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Harris’s Hawks: A Pack with Wings
Shell’s 2030 Carbon-Storage Deadline: An Independent Investigation into Europe’s New Legal Battle and the Missing Years in Shell’s Own Plans
AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION
By the Donovan–Shell Archive
12 November 2026
Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT.
As ExxonMobil challenges European legislation requiring oil and gas producers to develop carbon-storage capacity, official European Commission documents reveal that Shell Italia faces a 1.55-million-tonne annual obligation and the Shell–ExxonMobil-owned NAM faces a further 6.35 million tonnes. Their latest published reports identify several offshore storage projects whose anticipated operating periods begin after the 2030 deadline. The discrepancy raises important questions about commercial readiness, regulatory compliance and the future of Europe’s carbon-capture industry.
A legal challenge that reaches into Shell’s European businessA new confrontation has emerged between one of the world’s largest oil companies and the European Union.
On 11 November 2026, Reuters reported that ExxonMobil had initiated confidential arbitration proceedings challenging provisions of the EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act.
The Financial Times, citing a European Commission memorandum, reported that ExxonMobil was seeking interim relief from requirements obliging major oil and gas producers to contribute to the development of carbon dioxide storage capacity by 2030.
ExxonMobil argues that the legislation imposes unrealistic obligations on an industry that does not yet have a sufficiently developed market for carbon capture and transportation.
According to Reuters, the company contends that the requirements could increase costs for European energy consumers.
The European Commission was reported to be preparing a response.
The underlying arbitration documents have not been made available for independent examination in this investigation. The procedural details are therefore attributed to the Financial Times and Reuters rather than presented as independently verified court records.
There is no evidence in the material examined that Shell plc has itself initiated these arbitration proceedings.
Nevertheless, the dispute has direct relevance to Shell.
Shell and ExxonMobil jointly own the Dutch petroleum company NAM, one of the entities bearing the largest individual obligations under the contested European legislation.
Another Shell-related company, Shell Italia E&P, has a separate statutory contribution.
What makes this development particularly newsworthy is that the European Commission has already published detailed progress reports from both businesses.
Those reports reveal not merely their obligations, but also the practical difficulties involved in satisfying them.
Sources: Financial Times — ExxonMobil launches legal challenge to EU carbon capture rules; Reuters — Exxon files legal challenge to EU carbon capture law, 11 November 2026.
Europe’s ambitious 50-million-tonne targetThe EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1735, seeks to establish at least 50 million tonnes of annual carbon dioxide injection capacity by 2030.
The objective is to make geological storage available to industries that face particular difficulties eliminating carbon emissions through electrification or changes in manufacturing processes.
Cement, chemicals, waste processing and other industrial activities are among those for which carbon capture and storage may provide a means of reducing emissions.
The legislation places particular responsibilities on established oil and gas producers.
The rationale is that companies with experience drilling wells, managing underground reservoirs and operating offshore infrastructure possess expertise relevant to developing geological carbon-storage facilities.
The Commission subsequently identified 44 obligated oil and gas entities.
Their individual contributions were calculated principally by reference to their shares of EU oil and gas production during 2020–2023.
An important distinction must be made.
The obligation concerns the provision of qualifying annual injection capacity, not proof that the same quantity of carbon dioxide has already been captured and permanently stored.
A completed storage facility may have substantial available capacity before industrial customers begin using it at full volume.
Equally, announcing a geological storage resource or proposing a project does not establish that operational injection capacity is ready.
The necessary facilities, permits, wells, transport arrangements and commercial conditions are separate parts of the process.
Primary sources: Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 — Net-Zero Industry Act; European Commission — The EU’s 2030 carbon storage target.
The first documentary finding: NAM’s 6.35-million-tonne obligationThe European Commission’s formal allocation decision, adopted on 22 May 2025, places Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B.V. first on its list of obligated producers.
