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New Rules, Old Questions: What the UN’s Latest Carbon Market Decisions Mean for Forests and Communities

Global Forest Coalition - 4 hours 54 min ago
New standards for cookstove carbon credits promise greater environmental integrity. But can better accounting rules address the deeper problems of carbon markets?

By: Sophia Arias, Rahi Kumbar, Bob Yang, undergraduate students at the University of Southern California with the Gibson Climate Justice Lab

Can carbon credits for improved cookstoves in Myanmar really protect forests and combat global climate change? 

The United Nations’ new carbon market is betting that it can. But a growing number of civil society organizations are questioning whether the promises behind these credits can be trusted. 

On October 9, the UN’s Article 6.4 Supervisory Body concluded its twenty-third meeting (SBM023) by approving two new methodologies for generating carbon credits from cleaner, more efficient household cookstoves. These credits are marketed, in part, on the claim that cleaner stoves reduce the wood harvested for cooking fuel. 

That same week, over 130 civil society groups were still waiting for an answer to their call to suspend credits under the new mechanism, which faces serious concerns over human rights and carbon accounting.   

Against this backdrop, student researchers with the Gibson Climate Justice Lab (GCJLab) at the University of Southern California ask how SBM023 addressed, or failed to address, the problems civil society organizations have repeatedly identified.  

Can improved cookstoves really protect forests?

The promise behind cookstove projects sounds straightforward: households use less firewood, fewer trees are harvested, and fewer greenhouse gases enter the atmosphere.

But the relationship between cooking fuel and forest protection is considerably more complicated. 

Fuelwood may come from multiple sources, including deadwood, agricultural residues, managed woodlots, or natural forests. Reducing household wood consumption does not automatically translate into an equivalent reduction in deforestation, yet carbon-crediting methodologies depend on assumptions about how much fuelwood would otherwise have been harvested and whether that biomass would have regenerated. 

There are also questions about how emissions reductions are measured. Distributing an improved cookstove does not guarantee that households will use it consistently or abandon traditional cooking practices. Overestimating these changes can generate credits for emissions reductions that were never realized. 

Beyond the accounting concerns, these projects risk overlooking the traditional knowledge, livelihoods and customary forest management practices of Indigenous and local communities, and despite the UNFCCC’s claims that cleaner cookstoves “empower women,” they rely almost entirely on the unpaid labor of women who have very little say in project design and implementation, and receive no share of the financial benefits.

The issue is not whether households should have access to cleaner cooking technologies. They should. The question is whether changes in their cooking practices can then be used to justify continued emissions elsewhere. 

New rules, old problems: What changed at SBM023?

Clean cooking methodologies were at the heart of SBM023’s agenda. With numerous projects being grandfathered into the new systems, transitioning them to comply with new standards was the main priority. 

At SBM023, the Body approved two new methodologies for generating carbon credits from household cooking activities, which will replace existing CDM methodologies. The first, Cooking Energy Transitions, covers shifts toward lower-emission household cooking technologies and fuels. The second, Energy Efficiency Measures in Household Cooking, addresses improvements in cooking efficiency, including technologies that reduce the amount of biomass needed to prepare food. While the UNFCCC has yet to officially implement either methodology, they found that focusing on improvements in cooking efficiency would result in greater reversal buffer deductions from credits compared to historical baselines.

Compared with the Myanmar project’s AMS-II.G calculations (which used a 10% baseline improvement in efficiency and existing monitoring rules for continued traditional stove use), A6.4-AMM-005 overhauls several core variables. It introduces a performance-based baseline benchmark, requires household fuel measurements covering all cooking devices in use, and mandates reversal-buffer contributions that are immediately cancelled. At the same time, it raises the fuelwood CO2 emission factor from 63.7 to 112tCO2/TJ and incorporates non-CO2 emissions into the calculation. Because these methodological changes pull in opposite directions, determining how the Myanmar project’s credit volume would change under A6.4-AMM-005 is not possible without a full recalculation using household-level measurement data and a project-specific reversal-risk assessment.

Neither is entirely new, as they both build on earlier carbon-crediting approaches under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, the carbon trading predecessor to the Paris Agreement.

The Body also adopted new sampling and survey requirements intended to improve the reliability of emissions calculations. These changes matter, because carbon markets have often faced criticism for issuing credits that exaggerate emissions reductions. 

However, several decisions illustrate the limits of these technical reforms. 

For example, the Supervisory Body granted the household efficiency methodology an exemption from a downward adjustment to credited emissions reductions in the second and subsequent calendar years. It also requested further work on how uncertainty should be treated when project developers use alternative or measured data. 

Taken together the range of uncertainties coming from these decisions pose a risk of overcrediting and detrimental harm to the climate.

A woman using an improved cookstove in Myanmar. Soneva Foundation/Flickr

What happens when promised benefits do not last?

SBM023 also addressed another important issue: reversal risk.

In carbon markets, a reversal usually occurs when a previously credited climate benefit is subsequently lost. For example, carbon sequestered in a forest can be released when trees die, burn, or are cut down.

But cookstove projects raise a different question.

Unlike forest-based offsets which draw down and store carbon from the atmosphere, improved cookstoves generally claim to avoid emissions altogether by reducing fuel consumption. If households stop using the improved cookstoves, future emissions savings (which have already been modeled out) may disappear.  

Rules designed to protect stored carbon, such as those for forest carbon removal projects, may not then be appropriate for every type of emissions-reduction or avoidance project. 

At SBM023, the Supervisory Body adopted a new risk-reversal tool and requested that its expert panel continue monitoring evidence that could justify revising the risk factors applied to activities reducing non-renewable biomass consumption.

It also acknowledged unresolved accounting problems associated with the carbon market’s buffer pool. Buffer pools function by reserving a set amount of carbon credits from each project that are not sold. These credits serve as a ‘buffer’ if other credits in the project face reversal risks or fail to meet efficiency standards. Rather than resolving these problems though, the Body requested further analysis of alternative approaches and their implications for national climate accounting.

For cookstove credits, the practical test is whether credible emissions estimates are backed by arrangements capable of addressing reversals. The effectiveness of these rules will depend on how both requirements are met in practice. These questions about technical credibility also raise the issue of whose evidence informs the rules.

Myanmar exposes the limits of technical reform

The controversy surrounding Myanmar’s cookstove project makes these concerns especially urgent. 

In October, more than 130 civil society groups called for the suspension of all carbon credits from the project, citing concerns about the credits’ integrity and their connections to institutions operating under Myanmar’s military junta. 

Since the military seized power in February 2021, Myanmar has experienced widespread violence, repression, and serious human rights violations.

This context prompts serious questions about the involvement of state institutions controlled by the junta in the cookstove project, alongside questions about whether meaningful oversight, verification, and community participation – all required under Art. 6.4 mechanisms – are even possible under these conditions. 

In addition to being under junta control, carbon credit generation in Myanmar is being administered by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) rather than a non-nationally affiliated body.  With clean cookstoves serving as aid for underprivileged communities in Myanmar, many civil society groups question whether their MONREC can be trusted to evenly distribute cookstoves through the Dry Zone Greening Department (DZGD) and other regional departments while MONREC is under the illegal control of the junta. 

These are not issues that can be solved simply by improving emissions calculations. A carbon crediting project can satisfy technical requirements while still violating environmental, social and cultural norms and rules. 

Although the Supervisory Body formally addressed some stakeholder inputs at SBM023, they did not address this appeal directly and ultimately chose not to revoke any credits from the cookstove project. Rather, they revised risk reversal assessments to account for “human-induced reversal risk.”

As a result of this controversy, there was some reluctance among the Supervisory Body to even account for so much reversal risk at all, since it can decrease the worth of clean cooking credits by as much as 60%.

Furthermore, an interesting trend throughout SBM023 was the brevity of stakeholder consideration. As a whole, stakeholder input was initially presented but not followed up on later in negotiations. Outside input on cookstoves and forest protection was incorporated during Monday’s discussion but day-by-day, stakeholder input was hardly discussed past the Secretariat’s opening. 

Final Thoughts

SBM023 repeated a familiar failure of international negotiations: stakeholder input was treated as an afterthought. Time pressure, claims of irrelevance and members’ personal opinions crowded out serious engagement with what stakeholders had submitted. Forest-dependent and cookstove-using communities are among those most exposed to climate impacts, yet their views were not at the center of the decisions that affect them. The perspectives that carried the room were mostly those of credit-purchasing countries, not of the communities that generate the credits.

The way input was handled made this worse. The secretariat presented stakeholder statements without verifying them, attributing them or providing supporting evidence, so the Body had little basis to weigh them fairly. For example, Olga Gassan-Zade, the Chair of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body, noted that in response to the Methodological Expert Panel’s (MEP) request for views on credit non-permanence, eleven statements were presented, six in support and five opposed , yet each represented anywhere from ten to 100 people. Presenting them as equal in weight further obscures forest-dwelling communities and civil society in global debate.

The substantive outcomes follow the same pattern. The Body tightened sampling rules and added reversal-risk safeguards, but then weakened those safeguards with exemptions and postponed hard questions on uncertainty and buffer pools. Its refusal to suspend the junta-linked Myanmar cookstove project shows that technical compliance cannot substitute for human rights and political legitimacy. No amount of methodological fine-tuning can fix a market still designed around the priorities of credit buyers rather than the realities of forest-dependent communities.

Categories: G1. Progressive Green

Henri Deterding, Hitler and the Historical Press Record

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 15:10

A documented English-language source audit | 15 November 2026 AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION — RESEARCH DOSSIER By the Donovan–Shell Archive | Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT

EDITORIAL STATUS: Interim source audit, not a complete translation of the ZBW clipping collection. The original ZBW image viewer could not be inspected in this research session. The statements below are based on the independently accessible texts and reproductions specifically identified. Historical allegations are not converted into established facts.

Introduction

Sir Henri Deterding, the former head of Royal Dutch, has a well-documented history of intense anti-communism and increasing sympathy towards Nazi Germany. The critical historical question is not simply whether newspapers linked him to Adolf Hitler, but which alleged meetings, transactions and donations are supported by independent contemporary documentation. Press reports of private negotiations are evidence that claims circulated; they are not themselves proof that a negotiation occurred exactly as described.

The German National Library of Economics (ZBW) retains a dossier of press cuttings relating to Deterding. The Donovan–Shell Archive reproduced many scans in 2018, labelled DOC 1–72 with gaps, and published several preliminary English translations. Not all scans have readable text available in the web-accessible rendition. This audit avoids pretending that a complete translation has been completed.

Main finding: meetings between Deterding and Hitler

March 1933 — an audience request refused

The Shell-commissioned corporate history by historians Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden says that Deterding sought an audience with Hitler in March 1933 and was rebuffed. This is a specific claim about March; it does not settle whether Deterding met Hitler subsequently.

Source: A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1 (2007), pp. 477, 483, as reproduced at https://royaldutchshellgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ShellHistory36P.V1.May2015Comp.pdf

November 1933 — Deterding reportedly claimed a meeting

The same corporate history reports that Deterding said in November 1933 he had recently met Hitler. The historians characterize this as a claim rather than independent confirmation. The statement should therefore be attributed to Deterding until a corroborating meeting diary or official record is located.

Source: A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1, p. 477; source above

October 1934 — a newspaper alleges a four-day visit

The Daily Gleaner, 29 October 1934, reproduces a London-datelined account saying Deterding had recently visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden for four days to discuss a petroleum-distribution monopoly. It alleges disagreement over first-year oil credit, protected roadside distribution stations and reinvestment of frozen German funds. The report describes negotiations breaking down; it is attributed, not a verified transcript or proof of an agreement. The Donovan–Shell Archive also identifies reporting in the New York Times and Montreal Gazette. These could reflect a syndicated source rather than independent eyewitness corroboration.

Source: The Daily Gleaner report reproduced at https://royaldutchshellplc.com/1934/10/29/sir-henri-deterding-of-royal-dutch-shell-4-day-meeting-with-hitler/

Interpretation

The rejected March 1933 request and alleged October 1934 visit concern different dates, so neither automatically disproves the other. But a published 1934 story cannot, on its own, establish that Deterding met Hitler on the specified occasion or that any monopoly agreement existed. Access to the original diplomatic files, Hitler appointment records and the earliest version of the press dispatch would strengthen the finding.

Source: Comparison of sources above

The most significant newly verified German document

4 January 1937 — Nazi press instruction concerning Deterding

An edited collection of Nazi-era press directives reproduces an instruction dated 4 January 1937, archival identifier ZSg. 101/9/5/Nr. 4. It attributes to Hermann Göring a description of Deterding’s support as a generous foundation. The order states that Deterding had settled in Germany, married a German woman, and made ten million available for importing food because of his admiration for Hitler. It also reports gifts of a large Mecklenburg estate to the Reich Food Estate and a large workers’ settlement in Hamburg. Deterding allegedly did not want public thanks; newspapers were told not to publish further material on him unless the German News Bureau supplied it. These are the claims recorded in the regime’s internal press instruction; the instruction is strong evidence of how Nazi officials represented the assistance, but it is not independent proof of every asserted earlier gift. The currency of the “ten million” is not stated in this particular directive; contemporary reporting described ten million Dutch guilders.

Source: NS-Presseanweisungen der Vorkriegszeit, vol. 5/I (1998), edited by Karen Peter, document 8, printed p. 3. https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9783110964158_A31053539/preview-9783110964158_A31053539.pdf

English-language findings from accessible ZBW-related scans

DOC 5 — Frankfurter Zeitung, 27 January 1931

The archive’s existing English rendering describes rumours that Deterding was negotiating a gasoline monopoly in exchange for a $150 million loan. A German report called the claim implausible, while Deterding described his visit as almost entirely private and denied financial negotiations. This clipping is evidence of early rumours and explicit denials, not evidence that such a loan was agreed.

Source: 2018 annotated ZBW scan collection: https://royaldutchshellplc.com/2018/08/01/1930s-german-newspaper-clippings-about-sir-henri-deterding/

DOC 9 — Berliner Tageblatt, 19 September 1934

The archive identifies the headline and subject as Deterding’s claims concerning Soviet-expropriated oilfields. A full English translation of the scanned body is not available in the accessible page text and has not been created here. Its significance lies in the documented continuing prominence of the Soviet oil-property dispute.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

DOC 10 — report of Deterding travelling to Berlin

An existing short translation cites an Agence Économique et Financière report about Deterding travelling to Berlin. A Dutch newspaper reportedly sought confirmation at The Hague and was told that the alleged trip was not known. No meeting with Hitler is established by the available extract. The underlying article date and precise newspaper citation remain to be checked on the scan.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

DOC 15 — Berliner Tageblatt, 30 June 1936

The existing translation reports rumours that Deterding would retire and settle in the Netherlands and that Shell representatives disputed the retirement account. It does not report a Hitler meeting. The wording in the 2018 rendering is imperfect and should be checked against the original before being reissued as a verbatim translation.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

DOC 16 — Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 16 July 1936

The previously translated article marks the fortieth anniversary of Deterding’s association with Royal Dutch and recounts his commercial strategy, early Asian oil markets, the Asiatic Petroleum Company and competition with Standard Oil. It is biographical and does not independently establish political meetings.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

DOC 72 — French-language retrospective on Deterding

The 2018 archive publishes an English extract characterising Hitler as a defence against Bolshevism from Deterding’s perspective and mentioning visits to Mussolini and Pope Pius XI. This is a retrospective characterisation, not a verified account of meetings with Hitler. The source publication and date should be checked on the original scan.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

Other important sources outside the ZBW dossier

British diplomatic intelligence and the limits of the evidence

The Shell-commissioned corporate history reports that British ambassador Sir Eric Phipps heard in June 1934 that Deterding had promised a year’s supply of products on credit to Germany in an emergency. British Foreign Office specialists doubted the rumour, and the authors found no corroborating records in company archives. They cite Alfred Rosenberg’s diary for a separate May 1934 proposed oil-storage arrangement that ultimately failed. These differentiated claims matter: contemporary diplomatic hearsay, a Nazi official’s diary and proof of a completed contract are different kinds of evidence.

Source: A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1, pp. 484–485; PDF above

December 1936 — the Dutch food-purchase scheme

Contemporary British and international newspapers reported that Deterding made funds available to buy surplus Dutch agricultural produce for shipment to Germany. A key question is the commercial flow of food and the destination of sale proceeds, not merely whether the scheme was described as charitable. The corporate history states the proceeds went to the Nazi Winterhilfswerk. That constitutes a clearer documented link to Nazi-organised activity than uncorroborated rumours of earlier secret financing.

Source: https://royaldutchshellgroup.com/1936/12/12/news-reports-of-sir-henri-deterding-food-donations-to-nazi-germany/ ; corporate history PDF above

Corporate history offers an important counterpoint

The official company history does not deny Deterding’s pro-Nazi sympathies. It does, however, state that large pre-1933 donations and alleged monopoly-for-cash deals remained unsubstantiated in the archives its authors examined. That position should be represented accurately while comparing it with the independently sourced contemporary press and government directives.

Source: A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1, pp. 477–485; PDF above

What can safely be deduced

1. Deterding was demonstrably sympathetic to Nazi Germany, particularly from an anti-Bolshevik perspective; the corporate historians also document encounters with senior Nazi officials including Rosenberg and Göring.

2. The 1936 food-purchase arrangement and the January 1937 Nazi press directive provide firmer documentary evidence of material support to Nazi-era German institutions than allegations of earlier clandestine funding.

3. At least one published newspaper account alleges a four-day meeting between Deterding and Hitler in 1934. The evidence examined here is insufficient to confirm that account independently or determine exactly what occurred.

4. A rejected meeting request in March 1933 does not negate a possible meeting later in 1933 or 1934, but reports should not be combined into a categorical claim that multiple meetings have been definitively established.

5. Deterding’s personal financial support must not automatically be described as an authorised corporate donation by Royal Dutch Shell. The persons, legal entities, funds and date of each transaction require individual attribution.

Outstanding work needed for a comprehensive translation edition

The original ZBW folder and its image manifest were not retrievable through the research connection. Therefore the full texts and dates of the remaining labelled entries cannot be established, and this dossier must not be advertised as a translation of all 69 accessible scans. A complete edition would need the original page images supplied in an accessible package or export, then item-by-item transcription, translation, source identification, duplicate checking and copyright clearance where necessary.

Only limited extracts and original commentary are reproduced here. Some historical newspaper articles may remain protected by copyright; hosting the scans publicly does not by itself grant redistribution or full-translation rights. The recommended publication method is to link to originals and provide sourced English summaries unless reproduction rights or public-domain status are confirmed.

Source and corrections policy

Article dates are dates of original source publication wherever established; dates of archive web posts and book editions are separately identified. Contemporary newspaper allegations, official directives, corporate historiography and editorial deductions are labelled separately. Corrections and authenticated alternative records are welcome. The archive is independent of Shell plc and the findings do not constitute a judicial determination of corporate liability.

Principal live sources

ZBW Deterding dossier: https://purl.org/pressemappe20/folder/pe/003922

2018 Donovan–Shell scan index: https://royaldutchshellplc.com/2018/08/01/1930s-german-newspaper-clippings-about-sir-henri-deterding/

1934 Daily Gleaner report: https://royaldutchshellplc.com/1934/10/29/sir-henri-deterding-of-royal-dutch-shell-4-day-meeting-with-hitler/

1937 German press-directives edition: https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9783110964158_A31053539/preview-9783110964158_A31053539.pdf

Shell historical volume 1: https://royaldutchshellgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ShellHistory36P.V1.May2015Comp.pdf

International 1936 food-aid news references: https://royaldutchshellgroup.com/1936/12/12/news-reports-of-sir-henri-deterding-food-donations-to-nazi-germany/

Henri Deterding, Hitler and the Historical Press Record was first posted on November 16, 2026 at 12:10 am.
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Nigeria’s Plan to Restart Oil in Ogoniland Hits a Consent Test — A Documentary Investigation into Shell’s Unfinished Legacy

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 14:00

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

15 November 2026

Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT.

Thirty-one years after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight fellow Ogoni campaigners, Nigeria is again attempting to restore petroleum production in Ogoniland. But a committee involved in negotiations with the federal government has refused to sign a proposed agreement without further community consultation. A separate Ogoni organisation has rejected the arrangements more fundamentally. Government statements, recent reporting, Shell’s corporate disclosures and the United Nations’ original environmental assessment reveal why the dispute is about much more than restarting oil wells — and why Shell’s withdrawal from Nigerian onshore production has not erased its historical connection with the controversy.

An agreement that has not yet been agreed

On 9 November 2026, the Ogoni Dialogue Committee held a meeting in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, to consider proposals for the resumption of petroleum operations in Ogoniland.

Thirty-five committee members reportedly attended.

The meeting produced a significant decision.

The committee would not sign the proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the Nigerian federal government until credible community congresses had been held across the four Ogoni local government areas: Eleme, Gokana, Khana and Tai.

The committee’s position was reported by Nigerian newspapers including The Punch and subsequently Premium Times, and by Channels Television.

The King of Eleme, Philip Obele, explained that the committee would not sign until the proposed congresses had taken place under arrangements approved by the committee and organised by elected local government chairmen.

This was more than a routine request for consultation.

It established a condition that the committee itself considered necessary before entering into an agreement over the proposed restoration of petroleum activities.

The government may wish to restart production.

Some committee members support that objective.

But the latest meeting demonstrates that support for the general objective is not equivalent to approval of the particular agreement.

Contemporary reporting: The Punch, 10 November 2026 — Oil resumption: Ogoni leaders demand consent, FG action.

See also Premium Times, 11 November 2026 — Ogoni leaders withhold consent for oil resumption.

Punch Newspapers+1

 

The government’s earlier declaration of progress

The November decision deserves particular attention when compared with the government’s own earlier statements.

On 26 September 2025, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited published an official statement concerning the proposed re-entry into Ogoniland.

The announcement followed the presentation of a report by the Presidential Committee on Ogoni Consultations.

President Bola Tinubu acknowledged the suffering experienced by the Ogoni people.

NNPC Group Chief Executive Officer Bashir Bayo Ojulari described the development as a historic opportunity for reconciliation and national progress.

The statement presented the proposed return as a means of combining petroleum development with environmental protection, infrastructure improvements and community benefits.

NNPC also credited the National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, and the presidential consultation committee chaired by Professor Don Baridam with helping establish the framework for dialogue.

The company emphasised that restarting operations would require collaboration with affected communities.

Those were important public commitments.

They were not, however, proof that every Ogoni community had approved a final agreement.

Nor did the September statement establish that commercial oil production had actually resumed.

The distinction matters.

A government announcement celebrating progress towards reconciliation is not the same thing as an executed agreement accepted by the affected communities.

The November committee decision now provides evidence that significant questions concerning consent and implementation remain unresolved.

Primary source: NNPC Ltd, 26 September 2025 — Ogoni Re-entry is a Beacon of Reconciliation through Collaboration.

NNPC

 

The Ogoni Dialogue Committee is not simply rejecting oil production

It would be inaccurate to interpret the committee’s November decision as unanimous opposition to petroleum development.

The publicly reported statements indicate a more complicated position.

Rev. Monsignor Pius Kii, a senior committee participant and Judicial Vicar of the Catholic Diocese of Port Harcourt, explained that the committee supported the government’s efforts to resume petroleum activities for the benefit of Nigeria and the Ogoni people.

The committee also intended to continue harmonising the proposed Memorandum of Understanding.

Local government chairmen had been instructed to engage communities before the proposed congresses.

According to the reporting, progress had already been made on those consultations.

The committee therefore appears to be attempting to establish a process through which an agreement could acquire sufficient legitimacy to proceed.

That is materially different from announcing that petroleum production must never resume.

The position can be summarised accurately:

The committee supports continued negotiations and, according to its representatives, supports the objective of restarting petroleum operations.

It does not consider the proposed agreement ready for signature.

It wants further community approval before proceeding.

Whether that approval can be obtained remains unknown.

Nor have the publicly examined reports established precisely how the congresses will be organised, who will participate, how decisions will be recorded or whether each area must approve the same terms.

Those details will matter if the process is to provide a credible foundation for any eventual agreement.

A separate Ogoni organisation rejects the proposed compromise

The Dialogue Committee is not the only organisation claiming to represent Ogoni interests.

On 8 November 2026, the Green Ogoni Initiative, describing itself as a grassroots movement involving Ogoni people in the diaspora, issued a public statement rejecting the proposed resumption arrangements.

The statement was published by Newspot Nigeria under the title:

Ogoni Rejects Dialogue Committee’s Compromise — Green Ogoni Initiative.

The organisation questioned the legitimacy of the consultation process and argued that the proposed arrangements failed to respect the Ogoni people’s right to determine their future.

It also raised concerns about the absence of an adequate environmental impact assessment.

The Green Ogoni Initiative’s position is materially more critical than that expressed by members of the Dialogue Committee following the 9 November meeting.

While the committee supports continued negotiations and proposes community congresses, the Green Ogoni Initiative challenges the underlying terms and credibility of the proposed compromise.

These differences should not be concealed.

The Ogoni people are not represented by a single organisation holding one uncontested position.

Their communities include individuals and organisations with different views about petroleum development, environmental restoration, compensation, economic opportunity and political representation.

