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Tempest: For those tracking the housing issue during the election campaign, there were at least two notable moments pre-election which presaged Mayor Mamdani’s emerging housing policy. A “technocratic pivot” to a stated openness to working with private, for-profit developers, and, as your article details, the late endorsement of three ballot measures that had been proposed by Mayor Adams’ charter revision commission and which were meant to fast-track the construction of “affordable” housing. In backing the ballot measures, Mamdani lined up with significant forces within the mainstream of the Democratic Party, including Andrew Cuomo and Governor Kathy Hochul, as well as private developers and real estate industry advocacy groups. How do you assess these developments? Why the evolution within the campaign, including the very last minute endorsement of the ultimately successful ballot measures?

Ben Rosenfield and Holden Taylor: First, it’s important to note that the framing of ballot proposals 2-4 necessarily narrowed and abstracted the processes, dynamics, and relationships underlying the crisis tenants in New York City have been facing for years. The framing of the proposals was such that a ‘yes’ vote meant making changes to the status quo, whereas a ‘no’ vote meant a continuation of the status quo. In the context of an ongoing crisis, it’s easy to see why many may have thought or felt that some change is better than no change.

The problem is that this isn’t the case, and the aim of proposals 2-4, namely to build more and build faster, does nothing to empower tenants or create actual affordable housing. On the contrary, the proposals will not only give more power to the Mayor (Mamdani and future Mayors), but also a gift to developers and real estate more generally. Increased production (and the fast-tracking of said production) does nothing in and of itself to address the current crisis; the logic that it does is based in supply/demand economics.

It’s not particularly surprising that Mamdani ultimately came out in favor of these proposals. First, the proposals will facilitate the implementation and realization of his campaign goals. His campaign platform, released on February 3rd, 2025, mentions “creating 200,000 new units over the next 10 years, fast-tracking affordable developments, and increasing zoned capacity.” His goals and the aim of these ballot measures are entirely consistent with one another.

Secondly, a no vote would have pitted Mamdani against not only developers and real estate, who unsurprisingly were deeply in favor of these measures, but also, crucially, the right-wing of the socialist tenant movement in New York City, which is the pole that is most in line with Mamdani’s politics. Whereas in the past the socialist tenant movement would have been less likely to support these proposals, there is a growing ‘yimby socialist’ whose power and influence has been increasing. While the politics and ideology of this pole are not entirely hegemonic in the movement, they have taken advantage of the relative weakness of the autonomous and more radical wing of the movement. Accordingly, Mamdani had the backing of a not insignificant portion (in size and influence) of the socialist tenant movement in supporting the ballot measures.

Tempest: One of the targets of your article is what you describe as YIMBYism (“yes in my back yard”). It argues for an imperative on building more and more housing and that “obstacles to construction are problems to be solved, removed, or overcome…the target is “red tape”—a catchall term for any policy or state mediation that prevents construction.” You describe YIMBYism being adopted wholesale by social democrats and the right-wing of DSA whose theory of change rests on its belief that effectively administering the bourgeois state at various levels via governing coalitions and pressure campaigns will gradually improve material conditions for a broad sector of working people, thereby winning working class favor, thereby making more significant reforms possible. In the specific context of NYC’s housing crisis what is wrong with this approach?

BR & HT: A comrade puts it simply: “The fundamental division in the housing debate is not whether you support or oppose higher density, but if you view the market as the solution to the housing crisis or as the cause of it.” We’ve showed how the “affordable housing” that gets built through the market a) is not affordable and b) does not bolster our class power, our working-class organizations, whatsoever. Socialism is the double movement of improving our conditions and our class power.

Tempest: You clearly, if depressingly, chart the lines of continuity between the emergent housing policy of Mamdani and his two predecessors as Mayor (Adam and DeBlasio). You specifically point to: zoning and charter changes that further entrench market frameworks and “solutions”; a continuity of personnel (for example, Leila Bozorg the executive director of housing in the Mayor’s office under Eric Adam will serve as Mamdani’s deputy mayor for housing and planning); and a policy focus on the production of housing stock for middle-income and higher income New Yorkers resulting in less production or rental stock for more vulnerable, lower income NYers. Is it still possible for Mamdani to chart a different path? What do you see as the best ways to fight for an alternative housing policy?

BR & HT: The possibilities for Mamdani to chart a different path largely, if not entirely, depend on the ability of the autonomous/radical wing of the socialist tenant movement to put forth a clear and compelling alternative to that of the status quo generally and the YIMBY socialists more specifically. In order to accomplish this, we will need to (continue to) organize and build power in the movement so that those both inside and outside of the socialist tenant movement will have to engage and contend more seriously with our politics, ideas, and strategies.

In the article we spend only one paragraph (out of so many!) discussing where Zohran may mark a break from the past. This brevity is in part because those breaks–which are concerned more with the city government’s relationship to working-class and community organizations and the ‘masses’ than the capital-intensive world of real estate development–are still very much taking form. But the brevity is also because this was a point on which we disagreed most thoroughly.

Ben, for example, is much more skeptical regarding the possibilities of Zohran’s Office to Protect Tenants and his Office of Mass Engagement as it relates to the development of working-class tenant self-activity and the construction of independent working-class organizations. For Ben, demobilization and cooptation are not merely possibilities the socialist tenant movement will face as it navigates its relationship with the Mamdani administration–they are likely outcomes if the movement is not intentional regarding its strategy and politics and how it builds power. The movement is still relatively weak and lacks developed organizations and infrastructures; while there is exciting and meaningful organizing happening on these fronts, this reality increases the temptation of hitching our wagon to the Mamdani administration in a way that will undercut the very important work the movement is doing. This is not to say that we should not engage with these projects, but rather are an attempt to emphasize the importance of independence and autonomy as we navigate the contradictory terrain moving forward.

Holden thinks there are novel opportunities ahead, and that these offices–and the administration more broadly–might offer strategic tools. For example, the Office of Mass Engagement contacted thousands of Pinnacle tenants and gathered hundreds of them onto one call with the Mayor. While this obviously doesn’t equate to militant self-activity, it did give Union of Pinnacle Tenant organizers the opportunity to bring in dozens of tenant leaders into the union. It is a tricky balance, navigating these opportunities while maintaining class independence but it is, in Holden’s estimation, what must be done. But! As we say in the piece, there is the monumental risk (to take Ben’s view), of these offices to function as social justice veneers to a fundamental project of market entrenchment.

