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Nearly 16,000 nurses in New York City are preparing to go on strike on Monday as contract negotiations with several major hospital systems stall over pay, staffing levels, and healthcare benefits, according to the New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA).

The planned strike is set to affect five large hospitals across the city and comes after nurses issued 10-day strike notices on January 2. NYSNA says the action is aimed at pressuring hospital management to prioritize patient care over profits, amid what it describes as growing concerns over safe staffing ratios, workplace safety, and benefit protections.

The post 16,000 New York Nurses To Strike Over Pay, Staffing, And Benefits appeared first on PopularResistance.Org.

Nigeria stands at a pivotal juncture in its energy journey after the recent passage of the Electricity Act 2023, a landmark policy that empowers individual states to regulate, generate, and distribute electricity within their respective jurisdictions.

To date, a number of states, including Enugu, Ekiti, and Ondo, have leveraged the act to establish their own electricity regulatory commissions. For policymakers and development partners, this decentralization presents both an unprecedented opportunity and a critical responsibility to ensure that decentralization does not lead to fragmentation but to a more resilient and inclusive energy ecosystem.

This means that state-level planning is no longer optional; it is an urgent necessity to strengthen state grids and increase the share of renewable energy penetration to increase supply availability and reliability, increase access, reduce carbon emissions, and achieve economic growth.

The new legislative framework, if implemented effectively, will empower state governments to direct public investment more strategically and design regulatory frameworks that enable innovation, attract private capital, increase competition, and expand energy access.

For instance, state-level energy plans can increase transparency of procurement processes, which stimulates competition among developers and financiers, thereby driving down costs and creating stronger incentives for improved service delivery. Similarly, state-level planning that focuses on the utilization of local energy resources can support renewable distributed energy resources, which can improve supply availability and reliability. It can also accelerate the achievement of clean energy and climate goals.

Without robust state-level energy planning, decentralization risks reproducing federal-level failures at scale

While the new legislative framework could have positive implications, it also brings to the fore the urgent need for robust market structures and comprehensive state-level Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs) — a long-term, least-cost, and reliability-focused plan that guides how an electricity system will meet future demand. If not implemented effectively, the devolution of electricity regulation can amplify federal-level challenges, including chronic infrastructure gaps and non-market interventions in tariff setting, which leaves Nigeria’s utilities financially insolvent and unable to reinvest in better service delivery.

To date, national-level efforts, such as the IRP supported by the UK Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility (UK-NIAF), have laid important groundwork for the long-term energy planning needed to enhance grid resilience and increase renewable energy integration. To fully align with Nigeria’s clean energy and climate goals, however, state-level IRPs must prioritize grid resilience, renewable energy deployment, and climate resilience as key planning outcomes.

Indian, states such as Karnataka and Gujarat, have adopted IRPs to plan generation and to meet growing demand sustainably. Karnataka’s state IRP enabled the development of over 15 GW of renewable capacity by 2023, making it one of India’s front-runner states with over 50% of installed capacity from solar and wind generation. These plans also helped establish renewable energy industrial clusters, especially around solar equipment manufacturing and battery storage, creating jobs and improving grid flexibility.

Integrated state-level planning is the missing systems tool for aligning state action with national climate goals

Despite these commendable efforts, the lack of integration of state-level electricity markets into long-term national energy strategies presents a critical blind spot in Nigeria’s energy planning efforts. As states are now vested with the mandate to shape their energy sectors, the absence of clear frameworks for subnational planning could lead to uncoordinated electricity markets, policy fragmentation, infrastructure misalignment, and inefficiencies in energy deployment.

Without cohesive and well-coordinated subnational planning, the country risks replicating existing systemic failures at a smaller scale. These include challenges in coordination, financing, and resource optimization. This, in turn, could disincentivize private investment, reducing opportunities for innovation and competition and creating significant strain on Nigeria’s energy transition and climate goals.

A well-designed IRP process will offer Nigerian states a pathway to optimize local energy resources, including renewable energy, and integrate climate adaptation measures and resilience planning into the state’s economic and industrial development strategies. These plans must guide state-level infrastructure investments and policy decisions and align with energy access and climate change goals. A coordinated IRP process would also ensure that emerging state markets are not operating in silos but are actively contributing to a resilient and diversified national grid. However, the success of state-level planning will still hinge on each state’s ability to develop its own electricity markets and IRPs tailored to local realities: projected demand, renewable and fossil energy resources, industrial needs, and increased supply availability and reliability.

Development partners can catalyze state markets by building capacity, reducing risk, and aligning incentives

Development organizations and donor partners have a vital role to play to achieve this goal. Initiatives like Mission 300 and Nigeria’s Energy Compact are stepping in to bridge this gap by supporting states to develop and operationalize IRPs that align with national electrification and climate goals. Strategic support should focus on:

• Technical assistance and capacity building for state energy regulators and ministries that lack the technical expertise and institutional strength in conducting a landscape assessment of their state’s energy needs and available resources, and using the data to develop data-driven energy plans with strong institutional buy-in
• Toolkits and guidelines for state-level energy planning that align with national benchmarks;
• Pilot programs in leading states to showcase replicable models of state-level energy planning;
• Investment facilitation to attract private sector participation in state-managed energy projects;
• Coordination platforms to ensure harmonization of state and national energy goals, energy planning data, assumptions, and methodologies between federal and state actors, as well as across development agencies.

Additionally, electricity market structures must evolve to accommodate multi-level governance. This includes designing regulatory frameworks that promote private investment at the state level, ensuring consumer protection, and enforcing performance standards. For policymakers, this means putting in place enabling policies, regulatory frameworks, and institutional capacity to support effective planning and oversight. It also requires clarity on how state markets will interact with the national grid, participate in cross-border electricity trade, and coordinate with federal institutions such as the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) and the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN). To enable a smooth transition, states must engage existing DisCos as partners in reform by clarifying roles, harmonising approaches where operations span multiple states, and co-creating decentralisation pathways that protect service continuity while advancing new regulatory goals.

Coordinated governance will determine whether state-driven power markets strengthen or fragment the grid

In this evolving landscape, RMI can leverage its technical expertise, convening power, and deep footprint in Nigeria to establish coordination platforms that harmonize planning approaches, promote knowledge exchange, and support data-driven decision-making at both the national and state levels. Such platforms would facilitate collaboration between federal and state authorities, sector actors, and development partners to reduce duplication of effort and ensure alignment in Nigeria’s decentralized power sector. Moreover, development institutions like the World Bank can provide catalytic funds for technical assistance and capacity building.

The Electricity Act 2023 is more than just a policy reform, it is an invitation to reimagine Nigeria’s energy future through bottom-up innovation, state-driven leadership, and a coordinated national vision. It is therefore imperative for development partners to collaborate with state authorities to help shape an energy transition that aligns with national goals. Moreover, aligning state-level planning with strong, decentralized market structures presents an opportunity to increase grid resilience and supply availability and reliability at optimal cost. With the right regulatory framework, state-driven energy markets can become engines for national development and industrialization growth.

The authors wish to thank Suleiman Babamanu, Alberto Rodriguez, and Scarlett Santana for their contributions to this article.

The post Nigeria’s Electricity Devolution Law Creates an Opportunity to Reshape Its Power System appeared first on RMI.

Through this proposal, the state is attempting to fulfill the original requirements of A.B. 394, the law that CNA nurses fought for more than a decade to win so that patients could get safe, quality care and nurses could provide safe, quality care.

US President Donald Trump and Congress are moving to overturn a Biden-era mining ban on public lands in northern Minnesota, leading to the revival of one of the nation’s biggest mining projects, Reuters reported, citing official government documents.

According to the news outlet, the move has been in the offing for much of the past year and involves “a complex series of legislative steps.” The plan, set to be introduced this week, came together after efforts failed to include the measure in Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill,” signed into law last July, congressional staffers told Reuters.

It highlights the Trump administration’s intensified push to bolster the US supply of critical minerals. Minnesota, in particular the Duluth region in the north, is known for its vast endowment of copper, nickel and cobalt, which are essential materials in electric vehicles, AI data centers, wind turbines, weaponry and a myriad of other devices. These resources have mostly been untapped to this day.

20-year ban

Development of mineral projects in the region has long faced obstacles. In 2023, then-president Joe Biden issued a 20-year mining ban on more than 225,000 acres of the Superior National Forest near the US-Canadian border, citing environmental concerns and the economic value of outdoor recreation.

However, Interior Department officials argue that the ban was not properly filed in the Congressional Record, as required under a federal lands law introduced in 1976, and are now submitting the paperwork to Congress. If lawmakers reject the ban within 60 days, it would be nullified and future administrations barred from issuing similar orders under the Congressional Review Act.

Republican Representative Pete Stauber, whose district covers northern Minnesota, plans to introduce legislation this week to formally reject the ban.

“We have industries here in our country that need these critical minerals. We must never rely on foreign adversaries like China for supply,” Stauber, who is also chair of the US House Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, told Reuters.

Twin Metals boost

If the mining ban is lifted, the Trump administration would then be free to reissue mining leases to projects in the area. The biggest beneficiary would arguably be Chile’s Antofagasta, whose Twin Metals unit has been trying to develop a massive copper-nickel mine on public land for decades.

The project’s mining leases have become a political hot potato since their issuance in 1966. The Obama administration had taken steps to block the project, before Trump renewed them in his first term, only to have Biden cancel them.

Antofagasta loses bid to revive Minnesota copper-nickel project

Twin Metals representatives told Reuters that it expects to get the leases back in the near future and that it is “very appreciative of Congress for their efforts to overturn an unnecessary and detrimental action that locked out a significant domestic source of critical minerals.”

The company’s project sits on one of the world’s largest polymetallic deposits and would be the first underground mine in Minnesota since 1967. It would also be the next major nickel mine in the US, as its only existing one is set to close near the end of the decade.

Stauber also confirmed to Reuters that he’s been told the government is already working on reissuing the leases, though he did not have additional details.

On Friday morning, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a bill that would get the Department of Energy out of the business of energy standards for mobile homes, also known as manufactured homes, and could set the efficiency requirements back decades. 

Advocates say the changes will streamline the regulatory process and keep the upfront costs of manufactured homes down. Critics argue that less efficient homes will cost people more money overall and mostly benefit builders.  

“This is not about poor people. This is not about working people,” said Democratic Representative Melanie Stansbury of New Mexico, who grew up in a manufactured home, on the House floor before the vote. “This is about doing the bidding of corporations.”