The company’s assigned contribution is 6.35 million tonnes of annual CO₂ injection capacity by 2030.
This is the largest individual allocation among the 44 entities listed.
NAM is no ordinary unrelated Dutch petroleum company.
Shell’s published annual reporting identifies it as a joint venture owned equally by Shell and ExxonMobil.
NAM’s own 2026 regulatory report identifies its parent companies as Shell Nederland B.V. and ExxonMobil Holding Company Holland LLC.
It is essential, however, to distinguish NAM’s legal responsibility from the respective interests of its shareholders.
The EU decision assigns the 6.35-million-tonne obligation to NAM.
It does not allocate that entire amount to Shell plc, nor does it state that Shell alone is responsible for delivering it.
The shareholders’ respective financial contributions, contractual obligations and practical responsibilities cannot be established simply from their equal ownership percentages.
Nevertheless, Shell has a substantial corporate interest in the entity facing the largest individual requirement.
This makes NAM’s progress towards compliance directly relevant to Shell’s European carbon-management strategy.
Primary documents: Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1479 — Individual producer obligations; NAM — 2026 annual progress report submitted to the European Commission; Shell — 2024 Annual Report, Netherlands joint-venture disclosures.
The second documentary finding: Shell Italia’s separate obligationThe same Commission decision assigns Shell Italia E&P an obligation of 1.55 million tonnes of annual CO₂ injection capacity by 2030.
Shell Italia E&P identifies Shell Overseas Investments B.V. as its parent company.
Its position is particularly revealing because its public progress report, dated 30 June 2026, acknowledges substantial practical limitations.
The company reports that although it holds upstream petroleum licences, it does not operate assets domestically and does not possess the organisational resources or project-delivery capabilities needed to develop carbon-capture and storage projects independently.
Consequently, its proposed route to compliance depends on arrangements with other obligated entities or third-party storage developers.
The company explains that it cannot itself control the development schedules or financial viability of the projects upon which it would rely.
It also acknowledges that obtaining the necessary commercial agreements depends on counterparties’ willingness to participate, project maturity and market conditions.
This is an unusually candid statement of the limitations confronting an obligated corporate entity.
The issue is not that Shell as a multinational group lacks experience in carbon capture and storage.
Shell participates in major CCS projects internationally.
The narrower and more significant point is that Shell Italia E&P, the specific legal entity assigned the obligation, states that it cannot independently deliver the necessary projects and must depend upon a wider network of developers and commercial arrangements.
That distinction is central to understanding how the legislation operates.
It assigns obligations to identifiable companies, while allowing those companies to pursue compliance through partnerships and contractual arrangements.
The existence of a legal obligation does not automatically create a commercially viable project capable of satisfying it.
Primary document: Shell Italia E&P — 2026 regulatory progress report, pages 5–6.
European Commission
The most striking disclosure: the years 2031, 2034 and 2035
The most consequential finding of this investigation appears in the publicly available project schedules.
Shell Italia identifies three offshore Dutch carbon-storage developments relevant to its proposed compliance arrangements:
K14-FA/FC, L09-FF and K15-FB.
The first is associated with an offshore storage project for which a permit has been granted.
The other two were reported at the feasibility and site-characterisation stage.
In Table 8 of Shell Italia’s 2026 progress report, the company gives anticipated start years for the capacity associated with these projects.
For K14, the year is 2031.
For L09, it is 2034.
For K15, it is 2035.
The corresponding NAM progress report identifies the same anticipated start years for the same three offshore developments.
That is the central documentary discrepancy.
The European legislation requires qualifying operational injection capacity by 2030.
Yet the public reporting by these Shell-linked entities includes project schedules whose anticipated capacity periods begin one, four and five years later.
This does not establish that either company will breach the law.
Both entities may be able to secure alternative capacity, change delivery arrangements, accelerate projects or satisfy the requirements through legally recognised agreements.
