect nature conservation and endanger the acceptance of CCS, the CMS must present more concrete figures on land use, contain clear rules for nature-compatible land management, and show ways to compensate for impairments. The CMS must contain clear rules for meaningful CCS applications and reflect the systemic conditions of these application scenarios, including the availability of alternatives.
• It is crucial to ensure government support for the alternatives. Otherwise, there is a risk of justified loss of trust and acceptance for CCS as an important component of comprehensive climate protection. The core of the challenges in the area of financing is the economic risk mitigation and coordination of actors along the entire CO2 value chain in the initial phase of CCS development. Concrete governance solutions for complex economic problems must be developed within the framework of the CMS.
• The “chicken and egg dilemma” necessitates starting implementation activities before other steps are conclusively clarified. The state must be financially prepared to act as a market facilitator if no private-sector solution is found for the complex organizational problems. In the storage sector, securing economic risks will also be necessary over a longer period. The CMS and KSpTG must provide clear organizational structures for effective and transparent coordination of infrastructure development. The project management envisaged in the KSpTG should be specified with regard to its scope of tasks and working methods. The goal must be to coordinate and plan the development of connected infrastructures (e.g., offshore wind parks and CO2 storage, or pipelines, (sub) cables, and conduits) together.

Read the explanation of these points in our statement (in German).

The post The role of CCS in Germany’s climate toolbox: Bellona Deutschland’s statement in the Association Hearing appeared first on Bellona.org.

The use and production of LNG in the Arctic is a particularly fraught issue due to the region’s vulnerable climate. All operations with natural gas inevitably emit methane – a short-lived greenhouse gas 80 times more intense than CO2. Because of this, expanding LNG’s use as a shipping fuel and increasing its extraction in Arctic reserves is a matter of great concern to environmentalists.

Prior to launching their invasion of Ukraine, Russian authorities actively lobbied for the use of natural gas as a “green” solution in the international arena in a bid to prolong the use of fossil fuels for as long as possible. Indeed, gas exports are the lifeblood of the current political regime. Subsequent sanctions targeting Russian natural gas exports and related industries have curbed Russia’s ambitions, but certainly has not stopped them.

The newly published working paper by Bellona gives an overview of the Russian LNG sector with a focus on the current status and future projections of LNG production and use as ship fuel in the Russian Arctic. The influence of economic sanctions on Russian LNG development plans are also analyzed in the paper.

Bellona supports an appeal urging the EU and G7 countries to ban LNG imports from Russia, as well as its transshipment through European ports for exports to other countries. Along with strengthened economic sanctions on oil, the appeal will help shrink Russia’s budget revenues, and therefore, its ability to continue its military invasion of Ukraine.

Download a PDF of the report here.

The post Bellona’s new working paper analyzes Russia’s big LNG ambitions the Arctic appeared first on Bellona.org.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.  

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of this territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, plans of industrial companies, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news.  

Our previous monthly highlights for January can be found here.  

1. Environmental issues in the Russian Arctic 

On February 1st, a bill was introduced to the State Duma proposing a ban on the operation of old worn-out oil pipelines 

The bill suggests limiting the possibility of extending operation period of old pipelines to only once. This will hinder the use of deteriorating oil pipelines and potentially incentivize investments in the depreciation funds of enterprises.  

The explanatory note to the bill notes that oil companies often operate pipelines laid in Soviet times, and the age of some of them is completely unknown. The absence of restrictions on the number of industrial safety assessments allows obtaining a positive conclusion an unlimited number of times, which, combined with corruption, leads to the degradation of pipelines and accidents. For example, according to the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, almost all ruptured oil pipelines in the region had a positive conclusion of the last assessment. 

Oil spill near Usinsk, Komi Republic, 2017. Photo: Internet magazine “7×7” / semnasem.org

Bellona сomment: This bill was introduced to the State Duma by a member of the Russian Communist Party from the Komi Republic, which underscores the scale of the oil spill problem for the region. It was developed with the involvement of the independent environmental organization Committee to Save the Pechora, which, together with Greenpeace Russia (before its closure), has been trying to promote this initiative for 8 years. 

Pipeline ruptures in Komi occur regularly, and 90% of them are associated with pipe wear. Moreover, the majority of oil spills (up to 70%) are concealed and do not appear in the reports of either Rosprirodnadzor or the media. However, this is not just a problem in Komi. According to official data for the whole of Russia, there are annually from 8 to 12 thousand accidents on oil pipelines. 

Despite the potential benefits of this initiative for the environment, there is no certainty that the bill will be adopted. According to statistics, the majority of bills introduced to the Duma by members of the Communist Party are rejected. 

Russian Geographical Society is recruiting volunteers for its new environmental organization “Arctic Volunteer” until the end of February 

The new environmental movement “Arctic Volunteer” was established in 2023 by the Russian Geographical Society (RGS) as part of the youth environmental and social project “Arctic. Big Cleanup” with the support of the Presidential Grants Fund. The description of the movement states that “it gives young Russians the opportunity for self-realization and career growth, a chance to participate in the socio-economic life of Arctic regions and solve complex and relevant problems.” 

Bellona сomment: The creation of a new environmental movement by a state structure is one of the vivid examples of the trend in recent years to replace independent environmental non-governmental organizations with associations controlled by state structures. The goal of this is to show the public, especially young people, what kind of public environmental activity is welcomed by the state (physical garbage collection or tree planting), and which is not, as well as to take control over this activity. 

At the same time, while all international independent environmental NGOs, including Bellona, Greenpeace, and WWF, have been expelled from Russia, and local environmental NGOs and movements are constantly under pressure, including closure and administrative or criminal prosecution of employees and activists, it seems like a logical step for the Russian dictatorship to organize active public to engage in activities that are safe for the state under the banner of environmental protection replacing independent initiatives and public control. 

Interview with Scientists on Russia in the Context of Climate Change 

Scientists from the Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia (PONARS) have studied the impact of climate change on Russia and Russia’s role in global efforts to combat climate change or obstruct climate action. The main findings of the study indicate that Russia is already suffering from various consequences of climate change and is poorly prepared to adapt to them. While the rest of the world is moving towards renewable energy sources, the Russian government, heavily reliant on fossil fuels, is unwilling and unprepared to phase them out, which could potentially benefit the entire Russian society, emphasize the study’s authors. 

2. Heightened Industrial Activity in the Arctic 

Development of the Pizhemskoye titanium deposit in the Komi Republic will begin in 2026 

Deputy Chairman of the Komi Government Anton Vinogradov announced that the Rustitan Group of Companies plans to launch the first stage of the Pizhemskoye titanium deposit development project in the Komi Republic in 2026. 

The deposit is one of the world’s largest in terms of titanium and quartz reserves. Titanium ore reserves are estimated at 7 billion tonnes, while quartz sands are estimated at 1 billion tonnes. The projected investments in its development for the first stage are estimated at 52 billion rubles (EUR 521.2 mln), and for the second stage – 120 billion rubles (EUR 1.2 billion). 

Bellona comment: Despite Russia being one of the world leaders in titanium production, the ore for its production was imported from other countries, until 2022 primarily from Ukraine. This legacy of production chains created back in the Soviet era did not stimulate investments in domestic mining until the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Work on the development project of the Pizhemskoye deposit has been ongoing since 2006, but only now, when due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine the supplies of Ukrainian ore have significantly decreased (although they continue through intermediaries), the project has real chances of implementation. 

In 2022, another facility, owned by Rosatom, started extraction of titanium ores in the Tomsk region, also within the framework of import substitution of titanium ores to supply the Russian titanium producer VSMPO-Avisma (which produces 90% of Russian titanium and is under US and Canadian sanctions). 

The geological features of the Pizhemskoye deposit allow for open-pit mining, which will inevitably lead to degradation of natural landscapes and pollution of surface waters. Ore processing is planned in the Ukhta region at ore dressing and chemical-metallurgical plants using chlorine and hydrochloric acid. In addition, there is a plan of construction of the Sosnogorsk – Indiga port railway, with a length of 559 km through the Komi and Nenets Autonomous Districts, using convict labor. 

Arctic LNG-2 invites companies to collaborate on the construction of a large gas power plant 

Novatek, through its subsidiary LLC “Arctic LNG-2”, invites construction companies to declare their interest in the construction of a gas power plant on the Gydan Peninsula to support the operation of the planned second and third lines of the Arctic LNG-2 gas liquefaction plant. 

Arctic LNG-2. Photo: LaNataly

Bellona comment: A large gas power plant in the Arctic zone is an additional powerful source of greenhouse gases that will contribute to climate change. However, the extent to which these plans will materialize in the face of escalating economic sanctions against the Arctic LNG-2 project remains unclear. 

Novatek tries to optimistically implement the project according to plan, although to date there are no buyers even for the LNG produced on the first line, the second line is likely to be launched with delays if buyers are found, and the construction of the third line has already been suspended. In such conditions, Novatek’s optimism seems like an attempt to convince potential buyers from Asia that the economic situation on the project is stable, although in reality, this is no longer the case. 

3. Sanctions affecting Russian industry in the Arctic regions and the international situation in the Arctic 

In February, the USA, the United Kingdom, the EU Council, Canada, Japan, and Australia imposed new sanctions in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, timed to coincide with the two-year anniversary of the war 

This time, the sanctions were mainly aimed at individuals and legal entities directly or indirectly involved in the activities of Russia’s military-industrial complex, as well as those involved in the abduction and resettlement of Ukrainian children or facilitating it. 

Additionally, the list of goods banned for export to Russia due to their potential military use has been expanded. The sanctions also affect third countries to prevent circumvention of previously imposed restrictions, particularly it concerns shadow fleet vessels and traders facilitating the trade of Russian oil to bypass price ceilings. 

United Kingdom 

On February 22, the UK added 50 companies and individuals to its sanctioned list, including Turkish, Chinese, and Belarusian entities. New targets include ammunition manufacturers, electronics production companies, as well as diamond and oil traders. Among the companies from the Arctic region the updated list includes Novatek’s “Arctic LNG-2″ project and its management, the diamond mining company “AGD Diamonds” in the Arkhangelsk region, members of Novatek’s board of directors, and the management of the diamond company Alrosa. 

USA 

The new US sanctions list, published on February 23, consists of over 500 companies and individuals, including those operating in the Murmansk Sea Trade Port: Novatek-Murmansk (a subsidiary of Novatek, involved in the construction of large-tonnage marine facilities in the Murmansk region, including parts of the Arctic LNG-2 plant), Sevmorneftegeofizika (the largest marine geophysical company in Russia, a subsidiary of Rosgeologia), “KRDV Murmansk” (a subsidiary of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, managing company of the Arctic zone and the Far East), “Arctic Marine Engineering and Geological Expeditions” (conducts engineering and geological surveys on the Arctic shelf), as well as “SUEK” (Siberian Coal Energy Company, the largest coal company in Russia). 

Furthermore, restrictions were imposed on “Almazyuvelirexport”, the state exporter of diamonds and precious metals, on the subsidiary of Rosatom “Rusatom Arctic,” established in 2023 to assist in the development of the Arctic region, and the state Corporation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic (KRVD), as well as on the Far Eastern Shipbuilding Complex “Zvezda”, which is currently building 15 tankers for transporting LNG from the Arctic LNG-2 plant. “Zvezda” has been added to the SDN list, which means the inability to use the US dollar for settlements and the risk of secondary sanctions for all counterparties. 

The Zvezda shipyard. Photo: Kremlin.ru

European Union 

On February 23, the EU adopted the 13th package of sanctions, which included 194 legal and natural persons. This time, the sanctions targeted Russian companies and their executives associated with the defense complex, representatives of judicial and regional authorities, including those who contributed to the abduction and relocation of Ukrainian children. Additionally, foreign companies assisting Russia in circumventing previously imposed sanctions were included in the sanctions list, and the list of goods banned for export to Russia was expanded. 

Canada 

Canada has added 163 companies and individuals to its sanctions list and imposed a ban on the purchase of Russian diamonds and products containing them. 

Previous sanctions affect Novatek’s Arctic LNG-2 project 

According to the Barents Observer, Novatek’s 400-meter floating storage facility on the Kola Peninsula has been idle for six months. The vessel “Saam” arrived in the Ura Bay of the Barents Sea at the end of June 2023. It was intended for Novatek’s marine transshipment complex in the Murmansk region. It was planned that ice-class gas carriers would deliver gas from plants in Yamal and Gydan to the storage facility, and regular vessels would then transport it from there to buyers around the world. Based on ship movement data, the “Saam” has been idling in a remote bay since its arrival. It appears that the vessel has not transferred any batches of liquefied natural gas during this time. 

According to Reuters, Novatek plans to open an office in China to assist in trading liquefied natural gas in Asia amid sanctions. This move was taken to find customers for LNG from the Arctic LNG-2 project in the face of US sanctions. 

The third line of the Arctic LNG-2 project, according to TotalEnergies, has been suspended 

On February 7, 2024, the head of the French company TotalEnergies, Patrick Pouyanné, announced during a teleconference dedicated to the results of 2023 that the construction of the third line of the Arctic LNG-2 project has been suspended. TotalEnergies is no longer involved in project management due to the inclusion of the project in US sanction lists. 

India is seeking alternative oil suppliers instead of Russia due to US sanctions 

According to Bloomberg, the tightening of US sanctions is affecting oil trade between India and Russia. Russia remains a key oil supplier to India, but there are signs that Indian oil refineries are seeking to increase purchases from other countries. 

Bellona comment: The EU and G7 sanctions pressure on the Russian economy continues to gradually intensify, although, for the most part, it is highly targeted at specific legal or natural persons. In a situation where international business usually utilizes endless chains of offshore firms and subsidiary structures, such tactic is not very effective, especially in the short and medium term. 

A more effective way to significantly decrease Russian government income, and therefore limit its capability to fund military operations, is by imposing bans on importing Russia’s main export products like oil, gas, and metals. Additionally, implementing secondary sanctions on companies in third countries that still purchase Russian goods can further contribute to this effort. An example of this approach could involve imposing sanctions on projects like Arctic LNG-2. 

Therefore, Bellona has joined an open letter from around 300 European, Ukrainian, and international NGOs to the EU and G7 countries calling for stricter price restrictions on Russian oil, a complete ban on LNG imports, a cessation of imports of oil products from third countries refining Russian oil, more rigorous control over shadow fleet vessels transporting Russian oil, and decisive measures to reduce fossil fuel consumption in their countries. 

Russia has extended permission for a German trader to purchase gas from Yamal LNG until 2040 

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the German Government on April 4, 2022, transferred the Gazprom Germania group of companies – a subsidiary of Gazprom – under the management of the Federal Network Agency due to the company’s opaque legal relations and its importance to the country’s gas infrastructure. In May of the same year, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, any transactions with this company were prohibited, which, after coming under the control of the German government, changed its name to Securing Energy for Europe. 

As an exception, special permission for transactions to purchase Russian LNG was valid until the end of 2024. On February 9, by the order of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, permission for LNG supplies from the Yamal LNG plant was extended until 2040. 

Bellona comment: The search for new buyers of Russian LNG cannot be called successful, and Russia has to cling to the remaining clients in Europe and play by their rules. 

On February 14, Russia suspended its annual contributions to the Arctic Council 

Russia suspended its contributions to the Arctic Council, expressing disagreement with its activities, which it believes do not align with Russian interests. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Russia plans to resume payments after the practical work, such as ecosystem preservation in the Arctic and conducting research, is restored with all council members. There is no talk of Russia leaving the Arctic Council at the moment. 

However, on February 6, the Russian Ambassador at Large for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that Russia could exit the Arctic Council if its activities “do not correspond to Russian interests”. 

Representatives from Norway, currently chairing the council, oppose Russia’s exclusion, emphasizing the importance of shared responsibility for addressing Arctic region issues. 

Flags of the members of the Arctic Council – eight states and six organizations of indigenous peoples of the north, and the flag of the Arctic Council itself. Photo: Arctic Council Secretariat / Linnea Nordström

Bellona comment: The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental organization of Arctic states founded in 1996, consisting of Russia, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Canada, the United States, Finland, and Sweden, as well as representatives of Arctic indigenous organizations. 

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Arctic Council countries refused to participate in meetings and joint projects with Russian officials. In March 2023, Russia changed its approach to cooperation in the North and removed any mention of the Arctic Council from its Arctic State Policy Foundations until 2035. 

The suspension of payments is another political step by Russian authorities to distance themselves from Western countries, similar to their withdrawal from the Council of Europe, which was also preceded by the suspension of contributions. The refusal to make payments will not significantly affect the council secretariat’s work or project activities, which are funded by other sources, except for the possibility of implementing projects directly in the Russian Arctic with Russian participants, which is not currently happening anyway. 

In this situation, it would be wise for other council members to focus on the remaining two-thirds of the Arctic territory, including both scientific research and the development of joint policies to limit pollution and factors influencing climate change. 

4. Northern Sea Route and shipping 

65% of companies operating on the Northern Sea Route have zero transparency levels of environmental information 

The Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences conducted a study which revealed that out of 31 shipping companies operating on the Northern Sea Route, only two have a sufficient level of transparency of environmental information: Atomflot and the Far Eastern Shipping Company. Both companies belong to the Rosatom State Corporation and together manage 63 vessels (7% of the total number of vessels that entered Arctic waters under the Russian flag in 2022). 

Bellona comment: In our January digest, we wrote that Russia topped the Top 10 list of countries with the largest number of vessels in the Arctic zone. According to the Arctic Council report, vessels under the Russian flag make up approximately half of the fleet operating in the Arctic. Of these, 93% belong to companies that do not publish reports on their environmental impact. 

And those two companies that do publish reports do not show detailed statistics on emissions, in particular, they do not separate data on emissions of pollutants and greenhouse gases from stationary and mobile sources. 

5. Accidents, emergencies, and violations of environmental legislation in the Russian Arctic 

In February, two local environmental accidents were covered in the media: an oil spill in the Komi Republic at the facility owned by Lukoil-Komi, which could lead to oil products entering a stream, and pollution with coal dust in Murmansk due to coal transshipment at the Murmansk Commercial Port. 

Companies of the timber industry holding “Segezha Group” were conducting continuous logging within the boundaries of planned protected natural areas in Karelia, namely “Maksimyarvi”, “Zaonezhsky”, “Kuzharvi”, “Lake Nyuk”, and “Vygozersky-2” (the last two territories are located in the Arctic zone). Representatives of the scientific community and environmental organizations noted that logging has disturbed at least 5 animal habitats and 29 sites of plant and fungal growth listed in the Red Books of Russia and Karelia. The share of the area occupied by protected natural areas in Karelia is twice as low as in neighboring regions of Northwestern Russia (5.6% compared to 11.2% in the Arkhangelsk region and 13.5% in the Murmansk region). 

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, February 2024   appeared first on Bellona.org.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for February 2024, with comments by experts of Bellona’s nuclear project Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov.

Follow the links to read the last three digests for January, December and November. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest. Download a PDF of this digest here.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for February 2024

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. Sanctions on the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
3. European Union doubled purchases of nuclear fuel from Russia in 2023
4. USA increases export of enriched uranium from Russia during discussion of new measures for its reduction
5. Plans to build new NPP in Armenia
6. Urenco continues cooperation with Russia

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. Rosatom’s mining division reports overfulfilling the plan for uranium production in 2023. But the figures raise questions
8. Disputes over legal disputes concerning Hanhikivi NPP in Finland
9. Rosatom projects abroad in brief

SEPARATE EXTENDED COMMENTARY ON A SIGNIFICANT EVENT OF THE MONTH
10. Rosatom’s “government hour” at the Russian State Duma

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for February 2024 ↑

On 6 February, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kiev. Grossi informed the president about the main goals of the upcoming mission at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, and discussed the present safety situation and potential risks.

The IAEA delegation also met with Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko, the head of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate Oleh Korikov and the head of the Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom Petro Kotin. The main topics of discussion were risks of licensed Ukrainian staff being dismissed from their positions at the ZNPP, and also the end of the operational life of nuclear fuel used in plant reactors.

The IAEA team in the western section of the turbine hall of unit 4, where the IAEA mission experts were not granted access for a lengthy period prior to Grossi’s visit. Photo: IAEA

Herman Halushchenko noted that around 400 employees with licenses to perform necessary functions had been dismissed from the plant. The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the IAEA emphasizes that refusing access to plant staff violates the third of the seven indispensable pillars of ensuring nuclear safety and security in the course of an armed conflict, which states that “the operating staff must be able to fulfill their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure”.

On the second issue, Grossi stated that the IAEA would insist that the IAEA experts carry out an assessment of the state of fuel in power units.

On 7 February, Grossi visited the ZNPP for the fourth time since the outbreak of war in Ukraine. During this visit, Grossi noted that since the five concrete principles for the protection of the plant were declared in May 2023, the facility had not been shelled. These principles, among other things, state that there should be no attack from or against the plant, and that the ZNPP should not be used as a storage or base for heavy weapons or military personnel.

But nevertheless, there are other dangers that the ZNPP faces: on eight occasions, the plant has been completely disconnected from an external power supply, and forced to use emergency diesel generators (most recently in December 2023). Also, after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023, measures had to be taken to find alternatives sources of water for cooling reactors.

Grossi also stressed the importance of the IAEA experts having access to supervise implementation of the five concrete principles and seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security, which the IAEA set out at the start of the conflict, and also being permitted to ask questions. “There were situations where there were suggestions that they look but not talk,” said Grossi.

Grossi and his team visited the turbine hall and the main control room of unit 4, which is the only one in hot shut-down state, and where the presence of experienced staff is especially important. In recent months, the IAEA experts have not had the opportunity to examine some parts of turbine halls.

Additionally, during his visit Grossi was satisfied that at present there is sufficient water for the plant’s own needs, but the measures taken will not satisfy the plant’s requirements if and when the NPP starts to produce electricity again. At present, to cool reactors in shutdown mode, water is taken from sprinkler ponds, which are supplied by 11 wells on the plant territory. Grossi also examined four new diesel steam generators, which will be used to process liquid waste. So far there is no information as to whether these generators will make it possible to put unit 4 into cold shutdown mode.

During Grossi’s visit to the plant, the General Director of Rosenergoatom Alexander Shutikov and his Deputy for Corporate Affairs Dzhumberi Tkebuchava were also present.

The meeting with the IAEA team headed by Grossi was attended by the General Director of the Rosenergoatom concern Alexander Shutikov (first on the left) and his Deputy for Corporate Affairs Dzhumberi Tkebuchava (second on the left). Photo: Zaporizhzhia NPP

Grossi was informed of a detailed plant maintenance plan (in January the IAEA mission experts at the ZNPP were informed of this), and inspected the mine barriers installed at the plant (IAEA experts also made a report about them in January).

According to Grossi’s statement, the visit confirmed the crucial role of the permanent presence of the IAEA at the plant, and that the mission’s work would continue. “Until the conflict ends without a nuclear accident with radiological consequences, we will not be able to say that our job is complete,” he said. Following his visit to Kiev and the ZNPP, Grossi planned to hold meetings in Russia. Initially, a visit in mid-February was discussed, and then rescheduled for late February. Eventually the meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin and Rosatom management took place on 6 March.

Grossi was accompanied on his visit to the plant by the 16th team of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission in Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ).

On 13 February, they visited the ZNPP training center, where they observed staff training, including operators of the main control room, undergoing additional training on simulators for other power units besides the ones they worked on. The team was informed that previously there were two types of licenses for main control room operators at the ZNPP: one type for units 1-4, and another for units 5 and 6 (the third stage of the plant). The IAEA experts were told that “authorizations” for operators would now be valid for all six reactor units.

On 14 February, the IAEA experts observed Rostekhnadzor, the Russian nuclear regulator, inspecting authorizations of the operating staff at the main control rooms of units 2, 3 and 4. They were informed that new rules had been introduced, stipulating that main control rooms of units in cold shutdown required at least three staff members, and units in hot shutdown required four. On 19 February, the IAEA experts had the opportunity to examine the regulatory authorizations of personnel in these units again. The group was informed that many of the operating staff were in the process of transitioning from the Ukrainian licenses to “authorizations” issued by Rostekhnadzor.

On 14 February, Russia reported explosions in Enerhodar after a drone strike. The IAEA experts visited the town on 15 February, where they were shown damaged buildings (plant representatives stated that there had been four drones). Two of the four sites mentioned in the reports were inspected – Enerhodar City Hall and a school garden. Traces of damages were visible, but the remains of drones were removed before their arrival, the team was informed.

At the end of the month, experts were informed that on 25 February another drone attack had taken place in Enerhodar, where the target was a roof with telecommunications equipment. The following day, the IAEA experts went to Enerhodar to examine the building, but they were only able to see it from the outside, and no signs of damages were visible at the time of the visit.

The team continues to report sounds of explosions and other signs of military activity in the area. Explosions can sometimes be heard close to the plant. Experts cannot properly determine the origin or direction of explosions, with the exception of a major explosion on 22 February, which according to ZNPP information was part of “field traning”. Separately, members of the mission were informed by ZNPP representatives that a mine had exploded outside the perimeter of the territory, without causing physical injuries or casualties.

On 28 February, an explosion was heard at some distance from the plant, followed by the sound of gunfire close to or on the site. Experts were informed that Russian troops had taken measures to “protect the plant” against drones in this area, but the ZNPP itself did not come under attack, and there were no damages or casualties. The IAEA experts requested access to the territory, but they were told that there were no damages that could be inspected, and that this territory was outside the plant’s control.

Grossi, commenting on these reports, said that reports from mission experts indicate possible military actions near the site and called on all sides to observe the five principles for protecting the plant.

At other nuclear plants in Ukraine, air raid signals are frequently heard. The staff at the Khmelnitskyi NPP has had to take shelter several times.

Yuri Chernichuk and Rafael Grossi with a map diagram of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Photo: IAEA

On 20 February, the plant lost the connection to its last back-up external power line, the 330 kV Ferrosplavana-1 line. The only external powerline, the 750 kV Dneprovska line, remains in operation, which connects the ZNPP with the united energy system of Ukraine. On 22 February, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine at the IAEA informed the agency that damage took place on territory controlled by Ukraine 12 km from the open switchyard at the ZNPP as a result of artillery fire by Russian forces, and that it was impossible to carry out repair works because of continued shelling. The power line was not restored over the course of February.

During this time, the IAEA group visited the 750 kV electrical switchyard with the only connected line, and saw spare parts for the repair of the second line, but were told that there were no plans to carry out renovation work. They also observed tests of one of the emergency diesel generators of unit 4, which is in hot shutdown mode.

At the end of February, the experts were informed that all scheduled preventative maintenance activities on safety-related equipment had been suspended until the 330 kV powerline is reconnected, except for routine testing of the safety systems, including the emergency diesel generators.

Over the course of the month, experts of the IAEA mission continued to make walkdowns of the territory and plant rooms.

Information on walkdowns described in IAEA updates and information circulars by the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation at the IAEA is given below:

28 January -2 February

Unit 1: safety systems rooms of the reactor department and the central hall.
Unit 3: turbine hall.
Six back-up diesel power plants and three shore pump stations were examined, and the SNF site.

7 February with Rafael Grossi

Sprinkler ponds.
4 diesel steam generators.
Unit 4: turbine hall, main control room.

4-9 February

Unit 2: turbine department, safety systems rooms of the reactor department, central hall, back-up diesel power facilities, unit pump station.
Special buildings 1 and 2, training demonstration center.

12-16 February

Training centre.
Unit 2: reactor hall, safety systems rooms, turbine hall, emergency diesel generators
(by the spent fuel pool cooling pump a lubricant oil leak took place, later the spill was cleaned up; a water leak was observed in another pump of the same safety system).
Experts were not given access to the western part of the turbine hall.

19-23 February

750 kV electrical switchyard (spare parts for the repair of a second of four 750 kV lines were seen, so far there are no plans to start repair works).
Units 1-6: main control rooms, safety parameters collected in units 2,3 and 4, regulatory authorizations of personnel examined.
Chemical laboratory and back-up diesel plant of unit 4 (observed tests on one emergency diesel generator).

26 February – 1 March

Hydroengineering structures, including cooling pond and sprinkler ponds, cooling towers, and the isolation gate of the discharge channel of the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant.
Experts were not given access to the isolation gate of the cooling pond (it was last examined in November 2023, they were also not given access in December 2023 and January 2024).
Two fresh fuel storage facilities.
Unit 5: safety systems rooms (routine testing of some safety system pumps was being carried out), reactor department, spent nuclear fuel pool.

Commentary by Bellona. Alexander Nikitin: «At the present stage at the ZNPP, besides events caused by military operations, we may single out three groups of problems that require special attention.

Firstly, the lack of answers to the question as to what will be done with nuclear fuel in reactors operational life of which is expiring. At present, a decision on this problem has not been made public, which means that none has been taken. The issue is complex, as the decision must be passed in coordination with the nuclear fuel manufacturer, the scientific support group and the regulatory body. None of these structures can be from Russia, as the fuel is not of Russian manufacture, so it is unclear how decisions will be coordinated and passed on this very complex issue.

Secondly, it is unclear who will carry out works in the process of the announced technical maintenance. Technical maintenance is an important part of the operation of nuclear power units, which involves much more than just “dusting off” the surface of equipment, as all systems and mechanisms must be tuned, tested and checked.

