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Lecce's nuclear spin – and the $3.3 billion detail he forgot to mention

The post Lecce’s nuclear spin – and the $3.3 billion detail he forgot to mention appeared first on Ontario Clean Air Alliance.

While searching for the perfect plant for a garden or patio at a plant nursery, you may find yourself looking up all sorts of information.Does the plant require full sun or shade? How much watering...

The weather is cooler, the Yellow-Rumped Warblers are abundant, and our grounds are as lush as ever. It is winter here at the Audubon Center at Debs Park, which means that it is peak planting...

Albemarle (NYSE: ALB) says it will idle the remaining operating train at its Kemerton lithium hydroxide processing plant in Western Australia and place it into care and maintenance, effective immediately.

The news follows actions in July 2024 to place Train 2 operations into care and maintenance and to cease expansion plans for Trains 3 and 4, part of a broader strategy to reduce costs amid weak lithium prices.

The Kemerton plant processes spodumene from Greenbushes, the world’s biggest hard-rock lithium mine. Albemarle holds ownership interest and half of the offtake rights from Greenbushes through an Australian joint venture.

Kemerton, with its proven technology and commercial scale lithium hydroxide production, was built to enable the development of a Western lithium supply chain, said Albemarle, currently the world’s largest producer of lithium.

“Idling operations at Kemerton was a difficult decision. It follows significant actions we have taken over the past two and a half years to reduce operating costs during an extended period of price volatility in the market,” Albemarle’s CEO Kent Masters said in a news release on Wednesday.

Albemarle swings to quarterly loss on charges tied to Ketjen sale

“Unfortunately, recent lithium price improvements alone are not enough to offset the challenges facing Western hard-rock lithium conversion operations,” Masters continued. “This decision improves our financial flexibility and preserves optionality.”

The decision is expected to be accretive to adjusted EBITDA beginning in the second quarter of 2026 with no impact to projected 2026 volumes, Albemarle said, adding that it will meet customer demand for lithium hydroxide through other production channels.

Albemarle’s mining interests in Australia, including Greenbushes and Wodgina, are not expected to be impacted by the decision as they remain core components of the company’s strategy, it added.

China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the final quarter of 2025, likely securing a decline of 0.3% for the full year as a whole.

This extends a “flat or falling” trend in China’s CO2 emissions that began in March 2024 and has now lasted for nearly two years.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that, in 2025, emissions from fossil fuels increased by an estimated 0.1%, but this was more than offset by a 7% decline in CO2 from cement.

Other key findings include:

• CO2 emissions fell year-on-year in almost all major sectors in 2025, including transport (3%), power (1.5%) and building materials (7%).
• The key exception was the chemicals industry, where emissions grew 12%.
• Solar power output increased by 43% year-on-year, wind by 14% and nuclear 8%, helping push down coal generation by 1.9%.
• Energy storage capacity grew by a record 75 gigawatts (GW), well ahead of the rise in peak demand of 55GW.
• This means that growth in energy storage capacity and clean-power output topped the increases in peak and total electricity demand, respectively.

The CO2 numbers imply that China’s carbon intensity – its fossil-fuel emissions per unit of GDP – fell by 4.7% in 2025 and by 12% during 2020-25.

This is well short of the 18% target set for that period by the 14th five-year plan.

Moreover, China would now need to cut its carbon intensity by around 23% over the next five years in order to meet one of its key climate commitments under the Paris Agreement.

Whether Chinese policymakers remain committed to this target is a key open question ahead of the publication of the 15th five-year plan in March.

This will help determine if China’s emissions have already passed their peak, or if they will rise once again and only peak much closer to the officially targeted date of “before 2030”.

‘Flat or falling’

The latest analysis shows China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 21 months, starting in March 2024. This trend continued in the final quarter of 2025, when emissions fell by 1% year-on-year.

The picture continues to be finely balanced, with emissions falling in all major sectors – including transport, power, cement and metals – but rising in the chemicals industry.

This combination of factors means that emissions continue to plateau at levels slightly below the peak reached in early 2024, as shown in the figure below.

China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals until September 2025. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec.

Power sector emissions fell by 1.5% year-on-year in 2025, with coal use falling 1.7% and gas use increasing 6%. Emissions from transportation fell 3% and from the production of cement and other building materials by 7%, while emissions from the metal industry fell 3%.

These declines are shown in the figure below. They were partially offset by rising coal and oil use in the chemical industry, up 15% and 10% respectively, which pushed up the sector’s CO2 emissions by 12% overall.

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period January-September 2025, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec. 

In other sectors – largely other industrial areas and building heat – gas use increased by 2%, more than offsetting the reduction in emissions from a 3% drop in their coal consumption.

Clean power covers electricity demand growth

In the power sector, which is China’s largest emitter by far, electricity demand grew by 520 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2025.

At the same time, power generation from solar increased by 43% and wind power generation by 14%, delivering 360TWh and 130TWh of additional clean electricity. Nuclear power generation grew 8%, supplying another 40TWh. The increased generation from these three sources – some 530TWh – therefore met all of the growth in demand.

Hydropower generation also increased by 3% and bioenergy by 3%, helping push power generation from fossil fuels down by 1%. Gas-fired power generation increased by 6% and, as a result, power generation from coal fell by 1.9%.