Furthermore, the reports contain references to capacity potentially contributing by 2030, subject to eligibility criteria. Those entries must be read alongside the later operating-period estimates rather than ignored.
Nevertheless, the documents leave an important unresolved question.
What specific qualifying injection capacity will actually be available to meet the 2030 obligations if the publicly identified storage projects are not expected to begin their reported capacity periods until 2031 or later?
That is a matter which Shell, NAM and the European Commission could clarify.
It is not answered simply by pointing to the eventual geological capacity of the North Sea reservoirs.
A reservoir’s capacity over several decades is different from its operational annual injection capability by a particular statutory deadline.
Primary documents: Shell Italia E&P — 2026 progress report, Table 8, page 9; NAM — 2026 progress report, Table 8, page 10.
European Commission+1
The same projects appear in both companies’ plans
A further point deserves examination.
Shell Italia and NAM both refer to the K14, L09 and K15 offshore storage developments.
This is not inherently improper.
The Net-Zero Industry Act permits obligated companies to work together and to establish agreements with storage developers or other obligated entities.
Indeed, cooperation is likely to be essential if Europe is to create a functioning carbon-storage industry within the required period.
However, shared reliance on the same projects creates a legitimate requirement for clear allocation of capacity.
If a storage development has a specified annual injection capacity, its total capability cannot be assumed to multiply merely because several companies identify it in their compliance plans.
The Shell Italia report includes figures for the estimated capacity of agreements that explicitly take account of the contributions of all counterparties.
Those figures should not be misrepresented as capacity reserved exclusively for Shell Italia.
NAM’s report similarly refers to arrangements involving the same developments, while directing readers to additional supporting information for some commercial details.
The publicly examined material does not establish the precise contractual allocation of capacity between all participating entities.
Nor does it establish that any capacity has been improperly counted twice.
The appropriate investigative question is whether sufficiently clear arrangements exist to ensure that the combined obligations of participating companies can be met without relying upon overlapping claims to the same capacity.
That is an issue for documentary clarification, not an allegation of misconduct.
Shell has made genuine progress on the Dutch offshore projectsIt would be misleading to examine the later start dates without recognising progress already achieved.
Shell announced in June 2026 that the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate had granted a storage permit for the K14-FA and K14-FC depleted gas fields beneath the North Sea.
According to Shell, the public consultation period produced no objections, meaning the permit decision became final.
The company identified EBN, Rockrose and ONE-Dyas as partners involved in advancing the project.
Shell described the permit as an important step towards a final investment decision expected in 2027.
That is tangible regulatory progress, and it represents more than an announcement of geological potential.
A storage permit can require detailed technical and environmental scrutiny, including consideration of reservoir characteristics, well integrity, monitoring and risk management.
Nevertheless, an approved storage permit is not identical to a completed injection facility.
Investment approval, construction, commissioning, connection to transport infrastructure and the establishment of commercial operations remain separate stages.
Shell has also reported progress on L09, including publication of documents associated with the environmental impact assessment process in April 2026.
This development is at an earlier stage.
These differing levels of maturity help explain why the eventual delivery schedules are so important.
Primary source: Shell — Offshore Carbon Storage Netherlands: News and Updates.
Shell Global
The Aramis complication: a pipeline is not a storage reservoir
Much of the proposed offshore capacity depends upon the wider Aramis carbon-capture and storage network in the Netherlands.
Aramis is intended to transport captured industrial carbon dioxide to offshore storage facilities beneath the North Sea.
The infrastructure could play an important role in enabling difficult-to-decarbonise industries to access geological storage.
But an industrial carbon-storage system requires more than a suitable reservoir.
There must be capture facilities at industrial sites, arrangements for transporting the carbon dioxide, suitable pipelines or shipping infrastructure, compression facilities, receiving installations and permitted injection wells.
An operational storage reservoir without an effective transportation system may have limited commercial use.
