News Feeds

Scott County in southeastern Missouri faces the same challenges of many of the state’s rural areas — declining populations and labor forces, higher premature death rates, challenges for EMS services and closed hospitals.

But county commissioners made a major shift when they approved the Kelso Solar project, a 430MW farm that will generate $62 million in taxes over 30-year life of the project. The project increased Missouri’s solar generating capacity by 50 percent.

The first phase of the Kelso solar farm opened at the end of the 2025, and the second phase opened last March. While it will take a few months for the new taxes to appear in the county’s books, it is already reaping the benefits.

County officials estimate the project will generate $27 million for local schools. That may help build or renovate facilities in a county district where 75 percent of the buildings were constructed at least 25 years ago, according to the National Center for Education Statistics.

Arevon, the company developing the solar project, has also donated a vehicle to the Scott County Rural Fire Protection District, supported safety upgrades and agricultural education programs for county schools, partnered with a local food bank to help area families, provided equipment for the Kenny Rogers Children’s Center and paid for a water well in Blodgett.

The county has opened a new courthouse, which will enable judges to come and go from their chambers without having to mix with criminal defendants.

Ray Locker is the executive director for Checks & Balances Project, an investigative watchdog blog holding government officials, lobbyists, and corporate management accountable to the public. Funding for C&BP is provided by Renew American Prosperity and individual donors.

You may also want to read:

Missouri near the top in the number of lost farms

Declining populations and labor forces put rural Missouri counties under pressure

Rural Missouri counties face EMS crisis

Share Post Share

The post Solar project boosts Scott County’s fortunes appeared first on Checks and Balances Project.

From Chaco Canyon to the Arctic, BAAJA would make the Trump administration’s drilling, mining, and logging approvals nearly impossible to undo

The Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act is moving toward a vote in the Senate. Its sponsors are selling it as a fix for America’s antiquated electricity transmission system, and provisions in the bill would help build out the grid. But the bill, as currently written, also contains a number of dangerous provisions that would lock in the Trump administration’s attacks on our most vulnerable public lands.

What’s most at risk?

In New Mexico, the bill would lock in new oil and gas leases around Chaco Canyon. It could also lock in uranium mining plans around Chaco, Mount Taylor, and in the Chama watershed. It would lock in permits for the 522-mile Desert Southwest Pipeline, which would carve through Otero Mesa, a desert grassland home to more than 1,000 native species and thousands of archaeological sites.

In Utah, prospectors have filed more than 110 mining claims since Trump cut Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments by roughly 90 percent, and BAAJA could lock in any mining plans approved by the Trump administration inside the land Trump excised from the monuments. Valar Atomics’ Project Beehive would put 456 nuclear reactors and waste repositories on public land in central Utah, and BAAJA would lock those in if they’re approved before Trump leaves office.

In Arizona, any federal permits issued to Resolution Copper’s mine at Oak Flat would become nearly untouchable.

In Nevada, the bill could shield the Townsite data center outside Boulder City, the first AI data center approved on public land, if the Trump administration approves it.

In Colorado, it would lock in any oil and gas leases the administration sells on the Roan Plateau, where an upcoming lease sale includes over 4,600 acres atop a plateau that holds elk calving grounds and native trout habitat.

In Minnesota, the bill would shield any leases the administration issued to Twin Metals to mine upstream of the Boundary Waters, threatening the country’s most-visited wilderness area.

In Alaska, BAAJA would lock in oil leases on the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and around Teshekpuk Lake in the Western Arctic, as well as the Ambler Road, which the Trump administration approved and which would run through Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve. Finally, it would lock in any old-growth timber sales held by the Trump administration in Alaska’s Tongass National Forest once the administration’s Roadless Rule repeal is complete.

Our interactive map pinpoints these landscapes and explains exactly how they are threatened by BAAJA’s anti-public land provisions. This is not an exhaustive list. Almost all public land that lies outside of national parks or other permanently protected areas could be put at risk by BAAJA.

Dangerous provisions

Section 1401 of the bill bars federal agencies from revoking, suspending, or changing any permit in effect on or after September 16, 2026. The bill allows only five exceptions: a court order, fraud, the permit holder’s violation of the law or the permit’s terms, a request from the permit holder, or an urgent threat of harm based on new information. An agency that wanted to reverse an approval on public lands would have to prove that one of these applies by “clear and convincing evidence.” That’s a much higher bar than agencies currently face when trying to unwind the harmful actions of a previous administration.

Under Section 1401, if a project developer sued and the agency couldn’t meet that bar, a court would have to restore the previously approved permit and order the government to pay the developer 25 to 50 percent of what it had already spent on the project, from surveys and engineering to equipment and construction. UC Berkeley law professor Eric Biber calls this provision “a stealth repeal of a wide swath of federal regulatory law.” The Wilderness Society calls it “the final nail in the coffin for threatened landscapes.” Essentially, Section 1401 gives the Trump administration a generous runway of just over two years to lock in drilling, mining, and other development on public lands.

The environmental reviews that agencies do before issuing permits would be stacked in developers’ favor, too. Under Section 1106, an agency would have to toss out any alternative that doesn’t meet the developer’s own goals, so options like a smaller mine or a different pipeline route might never be studied. Agencies also wouldn’t have to consider any new science published after a review began, and they couldn’t delay a decision to wait for updated scientific analysis. The public would get a comment window of 45 to 60 days, which could be extended only if the developer agreed. If agencies disagreed over a project, the developer could take the dispute to the White House Council on Environmental Quality, whose decision would be final, could not be challenged in court, and could count as satisfying consultation requirements under other laws. And once a final review was done, agencies would have just 45 days to sign off on it.

The courts also wouldn’t be much help if BAAJA passes. Under Section 1110, a judge who finds that a federal land management agency skipped or botched an environmental review for a project on public land could not cancel the permit or stop the project from moving forward. The judge could only order the agency to redo the review, while drilling, mining, or logging continued. And even if the finished review revealed serious harm, Section 1401 would bar the agency from revoking or changing the permit. Former Council on Environmental Quality general counsel Justin Pidot says this reduces a court order to redo an environmental review to “essentially an empty paperwork exercise.”

Section 1402 makes it much harder for a future president to pause approvals for activities like drilling, data center construction, or coal mining on public lands. It says that if an administration slowed permits for a category of projects—like oil and gas drilling proposals—compared with the previous five years, developers could sue and collect 50 to 100 percent of their expected construction costs from taxpayers. For a president taking office in 2029, that baseline would be the Trump years.

Section 2215 would make it much easier for mining companies to dump waste rock and build roads on public land outside their claims. In 2022, a federal appeals court blocked Arizona’s Rosemont copper mine from dumping waste rock and tailings on over 2,000 acres of national forest land, ruling that the company’s claims there were invalid because no valuable minerals had been found on them. BAAJA would effectively reverse that ruling, letting companies occupy public land for waste whenever it is “reasonably necessary” to their operations, which Earthworks’ Aaron Mintzes says would give miners “a nearly unlimited amount of public lands for their waste dumps.”

Section 2301 would rewrite the National Historic Preservation Act, taking power away from Tribes. Under BAAJA, agencies could map out the area a project affects without consulting Tribes at all, and a Tribe would have just 30 days to object to an agency’s findings. If a Tribal preservation office missed a review deadline, the Interior Department could take over its work, which Tribal organizations call “deeply paternalistic.” Nine national and regional Tribal organizations, including the National Congress of American Indians, the Native American Rights Fund, and the National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers, have registered their “strong opposition” to the bill as written.

Explore the interactive map

Data center threat

The bill could also help protect the data centers the Trump administration wants to build on public land. The Bureau of Land Management has received applications for at least 16 more data center proposals, yet it has not formally weighed whether data centers are a legal use of public land nor where they should be allowed to be built, if so. The administration sought to make an end run around federal law in approving its first data center on public land, an 80-acre data center near Boulder City, Nevada, by simply swapping out a solar farm’s right-of-way application for a data center without collecting public comment or conducting a new environmental review. An Interior department judge froze that project in September, and BLM has since asked the judge to set aside its approval. Under BAAJA, approvals like that would be much harder to unwind. Because Section 1401 doesn’t define “project,” a data center right-of-way could be locked in the day it is approved. And if a future administration put a pause on data center approvals in order to study their impacts, developers could collect up to 100 percent of their expected construction costs from taxpayers under Section 1402 of the bill.

Locking in Trump’s DC makeover

BAAJA’s reach extends beyond the West. In Washington, DC, President Trump is renovating landmarks on public land. The National Park Service, which manages much of the capital’s public land, is carrying out many of these plans. At East Potomac Park, crews cut down at least 400 trees on the historic public golf course over a holiday weekend as Trump pushes to turn it into a venue for major championships. On Park Service land near Arlington National Cemetery, Trump plans to build a triumphal arch. And at the Kennedy Center, a federally owned memorial to President John F. Kennedy also located on public land, Trump is planning a massive renovation that he says could strip the building down to its steel frame.

Opponents are fighting each project in court, largely under the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act. In October, U.S. District Judge Ana Reyes halted the golf course work after finding that officials had rushed the tree-cutting plan to meet Trump’s demands for speed, then extended that order into a preliminary injunction. The District of Columbia and Virginia have sued to block the arch. Historic preservation groups have sued over the Kennedy Center project as well.

BAAJA could make it much harder to stop these projects. Under Sections 1110 and 2301 of the bill, a judge who found that the Park Service had skipped or botched an environmental or historic preservation review could not halt the project. The judge could only send the decision back for more study while chainsaws, bulldozers, and demolition crews kept working. By the time the agency finished its new review, the damage would be underway, and the Park Service could simply issue a new decision allowing the work to continue.

Explore the interactive map

What BAAJA would bar

Looking back, Colorado’s Thompson Divide shows what’s at stake if BAAJA passes as written. The 220,000-acre stretch of the White River National Forest draws more than 10,000 big game hunters a year and shelters native cutthroat trout. Beginning in the 1990s, the federal government sold oil and gas leases there that ranchers, hunters, and local governments fought for more than a decade. After a review found the leases had been improperly issued, the Obama administration canceled 25 of them, covering 33,000 acres. The main leaseholder, SG Interests, sued, and in 2018, the government settled for $1.5 million, ending the challenge and leaving the leases void.

Under BAAJA, that would not have been possible. Section 1401 would have barred the Interior department from canceling the leases unless a court ordered it, and Sections 1110 and 2301 bar courts from ordering the government to cancel a lease over a flawed environmental review. Even if the Interior department could have found a way to cancel the leases, the leaseholder could have sought 25 to 50 percent of the costs it had spent on them, instead of a negotiated amount.

Every leasing decision the Trump administration rushes through around Chaco, in the Arctic, or on the Roan Plateau could be just as flawed as the now-cancelled Thompson Divide leases. If BAAJA becomes law, a future administration that wants to overturn them would be essentially powerless to do so without a court order.

A false choice

As it’s currently written, BAAJA presents a false choice between lowering carbon emissions and protecting our most vulnerable public lands and cultural landmarks. Handing even more power to destroy our public lands to the Trump administration is clearly not worth the modest reduction analysts estimate BAAJA might have on climate-warming emissions.

It’s also worth noting that the climate math behind these analyses leaves public lands out. Rhodium Group’s modeling, which projects relatively modest emissions cuts, “does not include an attempt to reflect the permit certainty provisions of the bill.” Analyses by Resources for the Future and for the Solar Energy Industries Association model only the power sector. None counts the emissions from the drilling, mining, and gas-powered data centers the bill would lock in on public lands.

Right now, BAAJA contains a lopsided deal that would unnecessarily lock in decades of oil and gas infrastructure and allow corporations to pillage our public lands for their own profit. The incoming Congress will have significantly more leverage to pass a bill that speeds the grid buildout and unlocks stalled wind and solar projects, without sacrificing America’s public lands.

The post Map: The Senate permitting bill would lock in Trump’s assault on public lands appeared first on Center for Western Priorities.

Food was on the table. Now Congress should deliver. Anthony Lacey November 4, 2026

Food was on the table during the election – and voters are hungry for change. 

While many issues mattered to voters, polling shows that food issues like rising food inflation, food safety and how food affects our health were as important as health care and other concerns. 

For starters, voters want Congress to do more to make sure that our food is safe. In particular, Congress should make sure the chemicals added to our food meet tough safety standards. Congress should also do more to keep our food free from pathogens and contaminants like the “forever chemicals” known as PFAS.

When farmers offer to adopt regenerative practices like cover crops, Congress should make sure they get financial support. 

Voters also want Congress to do more to ensure consumers have access to healthy food. In particular, Congress should require that our schools offer healthier options, and some states have already acted to phase out harmful ultra-processed foods. 

Voters also want Congress to restore funding cuts to anti-hunger programs and take steps to address rising food prices. Reducing tariffs on food imports and breaking up monopolies would be good places to start. 

Until the election, few of these issues got the attention we deserve. Now that the voters have spoken, it’s time for Congress to deliver a recipe for success. 

Here are seven steps the new Congress can take right away to provide consumers with more safe, healthy, and affordable food:

1. The new Congress should require that all new food chemicals are reviewed for safety before they are added to our food. Right now, 99% of new food chemicals are reviewed for safety by the chemical companies, not the safety experts at the Food and Drug Administration. 
2. The new Congress should require that pesticide residues found on the fruits and vegetables most commonly eaten by our kids meet the toughest safety standards, and that safety experts at the Environmental Protection Agency quickly review pesticides when they are banned by other nations. 
3. The new Congress should define ultra processed foods and require a disclosure on food labels so we can find healthier options when we shop. 
4. The new Congress should make sure that food safety experts carefully track pathogens and regularly inspect food manufacturing plants and fruit and vegetable farms to reduce the risk posed by pathogens like cyclospora. 
5. The new Congress should direct food safety experts to set limits on the amount of toxic PFAS in our food and ban PFAS in cookware. 
6. The new Congress should triple spending on regenerative farming practices like cover crops to help address water pollution in places like Iowa. Right now, three out of four farmers are turned away when they seek help to adopt regenerative farming practices. 
7. The new Congress should rescind the cuts to anti-hunger programs that have increased hunger at a time of rising food prices. Everyone should have enough to eat. 

Food is a kitchen table issue. There’s much more Congress should do to make our food a priority. These seven steps are a good place to start.  

