I. Climate Science

24 September | New York

A strategy discussion at New York Climate Week 2026, bringing together frontline actors fighting data centers in communities and the policy advocates fighting for guardrails to prevent their economic, social, and climate harms. In this time of relentless attacks on people and planet, our strength is our aligned action. Just as the carbon bubble analysis equipped a generation of climate activists, bringing together community, economic, and political AI expertise can strengthen the fight on the ground.

If interested in attending, please contact events@carbontracker.org

SPEAKERS & TOPICS

• The AI bubble could burst — and take the economy with it
  • Matthew Scherer, Open Markets Institute
• Federal principles for data centers and AI governance
  • Clara Vondrich and J.B. Branch, Public Citizen
• The Investor Dilemma
  • Danielle Fugere, As You Sow
• How communities are stopping data centers
  • Abre’ Conner, NAACP
• Private equity financing of data centers
  • Ashlee Thomas, Private Equity Stakeholder Project
• Big Tech: now Big Oil’s #1 Accomplice
  • Holly Alpine, Embedded Emissions
• Data Centers and Democracy
  • Saul Levin, Hum podcast

The post NYCW 2026: AI Data Center Roundtable appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

24 September | New York

A breakfast strategy session at New York Climate Week 2026, aligning Amazon, Congo Basin and Coral Triangle strategies ahead of COP31. The aim: moving Fossil Free Zones from community-led demands into formalised, low-cost policy tools that governments can integrate into national energy transition and deforestation roadmaps.

PROGRAMME & SPEAKERS

If interested in attending, please contact events@carbontracker.org

The post NYCW 2026: Fossil Free Zones Breakfast appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

24 September | New York

What can we celebrate? What can we challenge?

A Laudato Si’ and Carbon Tracker panel at Climate Week NYC 2026. With overshoot of 1.5°C now called unavoidable and a stable climate recognised as a legal obligation, we ask what the Season of Creation gives us to celebrate, what it demands we challenge, and whether honest realism or optimism better serves the fight ahead.

If interested in attending, please contact events@carbontracker.org

THEMES FOR DISCUSSION

1. Limiting overshoot
   • UNEP’s September 2026 report: at least 1.8°C even in the most optimistic future. “There are no good
     outcomes above 1.5°C.”
2. A stable climate as a human right
   • The ICJ advisory opinion of July 2025, endorsed by the UN General Assembly 141–8 in May 2026,
     with the COP31 host among the abstentions.
3. A decade of COPs without “fossil fuels”
   • From Paris to COP30, outcomes that consistently omitted the phrase, and the Santa Marta coalition of
     the willing formed in response.
4. The growing cost of delay
   • Over 35,000 excess deaths across Europe in the summer 2026 heatwaves; seven of nine planetary
     boundaries already exceeded.
5. Optimism or realism?
   • “What if we stop pretending?” against communities that rise to the occasion, and Laudato Si’s reminder
     that the cry of the Earth is the cry of the poor.

SPEAKERS

 

The post NYCW 2026: Season of Creation appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

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All the ambulance services in England experienced some of their busiest-ever days during this summer’s record-breaking June heatwave, according to data obtained by Carbon Brief.

In June, temperatures climbed past 37C in parts of the country as authorities declared only the second ever “red” extreme heat warning.

Four out of 10 NHS ambulance services, including London’s, responded to unprecedented numbers of life-threatening emergencies on at least one day from 23-27 June.

Another two services – in the south-west and east of the country – received their highest volume of 999 calls on record.

Ambulance services provided data on their busiest days since records began, in response to freedom-of-information (FOI) requests from Carbon Brief.

The results show how demand during the June heatwave exceeded levels seen during the traditionally busy winter season in other years – and even the height of the Covid-19 pandemic – for many services.

Heat demand

Extreme heat ramps up the risk of numerous life-threatening conditions, including heart disease and respiratory problems. 

England experienced record-breaking temperatures at the end of June, with the whole country covered by amber or red “heat health alerts” from the government.

A red alert, which was issued for the entire Midlands and south of England, indicates “significant risk to life for even the healthy population”. This was only the second time such an alert has been triggered.

Researchers calculated that there were nearly 3,000 heat-related deaths in the UK this summer. There has also been unprecedented demand for A&E departments and some ambulance services.

To investigate the strain facing ambulances, Carbon Brief sent FOI requests to the 10 NHS ambulance trusts in England, asking for lists of their busiest days. 

This covered both the total volume of 999 calls and “category 1” responses – referring to incidents involving “life-threatening injuries and illnesses”, such as heart attacks.

The chart below shows the busiest days on record for England’s ambulances, including both total calls and category 1 responses. Most services were able to provide records back to the 2010s. (See: Methodology.)

The five-day period from 23-27 June is overrepresented in these results, with at least two heatwave days ranking in the top 20 for every service in the country.

The top 20 rankings for services across England cover different periods of time. See Methodology for more details.

This trend is especially pronounced in the south and east of England, where June temperatures exceeded 36C and even approached 38C in some regions.

London, South East Coast, South Central and North East ambulance services all reported daily records for responding to life-threatening emergencies during the heatwave.

For the South East Coast and South Central services – which cover a region stretching from Oxfordshire to Kent – 25, 26 and 27 June all saw unprecedented numbers of category 1 callouts. 

South Western and East of England services both saw record numbers of 999 calls on 26 June, the same day the highest-ever June UK temperature was reported in Norfolk.

It is worth noting that demand for ambulance services – including category 1 calls – has been growing for many years, driven by factors such as an ageing population, more complex health conditions and growing mental-health pressures.

This helps to explain why dates from before the 2020s are rare in the top rankings provided to Carbon Brief.

Beyond the heatwave, 2026 as a whole is on track to be a record year for ambulance demand.

‘Stifling heat’

On 26 June, the busiest day of the heatwave, ambulances across England responded to 4,084 life-threatening emergencies.

The average daily volume of such incidents is normally around 2,500 during the summer months.

Stu Holliday, head of emergency preparedness, resilience and response at North East Ambulance Service, tells Carbon Brief: 

“During periods of hot weather, we typically see an increase in calls from people affected by dehydration, heat exhaustion and heatstroke, as well as those whose existing health conditions, particularly heart and respiratory illnesses, can be made worse by prolonged high temperatures.

“Older people, young children and pregnant people can be especially vulnerable.”

Ambulance teams are generally busier in the winter because cold weather and seasonal illnesses drive up the number of severe medical emergencies.

However, the data from June shows that extremely hot days are starting to match or even edge out cold ones as the busiest days. This is a trend seen across the healthcare system.

While not every service provided records back to 2019, the data broadly shows that ambulances were busier during the heatwave than at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.

As well as patients, heatwaves put pressure on ambulance workers. The UNISON union has warned of crews facing “stifling heat with faulty or no air conditioning” and “back-to-back callouts” due to increased demand.

Methodology

Carbon Brief requested data on the top 50 busiest days for England’s 10 main ambulance services.

These are: London; South East Coast; South Central; South Western; West Midlands; East Midlands; East of England; North East; Yorkshire; and North West.

Data was requested for as far back as service records go. Most were able to provide records going back to some point in the 2010s, with the exception of North East and South Central, which only had records from 2021 and 2022 onwards, respectively. 

Rising annual demand for ambulance services means that most of the busiest days for ambulances have been in the 2020s. For example, all but four of the busiest days for category 1 emergencies reported to Carbon Brief were in the 2020s. 

Carbon Brief requested data on ambulance demand for all the UK nations. In Scotland and Northern Ireland – where temperatures are cooler – services did not see call volumes reach the top 50 rankings during the June heatwave. The Welsh Ambulance Service did not respond to Carbon Brief’s request.

related Revealed: More than 1,000 NHS operations cancelled due to record UK heatwaves 11.09.2026 Health and society Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa 29.07.2026 Health and society Q&A: How heat-related deaths are counted by scientists and public health authorities 17.07.2026 Extreme weather Guest post: France’s June heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths 07.07.2026 Health and society

The post Revealed: England’s June 2026 heatwave sparked record demand for ambulances appeared first on Carbon Brief.

 by David Spratt 

There can be no excuse for not knowing that 1.5°C of warming would create a disastrous outcome, but few have chosen to say so. Indeed, up to the 2025 COP in Belém, the large Australian advocacy and umbrella organizations were actively advocating for 1.5°C, for example that “the 1.5°C threshold represents an ethical and moral boundary”. 

What is the morality in saying 1.5°C is an appropriate threshold when the World Health Organization concludes that more than 200,000 lives have been lost to the "silent killer" of extreme heat in Europe since 2022?

Right now, there is very strong evidence for the coming collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), which transports tropical ocean heat to the north-east of North America and western Europe. AMOC is slowing down and now rapidly approaching a tipping point for its collapse over a hundred years.  This would be a going-out-of-business scenario for north-west European agriculture, monsoons that typically deliver rain to West Africa and South Asia would become unreliable, and huge swaths of Europe and Russia would be devastated by drought. As much as half of the world’s viable area for growing corn and wheat could dry out. 

And evidence has been accumulating over the last decade that tipping points have been passed for several large Earth systems. These include Arctic sea ice,  the Greenland Ice Sheet, the Amundsen Sea glaciers in West Antarctica, the eastern Amazonian rainforest, and the world’s coral systems. The Earth climate system is undergoing abrupt change.

System-level change is happening faster than forecast only two decades ago, and changes are cascading. “If damaging tipping cascades can occur and a global tipping point cannot be ruled out, then this is an existential threat to civilization,” leading scientists warned in 2017.

A 2025 assessment of non-linear change in climate systems —  the North Atlantic subpolar gyre, Tibetan Plateau, land permafrost, Amazon rainforest, Antarctic sea ice, monsoon systems, Arctic summer sea ice, Arctic winter sea ice, and Barents sea ice — found abrupt shifts in all of these across multiple models, except for monsoons. At global warming of 1.5°C, six out of 10 studied climate subsystems already showed large-scale abrupt shifts across multiple models.

Setting goals

There are too few words and too little focus from climate advocates, from governments and from policy-makers on these issues. Is 1.5°C a desirable end-goal, or a political trade-off? What are their goals and what are they aiming to protect? For more than a decade advocates talked a lot about 1.5°C, but now they seem to be dropping the topic from their agendas. So what’s the new goal? Two degrees?

For a quarter of a century, policymakers have speculated about the maximum climate damage that civilisation and the Earth system can tolerate and adapt to. How close to the edge of the climate cliff can we stand, without falling to our death? 

Clearly, the goal pursued in mainstream climate advocacy is not the provision of “maximum protection” to the most climate vulnerable, or “concern to protect the welfare of all people, all species, and all generations”, but rather some poorly-informed notion of maximum acceptable damage.

To protect small-island states, the Great Barrier Reef, Antarctica, the Amazon — indeed to provide protection for the many places and people we care about — requires returning to a climate similar to the relatively stable Holocene conditions of the last 9000 years and fixed human settlement, during which time CO2 levels did not exceed 280 ppm CO2. it also requires preventing a cascade of tipping points in the meanwhile.

If this were the goal, activists and policymakers would be advocating a “three levers” approach to reversing global warming: a strategy to rapidly “reduce, remove and repair”. That means reducing emissions to zero at emergency speed; removing carbon by drawdown to return atmospheric conditions to the Holocene zone; and the urgent research on active cooling to identify safe interventions that protect and repair vital systems and, in the shorter term, aim to prevent warming reaching a level that triggers a cascade of calamitous tipping points that are irreversible on human timescales. 

Note:  This is an extract from Searching for climate action’s missing goal, available at: https://safeclimate.org.au/paper/searching-for-climate-actions-missing-goal

 

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 6, 2026 thru Sat, September 12, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (10 articles)

• Satellite images of penguin droppings reveal impact of antarctic warming Penguin colonies are so large that their masses of excrement can be seen from space, offering scientists a useful means of studying the Antarctic birds. An analysis of 30 years of satellite images of penguin guano shows how the birds’ diets are shifting in response to warming. Yale Environment 360, Staff, Sep 06, 2026.
• Learning from the summers of 1976 and 2026 We have changed the climate in which our weather happens Climat Lab Book, Ed Hawkins, Sep 7, 2026.
• How climate change may amplify the impact of earthquakes in the Arctic Phys.org, Helmholtz Association of German Research Centres, Sep 07, 2026.
• America is losing its war against wildfire The opportunities to let wildfire do its job are being increasingly extinguished by hotter, drier conditions that last longer throughout the year. Grist, Mark Betancourt, Sep 08, 2026.
• Many People Aren`t Connecting the Dots Between Climate Change and Extreme Weather Scientific evidence has never been stronger. Why aren’t more people making the link? Inside Climate News, Kiley Price, Sep 08, 2026.
• Can an entire Arctic ecosystem evolve to adapt to the climate crisis? In the first project of its kind, scientists are trying to answer if the future of Alaska’s streams and tundra may depend not on survival of the fittest but on how species adapt together The Guardian, Gloria Dickie, Sep 09, 2026.
• We just had the hottest August, hottest summer, and hottest year to date in U.S. history NOAA data show unprecedented heat, as deepening drought, shrinking reservoirs, and a severe wildfire season underscore the growing impacts of a warming climate. Could El Niño bring some relief? Yale Climate Connections, Bob Henson, Sep 09, 2026.
• Major study to assess impacts of climate change on Scotland`s canals Scottish Canals is working with two globally renowned climate and heritage experts to assess the growing challenges posed by climate change to Scotland’s network of canals. The Herald News, Craig Williams, Sep 10, 2026.
• Climate `feedback loops` could worsen global warming by 30%, study finds Emissions of planet-heating methane and CO2 from natural sources are worsening the climate crisis, paper says The Guardian, Oliver Milman, Sep 10, 2026.
• Earth just had its hottest August on record The intensifying super El Niño, combined with global warming, is favored to make 2026 the hottest year on record, with 2027 expected to be even hotter. Yale Climate Connections, Jeff Masters and Bob Henson, Sep 10, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (4 articles)

• The Worst Case Is Still on the Table Why removing RCP8.5 from the National Climate Assessment would be a serious mistake The Climate Brink, Andrew Dessler, Sep 04, 2026.
• Climate experts respond to the government’s plan to amend the Fifth National Climate Assessment Climate.Us, Rebecca Lindsey, Sep 8, 2026.
• As science comes under attack at UN talks, climate movement splits over how to respond A rift over how IPCC messages are produced and turned into policy is creating tensions in the world’s most influential coalition of climate NGOs Climate Home News, Matteo Civillini, Sep 09, 2026.
• With multilateralism in crisis, what`s next for climate philanthropy? Climate philanthropy must do more than fill the gaps left by retreating governments and find new ways to support climate action in a fragmented global landscape. Climate Home News, Megan Rowling, Sep 11, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (3 articles)

• This is the work of our lifetime: Ayana Elizabeth Johnson urges action after new UN climate report A United Nations report has found that the world will warm to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Climate solutions advocate Ayana Elizabeth Johnson urges a quicker implementation of known strategies - and determination rather than despair. NPR, Joel Rose, Sep 05, 2026.
• Rewetting peatlands may curb warming-driven CO? emissions Press release from the University of Münster about a new paper published in Nature Communications. Phys.org, Kathrin Kottke, Sep 10, 2026.
• How California is kicking its natural gas habit Solar and batteries matter, but they’re not the only reasons for the steep decline in gas-fired electricity. Inside Climate News, Dan Gearino, Sep 11, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (3 articles)

• Reform continues to cast doubt on climate science. Do its supporters agree? Climate scepticism is common at the Reform party conference, but many also criticise Labour for failing to protect Britons from hot weather The Guardian, Fiona Harvey, Sep 05, 2026.
• Fixing one of climate`s worst plots This is the third and last in our series discussing the use of unadjusted data and how it overstates the warmth of the 1930s over the U.S. Skeptical Science, Andrew Dessler, Sep 07, 2026.
• Factcheck: Reform UK`s 45 false or misleading claims about climate and energy Carbon Brief gathers together by topic and factchecks 45 false or misleading claims made by the ReformUK's leadership relating to climate change, renewables and net-zero. Carbon Brief, Carbon Brief Staff, Sep 11, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (2 article)

• Can Studying Heat Waves in Real Time Save Lives? Heat drove medical emergencies across the country last summer. Tracking those changes more quickly could help doctors prepare. Inside Climate News, Keerti Gopal, Sep 04, 2026.
• The Guardian view on extreme heat: its scale should be a wake-up call to us all | Editorial With thousands dead across Europe this summer, it’s time to recognise heatwaves as the major natural disasters they are The Guardian, Editorial, Sep 06, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (2 articles)

• Climate Trunk - Political Economy Summary post of John Lang's Climate Trunk visuals in the "Political Economy" ring Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler, Sep 09, 2026.
• Beyond the heatwave: what it really takes for climate warnings to cut through in the UK As trust in institutions wavers, experts say local, collective action is more effective in driving change The Guardian, Natalie Wint, Sep 12, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 article)

• Does hosting wind turbines provide farmers with additional income? Yes - Wind projects provide farmers with substantial economic benefits while allowing most land to remain in agricultural use. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, Sep 8, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

• Global warming is ruining their way of life. These Colorado ranchers demand accountability A group of Colorado ranchers who are struggling with severe drought and heat have filed a friend-of-the-court brief in a climate case that soon will be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. The ranchers say that big oil companies should be held accountable for their role in causing climate change. LA Times, Ian James, Sep 05, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (1 article)

• The Arctic Report Card Matters More Than Ever; AGU Joins Partners to Publish in 2026 The critical and highly anticipated yearly assessment will be carried forward through a partnership with CIRES/CU Boulder and the University of Alaska Fairbanks. Eos, Chris Avery and Kristen Averyt Hinton, Sep 09, 2026.

Miscellaneous (1 article)

• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #36 2026 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, August 30, 2026 thru Sat, September 5, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Sep 6, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

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Wildfires currently burning large swathes of land in Indonesia are on track to produce emissions on a par with the country’s most-intense fire season this century, according to experts. 

Data from the Global Fire Emissions Database reveals that, as of 7 September, fires in Indonesia produced 76m tonnes of carbon (MtC) in 2026.

This puts 2026 on the same trajectory as 2015, when fires burned 2.6m hectares of land across the country and generated a total of 333MtC. 

Dr Guido van der Werf, a researcher at Wageningen University in the Netherlands, tells Carbon Brief that the fires in Indonesia are “more or less on track” to reach levels seen 11 years ago.

Parts of the country – including the eastern province of Papua – are “burning more than they’ve ever burned”, he says.

Indonesia is no stranger to emissions-intensive fires. Research has estimated that the record 1997 fire season generated carbon emissions equivalent to 13-40% of all global fossil-fuel emissions that year. 

Meanwhile, a separate study that looked at carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the 2015 fires in south-east Asia – which primarily burned Indonesia – found they were greater than the total of the EU’s fossil-fuel emissions that year. The “severe haze” from the fires has been linked to more than 100,000 premature deaths across the region.

El Niño influence

As in 2015 and in 1997, this year’s Indonesian fires come during an El Niño year.

The naturally-occurring climate phenomenon, linked to ocean temperatures in the Pacific, periodically drives up temperatures and dries out land in Indonesia – creating the conditions for fires so immense that they imprint on global emissions. 

Scientists are projecting that this year’s El Niño – which started in June and is expected to last into 2027 – will be one of the most intense on record.

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Dr Mark Parrington, a senior scientist from the Copernicus Climate Change Service explains: 

“From August until the end of October [to] November is the dry season in Indonesia. We do normally see fire around this time of year, but nowhere near the scale that we’ve seen this year, or indeed any of the previous El Niño years”.

Dr Nisa Novita, strategic lead for peatland at Indonesian environmental NGO Yayasan Konservasi Alam Nusantara, tells Carbon Brief that El Niño “does not directly cause most fires”, but acts as a “major amplifier by creating hotter and drier conditions, making fires easier to ignite, spread faster and much harder to control”. 

Studies have shown that fires in Indonesia often occur where there has been significant land clearance and peatland drainage for agriculture and palm oil plantations. These practices create a dry landscape that is highly flammable during times of drought.

Pink bars show years in which an El Niño event was called by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. GFED fire emissions data for 1980-96 is from Field et al. (2009) and Van Marle et al. (2017); data for 1997-2022 is from Van der Werf et al. (2025); and data for 2022 onwards is from Chen et al. (2026).

Van der Werf says the scale of this year’s fires – and whether they will end up being more intense than 2015 – will depend on the length of this year’s El Niño event, as well as the effectiveness of recent peatland conservation efforts.

Novita explains that Indonesia’s fires are heavily emissions-intensive due to its large tropical peatland ecosystem: 

“When peatlands are degraded and drained due to canal development for agriculture, the water table drops, making the peat dry and highly flammable especially during dry seasons or El Niño events, like now.

“Unlike fires in dry ecosystems, peat fires can smolder underground, so the soil itself becomes readily available fuel.”