Similarly, a functioning pipeline cannot deliver permanent storage unless suitable injection facilities are available at the other end.
In April 2025, the Aramis participants announced a restructuring of the project.
The Dutch public-sector entities Gasunie and EBN would assume the principal role in developing and ultimately owning the pipeline infrastructure.
Shell and TotalEnergies would continue contributing expertise during development and focus principally on offshore storage facilities and associated services.
This was not an abandonment of carbon capture and storage by Shell.
It was a redistribution of responsibilities within the wider project.
The distinction matters because it introduces another participant into the timetable for delivering a complete operational system.
On 3 September 2026, Aramis announced that the parties in its value chain were planning a final investment decision in 2027, with the objective of becoming operational in 2030.
It also acknowledged that appeals concerning project permits remained pending.
The 2030 infrastructure ambition is therefore not necessarily identical to the anticipated operating years of the individual storage projects listed in Shell Italia’s and NAM’s submissions.
Those schedules may eventually be reconciled through project revisions, different facilities or revised agreements.
For now, however, their relationship is not fully explained in the public documents examined.
Sources: TotalEnergies — Aramis restructuring announcement, 25 April 2025; Aramis — Progress towards final investment decision, 3 September 2026.
The public sector’s increasing roleThe Aramis restructuring also raises questions about the division of financial responsibilities.
The legislation places carbon-storage contribution obligations upon certain oil and gas producers.
Yet the transport infrastructure needed to make storage commercially accessible is being developed principally under the leadership of Dutch public-sector organisations.
That arrangement may be entirely justified.
Pipelines serving multiple industrial customers can resemble other forms of shared infrastructure in which public participation provides advantages unavailable to individual commercial operators.
Public involvement may improve coordination, support open access and reduce the risk of several competing companies building inefficient parallel networks.
There is nevertheless a legitimate public-interest question about the allocation of costs and risks.
Who ultimately finances the shared infrastructure?
Who bears losses if industrial demand for carbon storage develops more slowly than expected?
What commercial payments will storage developers and industrial users make?
And how will the obligations imposed upon hydrocarbon producers interact with infrastructure supported by public capital?
The available evidence does not establish that Shell or ExxonMobil has transferred an unlawful financial burden to taxpayers.
It establishes that the delivery arrangements include a substantial public-sector component.
That feature deserves transparency because the benefits and costs of developing an entirely new industrial system will extend beyond the companies named in the EU legislation.
The European Commission has already acknowledged insufficient progressThe uncertainty is not confined to Shell.
The European Commission’s own 2026 climate-action progress report contains a significant assessment of the wider carbon-storage programme.
It states that the projected contributions contained in the plans submitted by the 44 obligated producers in 2025 did not yet demonstrate sufficient progress towards the required 2030 injection-capacity objective.
That conclusion concerns the earlier plans.
It should not be presented as a final regulatory assessment of the subsequent June 2026 progress reports, or as a finding that Shell or NAM is non-compliant.
Nevertheless, it provides important context.
Europe’s carbon-storage target depends upon a coordinated industrial and regulatory programme involving multiple companies, governments and infrastructure providers.
Even where geological storage potential is available, development may be delayed by permitting, financing, technical feasibility or the absence of commercially committed customers.
The Commission itself recognises that this is a developing industry.
The legislation is intended partly to help create the market that does not yet exist at the desired scale.
This is precisely where the disagreement with ExxonMobil becomes significant.
ExxonMobil’s reported argument is that the law compels companies to deliver capacity before the necessary commercial conditions are in place.
The Commission’s position is that imposing obligations on companies possessing relevant expertise is part of the mechanism for establishing that infrastructure and market.
Both arguments involve genuine economic and practical considerations.
Neither proves the ultimate outcome of the arbitration proceedings.
Primary source: European Commission — 2026 Climate Action Progress Report, Chapter 6: Industrial Carbon Management.
Climate Action
Does the ExxonMobil legal challenge affect Shell?