Furthermore, the surge in additions of new wind and solar capacity at the end of 2025 will only show up as increased clean-power generation in 2026.

On the other hand, the growth in solar and wind power generation has fallen short of the growth in capacity, implying a fall in capacity utilisation – a measure of actual output relative to the maximum possible. This is highly likely due to increased, unreported curtailment, where wind and solar sites are switched off because the electricity grid is congested.

If these grid issues are resolved over the next few years, then generation from existing wind and solar capacity will increase over time.

Developments in 2025 extended the trend of clean-power generation growing faster than power demand overall, as shown in the top figure below. This trend started in 2023 and is the key reason why China’s emissions have been stable or falling since early 2024.

In addition, 2025 saw another potential inflection point, shown in the bottom figure below. It was the first year ever that energy storage capacity – mainly batteries – grew faster than peak electricity demand in 2025 and faster than the average growth in the past decade.

Top columns: Year-on-year change in annual electricity generation from clean energy excluding hydro, terawatt hours. Left solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in total electricity generation, TWh. Bottom columns: Year-on-year change in energy storage capacity, gigawatts. Right solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in peak electricity demand. Sources: Power generation and demand from Ember; peak loads from China Electric Power News since 2020; peak loads until 2019 and pumped hydro capacity from Wind Financial Terminal; battery storage capacity from China Energy Storage Alliance; analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta.

China’s energy storage capacity increased by 75GW year-on-year in 2025, while peak demand only increased by 55GW. The rise in storage capacity in 2025 is also larger than the three-year average increase in peak loads, some 72GW per year.

Peak demand growth matters, because power systems have to be designed to reliably provide enough electricity supply at the moment of highest demand.

Moreover, the increase in peak loads is a key driver of continued additions of coal and gas-fired power plants, which reached the highest level in a decade in 2025.

The growth in energy storage could provide China with an alternative way to meet peak loads without relying on increased fossil fuel-based capacity.

The growth in storage capacity is set to continue after a new policy issued by China’s top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in January.

This policy means energy storage sites will be supported by so-called “capacity payments”, which to date have only been available to coal- and gas-fired power plants and pumped hydro storage.

Concerns about having sufficient “firm” power capacity in the grid – that which can be turned on at will – led the government to promote new coal and gas-fired power projects in recent years, leading to the largest fossil-fuel based capacity additions in a decade in 2025, with another 290GW of coal-fired capacity still under construction.

Reforming the power system and increasing storage capacity would enable the grid to accommodate much higher shares of solar and wind, while reducing the need for new coal or gas capacity to meet rising peaks in demand.

This would both unlock more clean-power generation from existing capacity and improve the economics and risk profiles of new projects, stimulating more growth in capacity.

Peaking power CO2 requires more clean-energy growth

China’s key climate commitments for the next five-year period until 2030 are to peak CO2 emissions and to reduce carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels. The latter target requires limiting CO2 emissions at or below their 2025 level in 2030.

The record clean-energy additions in 2023-25 have barely sufficed to stabilise power-sector emissions, showing that if rapid growth in power demand continues, meeting the 2030 targets requires keeping clean-energy additions close to 2025 levels over the next five years.

China’s central government continues to telegraph a much lower level of ambition, with the NDRC setting a target of “around” 30% of power generation in 2030 coming from solar and wind, up from around 22% in 2025.

If electricity demand grows in line with the State Grid forecast of 5.6% per year, then limiting the share of wind and solar to 30% would leave space for fossil-fuel generation to grow at 3% per year from 2025 to 2030, even after increases from nuclear and hydropower.

Such an increase would mean missing China’s Paris commitments for 2030.

Alternatively, in order to meet the forecast increase in electricity demand without increasing generation from fossil fuels would require wind and solar’s share to reach 37% in 2030.

Similarly, China’s target of a non-fossil energy share of 25% in 2030 will not be sufficient to meet its carbon-intensity reduction commitment for 2030, unless energy demand growth slows down sharply.

This target is unlikely to be upgraded, since it is already enshrined in China’s Paris Agreement pledge, so in practice the target would need to be substantially overachieved if the country is to meet its other commitments.

If energy demand growth continues at the 2025 rate and the share of non-fossil energy only rises from 22% in 2025 to 25% in 2030, then the consumption of fossil fuels would increase by 3% per year, with a similar rise in CO2 emissions.

Still, another recent sign that clean-energy growth could keep exceeding government targets came in early February when the China Electricity Council projected solar and wind capacity additions of more than 300GW in 2026 – well beyond the government goal of “over 200GW”.

Chemical industry

The only significant source of growth in CO2 emissions in 2025 was the chemical industry, with sharp increases in the consumption of both coal and oil.

This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates how CO2 emissions appear to have peaked from cement production, transport, the power sector and others, whereas the chemicals industry is posting strong increases.

Sectoral emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Even though chemical-industry emissions are small relative to other sectors – at roughly 13% of China’s total – the pace of expansion is creating an outsize impact.

Without the increase from the chemicals sector, China’s total CO2 emissions would have fallen by an estimated 2%, instead of the 0.3% reported here.

Without changes to policy, emission growth is set to continue, as the coal-to-chemicals industry is planning major increases in capacity.