Extensive peatland restoration efforts in Indonesia in recent years have been credited with reducing the number of fires during the 2019 El Niño.

After the catastrophic fires in 1997-98, the Indonesian government introduced a range of measures designed to strengthen peatland protection and restoration through dedicated institutions and regulations. This included the introduction of a moratorium on licenses to convert forests and peatlands into plantations and logging areas. 

In the aftermath of the 2015 fires, it established an official peatland restoration agency, which was given an additional mandate for mangrove restoration in 2021. This agency was dissolved last year. Novita says:

“We have learned and improved…But the question is: is it enough? Or are we still underestimating the risk that degraded peatlands pose, especially when we face another El Niño?”

Van der Werf says it remains unclear from the 2026 fire data how great an impact recent efforts to restore peatland in Indonesia have had on reducing the impact and spread of the fires: 

“I had hoped that this year Indonesia would be relatively quiet, even though we have a big El Niño…You could argue if those regulations worked, then this wouldn’t be a big fire [season], even though it [has been] very dry. 

“This is maybe the case in Sumatra [which has seen a quiet fire season], but definitely not in other regions. Papua [a region of Indonesia] and [neighbouring country of] Papua New Guinea – those are the new frontiers. They are basically going through the same thing that Sumatra went through 20 years ago.”

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The post El Niño: Indonesia fire emissions in 2026 ‘on track’ to match record for this century appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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• Climate science
• Net-zero target
• Energy costs
• Oil and gas
• Impacts and adaptation
• Clean energy

Reform UK, led by Nigel Farage, has emerged as a major force in UK politics in recent years – pushing anti-net-zero policies, alongside vehement opposition to immigration.

The hard-right populist party is currently mired in a funding controversy and only has a handful of MPs, yet, until recently, it had been leading in national polls for more than a year.

As seen with many similar parties across Europe and beyond, a rejection of climate science is central to Reform’s ideological outlook.

Richard Tice, the party’s deputy leader, is a vocal critic of what he calls “net stupid zero” and has incorrectly blamed “the sun or volcanoes” for human-caused global warming.

As Reform’s energy spokesperson, Tice has also been clear that, if the party were ever to form a national government, it would scrap the UK’s net-zero target, support fossil-fuel expansion and tear up existing contracts for renewable energy.

While less vocal on the subject, Farage has, nevertheless, expressed climate-sceptic views and falsely blamed net-zero policies for the “deindustrialisation of Britain”.

These views draw on long-standing, inaccurate climate-sceptic narratives and are reflected in Reform’s election manifestos, its actions in local government and the opinions of many of its supporters.

Here, Carbon Brief gathers together by topic and factchecks 45 false or misleading claims made by the party’s leadership relating to climate change, renewables and net-zero.

• Climate science
• Net-zero target
• Energy costs
• Oil and gas
• Impacts and adaptation
• Clean energy

Climate science

FALSE

Tice: “There’s no evidence that man-made CO2 is going to change climate change…The Norwegian government’s own equivalent of our ONS [Office of National Statistics] has recently produced a report along the lines of what I’m saying.”

Sky News, February 2025

The world’s authority on climate science, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), says it is “unequivocal” that humans have warmed the planet, primarily through releasing greenhouse gases.

The IPCC says that, due to human activities, concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) “have increased at rates that have no precedent on centennial timescales in at least the past 800,000 years”.

It adds that concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere are now higher than they have been for at least the past two million years.

The report that Tice is referring to is by two independent authors, with Statistics Norway clarifying in 2024 that their views are “not the official stance” of the statistics bureau. (It has also not been formally peer reviewed.)

A factcheck of the Norwegian report by a climate scientist for RealClimate describes it as “misguided” and a “distraction due to errors”.

Another factcheck published by the Norwegian University of Science and Technology found it “contains standard talking-points of climate denial”.

MISLEADING

Tice: “Look, the climate’s always changed for millions of years. And it goes through cycles, long, medium and short.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Global temperatures are currently around 1.4C hotter than when the industrial era first began in 1850-1900, as shown in the figure below.

The IPCC says that this amount of warming is likely to have made Earth hotter than at any time in about 125,000 years.

Data from NASA GISTEMP, NOAA GlobalTemp, Hadley/UEA HadCRUT5, Berkeley Earth, Copernicus ERA5, JRA-3Q, DCENT, and China-MST. Temperature records are aligned over the 1981-2010 period and use the WMO approach to calculate warming relative to pre-industrial levels (1850-1900).

Scientists overwhelmingly agree that approximately 100% of this warming has been caused by humans. 

There are also natural influences that can affect Earth’s climate on shorter timescales, such as El Niño events, volcanic eruptions and small variations in the output of the sun. However, scientists have found that these have only a limited effect on the underlying trend of long-term global warming.

When looking at longer timescales of millions of years or more, Earth has experienced multiple ice ages interspersed with warmer periods.

These changes in climate were triggered by variations in Earth’s orbit around the sun, in combination with subtle fluctuations in the tilt and rotation of the planet, over tens of thousands of years. However, the resulting changes to CO2 levels in the atmosphere also played a role.

This should serve as a “cautionary example”, according to Dr Zeke Hausfather, a climate scientist and Carbon Brief contributor, “because human emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases push the Earth further out of the range of climate conditions that have characterised the past few million years”.

FALSE

Tice: “The idea that you can stop the power of the sun or volcanoes is simply ludicrous.”

BBC Breakfast, June 2024

Scientists overwhelmingly agree that humans have caused 100% of recent climate change.

Tice’s suggestion that the sun or volcanic eruptions are behind current warming is false.

As the video below explains, the sun and volcanic eruptions have little bearing on the long-term trend of global temperature rise since the Industrial Revolution.

MISLEADING

Farage: “All I do know is that man produces about 3% of the CO2 produced in the world every year and that it is nuts to call CO2 a poison.”

BBC Radio 5 Live, June 2024

The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere is now higher than it has been for at least two million years, having spiked dramatically since the Industrial Revolution.

This surge in CO2 levels is entirely due to human activity, particularly the burning of fossil fuels. While Farage is correct that, on an annual basis, humans only account for a few percent of all the CO2 that is released into the atmosphere, this is irrelevant.

The world’s land and ocean naturally release hundreds of billions of tonnes of CO2 each year. However, the land and ocean also absorb hundreds of billions of tonnes of CO2 each year, meaning that – before the start of the fossil-fuel era – these flows were broadly in balance.

The recycling of CO2 through Earth’s natural systems is known as the “global carbon cycle”.

Since the start of the Industrial Revolution, humans have disrupted Earth’s natural balance by releasing vast amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere.

The IPCC says that, because of humans, concentrations of CO2 “have increased at rates that have no precedent…in at least the past 800,000 years”.

It adds that concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere are now higher than they have been for at least the past two million years.

FALSE

Tice: “Many thousands of scientists fundamentally disagree about the need to [reach net-zero], or the pace to [achieve net-zero]…But they have been smeared and labelled. They can’t get any research grant funding.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Contrary to Tice’s claim, there are not “thousands” of scientists that disagree on the need for net-zero.

Tice is likely referring to a “world climate declaration” that was circulated on social media by climate sceptics in 2022, supposedly signed by “1,200 climate experts”. A closer look at the list of signatories revealed that less than 1% described themselves as climate scientists – and six of the people on the list were dead.

Reaching net-zero emissions globally is the “only way” to stop climate change, according to the IPCC. The IPCC’s most recent set of reports involved 721 scientists in 90 countries.

All modelled pathways for limiting global warming to 1.5C by 2100, the ambition of the Paris Agreement, involve reaching net-zero emissions around the middle of the century.

This is reflected in the text of the Paris Agreement, which aims to “achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century”.

FALSE 

Tice: “The proof of my argument is one of the IPCC reports a few years ago that said even if you get to net-zero effectively tomorrow, it’ll make no difference to one of the key things people are most worried about, which is sea level rise, for somewhere between 200 years on the one hand and 1,000 years on the other hand.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Although it is true that sea level rise is set to worsen, even if countries reach net-zero, it is certainly not the case that making efforts to cut emissions will make “no difference”.

Tice is likely referring to the IPCC’s special report on 1.5C released in 2018.

It said with “high confidence” that human-caused global warming to date will “persist for centuries to millennia and will continue to cause further long-term changes in the climate system, such as sea level rise”.

A more recent study, published in Nature Climate Change in 2025, found that following current climate policies would cause an extra 79cm of sea level rise by the year 2300.

However, reducing emissions in line with 1.5C would cut this additional sea level rise to 15cm. 

Moreover, the best-available evidence shows that warming will more or less stop when the world reaches net-zero emissions. Even if some sea level rise continues, net-zero would still prevent a long list of other increasingly severe climate impacts from taking place.

FALSE

Tice: “The IPCC has just resiled from one of its core assumptions, which was the [RCP]8.5 scenario…One of the foundations of the IPCC’s very ethos in the last 20-30 years, they’ve just abandoned.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The “foundations” of the evidence on climate change, as well as the risk of “catastrophic” warming without stronger action, are unchanged by the recent shift on “RCP8.5”.

“RCP8.5” is one of a range of emissions scenarios that climate scientists have used  when making projections about future climate change. It is a scenario of very high global emissions, imagining a future with large increases in coal use and no climate policies.

In May 2026, a new set of emissions scenarios were published, no longer including a scenario with emissions as high as those in RCP8.5 (or its successor, SSP5-8.5). 

This moment was seized upon by a range of climate-sceptic and rightwing figures – including US president Donald Trump – who falsely claimed it as evidence that the IPCC had to “admit” that it was “wrong” about future climate change.

This is incorrect because it both misrepresents the meaning of the shift on RCP8.5 and because the set of emissions scenarios in question were not developed by the IPCC in the first place. Instead, they were put together by a group of climate modelling experts. (See Carbon Brief’s factcheck for more information.)

While the new scenarios no longer include such high emissions as in RCP8.5 – partly as a result of limited climate policy success – they also show it is now “not possible” to limit global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels without significant “overshoot”.

Moreover, projections suggest that the world is still on course for between 2.5C and 3C of warming. This level of warming was previously described as “catastrophic” by the UN.

MISLEADING

Tice: “Cleaner air equals higher temperatures, not CO2.”

Twitter/X, July 2026

According to the IPCC, 100% of warming since the Industrial Revolution is due to human-caused greenhouse gas emissions, particularly CO2.

Tice cites a Daily Telegraph article with the incorrect headline: “Heatwaves caused by fall in pollution.” He erroneously claims this as evidence that “we have been gaslit and lied to” about the causes of climate change.

In fact, as a Carbon Brief factcheck of that article notes, scientists say that the framing of heatwaves being “caused” by declining air pollution is simply “wrong”.

The claim is based on a paper in Geophysical Research Letters, which looks at how air pollution affects circulation patterns in the atmosphere and influences summer temperatures in Europe. 

Scientists have long known that human-caused emissions of aerosols “mask” global warming, partly because they reflect or absorb sunlight. Curbing air pollution, therefore, removes some of this cooling effect.

Nevertheless, the lead author of the study in question is clear that greenhouse gas emissions remain the “most important factor” driving Europe’s extreme heat events, due to their role in global warming. 

A recent attribution study by the World Weather Attribution service concluded that the June heatwave in Europe would have been “virtually impossible” without climate change.

Net-zero target

FALSE

Tice: “Net-zero will make zero difference to climate change.”

BBC Breakfast, June 2024

In fact, reaching net-zero emissions globally is the “only way” to stop climate change, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 

At that point, when carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions have been cut substantially and any remaining emissions are balanced out by CO2-removal technology or tree-planting, then warming is expected to essentially stop.

FALSE

Tice: “It’s incredibly stupid for the UK to almost unilaterally say, we’re going to lead the way in the world.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

It is completely false to argue that the UK is acting “unilaterally” to tackle climate change.

The UK has indeed been a leader in climate legislation. When the then-Conservative government set the UK a legally binding “net-zero by 2050” target in 2019, it was the first major economy to do so. 

However, 140 of the world’s 198 countries now have net-zero targets, covering 74% of the world’s emissions. Some have set more ambitious goals, such as Germany’s target of reaching net-zero by 2045, while others are even aiming for “net-negative” emissions.

The UK is, therefore, not pursuing net-zero “unilaterally”. Indeed, if the UK abandoned its net-zero target, it would join the US and Iran as the only major emitters without one.

MISLEADING

Tice: “We’re responsible for 0.7, 0.8% of CO2 emissions.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The UK’s annual emissions, including emissions from fossil fuels and land-use changes, were roughly 0.7% of the global total in 2024, the most recent year for which data is available. When only considering fossil-fuel combustion, the figure is 0.8%.

Yet, while the numbers Tice quotes are accurate, it is misleading to use them as a justification for abandoning climate policies.

Only six nations each produce more than 2% of the world’s annual emissions. In 1990, the UK was one of those rare countries, but it has roughly halved its share since then, largely due to renewable-energy expansion. Even today, it remains the world’s 22nd largest emitter.

As the chart below shows, more than a third of all greenhouse gases come from the roughly 180 nations that produce 1% or less of the world’s emissions. If none of them acted, the world would never stop climate change.

Finally, some analysts point out the UK’s “moral responsibility” to act on climate change, given its large historical contribution to current levels of global warming. 

The UK, through its historical CO2 emissions, is responsible for around 3% of current warming. When emissions in other countries under the UK’s colonial rule are counted as well, its share grows to more than 5% of the global total.

FALSE

Tice: “[Net-zero is] killing our economy.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Efforts to cut the UK’s emissions are not “killing the economy”. In fact, there is plenty of evidence that they are boosting the economy.

UK emissions in 2025 were 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for the nation’s climate goals. The UK economy has nearly doubled in size over the same period, as the chart below shows. 

GDP has also continued to grow since the net-zero target was introduced in 2019.

A 2026 report from the CBI Economics – the consultancy arm of the Confederation for British Industry (CBI) – concluded:

“Net-zero is already one of the UK’s most productive and geographically distributed industrial sectors, generating high-value employment, driving supply chain activity, and anchoring the UK within one of the defining economic transformations of our era.”

The report concludes that the net-zero economy generated around £105bn in gross value added in 2025. It also supported 1.1m jobs across the country, with considerably higher wages than the UK average.

FALSE

Tice: “The cost of net-zero, which the Climate Change Committee admits is in the trillions of pounds, we don’t know how many trillions, who’s paying that? The British people.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The Climate Change Committee (CCC) estimates that it would cost the UK a total of £108bn to reach net-zero by 2050, equivalent to 0.2% of GDP, while the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) says this would be far cheaper than failing to act.

The idea that net-zero will cost the UK trillions of pounds is false. Such claims invariably rely on analysis that exaggerates the capital cost of net-zero, while excluding both the benefits of cutting emissions and the costs of a system without net-zero policies.

One prominent recent example, promoted by Reform UK, relied on the assumption that gas boilers and petrol cars, for example, would cost nothing to buy and would have free fuel.

The idea that the CCC has “admitted” that net-zero will cost “trillions” may stem from a misinterpretation of CCC analysis from 2019, which estimated a net cost of £321bn.

Alternatively, Tice may be conflating this with another misinterpretation in the 2024 Reform UK manifesto, which falsely claimed that the cost of net-zero would be “£2tn or more”, according to the National Energy System Operator (Neso).

In fact, Neso had estimated that the cost of a net-zero energy system would be “broadly the same” as a high-carbon alternative.

Since then, the CCC has calculated that the net cost of investments needed to reach economy-wide net-zero will be around £108bn out to 2050, or less than 0.2% of GDP. Not only are the up-front investment costs lower than originally thought, but, by the 2040s, there will likely be large operational savings, due to clean technologies being cheaper to run.

There are also benefits from reaching net-zero, such as avoiding climate damages from cutting emissions and shielding the UK from fossil fuel-driven energy price spikes. 

The government, therefore, expects net-zero to deliver substantial economic value to the UK, when weighing both the costs and benefits of meeting the target. The government says meeting its climate target for 2040 would yield net benefits worth £865bn.

Similarly, other bodies, such as Neso and the OBR, find that net-zero is the “cheapest” option for the UK, when compared with failing to cut emissions.

Finally, contrary to Tice’s comments, the vast majority of the capital costs of reaching net-zero will not be borne by public funding from the “British people”. The CCC estimates that 65-90% of the capital required will come from the private sector.

FALSE

Tice: “Labour’s reckless net-zero fantasies are destroying hundreds of thousands of industrial jobs.”

Press Association, July 2025

The transition to a net-zero economy is expected to boost the UK economy and create hundreds of thousands of new jobs.

In a “landmark moment”, as of 2024, there were more people employed in the UK clean-energy sector than the oil and gas industry for the first time, according to the Renewable Energy Association.

While jobs in some sectors are expected to decline in the coming years, there is currently no evidence that “hundreds of thousands” of jobs have been “destroyed” by the net-zero target.

The CCC says that there is a lack of “robust data” on whether UK climate policies have already driven job losses, but notes that “this is unlikely to be the case, as most decarbonisation has occurred in sectors where employment declined for other reasons”.

This can be seen in the employment figures for coal mining, steelmaking and oil and gas production, three industries that were mainstays of the UK economy.

As the chart below shows, all of these sectors employ fewer people today than they did in the past. But their major declines happened long before the net-zero target was set, resulting from a wide range of factors including coal being replaced by cheaper fuels, cyclical downturns in oil prices and competition with steel production overseas.

The grey shaded area indicates the period in which the UK has a net-zero target in place. Definitions from ONS Nomis have changed over the years, but the broad categories covered in this chart are “mining of coal and lignite”, “manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys”, “manufacture of other products of first processing of steel”, “extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas” and “support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction”.

(The chart above only includes jobs in oil and gas extraction, but figures for UK fossil-fuel jobs vary considerably between sources, depending on the sectors classed as relevant. Industry body Offshore Energies UK cites a much broader figure of 180,000 jobs in 2024, which includes “supply chains and regional economies”.)

This does not mean that there will be no impact on the UK workforce in the future. 

A literature review by the CCC concluded that the “phase-down of high-emitting sectors and redirection of sectors” could threaten 8,000-75,000 jobs. This could include roughly 15,000 oil-and-gas workers and around 1,000 people working in coal mines.

One of the sectors that could see big changes is livestock farming, as UK diets shift away from emissions-intensive animal products. Notably, this shift is already taking place without any intervention from the government, let alone net-zero policies.

The CCC also expects there to be “extensive job creation” as the country transitions to a net-zero economy. Job gains in low-carbon sectors, such as renewable energy and clean heating, are set to far surpass losses in other sectors, as the chart below shows.

Overall, the committee says 135,000 to 725,000 “net” new jobs are set to be “created by net-zero”. 

Rather than opposing net-zero targets, some trade unions have stressed the need to support a “just transition” for workers in fossil fuel-intensive sectors. 

Industry groups have also pointed to the significant employment opportunities that a “net-zero economy” will bring. 

FALSE

Farage: “We view the net-zero targets as being the prime reason for the deindustrialisation of Britain.”

Reform UK press conference, February 2025

Net-zero is at the heart of the UK’s industrial strategy and it has frequently been described as the “economic opportunity of the century”. 

CBI chief economist Louise Hellem has described the net-zero economy as “a major part of the national industrial base”, while the Aldersgate Group says net-zero has the potential to be “the UK’s growth engine”.

Moreover, net-zero targets – set in 2019 – are clearly not the “prime reason” for the UK’s “deindustrialisation”, which has been underway for decades.

Since around the 1960s, major industries such as steel and mining have declined in the UK. There are various reasons for this, including globalisation, but the timeline does not match up with the creation of climate legislation.

Around 30% of the nation’s workers were employed in manufacturing after the second world war. By 2000-2016, the period in which the UK introduced its first major climate policies, this had already dropped to 10%, according to the ONS.

In recent years, businesses have warned that the UK’s relatively high industrial electricity prices are driving further “deindustrialisation”. This has been a talking point for those seeking to blame the nation’s net-zero strategy for driving high prices.

However, these arguments tend to omit the UK’s high exposure to expensive gas, which sets the nation’s wholesale electricity prices most of the time. 

The UK steel industry itself says that this exposure to gas is the key reason why it faces much higher electricity prices than counterparts in countries such as France and Germany. 

Energy costs

FALSE

Farage: “If we had carbon-free electricity it would cost over a trillion – and maybe nearer two – to upgrade the entirety of our grid.”

Press conference, August 2025

Cutting the UK’s emissions by using clean power to run an electrified economy is expected to significantly reduce consumer bills.

This is because electrified technologies, such as EVs and heat pumps, are significantly more efficient than fossil-fuel alternatives.

Moreover, the UK would be consolidating three separate energy systems – electricity, gas and transport fuel – into a unified, more efficient and electrified whole.

It would cost £108bn to reach the UK’s net-zero target – including a “carbon-free” electricity grid – according to the Climate Change Committee (CCC).

This includes the investment needed to build a low-carbon energy system, instead of maintaining one built on fossil fuels.

