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The Global Forest Coalition is an international coalition of NGOs and Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations working for social justice plus the conservation and restoration of forest ecosystems
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New Rules, Old Questions: What the UN’s Latest Carbon Market Decisions Mean for Forests and Communities

4 hours 42 min ago
New standards for cookstove carbon credits promise greater environmental integrity. But can better accounting rules address the deeper problems of carbon markets?

By: Sophia Arias, Rahi Kumbar, Bob Yang, undergraduate students at the University of Southern California with the Gibson Climate Justice Lab

Can carbon credits for improved cookstoves in Myanmar really protect forests and combat global climate change? 

The United Nations’ new carbon market is betting that it can. But a growing number of civil society organizations are questioning whether the promises behind these credits can be trusted. 

On October 9, the UN’s Article 6.4 Supervisory Body concluded its twenty-third meeting (SBM023) by approving two new methodologies for generating carbon credits from cleaner, more efficient household cookstoves. These credits are marketed, in part, on the claim that cleaner stoves reduce the wood harvested for cooking fuel. 

That same week, over 130 civil society groups were still waiting for an answer to their call to suspend credits under the new mechanism, which faces serious concerns over human rights and carbon accounting.   

Against this backdrop, student researchers with the Gibson Climate Justice Lab (GCJLab) at the University of Southern California ask how SBM023 addressed, or failed to address, the problems civil society organizations have repeatedly identified.  

Can improved cookstoves really protect forests?

The promise behind cookstove projects sounds straightforward: households use less firewood, fewer trees are harvested, and fewer greenhouse gases enter the atmosphere.

But the relationship between cooking fuel and forest protection is considerably more complicated. 

Fuelwood may come from multiple sources, including deadwood, agricultural residues, managed woodlots, or natural forests. Reducing household wood consumption does not automatically translate into an equivalent reduction in deforestation, yet carbon-crediting methodologies depend on assumptions about how much fuelwood would otherwise have been harvested and whether that biomass would have regenerated. 

There are also questions about how emissions reductions are measured. Distributing an improved cookstove does not guarantee that households will use it consistently or abandon traditional cooking practices. Overestimating these changes can generate credits for emissions reductions that were never realized. 

Beyond the accounting concerns, these projects risk overlooking the traditional knowledge, livelihoods and customary forest management practices of Indigenous and local communities, and despite the UNFCCC’s claims that cleaner cookstoves “empower women,” they rely almost entirely on the unpaid labor of women who have very little say in project design and implementation, and receive no share of the financial benefits.

The issue is not whether households should have access to cleaner cooking technologies. They should. The question is whether changes in their cooking practices can then be used to justify continued emissions elsewhere. 

New rules, old problems: What changed at SBM023?

Clean cooking methodologies were at the heart of SBM023’s agenda. With numerous projects being grandfathered into the new systems, transitioning them to comply with new standards was the main priority. 

At SBM023, the Body approved two new methodologies for generating carbon credits from household cooking activities, which will replace existing CDM methodologies. The first, Cooking Energy Transitions, covers shifts toward lower-emission household cooking technologies and fuels. The second, Energy Efficiency Measures in Household Cooking, addresses improvements in cooking efficiency, including technologies that reduce the amount of biomass needed to prepare food. While the UNFCCC has yet to officially implement either methodology, they found that focusing on improvements in cooking efficiency would result in greater reversal buffer deductions from credits compared to historical baselines.

Compared with the Myanmar project’s AMS-II.G calculations (which used a 10% baseline improvement in efficiency and existing monitoring rules for continued traditional stove use), A6.4-AMM-005 overhauls several core variables. It introduces a performance-based baseline benchmark, requires household fuel measurements covering all cooking devices in use, and mandates reversal-buffer contributions that are immediately cancelled. At the same time, it raises the fuelwood CO2 emission factor from 63.7 to 112tCO2/TJ and incorporates non-CO2 emissions into the calculation. Because these methodological changes pull in opposite directions, determining how the Myanmar project’s credit volume would change under A6.4-AMM-005 is not possible without a full recalculation using household-level measurement data and a project-specific reversal-risk assessment.

Neither is entirely new, as they both build on earlier carbon-crediting approaches under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, the carbon trading predecessor to the Paris Agreement.

The Body also adopted new sampling and survey requirements intended to improve the reliability of emissions calculations. These changes matter, because carbon markets have often faced criticism for issuing credits that exaggerate emissions reductions. 

However, several decisions illustrate the limits of these technical reforms. 

For example, the Supervisory Body granted the household efficiency methodology an exemption from a downward adjustment to credited emissions reductions in the second and subsequent calendar years. It also requested further work on how uncertainty should be treated when project developers use alternative or measured data. 

Taken together the range of uncertainties coming from these decisions pose a risk of overcrediting and detrimental harm to the climate.

A woman using an improved cookstove in Myanmar. Soneva Foundation/Flickr

What happens when promised benefits do not last?

SBM023 also addressed another important issue: reversal risk.

In carbon markets, a reversal usually occurs when a previously credited climate benefit is subsequently lost. For example, carbon sequestered in a forest can be released when trees die, burn, or are cut down.

But cookstove projects raise a different question.

Unlike forest-based offsets which draw down and store carbon from the atmosphere, improved cookstoves generally claim to avoid emissions altogether by reducing fuel consumption. If households stop using the improved cookstoves, future emissions savings (which have already been modeled out) may disappear.  

Rules designed to protect stored carbon, such as those for forest carbon removal projects, may not then be appropriate for every type of emissions-reduction or avoidance project. 