The average income of a manufactured home resident is around $40,000, and they “already face disproportionately high energy costs and energy use,” said Johanna Neumann, senior director of the Campaign for 100% Renewable Energy at Environment America. That, she said, is why more stringent energy codes are so important. But the Energy Department, which oversees national energy policy and production, didn’t always have a say over these standards. 

Starting in 1974, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or HUD, became tasked with setting building codes for manufactured homes. But HUD last updated the relevant energy-efficiency standards in 1994, and they have long lagged behind modern insulation and weatherization practices. So in 2007, Congress assigned that task to the Department of Energy, or DOE. It still took 15 years and a lawsuit before President Joe Biden’s administration finalized new rules in 2022 that were projected to reduce utility bills in double-wide manufactured homes by an average of $475 a year. Even with higher upfront costs taken into account, the government predicted around $5 billion in avoided energy bills over 30-years.

At the time, the manufactured housing industry argued that DOE’s calculations were wrong and that the upfront cost of the home should be the primary metric of affordability. Both the Biden and now Trump administrations have delayed implementation of the rule and compliance deadlines, which still aren’t in effect. 

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This House legislation would eliminate the DOE rule and return sole regulatory authority to HUD. Lesli Gooch, CEO of the Manufactured Housing Institute, a trade organization, describes it as essentially a process bill aimed at removing bureaucracy that has stood in the way of action. “The paralysis is because you have two different agencies that have been tasked with creating energy standards,” Gooch said. “You can’t build a house to two different sets of blueprints.”

Representative Jake Auchincloss, a Democrat from Massachusetts, agreed and called the move “commonsense regulatory reform” in a letter urging his colleagues to support the bill. Ultimately, 57 Democrats joined 206 Republicans in voting for the bill, and it now moves to the Senate, where its prospects are uncertain. 

If the bill becomes law, however, the only operative benchmark would be HUD’s 1994 code and it could take years to make a new one. While more than half of the roughly 100,000 homes sold in the U.S. each year already meet or exceed the DOE’s 2022 efficiency rules, the nonprofit American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy estimates that tens of thousands are still built to just the outdated standard. 

“Families are struggling,” said Mark Kresowik, senior policy director at the council, and he does not expect HUD under Trump to move particularly quickly on a fix. “I have not seen this administration lowering energy bills.”

For now, though, it’s the Senate’s turn to weigh in.

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Mobile homes already have huge utility bills. Congress may make it worse. on Jan 9, 2026.

This past fall, I had the amazing opportunity to intern with Alaska Wilderness League, an experience that profoundly shaped my understanding of environmental advocacy, non-profit lobbying, Alaskan public lands, and the overall legislative process. Working closely with AWL’s lobbying team, I was given the unique opportunity to directly engage with their campaigns through attending lobbying meetings, congressional hearings, fly-ins, and other daily activities.

One of the most valuable aspects of my internship was the chance to shadow the lobby team during their meetings with congressional staffers. Through these meetings, I learned how AWL tailors their messaging to connect with different types of offices by appealing to their priorities or shared experiences. In contrast, meetings with allied offices looked very different. Rather than informing them of the threats facing Alaskan public lands, the focus was on sharing information about upcoming hearings or bill markups and coordinating strategy on legislation they were already working on together. Before this experience, I had simply discussed lobbying tactics in class, but actually seeing these meetings myself made clear the importance of preparation, communication, and framing, in addition to pure passion for protecting public lands.

Another highlight of my internship was participating in the fly-ins, through which AWL helped bring Arctic guides and Inupiat activist Rosemary Ahtuangaruak to Washington, D.C. to tell their stories on The Hill. Not only did I get to assist in preparing materials for the meetings, but I also got to attend them and learn about how national energy policy affects small businesses and some Alaska Native communities. This enlightening experience showed me that politics does not occur in a bubble. The decisions made in Washington, D.C. have real impacts on communities across the nation, and effective advocacy should combine lived experiences with policy expertise– an approach that AWL consistently emphasizes. 

Beyond lobby meetings, I also attended a significant congressional hearing. In September, the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing titled “Unleashing Alaska’s Extraordinary Resource Potential,” during which they discussed issues related to public lands, including energy development, mining, cultural resources, and climate change. I, along with others, wore bright blue “Save the Arctic” t-shirts that stood out among the crowd of pro-industry suits sitting in their reserved front-row seats. We even earned the attention of Republican committee member Tom Tiffany (WI-07), who pointedly mentioned us in his closing remarks.

Going from watching these hearings on TV to being directly called out in the Longworth Building by a member of Congress was a surreal experience I will never forget. It gave me the feeling that I am not simply a passive observer of the decisions made in our capital city, but someone who can engage in the process to help make meaningful change.

I am extremely grateful to Alaska Wilderness League for providing me with such a formative experience. My time with AWL reinforced my aspirations to get involved in non-profit environmental lobbying, and this experience taught me so many of the essential skills to excel in this field. In particular, I would like to thank Emma Powell for providing me with such a great experience and for her continued guidance and support throughout the semester, as well as Alex Cohen and Andy Moderow for teaching me so much about lobbying strategies and the legislative process, and the entire AWL staff for creating such a welcoming and supportive environment.

Connor Scafidi is a junior Political Science major and Environmental Studies minor from Boston, MA, studying at the College of the Holy Cross. He is an avid Boston sports fan who enjoys playing indie folk music on guitar, taking trips to the beaches of York, Maine, and hiking Mount Agamenticus with his goldendoodle, Charlie.)

The post Learning to Lobby for the Arctic: A Semester on the Front Lines of Public Lands Protection appeared first on Alaska Wilderness League.

Our November Nuclear Digest by Bellona’s Environmental Transparency Center is out now. Here’s a quick taste of just three nuclear issues arising in Ukraine, Russia and worldwide that our analysts have been discussing. Stay tuned below for the entire digest and lots more nuclear news.

‘Divided’ control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

“Virtually unacceptable.” That’s how Bellona’s nuclear experts describe various proposals for the so-called “divided” or “50/50” operation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in our latest Nuclear Digest. This refers to the idea of somehow dividing management of the enormous, six-reactor complex between the Russian and Ukrainian sides—a notion that has emerged in many of the peace proposals under discussion to end the war in Ukraine. Basically, “50/50” operation describes a scheme wherein Russia and Ukraine—and in some iterations, the United States—would jointly operate the plant that Russian troops overran early in the war as part of any peace brokered between the nations.

Our nuclear experts say this approach is doomed on all fronts. First, using plant’s shared cooling, control, power supply and safety systems in some sort of bifurcated manner would be next to impossible, and attempts to do so would seriously degrade overall plant safety.

Further, who, in fact, would be in charge? Which side would issue key commands in the event of an emergency (of which, in time of war, there is no shortage)—and in what language would they be communicated? What country’s nuclear regulator would be responsible for ensuring safety and radiation safety regimens, and whose regimens would be observed? Which side would legally own the nuclear fuel used at the plant and make sure that its use complies with international nonproliferation norms? How would the US-origin Westinghouse fuel burning in four of Zaporizhzhia’s reactors be treated? And how would a technical staff comprised of people from bitterly warring sides be expected to cooperate?

The questions are almost too numerous to list. But a final one we propose would be: Is this the sort of world we want to live in? A divided Russian-Ukrainian operation of the Zaporizhzhia complex would only serve to normalize the taking of nuclear plants as prisoners of war—then when peace comes, dividing the baby with Solomon’s sword.

As before, we at Bellona stipulate that the only safe outcome for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant is to return it to Ukrainian hands. Read our full commentary here.

Nuclear cooperation between Hungary and the US…and Russia 

The US played a role in other recent nuclear developments, this time in Hungary. A White House meeting between US President Donald Trump and his Hungarian counterpart Victor Orban in November yielded a $114 million deal for Westinghouse to supply fuel to the Russian-built PAKS I nuclear plant, a supply ample enough to run the plant’s four Soviet-style VVER-440 reactors for about a year. The US side also agreed to lift any trade restrictions impacting the construction of the Rosatom-built PAKS II nuclear plant—a project that makes Hungary the sole EU member state where a Russian nuclear plant is currently under construction.

Our analyst Dmitry Gorchakov says this development is notable given Hungary’s close cooperation with Rosatom and Budapest’s efforts to block EU-wide sanctions on the Russian nuclear behemoth. Hungary’s opposition to such measures has somewhat frayed the Brussels response to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Still, Gorchakov notes that even Hungary, despite its warm ties to Moscow, is seeking to diversify its nuclear fuel supplies amid western pressures to abandon Russian sources. The US agreement offers further evidence of that—though for the US side, the deal is likely driven by commercial, rather than political, considerations. Foremost in Trump’s foreign policy is securing deals for US companies—like Westinghouse.

The lifting of US restrictions on supplies to the PAKS II plant places Hungary and the EU at fork in the road—with one route encouraging EU unity against Russia’s invasion while the other further unravels it. With Westinghouse able to cover some of the demands for fuel that have traditionally been filled by Russia, Hungary can scarcely continue to oppose sanctions by arguing that its energy security depends upon trade with Rosatom.

However, very fact that the PAKS II project is getting the US nod to continue trade relations with Russia may give other EU countries reason to argue that they should get the same relief. Read more about this conundrum here.

Kazakhstan to start uranium enrichment—with a little help from its friends

In Kazakhstan, new laws on “subsoil use” could set the stage for a major expansion in nuclear cooperation between Astana and Moscow. Legislation passed in November envisages adding uranium processing to Kazakhstan’s role as the world’s largest uranium exporter—with a little enforced help from its foreign partners.

Essentially, foreign customers contracting to mine uranium in Kazakhstan will also be required to build and operate uranium conversion and enrichment facilities for what they mine, as well as commit themselves to buying at least half of what these new facilities produce.

It’s a novel idea that Bellona analyst Dmitry Gorchakov says fits into Kazakhstan’s long-term strategy for developing and diversifying its nuclear sector—especially now that Russia and China are leading consortiums to help Astana build its first two nuclear power plants. By adding enrichment capabilities to its already extant mining and conversion capabilities, Kazakhstan is eliminating a bottleneck in the process that could allow it to eventually fuel its own reactors, says Gorchakov.

While it’s still unclear if China, Russia and other foreign partners Kazakhstan has will fully buy into the new legislation, the dependence of Russia and China on Kazakh uranium likely means they will. See what else we think about these developments here.

