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On World Food Day, African chefs unite to reclaim the continent’s culinary heritage, champion agroecology and put African food at the centre of Africa’s future.

On World Food Day 2026, the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) calls on African citizens, governments, chefs, farmers, young people and food system actors to reclaim Africa’s rich food heritage and place healthy, culturally appropriate and ecologically produced food at the heart of the continent’s future. Under its Pan-African campaign, My Food Is African, AFSA is advancing a powerful message: Africa’s food is a source of identity, dignity, health and sovereignty, and its future must be shaped by the people who grow, prepare and consume it.

Across Africa, traditional food systems that have sustained communities for generations are increasingly threatened by industrial agriculture, the expansion of ultra-processed foods and changing dietary habits that undermine indigenous knowledge and local food cultures. Traditional African foods, despite their extraordinary diversity and cultural significance, are too often portrayed as inferior, outdated or incompatible with modern lifestyles. Meanwhile, the smallholder farmers, women, seed custodians and traditional food producers who sustain Africa’s food systems remain insufficiently recognised and supported.

For AFSA, reversing this trend requires a fundamental shift in how African societies understand and value food. My Food Is African is a call to reclaim our food, our health, our culture and our power. It challenges the notion that progress must come at the expense of African food traditions and asserts that the continent’s food future lies in embracing its rich culinary diversity, strengthening agroecological production and restoring the connection between people, land and food.

African Chefs Take the Lead in Reclaiming Our Food

This year’s World Food Day carries particular significance as African chefs across the continent come together to translate this vision into action. From 12 to 16 October 2026, the My Food Is African Chefs Network is leading the first continental MyFIA Chefs Week, celebrating indigenous ingredients, traditional recipes, African food knowledge and the farmers and communities who keep these traditions alive.

The initiative builds on the historic First African Chefs’ Gathering and Policy Convening on African Food Systems, organised by AFSA in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2025. Bringing together participants from 23 African countries, the gathering adopted the Declaration of African Chefs, affirming a collective commitment to elevate African cuisine, defend indigenous food systems and strengthen the role of chefs in advancing food sovereignty.

That commitment is now taking shape through a growing continental movement of chefs who recognise that their responsibility extends beyond preparing and serving food. African chefs are educators, cultural ambassadors, storytellers and advocates who can reconnect consumers with the origins of their food, celebrate forgotten ingredients, preserve ancestral recipes and promote food grown through agroecological practices.

Throughout Chefs Week, participating chefs are sharing stories from their kitchens, farms and local markets, highlighting the relationship between indigenous seeds, healthy soils, traditional food preparation and African culinary identity. The week culminates in an online gathering on 16 October, bringing together chefs, farmers, seed custodians, journalists and other food system actors to celebrate their collective efforts, discuss the future of African cuisine and consider the adoption of the MyFIA Chefs Network Charter.

The significance of this initiative goes beyond culinary celebration. It represents a growing recognition that the transformation of Africa’s food systems must also take place in our kitchens, restaurants, schools and everyday food choices. By bringing traditional African foods into contemporary culinary spaces, chefs can help challenge perceptions that equate imported and industrially processed foods with modernity, while demonstrating that African culinary heritage offers opportunities for creativity, innovation, livelihoods and entrepreneurship.

Healthy Food Begins with Healthy Soil

At the heart of the My Food Is African campaign is a principle that AFSA considers fundamental to Africa’s food future: what we eat cannot be separated from how our food is produced.

African food is deeply connected to the land, the seeds and the ecological knowledge that have sustained generations of farming communities. Its value cannot be measured by taste and cultural significance alone. It must also be understood through the health of the soil, the diversity of crops, the integrity of production systems and the well-being of the people who produce it.

AFSA therefore calls for a transition towards agroecological food systems that restore soil fertility, protect biodiversity, safeguard farmer-managed seed systems and strengthen resilience to climate change.

The campaign also draws attention to the growing public health concerns associated with unhealthy dietary transitions and the increasing consumption of ultra-processed foods. Reviving diverse African diets, including indigenous grains, legumes, vegetables, fruits and traditionally prepared foods, is an important part of promoting healthier food environments and protecting the continent’s nutritional heritage.

Healthy soil, healthy seeds, healthy food and healthy people are inseparable. Protecting African food therefore means protecting the ecological and cultural systems that make it possible.

Innovate Today, Nourish Tomorrow: Africa’s Knowledge Must Shape the Future

As the international community commemorates World Food Day under the 2026 theme, “Innovate today. Nourish tomorrow,” AFSA emphasises that meaningful innovation must recognise and build upon the knowledge, practices and resources that African communities have developed over generations. The global theme highlights the importance of combining forward-looking solutions with traditional knowledge and inclusive approaches to ensure nutritious food for all while protecting the planet.

For Africa, innovation must begin by recognising the enormous potential already present in its food systems. Indigenous crops, farmer-managed seeds, traditional food preservation methods, agroecological farming practices and culinary knowledge offer opportunities to improve nutrition, strengthen local economies and respond to environmental challenges. These resources must be protected, developed and passed on to future generations.

AFSA believes that African chefs, particularly young culinary professionals and women food entrepreneurs, have an important role in this transformation. By combining traditional ingredients with contemporary culinary creativity, strengthening relationships with local farmers and bringing African cuisine into new markets, they can help create livelihoods while preserving the integrity and identity of African food.

But innovation must also extend beyond the kitchen. It requires supportive public policies, investment in agroecological enterprises, stronger territorial markets, greater recognition of women’s contributions and education systems that teach African children the value of their own food heritage.

A Call to Reclaim Africa’s Food Future

On this World Food Day, AFSA calls upon African governments and institutions to recognise food sovereignty as a foundation of sustainable development. This requires policies that protect farmer-managed seed systems, support smallholder food producers, promote agroecology and integrate indigenous African foods into national nutrition strategies, school curricula and public food procurement programmes.

AFSA also calls upon chefs, restaurants, culinary institutions and food entrepreneurs to become active champions of African food sovereignty by celebrating indigenous ingredients, sourcing from local agroecological producers, preserving traditional recipes and introducing younger generations to the extraordinary diversity of African cuisine.

To African citizens, particularly young people, the message is equally clear. Our food heritage deserves to be celebrated, protected and carried forward. Every traditional recipe preserved, every indigenous seed protected, every local farmer supported and every African meal prepared with pride contributes to a larger movement for healthier people, thriving communities and a more sovereign Africa.

My Food Is African is a declaration of identity, a commitment to ecological responsibility and a call for collective action. It reminds us that our food connects us to our ancestors, sustains our communities and carries the possibilities of our future. Reclaiming African food means reclaiming the knowledge, resources and choices that determine how Africa feeds itself.

As African chefs unite this World Food Day, AFSA reaffirms its commitment to building a continental movement that celebrates African culinary heritage, strengthens the relationship between farmers and consumers, and advances food systems rooted in justice, health, biodiversity and dignity.

Our food. Our heritage. Our health. Our future.

My Food Is African.

Grow with Nature. Eat with Pride. Live with Dignity.

Campaign: #MyFoodIsAfrican | #JeMangeAfricain | #WorldFoodDay2026

Plans for a massive wind farm with 92 turbines and an up to eight-hour battery have been lodged, adding another hybrid to the list of projects lining up to replace coal.

The post Approval sought for another huge wind and battery hybrid as state prepares to move beyond coal appeared first on Renew Economy.

As birds embarked on their fall migration journeys, Audubon and partners welcomed approximately 250 visitors to Community Day at the John James Audubon Center (JJAC) in late September. The event...

The version of record of this op-ed was published in Yellowknifer on October 15, 2026.

By Jax Jacobsen (Strategic Communications Lead, Geothermal Energy Office, Cascade Institute) and Emily Smejkal (Policy Lead, Geothermal Energy Office, Cascade Institute)

With the Ekati diamond mine closing early, Yellowknife has to rethink what will drive its economy next. Jax Jacobsen and Emily Smejkal argue that the biggest barrier to growth in the North is energy: the NWT grid leans heavily on hydropower, and drought-driven low reservoirs have caused outages and pushed the territory's power corporation back onto costly, high-emission diesel.

Their answer is geothermal. The heat beneath Yellowknife itself is best suited to heating buildings, but power-grade resources lie south of Great Slave Lake, near Hay River and other South Slave communities. If the proposed Taltson hydro expansion connects the South Slave and North Slave grids, electricity generated there could flow straight to Yellowknife. With enhanced geothermal systems now delivering utility-scale power and drilling costs falling fast, they write, steady, low-cost, low-emission geothermal power could give the city the foundation for a new Northern industrial base.

Read the full op-ed in Yellowknifer.

Featured image: Old Town Yellowknife by Mike Tidd, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

The post Yellowknife can become an energy powerhouse through geothermal appeared first on Cascade Institute.

Harm reduction services and nonprofit supportive housing play a vital role in addressing the overlapping crises of opioid overdose, mental health, and homelessness that are causing so much hardship in many parts of Canada. These services have been widely debated and researched, but this discourse often overlooks the workforce that provides these services, whose skills and knowledge are often taken for granted.

During the summer of 2026, a research team based at the University of British Columbia’s School of Social Work undertook a study involving 30 online and in-person interviews with frontline workers and managers working in harm reduction and supportive housing in Vancouver’s downtown eastside (DTES). The interviews explored the knowledge and skills of harm reduction workers, and what changes they would recommend to strengthen this work. The findings documentd the wide array of finely-honed skills, knowledge and practices used by these workers, as they endeavour to provide dignity and care for those facing the challenges of homelessness, mental illness and addiction.

The findings of this innovative research are contained in a new report, ‘Do More for Less and Get Blamed for It’: What Harm Reduction Workers Bring to their Jobs and their Community, by Donna Baines, Oliver Hsueh and Denise Cheung. Their research confirms that the workers providing these frontline services bring a rich and multi-dimensional set of skills, both formal and informal, to their jobs. Investing in those workers, including through expanded training, improved safety and working conditions, and adequate compensation and benefits, must be an essential aspect of future efforts to improve these services and better help the populations they serve.

The post New Research Documents Vital Skills of Harm Reduction Workers appeared first on Centre for Future Work.

This article How Vermont shut down ICE was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

After Operation Metro Surge, the Trump administration moved to rein in the Bovino-style spectacle with its made-for-TV arrests. In an attempt to avoid another public outcry, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has quietly settled into a new rhythm.

Arrests have still increased month after month, reaching a record high of roughly 51,000 people taken into ICE custody in August. This is part of a new surge — carried out in hospitals, courthouses and airports — with an intent to stay off the nightly news. As The New York Times reported, this phase is “captured mostly by grainy security camera footage, through cracked blinds and from behind closed doors.” 

This phase is also backed by a dragnet of data. At airports, ICE has been running name matches with TSA to detain people at check-in counters and gates. It has found a backdoor into the country’s license-plate cameras: Records show local and state police ran more than 4,000 immigration-related searches on Flock’s camera network in a single year. (Yet another reason Flock cameras should not exist.)

Perhaps surprisingly, much of the tech infrastructure driving ICE’s new surge is headquartered in … Vermont. The town of Williston, outside Burlington, is home to both ICE’s Law Enforcement Support Center, which houses the agency’s national tip line, and ICE’s National Criminal Analysis and Targeting Center, or NCATC, its social-media surveillance hub. 

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As ICE tries a new approach, this new phase of resisting ICE requires moving to more offense — and the people of Vermont are offering us some clear lessons. 

Vermont resistance

Resistance started with the fight over flights. Early in Trump’s second term, activists documented ICE moving detainees onto commercial flights out of Burlington’s airport — more than 450 people as of mid-July 2025, by their count. They showed up in airports as witnesses and disruptors, sometimes aided by empowered flight attendants. They forced an ICE retreat: organizers say ICE hasn’t moved detainees through the airport in more than a year.

More recently they’ve gone after the hard infrastructure. Sit-ins at the White Cap Business Park in Williston, where the NCATC facility is located, have led to arrests for allegedly blocking the entrance to the ICE offices, including 11 people in February and 13 in July.

After those arrests came some unusual twists, which speak volumes about the courage it takes to refuse unjust orders and to continue protesting in the face of repression.

Complicity and noncooperation

Responses to authoritarianism are as old as a time — many of the same dynamics from Vermont show up in the ancient story of Pharaoh and Moses.

Undeniably the most powerful person in his land, Pharaoh was the ultimate authoritarian. His big trick was taking beautiful work and turning it evil. Take the work of midwives, whose job is to usher life into the world — he turned that work into ugliness by ordering the Hebrew midwives to kill every newborn boy. 

But we all have a choice. And famously, several of the midwives refused. Their act of noncooperation with an unjust order is the reason Moses lived.

We are living through a moment when institution after institution is being turned toward evil. Some, like the Department of Justice, were already a mixed bag. But now it is being turned against the very logic of due process it claims to serve, as we’ve seen recently with the criminal indictment of whistleblower Cassidy Hutchinson. Other institutions, like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, are being perverted, with great resistance from insiders who cling to the key values that these agencies were founded on.

Previous Coverage

The movement to defend the Minneapolis 15

In Vermont, the local prosecutor, Chittenden County State’s Attorney Sarah George, faced her own choice. When asked to bring charges against the protesters who held the sit-ins, she repeatedly declined, citing limited resources. That makes sense: No one was harmed, and the protesters have a strong necessity defense — the argument that they were preventing an even greater harm. Every minute that ICE isn’t taking part in abducting people is good for the country.

Then came a bizarre turn of events. The state’s public safety commissioner directed state police to send the cases to Vermont’s Attorney General Charity Clark, bypassing normal procedure and upending the traditional role of the attorney general. Clark, a Democrat, decided to charge the protesters with trespassing.

In an op-ed, she said her hands were tied: “Justice must be blind or our system will fail.” Back to Pharaoh: This is a bit like a midwife in the next town over raising her hand to say, “I’d like to kill Moses, because that’s what the law dictates.”

Protesters recently unearthed relevant Vermont history — a model of state-level noncooperation. After the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which ordered cooperation with slave catchers, Vermont passed a state statute known as the Habeas Corpus Law. It effectively nullified the federal law, and went so far as to require state attorneys to defend anyone accused of being a slave, with full representation before a judge and a jury. The entire practice of nullification was deemed highly escalatory — so much so the federal government threatened military invasion — but due to the state’s resistance, throughout Vermont there was effectively no participation in the Fugitive Slave Act.

As in that case, the pressure from the federal government has continued. One week before a planned week of direct action, the federal government suddenly charged five people from the earlier protests with obstructing access to a federal facility (punishable by up to 30 days in prison or a $5,000 fine), likely hoping to deter further escalation.

We all have a choice: complicity with Pharoah or noncooperation. Despite the threats and new legal challenges, the protesters in Vermont chose the riskier, more liberatory path.

A funeral, a guerrilla garden and a sit-in

The week of direct action went on as planned, beginning with a funeral. On Oct. 5, more than 30 clergy led a procession of a hundred or so mourners who walked behind a hearse to the White Cap Business Park, singing “Amazing Grace.” They carried 95 paver stones, each representing a life taken by ICE — directly or from complications while detained — and placed them one by one in a handmade coffin of Vermont pine. The action echoed the Stolen Neighbors Quilt created in Minnesota, which remembers people who were deported. Here, names of those killed by ICE were read out. Then, in front of the doors of the spy center, the coffin was nailed shut. 

A crowd gathers in Williston, Vermont on Oct. 5, behind a coffin filled with paver stones representing lives lost to ICE. (Shut Down ICE VT)

Rev. Marybeth Redmond said at the vigil, “I have walked alongside Vermonters struggling to survive, and I have never seen our immigrant neighbors so hunted, so afraid and so alone.”

In the end, it was a symbolic act. Security scattered the stones, and the property manager and others were seen taking crowbars to the coffin. But it was only the beginning of the week.

The next action was a garden. Because what would you expect from Vermont? Rather than using just their bodies to get in the way, about 40 protesters arrived at sunrise with pots, planters and bags of soil. 

They affixed the boxes to the pavement with construction adhesive, painted and chalked them with flowers, insects and slogans, flew a rainbow kite, and by mid-morning, had gotten a full dance party going. The action blocked the road to 188 Harvest Lane, which houses ICE’s national tip line.

They were also highlighting the environmental violence of ICE’s data intensive operation. Gardener Isaac Petersen said, “ICE’s surveillance technology is extremely energy-intensive, much of it powered by AI and data centers. It harms our communities directly by targeting our neighbors.”

State and local police moved some barriers, but largely left the garden alone, which blocked the road for most of the day. ICE’s parking lots were nearly empty all day, and the rumor was that ICE was told to avoid coming into the office.

Protestors hang handwritten “tips” outside the ICE office housing the agency’s national tip line. (Shut Down ICE VT)

Each day escalated from the day before. By Thursday, protesters went right up to the front entrance of the Harvest Lane facility. Dozens had arrived before 8 a.m. to deliver handwritten note cards with “tips” encouraging ICE employees to find other jobs. The protesters started by taping those messages to the windows and doors. Then they hauled out a rug, a couch, a coffee table and a fold-up mattress — a makeshift living room — and sat down, singing and playing music, effectively shutting the place down. 

Much of this has been intergenerational. Vermont protesters have ranged from people in their early 20s to an 83-year-old from Bethel and 85-year-old from Sharon.

Some of those sitting at the entrance this week had taken part in earlier acts of civil disobedience, and several now face charges brought by Clark. 

Organizers say the ICE facility was effectively shut for much of that week, its parking lots empty. Police interference was minimal: At one point, officers came over only to remove the items protesters had used to block a surveillance camera, then returned to their cars. As the organizers said in their press release, “ICE employees went home rather than face Vermont’s week of bold, decisive action.”

What you can do 

The week of action was only one moment, and organizers hope others will organize their own — aimed at different pieces of ICE infrastructure. There are other flash points around the country this month, too, in Austin, Minneapolis and Arizona.

As for Shut Down ICE VT, the group behind the week of action, they plan to keep going. One simple way to support them: Call the tip line that ICE runs out of Williston to encourage neighbors to turn each other in. To disrupt its activity, the group is encouraging people to call 866-347-2423 and tell whoever picks up all the different ways ICE could be making a better world. According to organizers, this tactic has been so successful the lines are clogged — one person was on hold for 2 hours and 18 minutes until her phone died. (This tactic was used in the early DOGE days.) Instead of doing Pharaoh’s bidding: What are the beautiful things you could be doing with your life? It can be a bit of a daily ritual.

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Because here, in the end, is Pharaoh’s trick: He changed the meaning of what was legal. He didn’t simply say, “You must obey me.” He said that if you refused, you were the one breaking the law.

But we should remember whose side the law has so often taken. The law stood against enslaved people seeking freedom. It stood against women having control of their own bodies. It stood against trans people claiming full autonomy. The law, by itself, is no defense against injustice — and must not be turned into an instrument of oppression.

Sarah George declined to prosecute protesters for a reason. By stepping in to take up the case, Charity Clark has signaled a willingness to participate in the repression. The people shutting down ICE in Vermont are on the right side of history. Let’s find ways to join them.