Areas of Focus Food Ultra-Processed Foods Food Chemicals Authors Scott Faber November 4, 2026

Last night the trajectory changed for the redrock wilderness. For the past two years we’ve been fighting for Utah’s wild places on three fronts: against a Republican-controlled Congress, against the president and his administration, and against the anti-public-lands state of Utah. Last night, when Democrats decisively took control of both the House and Senate, a new political reality emerged: one where wilderness and public lands will have champions in Congress with the power to deflect attacks from the administration.

We’re clear-eyed that the Trump administration’s corrupt attacks on public lands will continue—and perhaps even ramp up—during his lame duck presidency. Here in Utah, Republicans have an irrational antipathy to public lands and continue to hold statewide office and dominate the state legislature (though it seems their supermajority may soon be a thing of the past). We have plenty of work ahead, starting with defeating the permitting reform bill that the U.S. Senate may take up as soon as Monday.

But today also ushers in a new era. For the first time since 1989 and Rep. Wayne Owens, Utah will have a member of the House of Representatives—Ben McAdams in Congressional District 1—who has committed to champion America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act. After decades of having to build power outside the state of Utah to protect public lands in Utah, the tide is turning. We’ll be organizing in the Beehive State and across the country. When the 120th Congress convenes in January, we will have unprecedented opportunities and we’ll be working together to make the most of each and every one.

The work ahead is hard. It will take many more hard years to restore Bear Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments, to pass the Red Rock bill, and to protect Utah’s wild places. But SUWA is in it for the long haul, and we know that people like you—at the heart of the Protect Wild Utah movement across the country—are too.

Thank you for casting your vote. Thank you for entrusting us to do this work and for financially supporting us if you’re able. We’re deeply grateful. What we said after the 2024 election still rings true: We can protect the places and values that matter. Together, we will.

For the redrock,

Scott Braden

Executive Director
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance

The post A New Day for the Redrock appeared first on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.

The “blue wave” of Democrat wins in the midterm elections was a thunderous rebuke of the fascist Trump administration and its billionaire-class agenda of war and militarism, attacks on public health, and unregulated artificial intelligence. Working-class people across the United States are fed up, and we have raised our voices and stood in our collective power to demand real change.

The government said today it would deliver its promise to ban fracking by outlawing the issuing of new onshore oil and gas exploration licences.

Anti-fracking campaigners opposing plans for lower-volume fracking at Burniston in North Yorkshire, April 2026.
Photo: DrillOrDrop

The news has disappointed environmental campaigners, who had called for an outright ban on all forms of fracking.

Friends of the Earth said the measure, in the Energy Independence Bill, failed to meet Labour’s manifesto commitment to “ban fracking for good”.

The bill, published today, would not stop lower-volume fracking operations, which some scientists warn carry equally large and unpredictable seismic risks.

It would also not remove existing licences in onshore shale gas areas, such as Lancashire and Lincolnshire.

Fracking – the injection of liquid at pressures high enough to fracture rocks – is highly controversial in the UK.

Operations by Cuadrilla in 2018 and 2019 caused earthquakes felt by people living across the Fylde region near Blackpool.

A moratorium, in November 2019, introduced a presumption against associated hydraulic fracturing in England, defined as fracks that use more than 1,000m3 of fluid per stage or 10,000m3 in total.

But the moratorium did not cover operations using lower volumes of liquid. Campaigners have described this as a legal loophole and said it should be closed.

Permission has been granted for a lower-volume frack at the West Newton-A oil and gas site in Holderness, East Yorkshire. An appeal is imminent on refusal of plans for a similar operation at Burniston, near Scarborough in North Yorkshire.

The text of the Energy Independence Bill did not mention a specific ban on any form of fracking.

There was no reference to the fracking process, the current moratorium or permitted lower-volume fracks.

A government background document on the bill said:

“we will show climate leadership by implementing our manifesto commitment to not issue new licences to explore new oil and gas fields, including delivering our commitment to ban fracking.”

It added:

“we will implement plans to not issue new licences to explore new fields (in England), including those which could be used for hydraulic fracturing for shale gas (‘fracking’).”

There had been hints in September 2026 that the existing moratorium would not be turned into a formal ban.

The energy minister, Martin McCluskey, speaking in a parliamentary debate on fracking, said:

“The [Energy Independence] Bill was announced in the King’s Speech and will meet our commitment to not issue new licences to explore new fields—onshore and offshore—including those that could be used for fracking for shale gas. That will deliver on our commitment in law to ban fracking.”

He also rejected the idea of extending the moratorium to lower-volume fracking operations. His argument, rejected by campaigners and some scientists, stated:

“Low-volume hydraulic fracturing has been happening in the UK for decades. It has been used not just in respect of oil and gas but in the water industry and geothermal. In that time, there has been no clear evidence that it induces seismicity that can be felt on the surface.”

Reaction

Friends of the Earth’s energy campaigner, Danny Gross, said:

“Ending new gas and oil licences is extremely welcome, but this bill falls a long way short of delivering on Labour’s manifesto pledge to ban fracking for good.

“It won’t affect areas that are already licensed and leaves a gaping loophole in the existing fracking moratorium – one that companies are already exploiting to push ahead with new projects.

“One fracking scheme has already been granted approval, and more applications are in the pipeline. Just yesterday, Europa Oil and Gas lodged an appeal against the refusal of its planning application for a low-volume fracking project in North Yorkshire.

“The threat is real and growing. And the Bill still leaves communities across the country exposed to the threat of fracking.”

James Knapp, of the Weald Action Group, said:

“This is very weak from Labour. A frack ban in name only, which doesn’t add to or strengthen the existing moratorium and can easily be undone by future governments.

“It will do nothing to protect local communities from the risks of earthquake damage or water contamination since it ignores acidisation and proppant squeezes, forms of fracking currently in use in the UK.

“Proppant squeezes still fracture formation rock in the same way, and there’s a distinct lack of evidence to show it’s a safer form of fracking than the high volume hydraulic fracturing captured by the moratorium”.

Dennis May, of Frack Free Misson, said:

“The government claims to take an evidence-based approach to fracking, while turning a blind eye to any that would inconvenience the industry’s ambitions.

“Cuadrilla is continuing to procrastinate over the site restoration of the site at PNR, and in its 2025 accounts confessed:

‘At our PNR shale gas exploration site, the NSTA (North Sea Transition Authority) required the Company to plug and abandon two exploration wells. […] Whilst we are unlikely therefore to be able to re-use the wells, the underlying shale gas resource that they have helped to reveal, remains intact, waiting to be appraised and developed as and when the political will to do so emerges. In summary we continue to maintain a low-cost presence in the UK, with the objective of increasingly “self-funding” that position whilst continuing to hold an option on a very significant discovered shale gas accumulation.’

“Meanwhile at Burniston, Europa is proposing to drill and frack the same shale-encased strata that was targeted at KM8, using volumes of fluid proven to carry risks of induced seismicity.
This more of a bus lane than a loophole.”

• DrillOrDrop will update this article with further reaction as we get it.

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

4 November 2026

Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, drawing upon UK government publications, parliamentary records, Shell corporate disclosures, court documents and contemporaneous reporting.

Britain’s government has introduced legislation designed to end new licences for exploring oil and gas fields in the North Sea. But buried within the same legislative programme is a mechanism intended to permit additional production from areas adjoining existing fields. The government estimates that this could unlock approximately 60 million barrels of oil. For Shell, which jointly owns one of Britain’s largest offshore producers, the distinction between banning new exploration and permitting further development is commercially significant. The documents reveal a regulatory framework that seeks to restrict the geographical expansion of fossil-fuel exploration without bringing existing North Sea production to an abrupt end.

A ban that does not mean the end of North Sea oil

On Wednesday, 4 November 2026, the British government introduced its Energy Independence Bill to Parliament.

The legislation covers a wide range of reforms, including consumer protection, electricity infrastructure, renewable energy, household bills and the regulation of energy companies.

But one provision deserves particular attention from Shell shareholders.

The government proposes to remove the North Sea Transition Authority’s power to grant new oil and gas exploration licences.

That sounds like a fundamental break with Britain’s petroleum industry.

In one respect, it is.

The proposal would remove the route through which companies obtain new licences to explore previously unlicensed areas for oil and gas.

But the accompanying government documents contain an equally important qualification.

The government intends to introduce Transitional Energy Certificates, allowing certain additional oil and gas production associated with existing fields.

These certificates would enable development in already explored areas, including locations adjoining existing fields where production could be connected to established infrastructure.

The government estimates that the arrangements could unlock approximately 60 million barrels of oil.

That figure is a government projection, not a guaranteed volume of future production. Nor is it an estimate of barrels attributable specifically to Shell.

Nevertheless, the distinction matters.

Britain is proposing to end new exploration licensing, not to prohibit all additional oil and gas production.

And that distinction is particularly relevant to Shell’s remaining North Sea interests.

Primary sources: UK Government — Energy Independence Bill, 4 November 2026; Official Factsheet — Ending New Oil and Gas Licences and Introducing Transitional Energy Certificates. GOV.UK

Why Shell has a substantial interest in the outcome

Shell’s exposure to the proposed legislation is not confined to a few ageing offshore installations.

On 1 December 2025, Shell and Equinor completed the establishment of Adura, their jointly owned UK offshore oil and gas company.

Each owns 50%.

The venture combines substantial parts of the two companies’ British offshore portfolios.

According to Shell’s announcement, Adura assumed interests in twelve producing assets and development projects, including:

Mariner, Rosebank, Buzzard, Shearwater, Penguins, Gannet, Nelson, Pierce, Jackdaw, Victory, Clair and Schiehallion.

The company also holds a number of existing exploration licences.

Shell described Adura as the UK’s largest independent North Sea producer and projected output exceeding 140,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day in 2026.

That was a corporate forecast, not confirmation of actual annual production.

Nevertheless, it establishes the scale of the enterprise.

Adura is not a marginal operation.

It controls a substantial portfolio of producing fields, development projects and offshore infrastructure.

The proposed licensing restrictions and new transitional arrangements are therefore directly relevant to the regulatory environment in which Shell’s investment operates.

However, there is an important legal distinction.

Adura is a separate company.

Shell’s 50% ownership does not mean that Shell plc itself holds every licence or operates every field within the joint venture.

The precise consequences of the legislation will depend on the relevant licence holders, the provisions ultimately enacted and the regulatory decisions affecting individual developments.

Primary source: Shell — Shell and Equinor Complete Formation of Adura, 1 December 2025. Shell

The crucial distinction: exploration versus development

The government’s announcement is easily misunderstood.

There are several different stages in developing an offshore oil or gas field.

Exploration involves searching for petroleum resources.

Discovery establishes that hydrocarbons have been found.

Appraisal determines whether those resources are commercially and technically viable.

Development involves constructing the facilities necessary to produce them.

Production is the eventual extraction and sale of oil or gas.

These activities are connected, but they are not identical.

An existing petroleum licence may already cover a discovered field that has not yet entered production.

Consequently, preventing the issue of new exploration licences does not automatically invalidate every existing development project.

Nor does it necessarily prevent additional production from an established field.

The government’s proposed Transitional Energy Certificates are designed to address another category: previously discovered petroleum resources near existing infrastructure.

The distinction is commercially important.

A company may decide that discovering an entirely new field is no longer commercially or legally feasible under the new arrangements.

But it may still find opportunities to produce additional hydrocarbons close to an existing installation.

The government appears to regard that distinction as essential to managing the decline of the North Sea without unnecessarily accelerating the closure of existing infrastructure.

This is not an interpretation invented by the oil industry.

It is explicitly explained in the government’s own policy documents. GOV.UK

Transitional Energy Certificates: what the documents actually say

The government published provisional criteria for Transitional Energy Certificates on 21 April 2026.

Those criteria have now been incorporated into the legislative programme announced today.

They establish three central principles.

First, the proposed development must not involve new exploration.

Second, the relevant area must form part of, or be sufficiently close to, an existing field.

Third, the activity must support the government’s objective of managing the transition of the North Sea petroleum industry.

The government also refers to tieback infrastructure.

A tieback allows hydrocarbons from a nearby development to be transported through a pipeline to an existing production or processing installation.

This can reduce the need for an entirely new offshore facility.

It may also extend the commercial life of infrastructure that would otherwise become uneconomic as production from the original field declines.

That is an important consideration in a mature petroleum basin.

The government says the North Sea’s oil and gas production has declined substantially over the past quarter-century.

According to its latest factsheet, production in 2025 was approximately 75% below the historic peaks recorded in 1999 for oil and 2000 for gross gas.

The government argues that additional exploration licensing would not reverse the basin’s long-term decline.

It nevertheless considers continued production from existing resources necessary for energy security, employment and economic activity during the transition.

The proposed certificates are therefore intended to prolong the productive use of existing assets, rather than create an unrestricted replacement for conventional exploration licences.

There is an additional qualification.

The government has not yet finalised every administrative detail.

Its April guidance states that the North Sea Transition Authority will publish further guidance following the legislative process.

A Transitional Energy Certificate should therefore not be treated as an automatic entitlement to undertake a development.

Eligibility and any other required regulatory approvals will remain important.

Primary source: Government Guidance — Criteria for Transitional Energy Certificates, 21 April 2026. GOV.UK

Why this matters to Adura

The potential connection with Adura is straightforward.

The company operates within an established network of North Sea fields and infrastructure.

Some of its assets are mature.

Others are undergoing development.

The portfolio includes installations capable of receiving and processing hydrocarbons from nearby resources.

Such infrastructure can be commercially valuable beyond the original producing field.

If additional discovered resources can be connected to existing facilities, their development may help sustain production and infrastructure utilisation.

That is precisely the type of situation the government says its new certificates are intended to address.

But the distinction between potential eligibility and an approved development must be preserved.

No official document examined for this investigation identifies a specific Adura application for a Transitional Energy Certificate.

Nor is there evidence that Shell or Adura has received a commitment that any particular future project will qualify.

It would therefore be premature to suggest that the proposed legislation guarantees new production opportunities for the company.

What can be established is that Adura possesses the kind of mature offshore portfolio for which the government says the new arrangements are being designed.

That makes the legislation relevant to the investment decisions of both Shell and Equinor. Shell

Jackdaw: evidence that new exploration licences are not the whole story

The timing of the legislation is particularly interesting because of the recent approval of Jackdaw.

On 21 October 2026, the North Sea Transition Authority granted renewed consent for the Jackdaw gas development.