For our complete coverage of international nuclear industry issues though November, read the whole digest, out now! Subscribe to our mailing list to stay informed about future issues. Download a PDF of this digest here.

The post From Ukraine peace plans to Kazakh uranium—all that and more in our new nuclear digest appeared first on Bellona.org.

London-based La Mancha Resource Capital is reducing its stake in West Africa-focused gold producer Endeavour Mining (LSE, TSX: EDV) after its shares nearly tripled in value in a year.

The finance firm’s Luxembourg-based fund sold 3.5% of Endeavour in a bought deal at C$71.25 per share worth about C$605 million ($437 million), trimming its holding while remaining a major shareholder. The shares closed at C$77.61 apiece on Thursday, a 191% gain from a year earlier. The stock fell 6.1% on Friday morning to C$72.91, valuing the company at C$17.5 billion ($12.6 billion).

Shares in most major gold companies have more than doubled over the past 12 months as geopolitical tensions and central bank bullion buying has powered the yellow metal about 65% to successive record highs. The La Mancha fund, which had about $1.7 billion under management in November, held 35.3 million shares, or about 15% of Endeavour on a non-diluted basis before the sale. Now its stake stands at about 11%.

“This transaction forms part of La Mancha’s ongoing capital management strategy,” Vincent Benoit, CEO and managing partner of La Mancha, said in a statement. It’s “aimed at reducing leverage and rebalancing the portfolio following a significant increase in the fund’s exposure to Endeavour due to the strong performance of its share price,” he said.

Endeavour’s portfolio in West Africa includes main operations such as the Houndé mine in Burkina Faso and the Ity and Agbaou mines in Côte d’Ivoire with total annual attributable output from around the mid- to high-900,000-oz. range. It sold the non-core Boungou and Wahgnion properties in Burkina Faso in 2023.

‘Cornerstone’

“The La Mancha group has been a cornerstone shareholder of Endeavour for over a decade and this transaction does not reflect any change in our conviction in the company’s long-term potential,” Benoit said. “We remain a committed long-term shareholder, intend to retain a significant stake in excess of 10% of shares outstanding, together with board representation, and continue to fully support Endeavour’s strategy and management team.”

La Mancha said Egyptian businessman Naguib Sawiris will continue to represent the fund on Endeavour’s board of directors.

The group has been a key shareholder in Endeavour since 2015, when it sold its interest in Ity to the company in exchange for a significant position.

Government stakes

In Burkina Faso, the Ibrahim Traoré government has taken control of Endeavour’s former Boungou and Wahgnion gold mines following the collapse of their sale to Lilium Mining, a transaction that had been billed at more than $300 million including deferred payments and royalties. After a dispute over payments and ownership, the state moved in August 2024 to nationalize the assets and pay Endeavour about $80 million in cash and royalties.

Endeavour’s former Boungou and Wahgnion mines are now fully under state control, with the company no longer operating them but retaining a residual economic interest through the royalty structure. It’s a prime example of Burkina Faso’s recent push to expand state ownership in the gold sector.

Military governments across the Sahel region are pushing for greater stakes in mines operated by foreign majors as they seek revenue to counter Islamic extremists in the north and support some of the world’s poorest populations. Barrick Mining (TSX: ABX; NYSE: B) only recently settled a dispute with Mali for some $430 million, while 7th-largest uranium producer Niger is advancing projects with Global Atomic (TSX: GLO) and GoviEx Uranium (TSXV: GXU).

Rising geopolitical risks could push gold above $5,000 an ounce during the first half of the year, though a steep correction may follow in the second half, according to analysts at HSBC.

In a note published this week, the bank said it sees gold prices rising to a high of $5,050 an ounce within the first six months — up from its $5,000 target previously.

However, for the entire year, it expects gold to trade within a wide range that could go as low as $3,950 per ounce following a correction later in the year. This correction, its analysts said, could be significant should geopolitical risks subside or if the US Federal Reserve stops cutting interest rates.

Banks bullish on gold price as Morgan Stanley sets $4,800 target

As a result, the bank has slightly trimmed its average 2026 price forecast for gold to $4,587 an ounce from $4,600.

“We see a wide range of $5,050-$3,950/oz. for 2026 and an end-of-year price of $4,450/oz.,” HSBC analysts said, adding that trade is likely to feature high volatility.

“We believe that gold will continue to benefit from strong central bank demand, ongoing concerns over a weaker US dollar, and sustained interest in gold-backed ETFs,” HSBC wrote in its 2026 forecast note.

Beyond 2026, the analysts expect gold prices to rise further, averaging $4,625 per ounce in 2027 and $4,700 in 2028. Its previous average price forecasts for the two years were $3,950 and $3,630 respectively. In the note, they also introduced a 2029 average price forecast of $4,775.

Click on chart for live prices.

As of Friday morning, gold was trading above $4,500 an ounce, nearly $50 off its record high. The metal is coming off its best year since 1979 with an annual gain of 65%.

(With files from Reuters)

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week US to pull out from UNFCC, IPCC

CLIMATE RETREAT: The Trump administration announced its intention to withdraw the US from the world’s climate treaty, CNN reported. The move to leave the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in addition to 65 other international organisations, was announced via a White House memorandum that states these bodies “no longer serve American interests”, the outlet added. The New York Times explained that the UNFCCC “counts all of the other nations of the world as members” and described the move as cementing “US isolation from the rest of the world when it comes to fighting climate change”.

MAJOR IMPACT: The Associated Press listed all the organisations that the US is exiting, including other climate-related bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The exit also means the withdrawal of US funding from these bodies, noted the Washington Post. Bloomberg said these climate actions are likely to “significantly limit the global influence of those entities”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth Q&A on what Trump’s move means for global climate action. 

Oil prices fall after Venezuela operation

UNCERTAIN GLUT: Global oil prices fell slightly this week “after the US operation to seize Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro created uncertainty over the future of the world’s largest crude reserves”, reported the Financial Times. The South American country produces less than 1% of global oil output, but it holds about 17% of the world’s proven crude reserves, giving it the potential to significantly increase global supply, the publication added.

TRUMP DEMANDS: Meanwhile, Trump said Venezuela “will be turning over” 30-50m barrels of oil to the US, which will be worth around $2.8bn (£2.1bn), reported BBC News. The broadcaster added that Trump claims this oil will be sold at market price and used to “benefit the people of Venezuela and the US”. The announcement “came with few details”, but “marked a significant step up for the US government as it seeks to extend its economic influence in Venezuela and beyond”, said Bloomberg.

Around the world

• MONSOON RAIN: At least 16 people have been killed in flash floods “triggered by torrential rain” in Indonesia, reported the Associated Press.
• BUSHFIRES: Much of Australia is engulfed in an extreme heatwave, said the Guardian. In Victoria, three people are missing amid “out of control” bushfires, reported Reuters.
• TAXING EMISSIONS: The EU’s landmark carbon border levy, known as “CBAM”, came into force on 1 January, despite “fierce opposition” from trading partners and European industry, according to the Financial Times.
• GREEN CONSUMPTION: China’s Ministry of Commerce and eight other government departments released an action plan to accelerate the country’s “green transition of consumption and support high-quality development”, reported Xinhua.
• ACTIVIST ARRESTED: Prominent Indian climate activist Harjeet Singh was arrested following a raid on his home, reported Newslaundry. Federal forces have accused Singh of “misusing foreign funds to influence government policies”, a suggestion that Singh rejected as “baseless, biased and misleading”, said the outlet. 
• YOUR FEEDBACK: Please let us know what you thought of Carbon Brief’s coverage last year by completing our annual reader survey. Ten respondents will be chosen at random to receive a CB laptop sticker.

47%

The share of the UK’s electricity supplied by renewables in 2025, more than any other source, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

Latest climate research

• Deforestation due to the mining of “energy transition minerals” is a “major, but overlooked source of emissions in global energy transition” | Nature Climate Change
• Up to three million people living in the Sudd wetland region of South Sudan are currently at risk of being exposed to flooding | Journal of Flood Risk Management
• In China, the emissions intensity of goods purchased online has dropped by one-third since 2000, while the emissions intensity of goods purchased in stores has tripled over that time | One Earth

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

The US, which has announced plans to withdraw from the UNFCCC, is more responsible for climate change than any other country or group in history, according to Carbon Brief analysis. The chart above shows the cumulative historical emissions of countries since the advent of the industrial era in 1850.

Spotlight How to think about Africa’s just energy transition

African nations are striving to boost their energy security, while also addressing climate change concerns such as flood risks and extreme heat.

This week, Carbon Brief speaks to the deputy Africa director of the Natural Resource Governance Institute, Ibrahima Aidara, on what a just energy transition means for the continent.

Carbon Brief: When African leaders talk about a “just energy transition”, what are they getting right? And what are they still avoiding?

Ibrahima Aidara: African leaders are right to insist that development and climate action must go together. Unlike high-income countries, Africa’s emissions are extremely low – less than 4% of global CO2 emissions – despite housing nearly 18% of the world’s population. Leaders are rightly emphasising universal energy access, industrialisation and job creation as non-negotiable elements of a just transition.

They are also correct to push back against a narrow narrative that treats Africa only as a supplier of raw materials for the global green economy. Initiatives such as the African Union’s Green Minerals Strategy show a growing recognition that value addition, regional integration and industrial policy must sit at the heart of the transition.

However, there are still important blind spots. First, the distributional impacts within countries are often avoided. Communities living near mines, power infrastructure or fossil-fuel assets frequently bear environmental and social costs without sharing in the benefits. For example, cobalt-producing communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or lithium-affected communities in Zimbabwe and Ghana, still face displacement, inadequate compensation, pollution and weak consultation.

Second, governance gaps are sometimes downplayed. A just transition requires strong institutions (policies and regulatory), transparency and accountability. Without these, climate finance, mineral booms or energy investments risk reinforcing corruption and inequality.

Finally, leaders often avoid addressing the issue of who pays for the transition. Domestic budgets are already stretched, yet international climate finance – especially for adaptation, energy access and mineral governance – remains far below commitments. Justice cannot be achieved if African countries are asked to self-finance a global public good.

CB: Do African countries still have a legitimate case for developing new oil and gas projects, or has the energy transition fundamentally changed what ‘development’ looks like?