This article How Vermont shut down ICE was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

This table of U.S. Senator’s and Representative’s social media account handles was compiled and updated for 2025 by Triage Cancer.  Not sure who your elected officials are? Find out at CommonCause!

State   Name Party Twitter/X Instagram Facebook Alabama U.S. Senator Britt, Katie R @SenKatieBritt @katieboydbritt x Alabama U.S. Senator Tuberville, Tommy R @SenTuberville @sentuberville x Alabama 1st District U.S. Representative Moore, Barry R @RepBarryMoore @repbarrymoore x Alabama 2nd District U.S. Representative Figures, Shomari C. D @RepSCFigures @repscfigures x Alabama 3rd District U.S. Representative Rogers, Mike R @RepMikeRogersAL @repmikerogersal x Alabama 4th District U.S. Representative Aderholt, Robert R @Robert_Aderholt @robert_aderholt x Alabama 5th District U.S. Representative Strong, Dale R @RepDaleStrong @dalestrongforcongress x Alabama 6th District U.S. Representative Palmer, Gary R @USRepGaryPalmer @repgarypalmer x Alabama 7th District U.S. Representative Sewell, Terri A. D @RepTerriSewell @repterriasewell x Alaska U.S. Senator Sullivan, Dan R @SenDanSullivan @sen_dansullivan x Alaska U.S. Senator Murkowski, Lisa R @lisamurkowski @senlisamurkowski x Alaska At-Large U.S. Representative Begich, Nicholas R @RepNickBegich @RepNickBegich x American Samoa At-Large Delegate Radewagen, Aumua Amata R @RepAmata @repamata x Arizona U.S. Senator Kelly, Mark D @SenMarkKelly @senmarkkelly x Arizona U.S. Senator Gallego, Ruben D @RubenGallego @gallegoforaz x Arizona 1st District U.S. Representative Schweikert, David R @RepDavid @repdavid x Arizona 2nd District U.S. Representative Crane, Eli R @RepEliCrane @elicrane_ceo x Arizona 3rd District U.S. Representative Ansari, Yassamin D @RepYassAnsari @RepYassAnsari x Arizona 4th District U.S. Representative Stanton, Greg D @RepGregStanton @repgregstanton x Arizona 5th District U.S. Representative Biggs, Andy R @RepAndyBiggsAZ @repandybiggs x Arizona 6th District U.S. Representative Ciscomani, Juan R @RepCiscomani @juanciscomani x Arizona 7th District U.S. Representative Grijalva, Raul D @RepRaulGrijalva @repraulgrijalva x Arizona 8th District U.S. Representative Hamadeh, Abraham R @RepAbeHamadeh @repabehamadeh x Arizona 9th District U.S. Representative Gosar, Paul A. R @RepGosar @repgosar x Arkansas U.S. Senator Cotton, Tom R @SenTomCotton @tomcottonar x Arkansas U.S. Senator Boozman, John R @JohnBoozman @johnboozman x Arkansas 1st District U.S. Representative Crawford, Rick R @RepRickCrawford @reprickcrawford x Arkansas 2nd District U.S. Representative Hill, French R @RepFrenchHill @repfrenchhill x Arkansas 3rd District U.S. Representative Womack, Steve R @rep_stevewomack @rep_stevewomack x Arkansas 4th District U.S. Representative Westerman, Bruce R @RepWesterman @repwesterman x California U.S. Senator Padilla, Alex D @SenAlexPadilla @senalexpadilla x California U.S. Senator Schiff, Adam B. D @SenAdamSchiff @SenAdamSchiff x California 1st District U.S. Representative LaMalfa, Doug R @RepLaMalfa @repdouglamalfa x California 2nd District U.S. Representative Huffman, Jared D @RepHuffman @rephuffman x California 3rd District U.S. Representative Kiley, Kevin R @RepKiley @kevinpkiley x California 4th District U.S. Representative Thompson, Mike D @RepThompson @repmikethompson x California 5th District U.S. Representative McClintock, Tom R @RepMcClintock @repmcclintock x California 6th District U.S. Representative Bera, Ami D @RepBera @repbera x California 7th District U.S. Representative Matsui, Doris O. D @DorisMatsui @repdorismatsui x California 8th District U.S. Representative Garamendi, John D @RepGaramendi @repgaramendi x California 9th District U.S. Representative Harder, Josh D @RepJoshHarder @repjoshharder x California 10th District U.S. Representative DeSaulnier, Mark D @RepDeSaulnier @repdesaulnier x California 11th District U.S. Representative Pelosi, Nancy D @SpeakerPelosi @speakerpelosi x California 12th District U.S. Representative Simon, Lateefah D @RepLSimon @RepLSimon x California 13th District U.S. Representative Gray, Adam D @RepAdamGrayCA @repadamgrayca x California 14th District U.S. Representative Swalwell, Eric D @RepSwalwell @repswalwell x California 15th District U.S. Representative Mullin, Kevin D @RepKevinMullin @kevin.mullin x California 16th District U.S. Representative Liccardo, Sam D @RepLiccardo @repliccardo x California 17th District U.S. Representative Khanna, Ro D @RepRoKhanna @reprokhanna x California 18th District U.S. Representative Lofgren, Zoe D @RepZoeLofgren   x California 19th District U.S. Representative Panetta, Jimmy D @RepJimmyPanetta @repjimmypanetta x California 20th District U.S. Representative Fong, Vince R @RepVinceFong @repvincefong x California 21st District U.S. Representative Costa, Jim D @RepJimCosta @repjimcosta x California 22nd District U.S. Representative Valadao, David R @RepDavidValadao @repdavidvaladao x California 23rd District U.S. Representative Obernolte, Jay R @JayObernolte @repjayobernolte x California 24th District U.S. Representative Carbajal, Salud D @RepCarbajal @repcarbajal x California 25th District U.S. Representative Ruiz, Raul D @RepRaulRuizMD @RepRaulRuizMD x California 26th District U.S. Representative Brownley, Julia D @RepBrownley @RepBrownley x California 27th District U.S. Representative Whitesides, George D @Rep_Whitesides @repwhitesides x California 28th District U.S. Representative Chu, Judy D @RepJudyChu @repjudychu x California 29th District U.S. Representative Rivas, Luz D @RepLuzRivas @RepLuzRivas x California 30th District U.S. Representative Friedman, Laura D @RepFriedmanCA @RepLauraFriedman x California 31st District U.S. Representative Cisneros, Gilbert D x @repgilcisneros x California 32nd District U.S. Representative Sherman, Brad D @BradSherman @congressmansherman x California 33rd District U.S. Representative Aguilar, Pete D @RepPeteAguilar @rep.peteaguilar x California 34th District U.S. Representative Gomez, Jimmy D @RepJimmyGomez @jimmygomezca x California 35th District U.S. Representative Torres, Norma D @NormaJTorres @repnormatorres x California 36th District U.S. Representative Lieu, Ted D @RepTedLieu @reptedlieu x California 37th District U.S. Representative Kamlager-Dove, Sydney D @RepKamlagerDove @rep_kamlagerdove x California 38th District U.S. Representative Sánchez, Linda D @RepLindaSanchez @replindasanchez x California 39th District U.S. Representative Takano, Mark D @RepMarkTakano @repmarktakano x California 40th District U.S. Representative Kim, Young R @RepYoungKim @repyoungkim x California 41st District U.S. Representative Calvert, Ken R @KenCalvert @repkencalvert x California 42nd District U.S. Representative Garcia, Robert D @RepRobertGarcia @RepRobertGarcia x California 43rd District U.S. Representative Waters, Maxine D @RepMaxineWaters @repmaxinewaters x California 44th District U.S. Representative Barragan, Nanette D @RepBarragan @repbarragan x California 45th District U.S. Representative Tran, Derek D @RepDerekTranCA @repderektran x California 46th Division U.S. Representative Correa, Lou D @RepLouCorrea @reploucorrea x California 47th District U.S. Representative Min, Dave D @CongressMin @repdavemin x California 48th District U.S. Representative Issa, Darrell R @repdarrellissa @repdarrellissa x California 49th District U.S. Representative Levin, Mike D @RepMikeLevin @repmikelevin x California 50th District U.S. Representative Peters, Scott D @RepScottPeters @repscottpeters x California 51st District U.S. Representative Jacobs, Sara D @RepSaraJacobs @repsarajacobs x California 52nd District U.S. Representative Vargas, Juan D @RepJuanVargas @repjuanvargas x Colorado U.S. Senator Bennet, Michael D @SenatorBennet @senatorbennet x Colorado U.S. Senator Hickenlooper, John D @SenatorHick @senatorhick x Colorado 1st District U.S. Representative DeGette, Diana D @RepDianaDeGette @repdianadegette x Colorado 2nd District U.S. Representative Neguse, Joe D @RepJoeNeguse @repjoeneguse x Colorado 3rd District U.S. Representative Hurd, Jeff R @RepJeffHurd @repjeffhurd x Colorado 4th District U.S. Representative Boebert, Lauren R @RepKenBuck @repboebert x Colorado 5th District U.S. Representative Crank, Jeff R @RepJeffCrank @repjeffcrank x Colorado 6th District U.S. Representative Crow, Jason D @RepJasonCrow @repjasoncrow x Colorado 7th District U.S. Representative Pettersen, Brittany D @RepPettersen @reppettersen x Colorado 8th District U.S. Representative Evans, Gabe R @repgabeevans @RepGabeEvans x Connecticut U.S. Senator Murphy, Chris D @ChrisMurphyCT @senchrismurphy x Connecticut U.S. Senator Blumenthal, Richard D @SenBlumenthal @senblumenthal x Connecticut 1st District U.S. Representative Larson, John B. D @RepJohnLarson @repjohnblarson x Connecticut 2nd District U.S. Representative Courtney, Joe D @RepJoeCourtney @repjoecourtney x Connecticut 3rd District U.S. Representative DeLauro, Rosa L. D @rosadelauro @reprosadelauro x Connecticut 4th District U.S. Representative Himes, Jim D @jahimes @repjimhimes x Connecticut 5th District U.S. Representative Hayes, Jahana D @RepJahanaHayes @repjahanahayes x Delaware U.S. Senator Coons, Chris D @ChrisCoons @senatorchriscoons x Delaware U.S. Senator Blunt Rochester, Lisa D @SenatorLBR @senlbr x Delaware At-Large U.S. Representative McBride, Sarah D @Rep_McBride @congresswomansarahmcbride x District of Columbia At-Large U.S. Representative Norton, Eleanor Holmes D @EleanorNorton @congresswomannorton x Florida U.S. Senator Moody, Ashley R       Florida U.S. Senator Scott, Rick R @SenRickScott @flsenrickscott x Florida 1st District U.S. Representative Vacant       x Florida 2nd District U.S. Representative Dunn, Neal R @DrNealDunnFL2 @drnealdunnfl2 x Florida 3rd District U.S. Representative Cammack, Kat R @RepKatCammack @repkatcammack x Florida 4th District U.S. Representative Bean, Aaron R @RepAaronBean @aaronpbean x Florida 5th District U.S. Representative Rutherford, John R @RepRutherfordFL @reprutherfordfl x Florida 6th District U.S. Representative Vacant       x Florida 7th District U.S. Representative Mills, Cory R @RepMillsPress @repcorymills x Florida 8th District U.S. Representative Haridopolos, Mike R @RepHaridopolos     Florida 9th District U.S. Representative Soto, Darren D @RepDarrenSoto @repdarrensoto x Florida 10th District U.S. Representative Frost, Maxwell D @MaxwellFrostFL @maxwellfrostfl x Florida 11th District U.S. Representative Webster, Daniel R @RepWebster @websterforcongress x Florida 12th District U.S. Representative Bilirakis, Gus M. R @RepGusBilirakis @gusbilirakis x Florida 13th District U.S. Representative Luna, Anna R @RepLuna @realannapaulina x Florida 14th District U.S. Representative Castor, Kathy D @USRepKCastor @usrepkathycastor x Florida 15th District U.S. Representative Lee, Laurel R @RepLaurelLee @replaurellee x Florida 16th District U.S. Representative Buchanan, Vern R @VernBuchanan @repvern x Florida 17th District U.S. Representative Steube, W. Gregory R @RepGregSteube @repgregsteube x Florida 18th District U.S. Representative Franklin, Scott R @RepFranklin @repfranklin x Florida 19th District U.S. Representative Donalds, Byron R @RepDonaldsPress @byrondonalds x Florida 20th District U.S. Representative Cherfilus-McCormick, Sheila D @CongresswomanSC @congresswomanscm x Florida 21st District U.S. Representative Mast, Brian R @RepBrianMast @repbrianmast x Florida 22nd District U.S. Representative Frankel, Lois D @RepLoisFrankel @reploisfrankel x Florida 23rd District U.S. Representative Moskowitz, Jared D @RepMoskowitz @repmoskowitz x Florida 24th District U.S. Representative Wilson, Frederica D @RepWilson @repwilson x Florida 25th District U.S. Representative Wasserman Schultz, Debbie D @RepDWStweets @repdws x Florida 26th District U.S. Representative Diaz-Balart, Mario R @MarioDB @repmariodb x Florida 27th District U.S. Representative Salazar, Maria Elvira R @RepMariaSalazar @repmariasalazar x Florida 28th District U.S. Representative Giménez, Carlos R @RepCarlos @repcarlosfl x Georgia U.S. Senator Ossoff, Jon D @ossoff @jonossoff x Georgia U.S. Senator Warnock, Raphael D @SenatorWarnock @raphaelwarnock x Georgia 1st District U.S. Representative Carter, Buddy R @RepBuddyCarter @repbuddycarter x Georgia 2nd District U.S. Representative Bishop Jr., Sanford D. D @SanfordBishop @repsanfordbishop x Georgia 3rd District U.S. Representative Jack, Brian R @RepBrianJack @repbrianjack x Georgia 4th District U.S. Representative Johnson, Henry C. “Hank” Jr. D @RepHankJohnson @rephankjohnson x Georgia 5th District U.S. Representative Williams, Nikema D @RepNikema @repnikema x Georgia 6th District U.S. Representative McBath, Lucy D @RepLucyMcBath @replucymcbath x Georgia 7th District U.S. Representative McCormick, Richard R @RepMcCormick @reprichmccormick x Georgia 8th District U.S. Representative Scott, Austin R @AustinScottGA08   x Georgia 9th District U.S. Representative Clyde, Andrew R @Rep_Clyde @repclyde x Georgia 10th District U.S. Representative Collins, Mike R @RepMikeCollins @repmikecollins x Georgia 11th District U.S. Representative Loudermilk, Barry R @RepLoudermilk @reploudermilk x Georgia 12th District U.S. Representative Allen, Rick R @RepRickAllen @rep_rickallen x Georgia 13th District U.S. Representative Scott, David D @repdavidscott @repdavidscott x Georgia 14th District U.S. Representative Greene, Marjorie Taylor R @RepMTG @repmtg x Guam At-Large U.S. Representative Moylan, Jim R x @repjamesmoylan x Hawaii U.S. Senator Schatz, Brian D @SenBrianSchatz @senbrianschatz x Hawaii U.S. Senator Hirono, Mazie D @maziehirono @maziehirono x Hawaii 1st District U.S. Representative Case, Ed D @RepEdCase @repedcase x Hawaii 2nd District U.S. Representative Tokuda, Jill D @RepJillTokuda @tokudaforhawaii x Idaho U.S. Senator Risch, Jim R @SenatorRisch   x Idaho U.S. Senator Crapo, Mike R @MikeCrapo @mikecrapo x Idaho 1st District U.S. Representative Fulcher, Russ R @RepRussFulcher @reprussfulcher x Idaho 2nd District U.S. Representative Simpson, Mike R @CongMikeSimpson @congressmanmikesimpson x Illinois U.S. Senator Duckworth, Tammy D @SenDuckworth @senduckworth x Illinois U.S. Senator Durbin, Dick D @SenatorDurbin @durbincampaign x Illinois 1st District U.S. Representative Jackson, Jonathan D @rep_jackson @repjackson x Illinois 2nd District U.S. Representative Kelly, Robin D @RepRobinKelly @reprobinkelly x Illinois 3rd District U.S. Representative Ramirez, Delia D @repdeliaramirez @repdeliaramirez x Illinois 4th District U.S. Representative Garcia, Jesus “Chuy” D @RepChuyGarcia @repchuygarcia x Illinois 5th District U.S. Representative Quigley, Mike D @RepMikeQuigley @repmikequigley x Illinois 6th District U.S. Representative Casten, Sean D @RepCasten @repseancasten x Illinois 7th District U.S. Representative Davis, Danny K. D @RepDannyDavis @officialrepdannydavis x Illinois 8th District U.S. Representative Krishnamoorthi, Raja D @CongressmanRaja @congressmanraja x Illinois 9th District U.S. Representative Schakowsky, Jan D @janschakowsky @janschakowsky x Illinois 10th District U.S. Representative Schneider, Bradley D @RepSchneider @repschneider x Illinois 11th District U.S. Representative Foster, Bill D @RepBillFoster @repbillfoster x Illinois 12th District U.S. Representative Bost, Mike R @RepBost   x Illinois 13th District U.S. Representative Budzinski, Nikki D @RepNikkiB @repnikki x Illinois 14th District U.S. Representative Underwood, Lauren D @RepUnderwood @repunderwood x Illinois 15th District U.S. Representative Miller, Mary R @RepMaryMiller @repmarymiller x Illinois 16th District U.S. Representative LaHood,Darin R @RepLaHood @replahood x Illinois 17th District U.S. Representative Sorensen, Eric D @RepEricSorensen @repericsorensen x Indiana U.S. Senator Banks, Jim R @SenatorBanks @senjimbanks x Indiana U.S. Senator Young, Todd R @SenToddYoung @sentoddyoung x Indiana 1st District U.S. Representative Mrvan, Frank D @RepMrvan @repmrvan x Indiana 2nd District U.S. Representative Yakym, Rudy R @RepRudyYakym   x Indiana 3rd District U.S. Representative Stutzman, Marlin R @RepStutzman @repstutzman x Indiana 4th District U.S. Representative Baird, James R @RepJimBaird   x Indiana 5th District U.S. Representative Spartz, Victoria R @RepSpartz @repvictoriaspartz x Indiana 6th District U.S. Representative Shreve, Jefferson R @RepShreve @repshreve x Indiana 7th District U.S. Representative Carson, André D @RepAndreCarson @repandrecarson x Indiana 8th District U.S. Representative Messmer, Mark R @RepMessmer   x Indiana 9th District