The decision followed a prolonged legal dispute concerning the project’s environmental assessment.

Jackdaw had originally received consent in 2022.

But the Court of Session in Scotland ruled in January 2025 that the previous environmental decisions were unlawful because the assessments had failed to consider downstream greenhouse-gas emissions.

These are emissions associated with the eventual combustion of the oil and gas produced.

The court’s decision required a fresh lawful consenting process.

It did not establish that Jackdaw could never be developed.

Following further environmental assessment and consultation, the government agreed that consent could be granted.

The regulator issued the renewed consent on 21 October 2026.

Shell welcomed the decision.

However, Shell’s statement also confirmed that Adura, rather than Shell UK directly, is now the project’s operator.

That distinction is necessary when reporting the company’s present offshore activities.

The Donovan–Shell Archive examined the renewed approval in its article of 21 October:

Jackdaw Approved Again: Shell Welcomes North Sea Decision, but Government Sees No Material Reduction in Bills.

The relevance to today’s legislation is important.

Jackdaw demonstrates that a project based on an existing licence may proceed through a development-consent process, even while the government is committed to preventing new exploration licences.

It also demonstrates that obtaining a petroleum licence is not the same as receiving every environmental approval required to produce hydrocarbons.

The proposed Energy Independence Bill does not remove that distinction.

Nor does the proposed Transitional Energy Certificate regime eliminate the environmental-assessment requirements illustrated by the Jackdaw litigation.

Judicial source: Court of Session — Greenpeace and Uplift Petitions, [2025] CSOH 10, 29 January 2025.

Corporate source: Shell Welcomes UK Government Decision on Jackdaw, 21 October 2026. Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service

Rosebank remains a different question

Adura’s other major development project, Rosebank, illustrates the limits of drawing conclusions from Jackdaw’s approval.

Rosebank is a substantial offshore oil and gas development west of Shetland.

Its earlier consent was also affected by the Court of Session judgment concerning downstream emissions.

Adura has argued that the development would generate substantial investment, economic activity and employment.

Its July 2026 announcement described Rosebank as an £8.7 billion investment project and confirmed that a renewed public consultation was underway.

Those are the developer’s claims and projections.

They are not findings by a court or guarantees of economic performance.

As of the latest substantive reporting located for this investigation, the renewed Rosebank decision remained under consideration.

The Energy Independence Bill should not be interpreted as approving Rosebank.

Nor does its proposed ban on new exploration licences automatically prohibit development of a field already covered by existing licensing arrangements.

The project must be considered under the applicable consent requirements.

This is a legally important distinction.

A future government decision concerning Rosebank will need to be assessed on its own terms, including the environmental evidence and the statutory framework applicable at the time.

Source: Adura — Rosebank Public Consultation Announcement, 16 July 2026. Adura

Another complication: Shell still owns important British gas infrastructure

Shell’s North Sea interests do not consist exclusively of Adura.

Its 2025 Annual Report contains a further relevant disclosure.

In July 2024, Shell agreed to sell interests in eleven Southern North Sea gas fields, an exploration prospect and the Bacton gas processing terminal to RockRose Energy, a subsidiary of Viaro Energy.

But the transaction did not complete.

In January 2026, Shell, ExxonMobil and Viaro Energy agreed not to proceed because the completion conditions had not been met.

Shell disclosed that Shell and ExxonMobil would continue to own the assets, with Shell remaining the operator.

Separately, Shell’s announcement establishing Adura confirmed that Shell UK would retain interests in significant gas-processing and associated infrastructure outside the joint venture.

These included facilities associated with the SEGAL system, St Fergus, Fife and Braefoot Bay, together with interests in Bacton and Southern North Sea assets.

The ownership arrangements matter because the new legislation contains provisions extending beyond upstream petroleum licensing.

The government’s proposals include additional powers concerning the resilience of the midstream gas sector.

Its new factsheet explains that ministers would receive powers to require information from relevant operators and, where necessary, direct action to address risks to continuity of supply.

The legislation would also enable financial assistance in exceptional circumstances, subject to the applicable requirements.

Those measures are intended to strengthen Britain’s ability to respond to gas-supply disruptions.

Given Shell’s retained interests in British gas infrastructure, the proposed changes warrant examination.

However, the precise application of the new powers to individual Shell facilities cannot be established from the general government factsheet alone.

The legislation does not establish that any Shell facility has breached an obligation or requires intervention.

The important finding is that the proposed reforms may affect the regulatory environment for both offshore production and aspects of the gas infrastructure through which production reaches consumers.

Sources:

Shell plc — 2025 Annual Report, SEC Filing.

Shell — Formation of Adura and Retained UK Assets.

Government Factsheet — Extending the Core Fuels Regulatory Regime to the Gas Sector. SEC

The North Sea regulator is also being restructured

Another significant provision concerns the North Sea Transition Authority itself.

The government proposes to update the regulator’s statutory objectives and powers.

For many years, the regulator’s central statutory objective has been associated with Maximising Economic Recovery.

That principle encouraged the efficient recovery of commercially viable petroleum resources from the UK Continental Shelf.

The government’s new legislation would revise the framework.

According to its official factsheet, the regulator’s objectives would explicitly address the broader transition of the North Sea economy, including economic considerations, net-zero objectives, workers, communities and supply chains.

The government says this is necessary because the existing framework does not adequately reflect the basin’s declining petroleum resources and the increasing importance of decommissioning and other energy activities.

There is a further administrative change.

Although the organisation adopted the North Sea Transition Authority name for its public operations in 2022, its statutory legal name remained the Oil and Gas Authority.

The legislation proposes to align its legal and operating names.

These changes are not merely cosmetic.

The statutory objectives of a regulator influence the framework within which decisions are made.

For companies such as Shell and Adura, revised objectives may affect future assessments of offshore investment, decommissioning obligations and the management of existing assets.

Nevertheless, the precise consequences will depend on the enacted legislation, subsequent guidance and individual regulatory decisions.

The revised objectives should not be treated as evidence that future applications will automatically be approved or rejected.

The Donovan–Shell Archive previously examined questions about the regulator’s independence and boardroom interests.

Those governance questions are distinct from the changes proposed today.

Revising statutory objectives does not, by itself, establish that any previously alleged conflict of interest has been resolved.

Primary source: Changes to Powers of the North Sea Transition Authority — Official Factsheet, 4 November 2026.

Archive reference: Shell Shares in the Watchdog’s Boardroom — Questions Grow Over Independence of UK’s North Sea Oil Regulator, 15 October 2026. GOV.UK

The government’s argument: decline must be managed

The government’s position contains two connected propositions.

First, it considers further exploration licensing inconsistent with its intended direction for Britain’s energy transition.

Second, it believes existing oil and gas production should decline in an orderly manner rather than through abrupt closure.

These objectives create an obvious tension.

The government wishes to demonstrate progress towards reducing dependence on fossil fuels.

But it also acknowledges that oil and gas will continue to be consumed for decades.

Existing production supports employment, tax revenues, technical expertise and industrial infrastructure.

Closing facilities prematurely could have consequences for the remaining fields connected to them.

The Transitional Energy Certificate proposal attempts to accommodate these competing considerations.

It would prevent companies from obtaining new licences to explore previously unlicensed areas while allowing limited additional production associated with established fields.

The government describes this as a managed transition.

Whether that framework achieves the intended balance between climate policy and economic stability remains to be demonstrated.

The legislation has only just been introduced.

Its final provisions, implementation and practical effects are not yet established. GOV.UK

The industry’s argument: investment requires predictability

Shell has repeatedly emphasised the importance of regulatory certainty.

In welcoming Jackdaw’s renewed approval on 21 October, Shell UK Country Chair Tony Nunan argued that major energy projects require stable investment conditions and predictable regulatory decisions.

That position is consistent with the commercial characteristics of offshore petroleum development.

Projects can require substantial capital expenditure years before revenues are generated.

Their profitability depends on production volumes, commodity prices, taxation, operating costs and the duration of the producing field.

Regulatory uncertainty can therefore affect investment decisions.

The proposed Transitional Energy Certificate system may provide an additional route for developing discovered resources near existing fields.

But it does not remove every uncertainty.

Companies will still need to establish eligibility.

They may require other licences and environmental consents.

Their investments must remain commercially attractive.

And the government has made clear that the broader policy objective is a transition away from reliance on fossil fuels.

For Shell, this means the legislation could offer opportunities associated with existing assets while also imposing a more restrictive framework for future exploration.

Both effects should be recognised. Shell

The climate argument: additional production still produces emissions

Environmental organisations have argued that expanding fossil-fuel production risks undermining climate commitments.

Their criticism has been particularly prominent in the controversies surrounding Jackdaw and Rosebank.

Greenpeace, Uplift and other campaigners contend that the benefits of additional North Sea production are limited compared with its environmental consequences.

They also question claims that new domestic production will materially reduce household energy bills.

The government’s recent Jackdaw decision acknowledged that the project would not materially affect consumer prices, even while finding that it would provide a contribution to domestic energy security.

Those are different questions.

A project may increase domestic supply without producing a measurable reduction in internationally determined prices.

Likewise, making use of existing infrastructure may reduce some development costs or operational impacts without eliminating the emissions associated with burning the hydrocarbons produced.

The government’s proposed certificates should therefore not be interpreted as evidence that additional production is environmentally neutral.

The climate consequences of individual developments remain matters for assessment under the applicable regulatory regime.

The Court of Session judgment concerning Jackdaw and Rosebank provides an important reminder that environmental assessment must address downstream emissions where legally required. Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service

EDITORIAL ANALYSIS What the Energy Independence Bill actually means for Shell

The most important finding from today’s documents is that Britain’s proposed oil and gas policy is more complicated than the headline announcement suggests.

It contains both a restriction and an accommodation.

The restriction concerns new exploration licensing.

The accommodation concerns additional production associated with existing fields.

For an established producer with substantial infrastructure, that distinction matters.

Shell’s investment in Adura places it within a group of companies whose existing North Sea assets may remain commercially relevant under the proposed arrangements.

But it would be wrong to conclude that the government has created a special exemption for Shell.

The legislation proposes a general framework applying to qualifying developments. There is no evidence in the documents examined that it was designed specifically to benefit Shell or Adura.

Nor is there evidence that Shell has secured any particular Transitional Energy Certificate.

The significance is structural rather than preferential.

An established producer may have opportunities that are unavailable to a company seeking to explore an entirely new, unlicensed area.

That follows from the design of the proposed regime.

It does not necessarily imply improper influence.

The possible advantage of established infrastructure

There is a further commercial implication.

An offshore company already possessing pipelines, processing facilities and producing fields may be better positioned to use nearby discovered resources than a newcomer without comparable infrastructure.

That is an economic inference, not a finding that Shell has secured a competitive advantage in any specific application.

Existing infrastructure may reduce the expenditure required to develop an additional resource.

It may also extend the period during which existing facilities remain economically viable.

But infrastructure can also involve substantial maintenance and eventual decommissioning obligations.

The commercial result will depend on field-specific circumstances.

The proposed regulatory framework may therefore affect different companies in different ways.

For Shell shareholders, the question is whether Adura can use its established asset base to generate competitive returns while meeting its environmental and decommissioning responsibilities.

That is a legitimate issue for future financial and regulatory scrutiny.

The danger of misleading headlines

There are two inaccurate ways to describe today’s legislation.

The first is to say that Britain is ending all North Sea oil and gas production.

It is not.

The government explicitly anticipates continued production for decades.

The second is to describe Transitional Energy Certificates as a licence for unrestricted new exploration.

They are not intended to serve that purpose.

The government says they will be confined to specified circumstances involving previously discovered resources and existing fields.

A further distinction concerns timing.

The Energy Independence Bill was introduced on 4 November 2026.

It has not yet become an Act of Parliament.

Its provisions remain subject to parliamentary scrutiny, amendment and the legislative process.

The government’s announcement is therefore evidence of proposed policy and legislation, not proof that every proposed power is already in force.

That distinction is particularly important when reporting potential consequences for investors.

A revealing contrast with Shell’s wider strategy

Shell’s global investment strategy continues to emphasise oil and gas assets capable of delivering attractive returns.

Its recent activities include major natural gas investments in Canada and the expansion of LNG production.

Against that international background, Britain’s new restrictions may make the UK a less obvious location for conventional new exploration.

But the country may remain commercially important for established production, infrastructure and projects already in development.

Adura represents precisely that kind of existing portfolio.

The question for Shell is not simply whether Britain permits another exploration licensing round.

It is whether the combination of existing resources, transitional arrangements, environmental requirements, taxation and infrastructure costs produces an attractive investment environment.

Today’s legislation adds another important element to that calculation.

It does not settle it.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

Established by official documents

The Energy Independence Bill was introduced to the House of Commons on 4 November 2026.

The government proposes to end new oil and gas exploration licensing.

It also proposes Transitional Energy Certificates to permit specified additional production associated with existing fields.

The government estimates that the certificates could unlock approximately 60 million barrels of oil across the relevant sector.

Shell and Equinor each own 50% of Adura.

Adura holds substantial UK North Sea producing assets, development projects and existing exploration licences.

Shell retains interests in additional UK gas infrastructure outside Adura.

The government also proposes changes to the statutory objectives and powers of the North Sea Transition Authority.

Established by court and regulatory records

The Court of Session ruled in January 2025 that previous consents for Jackdaw and Rosebank were unlawful because their environmental assessments omitted downstream emissions.

Jackdaw received renewed consent in October 2026 following further assessment.

That approval is separate from today’s proposed legislation.

Not established

No verified application by Shell or Adura for a Transitional Energy Certificate has been identified.

No certificate has been identified as having been granted to either company.

There is no evidence in the documents examined that the proposed regime was created specifically for Shell.

The government’s estimate of 60 million barrels is not a forecast of Shell’s future production.

The proposed legislation does not automatically approve Rosebank or any other development.

The final statutory framework, subsequent guidance and commercial consequences remain uncertain.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

1. UK Parliament — Energy Independence Bill, 4 November 2026

Official parliamentary record confirming the introduction and legislative status of the Bill.

UK Parliament — Energy Independence Bill

2. Department for Energy Security and Net Zero — Energy Independence Bill: Factsheets

The government’s complete collection of explanatory documents published on 4 November 2026.

Official Government Factsheet Collection

3. Ending New Oil and Gas Licences and Introducing Transitional Energy Certificates

The principal government document explaining the proposed restrictions and the continued production arrangements.