In short, we (Ben and Holden) agree that the Mamdani administration will present opportunities, obstacles, and dangers for the socialist tenant movement. We disagree, perhaps, on what exactly the balance sheet looks like and to what extent we should engage with the administration and its projects. We will have more substance to concretely engage with and struggle over as we move forward.

In the article, we outline four planks of a prospective program that the socialist tenant movement can and should cohere around; an immediate eviction moratorium, the expansion of rent stabilization, tenant-led, democratic expropriation, and the preservation and expansion of the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). Some of these will be more difficult to win than others, and some will be more palatable to both Mamdani and the right-wing of the socialist tenant movement.

Tempest: You argue that on the housing question, most socialists agree that our end goal should be decommodified, publicly-owned, democratically-controlled housing for all. Is this a goal that is shared by the Mamdani administration? In other words, is it an issue of strategic differences among socialists, i.e. how we get there,  or is there a different goal being prepared by Mamdani?

BR & HT: This is not the goal of the Mamdani administration. It may be what he personally desires, but, as we know, he and his administration will have to navigate the limitations and contradictions of the capitalist city and state. Mamdani will advocate for and support reforms, some of which will have the ability to meaningfully materially improve the conditions that tenants in New York City face.  That said, their goal is not to completely transform the state of housing and tenancy, and even if it were they are not in a position to be able to do so.

I think the majority of the socialist tenant movement (both the left and right poles) embrace this goal in theory. In practice, however, we argue that embracing yimbyism is simply incompatible with the realization of these goals.

Accordingly, it is our task as the left-wing of the socialist tenant movement to organize with the aim of building power and popularizing our strategies and politics such that they become hegemonic within the movement. The development of independent organizations committed to class struggle will be both the means and the end to carrying out this task.

It is our task to recenter and redefine what is possible for our movement and what our north star should be (decommodified, publicly-owned, democratically-controlled housing for all); to create a compelling, genuine alternative around which the movement rallies and coheres.

Tempest: Especially for those outside the day-to-day activism and organizing of the tenants’ movement, your article provides a much appreciated deep-dive into the political dynamics, tensions, and developments within this movement in NYC, including its different organizational forms and competing strategic outlooks. How would you draw a balance sheet to assess the impact of the Mamdani campaign and his election on this movement?

BR & HT: There’s a double movement; on one hand, there’s this tidal wave of the tenant-as-political-actor–which is something to channel and cultivate. On the other hand, we have nonprofit directors celebrating the moment as the horizon has been reached–on a recent coalition call, one director declared outright that “mass governance is here.” Sobriety is the remedy.

I think, if anything, within the left flank of the tenant movement there’s been a maturation, both in orientation and politics. Zohran’s election has raised the stakes for what we do. There are more eyes watching but also more people dedicating their energies to these efforts. There is, in this movement, more clarity in what matters and what doesn’t–and I think there is also trust among the different factions that our future is shared. Though there are political differences–as there is in any formation of any consequence–I think they are subordinated to a shared structural analysis, at least on the Left. How this Left asserts itself, both amid the broader housing movement coalitions as well as independent actors on their own, is incredibly consequential. Because of the right of the movement’s submission to the administration, there are crucial openings for political leadership by the Left, by the rooted and grounded. This right-wing, the non-profit coalition, will hesitate to critique or clash with Zohran, and will be nervous to be seen undermining his agenda. But there are issues that necessitate this; particularly, the questions of the Fulton & Elliott-Chelsea Houses (their demolition, conversion from Section 9 to Section 8) and, as we articulate in our article, pushing for an eviction moratorium until ICE leaves the city. These issues expose the contradictions of municipal socialism.

Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the Tempest Collective. For more information, see “About Tempest Collective.”
Featured Image credit: SnippyHolloW; modified by Tempest.

The post Mamdani, the market, and the NYC housing crisis appeared first on Tempest.

In the cavernous halls of the US State Department last week, something unusual was on display: earnest cooperation rather than the usual diplomatic theatre. The inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial wasn’t about tariffs, trade tantrums, or chest-thumping press releases. It was, quite simply, a collective admission that the West is behind, China is ahead, and time is not on our side.

For the United States, the stakes are no longer academic. Critical minerals aren’t just inputs for batteries and wind turbines. They are strategic building blocks for modern defence, advanced manufacturing and economic independence. This is not a commodities story anymore. It’s a power story. And Washington gets it.

The Trump administration is backing ambitious measures, including a proposed $12-billion (C$16.3-billion) stockpile of essential raw materials – “Project Vault” – meant to shield US industry from shocks and reduce reliance on Beijing’s dominance. The Americans have discovered, rather late in the game, that you cannot build fighter jets, EVs, or the next industrial economy off of Chinese processing plants.

Closing the gap

The shift in tone at the Ministerial, from coercion to collaboration, reflects something deeper than diplomacy. It reflects anxiety. Because for all the tough talk of trade wars, the United States knows that to close the gap between the West and China it will take collaboration on a grand scale coupled with an internal build-up of Ameria’s own intellectual and physical capacity. 

One senior US official captured the moment perfectly: the goal now is to persuade America’s brightest young minds not to join the next Silicon Valley startup, but to enter mining and minerals engineering. It seems mining is back, not as nostalgia, but as necessity.

Trump launches $12B project Vault to cut China reliance

Of course, the question lingers: after a year of transactional American diplomacy, are allies skeptical? More than likely. But reality has a way of concentrating minds. China’s dominance – roughly 60% of mining and nearly 90% of processing in key sectors – is not something you diversify away from with a well-worded communiqué. Western nations know they cannot afford inaction, even if coordination occasionally requires holding one’s nose.

For Canada, the implications are profound.

Sleeping giant hitting snooze?

Canada is blessed with world-class deposits: gold, lithium, graphite, nickel, cobalt, copper, rare earths. These raw materials will determine who leads the next industrial era. Geologically, we are sitting at the grown-ups’ table. Strategically, we too often act like we’re still waiting in the lobby.

Because geology is not strategy. Reserves alone do not confer power. Processing and refining do. And that is where Western supply chains, Canada included, still lag badly.

Canada’s Critical Minerals Strategy, backed by nearly C$4 billion and coordination across 15 federal departments, aims to build resilient value chains from mine to midstream to manufacturing. Ottawa has also helped unlock 26 investments and partnerships worth billions under the G7’s Critical Minerals Production Alliance. Canada is looking better on paper. The question is whether we can be good in practice. And at speed.