An investigation that treats one committee’s statements as the settled view of every Ogoni resident would risk reproducing precisely the problem that the consultation process is supposed to address.

There is also a necessary evidentiary qualification.

The Green Ogoni Initiative’s published statement contains additional accusations concerning financial inducements and the conduct of committee members.

Those accusations have not been independently substantiated by the documents examined for this investigation.

They are therefore not adopted as findings of fact.

Similarly, the organisation’s concern about environmental impact assessment deserves examination, but the material reviewed does not establish whether every assessment required for a particular future petroleum development has or has not been completed.

The proper investigative questions concern the existence, scope, publication and adequacy of the relevant environmental documentation.

They cannot responsibly be answered by treating an allegation as a regulatory finding.

Why the Shell connection remains fundamental

At first sight, a dispute involving the Nigerian government and present-day Ogoni representatives might appear to be principally a Nigerian political and economic issue.

That is partly correct.

But Ogoniland’s modern petroleum history cannot be understood without reference to Shell.

Shell’s operations helped establish Nigeria’s petroleum industry, and the company’s former Nigerian subsidiary, the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, became central to controversies concerning pollution, operating practices, community relations and responsibility for environmental damage.

Petroleum production in Ogoniland was halted in 1993 amid protests over the environmental and social consequences of oil extraction.

The subsequent execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni campaigners by Nigeria’s military government on 10 November 1995 became an internationally recognised symbol of the struggle over oil, human rights and corporate accountability.

Shell has consistently denied responsibility for the executions.

In 2009, the company settled litigation brought in the United States concerning alleged involvement in human-rights abuses without admitting liability.

These historical events must be distinguished from the current negotiations.

The Nigerian government conducted the executions.

The existence of serious historical allegations against Shell does not mean that every allegation was judicially established.

But the controversy surrounding Shell’s former operations remains central to understanding why renewed petroleum production is such a sensitive issue.

The present dispute cannot be reduced to a disagreement over how quickly an oilfield should reopen.

It concerns whether the legacy of earlier petroleum operations has been adequately addressed and whether affected communities trust the arrangements now being proposed.

Shell has sold SPDC — but OML 11 requires a more precise explanation

An important development in Shell’s Nigerian operations occurred on 13 March 2025.

Shell completed the sale of its former onshore subsidiary, SPDC, to the Renaissance consortium.

The company was subsequently renamed Renaissance Africa Energy Company.

Shell’s official announcement confirmed that the transaction transferred its former subsidiary and the associated interest in the SPDC joint venture.

The new owner assumed the operating role previously carried out through SPDC.

Shell emphasised that it was redirecting its Nigerian investment towards deepwater petroleum production and integrated gas activities.

Those corporate facts are established.

Primary source: Shell, 13 March 2025 — Completion of sale of SPDC to Renaissance.

But a potentially important distinction has emerged from more detailed research into the Nigerian petroleum leases.

A lease-by-lease investigation published on 2 November 2026 by Africa Energies Report, an initiative of the African Petroleum Producers’ Organization, identifies Oil Mining Lease 11 as having a distinct operating history.

The report states that OML 11, which covers Ogoniland, did not pass to Renaissance as part of the wider former-SPDC portfolio.

It identifies NNPC Exploration and Production as the operator, following the earlier dispute over Shell’s entitlement to renew the lease.

The report also notes that although production in Ogoniland has been suspended since 1993, this should not be confused with the absence of all petroleum production throughout OML 11. It identifies the Otakikpo marginal field elsewhere within the lease area as having produced since 2017.

This is an important geographical and legal distinction.

The history of Shell’s former Nigerian subsidiary, the transfer of its other assets to Renaissance and the operating arrangements governing the particular Ogoni resources are related subjects.

They are not necessarily identical.

The underlying OML 11 licence and latest regulatory register have not been independently examined for this article. Consequently, the lease-specific findings are attributed to the published industry research rather than presented as a new legal determination by this archive.

Supporting source: Africa Energies Report, 2 November 2026 — The Great Handover: Who Now Runs Nigeria’s Major Oil Fields, Lease by Lease.

Africa Energies Report

 

The practical implication is clear.

It would be misleading to suggest that Shell plc is presently negotiating the Ogoni Memorandum of Understanding as the current operator of the proposed restarted production.

The available evidence identifies the Nigerian authorities and Ogoni representatives as the parties conducting the present dialogue.

Shell’s connection is overwhelmingly historical, while separate questions concerning legacy environmental obligations and litigation remain relevant.

That distinction does not make Shell’s earlier activities irrelevant.

It makes accurate attribution of present-day responsibility essential.

The United Nations established the environmental consequences

Any proposal to restore oil production in Ogoniland must be considered against the findings of the United Nations Environment Programme.

In 2011, UNEP published its landmark Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland.

The study was based on extensive fieldwork examining soil, groundwater, surface water, ecosystems, industrial practices and public-health risks.

The scale of the investigation was extraordinary.

UNEP examined more than 200 locations, reviewed over 5,000 medical records, surveyed 122 kilometres of pipeline rights of way and engaged thousands of residents.

More than 4,000 environmental samples were analysed.

The findings documented serious contamination.

At Nisisioken Ogale, investigators discovered benzene contamination in drinking-water wells at levels exceeding 900 times the World Health Organization guideline.

Hydrocarbons were found at substantial depths underground.

The investigation also documented damage to mangroves and other ecosystems, and identified pollution resulting from several sources, including petroleum infrastructure and illegal refining activities.

UNEP concluded that comprehensive environmental restoration could take 25 to 30 years.

It recommended urgent interventions to protect human health and substantial long-term investment in environmental remediation.

This was not simply an allegation advanced by campaigners.

It was the result of an independent scientific assessment undertaken by a United Nations body.

Its findings did not establish the legal responsibility of every individual company for every spill.

Nor did the report determine the exact legal obligations attached to any future petroleum development.

But it established an authoritative environmental baseline against which subsequent restoration claims and development proposals can be assessed.

Primary sources: UNEP — Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, 2011 and UNEP — Executive Summary and Recommendations.

WeDocs+1

 

Ten years of cleanup efforts — and the question of what remains unfinished

Nigeria has not entirely ignored the UNEP recommendations.

The Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project, HYPREP, has undertaken environmental restoration activities across parts of Ogoniland.

In September 2026, during events marking the tenth anniversary of the Ogoni Cleanup Programme, the Nigerian government announced further work on shoreline remediation, mangrove restoration and community infrastructure.

The government also disclosed plans for a new five-year strategic programme covering 2026 to 2031.

Minister of Environment Balarabe Lawal emphasised the importance of completing outstanding work and protecting areas where restoration had already been undertaken.

HYPREP Project Coordinator Professor Nenibarini Zabbey reported that programme activities had supported employment and training opportunities for thousands of Ogoni residents.

He also cited encouraging signs of ecological recovery in some restored areas.

These statements should be acknowledged fairly.

Environmental restoration is a long-term undertaking, and progress in individual locations can be meaningful even where other sites remain contaminated.

But government-reported progress should not be confused with independent verification that the entire Ogoni environment has been restored.

The government itself has identified outstanding and more complex restoration tasks.

That makes the relationship between cleanup and renewed petroleum development particularly important.

If additional extraction is contemplated, communities may reasonably seek evidence concerning the condition of the environment, the management of future spills, monitoring arrangements and the funding of any further remediation.

Source: Voice of Nigeria, 7 September 2026 — HYPREP Begins Five-Year Strategic Plan for Ogoni Cleanup.

Voice of Nigeria

 

The environmental impact assessment question

The Green Ogoni Initiative’s concerns raise a specific documentary issue.

What environmental impact assessment has been prepared for the proposed restoration of petroleum operations?

The answer cannot be established merely by observing that UNEP conducted its assessment in 2011.

The UNEP report is an authoritative investigation of historical contamination and the need for restoration.

It is not automatically equivalent to a project-specific assessment addressing the engineering works, infrastructure, production methods and environmental risks of a proposed new development.

The age and condition of infrastructure would also be relevant to an assessment of operational risk.

So would the potential for future leaks, accidental releases, illegal connections and other forms of contamination.

However, the precise legal requirements depend on the proposed activity and the applicable Nigerian regulatory framework.

A reopened existing well, a newly drilled well, a replacement pipeline and a substantially redesigned production facility may raise different approval questions.

No authenticated, complete project-specific assessment corresponding to the proposed agreement has been located in the public sources examined for this article.

That does not prove no such assessment exists.

It establishes a need for disclosure and clarification.

The Nigerian authorities should be able to identify the specific project being considered, the relevant approvals and the environmental documents supporting them.

Any eventual agreement should be examined against those records.

The road that has become part of the oil negotiations

There is another revealing aspect of the November committee meeting.

Members expressed concern about the suspension of previously agreed confidence-building projects.

Particular attention was directed towards the Eleme section of the East-West Road.

Professor Innocent Barikor, a member of the Dialogue Committee, urged the federal government to resume work.

The concern was not presented simply as a complaint about transport infrastructure.

Committee representatives linked the road project to public confidence in the government’s willingness to honour commitments.

That connection is significant.

An agreement concerning petroleum development may involve promises about roads, employment, water supply, health services and other community benefits.

Such commitments can be important to local residents independently of the value of any oil produced.

But they create questions about implementation and accountability.

Who is responsible for delivering the projects?

Are completion dates specified?

Are budgets secured?

What happens if an agreed project is delayed?

Are community benefits enforceable commitments or expressions of policy intention?

The November committee statements indicate that these matters are already affecting confidence in the negotiations.

The credibility of the proposed petroleum agreement may therefore depend partly on the delivery of infrastructure commitments made before production resumes.

That is an issue of governance and public accountability, not merely petroleum economics.

What is meant by community consent?

The phrase community consent is central to the present controversy.

But it must be used carefully.

The Ogoni Dialogue Committee has demanded community congresses before it signs the proposed agreement.

That is a reported position taken by the committee.

It is not, by itself, a judicial determination of the precise legal requirements for authorising petroleum operations under Nigerian law.

Nor can it be assumed that the committee’s proposed congresses will necessarily resolve every disagreement among Ogoni organisations.

A credible process would need to address who participates, whether dissenting organisations can present their objections, how the proposed agreement is disclosed and how competing views are recorded.

The distinction between consultation and consent is important.

A consultation may allow residents to express views without requiring approval of the final proposal.

A consent process implies a more consequential role for community agreement.

The legal effect of any particular process depends on the relevant law and the arrangements actually adopted.

The available public reporting does not establish that the proposed congresses will have the force of a legally binding referendum.

Nor does it demonstrate that their procedures have been finalised.

What can be established is that the Dialogue Committee has made these congresses a condition of signing the proposed Memorandum of Understanding.

Whether that condition will be satisfied remains to be seen.

What the original agreement could reveal

The most important missing document is the proposed Memorandum of Understanding itself.

Its precise terms would allow an independent assessment of the arrangements being offered to the Ogoni communities.

Several matters would deserve particular scrutiny.

The document should identify the entities expected to conduct petroleum operations and the legal basis for their involvement.

It should explain how community benefits are to be determined and administered.

It should distinguish government-funded infrastructure commitments from obligations placed on commercial petroleum operators.

It should clarify the arrangements for environmental monitoring, damage prevention, remediation and compensation.

And it should establish how affected communities will participate in decisions once any agreement has been signed.

Without the complete text, it is impossible to determine whether the agreement addresses these issues satisfactorily.

Nor should claims about particular financial percentages or payments be adopted without the relevant documentary evidence.

The absence of a publicly examined final text is especially consequential when different Ogoni organisations disagree about the legitimacy of the negotiating process.

Independent scrutiny requires access to the actual terms, not merely competing accounts of what those terms may contain.

Shell’s response to its Nigerian environmental legacy

Shell has defended its historical conduct in the Niger Delta.

On its current corporate website, the company maintains that oil theft, sabotage and illegal refining have caused extensive pollution.

It argues that criminal interference by third parties has been a major factor in the operational difficulties faced by its former Nigerian subsidiary.

The company also points to its participation in cleanup programmes and its cooperation with Nigerian authorities.

Following the sale of SPDC, Shell states that Renaissance retained the former subsidiary’s operating capabilities and responsibilities within the transferred joint venture.

These positions are relevant to the documentary record.

They should not be omitted simply because environmental organisations dispute Shell’s conclusions.

Source: Shell — What Are Shell’s Activities in Nigeria?.

Shell Global

 

There is also continuing litigation in the English courts involving Shell’s historical Nigerian operations.

The Bille and Ogale claims raise contested questions concerning pollution, the responsibilities of the former Nigerian subsidiary and the potential liability of Shell plc.

Those proceedings are distinct from the current Ogoni petroleum negotiations.

The Donovan–Shell Archive has previously examined the relevant High Court judgments, including the decision delivered in September 2026 concerning amended claims and contested allegations about earlier witness evidence.

The litigation has not established every allegation advanced against Shell.

Nor does Shell’s completion of its Nigerian onshore divestment automatically determine the outcome of those proceedings.

The appropriate distinction is between the company’s former commercial ownership, its present business activities, responsibilities assumed by successor entities and liabilities that may still be disputed in court.

Each requires separate evidence.

Thirty-one years after the Ogoni Nine

The timing of the present dispute is particularly significant.

On 10 November 2026, the thirty-first anniversary of the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni campaigners passed.

The anniversary came one day after the Dialogue Committee’s decision to require community congresses before signing the proposed agreement.

It also followed the Green Ogoni Initiative’s public rejection of the proposed compromise.

That sequence is historically resonant.

The original Ogoni struggle was never exclusively about the immediate financial value of the area’s petroleum.

It concerned environmental protection, political representation, community rights and the consequences of industrial activity.

Those subjects remain relevant to the current negotiations.

But historical remembrance should not be used to assume that all present-day Ogoni residents hold identical views about their economic future.

Some may support renewed production subject to enforceable safeguards and substantial community benefits.

Others may oppose it because of the environmental legacy and lack of confidence in the authorities.

Others may support development in principle while rejecting the negotiating process or the terms currently proposed.

A documentary investigation should allow those differences to emerge from the evidence.

The sacrifice of the Ogoni Nine is an essential part of the history.

It is not a substitute for examining what today’s communities are being asked to approve.

The Donovan–Shell Archive’s historical interest

On 8 November 2026, the Donovan–Shell Archive announced its intention to prepare a dedicated series entitled The Ogoni Files.

That project will examine the historical documentary record concerning Shell, the Ogoni Nine, environmental controversies, litigation, security issues and the long search for accountability.

It will also consider historical correspondence and materials preserved through the archive’s contact with Ogoni campaigners and individuals connected with the litigation.

The present investigation is separate from that archival research.

It is based on publicly accessible contemporary reporting, corporate disclosures, official Nigerian statements and the original UNEP assessment.

Unexamined private correspondence, historical allegations and trial recordings have not been treated as verified evidence for this article.

That separation is important.

The future Ogoni Files series may produce additional historical findings.

The current negotiations require scrutiny in their own right, on the basis of the evidence now available.

Related archive publication: Coming Soon: The Ogoni Files — A New Independent Documentary Investigation into Shell, the Ogoni Nine and the Long Search for Justice, 8 November 2026.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

Established by official corporate and institutional records

Shell completed the sale of its Nigerian onshore subsidiary SPDC to Renaissance in March 2025.

Shell continues to operate other businesses in Nigeria, particularly deepwater petroleum and integrated gas.

NNPC publicly promoted its proposed Ogoni re-entry programme in September 2025 and linked it to reconciliation, infrastructure, community participation and petroleum development.

UNEP’s 2011 assessment established severe historical environmental contamination in parts of Ogoniland and recommended extensive long-term restoration.

The Nigerian government has subsequently undertaken cleanup activities and announced further restoration plans.

Established by attributable contemporary reporting

The Ogoni Dialogue Committee decided on 9 November 2026 not to sign the proposed Memorandum of Understanding before community congresses had been held.

The decision followed a meeting involving 35 committee members.

The committee supports continued negotiations and has expressed support for the objective of renewed petroleum activities, subject to the consultation process.

Committee representatives identified concerns about outstanding infrastructure commitments, particularly work on the Eleme section of the East-West Road.

The Green Ogoni Initiative separately issued a statement on 8 November rejecting the proposed arrangements.

Important ownership distinction

Recent industry research identifies OML 11 as having a different ownership and operating history from the assets transferred to Renaissance in the wider SPDC divestment.

This finding warrants examination against the current official petroleum licence records before any definitive legal conclusion is drawn.

Allegations and positions not independently established

The Green Ogoni Initiative’s criticisms of the proposed agreement are attributed to that organisation.

Its claims about financial inducements are not independently substantiated.

The assertion that an adequate environmental impact assessment is absent remains a matter requiring verification against the relevant regulatory records.

No complete, authenticated version of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding has been examined for this article.

The reporting does not establish that all Ogoni communities have rejected renewed petroleum development.

Nor does it establish that the government has obtained consent through the proposed congresses.

Editorial conclusion

The current negotiations demonstrate that the Nigerian government’s objective of restarting petroleum operations has not yet been translated into an uncontested agreement with the Ogoni communities.

The most consequential unresolved questions concern the legitimacy of consultation, the terms of any eventual agreement, the adequacy of environmental safeguards and the delivery of government commitments.

These questions arise within a historically significant petroleum-producing region whose environmental and human-rights controversies remain closely associated with Shell’s earlier operations.

CONCLUSION: THE OIL MAY REMAIN, BUT AGREEMENT CANNOT BE ASSUMED

Nigeria’s effort to restore petroleum production in Ogoniland has entered another important stage.

The government has identified economic and developmental reasons for proceeding.

NNPC has presented the initiative as an opportunity for reconciliation and renewed investment.

Members of the Ogoni Dialogue Committee have indicated support for continued negotiations.

Yet the committee has now refused to sign the proposed agreement until community congresses have been held.

A separate organisation has rejected the proposed compromise more fundamentally.

The government’s confidence in its earlier consultations has therefore not resolved the dispute over legitimacy and consent.

The historical background explains why this matters.

Shell’s former operations became inseparable from decades of environmental controversy and demands for accountability.

The United Nations subsequently documented severe environmental contamination requiring sustained restoration.

The Nigerian government has made progress on some cleanup initiatives while acknowledging that further work remains.

Shell has sold its former onshore subsidiary.

But the transfer of corporate ownership has not removed the need to address the environmental and social consequences of the industry’s history.

Nor has it resolved every disagreement concerning the future of petroleum operations in Ogoniland.

The decisive question is no longer simply whether Nigeria wants the oil to flow again. It is whether the proposed arrangements can withstand scrutiny by the people expected to live with their consequences.

The November committee decision establishes that the answer has not yet been settled.

An agreement may eventually be reached.

It may provide substantial economic benefits.

It may also include environmental obligations and safeguards that communities consider adequate.

But those possibilities must be demonstrated through the actual terms, approvals and implementation arrangements.

They cannot be assumed from government announcements or expressions of support from selected representatives.

For the Donovan–Shell Archive, the documentary obligation is to follow the evidence.

That means acknowledging Shell’s historical involvement without incorrectly presenting the company as the current negotiating operator.

It means recognising the government’s restoration work without declaring the environmental crisis resolved.

And it means respecting the different positions expressed by Ogoni organisations rather than choosing one to speak for the entire population.

Thirty-one years after the Ogoni Nine were executed, the future of petroleum operations in Ogoniland remains contested.

The latest evidence shows that community legitimacy is now a central condition of the proposed return.

Whether the Nigerian government can secure it remains an open question.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

1. Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited — 26 September 2025

Ogoni Re-entry is a Beacon of Reconciliation through Collaboration

Official government-owned petroleum company statement outlining the rationale for re-entry, the consultation process and proposed community commitments.

2. The Punch — 10 November 2026

Oil resumption: Ogoni leaders demand consent, FG action

Contemporaneous reporting of the 9 November Dialogue Committee meeting, including attributable statements concerning community congresses, the proposed agreement and infrastructure commitments.

3. Premium Times — 11 November 2026

Ogoni leaders withhold consent for oil resumption, demand community congresses

Additional contemporary account, providing background on the federal government’s negotiations and statements from committee representatives.

4. Green Ogoni Initiative — Statement published 8 November 2026

Ogoni Rejects Dialogue Committee’s Compromise

Published advocacy statement providing a contrasting Ogoni position. Its allegations are attributed and not treated as independently established findings.

5. United Nations Environment Programme — 2011

Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland

Original independent environmental assessment establishing the historical contamination, public-health risks and long-term restoration requirements.

6. Shell plc — 13 March 2025

Shell Completes Sale of SPDC to Renaissance

Primary corporate announcement establishing the completion of Shell’s Nigerian onshore subsidiary divestment and its remaining business priorities.

7. Africa Energies Report — 2 November 2026

The Great Handover: Who Now Runs Nigeria’s Major Oil Fields, Lease by Lease

Recent industry research distinguishing OML 11 from the wider Renaissance acquisition and examining the operating arrangements associated with former international-major petroleum assets.

8. Voice of Nigeria — 7 September 2026

HYPREP Begins Five-Year Strategic Plan for Ogoni Cleanup

Reporting of the Nigerian government’s latest restoration programme, including official statements concerning achievements and outstanding work.

9. Shell plc — Current Nigerian operations and environmental position

What Are Shell’s Activities in Nigeria?

Shell’s explanation of its historical operations, sale of SPDC, remaining Nigerian businesses and position concerning environmental responsibility.

10. Donovan–Shell Archive — 8 November 2026

Coming Soon: The Ogoni Files

Earlier archive announcement providing context for the forthcoming historical documentary investigation.

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This article is an independent documentary investigation into current proposals to resume petroleum operations in Ogoniland, Nigeria, and the historical connection of those proposals with Shell’s former Nigerian onshore activities.

The investigation is based on official statements from NNPC and Shell, the United Nations Environment Programme’s published environmental assessment, identifiable Nigerian media reporting, published statements attributed to Ogoni organisations and recent industry research.

The 9 November 2026 Ogoni Dialogue Committee decision is supported by contemporary reporting. The complete committee minutes and signed resolutions have not been independently obtained.

The proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the Nigerian government has not been examined in authenticated final form. Its complete financial, environmental, operational and governance provisions are therefore not established by this investigation.

The views of the Green Ogoni Initiative are attributed to that organisation. Unsubstantiated allegations concerning financial inducements, misconduct or other improper behaviour are not treated as facts.

Statements concerning environmental impact assessment distinguish the organisation’s criticisms from independently verified regulatory findings.

The 2011 UNEP assessment is a historical scientific investigation. It is not presented as a current assessment of every affected location or as a determination of liability for individual historical spills.

Shell’s sale of SPDC to Renaissance in March 2025 is established by the company’s corporate disclosures. The more specific operating status of OML 11 is attributed to identified industry research pending examination of the current official lease record.

No allegation is made that Shell plc is presently conducting the Ogoni negotiations as the operator of the proposed restarted petroleum development.

Historical allegations concerning Shell and the Nigerian military regime, pollution, human-rights abuses and the Ogoni Nine are distinguished from established events and relevant legal outcomes.

The article does not make a finding that Shell, Renaissance, NNPC, the Ogoni Dialogue Committee, any Ogoni organisation or any individual has acted unlawfully in connection with the current negotiations.

The Donovan–Shell Archive welcomes factual corrections, authenticated documents and responses from Shell plc, NNPC, Renaissance, the Ogoni Dialogue Committee, the Green Ogoni Initiative, Nigerian regulatory authorities and other affected representatives.

Substantiated corrections and additional evidence will be considered fairly.

This publication is documentary reporting and analysis, not legal advice or an adjudication of liability.

Nigeria’s Plan to Restart Oil in Ogoniland Hits a Consent Test — A Documentary Investigation into Shell’s Unfinished Legacy was first posted on November 15, 2026 at 11:00 pm.
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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 15 NOVEMBER 2026

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 13:45
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 15 NOVEMBER 2026

Archive reference: SLF-2007-119

The Sakhalin Papers CIX: The Sakhalin Budget Test — How Shell’s $24.5 Billion Cost Recovery Led to a Regional Revenue Windfall

In March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced that it had recovered $24.5 billion in development and operating expenditure, triggering a new stage in the distribution of Sakhalin II’s oil and gas revenues. Four years later, the company reported that payments from the project accounted for more than 60% of Sakhalin Oblast’s public revenues. But its own figures also revealed a remarkable change: payments to regional and local budgets fell from $2.41 billion in 2015 to $1.28 billion in 2016. Original Shell-era corporate reports, an authenticated Shell filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, contemporary reporting and a preserved Russian governmental agreement reveal how the project moved from disputed costs to extraordinary public revenues — and why that success also created fiscal vulnerability.

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, using original Sakhalin Energy financial disclosures, an authenticated Royal Dutch Shell plc SEC filing, contemporaneous industry and Russian news reports, and a historical Russian governmental agreement preserved by Sakhalin Environment Watch.

Publication date: 15 November 2026

Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia

Previous instalment: SLF-2007-118 — The Sakhalin Address Test: 5,933 Local Contracts, but How Much of Shell’s Energy Legacy Stayed on the Island?

INTRODUCTION: THE YEAR THE MONEY STARTED TO CHANGE

On 30 March 2012, Sakhalin Energy made an announcement that marked a decisive moment in the financial history of Sakhalin II.