U.S. Representative Houchin, Erin R @RepHouchin @rephouchin x Iowa U.S. Senator Grassley, Chuck R @ChuckGrassley @senatorchuckgrassley x Iowa U.S. Senator Joni Ernst R @SenJoniErnst @senjoniernst x Iowa 1st District U.S. Representative Miller-Meeks, Mariannette R @RepMMM @repmmm x Iowa 2nd District U.S. Representative Hinson, Ashley R @RepAshleyHinson @repashleyhinson x Iowa 3rd District U.S. Representative Nunn, Zach R @ZachNunn @repzachnunn x Iowa 4th District U.S. Representative Feenstra, Randy R @repfeenstra @repfeenstra x Kansas U.S. Senator Marshall, Roger R @RogerMarshallMD @rogermarshallmd x Kansas U.S. Senator Moran, Jerry R @JerryMoran   x Kansas 1st District U.S. Representative Mann, Tracey R @RepMann @reptraceymann x Kansas 2nd District U.S. Representative Schmidt, Derek R @RepDerekSchmidt @repderekschmidt x Kansas 3rd District U.S. Representative Davids, Sharice D @RepDavids @repdavids x Kansas 4th District U.S. Representative Estes, Ron R @RepRonEstes @repronestes x Kentucky U.S. Senator Paul, Rand R @RandPaul @drrandpaul x Kentucky U.S. Senator McConnell, Mitch R @McConnellPress @mcconnellpress x Kentucky 1st District U.S. Representative Comer, James R @RepJamesComer @congressmancomer x Kentucky 2nd District U.S. Representative Guthrie, S. Brett R @RepGuthrie @repguthrie x Kentucky 3rd District U.S. Representative McGarvey, Morgan D @RepMcGarvey @repmcgarvey x Kentucky 4th District U.S. Representative Massie, Thomas R @RepThomasMassie @repthomasmassie x Kentucky 5th District U.S. Representative Rogers, Harold R @RepHalRogers @rephalrogers x Kentucky 6th District U.S. Representative Barr, Andy R @RepAndyBarr @repandybarr x Louisiana U.S. Senator Neely Kennedy, John R @SenJohnKennedy @senjohnkennedy x Louisiana U.S. Senator Cassidy, Bill R @SenBillCassidy @senbillcassidy x Louisiana 1st District U.S. Representative Scalise, Steve R @SteveScalise @stevescalise x Louisiana 2nd District U.S. Representative Carter, Troy D @RepTroyCarter @reptroycarter x Louisiana 3rd District U.S. Representative Higgins, Clay R @RepClayHiggins @repclayhiggins x Louisiana 4th District U.S. Representative Johnson, Mike R @SpeakerJohnson @speakermjohnson x Louisiana 5th District U.S. Representative Letlow, Julia R @RepJuliaLetlow @repjulialetlow x Louisiana 6th District U.S. Representative Fields, Cleo D @RepFields @repcleofields_ x Maine U.S. Senator King, Angus I @SenAngusKing @anguskingmaine x Maine U.S. Senator Collins, Susan R @SenatorCollins @sensusancollins x Maine 1st District U.S. Representative Pingree, Chellie D @chelliepingree @chelliepingre x Maine 2nd District U.S. Representative Golden, Jared D @RepGolden @repgolden x Maryland U.S. Senator Van Hollen, Chris D @ChrisVanHollen @chrisvanhollen x Maryland U.S. Senator Alsobrooks, Angela D. D @Sen_Alsobrooks @sen_alsobrooks x Maryland 1st District U.S. Representative Harris, Andy R @RepAndyHarrisMD   x Maryland 2nd District U.S. Representative Olszewski, Johnny D @RepJohnnyO @repjohnnyo x Maryland 3rd District U.S. Representative Elfreth, Sarah D @RepSarahElfreth @repsarahelfreth x Maryland 4th District U.S. Representative Ivey, Glenn D @RepGlennIvey @repglennivey x Maryland 5th District U.S. Representative Hoyer, Steny H. D @RepStenyHoyer @leaderhoyer x Maryland 6th District U.S. Representative McClain Delaney, April D @RepAprilDelaney @repaprildelaney x Maryland 7th District U.S. Representative Mfume, Kweisi D @RepKweisiMfume @repkweisimfume x Maryland 8th District U.S. Representative Raskin, Jamie D @RepRaskin @repraskin x Massachusetts U.S. Senator Warren, Elizabeth D @SenWarren @senwarren x Massachusetts U.S. Senator Markey, Edward D @SenMarkey @edmarkey x Massachusetts 1st District U.S. Representative Neal, Richard E. D @RepRichardNeal   x Massachusetts 2nd District U.S. Representative McGovern, James D @RepMcGovern @repmcgovern x Massachusetts 3rd District U.S. Representative Trahan, Lori D @RepLoriTrahan @reploritrahan x Massachusetts 4th District U.S. Representative Auchincloss, Jake D @RepAuchincloss @jakeauchincloss x Massachusetts 5th District U.S. Representative Clark, Katherine D @WhipKClark @repkclark x Massachusetts 6th District U.S. Representative Moulton, Seth D @Repmoulton @repmoulton x Massachusetts 7th District U.S. Representative Pressley, Ayanna D @RepPressley @ayannapressley x Massachusetts 8th District U.S. Representative Lynch, Stephen F. D @RepStephenLynch @repstephenlynch x Massachusetts 9th District U.S. Representative Keating, William D @USRepKeating @usrepkeating x Michigan U.S. Senator Slotkin, Elissa D @SenatorSlotkin @senslotkin x Michigan U.S. Senator Peters, Gary D @SenGaryPeters @sengarypeters x Michigan 1st District U.S. Representative Bergman, Jack R @RepJackBergman @repjackbergman x Michigan 2nd District U.S. Representative Moolenaar, John R @RepMoolenaar @repmoolenaar x Michigan 3rd District U.S. Representative Scholten, Hillary D @RepScholten @repscholten x Michigan 4th District U.S. Representative Huizenga, Bill R @RepHuizenga @rephuizenga x Michigan 5th District U.S. Representative Walberg, Tim R @RepWalberg @repwalberg x Michigan 6th District U.S. Representative Dingell, Debbie D @RepDebDingell @repdingell x Michigan 7th District U.S. Representative Barrett, Tom R @RepTomBarrett   x Michigan 8th District U.S. Representative McDonald Rivet, Kristen D @repkmr @repmcdonaldrivet x Michigan 9th District U.S. Representative McClain, Lisa R @replisamcclain @replisamcclain x Michigan 10th District U.S. Representative James, John R @RepJames @RepJohnJames x Michigan 11th District U.S. Representative Stevens, Haley D @RepHaleyStevens @rephaleystevens x Michigan 12th District U.S. Representative Tlaib, Rashida D @RepRashida @rashidatlaib x Michigan 13th District U.S. Representative Thanedar, Shri D @RepShriThanedar @RepShriThanedar x Minnesota U.S. Senator Klobuchar, Amy D @senamyklobuchar @amyklobuchar x Minnesota U.S. Senator Smith, Tina D @SenTinaSmith @senatortinasmith x Minnesota 1st District U.S. Representative Finstad, Brad R @repfinstad @repfinstad x Minnesota 2nd District U.S. Representative Craig, Angie D @RepAngieCraig @repangiecraig x Minnesota 3rd District U.S. Representative Morrison, Kelly D @KellyMorrisonMN @kellymorrisonmn x Minnesota 4th District U.S. Representative McCollum, Betty D @BettyMcCollum04 @repbettymccollum x Minnesota 5th District U.S. Representative Omar, Ilhan D @Ilhan @repilhan x Minnesota 6th District U.S. Representative Emmer, Tom R @RepTomEmmer @reptomemmer x Minnesota 7th District U.S. Representative Fischbach, Michelle R @RepFischbach @repfischbach x Minnesota 8th District U.S. Representative Stauber, Pete R @RepPeteStauber @petestaubermn x Mississippi U.S. Senator Wicker, Roger R @SenatorWicker @senatorwicker x Mississippi U.S. Senator Hyde-Smith, Cindy R @SenHydeSmith @sencindyhydesmith x Mississippi 1st District U.S. Representative Kelly, Trent R @RepTrentKelly @reptrentkelly x Mississippi 2nd District U.S. Representative Thompson, Bennie G. D @BennieGThompson @benniegthompson x Mississippi 3rd District U.S. Representative Guest, Michael R @RepMichaelGuest @repmichaelguest x Mississippi 4th District U.S. Representative Ezell, Mike R @RepEzell @repmikeezell x Missouri U.S. Senator Hawley, Josh R @SenHawleyPress @senatorhawley x Missouri U.S. Senator Schmitt, Eric R @SenEricSchmitt @senericschmitt x Missouri 1st District U.S. Representative Bell, Wesley D @RepWesleyBellMO     Missouri 2nd District U.S. Representative Wagner, Ann R @RepAnnWagner @repannwagner x Missouri 3rd District U.S. Representative Onder, Robert R @RepBobOnder @repbobonder x Missouri 4th District U.S. Representative Alford, Mark R @RepMarkAlford @repmarkalford x Missouri 5th District U.S. Representative Cleaver, Emanuel D @repcleaver @repcleaver x Missouri 6th District U.S. Representative Graves, Sam R @RepSamGraves @repsamgraves x Missouri 7th District U.S. Representative Burlison, Eric R @RepEricBurlison @repericburlison x Missouri 8th District U.S. Representative Smith, Jason R @RepJasonSmith @repjasonsmith x Montana U.S. Senator Sheehy, Tim R @TimSheehyMT @timsheehymt x Montana U.S. Senator Daines, Steve R @SteveDaines @stevedaines x Montana 1st District U.S. Representative Zinke, Ryan R @RepRyanZinke @repryanzinke x Montana 2nd District U.S. Representative Downing, Troy R @RepTroyDowning @reptroydowning x Nebraska U.S. Senator Ricketts, Pete R @SenatorRicketts @senatorricketts x Nebraska U.S. Senator Fischer, Deb R @SenatorFischer @senatorfischer x Nebraska 1st District U.S. Representative Flood, Mike R @USRepMikeFlood   x Nebraska 2nd District U.S. Representative Bacon, Don R @RepDonBacon @repdonbacon x Nebraska 3rd District U.S. Representative Smith, Adrian R @RepAdrianSmith @repadriansmith x Nevada U.S. Senator Rosen, Jacky D @SenJackyRosen @senjackyrosen x Nevada U.S. Senator Cortez Mastro, Catherine D @SenCortezMasto @sencortezmasto x Nevada 1st District U.S. Representative Titus, Dina D @repdinatitus @dinatitusnv x Nevada 2nd District U.S. Representative Amodei, Mark R @MarkAmodeiNV2 @markamodeinv2 x Nevada 3rd District U.S. Representative Lee, Susie D @RepSusieLee @repsusielee x Nevada 4th District U.S. Representative Horsford, Steven D @RepHorsford @rephorsford x New Hampshire U.S. Senator Shaheen, Jeanne D @SenatorShaheen @senatorshaheen x New Hampshire U.S. Senator Hassan, Maggie D @SenatorHassan @senatorhassan x New Hampshire 1st District U.S. Representative Pappas, Chris D @RepChrisPappas @repchrispappas x New Hampshire 2nd District U.S. Representative Goodlander, Maggie D @RepGoodlander @repgoodlander x New Jersey U.S. Senator Kim, Andy D @SenatorAndyKim @SenatorAndyKim x New Jersey U.S. Senator Booker, Cory D @SenBooker @corybooker x New Jersey 1st District U.S. Representative Norcross, Donald D @DonaldNorcross @donaldnorcross x New Jersey 2nd District U.S. Representative Van Drew, Jefferson D @Congressman_JVD @jeffvandrew x New Jersey 3rd District U.S. Representative Conaway, Herbert D @RepHerbConaway @repherbconaway x New Jersey 4th District U.S. Representative Smith, Chris R – @repchrissmith x New Jersey 5th District U.S. Representative Gottheimer, Josh D @RepJoshG @repjoshg x New Jersey 6th District U.S. Representative Pallone Jr., Frank D @FrankPallone @repfrankpallone x New Jersey 7th District U.S. Representative Kean Jr., Thomas R @CongressmanKean @congressmankean x New Jersey 8th District U.S. Representative Menendez, Rob D @RepMenendez @repmenendez x New Jersey 9th District U.S. Representative Pou, Nellie D @RepNellie     New Jersey 10th District U.S. Representative McIver, LaMonica D @RepLaMonica @replamonica x New Jersey 11th District U.S. Representative Sherrill, Mikie D @RepSherrill @repsherrill x New Jersey 12th District U.S. Representative Watson Coleman, Bonnie D @RepBonnie @RepBonnie x New Mexico U.S. Senator Luján, Ben Ray D @SenatorLujan @senatorlujan x New Mexico U.S. Senator Heinrich, Martin D @SenatorHeinrich @senatormartinheinrich x New Mexico 1st District U.S. Representative Stansbury, Melanie D @Rep_Stansbury @repstansbury x New Mexico 2nd District U.S. Representative Vasquez, Gabe D @RepGabeVasquez @repgabevasquez x New Mexico 3rd District U.S. Representative Fernandez, Teresa Leger D @RepTeresaLF @repteresalf x New York U.S. Senator Schumer, Chuck D @SenSchumer @chuckschumer x New York U.S. Senator Gillibrand, Kirsten D @gillibrandny @senkirstengillibrand x New York 1st District U.S. Representative LaLota, Nick R @replalota @replalota x New York 2nd District U.S. Representative Garbarino, Andrew R @repgarbarino @repandrewgarbarino x New York 3rd District U.S. Representative Suozzi, Thomas R. D @RepTomSuozzi @reptomsuozzi x New York 4th District U.S. Representative Gillen, Laura D @RepLauraGillen @replauragillen x New York 5th District U.S. Representative Meeks, Gregory W. D @RepGregoryMeeks @repgregorymeeks x New York 6th District U.S. Representative Meng, Grace D @RepGraceMeng   x New York 7th District U.S. Representative Velázquez, Nydia M. D @NydiaVelazquez @rep_velazquez x New York 8th District U.S. Representative Jeffries, Hakeem D @RepJeffries @repjeffries x New York 9th District U.S. Representative Clarke, Yvette D. D @RepYvetteClarke @repyvetteclarke x New York 10th District U.S. Representative Goldman, Dan D @RepDanGoldman @RepDanGoldman x New York 11th District U.S. Representative Malliotakis, Nicole D @RepNicole @nmalliotakis x New York 12th District U.S. Representative Nadler, Jerry D @RepJerryNadler @repjerrynadler x New York 13th District U.S. Representative Espaillat, Adriano D @RepEspaillat @repespaillat x New York 14th District U.S. Representative Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria D @RepAOC @repaoc x New York 15th District U.S. Representative Torres, Ritchie D @RepRitchie @RepRitchie x New York 16th District U.S. Representative Latimer, George D @RepGLatimer @RepGLatimer x New York 17th District U.S. Representative Lawler, Mike R @RepMikeLawler @RepMikeLawler x New York 18th District U.S. Representative Ryan, Pat D @RepPatRyanNY   x New York 19th District U.S. Representative Riley, Josh D @RepRileyNY @RepRileyNY x New York 20th District U.S. Representative Tonko, Paul D. D @RepPaulTonko @reppaultonko x New York 21st District U.S. Representative Stefanik, Elise R @RepStefanik @repstefanik x New York 22nd District U.S. Representative Mannion, John D @JohnMannionNY22 @congressmannion x New York 23rd District U.S. Representative Langworthy, Nick R @RepLangworthy @RepLangworthy x New York 24th District U.S. Representative Tenney, Claudia R @RepTenney   x New York 25th District U.S. Representative Morelle, Joseph D @RepJoeMorelle @repjoemorelle x New York 26th District U.S. Representative Kennedy, Timothy D @RepTimKennedy @reptimkennedy x North Carolina U.S. Senator Tillis, Thom R @SenThomTillis @senthomtillis x North Carolina U.S. Senator Budd, Ted R @SenTedBuddNC @sentedbudd x North Carolina 1st District U.S. Representative Davis, Don D @RepDonDavis @repdondavis x North Carolina 2nd District U.S. Representative Ross, Deborah K. D @RepDeborahRoss @repdeborahross x North Carolina 3rd District U.S. Representative Murphy, Greg R @RepGregMurphy @repgregmurphy x North Carolina 4th District U.S. Representative Foushee, Valerie D @ValerieFoushee @repvaleriefoushee x North Carolina 5th District U.S. Representative Foxx, Virginia R @virginiafoxx @repvirginiafoxx x North Carolina 6th District U.S. Representative McDowell, Addison R @RepMcDowell @repmcdowell x North Carolina 7th District U.S. Representative Rouzer, David R @RepDavidRouzer @repdavidrouzer x North Carolina 8th District U.S. Representative Harris, Mark R @@RepMarkHarrisNC @repmarkharris x North Carolina 9th District U.S. Representative Hudson, Richard R @RepRichHudson @reprichhudson x North Carolina 10th District U.S. Representative Harrigan, Pat R @RepPatHarrigan @RepPatHarrigan x North Carolina 11th District U.S. Representative Edwards, Chuck R @RepChuckEdwards @repchuckedwards x North Carolina 12th District U.S. Representative Adams, Alma D @RepAdams @repadams x North Carolina 13th District U.S. Representative Knott, Brad R @RepKnott @repknott x North Carolina 14th District U.S. Representative Moore, Tim R @RepTimMooreNC @reptimmoore x North Dakota U.S. Senator Hoeven, John R @SenJohnHoeven @senjohnhoeven x North Dakota U.S. Senator Cramer, Kevin R @SenKevinCramer @senatorkevincramer x North Dakota At-Large U.S. Representative Fedorchak, Julie R @RepFedorchak @RepJulieFedorchak x Northern Mariana Islands At-Large U.S. Representative King-Hinds, Kimberlyn R @RepKimKingHinds @RepKimKingHinds x Ohio U.S. Senator Moreno, Bernie R @berniemoreno @berniemorenoforohio   Ohio U.S. Senator Husted, Jon R       Ohio 1st District U.S. Representative Landsman, Greg D @RepGregLandsman @repgreglandsman x Ohio 2nd District U.S. Representative Taylor, David R @RepDaveTaylor @repdavetaylor x Ohio 3rd District U.S. Representative Beatty, Joyce D @RepBeatty @repbeatty x Ohio 4th District U.S. Representative Jordan, Jim R @Jim_Jordan @jimjordanoh04 x Ohio 5th District U.S. Representative Latta, Robert E. R @boblatta @boblatta x Ohio 6th District U.S. Representative Rulli, Michael A. 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17 Groups Sue to Require Montana PSC to Consider Climate in Utility Decision Making Groups seek to confirm Commission’s obligations to ensure a clean and healthful environment   CONTACTS: Amy Cilimburg, Climate Smart Missoula | amy@climatesmartmissoula.org Dara Deins, Forward Montana | dara@forwardmontana.org Nick Fitzmaurice, MEIC |  (406) 443-2520 x 007, nfitzmaurice@meic.org Perry Wheeler, Earthjustice | …