Crucially, it also takes into account the running costs of the two systems, such as the much higher cost of fuel needed for petrol cars, as shown below.

Investing in a net-zero economy would bring benefits worth around £865bn, according to the government. Unlike the CCC figures, this includes avoided climate damages.

It is not clear where Farage’s false claim comes from.

The 2024 Reform UK manifesto included a similar false claim that the “cost of net-zero has been estimated by the National Grid and others at some £2tn or more”.

In reality, the then-National Grid Electricity System Operator – now Neso – had said in 2020 that the cost of building and operating the UK energy system would be “broadly the same”, with or without net-zero.

It is true that the UK will need to invest heavily in upgrading its electricity grid. This will cost some £64bn out to 2030 and another £89bn in the following decade, according to Neso.

This is around 10 times lower than Farage’s claim. But, crucially, it does not include the savings this investment will unlock, such as cheaper travel with electric vehicles.

FALSE

Tice: “There was a direct link between the growth in renewable generating capacity and the growth in electricity prices in the UK.”

Bloomberg interview, May 2026

It is expensive gas that has largely driven up electricity prices in the UK.

High gas prices caused two-thirds of the rise in electricity bills over recent years, according to the UK Energy Research Centre – and this was before the Iran crisis.

The UK has high electricity prices principally because its electricity system remains heavily reliant on gas-fired power plants. This means gas usually sets the price of UK power.

Moreover, the growth in renewable capacity has helped to protect UK billpayers during the latest fossil-fuel price shock, after the US and Israel attacked Iran.

This is an “early sign” that the government’s clean-power plan “may be working”, according to thinktank NESTA. It says “electricity [prices are] beginning to decouple from gas“.

Electricity systems that have high shares of renewable energy tend to have lower wholesale power prices, according to evidence from US states and from European countries.

As the University of Oxford’s Prof Jan Rosenow explains in a recent post on his Bright Spots substack, the “‘renewables make electricity expensive’ claim doesn’t survive contact with the wholesale data”. He adds:

“The countries with the most expensive wholesale electricity are the ones still dependent on gas to set their prices.”

Rosenow notes that the relationship between renewables and consumer bills is less clear, because these also include network charges, policy costs and taxes. He argues for reforms to ensure that “lower wholesale prices [from clean power] feed through into lower bills”.

The CCC also argues for reforms to make electricity cheaper. Still, it concludes that clean power coupled to faster electrification is the clearest route to lower energy bills for the UK.

FALSE

Farage: “Perhaps the real unfairness of net-zero policies…has been the impact on domestic bills, something about which there has been an absolute wall of silence.”

Press conference, February 2025

By far the biggest driver of increases in domestic energy bills in recent years has been the rising cost of gas, not “net-zero policies”.

Gas prices have been trending upwards since the mid-2000s, long before the UK even had a net-zero target. Initially, this was due to dwindling supplies in Europe – including the North Sea – as well as more global competition for gas.

Gas prices then surged in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine and cut off supplies to Europe. This year, war in the Middle East has once again sent gas prices soaring.

Most of the energy bill increases in recent years have been the result of wholesale gas costs rising due to these successive global crises.

There are some parts of domestic energy bills that could be described as “net-zero policies” – notably, the subsidies or “green levies” to support both old and new renewable energy. 

However, these are not the drivers of recent price rises and are a much smaller component of a domestic energy bill than wholesale gas costs. (In addition, a chunk of policy costs have recently been moved off bills into general taxation.)

Moreover, the renewables they support have helped to curb the UK’s reliance on imported gas, saving the nation money.

Finally, the idea that this issue has faced a “wall of silence” is simply not true.

Energy bills and net-zero have been endlessly debated by politicians, commentators and the media. A pledge to cut energy bills was one of the central pillars of the Labour government’s election manifesto in 2024.

FALSE

Tice: “The cost of renewables plus backup, literally by definition, must cost more than backup because there is a cost of capital and a cost of retention of all of the backup…Don’t build it in the first place. We don’t need batteries.”

Bloomberg interview, May 2026

The UK is building a clean-energy system that will cost more to build – and much less to operate – than the current fossil-fuel economy.

Tice is ignoring half of this equation and – by definition – this means he is not giving a full picture.

For example, wind and solar do not need fuel to operate, whereas “backup” plants cannot generate power without gas or fuel oil.

It is highly misleading to look only at the capital investments needed to build wind, solar or gas plants, while ignoring the cost of operating them.

Electricity generation from wind and solar helped the UK avoid gas imports worth £1.7bn in the first two months of the Hormuz crisis alone, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

The CCC says that households could cut their bills by an average of £1,200 per year – even after higher upfront costs – by adopting solar, heat pumps and electric vehicles, as shown below.

.cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } } Household energy costs for heat, power and transport, £ per year. The upfront costs of purchasing cars, heating systems, chargers and solar panels are annualised. Source: CCC progress report 2026.

Ultimately, an electrified economy built on renewables and other sources of clean power will reduce energy waste and cut bills, according to the CCC and others.

FALSE

Tice: “It is as cost-effective or indeed cheaper to put the cables underground.”

Press conference, February 2025

Contrary to repeated claims by Tice, there is clear evidence that it is significantly cheaper to build overhead electricity pylons than it is to “put cables underground”.

It is 3.5-5 times more expensive to bury cables than to run overhead wires, according to research published in May 2026 and shown in the figure below, with other similar studies.

The latest study, by consultancy Ramboll, shows that underground cables remain far more expensive, even where techniques such as “cable ploughing” are used to bury them.

The findings are in line with previous research published by the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in April 2025.

This found that “underground cables are, on average, 4.5 times more expensive than overhead lines”. It said that undersea cables “can be up to 11 times more costly”.

Another consultancy, DNV, reached very similar conclusions in 2024. The IET said the same back in 2012, when it estimated underground cables to be five times more costly.

All of these reports directly contradict claims made by Tice in a 2025 press conference:

“We are serving notice on National Grid…put the cables underground…It is as cost-effective, or indeed cheaper, to put the cables underground.”

Tice’s claim is based on a highly misleading interpretation of the East Anglia network study, published by Neso in 2024.

This study put a price on various options to reinforce the electricity network in the east of England, including a planned overhead route from Norwich to Tilbury.

Contrary to Tice’s claims, figures from project developer National Grid suggest that using underground cables for this route would be 6.5 times more expensive than overhead wires.

If all of the country’s planned new electricity cables were put underground, it could cost up to an extra £22bn, according to Sam Dumitriu, head of policy at thinktank Britain Remade.

FALSE

Tice: “[A ‘windfall tax’ on renewables] is the best way that we can help get the bills down and lower the cost of living.”

Press conference, February 2025

Expensive gas has been the main driver of UK energy bill increases in recent years, particularly as successive global crises have sent global gas prices spiralling.

As such, reducing the UK’s exposure to international gas prices – as well as cutting its reliance on imported fuels for cars and boilers – is key to reducing bills.

Yet, Tice has claimed that the “best way” to cut bills would be through a so-called “windfall tax” on wind and solar power generators.

It is unclear how it would be possible to cut bills – by even a small amount – through an additional tax on renewables, which generate around half of the nation’s electricity.

With “windfall”, Tice borrowed a term that is often used for new taxes on the fossil-fuel companies making billions in additional profits due to war in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Renewables have helped to shield the UK from the impact of these conflicts, by curbing its reliance on gas and saving billions that would otherwise have been spent on costly imports.

Tice suggested that a new tax on renewable energy firms could help “recover” the money previously paid to them in subsidies. However, he has not offered any detail on how the proposed tax would work, how much money it would raise or what impact it might have.

A retrospective change to the tax treatment of existing energy infrastructure would hamper future investment in the system, whether that is for clean power or Tice’s own preferred energy sources.

Blocking renewables through a windfall tax and other changes could stop investments worth tens of billions of pounds, according to the New Economics Foundation thinktank.

MISLEADING
Farage: “Our electricity prices for industry are between five and six times higher than those in America.”

Press conference, February 2025

The UK primarily has high industrial electricity prices due to its exposure to high gas prices.

In turn, the UK and other European countries face much higher gas prices than the US.

This is particularly true since Russia cut off pipeline gas supplies to the continent amid its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – a shift that has been reinforced by EU sanctions.

This means Europe is reliant on internationally traded liquified natural gas (LNG), for which it competes with Japan and other countries.

In contrast, gas prices are low in the US because supplies are often a by-product of more valuable oil extraction, which comes out of the ground with “associated” gas. The demand for US gas is also limited by the amount that can be exported overseas as LNG.

As such, while it is true that UK industrial electricity prices are high compared to other countries, the reasons are different to what Farage implies.

In addition, his claim that costs are “five to six times higher” than the US is overstated. 

The most widely cited figures, based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data, suggest industrial prices are four times higher in the UK than those in the US.

Despite claims made by right-leaning commentators, it would not be possible for the UK to recreate the US gas market dynamics by fracking for shale gas, or by ramping up North Sea gas extraction.

Oil and gas

MISLEADING

Tice: “Let me remind you, in the 80s and 90s…we were growing at between 2.5% and 4% a year. We had deep, plentiful energy driven by oil and gas from the North Sea, right? No one was worried about the price of electricity. No one was worried about the quantity of supply. No one was worried about the reliability of supply.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The UK extracted a significant proportion of its oil and gas resources from the 1980s onwards, after privatising the industry and using the revenue to cut income taxes.

Now, as anticipated at the time, there is very little fuel left to drill.

The UK went through a “dash for gas” in the 1990s, with North Sea gas production levels steadily increasing from the 1980s until the 2000s. 

However, gas production in the North Sea fell by 74% between 2000 and 2025, while oil output fell by 75%.

This is not because policies favouring new oil and gas production ended, but rather because of competition from cheaper sources of the fuels and because the amount of fossil fuels left in the North Sea basin started to run out.

According to the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) thinktank, around 90% of the oil and gas that is likely to be produced from the North Sea has already been burned.

It is also true that electricity prices were much lower in the 1990s than they are today. This is largely explained by rising gas prices – and increasing exposure to imports. 

The UK dash for gas power was driven by cheap gas prices, which favoured a shift away from coal and nuclear. This included cancelling a planned fleet of new nuclear reactors.

When gas subsequently became expensive, electricity prices went up, because the UK was heavily exposed to the fuel. This dynamic continues today, although the rise of renewables is starting to break the link between gas and power prices..

FALSE

Tice: “We [would] allow licences to drill…If you increase the supply of anything, it’s basic economics, the price of that good will come down, as it does in America, where their gas price, their wholesale gas price, is give or take 30% of ours.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Gas is cheap in the US because it is widely extracted as a byproduct of more valuable oil and because demand is limited by export capacity.

These dynamics – and the abundant, easily accessible shale resources in the US – are a function of geography and cannot be replicated in the UK.

North Sea production is in long-term decline and this cannot be reversed by new licenses, because most of the oil and gas that was under the ground has already been burned.

In addition, the production of oil and gas in the North Sea has very limited effects on global energy prices, which determine the cost of UK energy bills.

This is because the country is a relatively small producer, accounting for around 1% of global output. By contrast, the US is the world’s largest oil-and-gas producer.

FALSE

Tice: “If we’d had this common sense not to abandon our North Sea, we wouldn’t have been in that pickle [referring to importing LNG from the US].”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The UK is increasingly reliant on imported fossil fuels, because it has already used up most of the oil and gas that was once under the North Sea.

The country was a net energy exporter in 2000, but, by 2010, was dependent on imports for 30% of its energy supplies. On the same metric, the UK’s net import dependency reached 44% in 2024.

This is not because policies favouring new oil and gas production ended, but rather because the amount of fossil fuels left in the North Sea basin started to run out.

Gas production in the North Sea fell by 74% between 2000 and 2025, while oil output fell by 75%.

This decline has occurred despite the previous Conservative government, which was in power from 2010-24, holding six new licensing rounds and issuing hundreds of new oil and gas licences.

FALSE

Tice: “Why are the Norwegians drilling 49 new wells last year? Because they think there’s plenty more to go that’s worth going for. So, why are we so stupid that, on our side of the line, we think it’s a good idea to drill zero new wells?”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The UK has already used up most of the oil and gas that was under its part of the North Sea, whereas the state-run Norwegian system has taken a different approach.

Nevertheless, even the most optimistic of Norway’s official forecasts sees a steady decline in production over the coming decades, as their oil and gas also starts to run out.

UK fossil-fuel production is lower than Norway’s because of geology and the decisions that were taken in the past, neither of which can be changed by the current or any future UK government.

Specifically, the UK has already used up the large majority of its North Sea resources, having extracted around 90% of the oil and gas that is available.

In contrast, Norway has only used up 57% of the “expected recoverable resource” from its part of the North Sea, according to official estimates published by Norwegian Petroleum.

FALSE

Tice: “We’ve got lots of [oil and gas] reserves, but if you just say it’s not viable because you make the regulations and everything too expensive, then don’t be surprised if people say, well, there’s not much to go for.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Projections of the amount of oil and gas that will be recovered from the North Sea have barely changed since the Labour government took office in 2024.

Tice’s suggestion that official estimates of North Sea reserves have been revised down as a result of the Labour government’s policies is, therefore, provably untrue.

For gas, there is little difference between official projections published before and after the government’s 2024 election win and its decision to ban new licensing, as shown below.

North Sea oil (right) and gas production (right), million tonnes of oil equivalent, under the baseline NSTA projection or with further drilling. Source: NSTA.

While the NSTA projections for oil have shifted more noticeably between 2023 and 2026, this largely relates to output from existing fields, rather than the potential from new drilling.

FALSE

Tice: “I go to Aberdeen and they’re literally losing a thousand jobs a month in and around Aberdeen and the oil and gas industry because of this mad policy.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Jobs in North Sea oil and gas have been declining rapidly for decades, having fallen by a third between 2014 and 2023 – well before the current government took office.

However, the major driver of job losses has been the irreversible decline of the North Sea basin. Gas production in the North Sea fell by 74% between 2000 and 2025, while oil output fell by 75%.

This decline has occurred despite the previous Conservative government, which was in power from 2010-24, holding six new licensing rounds and issuing hundreds of new licences.

MISLEADING

Tice: “All of the nations who’ve got energy treasure, who are extracting it, they are growing, whether it’s America, whether it’s the Middle East, whether it’s in Asia.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Fossil-fuel producers have received windfall profits as a result of price spikes in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the effective closure of the strait of Hormuz.

On the flip side of this, countries that rely on fossil-fuel imports – particularly in Europe and China – have been hit with an extra $330bn in costs since the Iran crisis began.

For the UK, the most effective way to cut the need for costly fossil-fuel imports is to continue expanding clean-energy supplies and the electrified technologies that use them.

It is true that the US economy is growing at a faster rate than Europe’s. This is down to a range of reasons, experts say, including the nation’s rapid uptake of AI.

Another factor is that import dependency has left the UK and others particularly exposed to the economic impacts of the recent fossil-fuel price spikes.

Meanwhile, there is also plenty of evidence to show that investing in clean energy is driving economic growth in countries around the world.

The International Energy Agency (IEA), the world’s energy watchdog, estimated that clean energy accounted for 10% of global GDP growth in 2023. The figure was 30% for the EU, according to the IEA.

Analysis published by Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025. And the International Monetary Fund (IMF) says that climate action will provide a long-term boost to China’s economy and energy security.

In the UK, emissions have “decoupled” from economic growth, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

The analysis found that UK emissions fell to 54% below 1990 levels in 2024, while GDP was up 84%.

FALSE

Farage: “Countries that frack get rich. Countries that don’t frack get poor.”

Edinburgh press conference, August 2025

The availability and accessibility of shale resources – and, therefore, the potential economic return from extracting oil and gas via fracking – is a function of geography and geology.

The UK’s shale gas resources are hard to extract and roughly 10-times smaller than initially thought. As a result, their potential to boost the UK economy is extremely limited.

While fracking has boosted economic growth in the US, there is little evidence to suggest this could be replicated by countries in Europe. 

Only four countries frack for oil and gas at a large-scale commercial level: the US, Canada, China and Argentina.

Across much of Europe, fracking faces legal bans over concerns that the practice can contaminate water supplies and impact public health.

There are also practical and economic hurdles to fracking in Europe.

US oil majors abandoned efforts to establish a shale gas industry in Poland more than a decade ago. As the Economist noted in 2014: “There is no getting around geology.”

In the UK, fracking is unpopular with the public, with just 17% of people supporting it and 45% opposing it.

Any attempt to produce oil and gas via fracking would likely face protests and lengthy legal battles. Even if projects were able to go ahead, it would likely take years to produce a meaningful amount of gas .(See Carbon Brief’s fracking factcheck.)

Impacts and adaptation

MISLEADING

Tice: “Actually, what we need to do with climate change…we need to adapt to it.”

BBC Breakfast, June 2024

Climate change will keep getting worse until the world cuts emissions to net-zero.

Moreover, there are hard limits to adaptation, which can be overwhelmed by higher warming.

The longer emissions continue, the higher global temperatures will rise and the more nations such as the UK will have to adapt. It is, therefore, misleading to present adaptation as an alternative to cutting emissions. 

The IPCC says that risks “will become increasingly complex and more difficult to manage” as climate change worsens. It also stresses that there are limits to adaptation, some of which have already been reached.

In response to the latest IPCC assessment report, Dr Aditi Mukherji told Carbon Brief:

“Effectiveness of most adaptation responses decreases drastically at global warming levels of 1.5C to 2C, showing that mitigation and adaptation efforts have to go hand in hand.”

In its latest advice to the UK government, the CCC set out the need to prepare for extreme heat, drought and flooding and states: “Without global emissions reductions, these risks may go past the point where the UK can protect itself with adaptation measures.”

FALSE

Tice: “It’s much cheaper to adapt to climate change than to think you can stop it.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Cutting emissions to net-zero will be much cheaper for the UK than dealing with the economic damages of unmitigated climate change, according to the OBR.

In addition, adapting to unavoidable warming will be far cheaper than “facing the damages”, according to the CCC.

While Tice frequently presents a false dichotomy between cutting emissions and adapting to climate impacts, they are not either/or alternatives. In fact, both are required to reduce the dangers of climate change – and both will require substantial investment.

Climate-related damages are already costing the UK, with one recent estimate concluding that the June 2026 heatwave alone led to a £1.15bn hit to the economy.

These costs will spiral if global emissions are not reduced. It is well established that the cost of inaction on climate change is considerably higher than the cost of cutting emissions.

The CCC estimates that climate change is already costing the UK economy £60bn a year in damages and this could rise to around £260bn by 2050, under around 2C of global warming. 

The committee says a comprehensive climate-adaptation programme in the coming decades will reduce these costs. 

As the chart below shows, CCC analysis has concluded that an adaptation package covering heat and health, urban heat and water scarcity could avoid up to £12bn a year in climate-damage costs across the UK by the 2050s.

In total, climate-adaptation actions are expected to cost at least £11bn per year out to the 2050s – a considerable sum, but one that the CCC says is “manageable” and will largely come from private-sector investment.

At the same time, the CCC says there is a risk of “catastrophic damages”, especially if warming continues to rise above 2C. Given this, it stresses that “reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions remain essential” to minimise such risks.

FALSE

Tice: “The issue [with drought] is not the quantity of water in the UK. The issue is how the water companies do or don’t capture it.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Climate change is making drought more frequent and severe in the UK, even as it makes winters wetter than they were in the past.

This is increasing the need for new reservoirs and other measures to manage the quantity of water available in the UK throughout the year. 

The summer of 2026 saw record-low levels of rainfall across much of the south of England and Wales, as shown in the map below.  

July 2026 was the driest month on record in England and Wales, according to the Met Office. This coincided with the two nations recording their sunniest July on record as well. 

These “remarkable conditions” in 2026 come as part of a summer “marked by multiple heat records, which have contributed to drought conditions”, the Met Office notes.

The Environment Agency says that, due to climate change, “we are experiencing longer, hotter summers…leading to an increased likelihood of drought”.

FALSE
Tice: “I’m old enough to remember 1976. This feels a bit the same. That was 50 years ago.”

Press conference, August 2026

Since 1976, global warming has made heatwaves “more frequent, long-lasting and intense”.

As a result, summer 2026 was the UK’s hottest on record, with the Met Office finding that this was made around 130-times more likely by human-induced climate change.

Moreover, this year’s record means that summer 1976 is now only the seventh-warmest for the UK, with the top five all having occurred since 2003.

In the summer of 1976, there were 15 consecutive days when somewhere in the UK was above 32C. This led to water shortages and frequent wildfires, followed by flash floods.

There has been a lot of comparison to this “historic event” amid the record-breaking temperatures seen in 2026.

However, climate change means that a 1976-style weather pattern would be 3-4C hotter today than it was at the time.

There were just three days in which UK temperatures breached 36C in the entire 20th century, including 1976. Yet there were three days above 36C in 2026 alone.

Summer 2026 also saw 10 separate days with temperatures above 35C, breaking the previous record of five days, which had been set in 1976.