Official Licensing and Transitional Energy Certificate Factsheet

4. Criteria for Transitional Energy Certificates — 21 April 2026

The government’s earlier guidance describing the proposed eligibility requirements.

Transitional Energy Certificate Criteria

5. Changes to Powers of the North Sea Transition Authority — 4 November 2026

Official explanation of the proposed changes to the regulator’s statutory objectives, powers and name.

North Sea Transition Authority Reforms

6. Shell and Equinor Complete Formation of Adura — 1 December 2025

Shell’s original announcement confirming the venture’s ownership, portfolio and production expectations.

Shell — Formation of Adura

7. Shell plc — 2025 Form 20-F

Shell’s SEC filing documenting its British upstream activities, retained assets and the abandoned Southern North Sea divestment.

Shell’s 2025 SEC Filing

8. Court of Session — [2025] CSOH 10, 29 January 2025

The original judgment concerning the Jackdaw and Rosebank environmental approvals.

Scottish Court of Session — Original Judgment

9. Shell Welcomes UK Government Decision on Jackdaw — 21 October 2026

Shell’s official response confirming its continued involvement through Adura.

Shell UK — Jackdaw Approval Statement

10. Extending the Core Fuels Regulatory Regime to the Gas Sector — 4 November 2026

Official government explanation of the proposed new powers concerning gas infrastructure resilience.

UK Government — Gas Sector Regulatory Powers

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This investigation is based on official UK government publications issued on 4 November 2026, parliamentary records, Shell corporate announcements, SEC disclosures, a published judgment of the Scottish Court of Session and contemporaneous reporting.

The Energy Independence Bill is proposed legislation. References to its provisions do not imply that those provisions have already entered into force.

Shell plc, Shell UK and Adura are distinguished as separate legal entities where relevant.

No assertion is made that Shell has received preferential treatment under the proposed legislation or has improperly influenced its preparation.

The government’s estimated additional production is identified as a projection rather than an established commercial result.

Corporate claims concerning production, investment and employment are attributed to their sources.

Environmental objections are identified as positions advanced by campaign organisations, except where supported by specific judicial or regulatory findings.

The implications for Shell and Adura are editorial analysis based on their documented interests and the government’s published policy proposals.

The investigation does not constitute legal, investment or financial advice.

Shell, Equinor, Adura, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and other interested parties are invited to provide factual corrections, relevant documents or comments. Substantiated corrections will be reflected in the archive.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

 

Editorial note: This investigation concerns an entirely new legislative development announced on 4 November 2026. It complements, rather than repeats, the archive’s earlier reporting on Jackdaw, Adura and North Sea regulation.

Britain’s New Oil and Gas Ban Has a Second Door: An Independent Investigation into Shell, Adura and the Energy Independence Bill was first posted on November 4, 2026 at 9:59 pm.
©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

This article first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. 

Outgoing Sen. Mitch McConnell was one of the most powerful figures ever to walk the halls of the U.S. Congress and was instrumental in steering the country’s climate policy. At virtually every opportunity, he chose to block efforts to address the problem.

McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, did not seek reelection and is set to retire from the Senate in January. At that point, he will have been the 10th-longest-serving senator in U.S. history. He was also the longest-serving Senate party leader in history.

During his tenure, McConnell exerted his power to halt or overturn climate action in Congress, at the Supreme Court, and in the White House. Over a decades-long career, he joined a short list of individuals most responsible for stymying political efforts to address climate change.

A Senate leader’s war against the president

Over his 40-year tenure in the Senate, McConnell received over $4 million in donations from the oil and gas and coal industries – the fifth-most of any senator.

He was chosen as the leader of Senate Republicans in 2007, shortly before President Barack Obama, a Democrat, won office with a 60-member filibuster-proof Senate majority and a Democratic-controlled House.

At the time, observers thought it possible that Congress would pass bipartisan legislation to combat climate change.

In 2008, Democratic House leader Nancy Pelosi and former Republican House leader Newt Gingrich had created an ad together in which Gingrich said, “We do agree: Our country must take action to address climate change.”

The House soon passed a carbon cap-and-trade bill designed to tackle climate pollution. Eight Republicans voted in favor.

But the Democrats were never able to put their filibuster-proof majority to work on climate legislation. Their majority was thinned by election recounts, legal challenges, member illnesses, the death of Democrat Robert Byrd, and a lost special election in January 2010. What’s more, several Senate Democrats did not support the cap-and-trade bill, so climate advocates needed support from perhaps half a dozen Senate Republicans.

Some Republicans, most prominently the late Sen. Lindsey Graham, worked on a version of the cap-and-trade bill. But rather than support the legislation, McConnell had decided instead to declare war on Obama’s entire agenda, as reporter Ryan Lizza documented in a 2010 article. By working on a climate bill, Republican senators risked angering McConnell.

The cap-and-trade bill died a quiet death, never having received a vote in the Senate.

In 2019, McConnell acknowledged the reality of human-caused climate change. At the time, he said he preferred to solve the problem through technology and innovation. Yet he opposed legislation that climate advocates and researchers said would spur technological innovation, such as a price on carbon pollution and clean energy tax credits.

The Senate finally passed sweeping climate legislation in 2022, when Democrats enacted the Inflation Reduction Act. McConnell vehemently opposed the bill.

In 2025, McConnell helped to repeal many provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act when he supported the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which passed the Senate by a single vote.

McConnell’s conservative Supreme Court

The senator expressed pride in his influence over the Supreme Court. Notably, he blocked Obama’s nomination of moderate Merrick Garland in 2016 to replace Justice Antonin Scalia. In a move that broke with norms and historical precedent, McConnell refused to allow the chamber to consider or vote on Garland’s nomination.

“The most important decision I've made in my entire political career was not to fill the Supreme Court vacancy when Justice Scalia passed away,” McConnell recalled in 2024.

Soon after taking office in January 2017, Trump nominated the conservative Neil Gorsuch to the court, and the Republican-controlled Senate approved him. The Senate under McConnell also approved the 2018 nomination of conservative Brett Kavanaugh and the 2020 nomination of conservative Amy Coney Barrett.

The now right-wing court has consistently issued rulings that undermine climate and other environmental regulations.

In the 2022 case West Virginia v. EPA, the court issued a 6-3 decision – with the three new conservative justices in the majority – ruling against the Obama administration’s 2016 Clean Power Plan to regulate climate pollution from power plants. They did so even though the proposed rule never went into effect and by then had already been repealed under the first Trump administration.

In that case, the court also formalized what it called the “major questions doctrine,” which prohibits federal agencies from issuing new regulations that will have major economic or political influence unless Congress has specifically and explicitly delegated that authority.

In the 2024 case Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, in another 6-3 partisan split, the court overturned the 40-year-old Chevron doctrine, a principle that federal judges should defer to a government agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous Congressional statute.

Both decisions could enable the Supreme Court to block federal climate regulations in the future.

A crucial vote to acquit

In January 2021, the senator had an opportunity to prevent a second Trump administration. He chose not to take it.

The House of Representatives had impeached Trump for inciting an insurrection at the Capitol a week earlier.

"There's no question that President Trump is practically and morally responsible for provoking the events of the day,” McConnell said at the time.

But he declined to whip his caucus to remove Trump. Instead, McConnell and 42 other Republican senators voted to acquit him.

Had Trump been impeached, he would have been constitutionally barred from ever again holding office. Instead, he was elected to a second term in 2024 and has presided over the most anti-climate-policy administration in U.S. history, which has included withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement for the second time and repealing virtually all federal climate policies. It proved to be a fitting capstone to McConnell’s lengthy career of sabotaging climate policy at every level of government.

 

//

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 4 NOVEMBER 2026

Archive reference: SLF-2007-108

The Sakhalin Papers XCVIII: The Account That Could Not Pay — Shell’s 94.8 Billion Roubles and Russia’s Compensation Dispute

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

Researched and drafted with the assistance of ChatGPT, using authenticated Shell financial disclosures, Russian government legal instruments, contemporaneous reporting and available records of proceedings before the Moscow Arbitration Court.

Russia assigned a value of 94.8 billion roubles to Shell’s former interest in the Sakhalin II project. It approved a buyer, changed that buyer, and ultimately transferred the corresponding interest in the replacement Russian operating company to a Gazprom subsidiary. But Shell did not simply receive the money. The explanation lies partly in the original presidential decree of June 2022, which expressly restricted access to sale proceeds pending government-controlled investigations. The financial dispute subsequently became entangled with an entirely separate claim concerning unpaid gas deliveries. Four years after Shell announced its withdrawal from Russia, the company’s own SEC disclosures still describe substantial uncertainty. An examination of the original legal instruments reveals that the restrictions on payment were not an unforeseen complication: they were built into the restructuring from the beginning.

Publication date: 4 November 2026

Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia

Previous instalment: SLF-2007-107 — Thirty Days to Decide: Putin’s Decree, Japan’s Acceptance and Shell’s Refusal, 3 November 2026

Principal authenticated evidence: Russian Presidential Decree No. 416 of 30 June 2022; Russian Government Orders No. 890-r of 11 April 2023 and No. 701-r of 23 March 2024; Shell’s 2022 financial disclosures; Shell’s 2025 Form 20-F filed with the SEC on 12 March 2026; available records concerning Moscow Arbitration Court Case No. A40-241354/2024.

Evidence classification: Original corporate and regulatory disclosures; published Russian legal instruments; contemporaneous reporting; publicly identified court proceedings; and separately identified editorial analysis.

Introduction: A billion-dollar question

The previous instalment examined the restructuring of Sakhalin II following President Vladimir Putin’s intervention in June 2022.

Russia replaced the project’s Bermuda-registered operating company with a Russian limited liability company.

Foreign shareholders were required to decide whether to seek equivalent interests in the replacement entity.

Japan’s Mitsui and Mitsubishi accepted the arrangements.

Shell refused.

That decision created another question.

What would happen to Shell’s former 27.5% interest?

By April 2023, the Russian government had supplied an answer.

It approved the disposal of the corresponding interest in the new operating company for:

94.8 billion roubles.

At contemporary exchange rates, that represented approximately US$1 billion.

But a valuation is not a payment.

And a government-approved sale is not necessarily a transaction in which the original foreign investor receives unrestricted proceeds.

The distinction became crucial.

Russia’s original presidential decree had already established a mechanism governing how those proceeds would be handled.

The mechanism required the money to be placed in a special account.

It restricted the former shareholder’s ability to use it.

It also authorised investigations into alleged damage attributable to foreign participants.

The resulting financial arrangements were therefore considerably more complicated than the conventional sale of an investment.

The primary documents establish how those complications arose.

They also reveal why Shell’s withdrawal from Sakhalin II continues to have legal consequences.

1. The original decree contained the answer

The most important document in this investigation is Presidential Decree No. 416, signed by Vladimir Putin on 30 June 2022.

Its full title concerns special economic measures in the fuel and energy sector in response to actions by foreign governments and international organisations.

The decree established the restructuring of Sakhalin II.

It also prescribed what would happen when a foreign shareholder did not obtain an interest in the replacement operating company.

Several provisions are particularly important.

Subparagraph (h) of paragraph 1 provided for an unclaimed interest to be valued by the Russian government and sold to a qualifying Russian legal entity.

Subparagraph (i) addressed the sale proceeds.

It required the purchaser to credit those proceeds to a special Type-C account opened in the former shareholder’s name.

Crucially, it also restricted the shareholder’s ability to dispose of the money until specified procedures had been completed.

Those procedures were contained in the next three subparagraphs.

Subparagraph (k) provided for financial, environmental, technological and other audits of foreign persons and companies involved in the production-sharing agreement.

Subparagraph (l) authorised the Russian government to determine the amount of damage allegedly caused and identify persons responsible for compensation.

Subparagraph (m) provided for amounts corresponding to that damage to be deducted from the relevant Type-C account in favour of the replacement operating company.

The implications are substantial.

Under the Russian government’s own arrangements, selling an unclaimed interest did not necessarily result in immediately accessible proceeds for the former investor.

A process for examining alleged liabilities stood between the sale and unrestricted use of the money.

The restriction was not introduced after Shell’s interest had been valued. It formed part of the original restructuring decree.

That is the central documentary finding of this instalment.

Primary legal source: Russian Presidential Decree No. 416, 30 June 2022 — Reproduced Legal Text. RuLaws

2. A Type-C account is not an ordinary bank account

The distinction between a Type-C account and an unrestricted commercial bank account is important.

Russia introduced special accounts in 2022 as part of its response to sanctions and financial restrictions imposed following the invasion of Ukraine.

Presidential Decree No. 95 of 5 March 2022 established arrangements governing certain obligations to foreign creditors.

Decree No. 416 expressly incorporated that mechanism into the Sakhalin II restructuring.

The proceeds from an unclaimed interest were to be credited to a Type-C account in the name of the original shareholder.

That provision could create the appearance that compensation had been provided.

After all, a sum could be assigned to an identified account.

But the existence of an account is not equivalent to unrestricted ownership and control of the funds held within it.

The specific Sakhalin provisions imposed an additional restriction.

The shareholder could not dispose of the proceeds until the specified audit and compensation procedures had been completed.

This created a significant difference between three separate events.

A Russian government decision could establish the price of an interest.

The purchaser could transfer the purchase consideration into the required account.

But the former foreign shareholder might still be unable to withdraw or use the money freely.

The decree expressly contemplated that separation.

It would therefore be misleading to describe the approved purchase price as money Shell necessarily received.

That conclusion does not require speculation about Russian motives.

It follows from the published legal mechanism.

Nor does it establish that every restriction imposed under the decree would necessarily be enforceable under every potentially applicable international investment agreement.

The decree establishes Russia’s domestic procedure.

Questions concerning the wider legal consequences are separate matters.

3. April 2023: Novatek becomes the proposed purchaser

On 11 April 2023, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed Government Order No. 890-r.

The order approved the disposal of the unclaimed interest in Sakhalin Energy LLC.

It identified the precise percentage concerned:

27.49999998621683%.

It established the price:

94.8 billion roubles.

And it designated Novatek Moscow Region LLC, a subsidiary of the Russian gas producer Novatek, as the purchaser.

The order was reported by Interfax and subsequently examined by the Japan External Trade Organization.

The degree of numerical precision in the legal instrument is notable.