IA: The energy transition has fundamentally changed what development looks like and, with it, how African countries should approach oil and gas. On the one hand, more than 600 million Africans lack access to electricity and clean cooking remains out of reach for nearly one billion people. In countries such as Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania, gas has been framed to expand power generation, reduce reliance on biomass and support industrial growth. For some contexts, limited and well-governed gas development can play a transitional role, particularly for domestic use.

On the other hand, the energy transition has dramatically altered the risks. Global demand uncertainty means new oil and gas projects risk becoming stranded assets. Financing is shrinking, with many development banks and private lenders exiting fossil fuels. Also, opportunity costs are rising; every dollar locked into long-lived fossil infrastructure is a dollar not invested in renewables, grids, storage or clean industry.

Crucially, development today is no longer just about exporting fuels. It is about building resilient, diversified economies. Countries such as Morocco and Kenya show that renewable energy, green industry and regional power trade can support growth without deepening fossil dependence.

So, the question is no longer whether African countries can develop new oil and gas projects, but whether doing so supports long-term development, domestic energy access and fiscal stability in a transitioning world – or whether it risks locking countries into an extractive model that benefits few and exposes countries to future shocks.

CB: What is the hardest truth about Africa’s energy transition that policymakers and international partners are still unwilling to confront?

IA: For me, the hardest truth is this: Africa cannot deliver a just energy transition on unfair global terms. Despite all the rhetoric, global rules still limit Africa’s policy space. Trade and investment agreements restrict local content, industrial policy and value-addition strategies. Climate finance remains fragmented and insufficient. And mineral supply chains are governed largely by consumer-country priorities, not producer-country development needs.

Another uncomfortable truth is that not every “green” investment is automatically just. Without strong safeguards, renewable energy projects and mineral extraction can repeat the same harms as fossil fuels: displacement, exclusion and environmental damage.

Finally, there is a reluctance to admit that speed alone is not success. A rushed transition that ignores governance, equity and institutions will fail politically and socially, and, ultimately, undermine climate goals.

If Africa’s transition is to succeed, international partners must accept African leadership, African priorities and African definitions of development, even when that challenges existing power dynamics in global energy and mineral markets.

Watch, read, listen

CRISIS INFLAMED: In the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo, columnist Marcelo Leite looked into the climate impact of extracting more oil from Venezuela.

BEYOND TALK: Two Harvard scholars argued in Climate Home News for COP presidencies to focus less on climate policy and more on global politics.

EU LEVIES: A video explainer from the Hindu unpacked what the EU’s carbon border tax means for India and global trade.

Coming up

• 10-12 January: 16th session of the IRENA Assembly, Abu Dhabi
• 13-15 January: Energy Security and Green Infrastructure Week, London
• 13-15 January: The World Future Energy Summit, Abu Dhabi
• 15 January: Uganda general elections

Pick of the jobs

• WRI Polsky Energy Center, global director | Salary: around £185,000. Location: Washington DC; the Hague, Netherlands; New Delhi, Mumbai, or Bengaluru, India; or London
• UK government Advanced Research and Invention Agency, strategic communications director – future proofing our climate and weather | Salary: £115,000. Location: London
• The Wildlife Trusts, head of climate and international policy | Salary: £50,000. Location: London
• Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, senior manager for climate | Salary: Unknown. Location: London, UK

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

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The agreements invest in future deliveries of advanced nuclear technology while also procuring power from existing plants and uprates.

The Trump administration in the US has announced its intention to withdraw from the UN’s landmark climate treaty, alongside 65 other international bodies that “no longer serve American interests”.

Every nation in the world has committed to tackling “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” under the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

During Donald Trump’s second presidency, the US has already failed to meet a number of its UN climate treaty obligations, including reporting its emissions and funding the UNFCCC – and it has not attended recent climate summits.

However, pulling out of the UNFCCC would be an unprecedented step and would mark the latest move by the US to disavow global cooperation and climate action.

Among the other organisations the US plans to leave is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN body seen as the global authority on climate science.

In this article, Carbon Brief considers the implications of the US leaving these bodies, as well as the potential for it rejoining the UNFCCC in the future.

Carbon Brief has also spoken to experts about the contested legality of leaving the UNFCCC and what practical changes – if any – will result from the US departure.

• What is the process for pulling out of the UNFCCC?
• Is it legal for Trump to take the US out of the UNFCCC unilaterally?
• How could the US rejoin the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement?
• What changes when the US withdraws from the UNFCCC?
• What about the US withdrawal from the IPCC?
• What other organisations are affected?

What is the process for pulling out of the UNFCCC?

The Trump administration set out its intention to withdraw from the UNFCCC and the IPCC in a White House presidential memorandum issued on 7 January 2026.

It claims authority “vested in me as president by the constitution and laws of the US” to withdraw the country from the treaty, along with 65 other international and UN bodies.

However, the memo includes a caveat around its instructions, stating:

“For UN entities, withdrawal means ceasing participation in or funding to those entities to the extent permitted by law.”

(In an 8 January interview with the New York Times, Trump said he did not “need international law” and that his powers were constrained only by his “own morality”.)

The US is the first and only country in the world to announce it wants to withdraw from the UNFCCC.

The convention was adopted at the UN headquarters in New York in May 1992 and opened for signatures at the Rio Earth summit the following month. The US became the first industrialised nation to ratify the treaty that same year.

It was ultimately signed by every nation on Earth – making it one of the most ratified global treaties in history.

Article 25 of the treaty states that any party may withdraw by giving written notification to the “depositary”, which is elsewhere defined as being the UN secretary general – currently, António Guterres.

The article, shown below, adds that the withdrawal will come into force a year after a written notification is supplied.

Excerpt from Article 25 of the UNFCCC (1992). Credit: UNFCCC

The treaty adds that any party that withdraws from the convention shall be considered as also having left any related protocol. 

The UNFCCC has two main protocols: the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement of 2015.

Although former US president Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, its formal ratification faced opposition from the Senate and the treaty was ultimately rejected by his successor, president George W Bush, in 2001.

Domestic opposition to the protocol centred around the exclusion of major developing countries, such as China and India, from emissions reduction measures.

The US did ratify the Paris Agreement, but Trump signed an executive order to take the nation out of the pact for a second time on his first resumed day in office in January 2025.

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Is it legal for Trump to take the US out of the UNFCCC unilaterally?

Whether Trump can legally pull the US out of the UNFCCC without the consent of the Senate remains unclear. 

The US previously left the Paris Agreement during Trump’s first term. 

Both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement allow any party to withdraw with a year’s written notice. However, both treaties state that parties cannot withdraw within the first three years of ratification. 

As such, the first Trump administration filed notice to exit the Paris Agreement in November 2019 and became the first nation in the world to formally leave a year later – the day after Democrat Joe Biden won the 2020 presidential election. 

On his first day in office in 2021, Biden rejoined the Paris Agreement. This took 30 days from notifying the UNFCCC to come into force.

The legalities of leaving the UNFCCC are murkier, due to how it was adopted. 

As Michael B Gerrard, director of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, explains to Carbon Brief, the Paris Agreement was ratified without Senate approval.

Article 2 of the US Constitution says presidents have the power to make or join treaties subject to the “advice and consent” of the Senate – including a two-thirds majority vote (see below).

Source: US Constitution.

However, Barack Obama took the position that, as the Paris Agreement “did not impose binding legal obligations on the US, it was not a treaty that required Senate ratification”, Gerrard tells Carbon Brief. 

As noted in a post by Jake Schmidt, a senior strategic director at the environmental NGO Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the US has other mechanisms for entering international agreements. It says the US has joined more than 90% of the international agreements it is party to through different mechanisms.

In contrast, George H Bush did submit the UNFCCC to the Senate in 1992, where it was unanimously ratified by a 92-0 vote, ahead of his signing it into law. 

Reversing this is uncertain legal territory. Gerrard tells Carbon Brief: 

“There is an open legal question whether a president can unilaterally withdraw the US from a Senate-ratified treaty. A case raising that question reached the US Supreme Court in 1979 (Goldwater vs Carter), but the Supreme Court ruled this was a political question not suitable for the courts.”

Unlike ratifying a treaty, the US Constitution does not explicitly specify whether the consent of the Senate is required to leave one. 

This has created legal uncertainty around the process. 

Given the lack of clarity on the legal precedent, some have suggested that, in practice, Trump can pull the US out of treaties unilaterally.

Sue Biniaz, former US principal deputy special envoy for climate and a key legal architect of the Paris Agreement, tells Carbon Brief: 

“In terms of domestic law, while the Supreme Court has not spoken to this issue (it treated the issue as non-justifiable in the Goldwater v Carter case), it has been US practice, and the mainstream legal view, that the president may constitutionally withdraw unilaterally from a treaty, ie without going back to the Senate.”

Additionally, the potential for Congress to block the withdrawal from the UNFCCC and other treaties is unclear. When asked by Carbon Brief if it could play a role, Biniaz says: 

“Theoretically, but politically unlikely, Congress could pass a law prohibiting the president from unilaterally withdrawing from the UNFCCC. (The 2024 NDAA contains such a provision with respect to NATO.) In such case, its constitutionality would likely be the subject of debate.”

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How could the US rejoin the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement?

The US would be able to rejoin the UNFCCC in future, but experts disagree on how straightforward the process would be and whether it would require a political vote. 

In addition to it being unclear whether a two-thirds “supermajority” vote in the Senate is required to leave a treaty, it is unclear whether rejoining would require a similar vote again – or if the original 1992 Senate consent would still hold. 

Citing arguments set out by Prof Jean Galbraith of the University of Pennsylvania law school, Schmidt’s NRDC post says that a future president could rejoin the convention within 90 days of a formal decision, under the merit of the previous Senate approval.

Biniaz tells Carbon Brief that there are “multiple future pathways to rejoining”, adding: 

“For example, Prof Jean Galbraith has persuasively laid out the view that the original Senate resolution of advice and consent with respect to the UNFCCC continues in effect and provides the legal authority for a future president to rejoin. Of course, the Senate could also give its advice and consent again. In any case, per Article 23 of the UNFCCC, it would enter into force for the US 90 days after the deposit of its instrument.”

Prof Oona Hathaway, an international law professor at Yale Law School, believes there is a “very strong case that a future president could rejoin the treaty without another Senate vote”. 

She tells Carbon Brief that there is precedent for this based on US leaders quitting and rejoining global organisations in the past, explaining:

“The US joined the International Labour Organization in 1934. In 1975, the Ford administration unilaterally withdrew, and in 1980, the Carter administration rejoined without seeking congressional approval. 