Whether these expansion plans receive backing in the upcoming five-year plan for 2026-30 will have a major impact on China’s emission trends.

Another key factor is the development of oil and gas prices. Production in the coal-based chemical industry is only profitable when coal is significantly cheaper than crude oil.

The current coal-to-chemicals capacity in China is dominated by plants producing higher-value – and therefore less price-sensitive – chemicals such as olefins and aromatics, as feedstocks for the production of plastics.

In contrast, the planned expansion of the sector is expected to be largely driven by plants producing oil products and synthetic gas to be used for energy. For these products, electrification and clean-electricity generation provide a direct alternative, meaning they are even more sensitive to low oil and gas prices than chemicals production.

Outlook for China’s emissions

This is the latest analysis for Carbon Brief to show that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable or falling for seven quarters or 21 months, marking the first such streak on record that has not been associated with a slowdown in energy demand growth.

Notably, while emissions have stabilised or begun a slow decline, there has not yet been a substantial reduction from the level reached in early 2024. This means that a small jump in emissions could see them exceed the previous peak level.

China’s official plans only call for peaking emissions shortly before 2030, which would allow for a rebound from the current plateau before the ultimate emissions peak.

If China is to meet its 2030 carbon intensity commitment – a 65% reduction on 2005 levels – then emissions would have to fall from the peak back to current levels by 2030.

Whether China’s policymakers are still committed to meeting this carbon intensity pledge, after the setbacks during the previous five-year period, is a key open question. The 2030 energy targets set to date have fallen short of what would be required.

The most important signal will be whether the top-level five-year plan for 2026-30, due in March, sets a carbon intensity target aligned with the 2030 Paris commitment.

Officially, China is sticking to the timeline of peaking CO2 emissions “before 2030”, which was announced by president Xi Jinping in 2020.

According to an authoritative explainer on the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the upcoming five-year plan, published by state-backed news agency Xinhua, coal consumption should “reach its peak and enter a plateau” from 2027.

It says that continued increases in demand for coal from electricity generators and the chemicals industry would be offset by reductions elsewhere. This is despite the fact that China’s coal consumption overall has already been falling for close to two years.

The reference to a “plateau” in coal consumption indicates that in official plans, meaningful absolute reductions in emissions would have to wait until after 2030. Any increase in coal consumption from 2025 to 2027, before the targeted plateau, would need to be offset by reductions in oil consumption, to meet the carbon intensity target.

Moreover, allowing coal consumption in the power sector to grow beyond the peak of overall coal use and emissions implies slowing down China’s clean-energy boom. So far, the boom has continued to exceed official targets by a wide margin.

In addition, the explainer’s expectation of further growth in coal use by the chemicals industry indicates a green light for at least a part of its sizable expansion plans.

The Xinhua article recognises that oil product consumption has already peaked, but says that oil use in the chemicals industry has kept growing. It adds that overall oil consumption should peak in 2026.

Elsewhere, the article speaks of “vigorously” developing non-fossil energy and “actively” developing “distributed” solar, which has slowed down due to recent pricing policies.

Yet it also calls for “high-quality development” of fossil fuels and increased efforts in domestic oil and gas production, suggesting that China continues to take an “all of the above” approach to energy policy.

The outcome of all this depends on how things turn out in reality. The past few years show it is possible that clean energy will continue to overperform its targets, preventing growth in energy consumption from fossil fuels despite this policy support.

The key role of the clean-energy boom in driving GDP growth and investments is one key motivator for policymakers to keep the boom going, even when central targets would allow for a slowdown. It is also possible that the five-year plans of provinces and state-owned enterprises could play a key role in raising ambition, as they did in 2022.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.

Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data. 

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.

For oil, apparent consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is taken from Sinopec quarterly results, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use.

Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated from refinery throughput, with the production of the transport fuels and the net exports of other oil products subtracted. Fossil-fuel consumption includes non-energy use such as plastics, as most products are short-lived and incineration is the dominant disposal method.

分析：清洁能源2025年为中国GDP增长贡献超过三分之一

China energy

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05.02.26

Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025

China energy

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05.02.26

‘Rush’ for new coal in China hits record high in 2025 as climate deadline looms

China energy

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03.02.26

Explainer: Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy

China energy

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22.01.26

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The post Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been ‘flat or falling’ for 21 months appeared first on Carbon Brief.

On the day before the Atitlán Christmas Bird Count (CBC) in western Guatemala, the group chat created to coordinate the event began to fill with messages. Eager birders first shared news of a...

The post From Farm to COP30: A Nurse’s Journey to Sustainable Food Systems appeared first on ANHE.

• The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) invites CFS actors to submit  their feedback on the zero draft by 18 March 2026.

The CFS has recently published the zero draft of the Policy Recommendations for Building Resilient Food Systems in English and reported that official translations will be available by the end of February 2026.

Throughout 2026, the CFS will develop these recommendations through a policy convergence process that includes open consultations on the drafts, meetings of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) and two rounds of negotiations scheduled for June and July. The final text is expected to be adopted during the plenary session of CFS 54 in October 2026.