Three initiatives matter most: the Critical Minerals Strategy and infrastructure funds meant to build domestic supply chains rather than exporting raw rock and importing finished product; the G7 Production Alliance investments mobilizing capital into graphite, rare earths and scandium; and emerging national funding mechanisms, including proposals for a Critical Minerals Sovereign Fund to back equity and offtake agreements. 

The policy wheels are turning, but Canada will not get where it needs to go on the back of good intentions and interdepartmental working groups. Too often, political leadership excels at saying the right things and then falls down on execution. Canada’s chronic weakness is not vision. It is velocity.

Sharp minds but who’s moving fast?

To Ottawa’s credit, there are now some serious economic minds closer to the centre of power. Tim Hodgson, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, brings senior experience from Goldman Sachs and Ontario Teachers’ pension fund. He’s earned strong marks from the resource sector so far.

Michael Sabia is the Clerk of the Privy Council, Canada’s highest-ranking civil servant, who manages the government’s agenda. Sabia is a rare figure whose credibility resonates as strongly in boardrooms as in ministries. He has been shaped by leadership roles at Bell Canada, Hydro-Québec and Quebec’s largest pension, CDPQ.

Both men understand the stakes. But the question remains: Do they have the willingness and the support to accelerate critical mineral development at the pace that this moment requires?

From the sidelines of the Ministerial, the scuttlebutt was that high-ranking US officials are talking about single-month permitting timelines for strategically important projects. Single-month. In Canada, we call that “the early stages of preliminary consultation.” Even if Washington’s timeline is aspirational, next to Canada’s glacial system it should be deeply uncomfortable. Permitting reform is not a bureaucratic detail. It is a strategic imperative.

Canada’s Arctic, long treated as a distant abstraction, is becoming a frontier of real geopolitical value. Like Greenland, its mineral wealth is suddenly coveted. And rightly so.

But sovereignty is not flag-planting. Sovereignty is capacity. To unlock the North, Canada needs infrastructure: ports, rail, grids, logistics, and the ability to assert presence. Canada’s current plans remain incremental where the moment demands boldness. We must ask ourselves: are we building what’s needed for resource security, or watching opportunities pass while others consolidate alliances and claims?

Closing the window

Canada has the geological assets, the intellectual capital, and the partnerships to lead in the era of critical minerals. Our strategies appear sound. Our intentions are sincere. But intention is not a supply chain.

In this competition of geopolitics and economics, hand-wringing will spell victory for our rivals and a dangerous loss for Canada. Canada must streamline permitting drastically, scale industrial infrastructure, and harness the full force of government, capital markets, and industry. The stakes – sovereignty, economic independence, and global influence – are too high to settle for anything less.

History does not reward countries that move slowly while the world scrambles for leverage. And right now, leverage is buried in the ground.

_____________________
Anthony Vaccaro is President of the TNM Group, which includes MINING.COM, The Northern Miner and Canadian Mining Journal.

Headline News:

• “Trump Orders Pentagon To Invest In ‘Beautiful, Clean’ Coal Power” • President Donald Trump signed an executive order aimed to sustain the US coal industry through federal funding, directing the Pentagon to purchase electricity from coal plants. He recently directed the DOE to distribute $175 million to fund upgrades at six coal plants. [ABC News]

USS Texas, the last coal-burning US warship, converted to oil by 1926 (USN employee, public domain)

• “Scientists Sound Alarm As Multiple Climate Systems Near Critical Tipping Points” • Scientists say multiple critical Earth systems appear closer to destabilisation than previously believed. This is putting the planet in increased danger of following a “hothouse” path driven by feedback loops that can amplify the consequences of global warming. [Euronews]
• “China Coal Power Output Falls 1.9% In 2025 Amid Renewable Surge” • China had a 1.9% decline in coal-fired power generation in 2025, signalling a significant shift in the country’s energy mix as the expansion of non-fossil fuel sources outpaced electricity demand growth for the first time in a decade, according to a report by Wood Mackenzie. [BioEnergy Times]
• “Trump EPA To Repeal Key Climate Finding” • The Trump administration will revoke a scientific finding that long has been the central basis for action to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and fight climate change, the White House said. By contrast, the National Academy of Sciences says the growing harm of climate change is beyond dispute. [Euronews]
• “Haugland And Watson Terminal Services Ink NY Pact” • The Haugland Group, based in New York, signed a memorandum of understanding with Rhode Island’s Waterson Terminal Services to collaborate on port development in the state of New York to support offshore wind development. The project will draw on the expertise of both. [reNews]

For more news, please visit geoharvey – Daily News about Energy and Climate Change.

The Popular Agrarian Reform program is a collective construction resulting from many years of organization and praxis.

The post In Brazil & Argentina Popular Agrarian Reform is a Unifying Axis for Peasant Organizations – ICARRD+20 Series appeared first on La Via Campesina - EN.

Felix Horne is a senior expert with Climate Rights International.

When The Washington Post laid off more than 300 staff last week, including journalists who covered climate and the environment, it was more than another grim headline about the state of the media. The cuts marked the loss of expertise and sustained scrutiny at one of the world’s most influential newsrooms, at precisely the moment when the climate crisis demands more reporting, not less.

These decisions do not simply downsize a business. They weaken public understanding of how climate change impacts lives, how cause and effect connect, and how power can be held to account.

Without expertise and experience, wildfires are reported without the underlying climate context that fuels them. Energy stories lose their climate dimension. Pollution is treated as an unfortunate accident rather than a foreseeable harm from fossil fuel dependence.

The facts still exist – but fewer people are paid, protected, or empowered to surface them, and with that goes people’s understanding of how climate is intimately intertwined with our lives.

These cuts follow a broader pattern across mainstream media in the United States, Europe and beyond. In 2024 and 2025 alone, major US outlets announced thousands of job losses.

CBS, CNN, NBC and other broadcasters cut newsroom staff. The Guardian has acknowledged sustained financial strain and has reduced or consolidated reporting capacity in recent years.

Meanwhile, local newspapers, the primary source of reporting on nearby floods, heatwaves, refineries, pipelines and mines, continue to disappear. In the US, more than 3,200 local newspapers closed since 2005, leaving large parts of the US without consistent, on-the-ground reporting.