Thirdly, there are ongoing “cat and mouse” games between the ZNPP management and the IAEA inspectors, who find they are not granted access to some sections of the plant, including turbine halls. If these games continue, this may only mean one thing – there is something to hide, which draws concern from all observers.

And finally, it is important to note the high-ranking Rosatom representatives who met with and accompanied Grossi at the ZNPP. It is unclear whether this was designed to make up for Likhachev’s absence, who in two years has never visited what he calls “a site of attention and responsibility [of Rosatom]”, or whether there was a need to reach an agreement on something that would not subsequently become known to the wider public, although this is unlikely, as there are more Ukrainian agents at the ZNPP than anywhere else in the occupied territories» International nuclear events and their connection with Russia Sanctions on the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ↑

On 23 February, the USA levied sanctions against several dozen Russian companies. They mainly affected the mining and metallurgy sector and Russian LNG projects, but this is also the sixth set of sanctions against Russia that includes affiliated companies of Rosatom that support Russia’s development of the Arctic region, and also an enterprise of the Russian nuclear weapons complex:

– Rusatom Arctic – an affiliated company of Rosatom founded in December 2023 to assist Russia’s development of the Arctic region;

– Innovation Hub – performs the functions of business accelerator for Rosatom, including an investment portfolio, a project office and research and development center;

– The Alexandrov Research Institute of Technology – a key enterprise of the nuclear weapons complex, which plans, tests and supports nuclear power and sea power reactors, including for submarines.

Additionally, the SDN list was joined by Transcontainer, the country’s largest owner of containers and operator of fitting platforms (part of the Delo company group, in which Rosatom owns a 49% share package) and the Far Eastern shipping complex Zvezda, a company which builds up to 15 specialized LNG tankers designed to support export in the Arctic LNG-2 project, and also construction of the nuclear icebreaker of the 10510 Leader design.

Inclusion on the SDN list means not being able to use the dollar for settling accounts, and carries the risk of secondary sanctions for all counteragents.

New sanctions on 23 February were also announced by Canada. The list of sanctioned companies included the Russian Federal Nuclear Center – Zababakhin All-Russia Research Institute of Technical Physics (RFNC-VNIITF), which solves scientific problems connected with providing and maintaining the reliability and security of Russian nuclear weapons.

On 1 March, the Japanese government also introduced new restrictive measures for Russia. The list of companies facing economic sanctions included Atomflot, which owns the Russian fleet of nuclear icebreakers, and the United Shipbuilding corporation (which includes the Baltic Shipyard that builds nuclear icebreakers of the 22220 design).

Christophe de Margerie ice-class LNG carrier, designed for servicing the Yamal LNG project, accompanied by the icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy, 2021. Photo: Atomflot

On 23 February, the European Union introduced 13th package of restrictive measures against Russia, which did not affect the Russian nuclear industry. There are also no Rosatom companies in sanctions by the UK announced on 22 February, or by Australia, announced on 24 February.

So far global sanctions against Rosatom are not foreseen. In an interview with Reuters on 19 February, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted that Europe still strongly depends on Rosatom, which supplies about 50% of the world’s enriched uranium, and that sanctions would cause an impasse in the nuclear industry in many countries. Meanwhile, on 28 February Rosatom General Director Alexey Likhachev reported that in 2023 the foreign turnover of Rosatom came to $16.4 billion (around 1.5 trillion rubles, which was more than half of Rosatom’s revenue for the year), more than $12 billion of which was on markets of “friendly countries”. In the same speech Likhachev also mentioned that Rosatom was developing models for non-nuclear weapons and military equipment.  Some of them have already been put into mass production and are used in Ukraine. (Perhaps this means products manufactured by the consortium of Rosatom companies, most of which are included on the sanction lists of western countries).

Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov: «As we can see, sanctions still do not affect the main areas of foreign activity of Rosatom – construction of NPPs and deliveries in the nuclear fuel sphere. The main problems that affect these Rosatom projects are connected with general sanctions against Russia in financial and logistical spheres. Nevertheless, we can see that besides Rosatom structures connected with the nuclear weapons complex, sanctions are also being levied against structures connected with ship building (in particularly with icebreaker construction), and also with the Northern Sea Route.

This policy may be justified if it pursues the goal of undermining plans for the economic development of the Arctic region of Russia, which focuses on increasing production and exporting resources (non-ferrous metals, LNG, oil etc.)» European Union doubled purchases of nuclear fuel from Russia in 2023 ↑

This is shown by data from the European statistics board and the UN service for international trade Comtrade, which was analyzed by Bellona. We have already published a detailed article about this on our website.

An analysis of transborder trade operations with the customs code 840130 (irradiated fuel assemblies or fuel elements) show a more than twofold increase of import to EU countries of fresh nuclear fuel in cash terms – from 280 million Euros in 2022 to 686 million Euros in 2023. In physical terms this means an increase of deliveries from 314 tons of nuclear fuel to 573 tons.

In the EU, only five countries purchase nuclear fuel for 19 reactors of Soviet design – VVER-440 or VVER-1000. They are the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. These countries are most vulnerable and dependent on deliveries in the nuclear fuel sphere, despite the lack of sanctions and bans on these deliveries from Russia to Europe.

As we have described in our digests previously, practically all operators of NPPs in these countries signed contracts with new fuel suppliers after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. So current purchases may be connected with the need to fill storage facilities for the upcoming transitional period.

According to data, the Czech Republic more than doubled its import of fresh nuclear fuel from Russia in comparison with 2022 (from 90 to 199 tons), Slovakia almost tripled import (from 80 to 229 tons). Hungary increased purchase volumes in 2022 and maintained this level in 2023. At the same time, according to our assessments fuel supply reserves at the Dukovany NPP in the Czech Republic may now be sufficient for five years.

Bellona requested commentary from the NPPs operators of all five countries and the Euratom Supply Agency, and despite the lack of specific figures in their replies, we received confirmation that the plants are increasing supply reserves, and that in future years purchases will drop.

Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov: «From all appearances, the increase of import in 2022-2023 reflects the purchasers’ desire to receive volumes of contracted fuel earlier to ensure a reliable supply during the period of a change in suppliers, and possible difficulties with supplies if sanctions against the nuclear industry are toughened, or if there is some other worsening in relations between Russia and the EU.

Rosatom itself may also profit from the increase in uranium purchases in the USA and fuel in Europe, as besides an increase in turnover this will help it to fulfill contracts before sanctions are applied or restrictions made by certain parties. However, this does not change the fact that strategically, the nuclear fuel market in the EU for Rosatom is practically closing down, along with the market of enriched uranium in the USA.

Given the current contracts for the change in suppliers, by 2030 deliveries of nuclear fuel to EU countries from Russia may drop by at least 60% to the level of 2022 – around 70-100 tons per year. Russia may lose purchasers for 10-15 power units in the EU with a capacity of 7 to 9 GW. Currently, only Hungary has no designated plans to change its fuel supplier, and given the development of the Paks II NPP project, this country will maintain close cooperation with Rosatom in the medium term» USA increases export of enriched uranium from Russia during discussion of new measures for its reduction ↑

Boris Schucht, Chief Executive Officer of Urenco, the major western supplier of enriched uranium, has announced that the company has sufficient capacities to replace Russian supplies on the US market if the law banning imports of Russian uranium is passed in the USA. The Biden administration initially did not support a ban on Russian nuclear fuel, as US NPPs strongly depended on Russian supplies. But now the government supports a ban after two years of accumulating supplies at power stations, and multi-million investments in the delivery chain of nuclear power from western companies, including Urenco, Orano in France and Centrus in the USA.

Urenco currently plans to expand all three of its enrichment facilities in the USA, the UK and the Netherlands. Schucht noted that the portfolio of Urenco’s orders has increased to $14 billion compared with $12 billion a year ago.

Nevertheless, during discussion of the law banning the import of enriched uranium from Russia, the import of enriched uranium from Russia to the USA grew in 2023 to a record level of $1.2 billion, 40% more than the import volume for 2022. With rising prices, import also increased in physical volumes by around 20%, from 588 tons in 2022 to 702 tons in 2023.

Volume of import of enriched uranium from Russia to the USA. Infographic by Bellona based on data from the Comtrade service

Schucht also said that Urenco is holding talks with the governments of the UK and the USA on potential investments in new plants for production of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). In July last year, the UK government allocated Urenco £9.56 million for planning a plant and processes for HALEU manufacture at a site in Capenhurst in Cheshire, as part of the strategy to oust Russia from the world energy market. In January, the USA also announced a tender for the sum of $500 million from companies to provide enrichment services for producing HALEU.

HALEU is required for advanced nuclear reactors and will be used in small modular reactors (SMR). At present, the only commercial supplier of this uranium is the Rosatom-affiliated company Tenex. The lack of alternative suppliers causes problems for several US reactor projects. For example, in December 2022, TerraPower announced a delay in construction of a planned new reactor with a capacity of 345 megawatts in Wyoming, citing a lack of fuel.

Last year, Centrus launched a demonstrational enrichment cascade, and in November 2023 made the first delivery of 20 kg of HALEU to the US Department of Energy. The contract with the US government involves the production of 900 kg of HALEU in 2024, which will be stored at a storage facility built by Centrus in Piketon, Ohio. The Department of Energy is contractually required to provide storage cylinders, but in its annual report Centrus states that difficulties have arisen with deliveries of these specialized “5B Cylinders”, and the company now expects that it will be unable to deliver the planned volume of HALEU.

Until a commercial chain of HALEU deliveries is established, the US Department of Energy plans to dilute its supplies of HEU to provide a primary source of HALEU.

Urenco production site. Photo: Urenco Global Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov: «The measures taken in the West to reduce dependence on Russia in supplies of enriched uranium are not sufficient to put a swift end to cooperation with Rosatom. Even plans announced to expand facilities of European companies will at best help to reduce dependence on Russia for enrichment services by around 60% by 2030.

Plans for independent development of HALEU are even vaguer. At the same time, the market reaction is observed in the increase of purchases of still-permitted products from Russia and creating supplies, similar to what is happening on the nuclear fuel market for VVER reactors in EU countries (see above)» Plans to build new NPP in Armenia ↑

In late January 2024, Rosatom head Aleksey Likhachev reported that the corporation was holding talks with several countries on building new nuclear power units. These include discussions on a third unit in Belarus, and for another four-unit plant in Turkey. Likhachev also said that over the next one-and-a-half to two years, Armenia should also settle on a format for developing nuclear power in the future.

The resource of unit two of the Metsamor NPP currently operating in Armenia with a capacity of 430-440 MW has been extended to 2026, and work is underway for further prolongation by another 10 years. In 2021, the Armenian government discussed the fact that from 2026-2027 it would be necessary to start building a new NPP, so that when the present plant reaches the end of its service life a new plant can begin operating. Besides Russia, proposals from other countries are also being examined, the government stated.

In January 2022, Russia and Armenia signed a memorandum of cooperation for building new nuclear power units, where they expressed readiness for cooperation in building new nuclear power units of Russian design on the site of the Armenian NPP. There was also discussion of the possibility of building a small-capacity NPP of Russian design.

Later that year, in May 2022, the USA and Armenia also signed a memorandum on cooperation in the nuclear power sphere.

In June 2022, the press-service of the Armenian NPP announced that specialists from Armenia and Russia had begun to discuss the future project for a new nuclear power unit in Armenia. In particular, the option for a VVER power unit of 1000-1300 MW is under examination.

In May 2023, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reported that Armenia showed an interest in US technologies of small modular reactors. In the same month, Maria Longi, coordinator of US assistance to Europe and Eurasia at the US Department of State, announced at hearings in Congress that in a number of countries, including Armenia, the US was assessing the possibility of building small modular nuclear reactors which could lead to greater energy independence both from Russia and from China.

In June 2023, South Korea and France joined the list of potential candidates for building the NPP. In autumn, it was reported that the governmental commission in Armenia was intensively studying three options for building a new nuclear plant – a Russian plant, the feasibility study of which were submitted to Armenia in February 2023, while the feasibility studies of US and South Korean proposals were also being studied (at that time the French were still only holding negotiations). Armenia’s Deputy Minister for Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Akop Vardanyan noted that in the project proposed by Russia, the capacity of 1200 MW was a problem, as this is too high for Armenia’s small energy system. When asked whether a unit of smaller power could be ordered from Russia, for example of 600 MW, Vardanyan replied that this project would be very expensive, perhaps no cheaper than the 1200 MW unit (which Rosatom General Director Aleksey Likhachev also pointed out).

The American proposal features small modular reactors of 77 MW – 6 units of 462 MW in total, or 300 MW versions of pressurized water reactors or boiling water reactors (some of these reactors have yet to receive licenses). In South Korea there are two versions for reactors – 1000 MW and 1400 MW, and also small modular versions which are at the licensing stage.

In January 2024, in a discussion of the procedure for analysis and further steps to build the new nuclear power unit in Armenia, installing small modular reactors, and also selecting necessary technologies, Pashinyan stated that while he was not aware of all the professional details, he considered the option of modular reactors politically interesting.

On 7 February, the Armenian information and analytical center VERELQ published an interview with Igor Yushkov, leading analyst at the National Energy Security Fund and an expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. In his opinion, if Armenia decides to give its preference to the US option to build the new reactor, this will be perceived as a blow to Russian interests, and will be interpreted as a political gesture. In the Russian media space and political circles, this step will be seen as a turning point in Armenian foreign policy.

Commentary by Bellona. Alexander Nikitin: «It is highly likely that the country selected to build the new Armenian NPP will be a political decision, and at present Russia’s chances are not high.

One may only imagine how Russian interests will be protected, which Russian government experts are currently discussing. Evidently, here political pressure will be used (perhaps even with the option of attempting to cause a regime change in Armenia, which will come as no great surprise to anyone), or economic pressure (funding and perhaps the offer of a complete or partial “Build-Own-Operate” format). In the latter case, not only financial support will be offered, but the possibility of sending SNF or radioactive waste back to Russia, which for Armenia, with its earthquake-prone territory, may be a very attractive offer» Urenco continues cooperation with Russia ↑

On 13 February, the Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection of the Netherlands (ANVS) issued three permits for transportation of enriched uranium hexafluoride from Russia (Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk, trading under the brand JSC TENEX), intended for Urenco Nederland B.V. in Almelo. The permits are valid until 13 February 2027 and allow for six deliveries in the validity period. One permit is for 120 small uranium samples, one is for 24 empty uranium containers and one is for 24 containers filled with fissile enriched uranium.

Diagram for processing reprocessed uranium from the presentation by the Director of the Nuclear Fuel Division of EDF, March 2022. Source: HCTISN

This came to the attention of the Laka Center for documentation and research of nuclear energy in the Netherlands. One aspect that has sparked indignation among a number of NPOs is that in 2022 Urenco reported that several days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it took the strategic decision to annul contracts with Russian suppliers immediately. The Urenco press-secretary explained that here fulfillment of work for Électricité de France SA (EDF) was involved. The route for uranium from France passes through Russia, as it must be converted to uranium hexafluoride before Urenco can process it. According to company representatives, as there are no sanctions against deliveries of uranium from Russia, Urenco cannot back out of the existing contract.

The work here concerns the processing of French spent nuclear fuel. In 2018, Tenex and Électricité de France (EDF) signed a long-term contract valued at $1 billion for comprehensive services for conversion and enrichment of reprocessed EDF uranium, and also technical maintenance of packaging containers for this material. The term of the contract was from 2022-2032. After conversion at the plant in Seversk, part of the uranium will be sent to Urenco for enrichment. The fuel assemblies will be produced at the Framatome plant in Romans-sur-Isère.

On 5 February, unit 2 of the Cruas-Meysse NPP in southeast France was relaunched with a first full core of processed uranium fuel. The EDF aims to use reprocessed uranium (RepU) in several reactors with a capacity of 1300 MW by 2027, to reach a level of over 30% of RepU used in French nuclear reactors by 2030.

The Cruas-Meysse NPP. Photo: Etienne Baudon Commentary by Bellona, Dmitry Gorchakov: «The present situation of the continuing cooperation of Urenco and EDF with Rosatom shows the deep historical mutual dependence between major nuclear companies.

On the one hand, this shows that for the nuclear sector as a whole, ending this cooperation is unprofitable and may lead to serious losses. Establishing new delivery chains may require time and investments, and a drastic unilateral annulment of contracts may lead to lawsuits. So without political will and pressure from civil society in western countries, these ties will not end of their own accord or be reduced.

On the other hand, all of this shows the importance of transparent and open relations in the nuclear sector, including in western countries» Events in the Russian nuclear industry and in Rosatom projects abroad Rosatom’s mining division reports on overfulfilling the plan for uranium production in 2023. But the figures raise questions ↑

On 19 January, in preparing Rosatom’s public report for 2023, the Executive Director of Atomredmetzoloto Viktor Svyatetsky reported that in 2023, Rosatom’s Mining Division had fulfilled the plan for uranium production by 103%, exceeding the division’s planned figure by 90 tons.

According to these figures, the production plan came to 3000 tons, and the total volume of production in 2023 came to 3090 tons, which exceeds production for the previous year by almost 600 tons.

At the same time, in recent years uranium production in Russia by Atomredmetzoloto has been dropping steadily. The company’s 2022 annual report states that production in the previous year came to 2508 tons, which is 127 tons lower than production for 2021 and 338 tons lower than production for 2020.

According to Svyatetsky, these high figures were achieved thanks to investments in production and use of new technologies. One example is the Priargunsky Mining and Chemical Production Association, where despite a decrease in uranium content in ore mined in existing fields, there was an increase in the volumes of processing low-grade ores by the heap leaching method.

Historical figures for uranium production in Russia (blue) and data for 2023 (yellow), based on the figures published by Atomredmetzoloto. Infographic by Bellona Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov: «According to the figures announced by the management of Atomredmetzoloto on overfulfilling the plan for uranium production, production in 2023 came to over 3000 tons, which considerably exceeds the level of production in recent years. No significant expansions of productions or even plans for this expansion were observed over the previous year. Otherwise, at the press conference it would have been more logical to announce a more impressive figure on exceeding production by almost 600 tons compared to last year, than merely overfulfilling the plan by 90 tons. So it is unlikely that the figures given correspond to reality.

The practice of concealing real figures with tall tales of overfulfilled plans when annual figures actually drop is becoming typical for Rosatom’s affiliated structures. We have already observed the same phenomenon this year, concerning electricity generation at Russian NPPs. The real generation indicators in 2023 dropped compared to 2022, but Rosatom has not yet announced them, and instead states that the plan has been overfulfilled.

The main volume of uranium production by Rosatom’s affiliated companies comes from outside Russia – from Kazakhstan, through the joint enterprises Uranium One (an affiliated company of Rosatom) and NAK Kazatomprom. Rosatom’s uranium production in Kazakhstan is approximately double the amount of uranium production within Russia» Priargunsky Mining and Chemical Production Association, Krasnokamensk, Zabaykalsky Krai. Photo: Rosatom Disputes over legal disputes concerning Hanhikivi NPP in Finland ↑

On 26 February, Rosatom head Aleksey Likhachev announced that after the first stage of hearings at a Court of Arbitration in Paris, the actions taken by Finland in the project of the Hanhikivi NPP were ruled to be unfounded and politically motivated. According to Likhachev said, subsequent legal proceedings will specify the material damages involved.

The following day, the General Director of Fennovoima Matti Suurnäkki reported that Fennovoima was not involved in any arbitration proceedings in Paris. He said that the dispute between Fennovoima and Rosatom would be examined at the arbitration court of the International Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm, that the procedure was in the initial stage, and no decisions on this issue had yet been passed.

Fennovoima annulled the contract for construction of the Hanikivi-1 NPP with Rosatom in April 2022, two months after Russia invaded Ukraine. However, Fennovoima states that the contract was annulled not because of the war but owing to Rosatom’s own problems and a number of delays in the project (the contract for building and supplying the NPP was signed in 2013). Rosatom believes that this was just a pretext, and that the true reason was political.

The construction site of the Hanhikivi NPP, February 2022. Photo: Fennovoima

Subsequently, both Fennovoima and Rosatom initiated legal proceedings against one another. In August 2022, Fennovoiuma demanded that Rosatom pay a debt of almost 2 billion Euros. Rosatom filed lawsuits for a total sum amounting to around 3 billion Euros.

In December 2022, Rosatom announced that the Dispute Review Board (DRB) had confirmed the illegality of Fennovoima’s actions on annulling the contract, and stated that Rosatom had the right to demand compensation for losses incurred.

Fennovoima had a completely opposite interpretation of the DRB’s ruling, saying that the board had found that Fennovoima essentially had the right to annul the contract, given the delays in the project, but that the board could not take a position on whether Fennovoima or Rosatom were to blame for these delays. Fennovoima believes that the DRB even supported Fennovoima’s demands for compensation on many points.

Commentary by Bellona. Alexander Nikitin: «After all of the military operations in which Rosatom has played an active part, no European courts, let alone boards and chambers of commerce, will take the side of a corporation that collaborates with an aggressor whose policies have done enormous damage to companies and entire countries. Therefore, the legal proceedings that Likhachev mentions may continue, but the result here seems predictable – Rosatom will receive nothing in compensation» Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

On 8 February, Akkuyu Nuclear reported that in the reactor compartment of unit 1 of the Akkuyu NPP, a “clean area” had been organized – a workspace to carry out controlled assembly of a reactor (installation of equipment components into the design position, loading a dummy core before switching between cold and hot shutdown modes of the reactor plant).

Several days later, on 12 February, Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev and Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar held a working meeting (details of the meeting are not reported) and visited the NPP construction site. Before Likhachev’s visit, a stator generator was installed in the turbine hall of unit 1 – the heaviest piece of equipment in the unit. The stator, like most of the main turbine equipment of all units of the Akkuyu NPP, was manufactured in France.

On 28 February, at a speech in the State Duma, commenting on Rosatom’s projects abroad, Likhachev stated that Turkish president Recep Erdoğan had publicly announced that a political decision had been made to allocate another site to Rosatom, in all likelihood the Sinop site.

“Talks are now underway in the format of Rosatom and the Turkish Energy Ministry, and the technical appearance, control system and economic parameters of the project are under discussion. In Rosatom’s understanding, it will be possible to build a plant at the Sinop site similar to the Akkuyu plant, with the same kind of reactors. So far, issues for managing the financing of the project have not yet been decided. The Turkish government is generally satisfied with the construction process of the Akkuyu NPP, which gives prospects for expanding cooperation in this sphere,” Likhachev said.

An unnamed representative of the Turkish Energy Ministry, commenting on Likhachev’s statements to the TASS news agency, said: “At the present stage we cannot provide any specific information. Yes, talks on this matter are continuing, they have not been completed. This is a long process, and it has been going on for some time. There is still no information about any final decisions.”

At the Energy and Climate Forum held on 7 March in Istanbul, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said: “As far as construction of the second NPP in Sinop is concerned, there are two interested countries. They are Russia and South Korea. And of course, for Sinop we are paying attention to Russia and Rosatom. We already have serious work experience at the Akkuyu NPP site, so we wish to apply it to the Sinop site as well. Our talks are continuing with both parties.”

On 7-8 February, Likhachev also visited the Kudankulam NPP in India, and in a meeting with the Head of the Indian Department for Atomic Energy Ajit Kumar Mohanty, discussed options and resources for accelerating the ongoing construction of units 3-6. Both delegations also discussed strengthening ties in other spheres of civil nuclear cooperation. On 8 February 2024, Mohanty and Likhachev signed an addendum to the intergovernmental agreement of 2008. In December last year, the Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov signed three agreements at a meeting in Moscow concerning Kudankulam. However, their content has not been made public.

Aleksey Likhachev at the Akkuyu NPP on 12 February. Photo: Rosatom Commentary by Bellona. Alexander Nikitin: «Turkey and India remain “quiet”, but not completely faithful (like Belarus for example) allies of Russia, as they are very strongly connected with the West economically and politically. On the other hand, the considerably successful construction in these countries of Rosatom’s first NPPs increase the probability of new agreements being signed. In all likelihood, the situation will once more depend largely on the domestic policy of these countries, and geopolitics in general.

Turkey’s economy is not in the best position, so it needs economically attractive projects, like the construction of the Akkuyu NPP. At the same time, Erdoğan is in his last presidential term and is now trying to observe a balance in relations between the West and Russia, i.e. to find and take advantages for himself from both sides (for example the case of Sweden’s acceptance into NATO).

Putin is far more dependent on Erdoğan than Erdoğan is on Putin, as Azerbaijan is an unconditional ally of Turkey, and Syria and the Kurds are no friends of Erdoğan. So the Bosphorus may be closed off at any time, turning the Black Sea and Azov Seas into big lakes for Russia, and Likhachev’s dreams may be dashed overnight.

There is no such political and geographic interconnection with India, but there is also no absolute certainty, as India has its own relationship with the West and its own elections approaching. In other words, not everything is so simple and straightforward in Rosatom’s plans in Turkey and India, so we will continue to monitor and comment on the situation surrounding these projects» Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov: «With the increasing number of visits by high-ranking Russian officials to India recently and constant reports of new agreements signed, but without the details been made public, one gets the impression that one or both sides are not very happy with the progress of the ongoing construction of the NPP of Russian design in India.

Objectively, this may be shown by the constant delays in construction, which we keep track of in our digests. So the frequency of these talks which do not lead to announcements on expanding cooperation or opening new construction sites may show that they are going through a difficult stage.

It is telling that in his recent speech at the “governmental hour” at the State Duma (see below), Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev slightly embellished both the prospects of transferring the Sinop NPP in Turkey to Rosatom, and the course of court proceedings concerning the Hanhikivi NPP in Finland. The official representatives of these countries commented on both situations in a more moderate tone, which may even cast doubt on Likhachev’s interpretation of events. Thus, it is clear that in his public statements, especially within the country, Likhachev tries to portray things in the most positive light for himself and Rosatom, sometimes misleading the public» Separate extended commentary on a significant event of the month Rosatom’s “government hour” at the Russian State Duma ↑

On 28 February, a “government hour” was held at the Russian State Duma with Rosatom General Director Alexey Likhachev and a number of his deputies. Bellona provides a brief survey of this event in the form of an extended commentary by the Head of Bellona’s Nuclear Project Alexander Nikitin:

«Rosatom was the first Russian state corporation to be invited to a meeting as part of the “government hour” by the Russian State Duma since its election in September 2021. It is notable that although by law (No. 317 FZ of 01.12.2007) the state corporation Rosatom is not a structure of the Russian government and its head is not a member of government, and State Duma regulations (article 41) state that only the Chairman of the government and members of government are invited to the “government hour” to answer questions from deputies.

Thus, the exception that the Duma made on 28 February 2024 by inviting Rosatom may mean that the corporation’s status has now risen to at least the level of a ministry or even higher, given how close Rosatom is to the Russian president and his administration.

Judging from the atmosphere at the meeting, each of the parties had their own agendas to follow at the event. Rosatom is not just about energy, it is also about nuclear weapons, so deputies on the same “wavelength” as Putin, who has recently speculated on the possibility of using nuclear weapons, were unsparing in their flattery, praise, encouragement and promises of all kinds of assistance to the department that manufactures nuclear bombs.

Rosatom, in its turn, is interested in an increase in budget financing to build new NPPs and to strengthen its business which is inexorably expanding within the country, and according to Likhachev now numbers over 460 companies working in 100 different fields. As was made clear, Rosatom today on the one hand is the main distributor of budget funds for many state programs, and on the other is a multifaceted business holding, holding assets in many different sectors of the economy.

Rosatom is a participant and user of funds in many federal and state programs. According to the Head of the Auditing Chamber, 70% of all budget funds are spent and managed by Rosatom as part of the state program “Development of the nuclear energy and industry complex”. This program completely finances the construction of nuclear icebreakers and creation of infrastructure for treating waste of hazard classes 1 and 2 (non-radioactive). The program “Scientific and technological development” accounts for 25% of budget funds which Rosatom receives and distributes. The bulk of NPP construction abroad and several other Rosatom businesses are also financed from the budget.

Just in case, Likhachev first reminded deputies that “the main service [of Rosatom] and its first mission… is the state defense order, which is annually fulfilled by 100%, despite huge growth in a number of sectors.” He also emphasized that “in future the volumes [of the defense order] would increase”.

Likhachev went on to discuss Rosatom’s great success, and continued in a “peacetime” spirit, i.e. as if the war did not exist. Practically the only mention of the war that is now in its third year was connected to a question from a deputy concerning the ZNPP.

In his reply to a question about the “well-being” of the ZNPP and the town of Enerhodar, Likhachev said practically nothing worthy of attention. He only stressed that the ZNPP was “our individual duty and responsibility”. Additionally, he distorted facts, saying that there had been shelling of the SNF facility, and that the physical protection of the plant (if this means the fence around the ZNPP site) had been destroyed by the Ukrainian armed forces. In summer-autumn 2022 there was indeed shelling near this area, but the site itself was not hit.

The IAEA have drawn attention to problems of shortages and low qualification of staff at the ZNPP. Likhachev essentially confirmed the IAEA’s concern, saying that only 4,700 people at the plant had signed a contract with Rosatom, and that several hundred more people had been sent to the ZNPP from other plants. Thus, Likhachev admitted that the staff shortage at the NPP is now around 50%, if one bears in mind that before the occupation around 11,000 people were employed at the ZNPP

 It is also noteworthy that Rosenergoatom has plans for activity on this site until 2026, which may mean that it does not intend to leave the ZNPP. Likhachev confirmed Rosatom’s active involvement in the occupation and the active development of captured territories. He reported that Rosatom “had embarked on activity on sites in new regions – the industrial waste ground in the Luhansk People’s Republic and Gorlovka, the Gorlovsky chemical plant in the Donetsk People’s Republic.”