The CSIPM Working Group on Resilient Food Systems facilitates the participation of civil society and Indigenous Peoples’ organisations in this process. In an initial analysis, the CSIPM highlighted as central elements the human rights-based approach, the creation of effective mechanisms for the participation of rights holders, and policies capable of strengthening the agroecology and addressing different structural vulnerabilities, such as poverty, socio-economic marginalisation and gender inequalities, among others.

We invite all interested organisations to join the working group and actively contribute by completing this form: https://www.csm4cfs.org/policy-working-groups/join-the-working-groups/

Read the zero draft of the CFS Policy Recommendations

Related links

• CSIPM Working Group on Building Resilient Food Systems website
• Policy priorities identified by the CSIPM Working Group
• HLPE Report No. 20

The post CFS publishes zero draft of Policy Recommendations on Resilient Food Systems appeared first on CSIPM.

US battery recycler Aqua Metals (NASDAQ: AQMS) announced Wednesday it has entered into a term sheet to acquire energy storage systems provider Lion Energy LLC.

Aqua Metals said in a press release that it plans to leverage Lion Energy’s brand, intellectual property, capital, technical talent and manufacturing capabilities to transform the company into a domestic player capable of managing the entire battery lifecycle.

Founded in Utah, Lion Energy has built a growing presence in the US energy storage market through the deployment of software-enabled residential and commercial energy systems.

“This transaction is intended to add meaningful revenue to Aqua Metals while expanding our participation in the rapidly growing energy storage market,” CEO Steve Cotton stated in the release.

In late 2025, Aqua Metals signed a letter of intent with Westwin Elements, the only major US nickel refinery, to supply up to 1,000 metric tons of recycled nickel carbonate a year starting in 2027.

“Energy storage is a natural extension of our battery materials strategy, and Lion Energy has built a complementary platform that spans systems, software and customer relationships,” Cotton said.

“Together, we believe this combination would strengthen our path toward a more vertically integrated, US-based battery supply chain, and supports our long-term vision for a robust domestic battery materials industry led by our new combined entity.”

“From the beginning, Lion Energy has focused on building more than batteries,” Tyler Hortin, CEO of Lion Energy, said in a press release. “We have invested heavily in a US-based energy management platform combining software, firmware, hardware and cloud connectivity designed to give customers intelligent control over their energy systems. This transaction could accelerate that vision.”

Under the term sheet, Aqua Metals would acquire Lion Energy through an all-stock transaction that preserves executive and board control of the combined company. At the closing, Lion Energy owners would receive approximately $25.8 million of Aqua Metals shares, and are entitled to receive up to $65 million in additional shares (for a total of $87.8 million) based on the company’s performance over a 12-month period after completing the transaction.

By market close in New York, Aqua Metals was down 6.9%. The company has a $12.8 million market capitalization.

An Indigenous-led partnership seeks to move the Arctic Economic and Security Corridor from a long-running idea into a defined infrastructure project, pitched as both a critical-minerals enabler and a sovereignty play, Northwest Territories Deputy Premier Caroline Wawzonek said.

The corridor is to connect the territory’s all-season road network to an Arctic Ocean port via the Grays Bay Road and Port project in Nunavut, creating a link from global markets to the North. The push is gaining traction as Ottawa seeks to diversify supply chains and improve access to mineral-rich areas that are costly to reach and develop, Wawzonek said.

“In an ideal world, it would be for the federal government to give the signal that this is no longer an if, but a how,” Wawzonek told The Northern Miner’s Western Editor, Henry Lazenby, during a recent industry conference.

For miners, the payoff is year-round access, fewer stand-alone road builds and a better platform for power transmission to cut operating costs across the Slave Geological Province. The shutdown of Rio Tinto’s (ASX, LSE, NYSE: RIO) Diavik diamond mine next month, one of the territory’s three operating diamond mines, sharpens the project’s urgency.

Watch the full interview:

Homeland Uranium (TSXV: HLU; US-OTC: HLUCF) is drilling in northwest Colorado to turn two forgotten uranium-vanadium deposits into a first compliant resource, president and CEO Roger Lemaitre said.

The 10-month-old company is advancing the Coyote Basin and Cross Bones projects in the past-producing Maybell district at the northern end of the Colorado Plateau. The focus is on Coyote Basin, where a 35-hole program budgeted at $4 million is testing about 5,600 metres of drilling aimed at an inferred resource by midyear.

Coyote Basin carries a historical estimate of 8.9 million tons grading 0.2% uranium oxide and 0.1% vanadium oxide for 35.4 million lb. uranium and 17.7 million lb. vanadium, while Cross Bones has a historical estimate of 7.1 million tons at 0.3% for 44.2 million lb. uranium.

“The absolute truth is by 2040 we need to find 11 Cigar Lake mines to meet the demand that’s coming,” Lemaitre told The Northern Miner’s Western Editor, Henry Lazenby, during a recent industry event. “In the world’s history in the last 50 years, we’ve only found six equivalents.”

Cigar Lake – Cameco’s (TSX: CCO; NYSE: CCJ) flagship, high-grade mine in Saskatchewan – runs at about 18 million lb. uranium per year (100% basis), making it a common yardstick for the scale of new supply required. By comparison, Homeland sees the U.S. market running an annual deficit of about 48 million lb. of yellowcake.