Threats and harassment

Beyond closures, climate journalists face numerous threats. Journalists covering climate and environmental issues report rising harassment, legal threats and violence, particularly when reporting on fossil fuels, mining and land conflicts. One study found that 39% of journalists and editors covering the climate crisis had been threatened because of their work.

Online abuse, often coordinated and sustained, has become a routine tool for silencing climate reporting. And this doesn’t count the many fixers, translators, drivers and other local employees who face threats because of their role in this reporting, many of whom face a further loss of their livelihood because of these cuts.

At Climate Rights International (CRI), we document climate harms and human rights abuses linked to fossil fuels, mining and deforestation, among many other subjects. But our investigations do not exist in a vacuum.

They are often strengthened, and sometimes made possible, by local journalists who first uncover these harms, and by climate reporters who amplify our findings, connect them to broader patterns, and further our investigations by focusing on new angles, ongoing efforts at accountability or updated findings over time. They are indispensable to what we do and the impact we are trying to have.

• Feb 5, 2026 Investigations Gas flaring soars in Niger Delta post-Shell, afflicting communities   Since the multinational sold its assets in Nigeria’s oil hub, data analysis for Climate Home News shows flaring has risen, harming locals and the climate Read more
• Dec 8, 2025 Finance Deep in the Amazon, forest protection cash must vie with glitter of illegal gold The TFFF fund launched at COP30 aims to pay communities to protect the rainforest, but will it be enough? On French Guiana’s border with Brazil, the profits to be had from mining are far higher Read more

When journalism retreats, misinformation fills the gap. In the absence of trusted, verified reporting, false or misleading climate narratives spread quickly online. Confusion replaces clarity about the reality of climate change: its links to energy choices, connections with the food we eat, and the scale of action required. Urgency erodes.

Climate change becomes less politically important when it becomes less visible. What is not reported is not discussed. What is not discussed does not become an issue for most voters, and therefore for politicians. The climate crisis can be manipulated by politicians as just another issue of special interest groups to balance with other interests, rather than being treated as the existential threat it is.

Fragile progress

To be clear, progress has been made. In recent years, climate considerations have been more consistently integrated into mainstream coverage of energy, economics, and geopolitics. Energy costs, rising food costs, migration, extreme weather and supply chains are now more often reported with climate dimensions in view.

But that progress is fragile. It depends on reporters and editors with climate expertise sitting in newsrooms, able to ask the second question, to connect today’s flooding with the climate crisis, and to connect today’s energy story to tomorrow’s climate harm.

This matters profoundly for fossil fuels, deforestation and transition minerals. Who is reporting on LNG terminals, new gas fields, lithium or nickel mining, the burning and clear-cutting of remote forests, or rising energy costs determines whether these developments are understood as narrow economic stories, or as climate and human rights choices with long-term consequences.

West Africa’s first lithium mine awaits go-ahead as Ghana seeks better deal 

Independent platforms, newsletters and Substack writers now produce some of the best climate coverage anywhere. They matter deeply. But they often reach audiences already paying attention to these issues. Mainstream media still plays a unique role: introducing climate realities to people who did not set out to read about climate change at all.

The erosion of climate journalism is unfolding alongside broader efforts to silence climate voices – through laws restricting protests, lawsuits aimed at stifling dissent, surveillance of activists and attacks on environmental defenders. CRI and others have documented how these tactics work together to suppress inconvenient facts.

Fewer journalists and fewer activists lead to less understanding of why climate is the story right now. The climate crisis will not pause because fewer people are paid to document it.

The question is whether societies choose to face our unfolding reality with evidence or allow silence and distortion to take its place. Supporting climate journalism is an investment in truth, accountability and a liveable planet for our children and future generations.

The post Why cutting climate journalism is a risk we can’t afford appeared first on Climate Home News.

Support workers with OPSEU Local 249 are in their twelfth week of a strike. They are fighting for better wages and have not seen a raise since 2020.

The post Worth striking for: Oakville care home workers fighting for decent pay  first appeared on Spring.

Last week, President Donald Trump announced the United States would temporarily increase the amount of beef the nation imports from Argentina — by 80,000 more metric tons this calendar year.

In an executive order, the president stated these beef imports would not be subject to tariffs, and that he came to the decision after discussion with Brooke Rollins, U.S. agricultural secretary. The White House described the move as part of its push to lower beef prices at the grocery store for American consumers. But almost as soon as the trade deal was announced, Trump was met with backlash from key allies and constituents, including ranchers who say that buying more beef from Argentina hurts U.S. producers.

“The National Cattlemen’s Beef Association and its members cannot stand behind the president while he undercuts the future of family farmers and ranchers by importing Argentinian beef in an attempt to influence prices,” Colin Woodall, head of the trade group, said in a statement. Deb Fischer, a Republican senator from Nebraska, also stated that the trade deal will “sideline” cattle ranchers in the U.S.

Trade groups, lawmakers, and economists agree that the increased imports from Argentina are unlikely to lower the record-high beef prices in the U.S. That’s partly because Americans already consume so much beef, according to David Ortega, professor in the Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics department at Michigan State University. 

“The added volume is rather small relative to what Americans consume each year, under 1 percent of total supply,” Ortega said in an email, adding that this “probably won’t move retail prices much.”

But regardless of how unpopular the trade deal is, it almost certainly will spell trouble for the environment, especially in Latin America. 

“I don’t see how Argentina can meet its climate commitments by expanding its beef production for the United States,” said Stephanie Feldstein, the population and sustainability director at the Center for Biological Diversity. 

Raising cattle — ruminants that emit methane as part of their digestive process — for human consumption has a huge climate footprint, both in terms of land use and greenhouse gas emissions. Whether the additional cattle Trump is seeking are raised in North or South America, it will still lead to more methane and other emissions in the atmosphere. “By importing Argentina’s beef to the U.S., this administration is exporting its disregard for the climate crisis,” said Feldstein.

Around the world, climate change has scrambled the economics of growing food and raising livestock. In Argentina and the U.S. alike, cattle ranches have been hit hard by unprecedented droughts and rising temperatures. These factors, along with producers facing higher prices for inputs like fertilizer, labor, and machinery have caused the U.S. supply of cattle to plummet to a 70-year low.