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The Washington D.C.-based organization FRESHFARM is working to strengthen food access, support local farmers, and improve food education in the mid-Atlantic region of the United States.

The nonprofit runs the third-largest farmers market network in the country as well as a food hub, “which is really all about providing farmers, especially small and mid-sized farmers, an opportunity to get into the wholesale market,” Cat Oakar, FRESHFARM’s Executive Director tells Food Tank. This allows nonprofits the ability to purchase fresh, local produce, “which they’re often shut out of.”

To connect more eaters with healthy food, the organization also operates two extensive food access programs, Produce Plus and FreshMatch, which offer qualifying shoppers additional dollars to spend at farmers markets. 

Oakar believes these programs are essential, arguing that there should be more investment and support to help families buy and prepare fresh produce. But, she is seeing the opposite, with federal cuts affecting initiatives like Local Food Purchase Assistance Cooperative Agreement Program (LFPA) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Education (SNAP-Ed). 

The loss of funding is particularly confusing to Oakar when the Trump-Vance Administration is doing so well to bring the link between food and health into national conversations, says Oakar, who previously served as Special Assistant to the President for Public Health and Disparities under the Biden-Harris Administration. “They’re succeeding “in a way that, frankly, we…couldn’t do.” But she believes the actions of the federal government represent a contradiction. 

“If we really want to make people healthy, investing in the food system, investing in local farmers, investing in programs that have been cut is the way to make a healthier society,” she tells Food Tank. “It’s the way to make a more resilient, stronger food system.”

The idea of building a healthier society is one that FRESHFARM takes seriously. Farmers markets aren’t just connecting people to fresh produce, Oakar explains. They are also “essential community infrastructure” that serve as economic engines and gathering places. “Our farmers markets are something that are so powerful and such a beautiful and necessary part of strong, resilient communities.”

Listen to the full conversation with Cat Oakar on “Food Talk with Dani Nierenberg” to hear about Oakar’s transition from the White House to FRESHFARM, the challenges facing local farmers, and how the organization is getting students excited about food systems. 

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Shelley Pauls, Unsplash

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As state legislatures begin preparing for their 2027 sessions, now is the time to start planning for the policy discussions and legislative activity that will shape the year ahead. Early preparation...

Recently, our team celebrated an incredible milestone: over 20,000 acres enrolled in the Conservation Forage Program (CFP)! This achievement was made possible by landowners, partners, and...

 

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 OCTOBER 2026 SLF-2007-088 The Sakhalin Papers LXXVIII: Washington Enters the Pipeline War — US Sanctions, German Resistance and Shell’s Nord Stream 2 Exposure

Between April 2017 and February 2022, Royal Dutch Shell’s financial participation in Nord Stream 2 became entangled in an escalating confrontation between Washington, Berlin and Moscow. The United States threatened sanctions against companies supporting the Russian gas pipeline. Germany resisted what it regarded as extraterritorial interference in European energy policy. A major offshore contractor abandoned construction work, while the American government subsequently warned that even financing partners could face sanctions. The pipeline was eventually completed, but it never entered commercial service. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany halted its certification, Washington sanctioned the project company, and Shell announced its withdrawal. In May 2022, Shell recognised a $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan. Authenticated corporate announcements, American sanctions records, German government statements, European court proceedings and contemporaneous reporting reveal how a commercially ambitious energy project accumulated increasingly visible political and financial risks.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-088
Publication date: 15 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Principal authenticated records: Shell and OMV corporate announcements, 24 April 2017; German Federal Government statement, 16 June 2017; US State Department sanctions guidance, 27 December 2019 and 15 July 2020; US-German Joint Statement, 21 July 2021; Shell corporate announcement, 28 February 2022; Shell First Quarter 2022 Financial Results, 5 May 2022.
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, June 2017, December 2019 and July 2020; Associated Press, September 2021; S&P Global, September 2021 and February 2022.
Judicial and regulatory context: Court of Justice of the European Union, Nord Stream 2 AG v European Parliament and Council, Case C-348/20 P, judgment of 12 July 2022; German Federal Network Agency certification decision, 16 November 2021; German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, 22 February 2022.
Evidence standard: Corporate commitments are distinguished from actual payments and equity ownership. Sanctions threats are distinguished from sanctions imposed. Government political assessments are attributed to their authors. Judicial decisions are reported according to their actual legal effect. Financial write-downs are distinguished from proof of misconduct or negligence.

Introduction: A financing agreement becomes a geopolitical liability

The previous instalment, The Shell Leaks Files — 14 October 2026, examined Poland’s extraordinary attempt to penalise Gazprom and five Western European energy companies over their participation in Nord Stream 2.

The Polish regulator initially imposed penalties exceeding PLN 29 billion against Gazprom and PLN 30 million against Shell.

Those principal competition penalties were subsequently overturned by the Polish courts.

But Poland was not the only government challenging Nord Stream 2.

Another confrontation was developing across the Atlantic.

Unlike Poland’s competition authority, Washington was not primarily concerned with whether the financing agreements constituted an unauthorised corporate concentration.

The United States regarded the pipeline as a strategic threat to European energy security and Ukraine’s position as a transit country for Russian natural gas.

Germany regarded the project differently.

Successive German governments argued that additional gas infrastructure could benefit European energy consumers and objected strongly to American attempts to impose sanctions on European companies undertaking lawful commercial activities.

Shell occupied an increasingly uncomfortable position between these competing interpretations.

It had entered into a substantial financing commitment with Gazprom’s pipeline company.

It was participating in a project that Germany supported but several other European governments opposed.

And it faced the prospect that the United States might extend its sanctions regime to companies financing Russian energy infrastructure.

The surviving documents establish that these risks did not emerge suddenly in February 2022.

They developed over several years.

The central question is what those documents reveal about the accumulation of risk — and what investors could reasonably have understood at the time.

1. April 2017: Shell commits up to €950 million

On 24 April 2017, Shell joined ENGIE, OMV, Uniper and Wintershall in signing financing agreements with Nord Stream 2 AG.

Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of the pipeline company.

The five Western European participants agreed to provide financing and guarantees covering half the project’s anticipated €9.5 billion cost.

Each company committed up to €950 million.

The agreement provided for an initial long-term funding facility of €285 million per company.

Further financing and guarantees of up to €665 million depended upon subsequent project requirements and decisions.

This distinction matters.

Shell did not acquire the 10 per cent shareholding originally envisaged in September 2015.

Its participation had become a contractual financing arrangement.

Nor does the €950 million commitment establish that Shell immediately transferred that entire amount.

It represented a maximum agreed financial exposure under the financing arrangements.

The participating companies presented Nord Stream 2 as commercially necessary infrastructure.

They argued that declining European gas production would increase demand for imports and that an additional Baltic Sea pipeline would strengthen supply security.

The corporate announcement also identified the project’s intended capacity: 55 billion cubic metres of gas annually.

The planned route extended approximately 1,220 kilometres from Russia across the Baltic Sea to Germany.

Construction was expected to commence in 2018 and finish by the end of 2019.

The project was therefore presented as a substantial but commercially conventional infrastructure investment.

Within weeks, however, the American Senate had brought the arrangement into an increasingly contentious sanctions debate.

Authenticated corporate source: OMV — Nord Stream 2 AG and European Energy Companies Sign Financing Agreements, 24 April 2017. Ocean News & Technology

2. June 2017: Washington’s sanctions proposals alarm Germany

On 15 June 2017, Reuters reported an unusually strong response from Germany and Austria to proposed American sanctions against Russia.

The US Senate had advanced measures intended to increase pressure on Moscow over its international conduct, including interference in the American electoral process and actions concerning Ukraine.

The proposed measures also created potential sanctions exposure for companies participating in certain Russian energy-export pipeline projects.

German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel and Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern publicly objected.

Their concern was not simply that Russia might face additional sanctions.

They feared that European companies financing or constructing Nord Stream 2 could become subject to American penalties.

The ministers argued that Europe should determine its own energy policy and that American sanctions should not be used to advance commercial interests in the energy sector.

That last argument was an interpretation advanced by the German and Austrian governments.

It was not an established judicial finding concerning American motives.

Nevertheless, their intervention exposed a serious disagreement within the Western alliance.

Germany and Austria regarded the proposed extraterritorial measures as a threat to European commercial sovereignty.

Washington regarded Russian energy infrastructure as a legitimate subject for national-security sanctions.

Shell and the other European financiers were directly relevant to this disagreement because they had signed their financing commitments less than two months earlier.

The possibility of American sanctions was no longer theoretical political commentary.

It had entered the legislative process.

Contemporaneous source: Reuters — US Sanctions on Russia Threaten European Energy Firms, Germany and Austria Warn, 15 June 2017.

3. The German government’s authenticated response

On 16 June 2017, the German Federal Government published an official statement concerning the American proposals.

The statement was unusually forthright.

Government spokesperson Steffen Seibert criticised the prospect that sanctions intended to influence Russian conduct might instead penalise European businesses.

The German government reiterated its opposition to extraterritorial sanctions affecting third countries.

It also confirmed that Chancellor Angela Merkel shared the concerns expressed by Gabriel and Kern.

Foreign Office spokesperson Martin Schäfer argued that the proposed measures could allow American authorities to penalise German, Austrian and other European companies for participating in energy projects.

The German government questioned whether such measures would be compatible with international law.

That was the government’s stated legal position, not a court ruling determining that the American legislation was unlawful.

The statement demonstrates that the dispute was not confined to an individual minister’s personal opinion.

It reflected an official German government position.

The United States and Germany were already divided over the treatment of Nord Stream 2.

The German government wanted coordinated action against Russia while resisting American measures that might penalise European companies.

The American government increasingly regarded Nord Stream 2 as inconsistent with European energy security.

Those positions would remain in tension for several years.

Primary source: German Federal Government — Trade Policy Should Not Be Mixed With Sanctions, 16 June 2017.

4. August 2017: American legislation creates a new category of risk

On 2 August 2017, President Donald Trump signed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, commonly known as CAATSA.

Section 232 established discretionary sanctions authority concerning specified investments and other activities supporting Russian energy-export pipelines.

The legislation did not automatically sanction Shell.

Nor did it make participation in every Russian pipeline project unlawful.

Its importance lay in providing American authorities with a mechanism for imposing sanctions upon qualifying activities by foreign companies.

This introduced a different kind of risk from Poland’s competition proceedings.

A company could face potential American consequences for activity undertaken outside the United States.

Sanctions might affect access to American markets, financing arrangements, commercial relationships or other activities subject to US jurisdiction.

The consequences would depend upon the actual legislation, implementing guidance and any subsequent designation.

For Shell, which operated extensively in the United States and international financial markets, the emergence of this sanctions authority was a development of potential commercial significance.

But the documentary record does not establish that Shell was sanctioned under Section 232 in 2017.

The distinction between the existence of a sanctions power and its exercise is essential.

5. December 2019: Washington targets the construction vessels

The confrontation escalated sharply in December 2019.

On 20 December, President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020.

The legislation included the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, known as PEESA.

Its provisions targeted specified vessels engaged in laying pipe for Nord Stream 2 and certain companies providing those vessels.

The legislation required identification of qualifying activities and provided sanctions mechanisms, subject to statutory conditions and wind-down provisions.

The United States was now moving beyond general opposition to Russian pipeline financing.

It was targeting the specialist contractors physically constructing the pipeline.

That change proved immediately consequential.

Allseas suspends construction

On 21 December 2019, Swiss-Dutch offshore engineering company Allseas announced that it had suspended pipe-laying operations associated with Nord Stream 2.

Allseas operated specialist vessels capable of installing large-diameter pipelines in deep water.

Its participation was important to the project’s construction programme.

The company explained that it was suspending work in anticipation of the new American legislation and would await clarification concerning its application.

Reuters independently reported the decision.

This was one of the clearest demonstrations that American sanctions could materially disrupt the project.

The sanctions had not merely generated diplomatic protests.

A major contractor had stopped work.

Construction, previously anticipated to finish in 2019, faced substantial uncertainty.

The pipeline consortium maintained that it intended to complete the project.

But the interruption demonstrated how dependent Nord Stream 2 had become upon access to specialist Western contractors and the international services they supplied.

For Shell and the other financiers, the consequences were indirect but important.

They had financed a project whose construction schedule could now be disrupted by American legislation.

The Allseas decision did not establish that Shell had violated sanctions.

It established that sanctions pressure had produced a significant operational consequence.

Primary US record: US State Department — Fact Sheet on US Opposition to Nord Stream 2, 27 December 2019.

Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters — Allseas Suspends Nord Stream 2 Work, 20–21 December 2019.

6. July 2020: Washington explicitly warns financing partners

On 15 July 2020, the US State Department issued updated guidance concerning Section 232 of CAATSA.

This document is particularly important to the Shell archive.

The department announced that its implementation of the legislation would explicitly encompass Nord Stream 2 and the second line of TurkStream.

It also identified financing partners among the categories of participants potentially exposed to sanctions.

The official statement distinguished between activities that might become sanctionable and persons actually sanctioned.

The department expressly stated that it was not imposing sanctions under Section 232 at that time.

However, it encouraged companies involved in the projects to reassess their participation and mitigate their exposure.

The guidance was therefore a direct public warning to relevant commercial participants.

It was not a finding that Shell or any other specific financing company had breached American law.

But it removed much of the uncertainty about whether Washington intended its sanctions authority to reach financial supporters of Nord Stream 2.

The category was now explicitly identified.

Shell’s participation in the project was already documented through its 2017 agreement.

The significance for investors is straightforward.

By July 2020, the American government had publicly identified financing partners in its sanctions guidance.

The possible implications for Shell’s loan and future participation were therefore matters that could be considered using public records.

Authenticated primary source: US State Department — Updated Public Guidance for Section 232 of CAATSA, 15 July 2020.

7. The changing relationship between sanctions and contractual commitments

The July 2020 guidance introduced an important complication.

Earlier American guidance had treated certain pipeline projects with contracts signed before the enactment of CAATSA differently.

The updated approach broadened potential sanctions exposure.

This mattered because Shell’s Nord Stream 2 financing agreement had been signed on 24 April 2017.

That date preceded CAATSA’s enactment in August 2017.

The changing guidance therefore raised questions about activities conducted under older contractual arrangements.

However, the legal analysis requires care.

An existing financing agreement is not identical to every later transaction performed under that agreement.

The imposition of sanctions depends upon the conduct concerned, the statutory criteria and the effective implementing guidance.

The fact that Shell signed its original agreement before August 2017 does not establish that all subsequent activities were permanently exempt.

Conversely, the July 2020 guidance does not establish that Shell was automatically in violation of American law.

The surviving public record supports a narrower conclusion.

A financing structure established in 2017 had become potentially vulnerable to sanctions interpretations that changed during the life of the project.

That was a material category of regulatory uncertainty.

8. January 2021: The sanctions framework expands again

Further American legislation expanded PEESA at the beginning of 2021.

The amendments widened the categories of activities potentially subject to sanctions.

They addressed support services associated with pipe-laying vessels, including specified insurance, technical and certification activities.

The legislation also introduced additional reporting and consultation requirements.

The significance was that construction could be affected through more than the direct withdrawal of pipe-laying contractors.

Companies providing essential supporting services could also face legal and commercial uncertainty.

The State Department’s formal guidance appeared in the Federal Register in April 2021.

It identified the expanded categories of potentially sanctionable conduct and explained the applicable wind-down arrangements.

Again, this was not a judicial finding against Shell.

Nor does the existence of wider sanctions authority prove that Shell personally performed the additional activities covered by the amendments.

But it demonstrates the increasing difficulty of completing a highly specialised international infrastructure project while essential contractors and service providers faced potential American restrictions.

Official legal record: Federal Register — Updated Public Guidance for the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act, 14 April 2021.

9. March and May 2021: Biden maintains opposition but grants a waiver

The arrival of President Joe Biden did not immediately end American opposition to Nord Stream 2.

On 18 March 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned companies participating in the project that they risked American sanctions.

The administration characterised Nord Stream 2 as a Russian geopolitical project that could weaken European energy security.

The statement reflected a position shared by successive American administrations.

But a different consideration was emerging.

Washington also wanted to repair and strengthen its relationship with Germany.

In May 2021, the Biden administration announced sanctions measures affecting entities and vessels associated with construction.

At the same time, it granted national-interest waivers concerning Nord Stream 2 AG, its chief executive Matthias Warnig and specified corporate officers.

The distinction was significant.

Washington remained opposed to Nord Stream 2.

But it chose not to impose certain sanctions on the project company and its leadership at that stage.

The waiver was a foreign-policy decision.

It was not an endorsement of the pipeline.

Nor did it establish that all companies involved in financing or constructing Nord Stream 2 were immune from future sanctions.

The administration was attempting to balance opposition to Russian energy infrastructure with the preservation of relations with Germany.

For Shell, this meant that the sanctions environment remained politically contingent.

The project had encountered repeated legislative and operational obstacles, but American policy was not entirely uniform in its immediate practical effects.

Primary sources: US State Department — Nord Stream 2 and Potential Sanctionable Activity, 18 March 2021 and Nord Stream 2 and European Energy Security, 19 May 2021.

10. July 2021: Washington and Berlin negotiate a compromise

On 21 July 2021, the United States and Germany issued a joint statement concerning Ukraine, European energy security and climate objectives.

It represented a significant diplomatic development.

The two governments committed themselves to supporting Ukraine’s energy security.

Germany undertook to use its influence to support the continuation of Russian gas transit through Ukraine beyond the existing contractual arrangements.

The agreement also addressed financial and technical support for Ukraine’s energy transition.

Importantly, the statement recognised the risk that Russia might use energy supplies as a political instrument.

Germany committed to take national action and support effective European measures if Russia engaged in further aggression against Ukraine or attempted to weaponise energy.

The document did not remove every disagreement concerning Nord Stream 2.

It represented an effort to manage those disagreements while acknowledging that the pipeline might be completed.

The compromise also illustrated the growing importance of Ukraine’s position.

For Kyiv, the pipeline presented risks extending beyond lost transit revenue.

The ability to transport Russian gas to Western Europe while bypassing Ukraine could potentially reduce the strategic importance of the Ukrainian transmission system.

That concern had been expressed for years by Ukraine and several Central and Eastern European governments.

Supporters of Nord Stream 2 continued to emphasise additional transport capacity, commercial efficiency and supply security.

The July agreement attempted to reconcile these competing interests.

Authenticated diplomatic record: German Federal Foreign Office — Joint Statement of the United States and Germany, 21 July 2021.

11. September 2021: Construction is completed — but the pipeline cannot yet operate

On 10 September 2021, Gazprom announced that construction of Nord Stream 2 had been completed.

The announcement followed extensive delays and the eventual continuation of work using Russian-controlled pipe-laying resources.

The project had survived the withdrawal of Allseas.

It had survived multiple rounds of American sanctions pressure.

And it had survived substantial political opposition within Europe.

But physical completion was not the same as legal authorisation to transport gas commercially.

The pipeline still required regulatory certification.

This distinction would prove decisive.

The completion announcement established a major engineering milestone.

It did not establish that Nord Stream 2 had entered commercial service.

Nor did it eliminate the possibility of further regulatory or political obstacles.

The original expectation that construction would be completed by the end of 2019 had already been missed by a considerable margin.

Even after construction was complete, the project remained exposed to decisions outside Gazprom’s immediate control.

Contemporaneous source: S&P Global — Russia’s Gazprom Completes Nord Stream 2 Construction, 10 September 2021.

12. November 2021: Germany suspends certification

On 16 November 2021, Germany’s Federal Network Agency, the Bundesnetzagentur, announced that it had suspended the certification procedure for Nord Stream 2 AG.