The company reported that production sharing had begun.

From March 2012, the Russian Federation and Sakhalin Oblast would receive their shares of profit production under the project’s production-sharing arrangements.

The development represented the culmination of an expensive and politically controversial investment programme.

It also carried important implications for Russia’s Far Eastern island.

The company’s announcement revealed that approximately $24.5 billion in project expenditure had been recovered.

That amount covered capital and operating expenditure associated with the project’s first and second development phases.

Only after the applicable cost-recovery conditions had been satisfied did the new stage of profit-production sharing begin.

For more than a decade, the financial implications of that arrangement had been a source of controversy.

Shell originally held a controlling interest in Sakhalin Energy.

During construction, the project’s estimated costs increased dramatically.

Russian officials argued that the escalation would delay the state’s economic returns.

The Accounts Chamber criticised the project’s financial arrangements.

Environmental regulators also challenged aspects of its implementation.

The resulting confrontation helped transform the ownership of Sakhalin II.

Gazprom acquired majority control in April 2007.

Shell retained a substantial minority interest.

But the production-sharing agreement continued to govern the project’s financial arrangements.

Then came the March 2012 announcement.

The project had crossed the threshold separating the earlier cost-recovery period from the stage in which the Russian side would receive profit production.

Sakhalin Energy’s Chief Executive, Andrey Galaev, described the transition as occurring ahead of the company’s previous expectations.

The announcement projected that Russia would receive approximately $500 million in profit production during 2012, assuming an oil price of $100 per barrel.

That was a forecast, not a certified final receipt.

But it identified the start of a different financial phase.

By the end of 2016, Sakhalin Energy would report cumulative payments to the Russian side exceeding $20.8 billion.

Approximately $8 billion was attributed to Sakhalin Oblast.

The company also reported that project-related revenues represented more than 60% of the region’s budget.

These were substantial achievements.

Yet the same corporate disclosures reveal another important feature.

Regional and local budget payments changed sharply from year to year.

The operator’s own figures show payments of $2.411 billion in 2015 and $1.281 billion in 2016.

That difference is central to the present investigation.

Sakhalin II had become an exceptionally important source of public income. But the greater its contribution to the regional budget, the more consequential changes in that income could become.

The original documents demonstrate both sides of this relationship.

They also reveal why it is necessary to distinguish project costs, profit production, royalties, corporate taxation and regional budget receipts.

These are different financial categories.

They cannot responsibly be treated as interchangeable.

PART ONE: THE ORIGINAL FINANCIAL BARGAIN 1. The 1994 production-sharing agreement

The Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement was signed on 22 June 1994.

It concerned the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye offshore oil and gas fields.

The investor was Sakhalin Energy.

The Russian side was represented by the Government of the Russian Federation and the Administration of Sakhalin Oblast.

The agreement was intended to attract the investment and advanced technology needed to develop fields located in a remote and demanding environment.

The offshore project required substantial expenditure.

The investors were expected to provide financing and undertake the development risks.

In return, they obtained contractual rights governing the recovery of expenditure and participation in the production generated by the fields.

The state retained ownership of the natural resources.

Sakhalin Energy’s official explanation of the production-sharing agreement describes the arrangement as replacing significant parts of the ordinary tax and licensing regime with a contractual system intended to remain effective over the project’s life.

It also identifies an important oversight provision.

The Russian state was entitled to approve work budgets and audit the investor’s expenditure.

This mattered because expenditure influenced the timing of the financial returns.

Under the operator’s description, the production-sharing stage began after the investor recovered its applicable costs.

The shares payable subsequently depended upon the project’s profitability.

Consequently, the classification and amount of recoverable expenditure were central to the economics of the agreement.

The longer the recovery process continued, the longer the Russian side could have to wait for certain profit-production entitlements.

That did not mean Russia received no payments before the recovery threshold.

Royalties, taxes and other contractual payments were separate categories.

But the timing of profit-production sharing was particularly important.

Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Production-Sharing Agreement.

Production Sharing Agreement

 

2. Sakhalin’s regional government wanted a defined share

Three years after the original agreement, Moscow and Sakhalin concluded a further arrangement governing the distribution of specified revenues payable to the Russian side.

The agreement was dated 3 April 1997.

A substantial reproduction survives in the historical document collection maintained by Sakhalin Environment Watch.

The agreement recognised Sakhalin Oblast’s economic difficulties.

It also established arrangements for distributing different categories of project receipts.

One provision allocated the state’s share of profit production equally between the federal government and Sakhalin Oblast.

Another provided that Sakhalin would receive 60% of specified development bonuses, with the federal government receiving 40%.

The agreement also addressed historical exploration expenditure, taxation, resource payments and supplies of natural gas for regional use.

Those distinctions were significant.

The share of profit production was not identical to the allocation of corporate profits tax.

Nor was either arrangement identical to the distribution of royalties.

The financial relationship involved multiple revenue streams.

It also depended upon the timing of production, expenditure and the applicable legal arrangements.

The full executed agreement and subsequent amendments have not been independently authenticated together for this investigation.

The reproduced text is therefore treated as a valuable historical source, not as a certified statement of every provision continuing unchanged throughout the project’s lifetime.

The federal-regional allocation was examined in greater detail in SLF-2007-112 — The Other Sakhalin Dispute.

The present investigation addresses a different question.

When did the financial mechanism begin generating substantial profit-production receipts, and what did the later corporate records reveal about Sakhalin’s dependence upon the resulting revenues?

Historical source: Sakhalin Environment Watch — Agreement Between the Russian Government and Sakhalin Oblast, 3 April 1997.

Экологическая вахта Сахалина

 

PART TWO: THE COST OVERRUN THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING 3. July 2005: Shell acknowledges a doubling of projected costs

On 14 July 2005, Shell publicly acknowledged a dramatic increase in the projected cost of Sakhalin II.

The project was expected to cost approximately $20 billion.

That was roughly twice the previous estimate.

Contemporaneous reporting identified several explanations.

They included rising construction and material costs, currency movements, difficulties associated with pipeline construction and environmental requirements.

Malcolm Brinded, then Shell’s Executive Director responsible for Exploration and Production, acknowledged that the original budget and timetable had been substantially underestimated.

The announcement was important for Shell’s shareholders.

But it also mattered to the Russian government.

Under the production-sharing arrangements, recoverable expenditure affected when the state would begin receiving its full profit-production entitlements.

An increase in project costs could therefore have consequences beyond the investor’s own financial accounts.

It could affect the timing of state revenues.

The July 2005 announcement did not establish that the increased expenditure was fraudulent or improperly recoverable.

Large engineering projects can experience genuine cost escalation.

But the scale of the revision inevitably raised questions about budgeting, oversight and the economic implications for the Russian side.

Contemporaneous source: The Guardian — Shell Costs Double at Sakhalin, 15 July 2005.

The Guardian

 

4. October 2006: The Accounts Chamber challenges the economics

By October 2006, Russia’s Accounts Chamber was publicly criticising the financial implementation of Sakhalin II.

A report distributed by RIA Novosti on 6 October stated that the watchdog considered the production-sharing arrangements disadvantageous to Russia.

The report attributed to the Accounts Chamber an assessment that Russia’s share of hydrocarbon output could remain very limited under the project conditions then being examined.

The Chamber also questioned assumptions used in forecasting future oil revenues.

It referred to project-cost estimates that had increased substantially.

These were official criticisms reported contemporaneously.

They were not judicial findings.

Nor were the Accounts Chamber’s projections definitive statements of what Russia eventually received.

But they provide evidence of the financial concerns that existed during the period of confrontation with Shell and its partners.

The criticism involved more than the absolute cost of construction.

It concerned the relationship between expenditure, future revenues and the state’s contractual entitlements.

The issue was therefore central to Sakhalin II’s financial structure.

The project could succeed industrially while remaining the subject of disagreement over whether its financial arrangements adequately protected the Russian side.

Historical source: RIA Novosti — Sakhalin PSA Gives Russia Limited Share, Accounts Chamber Says, 6 October 2006, preserved by the Donovan–Shell Archive.

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

 

PART THREE: SHELL’S AUTHENTICATED SEC FILING 5. April 2007: Gazprom takes majority control

The political and commercial confrontation culminated in a fundamental change to Sakhalin Energy’s ownership.

On 18 April 2007, Shell and its partners signed an agreement allowing Gazprom to acquire a controlling interest.

The transaction was documented in an original Royal Dutch Shell plc filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

The filing provides an authenticated corporate record of the transaction.

Gazprom acquired 50% plus one share of Sakhalin Energy for $7.45 billion.

The existing shareholders reduced their interests.

Shell’s holding fell from 55% to 27.5%.

Mitsui’s holding became 12.5%.

Mitsubishi retained 10%.

The transaction was implemented under the terms of an agreement reached in December 2006.

Shell’s original announcement welcomed Gazprom’s participation and linked it with improved prospects for completing the project and expanding future LNG capacity.

The filing is significant because it establishes the ownership change through an original company disclosure rather than retrospective commentary.

But it also establishes the limits of the event’s direct financial meaning.

The $7.45 billion was the consideration for Gazprom’s acquisition of shares.

It was not a payment into Sakhalin Oblast’s public budget.

Nor was it a calculation of the project’s recoverable expenditure.

It concerned the transfer of ownership between the relevant companies.

That distinction matters because the Sakhalin II financial history contains several exceptionally large dollar figures.

They do not all represent money received by the Russian state or Sakhalin’s population.

Authenticated primary source: Royal Dutch Shell plc — SEC Form 6-K, April 2007: Gazprom Enters Sakhalin II Project.

SEC

 

PART FOUR: MARCH 2012 — THE FINANCIAL TURNING POINT 6. The announcement that changed the revenue timetable

On 30 March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced that production sharing had begun.

The company’s statement was reproduced contemporaneously by LNG World News, now part of Offshore Energy.

The announcement said that the Russian Federation and Sakhalin Oblast had begun receiving their shares of profit production from March.

The Chief Executive, Andrey Galaev, stated that the transition had occurred ahead of expectations.

The company attributed the achievement to favourable market conditions and operational improvements.

The announcement included the most important figure for the present investigation.

Sakhalin Energy reported that approximately $24.5 billion in project costs had been recovered.

The company specified that the amount covered capital and operating expenditure associated with both development phases.

This is a crucial qualification.

The $24.5 billion figure should not be treated as identical to the $20 billion project-cost forecast announced by Shell in 2005.

The earlier figure was a forward-looking construction and development estimate.

The later figure was the operator’s reported cumulative recovery of applicable capital and operating expenditure.

They differ in scope, period and accounting purpose.

They cannot responsibly be used as interchangeable measures of a single cost overrun.

Nevertheless, the 2012 announcement establishes that the financial threshold for profit-production sharing had been reached.

The project had entered a new stage.

Contemporaneous company-sourced record: Offshore Energy — Russia: Production Sharing Under Sakhalin-2 Project Starts, 30 March 2012.

Offshore Energy

 

7. The Russian side had already received money before March 2012

The announcement contained another important distinction.

Sakhalin Energy reported that more than $1.14 billion in taxes and other mandatory payments had been transferred to government budgets during 2011.

It also stated that the Russian side had received approximately $3 billion from the project over the period from 1995 through 2011.

These figures demonstrate that Russia was receiving financial benefits before the beginning of the profit-production-sharing stage.

Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that Russia received nothing until March 2012.

The correct distinction is between the earlier forms of payment and the additional profit-production entitlements triggered when the cost-recovery conditions were satisfied.

That distinction also matters for Sakhalin Oblast.

The regional authorities could receive certain payments before the new production-sharing stage.

But the commencement of profit-production sharing created an additional source of economic entitlement.

The precise allocation of those benefits depended upon the contractual and federal-regional arrangements.

A single headline stating that Russia began receiving its share in 2012 would therefore be incomplete.

The state had already received several categories of payments. What changed in March 2012 was the commencement of profit-production sharing under the applicable cost-recovery arrangements.

PART FIVE: THE $100 BILLION FORECAST 8. An ambitious projection — not an established outcome

The March 2012 announcement included an exceptionally large forward-looking figure.

Sakhalin Energy stated that the Russian side’s total revenues over the entire life of the project were expected to exceed $100 billion.

That was a projection.

It was not money already received.

Nor was it a guaranteed payment.

The figure depended upon future production, prices, costs and other assumptions.

The same announcement estimated that Russia would receive approximately $500 million in profit production during 2012, based on an assumed oil price of $100 per barrel.

This qualification is important.

Commodity-price assumptions can materially influence projected receipts.

The future economics of an LNG and oil development also depend upon production performance, contract terms, operating costs, capital expenditure and the relevant allocation formulas.

Consequently, the $100 billion figure should be understood as a company forecast made in March 2012.

It cannot be presented as an independently verified valuation of the state’s eventual receipts.

Nor can the forecast be used to establish what Sakhalin Oblast alone would receive.

The projection concerned the Russian side as a whole.

Its regional allocation was a separate matter.

The announcement is nevertheless historically significant.

It demonstrates the scale of the future economic benefits anticipated by Sakhalin Energy after the project had crossed the cost-recovery threshold.

The forecast also provides a useful benchmark for examining subsequent company disclosures.

PART SIX: WHAT THE 2016 REPORT ACTUALLY SHOWS 9. The original Shell-era figures

The most useful authenticated corporate source for assessing the financial position four years later is Sakhalin Energy’s Sustainable Development Report 2016.

The report was published in March 2017.

Shell remained a substantial minority shareholder at that time.

The report’s section on economic impact management contains detailed information concerning payments to the Russian side and to Sakhalin’s regional and local budgets.

It states that cumulative receipts by the Russian side from the beginning of the project through the end of 2016 exceeded $20.8 billion.

Of that total, approximately $8 billion was attributed to Sakhalin Oblast.

These were considerable sums.

They establish that the project had become a major contributor to Russian public finances.

They also demonstrate the substantial financial benefits reported for the host region.

But the cumulative figures must not be confused with annual payments.

Nor should the regional amount be added to the Russian-side total, because the regional amount was included within it.

The report also contains year-by-year data.

Those annual figures reveal another important aspect of the project’s economic history.

Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016, pages 60–61 (PDF).

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

10. The regional payment record: 2012–2016

Sakhalin Energy’s report contains a chart showing taxes and other mandatory payments made to Sakhalin Oblast’s budget and local budgets.

The figures are expressed in millions of US dollars.

They provide a valuable historical sequence.

2012 — $391 million. The project had entered the profit-production-sharing stage in March of that year.

2013 — $947 million. The company’s reported payments to regional and local budgets increased substantially.

2014 — $2.234 billion. The annual amount rose again.

2015 — $2.411 billion. The reported regional and local budget payments reached the highest annual amount in this five-year series.

2016 — $1.281 billion. The figure declined markedly from the preceding year.

The sequence reveals two developments.

First, the period following the commencement of profit-production sharing was associated with a substantial increase in the reported amounts flowing into Sakhalin’s regional and local budgets.

Second, the payments were not stable.

After reaching approximately $2.41 billion in 2015, they fell to approximately $1.28 billion in 2016.

The reduction was approximately $1.13 billion.

That is a substantial change in a single reporting year.

The figures come from Sakhalin Energy’s own original corporate report.

They are not a reconstruction based upon later estimates.

But the chart does not independently establish the precise causes of the annual variation.

Changes in commodity prices, profitability, timing of tax payments, contractual allocations and other factors may affect receipts.

The complete underlying government accounting records would be required to explain every component of the change.

The defensible conclusion is that the operator reported a substantial decline in regional and local budget payments between 2015 and 2016, notwithstanding the project’s continuing importance to Sakhalin’s economy.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — 2016 Sustainability Report, page 61, annual regional and local budget payments.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

PART SEVEN: MORE THAN 60% OF THE REGIONAL BUDGET 11. September 2016: The company makes a remarkable statement

On 28 September 2016, Interfax reported comments made by Sakhalin Energy representative Ole Myklestad at the Oil and Gas of Sakhalin 2016 conference.

According to the report, Sakhalin II had paid approximately $2.4 billion in taxes to Sakhalin’s regional budget during 2015.

The company representative stated that this represented more than 60% of the region’s budget revenues.

He also reported cumulative payments of approximately $20.5 billion to Russian budgets at different levels.

Of that amount, approximately $7.9 billion had reached Sakhalin Oblast.

The figures correspond closely with the subsequently published 2016 Sustainability Report.

The later report recorded more than $20.8 billion in cumulative Russian-side receipts and approximately $8 billion for Sakhalin Oblast.

The difference is consistent with the later reporting date and additional project payments.

But the underlying figures remain attributed to Sakhalin Energy.

The Interfax article provides contemporary reporting of the company’s statements.

It is not an independent audit of the regional government’s accounts.

The significance of the statement is nevertheless considerable.

It shows that Sakhalin Energy was publicly acknowledging that its payments constituted the majority of Sakhalin’s reported public revenues.

Contemporaneous source: Interfax — Sakhalin II Paid $2.4 Billion into the Regional Budget in 2015, 28 September 2016.

Дальний Восток || Интерфакс Россия

 

12. The 2016 report repeats the dependence figure

The following year, Sakhalin Energy’s Sustainability Report made a similar statement concerning 2016.

The company reported approximately $1.3 billion in taxes and other mandatory payments to Sakhalin’s regional and local budgets.

It also stated that revenues associated with the project represented more than 60% of the regional budget.

The figures are striking when considered together.

In 2015, project-related receipts were reported as accounting for more than 60% of regional revenues.

In 2016, the operator again described the project as contributing more than 60%.

Yet the nominal dollar amount reported for regional and local budget payments had fallen substantially.

This does not demonstrate that the regional economy suffered an equivalent decline in overall public spending.

The budget’s other revenues, exchange rates and accounting arrangements also matter.

Nor does it establish that the operator reduced payments improperly.

But it illustrates the significance of fiscal concentration.

A regional government can remain heavily dependent upon a major revenue source even when the amount received from that source changes sharply.

The Sakhalin II disclosures therefore establish more than the existence of substantial public revenues.

They demonstrate that those revenues had become central to the financial position of the host region.

PART EIGHT: THE ACCOUNTING DETAIL THAT MATTERS 13. The 2016 payments were not all the same kind of revenue

The 2016 Sustainability Report provides another unusually informative breakdown.

The company stated that approximately $2.02 billion had been paid to the Russian Federation in cash and in kind during the reporting year.

Within the reported amounts, royalties paid in kind were valued at approximately $289 million.

The Russian side’s profit-production share was reported at approximately $330 million.

The company also identified approximately $1.36 billion in profits tax paid during 2016 in respect of the 2015 fiscal year.

It anticipated that approximately $900 million in profits tax relating to 2016 performance would be paid in 2017.

These figures demonstrate several important distinctions.

A royalty may be delivered in hydrocarbons rather than cash.

Profit production is a contractual entitlement arising under the production-sharing arrangements.

Corporate profits tax is a separate fiscal obligation.

And tax paid during one calendar year may relate to the company’s financial performance in a preceding fiscal year.

Consequently, the public accounting record cannot be understood merely by adding every headline amount together.

Different figures may have different scopes, reporting periods or accounting treatments.

They may also overlap when presented in broader totals.

Most importantly, the amount received by the Russian side as a whole is not necessarily the amount received by Sakhalin Oblast.

The regional share must be identified through the applicable contractual and governmental allocation arrangements.

The financial flows were significant, but their classification is essential to an accurate assessment.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016, Financial Benefits to the Russian Federation and Sakhalin Oblast, page 60.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 14. Cost recovery was the critical dividing line

The most important historical finding concerns the relationship between the original project costs and the timing of the state’s profit-production receipts.

The production-sharing agreement allowed the investor to recover applicable expenditure before the new profit-production-sharing stage began.

That structure was a central feature of the original commercial bargain.

It provided the investment framework for an expensive development in a remote region.

But it also meant that disagreement about costs could have significant fiscal consequences.

This helps explain why the dramatic cost escalation announced in 2005 became a matter of political controversy.

It was not simply a question of Shell spending more money.

It concerned the effect that expenditure might have upon Russia’s future financial entitlements.

The Accounts Chamber challenged the economics.

Shell and its partners faced growing governmental pressure.

Gazprom subsequently acquired majority control.

But the financial milestone was not reached until March 2012.

The project had then recovered the amount required under the operator’s reported interpretation of the applicable arrangements.

That was a significant event.

It demonstrates that the original contractual mechanism ultimately entered the stage in which profit production was shared with the Russian side.

It does not, by itself, establish that every earlier cost dispute had been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.

Nor does it demonstrate that every cost submitted for recovery was independently audited and approved without qualification.

A complete assessment would require the relevant budget approvals, recoverable-cost schedules, audit findings and contractual decisions.

15. The fiscal windfall created a different vulnerability

The later economic consequences were substantial.

Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 disclosures identify billions of dollars in cumulative public receipts.

They demonstrate that Sakhalin II had become a major source of financing for the Russian side and particularly the regional government.

But the annual figures also show significant variation.

Sakhalin’s regional and local budget receipts from the project rose sharply after 2012.

By 2015, the reported annual figure exceeded $2.4 billion.

In 2016, it was approximately $1.3 billion.

The difference illustrates a familiar challenge for governments dependent upon extractive industries.

Revenue from oil and gas developments can be considerable.

But it may also vary according to prices, profitability, production, tax timing and contractual arrangements.

When a single project accounts for a large proportion of public income, those changes can become particularly significant.

This is not evidence that Sakhalin Energy behaved improperly.

Nor is it proof that Sakhalin’s regional authorities failed to manage their finances responsibly.

It is an economic characteristic of a highly concentrated revenue system.

A large revenue contribution can create public opportunities while also exposing a government to substantial fluctuations in the source of its income.

The company’s disclosures establish that Sakhalin was experiencing both substantial economic benefits and heavy reliance upon one major industrial project.

16. The distinction between corporate success and fiscal security

Sakhalin II’s industrial achievements were considerable.

The development brought major offshore fields into production.

It established Russia’s first large LNG export operation.

It generated substantial business for contractors.

It employed Russian workers and provided significant public revenues.

But industrial success and fiscal security are not necessarily identical.

A company can operate a technically successful development while the resulting public revenues fluctuate.

A government can receive billions of dollars and nevertheless become exposed to changes in a particular revenue stream.

The Sakhalin Energy reports illustrate this distinction.

Their fiscal disclosures demonstrate the scale of the benefits.

Their year-by-year figures demonstrate the variation.

The important analytical question is therefore not whether the project benefited Sakhalin.

It did, according to substantial contemporaneous evidence.

The question is how those benefits were structured and how the regional government could manage dependence upon them.

That subject extends beyond Shell’s operational responsibilities.

It also involves the Russian federal and regional authorities.

Public spending, budget planning and the distribution of government revenues are governmental functions.

Shell’s historical role must be assessed according to its actual contractual and corporate responsibilities, not presumed responsibility for every subsequent budget decision.

17. The 2017 redistribution dispute was a separate development

The fiscal importance of Sakhalin II also helps explain a later political confrontation.

In 2017, Moscow proposed changing the distribution of corporate profits-tax receipts from the project.

Under the arrangements then in place, Sakhalin Oblast received 75% of the relevant profits-tax revenues.

The proposal reversed the proportions, assigning 75% to the federal budget.

The dispute, subsequent legislation and regional objections were examined in detail in the instalment published on 8 November 2026.

That investigation established that the redistribution concerned a particular category of revenue.

It did not mean Moscow acquired 75% of every fiscal and production-sharing entitlement associated with Sakhalin II.

The present investigation supplies additional context.

By the time Moscow proposed the redistribution, the project had already become a major source of income for Sakhalin Oblast.

The 2016 corporate disclosures establish that dependence.

But the 2017 decision was a governmental fiscal measure.

It should not automatically be attributed to Shell, which was then a minority shareholder in Sakhalin Energy.

The distinction between the company’s payments and the government’s subsequent allocation of those payments remains essential.

Historical source: RBC — Sakhalin to Transfer More Than 68 Billion Roubles to the Wider Far East over Three Years, 29 September 2017.

РБК

 

18. What the documents do not establish

The available record provides a substantial documentary foundation.

But it does not answer every question.

The original 1994 production-sharing agreement and all subsequent amendments have not been independently authenticated together for this investigation.

The complete cost-recovery ledger leading to the March 2012 milestone has not been reconstructed.

The full underlying governmental audit findings have not been reconciled with every expenditure approved for recovery.

The $24.5 billion figure is therefore identified as Sakhalin Energy’s reported recovered expenditure.

It is not presented as the result of an independent forensic audit undertaken by this archive.

Similarly, the regional revenue figures originate from the operator’s published reports and contemporaneous reporting of company statements.

They have not been independently reconciled against every entry in Sakhalin Oblast’s government accounts.

The figures nevertheless provide strong evidence of the amounts Sakhalin Energy reported at the time.

The historical conclusion should reflect those limits.

The evidence establishes the commencement of profit-production sharing, substantial public receipts and significant annual variation in regional payments.

It does not establish misconduct by Shell.

Nor does it support an allegation that the financial reports were deliberately falsified.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

The investigation establishes that Sakhalin II’s production-sharing agreement was signed in June 1994 and that the Russian side included both the federal government and Sakhalin Oblast.