Additionally, the humidity was much higher in 2026 than in 1976. According to the Met Office, this meant that “even where peak air temperatures were comparable, the perceived heat and associated health risks were often greater in 2026”.

Clean energy

MISLEADING

Tice: “80% of the offshore renewables is overseas owned. So the British consumer is being shafted to help overseas investors.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Around the world, more than 90% of new renewable power projects are cheaper than new fossil-fueled generation.

An energy system built around renewable power and electrified technologies such as EVs   is also the lowest-cost option in the UK.

While it is true that more than 80% of UK offshore windfarms are owned by foreign companies, this is just ​​a feature of the country’s privatised energy sector.  

For example, 40% of North Sea oil and gas licences are also owned by foreign investors. 

Additionally, regardless of the windfarms’ owners, their presence on the electricity grid is helping to protect consumers from high fossil-fuel prices. 

In 2025, windfarms cut wholesale power prices by a third, according to the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit thinktank. 

MISLEADING

Tice: “Why are we so stupid that we spent £700m on Hinkley Point C, £700m of taxpayers’ cash, to protect a bunch of salmon? About 70 salmon, for God’s sake.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant will include a system designed to protect millions of fish. 

However, the cost of this system amounts to just 1.5% of the overall £46bn cost of building the new reactors in Somerset. 

The £700m system is expected to stop more than 2.6m fish a year from being sucked into the cooling pipes at the site on the Severn estuary. 

Additionally, the use of the system is replacing plans to flood 900 acres (364 hectares) of farmland in neighbouring Gloucestershire, originally proposed by the site’s main developer, EDF. 

The construction of Hinkley Point C is being financed by EDF and the China General Nuclear Power Group, not the taxpayer. When it begins generation, it will benefit from a “contracts for difference”, which is funded via electricity bills.  

MISLEADING

Tice: “A hell of a lot more people have died building wind turbines than have died in the nuclear power industry. Little stated fact by the renewable industry.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Both wind and nuclear power are considered to be among the safest forms of energy generation in the world.

There are occasional fatalities among workers at windfarm construction sites, but these are very rare, particularly when compared with accidents in the fossil-fuel industry. 

This is before taking into account that fossil-fuel pollution is responsible for one in five deaths globally, according to research by University College London. 

Death rate from accidents and air pollution. Nuclear energy deaths include those from the Fukushima and Chornobyl disasters. Deaths from hydropower include those from the Banqian Dam failure in China.

Analysis from 2020 suggests that solar power was the safest source of energy, followed by nuclear and then wind. All three clean-energy sources are orders of magnitude safer than fossil fuels, as shown in the figure below.

For example, each unit of electricity generation from coal is associated with more than 600 times as many deaths as the same amount of power from wind.

Our World in Data, a non-profit collaboration between the University of Oxford and the Global Change Data Lab, which did the analysis, explains:

“People often focus on the marginal differences at the bottom of the chart – between nuclear, solar and wind. This comparison is misguided: the uncertainties around these values mean they are likely to overlap.

“The key insight is that they are all much, much safer than fossil fuels.”

MISLEADING

Tice: “[Solar is a] good use of rooftops, there’s no subsidy on those.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Solar power is the cheapest electricity in history and keeps getting cheaper.

It is expected to play a key role in the energy transition, including in the UK.

While the government’s subsidy scheme for domestic solar – the “feed-in tariff” (FiT) – closed to new applicants in 2019, several other incentives have subsequently been introduced.

It was directly replaced by the “smart export guarantee”, wherein utilities pay households for any excess power they generate from their solar installations. This – together with the savings from using self-generated power – helps to offset the cost of the installation of solar panels. 

Additionally, the government’s warm homes plan offers grants and loans designed to triple the number of homes with rooftop solar by 2030. 

Ultimately, Tice’s focus on rooftop solar (which his firm uses) positions it in opposition to ground-mounted solar farms – creating a false dichotomy between a “good use” and a “bad use”. 

Ground-mount solar is set to play a significant role in decarbonising the UK. It is much cheaper than rooftop solar and is not limited by the availability of rooftops. 

FALSE

Tice: “All the renewables, all the wind turbines and the solar farms, they want a fat subsidy for very long-term contracts.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Renewables are the cheapest source of new electricity in the UK, where recent surges in energy bills have been predominantly due to the role of gas in setting electricity prices.

The first subsidy-free solar farm in the UK was opened in 2017 near Flitwick in Bedfordshire. 

Across the UK, there are now a number of subsidy-free solar and windfarms, which either rely on selling power into the market or private power purchase agreements. 

The majority of solar and windfarms hold government contracts, but these are fixed-price deals rather than subsidies. 

The new wind and solar projects secured at the latest government auction of “contracts for difference” will be significantly cheaper than new gas, according to the government.

No new gas plants have been built in the UK without long-term subsidy contracts through the government’s capacity market. In addition, the price of fuel for gas-fired generation continues to spike in response to the latest global energy crisis in the Middle East.

The most recent large new gas plant was Keadby 2, which opened in 2023 and would now cost 3.5-times as much to build, according to its owner.

FALSE

Tice: “There is nothing environmentally friendly about covering 100 square miles of Lincolnshire, agricultural, productive farmland, with solar panels, surrounding whole villages, decimating property prices in those villages or making them unsaleable, and thinking that’s going to end well.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Even if solar farms expand in line with net-zero targets, they would cover just 0.7% of land in the UK – less than golf courses do currently. 

Solar farms are very rarely built on productive agricultural land in the UK – with the majority built on low-grade land – and pose “no threat to national food security”, according to the National Farmers Union. 

There is limited evidence that property prices are impacted by solar farms, with some studies suggesting that well-screened solar farms have no impact.

A London School of Economics study from 2021 did “not find any statistically significant effects [of solar on house prices], even at relatively small distances of 1km”. 

Other studies have found very small negative impacts – on the order of 1-3% – while one study of 70 solar farms in the US identified a small boost to house prices.

As such, there is nothing to suggest that solar farms either “decimate” property prices or make homes “unsaleable”. 

FALSE

Tice: “I drive a Tesla. Do I think it’s going to change the climate? No.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

As an electric vehicle (EV), driving a Tesla is far better for the environment than a petrol or diesel car, as it produces fewer greenhouse gases, air pollutants and noise. 

Typically, an EV driven in Europe emits around two-thirds fewer greenhouse gas emissions than an equivalent petrol car, even accounting for battery production and disposal. 

Carbon Brief analysis found that a Tesla Model Y, for example, will emit about 68% less CO2 over its lifetime than the average petrol car. 

In addition to cutting costs for drivers, EVs are a key part of decarbonising road transport.

In the UK, transitioning away from petrol and diesel vehicles to EVs is expected to account for 23% of the total reduction in emissions being targeted by 2050. Net-zero is the “only way” to halt global warming. 

MISLEADING

Tice: “The government says that the cost of renewable subsidies in the last 15 years is £100bn.”

Press conference, February 2025

Upfront renewable subsidies – in the UK and elsewhere – have helped deliver dramatic reductions in the cost of wind and solar power.

Since 2010, the cost of solar power has fallen by 89%, onshore wind by 71% and offshore wind by 63% – and these declines are set to continue.

As a result, 90% of new wind and solar installed in 2025 was cheaper than new fossil-fuel power, according to the International Renewable Energy Association (IRENA).

In the UK, wind power saved consumers more than £100bn between 2010-2023, after accounting for renewable subsidies, according to researchers at University College London.

In contrast, high fossil-fuel prices since the global energy crisis in 2022 had already cost the UK more than £180bn by the end of 2025, according to ECIU, with the first six months of the Iran crisis adding another £10bn in extra costs. 

FALSE

Tice: “Those farmers who want to sell out to the renewable industry for solar farms – you can’t have it both ways, folks. Either you’re part of food production, part of food security for our nation, or you’re part of the renewables industry.”

Press conference, February 2025

Contrary to Tice’s claims, farmers can – and indeed often already do – “have it both ways”. Government statistics for 2023/24 suggest that 32% of farm businesses make use of renewable energy, mostly solar power. 

Furthermore, some 37% of farmers, landowners and tenant farmers say the revenue from solar power helps secure their farms for future generations, according to interviews carried out by trade association Solar Energy UK. 

Finally, solar can also be combined directly with food production through the use of “agrivoltaic” systems. This concept combines farming – including livestock grazing and shade-tolerant crops – with solar panels and has been gaining momentum as a solution to land-use conflicts.

FALSE

Tice: “The British people are not being told that these battery energy systems are dangerous – and until they can be proven to be absolutely safe, they should be banned.”

Press conference, February 2025

Battery energy storage systems are safe and getting safer all the time. 

In the UK, there are over 1,659 large-scale battery storage projects and there have been only two reported fires in the past five years – neither of which had any injuries or fatalities.

Home battery storage systems are also safe. A recent study that looked at installations in Germany found the probability of a fire is 0.005% – this is around the same level as a tumble-dryer fire, 50 times lower than a general house fire and 18 times lower than a petrol or diesel engine fire.

(In contrast, there has been a spate of fires at UK waste facilities caused by the inappropriate disposal of lithium batteries in consumer devices, usually vapes.) 

FALSE

Farage: “The argument that wind power makes us less reliant on other sources of energy from around the world just is not true. The national grid is not fit to deal with intermittent renewable energy.”

Press conference, August 2025

Wind power is already making the UK less reliant on imported fuels.

Moreover, expanding clean-energy supplies will be a much more effective route to reducing the UK’s reliance on energy imports than efforts to increase North Sea drilling.

ECIU found that the growth of offshore wind had reduced the nation’s spending on imported fuels by at least £30bn by the end of 2025. 

Separately, Carbon Brief analysis found that wind and solar saved the UK from gas imports worth £1.7bn in March and April 2026 alone, amid the pressures of the Iran war. 

The UK’s electricity grid does require upgrades as part of the transition to an energy system dominated by renewables, EVs and heat pumps. This transition will enable the UK to cut its imports of not only gas for heat and power, but also oil for transport.

Regardless of net-zero targets, higher spending on the electricity network is partly making up for decades of “under-investment”.The grid needs upgrades to connect new nuclear plants and data centres, as well as to meet growing electricity demand from homes and businesses.

Despite the need for investment, there is nothing to suggest that the grid is “not fit to deal” with renewables.

Power cuts for the average UK household are now happening 43% less often than they did in 2011. During that time, renewables have grown from 9.5% to 47% of electricity supplies.

Related Revealed: England’s June 2026 heatwave sparked record demand for ambulances 14.09.2026 Health and society Revealed: More than 1,000 NHS operations cancelled due to record UK heatwaves 11.09.2026 Health and society UK aviation emissions to be 50% higher than thought by 2050, government admits 10.09.2026 Aviation and shipping Analysis: UK solar power hits record high over summer 2026 04.09.2026 Renewables

The post Factcheck: Reform UK’s 45 false or misleading claims about climate and energy appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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More than 1,000 operations at NHS hospitals were cancelled due to heat during the UK’s record May and June heatwaves, Carbon Brief can reveal.

This includes 167 orthopaedic surgeries, such as knee and hip replacements, as well as heart, eye and skin cancer operations.

At least 10 emergency surgeries – those for “life-threatening” conditions – had to be cancelled because of the record-breaking heat, according to the investigation.

Carbon Brief sent freedom-of-information (FOI) requests to 140 NHS trusts to investigate the impact of heatwaves on operations being cancelled in England and Wales.

Areas with the most operations cancelled due to heat include Surrey and Sussex, south Essex and parts of London – all regions experiencing among the highest temperatures.

High temperatures can threaten patient safety by stopping the ventilation systems used in theatres from working, increasing the risk of infection, experts tell Carbon Brief.

Less than half of the NHS trusts provided details of heat-related surgery cancellations – and Carbon Brief understands that many hospitals do not routinely record this information.

Carbon Brief’s figure is therefore likely to be a significant underestimate, but still provides an unprecedented insight into a surgical system “poorly prepared” for heatwaves and the impact on patients.

Overheating operations

The record-breaking heatwaves that have repeatedly struck the UK in 2026 – amplified by climate change – have already been linked to thousands of deaths. 

High temperatures can lead to all sorts of health complications and worsen respiratory, cardiovascular and kidney diseases. 

Extreme heat also threatens healthcare systems. News outlets have reported on the NHS “struggling”, as it faces record A&E demand, hospital wards reaching “unsafe” temperatures and equipment failing due to heat.

Among these reports was coverage of hospitals being forced to cancel operations, or even abandon them midway through, as surgical theatres became intolerably hot.

To investigate this problem, Carbon Brief sent FOI requests to the 140 NHS trusts and health boards in England and Wales responsible for hospitals with surgical theatres.

They were asked about all the operations that were cancelled due to extreme heat during the May and June heatwaves, when “amber” and “red” heat warnings were in place.

In total, 59 trusts and health boards responded with details of 1,110 heat-related cancellations across the 17-day period covering 22-28 May and 18-27 June.

(Of the 63 trusts that responded but did not provide details of heat-related disruption, many said that they simply did not record this data, rather than stating that heat was not a problem. See Methodology for more details.)

The map below shows the location of these cancelled surgeries, which cover everything from routine hernia operations to heart surgeries.

Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust reported the most cancellations – 140 in total – all in the surgery unit at Crawley Hospital. This hospital was in one of the hottest parts of the country in June, with temperatures approaching 36C.

Other hotspots for cancellations include south Essex, Dudley in the West Midlands, south Wales and parts of London. Many of the hardest-hit hospitals were in southern England, where temperatures were highest. 

Of the trusts that provided full datasets of all surgery cancellations in the period, around 7% were heat-related. This data illustrates how heat is placing more strain on an already stretched NHS, adding to existing issues such as staff shortages and lack of beds.

Nearly all of the cancelled surgeries were “elective”, meaning they were scheduled in advance and not immediately life-saving. Nevertheless, the list of cancellations includes at least eight heart operations and seven skin-cancer removals.

There were also 10 “emergency” operations cancelled due to heat in surgical theatres. Another 18 surgeries had to be abandoned mid-way through.

Dr Dmitri Nepogodiev, a public health researcher focusing on surgery at the University of Birmingham, says hospitals will always prioritise “time-sensitive, life-threatening” surgeries. 

Nevertheless, he tells Carbon Brief that every cancellation can cause significant “distress” and harm to patients’ quality of life, adding:

“Behind all of these statistics…are real people who have probably already been waiting a long time.”

Each dot in the graphic below indicates a cancelled surgery. Of the 596 for which trusts provided details, 167 are orthopaedic surgeries, such as knee and hip replacements.

Eye surgeries, gynaecological and urological surgeries are also among the most frequently cancelled, broadly reflecting how common such procedures are.

Richard Egan, an endocrine surgeon and a national clinical director within NHS Wales, notes the knock-on effects of cancelling surgeries for several days during heatwaves. He tells Carbon Brief:

“That’s a significant impact on waiting lists…For every week that patients are waiting on a waiting list, their condition could get worse and deteriorate.”

‘Increased risks’

When providing specific reasons for cancellations, most NHS trusts simply indicated that surgical theatres were “too hot and humid”. 

Sometimes, this was accompanied by comments about “risk of infection” or “overheating for both patients and staff”.

There are several reasons why it can get “too hot” for operations to take place, but the main one is that the complex ventilation systems installed in theatres can stop working above a certain temperature, explains Dr Ed Robinson, an NHS anaesthetist. He tells Carbon Brief:

“An operating theatre is a very tightly engineered clinical environment. There are quite complicated ventilation systems, which dilute airborne contaminants, remove fumes from different [medications] and anaesthetic gases.

“We have generalised airflow systems that make the air in theatre flow outwards to adjacent areas, so pathogens and fumes get carried away from the patient into non-clinical areas. When it gets to a certain heat, those systems can fail.”

These systems are also responsible for controlling heat and humidity levels inside theatres, says Robinson.

When the systems fail, it is not possible to guarantee patient safety, he continues, meaning surgeries may need to be cancelled.

Although most hospitals simply stated that it was “too hot” for operations to take place during the heatwaves, there were 48 cases where staff specified that this was due to air conditioning or ventilation units that were either broken or unable to sustain appropriate temperatures. 

Tim Lane, a urological surgeon and president of the Royal College of Surgeons of England (RCS England), tells Carbon Brief that heat places “extra physical strain” on patients:

“Extreme heat can increase risks and make it harder to deliver care under the conditions clinicians would consider ideal.”

If air in operating theatres is too humid, excess moisture can condense on surgical implements and transmit infections, he says.

Extreme heat and humidity inside theatres can also pose a risk to staff having to wear heavy protective clothing. Robinson explains:

“Staff are usually wearing PPE [personal protective equipment]. If it’s orthopaedics, they will be wearing ‘leads’ a lot of the time. This is because they will be doing lots of X-rays, and there’s no time to descrub and rescrub every time. 

“So if the ventilation system is not working, you’re going to overheat [and] that’s going to affect your ability to concentrate and perform a safe operation. You just wouldn’t start under those conditions.”

There are also “certain pieces of equipment and medications” that are not “validated to be used outside of certain ranges of temperature”, he says.

This includes specialised “cement” used to secure hip and knee replacements, which can set too quickly at higher temperatures, according to Lane.

‘Poorly prepared’

Following the record-breaking heat of 2022, one study found that surgical services in the UK were “poorly prepared for heatwaves”. 

Based on staff surveys, the study concluded that ambient temperatures “could not be controlled” in two-fifths of NHS operating theatres.

With hospitals once again under significant pressure this summer, health secretary Yvette Cooper told the Guardian that the NHS “has to make sure we are preparing for summer pressures now in the same way we prepare for winter”.

Nepogodiev notes that the problem of extreme heat extends from increased patient numbers to staff shortages, which can be the result of a range of wider factors such as heat-related train cancellations. He tells Carbon Brief.

“There isn’t a single magic solution because it’s a kind of complex, multifactorial challenge – so it also underlines the importance of broader preparedness.”

Egan, who is investigating ways to prepare surgical theatres for extreme heat, says the response so far has been “ad hoc”. He suggests it may be possible to continue with less risky operations, even at higher humidity levels.

As it stands, many NHS hospitals are old and not designed for increasingly extreme temperatures.

Government advisers at the Climate Change Committee (CCC) have recommended that all healthcare buildings should work to “maintain safe and appropriate temperatures” by 2035.

The UK’s national adaptation programme already says NHS England will work to “adapt NHS infrastructure to extreme weather events and overheating risks”, by incorporating adaptation measures into plans for new buildings. 

However, years of underinvestment have left many sites with what the King’s Fund thinktank calls “deteriorating buildings” and “outdated technology”.

Following the extreme heat this summer, the government has announced £32m from a £1.5bn spending programme for projects that strengthen hospitals’ “resilience to extreme heat, including improved “cooling and ventilation systems”.

RCS England president Lane tells Carbon Brief that heat-related surgical cancellations underline the need for investment in hospitals, ventilation systems and modern equipment:

“NHS staff work incredibly hard to adapt, often reorganising services and finding practical solutions to keep care running, but resilience alone cannot compensate indefinitely for outdated infrastructure or sustainability.”

Methodology

Carbon Brief contacted 140 NHS trusts and health boards in England and Wales, only including those that perform surgical procedures. Mental health trusts, community trusts and other specialist trusts were therefore excluded.

These requests covered the periods 22-28 May 2026 and 18-27 June 2026, when heatwaves affected much of England and Wales. 

At the time of filing the FOIs, these were the two periods when the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) had issued “amber” or “red” heat-health alerts across much or all of England. There were also comparable weather warnings in place across Wales for some of this time.

(Scotland and Northern Ireland were excluded from the analysis, on the basis that they did not experience such extreme heat.)

The FOI requests asked for details of all surgical procedures – both elective and emergency – that were cancelled during this period. Specifically, the requests also asked trusts to state which cancellations were related to extreme heat. Of these, 59 provided details of surgeries that were cancelled due to heat. 

Of the remaining 63 that responded to the FOI requests, only a few stated explicitly that there were no surgeries cancelled due to heat. Most either said that they did not record this information, or provided lists with standard cancellation reasons that may – or may not – indicate heat as a factor, such as “failure of equipment”. The remaining 19 did not respond to the request by the time of publication.

NHS trusts and health boards responded to Carbon Brief’s FOI requests in a large variety of ways, reflecting the inconsistent way in which heat-related cancellations are recorded.

Among those that disclosed data, some provided all the information requested while others only provided parts. Some would not provide exact numbers when the number of cancellations was five or less. In those cases, Carbon Brief assumed that two surgeries had been cancelled. (This assumption accounts for fewer than 50 of the 1,110 cancellations.)