The immediate issue concerned the legal organisation of the proposed transmission-system operator.

Nord Stream 2 AG was established in Switzerland.

The regulator determined that the German section of the pipeline required an operator organised under German law.

Nord Stream 2 AG proposed establishing a German subsidiary.

The regulator announced that certification would remain suspended until the relevant assets and personnel had been transferred and the necessary documentation examined.

This was a regulatory decision.

It was not the same as the political suspension announced by Germany in February 2022.

Nor was it a judicial finding that the project had been unlawfully financed.

Nevertheless, it demonstrated that the pipeline remained unable to begin commercial operation even after construction had been completed.

The available German regulatory record therefore supplies another important distinction.

A completed pipeline was not necessarily an operational or revenue-producing pipeline.

Primary source: Bundesnetzagentur — Certification Procedure for Nord Stream 2 Suspended, 16 November 2021.

13. The European legal challenge: Nord Stream 2 confronts EU gas rules

The pipeline also faced a separate legal controversy concerning European gas-market legislation.

In April 2019, the European Union had adopted Directive 2019/692, extending aspects of its gas-market regulatory framework to certain pipelines connecting EU member states with third countries.

The rules addressed matters including ownership separation, third-party access and regulatory supervision.

Nord Stream 2 AG challenged the legislation.

The proceedings eventually reached the Court of Justice of the European Union.

On 12 July 2022, the Court delivered its judgment in Case C-348/20 P.

The judgment concerned whether Nord Stream 2 AG was entitled to challenge specified provisions of the directive.

The Court concluded that the company had standing to pursue part of its challenge and referred that part of the proceedings back to the General Court.

It did not, in that judgment, declare the entire directive invalid.

Nor did it rule that Nord Stream 2 was exempt from EU gas-market rules.

The decision is relevant because it demonstrates that the project faced legal questions extending beyond American sanctions and Polish competition proceedings.

The pipeline’s regulatory position involved several overlapping legal systems.

Those systems should not be confused.

The Polish proceedings concerned merger-control rules.

The American measures concerned sanctions.

The EU proceedings concerned gas-market legislation and the ability of the project company to challenge it.

The German certification proceedings concerned the requirements for authorising the pipeline’s operator.

Together, these records reveal a complex and increasingly uncertain legal environment.

Judicial source: Court of Justice of the European Union — Nord Stream 2 AG v Parliament and Council, Case C-348/20 P, 12 July 2022.

14. February 2022: Germany changes course

On 21 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced recognition of the self-proclaimed separatist entities in eastern Ukraine.

The following day, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that the certification process for Nord Stream 2 would be halted.

The decision represented a fundamental change in German policy.

For years, German governments had defended the project against American objections and argued that decisions concerning European energy infrastructure should be made within Europe.

Now Germany itself was preventing the pipeline from entering service.

On 22 February, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action formally explained the administrative action.

The government withdrew its previous security-of-supply assessment.

That assessment was necessary for the German regulator to issue a favourable certification decision.

Without it, the pipeline could not be authorised to operate.

The ministry cited the deterioration of the geopolitical situation and the consequences of Russia’s conduct concerning Ukraine.

This was a political and regulatory decision taken by the German government.

It was not a court judgment finding Shell’s financing agreement unlawful.

But its commercial significance was profound.

The pipeline had been constructed.

The project company had invested heavily in the infrastructure.

European financiers had supplied substantial support.

Yet the pipeline remained unable to enter commercial service.

Authenticated primary source: German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs — Minister Habeck on the Discontinuation of Nord Stream 2 Certification, 22 February 2022.

15. February 2022: Washington sanctions the project company

On 23 February 2022, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG and its chief executive Matthias Warnig.

The decision followed Germany’s suspension of certification.

The sanctions reversed the earlier national-interest waiver granted in May 2021.

The project company became subject to American blocking sanctions.

This was a materially different position from the earlier warnings that certain participants might face sanctions.

An identified entity was now directly sanctioned.

The distinction is essential.

The available American record establishes the designation of Nord Stream 2 AG and Warnig.

It does not establish that Shell itself was designated under the same measure.

Nevertheless, the sanctions further complicated the legal and commercial position of the project company to which Shell had provided financing.

The pipeline’s future had become dependent upon a profound change in the geopolitical and regulatory environment.

Two days later, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine had transformed that environment still further.

Official record: US State Department — Department Press Briefing, 23 February 2022.

16. Shell announces its withdrawal

On 28 February 2022, Shell announced that it intended to exit its joint ventures with Gazprom and related entities.

The announcement included the company’s interests in Sakhalin-2, Salym Petroleum Development and Gydan.

Shell also stated that it intended to end its involvement in Nord Stream 2.

Chief executive Ben van Beurden condemned Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and said the company would work through the business consequences of its withdrawal.

The statement marked an abrupt change in Shell’s relationship with major Russian energy projects.

But the different investments must be distinguished.

Shell held an equity interest in Sakhalin-2.

Its Nord Stream 2 exposure arose from financing arrangements rather than ownership of the pipeline company.

Consequently, the legal and accounting implications were different.

The announcement did not retrospectively establish that the original 2017 financing agreement had been unlawful.

It represented Shell’s decision to withdraw from the project in the circumstances then prevailing.

The company’s own statement also acknowledged that the decision would affect the carrying value of relevant assets.

An impairment was anticipated.

The financial consequence would become clear in its first-quarter results.

Authenticated corporate announcement: Shell — Intention to Exit Equity Partnerships With Gazprom Entities, 28 February 2022.

17. May 2022: Shell recognises a $1.126 billion write-down

On 5 May 2022, Shell published its first-quarter financial results.

The announcement recorded substantial charges associated with withdrawal from Russian oil and gas activities.

The total recognised pre-tax charges were approximately $4.235 billion.

Within that amount, Shell identified a $1.126 billion write-down associated with its Nord Stream 2 loan.

The company separately recorded a $1.614 billion impairment relating to Sakhalin-2.

These amounts should not be conflated.

They concerned different investments with different ownership structures and accounting treatments.

The Nord Stream 2 write-down was particularly significant because Shell’s original financing commitment had been expressed as a maximum of €950 million.

The figures are denominated in different currencies and relate to different accounting concepts.

The €950 million represented a maximum financing-and-guarantee commitment under the 2017 arrangements.

The $1.126 billion represented the carrying amount of the loan written down in Shell’s 2022 financial reporting.

The two numbers should not be presented as though they were directly interchangeable.

Nor should the accounting charge automatically be described as a regulatory fine or a payment made in 2022.

It was a financial write-down.

The company had reassessed the recoverability of its loan and recognised the loss in its accounts.

That was the documented financial consequence of its Nord Stream 2 participation.

Primary source: Shell plc — First Quarter 2022 Unaudited Results, 5 May 2022.

Documentary Findings: What the Evidence Establishes Established facts

Shell entered into a Nord Stream 2 financing agreement on 24 April 2017.

Its maximum commitment was €950 million in financing and guarantees.

Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2 AG.

The United States introduced sanctions legislation affecting Russian energy-export pipelines and subsequently expanded its implementation of those measures.

Germany and Austria publicly opposed American extraterritorial sanctions affecting European companies.

In December 2019, Allseas suspended pipe-laying activities following the introduction of American sanctions legislation.

In July 2020, the US State Department explicitly identified financing partners among those potentially exposed to sanctions under Section 232 of CAATSA.

The Biden administration maintained opposition to Nord Stream 2 but granted specified sanctions waivers in May 2021.

The United States and Germany reached a diplomatic agreement in July 2021.

Construction was completed in September 2021.

Germany suspended the regulatory certification process in November 2021 and halted it on geopolitical grounds in February 2022.

Washington sanctioned Nord Stream 2 AG and Matthias Warnig on 23 February 2022.

Shell announced its intention to withdraw on 28 February 2022.

In May 2022, Shell recognised a $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan.

These findings are supported by authenticated corporate announcements, official government records, contemporaneous reporting and financial disclosures.

What is not established

The material examined does not establish that Shell violated American sanctions.

It does not establish that Shell secretly controlled Nord Stream 2 AG.

It does not establish that Shell’s financing agreement constituted an unlawful equity investment.

It does not establish that the company’s directors knowingly concealed material information from shareholders.

It does not establish that Shell should have recognised its loan impairment before 2022.

Nor does the later financial loss prove that the original commercial decision was negligent or unlawful.

Those conclusions would require evidence beyond the public documents examined here.

The record supports a narrower but important proposition.

Shell continued to have financial exposure to Nord Stream 2 during a period in which the project faced a succession of publicly documented political, legal and sanctions-related obstacles.

COMMENTARY: The Warnings Were Public — But the Financial Outcome Was Not Inevitable

The Nord Stream 2 story is particularly instructive because the eventual loss can be examined against a detailed chronology of publicly available warnings.

The original financing arrangement was signed in April 2017.

Within two months, Germany and Austria were protesting American sanctions proposals that could affect European companies supporting the project.

By December 2019, American legislation had prompted a major offshore contractor to suspend construction.

By July 2020, American guidance explicitly warned financing partners of potential sanctions exposure.

By September 2021, the pipeline had been completed, but regulatory approval remained outstanding.

By November, German certification proceedings had been suspended.

And in February 2022, the geopolitical situation changed decisively.

These events can be established without access to Shell’s confidential board papers.

They were public.

But the existence of warnings is not equivalent to proof that the ultimate loss was inevitable.

At various stages, reasonable commercial participants could have anticipated different outcomes.

The project survived Poland’s objections to the original shareholding structure.

It survived the withdrawal of Allseas.

It survived repeated American sanctions warnings.

And construction was ultimately completed.

Those facts help explain why the project’s supporters continued to believe it could enter service.

Commercial optimism and geopolitical risk

Shell’s commercial rationale was based upon the expected importance of natural gas to Europe.

The company and its partners anticipated additional demand for imports as domestic European production declined.

Nord Stream 2 was intended to provide additional transportation capacity.

From a narrow infrastructure perspective, that rationale was understandable.

But energy infrastructure does not operate independently of politics.

The route of Nord Stream 2 was politically significant precisely because it could transport Russian gas to Germany without passing through Ukraine or Poland.

That created consequences extending beyond transportation costs.

For Ukraine, gas transit was economically important and carried wider strategic significance.

For Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, additional dependence upon Russian gas created security concerns.

For Germany, the project was associated with access to gas supplies and commercially advantageous infrastructure.

For Washington, it became an object of sanctions policy.

Shell’s investment sat at the intersection of those competing interests.

The project was therefore not exposed merely to normal construction and commodity-price risks.

It was vulnerable to decisions taken by governments with conflicting strategic objectives.

The changing significance of Germany’s position

One of the most striking aspects of the chronology is Germany’s transformation from opponent of American sanctions to the government that prevented Nord Stream 2 from entering service.

In June 2017, Germany objected to Washington’s interference in European energy affairs.

In July 2021, Berlin negotiated a compromise with the Biden administration.

In November 2021, its regulator suspended certification on legal and organisational grounds.

In February 2022, Chancellor Scholz halted the process in response to Russia’s conduct concerning Ukraine.

The explanation is not simply that Germany reversed a commercial decision without warning.

The geopolitical circumstances had changed dramatically.

Nevertheless, the sequence demonstrates how dependent the project had become upon German government policy.

An investment initially justified by long-term gas demand could not generate the anticipated benefits merely because the infrastructure had been completed.

The necessary political and regulatory conditions also had to exist.

What should investors have understood?

The central shareholder question is not whether every investor could have predicted Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

That would impose an unrealistic standard of foresight.

The more reasonable question concerns the evaluation of identifiable risks.

By 2020, investors could see that Nord Stream 2 had become the subject of substantial sanctions controversy.

They could see that a major construction contractor had withdrawn.

They could see that Washington was willing to extend sanctions guidance to financing partners.

And they could see that European governments remained divided over the project’s strategic implications.

These were not hidden developments.

They were documented in government statements, legislation and international reporting.

Whether Shell appropriately evaluated those risks internally is a separate question.

Answering it would require the relevant board materials, risk assessments, accounting judgments and contemporaneous management records.

Those documents have not been established as part of the present source collection.

Accordingly, the archive does not assert that Shell’s management ignored warnings or failed to discharge its duties.

It records the existence of the warnings and their subsequent financial context.

That is a meaningful documentary finding in its own right.

The Sakhalin Connection

The original Sakhalin Papers examined Shell’s experience of managing a major Russian energy project during a period of increasing political and regulatory pressure.

Sakhalin-2 involved direct equity ownership, construction difficulties, environmental controversies, disputes with Russian authorities and the eventual emergence of Gazprom as the controlling shareholder.

Nord Stream 2 was different.

Shell’s participation was structured through financing rather than direct equity ownership.

The principal legal challenges came from Western governments and European regulatory institutions.

But the two histories contain a common issue.

Both projects demonstrate that substantial investment in Russian-linked energy infrastructure involved risks that could not be understood solely through engineering, commodity prices or conventional commercial forecasting.

Political authority mattered.

Regulatory decisions mattered.

International relations mattered.

And the legal structures through which Shell participated shaped its exposure.

In Sakhalin-2, Shell faced the consequences of negotiating with a Russian state determined to increase control over strategic energy assets.

In Nord Stream 2, Shell faced the consequences of financing Russian-controlled infrastructure that Western governments increasingly regarded as a strategic liability.

The circumstances were different.

The general lesson was similar.

A commercially attractive project could become extraordinarily difficult to complete or operate once it entered a confrontation between governments.

The archive should preserve that history without assuming that every political objection was justified or that every commercial decision was mistaken.

Conclusion: A Pipeline Completed, a Loan Written Down

The historical record establishes an extraordinary sequence.

In April 2017, Shell agreed to provide substantial financing for Nord Stream 2.

In June, Germany and Austria protested American sanctions proposals threatening European energy companies.

In December 2019, an offshore contractor withdrew from construction in response to sanctions legislation.

In July 2020, Washington expressly warned that financing partners could be exposed.

In 2021, the Biden administration combined continuing opposition with diplomatic concessions to Germany.

Construction was completed in September.

But the pipeline remained uncertified.

In February 2022, Germany halted certification, the United States sanctioned the project company, and Shell announced its withdrawal.

By May, Shell had recognised a $1.126 billion loss against its Nord Stream 2 loan.

The documentary conclusion is neither that Shell acted unlawfully nor that every warning should necessarily have caused immediate withdrawal.

It is that a series of substantial and publicly identifiable political risks accumulated around an investment that ultimately produced a major financial write-down.

The public record allows that sequence to be established.

It does not disclose every internal decision that Shell’s management made in response.

That distinction matters.

The purpose of this archive is not to replace missing evidence with confident speculation.

It is to establish what can be demonstrated, identify what remains uncertain and preserve the material through which later researchers may examine the decisions.

For Shell shareholders, Nord Stream 2 ultimately became a case study in the financial consequences of geopolitical exposure.

For European governments, it became a source of profound disagreement over energy security and relations with Russia.

For Ukraine, the project had long represented concerns about energy dependence, transit revenues and national security.

For Gazprom, the pipeline was completed but did not achieve its intended commercial operation.

And for the historical record, the most important fact may be the simplest.

The pipeline was physically completed. Its commercial purpose was not realised.

Source Record

The following authenticated records and contemporaneous reports underpin this instalment. They are distinguished according to their evidential function.

1. Shell and OMV — 24 April 2017

Nord Stream 2 AG and European Energy Companies Sign Financing Agreements

Primary corporate announcement identifying the five European financiers, their maximum commitments, the anticipated cost of the project and Gazprom’s continued sole ownership.

2. German Federal Government — 16 June 2017

Trade Policy Should Not Be Mixed With Sanctions

Authenticated German government statement concerning American sanctions proposals, extraterritorial measures and the position of Chancellor Merkel.

3. Reuters — 15 June 2017

US Sanctions on Russia Threaten European Energy Firms

Contemporaneous independent reporting of the German and Austrian objections.

4. US State Department — 27 December 2019

Fact Sheet on US Opposition to Nord Stream 2

Official explanation of the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act and the American government’s sanctions policy.

5. Reuters — 20–21 December 2019

Allseas Suspends Nord Stream 2 Construction Activities

Contemporaneous reporting confirming the suspension of pipe-laying activities following American legislation.

6. US State Department — 15 July 2020

Updated Public Guidance for Section 232 of CAATSA

Primary evidence that the American government explicitly included Nord Stream 2 within its expanded sanctions guidance and identified financing partners among potentially affected participants.

7. US Federal Register — 14 April 2021

Updated Guidance for PEESA, as Amended

Official record explaining the expanded categories of activity potentially subject to sanctions and the relevant statutory exemptions and procedures.

8. US State Department — 19 May 2021

Nord Stream 2 and European Energy Security

Official confirmation of American sanctions measures and national-interest waivers concerning Nord Stream 2 AG and specified corporate officers.

9. German Federal Foreign Office — 21 July 2021

Joint US-German Statement on Ukraine and European Energy Security

Authenticated diplomatic agreement recording the commitments of Washington and Berlin concerning Ukraine, Russia and the pipeline.

10. S&P Global — 10 September 2021

Gazprom Completes Nord Stream 2 Construction

Independent contemporaneous confirmation that physical construction had been completed.

11. German Federal Network Agency — 16 November 2021

Certification Procedure for Nord Stream 2 Suspended

Primary regulatory announcement identifying the requirements governing the pipeline operator and the suspension of certification.

12. German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs — 22 February 2022

German Government Halts Nord Stream 2 Certification

Primary government statement establishing the withdrawal of the previous security-of-supply assessment.

13. US State Department — 23 February 2022

Department Press Briefing on Nord Stream 2 Sanctions

Official confirmation of sanctions against Nord Stream 2 AG and its corporate officers following Germany’s decision.

14. Shell plc — 28 February 2022

Shell Intends to Exit Equity Partnerships With Gazprom Entities

Authenticated corporate announcement recording Shell’s decision to end its Nord Stream 2 involvement and withdraw from other Russian energy ventures.

15. Shell plc — 5 May 2022

Shell First Quarter 2022 Unaudited Financial Results

Primary financial record confirming the $1.126 billion Nord Stream 2 loan write-down and distinguishing it from impairment charges associated with Sakhalin-2 and other Russian assets.

16. Court of Justice of the European Union — 12 July 2022

Nord Stream 2 AG v European Parliament and Council, Case C-348/20 P

Judicial record concerning the admissibility of Nord Stream 2 AG’s challenge to specified provisions of EU gas-market legislation. It is not presented as a judgment invalidating the directive or authorising the pipeline’s commercial operation.

Evidence and Attribution Statement

This instalment relies upon authenticated corporate announcements, official American and German government documents, published regulatory decisions, European judicial records, and identified contemporaneous journalism.

Shell’s financing commitment and eventual loan write-down are established through its own disclosures.

The German and Austrian objections to American sanctions are recorded as their governments’ positions. Assertions concerning the commercial motives of American sanctions policy are not treated as established facts.

The sanctions legislation and guidance are distinguished from actual sanctions designations.

