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How much does it matter where you are born, or whether you are heavy or light, if you are a house sparrow?

Businesses along the Norwegian coastline are becoming increasingly vulnerable to storm surges and flooding. 

The University of Plymouth has forged a new partnership with the Nippon Foundation-GEBCO Seabed 2030 Project.

Intrepid Potash (NYSE: IPI), Aquatech International and Adionics SAS reported Tuesday the successful completion of test work to produce battery-grade lithium carbonate from byproduct brine at Intrepid’s potash facility in Wendover, Utah.

Intrepid is a supplier of high-quality potassium, magnesium, sulfur, salt and water products used in agriculture, animal feed, and the oil and gas industry. The Denver, Colorado-based company is the only US producer of muriate of potash, which is used in several industrial applications and as an ingredient in animal feed. It has two production facilities in Utah (Wendover and Moab) and one in Carlsbad, New Mexico.

Intrepid said the potential to develop a lithium processing facility in Wendover has continued to progress as Adionics and Aquatech successfully produced battery-grade lithium carbonate in a demonstration test of Intrepid’s Wendover brine.

The testing results achieved a lithium extraction rate of 92.9%, producing an overall lithium chloride purity above 99.5%, the company said. The lithium that was produced from Adionics’ facility was further processed by Aquatech to validate the conversion and refining to battery-grade lithium carbonate.

In additional testing, Aquatech said it successfully converted the lithium-rich brine to a more than 99.5%-pure lithium carbonate product, meeting key specifications for battery manufacturing. With the successful testing results, the parties will continue to move forward under the current joint development agreement with their evaluation of a lithium facility in Wendover, it added.

“We are very excited to partner with Aquatech and Adionics to continue the development of our lithium resource at Wendover,” Intrepid CEO Kevin Crutchfield said in a news release. “Advancements in direct lithium extraction (DLE) technologies have come at the perfect time, as the United States has reprioritized increasing its production of critical minerals.”

Crutchfield added that the company believes the existing infrastructure at its Wendover potash operation and the presence of lithium in its post-process brine differentiates this opportunity from other lithium development projects.

“We’re hopeful our Wendover lithium project will be among the first domestic projects to enter the market,” Crutchfield said.

“For this project, we still plan to limit our capital exposure and risk, and will continue to maintain our focus on our core fertilizer operations, but successfully monetizing lithium from our byproduct magnesium chloride brine will constitute an important step forward in driving margin improvement at Wendover.”

By market close, Intrepid Potash’s stock was up 2.85% in New York. The company has a $382 million market capitalization.

Roughly a fifth of solar panels have been found to degrade much more quickly than expected, leading to calls for different testing standards to identify faults.

The post Tiny cracks and hot weather can slash useful life of some solar panels to just 11 years, UNSW research finds appeared first on Renew Economy.

Clean Air Council is thrilled to announce we have been awarded the William Penn Foundations’ Investment in Public Parks Grant. This funding will allow the Council and community partners to expand the existing play and learning spaces at safe crossing entrances to Cobbs Creek Park. This project will transform park entrances to include mural art on the paved trail and areas for children and families to learn and play together. 

The Council has once again teamed up with Amber Art and Design and Tiny WPA to develop, design, and build art and play spaces in the vision of community members. Throughout the next several months we will be gaining inspiration and ideas from residents in order to guide the new play space designs.  There are multiple opportunities for residents to inform the design and locations of the new little nature playgrounds including at in-person community design workshops, see details below. 

1) January 27th 4-6:30pm at Cobbs Creek Community Environmental Center (700 Cobbs Creek Parkway) 

2) February 24th 4-6pm at Paschalville Library (6942 Woodland Ave)

3) March 10th 5-7pm at Cobbs Creek Library (5800 Cobbs Creek Pkwy)

4) April 25th join us at Celebrate Trails Day for a final community feedback opportunity! (Thomas Ave and Cobbs Creek Parkway)

The project team has created a short survey as a starting place to learn more about what neighbors would like to see included in the design. We invite area neighbors and Cobbs Creek Park users to complete the survey and attend any and all of the workshops which will include an evening of creativity, story sharing, and imagination as we collectively envision and design mural art on trails and play areas for children and families.

Lithium Argentina (TSX, NYSE: LAR), the country’s largest producer of the battery metal, achieved its Cauchari-Olaroz brine output target as it advanced second-stage permitting and squeezed costs.

The Switzerland-based company said Tuesday the operation, which started commercial output in 2024, produced about 34,100 tonnes of lithium carbonate last year, within its forecast range of 30,000 to 35,000 tonnes. Production in the three months ended Dec. 31 reached about 9,700 tonnes and averaged 97% of nameplate capacity.

“Cauchari-Olaroz has continued to ramp up production and lower operating costs,” Canaccord Genuity Capital Markets analyst Katie Lachapelle said in a note to investors. “The company continues to be a top idea for exposure to lithium producers.”

Argentina’s portion of the so-called lithium triangle – the high-altitude Andean salt-flat (salar) belt where lithium-rich brines are concentrated spanning northern Chile, southwestern Bolivia and northwestern Argentina – is busy as developers try to lower costs and prove new processing methods. Rio Tinto (NYSE, LSE, ASX: RIO) is expanding its Rincon project in Salta, while France’s Eramet has started ramping up its Centenario direct-lithium-extraction plant.

South Korean industrial giant Posco has also commissioned Argentina’s first commercial lithium hydroxide plant in Salta and China’s Ganfeng has started production at its Mariana project, in the same province.

Shares gain

Lithium Argentina shares reached a new 12-month high Tuesday afternoon in Toronto at C$9.55, up C$1.18, valuing the company at about C$1.6 billion ($1.16 billion). Canaccord Genuity kept a buy rating and a C$10.50 target price on the stock.

The $1 billion first stage Cauchari-Olaroz is run as a joint venture between China’s Ganfeng Lithium with 47% and Lithium Argentina at 45%. Jujuy’s state mining company JEMSE holding 8.5%.

Fourth-quarter cash operating costs were expected to come in below $6,000 per tonne of lithium carbonate sold, down from $6,285 per tonne in the third quarter.

Lithium Argentina said it expected the operation to reduce net debt by $26 million in the fourth quarter after distributing $15 million to each partner, and it finished the year with more than $150 million in liquidity from cash and undrawn debt facilities.

“Strong production through the fourth quarter, together with continued cost reductions, highlights the increasing operational maturity of the business,” CEO Sam Pigott said in a Tuesday press release.

Permit applications

Lithium Argentina said the joint venture submitted applications last month for an environmental permit and for financing under Argentina’s large-investment incentive regime known as RIGI, brought in by President Javier Milei. The company plans to expand lithium carbonate capacity by 45,000 tonnes per year.

Lithium Argentina’s Cauchari-Olaroz aims to triple production by 2029

It is also preparing a RIGI application for the Pozuelos-Pastos Grandes (PPG) project in Salta province, which it expects to submit in this quarter. In a November scoping study, Lithium Argentina outlined a staged build at PPG, starting with a 50,000-tonne-per-year first phase and an initial capital bill of about $1.1 billion. The partners are studying newer processing routes, such as direct lithium extraction, to lift recoveries and lower water use.

The next leg of growth still hinges on permits, financing and lithium prices. Canaccord flagged the usual risks for Argentina-based developers, including jurisdictional uncertainty, funding needs for expansions and the chance that operating hiccups or higher costs could erode cash flow.

Lithium Argentina’s also announced leadership changes as it shifts from ramp-up to expansion planning. Alec Meikle was promoted to president, with responsibility for running the company’s strategy and leading corporate development and capital-markets work. John Kanellitsas moved from executive chairman to chairman of the board.

From Chile to Venezuela, battles over who controls strategic resources have repeatedly shaped regime change, foreign intervention and political fallout across the Americas.

When Chilean socialist President Salvador Allende nationalized the copper industry in 1971, he moved to bring foreign-owned copper mines —primarily controlled by US corporations such as Anaconda and Kennecott— under state control through the creation of Codelco (Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile/ National Copper Corporation of Chile).

With this, Allende directly challenged corporate and US strategic interests tied to the country’s most valuable export. Washington responded with economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and covert destabilization by the CIA. Two years later, a US-backed military coup overthrew Allende, who died during the assault on the presidential palace, cementing his legacy as a cautionary example of the risks faced by leaders who seek to reclaim control over resource wealth.

Venezuela followed a similar trajectory, with resource nationalism reshaping its economy and foreign relations and culminating most recently in the capture and extradition of President Nicolás Maduro to New York to face criminal charges, another instance of a leader removed after defying foreign control over critical assets.

Venezuela shock lifts gold, but mining revival remains elusive

The roots of that confrontation stretch back decades. In the mid-2000s, then-president Hugo Chávez accelerated the nationalization of the oil sector, imposing tougher contract terms on foreign producers. Exxon Mobil and other major companies left the country. Chávez framed the move as a defence of economic sovereignty, but it carried lasting geopolitical consequences.

After his death, Maduro’s government struggled to offset collapsing oil output. In 2019, Maduro and Delcy Rodríguez, then vice president and now acting president, announced a five-year mining plan to expand mineral extraction as an alternative source of revenue.

Venezuela also moved last year to revive its coal industry, aiming to export more than 10 million tonnes in 2025, though it remains unclear whether that target was reached. The US Geological Survey estimated coal production at about 100,000 metric tons in 2019 from reserves totalling 731 million metric tons. Output of other minerals, including nickel, bauxite, iron ore and gold, has declined sharply over the past decade, mirroring the broader deterioration of the oil sector.

Absolute gain

On Saturday, the US launched “Operation Absolute Resolve”, a large-scale strike against Venezuela that resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, with US authorities accusing them of leading a narco-terrorism conspiracy. 

The operation marked the largest US military intervention in Latin America since the 1989 invasion of Panama and its most direct bid for regime change since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The Trump administration said Maduro would face corruption charges linked to major drug flows into the US. The strike followed months of escalating pressure, including the interception of oil tankers off Venezuela’s coast and actions against vessels Washington said were involved in narcotics trafficking. Trump openly linked the intervention to Venezuela’s energy wealth, saying the US would oversee a transition and suggesting US oil companies could return within about 18 months to rebuild production after years of collapse.

Few international observers expressed sympathy for Maduro or his inner circle. His government has been widely described as undemocratic and repressive, and as a source of regional instability. A recent United Nations report documented more than a decade of killings, torture, sexual violence and arbitrary detention by state-linked forces against political opponents. Maduro is also accused of stealing Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election and of fuelling economic and political disruption across the region by presiding over the exodus of nearly eight million migrants.

Broken system

Venezuela’s economic breakdown had already accelerated after oil prices fell below $30 a barrel in 2016, pushing the country into a deep political and financial crisis, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Chronic power failures further crippled oil and mining operations, eroding the state’s ability to monetize its resources.

While oil dominates headlines, analysts say Venezuela’s longer-term relevance to the US may lie in minerals critical to modern industry and defence. Chilean mining consultancy GEM says the country’s geology, particularly the Guiana Shield, is highly prospective for iron ore, bauxite, gold, nickel and other minerals aligned with US critical-mineral priorities.

Production data show how far the sector has fallen. Official gold output dropped from 5.95 tonnes in 1999 to about 30 kg in 2023, a decline of roughly 19% a year. Iron ore production fell from 14.1 million tonnes to about 2.5 million tonnes, while bauxite slid from more than 4 million tonnes to roughly 250,000 tonnes. According to GEM, the losses reflect failing power supply, infrastructure decay, security risks and regulatory instability, not depleted resources.

Gold Reserve aims to retake Venezuela assets after Maduro’s fall

Juan Ignacio Guzmán, GEM’s CEO, said the opportunity lies in rehabilitation rather than new mine development. Restarting idle mines and processing plants could take one to three years if governance and market access are restored, while formalizing informal gold and coltan production would require a longer horizon. Any reintegration into global supply chains, he said, depends on sanctions clarity, restored rule of law and credible environmental and social safeguards.