The preserved 1997 federal-regional agreement allocated specified categories of project revenue between Moscow and Sakhalin, including an equal division of the Russian side’s profit-production entitlement.

The operator’s published explanation confirms that cost recovery affected the commencement of profit-production sharing.

Shell announced a substantial increase in projected development costs in July 2005, bringing the estimate to approximately $20 billion.

The Russian Accounts Chamber publicly challenged aspects of the project’s financial implementation in October 2006.

The contemporaneous reporting establishes that these concerns were disputed and politically significant. It does not establish a judicial finding of fraud.

An authenticated Royal Dutch Shell plc SEC filing confirms that Gazprom acquired majority control of Sakhalin Energy in April 2007 for $7.45 billion.

Shell retained an interest of approximately 27.5%.

The share-purchase consideration was separate from Sakhalin’s public revenues and the project’s cost-recovery calculations.

In March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced that profit-production sharing had begun.

It reported that approximately $24.5 billion in capital and operating expenditure had been recovered.

The company identified earlier tax and mandatory payments, demonstrating that the Russian side had received financial benefits before the commencement of profit-production sharing.

Its March 2012 announcement projected approximately $500 million in profit production for the Russian side during that year, based upon an assumed oil price.

It also projected that total Russian-side revenues over the project’s lifetime would exceed $100 billion.

These were forecasts rather than established final receipts.

Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 Sustainability Report recorded more than $20.8 billion in cumulative receipts by the Russian side.

Approximately $8 billion was attributed to Sakhalin Oblast.

The report recorded payments to regional and local budgets of $2.411 billion in 2015 and $1.281 billion in 2016.

It also stated that Sakhalin II accounted for more than 60% of the regional budget in 2016.

The company reported separate payments for royalties, profit production and corporate profits tax.

These financial categories are not interchangeable.

The evidence therefore establishes substantial economic benefits alongside marked annual changes in regional receipts.

It does not establish that those changes resulted from improper conduct.

Nor does it provide a complete independent reconciliation of every cost-recovery and governmental revenue calculation.

CONCLUSION: THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCE

The financial history of Sakhalin II cannot be understood simply by comparing the amount invested with the revenues eventually generated.

The project was developed under a complicated production-sharing agreement.

The investors undertook substantial financial and technical risks.

The Russian state retained ownership of the resources.

And the regional government expected meaningful economic benefits.

But the financial timetable mattered.

Recoverable expenditure affected when the Russian side would begin receiving profit production.

That made the escalation of costs particularly controversial.

In 2005, Shell acknowledged that the projected cost of development had doubled.

In 2006, Russia’s Accounts Chamber challenged the economic implications.

In 2007, Gazprom obtained majority ownership.

Then, in March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced that the project had recovered approximately $24.5 billion in expenditure and entered the profit-production-sharing stage.

That was an important turning point.

The following years brought substantial public revenues.

The operator’s original 2016 report records cumulative receipts exceeding $20.8 billion for the Russian side, including approximately $8 billion attributed to Sakhalin Oblast.

Those figures cannot responsibly be dismissed.

They demonstrate the scale of the project’s financial contribution.

But the same report shows why the subject requires more than celebrating a large cumulative total.

Annual payments to regional and local budgets changed markedly.

The 2015 figure exceeded $2.4 billion.

The following year’s figure was approximately $1.3 billion.

Meanwhile, the operator continued to describe Sakhalin II as contributing more than 60% of regional budget revenues.

That combination reveals the central feature of the Sakhalin budget story.

The project had become an extraordinary source of public income.

But the region was also heavily exposed to changes in that income.

The revenue structure created opportunities for infrastructure, public services and development.

It also made the timing, allocation and predictability of payments exceptionally important.

Those matters extended beyond Shell.

They involved the operator, its shareholders, the Russian federal authorities and Sakhalin’s regional government.

The 2017 dispute over the redistribution of profits-tax revenues demonstrated how sensitive the arrangement could become.

But the underlying dependence was already visible in the company’s authenticated financial disclosures.

The documentary evidence therefore supports a balanced conclusion.

Sakhalin II delivered substantial public revenues. Its cost-recovery mechanism delayed the commencement of profit-production sharing until March 2012. The subsequent regional receipts were considerable, but the company’s own records demonstrate that those payments could change sharply from one year to the next.

That is a significant historical finding.

It does not establish that Shell manipulated the agreement.

It does not demonstrate that Sakhalin Energy improperly recovered expenditure.

Nor does it prove that the Russian government failed to manage the resulting revenues.

The available evidence does, however, show why the financial terms of the original contract mattered so greatly.

A development agreement determines more than who owns a project.

It helps determine when the state receives revenue, which payments are available before cost recovery, how subsequent profit production is divided and how the resulting economic benefits are distributed.

For Sakhalin II, those questions shaped more than two decades of corporate and governmental relations.

The original bargain was negotiated in 1994.

The cost controversy erupted in 2005 and 2006.

The ownership structure changed in 2007.

The profit-production-sharing milestone arrived in 2012.

By 2016, Sakhalin II had become central to the region’s finances.

The evidence demonstrates both the success of the project’s revenue-generating capacity and the vulnerability created when a regional government’s public income becomes concentrated in a major oil and gas development.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

1. Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016. Original corporate report, pages 60–61, containing cumulative payments to the Russian side, the Sakhalin Oblast allocation, annual regional and local budget payments, and the breakdown of royalties, profit production and profits tax. Original PDF.

2. Royal Dutch Shell plc — SEC Form 6-K, April 2007. Authenticated original corporate filing confirming Gazprom’s $7.45 billion acquisition of majority control of Sakhalin Energy and Shell’s resulting minority interest. Read the original SEC filing.

3. Sakhalin Energy — Production-Sharing Agreement. Official corporate explanation of the contractual structure, government expenditure oversight, cost recovery and commencement of production sharing in 2012. Read the official explanation.

4. Sakhalin Environment Watch — Federal-Regional Agreement, 3 April 1997. Historical reproduction of the arrangement between the Russian government and Sakhalin Oblast governing specified shares of project revenue. The text has not been independently checked against a certified executed original and every amendment. Read the historical document.

5. The Guardian — 15 July 2005. Contemporaneous reporting of Shell’s revised Sakhalin II cost estimate and explanations concerning the escalation. Shell Costs Double at Sakhalin.

6. RIA Novosti — 6 October 2006. Contemporaneous reporting of the Russian Accounts Chamber’s criticism of the project’s financial arrangements, preserved by the Donovan–Shell Archive. Read the archived report.

7. Offshore Energy — 30 March 2012. Contemporaneous reproduction of Sakhalin Energy’s announcement that profit-production sharing had begun, reporting $24.5 billion in recovered costs and the company’s future revenue forecasts. Read the announcement.

8. Interfax — 28 September 2016. Contemporaneous reporting of Sakhalin Energy’s statements concerning regional tax payments, cumulative receipts and Sakhalin II’s contribution to the regional budget. Read the Interfax report.

9. RBC — 29 September 2017. Investigation into the proposed redistribution of Sakhalin II corporate profits-tax receipts from the region to the federal government. Read the RBC report.

10. Donovan–Shell Archive — 8 November 2026. SLF-2007-112, examining the 1997 federal-regional agreement and the subsequent fiscal redistribution dispute. Read the earlier investigation.

11. Donovan–Shell Archive — 14 November 2026. SLF-2007-118, examining economic benefits, procurement and employment within Sakhalin Oblast. Read the previous instalment.

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This investigation examines the relationship between Sakhalin II’s cost-recovery arrangements and the subsequent revenues received by the Russian Federation and Sakhalin Oblast.

It relies upon original corporate disclosures, an authenticated Shell filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, historical contractual material and contemporaneous news reporting.

The Sakhalin Energy 2016 Sustainability Report is treated as an original corporate publication.

Its financial figures are attributed to the company.

They have not been independently reconciled against every underlying accounting entry or governmental budget record.

The historical federal-regional agreement dated 3 April 1997 is reproduced in the Sakhalin Environment Watch archive.

Its contents have not been authenticated against a certified executed original and every subsequent amendment.

No definitive legal conclusion is reached concerning the continuing application of every original revenue-allocation provision.

The July 2005 project-cost estimate, the $24.5 billion cost-recovery amount announced in March 2012, and the later regional fiscal receipts represent different financial measures.

They are not treated as interchangeable.

The Accounts Chamber’s criticisms are attributed to the contemporary reporting of those criticisms.

They are not presented as judicial findings.

The investigation does not allege that Shell deliberately inflated project expenditure, falsified recoverable costs or unlawfully delayed Russian state revenues.

The April 2007 transfer of shares is documented through Shell’s original SEC filing.

The purchase consideration is distinguished from project expenditure and payments into public budgets.

The March 2012 announcement is attributed to Sakhalin Energy through contemporaneous industry reporting.

The company’s $100 billion lifetime revenue projection and its forecast for 2012 profit-production receipts are identified as forecasts, not established final results.

The 2016 company report distinguishes payments to the Russian side from those made to Sakhalin regional and local budgets.

Reported royalties, profit-production receipts, profits tax and other payments are not automatically combined because their accounting treatment and reporting periods differ.

The reported fall in regional and local budget payments between 2015 and 2016 is established from the original corporate data.

No definitive causal explanation is advanced without the corresponding underlying financial and budget records.

The fact that Sakhalin II accounted for more than 60% of the region’s reported budget revenues is attributed to Sakhalin Energy’s disclosures.

The investigation does not independently establish the composition of every item of regional public income.

No court ruling establishing misconduct concerning the specific financial matters examined has been authenticated or relied upon.

The interpretation of fiscal dependence, revenue concentration and public accountability is editorial analysis rather than a judicial or regulatory finding.

Shell plc, former Sakhalin Energy personnel, the current operating company, Gazprom, Russian federal authorities, Sakhalin regional officials and other interested parties are invited to provide authenticated documents, independent audit findings, factual corrections or other relevant evidence.

Any substantive response should be considered and reported fairly.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-120 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CX The $100 Billion Projection — What Sakhalin Energy Promised Russia in 2012, and What the Subsequent Records Actually Show

In March 2012, Sakhalin Energy made an extraordinarily ambitious financial forecast.

The company stated that total revenues received by the Russian side over the life of Sakhalin II were expected to exceed $100 billion.

The projection was made when profit-production sharing began.

It followed the reported recovery of approximately $24.5 billion in project expenditure.

And it reflected expectations concerning production, commodity prices and the financial arrangements governing the development.

But a forecast is not a payment.

Nor does an estimate made in 2012 necessarily remain valid under different market or political circumstances.

The next investigation will examine the documentary basis of that $100 billion projection and compare it with subsequent reported receipts.

It will distinguish amounts actually received from forecasts, profit-production entitlements from taxes, and Russian federal receipts from Sakhalin regional revenues.

It will also examine whether the operator’s later financial disclosures permit a reliable assessment of progress against the original forecast.

An important distinction will concern the change in the project’s ownership and operating structure after 2022.

Shell announced its withdrawal from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.

The project subsequently continued under a replacement Russian operator.

Its later financial results cannot simply be attributed to Shell’s management.

Nevertheless, they may provide evidence relevant to the longer history of the project and its economic commitments.

The central documentary question is straightforward: when Sakhalin Energy predicted that Russia would receive more than $100 billion over the project’s lifetime, what assumptions supported that prediction — and how much of the forecast can be measured against subsequently disclosed payments?

The next file will follow the money, distinguish projected benefits from actual receipts and identify the evidence necessary for an independent historical assessment.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

Editorial note: This instalment adds an important documentary finding to the Sakhalin revenue investigation. The original March 2012 announcement establishes the reported $24.5 billion cost-recovery milestone, while the 2016 corporate report provides a year-by-year record of payments to Sakhalin’s regional and local budgets.

The figures demonstrate substantial public revenues alongside significant annual variation. The investigation deliberately avoids treating that variation as evidence of wrongdoing or attributing every subsequent governmental allocation decision to Shell.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 15 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 15, 2026 at 10:45 pm.
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2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #46

Skeptical Science - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 07:29
A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, November 8, 2026 thru Sat, November 14, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

International Climate Conferences and Agreements (6 items)

Climate Policy and Politics (6 items)

Climate Change Impacts (6 items)

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (3 items)

Climate Education and Communication (2 items)

Climate Science and Research (2 items)

  • What if digitalization isn`t the climate fix we imagined? Smart cities and paperless offices promised efficiency. Thirty years of data from the world’s largest economies suggest the energy needed to power them has so far outweighed the savings. The Anthropocene, Sarah DeWeerdt, Nov 10, 2026.
  • Skeptical Science New Research for Week #46 2026 Skeptical Science's weekly roundup of newly published climate research, in peer-reviewed academic journals and from government/NGO sources. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Nov 12, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (1 item)

  • The Scientists Fighting to Help Wildfire Survivors Heal A wildfire exposure study on Maui created a new blueprint for public health research and support after disasters—but funding was drying up. Could the organizers keep it afloat? Inside Climate News, Keerti Gopal, Nov 08, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 item)

Miscellaneous (1 item)

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!
Categories: I. Climate Science

COP31: Australia and Türkiye urged not to ignore calls for fossil fuel phaseout

Renew Economy - Sat, 11/14/2026 - 21:51

Failure to acknowledge growing calls for a fossil fuel phaseout – particularly by Australia and Türkiye – will damage COP credibility, summit hears.

The post COP31: Australia and Türkiye urged not to ignore calls for fossil fuel phaseout appeared first on Renew Economy.

After the blizzard: In a post-Snowy 2.0 world, what role does Snowy Hydro play?

Renew Economy - Sat, 11/14/2026 - 21:34

Now that we know Snowy 2.0 is going ahead, what role will Snowy Hydro play in the market? A cultural reset is required: Snowy needs to act like a public company.

The post After the blizzard: In a post-Snowy 2.0 world, what role does Snowy Hydro play? appeared first on Renew Economy.

Shell Wins Texas Appeal Over Multimillion-Dollar Trader Bonuses — A Documentary Investigation and an Archive Correction

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Sat, 11/14/2026 - 11:47

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

14 November 2026

Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT.

A Texas appeals court has upheld Shell’s victory in a multimillion-dollar dispute with former senior oil trader Eva-Maria Frohn. The decision examines the contractual meaning of redundancy, the treatment of conditional bonuses and performance shares, and the relationship between Shell’s international employment policies and individual compensation agreements. It also provides an important opportunity for the Donovan–Shell Archive to correct its own earlier coverage of the case.

A significant judgment in a dispute over Shell trading bonuses

On 13 November 2026, the First Court of Appeals of Texas issued a memorandum opinion in Eva-Maria Frohn v. Shell US Hosting Company and Shell Trading (US) Company.

The appeal arose from a lawsuit brought by a former senior Shell oil trader who claimed that the company had improperly withheld substantial bonus payments and performance-share awards following her departure in November 2021.

At the centre of the dispute was a deceptively simple question.

Had Frohn left Shell because her employment was redundant, or had she voluntarily ended an employment relationship that Shell wanted to continue?

The answer mattered because her compensation agreements contained restrictions on awards that had not yet vested.

Certain exceptions permitted awards to continue when employment ended for specified reasons, including redundancy.

Frohn maintained that her circumstances fell within that exception.

Shell disputed her interpretation.

A Texas jury had already rejected her breach-of-contract claim and found in Shell’s favour on her remaining claims.

The appellate court has now upheld that outcome.

The court’s opening explanation is particularly clear: the contractual question was whether Frohn’s employment ended because of redundancy, and the jury’s decision that Shell had not breached the agreements was supported by the evidence.

The judgment is therefore a documented legal victory for Shell in this particular dispute.

It is not merely a corporate assertion that the company acted properly.

It is the result of a trial and appellate proceedings.

Primary source: Texas First Court of Appeals, Case No. 01-24-00571-CV, memorandum opinion issued 13 November 2026.

The earlier revelation about Shell’s trading profits

The case first attracted substantial attention in April 2024 for reasons extending beyond Frohn’s personal compensation dispute.

Reuters reported that testimony disclosed in the proceedings provided a rare glimpse into the financial performance of Shell’s United States crude-oil trading business.

John Dimech, a former head of Shell’s US crude trading operations, had testified that the division typically generated between approximately $950 million and $1 billion annually.

Those figures attracted interest because Shell does not ordinarily disclose the profitability of individual trading desks in the same way it reports the results of its principal business divisions.

Reuters also reported the exceptional scale of compensation available to successful senior energy traders.

According to its April 2024 account, Frohn was seeking approximately $15 million, including a disputed $6 million bonus associated with 2021.

The report stated that she had previously received a bonus exceeding $5 million in 2020 for her work during the preceding year.

These were substantial amounts, even by the standards of highly compensated international financial and commodity-trading professionals.

But two distinctions must be maintained.

First, the historical trading-profit estimates arose from testimony reported during the litigation. They were not independent, audited disclosures of the division’s current profitability.

Second, the scale of compensation claimed did not establish that Shell had unlawfully withheld it.

That second distinction is especially important in light of the subsequent court decisions.

Contemporaneous source: Reuters, 29 April 2024 — Shell earns $1 billion a year from US crude trading, court filing shows.

What our own archive reported — and what it omitted

On 29 April 2024, royaldutchshellplc.com published an article entitled:

Shell Rakes in $1 Billion Annually from US Crude Trading, Lawsuit Exposes.

That article drew attention to the trading-profit disclosures and the extraordinary amounts involved in the compensation dispute.

Its presentation was satirical and strongly critical of Shell.

It also described the alleged breach of Frohn’s contract in terms that could reasonably give readers the impression that wrongful conduct had been established.

That was not an adequately qualified account of the legal position.

The Reuters report published on the same date had already stated that a Texas jury had returned a verdict favourable to Shell, rejecting Frohn’s claim.

Our original article did not mention that outcome.

The omission was material.

An allegation of contractual misconduct and a jury’s finding that the contract was not breached are fundamentally different matters.

The earlier article’s satirical character does not eliminate the importance of preserving that distinction.

Nor should the subsequent appellate victory be ignored simply because it favours Shell.

The Donovan–Shell Archive’s responsibility is to record the evidence accurately, including evidence that contradicts its earlier commentary.

We therefore correct the record explicitly: Shell prevailed at trial in the Frohn bonus dispute, and the Texas First Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on 13 November 2026.

The original reporting about historical trading-profit testimony is a separate matter and is not disproved by the appellate judgment.

The correction concerns the legal status and outcome of Frohn’s compensation claims.

An international career and a dispute over unvested compensation

The newly published appellate judgment provides a much fuller account of the employment history and contractual arrangements than was available to many readers of the original news reports.

Frohn began working for Shell in London in 2001.

In 2010, she accepted a long-term international assignment in Houston, Texas, as a trading manager.

Her assignment was extended several times, and she remained in Houston for approximately eleven years.

During her employment, she received conditional cash-bonus awards and performance-share awards.

The disputed agreements related to awards granted in 2019, 2020 and 2021.

Their conditions generally required continued employment through specified vesting dates before the awards became payable or transferable.

For the conditional cash bonuses, those dates fell in August 2022, August 2023 and August 2024.

For the performance-share awards, the relevant dates fell in January 2022, January 2023 and January 2024.

Frohn left Shell on 30 November 2021.

Consequently, the awards concerned had not vested when her employment ended.

However, the agreements recognised limited exceptions.

Depending on the award, those exceptions included redundancy, retirement, disability, injury or ill health, with an additional fixed-term-contract provision applying to the share awards.

The case did not turn on whether Frohn had been a successful or valuable trader.

It concerned whether the contractual conditions for retaining unvested awards had been satisfied.

That distinction is central to understanding why an employee could receive exceptionally large awards during employment yet fail to qualify for additional conditional compensation after leaving.

The disagreement over returning to London

The circumstances preceding Frohn’s departure were contested.

According to the appellate opinion, Shell had taken steps in March 2020 to retain her after learning that she was considering leaving the company.

Those steps included an improved compensation package.

In June 2021, Frohn informed Shell that she wanted to conclude her Houston assignment and return to London for personal reasons.

The court records that her circumstances included concern about her father’s health and a desire to spend more time with him.

Shell wanted her to continue in Houston.

When it became apparent that Frohn intended to return to London, the company explored alternative employment opportunities.

One involved a leadership position in an internal technology-modernisation initiative known as Project Punk.

Another concerned a senior low-carbon-fuels position with potential responsibilities in London and Rotterdam.

Shell presented evidence that these opportunities could preserve important aspects of Frohn’s seniority, remuneration or professional responsibilities.

Frohn did not accept the Project Punk position and did not pursue the low-carbon-fuels opportunity to the point of appointment.

Shell subsequently classified her departure as a resignation.

Frohn challenged that classification.

An important feature of her argument was that she had neither submitted a formal resignation letter nor expressly stated that she was resigning.

She also relied on the conclusion of her Houston assignment and the absence of an identical position available to her in London.

These circumstances were not simply ignored by the appellate judges.

They were examined as part of the evidentiary record.

The court acknowledged that Frohn had presented evidence supporting her interpretation.

The difficulty for her case was that the jury had also heard evidence supporting Shell’s position.

The appellate judges concluded that the jury was entitled to resolve those competing accounts in Shell’s favour.

What did redundancy mean under the bonus agreements?

The dispute illustrates the importance of distinguishing employment terminology from the specific language of an enforceable compensation contract.

Frohn argued that the conclusion of her international assignment, combined with the circumstances of her proposed return to London, meant that her departure should be treated as redundancy.

Shell maintained that her Houston position remained available.

The company had not decided that her work was no longer needed.

Instead, she had requested a move for personal reasons and had not accepted the alternative opportunities subsequently identified.

The appellate court addressed the contractual meaning of redundancy and treated its ordinary meaning as involving the cessation of employment because the employee was no longer needed.

Whether Frohn’s individual circumstances satisfied that meaning was a question to be assessed against the evidence.

The court did not say that a company could obtain the desired outcome merely by labelling a departure as resignation.

Rather, it examined the underlying facts.

The evidence that Shell wanted Frohn to remain in Houston was significant.

So was evidence that her original position had not been eliminated.

The court concluded that the jury had sufficient grounds to find that Frohn’s employment had not ended because she was redundant.

That meant the contractual exception permitting retention of the unvested awards had not been established.

The distinction is important for any international employer operating complicated compensation arrangements.

The language of a particular contract may be decisive even where broader human-resources policies employ overlapping terminology.

Could Shell’s own employment policies change the outcome?

A particularly interesting part of the appeal concerned the relationship between Shell’s individual bonus agreements and its wider internal employment policies.

Frohn relied upon materials connected with Shell’s United Kingdom redundancy procedures, its international mobility arrangements and a restructuring programme known as Project Reshape.

Her argument was that these materials supported a broader understanding of redundancy.

One of the policies addressed circumstances in which an international assignment ended and the individual was unable to secure another position.

Another concerned situations where employees rejected alternative employment following organisational changes.

These were not irrelevant subjects.

They helped explain why Frohn considered her departure to be something other than a straightforward voluntary resignation.

But the appellate court identified a decisive contractual difficulty.

The disputed bonus agreements did not incorporate the relevant policies as part of their own terms.

Under the Texas contractual principles applied in the case, separate guidance documents could not simply be used to alter the meaning of the compensation agreements.

The court also noted evidence that Project Reshape’s relevant UK provisions applied to local UK employment arrangements rather than Frohn’s continuing Houston role.

Even where internal policies discussed redundancy or severance, that did not necessarily confer an entitlement to the specific conditional cash bonuses and performance shares in dispute.

This finding should not be turned into a universal statement that corporate employment policies have no legal significance.

Their effect depends upon the relevant contractual language, governing law and circumstances.

The conclusion in Frohn’s case was narrower.

The particular documents on which she relied did not establish the contractual entitlement she claimed.

The court also rejected challenges concerning excluded evidence

Frohn raised a further appellate argument concerning the treatment of expert evidence.

The trial court had excluded excerpts from articles addressing British redundancy practices.

She contended that those materials supported her position and should have been admitted.

The appellate court upheld their exclusion.

It referred to deficiencies in the attempt to establish the publications as appropriate authorities for the expert evidence and to the fact that the expert had not relied on them when forming his underlying opinion.

The court also considered that the material would have been cumulative of evidence already presented.

It therefore found no basis for reversing the judgment on that ground.

The appellate judges additionally rejected Frohn’s challenge concerning the denial of attorney’s fees.

Because she had not succeeded in her contractual claim, the relevant grounds for recovering those fees had not been established.

These conclusions further reinforce the narrow but decisive nature of the judgment.

The court examined legal and evidentiary objections to the trial outcome and found no grounds to disturb it.

What the judgment does — and does not — establish

The outcome is clear, but its scope should not be exaggerated.

The appellate judgment establishes that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Shell did not breach the disputed bonus agreements.

It also establishes that Frohn’s challenges to the treatment of policy documents and excluded evidentiary material did not justify overturning the judgment.

The jury had found in Shell’s favour on the other claims presented at trial, including fraud and declaratory relief.

The November 2026 decision affirms the trial court’s judgment.

It does not, however, amount to a general judicial endorsement of Shell’s employment practices worldwide.

Nor does it establish that every bonus-forfeiture provision used by Shell is enforceable in every jurisdiction.