This is the critical legal distinction.
ExxonMobil and Shell are separate corporations.
The fact that they jointly own NAM does not mean that Shell has joined an arbitration initiated by ExxonMobil.
Nor does the existence of joint ownership automatically make Shell a party to proceedings brought by another shareholder.
The publicly available reporting examined here does not establish the precise relationship, if any, between the arbitration claims and the separate obligations assigned to NAM or Shell Italia.
It would therefore be premature to conclude that the proceedings will suspend, reduce or invalidate either company’s obligations.
Likewise, the fact that ExxonMobil has challenged the legislation does not establish that its legal arguments will succeed.
The arbitration has been reported, but no substantive tribunal ruling has been verified in the material examined.
What can reasonably be concluded is narrower but still significant.
A major shareholder in NAM is now publicly challenging European rules under which NAM itself faces a substantial obligation.
At the same time, NAM and Shell Italia have disclosed practical uncertainties regarding the projects upon which their compliance strategies depend.
Those facts create a significant corporate and regulatory issue for Shell’s European operations.
Carbon storage and climate responsibility are not interchangeableCarbon capture and storage can reduce emissions from suitable industrial processes if carbon dioxide is captured, transported and permanently stored under effective safeguards.
But the environmental benefit depends on what is actually accomplished.
The construction of future injection capacity is not the same as eliminating existing emissions.
Nor does a project’s projected geological storage volume establish how much carbon dioxide will ultimately be captured from industrial facilities.
The distinction becomes particularly important when considering claims about future emissions reductions.
A company may make genuine progress in permitting and developing storage facilities without those facilities yet delivering measurable atmospheric benefits.
It may also possess commercial storage capacity that customers use gradually.
Conversely, the absence of immediate full utilisation does not necessarily mean the investment has failed.
The relevant measurements differ.
There is geological storage volume, measured in total tonnes.
There is annual injection capacity, measured in tonnes per year.
And there is actual carbon dioxide captured and permanently injected, measured from operating activities.
Responsible reporting must not treat those figures as interchangeable.
For the same reason, the two Shell-linked entities’ combined allocated obligations should not be presented as Shell plc’s own individual legal obligation.
NAM’s 6.35 million tonnes and Shell Italia’s 1.55 million tonnes are assigned to separate legal entities with different ownership structures.
The appropriate analysis concerns their respective responsibilities and the identifiable Shell interests connected with them.
The questions that now require answersThere are several matters on which further corporate and regulatory clarification would materially improve the public record.
First, what capacity does Shell Italia E&P expect to have contractually secured and eligible under the Net-Zero Industry Act by the end of 2030?
Second, how does NAM intend to satisfy its 6.35-million-tonne annual contribution given that its publicly reported storage-project capacity periods begin in 2031, 2034 and 2035?
Third, how will the available capacity of K14, L09 and K15 be allocated among the multiple companies identifying those projects in their regulatory submissions?
Fourth, how do the Aramis system’s stated 2030 operating ambitions relate to the later start years reported for the associated storage facilities?
Fifth, has the European Commission accepted or sought clarification of the relevant companies’ proposed compliance pathways?
Finally, what would be the legal and commercial consequences for the Shell-linked obligations if ExxonMobil obtains interim relief or ultimately succeeds in its challenge?
These are questions arising from the documentary record.
They are not allegations that Shell, NAM or their partners have deliberately misled regulators.
Answers from the relevant parties would help distinguish ordinary project-development uncertainty from a more substantial risk to the 2030 timetable.
DOCUMENTARY FINDINGSEstablished facts
The EU Net-Zero Industry Act establishes a target of at least 50 million tonnes of annual operational CO₂ injection capacity by 2030.
The European Commission allocated 6.35 million tonnes per year to NAM and 1.55 million tonnes per year to Shell Italia E&P.
Shell and ExxonMobil each own 50% of NAM.