The comparison with Chile remains instructive. Chile’s copper nationalization ultimately stabilized a core industry under stronger institutions. Venezuela’s experience, capped by direct US intervention, shows how resource wealth can instead become a lever for external power when infrastructure and governance collapse.

Across decades and ideologies, the pattern has been consistent. In the Americas, asserting control over strategic resources has carried heavy consequences, while the ability to seize them has rested with those willing and able to intervene.

EWG testimony before the Indiana House Committee on Education on HB 1137, to ban 13 harmful food chemicals from being served at schools Iris Myers January 6, 2026

Good morning. 

My name is Scott Faber and I am testifying this morning on behalf of the Environmental Working Group. I am also an adjunct professor of food law at Georgetown University Law Center. Before joining EWG, I was the vice president for government affairs for the Consumer Brands Association, the food industry’s trade association. 

I’d like to make five points. 

One, the overwhelming evidence shows that synthetic dyes make it harder for some of our children to learn.

A recent systematic study looked at human evidence of what happens when children ingest dyes and animal studies of what happens to their brains. Scientists  concluded that some children’s behavior suffers, and that dyes change the structure of their brains and how their brains transmit signals. 

Two, the FDA has not thoroughly reviewed the safety of synthetic dyes since the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, long before toxicological studies could detect their effects on behavior and our kids’ brains. Meetings held in 2011 by the Food and Drug Administration’s Food Advisory Council and in 2019 by the FDA’ Science Board, were meetings of professionals, not thorough reviews that agencies conduct when deciding on the safety of chemicals like synthetic dyes.

Three, banning synthetic colors, titanium dioxide and the other chemicals addressed by HB 1137 will have no impact on our school food professionals. In 2024, EWG analysts found that only 3% of the foods sold “on the tray,” only 2% of foods sold a la carte, and none of the USDA Commodity Foods for the coming school year contain synthetic colors. 

Food companies can and do reformulate – quickly. When other countries required food companies to put a warning on foods containing dyes, companies quickly replaced synthetic colors with natural colors.

Four, three of the other chemicals removed from school foods by HB 1137 have been banned elsewhere. Other nations have already banned potassium bromate and azodicarbonamide, which are linked to cancer; propyl paraben, which harms our reproductive and hormone systems; and titanium dioxide, which damages our DNA. TBHQ and BHT also harm our hormone systems, but TBHQ has not been reviewed by the FDA since 1977, and BHT has never been reviewed by the FDA but was instead deemed safe by food chemical companies decades ago.

Five, the FDA has no plan to reconsider the safety of these chemicals any time soon and is not required to do so. The FDA does not have a comprehensive food chemical safety system. In fact, 99% of new food chemicals are reviewed by the chemical companies, not by the FDA. While we are hopeful that change is coming to the FDA, it’s not coming any time soon.

Let’s do what the scientists say is best for our children and for parents and teachers,and end the use of these toxic chemicals in food offered at school. 

Areas of Focus Food Ultra-Processed Foods Food Chemicals Authors Scott Faber January 7, 2026

Nova Minerals (NASDAQ, ASX: NVA) has downplayed recent reports of the company buying antimony produced in Pakistan for testing and processing at its Alaska-based facilities.

According to a Dec. 29 report by the Financial Times, the dual-listed miner is said to have partnered with a Pakistani company for the exploration of antimony as part of strengthened economic ties between the US and the Asian nation. Under the partnership, Nova would buy over 100 tonnes of Pakistani antimony concentrates for about $2 million early in 2026, FT reported, citing company CEO Christopher Gerteisen.

However, Nova issued a statement on Jan. 5 saying that only “preliminary discussions” took place about sourcing antimony from Pakistan, and the talks remain “exploratory” in nature.

Despite this clarification, shares in Nova Minerals surged by more than 6% on Tuesday, sending its market capitalization to nearly $396 million in New York.

Focus on Alaska

For this year, Nova said its focus is to complete a feasibility study for its gold assets in Alaska. Its flagship Estelle project comprises over 500 km2 in state mining claims in the Tintina Gold Belt, a region known to hold over 220 million oz. of primarily bulk-tonnage gold deposits.

To date, the company has identified as many as 20 prospects on the property, including four large, near-surface, intrusion-related gold deposits across a 35-km long corridor. Together, they hold a total gold resource of nearly 10 million oz., making it one of the largest undeveloped gold projects in the world.

In addition to gold, many prospects hold traces of antimony, a widely recognized critical mineral due to its importance to the defense sector. Historically, the Tintina region had been a major source of North American supply. Government data shows that antimony ores from at least 25 deposits in the state were shipped to markets between 1905 and 1986, and the mineral is found to be associated with some of Alaska’s major gold deposits.

With respect to this critical mineral, Nova said it will continue its work on starting the production of military-grade antimony trisulfide. Since 2016, the US has not produced any antimony commercially and has been relying on foreign imports.

In support of the company’s antimony plans, which revolve around a proposed mining and refining hub based in Alaska, the US Department of War last year provided $43.4 million in funding under the Defense Production Act.

Militarisation is Extraction: From Mines to Missiles YLNM Position Paper, 2025

 

CONTENTS

1. Introduction

2. Militarisation at the Frontlines of Mining Resistance

– Congo and Tigray: Mining War Profiteers

Mexico: Extractivism Enforced Through Systemic and Organised Violence

3. Minerals for Militarisation: How Resource Wars are built

– Gaza and the Mulitiplication of Ecological and Social Destruction

– From “Green Metals” to “Critical Minerals”: The Deep Sea Mining Industry’s Makeover

Key Players and the Narrative of Scarcity and Geopolitical Survival

Sub-Imperial Powers: Australia & Canada

– Lynas Rare Earths: Militarised Extractivism in Action

4. Intersections of Community Resistance and Global Profiteering of War

– West Papua and Myanmar: Self-Determination and Mining Resistance

– Guatemala: Militarisation and the Escobal Silver Mine on Xinka Territory

– North of Ireland: the Sperrins

– Ecuador: Rights of Nature versus Extractivism and Neoliberalism

5. Demilitarised and Non-Extractive Futures

6. Calls to Action & Solidarity Demands 

1. Introduction

Yes to Life No to Mining is a global solidarity network rooted in the lived realities and resistance of Indigenous Peoples and frontline communities confronting the violence of extractivism. We are united by a shared belief: that saying No to Mining is not a rejection of development, but a collective act of protection of land, water, culture, sovereignty, and life itself. Our principles are grounded in justice, dignity, and care for the Earth. We expose the systemic violence of extractivism, a model that treats land as a resource, people as obstacles, and profit as the highest law.

Militarisation and extractivism have always been entangled. From colonial invasions to modern-day globalised mining concessions, armed force has been used to occupy land, displace peoples, suppress resistance, and secure access to minerals and metals. The capacity for organising colonial plunder has only increased as developing technologies have been harnessed for this end.  Today, transition and so-called “critical minerals” such as cobalt, lithium, tungsten, nickel, rare earths and many more, are not only mined to feed consumer markets, but also to build ever more powerful and sophisticated weapons of war, surveillance technologies, and militarised borders. In this way, the mining industry is not separate from the military-industrial complex; in fact, it is foundational to it.

Military-industrial complex

Military-industrial complex is a term used to refer to the relationships between national and international military and political institutions and specifically describes a relationship in which political institutions profit from war and therefore benefit from ongoing militarised violence. This can occur when there is a revolving door between politics and the so-called defense industry or when politicians are beholden to weapons manufacturers to get elected.

Extractivism today increasingly relies on military, paramilitary, and militarised policing forces and, in some cases, organized crime to facilitate, protect, and expand access to resources. Increasingly at mine sites, armed forces are deployed to suppress community resistance, protect corporate operations, and impose extractive projects without consent. Along supply chains, entire territories are being militarised to secure access to minerals deemed vital for national security and strategic control of markets and supply sources.

At the geopolitical level, powerful states finance and use the threat or application of military force to secure access to the metals and minerals essential to weapons manufacturing, surveillance systems, and high-tech warfare. Additionally these mining operations pollute and leave lasting toxic and radioactive legacies in countries with limited capability to manage them safely, resulting in slow violence through increasing health and ecological hazards for local communities. This systemic violence is not new, it is a continuation of colonial extraction.

“From the mines that feed militaries, to the militaries that guard the mines.”

As states and corporations escalate the scramble for “critical minerals,” often under the banner of national security, energy transition, or development in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), the logic of militarised extraction deepens. It is Indigenous peoples and frontier communities, particularly from the global majority (south), who bear the brunt of this violence: through land dispossession, criminalisation, targeted violence, territories under military occupation or control of paramilitary or organized crime groups, environmental destruction, toxic legacy and war.

This position paper exposes the interlocking nature of militarisation and extractivism, from the mines that feed militaries, to the militaries that guard the mines. Yet, as this system expands, it is often met with fierce resistance. This paper centres the voices and struggles of Earth defenders, and calls for a bold and necessary shift: away from a world built on extraction and domination, toward one rooted in justice, solidarity, and life-sustaining alternatives.

2. Militarisation At The Frontlines Of Mining Resistance

Militarisation at mine sites sees armed forces, militarised police, private security and even organized crime used to suppress resistance and protect corporate interests, especially in Indigenous and rural territories. It enables extractive violence by criminalising, murdering and disappearing Earth Defenders, or using fear and terror to control territories, fostering impunity for human rights abuses, and turning conflict zones into sacrifice zones for mining expansion.

Militarisation in mining is a force overwhelmingly suffered by frontline communities of Indigenous Peoples, the rural poor, and defenders of land and water. As mining corporations scramble for ever-greater extraction-based profits, their gaze turns to communities whose ancestral lands sit atop lucrative deposits of nickel, copper, cobalt, lithium, and other ‘transition minerals’. These communities are not only dispossessed of land, but also subjected to persistent surveillance, threats, and state-sanctioned violence.

A 2023 Global Witness analysis recorded at least 334 violent incidents and protest events—an average of 111 per year—linked to the extraction of transition minerals across the world’s top 19 producing countries, nearly 90% of which occurred in poorer, emerging economies (1). In the Philippines, Global Witness and Kalikasan PNE documented that since the 1990s, Indigenous Filipinos have lost an amount of land equivalent to the size of Timor-Leste to mining, while suffering disproportionate rates of reprisals and violence. The Philippine military was identified as the top perpetrator of killings of Indigenous defenders between 2012 and 2023 (2).

These figures echo across continents. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the southern region of Kolwezi – centre of the cobalt industry – has over decades seen human rights abuses, violence and militarisation, including entire communities evicted by soldiers and police for land grabs by mining companies (3). Zambia is seeing one of the African continent’s most rapid expansions of critical minerals mining, with corruption, environmental contamination and social resistance increasing apace, alongside a surge of unregulated mining and associated armed conflicts (4).

In  Indonesia (5), dozens of people have faced criminal prosecution or violence for resisting nickel mining backed by laws designed to favor corporate and state elites. Much of Latin America, from Mexico (6) to Argentina (7), have similarly faced repression, including sometimes deadly crackdowns, as they mobilise for their rights to water and health in the shadow of transnational mining giants. In Argentina’s Jujuy province in June 2023, massive grassroots demonstrations against lithium mining were violently suppressed by police, with 170 injured and 99 arbitrary arrests reported by Amnesty International (8).

Congo and Tigray: Mining War Profiteers

Militarized conflicts in the DRC and Tigray have received little international attention. These situations, while different in many ways, are examples of the mining industry benefitting from and in some cases participating in war and human rights abuses; including demonstrating a pattern of obtaining mining licenses through militarized violence.