At SBM023, the Supervisory Body adopted a new risk-reversal tool and requested that its expert panel continue monitoring evidence that could justify revising the risk factors applied to activities reducing non-renewable biomass consumption.

It also acknowledged unresolved accounting problems associated with the carbon market’s buffer pool. Buffer pools function by reserving a set amount of carbon credits from each project that are not sold. These credits serve as a ‘buffer’ if other credits in the project face reversal risks or fail to meet efficiency standards. Rather than resolving these problems though, the Body requested further analysis of alternative approaches and their implications for national climate accounting.

For cookstove credits, the practical test is whether credible emissions estimates are backed by arrangements capable of addressing reversals. The effectiveness of these rules will depend on how both requirements are met in practice. These questions about technical credibility also raise the issue of whose evidence informs the rules.

Myanmar exposes the limits of technical reform

The controversy surrounding Myanmar’s cookstove project makes these concerns especially urgent. 

In October, more than 130 civil society groups called for the suspension of all carbon credits from the project, citing concerns about the credits’ integrity and their connections to institutions operating under Myanmar’s military junta. 

Since the military seized power in February 2021, Myanmar has experienced widespread violence, repression, and serious human rights violations.

This context prompts serious questions about the involvement of state institutions controlled by the junta in the cookstove project, alongside questions about whether meaningful oversight, verification, and community participation – all required under Art. 6.4 mechanisms – are even possible under these conditions. 

In addition to being under junta control, carbon credit generation in Myanmar is being administered by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) rather than a non-nationally affiliated body.  With clean cookstoves serving as aid for underprivileged communities in Myanmar, many civil society groups question whether their MONREC can be trusted to evenly distribute cookstoves through the Dry Zone Greening Department (DZGD) and other regional departments while MONREC is under the illegal control of the junta. 

These are not issues that can be solved simply by improving emissions calculations. A carbon crediting project can satisfy technical requirements while still violating environmental, social and cultural norms and rules. 

Although the Supervisory Body formally addressed some stakeholder inputs at SBM023, they did not address this appeal directly and ultimately chose not to revoke any credits from the cookstove project. Rather, they revised risk reversal assessments to account for “human-induced reversal risk.”

As a result of this controversy, there was some reluctance among the Supervisory Body to even account for so much reversal risk at all, since it can decrease the worth of clean cooking credits by as much as 60%.

Furthermore, an interesting trend throughout SBM023 was the brevity of stakeholder consideration. As a whole, stakeholder input was initially presented but not followed up on later in negotiations. Outside input on cookstoves and forest protection was incorporated during Monday’s discussion but day-by-day, stakeholder input was hardly discussed past the Secretariat’s opening. 

Final Thoughts

SBM023 repeated a familiar failure of international negotiations: stakeholder input was treated as an afterthought. Time pressure, claims of irrelevance and members’ personal opinions crowded out serious engagement with what stakeholders had submitted. Forest-dependent and cookstove-using communities are among those most exposed to climate impacts, yet their views were not at the center of the decisions that affect them. The perspectives that carried the room were mostly those of credit-purchasing countries, not of the communities that generate the credits.

The way input was handled made this worse. The secretariat presented stakeholder statements without verifying them, attributing them or providing supporting evidence, so the Body had little basis to weigh them fairly. For example, Olga Gassan-Zade, the Chair of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body, noted that in response to the Methodological Expert Panel’s (MEP) request for views on credit non-permanence, eleven statements were presented, six in support and five opposed , yet each represented anywhere from ten to 100 people. Presenting them as equal in weight further obscures forest-dwelling communities and civil society in global debate.

The substantive outcomes follow the same pattern. The Body tightened sampling rules and added reversal-risk safeguards, but then weakened those safeguards with exemptions and postponed hard questions on uncertainty and buffer pools. Its refusal to suspend the junta-linked Myanmar cookstove project shows that technical compliance cannot substitute for human rights and political legitimacy. No amount of methodological fine-tuning can fix a market still designed around the priorities of credit buyers rather than the realities of forest-dependent communities.

Categories: G1. Progressive Green

Real Solutions, Mapped from the Ground Up: Launching the Gender-Just Real Solutions Map at COP31

Thu, 11/12/2026 - 00:38

Communities around the world are already building the solutions we need to confront the intersecting social, ecological and climate crises we face. At COP31 in Antalya, Turkey, the Global Forest Coalition is launching a new tool to make these solutions visible: the Map of Gender-Just Real Solutions for Territories and Communities.

At a time when governments and corporations continue to promote false solutions such as carbon and biodiversity markets as answers to climate breakdown and biodiversity collapse, and UN processes become more and more captured by lobbyists, we need to look elsewhere for inspiration and concrete responses to overcome the crises.

The real solutions are already here

Across the Global South, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, youth, gender diverse people and grassroots organisations are protecting territories, restoring ecosystems, sustaining food systems, defending biodiversity and building more just and resilient economies. These initiatives are rooted in particular places, cosmovisions, cultures and relationships with nature. They are not commodities to be traded or generic models waiting to be scaled up.

The Map of Gender-Just Real Solutions brings some of these initiatives together in one place, helping to make visible the people, practices, values, rights and conditions that can underpin transformative change.

From the ground up

The map begins with six examples of gender-just, community-led real solutions.