It is interesting that Likhachev failed to discuss the approach to the issue of capital expenses for building NPPs, the lengthy duration of construction and how these factors affect the rates of nuclear-generated electricity for the population. This is a separate topic that deserves analysis and detailed coverage, but it is noteworthy that according to Likhachev, a government decision is being prepared to limit maximum capital expenses on construction of new nuclear units which Rosatom plans to build in Russia, and expenses that exceed established norms will be compensated for by Rosatom at its own expense.

Likhachev confirmed that Rosatom intended to bring nuclear power generation to 25% in the energy balance by 2045, building 42 power units of high, medium and small capacity, increasing generation in the Urals, in Siberia and the Far East. Additionally, he said, it is planned to operate Russian NPPs for up to 60 years, with possible extension to 100 years.

At the parliamentary hour, there were much talk and numerous promises about fourth generation technology, i.e. the construction of the Brest Pilot and Demonstration Power Complex, and the prospects in this field. Such categoricalness and unquestioning certainty of success is somewhat disconcerting, along with the claim to be 10 or more years ahead of the competition. Even Russian nuclear experts have serious doubts about this project. Additionally, the long and torturous experience of operating shipboard nuclear liquid-metal plants, which the navy was eventually forced to abandon, shows that everything is not so straightforward, simple and clear.

The “Breakthrough” project under which the Brest reactor is being built has been continuing for 16 years. The physical launch of the BREST-OD-300 reactor is scheduled for 2026, so the “celebration” is not far off.

Without a trace of doubt, Likhachev announced that Rostom’s position on international markets was solid and promising. He stated that in 2023 Rosatom “had a record $16.4 billion in revenue in foreign markets, more than $12 billion of which was generated on the markets of friendly countries.” The only unanswered question today is how long these countries will remain “friendly” under changing geopolitical conditions, since the market is not really about “friendship,” but primarily about politics, economics, ecology, and other components that can change unexpectedly and swiftly, while affecting the market.

Rosatom is actively involved in non-nuclear processes related to achieving Russia’s so-called technological sovereignty, as Likhachev constantly emphasized in his report, while deputies discussed Rosatom’s global technological leadership. For example, there was discussion about Rosatom’s success in digitalization, and that Russia’s wind power industry is developing rapidly only thanks to Rosatom (without mentioning the fact that today Russia is barely approaching 1% of solar and wind generation).

The deputies praised Rosatom for its unique Atom electric car (without even comparing it to Chinese products), and for record cargo transportation through the Northern Sea Route (NSR), noting that in 2023 it was as much as 34 million tons (for comparison, more than a billion tons of cargo are transported through the Suez Canal, which the NSR is trying to compete with).

Likhachev again proudly reported on the world’s only floating nuclear power plant (of course, without explaining that the main equipment already required for it is taken from scuttled military vessels) and lamented that the limiting factor for the construction of floating nuclear power plants is Russian shipbuilding, which is not fast enough in manufacturing hulls, so they have to be ordered from China.

All the figures and results discussed in parliament can be considered as separate domestic results, or perhaps even achievements. But it is impossible to assess them objectively after listening to the report, because there were no comparisons with worldwide achievements in developed countries and companies. It seemed that for some reason the parliamentarians were not even interested in comparisons with others. There were simply statements by Likhachev and deputies to the effect that we are the best and the first, and an atmosphere of euphoria and jubilation caused by everything that Rosatom does.

Lastly, there was no mention of such important and costly problems as the environmental safety of the nuclear industry, including the elimination of the Soviet nuclear legacy, nor was there any explanation of when and with what funds the eighteen NPPs that have reached the end of their service life will be decommissioned over the next decade (today only four are in the process of being decommissioned). In addition, it will be interesting to see how 42 new NPP units will be built over the next twenty years at a rate with a restricted maximum sum of capital expenditures» Recommended publications ↑

On 25 February, Novaya Gazeta published the article (subsequently posted on the Bellona website) by Bellona’s nuclear project expert Dmitry Gorchakov, “Rosatom loses domestic energy”, analyzing the causes of a decrease in generation of Russia’s NPPs in 2023 for the first time in 10 years.

The article describes both the accumulated causes in Russia’s aging nuclear reactors, and how operational problems at three NPPs in 2023 caused generation to fall below the expected result. In addition, three important consequences of this situation are described, which threatens the implementation of Rosatom’s goals of increasing the share of nuclear energy to 25% by 2045.

Firstly, Rosatom intends to extend the service life of old RBMK reactors for an additional five years. Secondly, in the coming years Rosatom will increasingly be occupied with building new nuclear units inside the country, reducing foreign activity. And thirdly, problems with Russian equipment, especially turbines, force Rosatom to rely on foreign deliveries, primarily from France, in their foreign projects. This cooperation increases the competitive ability of Rosatom’s proposals, but at the same time means a certain dependency on the West.

On February 28, Bellona held a forum in Oslo on the topic “War and the Russian Nuclear Industry.” Experts from the Bellona nuclear project spoke at the forum about the history of the organization’s activities in Russia, the closure of Russian offices after February 24, 2022, reformatting and new goals and objectives of the Bellona nuclear project. A detailed description of the event and video recordings of performances are available on Bellona’s website and YouTube channel.

The post Bellona nuclear digest. February 2024 appeared first on Bellona.org.

In recent years, Russia has been concerned with the development of its Arctic territories. However, it appears to be rather one-sided. The main focus is on the extraction and processing of natural resources, their export to the international market, and the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Other directions of socio-economic development receive much less attention, and the environmental management of the region, particularly in the context of existing and planned economic activities, lags even further behind.

Legislation defining the concept of managing the Russian Arctic was mainly adopted before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The international sanctions that followed have not yet affected this concept significantly, and has only adjusting certain indicators.

What is the Russian Arctic and how is it managed?

The main documents establishing the legal regime and determining the strategy for managing Russia’s Arctic territories include:

• Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035,
• Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035,
• Federal Law No. 193-FZ “On State Support for Entrepreneurship in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation”,
• Development Plan for the Northern Sea Route for the Period up to 2035,
• Federal Project “Development of the Northern Sea Route”.

The boundaries of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) are established by Law No. 193-FZ. They differ significantly from the commonly accepted boundaries of the Arctic, which are conventionally determined either by the Arctic Circle or by the southern boundary of the tundra zone. Thus, the southernmost point of the AZRF (the south of the Turukhansky District of the Krasnoyarsk Territory) is approximately 800 km south of the Arctic Circle and 600 km south of the tundra zone boundary.

Since 2020, the AZRF has been regularly expanding with new territories. Soon, two more districts of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug — Berezovsky and Beloyarsky — with areas of 88.1 and 41.6 thousand square kilometers, respectively, may be added to it. According to the text of the corresponding bill, this will create favorable conditions for the development and utilization of these municipal districts and the Arctic zone overall.

These favorable conditions are related to the fact that the same Law No. 193-FZ established a special economic zone in the AZRF — a territory with a special legal status distinct the rest of the Russian Federation, which implies various preferential conditions for attracting business.

The same law introduces the concept of “AZRF resident”. Only legal entities registered in the Arctic can be residents. Currently, there are 723 of them. Major corporations such as Gazprom and Novatek are not on this list, but their subsidiaries, such as Rosatom’s subsidiaries AO “Chukotatomenergo” and LLC “Arctic Atom-Service”, can be included.

Russia’s Arctic Zone. Source: erdc.ru

Among the residents is one of the largest industrial companies operating in the Russian Arctic, LLC “Severnaya Zvezda”, the operator of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit in the Taymyr (Krasnoyarsk Territory). It is planned that from 2029, the deposit will provide a cargo flow of 12 million tons along the Northern Sea Route (NSR).

Residents of the Arctic zone are entitled to tax preferences, such as a zero profit tax for 10 years from the moment of receiving the first profit (except for production related to the extraction of solid minerals), zero land tax, and others. Tax incentives may vary from region to region. Among the administrative bonuses is the possibility of obtaining land plots without auctions, which are state or municipal property, subsidizing the construction of infrastructure, and even assistance in personnel recruitment and management.

Moreover, the law provides for the possibility of applying the procedure of a free customs zone (FCZ) on developed and equipped areas of residents, which implies exemption from customs duties and VAT for the export and import of goods.

However, the FCZ procedure can be applied to specific areas of transportation facilities, such as seaports, international airports, as well as land plots adjacent to automobile or railway checkpoints, which may also be accessible to non-residents.

In addition to other benefits in the Arctic zone, established for non-residents, it is worth mentioning federal tax incentives for all organizations engaged in the search, evaluation, exploration, and extraction of hydrocarbon raw materials in certain territories of the Arctic zone and offshore deposits.

The law on the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation also includes two interesting points. The first is the possibility of conducting checks on residents, including compliance with environmental legislation, only with the consent of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic (Minvostokrazvitiye) and within shortened deadlines. The second is that the managing company of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation has the right to represent and defend the interests of applying residents in court, which increases their chances of success.

At the same time, the managing company for all residents is the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation (KRDV). It operates in both territories of advanced development (referred to as TOR in its Russian abbreviation), belonging to the Far Eastern Federal District (FEFD), and in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. Both the Far Eastern TORs and the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation are under the control of Minvostokrazvitiye, and the chairman of the board of directors of KRDV is concurrently the head of Minvostokrazvitiye, Alexey Chekunkov. Thus, the activities of Arctic business are essentially protected by the state.

In the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, there are also territories that have been separated from it into separate jurisdictions. For example, there are their own TORs here. These include the TOR “Arctic Capital” (Murmansk Region) specializing in port activities, logistics, industrial construction, and the TOR “Chukotka” (Chukotka Autonomous Okrug) specializing in “extraction of minerals and services to the population.” These TORs also have legislative incentives — in each individual case, they are different, and they also differ from the conditions in the rest of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.

But that’s not all. In the urban district of Pevek (Chukotka), the so-called Free Port of Vladivostok (FPV) regime is in effect, which also implies preferential tax, administrative, and customs regulation regimes, including the possibility of applying the FCZ procedure. In the urban district of Pevek, there is one of the most significant ports on the Northern Sea Route and large gold mining enterprises.

Thus, there are separate “autonomies” in the Russian Arctic living by their own rules.

Map of municipalities in five regions of the Russian Federation, which are subject to the regime of the Free Port of Vladivostok (marked in purple). Source: erdc.ru

The Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) is the largest special economic zone in the world and, in turn, is also an “autonomy” with its own legal regime in relation to the rest of the country’s territory. The land area of the AZRF is approximately 5 million square kilometers. For comparison, the area of Russia is 17 million square kilometers (excluding Crimea and other occupied territories of Ukraine).

However, the development of the Arctic is not singled out as a separate direction but is controlled by the same structure that deals with the development of the Russian Far East (RFE) and manages all such “autonomies” both in the Arctic and in the RFE, despite their very serious environmental, climatic, socio-economic, and other differences.

Why all this is necessary?

Let’s turn to another important document that determines the fate of Russia’s Arctic territories. This is the presidential decree “On the Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035.”

The document begins with a list of six main national interests of Russia in the Arctic. Among them are sovereignty and territorial integrity; peace and partnership; the well-being of the population; environmental protection, including the interests of indigenous peoples.

Another point is dedicated to the economic aspect of the region’s development. However, here the focus is solely on the extraction of minerals. Thus, one of the national interests is understood as the development of the AZRF “as a strategic resource base and its rational use to accelerate the economic growth of the Russian Federation.”

The next point in the list is “the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a competitive national transport route on the world market.”

The strategy for the development of the NSR, as well as the target indicators for its use, are detailed in other state documents. The first is the Federal Project “Development of the Northern Sea Route.” The main task is to increase cargo traffic along the NSR to 80 million tons by 2024 and to 150 million tons by 2030.

The second is the Plan for the Development of the Northern Sea Route until 2035, approved by the government of the Russian Federation on August 22, 2022, and subsequently supplemented on April 28, 2023. It implies an even greater increase in cargo traffic compared to the federal project – up to 90 million tons by 2024 and up to 216.45 million tons by 2030.

The plan also includes a forecast for annual loading, according to which the bulk of the cargo flow along the NSR (approximately 70-75% depending on the year) should consist of oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), non-ferrous metals, and coal produced in the AZRF by Gazprom, Rosneft, Novatek, Norilsk Nickel, LLC “Severnaya Zvezda,” and LLC “Baims Mining Company.”

The full implementation of these plans is in question, particularly due to sanctions. For example, the cargo traffic along the NSR in 2023, while breaking a historical record, reaching 36.25 million tons, still fell significantly short of the target indicator of the NSR Development Plan of 46.82 million tons.

Nevertheless, it is evident that a large portion of the cargo turnover along the NSR will eventually consist of minerals extracted in the AZRF. It is safe to say that two out of the six main interests of Russia in the Arctic, according to the Foundations of the State Policy in the region, are their extraction and transportation to markets.

Moreover, among the main threats to national security listed in the document is the “low pace of geological exploration of promising mineral resource centers in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.”

The theme of resource development in the Arctic is widely reflected in the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security until 2035, approved by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation.

Among other things, here, in seven points, the significance of the AZRF in the socio-economic development of the country and ensuring its national security is substantiated. Three points are devoted to the presence of useful minerals here, and a fourth — to the economic importance of the NSR.

Thus, the significance of the AZRF is justified by the fact that it contains 17% of all Russian oil (including gas condensate), and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic contains another 17.3 billion tons of oil (including gas condensate) and over 85.1 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, as well as the fact that the implementation of major economic projects in the AZRF (which again involves the extraction and export of raw materials) stimulates the production in Russia of high-tech and knowledge-intensive products and demand for them.

Foreign Participation

Russia currently seems to lack sufficient resources of its own to fulfill existing plans for the development of the Arctic, so foreign capital is actively involved in their implementation.

According to Law No. 2395-1 “On Subsoil,” only legal entities registered in the Russian Federation can use subsoil resources. However, nothing prevents foreign companies from being owners of these legal entities either partially or fully.

Such examples exist among the largest Russian mega-projects in the Arctic.

For instance, LLC “GDK Baimskaya,” developing the Baimskoye gold-copper deposit in Chukotka, is 100% owned by the Kazakhstani company Trianon Limited. Novatek’s “Yamal LNG” project is owned 49.9% by companies from China and France, and 40% of the shares of another project, “Arctic LNG 2,” are held by companies from France, China, and Japan. Indian companies have owned 49% of OJSC “Vankorneft,” the operator of the Vankor field in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, since 2016.

Moreover, Vietnam’s participation in the development of the North-Purovsky gas condensate field in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YNAO) and the possibility of Thailand’s participation in projects for hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including LNG, are being discussed.

An exception is made for the Russian Continental Shelf. Only Russian companies can operate there, with state participation exceeding 50%. Moreover, since 2016, there has been a moratorium on issuing new licenses for shelf development, and currently, only Gazprom and Rosneft operate there under previously issued licenses. Moreover, extraction is carried out only at one deposit — the Prirazlomnoye field.

Regarding transportation via the NSR of resources extracted in Russia, including in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, using vessels under a foreign flag, this is also possible according to the Merchant Shipping Code. There are separate restrictions on the transportation of oil and gas; however, they do not apply to legal relations arising from international treaties concluded by Russia or any agreements concluded before February 1, 2018. An example of such cooperation are the 26 tankers chartered by Novatek, which are allowed to transport LNG and gas condensate via the Northern Sea Route under a foreign flag until 2044.

Environmental Policy in the Arctic

Thus, it is evident that in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), there is active and planned new extraction and export of minerals. However, insufficient attention is currently paid to the environmental side of this process and to the overall fight against the environmental risks associated with economic activities in the region.

One of the main such risks is the thawing of permafrost. According to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, due to this process, 40% of the northern infrastructure in the country is already deformed. The potential economic damage to Russia could reach at least 5 trillion rubles (51.1 billion euros) by 2050, as stated by Deputy Minister of Ecology of the Russian Federation Sergey Anoprienko.

Therefore, in the updated edition of the “Foundations of State Policy of Russia in the Arctic until 2035,” issued on February 21, 2023, a point appeared on the creation of a state system for monitoring the condition of permafrost. And in the list of main threats to national security in the region provided in this document, there is mention of the unpreparedness of the environmental monitoring system located in the AZRF for environmental challenges.

The monitoring system began to be created in the first half of last year. On May 19, 2023, the first well for observing the condition of permafrost was opened in Salekhard. By the end of the year, there were 20 of them operating in five regions. By 2025, their number should increase to 140. Also, in December 2023, the first two stations for monitoring the concentration of greenhouse gases were put into operation.

However, it is quite telling that the main Arctic documents usually focus not on combating climate change but on adapting to it. This can be explained by the fact that Russia still considers climate change not only as a threat but also as a stimulus for economic development. For example, in the Strategy for the Development of the AZRF, it is stated that climate change contributes not only to “risks for economic activities and the environment” but also to “new economic opportunities,” one of which is cited as increasing cargo traffic along the NSR.

The first bore hole of the permafrost monitoring system in the Russian Arctic. Photo: Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation

Also noteworthy is that, on the one hand, Russia considers climate change in the region as one of the threats to national security, while on the other hand, it enshrines in various regulatory legal acts a multiple increase in the extraction and export of hydrocarbons, the burning of which precisely contributes to global climate change and the rise in temperatures in the Arctic. However, unlike the ongoing development of oil and gas fields in the region, climate measures are only at the initial stage of implementation.

Furthermore, Russia is not yet ready to join the ban on the transportation and use of heavy fuel oil in the Arctic — a voluntary initiative developed by the International Maritime Organization of the UN. The ban will begin to take effect with some exceptions on July 1, 2024, and will come into full force in 2029. This measure will reduce black carbon emissions from shipping by 44%, emphasize the “Clean Arctic” alliance, which includes “Bellona”.

Among other steps to reduce emissions in economic activities in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), a set of 13 measures adopted on October 29, 2022, by government directive No. 3219-r is illustrative.

These measures include reducing the use of coal and heavy fuel oil as fuel, modernizing boiler houses and thermal power plants to switch them to natural gas, biofuels, or wood pellets and chips, measures to eliminate open storage of coal. It is also planned to work on improving the quality of treatment of domestic sewage in settlements and wastewater from ships calling at Arctic ports.

In addition, according to the document, plans are being developed to stimulate the transition of automotive, maritime, and inland water transport to natural gas fuel and to develop proposals to increase charges for emissions and discharges of pollutants into the atmosphere and into the seas and rivers. However, as seen, these points are currently only about developing plans and proposals, not about concrete steps.

At the same time, in some cases, individual effective measures are being taken to reduce the negative impact on the environment. For example, in 2021, the energy system of Vorkuta was converted from coal to gas, sharply reducing emissions into the atmosphere.

Despite this, in the following year, 2022, the Vorkuta urban district took the 8th place in the list of Russian cities with the most polluted air, with total emissions of 168 thousand tons, because many environmental problems related to coal mining, decommissioning of closed mines, and the liquidation of accumulated environmental damage have not been addressed for 20, 30, or more years.

Another example is the reduction of emissions by the Norilsk branch on the Kola Peninsula. Emissions here were also sharply reduced, but primarily because outdated production facilities were closed and transferred to the Zapolyarny branch of the company, also located in the AZRF — in Norilsk.

Norilsk itself, along with another 11 cities across the country, is part of the federal project “Clean Air,” launched in 2019. However, as of the end of 2022, emissions from the largest polluter — Norilsk Nickel — were only reduced from 1.8 billion tons to 1.78 billion tons (for comparison, all emissions into the atmosphere of the Norilsk urban district this year amounted to 1.79 billion tons).

Summary

As a result of such environmental policy, emissions into the atmosphere from just the Arctic sites of Gazprom and Norilsk Nickel exceed those of the entire industry of Alaska and the Arctic zone of Canada combined. According to Greenpeace, the Zapolyarny branch of Norilsk Nickel is the world’s largest anthropogenic source of sulfur dioxide pollution in the atmosphere, and areas of historically strong pollution and disruption of the natural environment (in many cases, dating back to the Soviet era) are scattered throughout the European part of the Russian Arctic zone (due to its greater development), but also occur in its Asian part.

The industrial wasteland surrounding Monchegorsk (Murmansk region). Photo: Sergey Poteryaev

However, in Russian state documents on Arctic management, environmental protection measures are relegated to the background compared to industrial development of the region, are fragmented, incomplete, and often do not extend beyond the development of plans, while concrete steps supported by target indicators are needed now.

The foundations of state policy, the development strategy of the region, and many other important documents defining the fate of the Russian Arctic are adopted until 2035, and major changes are unlikely to be expected. This means that, barring economic obstacles, such as a significant strengthening of international sanctions, serious anthropogenic pressure is planned for at least the next 10 years, which will increase environmental risks for the entire Arctic, not just its Russian part.

The post The Arctic as a resource base appeared first on Bellona.org.

Five US producers are restarting operation in Texas, Wyoming, Arizona and Utah, where production boomed until the 2011 Fukushima disaster, which led to a worldwide downturn in nuclear plant building, Bloomberg reported.

But Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and Rosatom’s subsequent takeover of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, have cast a dim political light on continued reliance on fuel imports from Russia.

The global dependence on Russian fuel was again highlighted by Bellona’s discovery that most nations of the EU doubled their purchases of Russian fuel supplies over the last year — despite their political support of Ukraine as the war grinds into its second year.

While reopening the idled US mines — most of which are small and ending the end of their productive years — would account for only a small fraction of the world’s uranium supply, their reinvigoration nonetheless underscores market fears of price tremors thanks a Russian import ban.

But the renewed mining operations are drawing criticism from native tribes and environmentalists. One of the Arizona mines is located in a new national monument President Biden designated last year, while the other two are located in Utah’s quarter of the Four Corners region, where the impacts of  20th-century uranium mining persist to this day. 

In the US, 20 percent of the low-enriched uranium supply used to power its 93 reactors comes from Russia. Russia is further the lead supplier of fuel-ready uranium on the world market. While the US does import some of its uranium supply from other nations, like Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia, its partial reliance on Russian supplies has been spiking fuel costs.

In the wars early days, when the Biden administration and its European allies discussed the notion of sanctioning supplies from Rosatom, the price of uranium shot to roughly $60 per pound— a high not reached in more than a decade, E&E News reported.  As of March 11 this year, the price had reached $80 per pound.

Congressional Legislation that would ban Russian fuel supplies has yet to pass, but the bill’s existence has contributed to the market’s fragility.

Experts have suggested that full-blown sanctions against the Russian state corporation could further raise the cost of low-enriched uranium for nuclear power plants globally, and leave US utilities vulnerable to more wild fluctuations.

“They’re using it [uranium] as a geopolitical weapon against the United States of America, and we have the ability to be more self-sufficient,” Mark Chalmers, president and CEO of the largest US uranium mining company, Energy Fuels Resources Corporation, told E&E News.

Atop considerations of sanctions is a worldwide shift toward nuclear power as a zero-emissions tool to fight climate change, which also fuels an increase uranium demand. I May of last year, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated that the world will need more than 100,000 metric tons of uranium per year by 2040 — an amount that requires nearly doubling mining and processing from current levels.

Canada’s Cameco Corporation and Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom — which together account for half of global supply — have struggled to ramp up production and have warned that operational setbacks will result in less uranium output than expected in the coming years, Bloomberg said.

Production has sagged in recent years thanks to underinvestment in mining and exploration,” Scott Melbye, executive vice president of Texas-based Uranium Energy Corporation, told Bloomberg.  Uranium Energy Corporation says it will reopen mines in Wyoming and Texas that were idled in 2018.

Underinvestment in mining and exploration in recent year has caused production to sag, said Melbye. Uranium Energy is reopening mines in Wyoming and Texas that have been idled in 2018. Energy Fuels Inc likewise initiated plans late last year to restart operations in Arizona, Utah and Colorado, while Ur-Energy Inc. said it will revive an idled mine in Wyoming.

But more mining could have a negative impact on tribal lands. The US Environmental Protection Agency continues cleanup at 500 abandoned uranium mine within the Navajo Nation, which spans the Four Corners area of Utah, Colorado, Arizona and New Mexico.

The Navajo have cited impacts to water supplies and water quality, the negative health outcomes uranium mining has historically brought to Indigenous communities in their pushback against revived mining in Arizona and Utah.

Uranium miners pledge they have learned from past environmental damage and technological improvement assure mistakes of the past won’t be repeated.  

“We’re talking about 21st century, world-class mining operations in the United States,” Melbye said in a separate interview with E&E News. “I think if environmentalists actually came out and saw a uranium operation in the United States, they’d actually be pretty impressed.”

The post US revives forgotten uranium mines to replace Russian supplies appeared first on Bellona.org.

A Bellona analysis of cross-border trade operations under the customs code 840130 — the designation for unirradiated fuel assemblies or fuel elements — shows a more than twofold increase in imports of fresh nuclear fuel to EU countries in financial terms.  If EU countries paid a total of €280 million for Russian nuclear fuel in 2022, that more than doubled to €686 million for last year. In physical terms, this represents an increase from 314 tons of nuclear fuel to 573 tons. 

The EU trade figures represent purchases made for 19 Soviet-designed VVER reactors that reside in five member states. These are:  

• The Czech Republic’s two nuclear plants, the Dukovany, which hosts four VVER-440, and the Temelin plant with its two VVER-1000s;  

• Slovakia’s Mochovce and Bohunice plants, with their five VVER-440s;  

• Bulgaria’s two VVER-1000s at the Kozloduy plant;,  

• Hungary’s four VVER-440 at its Paks plant; 

• and Finland’s two VVER-440s at Loviisa plant. 

Despite there being no sanctions or bans on nuclear supplies from Russia to Europe, these countries remain highly vulnerable because of their dependence on Moscow for their fuel. 

But over the next 5 years, the market is poised to change significantly, and the increase in Russian imports over recent years might simply reflect the anxieties of EU nuclear operators as they hedge against interruptions that could come from switching suppliers.  

Why did imports grow? 

In its report for 2022, the Euratom Supply Agency already noted that during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European consumers of Russian nuclear fuel began to build up stocks in case of future supply disruptions. At that time, the increase in imports was small — within plus ten percent of the pre-war level.  

Obviously, in 2023, this trend only intensified — plus 80 percent — a buyup that was facilitated by the absence of full-fledged sanctions on fuel purchases from TVEL, the fuel subsidiary of Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation.  

The Czech Republic, for example, increased Russian supplies by almost twofold — from 90 tons in 2022 to 199 tons in 2023. In recent years, the country has sought to build up its stocks of fresh nuclear fuel — a strategy justified by its dependence on Russian fuel in the nuclear plants that account for 40 percent of its electricity production. This is all the more so in light of Prague’s strained relations with Russia even before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. 

Last year, the director of the Czech Dukovany nuclear power plant noted that his facility had approximately a three-year supply of fuel on hand. In October 2023, the plant completed an expansion of its storage facilities, which can now accommodate almost a five-year supply of fuel.  

It could be that the Czech Republic’s uptick in fuel purchases was synchronized with that expansion— in November and December of 2023, about 80 tons of fuel were imported into the Czech Republic, accounting for about 40 percent of the annual EUvolume of fuel imports from Russia.  

An additional, some 80 of fuel purchased in 2023 above the usual recent volumes correspond to almost a two-year supply of fuel for the four blocks at the Dukovany nuclear plant. 

The largest increase in nuclear fuel imports last year was seen in Slovakia. It nearly tripled from 80 tons in previous years to 229 tons in 2023. As of the beginning of 2024, Slovakia operates five VVER-440 reactors at two nuclear plants — Mochovce and Bohunice.  

Slovakia’s current fuel supply contract with TVEL was signed in 2019 and envisions deliveries from 2022 to 2026, with a possible extension until 2030. In the fall of 2022, fuel loading began at the new Mochovce-3 reactor, the fifth in the country. The delivery of such a large batch of fuel for its first loading may explain the increase in fuel supplies to Slovakia in 2022 — from the usual 50-60 tons in 2019-2021 to 80 tons. 

However, in 2023, Slovakia imported a record amount of fuel — about 230 tons, totaling about €200 million. This volume may include the first loading (about 50 tons) for the construction of the Mochovce reactor number 4, the sixth in the country — a reactor that could be commissioned as early as 2024. But even taking this into account, the amount of fuel Slovakia imported in 2023 could cover the needs of the country’s six reactor units for the next 2-3 years. 

Nuclear power plant operators in the Czech Republic and Slovakia did not respond to Bellona’s requests for information about the volume of nuclear fuel purchases and the availability of reserves. 

About 103 tons of nuclear fuel from Russia were imported to Hungary in 2023 worth more than €124 million, which is comparable to purchases the country made in 2022 in terms of physical volumes (about 104 tons) But the current purchases exceed past years in financial terms — with purchases in 2022 amounting to about €94 million. Moreover, the volume of fuel purchased in 2023 and 2022 exceeds typical nuclear fuel purchases Hungary made over the past 10 years, which ranged from 50 to 80 tons per year.   