The DRC has experienced ongoing theft from colonial powers, and since it gained independence has had multiple major civil wars. It is abundant in minerals, and even at the heights of conflict international mining companies have been active in extracting these minerals. The wealth from this extraction has not stayed in the DRC and has instead continued to enrich colonial and imperial powers. These companies have not only operated in a context where consent is impossible due to destabilization, but have actively participated in massacres and other violations of human rights. Anvil, a Canadian-Australian mining company, provided logistical support in a massacre of 70 people in 2004 (9). More recently Ivanhoe, a Canadian firm, has been accused of violating human rights through forced displacements (10). 

In Tigray, despite accusations of genocide and forced starvation, mining companies have been actively exploring for minerals (11). From 2020-2022 Tigray, a region of Ethiopia, experienced one of the most deadly conflicts of the 21st century between itself and Ethiopia, backed by Eritrean troops. As this deadly and unevenly matched war went on, Canadian companies such as SunPeak Metals (whose CEO was accused of using forced labour in Eritrea (12)) explored for gold with the full support of the Canadian government entity Canadian Executive Service Organization (CESO) (13).

These cases need international solidarity and have not been receiving enough attention outside of Afro-descendant diasporas. 

Yet while militarised mining devastates communities and ecosystems, its impacts reach far beyond the immediate violence and dispossession. The entire structure of mining-for-militarization stands in sharp contradiction to “green” and climate-washing narratives pushed by governments and corporations. 

Recent analyses reveal that the US military alone is the world’s single largest institutional emitter of greenhouse gases, responsible for up to 636 million metric tons of CO₂ equivalent since 2010 (14); globally, military activities are estimated to contribute 5.5% of total emissions, with military industries being almost twice as carbon-intensive as civilian sectors (15). Despite this, the UNFCC does not require states to report on military emissions (16), an omission that leaves a deliberate blindspot in global climate governance.  

In the end, mining operations often go hand in hand with militarization and bring layered devastation to affected communities and territories. Extraction begins with the exploitation and destruction of land, water, and biodiversity that tear apart traditional commons and undermine food sovereignty and cultural survival. This violence is then compounded by the presence of armed forces and militarised security, who suppress resistance and impose social control through fear, surveillance, and open aggression. 

This cycle also accelerates climate disaster, as pollution from mining sites merges with the massive, unregulated carbon emissions generated by militaries, especially those driving wars for resource control. Communities, therefore, face not only dispossession and repression but the mounting impacts of climate change, with both extractive industry and military infrastructure acting as engines of destruction.

Mexico: Extractivism enforced through systemic and organised violence

In Mexico, systemic violence linked to organized crime networks has been expanding across the country. Such violence foments extractivism, facilitating the opening up of sacrifice zones for mining (17), the continued operation of mines and impunity for related harms (18), and ever greater risk for individual defenders and whole communities to defend water, land, and territory (19). 

Systemic violence is understood as a range of acts, often associated with organized crime, that have the aim of striking fear in the population to exercise social and territorial control in the interest of diverse business interests. In this context, the violence is systemic because none of this could take place without the macrocriminal networks that enable it, involving licit business and political actors that benefit from such violence and may, in many cases, be those directly responsible. Violent acts such as recruitment of youth, extortion, surveillance, armed patrols, curfews, kidnapping, sexual violations, murder, disappearances, and forced displacement are all expressions of systemic violence. 

As such, while such violence is often attributed to one or another cartel, it is important to identify the macro-criminal networks that enable their existence. This goes beyond corporate capture of the state and entails close coordination between institutional actors, businesses and criminal armed groups. While cartels and their business connections are often perceived as external to the state, in macro-criminal networks the state actors, who may be governors, state attorneys or security officials, often play a key role (20).  

The strategy of capturing cartel kingpins or focusing on individual acts of violence has only contributed to cartel fragmentation and diversification of their business interests well beyond narcotrafficking, while failing to address the underlying economic and institutional networks. This phenomenon has emerged and deepened as a result of the militarized responses from the Mexican state, particularly since the administration of president Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) and his War on Drugs (21). Since this time, the annual murder rate has skyrocketed to over 30,000 per year and over 133,000 people have been disappeared, including over 14,000 during the first year of president Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration (22). 

While similarly alarming, the numbers of recorded murders and disappearances of defenders do not do justice to the risks and threats that communities in resistance face to defend their rights to land, health, food sovereignty and overall wellbeing when they are increasingly faced with systemic violence. As such, it is not surprising that Mexico is consistently recognized, year after year, as one of the most dangerous places to defend territory and the environment (23), or to practice journalism (24). This context also detrimentally erodes the role of the state in public safety and dissuades many victims and journalists from denouncing crimes, creating what have become known as “zones of silence” (25) and high levels of impunity. 

It is therefore troubling to note that militarization across the country has continued to deepen under the last two government administrations, with the military now in charge of federal public security forces, as well as key infrastructure such as ports and airports, and with a central role in megaprojects intended to open up new areas for extractivism and dispossession in the name of investment and development.

3. Minerals for Militarisation: How Resource Wars are Built

Militarisation does not begin on the battlefield, it begins at the mine. The minerals that power modern warfare and state violence (26) are ripped from territories where communities have long resisted colonial conquest and corporate greed. Cobalt for drones, rare earths for missiles and digital war machines, tungsten for bombs, all these minerals and many more, form the foundation of a global war economy (27). 

The mining of minerals and metals for weapons manufacturing is driving a new wave of extractivism (28) justified through national security and geopolitical dominance. This is exemplified in the agreement at the 2025 NATO Summit, at the behest of Donald Trump, to increase ‘defence- and security-related spending’ to 5% of the GDP of each NATO-aligned country by 2035 (29).

Mining for weapons manufacturing  is also allowed to advance unquestioned via the deliberately misleading terms ‘strategic minerals’ and ‘critical minerals’. Both of these are used interchangeably with a range of definitions and also with ‘transition minerals’. 

Transition minerals relate to minerals used for renewable energy technologies, therefore mining for these minerals has been cynically promoted as climate action (30). There is much to say to counter this argument, and we do so in greater detail in our position paper ‘Why We Say No to Mining’, namely that decarbonisation via electrification, while keeping the underlying system untouched, will bring us more of the same – more exploitation, more destruction. This is not to mention the additional issues concerning how renewable energy is used.

Application of the term ‘critical minerals’ goes wider than decarbonisation, with a focus on priorities for the economy as well as the ‘digital transition’. The economy referred to here is extractive capitalism, whose main driving force is profit-making (over and above societal need). The digital transition is also linked to extractive violence, not only in the extraction of the minerals it demands, but also to its role in supporting militarised global economies, with critical minerals powering surveillance of populations, AI-enhanced war technology (31), and weapons systems (32).

‘Strategic minerals’ more directly refer to defence, or war, as Trump is now more accurately calling it (33). In 2017 the US Department of Defence (as it was then known) used 750,000 tonnes of minerals on arms (34), and this is before the current genocide in Gaza and the renewed intensification of military aggression by imperial powers in recent years. 

Mining for militarization: Gaza and the multiplication of ecological and social destruction

Mining for militarization inflicts a triple burden: extractive exploitation, violent militarization, and catastrophic climate destruction. Palestine, especially Gaza, starkly exemplifies how minerals feed brutal neocolonial agendas. Between October 2023 and early 2025, Israeli bombardments generated approximately 50 million tonnes of debris and hazardous materials—contaminated with white phosphorus, heavy metals, and asbestos—derived from tens of thousands of bombs and missiles (35). These munitions depend on minerals such as phosphates, heavy metals, and rare earths sourced globally through neocolonial supply chains that fuel Zionist territorial domination through violence.

This militarization has unleashed a genocidal and ecocidal campaign, devastating Gaza’s environment by destroying over two-thirds of its farmland, contaminating groundwater, and annihilating 80% of its tree cover (36). Water and sewage infrastructures have collapsed, causing raw sewage to pollute the Mediterranean and underground aquifers, exacerbating a humanitarian and ecological crisis with toxic legacies lasting generations. The destruction of homes and vital infrastructure intensified the lifelessness imposed on Gaza, deepening the deprivation through military blockade and resource control.

Globally, militaries are major greenhouse gas emitters, contradicting any greenwashing narratives about mining. The Gaza conflict alone generated 420,000 to 652,000 tons of CO₂ within its first 120 days, with reconstruction potentially adding 47 to 60 million tons more (37).

It is clear that militarization driven by mineral extraction imposes not only ecological and social devastation but accelerates climate catastrophe, marking Gaza as a tragic epicenter of minerals-for-militarization fueling neocolonial violence and climate destruction.

Therefore, as demand for these greenwashed minerals surges, governments and corporations continue to justify violent extraction. Behind their ‘big ideas’ lies a deeper truth: resource wars are being built through the exploitation of land, labour, and life. Attempts are being made to exploit the ocean floor and even in outer space on other planets and the moon. 

This section unpacks how mineral extraction is fuelling militarisation, how states are reshaping law and policy to secure supply chains, and how Indigenous Peoples and affected communities are resisting being turned into sacrifices or collateral damage in the race for control.

From “Green Metals” to “Critical Minerals”: The Deep Sea Mining industry’s makeover

Deep sea mining (DSM) refers to the proposed industrial extraction of minerals and metals from the ocean floor, typically at depths of 4,000 to 6,000 metres. Targeting areas such as polymetallic nodule fields, seafloor massive sulphides, and cobalt-rich crusts, companies and states claim DSM could supply “critical minerals” like nickel, cobalt, and manganese for renewable technologies and defence industries. However, scientists warn that mining these fragile deep ocean ecosystems, many of which are home to unique and undiscovered species, could cause irreversible biodiversity loss, disrupt carbon sequestration processes, and release toxic plumes that travel vast distances (38).

Pacific peoples are at the frontlines of resistance to DSM, defending their ocean as a source of life, culture, and identity, and leading a powerful regional and international movement, rooted in Indigenous knowledge and sovereignty, that calls for a ban to protect the Pacific for future generations (39).

Over the past decade, the DSM industry has reframed its purpose, shifting from a purported climate solution to a pillar of national security and defence. Initially promoted as essential to supplying “green” metals for renewable technologies, DSM is now increasingly justified through the language of critical minerals, strategic independence, and resource security (40).

This transformation accelerated after U.S. President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order in promoting “America’s access to critical minerals” and directing agencies to explore options for exploiting seabed resources beyond the oversight of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) (41). 

The move effectively bypassed decades of multilateral negotiation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), undermining global governance of the seabed and reframing deep ocean resources as matters of national interest rather than the common heritage of humankind (42).

Since then, industry actors such as The Metals Company and pro-DSM governments like the United States have amplified narratives of geostrategic competition, particularly invoking China’s dominance in mineral processing to justify unilateral deep sea extraction (43). As critical minerals are also key inputs in weapons systems, submarines, and drone technologies, DSM’s alignment with the military-industrial agenda has become increasingly visible (44).

The convergence of militarisation and extractivism is clear: the same actors driving global rearmament are seeking to open the deep sea for industrial exploitation.

Key Players And The Narrative of Scarcity And Geopolitical Survival

At the heart of the militarised extractive system are powerful states, corporations and financial institutions working hand in hand to secure the metals and minerals sought for weapons manufacturing and military dominance. 

Mineral extraction is fuelling the machinery of war. What is framed as a clean energy solution is in reality powering the backbone of modern militaries: armoured vehicles, missiles, drones, fighter jets, AI weapons, and digital surveillance systems.

The United States, China, Russia, and European Union member states lead the demand, embedding critical minerals like cobalt, lithium, rare earths, tungsten, and titanium into their defence strategies and arms production. These states are supported by alliances such as NATO, AUKUS, and bilateral critical minerals agreements that tie extractive zones mostly in the Global South to geopolitical control in the North. 

Another central narrative driving this agenda is the notion of scarcity, a framing that portrays critical minerals as limited, under threat, and a matter of geopolitical survival. This is a dangerous logic: that securing resources by any means, including military power, colonial land grabs, and strategic coercion, is acceptable for the sake of ‘security’. It is also a logic that pushes competition as the only means of securing safety; we argue that we would be much safer in a world where the prevailing logic is cooperation and mutual benefit.