The June 2026 public progress reports from both entities identify K14, L09 and K15 as relevant offshore carbon-storage projects.
Both reports give anticipated start years of 2031, 2034 and 2035 for capacity associated with those projects.
Shell has obtained an offshore storage permit for K14-FA/FC and is advancing other developments through earlier planning and assessment stages.
The Aramis project is targeting an investment decision in 2027 and operation in 2030, subject to further development and regulatory considerations.
Reported development requiring careful attribution
ExxonMobil has reportedly commenced confidential arbitration proceedings challenging provisions of the Net-Zero Industry Act.
The Financial Times reported the proceedings, and Reuters reported the company’s public criticism of the legislation.
The underlying arbitration papers were not independently examined.
No court or arbitral decision suspending Shell Italia’s or NAM’s obligations has been verified.
Matters not established
The documents examined do not establish that Shell Italia or NAM has committed a breach of the Net-Zero Industry Act.
They do not demonstrate that carbon-storage capacity has been improperly counted more than once.
They do not establish that any company made false representations concerning its progress.
They do not show that Shell plc has joined ExxonMobil’s legal challenge.
They do not determine the ultimate commercial viability of the projects or the likely outcome of the arbitration.
Editorial analysis
The published project timetables reveal a genuine issue requiring clarification.
The relevant corporate entities have statutory contribution obligations for 2030, while their own reporting identifies material storage capacity associated with periods beginning after that year.
This does not prove that the obligations are impossible to meet.
It does demonstrate that successful delivery depends on project development, contractual arrangements and potentially further measures not fully established by the public records examined.
CONCLUSION: THE DIFFICULT YEARS BETWEEN A LEGAL TARGET AND AN OPERATING PROJECTThe new dispute between ExxonMobil and the European Union is significant in its own right.
But the Shell-related documentary evidence deserves separate attention.
The European Commission has assigned substantial carbon-storage obligations to two entities in which Shell has a corporate interest.
One is Shell Italia E&P.
The other is NAM, jointly owned with ExxonMobil.
Both have submitted public progress reports identifying offshore Dutch storage projects.
Both report anticipated project-capacity periods beginning after the statutory 2030 deadline.
Meanwhile, Shell is making identifiable progress on permitting and project development, and the wider Aramis infrastructure programme continues under substantial Dutch public-sector leadership.
These developments demonstrate neither the collapse of European carbon-storage policy nor the certainty of its success.
They expose the practical challenge at the heart of the legislation.
Europe has established a legal requirement for operational carbon-storage capacity by 2030. The companies and infrastructure providers must now turn that requirement into functioning industrial facilities, commercially viable arrangements and capacity that satisfies the applicable legal conditions.
The newly reported arbitration proceedings may influence that process.
But the central question exists independently of the litigation.
Can the responsible companies deliver qualifying capacity by the deadline, and can the public obtain a sufficiently clear explanation of how it will be achieved?
For Shell, ExxonMobil, NAM and European regulators, that is a question which cannot be answered by ambition alone.
It requires evidence.
PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES1. Financial Times — ExxonMobil launches legal challenge to EU carbon capture rules, November 2026. Initial reporting of the confidential arbitration, subscription access may be required.
2. Reuters — Exxon files legal challenge to EU carbon capture law, 11 November 2026. Contemporaneous reporting including ExxonMobil’s explanation of its position.
3. Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1479. Official individual injection-capacity allocations.
4. European Commission — Shell Italia E&P 2026 Progress Report. Primary corporate submission dated 30 June 2026, including project-development limitations and anticipated capacity dates.
5. European Commission — NAM 2026 Progress Report. Primary corporate submission dated 30 June 2026, including ownership information, the 6.35-million-tonne obligation and project schedules.
6. Shell — Offshore Carbon Storage Netherlands: News and Updates. Shell’s account of permitting and development progress.