Different contracts and different factual circumstances may produce different legal outcomes.

The decision also does not resolve broader questions concerning the appropriate size of commodity traders’ bonuses.

Those are separate matters of remuneration policy, corporate governance and commercial judgement.

Furthermore, the appellate ruling does not adjudicate the historical estimates of Shell’s US crude-trading profits reported by Reuters in 2024.

The $950-million-to-$1-billion figures arose from separate testimony disclosed during the proceedings.

They should not be presented as an independently verified estimate of current 2026 trading profits.

Similarly, the amount Frohn claimed in 2024 should not be confused with a court-ordered payment.

Reuters reported that she sought approximately $15 million. A report published by Law360 on 13 November 2026 described the disputed awards as approximately $16 million.

The appellate opinion itself does not establish a reconciled monetary valuation of the claims.

The important verified financial conclusion is that the trial judgment awarded Frohn no recovery on those claims and that this result was upheld on appeal.

The wider importance of conditional compensation

Although the dispute concerns an unusually highly paid professional, it raises broader questions about compensation structures in major international corporations.

Large trading organisations often seek to retain experienced employees whose decisions can influence substantial commercial exposures.

Deferred compensation provides one mechanism for encouraging continuity.

An employee may receive a conditional award reflecting performance during one period while remaining subject to vesting requirements extending several years into the future.

That arrangement can serve a legitimate business purpose.

It may discourage short-term risk-taking and encourage employees to remain with the organisation.

But it also creates potential disputes when the employment relationship ends before an award has vested.

The employee may regard the award as compensation generated by work already performed.

The employer may regard it as a contractual benefit payable only if future conditions are satisfied.

Neither interpretation necessarily determines the legal outcome.

The relevant agreements, the circumstances of departure and the applicable law are essential.

The Frohn judgment demonstrates the financial importance of those distinctions.

It also illustrates how international employment arrangements can become complicated when an employee begins a career in one country, spends many years on assignment in another and subsequently seeks to return.

Internal mobility policies, redundancy procedures, retention arrangements and compensation agreements may all become relevant.

But they do not automatically create identical legal entitlements.

An independent archive must record Shell’s victories as well as its defeats

The Donovan–Shell Archive has published substantial material examining Shell’s commercial practices, litigation history, corporate governance and relationships with employees.

Many of those investigations concern allegations, regulatory findings or documentary evidence unfavourable to the company.

That historical focus makes it particularly important to report legal decisions that do not support criticism of Shell.

The Frohn litigation is a useful example.

The original 2024 article drew attention to a genuine public-interest subject: the scale of compensation and profits associated with Shell’s oil-trading operations.

But it did not adequately explain the status of the legal claim on which the disclosures had arisen.

That omission requires correction.

A reader encountering only the earlier account could reasonably conclude that Shell had been shown to have wrongfully withheld compensation.

The court record supports a different conclusion in this particular case.

Shell defended the proceedings successfully.

A jury found that the company had not breached the compensation agreements.

The subsequent appeal did not overturn that finding.

Those are not facts that should be minimised because they are favourable to Shell.

They are part of the documentary history.

Nor is it necessary to adopt Shell’s commercial or ethical perspective in order to report them.

The purpose of an independent archive is not to guarantee that every legal dispute produces evidence against the corporation under examination.

Its purpose is to preserve an accurate record and to distinguish proven events from allegations, commentary and unresolved questions.

The present article therefore serves two functions.

It reports a new judgment.

And it corrects the treatment of an older case in the historical archive.

Both are appropriate responsibilities for an independent documentary publication.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

Established facts: On 13 November 2026, the Texas First Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favour of Shell US Hosting Company and Shell Trading (US) Company in the Frohn litigation. The jury had found no breach of the disputed bonus agreements. The appellate judges held that sufficient evidence supported that conclusion and rejected the additional challenges addressed in their opinion.

Frohn’s position: She maintained that the conclusion of her international assignment and the circumstances of her return to the United Kingdom brought her within the redundancy provisions of her conditional compensation agreements. She disputed Shell’s classification of her departure as a resignation and relied partly upon internal Shell employment policies.

Shell’s position: The company maintained that Frohn’s Houston position remained available, that it wished to retain her and that the relevant contractual exception did not apply. The jury accepted Shell’s defence, and the appellate court found that the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.

Unresolved or separate matters: The ruling does not independently establish Shell’s current US crude-trading profitability, evaluate the general appropriateness of its bonus policies or determine how different compensation agreements might operate under other employment laws. The possibility of further appellate proceedings has not been excluded by this investigation.

Archive correction: The Donovan–Shell Archive’s article of 29 April 2024 did not adequately distinguish Frohn’s allegations from the jury verdict already reported in Shell’s favour. This investigation corrects that omission.

CONCLUSION: A COURT VICTORY THAT DESERVES AN ACCURATE PLACE IN SHELL’S HISTORY

The Texas appeal has ended with another judgment in Shell’s favour.

That is the essential finding.

Eva-Maria Frohn pursued a substantial compensation claim based upon her interpretation of contractual redundancy provisions.

Shell disputed her entitlement.

The jury accepted Shell’s position.

On 13 November 2026, the First Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s judgment.

The dispute provides an instructive account of the way conditional compensation can operate in a major international trading organisation.

It shows why the distinction between an unvested award and a legally enforceable entitlement matters.

It also demonstrates the difficulty of reconciling international assignment policies with individual bonus contracts when an employment relationship ends.

But the case carries an additional significance for this archive.

Our original reporting drew attention to Shell’s trading profits and senior-trader remuneration without adequately recording that the company had already prevailed before the jury.

That omission should not remain uncorrected.

The strongest independent investigations are those prepared to report the documentary evidence wherever it leads, including when that evidence favours Shell or contradicts an archive’s earlier presentation.

The new appellate judgment supplies the authoritative record.

It deserves to be published accurately and preserved alongside the original 2024 account.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

1. Texas First Court of Appeals — 13 November 2026

Eva-Maria Frohn v. Shell US Hosting Company and Shell Trading (US) Company — Full memorandum opinion.

Case No. 01-24-00571-CV, originating from Harris County District Court case No. 2022-07028. The primary judicial record supporting the article’s findings on contractual interpretation, the evidence and the appellate outcome.

2. Full judgment, PDF reproduction

Download the 22-page Texas Court of Appeals opinion.

3. Texas judicial case information

Texas Courts — Appellate case record, No. 01-24-00571-CV.

The official appellate case information system. The judgment itself is the authoritative source for the outcome; public docket updates may lag behind newly issued decisions.

4. Reuters — 29 April 2024

Shell earns $1 billion a year from US crude trading, court filing shows.

Contemporaneous reporting of the trading-profit testimony, Frohn’s claimed compensation and the jury’s verdict in Shell’s favour.

5. Donovan–Shell Archive — 29 April 2024

Shell Rakes in $1 Billion Annually from US Crude Trading, Lawsuit Exposes.

The historical article examined and corrected by this investigation.

6. Law360 — 13 November 2026

Shell Didn’t Owe Ex-Worker $16M Bonuses, Texas Panel Says.

Contemporary legal reporting of the appellate decision. Subscription access may be required.

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This independent investigation is based principally on the Texas First Court of Appeals’ memorandum opinion issued on 13 November 2026, together with contemporaneous Reuters reporting, publicly available judicial case information and the Donovan–Shell Archive’s article of 29 April 2024.

The judicial findings are distinguished from the parties’ allegations and from the archive’s editorial analysis.

The appellate ruling concerns the specific agreements, evidence and claims presented in Frohn v. Shell US Hosting Company and Shell Trading (US) Company. It is not represented as a comprehensive legal assessment of Shell’s employment practices or as a determination of rights under other contracts or jurisdictions.

Amounts attributed to Frohn’s compensation claims come from contemporary reporting and are not presented as sums awarded by a court. The historical trading-profit figures were reported from testimony and are not treated as verified current financial performance.

The archive acknowledges that its 29 April 2024 article omitted the jury verdict in Shell’s favour and used language that could imply an established contractual breach. The present investigation corrects that presentation.

As of 14 November 2026, the appellate judgment has been verified. No claim is made that further review is legally impossible or that all applicable post-judgment procedures have concluded.

Shell plc, the defendant companies, Eva-Maria Frohn and their representatives are invited to submit factual corrections or relevant additional documents. Substantiated corrections will be considered fairly.

The Donovan–Shell Archive is independent of Shell plc. This article is documentary reporting and analysis, not legal advice or a determination of liability beyond the findings of the cited courts.

Shell Wins Texas Appeal Over Multimillion-Dollar Trader Bonuses — A Documentary Investigation and an Archive Correction was first posted on November 14, 2026 at 8:47 pm.
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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 14 NOVEMBER 2026

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Sat, 11/14/2026 - 11:27
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 14 NOVEMBER 2026

Archive reference: SLF-2007-118

The Sakhalin Papers CVIII: The Sakhalin Address Test — 5,933 Local Contracts, but How Much of Shell’s Energy Legacy Stayed on the Island? Sakhalin Energy reported that 70% of its Russian-company contracts and purchase orders in 2024 went to businesses registered on Sakhalin. Yet only 59% of its own employees were residents of the region. Earlier, while Shell remained a major shareholder, the operator reported that Sakhalin Oblast had received approximately $8 billion in project-related public revenues by the end of 2016. These are substantial economic benefits. But they represent three fundamentally different measurements: contracts awarded, employment and money received by government. Original Shell-era corporate reports, independent research, contemporaneous Russian reporting and the replacement operator’s disclosures reveal what can — and cannot — be established about the benefits retained by Sakhalin itself.

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT. Based on authenticated Sakhalin Energy corporate reports published during Shell’s involvement, contemporaneous Russian news reporting, independent WWF-Russia and International Institute for Environment and Development research, Shell’s subsequent withdrawal announcement, and the replacement operator’s published disclosures.

Publication date: 14 November 2026

Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia

Previous instalment: SLF-2007-117 — The Russian Supplier Test: What Was Really “Russian-Made” at Sakhalin II?

INTRODUCTION: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A RUSSIAN CONTRACT AND A SAKHALIN BENEFIT

The Sakhalin II project transformed the economy of Russia’s Far Eastern island.

Shell helped develop offshore platforms, processing facilities, pipelines and Russia’s first major liquefied natural gas export plant.

Thousands of workers participated in the enormous construction programme.

Russian contractors obtained substantial business.

The region received public revenues, infrastructure improvements and employment opportunities.

These benefits are documented.

But the original production-sharing arrangements involved more than generating economic activity somewhere within the Russian Federation.

Sakhalin was the region hosting the development.

Its communities experienced the disruption of construction.

Its rivers, coastal waters and fishing grounds were directly affected by the industrial infrastructure.

Its regional government was a party to the original 1994 production-sharing agreement.

And its population had a particular interest in receiving lasting economic benefits from the offshore resources.

The distinction between Russian national participation and Sakhalin regional participation therefore matters.

A contract awarded to a company in Moscow is not necessarily a contract awarded to an enterprise based on Sakhalin.

A company registered on Sakhalin is not necessarily manufacturing its products locally.

A worker employed on Sakhalin is not necessarily a resident of the region.

And money paid into the Sakhalin regional budget is different from money awarded to a contractor.

The project’s published records make these distinctions unusually clear.

Sakhalin Energy’s 2024 ESG Report recorded 8,788 contracts and orders during the year.

Of those, 8,443 went to Russian companies.

The report also stated that 5,933 contracts and purchase orders went to Russian companies registered on Sakhalin.

That represented approximately 70% of awards to Russian companies by number.

But the report did not attach a corresponding monetary total to those 5,933 regional awards.

It therefore does not establish that 70% of procurement expenditure remained within Sakhalin Oblast.

The same report provides an equally revealing employment statistic.

Of the company’s 2,068 employees at the end of 2024, 2,055 were Russian nationals.

But only 1,211 were Sakhalin Oblast residents.

That represented 59% of the workforce.

A Russian workforce and a workforce drawn from the host region are not identical.

Nor should the economic benefits of Sakhalin II be judged solely through procurement.

During Shell’s participation, Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 Sustainability Report stated that the region had received approximately $8 billion in project-related public revenues since the beginning of operations.

It also reported substantial infrastructure improvements.

These were real benefits according to the operator’s published accounts, although the figures remain attributed corporate disclosures rather than independently reconstructed calculations.

The documentary question is therefore more demanding than asking whether Sakhalin benefited.

It plainly did. The question is what proportion of the project’s different economic benefits can be demonstrated to have reached Sakhalin itself — and how those benefits should be measured.

PART ONE: WHY SAKHALIN’S LOCATION MATTERED 1. The regional government was a party to the original agreement

The Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement was signed on 22 June 1994.

The investor was Sakhalin Energy.

The Russian side was represented by the Government of the Russian Federation and the Administration of Sakhalin Oblast.

That arrangement recognised the relationship between the national government, the regional authorities and the international investors.

The development involved two major offshore fields: Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye.

It subsequently expanded into an integrated production and transportation system extending across the island.

Its infrastructure included offshore platforms, an onshore processing facility, lengthy pipeline systems, an LNG plant and marine export facilities.

The economic effects were therefore distributed across several levels.

The Russian Federation received fiscal and strategic benefits.

The regional government received public revenues.

Russian companies obtained contracts.

Sakhalin businesses and workers obtained opportunities associated with construction and operations.

But those categories did not always overlap.

A contract awarded to a national engineering company might generate considerable Russian economic activity without developing a manufacturing enterprise on Sakhalin.

Conversely, local transport, maintenance or catering services could generate employment and business income within the region without representing a particularly large proportion of the project’s overall expenditure.

The original arrangements must therefore be examined against the different types of benefit they were intended to generate.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — Production-Sharing Agreement.

2. The island also hosted the environmental consequences

The economic question cannot be separated entirely from the project’s physical location.

The development included hundreds of kilometres of pipelines crossing Sakhalin.

Construction activities involved rivers supporting salmon populations.

Offshore operations raised concerns about western gray whales and other marine species.

Industrial activities affected coastal environments and communities dependent upon fishing and other traditional activities.

These issues were examined by environmental organisations and independent researchers during the construction period.

The 2010 WWF-Russia and International Institute for Environment and Development report, Responsible Contracting in the Russian Oil and Gas Industry, identified Sakhalin II as an example of the importance of managing construction contractors’ environmental and social performance.

Its authors discussed the potential impact of pipeline construction on salmon rivers and the concerns of indigenous communities.

These matters do not establish that every environmental criticism was ultimately upheld.

Nor do they establish that the operator failed to undertake mitigation.

But they demonstrate why local economic participation deserves independent scrutiny.

Sakhalin was not merely a convenient geographical address for an international export operation.

It was the location where much of the industrial activity occurred and where the environmental and social consequences were experienced.

The benefits available to the host region therefore have particular historical importance.

Independent source: Aleksey Knizhnikov and Emma Wilson — Responsible Contracting in the Russian Oil and Gas Industry, WWF-Russia and IIED, 2010.

iied.org

 

PART TWO: THE CONTEMPORARY INDEPENDENT WARNING 3. March 2010: Researchers identify a weakness in local-content reporting

In March 2010, Aleksey Knizhnikov and Emma Wilson published their study of contractor relationships within Russia’s oil and gas industry.

The report is particularly relevant because it was prepared while Shell remained a substantial shareholder in Sakhalin II.

It also examined the underlying problem of distinguishing local contractors from national companies and foreign-controlled businesses.

On page 8, the researchers noted that operators sometimes counted Russian-registered companies established with foreign capital as local content.

Foreign contractors operating through Russian project offices could also be counted.

The authors questioned whether those classifications necessarily reflected the intended economic benefits.

Their research also identified a further ambiguity.

The term local could refer to a company operating anywhere within Russia.

Alternatively, it could refer to an enterprise based within the particular region hosting the energy development.

Those are different geographical categories.

The report observed that local-content definitions were not always consistent.

It also noted that the economic opportunities available to genuinely local contractors depended upon the industrial capacity already present in a region.

For Sakhalin, this was a significant issue.

The island did not initially possess every specialist engineering and manufacturing capability required by the project.

Some companies and workers therefore had to be brought from elsewhere.

Local companies could nevertheless participate in construction, transportation, services and other activities.

The researchers did not establish that Sakhalin Energy had deliberately manipulated its Russian-content calculations.

Their report was not a forensic audit of individual Shell contracts.

But it identified a genuine methodological problem.

Russian participation measured at the national level does not automatically establish the corresponding economic benefit retained within the region hosting the project.

That distinction is central to the present investigation.

Source: WWF-Russia and IIED, Responsible Contracting in the Russian Oil and Gas Industry, 2010, pages 7–8.

iied.org

 

PART THREE: WHAT SAKHALIN RECEIVED DURING THE SHELL ERA 4. September 2016: The operator reports billions in regional revenues

One of the most important contemporary financial statements appeared on 28 September 2016.

Interfax reported comments by Sakhalin Energy representative Ole Myklestad at the Oil and Gas of Sakhalin 2016conference.

According to the report, the company stated that Sakhalin II had transferred approximately $2.4 billion in taxes to the Sakhalin regional budget during 2015.

That sum represented more than 60% of the regional treasury’s income for that year.

The operator also reported that approximately $7.9 billion had been transferred to Sakhalin Oblast over the project’s history to that point.

These figures are significant.

They provide contemporary evidence of major public revenues received by the host region.

They should not be confused with procurement awards.

Tax payments to the regional government are fundamentally different from contracts awarded to commercial enterprises.

Both can benefit the economy.

But their effects and accounting treatment are different.

Public revenues can support services, infrastructure and government expenditure.

Procurement payments purchase goods and services for the project.

The two categories should not be added together as though they represent the same kind of benefit.

The Interfax report also provides a valuable independent record of what Sakhalin Energy was telling the public in 2016.

The news organisation reported the company’s statements at the time.

It did not independently audit every payment.

Accordingly, the figures remain company-attributed, although their contemporaneous reporting gives them a clear documentary provenance.

Contemporaneous reporting: Interfax — Sakhalin II Paid Approximately $2.4 Billion into Sakhalin’s Budget in 2015, 28 September 2016.

Дальний Восток || Интерфакс Россия

 

5. The 2016 Sustainability Report confirms substantial regional receipts

Sakhalin Energy’s Sustainable Development Report 2016 provides a further historical checkpoint.

In its section on economic impact management, the company reported that cumulative receipts by the Russian side from Sakhalin II had exceeded $20.8 billion.

Of that amount, approximately $8 billion was identified as having been received by Sakhalin Oblast.

The report also stated that taxes and other mandatory payments to the Sakhalin regional and local budgets totalled approximately $1.3 billion during 2016.

The company described those revenues as representing more than 60% of the region’s budget that year.

These figures are of considerable importance.

They demonstrate that regional economic benefits were not limited to the employment and procurement statistics frequently emphasised in corporate publicity.

Sakhalin II had also become a major source of public revenue.

The company’s published accounts identify a substantial direct financial relationship between the energy project and the host region.

But the distinction between receipts and expenditure must remain clear.

Money received by a regional government is not necessarily money permanently retained within that region.

Its ultimate economic impact depends upon government spending decisions, transfers, liabilities and other fiscal arrangements.

The published project figures do not provide a complete independent analysis of those subsequent flows.

They do, however, establish that Sakhalin’s public finances were receiving substantial project-derived revenues.

Primary Shell-era corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016, Economic Impact Management, pages 60–61.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

6. More than $600 million in infrastructure improvements

The same 2016 report identifies another category of regional benefit.

Sakhalin Energy stated that more than $600 million had been invested by the company in upgrading infrastructure on the island.

It also reported that Sakhalin companies had obtained contracts and subcontracts.

The operator maintained that local businesses had improved their capabilities and competitiveness through involvement in the project.

Those statements should be attributed to Sakhalin Energy.

The report does not provide, within the summary examined, a complete independently audited breakdown of every infrastructure improvement.

Nor does it demonstrate the precise long-term economic return from each investment.

But the disclosed infrastructure expenditure represents a distinct form of regional economic activity.

Roads, transport connections, utilities and other infrastructure can support industrial operations while also delivering wider public benefits.

The degree of that wider benefit depends upon the nature and accessibility of the particular assets.

It would therefore be inaccurate to describe all project infrastructure expenditure as money spent solely for the benefit of Sakhalin’s population.

Some facilities were constructed primarily to support the oil and gas development.

Others could also provide broader regional benefits.

A complete assessment requires the projects to be distinguished individually.

Nevertheless, the 2016 report records substantial infrastructure investment on the island during Shell’s participation.

PART FOUR: THE EMPLOYMENT TEST 7. A remarkable difference between where employees worked and where they lived

The 2016 Sustainability Report provides a particularly useful employment comparison.

At 31 December 2016, Sakhalin Energy reported a workforce of 2,307 employees.

Of those, 2,071 were Russian nationals.

That represented approximately 90% of its workforce.

The company also stated that 2,274 employees worked on Sakhalin, with 33 working in its Moscow office.

But the number of employees who were actually residents of Sakhalin Oblast was smaller.

It was 1,240.

That represented approximately 54% of total employees.

The distinction is important.

Working on Sakhalin does not necessarily mean being a Sakhalin resident.

A Russian employee may live elsewhere and travel to the island for rotational work.

An employee may be stationed in the region for professional reasons while maintaining their principal residence elsewhere.

The company itself acknowledged rotational employment arrangements.

The report stated that 27% of employees worked on a rotational basis.

These arrangements were understandable for a complex offshore energy development.

Specialist workers were not necessarily available locally.

But the data show why employment statistics require careful interpretation.

In 2016, Sakhalin Energy’s workforce was predominantly Russian.

Yet just over half of its total employees were identified as Sakhalin Oblast residents.

The company was highly Russian in employment terms, but considerably less local when the criterion was regional residence.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016, Social Impact Management, pages 88–89.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

8. The managerial positions reveal another distinction

The same report identified 399 Russian employees holding managerial positions.

Of those, 215 were Sakhalin Oblast residents.

This provides another useful measure.

Local employment is not solely about the total number of jobs.

It also concerns access to technical, professional and managerial positions.

Such positions can provide opportunities for long-term skills development and economic advancement.

The 2016 figures demonstrate that Sakhalin residents did hold important management roles.

But not every Russian manager was a resident of the host region.

The company described programmes intended to train and promote Russian specialists.

Its stated objectives included developing personnel capable of taking leadership and technical positions.

Those programmes may have provided genuine benefits.

The public figures do not, however, establish how many trainees subsequently remained in Sakhalin, obtained senior positions or continued their careers elsewhere.

Such outcomes would require longer-term personnel information.

PART FIVE: THE 2024 ADDRESS TEST 9. The operator reports 8,788 contracts and orders

The replacement operator’s Non-Financial ESG Report 2024 provides a more recent and unusually specific description of procurement activity.

It reported that 8,788 contracts and orders had been awarded during 2024.

Of those, 8,443 went to Russian companies.

It also stated that 5,933 contracts and purchase orders were awarded to Russian companies registered on Sakhalin.

This represented approximately 70% of awards to Russian companies.

The figures can be presented clearly:

2024 procurement category Number of awards All contracts and orders 8,788 Awarded to Russian companies 8,443 Awarded to Russian companies registered on Sakhalin 5,933

These figures establish substantial procurement activity involving enterprises registered within the host region.

They should not be minimised.

But the report’s calculation is based upon the number of contracts and orders.

It is not a calculation of their monetary value.

The distinction is decisive.

A hundred small purchase orders may have a lower total value than one major engineering contract.

Consequently, a high share of contract numbers does not necessarily represent an equivalent share of total expenditure.

The report separately states that Russian companies received approximately $1.381 billion in new contracts and amendments during 2024.

That represented 86% of the monetary value of the relevant awards and changes to existing agreements.

But it does not identify how much of that $1.381 billion was awarded specifically to businesses registered on Sakhalin.

The 5,933 regional awards therefore cannot be used to calculate the proportion of procurement expenditure retained by the region.

This is the principal limitation of the published 2024 local-procurement data.

Primary source: Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024, page 80.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

10. A Sakhalin registration is not proof that all contract value remains on Sakhalin

The address test goes further.

A company registered within Sakhalin Oblast may conduct substantial local operations.

It may employ regional workers.

It may purchase local materials and invest in local facilities.

Those activities generate genuine regional benefits.

But registration alone does not establish all those outcomes.

A Sakhalin-registered company might supply imported equipment.

It might subcontract specialist work to a company elsewhere in Russia.

It might be owned by shareholders outside the region.

And some of its revenue might be used to purchase goods and services from businesses located elsewhere.

Conversely, a company registered outside Sakhalin might employ significant numbers of Sakhalin residents and invest substantially in regional infrastructure.

That is why company registration is a useful indicator but not a complete measure of local economic value.

The company-reported figure of 5,933 awards therefore establishes that a large number of procurement relationships involved Russian enterprises registered in the region.

It does not establish the geographical distribution of the ultimate financial benefits.

That would require information on contract values, local wages, subcontracting, material purchases and other expenditure.

The public report does not provide a complete reconciliation.

11. Employment remains a separate test

The 2024 report also provides detailed personnel information.

At the end of that year, Sakhalin Energy employed 2,068 people.

Of those, 2,055 were Russian nationals.