The percentage corresponded to the interest that Shell would have been entitled to seek in the replacement Russian company.

It did not establish that Shell had voluntarily sold its shares in the original Bermuda company to Novatek.

That distinction must be preserved.

Russia was disposing of an unclaimed interest in the newly established Russian operating company.

Shell continued to assert rights associated with its existing investment.

The two positions were not necessarily consistent.

But they concerned different legal structures.

The Russian government had established a procedure for assigning ownership in the replacement company.

Shell had not agreed that the transfer of its original company’s rights and assets was legally effective in every applicable jurisdiction.

The resulting dispute could not be resolved merely by naming a purchaser.

Primary source: Russian Government Order No. 890-r, 11 April 2023.

Independent contemporary source: Japan External Trade Organization — Russia Approves Novatek Acquisition, 17 April 2023. Interfax.ru

4. Shell’s chief financial officer intervenes

The distinction between the reported sale and actual payment became apparent almost immediately.

On 4 May 2023, Shell Chief Financial Officer Sinead Gorman addressed questions concerning reports that the Sakhalin interest had been sold to Novatek.

Interfax recorded her response:

“No payments have been made and we retain our legal rights.”

The statement deserves attention.

Shell was not merely declining to confirm the price.

Nor was it simply refusing to discuss the transaction.

Its chief financial officer addressed two specific matters.

First, Shell had not received payment.

Second, the company continued to assert legal rights.

Those statements directly challenged any impression that the Russian government’s approval of Novatek as purchaser had completed an ordinary commercial disposal involving Shell.

The surrounding circumstances were unusual.

Russian financial reporting had discussed the possible effects of transferring approximately 95 billion roubles to Shell.

There had also been speculation concerning the conversion of the proceeds into foreign currency.

But the company’s own financial officer said payment had not occurred.

The difference between Russian government approval and Shell’s position was therefore publicly documented.

The statement did not establish what compensation might eventually become available.

It established that, as of 4 May 2023, Shell had not received the reported proceeds and was preserving its legal position.

Contemporaneous source: Interfax — Shell Has Not Received Funds for Sakhalin II Stake, 4 May 2023.

5. The buyer changes — but the price does not

Nearly a year later, the Russian government changed its decision.

On 23 March 2024, Prime Minister Mishustin signed Government Order No. 701-r.

This instrument is particularly significant because it expressly revoked the earlier Novatek order.

The replacement purchaser was:

Sakhalinsky Proekt LLC — Sakhalin Project LLC.

The company was associated with Gazprom.

The price remained unchanged.

94.8 billion roubles.

Government Order No. 701-r identified the same precise interest and approved its disposal to the Gazprom-controlled vehicle.

It also declared the April 2023 order ineffective.

This was a formal government decision, not merely a report that two commercial companies had privately agreed to substitute one purchaser for another.

Interfax reported the change on 25 March 2024.

The original Novatek arrangement had not progressed to completion.

The Russian government therefore approved a different buyer.

From Shell’s perspective, the important distinction remained.

The Russian authorities were determining how an interest in the replacement company would be disposed of.

Shell’s position concerning its original legal rights was not thereby resolved.

Nor did the substitution of Gazprom for Novatek establish that the purchase consideration had become freely accessible to Shell.

The special-account provisions remained relevant.

Primary source: Russian Government Order No. 701-r, 23 March 2024.

Contemporaneous source: Interfax — Gazprom Replaces Novatek as Buyer of Sakhalin Energy Interest, 25 March 2024. RuLaws

6. The transaction did not extinguish Shell’s original shareholding

A further complication emerges from Shell’s most recent annual reporting.

In its 2025 Form 20-F, filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on 12 March 2026, Shell disclosed that it still held a 27.5% minus one share interest in Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd.

That was the original Bermuda-registered company.

Shell also stated that this company purportedly no longer held the licences, rights and obligations associated with Sakhalin II.

The wording is significant.

Shell continued to recognise its interest in the original legal entity.

But the Russian authorities had transferred the operating project into a replacement company.

The interest assigned by Russia to Gazprom’s vehicle was therefore not the same legal instrument as Shell’s original shareholding.

The distinction explains why both propositions could appear in the documentary record.

Gazprom’s vehicle could acquire the corresponding interest in the Russian replacement company.

At the same time, Shell could continue to hold shares in the predecessor Bermuda company.

That does not mean Shell continued to exercise operational control over Sakhalin II.

Nor does it mean the original shares necessarily retained the commercial value associated with the producing project.

It means that the legal consequences of the restructuring extended beyond a straightforward share transfer.

Shell’s corporate withdrawal and the extinction of every associated legal interest were not necessarily the same event.

That distinction remains important when examining compensation and potential remedies.

Primary source: Shell plc — 2025 Form 20-F, Russia Disclosure, Filed 12 March 2026. SEC

7. Shell had already written down the investment

The financial history adds another complication.

Shell’s withdrawal announcement followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

In the first quarter of that year, Shell recognised a $1.614 billion impairment against its Sakhalin II investment.

The company reported that it lost significant influence over the project from 1 April 2022.

Its executive directors had resigned from the project, and managerial and technical personnel were withdrawn.

Shell subsequently changed the accounting treatment of the investment.

Following further adjustments and receipt of dividends, the carrying value had fallen to zero by 30 September 2022.

It remained zero at the end of that year.

These figures must not be confused with the subsequent Russian sale price.

The $1.614 billion impairment represented an accounting adjustment associated with Shell’s reassessment of its investment.

The 94.8 billion-rouble price was established under the Russian government’s disposal arrangements.

They arose from different accounting and legal processes.

The fact that an investment has a zero carrying value does not automatically extinguish every legal claim concerning it.

Equally, a later government-approved purchase price does not establish that the original investor can recognise or collect an equivalent sum.

The figures must be considered separately.

Shell’s original disclosures explain the basis of its accounting treatment.

Primary source: Shell plc — Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2022 Financial Disclosures, SEC. SEC

8. October 2024: Russia brings a different dispute into the picture

The compensation controversy acquired another dimension on 2 October 2024.

Russia’s Prosecutor General filed proceedings in the Moscow Arbitration Court against eight Shell-group entities.

The defendants included Shell plc and Shell Energy Europe Limited.

The case is identified as:

A40-241354/2024.

The proceedings were subsequently accepted by the court.

Publicly available legal records identify an order dated 11 October 2024.

The case was later placed behind closed doors because of confidentiality and commercial-secrecy concerns.

That restriction is important.

The complete statement of claim, contractual evidence and subsequent arguments have not been available for comprehensive independent examination.

The public record nevertheless establishes the existence of the proceedings.

Shell’s own financial disclosures provide the most authoritative accessible description of the principal remedies sought.

Court record: Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation v Shell plc and Others — Moscow Arbitration Court, Case A40-241354/2024.

Contemporaneous legal reporting: Pravo.ru — Russian Prosecutor Files Claim Against Shell, 4 October 2024. Jus Mundi

9. What Russia’s prosecutor is actually seeking

Shell’s 2025 Form 20-F contains a particularly revealing disclosure.

The company states that the Russian prosecutor seeks three principal forms of relief.

The first concerns Shell’s withdrawal from Sakhalin Energy Investment Company.

The prosecutor seeks declarations that Shell unlawfully withdrew support from the project company.

The second concerns a separate commercial relationship.

The prosecutor seeks approximately:

€1.5 billion

from Shell Energy Europe Limited for alleged unpaid gas deliveries in 2022.

The proposed beneficiary is Gazprom Export.

The third connects the two matters.

The prosecutor seeks a declaration allowing Gazprom Export to take approximately:

94 billion roubles

purportedly set aside for Shell as Sakhalin equity compensation in a Type-C account.

Those funds would then be applied against part of the alleged Shell Energy Europe debt.

That is the essential structure of the claim as described by Shell.

But the two financial amounts are not interchangeable.

The 94.8 billion roubles was the Russian government’s approved purchase price for the unclaimed interest.

The approximately 94 billion roubles identified in Shell’s disclosure concerns funds allegedly reserved in a Type-C account.

The approximately €1.5 billion relates to a disputed contractual gas-payment obligation.

The figures arise from different transactions.

The prosecutor’s proceedings seek to connect them.

That connection is the critical development.

What originated as a dispute over the consequences of Shell’s withdrawal from Sakhalin II became linked to an alleged liability arising from European pipeline-gas supplies.

Primary source: Shell plc — 2025 Form 20-F, Note 32: Legal Proceedings and Other Contingencies, Russia. SEC

10. The gas dispute did not originate at Sakhalin II

There is an important distinction concerning the underlying commercial relationship.

The €1.5 billion claim does not concern alleged non-payment for LNG produced at Sakhalin II.

It concerns gas supplied by Gazprom Export to Shell Energy Europe Limited.

The relevant dispute developed in 2022 following Russia’s introduction of new payment requirements for certain foreign purchasers of pipeline gas.

Presidential Decree No. 172, signed on 31 March 2022, established a mechanism involving payments through Gazprombank and conversion into roubles.

Shell Energy Europe did not accept the revised payment arrangement.

Gazprom subsequently announced that it was suspending supplies to Shell Energy Europe from 1 June 2022.

The contract reportedly involved up to 1.2 billion cubic metres of gas annually for delivery to Germany.

These events were documented contemporaneously.

They explain the commercial background to the later claim.

But they do not resolve the contractual dispute.

The publicly available record does not contain a complete set of the relevant contractual provisions and subsequent arguments.

It therefore cannot establish whether Russia’s revised payment mechanism was binding under the original agreement.

Nor can it establish whether Shell Energy Europe was liable for the amount subsequently claimed.

Those are disputed questions.

The significance for the Sakhalin investigation is that the Russian prosecutor seeks to apply funds associated with one commercial relationship against an alleged debt associated with another.

A gas-purchase dispute involving Shell Energy Europe became entangled with compensation associated with Shell’s former Sakhalin II investment.

That is materially different from suggesting that the disputed gas deliveries originated from Sakhalin II.

The distinction has been examined previously in the archive.

Related investigation: The Shell Leaks Files — 19 September 2026: The Type-C Account and the €1.5 Billion Claim. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

11. Two separate mechanisms for reducing the proceeds

The documents reveal a distinction that deserves particular attention.

The original Sakhalin restructuring decree and the later Russian prosecutor’s proceedings involve different mechanisms.

The first is contained in Presidential Decree No. 416.

It provides for audits concerning the implementation of the Sakhalin production-sharing agreement.

It also provides for deductions from the relevant Type-C account to compensate damage attributed to foreign participants.

The second arises from the subsequent Moscow litigation.

That case includes a claim concerning alleged unpaid gas deliveries under a separate commercial relationship.

The prosecutor seeks to use Sakhalin compensation funds against that alleged debt.

These are not identical claims.

The existence of one does not prove the validity of the other.

Nor does the original audit provision automatically establish that Gazprom Export is entitled to compensation for the disputed pipeline-gas deliveries.

The legal basis for the requested application of funds must be assessed separately.

This distinction is important because otherwise the story can be misleadingly simplified.

A reader might assume that the 94 billion roubles was withheld solely because of alleged environmental damage at Sakhalin II.

The published records do not support that conclusion.

The original decree established audit and damage-compensation provisions.

The later proceedings seek relief involving an entirely separate gas-payment dispute.

Both affect the potential availability of compensation.

But they arise through different legal pathways.

12. A closed courtroom and an unresolved claim

The litigation has continued for more than two years.

Shell’s 2024 Annual Report recorded that Shell Energy Europe filed a postponement motion in January 2025.

A hearing in February 2025 resulted in an adjournment.

Further hearings and postponements followed.

The proceedings continued during 2025.

Shell’s 2025 Annual Report, published on 12 March 2026, stated that the proceedings remained ongoing.

The company also emphasised uncertainty concerning any eventual financial obligations.

The available procedural reporting provides a more recent development.

On 8 July 2026, Interfax’s X-Compliance service reported that the Moscow Arbitration Court had scheduled the continuation of the case for:

18 January 2027.

The report cited the court’s case records.

It also confirmed that the proceedings were being conducted behind closed doors.

That limits the ability of an independent investigator to examine the underlying evidence.

The next scheduled hearing should not be confused with a judgment date.

Nor does the continuation of proceedings establish that either side’s legal position has been accepted.

No publicly verified final judgment resolving the claims has been identified in the material examined for this instalment.

As of 4 November 2026, the latest accessible procedural reporting therefore indicates that the litigation remains unresolved.

Source: X-Compliance/Interfax — Moscow Court to Continue Shell Proceedings on 18 January 2027, Reported 8 July 2026. X-Compliance

13. What Shell says about the financial uncertainty

The most recent authenticated annual disclosure is explicit about the uncertainty.

Shell’s 2025 Form 20-F states that the Russian prosecutor’s proceedings remain ongoing.

It identifies the three principal forms of relief sought.

It then explains that the company cannot reliably estimate the magnitude or timing of any possible obligation or payment.

Shell also states that it cannot determine whether any payment will ultimately be due.

The company identifies significant uncertainty concerning the outcome and potential effects on its future operations, earnings, cash flows and financial condition.

Those statements require careful interpretation.

They are not admissions of liability.

Nor are they assurances that Shell will ultimately recover the compensation.

They indicate that the outcome cannot presently be estimated reliably.

The disclosure also does not establish that every rouble associated with the Russian-approved purchase price is available for Shell’s unrestricted use.

On the contrary, the company describes the relevant funds as purportedly set aside in a Type-C account.

That wording reflects the unresolved nature of the arrangements.

It is therefore inappropriate to represent the Russian-approved sale price as a completed cash receipt by Shell.

Primary source: Shell plc — 2025 Annual Report, SEC Filing, Legal Proceedings and Contingencies. SEC

EDITORIAL COMMENTARY A sale price without an ordinary sale

The Sakhalin II compensation dispute demonstrates the importance of distinguishing financial value from financial control.

Russia established a price.

It selected a purchaser.

It replaced that purchaser.

The corresponding interest in the replacement Russian operating company was subsequently acquired by a Gazprom-controlled entity.

But Shell’s legal and financial position was not resolved through those decisions.

The original presidential decree had already prescribed restrictions on the resulting proceeds.

The subsequent litigation created an additional potential claim against them.

The result is a striking example of the difficulties that can arise when a foreign investor loses operational influence over an asset but continues to possess disputed legal and financial interests.