The full dataset is available here, with details of all the surgeries cancelled and the reasons given for their cancellations.

related Factcheck: Reform UK’s 45 false or misleading claims about climate and energy 11.09.2026 UK policy UK aviation emissions to be 50% higher than thought by 2050, government admits 10.09.2026 Aviation and shipping Analysis: UK solar power hits record high over summer 2026 04.09.2026 Renewables How this summer’s heat and drought impacted crops in Europe – in six charts 04.09.2026 Food and farming

The post Revealed: More than 1,000 NHS operations cancelled due to record UK heatwaves appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Open access notables

Early warning signals for tipping points in complex climate systems, LIU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research

The growing risk of climate tipping events underscores the urgent need for reliable early warning signals (EWS). Here we synthesize recent advances in EWS research for climate systems, systematically categorizing available methods into three groups, namely statistical indicators, nonlinear dynamical diagnostics, and data-driven approaches, and evaluating their theoretical applicability to practical limitations. In conclusion, statistical indicators offer theoretical clarity but are sensitive to non-stationary noise, nonlinear dynamical methods provide enhanced robustness in high-dimensional settings, and network- and deep learning-based approaches show the potential for detecting diverse tipping types, particularly when integrated with physical constraints and multi-modal observations. Given these trade-offs, we advocate for three practical strategies to enhance EWS utility, including adopting ensemble frameworks that combine multiple indicators to reduce false alarms, advancing cascade EWS to capture cross-system tipping interactions, and shifting from qualitative trend warnings toward quantitative, threshold-defined predictions with quantifiable uncertainties. We also discuss supporting techniques for these strategies, including adaptive noise filtering, dimensionality reduction, satellite data integration, and physics-informed machine learning. This review provides a structured reference for method selection across climate subsystems and data regimes, and underscores that operational EWS will require sustained integration of nonlinear dynamics, Earth observation, and data science.

Countering climate misinformation with large language models: Evidence from ChatGPT, Tsang & Wang, PLOS Climate

Public support for climate action hinges on the integrity of information environments. In an online experiment, U.S. adults used ChatGPT to evaluate climate-related claims. We first conducted computational text analysis of GPT conversation logs, assessing valence, formality, bias, recency, authority cues, and semantic richness of ChatGPT’s responses using language-model based classifiers and link-level metadata. Concurrently, we measured credibility judgments for both the claims and ChatGPT’s responses through participant self-reports. Credibility perceptions were driven primarily by individual differences; greater acceptance of the scientific consensus, attention to climate change, prior familiarity with ChatGPT, and younger age predicted higher perceived credibility. Once these factors were accounted for, authority cues were associated with slightly less extreme climate attitudes, while positive valence and semantic richness correlated positively with perceived credibility. These results support transparent, unbiased, audience-tailored engagement as a pathway to strengthen responsible climate communication and help bridge the gap between scientific consensus and public understanding.

Lost in Projection: Uncertainty is Misrepresented in Climate Risk and Vulnerability Assessments, Curran et al., Risk Analysis

In practice, many climate change risk assessments fail to capture the true depth of uncertainty. Despite widespread scientific recognition of deep uncertainty (large ranges of possibility) in climate conditions, this nuance is often lost in translation to policy and planning contexts; instead, conditions are presented as single projections. This means that communities are making large-scale infrastructure investments and long-term policy commitments based on false precision, leaving them unprepared for climate surprises or potentially wasting resources and disrupting communities unnecessarily by overadapting. To examine how climate uncertainties are represented and accounted for in adaptation planning, we conducted a structured review of 39 climate risk and vulnerability assessments from across the world, using sea level rise as a case study. These documents inform policy that guides billions of dollars in infrastructure investments and shape community preparedness strategies. Our analysis reveals that only 54% of these documents correctly represent sea level rise as deeply uncertain. This issue is compounded when making decisions; 71% of decisions were made by misapplying scenarios as individual projections to plan for, rather than as a tool for exploring potential future conditions, directly contradicting their intended use. This demonstrates a gap between scientific understanding of climate uncertainty and planning practice. Addressing this gap requires improved uncertainty communication, moving beyond just quantifying uncertainty to also characterizing uncertainty. This must be done in conjunction with the support of decision makers to incorporate a stronger understanding of uncertainty into planning by using tools designed specifically for decision making in deeply uncertain environments.

From this week's government/NGO section:

How Climate Resilient Are the World’s Largest Cities?, AlphaGeo

Geography is not destiny. Cities with near-identical physical risk scores diverge by as much as 33 resilience-adjusted risk (RAJ) points depending on the adaptation measures in place — demonstrating that risk is not fixed, and that resilience is a function of policy and investment, not geography alone. South Asian megacities face a compounding crisis. Ahmedabad (RAJ 41), Hyderabad Pakistan (41), Multan (38), Dhaka (36), Kolkata (35), and Lahore (35) combine extreme physical exposure with only moderate adaptation performance. European, African, and Latin American capitals outperform. Chicago, Addis Ababa, Melbourne, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, Paris, and Nairobi all score below 14 on the RAJ scale, making them among the most resilient major cities globally. Chinese megacities are closing the gap. Beijing (50%), Tianjin (49%), Shenzhen (49%), and Shanghai (46%) lead globally on adaptation efficiency — consistently converting high physical exposure into substantially lower residual risk. Mispriced risk is concentrated in South Asia. South Asia accounts for the majority of cities where residual RAJ scores remain high and adaptation rates remain comparatively low relative to the scale of physical exposure.

Heathrow Airport expansion risks for the Climate Change Act, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Manchester

The authors examine whether a third runway at Heathrow Airport is compatible with the UK’s domestic and international legal climate change obligations, and shows how growing airport capacity before climate technologies succeed will break the UK’s carbon budget. Through an analysis of future UK aviation scenarios and reviewing the status and outlook for key technology options, the authors findings show that Heathrow expansion cannot reasonably be considered consistent with UK Government climate targets. The authors examine three questions including the level of demand implied by an expanded Heathrow Airport; whether sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) can mitigate emissions arising from any net additional demand; and if greenhouse gas removal (GGR) expansion can address remaining additional residual emissions. This assessment is within the context of the UK’s Seventh Carbon Budget, which is a legally binding limit on greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in the period when the third runway is proposed to start operating. 92 articles in 50 journals by 638 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Anthropogenic forcing dominates relentless westward extension of the western North Pacific subtropical high, An et al., Atmospheric Research Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109301

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Transient overturning changes cause an upper-ocean nutrient decline in a warming climate, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52200-0 13 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

Changes in Compound Heat-Humidity over China: Insights from Homogenized Data, DENG et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.08.017

Long-term temperature, oxygen and water clarity trends in Swiss lakes, Bärenbold et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6527-2026

Recent intensification of extreme precipitation over East Antarctica driven by increases in greenhouse gases and stratospheric ozone, Chittella et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-5005-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Indian Ocean Acidification and Its Driving Mechanisms Over the Last Four Decades (1980–2019), Global Biogeochemical Cycles, 10.1029/2024gb008139 21 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

Advanced Visualization Techniques for Insight in Clouds and Climate Research, Sullivan et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society Open Access pdf 10.1175/bams-d-25-0055.1

An AI-driven reconstruction of global surface temperature with emphasis on refining the Antarctic record, Ouyang et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-6503-2026

Early warning signals for tipping points in complex climate systems, LIU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.002

Shallow Antarctic blue ice shows photochemical influence on trapped greenhouse gases, Lee et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03923-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
What is a heat wave: A survey and literature synthesis of heat wave definitions across the United States, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000468 18 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Downscaling and Trend Projection of Lightning Associated with Forest Lightning-Ignited Fires under Climate Change, Song et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106967

Global cities under multiple climate hazards, Nogherotto et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103132

Revealing Enhanced Signals of Future Marine Heatwave Changes in the East/Japan Sea Through a High-Resolution Dynamical Downscaling Ensemble, Oh et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef007760

The Source of Arctic Precipitation in HadGEM3-GC5, Ridley et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046751

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Strong regional trends in extreme weather over the next two decades under high- and low-emissions pathways, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01511-4 52 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Diagnosing CESM2 Biases in Northwest Indian Ocean Warming and Its Implications for India Summer Monsoon Precipitation, Chen et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl123060

Evaluating Deep Learning Models for Streamflow Prediction Under RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 Climate Scenarios, Piri et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106972

Global Kilometer-Scale Simulations with ARP-GEM2: Effect of Parameterized Convection and Calibration, Geoffroy & Saint-Martin, Journal of Climate pdf 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0650.1

Spurious Drifts in the ITCZ Location and Associated Atmospheric Circulation in Decadal Climate Predictions, Mahmood et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124719

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Artificial intelligence for climate prediction of extremes: State of the art, challenges, and future perspectives, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.914 113 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

Attribution of the Spread in Antarctic Sea Ice-Driven Water Mass Transformation in Coupled Climate Models, Chen et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jc024388

Glaciers of Ecuador: a review of current scientific knowledge, Avila & Campos, Earth-Science Reviews Open Access 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105680

Permafrost Degradation Drives Shifts in Chemostasis and Stream Geochemistry in the McMurdo Dry Valleys, Antarctica, Wright et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125327

Refreezing variability in the Greenland Ice Sheet firn zone and its response to extreme melt events, CHEN et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.08.015

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:

Evolution of the Antarctic Ice Sheet Over the Next Three Centuries From an ISMIP6 Model Ensemble, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004561 73 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

An improvement to short term variability in Global Mean Sea Level reconstruction, Shaw et al., Ocean science Open Access pdf 10.5194/os-22-2673-2026

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Global and regional climate change impacted Paleogene mammal faunas in Central Asia, Benevento et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-77374-7

Paleogeographic controls on Phanerozoic weathering rates and implications for climate regulation, Graham et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77289-3

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Opposing Changes in Indian Summer Monsoon Rainfall Variability Produced by Orbital and Anthropogenic Forcing, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl109897 8 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Aggravated forest fragmentation undermines productivity spatial stability and amplifies climate impact, Huang et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111455

An Integrated Oceanographic and Physiological Framework for Identifying Climate Refugia for Marine Invertebrates, Provost et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71091

Climate and Ecosystem Impacts of a Weakened Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) in Brazil, Komarov et al., Earth Interactions Open Access 10.1175/ei-d-25-0050.1

Ecosystem response of an anthropogenically impacted lagoon to induced climate-driven water stagnation: an enclosure experiment, Burini et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108393

Habitat Selection and Intrapopulation Spatial Segregation in an Arctic Top Predator at the Southern Limit of Its Range, Ross et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71024

Invertebrates at the Land-Sea Interface in a Climate Change World: Heatwaves, Floods, Fire and Ice, Byrne & Ross, Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71096

Mapping the Global Habitat Redistribution of Critically Endangered Commercial Fish Species Under Climate Change, Gong et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71077

Modeling climate adaptive habitat connectivity for conservation planning in Colombia, Song et al., Ecography Open Access 10.1002/ecog.08789

Modelling Climate-Resilient Habitats for Conservation and Restoration of Isoberlinia doka Craib and Stapf and Isoberlinia tomentosa (Harms) Craib and Stapf in Benin, Adjahossou et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1002/cli2.70062

Nonuniform resizing of marine life under climate change, Trindade-Santos et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2606099123

Parrotfish demonstrate little behavioural shift during marine heatwaves, Golanski et al., Biology Letters Open Access 10.1098/rsbl.2026.0337

Phenological fluctuations induce seasonal asymmetric warming in boreal forests, Yan et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77464-6

Plant dominated ecosystem respiration of alpine meadow in permafrost region under experimental warming, Qin et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.003

Predicted Global Redistribution of Pyrophilous Beetle Melanophila acuminata (Coleoptera: Buprestidae) Under Climate Change, Wang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74317

Projected AMOC Weakening Controls Future Diatom Decline in the Subpolar North Atlantic Ocean, Doléac et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef007992

Virulent Parasites Emerge in Hosts With Rising Temperatures, Hector et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71082

With Knowledge Comes Responsibility: Increasing Conservation Scientists’ Impact in a Time of Global Crises, Martin et al., Conservation Letters Open Access pdf 10.1111/con4.70076

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global change and premature hatching of aquatic embryos, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17488 22 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Atmospheric CH4 plateau sustained by NOx emission rise and southward shift, Zhu et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10983-w

C-PEAT’s Global Peatland Carbon Database (v.2025), Loisel et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6485-2026

Coordinated satellite, aircraft, and ground-based observations of a large transient methane release, He et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2603595123

Drivers of northern peatland CO2 fluxes revisited: interacting water level-temperature dependency, Behrens et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77456-6

Engineering carbon emissions induced by permafrost degradation and mitigation strategy: Insights from the Qinghai–Tibet Highway, LAN et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.005

Enhanced carbon loss in the Southern Ocean under mitigation scenarios, Lee et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aee9228

Global ecosystem carbon losses from earthquakes, He et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04012-x

Greenhouse Gas and Climate Effects of Global Wetland Restoration Under Future Warming, Wagner et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008632

Significant Decline in Carbon Storage at the Edges of Mangrove Forest, Zhao et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008723

Significant Reduction in Ethane Emissions in the Denver-Julesburg Basin From 2015 to 2021 From Oil and Natural Gas Operations, Ngulat et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jd044690

Temporal Amplification of Microbial Necromass Contribution to Soil Organic Carbon Under Nutrient Addition, Zhang et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2026gb009455

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global riverine land-to-ocean carbon export constrained by observations and multi-model assessment, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01524-z 93 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Asymmetric Response of Land Precipitation Variability Under Carbon Dioxide Removal, Gan et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd047086

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Enhancing electrochemical carbon dioxide capture with supercapacitors, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52219-3 61 cites.

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Decarbonization

Building a scalable climate coalition for heavy industry, Wolfram et al., Science 10.1126/science.aef7190

Copper supply chain decarbonization for the energy transition must maximize copper recovery, Cox et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03977-z

Toward efficient green methanol from biomass and renewable power, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77364-9

Towards a zero-waste city: carbon emissions and reduction potential from solid waste management in Wuhan, Tian et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.33465965

Utilising urban energy structure as a carbon management strategy for carbon emissions mitigation and climate neutrality, Sun & Tang, Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-68670-9

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Permeability partitioning through the brittle-to-ductile transition and its implications for supercritical geothermal reservoirs, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52092-0 28 cites.

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Black carbon

Atmospheric deposition, aquatic transformation and marine carbon sequestration potential of black carbon: A critical review, Wu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108384

Increase in global warming potential of atmospheric black carbon since 1750, Shen et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02085-z

Aerosols

Direct Radiative Impacts of Stratospheric Aerosols on the Tropical Troposphere: Clouds, Precipitation, and Circulation in Convection-Resolving and Global Simulations, McGraw & Polvani, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0688.1

Potential aerosol tradeoffs of vessel speed reduction for fresh ship plume composition and tracer coverage, Shi et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access 10.1038/s41612-026-01532-3

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Surface albedo regulates aerosol direct climate effect, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52255-z 27 cites.

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Climate change communications & cognition

Countering climate misinformation with large language models: Evidence from ChatGPT, Tsang & Wang, PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000930

Moralizing reproduction in a warming world: rethinking climate-reproductive concern beyond WEIRD contexts, Tu et al., Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2729092

Unsupervised NLP for quantifying sentiment deviation and framing in global climate discourse, K et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1827024

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Tackling the academic air travel dependency. An analysis of the (in)consistency between academics’ travel behaviour and their attitudes, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102908 27 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

A biological carbon pump code of practice for high seas fisheries, Cavan et al., Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 10.1038/s43017-026-00825-8

Collaborative learning networks on climate change adaptation practices among smallholder farmers: A case study from Central Uganda, Kekirunga et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100879

Genetically engineered crop adoption support yields and cultivation under climate change, Dong et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02737-3

Hail Risk and Cropland Exposure Changes in the United States, Bundy et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0160.1

Mapping the Global Habitat Redistribution of Critically Endangered Commercial Fish Species Under Climate Change, Gong et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71077

No significant long-term enhancement of sedimentary carbon burial by intensive Porphyra farming: Evidence from Haizhou Bay, China, Chen et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108396

Spatiotemporal evolution and influencing factors of the agricultural carbon footprint in the yellow river basin, Zhou & Pan, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1793645

The OsUVR8-OsNAC3-OsERF117 signaling module mediates metabolic acclimation and climate adaptation in rice, Liu et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aef5945

Transitioning From Rice-Wheat to Diversified Rice-Based Rotations Enhances Rice Production and Mitigates Greenhouse Gas Emissions Across Asia, Wang et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008580

‘We always make it work’: How Swedish dairy farmers manage and prepare for an unknown future of extreme weather, Simonsson et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100881

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change exacerbates the environmental impacts of agriculture, Science, 10.1126/science.adn3747 515 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Contrasting roles of climate change and land-use change on runoff dynamics in a semi-humid monsoon watershed of China, Afzal et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-67812-3

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Evaluation of precipitation extremes in ERA5 reanalysis driven regional climate simulations over the CORDEX-Australasia domain, Weather and Climate Extremes, 10.1016/j.wace.2024.100676 17 cites.

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Climate change economics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The role of green financial sector initiatives in the low-carbon transition: A theory of change, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102915 29 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Benchmarking climate futures: the public authorization of climate pathways and its political afterlives, Park, Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2729097

Crediting temporarily bound carbon reduces emissions and costs in integrated production of EU refineries, Bussmann et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03891-4

Stringent climate policies and energy poverty: Evidence of spatial spillovers and challenges for a just transition, Bai & Huaccha, Energy Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115590

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The impact of electricity market reform on renewable energy production, Energy Policy, 10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114306 35 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Applying design thinking for innovative climate adaptation solutions: Building capacity for locally led adaptation, Ziervogel et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104481

Assessing Wildfire Hazard for Powerline Expansion Under the Changing Climates in Alberta, Canada, Zong et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124354

Climate vulnerability and the subnational distribution of adaptation funding, Alberola, Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104488

Geospatial assessment of tropical islands vulnerability and impact under extreme cyclonic conditions, mitigation and management for climate-resilient planning, Raja et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103134

Limits and barriers to climate adaptation among Indigenous women: Insights from Vedda communities in Sri Lanka, Garbutt et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104478

Lost in Projection: Uncertainty is Misrepresented in Climate Risk and Vulnerability Assessments, Curran et al., Risk Analysis Open Access pdf 10.1111/risa.70331

Ten critical questions for scaling up floating developments, MacAfee et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77492-2

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
What is limiting how we imagine climate change adaptation?, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 10.1016/j.cosust.2024.101476 43 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Health impacts of climate change on children and adolescents: an umbrella review, Yahaya et al., BMC Public Health Open Access 10.1186/s12889-026-29270-4

Metabolic response and microbial assembly in the invader Ageratina adenophora with contrasting growth under local plant leaf and soil inoculants, Zhao et al., Plant and Soil 10.1007/s11104-026-09027-z

Mortality risks of seasonal temperature anomalies and the unrecognized risk of winter warmth: a nationwide case-time series, Ham et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-71032-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Spatio-temporal characteristics of Heat stress over Nigeria using evaluated ERA5-HEAT reanalysis data, Weather and Climate Extremes, 10.1016/j.wace.2024.100704 24 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics

Climate and digital transitions in a changing global order: resource dependencies, connectivity and uneven development, Meraj et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2726446

Climate change impacts on human culture

Climate extremes are associated with crime dynamics in China, Lin et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03948-4

Community-based archaeology reinforces Indigenous cultural resilience to climate change in Alaska, Hillerdal, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03970-6

Other

Investigation of the failure mechanism and reinforcement control effect of cut slopes under climate change, Meng, Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/feart.2026.1896698

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The 2023 Atlantic Hurricane Season: An Above-Normal Season despite Strong El Niño Conditions, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 10.1175/bams-d-23-0305.1 15 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

The Anthropocene debate, Chernilo, European Journal of Social Theory 10.1177/1368431016651874

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Disaster effects of climate change in High Mountain Asia: State of art and scientific challenges, Advances in Climate Change Research, 10.1016/j.accre.2024.06.003 75 cites.

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Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

2025 Electricity ATB Technologies and Data Overview, National Renewable Energy Lab

The 2025 Electricity Annual Technology Baseline (ATB) provides consistent, freely available, technology-specific cost and performance parameters across a range of research and development (R&D) advancement scenarios, resource characteristics, and sites for electricity-generating technologies, both at present and with projections through 2060. Two sets of financial assumptions are available: The With Tax Credits Case includes some effects of tax credits enacted as of July 2025, and the Without Tax Credits Case (shown by default in the figures) does not. The performance parameters in the Electricity ATB include Capital expenditures (CAPEX), Operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditures, and Capacity factors.

Heat Pump Rates in Rhode Island, Zuo et al., Conservation Law Foundation, Green Energy Consumers Alliance, Acadia Center, and Environmental Defense Fund

The authors analyze the electric bills of heat pump customers served by Rhode Island Energy (RIE). Under today’s rates, most gas-heated homes would pay more after switching to heat pumps. Only 21% of natural gas-heated households would save on their annual energy bills after installing a heat pump — not because heat pumps are inherently expensive to run, but because electricity bills are inflated by RIE's outdated delivery rates. The grid can handle the additional winter load. RIE should create a dedicated delivery rate class for heat pump customers that reflects what these customers actually cost the system — rather than letting default volumetric rates collect far more than the cost of serving them.