Western governments, particularly the U.S. and E.U., amplify concerns about China’s so-called ‘tight grip’ on rare earths and other strategic resources, using this to justify the rapid expansion of mining in previously off-limits areas like Indigenous territories, deep sea ecosystems, and protected lands. Notably, China’s global rare earth dominance started through the U.S. tightening its environmental regulations in the late 1970s; this led its polluting industries to transfer their hazards and radioactive pollution problems to China. This scarcity discourse serves to normalise extractive expansion, militarisation, and deregulation under the guise of defensive necessity and supply chain resilience.

On the corporate front, mining giants like Rio Tinto, Glencore, and Teck Resources extract the raw materials, while arms manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, BAE Systems, and Thales convert them into missiles, drones, and surveillance systems. 

Financial institutions, including pension funds, private equity firms, and state-backed investors, including the Pentagon and Japan’s JOGMEC (45), grease the wheels, turning wars and geopolitical tensions into profit. These actors do not operate in isolation but as a coordinated force, sustaining a global war economy built on the dispossession of communities and the exploitation of ecosystems.

Sub-Imperial Powers: Australia & Canada

While often positioned as secondary or benevolent actors on the global stage, Australia and Canada play critical sub-imperial roles in the military-industrial project. Both countries are major exporters of the minerals and metals that underpin modern warfare, such as rare earths, tungsten, lithium, copper, alloy steel, aluminium, cobalt, and uranium, and both operate with legal, financial, and diplomatic frameworks that shield their mining industries from accountability and help facilitate their interests. 

As key allies of the United States and NATO, Australia and Canada act as stable, politically-aligned sources of raw materials for weapons systems, surveillance infrastructure, and energy-intensive defence technologies. Rather than resisting extractivism, these states actively promote it by offering subsidies, tax breaks, and land access to mining corporations under the guise of economic development and critical minerals security.

Australia and Canada also act as geopolitical amplifiers for the extractive agendas of dominant powers. Through hosting global mining industry conferences like the Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada PDAC trade fair and the International Mining and Resources Conference IMARC, and also through their participation in alliances like AUKUS, NORAD, NATO and various critical minerals partnerships, they help enforce and legitimise the global militarisation of mineral supply chains. 

Canadian companies, protected by state-backed investment frameworks like Export Development Canada, are among the most aggressive operators in conflict zones from Latin America to Africa. Meanwhile, Australia’s rare earth industry, backed by direct defence funding, exports materials used in weapons reportedly deployed in genocides like Gaza (46, 47). Both countries contribute not only resources but also ideological cover, greenwashing militarised extraction through narratives of “strategic resilience,” “energy transition,” and “national security.” In doing so, they entrench their roles as sub-imperial enablers of global profiteering and ecological harm.

Australia and Canada: Colonialism and Militarism built into critical minerals supply chains

Australia and Canada are both states founded on colonial genocide; and this same logic extends to the government policies and supply chains of their “Critical Minerals” industries today.

The federal governments of both Australia and Canada launched their Critical Minerals Strategy policy frameworks in 2022, each listing 31 minerals and metals deemed strategically important. While promotion of these so-called critical minerals are framed around energy transitions, extraction is also promoted for weapons of war. Thirteen of the minerals on the Australian list are designated as essential for defence related technologies. Mining and militarism are framed as essential to Canadian national security (48), and spending on critical minerals is categorized as defence spending (49). These strategies can be understood as part of growing efforts to ‘onshore’ extraction in both Australia and Canada that often create ‘sacrifice zones’ on Indigenous lands. This onshoring is deemed necessary because of geopolitical instability brought on by war, militarized conflicts, and genocides.

In Australia, the Federal Government prioritises stockpiling in order to bolster national security and increase geopolitical leverage, such as its 2025 proposal for a Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve (50) with a $1.2 billion investment. This aims to secure domestic supply through national offtake agreements. Australia is trying to pivot away from China and towards the U.S., Japan, and Europe in efforts to secure critical minerals supply chains for defence. In 2021, the Australian Government launched the controversial, multi-billion-dollar AUKUS (51) trilateral security arrangement between Australia, the UK and the US. Critical minerals, especially rare earths, are needed for building AUKUS’s planned nuclear submarines and fighter jets, as well as for technologies including AI, cyber, quantum computing, and advanced propulsion (52). 

In addition to producing the metals required for modern warfare, Canadian mining companies are implicated in a wide range of egregious human rights abuses and environmental harm. Simultaneous to ‘onshoring’ efforts, Canadian companies continue to profit from militarized violence in Tigray (53), the DRC (54), and more. Canadian companies have been involved in forced evictions in Tanzania (55), assassinations and sexual violence in Guatemala (56), militarization and criminalization of land defenders in Ecuador (57), and the use of private security forces and mercenaries to impose and advance Canadian mining projects abroad in Papua New Guinea and Peru (58). 

Australian critical minerals feed directly into the manufacturing of weapons used by Israel for its genocide in Gaza. Australia exports specialised parts for F-35 fighter jets which are supplied to Israel via US based supplier Lockheed Martin (59). These include bomb release mechanisms (where Australia is the only manufacturer globally) and titanium structural components (titanium is a critical mineral produced in Australia) (60). F-35 jets also require about 420 kg of rare earth metals (61), of which Australia is becoming an increasingly important supplier to the US. Canada was exposed for sending arms to Israel even while claiming it was upholding a weapons embargo (62); though there is a lack of transparency on where the materials for the weapons came from, it is very possible that these weapons were built with mined materials supplied by Canadian companies.

In Australia, Aboriginal (63) and rural communities (64, 65), face rapidly increasing environmental and social injustices due to the expansion of critical minerals extraction. 57.8% of critical minerals projects in Australia are found in areas where Indigenous peoples have legal rights to negotiate, including Native Title claims. In Canada, resistance to exploration and extraction within Canada is often met with militarized violence or criminalization, especially when occurring on Indigenous lands. 

Canadian and Australian mining has, from the start, benefited from genocidal violence, and in its current form is using the guise of the climate crisis to continue profiting at all costs while feeding the military industrial complex and relying on it. 

Lynas Rare Earths: Militarised Extractivism in Action

Lynas Rare Earths Ltd, an Australian mining company, exemplifies the entanglement of militarism and extractivism justified under the banners of strategic security and the energy transition. Founded by Nick Curtis, the son of an Australian diplomat, Lynas was initially pitched as a key supplier of “critical minerals” independent of China. But as US-China trade tensions escalated, the company’s positioning shifted and its strategic importance became increasingly framed through a geopolitical and militarised lens, particularly given the role of heavy rare earths in advanced weapons systems and military technologies.

Lynas is bankrolled by the U.S. Department of Defense (66) and the Japanese and Australian governments, and is marketed as a “clean” and secure alternative to Chinese rare earth dominance. But this narrative obscures deeper realities of colonial extraction, toxic legacies, and community resistance. 

With its Mt Weld rare earth mine located in Western Australia, Lynas’ processing facility in Kuantan, Malaysia, has faced mass opposition since 2011 (67). With no social licence to operate and in violation of environmental and planning protections, the plant has become a sacrifice zone, storing close to two million tonnes of radioactive waste in a monsoon-prone peat swamp (68). Its own consultants have deemed the storage facility safe for just 20 years, despite waste remaining hazardous for millennia or in perpetuity.

Beyond environmental degradation, Lynas has also deployed damaging narratives to sanitise its image, including the promotion of its plant as a “women-affirmative” workplace, showing Muslim women operating in hazardous environments despite clear risks posed by radiation and chemical exposure to reproductive and foetal health. Meanwhile, it continues to portray rare earth mining as “critical” and “green,” sparking a wave of speculative rare earth fever across Malaysia, despite the known and irreversible harms.

Lynas’ expansion into the United States has been directly funded by the Pentagon, solidifying its role in militarised supply chains (69). But militarisation isn’t only global, it’s also local. In Malaysia, deregulatory policies have enabled Lynas to operate with impunity: safety standards are far below international norms, long-term oversight removed, and corporate tax exemptions granted. The Malaysian government has prioritised foreign military-linked interests over local safety, justice, and sovereignty.

Despite this, community resistance has been ongoing and visionary. Starting in 2011 when the project was first revealed in a New York Times article (70), opposition has continued to challenge Lynas’ greenwashing, lack of transparency, environmental violations and no social licence to operate (71). In 2025, a court case will test its failure to follow legal planning processes for its proposed permanent radioactive waste dump.

Lynas represents a global pattern of militarised extractivism, where “critical minerals” serve as a pretext for ecological violence, deregulation, and geopolitical control. It reflects how militarism and mining reinforce one another, while frontline communities are left to face the consequences, and lead the resistance.

4. Intersections of Community Resistance and Global Profiteering of War

Across the globe, Indigenous Peoples and frontline communities are rising up in resistance to an extractive system that is not only destroying lands, waters, and ways of life, but is increasingly backed by militarised force and justified by geopolitical agendas. 

While communities say no to mining in defence of life, transnational corporations and state actors profit from the violent extraction of minerals destined for weapons, surveillance technologies, and militarised “green” transitions. 

From the deep sea to desert plains, from West Papua to Palestine, this section exposes the sharp contrast between those defending territory and life, and those amassing power and wealth through the militarisation of the extractive frontier. These are not isolated struggles, but interconnected fronts in a global system of profiteering that thrives on dispossession and conflict.

West Papua and Myanmar: Self-Determination and Mining Resistance

 The struggle for self-determination and liberation from extractive militarization is vibrant in West Papua and Myanmar, where indigenous and oppressed peoples resist neocolonial resource exploitation. 

In West Papua, the ongoing Indonesian occupation has violently suppressed the Indigenous population’s desire for independence since the 1960s. The Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM), formed in 1970, emerged as armed resistance against Indonesian military control and the environmental destruction caused by multinational mining corporations, most notably the US- and UK-owned Freeport gold and copper mine. 

This massive open-pit mine has devastated sacred lands, poisoned rivers and displaced Indigenous communities, fueling a war for land and resources. Despite brutal military repressions that involve assassinations, mass arrests, and cultural erasure, West Papuans continue their liberation struggle through both armed resistance and cultural revitalization bolstered by unified political fronts like the United Liberation Movement for West Papua.

Similarly, in Myanmar, ethnic minority groups such as the Karen, Kachin, and Shan have waged prolonged battles for self-determination against state and corporate forces extracting timber, minerals, and jade. The military junta’s violent campaigns to control resource-rich areas devastate local ecologies and fuel endless cycles of displacement, militarization, and environmental degradation. Resistance movements here intertwine anti-colonial aspirations with environmental justice, emphasizing that mining and militarization operate hand in hand to entrench authoritarian control and economic exploitation.

These struggles expose how the militarization of extraction and mining are tools of neocolonial domination, violently suppressing Indigenous Peoples’ self-determination and national liberation movements. The extraction-driven militarism not only destroys environments but perpetuates political violence and systemic oppression. Minerals and weapons sustain regimes that deny peoples’ sovereignty over their land and resources that peoples are resisting.

Guatemala: Militarization and the Escobal Silver Mine on Xinka Territory

The Escobal Mine is a large underground silver mine in southeastern Guatemala, which has been suspended since June 2017 by the Peaceful Resistance of Santa Rosa, Jalapa and Jutiapa and successive court decisions for discrimination and failure to consult with the Xinka Indigenous people. For around fifteen years, Xinka Indigenous and farming communities have opposed the project over concerns about water contamination and depletion in the largely agricultural region, as well as social, cultural, and spiritual impacts, and lack of respect for their self-determination (72). The mine was originally put into operation in 2014 by Tahoe Resources, which was bought up by Vancouver-based Pan American Silver in 2019.