Javier Milei, the far-right Argentinian president, spoke highly of the trade deal, saying it signaled the nation’s trustworthiness as a trade partner. But boosting beef production in Argentina to meet Trump’s new quota will force ranchers in the Latin American country to make difficult decisions. 

A herd of cattle stand at their stockyard before a cattle auction in Argentina. Tobias Skarlovnik / Getty Images

Currently, Argentina devotes a tremendous amount of land to raising cattle in pasture-based systems. Unlike the confined animal feeding operations, or CAFOs, found in the U.S. and other parts of the world, these pasture-based systems allow cattle to graze on a variety of grasses until the “finishing” stage, when they are fed corn- and soy-based feed before they are slaughtered.

Even despite the role it plays in deforestation, raising cattle on pasture is often considered to be a more sustainable practice than feedlots. But Silvia Secchi, natural resource economist and professor at the University of Iowa, pointed out that how you measure sustainability depends on how you define it — and when it comes to beef, both pasture-based and CAFO systems come with drawbacks for the planet.

CAFOs, which are also referred to as factory farms due to how little space livestock are afforded, pollute nearby air and waterways; local communities will often report manure and fertilizer runoff as well as noxious odors. These feeding operations are terrible for both the farmed animals and the laborers who work there. However, CAFOs are sometimes touted as climate-efficient — in essence, because the livestock have such short lifespans before slaughter that they emit less methane relative to cattle who live longer grazing on pasture.

Producing more beef means choosing between two flawed systems, noted Secchi. “To me, the only answer is, we need to eat less beef,” she said.

The evolving trade relations between the U.S. and Argentina demonstrate some uncomfortable truths about animal agriculture, and our food systems more broadly. First, it shows how farming and ranching are industries that are both on the frontlines of the climate crisis and contributors to it. 

Second, it reflects the toll that meeting the rising demand for animal protein has on critical ecosystems. In addition to its impact on ranchers, drought in Argentina has also slashed soybean production. Feldstein added that this has forced Argentinian farmers to import soybeans from Brazil, where their production is a driver of deforestation, particularly in the Cerrado, a savannah heralded for its biodiversity. 

These knock-on effects have implications for the planet as a whole, as areas like the Cerrado are major carbon sinks. 

As the Trump administration and MAHA leaders gear up to promote even higher animal protein consumption in the U.S., Feldstein agrees with Secchi’s assessment that consumers should strive, actually, to do the opposite. “There is no form of beef production that can be considered sustainable at our current consumption levels,” she said. 

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This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Trump’s beef trade deal is a lose-lose gamble that won’t lower prices on Feb 12, 2026.

Two new studies have identified an alarming connection between exposure to wildfire smoke during pregnancy and autism in young children. The unprecedented findings suggest the neurological consequences of breathing smoke are more profound than previously thought. 

The research builds on a robust body of evidence that shows wildfire smoke is supremely unhealthy — about 10 times worse than inhaling car exhaust and other pollution emitted by burning fossil fuels. The ultra-fine particles that trees and vegetation release during combustion penetrate deep into the lungs and bloodstream, exacerbating preexisting conditions like asthma and, recent studies suggest, damaging internal organs. 

In recent years, researchers have also begun to suspect that conflagrations like the one that leveled swaths of Los Angeles County last year impact neurological health, but the effects of smoke on brain development are comparatively poorly understood. Two new studies shed light on the complicated web of genetic and environmental factors that contribute to autism spectrum disorder, building on previous research that found connections between the developmental disability and exposure to air pollution in general.  

The first study, published in the peer-reviewed journal Environmental Science and Technology, analyzed data on more than 200,000 children born in southern California between 2006 and 2014. It found that those born to mothers exposed to 10 or more days of smoke in their third trimester had a 23 percent greater risk of being diagnosed with autism by age 5. Pregnant women who endured between six and 10 days saw a 12 percent higher risk of such a diagnosis in their kids.

Notably, the study found that average wildfire smoke concentration across the entire pregnancy or individual trimesters had no material effect on autism diagnoses. What did make a difference was the number of days a person in their third trimester inhaled the pollutant. Even one day of exposure had an effect. 

“The more you get exposed the worse it is,” said David Luglio, a postdoctoral fellow at Tulane University and the lead author of the study. “But we can’t necessarily answer why that is the case.” Luglio said he hopes future research will help untangle why prolonged inhalation made such a big difference. Future studies may also help refine these results by incorporating information on how much time the subjects spent outside during fires and whether they wore masks that help filter particulate matter.

The second study, published in the peer-reviewed journal Environment International, examined a much bigger sample — some 8.5 million births in California between 2001 and 2019. It, too, found a link between wildfire smoke exposure and autism diagnoses, though its different methodology yielded more nuanced results. When researchers looked at average smoke exposure across all births, the association was relatively weak. But among women who experienced intense smoke episodes — particularly those in the top 10th percentile of exposure — the link was substantially stronger. And it was strongest in people who live where population centers meet undeveloped land and who are not exposed to very high levels of general air pollution normally.

For women in the highest percentile of wildfire smoke exposure who otherwise lived in areas with relatively little background air pollution — such as car exhaust and urban smog — the odds of having a child diagnosed with autism were 50 percent higher than among those with lower wildfire smoke exposure. The researchers adjusted their analyses for non-wildfire related sources of air pollution.

“It’s a really huge study,” said Rebecca Schmidt, a professor of public health at University of California Davis and the paper’s lead author — referring to the many millions of records her team analyzed. The earlier study was also quite large, she said, a sign that both findings are well-founded. “There’s more evidence when there’s replication of similar findings,” she said. 

Autism spectrum disorder affects 1 in 31 8-year-olds in the United States. The extent to which the neurological condition, which researchers widely agree is largely determined by genetics, may also be influenced by environmental factors remains an active area of research. In recent years, as wildfires have burned with more severity and frequency in some parts of the world, researchers have been considering their impact on the disorder. 

At the same time, public interest in autism and its causes has mounted since the late 1990s, when the esteemed British medical journal The Lancet published what was later found to be a fraudulent paper that claimed to find a connection between the MMR vaccine and autism. Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the U.S. secretary of health and human services and one of the world’s most prominent vaccine skeptics, has long championed that theory. Under his leadership, the agency has radically remade the childhood immunization schedule, stacked an expert vaccine safety panel with his skeptics, and wound down mRNA vaccine development, among other moves that public health experts say undermine confidence in vaccines and threaten disease elimination status. 