“Similarly, the US became a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1946. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration unilaterally withdrew the US. The Bush administration rejoined UNESCO in 2002, but in 2019 the Trump administration once again withdrew. The Biden administration rejoined in 2023, and the Trump Administration announced its withdrawal again in 2025.” 

But this “legal theory” of a future US president specifically re-entering the UNFCCC “based on the prior Senate ratification” has “never been tested in court”, Prof Gerrard from Columbia Law School tells Carbon Brief.

Dr Joanna Depledge, an expert on global climate negotiations and research fellow at the University of Cambridge, tells Carbon Brief:

“Due to the need for Senate ratification of the UNFCCC (in my interpretation), there is no way back now for the US into the climate treaties. But there is nothing to stop a future US president applying [the treaty] rules or – what is more important – adopting aggressive climate policy independently of them.”

If it were required, achieving Senate approval to rejoin the UNFCCC would take a “significant shift in US domestic politics”, public policy professor Thomas Hale from the University of Oxford notes on Bluesky.

Rejoining the Paris Agreement, on the other hand, is a simpler process that the US has already undertaken in recent years. (See: Is it legal for Trump to take the US out of the UNFCCC unilaterally?) Biniaz explains:

“In terms of the Paris Agreement, a party to that agreement must also be a party to the UNFCCC (Article 20). Assuming the US had rejoined the UNFCCC, it could rejoin the Paris Agreement as an executive agreement (as it did in early 2021). The agreement would enter into force for the US 30 days after the deposit of its instrument (Article 21).”

The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, an environmental non-profit, explains that Senate approval was not required for Paris “because it elaborates an existing treaty” – the UNFCCC. 

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What changes when the US withdraws from the UNFCCC?

US withdrawal from the UNFCCC has been described in media coverage as a “massive hit” to global climate efforts that will “significantly limit” the treaty’s influence.

However, experts tell Carbon Brief that, as the Trump administration has already effectively withdrawn from most international climate activities, this latest move will make little difference.

Moreover, Depledge tells Carbon Brief that the international climate regime “will not collapse” as a result of US withdrawal. She says:

“International climate cooperation will not collapse because the UNFCCC has 195 members rather than 196. In a way, the climate treaties have already done their job. The world is already well advanced on the path to a lower-carbon future. Had the US left 10 years ago, it would have been a serious threat, but not today. China and other renewable energy giants will assert even more dominance.”

Depledge adds that while the “path to net-zero will be longer because of the drastic rollback of domestic climate policy in the US”, it “won’t be reversed”.

Technically, US departure from the UNFCCC would formally release it from certain obligations, including the need to report national emissions. 

As the world’s second-largest annual emitter, this is potentially significant.

“The US withdrawal from the UNFCCC undoubtedly impacts on efforts to monitor and report global greenhouse gas emissions,” Dr William Lamb, a senior researcher at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), tells Carbon Brief.

Lamb notes that while scientific bodies, such as the IPCC, often use third-party data, national inventories are still important. The US already failed to report its emissions data last year, in breach of its UNFCCC treaty obligations.

Robbie Andrew, senior researcher at Norwegian climate institute CICERO, says that it will currently be possible for third-party groups to “get pretty close” to the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions estimates previously published by the US administration. However, he adds:

“The further question, though, is whether the EIA [US Energy Information Administration] will continue reporting all of the energy data they currently do. Will the White House decide that reporting flaring is woke? That even reporting coal consumption is an unnecessary burden on business? I suspect the energy sector would be extremely unhappy with changes to the EIA’s reporting, but there’s nothing at the moment that could guarantee anything at all in that regard.”

Andrew says that estimating CO2 emissions from energy is “relatively straightforward when you have detailed energy data”. In contrast, estimating CO2 emissions from agriculture, land use, land-use change and forestry, as well as other greenhouse gas emissions, is “far more difficult”.

The US Treasury has also announced that the US will withdraw from the UN’s Green Climate Fund (GCF) and give up its seat on the board, “in alignment” with its departure from the UNFCCC. The Trump administration had already cancelled $4bn of pledged funds for the GCF.

Another specific impact of US departure would be on the UNFCCC secretariat budget, which already faces a significant funding gap. US annual contributions typically make up around 22% of the body’s core budget, which comes from member states.

However, as with emissions data and GCF withdrawal, the Trump administration had previously indicated that the US would stop funding the UNFCCC. 

In fact, billionaire and UN special climate envoy Michael Bloomberg has already committed, alongside other philanthropists, to making up the US shortfall.

Veteran French climate negotiator Paul Watkinson tells Carbon Brief:

“In some ways the US has already suspended its participation. It has already stopped paying its budget contributions, it sent no delegation to meetings in 2025. It is not going to do any reporting any longer – although most of that is now under the Paris Agreement. So whether it formally leaves the UNFCCC or not does not change what it is likely to do.”

Dr Joanna Depledge tells Carbon Brief that she agrees:

“This is symbolically and politically huge, but in practice it makes little difference, given that Trump had already announced total disengagement last year.”

The US has a history of either leaving or not joining major environmental treaties and organisations, such as the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol. (See: What is the process for pulling out of the UNFCCC?)

Dr Jennifer Allan, a global environmental politics researcher at Cardiff University, tells Carbon Brief:

“The US has always been an unreliable partner…Historically speaking, this is kind of more of the same.”

The NRDC’s Jake Schmidt tells Carbon Brief that he doubts US absence will lead to less progress at UN climate negotiations. He adds: 

“[The] Trump team would have only messed things up, so not having them participate will probably actually lead to better outcomes.”

However, he acknowledges that “US non-participation over the long-term could be used by climate slow-walking countries as an excuse for inaction”.

Biniaz tells Carbon Brief that the absence of the US is unlikely to unlock reform of the UN climate process – and that it might make negotiations more difficult. She says:

“I don’t see the absence of the US as promoting reform of the COP process. While the US may have had strong views on certain topics, many other parties did as well, and there is unlikely to be agreement among them to move away from the consensus (or near consensus) decision-making process that currently prevails. In fact, the US has historically played quite a significant ‘broker’ role in the negotiations, which might actually make it more difficult for the remaining parties to reach agreement.”

After leaving the UNFCCC, the US would still be able to participate in UN climate talks as an observer, albeit with diminished influence. (It is worth noting that the US did not send a delegation to COP30 last year.)

There is still scope for the US to use its global power and influence to disrupt international climate processes from the outside.

For example, last year, the Trump administration threatened nations and negotiators with tariffs and withdrawn visa rights if they backed an International Maritime Organization (IMO) effort to cut shipping emissions. Ultimately, the measures were delayed due to a lack of consensus.

(Notably, the IMO is among the international bodies that the US has not pledged to leave.)

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What about the US withdrawal from the IPCC?

As a scientific body, rather than a treaty, there is no formal mechanism for “withdrawing” from the IPCC. In its own words, the IPCC is an “organisation of governments that are members of the UN or World Meteorological Organization” (WMO). 

Therefore, just being part of the UN or WMO means a country is eligible to participate in the IPCC. If a country no longer wishes to play a role in the IPCC, it can simply disengage from its activities – for example, by not attending plenary meetings, nominating authors or providing financial support.

This is exactly what the US government has been doing since last year. 

Shortly before the IPCC’s plenary meeting for member governments – known as a “session” – in Hangzhou, China, in March 2025, reports emerged that US officials had been denied permission to attend.

In addition, the contract for the technical support unit for Working Group III (WG3) was terminated by its provider, NASA, which also eliminated the role of chief scientist – the position held by WG3 co-chair Dr Kate Cavlin.

(Each of the IPCC’s three “working groups” has a technical support unit, or TSU, which provides scientific and operational support. These are typically “co-located” between the home countries of a working group’s two co-chairs.)

The Hangzhou session was the first time that the US had missed a plenary since the IPCC was founded in 1988. It then missed another in Lima, Peru, in October 2025.

Although the US government did not nominate any authors for the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle (AR7), US scientists were still put forward through other channels. Analysis by Carbon Brief shows that, across the three AR7 working group reports, 55 authors are affiliated with US institutions.

However, while IPCC authors are supported by their institutions – they are volunteers and so are not paid by the IPCC – their travel costs for meetings are typically covered by their country’s government. (For scientists from developing countries, there is financial support centrally from the IPCC.) 

Prof Chris Field, co-chair of Working Group II during the IPCC’s fifth assessment (AR5), tells Carbon Brief that a “number of philanthropies have stepped up to facilitate participation by US authors not supported by the US government”.

The US Academic Alliance for the IPCC – a collaboration of US universities and research institutions formed last year to fill the gap left by the government – has been raising funds to support travel.  

In a statement reacting to the US withdrawal, IPCC chair Prof Sir Jim Skea said that the panel’s focus remains on preparing the reports for AR7:

“The panel continues to make decisions by consensus among its member governments at its regular plenary sessions. Our attention remains firmly on the delivery of these reports.”

The various reports will be finalised, reviewed and approved in the coming years – a process that can continue without the US. As it stands, the US government will not have a say on the content and wording of these reports.

Field describes the US withdrawal as a “self-inflicted wound to US prestige and leadership” on climate change. He adds:

“I don’t have a crystal ball, but I hope that the US administration’s animosity toward climate change science will lead other countries to support the IPCC even more strongly. The IPCC is a global treasure.”

The University of Edinburgh’s Prof Gabi Hegerl, who has been involved in multiple IPCC reports, tells Carbon Brief:

“The contribution and influence of US scientists is presently reduced, but there are still a lot of enthusiastic scientists out there that contribute in any way they can even against difficult obstacles.”

On Twitter, Prof Jean-Pascal van Ypersele – IPCC vice-chair during AR5 – wrote that the US withdrawal was “deeply regrettable” and that to claim the IPCC’s work is contrary to US interests is “simply nonsensical”. He continued:

“Let us remember that the creation of the IPCC was facilitated in 1988 by an agreement between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who can hardly be described as ‘woke’. Climate and the environment are not a matter of ideology or political affiliation: they concern everyone.”

Van Ypersele added that while the IPCC will “continue its work in the service of all”, other countries “will have to compensate for the budgetary losses”.

The IPCC’s most recent budget figures show that the US did not make a contribution in 2025.

Carbon Brief analysis shows that the US has provided around 30% of all voluntary contributions in the IPCC’s history. Totalling approximately $67m (£50m), this is more than four times that of the next-largest direct contributor, the EU.