Operations at the Escobal mine from 2014 to 2017 was made possible thanks to a militarized security strategy that suppressed local opposition and labeled it a threat to national security (73). In the years leading up to the opening of the mine, communities suffered violent repression by private security, police and military, as well as a campaign to defame and criminalize community leaders. Nearly 100 people were criminalized for their participation in peaceful protests. 

Several members of the resistance, including 16-year-old Topacio Reynoso, were murdered during this time. In one incident, Tahoe private security opened fire on peaceful protesters in April 2013, seriously injuring six people. The victims sued the company in British Columbia civil court, achieving a landmark settlement in 2019 in which Pan American Silver took responsibility for the shooting and human rights violations (74). The settlement, however, did not dampen community opposition to the mine.

Since June 2017, residents from Santa Rosa, Jalapa, and Jutiapa, the three departments surrounding the mine, have maintained a 24-hour resistance camp to demonstrate ongoing opposition to the mine. The camp also aims to ensure compliance with the Supreme Court decision in July 2017 ordering the project’s suspension for lack of prior consultation and discrimination. 

Acts of harassment, threats, attacks, and defamation against Xinka leaders and community members have continued throughout the consultation process, which began in late 2018. Targeted intimidation and surveillance of Xinka Parliament leaders increased in the final months of 2024, so much so that the former President of the Xinka Parliament and his family were forced to flee Guatemala and are living outside of the country (75).

On May 8, 2025, after seven years of a consultation process, the Xinka announced their decision on the reopening of the mine: No (76). As the formal consultation process winds to a close, they are now fighting to have their decision respected. 

North of Ireland: The Sperrins Resist

In the Sperrin Mountains, Canadian company Dalradian Gold (now owned by US-based Orion Finance) has submitted the largest ever planning application in the North of Ireland for a gold mine. The plans for the proposed project include an underground gold mine at Curraghinalt, a processing plant and a 17-storey high tailings facility on Crockanboy Hill, less than one kilometre from the village of Greencastle. 

This project is being imposed on a local population who has already seen decades of recent conflict and centuries of colonisation. To facilitate British colonial occupation, the Irish population was driven from the fertile lowlands into the rocky highlands – in this case, the Sperrins. During the 30-year conflict arising from the violent repression of a peaceful civil rights movement, this area was also heavily militarised by the British army, as it was seen as an area of strong resistance to continued British rule in the North of Ireland. The ‘peace process’ from the turn of the century came in the form of a neoliberal ‘Open for Business’ model, desperate to seek foreign investment. The main target, in terms of extractive projects, was the Sperrins. 

However, the local population has rallied around this new threat and have been running a very successful campaign (77) to stop the mine for over a decade. The population has occupied an area within the proposed project site since February 2018. 

In response to this resistance, the communities have faced selective policing (78), constant surveillance (79), infiltration, intimidation and death threats (80), labelled as ‘dissidents’ (opposed to the peace process). They have also been heavily criminalised with a number of environmental defenders being dragged through court proceedings lasting years.

In addition to the militarisation against defenders, this mine also has links with the military industrial complex. Documents submitted for the ongoing public inquiry into the proposed gold mine list gold, copper and tellurium (despite tellurium not appearing in their planning application). All three elements are used in the manufacture of the F-35 fighter jet. Invest NI have already given £19.66 million pounds (81) of public money to the companies manufacturing parts for these jets, which have been used by Israel in their genocide in Gaza. In 2014, Invest NI also gave £326,000 (82) of public money to Dalradian, as well as tens of thousands (83) in rate exemptions. Militarism and extractivism are both key priorities for the government in the North of Ireland. 

Ecuador: Rights of Nature Versus Extractivism and Neoliberalism

In November 2021, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court created a national and international legal precedent by upholding the constitutional rights of nature for Los Cedros, a mega-biodiverse cloud forest. The ruling permanently banned mining in the reserve. The campaign to save Los Cedros lasted over three years. Led from the grassroots, it spread outwards to the international level, drawing in a diverse team of conservation groups, legal experts, scientists, artists, and activists. The story of this powerful campaign is told in a Yes to Life No to Mining emblematic case study (84).

Despite the historic precedent embodied by the forest’s win, its impact in Ecuador has been stifled by a series of government administrations which have become increasingly neoliberal in their political vision. Since 2008, the Ecuadorian Government has pursued an agenda to replace its former oil industry with mining. The so-called National Mining Plan involves the administration of thousands of exploration licenses mostly awarded to companies without public consultation, and the development of several large-scale mining projects in the pipeline, all of which are owned by Canadian or Australian transnational companies (85).

Since 2024, the government of President Daniel Noboa has been associated with a growing number of alleged human rights abuses (86), violations of civil rights, and attacks on the Constitution as it moves to suppress Indigenous and environmental organisations, especially those opposing mining expansions. Militarisation has been a key feature of state-led tactics, with the disappearances of 43 people and several deaths linked to the military since 2023 (87). From September to October 2025, an Indigenous-led uprising arose against the Noboa government’s increasingly autocratic behaviour. During this national strike, Ecuadorian human rights organisations tallied hundreds of human rights violations committed by state and military forces, including the assassination by police of a protester on the street (88).

The Noboa government also called for a referendum on November 16, 2025 to vote on four proposals, most significantly to build a US military base in the Galápagos Islands, and also to change Ecuador’s constitution, with the “Rights of Nature” articles singled out for altering or removal in order to streamline mining development. There were a majority of “No” votes for all four proposals – a win for people power and the environment, which was celebrated nationally at the grassroots level, and internationally. However the extractive government agenda and its threats to human rights and biodiversity continues to be pushed forwards, with conflict and militarisation continuing at mining hotspots throughout the country. 

This is the context in which the world’s most progressive constitutional framework is being tested: a direct confrontation between an Indigenous-led vision of the “Sumak Kawsay” or “good living”, and an extractive vision of billionaire-backed violence, neoliberal hegemony, and the global military-industrial complex. The question of which vision will prevail depends largely upon the struggles of Ecuador’s people and the extent to which solidarity can be built to support them.

5. Demilitarised and Non-Extractive Futures

To imagine a world beyond militarised extractivism, we must begin by redefining what it means to be secure. For too long, security has been weaponised, defined by governments and corporations as the right to control land, borders, and resources through force. In this logic, minerals are “critical,” extraction is inevitable, and resistance is a threat. 

For communities on the frontlines of mining and militarisation, security means something entirely different. It means sovereignty and self determination over land and water, the ability to live without surveillance or violence, to grow food, to raise children without fear, to speak and organise freely, and to heal from generations of harm. Real security is rooted in mutual care, ecological balance, social justice, and the collective right to say no to destructive activities.

Demilitarisation is not just about removing weapons, it is about transforming the systems that produce them. It is a process of healing: from colonial conquest, from war economies, and from extractive logics that see nature and communities as expendable. 

This vision is not held by YLNM alone. It is shared by allied movements fighting for climate justice, abolition, anti-colonial liberation, Indigenous sovereignty, and feminist economies. 

We stand with those dismantling prisons and borders, challenging fossil-fuel fascism, resisting settler colonialism, and building new systems of care, governance, and ecological stewardship. 

Our struggles are interconnected and so are our futures. A demilitarised and non-extractive world is not a dream. It is already being practiced, protected, and made possible by communities who refuse to be sacrificed, and who insist that another way is not only necessary, but already underway.

6. Calls to Action & Solidarity Demands

To confront the deepening entanglement of militarisation and extractivism, and to move toward a truly just and life-sustaining future, systemic change is not only necessary, it is urgent. 

A just transition cannot be built on the same foundations of colonial violence, resource extraction, and militarised control that have long defined the fossil fuel era. The path forward must not become a new frontier of exploitation disguised as progress and development. A just transition must mean a transition away from extractivism, not an acceleration of it under a different guise.

We demand an end to the violent and militarised expansion of mining under the banners of “security,” “critical minerals,””energy transition” and “digital transformation.” As affirmed in YLNM’s Statement of Principles we reject all forms of extractivism – green or otherwise – that treat the Earth as limitless, that commodify nature, and that sacrifice communities and ecosystems.

We call for:

• An immediate halt to the militarisation of mine sites, supply chains, and territories. Communities must not be criminalised, surveilled, or subjected to violence for defending their lands and waters. States must demilitarise extractive zones and uphold the rights of all Earth defenders.
• Self-determination for Indigenous Peoples and frontline communities. Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) must be respected not as a box-ticking exercise, but as an expression of sovereignty and self determination. Communities have the right to say NO, and to define their own visions of life beyond mining.
• Stronger regulations and international agreements. These need to hold corporations and states accountable for environmental and human rights abuses across the entire supply chain. This includes full transparency of mineral deals, corporate contracts, and military-industrial links.
• The protection and amplification of post-extractive alternatives. Alternatives already exist and are being built by communities across the world. Mineral-rich territories must not be reduced to zones of extraction for the benefit of wealthier nations. Instead, they must be supported to nurture locally-rooted, ecologically-just economies that restore rather than destroy.
• A dismantling of the systems of global profiteering. This includes financial institutions, military alliances, and transnational trade and investment frameworks, that enable and legitimise extractivism through violence, neocolonial imposition and impunity.

We call on all those committed to a just world beyond extractivism to stand in active solidarity with communities resisting militarised extraction – from the mines that feed militaries, to the militaries that guard the mines. This includes amplifying their voices, taking action in solidarity with their defense of rights, and building power together to expose and dismantle the structures that underpin this violent system.

The future we need cannot be mined or militarised into existence. It must be cultivated through solidarity, care, and resistance. 

We stand for life. 

We say yes to demilitarised futures rooted in justice and care.

Endnotes 

1. Global Witness, Critical mineral mines tied to 111 violent incidents and protests on average a year, 2023. Available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/natural-resource-governance/critical-mineral-mines-tied-111-violent-incidents-and-protests-average-year/ 

2. Global Witness, How the militarisation of mining threatens Indigenous defenders in the Philippines, 2024. Available at: https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/how-the-militarisation-of-mining-threatens-indigenous-defenders-in-the-philippines/ 

3. Amnesty International, DRC: Powering change or business as usual? 2023. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR62/7009/2023/en/ 

4. Transparency International Australia, The race to exploit critical minerals amidst governance concerns in Zambia, 2023, available at: https://transparency.org.au/the-race-to-exploit-critical-minerals-in-zambia/ 

5. https://yestolifenotomining.org/latest-news/resistance-to-the-dirty-face-of-the-green-transition/ 

6. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/mexico-land-defenders-criminalized-right-to-protest/ 

7. https://miningwatch.ca/blog/2025/5/14/open-letter-100-international-organizations-call-argentinian-authorities-end 

8. Amnesty International, Argentina: Two years after brutal repression in Jujuy, Amnesty International report exposes impunity, 2025. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/argentina-two-years-after-brutal-repression-in-jujuy-impunity/ 

9. EJ Atlas, “Kilwa Mine”. Available at:  https://ejatlas.org/print/kilwa-mine

10. https://amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/canadian-mining-firm-human-rights-violations-drc/

11. https://miningwatch.ca/news/2021/10/4/canadian-miners-pursue-prospects-war-torn-tigray

 12. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/settlement-amnesty-scc-africa-mine-nevsun-1.5774910

 13. https://breachmedia.ca/leaked-report-accuses-canada-of-covering-for-mining-companies-in-war-torn-ethiopia/ 

 14. Newsweek, World’s Biggest Polluter is in the US, Study Finds, 2025. Available at: https://www.newsweek.com/climate-change-us-military-pollution-carbon-emissions-2094434 

 15. Nature Communications, Rising military spending jeopardizes climate targets, 2025. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-025-59877-x

16. https://ceobs.org/new-data-reveals-the-military-emissions-gap-is-growing-wider/#:~:text=Introduction,C%20pathways%2C%20accelerating%20dangerous%20warming 