The record establishes that Nord Stream 2 AG and its chief executive were sanctioned in February 2022. It does not establish that Shell was sanctioned for participating in the financing arrangements.

The EU judicial decision cited concerns procedural admissibility and does not constitute a judicial finding that Shell’s investment was unlawful.

The public record establishes the sequence of political warnings and regulatory obstacles. It does not disclose Shell’s complete internal risk assessments or justify allegations concerning the personal motives of its directors.

Editorial commentary is identified separately from documentary findings.

No allegation of secret political arrangements, concealed ownership, sanctions evasion or established unlawful conduct by Shell is made.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-089 — The Sakhalin Papers LXXIX: The Baltic Explosions — Nord Stream’s Destruction, Competing Accusations and the Search for Evidence

On 26 September 2022, powerful underwater explosions damaged the Nord Stream pipeline system in the Baltic Sea.

The explosions triggered major gas leaks, international investigations and a succession of accusations concerning responsibility.

Russia blamed Western interests.

Other allegations pointed elsewhere.

Intelligence assessments, investigative journalism and official criminal inquiries would eventually produce a complicated and sometimes contradictory public record.

But which findings were authenticated?

Which accusations were supported by evidence?

And which conclusions remained speculative?

For Shell, the explosions occurred after the company had already recognised the full write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan.

The financial loss had therefore preceded the physical damage.

The next instalment will examine the documented chronology of the explosions, the official investigations, the evidence concerning possible perpetrators and the limits of what can responsibly be concluded.

It will also consider the implications for the historical record of Shell’s investment.

The distinction between evidence and allegation will be especially important.

Because few episodes in the modern history of European energy infrastructure have generated more speculation than the destruction of Nord Stream.

And speculation, however widely repeated, is not a substitute for authenticated evidence.

Historical visual references THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 15, 2026 at 7:27 pm.
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Record-setting heavy precipitation occurrence in 2024, Thackeray et al., Science Advances

Precipitation extremes have increased globally in recent decades, consistent with a warming climate. We find that 2024 experienced a record-high frequency of heavy (≥99th percentile; FP≥99) precipitation events globally based on MSWEP (Multi-Source Weighted-Ensemble Precipitation) observations from 1979 to 2025. This extends a long-term trend of ∼0.03%/decade in FP≥99, with similar but more uncertain increases for the 99.9th percentile. Unlike prior high FP≥99 years, 2024’s record was more globally distributed and emerged from a distinct seasonal evolution. El Niño and rare concurrent multi-basin tropical ocean warmth drove elevated extremes early in the year, before lagged global tropospheric responses and long-term warming sustained and amplified extremes through boreal summer. Climate models indicate that years with 2024-level FP≥99 typically require either stronger El Niño forcing or concurrent multi-basin sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies. Diagnostic projections within constrained ensemble members suggest that ∼40% of the 2024 anomaly aligns with global mean temperatures and ∼20% with El Niño variability, with some of the remainder linked to basin-scale SST structure.

A recent doubling of global warming rate signals a 1.5 °C breach by 2028, Jin & Pu, npj Climate and Atmospheric Scienc

Timely and accurate projections of when global warming will exceed the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C threshold are essential for effective climate policy. Existing estimates place this exceedance in the early 2030 s but carry substantial uncertainty. Here we analyze the latest observational temperature records through 2025 and identify a statistically significant doubling of the global warming rate during 2011–2025 (0.40 °C per decade) compared to 1971–2025 (0.20 °C per decade). Extrapolating this accelerated rate projects a crossing of the 1.5 °C threshold by 2028, nearly a decade earlier than previous estimates. Regional analyses attribute this acceleration primarily to intensified warming over East Asia–the North Pacific, mid-latitude Eurasia, and the South Atlantic–Antarctic regions. The ensemble mean of 26 climate models fails to capture the observed doubling of the warming rate, simulating a rate of only 0.29 °C per decade. These findings suggest a narrower window remains to limit warming to 1.5 °C, underscoring the urgency for rapid  and substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

Learning from young conservatives: Increasing pro-environmental behavior change and climate policy support in the United States, Caballero et al., Energy Research & Social Science

This study uses a mixed-methods (i.e., virtual focus groups with group discussion based on live polling results) approach to explore which potential interventions show the most promise for engaging conservatives on the topics of climate policy and household action, specifically among young people in the United States (U.S.). In coordination with the non-profit organization American Conservation Coalition (ACC), we held six virtual focus groups with ACC members from geographically diverse chapters. Using our mixed methods approach, we explored political efficacy, as suggested by ACC members, as well as four messaging types informed by the social psychological literature: superordinate identities, solution aversion, pluralistic ignorance, and personal responsibility. Our results suggest that young conservative study participants identified messages intended to address solution aversion and pluralistic ignorance to be most promising. Our results also suggest that although young conservative participants in the study tend to engage in incremental, convenient pro-environmental behaviors, they are optimistic about the potential for positive spillover effects. Additionally, our focus groups revealed that a promising area of future study is that young conservatives could serve as important messengers for pro-environmental individual action and support for climate and energy policies among their conservative peers. Thus, the study suggests promising topics for research on the role that young conservatives could play in supporting climate and energy-related initiatives.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Spinning Renewable Success Into a Climate Conspiracy: Co-opting the climate science story of RCP8.5, Climate Action Against Disinformation

Fossil fuels cause climate change, and replacing them with renewables will keep our climate safe for human civilization and natural ecosystems. The progress we made towards a cleaner future means that the worst possible fossil fueled warming gets less and less likely. Thanks to the massive growth in renewables, we are finally winning the climate fight- so why are some people claiming exactly the opposite, that it was a hoax all along? Over the years, “Representative Concentration Pathways”, or RCP scenarios have been refined, as renewable energy has gained momentum around the world, pushing the planet away from the most-heavily-fossil-fueled future that represented the worst-case scenario of a climate crisis, and into slightly safer territory. But this good news, tempered as it is by the incredible amount of work remaining to fully decarbonize, is highly technical, scientific, and detailed. That is not, however, how it was portrayed in the fossil fueled disinformation ecosystem, that instead interpreted it as evidence confirming a climate conspiracy theory.

Manufacturing Petropopulism: Exposing the secretive network of front groups shilling for Big Oil in Canada, Abde Amr and Keith Stewart, Greenpeace

The authors' investigation has identified a shadowy and coordinated network of pro–fossil fuel front groups, companies, think tanks, and charities that claim to have reached over one hundred million people. Based on materials and data from the entities involved, this investigation reveals influence efforts by the oil-linked Energy in Action (EIA) network, whose members are receiving funding and support from the Canadian Energy Prosperity (CEP) group, aiming to shape the energy conversation in Canada. Over 30 entities, targeting six different sectors, have been identified as part of a coordinated network, operating under the EIA umbrella and supported by CEP to manufacture support for the oil and gas industry and advance its' narratives. EIA appears to be linked to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), with many network entities receiving direct funding from the oil and gas sector. The network spreads its' influence across diverse sectors, including technology, grassroots advocacy, and industry trade associations, targeting specific groups including women, youth, students, and Indigenous communities among others.

The AI Gas Rush: Risks and Implications of “Bring Your Own Power”, Bangsund et al., Earthjustice

The race to scale artificial intelligence is driving an unprecedented rush to build power plants solely to power data centers that are predominantly gas-powered. These power plants are evading regulations, harming communities and the climate, and are not a solution to rising energy bills. The authors explore and analyzes this trend. Policymakers across the nation are incentivizing or requiring Bring-Your-Own-Power (BYOP) in an attempt to address energy bill impacts from new AI data centers. But AI data center developers are turning to BYOP to gain access to power as quickly as possible (“speed-to-power”) — not to solve the energy bill impacts of AI. The authors find potential ratepayer benefits are not guaranteed, while harms of the massive gas BYOP buildout have been inadequately addressed. 143 articles in 58 journals by 1015 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

A recent doubling of global warming rate signals a 1.5 °C breach by 2028, Jin & Pu, npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01561-y

Forest and bioenergy expansion amplifies climate warming by accelerating regional cloud loss, Liu et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-14133-2026

Ocean thermal inertia sustains a tropical Pacific mean state shift under net zero, Sengupta et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-04082-x

On the Changes in the Connection Between SSWs and Surface Extreme Weather in Response to an Abrupt 4xCO2 Increase, Maeseneire et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045140

Phase Transition of CO2-Driven Equatorial Pacific Warming Pattern Governed by Ocean Dynamics and Remote Forcing, Olonscheck & Kang, AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002437

Stratospheric Temperature Adjustment Robustly Damps the State Dependence of CO2 Radiative Forcing, He & Huang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123839

The Weakest Warming Rate in Spring over the Mid- to High-Latitude Land in a Warming Climate, Dong et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0222.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Temperature sensitivity of the mineral permafrost feedback at the continental scale, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adq4893 21 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

An abrupt shift towards a hotter and drier climate regime in the Western Eurasian Steppe, Piao et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02125-8

Fingerprint Evidence for Human Effects on Climate: Advances After the 2009 Endangerment Finding, Santer et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef009129

From paper to proof: revealing Congo Basin warming through rescued climate archives, Muheki et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/esd-17-1455-2026

Global expansion of compound drought–heatwave risk, Sutanto et al., Natural hazards and earth system sciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/nhess-25-3879-2025

Record-setting heavy precipitation occurrence in 2024, Thackeray et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb1692

Satellite altimetry reveals heterogeneity in global flood peak timing and its shifts, Zhou et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04115-5

Spatiotemporal Evolution of Temperature Extremes Across India's Agro-Climatic Zones, Misra et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70621

Temperature Change in Mode Water Source Regions, Song & Forget, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0127.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Surging compound drought–heatwaves underrated in global soils, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2410294121 60 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A framework for quantifying the effects of urbanization on regional climate change in a coastal watershed Southeast China: A nonstationary grid-to-grid method, Zhang et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100590

Extreme Heat and Rainfall Risk Attributed to Cumulative CO2 Emissions From Fossil Fuel Producers, Callahan, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008278

Fingerprint Evidence for Human Effects on Climate: Advances After the 2009 Endangerment Finding, Santer et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef009129

From paper to proof: revealing Congo Basin warming through rescued climate archives, Muheki et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/esd-17-1455-2026

Global Assessment and Error Budget of EarthCARE Column Aerosol Optical Depth: Physical Limits and Quantitative Mitigation, Xiong et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd048195

Uneven attention to climate tipping points, Wang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2618666123

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Arctic climate tipping points under delayed CO2 emissions mitigation, Wu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03872-7

Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation Weakening in CMIP6: Labrador Sea Surface Fluxes and Salt Transport Feedback, Lim et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0487.1

East Pacific Easterly Waves in the CESM2 Large Ensemble: Present-Day Characteristics and Projected Future Changes, Zhou & Maloney, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0132.1

Historical to future warm–dry to warm–wet transition over Mongolia and its permafrost regions (1850–2100), MA et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.014

Interpreting Air Temperature Trends Across the Antarctic Peninsula Between 1979 and 2025, Aa et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125798

No critical slowing down in the Atlantic Overturning Circulation in historical CMIP6 simulations, Ben-Yami et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000781

Structural Compactness of North Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Seeds in Historical and Projected Climates, Lu & Reed, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124707

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Customized Statistically Downscaled CMIP5 and CMIP6 Projections: Application in the Edwards Aquifer Region in South-Central Texas, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004716 10 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

A Crucial Role of Land–Atmosphere Interactions in Shaping Subseasonal Convective Variability over the Maritime Continent in Idealized Model Simulations, Jiang & Ma, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0654.1

Evaluating Statistical Downscaling Techniques for Regional Hydroclimatic Change Projections Over CONUS, Lybarger et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046624

Global Asymmetric Temperature Responses of Soil Respiration During Warming and Cooling Phases, Feng et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gb009547

Impacts of Sea Surface Temperature Warming Pattern Biases on Tropical Cyclone Activity and Hazard, Zhuo et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124022

Resolution Dependence in a Global Atmospheric Simulation From km to 220 m Grid Spacing, Matsugishi et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124411

Resolution Dependence of the Climate Feedback Parameter in Km-Scale Climate Models, Peinado et al., MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) pmh:oai:pure.mpg.de:item_3713425

Role of Shortwave Feedback in Non-Linear Response to CO2 Forcing in GFDL CM4.0, Shrestha et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122888

Southeast Asian climate and weather extremes simulated by the nextGEMS Earth system models, Koseki et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1915833

The role of the QBO for tropical high-cloud variability in CMIP6 models and observations, Jaison et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-14403-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Selecting CMIP6 global climate models (GCMs) for Coordinated Regional Climate Downscaling Experiment (CORDEX) dynamical downscaling over Southeast Asia using a standardised benchmarking framework, Geoscientific model development, 10.5194/gmd-17-7285-2024 17 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

Antarctic sea ice response to meltwater due to Antarctic ice sheet mass loss in a multi-model ensemble, Pauling et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5761-2026

On the possibility of deep seabed permafrost to occupy Ca. 7 million km2 in the Arctic Ocean, Dobi?ski & Saitô, Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-68112-6

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Environmental and societal consequences of winter ice loss from lakes, Science, 10.1126/science.adl3211 45 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

Contribution of the Pacific Decadal Oscillation to Global Mean Sea Level Trends: Revisited, Wang & Chen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124649

Sea-level contribution from Thwaites Glacier doubles in an observation-constrained ice-sheet model, Poinelli et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77976-1

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Ancient terrestrial forests reborn as modern marine ecosystems under shifting sea levels, Lebrato et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-65430-7

Antarctic sea ice over the past 130 000 years – Part 2: A review of its role in the Earth system, Chase et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-22-1881-2026

Evidence for Limited Atmospheric CO2 Rise at the Miocene Climatic Optimum, Wubben et al., Paleoceanography and Paleoclimatology Open Access 10.1029/2025pa005388

Shifts in Antarctic Intermediate Water properties coincide with atmospheric CO2 rise across the Mid-Brunhes Event, Tapia et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.ady4567

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Centennial-scale variations in the carbon cycle enhanced by high obliquity, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01556-5 7 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

A process-based spring phenology framework for projecting climate-change constraints on Chinese hickory cultivation areas, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111506

Climate-driven adaptive microevolution in wild yeasts, Oporto et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2618715123

Climate-driven expansion and richness hotspots of forest insect pests revealed by stacked species distribution models, Zhou et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111494

Contrasting climatic controls on bimodal growth of Pinus elliottii plantations between northern and southern subtropical zones, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111526

Cumulative effects of successive marine heatwaves impair physiological resilience in the clam Ruditapes philippinarum., Lebrun et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108467

Determining soil microbial responses to climate change with multi-omics, Wu, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 10.1038/s43017-026-00845-4

Elevated CO2 amplifies contrasting cultivar-specific plant–soil feedbacks mediated by soil biota, Zhang et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1111/1365-2745.70445

Faster-and-tighter nitrogen cycle supports mature forest productivity under elevated CO2, Rumeau et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed2732

Global change threatens the biodiversity of cold regions: Current knowledge and priorities for further research, Renault et al., Ecology 10.1002/ecy.70537

Increasing Climate Constraint on Vegetation Productivity Under Rising CO2 in Northeast Asia, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124463

Local forest structure modifies realized climate vulnerability under macroclimatic forcing: Attribution from a national forest inventory, Ji et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111510

Ocean acidification pushes Mediterranean marine calcifiers toward a tipping point, Frontalini et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-70159-4

Parasitoid insects unveil complex patterns of functional change across elevational bands, Gabrieli et al., Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08816

Phenological Flexibility in Nesting Grassland Birds Over a Half Century Informs Timing of Management, Ellis et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71128

Rapid coral bleaching recovery via symbiont transfer from healthy corals, Webster, Environmental Microbiology Reports 10.1111/1758-2229.12500

Reduced size of larvae and small fish linked to warming and reduced prey density, Lindmark et al., Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08354

Safeguarding global terrestrial vertebrate species from future sea-level rise, Jiang et al., Science 10.1126/science.aed5772

Species-specific reduction of survival and predation in ladybirds exposed to prolonged and intensified heat waves, Cecchetto et al., Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecy.70529

Strengthened sink control under heatwaves contributes to changes in the phenological sequence of photosynthesis and growth, Lin et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111507

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Trajectories of Terrestrial Vegetation Productivity and Its Driving Factors in China's Drylands, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl111391 47 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

A Net CO2 Sink in the Korea Strait and East/Japan Sea Revealed by Direct Eddy Covariance Measurements, Hamzah et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2026jc024139

Active and passive satellite observations coupled with carbon–nitrogen synergy for urban fossil fuel CO2 emissions monitoring, Yi et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-8475-2026

Air–sea CO2 exchange in the Southern Adriatic Sea: assessing its role as a moderate carbon sink over the last decade (2015–2024), Dentico et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-5399-2026

An Activity-Based Inversion Framework for Estimating Sectoral Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions Using Multi-Pollutant Satellite Observations, Qu, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122365

CO2 Emissions From Rivers Draining the Tibetan Plateau Reveal Substantial Increases Over the Past 20 Years, Iwan et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb009016

Contribution of the Pacific Decadal Oscillation to Global Mean Sea Level Trends: Revisited, Wang & Chen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124649

Disproportionate Soil Inorganic Carbon Loss and Associated CO2 Emission Driven by Soil Acidification, Zhang et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008227

Drivers of 2023–2024 Atmospheric CO2 Growth: Role of Northern Mid-to-High Latitude Land Carbon Cycle, Maity et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122221

Elevated CO2 amplifies contrasting cultivar-specific plant–soil feedbacks mediated by soil biota, Zhang et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1111/1365-2745.70445

Fire-derived ozone intensifies carbon loss in Amazon forests under extreme droughts, Brown et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04047-0

Frontal Dynamics Control the Contrasting Burial of Labile Organic Carbon and Refractory Black Carbon in Surface Sediments of the Northwestern South China Sea, Lao et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jc024605

Global and National CO2 Emission from Lime Production Process and Carbonation sink from 1930 to 2024, Bing et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-6741-2026

Groundwater is an overlooked component of the global methane cycle, Li et al., Earth-Science Reviews 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105725

Herbivorous Vertebrates Decrease CO2 Sequestration Across Global Terrestrial Ecosystems, Wu et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2025gb008878

In Situ and Space-Based CO2 Observations Reveal Moisture-Induced Seasonal Compensation of the Western U.S. Carbon Cycle, Rastogi et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2026gb009121

Inferring European fossil fuel CO2 emissions using TROPOMI NO2 data and sector-based NOx : CO2 emission ratios, Schooling et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-13743-2026

Lateral Accounting of Transport in Terrestrial Ecosystems (LATTE): A High-Resolution Global Land-Atmosphere CO2 Flux Data Set From 1961 to 2022 for Atmospheric Inversions and Carbon Budgeting Studies, Ciais et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gb009142

Long-Term CO2 Emissions From Anthropogenic Sectors and Recent Climatology of India, Jayachandran et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd046124

Mapping Global Terrestrial Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Atmospheric CO2 Carbon Isoscapes for Ecological Studies, Feng et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71002

Mechanisms of air–sea CO2 exchange in the central Baltic Sea, Dong et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-5567-2026