However, this is not the first time that the US has withdrawn funding from the IPCC. During Trump’s first term of office, his administration cut its contributions in 2017, with other countries stepping up their funding in response. The US subsequently resumed its contributions.

Chart showing the largest direct contributors to the IPCC since its inception in 1988, with the US (red bars), European Union (dark blue) and UNFCCC/WMO/UNEP (mid blue) highlighted. Grey bars show all other contributors combined. Figures for 2025 are January to June inclusive. Figures for 1988-2003 are reported per two years, so these totals have been divided equally between each year. Source: IPCC (2025) and (2010). Contributions have been adjusted, as per IPCC footnotes, so they appear in the year they are received, rather than pledged.

At its most recent meeting in Lima, Peru, in October 2025, the IPCC warned of an “accelerating decline” in the level of annual voluntary contributions from countries and other organisations, reported the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. As a result, the IPCC invited member countries to increase their donations “if possible”.

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What other organisations are affected?

In addition to announcing his plan to withdraw the US from the UNFCCC and the IPCC, Trump also called for the nation’s departure from 16 other organisations related to climate change, biodiversity and clean energy.

These include:

• The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) – the biodiversity equivalent of the IPCC.
• Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development – a voluntary group of more than 80 countries aiming to make the mining sector more sustainable.
• UN Energy – the principal UN organisation for international collaboration on energy.
• UN Oceans – a UN mechanism responsible for overseeing the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and other UN agencies related to ocean and coastal issues.
• UN Water – the UN agency responsible for water and sanitation.
• UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) – a UN collaborative initiative for creating financial incentives for protecting forests.
• International Renewable Energy Agency – an intergovernmental organisation supporting countries in their transition to renewable energy.
• 24/7 Carbon-Free Energy Compact – a UN initiative launched in 2021 pushing governments, companies and organisations to achieve 100% low-carbon electricity generation.
• Commission for Environmental Cooperation – an organisation aimed at conserving North America’s natural environment.
• Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research – an intergovernmental organisation supported by 19 countries in North and South America for the support of planetary change research.
• International Energy Forum – an intergovernmental platform for dialogue among countries, industry and experts.
• International Solar Alliance – an organisation supporting the development of solar power and the phaseout of fossil fuels.
• International Tropical Timber Organization – an organisation aimed at protecting tropical forest resources.
• International Union for Conservation of Nature – an international nature conservation organisation and authority on the state of biodiversity loss.
• Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century – a global policy forum for renewable energy leadership.
• Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme – a regional organisation aimed at protecting the Pacific’s environment.

As well as participating in the work of these organisations, the US is also a key source of funding for many of them – leaving their futures uncertain.

In a letter to members seen by Carbon Brief, IPBES chair and Kenyan ecologist, Dr David Obura, described Trump’s move as “deeply disappointing”.

He said that IPBES “has not yet received any formal notification” from the US, but “anticipates that the intention expressed to withdraw will mean that the US will soon cease to be a member of IPBES”, adding:

“The US is a founding member of IPBES and scientists, policymakers and stakeholders – including Indigenous peoples and local communities – from the US have been among the most engaged contributors to the work of IPBES since its establishment in 2012, making valuable contributions to objective science-based assessments of the state of the planet, for people and nature.

“The contribution of US experts ranges from leading landmark assessment reports, to presiding over negotiations, serving as authors and reviewers, as well as helping to steer the organisation both scientifically and administratively.” 

Despite being a party to IPBES until now, the US has never been a signatory to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the nature equivalent of the UNFCCC.

It is one of only two nations not to sign the convention, with the other being the Holy See, representing the Vatican City.

The lack of US representation at the CBD has not prevented countries from reaching agreements. In 2022, countries gathered under the CBD adopted the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, often described as the “Paris Agreement for nature”.

However, some observers have pointed to the lack of US involvement as one of the reasons why biodiversity loss has received less international attention than climate change.

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In non-data center news, offshore wind farms say they're losing millions a day and the government won't divulge the national security concerns behind a construction freeze.

Utah Governor Spencer Cox and U.S. Forest Service Chief Tom Schultz signed a 20-year agreement yesterday that gives Utah a greater role in management decisions on more than 8 million acres of national forest land. State officials say the deal will improve efficiency and collaboration, but conservation groups warn it could be bad for Utah’s national forests.

“This agreement strips federal protections, shuts the public out of decision-making, and puts Utah’s old-growth forests directly on the chopping block,” said Laiken Jordahl, national public lands advocate at the Center for Biological Diversity. Steve Bloch, legal director at the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, said the change “sets the stage for Utah officials to have both a heavy hand and the loudest voice” in the room, “crowding out all other stakeholders.”

Utah has had a Shared Stewardship Partnership with the Forest Service in place since 2019, but this deal goes further than previous agreements, giving the state and counties more say in planning and implementing watershed restoration and grazing and recreation projects, like trails and campgrounds. Utah is the third state to sign an updated stewardship agreement with the Forest Service this year, following Idaho and Montana.

Oil and gas auction gets zero bids in Colorado

Recent federal oil and gas lease auctions highlight sharply declining oil industry interest in public lands. In Colorado, the Bureau of Land Management received zero bids on 23 parcels totaling more than 20,000 acres in an auction held yesterday, even with new, lower leasing and drilling rates put in place last year by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.

In Wyoming, companies bid on less than 1 percent of the 26,000 acres offered in a December 30 BLM lease sale. These results suggest many public lands are viewed as uneconomic by the oil and gas industry, undercutting claims that drilling is being constrained by lack of access rather than market realities.

Quick hits Utah, feds ink new deal to manage 8 million acres of national forests

Salt Lake Tribune | Utah News Dispatch

Opinion: Risch must stand with Idahoans against BLM nominee Steve Pearce

Idaho Statesman

Nonpartisan PAC formed in Wyoming to counter efforts to sell off public lands

Buckrail | Powell Tribune

Wyoming’s Coursey leads National Wildlife Refuge System audit igniting sell-off worries

WyoFile

Feds backed Colorado’s plan to get Canadian wolves for years before abrupt shift

Colorado Sun

Congress once again tries to overturn Biden’s Minnesota mining ban

Politico

Panel of judges consider lifting injunction over controversial Oak Flat land swap

KJZZ

As Arizona groundwater disappears, an agricultural giant agrees to use less

Los Angeles Times

Quote of the day

The Shared Stewardship Agreement is nothing more than a sneaky way to clearcut roadless areas in national forests in Utah… Roadless areas provide clean drinking water and function as biological strongholds for populations of threatened and endangered species.”

—Mike Garrity, executive director of the Alliance for the Wild Rockies, Salt Lake Tribune

Picture This

@grandcanyonnps

“It is never the same, even from day to day, or even from hour to hour.” — Clarence Dutton, 1885

Get ready for winter at Grand Canyon National Park! With light snow yesterday afternoon and evening, the National Weather Service in Flagstaff anticipates additional snowfall today, with heavier snow possible along a cold front later this afternoon and evening. Grand Canyon Village could receive 2–3 inches of snow.

Visitors are encouraged to slow down on park roads, allow extra travel time, and use caution in winter driving conditions. If you plan to hike in the canyon or along the Rim Trail, shoe traction devices are strongly recommended to help prevent slips and falls on icy surfaces.

Follow Grand Canyon National Park’s weather forecast, road conditions and webcams here: http://go.nps.gov/06

Visitor stands on the Rim Trail near Hopi House on Jan. 8, 2026 (NPS Photo/J. Baird)

Feature image: Utah’s Wasatch-Cache National Forest; Source: CanyonChaser at the English-language Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0

The post Utah inks deal giving it more control over national forests appeared first on Center for Western Priorities.

Rio Tinto (ASX, LON: RIO) is said to be open to temporarily owning Glencore’s (LON: GLEN) coal business to clear a key hurdle in merger talks that could create the world’s largest mining company, with a market value of nearly $207 billion.

The shift, according to media reports including Bloomberg‘s, would mark a sharp reversal for Rio, which exited coal in 2018 under investor pressure. Retaining the assets could be key to removing one of the biggest obstacles to a deal with Glencore, one of the world’s largest coal producers, after doubling down on the fuel with its 2023 acquisition of Teck Resources’ coal business.

People familiar with the talks told Bloomberg News that one scenario under discussion involves Rio acquiring all of Glencore, including coal, with the option to divest the business later. No final decisions have been made.

Beyond coal, Rio is also keen to keep Glencore’s powerful trading division and expand it into a more formidable platform for selling commodities, according to sources cited by Reuters. The interest goes beyond copper, with Rio looking to draw on Glencore’s marketing and trading expertise as part of any transaction.

Goldman Sachs estimates Glencore’s marketing business could be worth about $4 billion by 2030. The unit generated $1.4 billion in adjusted earnings before interest and tax in the first half of last year, highlighting its contribution to Glencore’s valuation.

Rio Tinto and Glencore hold buyout talks to create $207 billion mega-miner

Rio and Glencore confirmed late Thursday they were in early-stage buyout talks that could value the combined group at nearly $207 billion. Rio, the larger company with an enterprise value of about A$200 billion ($134 billion), would likely be the acquirer under the structure currently envisaged, the people said. Negotiators are also weighing valuation, deal structure and who would run a combined company.

Under UK takeover rules, Rio has until Feb. 5 to make a formal offer for Glencore or walk away.

Analysts weigh in

The talks underscore a renewed wave of consolidation sweeping the mining industry as companies scramble to secure copper growth amid soaring prices and constrained supply. Last year, Anglo American (LON: AAL) and Canada’s Teck Resources (TSX: TECK.A TECK.B)(NYSE: TECK) agreed to merge, raising the pressure on rivals to scale up.

Market observers say a potential Rio-Glencore combination would also sharpen the spotlight on BHP, which made two failed bids for Anglo American in recent years and now risks being sidelined as competitors pursue a transformative deal. Glencore’s copper assets are widely viewed as attractive, while its coal business has long been seen as a stumbling block for potential buyers.

Courtesy of Benchmark’s Copper Service.

BMO analysts said the companies have limited overlap beyond a shared appetite for copper growth, with few obvious synergies outside marketing and corporate functions.

“If they were to merge as-is, it would create the largest listed mining company by a long way, but realistically we’d expect significant reshuffling of the portfolio, including spin or divestiture of coal,” analyst Alexander Pearce wrote. He added the talks could also lead to asset-level combinations focused on copper.