 17. Avispa Media, Chiapas: Denuncias reactivación de mina en Chicomuselo bajo hostigamiento y sin permiso ambiental, 2023. Available at: https://avispa.org/chiapas-denuncian-reactivacion-de-mina-en-chicomuselo-bajo-hostigamiento-y-sin-permiso-ambiental/  

 18. See the examples of mines in Michoacán and Jalisco described in The Fair Steel Coalition, The Real Cost of Steel, 2024. Available at: https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/The-real-cost-of-steel-report.pdf 

 19. For example, see examples of Canadian-owned mines in Guerrero described in JCAP, The “Canada Brand”: Violence and Canadian Mining Companies in Latin America, 2015. Available at: https://justice-project.org/the-canada-brand-violence-and-canadian-mining-companies-in-latin-america/ 

 20. Revista Hispana para el Análisis de Redes Sociales, Las estructuras políticas en las redes de macrocriminalidad en Veracruz (México), 2019. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/redes.948 

 21. Revista Hispana para el Análisis de Redes Sociales, Las estructuras políticas en las redes de macrocriminalidad en Veracruz (México). Available at: https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/redes.948 

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 52. Sharpe, Michael, 28 September 2025, AUKUS – from Quarry to Capability, in AUKUSForum, available at: https://aukusforum.com/aukus-news/f/aukus—from-quarry-to-capability 

53. Mining Watch Canada. Canadian Miners Pursue Prospects in War Torn Tigray. Oct 4th 2021. Available at: https://miningwatch.ca/news/2021/10/4/canadian-miners-pursue-prospects-war-torn-tigray

​​54. Pax. DR Congo: Forced Evictions at Barrick Mine. Dec 17th 2024. Available at: https://paxforpeace.nl/news/dr-congo-forced-evictions-at-barrick-gold-mine/

55. Mining Watch Canada. ‘Reported Violence against Indigenous Kuria by Mine Police at Barrick Gold’s North Mara Gold Mine during 2023-2024’. Available at: https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/brief_northmara_2024.pdf

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57. Mining Watch Canada. Available at: https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/brief_mining_impact_ecuador_fta_2024.pdf

58. Mining Watch Canada. ‘Mine Security: Crossing Boundaries, Abusing Rights’. Available at:  https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/2025-02_miningwatch-canada-submission-to-the-un-wg-on-the-role-of-mercenaries.pdf

 59. Amnesty International, 14 July 2025, Disturbing reports confirm Australia’s supply of F-35 parts used in Israel’s genocide against Palestinians, available at: https://www.amnesty.org.au/disturbing-reports-confirm-australias-supply-of-f-35-parts-used-in-israels-genocide-against-palestinians/ 

 60. Belot, Henry, 15 August 2025, What parts does Australia supply for the F-35s striking Gaza – and should shipments be halted? The Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/aug/15/is-australia-supplying-weapons-to-bomb-gaza-heres-what-we-know-about-fighter-jet-parts-in-the-f-35-program/

 61. The Hon. Madeleine King MP, 15 November 2023, Speech to ANU Rare Earths Conference, Canberra, accessed 28 September 2025, available at: https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/king/speeches/speech-anu-rare-earths-conference/ 

62. Arms Embargo Now Coalition, Exposing Canadian Military Exports to Israel, 29 July 2025. Available at: https://armsembargonow.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Exposing-Canadian-Military-Exports-to-Israel_07292025_compressed-.pdf

 63. John Burton, Deanna Kemp, Rodger Barnes, Joni Parmenter, ‘Mapping critical minerals projects and their intersection with Indigenous peoples’ land rights in Australia’, Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 113, 2024, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629624001476 

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 65. ABC News, Rare Earth Mining at Koppamurra Faces Opposition From South-East SA Farmers, 29 October 2024. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-10-29/koppamurra-rare-earths-mining-facing-farming-opposition/104501048

 66. Lynas Rare Earths (2025) U.S. DoD strengthens support for Lynas U.S. facility. Available at: https://lynasrareearths.com/u-s-dod-strengthens-support-for-lynas-u-s-facility/

 67. Whiting, N. (2013) Lynas Corporation sparks fresh anger in Malaysia. ABC News, 9 October. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-09/an-lynas-corporation-sparks-fresh-anger-in-malaysia/5011284

 68. Aid/Watch (2023) Aid/Watch welcomes Malaysia’s decision to stop Lynas dumping more radioactive waste. Available at: https://aidwatch.org.au/in-the-news/aid-watch-welcomes-malaysias-decision-to-stop-lynas-dumping-more-radioactive-waste

 69. Mining Weekly (2025) Lynas and Noveon join forces to strengthen U.S. rare earth magnet supply. Available at: https://www.miningweekly.com/article/lynas-and-noveon-join-forces-to-strengthen-us-rare-earth-magnet-supply-2025-10

 70. Bradsher, K. (2011) Rare earth metal mine, born of Chinese restriction, opens in Malaysia. The New York Times, 29 June. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/business/global/30rare.html

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 73. Luis Solano, Under Siege: Peaceful Resistance to Tahoe Resources and Militarization in Guatemala. Available at: https://www.resistescobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/undersiege_luissolanoreport_2015.pdf 

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 75. BIV, Guatemalan Indigenous Leaders Demand Canada Pull Support for B.C.-owned Mine. Available at: https://www.biv.com/news/resources-agriculture/guatemalan-indigenous-leaders-demand-canada-pull-support-for-bc-owned-mine-10729159 

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Congressional appropriators released final spending bills for fiscal year 2026 for the Interior department, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Energy on Monday. The package cuts funding slightly for most Interior department agencies, but stops well short of President Donald Trump’s recommended cuts.

The Bureau of Land Management is set to receive $1.34 billion, down from $1.41 billion in fiscal year 2025, but up from the $936 million recommended by Trump. Similarly, the Park Service is set to receive $3.27 billion, down from $3.34 billion in 2025, but up from Trump’s $2.12 billion. Fish and Wildlife is set to receive $1.65 billion, down from $1.68 billion in 2025, but up from Trump’s $1.14 billion. Finally, the Forest Service is set to receive $8.61 billion, up from ;$8.55 billion in 2025, and well above the $3.05 billion recommended by Trump.

The National Parks Conservation Association celebrated the package, saying, “These funding levels should keep parks open and staff on the ground as the system has been nearing a breaking point after losing a quarter of its permanent workforce in 2025.”

While his funding recommendations weren’t followed, President Trump’s priorities appear elsewhere in the bills, according to a House Appropriations Committee summary of the funding package. For example, the bills increase funding for onshore oil and gas development by $7.4 million and prevent sage-grouse from being listed under the Endangered Species Act. They also eliminate funding for environmental justice programs, increase funding for law enforcement on public lands, and prevent attempts to delay access to public lands for grazing.

Quick hits What will be the biggest public land stories of 2026?

Deseret News

Canadian conservationists alarmed by US border security plans

Canada’s National Observer

Feds threaten to terminate Colorado’s authority to manage wolves

Colorado Politics

DOI cracks down on stickers covering Trump’s face on national park passes

SFGate

Not settled yet: Wyoming hunting access issues will likely repeat in 2026

Cowboy State Daily

Trump official’s family busted cashing in on government deals

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BLM opens sage-grouse habitat to development

Wyoming Tribune Eagle

How the Trump administration sold out public lands in 2025

Los Angeles Times

Quote of the day

The impacts of the Trump/Burgum cuts to public land staffing will become even more apparent [in 2026]… They were able to paper over some of the damage [in 2025], but eventually you have to pay the piper when you lose that much experience and personnel.”

—Center for Western Priorities Deputy Director Aaron Weiss, Deseret News

Picture This

@BLMNational

It’s National Bird Day!

Did you know … The deep canyon of Idaho’s Snake River hosts the highest concentration of nesting birds of prey in North America, making it a vital National Conservation Area.

By day, hawks and eagles rule the skies. By night, the Milky Way lights the way for stealthy, swooping owls.

It’s no wonder the birds love it here. It’s owl about location, location, location!

Bob Wick

@blmidaho

The post Interior funding bill bucks big cuts proposed by Trump appeared first on Center for Western Priorities.

After delivering its best annual performance since 1979, gold is drawing bullish calls from major banks as conditions line up for fresh record highs.

In a note published on Monday, Morgan Stanley said prices could hit new heights this year and rise to $4,800 per ounce by the fourth quarter, citing falling interest rates, a potential leadership shift in the US Federal Reserve, and continued buying by central banks and funds.

Gold price: Most popular stories of 2025

Throughout 2025, the same factors already drove gold prices to multiple records, with its last peak set at $4,549.71 an ounce on Boxing Day. For the calendar year, gold was among the best-performing commodities, with a gain of nearly 65%.

That strong momentum is likely to extend into this year, analysts said, noting the geopolitical factors in play that could further raise the metal’s safe-haven appeal. Specifically, the bank pointed to the events in Venezuela over the weekend as a potential trigger of gold buying.

The same sentiment is being echoed by those at Bank of America. Also on Monday, analysts led by Michael Widmer, its head of metals research, said gold will remain a key portfolio hedge in 2026, projecting its price to average $4,538 per ounce through the year.

“Gold continues to stand out as a hedge and alpha source,” Widmer said in a Monday report, citing tightening market conditions and strong earnings sensitivity. “Whichever portfolio you’re looking at, whether it’s a central bank portfolio or an institutional portfolio, they can benefit from diversification into gold,” he noted.

BofA’s outlook is based on projections of falling supply and rising costs in the gold sector. According to Widmer, the 13 major North American gold miners are expected to produce 19.2 million ounces this year, a decline of 2% from 2025.

Market forecasts for costs are also too optimistic, he added, projecting that the average all-in sustaining costs will rise 3% to about $1,600 per ounce, a level slightly above the market consensus.

Other metals

In addition to gold, banks are also bullish on several other metals. For silver, BofA’s Widmer gave an ambitious price target of between $135 and $309 per ounce. The white-colored metal ended 2025 with a gain of more than 140%, more than doubling that of gold. Currently, it is trading near a record of near $80 per ounce.

Widmer’s prediction for silver, as he noted, is derived from the metal’s historical relationship with gold. At the moment, the gold-to-silver ratio of around 59 suggests silver could still outperform gold, he said, noting that the ratio had reached as low as 32 in 2011 — when silver last had a major rally — and 14 in 1980. Its price target range would fall between these two historic lows in the gold-silver ratio, Widmer said.

Live Gold Price Chart and Real-Time Updates

Morgan Stanley analysts also flagged “upside risk” for silver as it ends another year in deficit due to rising industrial demand and investor appetite. In its note, the bank said that China’s export licence requirements, which have taken effect from the start of this year, would further lift prices.

As for base metals, Morgan Stanley sees further rallies in aluminum and copper, as both are facing supply challenges and increasing demand.

“Aluminum supply is constrained everywhere except Indonesia, while the rising Midwest Premium suggests some US buying may be returning,” the bank said. Meanwhile, copper imports have risen, keeping other markets tight and that 2025’s high level of copper supply disruptions were continuing into 2026, it added.

Technological progress is rarely linear. From the automobile to the television to solar power, a process of “gradually, then suddenly” can be observed. This process traditionally follows five distinct phases (outlined in Exhibit 1). The good news when it comes to our clean energy future is that many promising solutions are reaching stages of maturity that bring them closer to widespread adoption across a wide array of sectors and geographies.

Exhibit 1. Ten trends for 2026 along the 5 phases of technology adoption.

1. Decision makers consider “soft energy paths” to meet growing electricity demand

October is the 50th anniversary of “The Road Not Taken”, a landmark article by RMI cofounder Amory Lovins. The article encapsulates “soft energy paths,” a strategy which combines quick renewable energy deployment with “a prompt and serious commitment to efficient use of energy.” Fifty years later, this idea is as relevant as ever — as a new era of load growth requires fast, flexible solutions to meet increased demand. This time, it’s especially important in the Global South, where rapid demand growth and scarce capital combine to make these strategies more compelling than ever before.