A Livable Future: Protecting Jobs and Growth from Extreme Heat in South Asia's Cities, Jain et al., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank Group

South Asia must absorb roughly 280 million new working-age people by 2050, most of them in cities, at a time when its labor markets already struggle to keep pace. Extreme heat is widening that shortfall. It already subtracts the equivalent of 31 million full-time jobs a year across the region and erodes the earnings of those who keep working. The losses concentrate in the cities where the new workforce must find employment, and they fall hardest on the households least able to absorb them. Heat reduces productivity in existing work, discourages the investment that will create new jobs, and shifts labor demand towards cooling and heat-resilient industries. Managing it has become integral to the region’s growth and jobs agenda, and governments can begin now, through institutions and budgets already in place. The authors set out how: heat and South Asia’s jobs challenge; the costs of inaction are large and growing; what needs to happen: three pillars, 15 interventions; what each decision-maker can do now; and the decade ahead.

Heathrow Airport expansion risks for the Climate Change Act, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Manchester

The authors examine whether a third runway at Heathrow Airport is compatible with the UK’s domestic and international legal climate change obligations, and shows how growing airport capacity before climate technologies succeed will break the UK’s carbon budget. Through an analysis of future UK aviation scenarios and reviewing the status and outlook for key technology options, the authors findings show that Heathrow expansion cannot reasonably be considered consistent with UK Government climate targets. The authors examine three questions including the level of demand implied by an expanded Heathrow Airport; whether sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) can mitigate emissions arising from any net additional demand; and if greenhouse gas removal (GGR) expansion can address remaining additional residual emissions. This assessment is within the context of the UK’s Seventh Carbon Budget, which is a legally binding limit on greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in the period when the third runway is proposed to start operating.

The Colorado River Water Supply Crisis in a Few Graphs: Part 2, Agricultural Water Use in the Lower Basin, Schmidt et al., Getches-Wilkinson Center, University of Colorado Law School

Reductions in Lower Basin water use during the last four years, including forecast use in 2026, are similar to the initial targets for Lower Basin shortages described in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (FEIS) and the accompanying Record of Decision (ROD). Lower Basin consumptive use in 2023, 2024, and 2025, and forecast for 2026 has been the smallest for the entire 2010-2026 period. These four years of smallest use are between 1.4 and 1.7 million acre feet/year (maf/yr) less than the 7.50 maf/yr amount generally recognized as the Lower Basin’s mainstem allocation. Reductions in Lower Basin use have been achieved by large reductions implemented by Central Arizona Project (CAP) contractors and subcontractors, the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), and non-CAP water users in Arizona. The reductions in use in the IID have been in summer water use and have not affected consumptive use in winter when garden crops, such as lettuce, onions, carrots, and broccoli, are grown.

Employing Domain-Informed AI for Energy Planning and Decarbonization under Uncertainty, Obringer et al., Institute for Water, Environment and Health, United Nations University

Renewable energy is a critical part of climate change mitigation but is also more susceptible to adverse climate conditions than fossil fuel-based energy generation. The electricity grid is further stressed by growing demand and the expansion of power-intensive end-uses, e.g., data centers and EVs, whose growth trajectory already exceeds the anticipated capacity expansion needs. Current long-term planning of electric grid upgrades and expansion generally relies on historical weather and climate trends that are unlikely to remain stable in the coming decades. In the past, the complexity of large-scale climate downscaling has inhibited deeper integration of climate projections and energy planning models. Failing to integrate climate projections exposes public infrastructure to severe physical and fiscal risk. Domain-informed AI can be used as a complement to existing tools to provide forward-looking information on the effects of climate change on renewable energy integration, informing decarbonization policies. Unregulated AI data centers consume massive amounts of electricity, directly straining the grid. Policymakers should mandate that this computational infrastructure of AI operates primarily on verifiable renewable energy.

Opposition to Renewable Energy Facilities in the United States: September 2026 Edition, Romany Webb and Ivonne Norman, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia University

The authors document legal obstacles and challenges to renewable energy siting at the state- and local-levels in the United States. In particular, the the authors focus on: (a) state laws and local ordinances that impede the siting of utility-scale solar, wind, battery storage, and related transmission projects, referred to as “state and local restrictions”; and (b) instances of organized opposition to individual projects, referred to as “contested projects”.

Peat-Emit. Supporting developing economies to estimate and report greenhouse gas emissions from organic soils, Freeman et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Accurate estimates of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from organic soils are essential for effective climate reporting and mitigation, yet developing countries often lack region-specific data to support reliable estimates. The authors address that gap by reviewing and synthesizing the latest available evidence on emissions from organic soils to develop updated greenhouse gas emission factors (EFs) tailored to developing economies. The authors focus on terrestrial emissions of carbon dioxide (CO?), methane (CH?), and nitrous oxide (N?O), and also evaluate emissions from tropical peatland fires, including fuel consumption and combustion completeness. Developing regions included are East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa, where existing emission factors have been limited or insufficiently representative. Although aquatic emission pathways were reviewed, they were not updated because new robust data is still lacking. These updated factors will improve the accuracy of national greenhouse gas inventories and support countries in meeting their reporting obligations and advancing climate mitigation efforts under international frameworks.

How Climate Resilient Are the World’s Largest Cities?, AlphaGeo

Geography is not destiny. Cities with near-identical physical risk scores diverge by as much as 33 resilience-adjusted risk (RAJ) points depending on the adaptation measures in place — demonstrating that risk is not fixed, and that resilience is a function of policy and investment, not geography alone. South Asian megacities face a compounding crisis. Ahmedabad (RAJ 41), Hyderabad Pakistan (41), Multan (38), Dhaka (36), Kolkata (35), and Lahore (35) combine extreme physical exposure with only moderate adaptation performance. European, African, and Latin American capitals outperform. Chicago, Addis Ababa, Melbourne, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, Paris, and Nairobi all score below 14 on the RAJ scale, making them among the most resilient major cities globally. Chinese megacities are closing the gap. Beijing (50%), Tianjin (49%), Shenzhen (49%), and Shanghai (46%) lead globally on adaptation efficiency — consistently converting high physical exposure into substantially lower residual risk. Mispriced risk is concentrated in South Asia. South Asia accounts for the majority of cities where residual RAJ scores remain high and adaptation rates remain comparatively low relative to the scale of physical exposure.

WMO Air Quality and Climate Bulleting, World Meteorological Organization

The authors highlight the need for improved atmospheric observations of air pollutants such as fine particulate matter, and ground-level ozone, as well as aerosol like black carbon and microplastics, which are not sufficiently monitored even though they are widespread and are potentially harmful to ecosystems. They stress the importance of complementary and coordinated policies on air quality and climate because they cannot be dealt with in isolation.

Weathering Extremes: A Toolkit for Information Resilience Amid Disaster, Jennie King, Council on Strategic Risks

Extreme weather events are fueling dangerous mis- and disinformation in communities across the United States. These crises can happen anywhere, as hyper-local events are weaponized by domestic or transnational actors. The resulting chaos endangers lives and hinders local responses during a crisis, and has corrosive effects on policymaking and community resilience in the long term. It also threatens to undermine national security by disrupting critical infrastructure, empowering extremists and foreign adversaries, and paralyzing decision-making. The toolkit positions information resilience as a key element of disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. It provides a model that combines upstream efforts to build readiness and trust architecture, with frameworks to triage and counter information threats when a crisis strikes. It is designed primarily for emergency managers, resilience officers, and public information officers. In tandem, it details how a more expansive set of actors is needed to realize and embed outcomes, working across government at the state, local, and tribal levels.

Assessing overcapacity risk in India’s solar PV manufacturing market, Sharma et al., The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis

India’s solar PV module manufacturing capacity reached approximately 233 gigawatts (GW) by June 2026, placing it among the world’s largest module manufacturing bases. However, this capacity is heavily concentrated in modules, at nearly 7x cell capacity and 116x ingot-wafer capacity, signaling a structural gap in upstream manufacturing. India’s module manufacturing base is operating at 35–40% utilization, well below the 50–65% level required for sustainable operations. With manufacturing capacity already exceeding domestic demand, further capacity additions risk widening the supply-demand gap in modules. Data centers, green hydrogen, and export markets could be the largest sources of incremental module demand by 2030, offering 17–22GW of annual additional opportunity beyond conventional solar deployment. Their ability to scale up will depend on supportive policy, project execution, and evolving procurement dynamics. Vertically integrated manufacturers with scale and technology depth are positioned to define the industry’s next growth phase. Small-scale assemblers, legacy Passive Emitter and Rear Cell (PERC)-based lines, and manufacturers without an upstream integration roadmap will be at risk of consolidation, acquisitions, or exit.

Built for backup, contracted to run: China’s coal support system risks crowding out clean power, Qi Qin and Christine Shearer, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air

New coal power plants entering operation in China reached the highest first-half year level since 2016, with 10 GW entering operation for every 1 GW retired, despite a policy shift towards tighter control of new project approvals. China commissioned 30 GW of new coal power, up 43% from last year, while retiring only 2.7 GW. Another 25.4 GW started construction. Coal power generation rebounded 3.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, reversing the 2025 decline. The rapid expansion of coal power capacity led to worsening oversupply, reflected both in the increase of wasted wind and solar generation and in falling use of coal power plants. The rebound was not evidence of a broad return to coal following LNG shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. China’s combined domestic coal production and imports in fact fell by 1.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, rather than expanding in response to the external energy shock. Growth in clean energy supply and electrification helped offset the fall in oil supply and limit increases in fossil fuel consumption.

Challenges related to sea level rise and ways and approaches to address it : report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly of the United Nations

The authors provide an assessment of the current context of sea level rise, key challenges and ongoing efforts by Member States and the United Nations system to address such challenges. The author provide forward-looking recommendations recognizing the global multidimensional effects of sea level rise and their implications for human rights and sustainable development. The authors call for strengthened international cooperation to ensure equitable, just and sustainable solutions that uphold the rights of affected States and their populations, through international governance frameworks and action that safeguard dignity, stability and opportunities for those affected and future generations.

Hidden assets: The economic and health case for climate and clean air action, Climate and Clean Air Coalition, United Nations Environment Programme

The authors provide the most complete assessment to date of the benefits and costs of integrated climate and clean air action, complemented by an empirically grounded analysis of how these benefits can be delivered quickly enough to avoid premature deaths and disease and improve the lives of many of the world’s most vulnerable people.

EV Transition Check 2026: Measuring progress toward zero emissions for road transport in Europe, Marie Rajon Bernard and Alexander Plummer, International Council on Clean Transportation

The authors assess the progress of Europe’s road transport toward zero emissions. This second edition widens the scope to include trucks and buses in addition to passenger cars. The authors provide a broad range of data and analysis for a comprehensive snapshot of the current status of the transition to battery electric vehicles (BEV). In terms of the affordability and accessibility of BEVs, the number of passenger car BEV models on offer in Europe’s largest automotive market, Germany, has quadrupled between 2020 and 2025 to about 160, and affordable options, defined as BEVs priced below €30,000, have grown to about 35. BEVs in the three largest car segments (medium, upper-medium, and luxury) have already reached upfront cost parity with comparable internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs). Although the median BEV sales price has increased in recent years, so has the electric range by approximately 30% on average in the past 5 years. Factoring in improvements in performance as well as inflation, BEV prices have decreased by about 18% over the past 5 years, spurred primarily by a decrease in global battery prices, which, adjusted for inflation, have fallen by about 35% in the past 5 years. The delta between battery cost reductions and BEV sale prices indicates further potential for BEV price reductions in the upcoming years. About New Research

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Extreme heat is one of the deadliest climate hazards, but no two heatwaves are the same.

Heat extremes that happen outside of the peak summer months are often more dangerous because they can catch people off guard.

Heatwaves that hit during the spring or the first heatwave of the summer are riskier because  people’s bodies are not yet accustomed to the heat and cooling strategies, such as air conditioning or public cooling centres, might not be available.

On the other hand, heatwaves that happen in the autumn, after a long summer season of heat exposure, can place further strain on bodies and local infrastructure that are already under stress.

As the climate changes and global temperatures rise, research has shown that heatwaves are becoming more frequent, intense and lengthy. 

Our study, published in AGU Advances, is the first to measure whether the timing of extreme heat during the calendar year is changing around the world.

We find that, in more than half of the world, extreme heat events are spreading into the “shoulder seasons”, but doing so unevenly – in other words, they tend to creep more into autumn or spring, depending on the location. 

Defining heat seasons 

Meteorological summer is often assumed to be the warmest three-month period of the year. It is simplistically defined as June to August in the northern hemisphere and December to February in the southern hemisphere.

However, extreme heat seasons vary from place to place and do not always neatly map on to these defined periods. 

Our study, therefore, goes beyond traditional definitions of seasons and instead focuses on “local heat seasons”. We define these as the three consecutive months when extreme heat events happened most often in the 1980s. 

From this starting point, our research looks at how extreme heat is creeping into the two-month periods before and after a local heat season. We call these periods “shoulder seasons”.

This flexible definition of heat and shoulder seasons allows us to measure how the timing of extreme heat has changed over time. 

Specifically, we look at the percent of annual heat days that occurred in the heat season and shoulder seasons at each location on Earth and measure how those relative shares have shifted over the last 45 years.

For our analysis, we use climate data from 1980-2024 from the MERRA2 reanalysis dataset. To ensure our results were robust, we repeated the process using ERA5 reanalysis data. 

We picked the 1980s as our baseline decade as it was the start of the common time period between the two reanalysis datasets. We compared this to climate data in the decade between 2015-24. 

Comparing these two time periods – the opposite ends of our datasets – allowed us to register a larger magnitude change and account for cumulative effects of climate change.

We consider measures of both dry and humid heat, as each has distinct impacts. Dry heat tends to be more dangerous to plant and ecosystem health, while humid heat is more strenuous for humans.

We use the dry-bulb temperature and wet-bulb globe temperature as our measures of dry and humid heat, respectively. 

Created in the 1950s by the US military, wet-bulb globe temperature has a long history as an international standard used for outdoor sports and occupational hazard monitoring. It combines measurements of temperature, humidity, wind speed and solar radiation.

Changing heat seasons

Our research finds that, in the 1980s, extreme heat around the world was closely confined to a single heat season. For example, some 93% of the world’s land area experienced more than 80% of extreme dry-heat days during its traditional dry-heat season. 

Surprisingly, this was even true in the tropics, where there is much less of a seasonal swing in temperatures.

We also show that extreme dry- and humid-heat seasons are often different from one another, typically offset by one month. This is especially true in places influenced by monsoon systems, such as north-western Mexico and central India, where the extreme dry-heat season precedes the extreme humid-heat season. 

But, the edges of these extreme heat seasons are starting to blur. 

Extreme heat events are spreading out significantly in the calendar year in more than half of global land areas.

This extension of the extreme dry- and humid-heat seasons means that dangerous heat has started to creep into the shoulder seasons – but not equally so.

The maps below show how, in western Europe, southern Africa and north-western India, a larger fraction of each year’s extreme heat events are happening in the months before the historical dry- and humid-heat seasons. These regions are shaded in green.

On the other hand, in much of the US, eastern China, northern Africa and eastern Europe, extreme heat events are increasing in frequency in the months after the traditional heat seasons. These regions are shaded in purple.

Shift of the extreme dry- (top) and humid-heat (bottom) seasons, where green indicates a greater percentage of heat events in the two months before the traditional heat season (analogous to spring in the mid-latitudes) and purple a greater percentage of extreme heat events in the two months after (autumn in the mid-latitudes). Black shading indicates locations without a consecutive three-month heat season. Credit: Ivanovich et al. (2026) Boosting existing seasons

It is possible that these observed changes have a straightforward – and somewhat simple  – explanation.

In many regions, one shoulder season – spring or autumn – is warmer than the other. One hypothesis we explored was whether a simple step up in daily heat across the calendar year makes it more likely for extreme heat days to occur in one shoulder season over the other.

Our research shows that things are not so simple.

To investigate, we created a new, “synthetic” timeseries in order to identify the impact of annual average warming. To do this, we took the baseline 1980s timeseries and “shifted up” the data by the average change in local dry or humid heat between the first and last 10 years of our dataset (1980-89 compared to 2015-24).

We find that, in most locations, intensifying the baseline seasonality in a given location by warming evenly over the course of the year explains the changes in extreme heat timing within the traditional heat season.

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However, annual average warming alone cannot explain the uneven changes in how extreme heat is occurring in the shoulder seasons. 

As such, we conclude there must be other factors at play. 

Long-term changes in seasonal precipitation and soil moisture – whether drying or moistening – could be contributing. 

There could also be potential links to land-use changes, such as agricultural intensification or increased irrigation. Natural fluctuations in regional climates, caused by phenomena such as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation and Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation, could also be playing an important role.

To tease out the contributions of each of these drivers, scientists will need to conduct more regionally-focused studies.

Managing hazards

The expansion of extreme heat events into the shoulder seasons indicates that key protections, such as heat early warning systems and the establishment of cooling centres, may be needed outside the traditional summer months.

Further research is also required to look into whether the overlap of extreme heat with other seasonal hazards is increasing.

For example, we find that, throughout much of the US, there is a larger expansion of the heat season into the autumn than the spring. In the western US, extreme heat which stretches later into the year could increase the overlap between the extreme heat and wildfire seasons. 

Meanwhile, a similar extension of the heat season into the autumn in the eastern US could increase the overlap between the extreme heat and Atlantic hurricane seasons.

Understanding how the intersection of these seasonal hazards is changing is essential for developing targeted climate adaptation strategies, given that multiple hazards happening at once or in quick succession are much more dangerous than when they happen in isolation.

Ivanovich, C. et al. (2026) Extreme dry- and humid-heat seasons are changing asymmetrically, AGU Advances, doi:10.1029/2026AV002516

related Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C 01.09.2026 Climate pollutants Guest post: France’s June heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths 07.07.2026 Health and society Guest post: Climate change has caused one-fifth of Pine Island glacier retreat 29.06.2026 Antarctica Q&A: What change of power in Colombia could mean for world’s fossil-fuel transition 26.06.2026 International policy

The post Guest post: How extreme heat is ‘creeping’ from summer into autumn and spring appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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The UK government has slashed its hopes for electric planes and “sustainable aviation fuels” (SAFs), ahead of giving the green light to a third runway at Heathrow.

An “ambitious” rollout of new technologies and efficiency upgrades will only cut flight emissions by a quarter over the next two decades, according to forecasts quietly released in June.

This would leave aviation emissions in 2050 nearly 50% higher than expected under the “jet-zero” strategy, launched by the previous Conservative government in 2022.

The Labour government has signalled its support for a contentious third runway at Heathrow airport, with a final planning decision expected by 2029.  

Ministers have justified this expansion by citing the rollout of clean-aviation technologies.

Yet, the updated forecasts suggest that rising flight numbers and a reduced role for “techno-fixes” will leave aviation emissions stubbornly high in 2050 – the UK’s legal target for net-zero.

If this is to be compatible with UK climate goals, then these higher emissions from flights in 2050 would need to be taken out of the atmosphere using costly and largely unproven “carbon dioxide removal” technologies – or by planting gigantic new forests.

Emissions up 

The previous government’s “jet-zero” strategy committed the UK to a “high ambition” pathway that would have seen aviation emissions peak at 38.2m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2019 and drop to 19.3MtCO2e in 2050.

At the time, the Conservative government said this “clear goal” was achievable, alongside airport expansion and rising flight numbers.

Its strategy relied heavily on the extensive use of early-stage technologies, such as SAFs and battery-powered planes, as well as wider fuel-efficiency improvements.

In public statements, Labour has broadly continued this approach, backing new airport runways while supporting SAFs as a way to curb aviation emissions.

However, the government’s latest forecast, quietly published ahead of the formal approval of a new runway at Heathrow, sets far lower expectations for these technologies.

Its “technology development” pathway, with “ambitious carbon abatement measures”, only sees emissions drop to 28.1MtCO2e in 2050. As the chart below shows, this is around 9MtCO2e higher than the jet-zero strategy’s stated goal – a roughly 50% increase.

The shift is down to much lower expectations for SAF uptake, fuel-efficiency improvements and the roll-out of battery-powered planes, as well as lower international carbon prices.

The government now expects SAFs to make up 30% of aviation fuel by 2050, rather than 50%. It also concedes that SAFs will save less carbon over their lifecycle than previously thought.

SAFs have faced considerable criticism, due to limited supplies and uncertainty around the extent to which they cut emissions. Even meeting the UK’s relatively modest goal of 22% SAF uptake by 2040 would require enormous – potentially unattainable – volumes of waste products, which are currently the main source of the fuel.

For its new forecasts, the government commissioned a separate analysis of likely aircraft fuel-efficiency improvements over the next few decades. This analysis, from the Aviation Impact Accelerator, yielded “less optimistic” projections than earlier work.