In response to Bellona’s questions, the operator of the Paks NPP — the MVM Paks Nuclear Power Plant company — confirmed the availability of fuel reserves at the station. Officials there said they have always strive to ensure a secure long-term supply of fuel, which in recent years has meant fuel sufficiency for two years — a factor the company intends to increase. 

In contrast, Finland reduced its imports of nuclear fuel from Russia by almost half —from the usual 37-39 tons to 20 tons. Yet this may owe to delays in the shipment of one of the batches, rather than a deliberate reduction in supplies.  

Overall, Finland’s purchases over the last six to seven years — totaling about 35-40 tons —exceed the annual needs of the two VVER-440 units it operates at the Loviisa nuclear plant. It’s possible that these imports allow for certain fuel reserves, but their size is unknown. 

Unfortunately, data on trade operations with Bulgaria are not available in the databases accessible to us. In response to Bellona’s questions, officials at the Kozloduy NPP refused to provide information on the volume of the plant’s nuclear fuel purchases or as well as the availability of fuel stocks, citing commercial secrecy. But when we consider the number and type of reactors Bulgaria operates, the country’s import of Russian fuel should amount to about 50 tons of fuel per year. Moreover, starting from this year, Bulgaria intends to begin the process of changing suppliers and to receive its first batches of Westinghouse fuel for the fifth unit of its Kozloduy nuclear plant. 

What awaits the market by 2030

Currently, only Hungary has no clear plans to switch from Russian nuclear fuel to alternatives. Beginning in 2024, the Czech Republic plans to receive its first deliveries of Western fuel fabricated by Westinghouse and possibly Framatom, for which the contacts have already been signed. Thus, their accumulated reserves of Russian fuel might be intended to help them survive the challenging period of changing suppliers. 

The operator of Slovak NPPs, Slovenské Elektrárne, in August 2023, signed a contract licensing Westinghouse fuel for its reactors and plans to finish the licensing process by 2026-2027. It should take another year to start new fuel deliveries. Whether this contract will be implemented, however, depends on the government of Robert Fico, whose warm relations with Moscow might scuttle the plans.  

From 2027 to 2030, Finland plans to switch its two Loviisa reactor units from Russian fuel to alternative sources when its current contracts for Russian fuel supplies expire. In response to Bellona’s questions, the operator of the Loviisa nuclear power plant, Fortum Corporation, confirmed that the plant has fuel in stock, but did not specify its volume. Fortum officials additionally told Bellona that discussions on securing fuel supplies form Westinghouse Electric Company have been underway before the war started.  

In November 2022, Fortum and Westinghouse signed an agreement for the design and supply of a new fuel type for the Loviisa power plant. Westinghouse’s fuel development is progressing well, the officials said. In addition to Westinghouse, Fortum is exploring the capabilities of another Western fuel supplier to develop a compatible fuel type for Loviisa. 

When we consider the current contracts spelling out supply changes for most EU nuclear plants, Russian nuclear fuel imports could drop by at least 60 percent compared to 2022 levels by the end the decade —comprising by then only about 70 to 100 tons per year. This means that Russia stands to lose 10 to 15 reactors — with 7 to 9 GW of capacity — as customers within the EU.  

Most likely, the growth in imports in 2022-2023 reflects the desire of buyers to quickly get the volumes of contracted fuel to ensure reserve for the period of changing suppliers and possible difficulties with supplies in the event of tightening sanctions in the nuclear industry or other aggravation of relations between Russia and the EU. 

The Euratom Supply Agency, in response to Bellona’s questions, confirmed that the majority of operators of nuclear power plants with VVER reactors in the EU have intensified efforts to find alternative suppliers and have thus increased fuel imports to head off possible supply disruption over the last 2 years. 

ESA also agreed that purchases under current contracts are, in principle, expected to progressively decrease over the coming years. 

A similar situation is observed in the United States with an increase in purchases of enriched uranium from Russia, which occurs against the background of discussion of a law banning the import of enriched uranium from Russia. At the end of 2023, imports of enriched uranium from Russia to the United States increased to a record level of $1.2 billion, which is 40% more than the volume of imports in 2022. Against the background of rising prices, imports also increased in physical volumes by about 20%, from 588 tons in 2022 to 702 tons in 2023. 

For Rosatom itself, the current increase in uranium purchases in the United States and nuclear fuel in Europe could also be beneficial, as it allows for contracts to be realized more quickly prior to any sanctions Washington or Brussels may eventually adopt. However, this does little for Rosatom in the long run — its EU nuclear fuel market is clearly shrinking, as is the market for enriched uranium in the US.  

These developments in the nuclear fuel market —which often remain hidden — once again underscore the need to increase transparency in the nuclear industry, regardless of the country in which it operates. This is especially so in light of the extensive and long-standing ties many countries have with the nuclear industry of Russia — a country whose political regime engages in aggressive wars and utilizes any tools and opportunities to achieve its goals and pressure its opponents, particularly Western countries. Against this backdrop, the gradual, albeit not rapid, reduction in the EU’s dependence on Russian nuclear fuel is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. 

The post Europe doubled its import of Russian nuclear fuel for 2023, data say  appeared first on Bellona.org.

The output of Russian nuclear power plants in 2023 decreased by 2.8% compared to 2022. A decrease in output occurred for the first time in 10 years and only the second time in 20 years – the last one was in 2013. This seemingly purely internal event can actually tell a lot about the state of the Russian nuclear industrial giant and show several key points that are important both for Russia’s neighboring countries and for the prospects of Rostom’s foreign projects and its role in the global nuclear market in the next few years.   

According to The Federal Service for State Statistics (Rosstat), nuclear power plant output in 2023 amounted to 217 billion kWh. This is 6.4 billion kWh less than the 2022 figure of 223.4 billion kWh, which became a record for the entire time of the Russian and Soviet nuclear industry. The output indicator of a nuclear power plant is extremely important for a state corporation that is proud of the fulfillment of important government tasks – both in state defense orders (nuclear weapons and their carriers), in the volume of transportation along the Northern Sea Route and the construction of nuclear icebreakers, and in foreign projects. In terms of electricity generation, Rosatom has also been given a task personally by Vladimir Putin – to achieve 25% of the share of nuclear energy in the country’s energy balance by 2045, compared to about 18%-20% in recent years.  

Therefore, the annual increase in electricity generation has always been an important indicator of which Rosatom was publicly proud. It is no coincidence that Rosatom has still not publicly announced the exact output figures for 2023, more than a month after the end of the year, since they show both a decrease in output from year to year and a decrease in the share of nuclear energy in the country’s energy balance to 18.4% (it has been declining for the 4th year in a row). And in the coming years it will not be easy to even keep these indicators at their previous values. 

Historical electricity generation by Russian nuclear power plants from 1991 to 2023 and the share of nuclear energy in total electricity generation in Russia. Author’s graph based on Rosstat data.

The decline in output itself was expected for those who closely follow events in the Russian nuclear industry. And Rosatom itself, at the level of statements made by not top officials, recognized the upcoming difficulties. Commenting at the beginning of 2023 on the high output figures of 2022, First Deputy General Director for NPP operation, and since June 2023, General Director of Rosenergoatom concern (Electric Energy Division of Rosatom), Alexander Shutikov, said: “By optimizing repair campaigns and increasing the efficiency of electricity production, we were able to support until 2023 there is a constant increase in the level of production, but miracles do not happen. The output for the next three years will be lower. We know this and are ready for it.”  

The forecast indicators reflected what was said in words. For 2023, the state target for the production of Russian nuclear power plants, agreed with the federal antimonopoly service, was 214.2 billion kWh, which is almost 2% lower than a year earlier. This reduction allowed Rosatom to once again report on exceeding the state target, elegantly veiling the decline in output in absolute terms. At the same time, Rosenergoatom failed to achieve its own target of 218.8 billion kWh.  

The main reason for this natural decline is the aging of the country’s nuclear fleet and the gradual closure of old power units, to replace which there is no time to build new capacities. In recent years, 4 large first-generation RBMK uranium-graphite reactors at the Leningrad and Kursk NPPs, which had exhausted their service life in 45 years, have been closed in Russia. The last one was just the other day, on January 31, 2024. But they were replaced by only two VVER-1200 units at Leningrad NPP-2. New units at Kursk NPP-2 lag behind the closure of old reactors by at least 3 years. This is precisely what accounts for the three-year period of expected decline. It is curious that the previous decline in nuclear power plant output in Russia in 2013 was also associated with first-generation RBMK reactors, which were taken out for repairs to carry out work to restore the parameters of the graphite stack.  

In such conditions, when no new capacities are commissioned, it is possible to maintain or increase electricity generation only through more efficient and trouble-free operation of existing capacities. This actually happened to be done in 2022, perhaps at the cost of a partial shift in some repairs to next year, but not in 2023. As Shutikov rightly noted, miracles do not happen.  

Although in the first six months of 2023, the concern apparently had such hope, and the stations worked beyond the plan, so that Rosenergoatom in June even increased its annual production targets, reaching 218.8 billion kWh instead of the approved 214.2 billion kWh. However, in the end, it was still not possible to reach it (otherwise this would have been solemnly announced). Summing up the results of 2023, Shutikov said that despite exceeding the indicators at eight stations, three nuclear power plants failed to fulfill their production plans – Leningrad, Novovoronezh and Beloyarsk. Indeed, it was precisely in them, and precisely in the second half of the year, that serious unscheduled equipment failures occurred. 

What exactly went wrong at the Leningrad, Novovoronezh and Beloyarsk nuclear power plants with the newest reactors in Russia

It is easy to see that the main problems in 2023 were at stations with the newest and most promising reactors – VVER-1200 and BN. It was the VVER-1200 reactors, first built at the second stages of the Novovoronezh and Leningrad NPPs, that became the main export product for Rosatom – first Russian powerful generation 3+ PWRss. The corporation is building them at 14 of 19 power units at its foreign projects in Turkey, Egypt, China and Bangladesh, and has already launched them at two units of the Belarusian NPP completed last year. And the fast sodium reactors BN-800 and BN-600 at the Beloyarsk NPP are prototypes of promising 4th generation reactors.  

More specifically, at the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant (NVNPP), problems arose precisely at the very first VVER-1200 in the country, at the 6th unit, launched in 2016. In 2023, it underwent a major overhaul with the replacement of the turbogenerator stator. This is the first equipment of its kind with such power, with water cooling, manufactured by the Russian JSC Power Machines. As Rosatom itself writes, quite soon after the unit was launched, an increased level of vibration was detected in this stator. For the next unit, NVNPP-7, commissioned in 2019, a modernized stator has already been installed. And on the first-born it was replaced only in 2023. The entire complex overhaul lasted 82 days.  

But, in addition to this, during the year the unit was disconnected from the grid 6 more times (!) for small (from several hours to 5 days) unplanned repairs due to breakdowns of “electrical equipment”. In normal operation, units operate without such unscheduled shutdowns, and their presence may indicate problems with equipment that could not be eliminated or prevented during scheduled shutdowns for repairs and refueling. The NVNPP-7 unit with the second VVER-1200 at the station was also switched off for several days at the end of the year for this reason (problems with “electrical equipment”). As a result, NVNPP produced less in 2023 than planned.  

Novovoronezh NPP-2 with the first two VVER-1200 units in Russia, launched in 2016 and 2018. If we carry out continuous numbering of the station’s units, then these are units No. 6 and No. 7 of the Novovoronezh NPP. Photo: Rosenergoatom.

At the Leningrad NPP, the main problems were with the 5th unit. This is the first VVER-1200 at this site and the second in the country after NVNPP-6, launched in 2018. The main problem is that the unit stopped twice due to broken turbine blades in the low-pressure cylinder, which in general is a rather rare and very unpleasant occurrence. The first time, at the end of summer, it took 2 months to fix the breakdown; the second repair in the fall took more than 3 months. The turbine, by the way, is produced by the same Power Machines that produced them for all 4 VVER-1200s in the country. In addition, there were 2 more emergency stops to eliminate minor breakdowns, and this is not counting the stop for scheduled repairs and refueling. As a result, this unit stood idle for more than 6 (!) months in 2023. On the 6th unit, in addition to scheduled repairs and refueling, there were also 4 unscheduled shutdowns for short-term repairs. Summing up the station’s work in 2023, its director chose not to announce production figures at all.

The low-pressure cylinder of the turbine of unit No. 5 of the Leningrad NPP during installation. Photo: Rosenergoatom.

At the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant with two fast neutron reactors, the plan also failed to be fulfilled. The catch there was that the BN-600 (commissioned in 1980), which was being prepared for extended operation, was under repair for almost 5 months during the year. The BN-800, launched in 2015, in 2023 marked its first full year of operation on a full load of MOX fuel – mixed uranium-plutonium fuel made from nuclear materials recovered from the reprocessing of spent fuel from other reactors. This process itself, important for closing the nuclear fuel cycle and truly unique for the global nuclear industry, has become another cause for pride and advertising for Rosatom.  

But any technical achievement has a downside and consequences that usually do not come into the spotlight but fall on the shoulders of the operating personnel. After a second scheduled repair and refueling in October 2023, the unit operated at reduced power, and a couple of weeks later it had to be briefly shut down to “optimize operating parameters”, as was vaguely described in the station’s press release. And a month after the launch, the power had to be reduced again by almost half due to a “malfunction in the thermal-mechanical equipment”. Beloyarsk NPP is one of the smallest in Russia, however, its reduction in output by almost 1 billion kWh due to the problems described above contributed to Rosenergoatom’s overall performance.  

BN-800 reactor at unit No. 4 of the Beloyarsk NPP. Photo: Newspaper “Strana Rosatom”

Why is it important for us to know these details about the production of Russian nuclear power plants and what conclusions can a foreign reader who is interested in the environmental issues of Russian nuclear power and the foreign policy influence of the nuclear state corporation during the war in Ukraine draw for themselves? We can highlight at least three important aspects of the current situation.  

1. By 2030, Rosatom will be more focused on building nuclear power plants in Russia than abroad.

To achieve the goal of increasing the share of nuclear power generation in Russia to 25% by 2045 and replacing retired capacities, Rosatom urgently needs to begin massive construction of new units. According to our calculations, published in the Bellona report on the Russian nuclear industry, if this is not done, then by 2035 the total capacity of the Russian nuclear fleet will be reduced by a third, and by 2045 – by almost half from the current level of 29.5 GW.  

Currently, only three units are being built in Russia – two 1250 MW VVER-TOI units at Kursk NPP-2 and a 300 MW BREST-OD reactor in Seversk. However, permission has already been received for the construction of two more VVER-1200 at Leningrad NPP-2, and in total, according to the current general scheme, Rosatom plans to build 10 large power units by 2035. By 2030, 8 of them will be under construction with a total capacity of 9 GW. 

Abroad, at the beginning of 2024, Rosatom is constructing 19 nuclear power units at 7 nuclear power plants in 6 countries: 4 each in Turkey, Egypt, China, India, two in Bangladesh and one in Iran. By 2030, almost all of them should be completed, except maybe 1-2. According to current contracts and discussed plans, most likely by 2030, two more units will be under construction in Hungary at the Paks-2 nuclear power plant, two units at the nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan, and construction of 2 to 4 new units will possibly begin in India. However, Rosatom has not signed new contracts for the construction of units in recent years. Potentially, if luck is on Rosatom’s side, then in the coming years it may receive contracts for the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Turkey, another nuclear power plant in India, it is possible to win a tender for two units in Kazakhstan, and receive several more orders in China, which are rarely widely known in advance announced, as well as bring the intentions for the construction of nuclear power plants in African countries to the level of contracts. However, even if new projects appear in the coming years, it is still unlikely that by 2030 they will reach the construction stage. In total, by 2030, Rosatom will be constructing from 6 to 10 large nuclear units abroad. We are deliberately not considering SMR projects yet due to their smaller power scale.  

Thus, according to known plans and projects, the volume of construction of large nuclear power units with the participation of Rosatom in the world will be reduced from 22 at the beginning of 2024 to 14-18 by 2030, i.e. by 20-40%. At the same time, the share of foreign projects will decrease by almost half, from about 90% now (19 out of 22) to about 55% (no more than 10 out of 18) in 2030. Thus, in 6 years, Rosatom will be more focused on building nuclear power plants inside Russia than abroad, and the total volume of construction of large blocks under his projects may decrease by a third. Only the sudden start in the coming years of new Rosatom projects in China in the amount of at least 4 large blocks can maintain the total volume of construction by 2030.  

If Western countries, as part of the sanctions pressure on Russia due to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, plan to use various measures to restrain Rosatom’s foreign expansion in developing countries, then in the coming years “natural” reasons will come to their aid, since Rosatom will be more occupied with resolving issues within Russia.  

2. Rosatom is forced to extend the service life of those old units that it had not previously planned to extend. 

Even the announced plans for large-scale construction in the next 10 years will most likely not be enough for Rosatom to compensate for the impending failure with the withdrawal of old units. Therefore, in recent years, Rosatom has started talking about extending for another 5 years (up to 50 years of operation) 7 operating second-generation RBMK-1000 reactors and the first two units of the Kola NPP to 65 years. Just a couple of years ago, no one publicly voiced such plans. And even its director is not yet sure about the possibility of extending two VVER-440 units at the Kola NPP. 

Such an extension of the units’ operation should allow Rosenergoatom to avoid a whole wave of closures of old units in the coming years and maintain a stable level of output until the commissioning of new capacities after 2030.  

Despite the fact that extending the life of units is a common global practice, such decisions must be carefully considered and assessed for each unit individually, and carried out in conditions of transparency of the decisions made. A closed procedure may carry risks not only of future accidents or equipment failures, but also risks of cost overruns and public fears. 

NPP Units inside Russia, which will be under construction stage by 2030. Compared to the situation at the beginning of 2024. Author’s infographics.

In addition, all these reactors are located closest to the western borders of Russia. In particular, RBMK reactors at the Leningrad, Kursk and Smolensk nuclear power plants are located no further than 70 km from the European borders. All of them are Chernobyl-type reactors. All such reactors abroad, in Lithuania and Ukraine, have already been shut down due to political and safety concerns. The Kola Nuclear Power Plant is located 100 km from the border with Finland, is the world’s largest nuclear power plant beyond the Arctic Circle and one of the oldest nuclear power plants in Russia. Therefore, extending the operation of these reactors for another 5 years may cause already existing concerns among neighboring countries both about the possible consequences for themselves and for the Arctic region as a whole. Moreover, in the context of the current confrontation between Russia and the West, a full-fledged international dialogue to reduce concerns on these issues will be impossible. However, in conditions of war, the concerns of neighboring Western countries on this issue will not play any significance for the Russian authorities.  

3. The quality of Rosatom projects in foreign markets depends on cooperation with foreign partners in terms of turbine equipment. 

The third important aspect concerns the provision of Rosatom’s foreign projects with domestic equipment. As we can see from the example of problems in 2023, many of them were related specifically to the quality of equipment at VVER-1200 power units, namely in terms of turbine equipment produced by JSC Power Machines. On foreign projects, Rosatom offers foreign customers its main export project of the VVER-1200 power unit with the option of choosing a supplier of engine room equipment.  

For example, for 4 VVER-1200 units in China at the Tianwan NPP and Xudapu NPP, Rosatom supplies only nuclear island equipment. And China equips turbine halls with equipment of its own production. Most other projects, in particular all 4 units at Akkuyu NPP in Turkey, 4 units at El Dabaa NPP in Egypt, two planned units at Paks II NPP in Hungary and the canceled Hanhikivi single-unit NPP project in Finland were or are expected to be installed French Arabelle turbines from Alstom Power Systems (owned by the French Alstom, and previously, from 2016 to 2022, by General Electric). 

Equipment for turbine halls from Power Machines was produced in the amount of 8 pieces – for 4 VVER-1200 in Russia, two units of the Belarusian NPP (where they also had problems) and for two units under construction at the Rooppur NPP in Bangladesh. 

Thus, the direct participation of Western industrial companies, in particular French ones, allows Rosatom to offer foreign customers who have the opportunity to choose more competitive products or increase the chances of winning tenders. If the West is seriously concerned about how to limit Rosatom’s activity in third countries, then reducing cooperation in the supply of turbine units for new projects could be a serious and significant step.  

Conclusions

A decrease in output from Russian nuclear power plants is an expected and natural stage in the development of the country’s nuclear energy industry, which is experiencing a period of aging of a certain part of its nuclear fleet. In recent decades, Rosatom has taken a leading position in the construction of nuclear power plants abroad, but has delayed the construction phase of replacement capacities within the country. Over the next 5 years, there will be a gradual reorientation of Rosatom’s activities from foreign nuclear power plant construction projects to domestic ones. At the same time, the quality of Russian turbine equipment still leads to periodic technical problems and is mainly used on domestic Russian projects. It is unlikely that the situation will change quickly in the coming years, therefore, in many cases of competitive selection of projects, the success of Rosatom’s new export proposals for the construction of nuclear power plants will depend on effective cooperation with foreign, primarily Western, partners. And in the future, perhaps even Chinese. 

The post Rosatom’s output dropped over the last year. We look at three reasons why appeared first on Bellona.org.

These and other questions were raised during today’s Bellona forum, “War and the Russian Nuclear Industry,” which brough together experts from Norway and Bellona’s new offices in Vilnius — the new locale for the organization’s Russian staff, who can no longer safely conduct their work on Russian soil.

“We have full-scale war in a country with full-scale nuclear installations, and a situation where international cooperation on nuclear security no longer exists,” said Bellona founder Frederic Hauge in the forum’s opening remarks.

Bellona has worked on nuclear cleanup in Russia since the early 1990s, and this month mark 30 years since Bellona released its first report on the nuclear threat caused by the legacy of the Soviet nuclear navy. It has also been almost exactly two years since Russia invaded Ukraine. That was the backdrop for today’s Bellona Forum, where about 100 people participated physically or digitally.

Tons of Nuclear Waste

Aleksandr Nikitin, a former Russian nuclear submarine officer and Bellona employee of 30 years standing, opened the forum by discussing Bellona’s strategic goals for its nuclear project in Russia.

Alexander Nikitin.

“First and foremost, together with international actors, we have worked to prevent radiation and nuclear accidents at Russian facilities,” he said. “We have also been concerned with ensuring the elimination or safe conversion of the Soviet nuclear and radiation legacy.”

He noted that the Russian nuclear and radiation legacy consists of nearly 20,000 tons of used nuclear fuel, approximately 800,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste, over 4,700 nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities — as well as more than 30,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste dumped on the seabed.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, international efforts to grapple with those issues have stalled.

“But at Bellona, we still have full focus on the Russian nuclear industry, even though now, since we were banned by Russian authorities, we must operate from outside Russia’s borders,” Nikitin said. “We are still working to gather and disseminate information; we share knowledge about the use of nuclear technologies and how the Russian nuclear industry contributes to the continuation of the war in Ukraine.”

‘Rosatom Significantly Involved in the War’

One of the employees at Bellona’s Environmental Transparency Center in Vilnius is nuclear expert Dmitry Gorchakov, who spoke at the Bellona Forum about the role of the Russian atomic agency Rosatom in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Dmitry Gorchakov

“We closely monitor nuclear risks in Ukraine. And we monitor Rosatom’s global nuclear activities and the agency’s role in the international nuclear market closely,” said Gorchakov.

Rosatom is the world’s largest builder of nuclear power plants. One-third of all nuclear power plants under construction in the world are either built by Rosatom or according to Rosatom’s technology and design.

“Rosatom is significantly involved in the ongoing war. One of the most critical situations is the occupation of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, Zaporizhzhia (in southeastern Ukraine), which the Russians have occupied since the first weeks of the war. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been denied access to several areas of the facility,” said Gorchakov.

He highlighted three main risks at the nuclear power plant as it continues to be controlled by Russia on the front lines of the conflict.

“First, there is a risk of equipment damage due to abnormal operation and lack of maintenance. The second risk is the lack of qualified personnel. But the biggest risk, of course, is the war itself; it is unpredictable and creates chaos. Dramatic changes can occur at any time. For example, if Russia decides to switch reactors to power mode or if military activity escalates near the plant,” said Gorchakov.

Secret Nuclear Weapons Program

Thomas Nilsen from The Independent Barents Observer also participated in the Bellona forum. He talked about Russia’s secret reactor-driven nuclear weapons program and its development and testing in the Arctic.

Thomas Nilsen of the Independent Barents Observer.

“We are in a new arms race involving new nuclear weapons and new reactor systems. And we are back to the flow of information that existed during the Soviet era, meaning almost no information. We at The Barents Observer have not reported a single incident from Russian nuclear submarines in the past four years, and that’s not because accidents haven’t happened. It’s becoming harder and harder to obtain information from Russia,” Nilsen explained.

The Barents Observer is the only Norwegian media outlet with four exiled Russian journalists on its editorial staff.

You can watch the entire Bellona forum by clicking on this link.

The post Nuclear security is under attack in Ukraine, say experts at Bellona forum appeared first on Bellona.org.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2002, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023 the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for January 2024.

Follow the links to read the last three digests for December, November and October. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for January 2024
2. Ukrainian Energy Minister announces plans to start construction of four new nuclear power units in 2024

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
3. Plans to develop HALEU production facilities in UK and USA
4. Construction of new nuclear units in Europe. Rosatom is not invited
5. Mongolia prepares to conclude deal with French Orano on use of new uranium field

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
6. Transportation volume on NSR grows. But at slower rates than planned in 2022, and future plans are being adjusted
7. Generation at Russian NPP dropped in 2023. Rosatom tries to avoid discussing this
8. Russia increases export of isotope production
9. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for January 2024 ↑

The 14th team of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) was present at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant until 11 January. This team, like the previous IAEA missions, inspected the buildings and plant territory as part of monitoring the nuclear safety situation at the ZNPP, and also observed the five concrete principles of protecting the plant.

The IAEA team at the ZNPP. Photo:IAEA

On 3 January, the IAEA reported that members of the team, for the first time since the IAEA mission began working at the plant in September 2022, were not granted timely access to the reactor halls of units in cold shutdown, where the reactor core and spent fuel storage pool are located. This concerned the reactor halls of units 1, 2 and 6.

On 5 January, Rosenergoatom representative Renat Karchaa reported that IAEA employees had not been permitted access to the containments in the reactor buildings in connection with safety requirements at the plant, as in usual (non-emergency situations) the containments are sealed. “In ‘sealed’ mode, staff access to the containment is prohibited, and only granted with clear justification and in emergency situations,” said Karchaa.

Later, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation at the IAEA sent a Note Verbale on 11 January which among other things described where the mission experts had been permitted to go in past months. And it is noted that in early December they had the opportunity to examine reactor compartments and the main equipment (reactor, main circulation pumps, steam generators) of units 3 and 5. This information is also confirmed in an IAEA report of 21 December. This means that in December there were no problems in giving mission experts access to the containment.

On 12 January, the 15th IAEA mission began work at the ZNPP. The new team repeated the request for access to the reactor hall of unit 6, but did not receive permission. They were informed that the reactor hall was “sealed”, but experts were not refused access, and rather invited to conduct the inspection in about a week’s time. (Later, in a Note Verbale from the Russian Federation on 19 January, it was noted that the containments of power units are sealed in order to exclude unauthorized access). The IAEA reports that previously all ISAMZ teams were able to receive access to the reactor hall of any power unit in cold shutdown mode, and that the plant management did not mention the status of a containment as being “sealed”.

On 15 January, IAEA experts did receive access to the reactor hall of unit 6, where they inspected the main components of the reactor and confirmed that it was in cold shutdown. During their inspection, the operators transferred the operation of the cooling pumps of the spent fuel pool from one safety train to another.

In the second half of January, experts also visited the reactor hall of unit 3, and in late January the reactor hall of unit 1.

On 22 December, during a walkdown of the safety system rooms of unit 6, IAEA experts observed boric acid deposits on valves, a pump and on the floors of several rooms of the containment building. They were informed that the source of the leak was one of the boric acid storage tanks. The IAEA report notes that these types of leaks can occur during the operation of a plant, but that this kind of event still requires proper and timely attention, investigation and response from the plant operator, to prevent potentially more severe consequences for safety.

On 9 January, experts conducted a follow-up walkdown, noting a significant reduction in boric acid deposits, and that the leak from the tank had also diminished considerably. The group was informed that the cause of the leak was micro-cracks in the boron tank caused by aging, and a blockage in the leak detection pipe. The IAEA was informed that the blockage had been repaired, but that micro-cracks in the tank could only be repaired after draining the tank, which was postponed until scheduled maintenance, as the leak rate was currently within technical specifications.

On 18 January, during a visit to the main control room of unit 6, the IAEA team confirmed that the level of boric acid in the storage tank was above the minimum level in the technical specifications, despite the previously observed leak.

On 20 January, according to the IAEA’s information, the Russian nuclear regulatory body (Rostekhnadzor – note by Bellona) issued a special order to repair this leak.

The IAEA reports that the boric acid deposits were also observed in several safety system rooms of units 1 and 3.

As well as difficulties with access to the reactor halls of power units, since 18 October 2023 IAEA mission experts have been unable to receive access to some sections of the turbine hall of each power unit. On 10 January, access was again restricted at the turbine halls of units 1 and 2, and on 15 January access was denied to some areas of the turbine hall of unit 6. In January, permission was not received to examine the rooftops of reactor buildings, which had been planned for inspection on 19 December, but did not take place “due to security concerns”.