Energy efficiency is a critical first fuel. Compared to supply-side projects, demand-side measures can increase grid capacity at roughly half the cost and 5 to 10 times the speed. For the grid itself, alternative transmission technologies can increase buildout several times faster and cheaper than traditional transmission. Innovative supply solutions, from virtual power plants to “power couples” for co-location, are also in the early adoption phase (phase 3).

2. Clean energy supports affordability with the right policies and investments

Meanwhile, wind and solar energy have entered phase 4 (system integration) and are set to continue growing. Countries such as Denmark have generated 70 percent of their electricity from solar and wind, while rising renewables are taking a larger share of generation in much of the Global South.

Combined with rapid electrification, this puts massive requirements on infrastructure and “supporting innovations” such as flexibility. The main challenges now lie in orchestrating the renewable technologies into a new energy system that can support electrification efficiently.

Now, as electricity demand rises, rising costs are a major concern — including in the United States, where affordability played a key role in recent elections and could do so again in November’s midterms. Thankfully, we can slash energy costs and waste by upgrading home technologies, implementing the right market mechanisms and policies to fix who pays, and accelerating investment in the “soft energy path” solutions above.

Global trends are already showing what’s possible for clean energy affordability. Average battery grid storage costs are more than 2 times lower than 2 years ago and more than 3 times lower than 3 years ago. In tandem, more than 90 percent of new renewable energy projects are cheaper than fossil fuel alternatives, and new renewables generation is now eclipsing total electricity demand growth. Leading experts expect this trend to continue as renewables and storage rise up the S-curve of phase 4, accelerating the transition away from fossil fuels.

3. Electric vehicle adoption enters a new phase with further action on key enablers

In the passenger transport sector, EVs have emerged as the ‘winning technology’ and are moving from niche markets (phase 3) to the mass market (phase 4). As such, adoption varies widely, but more than 1 in 4 new cars globally now have a plug, helping importing countries collectively save more than a million barrels of oil per day.

Reaching scale will also come with infrastructure and supply chain bottlenecks that must be resolved. For example, this new phase requires further work on the enabling environment, from manufacturing investment to preparations for the grid. Affordable purchase prices and charging options are also crucial. New research, policies, and tools can help accelerate charging stations to match EV growth while managing new electricity demand and improving battery circularity.

In addition, battery electric trucks are moving from pilots (phase 2) to niche markets (phase 3) with several models commercially available and others nearing commercialization. We expect continued rapid improvement of battery electric trucks in terms of cost and performance, alongside a need for scaling niche markets (through trucking corridors, for example).

4. Aviation contrails see further awareness and action with new collaborations

New partnerships and explainers have highlighted the potential impact of aviation contrails — and the opportunity to quickly cut 80 percent of their warming by just tweaking 2 percent of flights. Success would make contrail avoidance the sector’s greatest near-term solution for warming through 2050.

Early solutions are ready for pilots as they move from phase 1 to 2. Recently tested corporate accounting methods could make a major difference, if strong stakeholder collaboration continues. Further action could come from the EU Emissions Trading System. A key step now will be to build the transparent data practices that can underpin future progress.

5. Industrial cleantech is boosted by new policies and protocols

Industrial heat pump adoption is nearing mass market (from phase 3 to phase 4), as progress in the buildings sector helps heat pumps improve performance while cutting costs. This progress creates inroads into higher-temperature industry, enabling further opportunities for electrification in industry.

However, many industrial solutions are still in phase 2 or early phase 3 — such as green hydrogen, where top-down market mechanisms can incentivize early adoption. In 2026, several related policy efforts can spark change across the world.

First, industrial efficiency could be improved significantly. High-efficiency motors are mature (phase 5), but only account for one-quarter of industrial motors; technological improvements could save more electricity globally than the entirety of demand from data centers. Other measures include facility design, flexibility, and smart manufacturing.

Broader actions include the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, which is moving from reporting to action across several industrial sectors alongside new reporting requirements from the EU Methane Regulation. India’s carbon market is also preparing for compliance trading in the second half of 2026. And voluntary carbon markets will continue to build on the recently launched Carbon Data Open Protocol (CDOP).

6. Super pollutant solutions find increased visibility and new market mechanisms

Similar progress is helping to raise awareness across methane and other non-CO2 super pollutants. New funder collaboratives, action roadmaps, and powerful data from Climate TRACE are starting to bring unprecedented visibility to ground-level ozone, the air pollutant that also causes as much current warming as the global road transport sector.

Though early-stage field-building remains, many solutions intersect with energy transition efforts that are well into phases 3 and 4 of deployment. Enabling conditions are catching up, from recent landfill methane policies to corporate credit purchases that reach more sectors. If this progress continues, it can leverage a crucial opportunity to cut warming fast.

7. Cooling solutions reach new readiness, from innovation to deployment

From appliances to design innovations, cooling solutions are gaining ground. India is a crucial player, as a leader in recent efficiency progress as well as cooling demand growth.

Take super-efficient air conditioners, which have progressed from a phase 1 solution search (via the Global Cooling Prize) to a phase 2 proof of concept. Nine months of field testing in India’s Palava City showed that the winning technologies can cut appliances’ costs, energy use, and strain on peak electricity demand by half or more. This coming year can accelerate adoption by scaling proof points, building capacity among manufacturers, and taking other market activation steps across awareness, finance, and demand aggregation.

Passive daytime radiative cooling (PDRC) is nearing a similar stage, with a recent call to demonstrate performance in real-world pilots. The coming months could show which approaches can lead.

8. New standards catalyze embodied carbon solutions

Another opportunity for buildings is to improve embodied carbon, which accounts for more than one-tenth of global emissions today. In countries like India, where as much as 90 percent of 2050 floor space has yet to be built, there are immense benefits to building right the first time.

With many approaches in phase 2 and 3, policy standards can help incentivize early adoption. The RESNET Standards in the US are one such example, with publication and training expected in early 2026.

9. China’s upcoming Five-Year Plan has ripple effects across the world

China is the pivot nation in the global energy transition, and its recent cleantech exports are reshaping the international landscape. Thus, this spring’s release of the 15th Five-Year Plan will be closely watched. As emissions begin to plateau and fall, but climate pledges remain modest, how will the next plan approach different energy technologies?

With its clean energy buildout firmly in phase 4 (or 5) across key technologies, China is transitioning fast and looking to new markets for its solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. But results will depend on how other countries navigate trade tensions alongside the demand for clean energy’s affordability.

10. Global climate efforts host key convenings after a year of unfinished business

At the global level, 2025 left unfinished business across a range of policy efforts, from the International Maritime Organization to the COP30 climate conference outcomes. Even with the delays, there is a clear theme of implementation as policy efforts attempt to match the progression of technologies to the deployment phase.

The coming year will have several key milestones, including sessions of the new Global Implementation Accelerator as well as April’s First International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels. Key roadmaps on fossil fuels and forests are set for release by COP31, when last year’s Brazilian hosts pass the baton to Turkey and Australia.

It can be easy to get lost in the noise of the news cycle. But by returning to these energy transition phases, we can keep a systems view of the incredible opportunities for progress.

The authors wish to thank Yuki Numata, Ben Feshbach, and Colm Quinn for their contributions to this article.

The post The Energy Transition in 2026: 10 Trends to Watch appeared first on RMI.

Centerra Gold (TSX: CG; NYSE: CGAU) gained the green light to extend operations until 2035 at its Mount Milligan copper-gold mine from British Columbia’s Environmental Assessment Office (EAO).

While Mount Milligan’s mine plan already forecast the open-pit site would produce until 2035, the EAO decision gives it a regulatory stamp of approval, according to the decision published Monday. It authorizes an 11% production boost to 66,500 tonnes of ore per day by deepening the pit and an 80-hectare expansion to the disturbance area for construction materials.

The amendment to the environmental assessment certificate also includes building new infrastructure at the mine 155 km north of Prince George. It also changes the transportation route, raises the tailings storage dam height by 26 metres to 1,121 metres above sea level and updates the reclamation and closure plan.

Centerra shares rose 2% to C$20.85 apiece on Tuesday morning in Toronto, valuing the company at C$4.2 billion ($3 billion). The stock has traded in a 12-month range of C$7.72 to C$21.27.

2045 life possible

The extension comes almost four months after a pre-feasibility study envisioned Mount Milligan could operate until 2045 based on raising gold and copper reserves by 52% and production by 12%.

The EAO decision follows a nine-month review of Centerra subsidiary Thompson Creek Metals’ application to continue mining at the site. That review assessed potential effects on nearby communities and First Nations, water and fish habitats, air quality and noise and considered safety risks.

Economic benefits

If all other authorizations are green lit, the mine expansion will generate more jobs during construction in addition to the 600 people already employed at Mount Milligan, the EAO said. It could also contribute as much as C$450 million in economic benefits to the region.

Mount Milligan, ranked as a mid-tier project by reserve size and grade compared to other mines in BC, had already received a two-year extension through a deal in February 2024, in which Royal Gold (Nasdaq: RGLD) is to pay $125 million in cost support for its share of gold and copper from the mine.

Royal Gold strikes deal with Centerra Gold to boost Mount Milligan mine life

Mount Milligan could produce 150,000 oz. of gold and 69 million lb. of copper annually until 2042, according to the recent pre-feasibility study.

It hosts proven and probable gold reserves of 483.2 million tonnes grading 0.28 gram gold per tonne for 4.4 million oz. of contained gold. Red metal reserves grade at 0.16% copper for 1.7 billion pounds.

>>Before you read about our December winners, add your voice to January’s benchmark. Vote Now – It takes 60 seconds<<

Agnico Eagle Mines (TSX, NYSE: AEM), Aya Gold & Silver (TSX: AYA) and Gunnison Copper (TSX: GCU)
led the December Global Mining Power Rankings as investor sentiment, firmer commodity prices and clear 2025 execution separated winners from peers.

The December rankings highlight companies viewed by investors, analysts and industry insiders as delivering operational consistency, financial momentum and strategic progress across market capitalizations. Sentiment played a larger role this month, underpinned by improving balance sheets, steady project delivery and supportive metals prices, particularly for gold, silver and copper.

These rankings are not paid sponsorships or promotional placements. They are determined entirely by votes from the MINING.COM community, reflecting real-time market sentiment rather than advertising influence.

Below, we break down the top performers across all market caps and celebrate the leaders driving mining forward:

Large-cap winner: Agnico Eagle (11.9% of votes) The Northern Lights over the Meliadine mine in the Kivalliq district of Nunavut. Agnico Eagle photo.

Canada’s Agnico Eagle (TSX, NYSE: AEM) once again topped the large-cap category, supported by steady production across Canada, Australia, Mexico and Finland, disciplined cost control and a strong third quarter that kept the stock ahead of global peers. Investors continued to favour the company’s predictable operating profile in a year marked by inflationary pressure across the mining sector.

Shares have gained 116% in Toronto and 125% in New York over the past year as Agnico reaffirmed its 2025 production outlook of 3.3 to 3.5 million oz of gold and advanced the Canadian Malartic underground expansion on schedule and within guidance. Balance sheet strength also remained a key draw.

Agnico broadened its strategic footprint in 2025 with the launch of Avenir Minerals Limited to pursue roughly $80 million in early-stage critical minerals investments, following its $180 million investment in Perpetua Resources (NASDAQ, TSX: PPTA) and the Stibnite gold-antimony project in Idaho. Through the first nine months of 2025, the company generated about $3.1 billion in free cash flow, putting it on an annualized run rate approaching $6.8 billion. That cash flow supported higher dividends, $1 billion in share buybacks for 2025 and full debt elimination by the fourth quarter.