The significance of the original Type-C provisions

The original decree is particularly revealing.

It did not merely require compensation to be placed in a special account.

It expressly restricted the former shareholder’s ability to use the money pending further procedures.

It also empowered the Russian government to investigate alleged damage and determine corresponding deductions.

That meant the valuation of an unclaimed interest was only one stage of the process.

For an international investor, the distinction is commercially significant.

A nominal valuation does not necessarily produce an equivalent financial benefit.

The ability to receive, transfer and use the proceeds matters.

So does the enforceability of the underlying legal rights.

The Russian measures placed those questions within a framework controlled by Russian state institutions.

Whether particular provisions could be challenged under applicable international law is a separate question.

The published documents do not establish the outcome of any such challenge.

Why the Gazprom Export claim matters

The later Russian lawsuit demonstrates another complication.

Shell’s former Sakhalin interest became financially linked to a separate dispute involving pipeline-gas deliveries.

The prosecutor seeks to apply compensation associated with the former investment against an alleged contractual debt.

This involves different Shell-group companies and different underlying transactions.

For shareholders, the implication is that withdrawal from an overseas investment may not necessarily eliminate the corporate group’s exposure to disputes associated with its previous commercial relationships.

But the existence of such exposure must not be confused with established liability.

The prosecutor’s allegations remain contested.

The court proceedings have not produced a publicly verified final judgment resolving the claims.

The historical parallel with 2006

There is also a significant connection with the earlier Sakhalin Papers.

In December 2006, Shell agreed to surrender majority control of Sakhalin II to Gazprom following a prolonged confrontation involving environmental allegations and regulatory pressure.

That transaction was negotiated.

Gazprom acquired a controlling interest.

The project continued.

In 2022, the situation was different.

Shell announced its withdrawal from Russian ventures following the invasion of Ukraine.

Russia imposed a new corporate structure through presidential measures.

Shell refused to participate.

The Russian government subsequently determined how the corresponding unclaimed interest would be disposed of.

The legal mechanisms were different.

The political circumstances were different.

But the broader historical lesson concerns the vulnerability of long-term international investments when governments possess substantial powers over the assets, infrastructure and regulatory arrangements within their territory.

Sakhalin II illustrates that vulnerability across two very different periods.

It also demonstrates why the history cannot be reduced to a single transaction or political confrontation.

The unanswered question

The most important unresolved question is not simply whether Russia assigned a reasonable value to the former Sakhalin interest.

It is whether Shell will ultimately receive compensation that it can lawfully and practically use.

That question depends on several distinct matters.

The legal consequences of the 2022 restructuring.

The operation of Russia’s special-account provisions.

Any valid deductions under the applicable arrangements.

The outcome of the separate gas-payment dispute.

And any remedies available to Shell outside the Russian proceedings.

The documents establish the framework and the competing positions.

They do not establish the final outcome.

That is why documentary caution remains essential.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

Established by authenticated documents

President Putin signed Decree No. 416 on 30 June 2022.

The decree established a mechanism for disposing of unclaimed interests in the replacement Sakhalin II operating company.

It required the proceeds to be credited to a Type-C account.

It restricted the former shareholder’s ability to use those proceeds pending specified procedures.

It also provided for financial, environmental, technological and other audits, together with potential deductions concerning alleged damage.

Russian Government Order No. 890-r, dated 11 April 2023, approved Novatek Moscow Region LLC as purchaser of the unclaimed 27.5% interest for 94.8 billion roubles.

Russian Government Order No. 701-r, dated 23 March 2024, revoked that arrangement and approved Sakhalin Project LLC as purchaser at the same price.

Shell’s chief financial officer stated on 4 May 2023 that the company had not received payment and retained its legal rights.

Shell’s 2025 Form 20-F confirms that it continued to hold its original shareholding in the Bermuda-registered Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd.

The same filing identifies Russian proceedings brought against eight Shell-group entities on 2 October 2024.

The prosecutor seeks approximately €1.5 billion concerning alleged unpaid gas deliveries and permission to apply approximately 94 billion roubles of purported Sakhalin compensation against part of that alleged debt.

Shell reports substantial uncertainty concerning the outcome.

The latest procedural report identified for this investigation schedules further proceedings for 18 January 2027.

Allegations and disputed positions

The Russian prosecutor alleges that Shell unlawfully withdrew support from the original Sakhalin operating company.

The prosecutor alleges that Shell Energy Europe owes Gazprom Export approximately €1.5 billion for 2022 gas deliveries.

The prosecutor seeks to apply funds purportedly reserved for Shell’s Sakhalin compensation against part of that alleged debt.

These are contested claims.

Not established by the documents examined

It has not been established that Shell caused environmental or other damage under Decree No. 416.

No completed independent assessment of damages under that decree has been identified in the material examined.

It has not been established that Shell Energy Europe is legally liable for the €1.5 billion claimed.

It has not been established that Gazprom Export is entitled to the disputed Sakhalin compensation funds.

It has not been established that Shell received 94.8 billion roubles as unrestricted cash.

Nor has a publicly verified final judgment resolving the Russian prosecutor’s claims been identified.

The legal effects of the restructuring under potentially applicable international agreements remain distinct from the measures adopted under Russian domestic law.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

1. Russian Presidential Decree No. 416 — 30 June 2022

The original legal instrument establishing the replacement Sakhalin II operating company, the treatment of unclaimed interests, the Type-C account arrangements and the procedures concerning alleged damage.

Particularly relevant are paragraph 1, subparagraphs (h) through (m).

Read the Reproduced Russian Legal Text of Decree No. 416

2. Russian Government Order No. 890-r — 11 April 2023

The order approving Novatek Moscow Region LLC as purchaser of the unclaimed interest for 94.8 billion roubles.

Read Government Order No. 890-r

3. Russian Government Order No. 701-r — 23 March 2024

The order revoking the earlier Novatek arrangement and approving Sakhalin Project LLC as purchaser for the same amount.

Read Government Order No. 701-r

4. Interfax — 4 May 2023

Contemporaneous reporting of Shell Chief Financial Officer Sinead Gorman’s statement that Shell had not received payment and continued to retain its legal rights.

Shell Has Not Received Funds for Sakhalin II Stake, Says CFO

5. Interfax — 25 March 2024

Contemporaneous reporting confirming that Gazprom replaced Novatek as the approved purchaser.

Gazprom Replaces Novatek as Buyer of Sakhalin Energy Interest

6. Shell plc — Full-Year 2022 Financial Disclosures

Original SEC-hosted corporate disclosures covering the Sakhalin II impairment, loss of significant influence, restructuring and zero carrying value.

Shell Full-Year 2022 Financial Disclosures — SEC

7. Shell plc — 2025 Annual Report and Form 20-F

Filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on 12 March 2026.

The Russia disclosure describes Shell’s remaining interest in the original Bermuda company.

Note 32, Legal Proceedings and Other Contingencies, describes the Russian prosecutor’s proceedings and requested remedies.

Shell plc 2025 Form 20-F — Original SEC Filing

8. Moscow Arbitration Court — Case A40-241354/2024

Publicly identified proceedings brought by the Russian Prosecutor General against Shell-group entities.

An order dated 11 October 2024 is identified in the available legal record.

The proceedings are understood to be conducted behind closed doors.

Jus Mundi — Prosecutor General’s Office v Shell, Moscow Arbitration Court

9. X-Compliance/Interfax — 8 July 2026

The most recent procedural report identified for this investigation, stating that the proceedings are scheduled to continue on 18 January 2027.

Russian Court to Continue Shell Proceedings in January 2027

10. Donovan–Shell Archive — 18 and 19 September 2026

Earlier instalments examining the original sale arrangements and the development of the subsequent gas-payment dispute.

The Sakhalin Papers LI — The Billion-Rouble Exit Price

The Sakhalin Papers LII — The Type-C Account and the €1.5 Billion Claim

These earlier investigations provide the detailed commercial and litigation chronology. The present instalment concentrates on the original decree’s specific restrictions and their consequences for the payment of compensation.

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This instalment draws upon published Russian legal instruments, authenticated Shell financial disclosures filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, contemporaneous Interfax reporting, available court records and material preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.

The Russian presidential decree and government orders are examined as legal measures adopted under Russian domestic law.

Their description does not constitute a determination that the measures extinguished every contractual or investment right potentially enforceable under other applicable laws or agreements.

The English explanations of the Russian instruments are summaries of the original Russian-language provisions.

The original Bermuda-registered Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd is distinguished from the replacement Russian operating company, Sakhalin Energy LLC.

The 94.8 billion-rouble government-approved sale price is distinguished from the approximately 94 billion roubles identified in Shell’s later litigation disclosures.

Neither amount is represented as unrestricted cash received by Shell.

Shell’s accounting impairment is distinguished from the Russian valuation and from any potential compensation entitlement.

The original audit-and-damages mechanism established by Decree No. 416 is distinguished from the later claim involving disputed gas deliveries to Shell Energy Europe.

No allegation is made that Shell or its personnel caused environmental damage merely because the Russian decree authorised an investigation.

No allegation is made that Shell Energy Europe unlawfully withheld gas payments.

The Russian prosecutor’s claims are identified as allegations and are not presented as established judicial findings.

The full contractual evidence and complete Russian court proceedings have not been independently examined.

The case has been reported as proceeding behind closed doors, limiting the information available to external researchers.

No publicly verified final judgment resolving the claims has been identified.

Editorial interpretation is separated from authenticated documentary findings.

Relevant factual corrections, additional primary documents and responses from Shell, Gazprom, Novatek or other interested parties are welcome.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-109 — The Sakhalin Papers XCIX: The Shareholding That Survived — Shell’s Bermuda Company, Its Novatek LNG Contract and the Exit That Remained Incomplete

Shell announced its intention to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons in February 2022.

It resigned from the management of Sakhalin II.

It withdrew personnel.

It declined to participate in Russia’s replacement operating company.

And the Russian government ultimately arranged for the corresponding interest to pass to a Gazprom-controlled purchaser.

But Shell’s own 2025 Annual Report contains two important statements.

First, Shell still held its 27.5% minus one share interest in the original Bermuda-registered Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd.

Second, Shell still held a long-term LNG purchase contract with a Novatek entity.

These disclosures raise questions concerning the legal and commercial meaning of corporate withdrawal.

What rights remained attached to Shell’s shares in the original Sakhalin Energy company?

What became of the long-term LNG supply contracts after Russia’s restructuring?

How did the Novatek contract survive the termination or suspension of other Russian commercial relationships?

And to what extent did Shell’s formal withdrawal leave behind contractual obligations or rights that could not simply be extinguished by a corporate announcement?

The next instalment will examine Shell’s original withdrawal commitments against its subsequent authenticated disclosures.

It will distinguish the continued existence of a legal shareholding from operational participation in an energy project.

It will also distinguish the existence of an LNG purchase contract from evidence of continuing physical deliveries.

The purpose will not be to suggest that Shell secretly continued operating Sakhalin II.

The purpose will be to establish precisely what the company had left behind — and what, according to its own financial statements, remained.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 4 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 4, 2026 at 9:34 pm.
©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

The world breathed a collective sigh of relief this week as voters in the United States offered a stunning rebuke to the Trump administration and its allies. The midterm elections — a Blue Wave unlike any in the past 50 years — brought change on almost every level, with Democrats taking the House and Senate as well as governorships and state legislatures around the country.

Of course, the full shape of the future ahead of us remains foggy. Full results for many races won’t be available for a few days or even weeks, and the Trump administration still has plenty of opportunities to gum up the works. But some truths have started to emerge that should help us to set the agenda for the next two years (and beyond).

With that in mind, we’re collecting some of the best environmental reporting and commentaries about the 2026 midterms. This list will be updated frequently over the next few days as new reports become available.

Election Results:

The Associated Press has the best and most concise data.

Democrats Seize Congress, Statehouses in Referendum on the Economy (Inside Climate News)

A Chief Antagonist of Offshore Wind Loses His Seat (Heatmap)

Democrat Wins Race for Texas Governor in Tectonic Upset (The New York Times)

Democrat Jon Rosenthal Elected Texas Railroad Commissioner Over Controversial Republican Bo French (The Guardian)

Democrats Win Control of Georgia’s Energy Regulator (Inside Climate News)

Top Clean Energy Wins From the Midterm Elections (Canary Media)

Conley’s Victory in New York’s Lower Hudson Valley Opens Door to Renewed Climate Action (Inside Climate News)

Democrats’ Big Statehouse Wins Could Transform Climate and Energy Policy (Inside Climate News)

How Democrats Used the Midterms to Turn Affordability Concerns Into ‘Green Populism’ (The Guardian)

Revolting Against Data Centers, Voters in Nearly 40 Towns Reject Projects (Capital B)

Energy and Water Issues Propel Democrats to Victory in Arizona (Inside Climate News)

The Issues:

Voters Across the Country Reject Data Centers (Stateline)

Environmentalists Notch Wins on Key Ballot Measures (Yale Environment 360)

Blue Wave Changed Who Governs. But Not Who Has Influence. (Health Care Un-Covered)

Elon Musk Loses Texas Senate Race (Mother Jones)

How Would Xavier Becerra and Steve Hilton Manage California’s Most Precious Resource, Water? (CalMatters)

Democrats Won. Oil Money Lost. (Heated)

Iowa’s Water Crisis Crashed the Midterms (Sentient)

Trump’s Midterm Collapse Is Good News for Public Lands (Public Domain)

What Does the Blue Wave Mean for Permitting Reform? (Heatmap)

 

Waves and Echoes

Oil Futures Plummet After Vance Blames Historic Midterm Loss on Iran War (CNN)

Shares of Elon Musk’s Tesla and SpaceX Tumble After Republican Losses (New York Times)

 

Looking Back:

Mitch McConnell’s Climate Legacy (Yale Climate Connections)

How Trump’s Energy Policies Helped Trigger Tuesday’s Election Rout (New York Times)

 

Looking Forward:

What a Historic ‘Blue Wave’ Midterm Means for Climate Action (Grist)

‘Newly Empowered and Emboldened’ Democrats Threaten Permitting Bill (Politico)

What Comes Next? (Climate Colored Goggles)

Democrats Draw Up Energy and Environment Agenda with Control of Congress in Sight (Politico)

Here Are the [Environmental] Messes the Next Florida Governor Needs to Clean Up (Florida Phoenix)

Democrats’ Victory in Texas Raises Potential for Environmental Reform (Inside Climate News)

Now We Act interview series (Timothy Snyder)

Musk Bet Big on Keeping Texas Red. What Happens to His Business Empire Now? (CNN)

How the Midterms Could Unleash a New Era for Clean Energy in These 3 States (Grist)

Will Trump’s Wipeout Change the Game at COP31? (Covering Climate Now)

 

Send suggestions to include on this list to jplatt@therevelator.org.