Watch the full interview below:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Date: Feb 11, 2026
Contact: Anja Semanco | 724-967-2777 | anja@alaskawild.org 

Lease Sale in Western Arctic Proves No Corner of Alaska’s Arctic Is Off-Limits to Industrialization 

Washington, D.C. — Today, the Trump administration released final details for a sweeping federal oil and gas lease sale in the Western Arctic (National Petroleum Reserve–Alaska), opening millions of acres of globally significant wildlife habitat the size of New Jersey to industrial development. The Detailed Statement of Sale—and specifically how it offers up areas of the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area that have not been made available for leasing for decades—demonstrates that no place is too sacred to drill for the Trump administration. 

“The details of this lease sale show that companies like ConocoPhillips won’t stop with Willow and that this administration will always put profit over people,” said Kristen Miller, executive director of Alaska Wilderness League. “Just weeks after the complete collapse of an oil rig in the nearby village of Nuiqsut, this administration is throwing open the doors to some of the most sensitive, wildlife-rich places in the Arctic and gambling with landscapes that sustain communities, caribou herds, and millions of birds. The financial and environmental risks here far outweigh any speculative profits. Fortunately, smart companies and investors know a bad bet when they see one.” 

The Western Arctic sale offers tracts that surround the vast majority of Teshekpuk Lake, including areas in the far north of the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area that haven’t been offered for sale in decades. Careful consideration of science and community input by past administrations deemed these areas too sensitive to drill, making this sale an outlier from other lease sales that occurred in the past three decades.   

The agency will accept minimum bids as low as $5 per acre in western parcels, setting a small price for the potential industrialization of Alaska public lands. This reflects a long-standing pattern of decline in the region dating back to the large 1999 lease sale, when ConocoPhillips acquired the leases that now underpin the Willow project. Details of past sales can be found at this link. 

The lands targeted in this lease sale have long been recognized for their irreplaceable value to clean water, wildlife, and Alaska Native subsistence communities—including areas that past administrations of both parties deemed too sensitive to lease. The sale offers vast acreage within the former Colville River Special Area, further impacting some of the most ecologically important landscapes left in the Arctic. Additionally, tracts surrounding the community of Atqasuk are also being put up for sale, along with a few final parcels near the community of Nuiqsut, where drilling continues to get closer to the community each year. 

Today’s detailed notice of sale was posted the week after an agency error in public notice took place, with the Federal Register failing to publish the lease sale notice last Friday.  The result of this error is the delay of the sale by nine days, with results now due to go public on March 18. 

Additionally, the announcement comes just weeks after Doyon Rig 26 toppled over on the tundra near the Western Arctic, spilling diesel fuel and catching fire after unstable, warming conditions reportedly compromised the ice road beneath it. Cleanup has only just begun. As the Arctic warms three to four times faster than the rest of the planet, thawing permafrost, melting ice roads, and extreme weather are making industrial accidents more frequent and more dangerous, underscoring the growing risks of operating heavy infrastructure in this fragile environment. 

 

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Photo Credit: Richard Spener 

CopperTech Metals has entered a strategic partnership with Axiom Group, VBKOM and Fleet Space Technologies to deploy next-generation geoscience technologies at its Konkola copper mine in Zambia.

CopperTech, a US-domiciled company launched by India’s Vedanta Resources last November, holds a majority stake in the asset through its subsidiary Konkola Copper Mines (KCM).

Considered one of the highest-grade copper-producing assets in the world, Konkola features ore grades of 2.9% to 3.3% and has combined reserves/resources of roughly 16 million tonnes of copper.

The new company said it intends to further develop this resource by leveraging advanced mining and AI-driven technologies. This collaboration will accelerate subsurface insights, improve decision velocity and strengthen CopperTech’s resource development capabilities, it said in Wednesday’s release.

The partnership brings together Axiom’s geoscience and VBKOM’s mining systems expertise and Fleet Space’s ExoSphere platform, a space-enabled, AI-powered data and analytics system, to enhance how near-mine exploration and resource definition are undertaken.

“CopperTech is deploying innovative technologies at KCM to strengthen our vertically integrated mining operations from exploration to metal production,” CopperTech CEO Deshnee Naidoo said in a news release.

“This strategic partnership with Axiom, VBKOM and Fleet brings together world-class partners to integrate advanced geoscience technology and earth-based applications to enhance exploration accuracy, target definition and resource confidence.”

Through this partnership, Axiom will embed Fleet’s ExoSphere and conduct a high-resolution 3-D seismic survey covering the orebody and proximal areas at KCM, generating high-resolution 3-D OBK (ore body knowledge) models, AI-driven drill targeting insights, and integrated geoscience intelligence that supports data-rich drill campaign design and execution.

This approach enables faster learning cycles, reduces exploration uncertainty and enhances the efficiency of resource delineation in complex geological settings, the Saskatchewan-based company said.

“Our work with CopperTech, VBKOM and Fleet Space represents a new model for how mining companies deploy innovation, not just to accelerate geological understanding and drill confidence, but to build long-term capability and competitiveness,” Axion CEO Doug Engdahl stated.

“By combining our global technical experience and leadership with Fleet’s real-time data systems, we are driving a change in speed, precision and confidence in exploration decision-making.”

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Sarah Wesseler

Want to lower your carbon footprint? Consider ditching your car. 