In January, mission experts examined the main control rooms of all six units. The IAEA reported that on 18 January the experts were able to observe staffing levels at the main control rooms, but did not have the opportunity to ask questions about their qualifications and experience.

Additionally, the IAEA reports inform that ISAMZ members visited the pumping stations of units 3 and 4, the emergency diesel generators of unit 6, and the safety system rooms of units 3 and 5.

At the end of January, they visited the two fresh fuel storage facilities, the dry spent fuel storage facility and water sprinkler ponds. They performed radiation monitoring, confirming that radiation levels were normal.

Also at the end of January, experts performed a walkdown of the cooling pond area, which supplies water for some of the site’s needs not related to safety (cooling water for the six shutdown reactors is supplied by the 11 groundwater wells near the sprinkler ponds). There they met with plant staff handling the site’s water management, and discussed how the cold winter weather may affect the cooling pond, and how the ZNPP deals with any impact of ice. Before the war, the water in the cooling pond was kept warm due to the operation of the reactor units. This winter, when it was coldest, the pond was covered by a two-centimeter layer of ice. During the walkdown, experts observed ice in a few locations of the cooling pond.

During this visit, experts were once again not permitted to examine the isolation gate of the cooling pond.

An inspection of the 750 kV open switchyard was also carried out, where experts confirmed that only one such power line was connected to the electricity grid (of the four that were connected before the war). 

On 19 January, the IAEA reported that in the buffer zone between the external and internal fences of the plant around the perimeter of the site, anti-infantry mines had once more appeared. Previously experts had already reported the mining of this area in July 2023, but the mines were removed in November 2023.

The Russian permanent mission replied that the presence of mines was due to the need to deter potential saboteurs, which “corresponds to the fourth of the five principles to ensure the nuclear safety and security of the ZNPP” presented by Grossi in May 2023. “Moreover, laying mines to protect the perimeter of a nuclear power plant is an acceptable practice that does not contradict any IAEA recommendations. This method can be used even in case when the nuclear facility is not located in the zona of an armed conflict”.

In the summer of 2023, however, Grossi discussed mining the perimeter of the plant, saying that “having such explosives on the site is inconsistent with the IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance and creates additional psychological pressure on plant staff – even if the IAEA’s initial assessment based on its own observations and the plant’s clarifications is that any detonation of these mines should not affect the site’s nuclear safety and security systems.”

The IAEA team at the ZNPP constantly reports that explosions can be heard at some distance from the site. At other Ukrainian NPPs, IAEA representatives also report air raid alarms almost daily. A communication from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the IAEA reported that in mass rocket attacks of Ukrainian territory by Russia, on 29 December in the regions of the Rivne and Khmelnitsky NPPs two missiles flew at an altitude of 500 meters, and on 2 January as a result of a missile attack on Kiev, the electricity and water supply was lost in the building of the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety.

Since July 2023, if the single main power line is switched off, the plant can receive electricity through the 330 kV reserve line. But all this time, for the line to work, it had to be connected manually. In early January, the IAEA published a report that measures had been taken at the plant to ensure the automatic supply of reserve electricity: work was conducted on the back-up electrical transformers, and two of the three transformers were put into operation, of which one is constantly connected to the on-site back-up power lines of all six power units. But on 18 January, an accident took place on the transformers that had been put into operation. Eight hours later, two other back-up power electrical transformers were connected. Maintenance on the malfunctioning transformer was completed in late January, and it resumed work. The preliminary cause of the failure has been determined, but IAEA experts have not yet been informed of the cause of the accident.

Inspection of the auxiliary back-up power transformers 5 and 6 during a visit by Rafael Grossi to the ZNPP on 7 February 2024. Photo IAEA

In January, IAEA experts at the ZNPP were shown the high-level maintenance plan for 2024, and informed about plant maintenance. They were told that priority was maintenance of safety systems of the site, and also important works that had not been carried out in 2023. The annual maintenance plan includes safety systems, diesel generators, unit transformers and the 750 kV electrical switchyard. The mission experts did not receive a copy of the plan for detailed study. But on the basis of discussions and information presented to the team, the IAEA came to the conclusion that the ZNPP would not realize the comprehensive maintenance plan in 2024.

On 8 January, Rosenergoatom representative Renat Karchaa reported that specialists from Atomenergoremont (the head specialized repair organization in Russia) and the repair division of the ZNPP would be brought in for scheduled and preventative repair works. The latter currently employs around 800 people, and in 2024 it is planned to increase the size of the staff to 1,200.

As of late January, five of the six reactors at the ZNPP remain in cold shutdown, while unit 4 is in hot shutdown to produce steam and heat. On 1 February four new diesel steam generators were put into operation, and the steam generated will be used to process liquid waste. It has not yet been confirmed at the ZNPP whether the steam generated by this new equipment will enable it to place all reactor units in cold shutdown.

On 23 January, Energoatom reported that soon the six-year warranty period permitted by the manufacturer would expire for nuclear fuel at all six reactors of the ZNPP.

On 25 January, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi made a general statement on the situation at nuclear sites of Ukraine at a closed meeting of the UN Security Council. He reported that in early February he would visit the ZNPP for the fourth time since the beginning of the war, and prior to this on 6 February would hold high-level talks in Kiev, and also hold meetings in Russia in mid-February.

One issue that he plans to discuss at the ZNPP is the statement by the Russian side that from 1 February employees of the Ukrainian national operator Energoatom will not be permitted at the plant. These concerns 120 specialists who did not sign a contract with the operating organization appointed by Russia.

Grossi says that to ensure nuclear safety it is extremely important that qualified and experienced staff work at the plant. To inquiries by the IAEA team about staff at the ZNPP, the Russian side replied that at present the Russian operating organization of the ZNPP employs 4,500 people and is currently considering 940 applications. The staff consists of former employees of Energoatom, who took Russian citizenship and have signed labor contracts with the Russian operating organization, and also employees sent to the ZNPP from Russia. The plant has sufficient qualified staff and all vacancies are filled completely. It also announced that the nominal number of staff for the NPPs operated by Rosatom is significantly lower than the number of staff established by Ukraine. Before the war began, the staff at the plant numbered around 11,500 people.

Commentary by Bellona. Alexander Nikitin:

The situation at the ZNPP is unique from the standpoint of international law, safety provision and common sense. A nuclear facility was captured by the military of a neighboring state using weapons, i.e. essentially an act of nuclear terrorism was carried out. The perimeter of the plant has been mined, and nearby military operations are being carried out with heavy weaponry and aircraft.

A strict military administrative regime has been established at the ZNPP. The civilian staff of the plant are subject to threats, pressure and blackmail. Those who do not accept the conditions of the new administration are fired or face other measures of punishment. As a result, the size of the operating staff of the plant has dropped by 2.5 times. It is an open question as to whether this number of staff is sufficient, and to what extent they are professionally reliable to ensure a high level of safety. Energoatom claims that the majority of staff do not have licenses.

There is practically no international influence on the situation. The IAE mission at the ZNPP is in the position of “poor relations”, who are sometimes permitted to look at what they want to. The mission and the IAEA itself have no special rights and capabilities.

The NPP units are not in operational mode. As a result, unpredicted breakdowns and leaks take place, which evidently may be caused by the fact that they were not supposed to be used in these modes. Ukraine’s Energoatom is beginning to worry that the six-year period of holding nuclear fuel in reactors established by the manufacturer is running out, and this is an beyond design previously untested conditions.

Rosenergoatom’s plan to carry out full maintenance of the equipment, systems and mechanisms of the ZNPP in 2024 is designed primarily to reassure itself and improve its image in the international community. Testing the functionality of nuclear unit equipment without the ability to use all modes, and not knowing many features of systems and mechanisms of nuclear units, will at best change nothing, and at worst will lead to dangerous situations.

Thus, Bellona believes that the ZNPP remains a nuclear hazardous facility with an uncertain technical state of the equipment of nuclear units, with an unclear level of staff numbers and qualifications, and also with uncertain prospects for the near future.

Ukrainian Energy Minister announces plan to start construction of four new nuclear power units in 2024 ↑

Ukrainian Energy Minister German Galushchenko reported on 25 January that in the summer or autumn of 2024 Ukraine plans to start building four new nuclear power reactors to compensate for the capacity of the Zaporizhzhia NPP occupied by Russia.

It is planned to build all four units at the Khmelnitsky NPP. Two power units, including reactors and accompanying equipment, will be based on equipment of Russian manufacture, which Ukraine plans to import from Bulgaria (it was designed for construction of two VVER-1000 units at the Belene NPP). These will be units 3 and 4, which were 75% and 28% complete respectively at the time construction came to a halt in 1990.

Galushchenko said that if Ukraine received the Bulgarian reactor equipment now, then in 2.5 years the first reactor could be put into operation. It is planned to install the reactors together with the assistance of the Westinghouse company.

The modern appearance of unit 3 of the Khemlnitsky NPP. Photo: xaec.org.ua

Discussions about purchasing equipment from the uncompleted Belene NPP began in July 2023. The national assembly of Bulgaria passed a decision that the sale price could not be less than 610 million Euros. In December 2023 Bulgarian energy minister Rumen Radev stated that the price would be higher than this sum, and that if the deal was completed, this money would be used to build two new reactors on the site of the Bulgarian Kozloduy NPP. At present, the reactors continue to be maintained according to the constructor’s recommendations, and conservation is managed by the Russian Atomstroiexport.

Radev also said that Ukraine was not only interested in all the equipment, but also in the engineering project. On 13 January, he reported that the sale of equipment from the Belene NPP to the Ukrainian side would depend on the financial package that the European Union approves for Ukraine. On 1 February, the EU agreed on a decision to issue macro-financial assistance to Ukraine.

Steam generator for a VVER-1000 unit in storage on the Belene NPP site. Photo: 3e-news.net

The two other units at the Khmelnitsky NPP, 5 and 6, will be built with AP1000 reactors from Westinghouse. In December, the Ukrainian nuclear power company Energoatom and Westinghouse signed an agreement on purchasing equipment for unit 5. Energoatom and Westinghouse are preparing to pour the first concrete in the first quarter of 2024.

Galushchenko says that to start the construction of all four units, the Ukrainian parliament must pass an according law.

It should be recalled that plans to build the units using equipment from Bulgaria, as well as units using the American AP1000, drew questions from a number of independent Ukrainian experts concerning the quality and cost of equipment, and the legality of all these procedures.

Commentary by Bellona. Alexander Nikitin:

Building four units in a situation when Russian missiles strike sites in the Khmelnitsky Oblast practically every day is no simple task. It would be interesting to see an analysis about how much electricity Ukraine requires today with the slump in industry caused by the war. If guaranteed electricity supply to the population is concerned, then it may be simpler to create wind and solar power sites on the right bank and western oblasts of Ukraine. This is cheaper, quicker and safer.

To build nuclear units, qualified staff is required, including employees who are supposed to be fighting in the war. In short, the intentions would make more sense if this was a time of peace, or at least a predictable time. But at present, the best choice of action should be chosen wisely.

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia Plans to develop HALEU production facilities in UK and USA ↑

Two countries in the Sapporo-5 alliance have announced their plans for developing production of enriched uranium for advanced nuclear reactors.

On 7 January, the UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero announced plans to launch a program to produce high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) in the UK. State investments in developing the program will come to 300 million pounds, which is part of plans to provide up to 24 GW of nuclear power by 2050. An additional 10 million pounds will also be provided to develop skills and sites for producing other modern types of nuclear fuel in the UK. The first plant for producing nuclear fuel in northwest England is planned to be put into operation in the early 2030s. This program is included in the Roadmap published on 11 January for developing civil nuclear power until 2050.

On 9 January, the US Department of Energy issued a request for proposals for uranium enrichment services to help establish a reliable domestic supply of fuels using HALEU, which will be used in advanced nuclear reactors. At present, there is no commercial manufacturer of HALEU in the USA, and the department of energy believes that boosting domestic supply could spur the development and deployment of advanced reactors in the USA.

Altogether, the Inflation Reduction Act will provide up to USD 500 million for contracts on HALEU enrichments selected as part of this request for proposals, and for a separate contract on uranium deconversion services.

It is planned to award one or more contracts for HALEU production on the basis of US capacity, with a duration of up to 10 years. The government assures each contractor a minimum value of order of USD 2 million for the term of the contract. After enrichment, the material will be stored on site, until there is a need to ship it to deconverters. The proposals should be presented before 8 March.

HALEU is expected to be required for a planned generation of reactors in the works by companies including X-energy and TerraPower. The Department of Energy predicts that by 2030 over 40 tons of HALEU will be required, and in each subsequent year an additional amount will be needed to deploy new advanced reactors in a timeframe that supports the net-zero emissions targets by 2050.

In mid-December, US Congress also passed the National Defense Authorization Act and created a new Nuclear Fuel Security Program. Under this program, the Department of Energy undertakes to purchase not less than 20 tons of HALEU annually from American manufacturers, to create a supply and make these resources available for US companies.

In October 2023, the US company Centrus launched a demonstrational cascade for HALEU production as part of a three-year contract with the US government, and in November the first 20 kg of enriched uranium were delivered. This is the only US company with a license to produce HALEU. They also plan to “fight for financing required to expand production”.

Until now, the only major producer of HALEU on a commercial basis was Russia (Tekhsnabeksport, part of Rosatom). At present the main consumer of HALEU is not power reactors, but nuclear research reactors. According to assessments of the Euratom Supply Agency, the current requirements in the EU for this type of nuclear material is around 1 ton per year.

View of a cascade, HALEU Demonstration Program, Centrus Energy Corp. Credit: Centrus Energy Corp.

Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov:

The growing interest in small modular reactors (SMR) in the world nuclear industry gives rise to a growing demand for a new type of fuel used in many SMR projects. At present Russia occupies a practically monopolistic position as the supplier for this type of fuel on the free market, as opposed to its share of not more than 40% on the market of low-enriched uranium. Therefore, efforts by western manufacturers and governments to develop HALEU production are directed towards preventing future serious dependence on this new market that is critically important for the western nuclear industry. At the same time, in the coming years it will probably not be possible to increase capacities drastically, and in the US the need for HALEU may be covered by dilution of high-enriched weapons-grade uranium.

Construction of new nuclear units in Europe. Rosatom is not invited ↑

On 19 January, the Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria began the procedure of selecting an EPC contractor (engineering, procurement and construction) to build units 7 and 8 of the plant under the Westinghouse AP1000 project, publishing an invitation to express interest. Westinghouse will be responsible for planning AP1000 reactors, while planning individual systems and buildings of the plant will be delegated to the contractor.

The invitation states that the applying companies should confirm experience of working in the nuclear sphere acquired over the last 15 years, and as a leading constructor in contracts for building and putting into operation at least two nuclear power units.

The invitation text directly stipulates that candidates from Russia will not be examined in this procedure or included on the short list.

On 2 February it was learned that 5 companies had expressed interest (three companies expressed interest before the end of the deadline for submitting applications – South Korea’s Hyundai Engineering and the US corporations Fluor and Bechtel, said the executive director of the Kozloduy NPP Valentin Nikolov).

This is not the first case when Russia has been deprived of the opportunity to take part in European tenders for construction of NPPs. In April 2021, during the scandal concerning the involvement Russian special services in explosions at an ammunition storage facility in the Czech Republic in 2014, Rosatom was excluded from the list of candidates for a tender to build a new unit at Dukovany NPP out of safety considerations (China was also excluded from the list of candidates).

In May 2022, the Finnish company Fennovoima annulled the EPC contract with Rosatom for the delivery of the Hanhikivi-1 NPP and stopped construction, and arbitration proceedings concerning this project are continuing. On 22 January 2024, the company Fortum (operator of the Loviisa NPP in Finland) reported that it was examining several potential sites in Finland and Sweden to build NPPs with small and large reactors. The site of the Hanhikivi NPP is not one of them. It was also reported that if Forum builds a new nuclear reactor, the supplier of technologies will not be from Russia or China.

The project of the Hanhikivi-1 NPP. Credit: Fennovoima

Commentary by Bellona. Alexander Nikitin:

Evidently, the process of Rosatom’s participation in building power units in Europe has taken a pause, and it is uncertain when and how it will end. At present Rosatom only remains in Europe in Hungary at the construction of the Paks-2 NPP, and in the court proceedings with the Finnish company Fennovoima, which unilaterally annulled the contract with Rosatom to build the Hanhikivi NPP. No prospects for new construction in Europe are envisaged for Rosatom. Furthermore, practically all European countries where NPPs of Russian (Soviet) design have been built, maximum efforts are being taken to replace Rosatom nuclear fuel with fuel from other companies.

Hence Rosatom’s aspiration to move into the construction market in countries of the Global South, where China will be a serious competitor for them. A difficult situation for Rosatom is also unfolding on the market of the former Soviet Asian and Caucasian republics. The decision on what design will be used and who will build NPPs, for example, in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or Armenia, has not been taken, but given the current geopolitical situation and the recent talks of these countries with France concerning uranium surveying and production, it is unclear what Rosatom’s chances are.

Mongolia prepares to conclude deal with French Orano on use of new uranium field ↑

At the International economic Forum in Davos, Mongolian Prime Minister Luvsannamsrai Oyun-Erdene reported that Mongolia was close to reaching an agreement with the French company Orano on operation of the Zoovch-Ovoo (Зөөвч-Овоо) uranium field. The chief executive officer of the Orano group Nicolas Maes in an interview with a Mongolian newspaper on 29 January shared several details of the future project.

The project for production in this field has been developed for 25 years, and production will be carried out using underground leaching technologies. It is expected that after an investment agreement is signed and the required infrastructure is built, production will begin in 2028-2029 with a planned production capacity of 2500 tons per year. USD 400-500 million will be invested before the project starts, and USD 1.6 billion during realization.

In previous years, surveying works were carried out at the field to establish the expediency of its future development, with test production of a total volume of up to 10 tons of uranium concentrate. Works were carried out by the company Badrakh Energy – a joint enterprise of Orano (66%) and the Mongolian state company Mon-Atom (34%).

Previously in 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Mongolia, and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh visited France, where a protocol on developing the field was signed.

In November 2023, Macron made official visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where issues were also raised concerning surveying and production of uranium.

Yellow cake (uranium oxide concentrate) manufactured by Badrakh Energy, Mongolia. Credit: unuudur.mn

Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov:

The potential production of uranium in Mongolia and reaching planned work indicators by the end of the decade are capable of replacing current deliveries of uranium from Russia to the EU, which in 2022 came to around 2000 tons. However, possibilities for replacing Russian supplies will also depend on the possibilities for maintaining deliveries to the EU from other traditional sources – Kazakhstan, Canada and Niger.

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad Transportation volume on NSR grows. But at slower rates than planned in 2022, and future plans are being adjusted ↑

Summing up the results of 2023, the head of Rosatom reported that in 2023 the volume of cargo transportation by the Northern Sea Route (NSR) had reached a record level of 36.3 million tons. This is almost 2.3 million tons more than the figure for 2022. Transit also increased, coming to 2.1 million tons (compared to 0.2 million tons in 2022), surpassing the previous record of 2 million tons in 2021. One reason for the drastic rise in transit to the historical maximum was the high demand for Russian oil in China. According to data from High North News, in 2023 deliveries to China and from China came to over 95% of transit cargo on the NSR.

“It was possible to achieve record figures thanks to our partners, above all the company NOVATEK, whose liquified natural gas comprises over half of the cargo flow,” said Rosatom general director Aleksey Likhachev. “A major role was also played by Gazprom Neft, Lukoil and Nornickel, which redirected their cargos from the western to the eastern direction.”

Additionally, according to statements by Rosatom representatives, the target figure for cargo transportation on the NSR in 2023 was 36 million tons, and this was exceeded. In June 2023 these figures were named by the special representative of Rosatom for the Arctic Vladimir Panov.

However, according to the plan for developing the NSR until 2035 approved by the Russian government in August 2022, the target figure for transportation volume for 2023 was 46.82 million tons, and this was not achieved. The target figure for 2024 is set at 80 million tons, by 2030 150 million tons, and by 2035 220 million tons. These forecasts will evidently be adjusted.

According to information from Kommersant newspaper published in October 2023, the Ministry of Eastern Development proposed three scenarios for cargo volumes until 2030 – optimistic, basic and conservative. According to the present plan of development for the NSR, by 2030 the volume of cargo should come to 150 million tons. The optimistic, basic and conservative forecasts envisage volumes of 244 million tons, 224 million tons and 117 million tons respectively.

The realization of a certain scenario will depend on the development of a number of key projects in the Arctic, such as Rosneft’s Vostok Oil and also NOVATEK’s projects Arctic LNG-2, Arctic LNG-1, and Ob LNG. Some of these projects are already facing difficulties caused by sanctions placed on Russia (for example, NOVATEK’s Arctic LNG-2 project). According to experts surveyed by Kommersant, the conservative scenario is the most realistic one.

Beside foreign policy factors and sanctions, the rates of development of the NSR will also be influenced by the speed of development of infrastructure on the NSR, rates of launching new transport vessels and icebreakers, and the extent of their financing.

It is planned that in 2024 the icebreaker group to provide support on the NSR will consist of eight nuclear and three non-nuclear icebreakers, in 2030 and 2035 nine nuclear and five non-nuclear icebreakers. At present, Atomflot has seven functioning icebreakers. At the Baltic shipyard at present two more serial universal nuclear icebreakers of design 22220 are being constructed – Chukotka and Yakutia, which are planned for launch in December 2024 and December 2026 respectively, and in the Far East construction continues of the head icebreaker of the 10510 Leader deign, which has been given the name Rossiya – its construction is planned for completion in 2027.

On January 26, the fifth icebreaker “Leningrad” of Project 22220 was launched at the Baltic Shipyard (earlier this icebreaker was planned to be named “Kamchatka”). The ceremony was opened by Russian president Vladimir Putin, and was also attended by Valentina Matvienko, Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Alexander Gutsan, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian president in the North-Western Federal District, Alexander Beglov, Governor of St. Petersburg, Alexey Likhachev, Director General of Rosatom, Andrey Kostin, Chairman of the Board of Directors of United Shipbuilding Company, and others. Construction of the fifth icebreaker of project 22220 began in August 2023. Later, the press-secretary of the St. Petersburg government reported that the sixth icebreaker of project 22220 “Stalingrad” (previously it was planned to be named “Sakhalin”) would be launched at the Baltic shipyard in 2025.

Meanwhile, budget funds for construction of icebreakers in 2024-2026 have been reduced.

The first section of the fifth serial nuclear icebreaker Leningrad. Credit: Baltic Shipyard

According to the January report delivered at the Federal Council by the minister for the development of the Far East and the Arctic Alexey Chekunkov, under the plan for developing the NSR, the total volume of investments up to 2035 is assessed at 1.791 trillion rubles. Of this, it is planned that 620 billion will be provided by the federal budget, and 407 billion from extrabudgetary sources. For the remaining 764 billion rubles (over 40% of the program), sources have not been determined.

Nuclear icebreakers of the 22220 design. Credit: Atomflot

 Commentary by Bellona. Alexander Nikitin:

It would seem that the NSR has become the «favorite child» of Putin and Rosatom. Putin’s aim and intentions are generally understandable.

Firstly, the geopolitical aspiration to create a route from Europe to Asia which would realistically compete with oceanic traffic through the Suez Canal. An important role is played by China’s interest and involvement in this project, whose friendship and economic cooperation Putin is betting on in the long term. Secondly, military and political goals aimed at creating military bases that are difficult to access for western opponents, which may allow Russia to gain complete control of the Arctic region. And finally, the economic interest in the minerals of the Arctic region and the development of its coastline when favorable climatic conditions begin.

Rosatom at present is one of the reliable state structures which Putin trusts almost unconditionally. Therefore, in the near future we should expect further activity by Rosatom in the Arctic, construction of new vessels, including nuclear ones, and also the construction and development of new ports, the capacity of which is already over 40 million tons at present.

Later, we may expect that Rosatom will include coastal fields of rare earth and other valuable metals in its structure on various terms, consolidate its enterprises on Novaya Zemlya, and develop the Arctic fleet and its infrastructure for trade and transportation. To achieve this, it will attempt to acquire shipyards of the United ship building company specializing in construction of icebreakers and transport vessels, and it has in fact already started this process. 

Generation at Russia’s NPPs dropped in 2023. Rosatom tries to avoid discussing this ↑

On 31 January, the Russian statistics board published data on industrial production in Russia for 2023. The data shows that in 2023, NPPs generated 217 billion kWh of electricity, which is 2.8% less than in 2022. However, according to Rosatom reports, this exceeded the target figure for the year. As we predicted earlier in our digests, for 2023 we can observe a drop in generation at Russian NPPs, caused by the aging of the country’s NPPs.

Electricity generated by Russian NPPs from 1991 to 2023, and the share of nuclear power in total electricity production in Russia. Graph by Bellona.

The share of NPPs in total electricity generation in Russia in 2023 came to 18.5%. This share has been dropping for four years in a row from the maximum figure of 20.3% achieved in 2020 during the pandemic. The target figure for electricity generated by nuclear power that Putin set Rosatom is 25% of the total energy balance of the country by 2045. “According to preliminary assessments, this will require 24 power units being put into operation, including at new sites and in new regions,” Rosatom general director Alexey Likhachev said in March 2021.

But in late 2022 construction plans of new NPPS in Russia were adjusted downwards. It was decided to compensate for the lag in the pace of construction of replacement facilities in the coming years by extending the service life of old units of high-power channel-type reactors (RBMK) from 45 to 50 years.

Incidentally, on January 31, power unit 2 of Kursk NPP with a RBMK-1000 reactor was shut down according to schedule as it reached the end of its 45-year service life, and it is planned to replace it by the end of this year the new power unit 1 of the Kursk NPP-2 with a VVER-TOI reactor.

Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov:

The drop in generation by Russian NPPs is an expected and natural stage in the development of the country’s nuclear power industry, which is going through a period of aging of a certain part of its nuclear units, namely the many RBMK units which were built in the 1970s and 1980s. The forced decision to extend the operation of the second generation of these reactors will make it possible to postpone a drop in generation in the coming years. However, the situation will not change critically without the mass construction of replacement facilities.

Rosatom has taken the lead in building NPPs abroad in recent decades, but has delayed the phase of building replacement facilities domestically. In the next 5 years, construction of up to 8 new large nuclear power units will begin in Russia, and Rosatom will gradually reorient its activities from foreign NPP construction projects to domestic ones, in order to solve the tasks of maintaining and increasing the share of nuclear power in the country.

Russia increases export of isotope production ↑

In 2023, exports of isotope products by Isotope JSC, part of Rosatom Health Technologies Division (recently renamed from Rosatom Healthcare) increased by 15%. Over the past year, new contracts were signed in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and the CIS. In particular, agreements with enterprises in China and India increased turnover there by one and a half and three times respectively.

After a break of many years, a shipment of Russian cobalt-60 products was received by Middle East irradiation centers. Deliveries began of the Macrotech preparation and technetium-99m generators to Belarus, and gallium-68 generators to Kazakhstan began. Cooperation with Latin American countries was expanded. Medical products are being supplied to Brazil. In January this year, regular deliveries commenced of molybdenum-99m and iodine-131 to clinics in Cuba.

Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov:

In addition to its serious share on world markets in NPP construction and the nuclear fuel cycle, Rosatom is a major supplier of isotope products for medicine and industry. According to information provided by Isotope JSC, the company works with more than 17 partners in 50 countries around the world, making around 2,000 export shipments of isotope products annually.

At the same time, in addition to the centralized and official shipments from Russia through Isotope, there may be unofficial shipments from Russia where the products’ source of origin is not made public. The last high-profile scandal concerning semi-legal shipments of isotope products from Russia involved isotopes sent to Sweden from the Russian plant Elektrokhimpribor through a number of private firms.

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

On January 24, the VVER-1000 reactor vessel of Unit 4 was installed in the design position at India’s Kudankulam NPP. After the installation of the reactor vessel, the equipment for the nuclear steam supply system will be assembled – steam generators, main circulating pump units and pressure compensator casings.

Earlier, on December 26, 2023, Russia and India signed a protocol under which Russia deferred payment by India of the debt for construction of the Kudankulam NPP due in 2022 (interest totaling USD 4.06 million and principal with capitalized interest totaling approximately USD 50 million). The deferred amounts are to be paid by India not later than 60 days after the date of signing of the protocol. The payment is proposed to be made in rubles or rupees. Evidently, this was one of the agreements on the Kudankulam NPP units signed by Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar with the Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov. It should be recalled that due to Western sanctions, in 2022 Bangladesh also fell behind in making payments on the Russian loan for the construction of the Rooppur NPP, which Bangladesh and Russia agreed to pay in yuan.

Installing the shell of VVER-1000 reactor of unit 4 of the Kudankulam NPP. Credit: Atomstroiexport

On January 23, a ceremony was held at the construction site of El-Dabaa NPP in Egypt to mark the pouring of the “first concrete” into the foundation slab of Unit 4. The ceremony was attended by Russian president Vladimir Putin and President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in video conference format. Egyptian Prime Minister Moustafa Madbouly, Rosatom General Director Alexey Likhachev and other officials were present at the event site. Earlier, this event had been scheduled for November 19, to coincide with Atomic Energy Day in Egypt. Now all four power units of El-Dabaa NPP are in the construction stage.