They include the Nainu ancestral farming and agroforestry system of the Gunadule People in the Gunayala territory, in Panama, where traditional knowledge, food sovereignty, biodiversity protection and the active role of women and youth are central. In Zambia, the map features the Kamukolwe Multipurpose Cooperative Society, where women farmers are using agroecology, traditional seed saving and community-based alternatives while resisting the impacts of copper mining, as well as the Kapyanga Women’s Association, which combines agroecology, Indigenous seeds, forest restoration and local economic empowerment.

In Morocco, the map highlights the role of Amazigh Indigenous women in protecting argan forests, maintaining traditional ecological knowledge and strengthening women-led cooperatives and livelihoods. In Bangladesh, it documents Indigenous-led public interest litigation to protect the Madhupur Sal Forest, demonstrating how legal action, collective mobilisation and recognition of customary rights can contribute to forest protection.

And in the Bolivian Amazon, the map explores territories free from extractivism, where Indigenous Peoples, rural communities and agroecological organisations are working together to protect forests, rivers and livelihoods from gold mining.

These are only the beginning. The map is designed to grow.

Gender justice is at the heart of the map

A gender-just approach is essential because the defence and care of territories and ecosystems is deeply connected to gender relations and patriarchal structures. 

Women in all their diversity hold critical traditional knowledge of ecosystems, food systems, seeds and natural resources, while carrying a disproportionate share of unpaid care and domestic work. Yet they remain systematically excluded from decision-making, land ownership, access to resources and political power. Gender-diverse people, youth and people with disability are equally invisibilized from power spaces and excluded in policy design, while confronting multiple forms of violence in territories.   

The initiatives featured in the map demonstrate that gender justice is not simply about ensuring that women are represented. It is about who has power, who makes decisions, who controls land and resources, whose knowledge is valued, and who benefits from the protection of territories and ecosystems.

That is why gender justice and intersectionality are core criteria for inclusion in the map. Initiatives must demonstrate meaningful leadership and participation by women, youth, gender-diverse people and/or people with disabilities, alongside a human-rights-based and non-market approach.

What makes a real solution possible?

The map does not simply ask “What is the solution?” It also asks: What makes it possible? And what stands in its way?

Communities do not need another externally imposed blueprint for how to protect their territories. Their solutions are specific to their histories, cultures, ecosystems and forms of governance. Instead of trying to scale up a particular practice everywhere, we need to understand and strengthen the conditions that allow diverse real solutions to flourish.

Across the initial cases, these conditions include secure land and territorial rights, autonomous and community-led governance, traditional and local knowledge, collective organising, women’s leadership, supportive legal frameworks, access to public financing, and protection from extractivism.

At the same time, communities face systemic barriers including land grabbing, extractive industries, destructive infrastructure, corporate influence over policy, insecure land rights, inadequate financing, patriarchal structures and the continued marginalisation of Indigenous and local knowledge. Making these conditions and barriers visible is crucial for changing policy.

A methodology built collectively

The map itself has been built through a participatory process. Global Forest Coalition members and allies worked together to develop its political framing, inclusion and exclusion criteria and data collection approach. Through collective discussions, participants explored what distinguishes a real solution from a false one, how gender justice should be understood, and which social, political, ecological, economic and cultural conditions allow community-led initiatives to thrive. This collective process matters. A map about communities should not be designed for communities without their participation and control.

The methodology is therefore based on principles including collective ownership, community consent and control, shared power and responsibility, and non-commercial use. It is also deliberately evolving. As more communities and organisations contribute, the methodology will continue to be reviewed, challenged and strengthened.

The initial process brought together GFC members and allies working across the Global South, and the project now opens the door for many more communities and organisations to contribute.

From Antalya and beyond

We are launching the Map of Gender-Just Real Solutions at COP31 in Antalya, where we will also hold a workshop during the People’s Summit to introduce the map and its methodology to allies, members and partners. The workshop will be an opportunity to explore the initial cases, discuss how the map can support collective struggles against false solutions, and gather feedback to help shape its future development. This is particularly important because the map is intended to remain participatory and open to continued learning.

This launch is therefore not an endpoint. It is a beginning.

We invite Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, grassroots movements and civil society organisations to explore the map, share it with others and help us build it further.

If you know of a gender-just, community-led initiative that should be represented, we want to hear from you. You can contact us at contact@realsolutionsmap.org to find out more about the criteria and methodology and how to suggest an initiative for inclusion.

Together, we can make visible the solutions that are already protecting forests, biodiversity, territories and communities, and build the political power needed to remove the barriers that stand in their way.

Explore the Gender-Just Real Solutions Map at https://realsolutionsmap.org/

Categories: G1. Progressive Green

The Clock is Ticking for TFFF: Will COP31 Deliver Where COP30 Failed?

Thu, 11/05/2026 - 04:29
Lula’s victory has saved the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) for now, but its reliance on private investment, Global South debt, and dubious governance means that it is still a false solution for forests, regardless of who is in power in Brazil. 

This article was originally published by Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

By Valentina Figuera Martínez and Oli Munnion

The re-election of Lula da Silva in Brazil’s presidential race is a huge victory for progressive politics in Latin America, narrowly avoiding descent once more into the chaos of the far-right Bolsonaro dynasty. Lula’s decisive win is also a victory against U.S. interventionism, and the Trump Administration’s efforts to impose its political, neocolonial and military dominance across the region.

However, one consequence of the result is that a lifeline has been thrown to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), a new and highly controversial forest finance scheme championed by the Brazilian government. A Bolsonaro victory would undoubtedly have been the final nail in the coffin for TFFF, a silver lining to an otherwise very big, dark cloud.