There is no credible evidence that vaccines cause autism. Even the two studies on autism and wildfire smoke do not indicate that wildfire smoke specifically causes autism. Credible experts who study the disorder, including the authors of these studies, agree that a diagnosis is very likely the result of several factors working in tandem. 

“All we can point out is this association in the third trimester,” Guglio said. “It takes other people down the line to investigate those pathways more directly.”

toolTips('.classtoolTips5','In scholarly research, a “peer-reviewed” study or article is one that has been independently evaluated by other experts in the field to assess scientific accuracy. Not all studies go through a peer-review process, so peer-reviewed studies and journals typically indicate a higher level of confidence in methodologies and results.');

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Growing evidence points to link between autism and wildfire smoke on Feb 12, 2026.

South America is emerging as the most stable and politically viable option for Western countries trying to rebalance critical mineral supply chains away from China, according to new research from Verisk Maplecroft.

The study comes as the United States and its allies intensify efforts to secure supplies of lithium, copper, cobalt, nickel, graphite and rare earth elements, driven by concerns over technology dependence, supply-chain resilience and geopolitics. 

Recent moves include US plans to expand strategic stockpiles and a 55-country push to establish a preferential critical minerals trade bloc.

Verisk Maplecroft assessed 10 emerging markets with major reserves using its Resource Nationalism Index and Political Risk Data, finding that Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru stand out for combining large resource endowments with comparatively moderate levels of state intervention and political risk. Other countries in the analysis included the Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, the Philippines and Tanzania.

Low-risk Andes

Most South American producers do not rank among the world’s highest-risk jurisdictions for resource nationalism. Peru, Chile and Argentina are among the strongest performers globally, while DR Congo, Indonesia and Tanzania sit within the top 20 most exposed countries out of 198 assessed.

“What differentiates South America is not the scale of reserves, but the distribution of risk,” Verisk Maplecroft’s chief analyst Jimena Blanco said. “Producers consistently combine large endowments of tech-critical minerals with comparatively moderate levels of resource nationalism and political risk.”

The firm rates the region’s overall risk-adjusted opportunity as distinctly favourable, although it cautions that exposure to higher-risk jurisdictions will remain unavoidable for certain minerals. 

This is already reflected in recent Western initiatives, such as the EU’s free trade agreement with India, partly tied to rare earth ambitions, and the US Strategic Minerals Cooperation Framework with DRC launched in December 2025.

US Assistant Secretary of State Caleb Orr recently disclosed that the US is actively negotiating with Brazil to develop critical mineral processing capabilities, focusing on heavy rare earths. The announcement follows Serra Verde Group giving the US an option to acquire a stake in the company as part of a financing deal.

When political instability is considered alongside state intervention, many countries with major critical mineral reserves still fall into a medium-risk category, suggesting relatively supportive conditions for long-term investment. However, some producers combine high political volatility with assertive government control, increasing the likelihood of export restrictions, state ownership or domestic value-addition requirements.

India’s rare earth policies, as well as conditions in DR Congo and Indonesia, highlight this dynamic. The findings suggest that while Western governments cannot fully avoid higher-risk suppliers, South America offers a comparatively stable anchor in an otherwise constrained global landscape.

West-friendly tilt

The research also challenges assumptions about geopolitical alignment. Using its Geopolitical Alignment Tool, which tracks factors such as UN voting, trade agreements and security ties, Verisk Maplecroft found that most of the 10 countries analyzed sit on the pro-Western or neutral end of the spectrum.

Argentina and the Philippines rank as close US allies, while Chile, Madagascar and India show strategic alignment. Peru and Indonesia are broadly neutral. Only Brazil, Tanzania and DR Congo tilt further away from Washington, largely due to stronger ties with US rivals.

According to the report, the overlap between sizeable reserves, manageable political risk and favourable geopolitical alignment makes South America central to Western diversification strategies.

“Securing tech-critical minerals is no longer just an economic challenge,” Blanco said. “The race will be won not by eliminating risk, but by managing it better than competitors.”

RELATED: Bolivia’s lithium gamble tests US realignment in Latin America

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Albemarle (NYSE: ALB) says it will idle the remaining operating train at its Kemerton lithium hydroxide processing plant in Western Australia and place it into care and maintenance, effective immediately.

The news follows actions in July 2024 to place Train 2 operations into care and maintenance and to cease expansion plans for Trains 3 and 4, part of a broader strategy to reduce costs amid weak lithium prices.

The Kemerton plant processes spodumene from Greenbushes, the world’s biggest hard-rock lithium mine. Albemarle holds ownership interest and half of the offtake rights from Greenbushes through an Australian joint venture.

Kemerton, with its proven technology and commercial scale lithium hydroxide production, was built to enable the development of a Western lithium supply chain, said Albemarle, currently the world’s largest producer of lithium.

“Idling operations at Kemerton was a difficult decision. It follows significant actions we have taken over the past two and a half years to reduce operating costs during an extended period of price volatility in the market,” Albemarle’s CEO Kent Masters said in a news release on Wednesday.

Albemarle swings to quarterly loss on charges tied to Ketjen sale

“Unfortunately, recent lithium price improvements alone are not enough to offset the challenges facing Western hard-rock lithium conversion operations,” Masters continued. “This decision improves our financial flexibility and preserves optionality.”

The decision is expected to be accretive to adjusted EBITDA beginning in the second quarter of 2026 with no impact to projected 2026 volumes, Albemarle said, adding that it will meet customer demand for lithium hydroxide through other production channels.

Albemarle’s mining interests in Australia, including Greenbushes and Wodgina, are not expected to be impacted by the decision as they remain core components of the company’s strategy, it added.

China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the final quarter of 2025, likely securing a decline of 0.3% for the full year as a whole.

This extends a “flat or falling” trend in China’s CO2 emissions that began in March 2024 and has now lasted for nearly two years.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that, in 2025, emissions from fossil fuels increased by an estimated 0.1%, but this was more than offset by a 7% decline in CO2 from cement.

Other key findings include:

• CO2 emissions fell year-on-year in almost all major sectors in 2025, including transport (3%), power (1.5%) and building materials (7%).
• The key exception was the chemicals industry, where emissions grew 12%.
• Solar power output increased by 43% year-on-year, wind by 14% and nuclear 8%, helping push down coal generation by 1.9%.
• Energy storage capacity grew by a record 75 gigawatts (GW), well ahead of the rise in peak demand of 55GW.
• This means that growth in energy storage capacity and clean-power output topped the increases in peak and total electricity demand, respectively.