More Frequent and Enhanced Extreme Events of Air–Sea CO2 Fluxes, Cheng et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jd044933

Observation-Constrained Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions Reveal Post-2018 Stabilization in China, Feng et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl121913

Poleward Shift of Arctic Oceanic CO2 Uptake From Asymmetric Seasonal Changes Under Climate Warming, Pan et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007550

Prescribed Fire Mitigates Climate-Driven Aboveground Carbon Losses From Wildfire in High Elevation Ecosystems of the Sierra Nevada, Cale et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009930

Probabilistic Wetland Maps for Mapping Soil Carbon Stock Distribution Across the Pacific Northwest, Stewart et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009633

Quantifying Deep Ocean Methane Along the Central Chilean Margin, Wieman et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124079

Regime shifts in South Florida groundwater: distinguishing upstream recharge from coastal sea level influences (1997–2022), Zeleke et al., Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Open Access pdf 10.1007/s10661-026-16000-x

Satellite observations reveal underestimation of CO2 emissions in Africa and the Middle East, Lin et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aee1447

Sea level-induced oyster reef accretion causes minimal net carbon burial change, Rodriguez et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02121-y

Separating Environmental Modulation From Source Intermittency in Methane Leakage From a Legacy Well in British Columbia, Pullen & Cahill, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046590

Soil Physical Properties in Estimating the CO2 Emissions in Drained Peatland Forests, Tenhovirta et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2026jg009736

Thermally driven CO2 adsorption/desorption and its effect on soil respiration, Abramova et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed9979

U.S. oil and gas methane emission intensity declined 2019–2024 with little indication of federal policy impact, Chen et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-04039-0

Using high frequency observations of δ13C-CH4 and δ2H-CH4 and uncertain regional isotopic signatures to estimate sources of UK methane emissions, Ramsden et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-11421-2026

Warming Amplifies the Variability of Methane Emissions From a Coastal Wetland, Lewis et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009973

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Soil carbon and nitrogen cycling at the atmosphere–soil interface: Quantifying the responses of biocrust–soil interactions to global change, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17519 27 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Assessing the potential and cost of enhanced rock weathering in China, Wang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04136-0

Circular and athermal atmospheric CO2 capture by food waste-derived amyloid sorbents, Dong et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2535689123

Hysteresis of extreme precipitation in East Asia under various CO2 removal pathways, Lee et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78431-x

Mineral Carbonation of Mixed Industrial Residues for Enhanced CO2 Sequestration and Environmental Stabilization: The Role of Slag Composition and Industrial Symbiosis, Pietrobelli et al., Advanced Energy and Sustainability Research Open Access pdf 10.1002/aesr.70261

Strong-Acid Weathering in a Carbonate-Siliciclastic Cropland Diminishes Removal of CO2 From the Atmosphere Without Becoming a CO2 Source, Forgeng et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jg009418

Wettability and Interfacial Tension in Carbonate Rocks for CO2 Storage: A Critical Review of Trapping Mechanisms and Governing Factors, Suramairy et al., Greenhouse Gases Science and Technology 10.1002/ghg.70040

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Carbon storage in the built environment: a review, Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability, 10.1088/2634-4505/ad139f 14 cites.

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Decarbonization

A socio-technical analysis of the natural hydrogen hype: Network dynamics and institutional expectation governance, Zini et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104997

Impact of climate change on the photovoltaic power potential in Sweden across 21st century, Ruan et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04091-w

Modeling tensions and tradeoffs in community responses to large scale solar development in rural Georgia, Kurtz et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115660

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Exploring the cost and emissions impacts, feasibility and scalability of battery electric ships, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01655-y 73 cites.

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Aerosols

Effects of solar position and surface albedo on retrieved aerosol optical properties and radiative forcing effects, Ningombam et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106991

Overestimation of Cloud Sensitivity in Orographic Clouds Over the Southern Tibetan Plateau Due To Neglected Dynamical Constraints, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046935

Climate change communications & cognition

From Grand Narratives to Riverbank Realities: How Local Experience Influences Perceptions of Climate Risk and Adaptation in Rural Australian Freshwater Tourism, Downey et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0167.1

Interactions of emotion and political orientation in predicting intentional climate action, Flesch et al., Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2744713

Learning from young conservatives: Increasing pro-environmental behavior change and climate policy support in the United States, Caballero et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.105015

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The Greta Effect: Is there more public support for climate protesters who are young and female?, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103924 4 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Compound climatic extreme events amplify food insecurity, Wang et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103248

Mapping CO2 fixation to two effective parameters: A framework toward data-informed species and model comparison, Stillits et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2609915123

Thermal Vulnerability of Reef Fish and Implications for Subsistence Fisheries Throughout the Caribbean, Cortese et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71118

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Maize breeding for smaller tassels threatens yield under a warming climate, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02161-5 23 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Assessing Probable Maximum Precipitation in the Soummam Basin (Algeria) Using Bias-Corrected Climate Projections, Taguemount et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70626

Climate warming redistributes the seasonality of inland open-water evaporation, Farooq et al., Global and Planetary Change Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105750

Hydrological Extremes Increase Water-Resource Constraints Under Climate Change, Sun et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122652

Hysteresis of extreme precipitation in East Asia under various CO2 removal pathways, Lee et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78431-x

Quantified impact of projected climate change on groundwater recharge and river discharge leveraging the use of open access geospatial data, Jimenez et al., Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/feart.2026.1857327

Record-setting heavy precipitation occurrence in 2024, Thackeray et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb1692

Regional Trends in Northern Hemisphere Summer Extratropical Cyclone Activity and Their Link to Precipitation and Temperature Trends, Baxter et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2026jd046609

Satellite altimetry reveals heterogeneity in global flood peak timing and its shifts, Zhou et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04115-5

Shifting Patterns of Precipitation Extremes in the Southeast Atlantic Basin—Brazil: From Observed Trends to Future Projections, Oliveira-Santos et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70629

Structural Compactness of North Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Seeds in Historical and Projected Climates, Lu & Reed, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124707

Uneven warming–moistening rates amplify atmospheric aridity differences between wet and dry regions, Jin et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105757

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Assessment of Meteorological Drought in a Changing Environment: An Example in the Upper Yangtze River, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd041019 4 cites.

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Climate change economics

Beyond linear assumptions: neural network tracing of climate-driven financial contagion in firms, Niu et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1909195

Heterogeneous effects of climate change on real GDP per capita: evidence from selected MENA countries and Türkiye, Y?lmaz, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1930700

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: A financial disaster in the making: Temperature shocks, climate change and savings, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103782 9 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Citizens’ assemblies propose ambitious climate policy but impacts remain limited, Feldman et al., Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society Open Access pdf 10.1093/cjres/rsaf032

Climate policies neglect risks posed by legacy landfills, Zhang et al., Science 10.1126/science.aem1978

Enhancing fairness in climate action through policy packages, Vandyck et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access 10.1038/s41558-026-02751-5

Firms’ renewable energy adoption and energy taxes: How institutional quality matters, Ruberto, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115631

The embeddedness of Emissions Trading Systems, Barlaup et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2743153

The politics of baselines: A political feasibility framework for energy and climate scenarios, Fornborg, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104981

Why support for net-zero technologies can be politically vulnerable: Evidence from Celtic Sea floating offshore wind, Gregory & Thies, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.105012

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Assessing the impacts of fertility and retirement policies on China’s carbon emissions, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02162-4 29 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Building adaptive capacity of US Gulf Coast city practitioners to extreme weather events, Wong-Parodi et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access pdf 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag330

Crossing the behavioral threshold: social amplification and climate risk management in urban flood evacuation, Tanaka et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100901

Cumulative impact of climate change and adaptation measures on Venice and its lagoon, Canu et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-73719-w

Evaluation of heat stress mitigation potentials of climate change adaptation measures in cities: Scenario analyses for technical- and nature-based solutions using 3D microclimate modelling, Eingrüber et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100894

Overcoming under-adaptive innovation and maladaptation in urban heat governance, Lao & Istrate, Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100895

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Measuring the contribution of nature-based solutions beyond climate adaptation in cities, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102939 25 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Climate Resilience and Environmental Sustainability of Healthcare Facilities in a Rural District of Pakistan: A Mixed-Methods Assessment Using the WHO Framework, Nazir et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1002/cli2.70065

Climate-amplified wildland–urban interface disasters create persistent internal metal mixtures associated with pulmonary impairment, Maunakea et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2613208123

Compound Heatwaves and Health Inequality: A Nationwide Study on Emergency Admissions and Socioeconomic Vulnerability in South Korea, Kim et al., GeoHealth Open Access 10.1029/2026gh001920

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: On the Stationarity of the Global Spatial Dependency of Heat Risk on Drought, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl111117 6 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics

Cross border consequences of responses to climate change: Risks and opportunities, Mason et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103245

The geopoliticization of Europe's energy transition: Geopolitical risk and selective transition adjustment across EU member states, Cong et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115663

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Weaponization of climate and environment crises: Risks, realities, and consequences, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103928 12 cites.

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Other

Background Atmospheric CO2 Regulates the Local and Non-Local Climate Impacts of Amazon Deforestation, Lee et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007636

Intensification of near-inertial currents in the Atlantic Ocean over the past two decades, Zheng et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78555-0

Springtime Soil Moisture Teleconnections Drive Summertime Warming in the Western United States, Zhang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0459.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Global wildfire activity re-visited, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102894 6 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Climate change reshapes the global mercury cycle, Feinberg & Saiz-Lopez, Science 10.1126/science.aeh7034

Discovery as public infrastructure: Renewing the social contract for science, Carbajo et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag312

Uneven attention to climate tipping points, Wang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2618666123

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The role of forestry sciences in combating climate change and advancing sustainable development goals, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1409667 27 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

2026 Global Climate Investing Survey, CoreData Research, Robeco

The number of investors making climate change a strategic priority has increased slightly to 47%, rising further to 62% over the next two years. The tide is also turning in North America, where there is now growing support for climate investing, following a large backlash that began in the U.S. in 2023. Both mark a turning point after several years of declining commitments, as governments globally made net zero a lower priority – and commitment that comes back after a cycle like that is of a different quality from commitment that never had to. 75% believe that war in the Middle East, and the disruption it is causing to oil and gas markets, will moderately or significantly accelerate the transition to renewable energy. 63% think the increasing adoption of AI will have a positive effect on accelerating the development of sustainable infrastructure. 64% say the slowdown in government support for net-zero goals has not affected their commitment to net zero. 63% expect physical climate risks to have a moderate or significant effect on their organization’s strategic asset allocation over the next five years.

10 New Insights in Climate Science 2026/2027, Future Earth, The Earth League, and the World Climate Research Programme, Future Earth, The Earth League, and the World Climate Research Programme

Ocean heat content keeps climbing as Earth’s energy imbalance grows. Sea level rise in a warming world: acceleration, ice mass loss, and long-term commitment. Water gaps widen as continental drying accelerates. A larger overshoot of 1.5°C increases the risk of irreversible impacts, forces greater reliance on carbon dioxide (CO?) removal, and narrows adaptation options. Bundled interventions for food system transformation can deliver major gains for human health and planetary stability. The social cost of carbon has been severely underestimated. Advances in attribution science demonstrate individual emitters’ climate effects. Climate clubs can limit carbon leakage, but fairness shapes their feasibility and effectiveness. Organized obstruction prevents effective climate policy through denial, delay, dilution and distraction. A just energy transition is threatened by geopolitical risks and fragmentation.

Offshore wind a safe bet for East Asia’s future, Lu et al., Ember

The share of offshore wind in the total renewable energy pipeline across Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is 84%, compared to the global average of just 21%, totaling 82 GW. East Asia represents 8% of the global offshore wind pipeline, and 2026 policy reforms across the three markets signal the region's growth opportunity. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan aim to scale up offshore wind to more than 30 GW across the region by 2030. Market readiness is needed now to meet these goals.

Western Seams Analysis, Aurora Energy Research, Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council

Modeling shows that a single, West-wide market produces the lowest total system cost because no market boundaries means a single operator can maximize efficient dispatch at lowest-cost energy resources across the entire region. Best-in-class seams management in a multi-market West can unlock up to $840 million in annual cost savings that would be lost in uncoordinated, poorly-managed seams agreements.

The AI Gas Rush: Risks and Implications of “Bring Your Own Power”, Bangsund et al., Earthjustice

The race to scale artificial intelligence is driving an unprecedented rush to build power plants solely to power data centers that are predominantly gas-powered. These power plants are evading regulations, harming communities and the climate, and are not a solution to rising energy bills. The authors explore and analyzes this trend. Policymakers across the nation are incentivizing or requiring Bring-Your-Own-Power (BYOP) in an attempt to address energy bill impacts from new AI data centers. But AI data center developers are turning to BYOP to gain access to power as quickly as possible (“speed-to-power”) — not to solve the energy bill impacts of AI. The authors find potential ratepayer benefits are not guaranteed, while harms of the massive gas BYOP buildout have been inadequately addressed.

Behind the Bill: What’s Driving Increases in Electricity Costs in Maine?, Heather Sanborn, Office of the Public Advocate (Maine)

A typical Central Maine Power (CMP) household’s monthly bill rose from about $91 in October 2020 to about $157 in October 2026, an increase of $66 (72%). The total price went from 16.6 to 28.6 cents per kilowatt-hour. No single cause explains it. Three parts of the bill account for about $57 of the $66; energy supply (+$30), driven mainly by New England natural gas prices; local distribution (+$18), with storm costs alone adding $12; transmission (+$9), driven by infrastructure replacement and high federally set profits. Stranded costs, mostly from Maine’s community solar program, added about $9. Focusing on that issue alone misses about $57 of the $66 increase. About $27 of the total would be expected from general inflation.

Manufacturing Petropopulism: Exposing the secretive network of front groups shilling for Big Oil in Canada, Abde Amr and Keith Stewart, Greenpeace

The authors' investigation has identified a shadowy and coordinated network of pro–fossil fuel front groups, companies, think tanks, and charities that claim to have reached over one hundred million people. Based on materials and data from the entities involved, this investigation reveals influence efforts by the oil-linked Energy in Action (EIA) network, whose members are receiving funding and support from the Canadian Energy Prosperity (CEP) group, aiming to shape the energy conversation in Canada. Over 30 entities, targeting six different sectors, have been identified as part of a coordinated network, operating under the EIA umbrella and supported by CEP to manufacture support for the oil and gas industry and advance its' narratives. EIA appears to be linked to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), with many network entities receiving direct funding from the oil and gas sector. The network spreads its' influence across diverse sectors, including technology, grassroots advocacy, and industry trade associations, targeting specific groups including women, youth, students, and Indigenous communities among others.

Powering Rural Prosperity: The Local Economic Impact of Utility-Scale Wind and Solar Developments, Ohler et al., University of Missouri

A growing literature documents a relationship between renewable energy development and local economic outcomes. Yet, important gaps remain in understanding how these effects manifest in rural economies, across technologies, and within specific sectors. Using county-level data on U.S. energy installations between 2001-2023, the authors examine how renewable energy adoption shapes sector-specific economic activity, focusing on GDP, employment, and wages in rural counties. They extend prior work in three ways. First, they focus explicitly on rural outcomes, where utility-scale renewable development is concentrated but where economic structures may limit local benefits. Second, they incorporate solar adoption alongside wind, enabling a comparison of technology-specific impacts. Third, they move beyond aggregate measures to conduct a sectoral analysis, identifying how effects vary across industries. Wind development is associated with significant GDP gains concentrated in the utilities sector, while solar development is associated with modest wage and employment gains driven largely by utilities and construction. For very large utility-scale solar, e.g. 5MW or 20MW, agriculture, construction, and utility GDP increase with solar adoption. Neither technology is associated with detectable declines in agricultural GDP, employment, or wages, providing little evidence of substantial disruption to agricultural production or related labor markets. These findings provide a more nuanced understanding of the local economic consequences of the energy transition and highlight the importance of technology type and sectoral composition in shaping rural development outcomes.

Data Center Policy in Ohio: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, Scioto Analysis

Data centers have had a major impact on Ohio's economy. Between 2013 and 2026, we estimate that Ohio data centers produced a net social benefit of $62 billion in the state. Data centers produced $77 billion in total benefits, mostly from employment: they created about 96,000 new jobs and added $75 billion in wages. They also produced $15 billion in total costs, mostly from emissions and higher utility prices. When data centers draw power from the statewide grid, electricity bills rise for Ohio ratepayers. If current policy stays the same, the authors estimate that higher electricity prices will cost Ohio ratepayers $16 billion between 2027 and 2034. As energy use rises, emissions rise as well, and the largest costs come from air pollutants that harm local public health, including nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter 2.5. Under the status quo, these pollutants account for about $41 billion of the $62 billion in total costs between 2027 and 2034, compared to $220 million from carbon, since the authors count only Ohio's share of the global cost of carbon. The data center industry is beginning to respond to some of these issues. Every company planning new data centers in Ohio has committed to closed-loop cooling, which uses zero excess water, but more electricity. Additionally, 19% of planned data center capacity in Ohio is set to use behind-the-meter generation, meaning companies will build their own power plants instead of relying on the statewide grid. This keeps new data centers from raising electricity prices for Ohio ratepayers and it is cleaner for most pollutants.

Spinning Renewable Success Into a Climate Conspiracy: Co-opting the climate science story of RCP8.5, Climate Action Against Disinformation

Fossil fuels cause climate change, and replacing them with renewables will keep our climate safe for human civilization and natural ecosystems. The progress we made towards a cleaner future means that the worst possible fossil fueled warming gets less and less likely. Thanks to the massive growth in renewables, we are finally winning the climate fight- so why are some people claiming exactly the opposite, that it was a hoax all along? Over the years, “Representative Concentration Pathways”, or RCP scenarios have been refined, as renewable energy has gained momentum around the world, pushing the planet away from the most-heavily-fossil-fueled future that represented the worst-case scenario of a climate crisis, and into slightly safer territory. But this good news, tempered as it is by the incredible amount of work remaining to fully decarbonize, is highly technical, scientific, and detailed. That is not, however, how it was portrayed in the fossil fueled disinformation ecosystem, that instead interpreted it as evidence confirming a climate conspiracy theory.

451,000 at Risk, Where Action Can Save Lives During the Super El Niño, Greenstone et al., Climate Impact Lab, University of Chicago

The authors project that 451,000 lives will be lost due to heat the first nine months (June-February) of El Niño, compared to a normal year. This is about 65 times larger than the 6,800 people believed to be dead or missing from the recent Nepal flash flood. In just the next 6 months, this includes 239,000 ± 11,000 deaths across the globe. With current forecasts suggesting El Niño will remain in place through spring 2027, all of these numbers likely will grow even higher, particularly as effects such as higher-than-average temperatures and heat-related deaths will linger into June and July.