The TFFF is still on life support though—it has until the end of the year to secure USD 10 billion in initial funding, which it has so far failed to do, or face key investors such as the Norwegian government pulling out, regardless of whether Lula or Bolsonaro sit in the presidential chair.
This makes COP31 make or break for TFFF. Although not on the formal agenda of the UN climate negotiations, the scheme’s backers will be desperately seeking additional pledges in the corridors of the Antalya conference centre.

What Went Wrong in Belém?

Alongside the failure of COP30 in Belém, Brazil, to establish a binding roadmap to end deforestation, the TFFF also fell short of its promise to secure the “future of tropical forests”. Brazil’s flagship financing scheme had attracted only USD 6.7 billion in sponsor capital, well below the USD 25 billion initially required to operate at a full scale.

What it did attract was widespread opposition from civil society and Indigenous Peoples’ organisations. Messaging against TFFF featured prominently in demonstrations in Belém, and a statement rejecting TFFF and defending forest rights was signed by 205 organisations, many of which were participating in counter-mobilisations.1

The plan had been to use the USD 25 billion in sponsor capital to issue up to USD 100 billion of “senior market debt” (low interest rate, high repayment priority loans and bonds), at a one to four leverage, to build a total investment fund of USD 125 billion.

This sum would then be invested by the fund at a higher rate of return in order to generate an anticipated revenue of USD four billion per year, which would be paid to tropical forest countries in exchange for conserving one billion hectares of standing tropical forests.

In Belém, sponsor capital pledges from the Global North included Norway’s USD 3 billion, Germany’s €1 billion (USD 1.15 billion), and France’s €500 million (USD 577 million), totalling USD 4.7 billion, all with specific conditions and strings attached.

So far, more than a quarter of TFFF funds come from countries that are supposed to be its main beneficiaries

Brazil and Indonesia, which are two of the three largest tropical forest countries, committed USD one billion each in sponsor capital. That means that so far, more than a quarter of TFFF funds come from countries that are supposed to be its main beneficiaries.

In addition to these five countries, very small pledges from the Netherlands (USD 5 million), Portugal (USD 1 million), and the Minderoo Foundation (USD 10 million) brought the total to USD 6.7 billion, although this sum isn’t available immediately due to several of the conditions imposed.2

Since then, other pledges have trickled in, such as the UK’s £400 million (approximately USD 534 million), and another USD 500 million from the Netherlands post-election, taking the total to USD 7.8 billion. At the same time though, Europe’s steady march to the right and cooling of climate commitments has put some pledges in doubt. A member of the German Chancellor’s CDU budget committee has argued that Germany’s €1bn investment is hard to justify and should be removed from the 2027 national budget.

A “once-in-a-generation initiative (…) via an innovative financing mechanism” was promised, but what is the financial logic behind the TFFF and will it tackle the underlying drivers of deforestation? Let’s start at the beginning.

Whose Proposal Is It?

The Brazilian government claims that the TFFF is led by Global South tropical forest countries. In reality, it is a proposal written by bankers for bankers, and was conceived of in the Global North under the leadership of the World Bank.

One of its earliest iterations was a set of four papers published in 2018 by the Center for Global Development (CGD) under the title “Creating a Multilateral Wealth Fund for a Global Public Good: A Proposal for a Tropical Forest Finance Facility”. Among the authors is Kenneth Lay, former vice president and treasurer of the World Bank from 2006 to 2010. Other Global North contributors are cited, as well as officials from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

However, there is no mention of Brazil, Indonesia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo in this initial documentation, and the participation of these tropical forest countries and the subsequent leadership of the Brazilian government have come later, giving legitimacy to the scheme.

A Neo-Colonial Economic Model Underlies the TFFF

According to the 2018 version of the scheme,

“TFFF is a proposal to mobilise significant low-cost resources which can be invested in private markets to generate a financial return for rewarding successful actions that contribute to achieving a global goal, reduced deforestation. (…) Utilising primarily public funds to generate investment profits from the private sector that in turn provide international finance for public goods could serve to move beyond the finite borders of overseas development aid.”

From its inception, the intention was clear: the TFFF was designed to use limited public funds to leverage much larger private investments in order to generate profit for wealthy investors and claim to contribute to “halting deforestation”. A convenient formula for limiting public contributions and maximising private returns, while claiming deforestation benefits in the Global South.

This original 2018 financial logic has been revived in the three concept notes subsequently presented by the Brazilian government3, which hinge on: 1) converting money borrowed from wealthy investor countries and companies into profit that can be used to “drive change in developing countries”; and 2) distributing these funds using a results-based aid approach once pre-agreed measurable outcomes are achieved.

In essence, it reproduces a neo-colonial and technocratic dynamic.

In essence, it reproduces a neo-colonial and technocratic dynamic that privileges “measurable outcomes” over lived realities, reducing complex social, cultural, and ecological factors to narrow metrics. What is easy to measure tends to be prioritised over what matters most, sidelining gender justice, Indigenous governance systems, collective rights, structural drivers of inequality and other forms of environmental harm beyond deforestation.

TFFF is presented as a “country-led” approach, but reinforces a paternalistic mindset in which donors and Global North actors “drive change” in the Global South, rather than addressing historical responsibility for climate breakdown, ecological harm, colonial crimes, and debt injustices.

The TFFF is seen by its proponents as a unique opportunity to kill two birds with one stone, allowing private investors to make money and secure corporate greenwashing by reporting their alleged “contributions” to ‘Net Zero commitments’ and ‘nature positive finance’, such as the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD)4. All of which have been denounced by civil society as controversial schemes to perpetuate corporate abuses, human rights violations and environmental crimes.