Fuel-efficiency improvements have therefore been revised downward from 2% per year in the “jet-zero” strategy to 1.3% in the new “technology development” scenario.

There is also a reduced role for battery-powered planes, with only some of the smallest zero-emissions aircraft expected to be in use by 2035.

Crucially, even making the more limited emissions cuts in the new “technology development” pathway would require greater efforts to decarbonise the aviation sector.

If the UK fails to implement new policies or innovations, while flight numbers continue to rise, then aviation emissions would be even higher in 2050 than they are today. 

This is illustrated by the pink “current trends” pathway in the chart above, in which emissions increase to 41.1MtCO2e by 2050.

This is roughly double the amount targeted by the jet-zero strategy and recommended by government climate advisors, the Climate Change Committee (CCC).

Budget ‘busting’

The new forecasts all account for the growth of several UK airports, including “planned Heathrow expansion”. Overall, passenger numbers would be at least 50% higher by 2050. 

In contrast, the CCC and other experts have advised that the rise in passenger numbers may need to be limited, in order to keep emissions down.

In order to meet the UK’s net-zero target, any aviation emissions that remain in 2050 would need to be offset by planting many thousands of hectares of new forest, or by relying on costly and largely unproven CO2 removal technologies.

Tim Johnson, director at the Aviation Environment Federation (AEF), says the new forecasts present “a more honest and realistic vision of what’s possible in the next 24 years”. However, he tells Carbon Brief:

“Less reliance on cleaner technology and fuels reopens the debate about the role and scale of greenhouse gas removals and ways to tackle the projected 50% growth in demand for air travel.”

AEF calculations, based on government data and shared with Carbon Brief, suggest that emissions from the third runway at Heathrow would initially be relatively modest, reaching 3.5MtCO2e per year in 2050. Its emissions would then be expected to rise significantly beyond the legal 2050 net-zero deadline.

Previously, the Labour government has explicitly cited SAFs and other new technologies as part of its justification for expanding Heathrow airport.

Dr Lois Pennington, a research associate at the University of Manchester who has analysed Heathrow’s emissions impact, says the government’s new forecast shows “we are projected to be well over aviation’s share of the carbon budget even before a third runway is considered”. 

She tells Carbon Brief:

“For Heathrow, it means expansion can no longer be waved through on the promise of technology, and any approvals will be in the full knowledge that it will bust our legally binding carbon budgets.”

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The post UK aviation emissions to be 50% higher than thought by 2050, government admits appeared first on Carbon Brief.

29 September | Online

Join Carbon Tracker and Transport & Environment, with guest panellists from the investor and sector community, for a 60-minute briefing on Carbon Tracker’s recently published report Trucking’s Tipping Point and an Investor Statement on zero emission freight. Drawing on the University of Exeter’s FTT model and Carbon Tracker’s market and asset data, the session sets out why heavy-truck electrification is becoming an economic rather than a regulatory decision, what that means for transition risk in the sector, and how exposed European incumbents are to faster-scaling Chinese competitors.

It will also introduce the Investor Statement on zero emission freight, coordinated by Transport & Environment, in the context of the current EU CO₂ standards review. For investors, this raises a pointed question: are automotive and industrials portfolios carrying transition risk that isn’t yet being priced in?

The post Trucking’s Tipping Point: Are Markets Underpricing the Electric-Truck Transition? appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

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• What happened?
• How did bedrock collapse trigger the flash floods?
• How have temperatures risen in the affected region? 
• How have rising temperatures affected mountain stability?
• How have glaciers retreated in the affected region?
• Can the event be attributed to climate change?

On the morning of 26 August, flash floods surged through a Himalayan border region of Nepal and the Chinese region of Tibet, killing more than 1,300 people, with thousands still missing.

In the days since the floods, scientists have examined satellite imagery, drone footage and seismic data in order to understand and explain the forces behind the event.

While initial theories pinned the flood on a glacial collapse, scientists now understand the event as a “multi-hazard cascade”, which began with a bedrock collapse. 

Some climate sceptics have tried to use this to falsely claim that human-caused climate change had no impact on the event. 

Yet, scientists have noted that, while no formal attribution study has been carried out thus far, warming is making such ice-rock avalanches in the region more likely.

Researchers have highlighted how rapid warming is dramatically reshaping Asia’s high-mountain region – and identified rising temperatures, glacier retreat and permafrost thaw as factors that may have all contributed to the disaster. 

Balendra Shah, Nepal’s prime minister, has called the floods a “serious signal that…the risks we must bear in the Himalayan region are increasing” due to climate change.

Here, Carbon Brief unpacks what scientists currently know about the causes of the catastrophic event and what they can – and cannot – say about the role of climate change. 

• What happened?
• How did bedrock collapse trigger the flash floods?
• How have temperatures risen in the affected region?
• How have rising temperatures affected mountain stability?
• How have glaciers retreated in the affected region?
• Can the event be attributed to climate change?

What happened?

A report published on 28 August by the HiRisk scientific consortium of high mountain experts detailed the events that led to the flash floods.

It said that events were set in motion on 26 August when a mass of bedrock, as well as the glacier ice on top of it, broke off a slope of Langtang-Lirung mountain in the Nepalese Himalaya, plunging from approximately 5,200 metres above sea level to the valley floor at 3,000 metres. 

The landslide shook the ground hard enough that, at 8:37am Nepal local time, the US Geological Survey (USGS) initially reported a magnitude 4.4 earthquake. Later that day, it clarified the shaking was caused by glacier collapse and debris flow, equivalent to a magnitude 5.2 earthquake.

On the valley floor, the melting ice, water and debris slammed into the Lhende Khola river, a high-altitude river that runs along Nepal’s border with China. 

Known downstream as the Bhote Koshi river in Nepal and the Poiqu or Poqu in China, the Lhende Khole feeds a network of rivers across Nepal and the Chinese region of Tibet, including the Trishuli river. (In China, the Lhende Khola is known as the Donglin Tsangpo.)

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Carbon Brief concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Credit: Carbon Brief.

A large “debris” lake was briefly formed on the valley floor. When this lake burst, a wall of water and rock travelled downstream, killing more than a thousand people and destroying settlements, roads, bridges, hydropower plants and border posts across Nepal and Tibet.

HiRisk said that the floodwave travelled down rivers as fast as 30km an hour (around 19 miles per hour) and reached Mugling – a Nepalese town more than 130km downstream – at around 1pm local time.

A separate report from the Center for Land Surface Hazards in the US noted that the flood moved “exceptionally fast, was sediment-laden and extreme in scale”. For example, in the Nepalese municipality of Galchhi, the Trishuli river rose by nine metres in 30 minutes, it said.

Writing in the Conversation, Dr Umesh Haritashya, a glaciologist at the University of Dayton in Ohio, explained that the disaster “wasn’t finished when the first wall of water passed [on 26 August]”. 

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He continued that a new “barrier lake” – estimated to hold a few million cubic metres of water – had developed in a location where two rivers meet in Tibet before crossing into Nepal. This lake burst on 28 August and the river rose again, he said. 

On 4 September, the chief of Nepal’s National Disaster ​Risk Reduction and Management Authority, told Reuters that property and infrastructure worth “at least” $2.5bn (£1.9bn) had been lost. Dharma Raj Upreti estimated the cost to build roads and temporary shelters, provide drinking water and ⁠restore power would be around $53m (£39m). 

How did bedrock collapse trigger the flash floods?

In the immediate aftermath of the floods, initial reports suggested that the trigger was a collapsing glacier or earthquake in the high mountains of Nepal.

After confirming that a seismic tremor was as a result of falling rock and ice, the USGS said the trigger was likely a “glacial collapse and debris flow”. This was widely picked up by the media. 

Subsequently, satellite imagery revealed that an “enormous chunk of the mountainous bedrock” beneath the glacier had also given way, reported the New York Times. 

Dr Kristen Cook, a geomorphologist at the Université Grenoble Alpes in France, told the newspaper:

“The rock that the glacier was sitting on collapsed…It was a much larger collapse than we were initially able to see in the satellite imagery.”

The result was a “deluge of rock and ice, which pulverized into mud and water as it surged down the mountainside”, the newspaper said.

Dr Jakob Steiner a geoscientist at the University of Graz in Austria, tells Carbon Brief:

“It was not a glacier that collapsed. It was the mountain below the glacier that collapsed and the glacier had no other chance but to go with it because it was sitting on top of it. 

“The trigger for that is something that we are not 100% certain about, but, in the end, it very much looks like simply a mechanical failure of the rock material because of stressors that have built up over a long period of time.”

Failures of “bedrock” – the hard, solid rock that sits below looser rocks and soil – are an “increasingly common occurrence”, says Prof Bethan Davies, a professor of glaciology at Newcastle University. She tells Carbon Brief:

“These massive landslides occur in mountain regions, commonly following rapid deglacierisation [the melting away of a glacier]. Similar events happened in the Chamoli event in 2021 [in the Indian Himalaya] and in the Blatten landslide last year in Switzerland. They’ve also occurred recently in Alaska.”

With a shift in focus from the failure of a glacier to the bedrock underneath, some climate sceptics seized on the development to falsely claim that climate change had not played any role in the disaster.

These include Dr Matthew Wielicki, recently appointed by the Trump administration to lead the US Global Change Research Program, on Twitter, as well as former Conservative peer and climate-sceptic commentator Matt Ridley in the Spectator. 

However, scientists have highlighted the likely contribution of rapid warming in the region. These factors include the thawing of permafrost and glacier retreat. (For more, see sections below).

Fundamentally, “this would have been a much less significant tragedy if it had been just a rock-slope failure”, notes Davies.

The initial landslide took a mixture of rock and ice into a valley that “contains buried ice” as well, she says, providing the water that “resulted in the hyperconcentrated flow, which took so many lives”.

How have temperatures risen in the affected region? 

Global temperatures have risen by roughly 1.4C since the pre-industrial period. However, this increase is not uniform across the planet, with some regions warming faster than others. 

A study published in Global and Planetary Change in June 2026 investigated changes in the Langtang catchment – a river basin in central Nepal, in which the Langtang-Lirung mountain is located, which eventually drains into the Ganges. Around one-quarter of the area is made up of glaciers.

The paper found that glacial areas of the catchment – found at 4,000 metres above sea level – warmed at 0.31C per decade over 1960-2023. This was “more than three times” the rate observed at a lower elevation weather station, the authors said.

Looking in more detail at the site of the glacial collapse, Dr Robert Rohde, chief scientist for Berkeley Earth, used ERA5 reanalysis data to show how temperature has changed at the 5,200-metre elevation site where the mass of ice and rock broke loose. 

Rohde’s analysis found that June-to-August temperatures have been rising at the site of the glacier collapse since the year 1940, with 2026’s summer the fourth warmest on record, behind 2024, 2025 and 2022. This is shown in the graph below.

Average summer (June-August) temperature at the ice-rock avalanche site over 1940-2026. Data source: Rohde, Bluesky (2026)

Rohde also found that the days leading up to the disaster recorded the hottest August temperatures ever experienced at the site. This is shown in the graph below.

Daily average temperature, from 1 June-1 September, at the ice-rock avalanche site. 2026, 2025 and 2024 are shown in dark, mid and light blue. All other years from 1940-2023 are shown in grey. Source: Rohde, Bluesky (2026)

On social media, Rohde stated:

“Given the warming trend, this Nepali glacier had probably been thinning and weakening for years, or even decades. But it ultimately failed during the warmest week in one of its warmest years on record. It would be a hell of a coincidence if global warming wasn’t at least partially to blame.”

How have rising temperatures affected mountain stability?

Many experts have linked warming temperatures in the region to thawing permafrost – ground that has been frozen for at least two consecutive years, whose thickness ranges from less than one metre to more than a kilometre. 

Steiner is part of a research team that has been using sensors to monitor permafrost in the region since 2014. He tells Carbon Brief that it is “pretty clear” the permafrost has been thawing “very actively” at elevations as high as 5,200 metres above sea level “for many years”. He adds:

“This means that the ground has, over the last decades, moved from being in a solid state into – at least, periodically during the warm season – patchy ground where some is frozen and some isn’t…

“If you have frozen ground next to non-frozen ground, you have dynamics happening between that because there are different densities and there’s movement happening, which is conducive to interventional failure – and that we know from many other cases.”

Davies also points to the “degradation” of perennially frozen ground as a factor in the disaster:

“This permafrost acts as a glue to hold together the rocks and, as it melts, the rock can become weakened.”

Permafrost thaw can also result in saturated ground, says Davies, which adds “pressure in the joints” of rock and can “facilitate” failure. She continues:

“Sources of the water include melting permafrost and meltwater from the overlying glacier. We know that this event happened during a period of warmth, but in the absence of heavy precipitation, pointing to ice melt as the source of water.”

A 2025 study of rock and ice avalanches in High Mountain Asia found that more than two-thirds started in areas “where permafrost is probable”.

How have glaciers retreated in the affected region?

Glaciers – frozen rivers of ice holding three-quarters of the global freshwater supply – are extremely vulnerable to climate change.

In the Himalaya, the rate of glacier retreat has doubled since the late 20th century, according to a 2019 study in Science Advances.

The Global and Planetary Change study found that glacier area loss rates in the Langtang catchment increased more than fourfold from 1964 to 2023 – with melting accelerating after 2000.

It added that glaciers in the region also experienced “fragmentation” and “widespread thinning” over this period.

The study noted that this loss “coincided with elevation dependent warming”.

The figure below provides an overview of glacier loss in the Langtang catchment over 1964-2023, with orange, red and dark red indicating areas of retreat.

In addition, green dots note points of glacier fragmentation, while blue dots show separation and pink show disconnection.

Glacier loss in the Langtang catchment over 1964-2023. Orange, red and dark red indicate areas of retreat. Green dots note points of glacier fragmentation, while blue dots show separation and pink show disconnection. Credit: Silwal et al. (2026)

In comments released by the University of Reading, Prof Maria Shahgedanova, a climate scientist researching climate impacts on mountain glaciers, said that the glacier involved in the floods had “retreated by approximately 450 metres between 1990 and 2020”.

She adds that this “potentially reduce[d] the mechanical support provided by the glacier to the underlying rock slope”.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Davies reiterates that the retreat of the glacier is “potentially a contributing factor” to the bedrock collapse and subsequent disaster.

This is because the removal of the glacier from the lower slopes leaves the “upper rock slopes less stable”, she says.

The most recent assessment by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development said that glaciers in the Hindu Kush Himalaya region are “rapidly shrinking” as a result of climate change. (This region extends 3,500km over Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan.)

It said this loss is threatening the safety of the nearly two billion people, including by increasing the risk of “glacial lake outburst floods” (GLOFs). A GLOF is a sudden and catastrophic release of meltwater from a glacial lake. 

Although this disaster was not caused by a GLOF, it is known that climate change is making such events more likely.

Can the event be attributed to climate change?

In the wake of the flash floods, climate campaigners, media outlets and Nepalese politicians have linked them to human-caused climate change.

However, many climate scientists have cautioned that it is too early to say precisely how climate change impacted the disaster. 

Davies tells Carbon Brief:

“These events happen so quickly that the exact causes and drivers can take a little time to uncover, especially if the event was a surprise and there had been no monitoring system in place.”

When trying to determine the role human-caused climate change played in the intensity or likelihood of extreme weather, scientists turn to the field of “attribution science”. 

To date, no formal rapid attribution study has been produced that attempts to quantify whether – and how – climate change contributed to the event.

Scientists have noted that climate attribution of ice-rock avalanches – which are typically driven by a variety of factors – remains limited, in part because of the lack of a long-term observational record of previous collapses in high mountain areas.

Meanwhile, the studies that do exist stop short of directly linking such disasters to climate change. For example, the authors of a 2021 study into the Chamoli ice-rock avalanche concluded that “we cannot attribute this individual disaster specifically to climate change”. 

However, they added, the “possibly increasing frequency of high-mountain slope instabilities can likely be related to observed atmospheric warming and corresponding long-term changes in cryospheric conditions (glaciers and permafrost)”.

In the aftermath of the disaster, many researchers have similarly highlighted that climate change could not be singled out as the cause of the disaster, even if warming likely increased the probability of its occurrence.

On the Climate Brink substack, Carbon Brief’s climate science contributor Dr Zeke Hausfather noted that a “definitive single-event attribution” of the more recent disaster “may never be possible” due to the “messy causality of rock-ice avalanches”.

However, he added that both the existing scientific literature and “essentially every scientist working on these hazards point in the same direction” – namely, that warming is making such events more likely in the Himalaya.

Steiner tells Carbon Brief it might be possible to attribute different factors that played a role in the disasters to climate change – for instance, the recession of the glacier – but it would be more difficult to do so for the event as a whole.

Part of the reason for this, he says, is that rock failures in this region of the Himalaya have occurred for millennia, well before humans started altering the climate. 

However, he continues:

“The physics of it is not something that has been made possible by climate change. This could have happened without it. But the chance of it happening – and the likelihood of it happening five years after a previous, similar event [in Chamoli] – we, as the scientific community, can be pretty confident about that [being increased because of a changing climate].

“This is because so many of the changes that we know are related to climate change can potentially drive the build-up to eventual failure.”

Ultimately, says Davies, a “careful attribution study is needed, but it is hard to argue that the rapidly warming climate is not having an effect in these regions”. She adds:

“A single event may have multiple drivers, but we are seeing an increase in these events and are likely to see more as the permafrost and glacier melt continues.”

Related Revealed: England’s June 2026 heatwave sparked record demand for ambulances 14.09.2026 Health and society El Niño: Indonesia fire emissions in 2026 ‘on track’ to match record for this century 11.09.2026 El Niño and La Niña Revealed: More than 1,000 NHS operations cancelled due to record UK heatwaves 11.09.2026 Health and society Guest post: How extreme heat is ‘creeping’ from summer into autumn and spring 10.09.2026 Heatwaves

The post Q&A: What can – and cannot – be said about global warming’s role in the 2026 Himalayan floods appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Skeptical Science is partnering with Gigafact to produce fact briefs — bite-sized fact checks of trending claims. You can submit claims you think need checking via the tipline.

Does hosting wind turbines provide farmers with additional income?

Wind projects provide farmers with substantial economic benefits while allowing most land to remain in agricultural use.

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimates about 98% of land within a typical wind project remains available for farming, grazing, or other uses.

Meanwhile, farmers who host turbines can receive long-term lease payments that provide additional income and financial stability. One study found that farmers with turbines invested about twice as much in their farms, while 80% had plans for who would take over or inherit the farm, compared with 62% of farmers without turbines.

Compared with the small amount of farmland used by turbines, unmitigated climate change poses broader risks to agriculture through heat, drought, shifting pests, and reduced crop yields.

Go to full rebuttal on Skeptical Science or to the fact brief on Gigafact

This fact brief is responsive to quotes such as this one.

Sources

NREL Examining Supply-Side Options to Achieve 100% Clean Electricity by 2035

Handbook of Sustainability and Social Science Research Wind Energy and Rural Community Sustainability

Center for Rural Affairs Navigating Land Leases for Wind and Solar

IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land: Chapter 5

Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

Please use this form to provide feedback about this fact brief. This will help us to better gauge its impact and usability. Thank you!

About fact briefs published on Gigafact

Fact briefs are short, credibly sourced summaries that offer "yes/no" answers in response to claims found online. They rely on publicly available, often primary source data and documents. Fact briefs are created by contributors to Gigafact — a nonprofit project looking to expand participation in fact-checking and protect the democratic process. See all of our published fact briefs here.

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Andrew Dessler

This is the third and last in our series discussing the use of unadjusted data and how it overstates the warmth of the 1930s over the U.S. See part one and part two for more.

A hall of fame for bad climate plots would definitely include this one:

The plot covers the continental U.S., and it dramatically shows that temperatures in the 1930s were more extreme than those of the present period. The metric plotted, the heat wave index, is constructed as a station?average count of qualifying 4?day warm spells (mean temperature exceeds a local one?in?ten?year threshold) in each year, so higher values mean that heat waves were more frequent in that year.

It was originally published in 1999 and has gone through several iterations, with the one above from an EPA website in 2021.

Don’t take this as criticism of the original paper — it was published in 1999, after all. However, the plot has hung around long past its expiration date and has since become a staple of climate denial. I think it’s time to reconsider what the plot actually tells us.

But is it right?

After reading our previous posts on the heat of the 1930s, you probably already know the answer: this plot is wrong in important ways.

The plot above is constructed from raw, unadjusted station data, which contain significant biases both in the individual station records and in the geographic distribution of the stations.

As we discussed in our previous posts, we can adjust for those biases. Here are the plots with biases removed:

In these plots, I’m using the adjusted and area-weighted GHCN-daily data (described in this post) and the daily Berkeley Earth land data (used in this post).

Both plots show something different than the raw, unadjusted data. The GHCN-daily data show that the most extreme years were 1936, 2023, 1934, 1931, and 2011. In the Berkeley Earth dataset, the most extreme years were 2023, 2011, 1936, 2020, and 1931.