In a 2025 study, researchers at the World Resources Institute found that going car-free is the most effective step individuals can take to lower their personal emissions. In fact, it has a bigger impact than adding a home solar system and going vegan combined, they wrote, and 78 times more effective than composting.

But in much of the U.S., getting around without a car is difficult, if not impossible, due to overwhelmingly car-centric infrastructure. However, while going car-free may be hard for many Americans to imagine, this could change. As cities like Amsterdam and Paris have shown, when governments take decisive action to reduce car dependency, the results can be dramatic.

Moreover, the remedies for car dependency are well understood, at least at a high level. Decades’ worth of research from universities, government agencies, nonprofits, and design firms has created a significant body of knowledge about how to reduce reliance on cars.

Susan Handy, who leads the National Center for Sustainable Transportation at the University of California at Davis, said the main takeaways of this research are clear and compelling. 

“When people live in more compact communities where they’re in closer proximity to the places they need to go, and when they have good alternatives to driving – meaning good bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure and decent transit service – they will, in fact, drive less,” she said.

(Image credit: Tejvan Pettinger / CC BY 2.0)

Must-haves for reducing reliance on cars

In 2025, Kostas Mouratidis, a professor at the University of Copenhagen, published a peer-reviewed study identifying seven strategies that have successfully reduced car dependency in Western European cities.

Two of these strategies – raising awareness about the benefits of reducing car dependency and supporting compact cities through policy – are prerequisites for the others to succeed, he wrote.

Awareness-raising is vital to creating buy-in and shaping public behavior. This can take many forms, including open streets events, which temporarily close roads to vehicles and open them to other uses. Found everywhere from Bogotá to Tucson, these events demonstrate how space currently devoted to cars could be used for things like cycling, walking, and entertainment. In London, Mayor Sadiq Khan has used open streets days to build support for permanent pedestrianization.

Governments can also use information and incentives to raise awareness about alternatives to driving. In Portland, Oregon, households moving into some multifamily buildings receive a welcome packet from the municipality containing several hundred dollars’ worth of credits for bikeshare and public transportation, along with advice for navigating the area without a car. 

This and similar initiatives take advantage of the fact that people are more likely to change their transportation habits when their lives are already in flux, said Stefanie Seskin, the director of policy and practice at the National Association of City Transportation Officials. 

“Because you’re already moving and you’re changing your patterns, it’s a great time to try riding a bike, to try walking places, to try taking TriMet, [Portland’s] transit system,” she said.

Policies that make communities denser by locating buildings and amenities closer together are also critical for sustainable transportation to flourish. 

“Without a relatively compact urban form, you cannot expect people to be able to walk or cycle to destinations that they need to cover their daily needs,” Mouratidis said.

One vital mechanism for achieving this is zoning. In many American communities, zoning regulations make it illegal to build anything other than single-family homes on 75% of residential land. Changing this policy allows apartment buildings and small businesses to pop up in areas where they have historically been prohibited, allowing more people to walk or cycle to amenities close to their homes. 

Zoning changes can also lower the number of off-street parking spots developers are required to build for different building types, freeing up space that allows structures to be built closer to one another. Since parking is expensive to build, parking reform can also make neighborhoods more affordable.

Limiting private vehicles and investing in alternatives

Once communities reach sufficient levels of public buy-in and urban density, five additional strategies can successfully help people shift away from their cars, Mouratidis said. (Governments don’t need to wait to implement them until they’ve fully attained these goals, however, he stresses.) 

These strategies are:

• Investing in public transportation
• Improving pedestrian and bicycle infrastructure
• Restricting car use
• Supporting shared mobility (such as car-sharing services)
• Facilitating virtual mobility (such as teleconferencing and online shopping). 

These categories encompass a wide variety of actions. To restrict car use, some cities turn to congestion pricing programs in which drivers must pay to enter designated areas. Building on successful programs in Singapore, London, and Stockholm, New York City became the first U.S. city to implement congestion pricing in early 2025, charging cars $9 to enter Manhattan south of 60th Street during peak hours. In the program’s first year, 27 million fewer vehicles entered the affected area.

Investments in public transportation, pedestrian infrastructure, and bike lanes are also critical to reducing car dependency. Although many U.S. cities are struggling to fund existing public transit systems, some have found ways to not only maintain current services but also expand and improve them. In New York City, congestion pricing proceeds are being used to maintain and upgrade the city’s subways, buses, and commuter trains. In Virginia, the state government has dramatically increased its investment in public transportation as well as pedestrian and bicycle infrastructure in the past decade.

Illinois offers another promising model for supporting financially vulnerable public transportation systems. A law signed by Governor JB Pritzker in late 2025 designated $1.5 billion dollars annually for mass transit in Chicago and elsewhere in the state, with part of the funding coming from gas sales taxes that were diverted away from road construction. 

This represents a “groundbreaking, transformational investment in Illinois’s transit system,” said Kevin X. Shen, a transportation policy analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “It’s not only filling the fiscal cliff gap they faced that was threatening service cuts, but also going over that hump to increase transit service in ways that are needed for communities across the state.”