Commentary by Bellona. Dmitry Gorchakov:

The implementation of the Kudankulam NPP project is proceeding with delays, as we have noted earlier in our digests. The installation of the reactor vessel at Unit 4 took place more than 6 years after the first concrete was poured at the site. For many other foreign projects of Rosatom, this period is 3-4 years. In China, however, with the same Rosatom VVER-1000 export reactors at the Tianwan NPP, construction of the units has been fully completed and put into operation during this time. This may indicate that Rosatom’s projects in India are difficult to implement for one reason or another. It is characteristic that recent mutual visits of Russian and Indian ministers, as well as the visit of the head of Rosatom to India for the reactor vessel installation ceremony, did not result in the signing of agreements on the start of construction of new Russian power units in India, although the roadmap drawn up between the countries earlier provides for the construction of up to 12 units. At the same time, according to media reports, both sides noted the need to accelerate the ongoing construction of units 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Kudankulam NPP.

In Egypt, the pouring of the first concrete at the fourth unit of El Dabaa NPP has also been inexplicably delayed. At the first three units of the plant in 2022-2023, the pouring of the first concrete took place no more than a month after the relevant license was received from the Egyptian regulatory authority. At the fourth unit, the interval between these events was about 6 months. The ceremony was scheduled for November 19, 2023, but did not take place until 2 months later. Perhaps ceremony with the online participation of heads of state was postponed owing to events in the Middle East and the Gaza Strip.

Recommended publications ↑

On 18 January, Energypost.eu published an article about the dependence of the EU and the US on Russian deliveries in the nuclear fuel cycle, steps taken in recent years and prospects for the future – “Can the EU and US end their dependence on Russia’s nuclear energy industry?” The article describes the differences in the security of deliveries and in the approaches of the EU and US to sanction policy against Russia’s nuclear enterprises, and predicts the consolidation of the western nuclear industry and its prospects in future competition with Russia. The article was written by Ihor Moshenets, PhD candidate at the Central European University.

On 15 January, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published an article on a similar topic: “Diversification from Russian nuclear fuel requires market-oriented solutions”, mainly discussing the diversification of deliveries in the nuclear fuel cycle of the USA and risks of intervening in this sphere by the government. The article was written by Yanliang Pan, graduate student at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies (California).

The post Bellona Nuclear Digest, January 2024 appeared first on Bellona.org.

In solidarity with 290 other European, international and Ukrainian NGOs, Bellona says there is a clear need to ban Russian LNG exports and to close all loopholes in existing sanctions that allow Russia’s fossil fuels to slip into Europe’s energy stream.

Indeed, a Bellona analysis has found that EU countries have continued to actively import Russian fossil fuels throughout the war, placing the bloc among Russia’s biggest customers. Russia’s main gas producing giant Gazprom is also a major contributor of methane at its extraction points, contributing to ongoing warming of the planet, Bellona has reported.

In such circumstances, say the signatories of the letter, it’s clear that what Russia is making on its fossil fuel exports dwarfs the ever-dwindling support for Ukraine coming from the EU and the G7. It is therefore paramount to stop aiding Russia’s war complex through continued fossil fuel imports to the West.

In solidarity with the Ukrainian people, civil society groups demand the G7 and EU to:

1. Fully enforce and lower price caps on Russian crude oil and oil products.
2. Prevent Russia from further expanding the shadow fleet of dangerous, practically uninsured and unaccountable old tankers, operating through illegal and dubious management arrangements and lacking transparency in ownership.
3. Close the “refining loophole”, which allows EU and G7 countries to import oil products — mainly diesel, jet fuel and gasoline — produced from Russian oil at refineries in third countries like India, Turkey or UAE.
4. Fully ban liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from Russia and its transshipment in European ports for exports to other countries. 
5. Take decisive actions to reduce oil and gas consumption and end import dependency to deflate the Russian war economy.

The post Bellona joins appeal to end import of Russian fossil fuels appeared first on Bellona.org.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became worse. Some information ceased to be published altogether, for instance, daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations had been banned or closed. 

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending and overseeing global climate change process. Russia owns approximately one-third of this territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and show the trends, we monitor new legislation, plans of industrial companies, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. 

1. Environmental issues in the Russian Arctic 

The scientific isolation of Russia is having an extremely detrimental impact on climate and environmental research in the Arctic 

A study published in the journal Nature Climate Change on January 22, 2024, confirms that the absence of data from Russian research stations in the Arctic has created a significant information gap for Western scientists. The primary role of the Arctic Council in providing knowledge to national governments and the international community has been questioned since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. By excluding Russia from the Arctic monitoring system, the accuracy of global climate models will be compromised. The dynamics of the taiga zone and the degradation of permafrost cannot be properly accounted for without the data from the 17 Russian stations. 

The Arctic needs updated environmental standards 

The Krasnoyarsk Scientific Centre of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences recently hosted a round table discussion titled “Large Scientific Expedition: Results and Prospects,” which was based on the findings of the Arctic expedition that took place from 2022 to 2023 with financial backing from Norilsk Nickel. The participants of the round table reached the conclusion that the Arctic region of Russia must establish new environmental standards, as the current ones are outdated. 

One illustrative example is the Kola Bay, where numerous cities and enterprises continue to discharge untreated wastewater into the bay. Presently, there is no precise data on the quantity of wastewater being released into the Kola Bay. The most heavily polluted area is believed to be near Murmansk, where wastewater treatment facilities are only operational in the northern part of the city. Insufficient funding and outdated guidelines regarding acceptable discharge level in water bodies hinder the construction of additional facilities in this region. 

Kola Bay. Credit” commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Insider

The increasing methane emissions from the Arctic shelf pose a threat to the global climate 

In an interview with the publication “Arguments and Facts” on January 17, 2024, Igor Semiletov, a Russian scientist and the head of the Arctic Research Laboratory at the Pacific Oceanological Institute of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, discussed the preliminary findings of a study conducted in the seas of the Far East and the Pacific sector of the Arctic, which was concluded in December 2023. 

According to Semiletov, the underwater permafrost of the Arctic shelf contains a significant amount of methane combined with water molecules, known as gas hydrate, which is released due to a phase transition triggered by the warming of the ocean. The estimated methane potential of the Russian Arctic seas’ shelf exceeds one trillion tons, and its release can have a substantial impact on climate warming. Releasing just 5% of the estimated methane reserves from the Arctic shelf could lead to a 2-3C increase in global air temperature within a decade. 

Bellona comment: Anthropogenic emissions causing climate warming have a direct impact on natural processes, including the stimulation of methane release from the eastern Arctic seas’ shelf. This, in turn, can intensify the greenhouse effect and accelerate the process of global warming. 

2. Heightened Industrial Activity in the Arctic  

The boundaries of the Russian Arctic zone are expanding 

During a meeting of the Russian government on January 18, a decision was made to extend the boundaries of the Arctic zone to include two regions of Ugra – Berezovsky and Beloyarsky districts. The bill states that adopting this document will create favorable conditions for the growth and development of municipal areas within the Autonomous Okrug and the Arctic zone as a whole. The industrial potential of Ugra was discussed during the deliberation of the draft federal law. Expanding the Arctic boundaries will facilitate the establishment of new industries and enhance transportation accessibility for geological exploration and the discovery of deposits of natural resources. 

Bellona comment: The Russian Federation’s Arctic zone operates as a special economic zone, offering significant federal and regional benefits for businesses. These benefits include reduced taxation on mineral extraction, excluding hydrocarbons, for new deposits, and inspections of zone residents only with the consent of the Ministry of Eastern Development. Additionally, non-residents also enjoy reduced mineral extraction taxes. Therefore, extending the boundaries of the Arctic zone with preferential conditions for miners inevitably increases environmental risks on a wider territory. 

From January 1, 2024, the customs duty on the export of oil and petroleum products in Russia has been set to zero, and the duty on the export of natural gas has seen a significant decrease.  

Starting from January 1, there will be no export duty applied to crude oil, light and dark petroleum products, oils, commercial gasoline, and coke. The duty on liquefied natural gas is reduced from $4.7 to $1.6, and on pure fractions of LPG, it is reduced from $4.2 to $1.4. Since 2019, the export duty has been annually reduced by 1/6, while simultaneously increasing the mineral extraction tax. 

The Cape Kammenoy shipping and receiving site of the Novoportovskoye oil and gas condensate field. Credit: Vadimirushka

Bellona comment: Approximately 13% of Russian oil and 87% of gas are produced in the Arctic zone. The elimination of export duties on oil and the significant reduction in gas export duties clearly incentivize producers to prioritize the foreign market at the expense of the domestic market, as this measure reduces costs for exporting raw materials. As hydrocarbon exports to Europe gradually decline due to some European countries’ refusal to purchase them from Russia in response to Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, new exports are planned to be directed towards Asian countries. This will contribute to a more intensive use of the Northern Sea Route in the eastern direction, increasing the environmental risks associated with shipping and oil&gas transportation. 

The confirmation of the largest gold reserves since the Soviet era in Chukotka 

The State Commission for Reserves of the Federal Agency for Subsoil Use has confirmed the presence of significant gold reserves at Rosatom’s Sovinoye deposit, located on the shores of the Chukchi Sea. These reserves amount to over 100 tons and include more than 30 placer gold deposits and three ore fields. Drilling operations have been carried out throughout the year, despite continuous permafrost conditions. In just three years, a total of 123 wells, spanning over 32 kilometers, have been drilled. The construction of a landing strip, roads, a sea pier, and the gold ore mining and processing complex itself is planned to be completed by 2028. The company aims to achieve its design capacity of producing 3 tons of gold per year as early as 2029. 

Bellona comment: Gold mining in Russia is an industry that poses serious environmental concerns. In 2021, WWF conducted satellite monitoring and identified over 4,300 kilometers of polluted rivers resulting from alluvial gold mining in Siberia and the Far East. Rosprirodnadzor, the federal environmental oversight agency, consistently reports excessive levels of pollutants in water bodies near gold mining sites. In the Arctic, where simplified inspection procedures have been implemented for enterprises, limited official information is available (no data on gold mining in Russia has been published since 2022), making it practically impossible for independent environmental organizations and activists to monitor activities. These circumstances raise concerns about heightened pollution risks at new deposits. 

The authorized capital of Polar Lithium has increased by 2.6 thousand times 

Norilsk Nickel and Rosatom have recapitalized Polar Lithium company to the sum of 2.6 billion rubles. This significant increase may be attributed to the project’s transition into the active phase of the development of the Kolmozerskoe lithium deposit. Currently, lithium, a crucial element for batteries, including those used in electric vehicles, is not mined in Russia. 

The previous year witnessed a record-breaking period for oil drilling 

According to the international news portal Bloomberg, there was an “oil well boom” in Russia in 2023. By the end of the year, approximately 9,000 new wells, with a combined length exceeding 30,000 km, were drilled in the country. The surge in drilling activities can be attributed, among other factors, to the development of new oil sites, notably the implementation of Rosneft’s Vostok Oil project. 

Rosneft has discovered an underground reservoir in Yamal that potentially suits for storing carbon dioxide 

Experts from the Tyumen Scientific Institute of Rosneft have reported that during a geological survey of the subsoil in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region, they have identified an underground reservoir potentially suitable for pumping and storing over 300 million tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). The site is situated in a zone of low seismotectonic activity, which could ensure the tightness of the reservoir and safeguard the overlying horizons of ground and surface water from the intrusion of carbon dioxide for 1000 years. 

Bellona comment: In Russia, for several years now, the issue of how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions without forsaking the production and use of hydrocarbons has been actively explored. Thus, Rosneft plans to employ technology for capturing and storing CO2 in underground reservoirs at its Arctic oil fields. Therefore, Russia does not intend to systematically address the root cause of anthropogenic impact on the climate by decreasing the use of hydrocarbon fuels in favour of carbon-free alternatives. Instead, it prefers, contrary to the recommendations of the International Energy Agency, to develop new oil and gas fields in the Arctic, and greenwashing the oil and gas industry. This utilization of otherwise beneficial technology does not align with the goals of achieving climate neutrality. 

3. Sanctions affecting Russian industry in the Arctic regions and the international situation in the Arctic 

Sanctions have been imposed on the import of Russian diamonds 

On January 1, 2024, the 12th package of sanctions came into effect, targeting the import of Russian diamonds into the G7 countries and imposing restrictions on the supply of diamonds to the European Union. From January 1, restrictions on the import of diamonds mined or processed in Russia were enforced, and from March 1, sanctions will apply to Russian diamonds processed in other countries. 

Bellona comment: Russia holds the first place globally in terms of both volume and value of mined diamonds. In 2022, Russia produced more than a third of the entire world market’s 40 million carats of diamonds. Diamonds in the Arctic are primarily concentrated in Yakutia and Arkhangelsk, with Yakutia accounting for 82% of all diamonds mined in Russia. According to Comtrade data from 2022, the European Union imported approximately $1.5 billion worth of diamonds from Russia, constituting 40% of all Russian diamond exports. Hence, the sanctions imposed by the EU could significantly impact the income of the Russian diamond industry, particularly affecting the revenue of Alrosa company, which produces 90% of diamonds in Russia. 

The Verkhne-Munskoye diamond deposit, owned by Alrosa, Oleneksky district, Yakutia. Credir: Alrosa

Finland plans to stop buying Russian gas by 2025 

Finland will initiate legislative measures to prohibit the import of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) this year, with the ban scheduled to take effect from the beginning of 2025. This was reported by the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, citing Finnish Minister of Environment and Climate, Kai Mykkänen, who oversees the LNG sector. Unlike pipeline gas supplies, which cost Finland hundreds of millions of euros per month, and which were terminated in May 2022, the imports of LNG are negligible, amounting to several million euros per month, clarified the newspaper.  

In September 2023, Novatek’s CEO Leonid Mikhelson informed reporters that the Russian company had resumed the supply of liquefied natural gas from the Cryogas-Vysotsk facilities to the Finnish Gasum under contract volumes. Gasum received approximately 40% of the company’s LNG volume, he specified. The Cryogas-Vysotsk plant has a capacity of 770 thousand tons of LNG per year, with gas sourced from Novatek’s Arctic fields. 

Bellona comment: Finland’s sanctions on Russian LNG are unlikely to significantly impact the plans and revenue of the Russian gas industry due to the minimal volume of imports. However, they may set a precedent for other EU countries, hastening the process of phasing out Russian gas. 

Norilsk Nickel reduces production volumes due to negative geopolitical situation 

On January 29, 2024, Norilsk Nickel announced its production results for the past year. In 2023, Norilsk Nickel decreased the production of all metals except platinum by 2-5%, which, according to the company, is attributed to the replacement of mining equipment. For 2024, the forecast indicators for the extraction and production of metals are projected to be below the level of 2023. The Company explains this as a result of persistent risks associated with an unfavorable geopolitical environment, which will adversely affect operational activities. 

Norilsk Nickel also announced that in 2023 it inaugurated a Sulfur Program at the Nadezhda Metallurgical Plant (a new sulfuric acid production plant), aimed at reducing sulfur dioxide emissions into the atmosphere from nickel and copper production facility. However, quantitative results on emissions for last year have not yet been published. 

Kola Nuclear Power Plant reduced plans for hydrogen production from 200 to 150 tons per year 

The press service of the Kola Nuclear Power Plant has announced that the station intends to produce up to 150 tons of pure hydrogen per year at its future bench testing complex. Initially, the capacity of the complex was planned to be 200 tons per year. The director of KNPP remarked that hydrogen projects were originally aimed at export, but now exports are suspended, leaving hydrogen projects in a state of “considerable uncertainty.” 

Japan enhances cooperation with Nordic countries to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the Arctic 

During the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa to Finland, the Japanese government unveiled a diplomatic initiative to strengthen collaboration with the five Nordic nations. This initiative will encompass four key areas: Arctic Ocean matters, gender equality, green and digital science and technology, and security and defense cooperation. 

Regarding the Arctic Ocean, the government intends for Japan and the five countries to reaffirm the significance of the principles of free and open seas, based on the rule of law, which Japan holds in high regard. The aim of this initiative is to counter the active presence of China and Russia in the Arctic Ocean, as well as other regions of the world. 

4. Northern Sea Route and shipping 

Russia Leads the Top 10 Countries with the Highest Number of Ships in the Arctic Region 

The Arctic Council for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment has released a report analyzing the entry of ships into the Arctic under different flags. In 2022, Russia emerged as the country with the highest number of ships in the Arctic region, with a total of 885 vessels. Norway secured the second position with 180 ships. 

The report emphasizes the importance of knowing the country under whose flag a ship sails, as this determines the legal responsibilities for ensuring ship safety, security, and environmental compliance. It also highlights the need to develop strategies to address and prevent hazardous ice conditions and temperature-related challenges. 

The cargo ship “Bering” and the icebreaker “Captain Chadayev”. Arkhangelsk, April 2023. Credit: Shutterstock

Freight traffic along the NSR in 2023 was 36.3 million tons, which is 10 million tons lower than planned 

On January 10, 2024, the Department of Communications of the State Corporation Rosatom announced that cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in 2023 reached a record figure of 36,254,000 tons. This milestone represents the highest amount in the history of the Northern Sea Route’s development, although it fell short of the target of 46 million tons. More than half of the cargo flow was attributed to LNG transportation from the Novatek Yamal LNG plant, while the remaining cargo primarily came from Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, and Norilsk Nickel, who redirected their shipments from the western to the eastern direction. 

5. Accidents and emergencies in the Russian Arctic 

In January, two local incidents occurred: a groundwater breakthrough at the Zapolyarnaya coal mine near Vorkuta, resulting in one fatality, and an explosion of the main engine turbine on a fishing vessel in the Barents Sea. 

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, January 2024  appeared first on Bellona.org.

The Clean Arctic Alliance, of which Bellona is a member, has issued an open letter following its meeting with Arctic Council leadership, reiterating the urgency of combating black carbon and pressing the body’s Norwegian leadership to encourage broad measures for its reduction.

The letter, penned following a meeting of Alliance members with Morten Høglund, the Norwegian chair of the council earlier this month, sought again to underscore the urgency of pursuing Arctic emissions targets for black carbon, a particularly potent pollutant that accelerates Arctic melt.

“Black carbon emissions impacting the Arctic is a critical issue for the Clean Arctic Alliance and members, and we are pleased that it is a priority for the Norwegian Chairship” wrote Sian Prior, the lead advisor with the Clean Arctic Alliance.

“Agreement on a new black carbon target for Arctic States and observers is critical and we would be happy to provide support where we can. Black carbon emissions from shipping in the Arctic have doubled between 2015 and 2021 and it will be important that a new target recognizes the importance of reducing emissions from the shipping sector,” the letter added.

She added that concerted action by Arctic States at the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) would be critical for achieving global black carbon emissions from ship — a measure that would be indigenous peoples in the Arctic, as well as non-governmental groups that have Consultative Status at the IMO.

The letter also highlighted the importance of developing zero-emissions energy strategies in the Arctic — an area of special importance to Sigurd Enge, Bellona’s senior shipping and Arctic advisor.

“As the Arctic climate rapidly changes, we need to develop all the options of how to combat the trend of black carbon,” he said. “To amplify the strategy of reducing these emissions is probably the most efficient and achievable measure to use.”

Enge says that exploring how alternative energies can substitute the use of oils and gas as Arctic shipping fuel is an additional area where the Arctic Council can play an important role.

“The Council can help establish a better common knowledge base for production, distribution, and use of alternative energy in the Arctic,” said Enge. “When fossil fuels are not an option for the future, we need to cooperate to find the new path for energy, and the Arctic Council is the right international body to lead this.”

The Clean Arctic Alliance letter comes at an important moment for the Council, whose eight-nation membership has been in turmoil since Russian invaded Ukraine in February 2022. At that time, Russia held the two-year rotating chairship of the organization.  But government-level contact and cooperative scientific work between Moscow and the Council’s other seven members — Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States— were effectively frozen in the wake of Russia’s attack, now in its second year.

Norway, which assumed the Council’s chairship last May and will hold it until 2025, has sought not only to reinvigorate environmental discussions that were sidelined during Russia’s leadership, but also to carefully attempt to bring Russia back into the fold.   

“Russia is, and has always been, a constructive member of the Council,” Solveig Rossebø, Norway’s current senior Arctic official, told the Arctic-based news site High North on the eve of the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø, Norway late last month.

But last week, Russia’s foreign ministry told state news agencies that Moscow would be suspending its annual payment to the Arctic Council until “real work” within the forum resumes — an apparent dig at ongoing apprehensions among some Council nations toward Russia’s full participation.

Bellona’s Yury Sergeev said Russia’s new stance is throwing a wrench in the works of the Council’s progress.

“What happened, of course, is a wake-up call, but should not be seen as anything other than political blackmail. The same statements and actions by Russia preceded its withdrawal from other international cooperation organizations. Cooperation has never been the main goal for Russia — what was important is the fact of public recognition of the Russian Federation as a key player in the international arena,” Sergeev said.

“No matter how this political crisis in the Arctic Council is resolved — whether Russia comes out and creates an alternative council with the participation of the BRICS countries, whether the status quo is maintained or whether a constructive solution is found – we are wasting time! The Arctic only loses from this, and along with it all of humanity,” he added.

Black carbon is composed of small light-absorbing graphite particles produced by diesel engines such as those found on cargo ships and tankers that ply Arctic waterways, and they are a major cause of climate change.  In the Arctic, the accrual of these emissions is visible as soot coats on the polar icecap, absorbing rather than reflecting solar radiation.

That very melting has also caused a spike in maritime traffic through the Northern Sea Route — a 5600-kilometer navigation artery running along Russia’s Arctic coast — leaning to yet more soot deposits on the polar ice cap.

According to the Alliance’s Prior, shipping through the Arctic between 2015 and 2021 doubled. Her follow-up letter to Høglund emphasized that, unless an agreement to cap soot emission in shipping is reached among Arctic nations, the cycle will continue.

The Clean Arctic Alliance is a global alliance consisting of over 20 international organizations with the aim of protecting the Arctic from pollution from heavy fuel oil in the region. Among its members aside from Bellona are Greenpeace, Alaska Wilderness, Clean Air Task Force, the WWF, Pacific Environment, the European Climate Foundation and the Council for Green Transition.

The post Clean Arctic Alliance follows up on Arctic Council meeting to reduce black soot emissions appeared first on Bellona.org.

It has been almost 2 years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and 30 years after Bellona published its first nuclear report on Russian nuclear issues. As the war in Ukraine grinds on Russia’s state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom has emerged as an important player in Russia’s war effort. On February 28th you will have the opportunity to watch the live english broadcast of the Bellonaforum in Oslo, where we will be discussing the following topics:

• How has the war affected the Russian nuclear industry? (We discuss trade, nuclear weapons and the seizure of Ukrainian nuclear power plants)

• What role does the Russian nuclear industry play internationally – and to what extent is it an instrument of the Kremlin? (We discuss markets, sanctions and the EU policy).

• Is there any progress in the work on nuclear clean-up in north-west Russia where the former military bases with spent nuclear fuel are located? (Bellona played an important role in raising awareness and securing funding for this issue. We talk about the termination of international cooperation and the current state of things). 

We will present our analysis of the development, along with invited scientists, journalists and representatives of Norwegian authorities. You will have the opportunity to ask questions online during the broadcast. 

To watch the broadcast that will start on 28 February from 11:00 to 13:00 (GMT+1) please sign up here. 

Speakers:

11:00 – Frederic Hauge, The Bellona Foundation: Bellona’s Nuclear Russia work – before and after the invasion of Ukraine

11:20 – Alexander Nikitin, The Bellona Foundation: Strategic goals of Bellona’s nuclear project during the war. The «nuclear legacy» of the Arctic, today and in the future

11:50 – Thomas Nilsen, The Independent Barents Observer: Russia’s secret reactor-powered nuclear weapons program. Testing and deployment in the Arctic

12:05 – Dmitry Gorchakov, The Bellona Environmental Transparency Center: The activity of Rosatom in Ukraine and on the international stage during the war

12:20 – Ingar Amundsen, The Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority: Norways cooperation with Ukraine to address threats in wartimes

12:35 – Kacper Szulecki, The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs:Russian nuclear energy diplomacy before and after the invasion of Ukraine: the broader picture

13:00 – 13:30 – Panel discussion 

Moderator: Oskar Njaa, The Bellona Foundation 

The post Bellonaforum on nuclear issues: Russia, Ukraine, Rosatom and the war appeared first on Bellona.org.

As new environmental priorities fill the agenda of the Arctic Council under Norway’s leadership, Bellona met last week with its chair, Morten Høglund, to discuss battling climate change in the earth’s most vulnerable and rapidly heating region.

Reducing ongoing pollution from black carbon, carving out green shipping corridors, using cleaner shipping fuels and pursuing an overall zero-emissions policy were among the priorities for Sigurd Enge, Bellona’s senior shipping and Arctic , during the meeting, which took place on the sidelines of the Thursday’s Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø.

Enge was joined in the meeting with Høglund by Sian Prior, lead advisor of the Clean Arctic Alliance, of which Bellona and a number of other international environmental groups, is a member. Together, the organizations have campaigned for new Arctic emissions targets for black carbon, a particularly potent pollutant that accelerates Arctic melt.

“Black carbon emissions from ships have a particularly damaging impact on snow and ice in the Arctic and we are conscious that the Norwegian Chairship have made it one of their priorities for progress and action,” said Prior.

She emphasized that Council member must work to reach new black carbon emissions targets. While nations are on track to reduce emissions by 25-30% from all sectors by 2025, based on 2013 levels, shipping emissions have doubled during the same time.

“This is because currently there is no global or Arctic regulation of ship emissions of black carbon,” she continued. “Plus shipping in the Arctic is increasing  — up 25% between 2013 and 2019 — and ships are spending longer at sea in the Arctic (75% increase in same period). A new ambitious target will update the existing target, but it will be important that shipping emissions are highlighted as a sector in need of urgent action.”

Enge said that, as a Norwegian environmental organization, it was impingent upon Bellona to advance these goals while the council’s two-year rotating presidency was in Norway’s hands.

In the meeting with Høglund, Enge said: “In the alternative energy sector there is a lack of knowledge about production potential, environmental impact, and the future need for alternative energy for the arctic green shift, especially for shipping. Do the different alternative fuel types have a worse impact in arctic’s condition? One of the Arctic Council’s core tasks is to establish a common fact base for the Arctic nations’ challenges. Energy is a main driver for a fossil free arctic shipping sector.”

Enge and Prior also said it was critical for the International Maritime Organization, the UN agency that regulates international shipping, to commit to taking action against black carbon and enforce fuel standards particularly in the Arctic.

“IMO has spent over a decade prevaricating on action to reduce black carbon emissions from ships,” she said. “It has decided what black carbon is, it’s agreed to three different ways to measure emissions but apart from a voluntary resolution it has not yet agreed on any action which will reduce emissions.”

An IMO directive demanding cleaner fuels in the Arctic, enforcement of an Arctic fiuel standard, and the creation of black carbon control areas would, said Prior form the backbone of such regulation.

“A coordinated Arctic Council Member initiative at the IMO could achieve this, as the rest of the world should respect that the Arctic States know what is needed and achievable in the Arctic,” she added.

Black carbon is composed of small light-absorbing graphite particles produced by diesel engines such as those found on cargo ships and tankers that ply Arctic waterways, and they are a major cause of climate change.  In the Arctic, the accrual of these emissions is visible as soot coats the polar icecap, absorbing rather than reflecting solar radiation.

Yet, that very melting has also caused a spike in maritime traffic through the Northern Sea Route — a 5600-kilometer navigation artery running along Russia’s Arctic coast — leaning to yet more soot deposits on the polar ice cap. Unless an agreement is reached among Arctic nations to cap soot emission in shipping, the cycle will continue.

Soot is also distributed across the Arctic by jets, burning wood and forest and tundra fires – the last of which are an ever-increasing problem emanating from Russia each summer as increasingly hot and dry seasons foster long burning and geographically enormous forest fires, which emergency service workers there are finding increasing difficult to cope with.

Black carbon has been known to warm the atmosphere for many years by absorbing sunlight and speeding the melting of ice and snow.  Studies have shown that these soot emissions are a far larger contributor to global warming than has been though, and reductions in these emissions would have a positive effect on slowing warming.

Norway assumed the two-year rotating chairship to the council in May of last year. Prior to that, the eight-nation council — comprised of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States, who each have an Arctic coast — had effectively been frozen for the past two years following Russian’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

During that time, Russia held the Council’s rotating presidency of the organization. But a freeze in cooperation among Moscow and the other countries on the council made agreement on an environmental agenda for the Arctic sphere a tough prospect. Research involving Russia on issues ranging from climate change to polar bearswas been put on hold, and scientists lost access to important facilities in the Russian Arctic.

As for Russia’s continuing role in the Council, senior Norwegian officials told the Arctic-base news site High North, that Russia’s participating in the council remains important.

“We are not the Arctic 7. We are 8. We are the Arctic” Solveig Rossebø Norway’s current senior Arctic official, told the site. “Russia is, and has always been, a constructive member of the Council.”

The Arctic Council, which doesn’t deal with security issues but makes binding agreements on environmental protection and gives a voice to the Indigenous peoples of the polar was one of the few settings where Western countries and Russia worked together closely.