Who is Really Funding the Fund?

One of the most concerning aspects of the scheme is its heavy reliance on bond markets for Global South debt. In essence, the money used to “protect” tropical forests will be largely paid for by countries in the Global South, through debt servicing and payments to wealthy international investors. As the Third World Network has warned, the real financing will come from “developing countries themselves, disguised by the international capital markets as ‘natural’ return on investments”.

This reflects a perverse money-machine logic: the TFFF will borrow billions of dollars from sponsors and wealthy investors at a lower interest rate, and then invest those resources heavily in emerging market bonds, issued, for example, by highly indebted Global South countries or companies driving deforestation that need immediate liquidity, at a higher rate of return. These emerging market bonds are issued at higher interest rates as they are judged to involve higher risk for the lender (in this case, the TFFF), as it is assumed, for example, that Global South borrowers are more likely to default.

The TFIF will make its money through deepening the debt crisis and insolvency in the Global South.

The profit generated through this difference in interest rates (and often unjust assessment of risk) will then be used primarily to repay lenders, cover World Bank fees, and service interest on sponsor capital. Only if there are profits left over following these transactions would any funds actually be transferred to tropical forest countries. Therefore, the TFIF will make its money through deepening the debt crisis and insolvency in the Global South, at a time when debt levels are already unprecedented.

Merel van der Mark, Forests and Finance Coalition Coordinator and an expert on financial mechanisms, has made the link between a failure of the Global North to pay what is owed when it comes to climate and biodiversity finance, and the shift towards private finance to make up the shortfall.

In an interview given for this article, she explains how

“for years and years, tropical forest countries have asked for support from richer countries, for the protection of their forests. But rich countries have failed to mobilise the amounts that are needed to achieve real forest protection.”

“So the TFFF seems to me a sad acknowledgement that rich countries are not doing their part, and that the only way to mobilise them to allocate money to forest protection is if they get their money back, with interest. So in that sense, I think that TFFF does not mobilise finance in an equitable way.”

Deforestation as a Market Failure

The TFFF’s rationale is that by valuing standing tropical forests, the fund will address a “market failure” by assigning a value to, and paying for, the “ecosystem services” provided by tropical forests, thereby incentivising their protection over their destruction or degradation. The financialisation of nature is therefore the proposal’s driving force, where forests are turned into a market value that can generate returns, prioritising capital accumulation above human rights, ecosystem integrity, and all other considerations.

This poses a profound contradiction: the dominant economic system that turns nature into a financial asset is destroying the cultures, practices, rights and relationships to territories of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, and youth—the commodification of nature is therefore not compatible with respecting the interdependent complexities that make up an ecosystem.5

The structural drivers of deforestation are precisely the same commodity supply chains and industrial processes that fuel the current economic system.

Aligning an economic and financial system designed to extract wealth from nature and forest-dependent peoples with the protection of tropical forests is a paradox in itself. The structural drivers of deforestation are precisely the same commodity supply chains and industrial processes that fuel the current economic system: agribusiness, intensive livestock farming, mining, fossil fuel extraction, infrastructure development, logging for pulp and paper and biomass energy, among other economic sectors.

The same financial system that will sustain the TFFF generates vast profits from companies driving deforestation. It’s like deliberately fighting a losing battle, just to ensure profits for wealthy investors.

The Propaganda Trap: IPLC “Advice” Is Not the Same as Decision-Making Power

A key pillar of the TFFF is that tropical forest countries will allocate a minimum of 20% of payments they receive to supporting Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs). This means that if a tropical forest country receives USD four per hectare of standing forest, 80 cents would have to be allocated to IPLCs.

Subsequently, the most recent TFFF proposal (Concept Note 3.1) developed “Guiding Principles for the Allocation to Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities”, and established a “Technical and Scientific Advisory Panel” and an “IPLCs Advisory Council”. Primarily composed of 10 IPLC representatives, the IPLCs Advisory Council will only advise the TFFF Board, and will have no access to decision-making over mobilising and managing the fund’s overall resources. Moreover, the members of the IPLCs Advisory Council will need to be approved by the TFFF Board.

The really important decisions will be taken by the Board of the Tropical Forest Investment Fund (TFIF), which is the “financial heart” of the fund and responsible for managing the capital (discussed in more detail below). As the World Rainforest Movement (WRM) points out in its analysis of the scheme, it is a mechanism steeped in colonial rationale. Giving IPLCs an advisory role and the power to decide how a fraction of the leftover resources are spent is not the same as giving them full access to decision-making and participation in the fund’s governance structure.

Chief Ninawa Huni Kui, an Indigenous leader from the Brazilian Amazon and president of the Federation of the Huni Kui Indigenous People in Acre, Brazil, is highly skeptical of the scheme. In an interview given for this article, he said:

“I don’t believe we will have positive results with those actions. The Tropical Forest Forever Facility is just another propaganda trap that will generate huge profits [for wealthy investors]. From a critical perspective, it is a form of co-optation: involving Indigenous Peoples without letting them make the decisions. It’s another deception. The fund’s decisions will not respond to the real desires and needs of all peoples. This ends up weakening the Indigenous movement, rather than strengthening it”.