Republish this article for free! Read our reprint policy.

 

The post The Best Environmental Reporting About the 2026 Midterms — and Beyond appeared first on The Revelator.

Historic midterms deliver clear message to Congress: Prioritize people’s health and well-being Anthony Lacey November 4, 2026

WASHINGTON – The American people have sent a powerful message with the historic midterm elections: They demand a government that works for them, not a government corrupted by the power of polluters and corporate interests. 

The sweeping rejection of the Trump administration’s policies presents Congress’ incoming Democratic majority with both an opportunity and an obligation to deliver on the issues that matter most to families. 

The Environmental Working Group says the next Congress should pursue efforts to provide safe, healthy food and clean drinking water, strengthen protections against toxic chemicals and pesticides, and support affordable clean energy.

The following is a statement from EWG President and Co-founder Ken Cook:

This historic election is a celebration of American pluralism – and a reminder that, to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin’s warning, we have a republic, if we can keep it. 

Last night’s results offer us a reason for optimism and a renewed confidence that progress is possible. By listening to voters and putting people first, we can begin to restore trust in government, and build a healthier, safer and more hopeful future for generations to come.

The results are also a resounding rejection of President Donald Trump’s agenda and a powerful affirmation of the values that make America stronger: opportunity, accountability and the fundamental promise that government should work for the people, not powerful corporate interests.

The people are fed up with policies that cater to polluters and corrupt corporate interests ahead of the health, safety and economic well-being of millions of Americans. 

Democrats now have an opportunity – and an obligation – to deliver on a different vision, one grounded in the kitchen-table issues that matter to families every day. That means fighting for clean, safe, healthy food free from harmful pesticides and toxic additives; drinking water free from dangerous contaminants; and affordable, clean energy. 

It means holding polluters accountable, restoring the government’s ability to protect public health and the environment, and rejecting the playbook of the last two years of putting Big Food, Big Ag and Big Pesticides ahead of the public interest.

Democrats must also begin to repair the damage inflicted by the most stridently anti-environmental, anti-science administration in our history, and rebuild the federal government’s capacity to protect Americans.

That means restoring and strengthening critical agencies, including the EPA, the FDA and the CDC. It means restoring and strengthening science-based safeguards against pesticide exposure and toxic chemicals; protecting drinking water from contamination; and ensuring that public health, not corporate influence, drives regulatory decisions.

EWG stands ready to work with Congress – and all stakeholders – to make it happen and to turn this electoral mandate into real action.

We have an ambitious agenda and concrete opportunities to make progress. We look forward to working with incoming members of Congress and continuing our work to reform our food chemical safety system, strengthen pesticide protection and help farmers lead the transition to regenerative agriculture. 

###

The Environmental Working Group (EWG) is a nonprofit, non-partisan organization that empowers people to live healthier lives in a healthier environment. Through research, advocacy and unique education tools, EWG drives consumer choice and civic action.

Press Contact Alex Formuzis alex@ewg.org (202) 667-6982 November 4, 2026

International funding to help developing countries protect their communities, infrastructure and economies from climate impacts remains far below what is needed, a new United Nations report has found, leaving vulnerable nations increasingly exposed as global warming heads past 1.5C.

The UN Environment Programme’s (UNEP) 2026 Adaptation Gap Report estimates that developing countries will need about $305 billion a year to adapt by 2035 in today’s prices, or around $420 billion once inflation is taken into account. Yet international public adaptation finance from developed countries reached only $28.2-31.7 billion in 2024, a modest increase on the previous year.

The estimate is slightly below last year’s $310-365 billion, mainly because UNEP now relies more on countries’ own assessment of costs reported through their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans (NAPs).

• Oct 28, 2026 News Africa wants adaptation finance on COP31 agenda, raising risk of a fight The African Group wants dedicated space on tripling adaptation finance, the Green Climate Fund and trade, setting up a possible clash Read more
• May 21, 2026 Finance New data shows rich nations likely missed 2025 goal to double adaptation finance OECD figures suggest developed countries have not met a target to deliver $40 billion a year to help poorer nations adapt to climate change, as aid cuts bite Read more
• Nov 22, 2025 News COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel transition but triples finance for climate adaptation Instead of a global agreement to create roadmaps to shift away from fossil fuels and end deforestation, Brazil announces voluntary initiatives Read more

UN secretary-general António Guterres said the gap in adaptation finance is not measured in money alone but in the lives, livelihoods and futures that are lost in the process. 

He called on developed countries to deliver “fast, simple, accessible support” to vulnerable countries, adding that development banks must also scale up their financing. “We know who is most at risk. We know what works. What is missing is the money and the political will. The choice is simple – invest in adaptation today or pay for catastrophe tomorrow,” he said.

At COP30 last year, countries agreed to at least triple adaptation finance for developing nations by 2035. Depending on whether that is measured from current flows or from the $40 billion that rich nations were meant to reach in 2025 under an earlier pledge, tripling would deliver $85-120 billion a year. Even if it is achieved, UNEP says, that would cover only 20-29% of developing countries’ needs in 2035.

The report warns the pledge may be less ambitious than it looks. The COP30 decision sets no baseline year, does not adjust for inflation and allows money that developing countries channel through multilateral development banks (MDBs) to count towards the target. Taking all of this into account, developed countries’ own contribution in 2035 could be as low as $45-66 billion a year in 2025 prices.

“The world is not ready to adapt to current climatic conditions, never mind what overshoot of 1.5°C will bring,” said Inger Andersen, UNEP executive director, calling on governments to intensify efforts to increase adaptation finance.

Global South countries step up

While funding from rich nations flatlines, adaptation finance flowing between developing countries is growing, though it is nowhere near enough to close the gap.

What’s on the climate calendar for November 2026?

The UNEP report estimates that developing countries contributed $9.65 billion towards international public adaptation finance in 2024, more than double the $3.81 billion recorded in 2019. That is about a quarter of all international public adaptation finance.

The report does not break the figure down by country. “These are voluntary contributions that capacitated developing countries provide via their shares in the MDBs but also through direct South-South cooperation,” said Henry Neufeldt, the report’s lead author, at a press conference on Wednesday.

Fatima Denton, the report’s co-author, said it is “comforting” to see South-South learning and cooperation because countries with similar ecosystems face similar challenges.

Loss and damage mounting

Without stronger action to cut emissions and adapt, climate-related losses and damages will keep rising, the report says, overwhelming the limited resources of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), whose complex procedures also make support hard to access.

Last month, the fund’s board agreed to set aside $20 million for Nepal’s recovery from the devastating climate-driven flood it suffered in August. It is the first money the fund has allocated since its creation, but Nepali officials called the sum symbolic against estimated recovery costs of $4.8 billion. Nepal must now submit a proposal setting out how it will use the money.

The FRLD has yet to approve any projects from its first funding round, when it received nearly 180 submissions, requiring around $2.8 billion – an amount that dwarfed the around $350 million available to allocate.

Loss and damage fund delays first project approvals as needs dwarf resources

Mattias Söderberg, global climate lead at DanChurchAid, said the risk of loss and damage grows when adaptation falls short, as communities become more exposed to increasingly severe climate impacts.

“When we fail to invest in adaptation today, we risk paying a much higher price tomorrow. And that price is not only measured in dollars. It is measured in lives lost, homes destroyed and futures taken away,” Söderberg added.

A failure to match climate ambition

Ahead of COP31 starting on Monday in Antalya, climate campaigners are calling on rich governments to set out how to close the remaining gap and meet developing countries’ full adaptation needs.

Pooja Dave, adaptation lead at Climate Action Network International, said COP31 must agree a credible plan to deliver at least US$120 billion a year in adaptation finance well before 2035, through new and additional public, grant-based funding that reaches the communities most at risk.

“People have a right to a climate safe world and protection from climate impacts. Adaptation is not charity. It is a legal and moral obligation,” Dave said.

Mohamed Adow, director of Kenya-based climate change think tank Power Shift Africa, said COP31 must establish a clear starting point, milestones and a credible delivery plan, especially on how public finance, in the form of grants not loans, must reach those most at risk

“Communities facing floods and droughts cannot wait until 2035 to find out what this promise means,” he said.

The post COP30 adaptation pledge would meet under a third of poorer nations’ needs, UN warns appeared first on Climate Home News.

By: Morgen Snyder, Director of Policy and Programs

On September 30, 2026, Senators Shelley Moore Capito, Mike Lee, Sheldon Whitehouse, and Martin Heinrich introduced a sweeping permitting reform bill that threatens to undermine the bedrock environmental laws protecting tribes, communities, and ecosystems across the country. The “Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act of 2026” would set the stage for weakened oversight of industry-caused environmental impacts by gutting key provisions of the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, the National Heritage Preservation Act, and the National Environmental Protection Act.

These foundational environmental laws were hard-won and are critical to ensuring the health of our communities and ecosystems. In 1969, the Cuyahoga River in Ohio caught on fire due to the toxins, oils, and waste clogging the waterways. That same year, Santa Barbara’s beaches were stained black from the worst oil spill in U.S. history at the time. Polluters went unchecked, dumping toxins into our rivers and streams. Only one third of all waterways were safe to swim in. Because of this crisis, Congress took action with the creation of the Environmental Protection Act in 1970. Only two years later, seeing the growing threats facing our waterways, the federal legislature came together to override President Nixon’s veto of the Clean Water Act, reaffirming the need to safeguard  waterways, communities, and ecosystems across the country.

Fifty years after the Clean Water Act was established, over 50% of U.S. waterways remain impaired. That means over half of our waterways are not swimmable, fishable, or drinkable due to continued contamination. Yet today, federal legislators threaten to rollback critical protections by loosening environmental permits, and limiting legal challenges and state authority over water and energy projects. The proposed legislation would rollback critical Endangered Species Act protections and significantly limit what challenges can be brought under the National Environmental Policy Act.

Importantly, this bill also jeopardizes Tribal sovereignty, limiting and creating exemptions for review processes central to protecting Tribal cultural sites, introducing federal oversight of Tribal Heritage Preservation Officers that far oversteps, and creating significant limits to judicial review.

Energy and water development cannot come at the expense of environmental safeguards, state and Tribal authority and the health and wellbeing of Californians. Just over 50 years ago, we vowed never to allow another U.S. river to catch fire. There is no reason for Legislators to fold to the whims of this administration. Legislators must reject this proposal and instead ensure any permitting reform goes hand in hand with the protection of our environment and communities.

Find your representative here and urge them to oppose SB 5653.

Scott County in southeastern Missouri faces the same challenges of many of the state’s rural areas — declining populations and labor forces, higher premature death rates, challenges for EMS services and closed hospitals.

But county commissioners made a major shift when they approved the Kelso Solar project, a 430MW farm that will generate $62 million in taxes over 30-year life of the project. The project increased Missouri’s solar generating capacity by 50 percent.

The first phase of the Kelso solar farm opened at the end of the 2025, and the second phase opened last March. While it will take a few months for the new taxes to appear in the county’s books, it is already reaping the benefits.

County officials estimate the project will generate $27 million for local schools. That may help build or renovate facilities in a county district where 75 percent of the buildings were constructed at least 25 years ago, according to the National Center for Education Statistics.

Arevon, the company developing the solar project, has also donated a vehicle to the Scott County Rural Fire Protection District, supported safety upgrades and agricultural education programs for county schools, partnered with a local food bank to help area families, provided equipment for the Kenny Rogers Children’s Center and paid for a water well in Blodgett.

The county has opened a new courthouse, which will enable judges to come and go from their chambers without having to mix with criminal defendants.

Ray Locker is the executive director for Checks & Balances Project, an investigative watchdog blog holding government officials, lobbyists, and corporate management accountable to the public. Funding for C&BP is provided by Renew American Prosperity and individual donors.

You may also want to read:

Missouri near the top in the number of lost farms

Declining populations and labor forces put rural Missouri counties under pressure

Rural Missouri counties face EMS crisis

Share Post Share

The post Solar project helps revive Scott County appeared first on Checks and Balances Project.

26553Audubon is thrilled to welcome Julie Shapiro as Vice President of the Rockies region! Julie brings more than 20 years of experience in natural resource and environmental policy, strategy, and...

Alex Maitland, Nafkote Dabi and Pubudini Wickramaratne work on climate and inequality for Oxfam International.

Few places on Earth have escaped the deadly effects of climate breakdown in 2026. In the early half of the year, devastating floods swept through Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and other West African countries while August flash floods in Nepal, caused by a glacier collapse, affected over 80,000 people.

India endured a prolonged extreme heatwave in May, followed by the weakest monsoon in 20 years. Excess deaths from the European heatwaves are likely to have topped 50,000. And 2026 is on track to be one of the hottest years on record.

The effects of these disasters have not been caused nor felt equally. Disasters discriminate: the less you have, the more you stand to lose. 

While everyday people died in heatwaves, the super-rich built snow rooms in their mansions. As families fled from wildfires, the rich were evacuated by helicopter to five-star hotels. As flash floods wiped out entire villages, luxury properties stood protected by high-end private flood defence systems.

What’s even more galling is that the same people that have done the most to drive climate chaos can pay to insulate themselves from its effects and are now finding new ways to profit from disaster.

Oxfam’s latest report “Disaster Divide” sets out exactly how climate breakdown is deepening inequality and enriching a tiny few.

Unequal emissions

Billionaires and the super-rich are destroying the planet at a wildly disproportionate rate. The richest 0.1% (roughly 8 million people) emit more carbon than the poorest 3.5 billion people, almost half of humanity. 

There is perhaps no starker symbol of wasteful emissions than travel by private jet. Every two seconds, the world’s private jets pump out more carbon than someone in the poorest 50% of the world will emit in an entire year. 

But the climate impacts of the super-rich go far beyond their luxury lifestyles. How they invest their fortunes helps determine which high-carbon infrastructure gets built. 