The CO2 numbers imply that China’s carbon intensity – its fossil-fuel emissions per unit of GDP – fell by 4.7% in 2025 and by 12% during 2020-25.

This is well short of the 18% target set for that period by the 14th five-year plan.

Moreover, China would now need to cut its carbon intensity by around 23% over the next five years in order to meet one of its key climate commitments under the Paris Agreement.

Whether Chinese policymakers remain committed to this target is a key open question ahead of the publication of the 15th five-year plan in March.

This will help determine if China’s emissions have already passed their peak, or if they will rise once again and only peak much closer to the officially targeted date of “before 2030”.

‘Flat or falling’

The latest analysis shows China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 21 months, starting in March 2024. This trend continued in the final quarter of 2025, when emissions fell by 1% year-on-year.

The picture continues to be finely balanced, with emissions falling in all major sectors – including transport, power, cement and metals – but rising in the chemicals industry.

This combination of factors means that emissions continue to plateau at levels slightly below the peak reached in early 2024, as shown in the figure below.

China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals until September 2025. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec.

Power sector emissions fell by 1.5% year-on-year in 2025, with coal use falling 1.7% and gas use increasing 6%. Emissions from transportation fell 3% and from the production of cement and other building materials by 7%, while emissions from the metal industry fell 3%.

These declines are shown in the figure below. They were partially offset by rising coal and oil use in the chemical industry, up 15% and 10% respectively, which pushed up the sector’s CO2 emissions by 12% overall.

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period January-September 2025, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec. 

In other sectors – largely other industrial areas and building heat – gas use increased by 2%, more than offsetting the reduction in emissions from a 3% drop in their coal consumption.

Clean power covers electricity demand growth

In the power sector, which is China’s largest emitter by far, electricity demand grew by 520 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2025.

At the same time, power generation from solar increased by 43% and wind power generation by 14%, delivering 360TWh and 130TWh of additional clean electricity. Nuclear power generation grew 8%, supplying another 40TWh. The increased generation from these three sources – some 530TWh – therefore met all of the growth in demand.

Hydropower generation also increased by 3% and bioenergy by 3%, helping push power generation from fossil fuels down by 1%. Gas-fired power generation increased by 6% and, as a result, power generation from coal fell by 1.9%.

Furthermore, the surge in additions of new wind and solar capacity at the end of 2025 will only show up as increased clean-power generation in 2026.

On the other hand, the growth in solar and wind power generation has fallen short of the growth in capacity, implying a fall in capacity utilisation – a measure of actual output relative to the maximum possible. This is highly likely due to increased, unreported curtailment, where wind and solar sites are switched off because the electricity grid is congested.

If these grid issues are resolved over the next few years, then generation from existing wind and solar capacity will increase over time.

Developments in 2025 extended the trend of clean-power generation growing faster than power demand overall, as shown in the top figure below. This trend started in 2023 and is the key reason why China’s emissions have been stable or falling since early 2024.

In addition, 2025 saw another potential inflection point, shown in the bottom figure below. It was the first year ever that energy storage capacity – mainly batteries – grew faster than peak electricity demand in 2025 and faster than the average growth in the past decade.

Top columns: Year-on-year change in annual electricity generation from clean energy excluding hydro, terawatt hours. Left solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in total electricity generation, TWh. Bottom columns: Year-on-year change in energy storage capacity, gigawatts. Right solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in peak electricity demand. Sources: Power generation and demand from Ember; peak loads from China Electric Power News since 2020; peak loads until 2019 and pumped hydro capacity from Wind Financial Terminal; battery storage capacity from China Energy Storage Alliance; analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta.

China’s energy storage capacity increased by 75GW year-on-year in 2025, while peak demand only increased by 55GW. The rise in storage capacity in 2025 is also larger than the three-year average increase in peak loads, some 72GW per year.

Peak demand growth matters, because power systems have to be designed to reliably provide enough electricity supply at the moment of highest demand.

Moreover, the increase in peak loads is a key driver of continued additions of coal and gas-fired power plants, which reached the highest level in a decade in 2025.

The growth in energy storage could provide China with an alternative way to meet peak loads without relying on increased fossil fuel-based capacity.

The growth in storage capacity is set to continue after a new policy issued by China’s top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in January.

This policy means energy storage sites will be supported by so-called “capacity payments”, which to date have only been available to coal- and gas-fired power plants and pumped hydro storage.

Concerns about having sufficient “firm” power capacity in the grid – that which can be turned on at will – led the government to promote new coal and gas-fired power projects in recent years, leading to the largest fossil-fuel based capacity additions in a decade in 2025, with another 290GW of coal-fired capacity still under construction.

Reforming the power system and increasing storage capacity would enable the grid to accommodate much higher shares of solar and wind, while reducing the need for new coal or gas capacity to meet rising peaks in demand.

This would both unlock more clean-power generation from existing capacity and improve the economics and risk profiles of new projects, stimulating more growth in capacity.

Peaking power CO2 requires more clean-energy growth

China’s key climate commitments for the next five-year period until 2030 are to peak CO2 emissions and to reduce carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels. The latter target requires limiting CO2 emissions at or below their 2025 level in 2030.

The record clean-energy additions in 2023-25 have barely sufficed to stabilise power-sector emissions, showing that if rapid growth in power demand continues, meeting the 2030 targets requires keeping clean-energy additions close to 2025 levels over the next five years.

China’s central government continues to telegraph a much lower level of ambition, with the NDRC setting a target of “around” 30% of power generation in 2030 coming from solar and wind, up from around 22% in 2025.

If electricity demand grows in line with the State Grid forecast of 5.6% per year, then limiting the share of wind and solar to 30% would leave space for fossil-fuel generation to grow at 3% per year from 2025 to 2030, even after increases from nuclear and hydropower.

Such an increase would mean missing China’s Paris commitments for 2030.

Alternatively, in order to meet the forecast increase in electricity demand without increasing generation from fossil fuels would require wind and solar’s share to reach 37% in 2030.

Similarly, China’s target of a non-fossil energy share of 25% in 2030 will not be sufficient to meet its carbon-intensity reduction commitment for 2030, unless energy demand growth slows down sharply.