Only 13 were foreign nationals.

But the number of Sakhalin Oblast residents was 1,211.

That represented 59% of total employment.

The company also reported 538 employees in managerial positions.

Of those, 251 were Sakhalin Oblast residents.

These figures provide evidence of significant regional employment and managerial participation.

But they also show that Russian nationality and Sakhalin residency remained separate categories.

The same distinction existed during Shell’s participation in 2016.

The comparison is revealing.

Company workforce measure 2016 2024 Total employees 2,307 2,068 Russian nationals 2,071 2,055 Sakhalin Oblast residents 1,240 1,211 Sakhalin residents as share of total 54% 59%

The regional-resident percentage increased between the two reporting dates.

But the absolute number of employees resident in Sakhalin Oblast was slightly lower.

This was partly because the company’s total workforce was smaller.

It would therefore be misleading to describe the higher percentage as proof that the number of local jobs had increased.

It would also be inappropriate to attribute the 2024 workforce composition to Shell’s management.

Shell had withdrawn from the replacement operating structure in 2022.

The comparison illustrates the different statistical measures, not a continuous period under unchanged ownership and management.

Primary source: Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024, pages 124–125.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

PART SIX: BUILDING INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY ON SAKHALIN 12. The Sakhalin Industrial Park

The replacement operator’s 2024 report identifies another category of economic development.

The Sakhalin Oil and Gas Industrial Park was intended to support local engineering and technological activities.

The programme included plans for a maintenance and repair facility.

The company’s account traced the initiative through feasibility work, discussions with regional authorities and the development of detailed designs.

A formal decision to begin the initial phase was taken in 2019.

In August 2020, Sakhalin Energy and the Sakhalin regional government reached an agreement concerning external engineering infrastructure.

Further design and development work continued.

The 2024 report stated that preparatory and construction activities had advanced, including work on an archive building and vehicle maintenance shop.

The proposed later facilities included specialised equipment maintenance, hydraulic testing, laboratory activities and drill-pipe repair.

These are potentially important forms of regional industrial development.

They could enable maintenance and engineering work to be performed on Sakhalin rather than being sent elsewhere.

But their economic effects must be distinguished from the project’s original construction and export operations.

The industrial park programme was developed over many years.

Some decisions occurred while Shell remained involved in Sakhalin II.

Other elements progressed after its departure.

The 2024 report describes a programme under development.

It does not establish that every proposed facility had been completed and was operating commercially.

Nor does it provide a full independent assessment of the long-term economic value created for local businesses.

Nevertheless, the programme provides a concrete example of the distinction between temporary procurement activity and the development of lasting industrial capability.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024, page 81.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

13. Social investment is another separate category

The 2024 report also identifies expenditure on community and social programmes.

Sakhalin Energy reported investing 85 million roubles in external social programmes during the year.

It described activities supporting education, safety, cultural initiatives, indigenous communities and other regional objectives.

Those programmes may provide meaningful local benefits.

But they are not procurement expenditure.

Nor are they equivalent to tax revenues received by government.

The report identifies them as corporate social investment.

A proper assessment of the project’s regional economic contributions should therefore maintain at least four separate categories.

Commercial procurement.

Direct employment.

Payments to government.

And voluntary social investment.

Adding all these figures together without adjusting for overlap, different accounting methods and other factors would not produce a reliable measure of value retained within the region.

The 2024 report provides useful information in several categories.

It does not provide a consolidated, independently verified estimate of Sakhalin’s ultimate net economic benefit.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024, pages 176–177.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

PART SEVEN: SHELL’S HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY 14. The distinction between 2016 and 2024

The change in ownership and management is central to interpreting the record.

In 2007, Gazprom acquired majority control of Sakhalin Energy.

Shell retained a 27.5% interest and continued participating in the project.

The 2016 Sustainability Report was therefore issued while Shell remained an important shareholder.

It is relevant to the historical assessment of Shell’s Sakhalin involvement.

But the situation changed in 2022.

On 28 February that year, Shell announced its intention to withdraw from its Russian equity partnerships, including its stake in Sakhalin II.

The announcement followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian government subsequently established a replacement operating structure.

Shell declined to participate in that arrangement.

Therefore, the 2024 report belongs to a different corporate period.

It can help explain the continuing operation and development of Sakhalin II.

It can also provide useful comparisons with earlier reporting.

But its results must not automatically be attributed to Shell.

That distinction is particularly important where the post-2022 operator describes localisation and replacement of imported equipment.

Those decisions occurred under different circumstances.

Shell’s authenticated withdrawal statement: Shell — Media Statements, 28 February 2022.

Shell Global

 

EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 15. The real question is not whether Sakhalin benefited

The available evidence demonstrates substantial economic benefits.

The 2016 report recorded billions of dollars in revenues received by the regional government.

It also identified infrastructure investment, employment and local contracting opportunities.

The 2024 report continued to describe considerable procurement and workforce participation involving Sakhalin residents and businesses.

It would therefore be incorrect to suggest that the island received nothing from Sakhalin II.

The evidence clearly contradicts such a claim.

But there is a difference between establishing that benefits existed and measuring the complete benefit retained within the region.

The operator’s published figures answer several narrower questions.

How much public revenue was reported as received by Sakhalin Oblast?

How many employees were resident in the region?

How many contracts were awarded to Sakhalin-registered businesses?

How much was invested in specified infrastructure and social programmes?

Those questions can be answered, at least partly, from the original reports.

A broader question remains.

After accounting for imported equipment, outside contractors, subcontracting, labour movements and expenditure outside Sakhalin, how much of the project’s commercial activity ultimately generated lasting regional economic value?

The public documents examined do not provide a complete answer.

16. The apparent success of local procurement needs the correct denominator

The figure of 5,933 contracts and purchase orders is meaningful.

It establishes extensive commercial participation by Sakhalin-registered enterprises.

But the underlying denominator is the number of awards to Russian companies.

It is not the total monetary value of procurement.

That distinction prevents a common statistical error.

A high percentage of contract numbers cannot automatically be described as a high percentage of spending.

The same applies to employment.

A high proportion of Russian nationals does not establish an equivalent proportion of workers resident within the host region.

The difference is visible in the company’s own figures.

For 2024, 99.4% of Sakhalin Energy’s employees were Russian nationals.

But only 59% of the workforce were Sakhalin Oblast residents.

Both statistics can be accurate.

They simply answer different questions.

The problem arises only when the categories are confused.

17. Fiscal benefits were more directly identifiable

The historical record contains an important counterbalance to the uncertainty about procurement.

The regional fiscal benefits are more directly identifiable in the company’s disclosures.

Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 report stated that Sakhalin Oblast had received approximately $8 billion in cumulative public revenues.

Contemporaneous Interfax reporting corroborates that the company was publicly disclosing closely corresponding figures at the time.

This gives the claim a clearer historical provenance.

However, a company-reported public revenue figure should still be distinguished from an independent audit of the corresponding government accounts.

Moreover, receiving public revenue does not resolve how effectively that revenue was spent.

Public finances involve political and administrative decisions beyond the immediate control of an energy operator.

The available record is therefore sufficient to demonstrate substantial reported fiscal benefits.

It is not sufficient to establish the ultimate value of every public expenditure financed by those receipts.

18. The question of lasting industrial development

The industrial-development issue remains particularly important.

A major construction programme can generate large quantities of temporary work.

An operating oil and gas project may subsequently employ a smaller permanent workforce.

Local contractors may obtain significant revenue during construction but fewer opportunities after the principal facilities have been completed.

The strongest long-term benefits may therefore come from technical training, specialist services, domestic manufacturing and the development of competitive businesses.

The industrial park programme provides an example of that strategy.

But the documentary evidence required to evaluate its success is different from the evidence required to count contracts.

It would include records of completed facilities, operating employment, local ownership, manufacturing activity, retained income and the ability to obtain business from customers other than Sakhalin II.

The original reports document programmes and investments.

They do not provide every long-term outcome.

This is not evidence of failure.

It identifies the difference between announcing an industrial-development programme and demonstrating the economic results it ultimately achieved.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

The investigation supports the following conclusions.

1. Sakhalin was a contractual participant in the original development framework. The Sakhalin regional administration represented part of the Russian side in the 1994 production-sharing agreement.

2. The host region experienced substantial environmental and social consequences. Independent research documented concerns arising from construction, pipeline crossings, fishing grounds and other activities.

3. Independent researchers identified an important definitional problem. The 2010 WWF-Russia and IIED study distinguished national Russian participation from genuinely local economic participation.

4. Regional fiscal receipts were substantial. Contemporaneous Interfax reporting attributed approximately $7.9 billion in cumulative regional revenues to Sakhalin II by September 2016.

5. Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 report recorded approximately $8 billion in regional receipts. It also identified approximately $1.3 billion in regional and local budget payments for 2016.

6. The operator reported major infrastructure investment. Its 2016 report identified more than $600 million invested by the company in upgrading Sakhalin infrastructure.

7. Shell-era employment was predominantly Russian but not entirely local. In 2016, Sakhalin Energy reported 2,071 Russian nationals among 2,307 employees, while 1,240 employees were Sakhalin Oblast residents.

8. The replacement operator reported substantial regional procurement. During 2024, 5,933 contracts and purchase orders went to Russian companies registered on Sakhalin.

9. The 5,933 figure represented approximately 70% of Russian-company awards by number. It was not a statement that 70% of procurement expenditure remained within Sakhalin Oblast.

10. The 2024 report did not identify a separate monetary total for those 5,933 awards. The value attributable specifically to Sakhalin-registered enterprises therefore cannot be calculated from the disclosed count.

11. The 2024 workforce remained predominantly Russian. The operator reported 2,055 Russian employees out of a total of 2,068.

12. Regional residence remained a separate category. Only 1,211 employees, or 59%, were identified as Sakhalin Oblast residents.

13. The share of local residents increased between 2016 and 2024, but their absolute number did not. The comparison reflects changes in the total workforce as well as the regional-resident percentage.

14. The operator reported continuing regional industrial-development efforts. These included maintenance and repair facilities associated with the Sakhalin Industrial Park.

15. Corporate social expenditure was separately identified. The replacement operator reported 85 million roubles invested in external social programmes during 2024.

16. Shell’s departure in 2022 creates an important historical boundary. Post-withdrawal procurement and employment decisions cannot automatically be attributed to Shell.

17. Substantial economic benefits are documented, but the complete net regional economic value is not independently established. The public records examined do not supply a comprehensive reconciliation of procurement, local wages, subcontracting, fiscal revenues and retained commercial value.

18. No finding of procurement fraud, deliberate misclassification or breach of a particular local-content obligation is advanced. The evidence supports methodological scrutiny, not an allegation of misconduct.

CONCLUSION: WHAT REALLY STAYED ON SAKHALIN?

The Sakhalin II development produced substantial benefits for Russia and its Far Eastern island.

That conclusion is supported by the historical record.

Shell helped develop an internationally important energy project.

Russian contractors performed extensive work.

Sakhalin businesses participated in construction and operations.

Thousands of workers were employed.

The regional government received substantial public revenues.

And the project contributed to infrastructure improvements.

These achievements should be recognised.

The 2016 corporate disclosures are particularly important.

They demonstrate that Sakhalin Oblast was receiving substantial fiscal benefits while Shell remained involved.

The approximately $8 billion cumulative regional-receipts figure should not disappear from the historical account merely because the archive is examining unanswered procurement questions.

But the disclosures also show why the word local requires care.

Russian nationality is not the same as Sakhalin residence.

Russian company registration is not the same as Sakhalin registration.

A contract awarded within the region is not necessarily money spent entirely within the region.

And a large number of small contracts may represent less economic value than a smaller number of substantial contracts.

The 2024 report provides an unusually clear example.

It identifies 5,933 procurement awards to Russian companies registered on Sakhalin.

That is a significant number.

But it does not disclose the corresponding total monetary value of those awards.

The report also identifies 1,211 Sakhalin Oblast residents employed by the operator.

That represents substantial local employment.

But it is a different measure from the company’s near-total reliance upon Russian nationals.

The report’s social investment figures describe another category again.

None of these figures should be dismissed.

None should be combined indiscriminately.

And none, alone, establishes the full economic value ultimately retained within the host region.

The outstanding documentary questions are therefore precise.

What was the combined monetary value of contracts awarded specifically to Sakhalin-registered enterprises?

How much of that value was spent within the region?

How much work was subcontracted elsewhere?

What proportion of wages was earned by regional residents?

What lasting technical and manufacturing capabilities were created?

And how did the regional economy benefit from the substantial fiscal revenues generated by the project?

The public evidence examined provides partial answers.

It also establishes that substantial benefits occurred.

But it does not provide a complete independent regional economic assessment.

The strongest conclusion is not that Sakhalin was denied the benefits of its offshore resources. The evidence demonstrates that the region received considerable benefits. The unresolved question is how those benefits were distributed, measured and converted into lasting local economic capacity.

That is an important distinction.

It avoids dismissing documented achievements.

It also avoids treating broad corporate participation statistics as a complete measure of regional prosperity.

For Sakhalin II, the distinction matters because the project was extraordinary in scale.

It involved international investment, advanced technology, complex contractual arrangements and significant consequences for the communities hosting it.

Its economic history deserves an equally rigorous examination.

The contracts were real. The jobs were real. The public revenues were substantial. But the precise amount of commercial value ultimately retained within Sakhalin itself remains a question that the published procurement figures cannot fully answer.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

1. Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016

Original corporate report published while Shell remained a substantial shareholder.

The report records regional fiscal benefits, infrastructure investment, procurement commitments and employment statistics.

Particularly relevant are pages 60–61 and 88–89.

Read the original 2016 Sustainability Report (PDF)

2. Interfax — 28 September 2016

Contemporaneous report of statements by Sakhalin Energy at the Oil and Gas of Sakhalin conference.

Records the company’s reported regional fiscal payments and cumulative receipts.

Read the original Interfax report

3. WWF-Russia and International Institute for Environment and Development — March 2010

Aleksey Knizhnikov and Emma Wilson, Responsible Contracting in the Russian Oil and Gas Industry.

Independent research examining contractors, local participation, industrial capacity and environmental and social responsibilities.

Particularly relevant are pages 4–8.

Read the independent research report (PDF)

4. Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024

Original report from the replacement Russian operator.

Page 80 contains the procurement statistics. Pages 124–125 contain workforce figures. Pages 176–177 contain social investment disclosures.

Read the original 2024 ESG Report (PDF)

5. Sakhalin Energy — Official Production-Sharing Agreement Explanation

The operator’s description of the original contractual framework and the Russian parties.

Read the PSA explanation

6. Shell plc — 28 February 2022

Original corporate announcement concerning Shell’s intended withdrawal from its Russian joint ventures, including its 27.5% interest in Sakhalin II.

Read Shell’s original media statement

7. Sakhalin Energy — Vendor Development Programme

Official description of arrangements intended to support Russian manufacturers, suppliers and service providers.

Read the Vendor Development Programme

8. Donovan–Shell Archive — 13 November 2026

The preceding Sakhalin Papers instalment examining Russian-manufactured equipment and the distinction between company registration and manufacturing origin.

The Shell Leaks Files — 13 November 2026

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This investigation examines the economic benefits associated with Sakhalin II and the distinction between Russian national participation and Sakhalin regional participation.

It relies upon published Sakhalin Energy corporate records, contemporaneous reporting, independent WWF-Russia and IIED research and original Shell statements.

The production-sharing agreement was signed in June 1994.

The complete executed agreement and all amendments have not been independently examined together for this instalment.

Accordingly, no definitive conclusion is reached concerning every contractual obligation relating to regional procurement, employment or economic participation.

The 2016 fiscal and infrastructure figures are attributed to Sakhalin Energy.

The contemporaneous Interfax report is used to establish the statements made publicly at the time.

It is not presented as an independent audit of every financial payment.

The difference between public revenue, procurement expenditure, employment and corporate social investment is maintained.

Reported cumulative project payments are not treated as equivalent to net economic value permanently retained within the host region.

The 2010 WWF-Russia and IIED report is identified as independent research.

Its observations are distinguished from judicial findings or established contractual breaches.

The 2024 ESG figures are attributed to the replacement Russian operator.

They concern a period after Shell’s withdrawal from the replacement operating structure.

They are not presented as decisions or achievements directed by Shell in 2024.

The 2024 report records the number of contracts and purchase orders awarded to Sakhalin-registered Russian companies.

The investigation does not infer a corresponding share of monetary procurement value.

The number of contracts awarded, the value of contracts, the value of services performed and the amount of money ultimately retained within the region are distinct measures.

The employment figures are attributed to the respective corporate reports.

Russian nationality, place of employment and Sakhalin Oblast residence are distinguished.

The 2016 and 2024 workforce comparisons are descriptive rather than a causal assessment of changes under different management arrangements.

The 2024 report’s description of industrial park development is not treated as proof that every proposed industrial facility was fully completed and operational.

The operator also lists a 2025 ESG report, but its underlying detailed figures could not be independently examined for this instalment. The 2024 data are therefore identified by their reporting year rather than represented as the most recent available statistics.

No allegation is made that Shell deliberately withheld regional economic benefits.

No allegation is made that Sakhalin Energy falsified local procurement or workforce figures.

No allegation of procurement fraud, improper registration or contractual breach is advanced.

No relevant court judgment establishing such misconduct has been authenticated for this investigation.

The inability to reconstruct complete regional economic flows from publicly disclosed figures does not establish that the underlying records do not exist.

Editorial commentary concerning local development, public accountability and economic measurement is distinguished from the documentary findings.

Shell plc, former Sakhalin Energy personnel, the current operator, Gazprom, Sakhalin regional authorities, contractors, employees and other interested parties are invited to provide factual corrections, relevant original documents and other evidence for consideration and publication.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-119 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CIX The Sakhalin Budget Test: When Offshore Oil and Gas Revenues Became More Than Half the Region’s Public Income

In September 2016, Sakhalin Energy publicly reported that Sakhalin II had generated approximately $2.4 billion in regional tax revenues during the preceding year.

That represented more than 60% of Sakhalin Oblast’s reported public income.

The operator’s subsequent Sustainability Report stated that the project’s payments accounted for more than 60% of the regional budget in 2016.

These figures raise an important historical question.

What happens when a regional government’s public finances become heavily dependent upon revenue from a major offshore energy development?

Sakhalin II was established under a production-sharing agreement signed in 1994.

The arrangements concerned how production, costs and revenues would be allocated between the investors and the Russian side.

The original contractual framework was negotiated during a period of substantial economic uncertainty.

The project’s subsequent development involved enormous capital expenditure, major revisions to cost estimates and a prolonged confrontation between its foreign shareholders and Russian authorities.

By 2006, the Accounts Chamber was challenging elements of the financial arrangements.

By April 2007, Gazprom had assumed majority control.

A decade later, the project was generating substantial revenues for Sakhalin’s public finances.

The next investigation will examine how those different developments were connected.

It will distinguish production-sharing entitlements, royalties, taxation, dividends and regional budget receipts.

It will examine the available historical financial records and the contemporary concerns about cost recovery.

It will also consider the implications of a regional government receiving such a large proportion of its revenue from a single industrial development.

The objective will not be to assume that fiscal dependence produced improper conduct.

Nor will it suggest that the public revenues were illegitimate.

Instead, the investigation will examine what the documents establish about the scale, timing and structure of Sakhalin’s financial dependence upon the project.

The central question: Sakhalin II generated billions in public revenues — but how did the original agreement determine when and how much the island’s government would receive?

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

Editorial note: This instalment builds on the 13 November investigation by introducing two additional categories of authenticated evidence: Sakhalin Energy’s regional fiscal disclosures during Shell’s involvement and its detailed workforce-residency statistics. These provide a more balanced picture than procurement counts alone.

The principal documentary finding is that Sakhalin received substantial, identifiable economic benefits, including reported public revenues, employment and infrastructure improvements. The remaining limitation is the absence, in the records examined, of a complete independently reproducible calculation of the commercial value ultimately retained within the host region.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 14 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 14, 2026 at 8:27 pm.
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The scientists fighting to help Maui wildfire survivors heal

Grist - Sat, 11/14/2026 - 06:00

Early on a Saturday morning in May, Ruben Juarez took the 45-minute flight from Oʻahu to Maui, just like he’d done dozens of times over the past three years. 

This one felt different. 

Juarez landed in Kahului Airport with his partner, Alika Maunakea, and drove on a long winding highway beside the piercing blue ocean until they reached the Lahaina Comprehensive Health Center.

A cool breeze wafted in from the Pacific less than half a mile below as they set up stations for blood collection, lung function tests, and mental health check-ins, directing a team of Ph.D. students and local healthcare providers. Then they waited for the fire survivors to arrive.

Ruben Juarez, left, and Alika Maunakea are professors at the University of Hawaiʻi and co-leads of the Maui Wildfire Exposure Study.
Keerti Gopal

On August 8, 2023, Maui was hit with the deadliest wildfires the U.S. has seen in over a century. They killed at least 102 people, displaced nearly 13,000 residents, and destroyed more than 2,200 buildings. Three years later, just 15 percent have been rebuilt. 

Juarez, an economist, and Maunakea, a biomedical scientist, never expected to focus on disaster recovery. But after the fires, they were thrust into the space by the overwhelming scale of need. The two University of Hawaiʻi professors dreamed up the Maui Wildfire Exposure Study, or MauiWES, as a form of rapid response: an effort to track the impacts of the fires on survivors’ health. 

Three years and 2,500 participants later, the study has blossomed into a combination of research and intervention, a web of community organizations working together to give participants not just free testing but also therapy, food assistance, cash support, and help connecting with doctors and insurance. Some even say the study saved their lives.

The researchers hope MauiWES could become a national blueprint for public health response after disasters. Experts across the country are paying attention. One longtime disaster researcher, David Eisenman at the University of California, Los Angeles, said the study’s holistic approach is “singular.”

Alika Maunakea checks wildfire survivor Nilsson Panis into the Maui Wildfire Exposure Study at the Lahaina Comprehensive Health Center in May. Keerti Gopal

But critical federal support to keep the effort going for at least a decade was running out, and its renewal was uncertain — grant applications had been met with silence for months. And just two weeks before Juarez and Maunakea landed on Maui, state funding they were counting on fell through. 

Now, here they were at what might be their last big event to understand how survivors were doing and what help they needed. 

Juarez was distraught: It felt like the end. But Maunakea, usually the pessimist of the pair, refused to believe it. He felt the study had to continue. The need was too great. They would find a way.

At the health center that Saturday morning, Maunakea greeted Lisa and Nilsson Panis, a pair of siblings born and raised in Lahaina. As he checked them into the study, he explained what they’d do that day. Urine samples to track environmental exposures. Saliva collection for biomarkers of stress and aging. Blood tests for metabolic function. Two assessments of lung health. Recordings of blood pressure, height, and weight. A mental health screener. 

At the end of it all, they’d meet with a volunteer physician who would help them understand their test results, and they’d each walk away with $100, compensation for their time.

“We’re trying to do this every year,” Maunakea told the Panises. 

He was determined to make that happen.

The lobby of the health center had a dark stain on its ceiling where water had leaked in just a month before. 

The building — run by the state’s Department of Health and loaned to MauiWES for the weekend — sits near the base of the sprawling West Maui mountains. That weekend, the foothills above the center were covered in dry, yellowing grass that was nonetheless much greener than usual, courtesy of recent Kona low storms.

The storms swept water damage into construction sites and homes that had just been rebuilt. They busted up highways and caused torrential flooding, triggering millions of dollars in damage across the county. They also kicked off an unusually verdant spring, with flowers blooming on the trees outside the center and along the highway below. Wetness that early can heighten the fire risk later in the year, fueling grass and brush growth that dries out and becomes plentiful tinder, susceptible to heat and strong winds.

Lisa Panis, a participant in the Maui Wildfire Exposure Study, has struggled with her mental and physical health since the fires, and her family is still in temporary housing. Keerti Gopal​​

Lisa Panis had an appointment with MauiWES that day, but she was hoping they’d have room for her older brother, too. In a fluorescently lit room just beside the center’s main lobby, she introduced Nilsson to Maunakea and explained that he had been a first responder after the wildfires, cleaning up debris in the burn zone. Maunakea immediately instructed the Ph.D. students working the check-in desk to sign him up, along with Nilsson’s girlfriend, another survivor.  

MauiWES had limited resources, especially with funding so up in the air. But on an island already suffering from a severe healthcare provider shortage, Maunakea and Juarez didn’t like turning anyone away. 

Maunakea listened to Nilsson explain what his life looked like in the months after the fires:12-hour days, seven days a week, clearing the burn zone for a construction company. He wore full-body gear to keep as much of the dust out as possible, but he still ended each day coated in grime. Though he’d never been tested, Nilsson felt confident the constant inhalation of ash and the debris that covered his body as he worked had impacted his health.

“We tried to push all the dust down with water,” Nilsson said to Maunakea, describing the cleanup. “But you cannot get everything.”

“Are you still doing that, or pau?” Maunakea asked.

“Pau,” Nilsson replied. Finished. Now he was working as a mason, bringing his sister on whenever he could. It wasn’t steady. He hoped jobs would pick up in the summer.