About 70% of billionaire investments are in “high climate-impact sectors” such as oil, gas or chemicals. The economic damage linked to individual billionaires’ investments can run into billions of dollars. Mexican oligarch Carlos Slim’s investments, for example, caused $3.7 billion of environmental damage in 2024, and French fashion titan Bernard Arnault, owner of Louis Vuitton, was responsible for $1.7 billion in damage, our calculations show.

Emissions of the rich drive climate disasters 

For the first time, Oxfam combines the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI)’s carbon inequality data with climate attribution models to link the emissions of the super-rich to extreme weather events. 

The richest 1% are responsible for 20% of global warming since 1990, 100 times more per person, than someone in the poorest half of humanity.

The data also shows how the rich increase the likelihood of extreme heat occurring: a person from the richest 0.1% has contributed 125 times more than the average person to extreme heat events.

Inequality is what turns extreme weather events into disaster. In more unequal countries, disasters cause higher death tolls, inflict greater damage and affect more people. 

Inequality also determines who can survive, endure and recover. A study of floods in Mumbai, India, found that lower-income households had to spend 15 times more than rich households to repair and replace damaged assets.

Billionaires escape climate consequences

Climate impacts are also deeply unequal along gender lines. A review of 130 studies found that women and girls were more affected than men and boys by climate-related health impacts in 68% of cases. Climate disasters exacerbate pre-existing gender inequality: gender-based violence increases during and after extreme weather events, with two-thirds of studies identifying increases in intimate partner or domestic violence following floods, storms or droughts.

“Coordinated backlash”: Activists say COP30 gender spat reflects wider threat

For millions of people, the consequences of climate chaos go further still: being forced to leave their homes and communities. UN Migration projects that, if the international community fails to act, as many as 1 billion people (around 10% of the world’s population) will have been displaced by 2050. The majority of those displaced will be in the Global South, but rich people are quietly joining their ranks.

Billionaires are buying islands and building fortified compounds and underground bunkers — tech billionaires are increasingly at the forefront of this trend. This is a form of climate apartheid: the super-rich use their wealth and power to escape the consequences of the crises they largely helped create.

Destroying the food system

Climate change is lowering food production and pushing food prices higher. Low-income households are more exposed to high food prices because it makes up the greatest share of their overall spending. People in low- or lower-middle-income countries spend almost three times as much of their income on food as people in high-income countries.

Some of the richest people in the world and their corporations are directly benefiting, exploiting rising food prices and uneven food production to reap large profits.

In 2024, extreme weather damaged West African cocoa harvests, resulting in prices jumping around 230% year-on-year but accruing no gains to cocoa farmers. The same year, heavy rains in Indonesia and droughts in Brazil and Vietnam contributed to a surge in coffee prices, with a 39% increase on the previous year’s average. Coffee-trading corporations, the intermediary traders of the supply chains, made huge profits as a result. 

A farmer walks on his cocoa farm in Gabeadji near San Pedro, Ivory Coast, January 31, 2023. (Photo: Reuters/Ange Aboa) A farmer walks on his cocoa farm in Gabeadji near San Pedro, Ivory Coast, January 31, 2023. (Photo: Reuters/Ange Aboa) Profiting from disaster

Corporations have long made massive amounts of money from wrecking the planet. Now, the wreckage itself is becoming a lucrative market. The global disaster recovery market is forecast to grow from $70 billion to $92 billion a year by 2029, driven in part by increasingly frequent climate-related extreme weather events.

Often, the very same people profiting from fuelling climate breakdown are also cashing in on disaster clean-ups. To investigate this trend, Oxfam created a sample of 217 corporations which profit from business activities that either drive climate disasters, build resilience before they hit, or work on repairing the damage. We coined it the “Destroy and Rebuild” Index.

The corporations in the “Destroy and Rebuild” Index made $1.8 billion on average in 2025, paying out more than $1 billion on average to their shareholders. Ten asset managers have investments in over 90% of these corporations, with BlackRock and Vanguard invested in 92% of the corporations in the index: the pair’s total investments in these companies exceed$1 trillion.

Coalition set sights on taxing luxury air travel to fund climate action

The lengths the super-rich go to exploit disasters doesn’t stop at cynical profiteering. Recovery efforts have also been used to push through the privatisation of public services and deregulation, reshaping communities in ways that benefit private interests rather than the people affected. 

After Hurricane Irma devastated Barbuda in 2017, reconstruction made way for luxury residences and a golf course on land that included natural coastlines and wetlands. This restricted access to the sea for many fisherfolk and local people. In Puerto Rico, Hurricane Maria’s aftermath was used to advance the privatisation of the island’s electrical grid. Since then, the grid has suffered widespread failures, including a blackout in April 2022 that left the entire country without power.

A man stands in a home where the roof was ripped apart, in the aftermath of Hurricane Beryl, in St. Elizabeth Parish, Jamaica, July 5, 2024. REUTERS/Maria Alejandra Cardona A man stands in a home where the roof was ripped apart, in the aftermath of Hurricane Beryl, in St. Elizabeth Parish, Jamaica, July 5, 2024. REUTERS/Maria Alejandra Cardona Make rich polluters pay

Climate breakdown is the result of political choices and an economic system that protects the wealth and power of polluters while leaving others to pay the price. This is neither just nor sustainable. It must change.

Governments meeting at COP31 must commit to curb the excessive emissions of the super-rich through taxes on wealth, income and carbon-intensive luxury consumption, like private jets and mega-yachts. These measures will help generate the public climate finance urgently needed for Global South countries to adapt, recover and rebuild without being pushed deeper into debt. 

Governments must also draw a hard line against disaster capitalism, refusing to let corporations turn human suffering into shareholder value.

The post The great disaster divide: How the super-rich are profiting from global climate suffering  appeared first on Climate Home News.

Arizona Public Service expects peak demand will grow about 3.4% annually over the next 15 years, driven by industry and data centers, the utility said in an integrated resource plan filed Friday with regulators.

With Democrats in control of the House, U.S. RepresentativeJared Huffman of California is in line to chair the House Natural Resources Committee, which oversees virtually all federally managed land. Leading the committee has been his goal since he arrived in Congress in 2013, he told TIME in September.

Huffman has served on the committee throughout his congressional career, including two terms as chair of the Water, Oceans, and Wildlife Subcommittee. As ranking member, he co-introduced the bipartisan Great American Outdoors Act 250 to extend maintenance funding for national parks, and backed a spending bill that rejected the administration’s proposed $1.2 billion cut to the National Park Service.

As chair, Huffman has said the committee would investigate President Donald Trump and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum’s spending on vanity projects, including the White House ballroom and a planned 250-foot triumphal arch. He has also questioned why National Park Service money and staff were being concentrated in Washington D.C. while staff and services were cut across the rest of the park system: “This is real money that is being misprioritized.”

Huffman also plans to seek communications behind a proposed land swap that would give a private developer a parcel of Yosemite National Park for an access road. Responding to reports in September that the administration is considering more data centers on public lands, Huffman said, “These lands belong to the American people.”

Deb Haaland becomes first Native American female governor

Deb Haaland made history in New Mexico on Tuesday night as she was elected the nation’s first Native American female governor. Haaland served as U.S. secretary of the Interior under President Joe Biden, where she developed a track record of championing historic public lands protections and strengthening Tribal co-stewardship.

Quick hits Enviro lawyers say the permitting bill could aid Trump’s DC renovations

POLITICO

Deb Haaland makes history as first US Native American female governor

The Hill | Native News Online | Las Cruces Sun-News | Source New Mexico

A Tribe returns, joyful, to 51 acres in California’s San Gabriel foothills

Los Angeles Times

Colorado losing ground in fight to clean up record number of “orphaned” oil and gas wells

Colorado Sun

Trump cuts have left Tribes without millions of dollars for clean energy

Canary Media

Glacier projects shelved on National Park Service ‘low priority’ list

Flathead Beacon

Feds initiate 15-day review of Colorado’s wolf management authority, following Trump executive order

Aspen Times

Opinion: Is Yellowstone National Park (back) in its wild west era?

Outside

Quote of the day

This work represents more than land conservation. It represents our history, our identity, our connection, our ancestors and our responsibility to the future generations.”

—Rosalinda Ortega, a Tribal citizen of the Fernandeño Tataviam Band of Mission Indians, Los Angeles Times

Picture This @nationalparkservice

It’s leaf-peeping season. The trees have made an effort, so the least we can do is go outside and stare at them.

Leaf peeping is the ancient human tradition of traveling long distances to look at leaves, take photographs, and stand in the middle of roads while saying, “Oh, wow, look at that one.”

Nobody knows exactly when this became a major event, but the trees seem okay with the arrangement. So get out there and see what all the rustle is about.

NPS photos

 

(Featured image: U.S. Representative Jared Huffman in a September post on X.)

The post Jared Huffman poised to chair House Natural Resources committee appeared first on Center for Western Priorities.

New study: Neonic pesticides found in semen and urine, linked to lower sperm concentration Anthony Lacey November 4, 2026

• A study of 179 men at a fertility clinic tested urine and semen for neonicotinoids, or neonics, and linked higher neonic exposure in semen to lower sperm concentration.
• Eleven neonics or their breakdown products were found in more than 75% of urine samples, and four were found in more than 75% of semen samples.
• A proposed settlement would give the Environmental Protection Agency until April 30, 2027, to decide on revoking legal limits for residues of five neonics on food.

Neonicotinoid insecticides, notorious for their role in the collapse of bee populations, are turning up in human semen and may be linked to lower sperm count, a new peer-reviewed study finds.

Researchers found these pesticides, also known as neonics, and their breakdown products – the compounds the chemicals become in the body – in nearly every study participant. 

In urine, 11 neonics or their breakdown products were found in more than 75% of samples, and acetamiprid, one of the most widely used neonics, was found in every one. In semen, four were found in more than 75% of samples, and one, a breakdown product of the neonic dinotefuran, was detected in more than 99%. 

It’s just one study of 179 men in China, and the findings are preliminary. The men were partners in couples seeking fertility treatment and they provided samples once. A stronger study would include a comparison group from the general population. But the finding of an association between neonic exposure and semen quality adds to a growing set of studies showing wide human exposure to neonics. 

Beyond this study, concerns have also emerged about how that exposure may harm human reproduction and development.

Delay on deciding neonics petition

The prevalence of neonics in humans, combined with the building case for potential health concerns linked to exposure, comes as the Environmental Protection Agency may face a legal deadline for deciding whether to keep allowing five neonics’ residue on food.

In August 2026, the EPA agreed to a proposed settlement with the Natural Resources Defense Council that would set a binding April 30, 2027, deadline to respond to the group’s neonics petition. 

That petition asked the agency to revoke tolerances – the maximum allowable amount of a pesticide on food – for five neonics: acetamiprid, clothianidin, dinotefuran, imidacloprid and thiamethoxam. 

The study’s findings point to issues the NRDC flagged in its petition: The EPA ignored evidence that harm may occur at low exposure levels, the compounds neonics become can be more toxic than the original chemicals, and people are exposed to several neonics at once.

What did the new study find?

Published in the journal Frontiers in Endocrinology in September 2026, the study was led by researchers at a Chinese fertility clinic and a medical university.

The authors collected urine from 179 men and semen from 173, with 146 men providing both. After testing for 18 neonics and their breakdown products, the researchers detected at least one neonic in almost every sample, though how often each compound turned up varied by neonic and sample type.

Some compounds were found at higher levels in semen than in urine. And levels in urine were a poor predictor of levels in semen, suggesting urine tests alone may miss what’s in semen.

Most previous pesticide exposure studies rely on testing urine. The study’s authors suggest semen may be “a potentially informative matrix for reproductive risk assessment” – meaning it could give a clearer picture of how neonic exposure affects reproductive health.

Two breakdown products in semen were linked to lower sperm concentration, a key measure of sperm quality and male fertility. Looking at the combined effect of all the neonics in semen, higher overall exposure was also associated with lower sperm concentration but not to lower total sperm count, movement or shape. 

Why are neonics a concern?

Some human health studies suggest exposure to neonics may harm children and the developing fetus. Biomonitoring studies show that exposure is widespread in children and pregnant people around the world. 

In federal biomonitoring from 2015-2016, a neonic breakdown product was detected in the urine of half of kids ages 3 to 5, and their diet may be a primary route of exposure. 

The EPA continues to allow the use of these insecticides. But some states are taking action to limit their use, in an effort to protect pollinators. 

California’s Department of Pesticide Regulation moved to limit outdoor uses of imidacloprid, clothianidin, dinotefuran and thiamethoxam on most food and feed crops that are attractive to bees and other pollinators. Several other states, including Maine and New Jersey, regulate the use of neonics. 

But the U.S. has lagged far behind these states in taking action on neonics, even though bee colony collapse has caused severe economic losses for American beekeepers. 

It has also harmed others who rely on bees and other pollinators. For instance, they’re essential for U.S. farmers who grow squash, melon, cantaloupe, apples, almonds and many other crops that need pollination to bear fruit. 

Other studies show the extensive use of neonics may not be necessary. 

Research published in the journal PNAS in 2021 found that on farms growing corn and watermelon together, integrated pest management – treatment of crops only when pests reach damaging levels – cut insecticide use by 95% while maintaining corn yields and increasing watermelon yields.

EWG and more than 120,000 of our supporters have written to the EPA urging it to ban all unnecessary uses of neonic insecticides in the U.S. 

How can I reduce my exposure to neonics?

Because neonics are absorbed into plants, washing produce can’t get rid of their residue on produce entirely. But EWG still recommends washing your produce to potentially reduce the amount of pesticide residue on it.

Other steps you can take to reduce your exposure to these chemicals:

• Check EWG’s Shopper’s Guide to Pesticides in Produce™. The guide identifies the Dirty Dozen™ list of non-organic fruit and vegetables with the most pesticide residues. Neonics can be found on some U.S. produce, including blackberries. 
• Choose organic when you can, especially for the produce on the Dirty Dozen. Synthetic neonics aren’t permitted in organic farming. 
• Keep eating fruits and vegetables. The health benefits of a diet rich in produce outweigh the risks of pesticide exposure. If organic isn’t available or affordable, non-organic produce is still far better than none. 
• Skip neonics at home. Many lawn, garden and pet flea products contain imidacloprid and other neonics. Check labels before you buy, and skip products with neonics. 

Areas of Focus Farming & Agriculture Pesticides Authors Anthony Lacey November 5, 2026