For Benchmark Minerals experts, the merger would be beneficial for both companies but wouldn’t necessarily alleviate supply concerns, as it would be consolidating production rather than creating new production. The consultancy says their combined 2026 output would be over 1.6 million tonnes of production, higher than any other company globally.

Courtesy of Benchmark’s Copper Service.

Richard Hatch, an analyst at Berenberg, said the rationale echoed recent successful mergers driven by access to copper. Rio needs more of the metal as investors increasingly view iron ore as facing long-term price pressure, he said, adding that buying producing assets is preferable to waiting years to build new mines.

George Cheveley, natural resources portfolio manager at Ninety One, and a Glencore shareholder, also pointed to copper as the key driver. He said Rio’s investor day last month “struggled to articulate copper growth beyond 2030,” while Glencore has a deeper project pipeline. One uncertainty, he added, is whether BHP might feel compelled to get involved.

A decade in the making

The renewed talks mark a striking change from 2014, when Rio swiftly rejected Glencore’s proposal for what would have been the largest mining deal on record, triggering a public feud that exposed deep cultural differences. Glencore’s then-chief Ivan Glasenberg accused Rio of misunderstanding iron ore markets, while Rio criticized Glencore’s traders as short-term focused.

Negotiations resumed quietly in the second half of 2024 but collapsed over valuation, according to people familiar with the matter. Since then, copper prices have surged and Glencore has repositioned itself as a company with significant copper growth potential, while Rio continues to derive most of its earnings from iron ore.

Rio Tinto and Glencore spoke for months about deal that was once taboo

Leadership dynamics have also shifted. Glencore previously pushed for chief executive Gary Nagle to lead a combined group. Rio has since replaced former CEO Jakob Stausholm with company veteran Simon Trott, who took over in August and is seen as more closely aligned with chair Dominic Barton, a change analysts say could smooth negotiations.

Rio’s openness to coal reflects a broader change in the political and business climate, including a backlash against green policies championed by US President Donald Trump. Even so, the move could deter some investors.

“It could be difficult for some shareholders, given how many have mandates against holding thermal coal,” said Iain Pyle, senior investment director at Aberdeen Group Plc, which holds about 0.5% of Rio but bars Glencore from its future minerals fund because of coal exposure. Access to Glencore’s copper growth assets, he added, remains the appeal.

Glencore has disappointed investors in recent years by missing production targets, particularly in copper, but sought to reset expectations at an investor day last month by outlining plans to nearly double copper output over the next decade. That coincided with a rally that pushed copper above $13,000 a tonne this week amid mine outages and US stockpiling ahead of possible tariffs.

1. Includes copper demand from construction, cooling, appliances, fossil power generation, machinery and internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. 2. Includes copper demand from clean energy technologies, transmission and distribution and EVs. (Courtesy of S&P’s Copper in the Age of AI.)

For Rio, which has limited near-term copper growth after completing a major expansion at its Mongolian mine, the rally adds time pressure as iron ore prices remain subdued by China’s prolonged property slump. Glencore’s coal unit remains a major profit contributor despite weaker prices over the past year.

After acquiring Teck’s coal assets, Glencore scrapped plans to spin them out following shareholder pushback, with Nagle saying the ESG pendulum had swung back in coal’s favour.

(With files from Bloomberg, Reuters)

“The Hub” is a weekly round-up of transportation related news in the Philadelphia area and beyond. Check back weekly to keep up-to-date on the issues Clean Air Council’s transportation staff finds important.

Happy 2026! Kick off the new year by following the Clean Air Council on Instagram, and check out our website.

Image Source: BillyPenn

BillyPenn: SEPTA expects Regional Rail crowding and delays to subside this month – After months of delays, crowded trains, and cancelled service, Regional Rail riders can expect relief, according to SEPTA. Inspections and repairs have been completed, and railcars are being put back into service. The current rate is about 8 repaired cars back into service every day. The increase in cars will cut down on the crowded conditions that commuters have been experiencing. SEPTA has also leased 10 coaches from Maryland’s transit system to fix the shortage during inspection and repairs. SEPTA is looking to purchase new railcars to upgrade and expand Regional Rail service, but the lack of funding in the State budget severely limits any improvements the agency can make.

Image Source: WHYY

WHYY: SEPTA says trolley wire replacements are done, estimates tunnel will reopen in ‘weeks’ – The trolley tunnel between Center City and West Philadelphia has been closed since November, and work is nearing completion, according to SEPTA last week. Wire replacements have been completed, but system testing is still ongoing, with estimates that the tunnel will reopen in mid-January. The longer repair times are due to the unique nature of the work. SEPTA spokesperson Andrew Busch noted that SEPTA is focused on returning service only when it’s tested and proven safe and reliable for public transit users.

Image Source: The Inquirer

NBC Philadelphia: SEPTA buses replace trains during construction along the Fox Chase Line – Starting Monday, January 5th, SEPTA riders on the Fox Chase Line will rely on bus service at the Fox Chase, Ryders, Cheltenham, Lawndale, and Olney stations. SEPTA crews will be installing new tracks on weekdays, from 9 a.m. until 2:30 p.m. Regional Rail service is expected to operate between Wayne Junction and Center City. Construction and bus service will be expected to continue through early April.

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Canada’s Lundin Mining (TSX: LUN) has applied for environmental approval in Chile for a $150 million project aimed at optimizing infrastructure and extending operating continuity at its Caserones copper-molybdenum mine to 2039.

The company submitted the project for review to Chile’s Environmental Evaluation Service on Jan. 6 through its local unit, SCM Minera Lumina Copper. Lundin said the plan focuses on operational improvements without changing approved production levels or fresh water consumption at the Atacama Region asset.

The decision comes as copper prices hit record highs, touching almost $14,000 a tonne in London earlier this week. The rally has fuelled a recent surge in sector mergers and acquisitions, as miners increasingly favour a “buy over build” strategy amid a looming supply deficit and the rising cost and complexity of developing new mines.

Caserones, located in the Tierra Amarilla commune, is expected to produce between 127,000 tonnes and 133,000 tonnes of copper this year, in line with the company’s guidance.

The proposal keeps the mine’s approved operating life and input and output volumes unchanged from the original 2010 permit. Planned works include new access roads, a fresh water reservoir, and two backup sulphuric acid storage tanks to secure supply, according to the environmental impact study. Lundin also plans to expand leaching capacity by 90 Mt and extend operations at the solvent extraction and electrowinning plant.

The project represents the next phase of the Caserones operational adjustment program, which received regulatory approval last year.

Top-ten ambitions

Lundin aims to rank among the world’s top ten copper producers, targeting annual output of 500,000 tonnes of copper and about 550,000 ounces of gold within three to five years.

The strategy centres on brownfield expansions at Candelaria and Caserones in Chile and Chapada in Brazil, along with new developments in the Vicuña district on the Chile–Argentina border, including the Josemaría and Filo del Sol projects.

AI to boost copper demand 50% by 2040 — S&P

Caserones is owned 70% by Lundin and 30% by Japan’s JX Advanced Metals. The mine processes about 84 Mt/a of ore, has milling capacity of 100,000 t/d, and can produce up to 35,000 t/a of copper cathodes. While the operation forms part of Lundin’s district-scale Vicuña approach, declining ore grades in Chile are expected to reduce output by 2027 to 105,000-115,000 tonnes

To support potential future expansion, Lundin has stepped up exploration around Caserones, completing 18 km of drilling in 2025.

On Saturday, hours after U.S. forces in Caracas killed at least 80 people and kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Donald Trump sounded less like a wartime commander than a developer surveying a newly acquired property. The country’s future, he told reporters at his Mar-a-Lago resort, belonged to “very large United States oil companies,” which would soon be pumping “a tremendous amount of wealth out of the ground.”

The land in question includes the largest proven oil reserves on Earth — at some 300 billion barrels, roughly 17 percent of global totals. But after years of political turmoil and U.S. sanctions, Venezuela accounts for barely 1 percent of global crude production. “It’s true that they know the oil is there,” said Samantha Gross, the director of the Energy Security and Climate Initiative at the Brookings Institution. “But the aboveground risks are huge.” 

Chevron is the only major U.S. firm still operating in Venezuela, after other oil giants pulled out in 2007 when former president Hugo Chávez nationalized the industry. By continuing to operate as a minority partner under the state oil company’s terms, Chevron preserved its infrastructure, personnel, and legal foothold — giving it geopolitical leverage in the ongoing tug-of-war between the United States, China, and the Maduro government. “We play a long game,” CEO Mike Wirth explained in November at a U.S.-Saudi investment summit in Washington. 

Today, Chevron is uniquely positioned in the aftermath of the invasion: Its leadership and board have long orbited Republican circles, with deep ties to the Trump administration and a history of big GOP donations. “Chevron’s in [Venezuela],” Trump said on Saturday, but “they’re only there because I wanted them to be there.” The company did not respond to requests for comment.

When Trump returned to office, his administration revoked Biden-era licenses that had allowed the oil major to operate in Venezuela despite the sanctions. Though told to stop producing by April, the company made no attempt to wrap up contracts, pull out personnel, or wind down supply chains. Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin American energy program at Rice University, said in March that it appeared “Chevron is very confident it can obtain an extension.” 

President Donald Trump monitors U.S. military operations in Venezuela from his Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida, on January 3.
Molly Riley / The White House via Getty Images

Behind the scenes, executives were busy meeting with Trump and top officials, spending almost $4 million on lobbying in the first half of the year to keep their Venezuelan foothold alive. In March, Wirth joined Trump in the Oval Office, hashing out how to tweak or extend Chevron’s license. The president finds Wirth’s TV appearances entertaining, regularly calling him after cable news appearances. The CEO followed that blitz up with private sit-downs with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and staffers from the National Security Council, making the case for his company’s continued presence in the country.

By July, the gamble had paid off. The administration issued a new license, letting Chevron resume operations in Venezuela. As it did so this fall, the company saw record-breaking production and earned $3.6 billion in its last reported quarter. Though Venezuela accounts for just 100,000 to 150,000 barrels daily — a sliver of Chevron’s production — that oil is heavy, the kind the company’s Gulf Coast refineries are designed to process. Having access to Venezuelan crude can help those facilities run more efficiently, increasing supplies and reducing costs. 

Just before Chevron celebrated its renewed lifeline, it scored another victory: After years of wrangling with the Federal Trade Commission, it finally acquired Hess Corporation, one of the biggest independent oil producers in the United States. Last year, the agency had banned CEO John Hess from joining Chevron’s board as part of its anti-trust review, alleging that he had colluded with OPEC representatives to fix oil prices. 