In a recent open letter to the Arctic Council, Bellona and the Alliance requested that a concrete zero-emissions policy be established for Arctic shipping, and that all Arctic nations implement the IMO resolution that requires the use of distillate or cleaner alternative fuels in or near the Arctic.

The Alliance and Bellona also ask that the Arctic Council consider the indigenous population in the Arctic and ensure that their way of life is protected through a reduction in soot emissions.

The Clean Arctic Alliance is a global alliance consisting of over 20 international organizations with the aim of protecting the Arctic from pollution by the use of heavy fuel oil in the region. Among its members aside from Bellona are Greenpeace, Alaska Wilderness, Clean Air Task Force, the WWF,   Pacific Environment, the European Climate Foundation and the Council for Green Transition.

The post Bellona meets with Arctic Council officials on black carbon and alternative energy in the polar region appeared first on Bellona.org.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2002, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023 the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization. 

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for December 2023. 

Follow the links to read the last three digests for November, October and September. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest. Download a PDF of December’s digest here.

In this issue: 

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for December 2023
2. Events in the nuclear sector in Ukraine
2.1. Energoatom purchases equipment for new unit at Khmelnitsky NPP
2.2. Service life of unstable structures of “Shelter” facility at Chernobyl NPP extended for 6 years
2.3. Central spent fuel storage facility prepared to receive SNF of Ukrainian NPPs
3. Rosatom structure delivers electricity to occupied territories of Ukraine from subsidies from the budget and surcharges for payments in Russia

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NEWS AND ITS CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
4. The nuclear topic at COP28: 22 countries pledge to triple nuclear capacity by 2050, and the Sapporo-5 alliance intends to allocate USD 4.2 billon to increasing western deliveries in the nuclear sphere
5. Urenco announces second major expansion of capacity for uranium enrichment in a year
6. Ban on import of Russian uranium to the USA
7. Rosatom extends operation of Armenian NPP
8. Preparation for extending the service life of Paks NPP
9. Fortum seeks alternative fuel suppliers

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
10. First floating NPP has steam generators repaired with spare parts from a warship decommissioned over 20 years ago
11. Kola NPP examines possibility of extending service life of first two units to 65 years
12. Rosatom projects abroad in brief
13. Rosatom continues to expand assets

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear Events in Ukraine and the War  Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for December 2023 ↑

On 2 December a complete cutoff of external power took place at the ZNPP for the eighth time since the plant was occupied – the main 750 kV Dniprovska power line and the backup 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 line. The plant switched to the reserve diesel generators. At power unit 4, which is in hot shutdown mode, the main cooling pumps stopped running for a short time. 

The power from the 750 kV line was restored several hours later, but because of shelling of the Ukrainian territory where the power cut took place, it took over two weeks to restore the connection to the reserve power line. On 15 December, the IAEA reported that the Zaporizhzhia NPP once more had two alternative external power sources. 

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, March 2023 Credit: Frederick Dahl/IAEA

On 5 December, a rotation of the IAEA group took place, and the 14th mission since September 2022 began working at the plant. The experts continued to observe work on maintenance at the plant, including measures taken after boron was detected in November in the secondary cooling circuit of unit 5, after which the reactor of this unit was switched from hot shutdown to cold shutdown. Regarding this situation, in mid-December IAEA experts at the ZNPP reported that the levels of boron concentration in the secondary cooling circuit of all 24 steam generators of the plant were within established limits, and that no further actions would be taken at present.  

The IAEA mission also was informed that there are no plans to switch unit 5 to hot shutdown. In December, four new mobile diesel boilers were installed at the ZNPP to produce additional steam, required for various functions at the site, including for processing waste. As well as these boilers, there are already nine mobile boilers at the site, eight of which provide heating in winter. 

The IAEA team at the ZNPP continues to make walkdowns of the premises and territory of the plant. On 7 December, a group of experts made a walkdown of the turbine halls of all six reactor units. However, access was provided with restrictions, and it was not possible to inspect all parts of the turbine halls. At the areas that were inspected, experts did not detect any mines, explosives, military equipment or transport vehicles. On 18 December, the experts inspected the turbine hall of unit 5, but noted that despite the request submitted before the visit, access was once again not provided to the north-western section of the turbine hall, and since mid-October the IAEA has not been able to inspect the north-western section of any one of the six turbine halls. 

Locations on the territory of the Zaporizhzhia NPP where access to IAEA inspectors was restricted in December 2023. Credit: Bellona infographic, background - Google Earth satellite image

On 19 December, an inspection was planned of rooftops of the reactor buildings of units 1, 5 and 6. Despite numerous requests, in the past months members of the IAEA were only able to inspect the rooftops of reactor buildings of units 2, 3 and 4. But this time the inspection was also not carried out, it was cancelled “due to security concerns”, and an alternative date was not scheduled. In addition, in the last weeks of December, inspectors were unable to gain access to the reactor halls of power units 1, 2 and 6. For the first time, the IAEA experts were not allowed into the reactor halls of power units that was in cold shutdown. 

As well as difficulties with access to the turbine halls and rooftops of reactor buildings, it was reported that in December the IAEA mission was not given access to the isolation gate of the cooling pond, and yet again was denied the opportunity to inspect the 330 kV open switchyard at the Zaporizhzhia TPP located next to the ZNPP (In March 2023, the Russian Federation informed the IAEA that it would carry out restoration works at the thermal power station, and that restoration of the open switchgear would allow to ensure the power supply of the ZNPP from the energy system of Russia. In June 2023, during a visit to the Zaporizhzhia NPP, after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam, IAEA director general Rafael Grossi visited the ZTPP, where he saw significant damage on the territory of the 330 kV open switchyard). 

On 12 December, an emergency communication drill was held at the plant involving on-site and off-site representatives from different Russian organizations, and IAEA experts were able to observe part of the drill. 

On 20 December, without preliminary notification, a fire drill were held at the ZNPP site. The drill scenario involved a hypothetical oil leakage at the transformer of reactor unit 2, which resulted in a fire. Regional, city and on-site fire departments took part in the drill. The IAEA team was only made aware of the drill afterwards.  

On 2 December, during the UN Climate Change Conference (COP-28) in Dubai, the director general of Rosatom Aleksey Likhachev met with IAEA director general Rafael Grossi, and full-scale consultations was planned for January-February 2024. 

On 20 December, the advisor to the general director of the Rosenergoatom concern Renat Karchaa reported that at the ZNPP in 2023 repair of safety systems had been carried out. According to Karchaa, work “was completed from the standpoint of applying federal (Russian – author’s note) standards and rules, and from the technical standpoint”, and that the plant was continuing to move to Russian standards. One of the stages of this process is preparing applications for receiving licenses from the Rostekhnadzor board for each power unit, a complex for processing radioactive waste, a dry storage facility of spent nuclear fuel and other facilities of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. 

Karchaa also noted that technically, the plant was prepared to put power units into operation, but that this would become possible under two conditions: a ceasefire and ensuring that the cooling pond was kept at the necessary level and had a sufficient water supply, “which should involve restoring the Kahkovka hydro-power plant or creating some alternative water supply”. 

On 29 December, the ZNPP and Enerhodar were visited by the first deputy head of the Russian presidential administration Sergey Kiriyenko and senator Dmitry Rogozin, where a meeting was held to discuss development plans for the plant in 2024. 

Commentary by Bellona: For the first time in history, a war is being fought in a country with an abundance of nuclear and radiation sites. In the events surrounding the ZNPP, the two warring sides and the IAEA are involved. Each side has its own interests and tasks, which are not fully revealed. Therefore, we often have to make assumptions.  

For example, it is reported that a meeting is planned between IAEA director Rafael Grossi and Rosatom head Aleksey Likhachev with the goal of carrying out full-scale consultations. Firstly, the question arises – what exactly are full-scale consultations, and what is the goal of carrying them out? Assumptions or guesses are pointless here. We will see what report is made after the meeting.  

What is the real interest of the IAEA at the ZNPP, and what can this organization do? We may assume that its main interest is for nuclear and radiation incidents not to take place (not to mention accidents and disasters), but it cannot do anything other than share limited information, given the nature of its mission, about what is taking place at the ZNPP.  

Rosatom’s interest comes down to the military and political interests of Putin’s current policies. Rosatom cannot exist in these conditions in any other way. Rosatom also does not have particular strategic capabilities in this situation. Rosatom is pretending (or perhaps even doing something in reality) that it is trying to maintain NPP units in a technically safe condition. And this is all. Nothing more is required from Rosatom, and nothing more depends on it.  

Thus, the event with the grandiose title of full-scale consultations is from all appearances a discussion about how to maintain the units technically as long as the two warring military political groups do not start active warfare. If the Ukrainian armed forces start to attack, then no technical measures may no longer be necessary. 

If (which is highly improbable) Ukraine and Russia suddenly reach a peace agreement (a ceasefire does not count) and liberate the ZNPP, then all technical measures will be Ukraine’s responsibility. Rosatom does not decide any military and political issues, it is an executor within the limits of its own functions and capabilities. Sometimes it appears that for Rosatom, the ZNPP is an unnecessary burden and headache forced on it by the war. But on the other hand, one might say that it consented to this burden itself… although it is unclear if it really had a choice. Perhaps for this reason, Likhachev devoted more attention in his report for 2023 on raising money for residents of Enerhodar and social policy, and not about what to do with the ZNPP. 

We may further propose several possible scenarios, but there is hardly likely to be one where Putin says that he intends to give everything back and that will be an end to it. So in 2024 we should expect this region to bring us rather unpleasant news in the nuclear and radiation sphere. But even if such events do not take place, it is always pleasant to be in a situation when one expects bad news, but receives good news instead. A “fog” continues to surround the situation at the ZNPP. 

Events in the nuclear sector in Ukraine ↑

Energoatom purchases equipment for new unit at Khmelnitsky NPP

On 17 December, Energoatom and Westinghouse Electric Company signed an agreement to purchase equipment for unit 5 of the Khmelnitsky NPP. It will be built according to US technology with AP1000 reactors. 

Two agreements on cooperation with the goal of realizing a pilot project for the construction of AP1000 power units at the Khmelnitsky NPP were signed in November 2021, and a decree on developing a feasibility report for building a nuclear facility using the technical characteristics of the AP1000 type reactor was signed by the Ukrainian government in January 2023. The agreements signed with the Westinghouse company propose building up to 9 power units in Ukraine with AP1000 reactors. The first two will be built at the Khmelnitsky NPP site. 

Commenting on the signed agreement, Petro Kotin noted that the equipment of the reactor island in question has already been manufactured and is ready for delivery. The agreement is priced at USD 437.5 million. Petro Kotin also noted that as soon as the Supreme Rada of Ukraine passes a law to build power units with AP1000 technology, Energoatom will commence construction work at the Khmelnitsky NPP site. The total cost of construction will come to around USD 5 billion. 

Detailed conditions of the deal are classified as a commercial secret. This probably concerns the reactor island manufactured for power unit 2 of the Virgil C. Summer NPP, construction on which was suspended in the USA in 2017. In 2021 the president of Energoatom visited the site where this equipment is stored. 

Forbes Ukraine reports that the agreement on the purchase of the equipment has raised questions among several Ukrainian independent experts. One of their objections is the premature nature of this agreement, as it violates Ukrainian legislation on the standards and rules for NPP construction.  

Preparation for building a nuclear power unit should include a feasibility study and coordination with several channels, consultations with neighboring nations under the Convention to assess environmental impact in the transborder context; and developing a bill for stationing, planning and building an NPP power unit, planning a reactor, and receiving permission for construction. This process usually takes several years, and at present these stages have not been completed.   

Energoatom responded to this that in December 2023 it had completed a feasibility study for the construction of power units 5 and 6 of the Khmelnitsky NPP with AP1000 reactors and had submitted it for consideration to the Ukrainian cabinet of ministers according to established procedure. This issue will soon be submitted for consideration by members of government and presented to parliament for passing a law on construction of the power units. 

Service life of unstable structures of “Shelter” facility at Chornobyl NPP extended for 6 years

At the end of November, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate extended the license by 6 years giving the Chornobyl NPP the right to conduct activity on processing and storing existing and generated radioactive waste in converting the “Shelter” facility into an environmentally safe system. According to the new license, dismantling unstable structures of the facility should be carried out before 31 October 2029. In the preliminary version of the license, it was stated that these unstable structures should be dismantled by 31 October 2023. However, for a number of reasons (lack of full and stable financing of works, the spread of COVID-19, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, including the occupation of the plant in February-March 2022), the ChNPP was unable to carry out these works. 

For this reason, the ChNPP and contracted organizations held an additional inspection of the building structures, and made calculations of stability and the support ability of structures. Technical reports on the results of these works were used as the justification for extending the operation period of the Shelter facility. Based on the justification, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate passed the decision to permit changes to the license. 

At a meeting in October 2023, the Board of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate proposed the ChNPP to pass additional measures immediately to strengthen control of the state of localizing structure of the Shelter facility. The Board’s statement noted that the Ukrainian State Agency for Exclusion Zone Managment and the ChNPP must ensure the planning and commencement of realizing work on dismantling unstable structures in a period up until 31 October 2025. At the same time, it is necessary to develop and introduce measures for additional stabilization of individual structures of the Shelter facility, in particular in the case if dismantling works begin after 31 October 2025. The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate reported that it would establish according conditions in the present license of the ChNPP for operation of the complex of the New Safe Confinement and the Shelter facility. 

The Shelter facility inside the New Confinement, 2019. Credit: SSE ChNPP

Central spent fuel storage facility prepared to receive SNF of Ukrainian NPPs

On 20 December, Energoatom reported that it had begun transportation of spent nuclear fuel from functioning reactors to the new and commissioned Central Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF), designed by the Holtec company.  

The facility, located in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, is a dry storage facility of spent fuel assemblies of VVER-1000 and VVER-440 reactors. Its total capacity is 16,530 used fuel assemblies, including 12,010 VVER-1000 assemblies and 4,520 VVER-440 assemblies. Contracts for its construction were signed with the American company Holtec International in 2005, but construction only began in 2017.  

Energoatom announced that the new facility would make it possible to save USD 200 million per year, which was previously paid for transportation and storage of spent fuel in Russia. This will also help to avoid risks of plant operation stopping because of a lack of capacities for safe storage of spent fuel. 

Energoatom and Holtec plan to organize a joint enterprise for creating a production complex in Ukraine for localizing manufacture of equipment for the storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel, and also equipment for the Holtec small modular reactor. 

Energoatom reported receiving a separate permit for putting the CSFSF into operation in April 2022, and autonomous tests of CSFSF systems in cold mode were completed earlier, in January 2022. 

In June 2023, the IAEA published information that in May 2023 Ukraine had sent the first batch of spent fuel from the Rivne NPP to the CSFSF site.  

Discussing the results of 2023, the head of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate Oleg Korikov reported that last year test operation of CSFSF began. The operating organization developed transport and technological operations in treating spent nuclear fuel under modified technology at the NPP power units, and routes by which spent nuclear fuel is delivered from the Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South Ukrainian NPPs to the CSFSF (note – the Zaporizhzhia NPP has its own dry storage facility). After successful test operation and required safety analysis, the operating organization will be able to submit an application to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate to receive a license for commercial operation. 

Vertical Cask Transporter with Empty HI-STORM in Front of the Cask Receiving Building, CSFSF Credit: HITECH

Commentary by Bellona to the section “Events in the Ukrainian nuclear sector”: Any operations on conducting construction works on nuclear facilities, transportation of radioactive and nuclear materials, carrying out special works on radiation hazardous facilities during wartime entail additional risks. Military operations and regular shelling of the entire territory of Ukraine from Russia with missiles and long-distance drones pose a threat of intentional or random attacks on the facilities themselves or transported materials, and also indirectly puts their power supply at risk, and delivery of necessary materials by attacks on the infrastructural sites of the country.  

Additionally, during wartime there is a critical reduction in the possibility of independent public control and access to important information on the real state of affairs at sites, and the transparency of procedures for decision-making in the nuclear sector drops, arising from political expediency or military censorship, which causes additional risks of taking ineffective decisions. Ukraine, including its energy sector, is in a very difficult situation. So it is important that representatives of society and the energy sphere find a consensus, or at least mutual understanding, and do not descend to quarrelling about a certain issue.  

Rosatom structure delivers electricity to occupied territories of Ukraine from subsidies from the budget and surcharges for payments in Russia ↑

On 28 December, the Russian government passed a decree making changes to the Rules for the wholesale market of electrical power and capacities, establishing a surcharge on the price of NPP capacity in the first price zone, which includes the European part of Russia and the Urals, for subsidizing deliveries of power in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine (the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts) at reduced rates.  

Kommersant reports that the lost revenue of LLC “Yedyny Zakupshchik” (a structure of Atomenergosbyt, part of the Rosenergoatom concern) – a Rosatom structure that received the status of electricity supplier on these territories, may come to 36 billion rubles in 2024. From this sum, 3 billion may be allocated from the budget, and 33 billion rubles will be raised through a new surcharge on power prices for industry in the above-mentioned price zone.  

Gradually, by 2028, it is proposed to include the occupied territories in the first price zone. It is planned that electricity prices and rates on these territories will increase and reach economically justified levels within 10 years, eliminating the need for subsidies.  

Commentary by Bellona: The participation of an affiliated structure of Rosatom in distributing electricity on the occupied territories is another example of the full involvement of the state corporation’s involvement in the war in Ukraine, described in detail in Bellona’s recent report, “Rosatom during the war in Ukraine: how militarization of the Russian nuclear giant took place”. Subsidizing these deliveries from the federal budget and surcharges on payments within Russia is yet another cost that all citizens of Russia must pay for this war, regardless of how they feel about it. 

International nuclear news and its connection with Russia The nuclear topic at COP28: 22 countries pledge to triple nuclear energy capacity by 2050, and the Sapporo-5 alliance intends to allocate USD 4.2 billion to increasing western deliveries in the nuclear sphere ↑

On 30 November to 12 December, the COP28 UN Conference on climate change was held in Dubai. On 2 December, as part of the International summit on climate activity, the heads of several countries announced the signing of a Ministerial Declaration, to triple nuclear power capacity. It recognizes the key role of nuclear energy in achieving the goal of carbon neutrality by the middle of the century, and restricting the rise in temperature at a level of 1.5 °C.  

Key elements of the declaration include joint work on achieving the goal of tripling nuclear energy capacity worldwide by 2050, mobilizing investments in nuclear power, inviting shareholders of financial institutions to encourage including nuclear energy in the policy of energy lending, ensuring stable delivery chains, including fuel.  

At the end of the conference, the declaration was supported by 25 countries: Armenia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Ghana, Hungary, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine, the UAE, the UK and the USA. 

Tripling Nuclear Energy by 2050, Net Zero Nuclear Event, COP28, 2 December 2023 Credit: Dean Calma / IAEA

Following this declaration on 5 December over 120 companies of the nuclear industry with headquarters in 25 countries and operating in over 140 countries made a pledge to support the goal of tripling nuclear energy generation by 2050, and called for governments, development banks and the World Bank to provide nuclear energy projects with access to climatic financing on an equal level with other clean energy sources. 

The pledge states that it is the nuclear industry that will take responsibility for realizing these political goals, and the signatories: 

• Consider that nuclear energy should grow at a rate faster than the increase in global electricity demand; 
• Commit to mobilize and/or support investments in nuclear power, including through innovative financing mechanisms; 
• Will work with “governments, regulators and other stakeholders to maximize the contribution from existing operating nuclear power plants and accelerate the pace of new nuclear deployment in a safe, responsible and secure manner”. 

This statement by companies of the nuclear sector (Net Zero Nuclear Industry Pledge) was joined by Rosatom, whose representatives were also present at COP28 events. 

Also during the COP28 on 7 December, the USA, Canada, France, Japan and the UK announced plans to mobilize USD 4.2 billion in the form of state investments for developing a secure and reliable global supply chain of nuclear energy. The statement notes that these five countries of the G-7, which form an alliance known as the “Sapporo 5” bear collective responsibility for 50% of world production capacity for uranium conversion and enrichment. Their investments will be directed towards increasing capacity for uranium enrichment and conversion over the next three years, in order to create a stable global market of uranium deliveries free from Russian influence. 

Commentary by Bellona: The signing of the ministerial declaration at COP28 by the governments of a number of the world’s largest economically developed countries gives a clear signal to the Western nuclear industry itself for future investment and development. The absence of Russia and China among the signatories of this declaration indicates the political nature of the statement, which can be considered a continuation of the initiative of the countries of the Sapporo-5 alliance to strengthen the Western nuclear industry and reduce its dependence on Russia, even if this does not explicitly follow from the text of the declaration. 

Nevertheless, the achievement of the stated goals for a multiple increase in global nuclear capacity at the current stage is unrealistic without the participation of Russia and China, which account for almost 70% of the world’s new nuclear power plant units built over the past 20 years and more than 90% of nuclear constructions started over the past 5 years. At the same time, Russia and China undoubtedly share goals to increase nuclear capacity, and Rosatom, among other 120 companies, signed a similar declaration at the level of industrial companies, not governments. 

Thus, on the one hand, such statements provide a basis for strengthening the independence of the Western nuclear industry. On the other hand, the designation of ambitious goals creates risks of increasing hidden contacts within the global nuclear industry with Russia and China, as well as their open cooperation in nuclear projects in developing countries, which may receive additional stimulus for development, including financing under the climate agenda. 

Urenco announces second major expansion of capacity for uranium enrichment in a year ↑

Urenco has announced that it will be expanding capacity for uranium enrichment at its site in the Netherlands. As part of the project for the existing plant in Almelo several new cascades of centrifuges will be added. 

This plant has been operating since 1973, and its capacity at present is 5.1 million separative work units (SWU) per year. The complex includes five enrichment plants, and at present two of them are operating, SP4 and SP5. The first three plants have been fully decommissioned. SP5 has been operating since 2000 and produces more than 80% of the total production capacity of Urenco Nederland. 

Urenco general director Boris Schucht at COP28, where the company announced expansion of the it’s capacity Credit: live feed from Net Zero Nuclear

As a result of expansion, Urenco plans to increase the production capacity of the complex by 15%, around 750,000 SWU per year. The first new cascades are planned to be put into operation approximately in 2027. 

In June 2023, Urenco already approved its first expansion project at the site in New Mexico, USA, which will ensure additional capacity of 700,000 SWU per year. 

Additionally, in May 2023 it was reported that Urenco would reequip its enrichment plant in Gronau, Germany, with more modern centrifuges. This will slightly increase the capacity of the plant, which is currently 3.7 million SWU per year. 

Commentary by Bellona: The EU and the US are still dependent on Russian uranium enrichment services by at least 25%-30%, which explains the absence of drastic sanctions on Russian supplies in this field after 2 years of war. After a number of political signals and statements, the main Western market players have developed their strategies in this situation and made investment decisions to expand their capacities in order to gradually reduce their dependence on Russia.  

If we sum up the announcements to increase the capacity of Urenco plants in the US and the Netherlands, as well as Orano in France, we estimate that within the next 5 years Western companies will be able to increase capacity by at least 4.1 million SWU, which will make it possible to replace up to two thirds of the 6.6 million SWU currently purchased by the EU and the US from Russia. 

Ban on import of Russian uranium to the USA ↑

The US House of Representatives on December 11 approved a bill banning imports of Russian uranium. The bill must be passed by the Senate and signed by President Joe Biden before it becomes law. Then imports of low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel would be banned 90 days after the law takes effect.  

However, the phase-out of Russian fuel would be gradual. The bill provides exceptions that would allow uranium imports from Russia if there are no alternative supplies for US reactors or if the supplies are in the US national interest. For such exceptions, the allowed imports of low-enriched Russian uranium (including low-enriched uranium obtained under separation contracts) would be gradually reduced to 459 tons in 2027 from about 476.5 tons in 2024. But from January 1, 2028, imports will be banned entirely. 

Russia remains the leader in supplying uranium enrichment services for US nuclear power plants. In 2022, Russia’s share in this segment amounted to 33% of imported services (24% including the USA’s own production), or 3.4 million separative work units (SWU). The remaining supplies came mainly from the EU and the UK, where the Urenco plant is located. The volume of deliveries from Urenco’s sole US enrichment plant totaled 3.9 million SWU. 

One of the bill’s co-authors, Congresswoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers, stated that Russia now accounts for more than 20% of nuclear fuel used in US reactors and that Rosatom and its subsidiaries received more than $800 million from the US nuclear industry in 2023. 

On December 14, Bloomberg news agency, citing unnamed sources, reported that a number of US electric utilities, including Constellation Energy Corp., Duke Energy Corp. and Dominion Energy Inc. had been warned by the US division of Russian uranium company Tenex (subsidiary of Rosatom) that in response to the law banning imports of low-enriched uranium from Russia, the Kremlin could preemptively ban exports of its nuclear fuel to the United States. 

Russian centrifuges for uranium enrichment at an enrichment plant. Credit: Bellona Archive

On December 15, a refutation of this report appeared in the Russian media: ” Neither Tenex nor its subsidiaries have provided such notices to their foreign customers. We have always met our contractual obligations in full and on time and will continue to do so in the future,” the Rosatom press-release states. 

Commentary by Bellona: The US bill to ban the import of enriched uranium from Russia could be the largest unilateral act of withdrawing from ongoing cooperation projects with the Russian nuclear industry since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, comparable only to Finland’s withdrawal from the Russian Hanhikivi NPP project and Ukraine’s complete rejection of Russian fuel deliveries. At the same time, US purchases of enriched uranium from Russia have become a long-standing practice which will not be so easy to abandon for a country that does not face a direct military threat. 

Nevertheless, the bill gives a 5-year grace period for adaptation and allows uranium purchases until 2028 from Russia at the same volumes and limits that also existed before this bill. But the long preparation of this bill has already sent an important signal to the industry, and the main enrichment companies Urenco and Orano have already announced expansion plans. These plans (see above) will cover the drop-off in Russian supplies to the U.S. during these 5 years. It is possible that discussion of a similar ban on uranium imports from Russia and the EU could trigger additional expansion of capacities that could also close this gap. 

All this has naturally had quite a nervous reaction in both the Kremlin and Rosatom, as shown by leaks in the media. At the same time, Rosatom itself does not want to lose these export flows, and it is important to maintain its image as a reliable supplier. This is why Rosatom is eager to refute possible rumors about retaliatory measures and unilateral rejection of fuel supplies, and shifts all responsibility for them to the Kremlin and the country’s political leadership. 

Taken together, the declared changes in the uranium enrichment services market by major Western buyers and suppliers could significantly reduce Western countries’ dependence on Russia in the nuclear sphere by the end of the decade. 

Rosatom extends operation of Armenian NPP ↑

Rusatom Service and Haykakan Atomayin Elektrakayan signed an agreement on the repeat extension of the service life of unit 2 of the Armenian NPP until 2036. The agreement was signed on December 15. The cost of the project will come to USD 65 million. 

The Armenian NPP consists of two power units with VVER-440 reactors. The first power unit of the ANPP was put into commercial operation in 1976, the second in 1980. The installed capacity of the power units is 407.5 MW, with a planned service life of 30 years. Power unit No.1 is in long shutdown mode. It is not planned to restart the power unit. The share of the Armenian NPP in the total electricity generation in the country is about 30%. 

Rosatom has already carried out modernization of the Armenian NPP since 2015, and work was completed in 2021. As a result of the modernization, the capacity of the power unit was increased from 380-390 to 440 MW. The current service life of the Armenian NPP ends in 2026; and relevant license was issued by the Armenian State Committee for Nuclear Safety Regulation in 2021. 

Armenian NPP Credit: Armenian NPP website

Commentary by Bellona: Rosatom has experience and technologies for extending the service life of VVER-440 reactors, which are widely represented not only in Russia but also in European countries. However, the Russian corporation is rarely involved in this works on reactors in EU countries. Therefore, the choice of Rosatom to work on the Armenian NPP shows that there are long-standing technological ties, and that Russia’s political influence on Armenia has not yet fallen to its lowest level.  

Additionally, Armenia had a limited choice of contractors to carry out work to extend the life of their old nuclear power plant, which was built by Minatom during the Soviet era. This agreement may increase the likelihood that Rosatom will receive an order to build a small nuclear power plant in Armenia, a possibility currently being examined by the Armenian authorities. 

Preparation for extending the service life of Paks NPP ↑

Péter János Horváth, head of the Hungarian company MVM Paksi Atomerőműn, announced that Hungary has notified the European Union that it has started the process of extending the service life of the Paks NPP. This is the first step in a ten-year process that will extend the plant’s operating license until 2052-2057. 

The four operating units of the Paks plant with VVER-440 reactors were put into operation between 1982 and 1987. Their intended service life is 30 years, but this was already extended in 2012-2017 by 20 years, until 2032-2037. 

Paks NPP, Hungary Credit: Paks NPP

Horváth also said that although the plant’s Russian supplier has been a reliable partner for four decades, the plant is looking for ways to diversify its supply lines. Pál Tóth, deputy director of the Paks NPP, said the extension will require the completion of about 250 reconstruction projects, half of which are expected to cost more than 2.6 million euros. Modernization of electrical and control systems will cost 1.5 billion Euros. It is expected that a project implementation plan could be submitted in 2028. 