In addition to concerns about decision-making, the Huni Kui leader also sees the TFFF’s speculative nature as a contradiction to the cosmovision of Indigenous Peoples. “A capitalist fund is very contrary to the spiritual worldviews of Indigenous Peoples, to the relationship between bem viver6 and territories. Financial resources cannot be confused with bem viver. ‘I’ll give them some money and they’ll have a better relationship with nature.’ It’s not about that. We’re talking about a deeper notion; it’s about reverence and recognition of nature,” he said.

On top of this, the fund’s stated commitment to equity, rights and inclusion—expressed through the introduction of “funding access modalities” for IPLCs and tropical forest countries—is not guaranteed in the event of market stress, liquidity pressure, drawdowns or default. Even if the financial architecture of the fund remains intact, tropical forest countries, and therefore IPLCs, may receive no payments, as priority would be given to repaying investors.

TFIF: the Real Decision-Making Player

The governance structure of the TFFF involves two independent entities: the Tropical Forest Investment Fund (TFIF) and the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (“the Facility” or TFFF).

The TFIF will be responsible for mobilising and managing financial resources, and will take important decisions through the TFIF Board, a central institution in the scheme. The TFIF will have its own governance structure and the freedom to make “market-driven decisions”, which will inevitably mean prioritising economic interests over rights. The TFFF will be limited to “oversee[ing] the forest cover rewards system, including eligibility criteria, monitoring methodologies, and disbursement rules”.

The TFFF Board will include eighteen member countries: nine sponsor countries and nine non-sponsor tropical forest countries that meet the criteria set out in the Facility Charter, the fund’s institutional governance framework, which will guide implementation arrangements, eligibility criteria, and other foundational considerations. All sponsor countries contributing at least USD one billion to the TFFF will be granted a seat on the TFFF Board, until the total number reaches nine.

The Technical and Scientific Advisory Panel and the IPLCs Advisory Council will function under the supervision of the TFFF Board, which limits their decision-making power in key areas such as conflict resolution, enforcement action, defining indicators, and setting baselines. This contradicts principles of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and weakens democratic control.

On the other hand, the TFIF Board will consist of “professionals” with the required “expertise”, and will be nominated and appointed by the “Sovereign Sponsors” (national governments providing sponsor capital) from an “independent committee’s recommendation”.

The Role of the World Bank

The World Bank will be the scheme’s trustee and host the TFFF Secretariat, and may also “provide certain Treasury Management services to TFIF”. Its reputation has been discredited in the Global South as it has been widely recognised for sinking countries in debt, imposing unjust conditions on loans, shaping economies to benefit big corporations instead of people, and even backing military dictatorships.

The TFFF will therefore be hosted by and benefit an organisation responsible for promoting policies that exacerbate inequalities and ecological impacts in the Global South7, which could prove even more problematic in times of global crisis and financial instability.

The payment hierarchy that the World Bank will oversee will be determined according to the revenues of the TFIF, and will be prioritised in the following way:

  1. Bond-holders, including “debt service and fees payments” to those who lent their money to the TFFF and World Bank fees;
  2. Other Private investors;
  3. Sovereign sponsors, which are mainly state loans;
  4. In last place, eligible tropical forest countries that have a deforestation rate lower than 0,5 percent.

If revenues decline, payments to tropical forest countries will be the first to be postponed, and if things get even worse, the TFIF will “commence an orderly liquidation”.

This payment hierarchy matters: in years when returns are low, forest-based payments would be reduced before investor returns are affected. In extreme market downturns, forest-related payments might pause altogether. Next in line would be reductions in payments to sovereign sponsors, further protecting the interests of private investors.

Payments to IPLCs will therefore be the lowest priority, while the interests of sponsors and wealthy private investors will be protected through the fund’s investment strategy. Trying to align profit-making with environmental outcomes in this way could therefore put more pressure on forest-dependent communities, as it is ultimately they that will bear the greatest risk burden from market volatility, potential liquidation, and penalties.

Will the TFFF Incentivise Investments that Harm Forests?

Although the TFFF’s concept note 3.1 states that investments in deforestation, coal, peat, oil, and gas will be excluded, the fund’s unclear investment exclusion criteria are a serious concern. Questions remain unanswered about whether and how the criteria would effectively prohibit investments in sectors that cause deforestation, and ensure that companies that are linked to harmful biodiversity impacts would not benefit from the scheme.

Van der Mark points out that there are many more industrial sectors that have “impacts on biodiversity, like the use of agrotoxics and intensive water use, that are for now not excluded. And here lies a tension, because if the exclusion criteria are too strict, they will exclude too many activities and the fund won’t be able to generate the returns it needs to make the payments to forest countries.”

Generating profits from speculative financial markets while relying on exclusion criteria to avoid investing in biodiversity-destroying activities reveals a fundamental contradiction at the fund’s core. What’s the point in creating a scheme that could lead to social and environmental harms if safeguards are not developed and strictly enforced?

The TFFF also claims that it will have strict criteria to ensure that payments to tropical forest countries will be reduced significantly if their deforestation rates increase. However, as van der Mark explains, there is a risk of leakage to other biomes if TFFF-related payments mean that commodity production just expands into areas not covered by the scheme.

Furthermore, “there is also the risk that intensification of production on already converted areas, through the use of more fertilisers and pesticides, will harm nature in other ways than through deforestation.” The TFFF’s criteria are not able to mitigate either of these risks.

The TFFF may become another tool to instrumentalise finance for destruction

Civil society organisations have long warned about the urgent need to halt destructive finance that is directed towards activities that harm forests and biodiversity. Ironically, by its design, the TFFF may become another tool to instrumentalise finance for destruction, displace forest loss into other biomes within eligible tropical forest countries, and detract from efforts to fundamentally change how international finance flows.