Big cities aren’t the only ones investing in alternatives to the car. In Dublin, Ohio, a suburb of Columbus that’s home to approximately 50,000 people, the local government is helping extend existing bus lines, upgrading bus stops, working with regional partners to introduce bus rapid transit service, upgrading its bicycle infrastructure, working with companies that provide bike- and scooter-share programs, and partnering with developers and designers to build walkable neighborhoods. 

Obstacles to reducing car dependency

Despite these and other success stories, reliance on cars is growing around the world, Mouratidis said. 

“Car ownership is increasing, the sales of cars are increasing, and overall, little is done towards reducing car dependence,” he said. “Globally, we have some cities that are quite pioneering in reducing car dependence. But besides those, there is little that is done.”

One challenge is that although government officials may understand the high-level solutions, many aren’t sure how to implement them on the ground. 

“Anybody going through a master’s of city planning program now is probably familiar with the research about how the built environment affects car dependence,” Handy said. “[But] even if the planners and the public officials know something about that research and believe that this is what they should be trying to do, they don’t necessarily know how to do it.”

Moreover, governments often lack the support and resources they need to make progress on this issue. Opposition from NIMBY (which stands for “not in my backyard”) groups and others can block progress. 

“There’s definitely a solid base of knowledge of what works,” Seskin said. “That doesn’t necessarily mean that what works is initially popular, though. And I think that’s where things get tricky.” 

The private sector also plays a vital role in determining how this issue plays out. Many businesses and other organizations take steps that reduce car dependency. For example, employer-run programs to shift people from cars to other modes of transportation are the most common and popular initiatives of this type in the country, Seskin said. 

But other private-sector actions are less beneficial. For example, developers and financiers often slow attempts to make communities more compact, since they, not governments, ultimately determine exactly what gets built where. 

“There’s a lot of inertia and risk aversion in the development community, so that’s why we keep getting the same stuff that we always get – because that’s what the private sector knows how to do,” Handy said.

Groups with economic interests in maintaining the status quo are another major barrier to progress, said Shen, who was the lead author of a 2024 report about car dependence in the U.S. 

“We found that the oil, auto, and roadbuilding industries receive more than 80% of the over $2 trillion in yearly public and private transportation spending,” he said. “And if you look through our history, they’ve lobbied for decades to prioritize cars over a more complete or affordable set of transportation options.”

“Our transportation system isn’t just a blank slate where people are vying for the best technical solution,” he said. “There are industries with real financial interests in shaping how we get around.”

Ascot Resources (TSXV: AOT.H) is proposing a rebrand of the troubled company as it looks to a fresh start under a new leadership team, with plans in place for its two projects in British Columbia.

Cambria Gold Mines Inc. — its new name — originates from the “spectacular icefield” located adjacent to the Red Mountain project east of Stewart, BC, Robert McLeod, its new president and CEO, said in a press release on Tuesday.

The new management led by McLeod, a mining executive and geologist from Stewart, views the Red Mountain project as a key part of the company’s new vision to create an integrated mine operation centered around its Premier gold project, which it briefly brought into production in 2024 and is looking to restart again.

Ascot Resources’ shares gained as much as 7.5% on Wednesday, for a market capitalization of C$55.6 million ($41 million). The stock has more than doubled since the start of 2026.

Multiple setbacks

Located 25 km from Stewart, the Premier project is home to a former gold mine that was once the largest in North America. Between 1918 and 1952, the underground mine produced over 2 million oz. gold and 45 million oz. silver.

Ascot has been working to return the historic site to production and successfully poured its first gold in April 2024. However, operations were put on hold after just five months due to insufficient underground development. The company has since faced multiple setbacks in its attempt to restart the operation, eventually placing the mine on care and maintenance in summer 2025 and initiating a strategic review.

Last month, Ascot was also penalized C$142,000 by BC’s environmental regulators for failing to prevent wastes stored at the shuttered gold mine from leaking into a local river, Business in Vancouver reported.

Hub-and-spoke plan

Under the new plan, ore from the Red Mountain project would be blended with high-grade mineralization from the Premier-Northern Lights (PNL) deposit and/or the potentially bulk-mineable mineralization from the Big Missouri deposit, both located at Premier.

According to company estimates, the Red Mountain property hosts measured and indicated resources of 3.19 million tonnes averaging 7.63 grams per tonne gold for 783,000 oz. The deposit is amenable to long-hole stoping, has existing production size underground workings and would provide the majority of mill feed for the Premier mill.

Work to advance permitting of the Red Mountain access road to transport material to Premier was initiated in the fall of 2025, led by the new management team, and included consultation with the Nisga’a Nation. Road construction is expected to begin this spring, upon regulatory approval, the company said.

“Management has been rapidly developing key permitting, geological and engineering elements to develop the Premier and Red Mountain deposits with the goal of a high-grade, hub-and-spoke gold mining operation to feed the recently constructed mill,” McLeod said.

The rebrand follows the company’s recent fundraising for proceeds of C$175 million and completion of debt settlement and restructuring to keep the business running. It also amended its agreement with Sprott to waive deliveries and missed royalty payments in exchange for equity.

21378 In November, less than one-tenth of an inch of rain was recorded at the Sanctuary. In December, we recorded 1.27 inches of rain. This was 74% of the average for the month. By January, the...