No Time to Recover: Compounding Crises, Depleted Fiscal Buffers, and What It Means for Developing Economies, Molina et al., United Nations Development Program

Seven months into the Middle East crisis, developing countries face compounding pressures: renewed energy price surges following the July ceasefire breakdown, a potentially record El Niño, and global benchmark interest rates at multi-decade highs. Governments have cushioned energy price increases at substantial fiscal cost, with global explicit fossil fuel subsidies potentially exceeding $1 trillion this year. Yet containment is becoming unsustainable. Across 130 countries, gasoline and diesel prices have risen by averages of 26 and 38 percent since the conflict began, with increases widening in nearly two-thirds of countries between June and September. Higher prices have contributed to protests and unrest. The authors estimate that full transmission of the energy and food price shock could push an additional 130 million people below $6.85 a day, 121 million below $3.65, and 66 million below $2.15, overwhelmingly in developing countries. These figures represent potential exposure, not observed poverty increases. Fully compensating households would cost approximately 1.1 percent of developing-country GDP; protecting only those below $6.85 would cost around 0.3 percent. However, fiscal constraints and rising debt service increasingly divert resources from long-term development.

Driven by Dirty Steel: The Pollution Behind Europe's Automotive Supply Chain, Mighty Earth

The automakers analyzed in this report have set ambitious carbon-neutrality targets, yet their continued reliance on coal-based steel from ArcelorMittal, Tata Steel, and Acciaierie d’Italia undermines these commitments and perpetuates significant environmental and public-health harms. If European automakers pushed for change in European steel manufacturing, these three steel producers would be required to adjust. Without that pressure, as the authors demonstrate, these companies will remain heavily invested in aging blast furnace operations and fossil gas that generate high levels of greenhouse gases and toxic pollutants, causing elevated rates of respiratory illness, premature death, and degraded air and water quality in surrounding communities.

How Spending for Flood Adaptations Affects the Federal Budget, Chad Shirley, Congressional Budget Office

Flooding is among the costliest natural disasters in the United States. Over the next few decades, damage from flooding is expected to worsen because of continued coastal development and changes in the climate. The authors examine how spending for flood adaptations today might affect the federal government’s potential costs for disaster relief later, as well as what households are likely to pay for flood insurance that is subsidized by the federal government.

Beyond the Funding Gap. A Global Assessment of the Loss of USAID's Environment and Climate Programming, Monica Bansal and Hadas Kushnir, One Earth Partners

The authors document the on-the-ground consequences of the 2025 U.S. foreign assistance withdrawal on global environmental programming and identifies vulnerabilities in the funding ecosystem left behind. They begin by establishing the baseline: the distinctive role the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) played in the environmental sector, including both its strengths and structural flaws. They then presents ten major findings on the effects of the withdrawal across five focus countries, including direct impacts to policy, people, and the environment; institutional and economic impacts; and diplomatic and geopolitical effects. They close with recommendations for funders and for U.S. foreign assistance on how to stabilize and rebuild momentum going forward. The information in the report comes from on-the-ground sources and media articles.

Climate adaptation’s delivery gap: Turning national plans into action, Ellena et al., Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change

The challenge is no longer recognizing the need for adaptation, but rather delivering it at scale. Adaptation gaps are already evident and are projected to widen according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whereas the U.N. Environment Program estimates that annual adaptation finance needs in developing countries could reach US$310-365 billion by 2035, compared with roughly US$26 billion in international public finance in 2023. Two recent initiatives address this bottleneck directly including the Adaptation Accelerator Hub (AAH) and the National Adaptation Plan Implementation Alliance (NIA). The authors explains how these two initiatives are complementary rather than in competition. These two initiatives are part of a single adaptation delivery chain that runs from national priorities to measurable results on the ground. The AAH operates at the country end of that chain - the “missing middle piece” between strategies and financing decisions, whereas the NIA operates at the system end, aligning the actors and the finance that surround it. Their value depends on keeping that division of roles and actions explicit and testable. The message for the next phase of cooperation is that the frontier is shifting from planning alone toward parallel delivery, even as many countries are still completing their National Adaptation Plan. About New Research

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As another legislative session closes, we’re looking back at our work for birds, wildlife, and the places they depend on.  This year, we were proud to bring back Audubon California’s Advocacy...

Equinox Gold’s Western Mesquite Mine in the desert of Southern California is the state’s largest producing gold mine. The company wants to expand their open pit, cyanide heap leach operation. Their first step is to test the quality of the nearby gold deposit at the Rainbow East exploration project.

SUBMIT A COMMENT The project would impact sensitive environments and Tribal cultural resources

The project would build and widen access roads, drill 23 holes, and disturb 2.34 acres on lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management in Imperial County. These lands are part of Desert Tortoise Critical Habitat and the Picacho Area of Critical Concern. 

The project is also located within a cultural landscape that the Fort Yuma Quechan Indian Tribe seeks permanent protection for. Mineral exploration here needs careful study, public input, tribal consultation, and strong safeguards in order to protect these sensitive desert resources.

This biodiverse desert should not be sacrificed for more gold

In February, I visited the site together with local resident Gail Overton. Gail lives in the desert and cares deeply for the plants and animals who call it home. Together we walked along the proposed access roads and drill sites. Here the desert was full of life. Desert washes braid through the area, providing water to plants and wildlife. The brittlebush and ocotillo were in bloom; we saw burrows that could be used by tortoises or burrowing owls, and several lizards. 

Future mining operations in this area would block this critical source of water runoff from the Chocolate Mountains to the desert floor below. An entire ecosystem of deer, coyote, tortoise, lizards, birds, and native plants should not be sacrificed to chase low-grade gold ore that only serves the profit margin of this Canadian mining outfit.

Gail Overton Trump’s tools could allow Equinox to skip environmental review

Last year, almost 5,000 Earthworks supporters asked the BLM not to skip environmental review. Now they are doing just that, considering approving the project under a Categorical Exclusion, one of the many tools Trump is using at breakneck pace to permit irresponsible mining on public lands. 

The public has a chance to weigh in

Luckily, we still have a chance to weigh in. The project and its reclamation plan are being reviewed by Imperial County under the California Environmental Quality Act. However, Imperial County is considering approving the project using outdated documents from more than 20 years ago. These documents studied and approved a 2002 mine expansion within the project boundaries, but never looked at the impacts of exploration drilling in Rainbow East, which would disturb an entirely new area outside of the mine plan boundaries. 

Submit a comment

Make sure Imperial County doesn’t cut corners on its environmental review. Comment by October 19 to urge the planning commission for a new study.

The post Equinox Gold’s Outdated Environmental Studies Won’t Protect the California Desert appeared first on Earthworks.

Today, 17 organizations—including healthcare providers, youth organizations, and clean energy and climate advocates—filed a lawsuit against the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) for rejecting a 2024 petition demanding that it recognize its constitutional duty to consider climate change in the regulation of Montana gas and electric utilities. Montana courts have found that the state has an obligation to consider climate change in decision making, but the PSC has failed to protect Montanans from the climate-related costs and risks of its utility decisions.

The groups petitioned the PSC to confirm its constitutional obligation to account for climate costs and risks in its decisions in February 2024, and the PSC held a public hearing in April 2024. After nearly two and a half years, the PSC resolved the petition on September 15, 2026, refusing to recognize its constitutional obligations. Meanwhile, the Commission has continued to make consequential decisions that have increased ratepayer exposure to climate-related costs and risks, including approving NorthWestern Energy’s request to charge customers for the high construction and operation costs for the Yellowstone County Generating Station, a 175-megawatt methane gas plant in Laurel, Montana.

“Montana children are growing up with climate-related disasters that are no longer distant or abstract,” said Patricia M. Notario, MD, FAAP, president of the Montana Chapter for the American Academy of Pediatrics. “Wildfire smoke can make it difficult for a child with asthma to breathe, floods and severe weather can disrupt homes, schools and medical care, and the stress of these events can affect children’s mental health long after the immediate danger has passed. As pediatricians, we have a responsibility to prepare our patients and communities for these threats and to advocate for a healthier environment for every Montana child.”

“When the PSC fails to consider climate change in its decisions, Montanans bear the high costs and risks that come with fossil-fuel electricity, as well as the unaffordable and unconstitutional effects of a changing climate,” said Amy Cilimburg, executive director of Climate Smart Missoula. “Our longer fire and smoke seasons, hotter temperatures, and drought – all of these impacts can credibly and proportionally be attributed to the burning of fossil fuels. The health of members of our community and our ability to afford electricity is directly connected to the electricity generation and rates as determined by the Commission.”

“Young Montanans deserve a future where we can build our lives, raise families and continue to enjoy the places that make Montana home,” said Alice Boyer, executive director with Forward Montana. “Climate change threatens that future and young people will live with the consequences of the decisions being made about our energy systems today, which have real impacts on the health and affordability of our communities. When the Public Service Commission ignores the Montana Constitution and fails to account for impacts to our environment, it jeopardizes the future young Montanans deserve and the communities we call home.”

“Our kids fought for their constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment in Held v. Montana, and have been advocating for climate justice long before and ever since,” said Sarah Lundquist, executive director of Families for a Livable Climate. “Now it’s our turn. The Public Service Commission has enormous influence over Montana’s energy future, and we must ensure climate change is at the center of its decisions. It is our responsibility as adults to protect the future our kids deserve.”

“Montana’s landscapes, wildlife, rivers, and fisheries are all being affected by climate change. Hunters and anglers will suffer when the building blocks of our environment are altered,” said Gayle Joslin, board member of Helena Hunters and Anglers Association. “Functional ecosystems are not only important for fish and wildlife, but they also provide ecosystem services to Montana’s people in the form of clean water, clear air, and vibrant outdoor spaces. The Montana Public Service Commission has a constitutional duty to seek remedies that protect and improve our environment.”

“The Public Service Commission has more influence over Montana’s greenhouse gas emissions and the climate crisis than any other state agency,” said Nick Fitzmaurice, energy transition engineer for Montana Environmental Information Center. “Our Constitution is clear, and the Held v. State of Montana Supreme Court ruling reaffirmed that the state and each person must maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment, which includes a right to a stable climate. It is long overdue for the Commission to protect utility customers and their wallets by taking climate impacts into consideration in its regulation of gas and electric utilities.”

“With each passing year, the effects of greenhouse gas pollution on Montana and the region become more severe,” said Derek Goldman, Montana policy and regulatory associate with the NW Energy Coalition. “It’s time for the Commission to honor its legal obligation and nudge Montana’s utilities towards cleaner, cheaper renewable energy resources.”

Earthjustice and Western Environmental Law Center represent Climate Smart Missoula, Citizens for Clean Energy, Earthworks, Families for a Livable Climate, Forward Montana, Helena Hunters and Anglers, Helena Interfaith Climate Advocates, Montana Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, Montana Environmental Information Center, Montana Health and Climate, Montana Public Interest Research Group, Montana Renewable Energy Association, NW Energy Coalition, Park County Environmental Council, Renewable Northwest, Sierra Club Montana Chapter, and 350 Montana in the lawsuit.

Background:

The PSC is an elected body charged with ensuring that utility customers have continued access to utility services that are affordable, reliable, and in the public interest. Five commissioners represent PSC districts across the state. With broad oversight authority over Montana’s monopoly utilities, the PSC makes decisions that can either promote or discourage continued utility investment in expensive fossil-fuel infrastructure. For example, in December 2025, the PSC approved NorthWestern’s request to increase customers’ electricity bills, in part to pay for the Yellowstone County Generating Station.

In the historic youth constitutional climate trial, Held v. State of Montana, the court declared that, under Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution, Montanans “have a fundamental constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment, which includes climate as part of the environmental life-support system.” (Held Order, p. 102, ¶ 7). The court also confirmed that Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution places “an affirmative duty upon the government to take active steps to realize this right.” (Held Order, p. 96, ¶ 45) Critically, the court determined that “Montana’s climate, environment, and natural resources are unconstitutionally degraded and depleted due to the current atmospheric concentration of GHGs and climate change.” (Held Order, p. 98, ¶ 50). The district court’s decision was upheld by the Montana Supreme Court in December 2024.

While the Montana PSC has not recognized its obligation to consider climate-related costs and risks in its decisionmaking, utility commissions in other states regularly do so.

Contacts:

Melissa Hornbein, Western Environmental Law Center | 406-708-3058, hornbein@westernlaw.org

Amy Cilimburg, Climate Smart Missoula | amy@climatesmartmissoula.org

Dara Deins, Forward Montana | dara@forwardmontana.org

Nick Fitzmaurice, MEIC |  (406) 443-2520 x 007, nfitzmaurice@meic.org

Perry Wheeler, Earthjustice | pwheeler@earthjustice.org

The post 17 groups sue to require Montana PSC to consider climate in utility decision making appeared first on Western Environmental Law Center.

The votes are in, and CALIFORNIA CONDOR has officially soared to victory as Audubon California's 2026 Bird of the Year!To celebrate Audubon California's 30th anniversary, we invited Bird Lovers...

A Fox News poll has revealed that corruption is a leading issue for voters ahead of the 2026 midterm elections, with a whopping 88 percent saying they are concerned about corruption, including 60 percent who say they are “extremely concerned” about it.

In response, Public Citizen co-president Lisa Gilbert issued the following statement:

“The public is furious about the corruption they see from the government. Even Fox News polling says as much. If we see a shift in power in the next Congress, the American people will expect the new holders of the gavels to deliver oversight and accountability in a strategic and disciplined way that zeroes in on the real harms that the current regime, in cahoots with corporate power, have carried out at the expense of everyday Americans.”

Environmental justice, health Indigenous and climate organizations urge Gov. Newsom and CalGEM to protect frontline communities over polluters’ profits

BAKERSFIELD, Calif.— The oil industry sued to overturn California’s fracking ban, and a Kern County judge’s tentative ruling now puts one of the state’s most important environmental justice victories at risk. Chevron, Aera Energy and the Western States Petroleum Association are asking the courts to wipe out a protection that frontline communities fought for years to win. Environmental justice, health, Indigenous and climate organizations from across California are demanding that Gov. Gavin Newsom and the California Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM) defend it.

The tentative decision, issued October 8, finds that CalGEM’s 2021–2024 practice of denying every fracking permit was unlawful and that the 2024 regulation is invalid because the state’s rulemaking record did not adequately support it. If finalized, it would send denied and pending permit applications back to CalGEM for individualized review. The court did not order any permits issued and did not decide whether the state can ban fracking through a properly supported regulation.

“The fracking ban finally gave protection to the families in Kern County who have lived next to wells that for decades have poisoned our air and threatened our water,” said Cesar Aguirre, Director of Air and Climate Justice Campaign at the Central California Environmental Justice Network. “This ruling hands that protection back to the oil companies. The fracking ban was a sign showing that California was ready to stop treating our communities as sacrifice zones. The price of big oil using the Courts to undo progress is paid for with the health of our children and communities.”

The science on fracking is not in doubt. Fracking uses toxic chemicals, including benzene and formaldehyde, that are known to cause cancer, and the industry has used “trade secret” claims to hide the identities of others. It releases smog-forming pollutants, fine particles and hydrogen sulfide into the air that nearby families breathe. 

In California, a 2021 study of nearly 980,000 births found that fracking within about half a mile of a mother’s home was linked to higher rates of low birth weight, preterm birth and small-for-gestational-age babies. Other research ties living near fracking to asthma attacks and hospitalizations, heart disease hospitalizations and early death among older adults. A 2022 study in Pennsylvania found a two- to three-fold increase in leukemia among children who lived near a fracking well during their mothers’ pregnancies or early in life.

“California’s fracking ban is a critical public health and environmental protection grounded in years of scientific evidence,” said Gabriela Facio, Policy Strategist at Sierra Club California. “This ruling comes right after recently extended permitting for oil and gas extraction, which will have significant consequences for frontline communities. These same communities will now have to face yet another added rollback that will only put their lives at a greater risk. If this ruling is finalized, the state must take action immediately to protect communities from the dangerous and polluting oil and gas industry.”

California’s conditions make the risks worse. About three-quarters of the state’s fracking was shallow, in wells less than 2,000 feet deep, and some of it was permitted directly beneath drinking water aquifers. Fracking was concentrated in already overly impacted communities, including in Kern County.

“Permitting fracking in California’s already heavily developed oil fields would be a high-risk, low-reward proposition,” said Kyle Ferrar, Western Program Director at FracTracker Alliance. “Unlike other basins, the state’s geology simply won’t yield meaningful production gains from well stimulation. Meanwhile, the dangers of groundwater contamination and surface blowouts are already mounting due to downhole communication between wells and increasingly tight well spacing—risks that would only intensify under fracking.”

According to state estimates, the ban reduces production by only about 4% over ten years, a sliver of output weighed against harms that fall hardest on communities of color already living next to wells. This is a fight over whose health comes first: families breathing the air, or oil companies counting profits.

“Governor Newsom and CalGEM have a duty to protect California’s environmental justice communities by strengthening the administrative record with scientific evidence supporting the fracking ban,” said Wilder Zeiser, Richmond Organizer at Communities for a Better Environment. “Our communities deserve protections that can withstand oil industry legal challenges.”

The organizations are urging the Governor and CalGEM to strengthen the record with the science on fracking’s harms and to act immediately to protect communities if the ruling is finalized. The tentative ruling begins a process of additional filings leading to a final decision, which is usually issued within about 50 days of the tentative order. 

Members of the Last Chance Alliance and allies said the following:

“Frontline communities across California, primarily made up of communities of color, are already bearing the brunt of adverse health effects caused by oil production,” said Tanvi Kardile, Coalition Manager at VISION. “This dangerous ruling would put our communities even more at risk for the sake of corporate interests.”

“Sacred Places Institute for Indigenous Peoples opposes Hydraulic fracturing, also known as fracking which is exactly what it sounds like: breaking through rocks and soil while contaminating water with the chemicals injected into the earth,” said Jessa Calderon, Director of Environmental Health and Creative Wellness at Sacred Places Institute for Indigenous Peoples. “This process not only disturbs and contaminates water and soil, but it also causes habitat disruption, increases the chances of earthquakes, and contributes to long-term health issues in our communities. We support ending the fossil fuel economy as it stands on our ancestral homelands.”

“If this tentative decision is finalized, it’ll put fracking pollution back on the table five years after it should’ve ended,” said Kassie Siegel, director of the Center for Biological Diversity’s Climate Law Institute. “Gov. Newsom’s fracking ban is one of the most important health and environmental achievements in California’s history and it’s backed by strong science. If the judge doesn’t change his mind, the state should immediately appeal and do everything in its power to keep protecting Californians from this dangerous, dirty business.”

“Fracking is a shameful, harmful practice that puts us at risk of toxic air and water contamination – especially those who are living near this polluting infrastructure. It has no place in California’s energy future,” said Nicole Ghio, California Director at Food & Water Watch. “Instead of allowing Big Oil to push us backwards for their financial gain we must instead invest in the future Californians want: clean air, clean energy, clean water and a livable climate.”

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LCA LAND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We acknowledge that Bakersfield is the traditional home of the Kitanemuk people of the Tejon Tribe. Part of our commitment to decolonizing ourselves, our language, and our organizations is a commitment to learning and better understanding the history of Indigenous Peoples of so-called California, including the history of contact, colonization and the extraction of resources from Indigenous lands which has been part of the continuation of modern colonization.

 

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