“2025 has been an exceptional year for gold on many fronts,” president and CEO Ammar Al-Joundi said. “This renewed distinction from MINING.COM is a demonstration of Agnico Eagle’s focus on operational performance, cost control, and disciplined capital management. We look forward to continuing building on this performance in 2026.”

With gold prices strengthening further in the second half of 2025, analysts expect strong financial performance to extend into 2026, positioning Agnico for continued shareholder returns.

Notables:

2. Rio Tinto (8.1%): Firm iron ore prices and steady global steel demand underpinned sentiment.

3. Newmont (6.7%), with investors weighing portfolio optimization and integration progress following asset sales and strategic refocusing during 2025.

Small-cap winner: Aya Gold & Silver (6.4% of votes) Zgounder  silver mine. (Image courtesy of Aya Gold & Silver.)

Aya Gold & Silver, a Morocco-focused silver producer, captured the small-cap title as soaring silver prices and operational milestones reshaped its investment case in 2025. The company benefited from silver’s roughly 160% price surge during the year, driven by industrial demand, safe-haven buying and supply constraints.

Aya moved past a short-seller report alleging that the company had overstated the resource and value of the Zgounder mine, its only producing asset. The asset achieved commercial production in early 2025 following a major expansion, positioning Aya as a low-cost producer.

The company also released a preliminary economic assessment for its Boumadine polymetallic project, showing rapid capital payback under current metals prices. Aya owns 85% of Boumadine and envisions a multi-pit, multi-underground operation over an 11-year mine life.

Notables:

2. Snowline Gold Corp (6.4%) (TSX: SGD; OTCQX: SNWGF) tied with Aya, but was placed second due to its slightly lower market capitalization. The company delivered a total return of about 209% in 2025, far outpacing gold’s gains. The Yukon-focused explorer advanced its Rogue project, where drilling at the Valley deposit extended mineralization beyond 1 km, and graduated to the TSX in November, a key corporate milestone.

3. Taseko Mines (4.8%). One of this Canadian miner’s biggest milestones in 2025 was continuing to advance the Florence Copper project in Arizona toward commercial production. After nearly two years of construction, Florence’s wells began pumping in 2025, with first copper cathode production expected in early 2026. The milestone marks Taseko’s shift from reliance on a single asset toward becoming a multi-asset copper producer alongside its Gibraltar Copper mine in British Columbia. The company also released an updated technical study for Yellowhead Copper and reached a landmark agreement with the Tŝilhqot’in Nation and the province of British Columbia on the New Prosperity project, helping clarify a potential development pathway.

“2025 was a great year for Taseko,” CEO Stuart McDonald said. “Major milestones achieved at Florence Copper in Arizona contributed significantly to Taseko’s share price appreciation over the past 12 months. First copper cathode production from Florence Copper is expected in early 2026, with ramp-up to full production over the following year. This new operation, together with strong production from Gibraltar, ideally positions Taseko to benefit from current copper price momentum.”

McDonald believes Taseko is quickly becoming “a major North American-based copper producer” with near- and long-term growth opportunities. “We appreciate the recognition from MINING.COM readers as being one of the top small-cap mining stocks.”

Micro-cap winner: Gunnison Copper (7.2% of votes) First copper at Gunnison project. (Image courtesy of Gunnison Copper.)

Gunnison Copper topped the micro-cap category after achieving a defining milestone in 2025 by producing its first pure copper cathode at the Johnson Camp mine in Arizona. First sales followed in September, formally transitioning the company from developer to operating producer, with commercial output reached ahead of schedule.

With its made-in-America copper, Gunnison supports domestic supply at a time when US infrastructure and electrification demand is accelerating. Gunnison also received about $13.9 million in US Department of Energy Section 48C tax credits in 2025, strengthening its funding position for expanded domestic copper production.

“We’re honoured to be recognized with this achievement,” Melissa Mackie, director of investor relations and communications said. “It reflects a year of disciplined execution and meaningful progress, including first production of copper cathode at our Johnson Camp mine, continued advancements at our flagship open-pit Gunnison project, debt repayment deleveraging our balance sheet, and backing from the US Department of Energy and Rio Tinto’s Nuton LLC,” Mackie said. “Located in Arizona’s copper belt, we’re proud to be America’s newest copper producer providing domestic supply chains. This achievement is a testament to the dedication of our team and the momentum we’ve built as we continue to deliver on our strategy and create value for stakeholders.”

Notables:

2. Sidney Resources Corp. (6.78%) The Idaho-focused explorer expanded its footprint in the historic Warren Mining District through the acquisition of Unity GoldSilver Mines assets early in the year and staked roughly 7,600 acres of new claims in December. The company advanced gold, silver and critical minerals exploration while continuing development of its proprietary laser mining technology.

“We are deeply grateful to the MINING.COM community for this recognition,” CEO Sean-Rae Zalewski said. “It reflects growing confidence in our team’s steady progress, from recent claim expansions in the Warren District to encouraging rare earth and critical mineral results, alongside continued development of our laser mining technology.”

Zalewski noted that while this recognition was encouraging, the company remained focused on building long-term value through disciplined exploration and responsible development.

3. Xtra Energy (6.78%) The micro-cap explorer spent 2025 advancing early-stage critical mineral and energy-related assets, focusing on asset consolidation, permitting and positioning for drilling as investor interest in domestic resource supply chains increased.

“We appreciate the recognition,” the company said. “This acknowledgment highlights Xtra Energy’s progress in advancing US-based antimony resources at a time when secure domestic supply is increasingly important. We remain focused on steady execution and technical validation.”

Registered nurses and veterans will hold a rally in the Bronx on Thursday, Jan. 8, to denounce the Trump administration’s plans to cut tens of thousands of jobs from the VA. The VA informed NNOC/NNU that 138 positions will be eliminated in the Bronx, and 245 positions will be cut across Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens. 

Growing up in Türkiye, I saw up close how decisions about energy were usually made by a small, powerful group – most of the time putting profit before people and the planet. Over the years, I came to believe that real energy change wouldn’t come from the top down, but from communities themselves. That belief is what led me to spend the last 17 years with the Troya Environmental Association, working to grow renewable energy cooperatives and put power – literally and politically – back into people’s hands.

Oral Kaya at Troya Enviornmental Association

 

In the last few years, Türkiye’s renewable energy scene has changed fast. By September 2025, the country’s total installed electricity capacity reached 121,418 MW, and our solar capacity doubled in just two and a half years. That’s huge. It shows clearly that Türkiye has massive renewable potential, and that we could be even more ambitious if we chose to be.

But big numbers alone don’t tell the full story. The real question is: who benefits from this growth? This is where energy cooperatives really matter. A 2025 report by 350 Türkiye shows that while the country aims to reach 120 GW of combined solar and wind capacity, getting there in a fair way – not just pumping out megawatts – depends on active citizen participation. Without people at the center, the energy transition risks becoming just another business model for the elites.

Right now, energy cooperatives in Türkiye face real challenges. The rules are complicated, the permits take forever, and the system clearly favors large investors. Even when communities come together to start a coop, getting grid access, licenses, and financing can be slow, frustrating, and uncertain. Many great ideas struggle just to survive.

Troya Environmental Association meeting with communities in Türkiye, July 2025.

 

That’s exactly why I joined the Empower Our Future campaign led by 350 Türkiye. This campaign is all about strengthening community power in the energy transition – supporting local groups and citizens to take control of how energy is produced and used. It pushes for fair rules for cooperatives, awareness around community energy, and a future where clean power isn’t owned by just a few, but shared by many.

When I think about the future I want for Türkiye, I don’t just imagine more solar panels and wind turbines. I imagine neighbourhoods and towns running their own microgrids. I imagine transparent, democratic energy systems where people actually get a say – and where the money generated stays in the community instead of flowing to distant corporations.

To make that future real, we need strong laws that support cooperatives, make licensing and grid access simpler, and open the door to real community ownership of energy.  And we will get there – I’m confident we will make renewable energy cooperatives possible, accessible and easy to set up in Türkiye soon.

Energy is not just a product to be sold. It’s a public good. And as I see more panels going up on rooftops, more local projects taking shape, and more people realizing they have a right to be part of these decisions, I become even more hopeful. That’s what keeps me going – and why I’ll keep pushing for a people-powered energy future!

The post Energy is not just a product to be sold – It’s a public good appeared first on 350.

Copper prices surged to a fresh record on Tuesday as supply disruptions and US trade uncertainty continues to fuel a sharp early-year rally across base metals.

Benchmark three-month copper on the London Metal Exchange rose 1.8% to $13,225 a tonne in official open outcry trading, after earlier jumping as much as 3.1% to an all-time high of $13,387.50. The red metal has gained about 6.6% so far in 2026, having crossed $13,000 for the first time on Monday following a 42% surge last year.

Nickel also climbed, reaching a near 15-month high above $18,000 a tonne, supported by Indonesia’s curbs on mine output.

Copper’s momentum has been building since late 2025, when prices posted their largest annual dollar increase in at least a decade, Albert Mackenzie, copper analyst at Benchmark Minerals says. Much of the price moves came in December, when copper jumped about 14%, quickly pushing past $12,000 and then $13,000 in a matter of weeks.

Click on chart for live prices.

Supply concerns have been a key driver, Mackenzie notes, alongside expectations that artificial intelligence (AI) and the energy transition will lift long-term demand. 

A strike at Capstone Copper’s (TSX: CS) (ASX: CSC) Mantoverde copper-gold mine in northern Chile has renewed fears of disruptions, while Chinese producer Tongling Nonferrous has reported delays to the second phase of its Mirador mine in conflict-ridden Ecuador.

Market participants also point to US rhetoric around potential copper tariffs, which has drawn material into the country and disrupted global flows, adding to price pressure.

Still, the speed of the rally is prompting some traders to question whether current levels are justified, Mackenzie says. As prices rise, debate is growing over whether sentiment and speculative inflows are beginning to outpace underlying fundamentals, even as supply risks and demand trends remain broadly supportive.

Canada’s Lucara Diamond (TSX: LUC) is pressing ahead with its plan to extend the life of the Karowe mine in Botswana after an updated feasibility study showed the underground project could recover 4.5 million carats over a 10-year mine life.

The reviewed study reinforces Lucara’s strategy to expand Karowe despite a rapid global downturn in the diamond industry marked by halted operations, falling revenues and rising competition from lab-grown stones that have cast doubt on diamonds’ long-term appeal.

Open-pit mining at Karowe is expected to end before June, after which surface stockpiled reserves will be processed while underground operations ramp up to commercial production, the company said.

“We look forward to continue recovering large, exceptional diamonds from the underground project,” president and CEO William Lamb said, noting Karowe is the only mine globally to have recovered nine diamonds weighing more than 1,000 carats each.

Lab-grown gems put squeeze on diamond mining industry

The underground expansion is expected to generate revenue and cash flow through 2038, with a pre-production capital cost of $779 million, of which Lucara has already spent $436 million over the past five years. The remaining $343 million is expected to be funded through operating cash flow, along with potential equity or debt financing, as the company works with existing lenders and its major shareholder to evaluate options.

The project carries an after-tax net present value of $432 million. Once underground production begins in the first half of 2028, Lucara expects the operation to generate more than $1.3 billion in net income over its life.

Lamb said the mine plan targets the highest-value domain of the South Lobe of the AK6 kimberlite, which continues at depth below the open pit. The underground operation is designed to support a 2.85-million-tonne-a-year mine and processing plant as surface mining winds down in the first half of this year.

Massive diamonds source

Since it began operations, Karowe — which means precious stone in the local language — has produced some of the world’s most remarkable diamonds. These include the 1,758-carat Sewelô in 2019, the 1,109-carat Lesedi La Rona in 2015, and the 813-carat Constellation, also recovered in 2015. 

Karowe has also yielded Botswana’s largest fancy pink diamond to date, the Boitumelo.

The operation remains one of the world’s highest-margin diamond mines, producing an average of 300,000 high-value carats each year.