Commentary by Bellona: As mentioned above regarding the extension of the service life of the Armenian NPP, close political ties and influence can guarantee the participation of Russia and Rosatom in this project. In this case, the modernization of Paks NPP with 4 VVER-440 units may become Rosatom’s second largest project in Hungary after the construction of the Paks-2 NPP. However, the final selection of the main contractor has not yet been made. 

Fortum seeks alternative fuel suppliers ↑

The Finnish Ministry of Employment and Economic Affairs has published a report by Fortum, the energy company that owns the Loviisa NPP with two VVER-440 reactors, on future purchases of nuclear fuel for the plant. Providing information on how Fortum will purchase fresh fuel and move away from relying solely on Russian producers was one of the conditions for receiving permission to extend the service life of the NPP until the end of 2050, which was granted on February 16, 2023. 

The report states that the fuel was originally purchased under contracts signed during the construction of the plant (the units were put into operation in 1977 and 1980); the current supplier under these contracts is TVEL. Uranium for these contracts was also mined and enriched in Russia. 

The Loviisa NPP in Finland with two VVER-440 reactors Credit: Fortum

Between 1995 and 1998, together with the Paks power plant in Hungary, Fortum carried out licensing of fuel from another supplier, British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL, the company was the owner of Westinghouse Electric from 1999 to 2006). As a result of the post-licensing tender, BNFL supplied seven replacement batches of fuel to the Loviisa Power Plant, so that in the first decade of the 2000s, one power unit at the Loviisa Power Plant primarily used fuel supplied by BNFL and the other unit used fuel supplied by TVEL. The uranium used in BNFL fuel production was obtained from Russia. 

Later, BNFL abandoned production of fuel for VVER-440s, and TVEL remained the only supplier for this type of reactors. 

A fuel supply contract was last signed in 2006 when the previous license was extended. Following a tender, Fortum entered into an agreement with TVEL to supply fuel for Loviisa-1 until 2027 and Loviisa-2 until 2030. 

In order to diversify fuel suppliers, in November 2022 Fortum signed an agreement with Westinghouse Electric Company to design, license and produce alternative fuel for the Loviisa NPP based on BNFL developments. (Also note that Fortum is one of the participants in the APIS project, which aims to develop fuel for European Soviet-designed VVER reactors.) During the last annual maintenance in late summer 2023, the Loviisa-2 reactor was loaded with the first test batch that did not contain real uranium pellets. The report also shows that Fortum has entered into uranium purchasing and enrichment agreements with Western suppliers. 

Additionally, according to the report, Fortum will hold a tender for fuel supply for the period after 2027-2030 and will explore the possibilities of other Western suppliers besides Westinghouse Electric. The current contract with the US company and the fresh fuel held in storage ensure that Loviisa will be supplied with fuel until the tender is held. 

Commentary by Bellona: Finland, following Ukraine, is setting an example of abandoning deliveries of Russian fuel for VVER-440 reactors. There are 19 such reactors operating in EU countries, and not all of them have signed agreements on alternative fuel supplies, unlike the operators of VVER-1000 reactors. For the latter type, fuel from an alternative supplier has been successfully used in Ukraine for a long time. Therefore, converting reactors in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria to alternative fuel will be somewhat easier and will begin as early as this year. An alternative to Russian fuel for VVER-440 reactors was previously used only in Finland itself almost 10 years ago, and only since the end of 2023 has been loaded into one of the VVER-440 units at the Rivne NPP in Ukraine. Nevertheless, additional work on its licensing in Finland will simplify the process of future conversion of the remaining VVER-440 reactors in Europe to alternative fuel. 

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad First floating NPP has steam generators repaired with spare parts from warship decommissioned over 20 years ago ↑

The general director of the Rosenergoatom concern Alexander Shutikov stated that the work included repair of the unit’s steam generators. On December 26, in an interview with the corporate publication “Strana Rosatom“, he said that according to the project, the replacement of steam generator internal units was to be carried out in factory conditions after the equipment had completely exhausted its service life, and that 12-15 years were allotted for this purpose. However, when the floating unit was put into operation four years ago, the heat exchange tubes in the steam generators began to fail. It was decided to repair the steam generators locally. Steam generators were ordered for the Baltic Plant, where they were originally manufactured, but such long-lead equipment cannot be delivered quickly. 

On December 19, scheduled and preventive maintenance of reactor unit 1 of the Akademik Lomonosov floating power unit was completed at the floating nuclear thermal power plant (FNTPP) in Pevek. As part of this work, nuclear fuel was reloaded. The repair of the second reactor unit of the Akademik Lomonosov, also with reloading of nuclear fuel, is scheduled for 2024. 

As Kommersant reports, during repair in 2023, the internal devices of two steam generators at unit 1 were to be replaced, while three steam generators at unit 2 are scheduled for repair in 2024. By 2025, the plant will reach a capacity of 70 MW, Rosatom claims. 

According to Alexander Shutikov, in connection with the repair of the FNTPP, Rosenergoatom decided to extend the operation of the Bilibino nuclear power plant, which together with the FNTPP is part of the isolated Chaun-Bilibino energy hub, by three years until December 2025. For repairs, they found “practically new” steam generators that were previously used on the decommissioned nuclear warship “Ural”. According to Atomenergoremont, which is involved in the repair of the FNTPP, the steam generators were transported from Fokino, Primorsky Krai, to Murmansk and Polyarnye Zori after preliminary hydraulic tests. 

To carry out work safely for replacing the old internal devices of the steam generator with new ones, special containers are used that protect the tube of the new devices from damage in transportation and assembly Credit: Telegram Channel

The twin-reactor warship “Ural” of 1941 project was launched in 1983 and decommissioned from the Navy in 2001. In 2008, it began to be scrapped at the Zvezda plant in Bolshoi Kamen. In June 2012, the Director General of FSUE Rosatomflot announced plans to use the ship’s steam generators and other spare parts to repair functioning nuclear icebreakers. 

In 2024, Rosenergoatom plans to carry out repairs on the other side of the FNTPP and immediately replace all defective internal devices and restore the capacity of the left side unit to 35 MW. 

December 2023 also marked 4 years since the FNTPP was put into operation, in 2019. During this time, the plant has been steadily increasing electricity generation: from 127 million kWh in 2020 to 222 million kWh in 2023 (as of December 19, 2023). However, this still amounts to no more than half of the maximum possible output of the plant in combined heat and power generation mode. These limitations may be related to both technical problems at the FNTPP and the limited electricity needs of this region. According to Victor Yelagin, director of the FNTPP, by the end of 2023, the plant will cover about 55% of the demands of the Chaun-Bilibino energy hub, and together with the Bilibino NPP, the share of nuclear power generation will reach 88%. 

The decommissioned ship “Ural” at Fokino base in the Far East, 2004 Credit: Dmitry Lakhtikov

Commentary by Bellona: The fact that Rosenergoatom is starting to look for old equipment for use at the FNTPP (of which it never tires of being proud) is bad news. Bellona has also previously drawn attention to the problems that could arise in the operation of the FNTPP as a result of the VERY protracted construction of this facility and the physical aging of the equipment.  

The “Ural” ship was not used intensively, so the steam generators may indeed have a short number of service hours. Steam generators belong to the first category of equipment affecting the safety of a nuclear facility. Evidently, the situation was hopeless if the decision was made to use steam generators manufactured 45 years ago and stored in unknown conditions for 15 years since the ship’s nuclear device was dismantled. 

Additionally, it should be remembered that steam generators of the first and second generations of transport nuclear units were not very reliable, and in many respects their operability was determined by the correctness of operation (for example, how strictly the water mode of the 1st and 2nd circuits was observed). No one can say for certain how correctly the Ural nuclear units were operated. Therefore, such decisions as using old equipment on which the safety of the nuclear plant directly depends may be made out of desperation or in order to wait things out for a while. But in any case, this poses a threat to the safe operation of the FNTPP. 

Kola NPP examines possibility of extending service life of first two units to 65 years ↑

Vasily Omelchuk, the director of the Kola NPP in the Murmansk Oblast, announced that the possibility of extending the operation of the plant’s first and second units with VVER-440 reactors until 2038 is being considered. These units were first put into operation in 1973 and 1974 respectively. “The first and second units of the Kola NPP will operate until 2033-2034, but there are instructions from the country’s leadership to consider the possibility of extending their service life… Whether this will be possible or not, it is impossible to say at present,” Omelchuk said. 

He noted that the decommissioning of units 1 and 2 could be synchronized with the launch of the new Kola NPP-2 plant, which is scheduled to begin operation by 2035 (the general plan for power facilities includes commissioning one VVER-600 reactor).  

According to plan, construction and installation works for power unit 1 should start by November 16, 2028, and for power unit 2 by November 16, 2030. The first concrete is scheduled to be poured by January 31, 2030 and January 31, 2032 respectively. The physical launch of unit 1 is scheduled by December 31, 2034, of unit 2 by December 31, 2036, and they will be put into operation by December 31, 2035 and December 31, 2037 respectively. 

In October 2023, the plant management reported that the future Kola NPP-2 may consist of four units instead of two. Rosatom agreed to this and sent an updated “roadmap” to the Russian government, where power units 3 and 4 are scheduled to be put into operation in 2041 and 2044. 

The old KNPP power units 3 and 4 are scheduled for shutdown in 2041 and 2044 respectively. 

Kola NPP with 4 VVER-440 units Credit: Kola NPP

Commentary by Bellona: For the first time, the management of Kola NPP has discussed the possibility of extending the service life of the plant’s first two units for an additional period beyond the declared 60 years. This may be caused by difficulties with Rosatom’s fulfillment of the task from the country’s leadership to increase the share of nuclear power generation to 25%. It is characteristic that the director of Kola NPP says that the idea of extension arises from an order from the country’s leadership, rather than from its direct management in the Rosenergoatom Concern or in Rosatom itself. 

The power generation of Russian NPPs decreased in 2023 by about 2% compared to 2022. This was the first decline in Russian NPP power generation in almost 20 years, not counting the COVID year of 2020. This is caused by the aging of the nuclear fleet and the decommissioning of old RBMK-1000 units in recent years, which are not being replaced by new capacities in the form of units with VVER-1200 reactors. That is why in the next 10 years, according to Bellona’s own calculations, it will be difficult for Rosatom not only to raise the share of NPP generation to 25% of the country’s energy balance, but even to keep it at the current level of 20%. This explains the ideas to extend the life of the remaining RBMK units to 50 years instead of 45, and now the old VVER-440 units to 65 years instead of 60. 

Extending the operation of power units requires serious work on inspection and modernization of equipment and may not always be economically justified. Nevertheless, this is a global practice, and for many units in different countries it is technically and economically feasible to implement. For similar units with VVER-440 reactors in Finland, last year the Loviisa NPP was granted a license to operate for up to 70 years. 

However, initially the first units of the Kola NPP were not planned to be extended beyond 60 years, and at present judging by the statement of the plant director, there is no certainty that such an extension is possible. All this shows that the decision is a forced measure to fulfill a task set by country’s leadership. It remains in question whether this task will be fulfilled at any cost, or if it will prove technically or economically inexpedient and will not be fulfilled after all. 

Rosatom’s foreign projects in brief ↑

In early December, the first reactor assembly inspection – an operation required to confirm that the assembled reactor meets the design specifications – was completed at the first unit of the Akkuyu NPP under construction in Turkey. Reactor assembly is carried out twice before nuclear fuel is loaded. On December 12, the Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency of the Republic of Turkey granted permission to put the first power unit into operation. The permission makes it possible to start commissioning works. The next stage in the licensing of the plant will be obtaining a license for the operation of unit 1, which will allow the loading of nuclear fuel into the reactor and the start of pre-start-up control operations. 

The Turkish government plans to start generating electricity at unit 1 of the Akkuyu NPP on October 29, 2024, timed to coincide with Turkey’s Republic Day. The rest of the units are planned to be commissioned at one-year intervals, with construction of the NPP due to be completed by 2028. 

On December 18, the European Union’s 12th package of sanctions against Russia came into force. They explicitly made exceptions for the Paks-2 nuclear power plant under construction in Hungary. Paragraph 21 of the document states: ” In view of the importance of the Paks II project for the interests of Hungary in relation to security of energy supply, the exemptions and derogations in this Decision concerning civil nuclear projects are fully applicable to all goods and services needed for that project”. The Paks-2 project was also named specifically in all paragraphs describing exemptions relating to the security of the civil nuclear sector. 

On December 21, Vitaly Polyanin, the new director of the Paks-2 project who was appointed in November and until recently was in charge of the construction of the Belarusian NPP, stated that the first concrete for the foundation of the future NPP could be poured ahead of schedule in December 2024 instead of March 2025. The main construction work on the facilities, including the nuclear island, is planned to be completed by 2028. Then equipment installation and preparation for commissioning will begin. The two power units are to be put into commercial operation in the early 2030s. 

Vitaly Polyanin (far left), director of the project for building the Paks-2 NPP, during a visit to the building site in Hungary by Rosatom head Aleksey Likhachev (fifth on the left) in mid-November 2023 Credit: Paks2.hu

Commentary by Bellona: Rosatom continues to implement foreign NPP construction projects in Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, India and China, which have been virtually unaffected by sanctions and restrictions imposed on Russia by Western countries. Rosatom’s only NPP construction project in the European Union – the Paks-2 NPP in Hungary – is also moving ahead despite delays and has now received a separate mention as a project protected from restrictions in the EU’s 12th package of sanctions.  

All of this points to an obvious fact – in the sanctions pressure on Russia, Europe and the U.S. have so far been more successful in reducing their own dependence on Russia in the nuclear fuel sector than in influencing Rosatom’s foreign projects in third-party countries. And these goals are achieved not primarily through direct international sanctions, but through the decisions of individual countries or companies, and require at least several years for implementation. 

Rosatom continues to expand assets ↑

On December 8, Rosatom received 89.4% of federally owned shares in Solikamsk Magnesium Plant (SMP), Perm Krai, as an asset contribution from the Russian Federation. The SMP will become part of the corporation’s Mining Division. SMP shares were transferred to state ownership in the fall of 2022 after they were confiscated from private shareholders on the initiative of the Prosecutor General’s Office. According to the supervisory body, the privatization of the plant in the first half of the 1990s was carried out illegally, without the permission of the federal government. Now the Prosecutor’s Office is trying to obtain a court decision to confiscate shares in the state’s favor from more than 2,000 minority shareholders of SMP. 

Earlier in May 2023, following the state transferred the controlling stake in the charter capital, the Mining Division already included the Lovozero Mining and Enrichment Combine. This asset also became the property of the state after the former owners were taken to court. The Lovozero combine is the only enterprise in the country that mines and enriches loparite ore, which is a raw material for the production of many rare-earth metals. Loparite is supplied to the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant, which processes it and produces rare earth metal concentrate, tantalum, niobium, and titanium sponge. 

The Lovozero mining and enrichment combine Credit: Strana Rosatom

As a next step, Rosatom plans to build a separation facility to provide a complete raw material cycle of rare earth metals, from mining to production. 

Commentary by Bellona: Rosatom continues to expand its own assets and authority within Russia, taking over new industries and sectors. In the previous digest, we already described the transfer of the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO) to Rosatom and the consolidation of the largest assets in Russia’s transportation and logistics industry in the hands of the state corporation. 

In addition to Rosatom’s expansion of non-core (non-nuclear) assets capable of contributing to Russia’s military-industrial complex, as well as greater centralization and essentially nationalization of certain elements of economic activity within the country, this process is increasingly accompanied by dubious procedures of seizing property and transferring assets from private owners to a state corporation using the repressive apparatus of the state. In an autocratic state during wartime, these processes do not have any real constraining factors and can swiftly escalate. 

Recommended publications ↑

On 10 December, Bellona published the report “Rosatom during the war in Ukraine: how militarization of the Russian nuclear giant took place”, studying the process of how one of the world’s largest nuclear corporations was transformed into a tool for Russia to achieve its military goals. 

On 4 December, Bellona published the expert article on its website, “The Nuclear legacy of the Arctic: a cleanup will be difficult without international assistance”, with a survey of the history of the legacy of Soviet nuclear military and civil programs in the Arctic region, what was been done in the past 30 years, including with Bellona’s involvement, and how the situation at these sites has changed since the outbreak of war in Ukraine and the withdrawal of foreign donors from these projects. 

The post Bellona nuclear digest, December 2023 appeared first on Bellona.org.

After several days of wrangling with Russian official, experts from the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency on Monday were given access to the sixth and final reactor unit at the embattled Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine.

Situated on the front lines of fighting as Ukraine struggles to repel Moscow’s invasion, the plant has been held by Russian troops since the early days of the war, now reaching its second year.

The IAEA experts on the site of the plant — which is the largest nuclear power station in both Ukraine and Europe —regularly cross the frontlines of the war to maintain a presence at the facility.

In about mid-December, according to an IAEA, the experts had requested access to the reactor halls of Units 1, 2 and 6. But Renat Kharchaa, a Ukraine-based official with Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, denied access, saying the reactors were “sealed.”

This explanation, however, strained credulity, given that the team has visited reactor Unit 3, which was likewise hermetically sealed, as recently as December 15, according to an earlier IAEA statement

In a subsequent statement, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted that the denial of access to the Unit 6 reactor hall constituted the first time Russian officials had been rebuffed in their attempts to inspect any unit that, like Unit 6, was in cold shutdown.

On Monday, the IAEA released a statement saying that their “experts were yesterday granted access to the reactor hall of unit 6 of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant after previously having not been given access.”

“While in the reactor hall, the team observed main components of the reactor, confirming the cold shutdown state of the reactor,” the statement added.

The statement continued, however, to note that the Agency’s inspectors were denied a view of some segments of the sixth unit’s turbine halls, adding that their visits to the halls have been prevented since October of last year.

“For the first time, under far-fetched pretexts, IAEA inspectors were rebuffed from entry into the reactor halls of power units in a state of cold shutdown — and in the end, with a delay of a couple of weeks, they were allowed into only one of them.,” says Dmitry Gorchakov, a nuclear expert with Bellona.

“But the problem is much deeper,” he continues. “After all, such delays and restrictions in access are systemic problem. IAEA inspectors are not allowed or are allowed with huge delays into requested Zaporizhzhia NPP locations while almost the entire time they are present at the plant. As Rafael Grossi said on his very first visit to the plant on September 1, 2022, ‘If we are not allowed somewhere, we will say  so.’ And since then, regularly in numerous IAEA information messages on Zaporizhzhia NPP you can see that inspectors are waiting until they are allowed access to numerous plant facilities and they have been waiting for this for months. And no meetings between the head of Rosatom Likhachev and Grossi, as a matter of principle, can solve this problem. This is an obvious obstruction of the IAEA’s work at the site. Under one pretext or another.”

Grossi has warned numerous times that, should outside power be cut to the plant, cooling apparatus could be interrupted, risking a nuclear accident.

The IAEA teams at the Zaporizhzhia site also inspect for the presence of weapons and troops onsite, which would further put the six-reactor plant at risk of bombardment and attack.

All of the plant’s reactors have been in some state of shutdown since September of last year, a measure that would lessen the radioactive consequences should they get caught in the crossfire of warring troops.

The IAEA has lobbied both Moscow and Kyiv to implement a non-military zone around the plant to prevent it from coming under fire, but those efforts have proven unsuccessful.

Bellona has closely monitored events at the plant and last year published an exhaustive report on the dangers the plant — and the world — face as a result of its seizure. For the first time ever, the report notes, a nuclear plant has been made hostage to a raging military conflict.

At present, IAEA experts at the plant are still waiting on access to the roofs of the reactors — an inspection that was scheduled for December 19, but which was scotched by Russian officials over what they described as security concerns, the Ukrainian national newswire Ukrainska Pravda reported.

The IAEA team likewise has yet to receive 2024 reactor maintenance schedules from the Russian occupiers, Ukrainska Pravda said.

 

 

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In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Bellona Foundation was forced to navigate a treacherous and evolving geopolitical landscape. In light of the Russian attack on its neighbor, we arrived at the difficult decision to shutter our operations in Russia, and closed our offices in St. Petersburg and Murmansk.

This seismic shift, however, has not deterred the organization from its core mission. Even as our Russian-speaking team has been transplanted to Vilnius, Bellona has persisted in meticulously monitoring and analyzing environmental risks originating from Russia.

The repercussions of Russia’s war were far-reaching, as the once-freer flow of information about polluting enterprises, environmental incidents, and associated risks began to dry up.  This forced Bellona – with its 30-year history working in Russia — to get back to brass tacks: gathering reliable information about the environment, analyzing risks, and providing forecasts.

Yet, operating in the shadows of repression and isolationist policies, Bellona — along with other international environmental organizations — found itself cast as an enemy of the Russian government. In April, the General Prosecutor’s Office in Moscow officially declared Bellona an ”undesirable ”organization, essentially outlawing our activities in the country.  The move, however, was not a surprise in the current climate of escalating repressions, and puts us among some good company.

“It is evident to us that the Russian authorities want to prevent the leakage of information about how poorly they are addressing environmental issues in their country,” said Frederick Hauge, Bellona’s, who pledged that, despite the altered conditions within Russia, our organization’s commitment to documenting its environmental issues would remain unwavering.

For those following our work from within Russia, we have collaborated with legal experts to craft a comprehensive guide on safely accessing and distributing what we offer on our websites — which have been blacklisted by Russian authorities. Our materials can now be found from within Russia with the help of VPN — a common challenge faced by the broader rights and journalistic diaspora that has had to relocate beyond Russia’s borders.

A pivotal facet of Bellona’s work during this turbulent period centered on scrutinizing Russia’s nuclear industry amid the war and looming threats to nuclear safety its activities present. We have particularly focused on the role of Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, which has taken on a newly militarized role.

The resulting reports painted a vivid picture of Rosatom’s deep involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Financial support for military objectives, direct participation in the occupation of Ukrainian territory, and the expansion of its significance within Russia by acquiring non-nuclear enterprises have all been examined in detail in our reports.

Parallel to this work, Bellona has delved into broader environmental and climate risks in the Russian Arctic, highlighting a shift in Russian priorities towards economic development over environmental conservation.  Though western sanction have supposedly hobbled the activities of Russia’s oil and gas industries, we have nonetheless reported that much of this climate damaging sector has continued full steam ahead. We have also released articles exposing continued Arctic pollution by major corporations like Norilsk Nickel and Gazprom.

As detailed by our reporting, if sanctions have impacted Russian industry, it has been chiefly in the form of curtailing whatever environmental programs Russia’s polluting Arctic behemoths may have been observing — another environmental consequence of Russia’s invasion.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine also left a lasting mark on nuclear facilities, with the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant falling into Russian hands. The subsequent damages, estimated at €100 million, include the seizure of valuable equipment and computers, painting a grim picture of environmental consequences in the wake of geopolitical conflicts. Our report on the Zaporizhzhia plant  details the outlines of what many would call nuclear terrorism perpetrated by the Russian state.

As Bellona looked forward to 2024, we plan to continue reporting on environmental issues in the Russian Arctic, nuclear and radiation safety, climate change, and the environmental fallout of the war in Ukraine. Our intentions are clear. We will present materials globally and work with media organizations to emphasize the critical need for accessible information on environmental risks originating from Russia, in both Russian and English-speaking spaces.

We are grateful to our readers for sharing this turbulent year of transitions with us.  It will take collective efforts and will to continue navigating the dark period of this war, but it remains our sincere hope that, together, we can fight for a world built on fundamental principles – the safeguarding of human rights, the preservation of territorial integrity for independent states, and the unequivocal right to a healthy environment.

 

The post Bellona’s Vilnius office examines a turbulent, but successful, year past appeared first on Bellona.org.

As the past year drew to a close, the US House of Representatives passed legislation that would ban the purchase of enriched Russian uranium for use in American nuclear reactors — a measure meant to hobble Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, which is actively participating in Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, which was approved by voice vote, would bar Russian uranium imports 90 days after enactment while allowing a temporary waiver until January 2028. The bill needs to be passed by the Senate and then signed by President Joe Biden to become law, though the timeline for this remains unclear.

The US has imposed deep sanctions on Russian-produced oil and gas over the war, but Russian-enriched uranium used to fuel America’s 92 commercial nuclear reactors has thus far escaped legislative action.

That a US uranium ban has not been pursued earlier puts in Washington in shaky moral territory, especially as Rosatom helped orchestrate the takeover of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant — both Ukraine and Europe’s largest such facility — a state of affairs that has made the station hostage to an active war zone.

Experts from the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency have repeatedly raised alarm over the plant’s vulnerability, and agency monitors stationed onsite report constant military fighting nearby. IAEA director General Rafael Grossi has pleaded for both sides to establish a demilitarized zone around the station, without result. Meahwhile, what agency monitors at the plant can view and report on is subject to the whims of the Russian military occupiers.

Yet, like many of its European counterparts that support Ukraine’s resistance, the United States remains heavily dependent on enriched uranium from Russia. Last year — as in decades before — Russia was the United States’ number one supplier of enriched uranium supplies, sending almost a quarter of the nuclear fuel used in the America’s commercial reactor fleet, Department of Energy date show.

Most of the rest is imported from Europe. A final third or so is produced by a British-Dutch-German consortium operating in the United States called Urenco. Nearly a dozen countries around the world depend on Russia for more than half their enriched uranium — many of them likewise Ukraine-allied members of Nato.

Russia is also the only commercially available source of special highly enriched reactor fuel known as Haleu, which is needed for a new breed of advanced nuclear reactors that are under development, numerous nuclear analysts have noted.

The US reliance on Russian-enriched fuel also leaves the country’s current and future nuclear plants vulnerable to a Russian shutdown of enriched uranium sales, which analysts say is a conceivable strategy for President Vladimir Putin, who often wields energy as a geopolitical tool.

”We cannot be held hostage by nations that don’t have our values, but that’s what has happened,” Senator Joe Manchin III, the West Virginia Democrat who leads the Senate’s energy committee, told The New York Times. Manchin is sponsoring a bill that would help rebuilt US enrichment capacity with the help of federal subsidies.

“The United States must ban the sale of Russian uranium in America,” Wyominc Senator John Barrasso, the author of the Senate’s version of the uranium ban, said in a statement following the House vote last month, according to Bloomberg. “Vladimir Putin has used Russia’s nuclear industry to fund his brutal invasion of Ukraine.”

The US spends an estimated $1 billion per year on nuclear fuel from Russia, Barrasso told Bloomberg. While this would pale in comparison to losses Moscow faces in oil and gas sanctions, it nonetheless represents an important source of foreign revenue for Rosatom, whose foreign receipts last year totaled around $8 billion.

So, what has prevented Washington, Ukraine’s primary financial supporter in the West and the de facto head of Nato, from taking steps to phase out its use of Russian-produced uranium?

For one, it is maddeningly difficult to refuse that Russian supply. Throughout the 1990s, the Unites States turned away from its own enrichment capabilities in favor of using down-blended stocks of Soviet-era weapons grade uranium.

That program — dubbed Megatons to Megawatts — was part of a raft of nonproliferation efforts undertaken cooperatively in the 1990s by Moscow and Washington to sequester and dilute post-Soviet stocks of nuclear weapons and materials. Many of these weapons were located in former Soviet republics that, when the union dissolved in 1991, overnight became their own states. Such was the case with Ukraine, which in 1993, relinquished Soviet-era nuclear weapons held on its territory to Moscow.

Megatons to Megawatts provided the US with cheap fuel and Moscow with needed cash during the recurring economic crises of the 90s, and was seen as critical effort to winnow down weapons grade materials. So prevalent were the down blended HEU stocks that every single US nuclear power plant at some point fueled their reactors with them.

But it also destroyed the profitability of America’s inefficient enrichment facilities, which were eventually shuttered.  Then, instead of investing in upgraded centrifuges in the United States when the Megatons to Megawatts program concluded in 2013, successive presidential administrations kept buying enriched uranium from Russia. So prevalent are the Russia uranium stocks that one of every 20 US homes is powered by fuel that Rosatom has enriched.

This now leaves the US on the backfoot should it strive to extricate itself from Russian supply chains. As it stands now, there only one wholly US-owned company that enriches uranium.

As part of the new uranium-ban bill, the Biden administration would earmark $2.2 billion toward the expansion of uranium enrichment facilities in the US. But, under the proposed 2028 implementation of the ban, that only leaves another five years for US nuclear power plants to find alternative suppliers.

That’s a tight deadline. The single facility enriching uranium and providing Haleu is the American Centrifuge Company, owned by Centrus Energy, in Ohio. The plant has been on a 22-year hiatus, but in October, it began enriching again, largely as a response to possible shortages from Russia. But it will be difficult for the company to fully replace that supply in the near term.

As such, the US would likely have to pursue other foreign enriched uranium suppliers, most likely France. But France likewise has deep ties to the Rosatom from which it, like the US, has yet to disentangle.

Meanwhile, the most promising alternative for the US is likely a Urenco plant in New Mexico, which last summer announced plans to expand it production by 2025 to answer demand for non-Russian fuel.

All told, a cold-turkey break with Russian nuclear fuel supplies would be nearly impossible for the US and its allies in the Ukrainian struggle to undertake. But Washington and its European counterparts nonetheless must develop an exit strategy, both for the near term, as the war continues to rage, and for the more distant future as well, when relations with Russia are impossible to predict.

We at Bellona will continue to report on and analyze these strategies, and will over the next several months continue to publish our insights on how a nuclear market free of Rosatom could function.

 

 

 

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