Thus, once you account for biases in the data, you cannot conclude that temperatures during the 1930s over the continental U.S. were more extreme than those of recent years.

Rather, the only fair conclusion is that the last few years have been about as extreme as the hottest years of the 1930s over the continental U.S.

The 1930s were hot, but not because of global warming

Despite this ambiguous answer, we can still learn something from the plot.

First, as we’ve pointed out many times, the heat of the 1930s was regional — it was concentrated in the middle of the U.S. That’s different from today, when extreme temperatures are a global phenomenon.

We understand why this small part of the U.S. was so hot in the 1930s. It was normal climate variability combined with human activities. The relevant human activity was not fossil-fuel combustion but bad farming practices that contributed to the Dust Bowl.

During the early 20th century, aggressive plowing and the replacement of native grasses left Great Plains soils exposed. When drought conditions developed, those degraded soils dried out quickly, reducing evaporation and soil moisture and reinforcing the heat.

This feedback between drought and land degradation amplified temperatures over the U.S. Midwest and helped create the extraordinary heat of the Dust Bowl era seen in the plots above.

A picture is worth 1,000 words, so here’s what Dalhart, Texas looked like in 1938:

Abandoned farm with windmill and farm equipment. Dalhart, Texas. June 1938. Credits: Dorothea Lange; The Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division. Source.

Here’s what Dalhart, Texas looks like today from space:

Dalhart, Texas in 2016. Google Earth.

Those circles are the signature of center-pivot irrigation. Irrigation cools the surface, and the expansion of agriculture and irrigation in the central U.S. in the middle of the 20th century played a key role in why heatwaves were low in the middle of the 20th century:

the corrected figure: same data as plotted above, but smoothed with a 10-year centered average

Starting in the 1970s, we see heatwaves trending upward. Unlike the heat of the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, this post-1970 increase is global. This is climate change making heatwaves more extreme.

Conclusions

1. The extreme heat of the 1930s covered a very small part of the planet, the U.S. Midwest. Focusing on just that region is a classic case of cherry-picking.

2. The heat of the 1930s was due to human activity in the form of bad agricultural practices combined with natural variability.

3. Since the 1970s, heatwaves have become more frequent. This differs from the Dust Bowl because it is a global signal, occurring essentially everywhere. This is almost certainly due to greenhouse gas emissions from human activities.

Thus, if you see someone trying to downplay today’s extreme heat by claiming that ‘the 1930s were hotter,’ it’s a scam. Tag it with #1930sScam, hit the share button below, and share the link and the corrected figure.Code to reproduce the figures is here.

Other stuff

My colleague, Prof. Adam Sobel, has a nice post on his substack Deep Convection about km-scale modeling and the state of U.S. climate modeling. You should read it.

 

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, August 30, 2026 thru Sat, September 5, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (6 articles)

• When a mountain falls: How ice and rock triggered Nepal`s catastrophic flood - and why climate change is raising the risks The Conversation, Umesh Haritashya, Aug 29, 2026.
• Climate crisis pushes French winemakers to bet on warmer future in Brittany and Normandy An important part of the French economy is chased north by climate change but successful adapatation is not a certainty. France 24, France 24 staff, Aug 31, 2026.
• Coral Reefs Are Running Out of Time to Recover, Research Finds Rising sea temperatures mean reefs don’t have enough time to bounce back between intense heat waves, a new report warns. New York Times, Quinn Glabicki, Aug 31, 2026.
• Nepal`s glacial collapse foreshadowed a future of climate disaster | Michael Mann The deluge capped a summer of extreme climate events, from deadly heatwaves to wildfires. We must take action now The Guardian, Michael Mann, Sep 01, 2026.
• UN finally admits global warming will shoot past 1.5 ºC climate limit According to a report released today by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the best the planet can hope for on its current emissions trajectory is warming of about 1.8 ºC above pre-industrial levels this century. Nature, James Dinneen, Sept 2 2026.
• Canadians should prepare for a 5 C hotter future, report warns The second edition of Canada's Changing Climate Report, a synthesis of the science on the impact of a warming planet on Canadians, confirms with greater confidence that burning fossil fuels, or what the report calls "human activities," are responsible for climate change. CBC Canada News, David Thurton, Sep 04, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (6 articles)

• How the greenhouse effect was discovered A video about the first paper detailing the greenhouse effect and examining the role of varying levels of carbon dioxide was released back in 1896. Youtube, Simon Clark, Aug 29, 2026.
• As super El Nino strengthens, study suggests that climate change is intensifying El Ninos Phys.org, Seth Borenstein, Aug 30, 2026.
• Forests didn't fare well during an ancient global warming event, offering a 'cautionary' tale about today's climate change Smithsonian Magazine, Sarah Hashemi, Aug 30, 2026.
• Explainer: The CMIP7 emissions scenarios - and how they explore future climate change Every six to seven years, climate modelling groups around the world run a coordinated set of simulations that explore how the climate could change in the future. Carbon Brief, Zeke Hausfather, Aug 31, 2026.
• EXPERT REACTION: Quick action needed as the world is set to get hotter than we hoped Rapid expert reaction to the UN's belated acknowledgement of committed overshoot of the previously agreed acceptable 1.5°C global warming threshold. Australian Science Media (scimex), Australian Science Media Centre staff, Sept 2, 2026.
• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #36 2026 Highlighted articles in our latest weekly climate research scan focus on various forms of reality-denial, purposefully for profit or as unconscious obedience to political ideology. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Sep 03, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (4 articles)

• Rebutting 38 False Claims About Solar, Wind, Electric Vehicles, and Battery Storage In this report, the Sabin Center identifies and examines 38 of the most pervasive false claims about solar energy, wind energy, and electric vehicles, with the aim of promoting a more informed discussion about energy modernization Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Andrew Kieffer, Sep 02, 2026.
• Energy In, Motion Out EVs waste miles less energy than their fossil-fuelled counterparts. Climate Trunk, John Lang, Sep 02, 2026.
• How to respond to disinformation about clean energy, at scale David Roberts interviews Leah Qusba about scalable methods for leveling the playing field when countering organized energy modernization disinformation campaigns. Volts, David Roberts, Sep 02, 2026.
• Widespread Local Opposition, Often Driven by Misinformation, Continues to Hamper Renewable Energy Development Opposition frequently stems from, and/or is heightened by, mis- and dis-information about renewable energy development which is often spread by the fossil fuel industry and its supporters. Climate Law Blog, Ivonne Norman, Andrew Kieffer and Romany Webb, Sep 03, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (3 articles)

• The Earth is sizzling, but climate isn't a hot topic for Democrats in this year's campaigns Climate change has become a less prominent election-year issue for Democrats as voters say concerns such as affordability are more pressing ABC News, Nicholas Riccardi, Jennifer McDermott, Leah Willinghanm, Aug 29, 2026.
• Inside the passage of America`s biggest climate law In a new memoir, author Leah Stokes takes readers behind the scenes of U.S. democracy – and shows how people can still have an outsize impact by working together. Yale Climate Connections, Michael Svoboda, Sep 02, 2026.
• Who decides what climate change caused? Critical analysis of climate change attribution in press coverage of disasters finds generally good results, advises guarding credibility without underplaying the role climate change is playing in amplifying havoc. Atmos, Miranda Green, Sep 03, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 articles)

• Vycarb Successfully Stores Low-Purity CO2 In Seawater Some fairly easy chemistry not only can handle impurecombustion gas streams but also offers a side-benefit for at least somewhat offsetting ocean acidification. CleanTechnica, Larry Evans, Aug 29, 2026.
• Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming `well-below` 2C A new study highlights that, to limit peak warming to well-below 2C, net-zero CO2 targets must be complemented by stringent methane emissions cuts. Carbon Brief, Konstantin Weber, Prof Reto Knutti, Dr Cyril Brunner, Sep 01, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (2 articles)

• Koonin`s Temperature of the LOL Stratosphere Longest-running climate blog does a forensic deconstruction of a ''climate skeptic'' claim, presented as part of the US Department of Energy's ''Climate Working Group'' misinformation workshopping. RealClimate, RealClimate Group, Aug 31, 2026.
• How climate denialism finds its way to the US 's highest office The Guardian on Youtube, Dharna Noor, Sep 3, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (2 articles)

• Heathrow expansion would make UK `overshoot` climate targets, report suggests New modelling says UK aviation industry is already forecast to exceed limits in the seventh carbon budget, even before third runway is built The Standard News, Tom Place, Sep 02, 2026.
• Oil lobby tanking climate Superfund bills in Oregon, 11 states despite public support, study finds Brown University researchers found that a small amount of testimony from fossil fuel lobbyists opposing polluter pay laws has had greater power than massive public support. Oregon Capital Chronicle, Alex Baumhart, Sept 3, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #35 A listing of 29 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, August 23, 2026 thru Sat, August 29, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Aug 30, 2026.
• Readers reply: If all car tyres were filled with CO2, would this cut atmospheric carbon significantly? Newspaper readers answer an intriguing question; one reader goes through the numbers quantifying correct intuition. The Guardian, Guardian Staff, Aug 31, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

• Science, Attribution Studies, & Identifying Climate Criminals CleanTechnica, Steve Hanley, Aug 31, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

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Solar power generation in the UK reached a new record over the summer of 2026, as temperatures across the nation soared, according to new analysis by Carbon Brief. 

Collectively over June, July and August, solar farms and rooftops generated 8.8 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity in the UK*, as shown in the chart below. 

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Chris Hewett, chief executive of trade association Solar Energy UK welcomed the new record, adding that it was driven by “clear skies and continued growth in deployment”. 

This surge in generation took place amid the hottest summer on record in the UK, with five heatwaves between May and August.

Summer 2026 was the sixth sunniest on record, with more than 620 hours of sunshine, according to the Met Office. England and Wales – which experienced the most extreme heat – saw their second-sunniest summers on record. 

June 2026 was the hottest June in England since records began in 1884, according to Met Office data, while Wales and the UK as a whole experienced their second-warmest June. 

It was the driest July for England and Wales since records began in 1836, with some parts of London seeing no rain at all in the month, while Wisley in Surrey had no rain for 62 days. 

In England, temperatures peaked at 38.1C at Kew Gardens in London on 13 August. 

According to the Met Office, this summer’s record mean temperature was made 130 times more likely by climate change.  

Amid these hot and sunny months, solar power generation increased 23% from the same period in 2025. This is double the level of solar generation over the summer of 2021, according to Carbon Brief analysis. 

While solar panels can be affected by periods of extreme heat, the longer hours of daylight and higher levels of irradiation over the summer more than offset any efficiency losses. 

June, July and August all saw solar set new monthly records for solar generation – July saw the highest solar generation in a calendar month ever, with 3.3TWh meeting 15% of overall electricity demand for the month. 

As of the end of August, the total UK solar generation in 2026 stood at 17TWh – 13% higher than the same point in 2025. 

The number of solar farms and rooftop installations has grown substantially in recent years, helping to boost generation. Domestic rooftop solar accounts for around 29% of total capacity.

In 2025, the UK’s solar capacity reached 21 gigawatts (GW) by the third quarter of the year, according to UK government figures. This is a jump of 3GW, or 18%, year-on-year, as Carbon Brief reported in January. 

(Capacity is the maximum output possible from an electricity generation, whereas generation is what was produced over a certain time period, such as a day, month or year.)

According to the University of Sheffield, the installed solar capacity is now nearly 24GW. 

This includes nearly 172,000 solar installations that have been fitted across the UK since the start of 2026, according to recent government figures. In July alone, more than 19,800 rooftop solar panels were installed – the equivalent of one installation every two minutes. 

In total, nearly 1.7m households in the UK now have solar panels installed. 

Over 26 heatwave days this summer – periods of at least three days when temperatures exceed the Met Office’s county-level heatwave temperature threshold – UK households with rooftop solar panels avoided an estimated £86.7m in electricity costs, according to analysis by Utility Bidder.

Talking about the surge in solar generation this summer, Hewett says: 

“[It] not only kept bills down for people with solar and batteries in their homes, but helped keep overall power prices much lower than they would have been if Britain had been relying on more gas generation during the day”.

Despite the record generation, no new half-hourly solar power output record was set in the summer of 2026. This still stands at 15.2 megawatts (MW) on 23 April 2026.

* This article refers to the UK throughout, but strictly relates to the island of Great Britain, made up of England, Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland is part of the separate, all-Ireland electricity system.

related Factcheck: 10 flaws in the Conservative report on ‘cheap power’ 20.08.2026 Renewables Q&A: What is ‘long-duration energy storage’ – and why does the UK need it? 19.08.2026 Electricity Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change? 29.07.2026 China policy Analysis: Wind and solar power overtake fossil fuels in Germany for first time ever 28.07.2026 Energy

The post Analysis: UK solar power hits record high over summer 2026 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Farmers around Europe are dealing with the aftermath of a summer of extreme heat, drought and wildfires that were exacerbated by climate change. 

Human-caused climate change is increasing the severity and likelihood of many extreme weather events around the world, which is increasing volatility for food producers.

This summer resulted in, for example, shrunken potatoes in the Netherlands, reduced carrot harvests in France, dried-up rice fields in Italy and scorched olive groves in parts of the Mediterranean region.

Global food prices are currently at their highest level since early 2023 due to “heatwaves and energy price dynamics”, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. 

Other factors such as blocked fertiliser supplies in the Strait of Hormuz and high fuel costs have also played a role in this year’s agricultural outputs. 

In the six charts below, Carbon Brief provides a snapshot of the impact this summer’s extremes are considered to have had on crop production and yields across Europe. 

1. Most EU countries expect to see declines in cereal production this year

2. Most countries are recording reduced crop yields

3. Around €2bn worth of cereal losses after June heatwave

4. UK yields of wheat, barley and oats are all due to drop in 2026

5. Maize production in France is due to hit a four-decade low

6. Declines in EU grains since 2025

Article Contents Expand menu

• 1. Most EU countries expect to see declines in cereal production this year
• 2. Most countries are recording reduced crop yields 
• 3. Around €2bn worth of cereal losses after June heatwave 
• 4. UK yields of wheat, barley and oats are all due to drop in 2026
• 5. Maize production in France is due to hit a four-decade low 
• 6. Declines in EU grains since 2025

1. Most EU countries expect to see declines in cereal production this year Changes in cereal production in 26 EU countries between 2025 and 2026. Malta is excluded due to a lack of available data. Source: European Commission.

France, in particular, will see heavy losses in the amount of cereals – such as wheat, barley and oats – it produces this year, according to European Commission data. 

French cereal production is expected to drop by almost 8 megatonnes (Mt) in 2026, compared to 2025. 

The chart above shows that most European countries, aside from Bulgaria, will also see production losses this year. 

Germany is due to see the second-largest losses in production, dropping by almost 4Mt compared to 2025.

Prof Til Feike, a cropping systems expert at the Julius Kühn-Institut, says many areas in Germany and Austria, as with other parts of Europe, have been “hit hard by a long-lasting dry period in combination with record-high heatwaves”.

This has resulted in dry grassland for animals and lower yields of maize, which is a “key fodder crop” for livestock. He tells Carbon Brief: 

“In the long run, farming must adapt better to more extreme weather conditions, not only heat and drought, but also prolonged wet periods. So, there is no one-fits-all solution for climate change adaptation.” 

2. Most countries are recording reduced crop yields 

Heat and a lack of water have “substantially worsened” crop expectations this summer in western and most of central Europe, according to a recent bulletin from the EU Joint Research Centre.

Yields are expected to be “significantly reduced”, with local crop failures “likely” in areas such as France, southern Germany, northern and central Italy, and Hungary, it added. 

The chart below shows that yields of cereal grains – which, here, refers to the tonnes of a grain grown per hectare of land – are expected to fall in most EU countries in 2026.

Changes in cereal yields in 26 EU countries between 2025 and 2026. Malta is excluded due to a lack of available data. Source: European Commission.

Slovakia, Austria and Hungary are expected to see the largest declines in cereal yields, reducing by more than one tonne per hectare in 2026 compared to 2025.

The recent EU bulletin noted that irrigated crops performed well in Portugal this summer – the country with the largest yield increases. Other crops relying on rainfall showed growing signs of heat stress, it added.  

3. Around €2bn worth of cereal losses after June heatwave 

The record heatwave that hit many parts of Europe in June contributed to an estimated €2-2.3bn in cumulative grain production losses, as shown in the chart below.

Estimates of revenue lost due to changes in production forecasts between June and July 2026. Source: ECIU.

The intense June heat in western Europe would have been “virtually impossible” just 50 years ago, according to a rapid climate attribution study. It was the region’s hottest June on record. 

The Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) thinktank analysed June and July 2026 grain forecasts from Coceral, a European grain traders association.

ECIU estimated lost supply by multiplying the change in tonnes of grains between these two months by prices for harvest delivery in 28 European countries. 

Major grain producers France, Germany, Hungary and Spain accounted for 86% of the lost revenue, according to the ECIU.  

Extreme heat is also expected to have a wider economic impact across the continent. Analysis from Triodos Bank found that this summer’s extreme weather could reduce the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) by around 1% this year, or around €180bn. 

4. UK yields of wheat, barley and oats are all due to drop in 2026

If current trends continue, the average yields for cereals and oilseeds will result in the UK’s worst harvest since detailed records began in 1984, according to ECIU.  

Yields of cereals and oilseed rape in the UK over 1990-2026. Source: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board.

Barley yields could fall by 15%, oats by 14% and wheat yields by 6% year-on-year, according to 2026 harvest surveys from the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board, a non-departmental public body that provides agricultural data to the UK government. 

ECIU said that, even if the situation improves, this year is still expected to be one of the five worst harvests on record. This means that four of the five worst harvests in the UK have occurred in the past decade. 

Consumers will likely see higher prices and/or smaller vegetables in supermarkets as a result, Tim O’Malley, chairman of UK company Nationwide Produce, told BBC News in August.

Other crops, such as berries, have grown successfully in the extreme heat. But the Guardian noted fears this could dip later this year “as plants become exhausted from heavy cropping during the heatwave”. 

5. Maize production in France is due to hit a four-decade low 

France has been acutely affected by this summer’s extreme weather, with more than 7,300 excess deaths during heatwaves and a record number of weather stations recording temperatures of above 40C. 

The country is the EU’s largest agricultural producer, but heat, drought and wildfires have affected many crops. 

The chart below shows that maize production is set to drop by more than one-third (35%) year-on-year. 

Maize production in France over 1980-2026. Source: Agreste.

This could result in France’s lowest maize production since 1980, according to data from Agreste, the country’s agriculture ministry’s statistics service.  

Due to the heat, “record-early” grape harvests have also been recorded in various parts of the nation since mid-July, reported Le Monde. In some cases, this means “smaller, less juicy grapes, which will yield less wine”, explained the newspaper. 

6. Declines in EU grains since 2025 Production of cereal crops in Europe over 1993-2026. The “other” category includes oats, rye, sorghum, millet and buckwheat. Source: European Commission.

Overall in the EU, data and projections indicate declines in the output of cereal grains this year. 

Cereal production is set to fall by 9% compared to 2025, according to the European Commission. 

Just one year in the past decade – 2024 – recorded lower production levels. 

Maize production is set to be particularly affected, with projections indicating a 13% drop, to 52Mt – the lowest level in the EU since 2007. 

related Livestock heat deaths in transit doubled in UK record-hot summer of 2025 25.06.2026 Food and farming Q&A: What England’s new ‘land-use framework’ means for climate, nature and food 20.03.2026 Food and farming Mapped: How extreme weather is destroying crops around the world 11.03.2026 Food and farming Adopting low-cost ‘healthy’ diets could cut food emissions by one-third 21.01.2026 Food and farming

The post How this summer’s heat and drought impacted crops in Europe – in six charts appeared first on Carbon Brief.

24 September | New York

Carbon Tracker is taking part in a series of discussions at New York Climate Week, bringing an investor perspective to key questions shaping the energy transition

• AI, climate and corporate accountability
  Carbon Tracker is co-hosting a roundtable with As You Sow and Public Citizen exploring the economic, social and climate implications of AI and data centre development. The discussion will bring together investors, policy advocates and communities working to address the impacts of data centres, including questions around financing, corporate power and the potential risks of an AI bubble. 
• Climate and the energy transition
  Carbon Tracker will join the Laudato Si’ Movement for a discussion on climate and the energy transition, including the Santa Marta fossil fuel phase-out. The session will explore how finance, policy and investment can support a shift away from fossil fuels, as well as the barriers that remain to accelerating the transition. 
• Fossil Free Zones
  Together with Earth Insight, Carbon Tracker will convene philanthropic partners and civil society leaders from across the Amazon, Congo Basin and Coral Triangle to examine how Fossil Free Zones could support national energy transition and deforestation strategies ahead of COP31. The session will explore how the introduction of zones to protect key ecosystems from fossil fuel development can become a practical tool for national energy transition and deforestation strategies ahead of COP31. 

The post New York Climate Week 2026 appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.