The current climate and biodiversity finance architecture—designed to support the goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—is subservient to the extractive economic model. The barriers to accessing funding by Global South countries, such as power asymmetries, debt injustices and challenges in resource mobilisation are not going to be overcome with debt-driven conservation schemes like the TFFF.

“As much as it’s important to mobilise finance for nature protection, as TFFF is trying to do, it is even far more important to regulate harmful finance. If destructive finance is not halted, it’s like mopping the floor with the tap still open,”

explains van der Mark.

“To really halt destructive finance, we must address the core problem: our economic system built on extractivism and a structural dependence on perpetual growth. This growth imperative drives ecological overshoot, social inequity, and financial practices that externalise harm while privatising gains. We need to shift to an economic system that operates within planetary boundaries, that restores ecosystems, and prioritises sufficiency over accumulation.”

Real Solutions: Addressing the Root Causes of Deforestation and Biodiversity Loss

Market-based approaches to climate change and biodiversity loss are constantly embroiled in scandals and facing serious questions over integrity.8 Concerns over human rights violations and poor performance records demand alternative approaches rooted in human rights, traditional knowledge, and gender justice.

An effective funding mechanism must aim to address the root causes of deforestation, climate change and biodiversity loss, as well as transform dominant economic and financial structures to prioritise nature and social equity over private interests. While common but differentiated responsibilities among countries are a crucial foundation to build strong finance architecture around, the TFFF design has major flaws and won’t be able to mobilise resources in a sustained, gender-responsive, equitable and predictable manner for tropical forest countries. Instead, the TFFF is a speculative financial mechanism that will feed off Global South debt and gamble on volatile financial markets amid geopolitical instability.

The much-lauded 20 percent direct access to funds for IPLCs is a trap designed to buy support from Indigenous groups: having a say over the leftovers is not the same as having full governance power over the fund. Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women and youth must have full access to decision-making in the entire governance structure of any fund that truly wants to be effective.

An effective fund must ensure continuous capacity-building, legal protection, and strong regulations to protect land rights, alongside a robust grievance mechanism. It must also actively support efforts to dismantle the financial incentives that drive deforestation, while strengthening legal systems to address the high levels of risk faced by environmental defenders when protecting their territories.9

An effective fund must ensure continuous capacity-building, legal protection, and strong regulations to protect land rights

Moreover, institutional arrangements and policy decisions that genuinely aim to enable transformative change must address underlying structural constraints, including:

Debt restructuring and cancellation10, and tax justice: priority must be given to relieving the fiscal pressures on Global South countries to expand commodity production and dependence on destructive activities. Public sources of funding must be increased to fund social and environmental priorities, rather than perpetuating the debt crisis. In this context, taxing the super-rich and extractive sectors is an urgent conversation to design an efficient fund capable of addressing the root causes of deforestation and biodiversity loss.

Recognition of ecological debt: Global North countries are historically responsible for the majority of biodiversity destruction and ecological degradation, but they continue to evade their responsibilities. Only two countries have contributed their share of USD 20 billion per year agreed under the Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF)11. An effective fund must ensure not only human rights-based and gender-responsive approaches, but also recognise the colonial legacies of nature depletion and its implications for societies, economies, traditional cultures, and ecosystems.

Increasing public finance for biodiversity and climate action while lessening the fiscal pressures that push Global South countries toward biodiversity-harming activities is essential to achieving meaningful and lasting outcomes.

In Conclusion: The Ecological Collapse Caused by Capitalism will not be Solved with More Capitalism

Genuine efforts to curb deforestation demand moving away from market-based approaches that perpetuate wealth accumulation and greenwashing, and instead support inclusive decision-making while confronting the structural drivers of forest loss. The TFFF cannot meaningfully challenge agribusiness, extractive industries, illegal logging, false solutions, and perverse incentives that sustain destructive activities.

Forest protection requires robust, rights-based public financing mechanisms.

At its core, the TFFF is a leveraged bet on risky emerging market debt12 that embodies contradictory approaches to forest conservation and diverts attention from the urgent need to halt the expansion of extractive sectors. It also obscures the role of state policies—often shaped by pressures from the international financial system—that render extractivism a perceived necessity for maintaining financial stability.

Forest protection requires robust, rights-based public financing mechanisms that place ecosystem integrity and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities at the center, rather than market-driven schemes that demand regulation, investment screening, and social and environmental safeguards.

Real solutions are already being built on the ground, and we must work towards ensuring that the right financial resources, as well as political, social and economic conditions, are in place to allow them to flourish. These alternatives need to be strengthened, policies must be coherent, and key conditions such as land rights must be guaranteed.

Recognising that forests and biodiversity cannot be treated as commodities or financial assets is essential. Fundamentally, the ecological collapse caused by capitalism will not be solved with more capitalism.

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Categories: G1. Progressive Green

Delegates at biodiversity COP17 should follow the lead of Global South women

Tue, 10/27/2026 - 06:07

By Valentina Figuera Martínez, GFC Gender Justice and Forests Campaign Coordinator

The original version of this article was published in Mongabay

As global leaders convene in Armenia this week for the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) conference of the parties (COP17), it is difficult to ignore how women’s oppression is deeply intertwined with the exploitation of ecosystems. After almost two decades of pledges, biodiversity action remains underfunded, forest loss continues to be a growing threat, socio-ecological transitions are a low priority, and ecosystems are spiraling toward collapse.