This target is unlikely to be upgraded, since it is already enshrined in China’s Paris Agreement pledge, so in practice the target would need to be substantially overachieved if the country is to meet its other commitments.

If energy demand growth continues at the 2025 rate and the share of non-fossil energy only rises from 22% in 2025 to 25% in 2030, then the consumption of fossil fuels would increase by 3% per year, with a similar rise in CO2 emissions.

Still, another recent sign that clean-energy growth could keep exceeding government targets came in early February when the China Electricity Council projected solar and wind capacity additions of more than 300GW in 2026 – well beyond the government goal of “over 200GW”.

Chemical industry

The only significant source of growth in CO2 emissions in 2025 was the chemical industry, with sharp increases in the consumption of both coal and oil.

This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates how CO2 emissions appear to have peaked from cement production, transport, the power sector and others, whereas the chemicals industry is posting strong increases.

Sectoral emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Even though chemical-industry emissions are small relative to other sectors – at roughly 13% of China’s total – the pace of expansion is creating an outsize impact.

Without the increase from the chemicals sector, China’s total CO2 emissions would have fallen by an estimated 2%, instead of the 0.3% reported here.

Without changes to policy, emission growth is set to continue, as the coal-to-chemicals industry is planning major increases in capacity.

Whether these expansion plans receive backing in the upcoming five-year plan for 2026-30 will have a major impact on China’s emission trends.

Another key factor is the development of oil and gas prices. Production in the coal-based chemical industry is only profitable when coal is significantly cheaper than crude oil.

The current coal-to-chemicals capacity in China is dominated by plants producing higher-value – and therefore less price-sensitive – chemicals such as olefins and aromatics, as feedstocks for the production of plastics.

In contrast, the planned expansion of the sector is expected to be largely driven by plants producing oil products and synthetic gas to be used for energy. For these products, electrification and clean-electricity generation provide a direct alternative, meaning they are even more sensitive to low oil and gas prices than chemicals production.

Outlook for China’s emissions

This is the latest analysis for Carbon Brief to show that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable or falling for seven quarters or 21 months, marking the first such streak on record that has not been associated with a slowdown in energy demand growth.

Notably, while emissions have stabilised or begun a slow decline, there has not yet been a substantial reduction from the level reached in early 2024. This means that a small jump in emissions could see them exceed the previous peak level.

China’s official plans only call for peaking emissions shortly before 2030, which would allow for a rebound from the current plateau before the ultimate emissions peak.

If China is to meet its 2030 carbon intensity commitment – a 65% reduction on 2005 levels – then emissions would have to fall from the peak back to current levels by 2030.

Whether China’s policymakers are still committed to meeting this carbon intensity pledge, after the setbacks during the previous five-year period, is a key open question. The 2030 energy targets set to date have fallen short of what would be required.

The most important signal will be whether the top-level five-year plan for 2026-30, due in March, sets a carbon intensity target aligned with the 2030 Paris commitment.

Officially, China is sticking to the timeline of peaking CO2 emissions “before 2030”, which was announced by president Xi Jinping in 2020.

According to an authoritative explainer on the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the upcoming five-year plan, published by state-backed news agency Xinhua, coal consumption should “reach its peak and enter a plateau” from 2027.

It says that continued increases in demand for coal from electricity generators and the chemicals industry would be offset by reductions elsewhere. This is despite the fact that China’s coal consumption overall has already been falling for close to two years.

The reference to a “plateau” in coal consumption indicates that in official plans, meaningful absolute reductions in emissions would have to wait until after 2030. Any increase in coal consumption from 2025 to 2027, before the targeted plateau, would need to be offset by reductions in oil consumption, to meet the carbon intensity target.

Moreover, allowing coal consumption in the power sector to grow beyond the peak of overall coal use and emissions implies slowing down China’s clean-energy boom. So far, the boom has continued to exceed official targets by a wide margin.

In addition, the explainer’s expectation of further growth in coal use by the chemicals industry indicates a green light for at least a part of its sizable expansion plans.

The Xinhua article recognises that oil product consumption has already peaked, but says that oil use in the chemicals industry has kept growing. It adds that overall oil consumption should peak in 2026.

Elsewhere, the article speaks of “vigorously” developing non-fossil energy and “actively” developing “distributed” solar, which has slowed down due to recent pricing policies.

Yet it also calls for “high-quality development” of fossil fuels and increased efforts in domestic oil and gas production, suggesting that China continues to take an “all of the above” approach to energy policy.

The outcome of all this depends on how things turn out in reality. The past few years show it is possible that clean energy will continue to overperform its targets, preventing growth in energy consumption from fossil fuels despite this policy support.

The key role of the clean-energy boom in driving GDP growth and investments is one key motivator for policymakers to keep the boom going, even when central targets would allow for a slowdown. It is also possible that the five-year plans of provinces and state-owned enterprises could play a key role in raising ambition, as they did in 2022.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.

Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data. 

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.

For oil, apparent consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is taken from Sinopec quarterly results, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use.

Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated from refinery throughput, with the production of the transport fuels and the net exports of other oil products subtracted. Fossil-fuel consumption includes non-energy use such as plastics, as most products are short-lived and incineration is the dominant disposal method.

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• The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) invites CFS actors to submit  their feedback on the zero draft by 18 March 2026.

The CFS has recently published the zero draft of the Policy Recommendations for Building Resilient Food Systems in English and reported that official translations will be available by the end of February 2026.

Throughout 2026, the CFS will develop these recommendations through a policy convergence process that includes open consultations on the drafts, meetings of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) and two rounds of negotiations scheduled for June and July. The final text is expected to be adopted during the plenary session of CFS 54 in October 2026.

The CSIPM Working Group on Resilient Food Systems facilitates the participation of civil society and Indigenous Peoples’ organisations in this process. In an initial analysis, the CSIPM highlighted as central elements the human rights-based approach, the creation of effective mechanisms for the participation of rights holders, and policies capable of strengthening the agroecology and addressing different structural vulnerabilities, such as poverty, socio-economic marginalisation and gender inequalities, among others.

We invite all interested organisations to join the working group and actively contribute by completing this form: https://www.csm4cfs.org/policy-working-groups/join-the-working-groups/

Read the zero draft of the CFS Policy Recommendations

Related links

• CSIPM Working Group on Building Resilient Food Systems website
• Policy priorities identified by the CSIPM Working Group
• HLPE Report No. 20

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