Last week, CalCAN staff attended a regenerative tree nut field day at Burroughs Family Farms in Denair, CA. Ward and Rosie Burroughs along with their five grown children grow organic almonds, olive oil, milk, cheese, and pasture-raised eggs and meats.

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A confidential UK government briefing forwarded by former trade envoy Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor to Jeffrey Epstein in 2010 highlighted uranium among several “high value” mineral opportunities in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, according to a BBC report.

The document, prepared by UK officials for Andrew during an official visit to Helmand that December, outlined investment prospects tied to “significant high value mineral deposits” and the “potential for low cost extraction,” including uranium, thorium, gold, iridium and marble, as well as possible oil and gas resources.

In an accompanying email, Andrew described the material as a “confidential brief produced by the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand Province,” the BBC reported. The briefing was compiled at a time when Britain was militarily and politically engaged in rebuilding Afghanistan and seeking to encourage commercial development alongside reconstruction efforts.

Afghanistan’s uranium potential has long been noted but remains undeveloped. Much of the country’s geological data derives from Soviet-era surveys conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, which identified uranium occurrences in several provinces, including Helmand. Subsequent assessments by the US Geological Survey have suggested Afghanistan hosts a broad range of strategic minerals, though few deposits have advanced beyond early-stage evaluation.

Uranium market gathers momentum in 2026: Sprott Potential new source

Globally, uranium production is concentrated in a limited number of jurisdictions. Kazakhstan accounts for the largest share of annual output, followed by Canada and Namibia. The nuclear fuel market is sensitive to geopolitical risk and supply concentration. Any new source of production, particularly in a frontier jurisdiction, would carry strategic implications.

Any future extraction in Afghanistan would face substantial security, infrastructure and regulatory hurdles, in addition to strict international safeguards governing uranium trade. Uranium and thorium are dual-use materials: while uranium underpins civilian nuclear power generation, it is subject to global non-proliferation oversight and export controls.

The Afghan briefing was one of several official trade-related documents Andrew appears to have shared with Epstein during his tenure as the UK’s special representative for international trade and investment from 2001 to 2011, the BBC said.

Emails reviewed by the broadcaster suggest additional reports from official visits to Singapore, Hong Kong and Vietnam were also sent, along with further compressed files labelled “Overseas bids.”

‘Appalling behaviour’

Sir Vince Cable, who was Business Secretary at the time, described the sharing of the Helmand briefing as “appalling behaviour,” according to the BBC.

Thames Valley Police said it is assessing whether a criminal investigation is warranted. In a statement, the force said it is engaging with specialist Crown Prosecution Service prosecutors and that allegations of misconduct in public office involve “particular complexities.”

Andrew has previously denied wrongdoing in relation to his association with Epstein and has rejected suggestions that he used his role as trade envoy to further personal interests. He has not publicly responded to the BBC’s latest report.

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White Gold (TSXV: WGO) will spin off its critical minerals projects located in Canada’s Yukon Territory in a bid to “unlock” the value of its non-gold assets amid a supportive policy environment.

The spin-out will hold six properties that host several large-scale targets prospective for copper, molybdenum, tungsten, antimony, zinc and bismuth, the Yukon-focused explorer said in a statement on Wednesday.

Together, they comprise approximately 15% of White Gold’s claim holdings, estimated at 3,051 km2 covering 21 properties in total.

Some of the key exploration targets – such as the Bridget, Isaac, and Mascot – are situated within the Dawson Range, a prolific mineral belt that hosts several significant copper-gold porphyry deposits in the region, including the Casino deposit, one of the largest undeveloped projects in Canada.

“Spinning these assets into a dedicated vehicle allows them to be advanced more effectively with the technical focus and disciplined exploration strategy they warrant,” White Gold’s VP, exploration Dylan Langille said in a news release.

“Assets such as Bridget, Isaac and Wolf exhibit the size, metal zonation, and geophysical signatures typically associated with large, fertile porphyry systems, yet remain largely untested by drilling,” he added.

Shares of White Gold rose by 4.7% to C$1.57 apiece by midday Wednesday in Toronto, taking its market capitalization to C$311.6 million ($230 million).

Mo-Cu target

In its news release, White Gold highlighted the Bridget target as the most significant to date. It comprises a standout molybdenum-copper porphyry anomaly covering a 3 x 3.5 km area, enriched with tungsten, bismuth and silver.

An initial technical report on this property will be filed in connection with the spin-out, White Gold said.

The other projects offer additional upside potential for antimony and bismuth as secondary metals across orogenic gold, intrusion-related, epithermal and porphyry systems, it added.

Government support

The spin-out process is currently underway and would require shareholder as well as regulatory and court approvals.

“The timing of this proposed spin-out aligns exceptionally well with the strong and growing support we are seeing from both the Yukon and federal governments for the responsible development of critical minerals,” CEO David D’Onofrio said.

“Recent initiatives focused on advancing critical mineral exploration, improving infrastructure, streamlining permitting, and strengthening collaboration across Western and Northern Canada reinforce Yukon’s position as a globally desirable jurisdiction for discovery and development.”

The move would also allow the company to focus solely on advancing its flagship gold project, which hosts four near-surface gold deposits that collectively contain an estimated 1.73 million oz. of gold in indicated resources and 1.27 million oz. in inferred resources.