That victory, however, did not occur in a vacuum. The Hess family is a major donor to the Republican party and contributed more than $1 million to Trump’s first inauguration. (Chevron, for its part, donated $2 million to the president’s 2025 ceremony.) Hess — whom Trump has called “a friend of mine for a long time” — petitioned the FTC to revisit its decision. The agency later reversed course, unlocking the deal. On July 18, Chevron officially closed its $53 billion merger, and Hess took his seat on the board. 

President Donald Trump shakes hands with John Hess, CEO of Hess Corp., before signing a series of bills related to California’s vehicle emissions standards on June 12, 2025.
Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images

This bought Chevron’s entry into what many analysts call the decade’s most consequential oilfield, in Guyana, Venezuela’s neighbor. In 2015, Exxon Mobil announced a huge reserve off the tiny country’s shoreline. That discovery catapulted Guyana — a nation of fewer than 1 million people — into the petroleum spotlight. Hess’ 30 percent stake in the project was a key part of Chevron’s recent acquisition.

Thanks to Trump, one of the largest remaining political obstacles to the Guyana project was just removed. Maduro had challenged Guyana’s control over the offshore area. Venezuela has periodically claimed the territory since the 1960s under a long-running border dispute. As production in the region ramped up in 2019 and as Venezuela’s own industry faltered, Maduro escalated his attacks, sending naval ships into Guyanese waters and vowing Venezuela would take “all necessary actions” to stop its development — rhetoric remarkably similar to what Trump used to justify his own actions against Maduro this week. 

Read Next Trump invaded Venezuela to restore an oil industry he helped destroy Naveena Sadasivam

But though Trump claims he spoke with oil companies before and after the invasion, taking over the Venezuelan government may have been more than the industry bargained for. “There aren’t oil companies just running to get rid of tens of billions of dollars right now to rebuild the Venezuelan industry,” David Mares, the former Institute of the Americas Endowed ​Chair for Inter-American Affairs at the University of California San Diego, told Grist. “It’s not even clear there’s a legitimate government in place to make the contracts they sign for legal.” 

Then there’s the question of Venezuela’s tangled debt. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., the state oil company, has racked up more than $150 billion in liabilities over decades of defaults and expropriations. Creditors — from energy companies like ConocoPhillips to so-called “vulture funds” that bought defaulted contracts at deep discounts — have pursued arbitration against the country, and won court rulings for damages that remain unpaid. China has been the country’s largest foreign lender, loaning it more than $60 billion over the years. Only some of that has been repaid, mostly in the form of oil exports. As Mares notes, “As soon as Venezuelan oil starts to flow, some of those claimants can attach the proceeds, and they’re going to demand their money back.”

Experts warn that returning to even modest levels of production would require upgrading Venezuela’s aging infrastructure, a process that would require massive investment and political stability — conditions that have eluded Caracas for years and seem unlikely to materialize anytime soon. “There is no realistic prospect of immediately increasing Venezuela’s crude output,” Gus Vasquez, the head of oil pricing in the Americas for commodity markets analyst Argus Media, wrote in an emailed statement. “Venezuelan oil infrastructure would take years and possibly hundreds of billions to bring up to something close to its former capacity. Repairing refineries would be even harder.”

Chevron’s existing assets give the company a very different calculus than newcomers would face. But the timing could not be worse: Global crude oil prices have steadily declined over the last several years, recently dropping below $60 a barrel — approaching the break-even point for many American operators. That’s been driven by global supply surpluses and by weakening demand, as renewable energy prices drop. “I think what we’re seeing is that the days of the oil and gas industry being the growth engine of economies is well behind us,” said Trey Cowan, an oil and gas energy analyst at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. 

Read Next Trump says he’ll unleash Venezuela’s oil. But who wants it? Jake Bittle

Despite these structural shifts, Gross notes, “Trump has a very old-school way of thinking about resource economics,” as a blunt lever of power.  As companies like Chevron have found, aligning with his priorities can bring financial and regulatory advantages, even if they are not supported by broader market conditions. This week, the company’s stock jumped 6 percent.

On TruthSocial on Tuesday, Trump announced that Caracas would be “turning over” between 30 and 50 million barrels of “sanctioned oil” that will then be sold. “[T]hat money will be controlled by me,” he wrote. Trump hopes to lower oil prices to $50 a barrel, which would squeeze shale producers and destabilize the U.S. oil industry. On Wednesday, the Department of Energy issued a brief announcement elaborating, as Chevron entered talks with the administration to increase its operations and resell oil to other refiners. The statement declares the U.S. will sell the sovereign nation’s crude on the global marketplace and describes the proceeds as going to “U.S.-controlled accounts at globally recognized banks,” an unusual setup that bypasses the U.S. Treasury. The money is vaguely promised to serve both Americans and Venezuelans, and the arrangement will be indefinite. “You’re going to see, probably, a growth in Chevron activities there quickly,” Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said on Thursday.

Senate Democrats have launched an investigation into the Trump administration’s communications with oil companies, which they claim occurred 10 days before the invasion, while Congress was not briefed. “The suggestion that taxpayers could pay the cost of rebuilding Venezuela’s oil infrastructure raise serious concerns about how the Trump administration engaged with the oil companies prior to his decision to use military force,” they wrote. Gross says to the extent Trump can be described as a populist, it is largely a performance — one “he might play on TV” — but she added that typically, “When you see populist governments take over oil industries, it doesn’t usually turn out well.” 

In all the turmoil, what no one appears to be asking is what is good for Venezuela. “The saddest part of this is that unwinding the Maduro regime does not seem to be a part of what Trump policy is aiming for,” said Cynthia Arson, former director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center’s Latin American Program. In its statements after the strike, the White House has largely overlooked questions about a democratic transition, sidelining concerns about human rights abuses and the treatment of political prisoners. 

Even when oil starts flowing, a new Venezuelan government will likely struggle to meet public expectations while attracting foreign investment. Before Chávez, the country’s oil contracts typically gave the government around 50 percent of revenue, helping fund social programs and the middle class. U.S. oil majors, by contrast, often offer royalties around 12 percent. 

The contrast highlights just how fragile and uncertain the path ahead is: Years of economic collapse, which have driven millions abroad, have left those remaining struggling with profound political and social upheaval that can’t be solved by oil alone. “If good things happen, they’re going to take time,” Gross said. “Bad things could actually happen pretty quickly.”

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline How Chevron played the long game in Venezuela on Jan 9, 2026.

On Thursday, Republicans in the House failed to override President Donald Trump’s first two vetoes in office: a pipeline project that would bring safe drinking water to rural Colorado, and another that would return land to the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians in Florida. Their inability to block the president’s move signals their commitment to the White House over their prior support for the measures. 

The Miccosukee have always considered the Florida Everglades their home. So when Republicans in Congress voted to expand the tribe’s land base under the Miccosukee Reserved Area Act — legislation that would transfer 30 acres of land in the Everglades to tribal control — the Miccosukee were thrilled. After years of work, the move would have allowed the tribe to begin environmental restoration activities in the area and better protect it from climate change impacts as extreme flooding and tropical storms threaten the land.

“The measure reflected years of bipartisan work and was intended to clarify land status and support basic protections for tribal members who have lived in this area for generations,” wrote Chairman Cypress in a statement last week, “before the roads and canals were built, and before Everglades National Park was created.”

A portion of the Miccosukee Indian Reservation in Florida’s Everglades in 2024.
Rebecca Blackwell / AP Photo

The act was passed on December 11, but on December 30, President Donald Trump vetoed it; one of only two vetoes made by the administration since he took office. In a statement, Trump explained that the tribe “actively sought to obstruct reasonable immigration policies that the American people decisively voted for when I was elected,” after the tribe’s July lawsuit challenging the construction of “Alligator Alcatraz,” an immigration detention center in the Everglades. 

“It is rare for an administration to veto a bill for reasons wholly unrelated to the merits of the bill,” said Kevin Washburn, a law professor at University of California Berkeley Law and former assistant secretary of Indian affairs for the Department of the Interior. Washburn added that while denying land return to a tribe is a political act, Trump’s move is “highly unusual.”

When a tribe regains land, the process can be long and costly. The process, known as “land into trust” transfers a land title from a tribe to the United States, where the land is then held for the benefit of the tribe and establishes tribal jurisdiction over the land in question. When tribal nations signed treaties in the 19th century ceding land, any lands reserved for tribes — generally, reservations — were held by the federal government “in trust” for the benefit of tribes, meaning that tribal nations don’t own these lands despite their sovereign status. 

Almost all land-into-trust requests are facilitated at an administrative level by the Department of Interior. The Miccosukee, however, generally must follow a different process. Recognized as a tribal nation by the federal government in 1962, the Miccosukee navigate a unique structure for acquiring tribal land where these requests are made through Congress via legislation instead of by the Interior Department.

“It’s ironic, right?” said Matthew Fletcher, a law professor at the University of Michigan. “You’re acquiring land that your colonizer probably took from you a long time ago and then gave it away to or sold it to someone else, and then years later, you’re buying that land back that was taken from you illegally, at a great expense.”

While land-into-trust applications related to tribal gaming operations often meet opposition, Fletcher says applications like the Miccosukee’s are usually frictionless. And in cases like the Miccosukee Reserved Area Act, which received bipartisan support at the state and federal levels, in-trust applications are all but guaranteed.

On the House floor on Thursday before the vote, Florida’s Democratic Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz said, “This bill is so narrowly focused that [the veto] makes absolutely no sense other than the interest in vengeance that seems to have emanated in this result.” The bill’s sponsor, Republican Representative Carlos Gimenez of Florida, did not respond to requests for comment. In July last year, Gimenez referred to the Miccosukee Tribe as stewards of the Everglades, sponsoring the bill as a way to manage water flow and advance an elevation project, under protection from the Department of the Interior, for the village to avert “catastrophic flooding.”

“What you’re asking is for people in the same political party of the guy who just vetoed this thing to affirmatively reject the political decision of the president,” Fletcher said.

The tribe is unlikely to see its village project materialize under Trump’s second term unless the outcome of this year’s midterms results in a Democratic-controlled House and Senate. Studies show that the return of land to tribes provides the best outcomes for the climate.

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline The Miccosukee Tribe blocked Alligator Alcatraz. Then Trump blocked a bill to return their land. on Jan 9, 2026.