The impacts of resulting climate disasters and biodiversity destruction are not felt equally, yet gender justice issues also remain unresolved within these international talks.

In Yerevan, Armenia, countries will consider the first global review of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF), which was the first formal assessment to measure progress since its adoption in 2022. COP17 is also poised to advance efforts on biodiversity finance under the umbrella of common but differentiated responsibilities.

But progress cannot be measured only in targets, financial commitments and international mechanisms. We should also ask a more basic question: What can we learn from the people who are already protecting biodiversity in their territories?

Women leading agroecology and community conservation initiatives in Zambia. Image courtesy of Kapyanga Women Association & Zamsof.

While hundreds of policymakers spend long hours negotiating decisions to promote false solutions and powerful corporate actors lobby to continue profiting from biodiversity destruction and obstruct environmental regulations, women from the Global South continue working without big cameras or fancy social media presences to protect what is left of their territories. They are ensuring the continuation of life on Earth for you, me, and future generations.

The reality in the negotiation corridors will be very different from the violence, extortion, and environmental destruction in the mining areas surrounding El Callao, in Bolívar state, Venezuela, for example, which is one of the epicenters of the gold rush promoted after the U.S. military invasion of the country earlier this year. Being born and raised in Bolívar, it will be difficult for me to agree in Yerevan that governments are “taking action for nature.”

And after hearing over the last several months from friends and colleagues from the Global South about human rights violations and ecosystem destruction they confront, it is important to remind everyone of an incontrovertible fact: As long as governments fail to address the systemic drivers of biodiversity destruction — especially in the Global South — and continue using domestic policies to expand extractivist sectors while broadening status quo dependency, these failures will persist.

One of the most contentious topics is biodiversity finance. Biodiversity offsets and credits, debt-for-nature swaps, and nature-based solutions are just some of the flawed market-based instruments presented to mobilize finance toward Global South countries. Despite all the widely known controversies, poor performance and human rights abuses, they are increasingly dominating attention while urgent priorities — including allocation of direct resources for community-led conservation actions and giving communities full decision-making power in finance institutional structures — remain unaddressed.

Market-based schemes should be ruled out. They instrumentalize greenwashing and allow brokers, developers, intermediaries and large NGOs to extract funding that should be benefiting communities.

Indigenous women of the Ticuna community of San Francisco de Yahuma in Loreto, Peru, are breaking gender barriers and taking on leadership roles on conservation in their communities. Image courtesy of Joseph Zegarra/Rainforest Foundation US.

Women and youth making a difference

Over the last few months, I have been working with friends and colleagues from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia to understand what real solutions to the climate and biodiversity crises look like. We all have in common a deep reverence for life, respect for traditional wisdom, a great deal of technical forest knowledge, advocacy experience, and a strong commitment to defending territories. And, of course, a tireless stubbornness to fight for systemic changes to the current model of development.

Real solutions might look like an agroecological farming system rooted in traditional knowledge, or a community defending its territory from extractivist industries. They might be women organizing to protect forests, strengthen food sovereignty, or build more equitable forms of community autonomy. I’ve also seen women from Brazil, Colombia, Chile, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nepal plus researchers from Morocco and Zambia, a peasant from Uruguay, an Indigenous leader from Panama and legal activists from Bangladesh all showing resilience and concrete community-led conservation actions.

All of them remind us that the value of ancestral knowledge, community autonomy, and access to decision-making power cannot be replaced by money or “innovative schemes.” Their real community-led solutions cannot be separated from the political dimensions of life and stay only on the technical side, focusing on reformist approaches to delay urgent systemic changes. They cannot be “scaled up” like the top-down generic schemes presented in international talks.

Real women-led solutions are unique, as every complex ecosystem is, and demand putting power in the hands of environmental defenders. The ancestral ‘nainu’ agroforestry system in the Gunayala autonomous territory of Panama is a hopeful example capable of teaching us what biodiversity action actually looks like, as the Gunadule people create a shield of resistance with a concrete community-led solution centered on traditional knowledge and women’s leadership. The strong understanding of these Global South women about the interconnections between oppression and the exploitation of ecosystems is just as inspiring as the sophisticated strategies they have built to confront mining, agribusiness, colonial legal frameworks, and patriarchal policies.

Working with the women behind these initiatives has also shown me that documenting their solutions is only part of the task. The point is not to turn these communities into inspirational examples for an international audience, nor is it to extract their knowledge and package it into another global model. It is to recognize that these communities have their own knowledge, priorities and political agency, and that biodiversity policy needs to create the conditions for those solutions to flourish.

That means secure rights to land and territory. It also means direct, public and accessible finance. And, it means protecting communities from destructive extractive projects, recognizing traditional knowledge and women’s leadership, and giving communities meaningful power over the decisions and financial structures that affect them.

Working with this group of women and men on a Gender-Just Real Solutions Map for Territories and Communities is a learning path to find answers to a complex crisis. One thing is clear: We must support localized actions which are genuinely community-led solutions that uphold rights, autonomy, socio-ecological transitions and create conditions to fight social inequalities.

The question for COP17 is not whether these solutions exist. They do.

The question is whether governments are prepared to recognize them, resource them, and most importantly, listen to the people who are already putting them into practice.

Valentina Figuera Martínez is a feminist researcher and campaign coordinator at the Global Forest Coalition, where she works with communities and civil society organizations to advance gender justice, biodiversity protection and the rights of women and Indigenous and local communities.

Categories: G1. Progressive Green

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