The Panis siblings’ father is descended from Filipino immigrants who came to the island to work on the sugar plantations more than a century ago, during a period when American and European companies brought indentured laborers from the Philippines to work under brutal conditions for extremely low pay. The plantations, established before Hawaiʻi’s illegal annexation by the United States and continuing another century after, sucked water out of Lahaina’s once green and fertile hills. 

Kelly Panis, Lisa and Nilsson’s mother, sits in her FEMA-built temporary home in May. Three years after the fires, she still does not have permanent housing. Keerti Goapl

That set the stage for modern-day wildfire risks, now worsened by climate change, and cemented a pattern of local disenfranchisement that continued as the tourism industry took hold. 

For years, the Panises had experienced the harder realities of life in Lahaina, like gentrification and unstable housing and employment. On the day of the fires, Nilsson was meant to fly back from Las Vegas to spread the ashes of two siblings who had passed away just weeks apart that spring. Lisa was living with an aunt whose home would not survive. She remembers standing on the field next to the post office where she and her brothers played football as kids, watching as flames engulfed the town above and below her. 

After they finished checking into the study, the Panis siblings moved through the stations, a sort of medical assembly line: urine samples, then blood tests, then blood pressure, then spitting into a tube. A few feet away, Juarez coached another participant on how to blow into a spirometer to test lung function. 

Ruben Juarez explains to a participant in Spanish how to take the lung function test. Keerti Gopal Amy Jackson, a former trauma nurse, credits MauiWES with saving her life after her hemoglobin was so low she had to go to the hospital. Keerti Gopal

“Sigue, sigue, sigue,” he said, reminding the man to keep breathing out. Throughout the day Juarez greeted Spanish-speaking participants, acting as one of a handful of interpreters who walked people through the study’s tests in English, Spanish, and Tagalog.

Juarez was pulled into Maui’s recovery because of his connections to Lahaina’s abundant immigrant community. One-third of Lahaina residents were born outside the U.S., many in Asia or Latin America. Juarez moved from Mexico to Houston for a doctorate at Rice University, then to Oʻahu for a job at the University of Hawaiʻi. There, he met Maunakea, and as neighbors in the university’s faculty housing, they fell in love. 

When they met, Juarez’s research was focused on social networks and Maunakea’s on health disparities in disease. After the fires, Maunakea was drawn to Maui by his connections with people working to address the disproportionate public health burdens faced by Native Hawaiians across the islands. Although he lives on Oʻahu, his great-grandmother, a Native Hawaiian healer, was born in Kula, an upcountry Maui community that was also badly impacted by the 2023 fires.

Mikey, left, and Rob Burke stand outside of their rental home. Their home burned down in the 2023 wildfires, and three years later they are just beginning their rebuild.
Keerti Gopal

He and Juarez met with community leaders and healthcare workers on Maui soon after the fires. They became part of the MauiWES advisory board, consulting on design and implementation. For many study participants, that grounding made a big difference.

Mikey Burke, a Native Hawaiian mother of four who grew up in West Maui, remembers an influx of mental health practitioners from the continent who swarmed to Maui after the fires. They roamed the lobbies of hotels where she and other displaced families were sheltered. But though they were well-intentioned, they felt largely unapproachable. She gravitated toward local organizations like Maui Medic Healers Hui, which was working with MauiWES. It was something in their mannerisms, the way they spoke to her, the normalcy and familiarity they offered.

In the months after they lost their home, Burke, her husband Rob, and their four young sons were shuttled between temporary shelters, family homes, and rental properties. She could see that her twin boys, just 8 years old when the fires hit, were struggling. But it wasn’t until they got screened by MauiWES that addressing their mental health shot to the top of her lengthy to-do list. The study team told her that both boys were showing serious signs of post-traumatic stress disorder, and got them connected with a free therapist right away. 

The Burkes aren’t an anomaly. The study found widespread emotional distress and trauma in adults and children, and connected many with therapists.

During a weekend collection event in May, the Lahaina Comprehensive Health Center was bustling with families, healthcare workers, and researchers. MauiWES has seen 2,500 participants in three years. Keerti Gopal​

On an island with a severe shortage of physicians, MauiWES was also most early participants’ first time seeing a doctor after the fires. Over the past three years, the team made some big saves. 

In August 2024, one year after the fires, a former trauma nurse named Amy Jackson had such a low hemoglobin count that it wasn’t registering on MauiWES’ testing system. The team urged her to go to the emergency room immediately. Jackson had signed up for the study because the cash would be a good birthday present for her daughter. If it wasn’t for that, she wouldn’t have gotten checked out at all.

At the hospital, she remembers a doctor telling her he was amazed she was still alive. She was admitted and treated, and she credits MauiWES with saving her life.

Lisa and Nilsson Panis wait for their test results at the Lahaina Comprehensive Health Center. Keerti Gopal

In February 2024, another participant presented with symptoms suggesting a serious lung infection. Volunteer physicians were concerned and said she needed medical attention right away. But she was an undocumented immigrant and one of the 10 percent of study participants who had both lost their jobs in the fire and weren’t eligible for state insurance. 

Juarez coordinated with Roots Reborn — a local organization supporting Maui’s immigrant community — and reached out the next day to ask an insurer with a charitable health coverage program to consider an emergency enrollment. 

She got the insurance and then the treatment she needed. She’s one of more than 200 participants Juarez estimates have been connected with private insurance via Kaiser Permanente because of interventions from MauiWES and Roots Reborn. He was happy to see her now, in good spirits and good health, coming in for her follow-up at the May collection event. He thought the immigrant population had the most to lose from the study ending.

The team still had so much to do.

Alika Maunakea walks MauiWES participant Ekolu Lindsey through his test results, including a panel on heavy metals. Keerti Gopal

After her lung test, Lisa Panis stood underneath the stain on the lobby’s ceiling and waited for her brother. The Panis siblings stay strong for one another. But she’s experienced depression since the fires, like many other survivors, and her tests revealed elevated levels of several toxic metals in her body.

In their first, smallest cohort, about six months after the fires, Juarez, Maunakea, and their colleagues found that about half of study participants were experiencing breathing problems that suggested ongoing, residual impacts from wildfire smoke. They’ve also found that poor lung function was linked to elevated levels of heavy metals in participants’ urine, including some of the same metals the health department found in the burn zone.

After looking at so many test results, Maunakea can guess with considerable accuracy what neighborhood a participant lives in just by seeing the distribution of metals in their body. Some of that contamination may predate the fires. But the health implications are the same.

Lahaina residents lay flowers at a memorial for the at least 102 people who were killed in the 2023 fires, the deadliest the U.S. has seen in more than a century. Keerti Gopal

Before Nilsson Panis left for the day, Juarez gave him a T-shirt with the MauiWES logo — a sun rising behind the island — and a hundred-dollar bill. Then he ushered him over to the front desk, where a case manager who works for the Department of Health was waiting.

She asked Nilsson if there was anything he might need help with. 

He paused for a moment before answering. Maybe some assistance with food, he said. He also asked about opportunities to volunteer and help other survivors.

The case manager took down his email.

The next day Maunakea supervised a group of staff and volunteers administering lung function tests. A participant wearing a neon-yellow baseball hat and flower-patterned shorts walked in and took a seat. 

“It’s unfortunate that you guys didn’t get more additional funding from the legislative session this time,” Ekolu Lindsey said to Maunakea as he took a break from breathing hard into a plastic mouthpiece. 

It had been MauiWES’ most recent funding attempt: A bill sponsored by the state senator for West Maui, Angus McKelvey, would have allotted $3 million to keep the study going and expand the number of children it could serve. But at the last minute, the bill failed to make it through. 

“I get it, they went for the bigger-ticket items, but the health part is also a big-ticket item that didn’t take precedence,” continued Lindsey, who is the president of a grassroots land trust organization on Maui. “I don’t think they understood, because probably none of them went through it.”

Maunakea agreed. He had thought that public health would be more of a priority in the wildfire recovery, especially in a state with a doctor as a governor. But funding MauiWES has been an ongoing challenge.

The study’s first cohort, in early 2024, began with charitable funding from the Hawaiʻi Community Foundation and Kaiser Permanente, while the researchers pursued government support. That summer, they got $2.3 million from the state. And almost one year after the fires, they received a $1.4 million grant from the National Institutes of Health’s minority health disparities program. 

That support quickly turned precarious after Donald Trump retook office and slashed funding for programs focused on diversity or health disparities, along with a wide swath of academic research. 

Since the 2023 wildfires, the Maui Wildfire Exposure Study has tested more than 2,500 participants for a range of physical and mental health impacts. Keerti Gopal

The MauiWES researchers hoped to renew their federal funding and keep the study going for at least a decade. But heading into the May event, applications they submitted to the agency had been languishing without a decision for more than a year. By that time, the NIH had lost 23 percent of its staff under the Trump administration, almost double the reduction across the entire federal government, according to an analysis by Inside Climate News.

The MauiWES researchers started getting national recognition in the disaster recovery space, speaking on panels and presenting at conferences on the mainland, hoping that might drum up more cash. But private funding wasn’t enough to keep the study going, and the speaking engagements had yet to pay off. More state funding seemed like Juarez and Maunakea’s best hope.

Initially, the team had strong backing from the state’s Department of Health, which wrote enthusiastic letters of support for federal grants. But as the study progressed and the researchers began publicizing their results, the agency pushed back.

The Department of Health had earlier screened 557 West Maui residents for lead in their blood, saying in May 2024 that so few had elevated levels that it was not necessary to screen the general population for toxic substances identified in the burn zone. 

Christopher Knightsbridge leads the mental health portion of the Maui Wildfire Exposure Study. He worries about study participants who are still facing acute, ongoing trauma due to fallout from the fires. Keerti Gopal

“On the basis of these results with lead as an indicator of exposure, we do not expect to find health impacts caused by toxins in the wildfire ash,” agency director Kenneth Fink said in a statement at the time.

But lead is just one of the toxic substances the department found at elevated levels in burn zone ash, and it’s undetectable in people’s blood relatively quickly after exposure, unlike some other substances found in the burn zone. Environmental health experts questioned why the department used a limited sampling of lead to draw broad conclusions about the burn zone as a whole. 

Then MauiWES found elevated levels of heavy metals associated with heart and lung issues and cancer risks in a cohort of more than 1,200 fire survivors.

As of early October 2026, more than 360 Maui families are still living in temporary FEMA housing, and another 169 are receiving rental assistance from the federal agency. MauiWES researchers have found that temporary or unstable housing is a strain on survivors’ health. Keerti Gopal

The findings seemed to contradict the Department of Health’s assertion that the burn zone was safe. Emails and letters Inside Climate News obtained through public records requests suggest that agency staff quickly moved into damage-control mode. 

The day after Honolulu Civil Beat published a story about the preliminary findings last year, a naturopathic doctor on Maui emailed state toxicologist John Jacob for information about the effects of heavy metals like arsenic, nickel, cadmium, mercury, and lead on psychological function. Her clients had been tested by MauiWES and registered high levels of those metals, she wrote.

Jacob forwarded the email to colleagues at the Department of Health.

“I don’t want to affirm what UH is stating,” he wrote, referring to the University of Hawaiʻi. “The panic has begun!”

A few days later, agency staff discussed whether to stop assisting MauiWES with data collection. Fink, the director, said staff could continue for now, but he felt the department’s recommendations on study design had been either inadequate or disregarded. “If the latter, I would need to reevaluate our involvement,” Fink wrote to colleagues.

In October, the Department of Health sent a letter to the University of Hawaiʻi, criticizing MauiWES’ reliance on sampling survivors who showed up — as opposed to a randomized cohort — and its findings of elevated heavy metals in their urine. 

Read Next Long after the Maui fires, toxic metals linger in residents’ bodies

The university defended the research in its response and explained that MauiWES was not claiming a definitively causal relationship between the fires and the heavy metals. 

Although the team remained committed to working with the state, Juarez said he saw the Department of Health’s letter as an attempt to censor their research. Academics not involved with MauiWES told Inside Climate News the exchange seemed unusual for a university and a state agency, and they did not think the health department’s dismissal of burn-zone dangers was warranted based on the limited information it had collected.

The agency’s director said in a statement to Inside Climate News that discussions about the best way to approach research “are a normal and healthy — and often essential — aspect of scientific collaboration.”

“While our perspectives may differ, both DOH and UH remain committed to respectful dialogue and evidence‑based inquiry,” Fink wrote in his statement. “Most importantly, the public needs clear, accurate, and consistent information about how the wildfires may have affected their health. Residents deserve timely communication they can trust — free of speculation and grounded in the best available data.”

In an emailed statement to Inside Climate News, Jacob acknowledged that the researchers’ approach was acceptable but said that not disclosing limitations could “result in confusion among the general public.”

In defense of the agency’s own approach to quantifying post-wildfire health risks, a department spokesperson said in an email that a structured soil sampling technique allowed staff to use the lead screening as a “reasonable indicator for population exposure.”

In internal emails in January, agency staff discussed a bill with funds earmarked to keep MauiWES alive. They agreed to keep a close watch on the effort. “Especially since we are not satisfied with their science,” wrote Jacob, the toxicologist.

In the end, a department subagency was among those submitting testimony in support of the funding. But that wasn’t enough to push it through. When the bill fell short with still no word on federal money, it looked like the end of MauiWES.

At nearly 5 p.m. on Sunday, the team packed up while finishing tests for the last few stragglers. Most of the staff and volunteers had to catch a flight back to Oʻahu in a couple of hours, but Christopher Knightsbridge, a therapist working on the study’s research team, would stay on Maui a few more days to see patients in person. 

Knightsbridge was overcome with pure frustration. All weekend, he’d done mental health check-ins with participants still focused on getting by, day by day. He felt certain the study was having an impact. He saw it every week. And he was still concerned about what he’d been hearing in his sessions. He wanted his patients to wake up and feel like they were living, not simply fighting to survive. For that, they needed more support, not less.

Knightsbridge poured everything he had into supporting survivors’ mental health in recovery. He spent half of most weeks away from his wife and young children on Oʻahu to see patients still dealing with ongoing crises: survivors in temporary housing and unstable employment, people with cancer diagnoses, young children whose lives were turned upside down by the fires. He’s seen serious PTSD symptoms, depression, and even suicidal ideation from kids as young as 6.

That same week, he sat in his video gaming group for kids at the health center with two of Mikey and Rob Burke’s sons, the twins dealing with PTSD. Knightsbridge was seeing both boys for therapy and organized the gaming group as another form of support, a low-stakes place for kids to open up. But the federal emergency grant supporting his position — separate from MauiWES’s funding — was also about to run out. 

Read Next First came the wildfire. Then came the scams.

On the other side of the lobby, Juarez stood in a doorway, gutted. The study had made painfully apparent the gaps in healthcare access on the island, and it felt like their work was just beginning. The thought brought him to the brink of tears. Throughout the weekend, he heard from worried participants who asked if the study was going away. He didn’t want to let them down.

Near the entrance to the courtyard, Maunakea carried a table from the hallway back into one of the offices, tired but heartened by how many people had come through. Sitting with returning participants, learning about their recovery journeys and watching how they were putting the pieces back together was energizing for him. Healing is a communal task in Lahaina. The study leaned into that. 

Maunakea knew the next disaster was just around the corner. He believed Maui could adapt and offer a model to the rest of the world for building resilience to the steep challenges climate change brings. 

Maybe, he thought, that would be the ultimate lesson from the study: that documenting and addressing health inequities in the wake of a disaster helps communities withstand what they cannot escape. 

Toward the end of the day, more survivors arrived without appointments after hearing about the study from family and friends. By closing, he estimated the team had turned away more than a dozen new people, taking down their names in case funding came through. Maunakea met people that weekend who said they’d known about the study for several years but hadn’t felt ready to participate until now. It hammered home to him how crucial it was for their work to go on.

The team would find a way to continue the study, Maunakea felt certain. He didn’t know how, but he saw no other choice. If his great-grandmother was alive, she would have said: ‘O ka pono ke hana ‘ia a iho mai nā lani. Continue to do good until the heavens come down to you. 

He believed that this study is pono, and that the community wanted and needed this service. So, somehow, iho mai nā lani. The heavens would come down.

Inside Climate News’ Peter Aldhous contributed to this story. 

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This story was originally published by Grist with the headline The scientists fighting to help Maui wildfire survivors heal on Nov 14, 2026.

Categories: H. Green News

COP31 Bulletin Day 6: Limited progress as ministers arrive in Antalya

Climate Change News - Sat, 11/14/2026 - 03:21

As technical negotiators race to lay the ground for the big political fights coming in the second week of COP31, delegates will spend their Saturday night at a stocktaking plenary presided over by Türkiye and Australia, where countries’ first red lines are expected to emerge.

Countries will have to decide whether to move forward with a cover decision as the main outcome from the Antalya talks. Some large developing countries have pushed back on it all week, as well as on any inclusion of sectoral targets, including a flagship new pledge to increase electrification to 35% by 2035.

UN climate chief Simon Stiell told a press conference on Saturday morning that progress so far has been “constructive” and praised the fact that negotiations were able to start on time as countries avoided what had seemed to be shaping up as a fight over the agenda.

He added that Saturday’s plenary will provide a sense of the most controversial issues, which ministers now flying will have to take up and settle. “As we head into the second week, I urge [governments] to move swiftly to the hardest issues and to avoid tactical delays,” he added.

As of now, most issues on the formal agenda still need a lot of work. The cover text is more a wishlist of every proposal tabled and still needs to be worked up into a draft – expected by early next week.

An informal note on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), which tackles cutting planet-heating emissions, is heavily bracketed. The EU has said one of its priorities is to extend the MWP, with current options for a timeline going up to 2030, 2031 or 2040 (at COP45!). The MWP has so far delivered weak outcomes, but the current fight is over whether to expand its scope and task it with informing the next Global Stocktake of climate policies in 2028.

    A separate draft text on the global goal on adaptation released overnight is set to become the main battleground for Africa’s top priority to triple adaptation finance to “at least $120 billion per year by 2035”, based on a previous goal set in 2021 – a figure it wants agreed in Antalya.

    Another option in the text proposes starting a process to review several elements of this finance target – which was adopted in the final deal at COP30 – including the baseline, the total amount and its scope. It requests this to be reflected in a report that would then be considered at a later summit. African countries are likely to push back on this idea.

    An informal note that includes the set-up of a new Just Transition Mechanism also came out late on Friday and has been condemned by civil society groups for the limited scope of what it would be expected to achieve.

    In the meantime, the Turkish and Australian co-presidency has continued consultations on a number of issues, including on how to strengthen the UN climate process itself. Some countries – including Arab nations, Mexico, Korea and Switzerland – have proposed switching COPs to a once-every-two-years format, instead of the current yearly summits.

    EU hints it could drop “clean” electrification demand 

    EU negotiators went into COP31 with a mandate from EU governments to push for “clean electrification”. But on Friday, the EU’s top climate negotiator Wopke Hoekstra seemed to weaken that demand. 

    Ahead of his arrival in Antalya, he told reporters that “a certain degree of pragmatism is probably warranted and needed, to also make sure that the group of countries signing up is as large as possible”. 

    A voluntary pledge proposed by the Turkish COP31 presidency aims to raise electricity’s share of global final energy consumption to 35% by 2035, from 23% currently, but does not specify how that electricity should be generated.  

    While solar, wind and nuclear are needed, Hoekstra said: “if we embark on more electrification and part of that is grey, it is still much better to have someone charging their car with gray electricity than to continue to drive on fossil fuels, right? It would be a tactical mistake to seek absolutes in this.”

    His comments split European climate campaigners. Linda Kalcher, head of think-tank Strategic Perspectives, said on Linkedin that it was “pragmatic”, because including the word “clean” in the final cover decision from COP31 won’t accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels on the ground, whereas EU cooperation, investment and partnerships will.

    She added that the EU is unlikely to win the fight on “clean electrification” at COP31 and that every push to step up emissions reductions raises expectations that the EU will do more on adaptation and climate finance.

    But 350.org’s head of political strategy, Andreas Sieber, reacted differently. He said dropping the demand would be a “cheap move” and that even if it does bring more countries on board, it is a “spineless tradeoff”. Writing on LinkedIn, he proposed using the phrase “Paris-aligned electrification” as a potential compromise.

    Electricity pylons in Kibuye, Rwanda (Photo by Luke Dray/Getty Images) Electricity pylons in Kibuye, Rwanda (Photo by Luke Dray/Getty Images)

    On whether the voluntary electrification pledge – which has been publicly backed by at least 15 countries so far – is likely to be included in the cover decision, Australia’s climate minister Chris Bowen, who is managing the process, noted on Saturday that it was not part of the formal negotiations.

    “What we are seeking to do is to capture some of that ambition that’s around electrification – there’s a lot of momentum, and to reflect that [in the cover decision] in a way that reflects consensus,” he told journalists, adding “there’s more work to do there”. A first draft of the cover decision is due early next week.

    ‘Shocking’ just transition text sets low bar on key demands

    The birth of a new Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) is one of the few concrete outcomes expected from COP31. Civil society activists who pushed hard for last year’s agreement to set up the JTM have high hopes for a new body that will do things differently, bringing together governments, workers and other social groups to ensure a fair transition away from fossil fuels.

    On Saturday, they said they were shocked by what they described as the low bar set in a first draft text on just transition, issued overnight by the presidency as an “informal note”.

    Anabella Rosemberg, a just transition expert with Climate Action Network International, said it leaves out key demands from developing countries for a formal body that would be tasked, among other things, with increasing finance flowing to just transition efforts through a taskforce.   

    Instead the text proposes a two-tier mechanism, with one arm driven by governments and the other aimed at implementation, including civil society but hosted or supported by the UN climate secretariat. 

    The main dissatisfaction for campaigners lies with the mechanism’s suggested outputs, which consist largely of a “knowledge hub”, some reports and information-gathering, and an annual meeting to “exchange experience and identify opportunities for cooperation”. It leaves out explicit efforts to mobilise finance but instead proposes a “matchmaking of requests with existing support”.

    Speaking to reporters on Saturday, Australia’s climate minister and COP31 negotiations president Chris Bowen said there is “strong interest in an ambitious and practical outcome on the Just Transition Mechanism” and described the draft text as “comprehensive”.

    Feminist demonstrators call for a just transition at COP31 in Antalya, Turkiye on November 13, 2026. (Photo: IISD/ENB – Mike Muzurakis) Feminist demonstrators call for a just transition at COP31 in Antalya, Turkiye on November 13, 2026. (Photo: IISD/ENB – Mike Muzurakis)

    However, Romain Ioualalen, global policy lead at Oil Change International, accused the Australian COP31 presidency of watering down the just transition text overnight, stripping away key demands from developing countries and “leaving the proposed mechanism dangerously weak”.

    The Fossil Fuel Treaty Initiative warned that the text, intended to serve as the basis for negotiations next week, offers a mechanism “in name only” and falls far short of the terms agreed at COP30 in Belém. 

    Amiera Sawas, head of policy and research with the initiative, urged countries to “reject this text and demand one that reflects what was discussed in the rooms this week – modalities that bring practitioners and governments together, and connect resources with projects and plans”. 

    “Justice needs structures, not endless hollow words,” she added. 

    Brazil says it will host a future fossil fuel phase-out conference

    Brazilian President Lula da Silva told civil society in Antalya this week that his country should host a future edition of the global conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels (TAFF).

    “We have the moral obligation,” Lula said at a meeting before heading off to the Philippines for the ASEAN summit. The Brazilian president told the event he came to Antalya to demonstrate that “no country has more credibility on climate” than his.

    The first conference on TAFF was held in Santa Marta by a coalition of around 60 governments that decided to take voluntary measures to wean their economies off coal, oil and gas. The next conference is expected to take place mid-next year in Tuvalu, with a pre-conference event for academics, subnational governments and civil society in Dublin.

    In Antalya, Brazil’s COP30 presidency held a big launch event for a voluntary global roadmap it produced to help countries shift off fossil fuels, proposing a build-up of clean energy systems followed by a push to start phasing out coal, oil and gas production and consumption after 2031. 

    Currently, a proposal to welcome the Brazil-led roadmap in the formal UN negotiations is included in the COP31 cover decision, as well as an option for “ongoing implementation” of a COP28 landmark deal to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems.

    Nepal’s climate suffering should pave the way for a safe and fair future

    Australia: Co-presidency may become a model for future COPs

    An unprecedented arrangement between Australia and Türkiye to split the COP31 presidency has so far worked “exceedingly well”, according to president of negotiations and Australian climate minister Chris Bowen, speaking at a press conference this Saturday.

    Bowen, who is overseeing the nitty-gritty of the negotiations while his Turkish counterpart Murat Kurum takes care of the voluntary initiatives in the Action Agenda, said the deal struck between the two countries gives the COP “a better chance” for a good outcome.

    “It means that we can draw on each other’s skills, each other’s experiences, and each other’s international outlooks. There’s countries that Türkiye has deeper relationships with than Australia and vice versa,” Bowen told journalists in Antalya.

    COP31 President Murat Kurum, Türkiye, and COP31 President of Negotiations Chris Bowen, Australia, at the opening plenary in Antalya. (Photo: UN Climate Change – Kiara Worth)

    The Australian minister also said the division of labour allows for him to fully concentrate on the negotiations, while his Turkish counterparts take on the logistics. “I would not be surprised if this ultimately becomes a model going forward. If you think about it, it’s a lot of pressure on one country to do it all for one year.”

    During the first week of the talks, negotiations are led by the technical UN bodies – known in the jargon as the subsidiary bodies – which take them as far as possible without the need for big political decisions. Now, they will hand over to the COP co-presidency, who – supported by pairs of countries – will take over the most controversial issues to be settled by ministers.

    David Waskow, director of international climate action at the World Resources Institute, said that while there haven’t been major “bumps in the road” in the first week of negotiations, all eyes will be on how both countries can cooperate towards the same objectives, including landing a planned cover decision as the main outcome of the COP – and what topics it will include.

    The deal, for Türkiye to host the COP on its soil and run the non-negotiated Action Agenda side of things while Australia manages the formal negotiations, was reached last year after Ankara steadfastly refused to back down in the face of greater support for its rival. 

    It’s all smiles for now, with Australia backing the Turkish-championed electrification goal and early signalling in Fiji that both COP31 teams will work on producing a COP cover decision, summarising key outcomes and setting the political direction for the year ahead.

    The post COP31 Bulletin Day 6: Limited progress as ministers arrive in Antalya appeared first on Climate Home News.

    Categories: H. Green News

    From COP31: Investing in the Future of Food Systems

    Food Tank - Sat, 11/14/2026 - 03:00

    Every week, I share some of the news that makes me excited, energized, infuriated, or curious.

    And this week, I’m coming to you from Antalya, Türkiye, where COP31 has officially begun.

    I’m encouraged that food, agriculture, and health are front and center on the very first day of the U.N. Climate Change Conference.

    In fact, COP31 President Murat Kurum made the connection explicit in his opening remarks. He said, “Climate shapes our food supply,” and reminded delegates that climate policy is also food policy.

    I was glad to hear that. But here’s my question: Will we finally see meaningful investments in food systems, or will we spend another two weeks talking about what needs to happen?

    Because farmers don’t need more promises. They need resources.

    And there’s a lot at stake.

    A new report from the World Meteorological Organization warns that 2026 will be one of the four hottest years on record, with a powerful El Niño threatening more droughts, floods, and extreme heat.

    The World Food Programme is warning that El Niño could push at least 49 million additional people into acute food insecurity by the end of 2027.

    But here’s the thing. We can often predict these disasters. We should be investing in early warning systems and helping farmers prepare before their crops fail, not waiting until people are hungry.

    Also at COP31, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) released a new report called The Unfunded Half.

    And the findings are frustrating.

    Just three percent of international public climate finance for agrifood systems has gender equality as its primary objective.

    Three percent!

    Women are absolutely essential to food production, yet they continue to face enormous barriers to land, credit, and other resources.

    There is some encouraging news. IFAD announced a new US$70 million adaptation bond focused on rural communities, with gender targets built into its lending.

    It’s a start. But we need to see that money reaching women farmers.

    In other news, global food prices actually declined slightly in October, according to new data from the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization.

    Prices fell 1.2 percent from September, largely because of lower cereal, dairy, and meat prices.

    That’s welcome news, but global food commodity prices are still nearly 6 percent higher than a year ago. And lower international prices don’t necessarily mean families are seeing relief at the grocery store.

    Meanwhile, a new peer-reviewed study published in Nature Communications offers an interesting lesson for the Food is Medicine movement.

    Researchers studied 210 adults receiving food pantry support, medically tailored groceries, or tailored groceries with coaching.

    All three groups improved in food security, diet quality, and perceived health. But the more specialized interventions didn’t clearly outperform regular pantry support.

    This doesn’t mean Food is Medicine doesn’t work. It means we need more rigorous research to understand which approaches work best, for whom, and why. And perhaps it reminds us just how important access to food is in the first place.

    Finally, some good news for organic agriculture.

    The U.S. Department of Agriculture announced US$66.8 million in grants supporting 35 organic agriculture research and extension projects.

    I’m always happy to see more investment in agricultural research, especially research that helps farmers become more resilient, improve their practices, and remain profitable.

    Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

    Photo courtesy of Deepak Kumar, Unsplash

    The post From COP31: Investing in the Future of Food Systems appeared first on Food Tank.

    Categories: A3. Agroecology

    A Car-Dependent Florida Community Voted to Make Multimodal Infrastructure Its Default

    Streetsblog USA - Fri, 11/13/2026 - 21:05

    A winning Florida ballot measure could provide a model for car-dependent communities to make multimodal infrastructure their default, after demonstrating how popular it actually is when people get the chance to vote on it directly.

    The Miami suburb of Palmetto Bay voted to approve a new charter amendment this midterms, which will require the village to install non-automotive infrastructure in places without it every time officials repave or otherwise alter a roadway.

    The measure, which won with nearly 68 percent of the vote, also creates a dedicated multimodal fund within a larger pot of transportation money the county is already collecting. That more or less removes any easy excuse transportation officials have not to build new bike lanes, sidewalks or — because this is Florida, after all — golf cart paths.

    Taken together, those changes will elevate life-saving infrastructure above the political fray where it belongs – and challengers will need to provide hard evidence that a project isn’t feasible and secure four out of five council votes in order to earn an exception to the rule. In a community with a WalkScore of just 37 out of 100, that could be the start of a sea change.

    “We’re one of the most textbook car-dependent municipalities in all of Miami-Dade County,” said Mark Merwitzer, Palmetto Bay’s Vice Mayor and the author of the measure. “So for a jurisdiction like ours to be in a position where people who are essentially forced to use their car literally voted to say, ‘I want more options’? That’s going to be a very powerful thing.”

    Recommended L.A. Voters Mandate City Implement Sustainable Transportation Improvements Whenever It Repaves Joe Linton March 6, 2024

    Palmetto Bay isn’t the first to try to make multimodal infrastructure their default — or to put it to a vote.

    In March 2024, Los Angeles overwhelmingly approved a similar measure known as HLA, only for the city to undermine the mandate by leveraging loopholes to avoid triggering the new rule. 

    Unlike HLA, though, Palmetto Bay’s charter amendment applies to all road segments, not just those longer than an eighth of a mile. It also isn’t restricted to improvements outlined in the community’s formal mobility plan, which Streetsblog LA says has provided its leaders with a perverse incentive to “essentially pause repaving streets where improvements were planned.”

    Charter commission member and attorney Paul Schweip hopes that the Florida measure won’t just avoid a similar fate, but instead hand transportation officials the tools they need to defuse angry homeowners from derailing good projects before they start. And as a daily bike commuter between Palmetto Bay and Miami himself, he says the work can’t start soon enough.

    “Anytime they talk about including bike lanes and roadway projects, [there are] folks who might lose a little bit of their yard — which is actually not their yard because it’s village right-of-way,” Schweip said. “[Now, a transportation official can say,] ‘Look, people voted for this … It will give me a license to get this work done.”

    Recommended Study: Two-Thirds of Americans Know Highway Expansions Don’t Cure Traffic Kea Wilson June 29, 2023

    Both Merwitzer credit the success of the new ballot measure to careful campaign messaging, which emphasized how multimodal infrastructure could help address residents’ number one concern: getting stuck in traffic jams.

    Because studies show most people do understand that endlessly adding lanes won’t cure congestion — but getting other drivers out of their vehicles and onto dedicated bike paths and sidewalks will.

    “The message that I carried in my own election was, we have to take a different approach and figure out ways to give people more options,” Merwitzer said, who first won office at just 24 years old after graduating with a minor in urban planning. “Because every single person who is not in a car isn’t stuck in traffic in front of you.”

    And Palmetto Bay does have a plan to initiate that shift – or more accurately, several of them.

    The new measure arrived just after the village adopted its Safe Streets For All action plan, a new multimodal transportation plan, and a new resolution to adopt NACTO standards whenever feasible – though Merwitzer says none of those things would be worth the paper they’re written on without the means and mechanisms to turn them into real infrastructure.

    “I was looking at these [documents] and I was saying to myself, ‘Look, we can have all these great plans, but if we’re not using the right tools to actually implement them, it’s just not going to [work,]” he added.

    Recommended Commentary: Cities Need to Make Protected Bike Lanes and Intersections the Default Roger Rudick August 29, 2022

    With the new measure restricted only to village-owned roads and only a fraction of roads in Palmetto Bay falling under village jurisdiction, neither Merwitzer nor Schweip claim the new measure will revolutionize multimodal access overnight. Still, there’s no reason why the same model couldn’t be applied at scale of the county or even the state, and eventually encompass all of the community’s roads.

    And if Palmetto Bay’s success is any indication, there’s a lot of latent demand for change elsewhere in Florida, too — and a lot of it’s going unheard, even in ultra car-dependent communities.

    “Very few things get that level of support within a particular community,” added Schweip. “What you’re seeing is, given an opportunity to vote on this, people are very supportive.”

    Merwitzer hopes the amendment will inspire other communities to put make safe streets infrastructure the default — and maybe even put it on the ballot. Because chances are, they’ll win.

    “Look: this is the single best anti-traffic ballot measure that you can approve,” he added.” it’s about tying things to basic quality of life issues, and not really making it about cars or bikes or pedestrians or anything else. It’s about: How do we make this place livable for everybody? … And I think when you ask most people if they want to have a way of getting around that doesn’t rely on cars, the answer is usually going to be yes.”

    Five Fixes for Food Waste

    Anthropocene Magazine - Fri, 11/13/2026 - 16:29

    Let the best of Anthropocene come to you.

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    5 Fixes for Food Waste

     

    Every day, the world throws away more than a billion meals’ worth of food, even as hundreds of millions of people go hungry. About a fifth of all the food that reaches stores, restaurants and kitchens ends up wasted, and food loss and waste together produce 8 to 10 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. That’s nearly five times the emissions from flying. Here are five fixes that are keeping food out of the trash by making it last longer, finding new uses for scraps and getting surplus to the people who need it.

    Five Fixes for Food Waste

    Let the best of Anthropocene come to you.  Every day, the world throws away more than a billion meals’ worth of food, even as hundreds of millions of people go hungry. About a fifth of all the food that reaches stores, restaurants and kitchens ends up wasted, and...

    From sundae to solvents: Chemists find a way to recycle mountains of industrial ice cream waste

    The same proteins that keep a frozen pint smooth also make its fat hard to recover. A research team found an inexpensive way around the problem.

    Recycling food waste has a huge climate upside and a surprising downside.

    A study of American composting and biogas schemes finds a climate win is shadowed by a microplastics problem. The clue is what food is wrapped in.

    Scientists make a seaweed coating that beats the fridge for cutting food waste

    Canadian researchers found a cheaper, lower-carbon way to keep strawberries fresh, cutting into a $58 billion waste problem.

    New produce wash removes 93% of pesticides and keeps fruit fresh for 15 days

    A biodegradable nanoparticle rinse made of starch, iron, and tannic acid outperforms water at stripping residues and doubles as a preservative. Cost at scale: roughly three extra cents per apple.

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    Five Fixes for Fresh Water Access

    Anthropocene Magazine - Fri, 11/13/2026 - 16:04

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    5 Fixes for Fresh Water Access

     

    Water covers most of our planet, but clean water to drink is still out of reach for a staggering number of people. One in four people on Earth, 2.1 billion in all, still lack safe drinking water at home, and 106 million drink straight from untreated rivers, lakes and ponds. As climate change brings longer droughts, saltier aquifers and stressed supplies, getting safe water to everyone will take more than digging deeper wells. Here are five fixes that are rethinking where fresh water comes from and how it reaches the people who need it.

    Five Fixes for Fresh Water Access

    Let the best of Anthropocene come to you.  Water covers most of our planet, but clean water to drink is still out of reach for a staggering number of people. One in four people on Earth, 2.1 billion in all, still lack safe drinking water at home, and 106 million...

    Could dirty, salty wastewater quench data center thirst?

    Data centers need millions of gallons of water a day. Oil and gas industries produce more wastewater than that. Connecting them using today’s desalination technologies makes sense.

    Scientists made an ultra-black wool. And it turns saltwater into drinking water

    The natural biodegradable material, which costs less than $1 for a piece the size of a sheet of paper, could provide an purification for vulnerable communities.

    MIT researchers invented a way to shake water out of thin air

    Inspired by molecular motion, they used vibrations to jolt water loose from sorbents, capturing droplets 45x faster than today’s tech, with minimal power.

    Scientists develop energy-free cooling paint that produces potable water

    A nanoengineered roof coating reflects 97% of sunlight, condenses dew, and could help fight heat and drought in climate-stressed regions worldwide.

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    Five Fixes for Low Carbon Buildings

    Anthropocene Magazine - Fri, 11/13/2026 - 14:14

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    5 Fixes for Low Carbon Buildings

     

    We spend most of our lives inside buildings, and the planet pays for it. Constructing and running the places where we live, work and learn accounts for about 27% of global emissions and nearly half of all the materials humans extract from the Earth. Half of the buildings that will be standing in 2050 still haven’t been built or renovated, which makes this a rare chance to get things right from the ground up. Here are five fixes that are reimagining how we design, build, heat and cool the spaces we live in.

    This concrete could turn your house into a battery

    The amount of concrete that goes into an average American home’s basement wall could hold enough energy to meet the daily needs of the household.

    Greener Steel Through Chemistry

    In a lab outside Boulder Colorado, engineers are reinventing one of the dirtiest industrial processes on Earth—by swapping fire for modern alchemy.

    These new building materials are alive, photosynthetic— and carbon hungry

    Scientists have engineered a living, carbon-capturing material that can be shaped by 3D printing and hardened over time through biological growth.

    This ‘living paint’ traps carbon dioxide and produces oxygen

    By encasing bacteria in a tough but porous coating, researchers have made paint that could be used to capture carbon and produce biofuels

    Wood, now turbocharged with carbon-capture powers

    Researchers created a novel wood composite that contains CO2-absorbing materials, paving the way for carbon-negative furniture and structures.

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    EA faces more complaints over Burniston fracking permit

    DRILL OR DROP? - Fri, 11/13/2026 - 13:52

    Councillors in the North Yorkshire village of Burniston made a formal complaint today about the Environment Agency’s handling of a permit for proposed gas drilling and lower-volume fracking.

    This is at least the second formal complaint made about the Burniston permit process.

    A separate earlier complaint, by campaigner Dennis May, advanced this week to the Environment Agency’s final complaints stage.

    Today’s formal complaint, by Burniston Parish Council and the village’s North Yorkshire Council representative, Cllr Derek Bastiman, centred on the announcement in August 2026 that the Environment Agency (EA) was “minded” to grant an environmental permit to Europa Oil & Gas for its plans at Burniston.

    The EA’s draft decision and permit documents, published with the announcement, were criticised locally and nationally. Numerous corrections and changes were later made to the documents. A public consultation period was extended.

    Questions over EA impartiality

    Burniston Parish Council today questioned the EA’s appearance of impartiality and its ability to reach decisions through a “fair, transparent and evidence-based process”.

    The council made 21 formal requests to the EA. These included confirmation that the EA would not make a final decision on the Burniston permit application until the concerns in the complaint were investigated.

    The council also asked the EA to provide details of when decisions had been made, what discussions EA officers had with Europa, what technical assessments had been used to make the draft decision, whether outstanding issues remained and what safeguards were used to ensure the assessment remained impartial.

    The complaint also asked for information about errors in the draft decision documents and what impact this had on the decision-making process.

    “Wholesale failure”

    Mr May, of the Nottinghamshire campaign group, Frack Free Misson, is seeking a management review of the handling of his formal complaint.

    Mr May said there had been a “self-evident” “wholesale failure in quality assurance” in the permit process.

    He said:

    “The sheer number of amendments made to the revised draft decision document and permit following the submission of this complaint should raise concerns among senior management with regards the EA’s understanding, processing and resultant quality control of information conveyed to the public for consultation.”

    He accused the EA of carrying out the permitting process “under an inappropriate perception of time pressure” and of aligning itself with company rhetoric in the public consultation process.

    He said:

    “The proceedings of this public consultation process and wider management of the oil and gas permitting should be subject to a full management review to ensure that the EA is meeting its stated objectives in serving the public.”

    Burniston Parish Council complaint details

    The formal complaint from Burniston, submitted today, called for a “full and substantive investigation by the Environment Agency. It said:

    “The Parish Council has serious concerns about the manner in which the application has been assessed, the effectiveness and fairness of the public consultation, the apparent timing of the Agency’s minded-to-grant position and, importantly, whether the potential environmental, geological and public safety risks associated with the proposed operation have been adequately investigated.”

    The complaint said the concerns “relate to the integrity of the regulatory process, the quality and completeness of the technical evidence, the protection of the local community and the transparency of the Agency’s decision-making”.

    The parish council said it expected the EA to “demonstrate that its assessment has been conducted impartially, that all relevant evidence has been properly scrutinised and that the public has been afforded a genuine opportunity to influence the outcome”.

    The Burniston complaint focused on 10 issues.

    1. The timing of the minded-to-grant position and impartiality of the process

    The parish council said it was “particularly concerned about the timing of the Environment Agency’s indication that it was minded to grant the environmental permit”. It said:

    “Where an indication that the Agency is minded to grant a permit is given at the very beginning of the consultation period, following lengthy engagement with the applicant, there is an understandable concern that a preferred outcome may already have emerged before the public has had an opportunity to make its views known.”

    2. Errors in the draft decision document

    The errors and inaccuracies identified in the original minded-to-grant report led to an extension of the consultation period. Burniston said:

    “The Parish Council considers that this raises further questions about the adequacy of the original assessment and the extent to which the technical and environmental information had been properly checked before the Agency indicated that it was minded to grant the permit.”

    It added:

    “We believe that the local community is entitled to understand why the original report required correction and whether those corrections affected the basis upon which the Agency was minded to grant the permit.”

    3. Failure to arrange a further public meeting

    Burniston Parish Council asked the EA to arrange a further public meeting in the village after the changes to the draft decision documents. The council said “to the Parish Council’s knowledge, no substantive response [from the EA] was provided to the request”.

    The council said:

    “Given that the original report had required correction and the consultation period had been extended, the Parish Council considers that a further opportunity for public engagement would have been particularly important.”

    It asked the agency for explanations including who considered the request for a public meeting, why no meeting was arranged and what steps were taken to ensure the local community understood the changes.

    4. Public consultation and notification of residents

    The EA wrote to residents about the extended consultation, which closed on 21 October 2026. But the parish council said some residents did not receive their letters until 22 October 2026, after the consultation closed.

    The council said:

    “This is a particularly serious concern.

    “Residents who received their notification after the consultation had closed were effectively denied the opportunity to participate through the normal consultation process. They could not reasonably have been expected to submit representations within a period of which they had not been made aware.”

    It said issuing letters was not sufficient if arrangements did not allow recipients a “reasonable opportunity to respond”.

    The council added that the letters problem and the failure to arrange another public meeting raised “significant questions about whether the consultation process provided the local community with a sufficiently informed and meaningful opportunity to participate”.

    5. Geological assessment and absence of seismic investigation

    The council said it had “serious concerns” about whether the geological and seismic risks of the Burniston fracture operation had been “adequately investigated”.

    No seismic testing or baseline seismic monitoring had been undertaken at the proposed site, the council said.

    It asked for details about how the EA had assessed the underlying geology and the risks of seismic activity from hydraulic fracturing.

    It said:

    “The Parish Council is particularly concerned that the Agency should not reach a final permitting decision where significant uncertainties about the underlying geology remain unresolved.”

    6. Hydraulic fracturing

    The council said it was concerned about the impact of hydraulic fracturing on nearby homes and unstable coastal cliffs. It asked the EA to demonstrate that it had properly assessed the characteristics of the geology and the risks from hydraulic fracturing.

    7. Underground retention of hydraulic fracturing materials

    The majority of the fluid from the Burniston fracturing operations is likely to remain underground, near Barmoor Lane, Scalby.

    The council said:

    “insufficient information has been provided to the local community about the precise nature, composition, quantities and long-term environmental implications of the materials that will remain underground”.

    It asked the EA to provide details including the precise location of the proposed underground area where material would be stored, estimated volumes and assessments of potential migration and contamination of groundwater.

    8. Other parish council concerns
    • “Insufficient consideration” given to the experience and environmental consequences of hydraulic fracturing at Preston New Road, Lancashire
    • Request for confirmation that the EA has done a “sufficiently comprehensive assessment of the combined environmental implications of the proposed operation”.
    • Relationship with planning process – the council asked for clarification about how the EA took into account the planning position when determining an environmental permit.
    Management review details Conventional or unconventional

    The EA was accused in Mr May’s request for a management review of giving misleading information through incorrect and vague terminology.

    A key issue was the classification of the Burniston reservoir as “conventional” or “unconventional”.

    The EA said the proposed “small-scale hydraulic fracturing process”, described by Europa as a proppant squeeze, had historically taken place in conventional oilfields.

    But Mr May said Burniston would the UK’s first onshore, multi-stage hydraulic fracturing operation of unconventional strata since 2019.

    He said:

    • A 2005 industry appraisal of the prospect around Burniston, known as Cloughton, classified the target strata as “tight sand” that would require “massive hydraulic fracturing to produce gas at commercial rates. In industry guidance, tight formations are classified as unconventional.
    • The Cloughton target formations are “reservoir-shale pairs” or “strata encased in shale”, usually considered to be unconventional.
    • The permeability of the Cloughton target formation has been assessed as low, at 0.04 millidarcys, meeting the industry definition of unconventional.
    • The Cloughton strata is the equivalent of the target formation at Kirby Misperton, less than 30km away, where there were plans in 2017 for high-volume fracking.
    • The Cloughton operation, which seeks to use 300m3-500m3 of fluid per fracking stage, is a different scale from a typical proppant squeeze, which would use 100m3-200m3 per stage.
    Volumes

    Mr May said the industry, government and the EA had attempted to “downplay the potential impacts” of the Burniston fracturing project by comparing it with onshore associated hydraulic fracturing.

    This is defined in the Infrastructure Act as an operation using 1,000m3 of fluid per fracking stage or 10,000m3 in total.

    A moratorium in 2019 prevented associated hydraulic fracturing in England. But it does not cover operations using lower volumes of fluid.

    Mr May said the volumes in the act had “by a wide margin, never been attained” in the UK. And he said:

    “the proposed injection volumes for the Cloughton 2 well [at Burniston] are directly comparable to those deployed on the PNR2 [Preston New Road-2] well in Lancashire which caused the 2.9ML seismic event that resulted in the ongoing moratorium.”

    Mr May said:

    • The proposed total volume of fluid proposed for Burniston is 80% of that which caused the 2.9ML seismic event at Preston New Road
    • The maximum proposed stage volume for Burniston is higher than any used on the PNR2 well
    • The minimum proposed stage volume for Burniston is twice the final quantity which triggered the 2.9ML event.
    Seismic survey

    The EA acknowledged that Europa had not carried out a 3D seismic survey at Burniston and described this as “unusual”.

    But it said it was “standard practice for onshore oil and gas applications” to make this a pre-operational condition, after the permit had been approved.

    Mr May said:

    “If the EA is applying standard, i.e. ‘usual,’ practice,’ it should not be considered unreasonable for a 3D seismic survey and resulting preliminary seismic assessment to be carried out prior to subjecting the Burniston community to the impacts of site construction and drilling operations.”

    Industry guidance

    Mr May said the EA had misrepresented guidance from the industry regulator, the North Sea Transition Authority.

    The EA said “small-volume hydraulic stimulation of a conventional target requires less information and a proportionate level of control”.

    But Mr May said the NSTA guidance actually states:

    ‘If the proposed injection volumes fall below the BEIS associated hydraulic fracturing thresholds, the OGA may {emphasis added] decide less information or monitoring is appropriate…’

    • The consultation documents and responses for the Burniston permit application have been archived. These documents normally remain online in the EA’s citizen space webpages for about a year. But an EA spokesperson told DrillOrDrop today that the organisation was changing contractors and consultations handled by the former contractor were all being archived.
    Categories: G2. Local Greens

    Burniston appeal submitted

    DRILL OR DROP? - Fri, 11/13/2026 - 13:50

    A challenge to the refusal of planning permission for gas drilling and fracking in the North Yorkshire village of Burniston was formally submitted today on the last possible date.

    We reported earlier this month that Europa Oil & Gas had given notice that it would appeal against the decision by North Yorkshire Council, made in May 2026.

    The Planning Inspectorate confirmed to DrillOrDrop that the formal appeal had been submitted. Today was the deadline for appealing against the refusal.

    There will now be a validation process to ensure that all the documents submitted by the appellant are correct.

    A case officer and planning inspector will then be assigned to the appeal. The inspector will decide the timetable for the process, including dates for submission of the rival cases.

    The inspector will also decide how the appeal will be considered. It could be by a full public inquiry, a less formal hearing or by written representations.

    The Planning Inspectorate was affected by today’s worldwide Microsoft outage. It reported this evening:

    “To guarantee the security and stability of the digital appeals service for customers, we have decided to keep new submissions paused over the weekend.

    “We intend to have the service back up and running safely on Monday 16 November. We will update this page when we do so.”

    DrillOrDrop will update this article with web links to the Burniston appeal when the digital service is fully restored

    Categories: G2. Local Greens

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