7. Aramis — September 2026 Project Update. Primary announcement of the anticipated investment and operational timetable.
8. European Commission — 2026 Climate Action Progress Report, Industrial Carbon Management. Assessment of the wider EU carbon-storage programme and challenges.
DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMERThis investigation is based on European Union legislation, European Commission publications, corporate regulatory submissions dated 30 June 2026, corporate project announcements and attributed contemporary news reporting available as of 12 November 2026.
The reported ExxonMobil arbitration proceedings have not been independently verified against publicly available initiating documents. No finding is made concerning the validity or likely outcome of those claims.
The obligations assigned to Shell Italia E&P and Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B.V. are obligations of those named entities. NAM is jointly owned by Shell and ExxonMobil. The legal and commercial responsibilities of shareholders must not be conflated with the statutory obligations of the joint venture.
Statements about future capacity, operational start dates, investment decisions, permitting and project viability are distinguished from established completed activities.
Differences between statutory deadlines and reported project-development timetables are identified as matters requiring clarification, not proof of non-compliance, wrongdoing or intentional misrepresentation.
This article does not allege that Shell plc, ExxonMobil, NAM, Shell Italia E&P or any project partner has breached the law.
The Donovan–Shell Archive is independent of Shell plc and its subsidiaries. Shell, ExxonMobil, NAM, the European Commission and other interested parties are invited to provide factual corrections, clarifications or additional documentary evidence. Substantiated information will be considered and incorporated fairly.
Publication assessment: This investigation meets our documentary standard. It is founded principally on official European Commission records and corporate submissions rather than the paywalled ExxonMobil report. Its strongest finding is the independently verifiable difference between the 2030 regulatory obligation and the 2031–2035 anticipated project-capacity periods disclosed by both Shell Italia and NAM.
Shell’s 2030 Carbon-Storage Deadline: An Independent Investigation into Europe’s New Legal Battle and the Missing Years in Shell’s Own Plans was first posted on November 12, 2026 at 9:48 pm.
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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 12 NOVEMBER 2026
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 12 NOVEMBER 2026
Archive reference: SLF-2007-116
The Sakhalin Papers CVI: The Procurement Audit Trail — Who Checked Shell’s 70 Percent Russian-Content Promise? In October 2006, Russia’s Accounts Chamber publicly challenged Sakhalin II’s financial arrangements and reported that Russian companies had received only 39% of the value of contract work. The project’s operator subsequently published much higher Russian-participation figures — but measured labour, materials and contract expenditure differently. An examination of the original audit controversy, Sakhalin Energy’s procurement controls and a revealing disclaimer in its independently reviewed 2016 sustainability report exposes a fundamental question: who actually verified whether the project’s lifetime Russian-content commitments were fulfilled?AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION
By the Donovan–Shell Archive
Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, using contemporaneous Russian Accounts Chamber reporting, original Sakhalin Energy disclosures, published Russian legislation, authenticated corporate sustainability reports, procurement documentation and historical material preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.
Publication date: 12 November 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-115 — The 70 Percent Question: Shell, Russian Suppliers and the Local-Content Promise Behind Sakhalin II
INTRODUCTION: AN AUDIT IS NOT ALWAYS WHAT IT SEEMSOn 6 October 2006, Russia’s Accounts Chamber publicly challenged the economic arrangements governing Sakhalin II.
The project was already embroiled in an escalating confrontation between its foreign shareholders and the Russian authorities.
Shell controlled the operating company, Sakhalin Energy, with a 55% interest.
Mitsui held 25%.
Mitsubishi held 20%.
Construction expenditure had increased dramatically.
Russian officials were challenging the financial consequences of the production-sharing agreement.
Environmental regulators were investigating the project.
And Gazprom was seeking a greater role.
But among the issues raised by Russia’s state auditors was a question that has received less attention than the eventual transfer of majority control to Gazprom.
How much of Sakhalin II’s enormous procurement expenditure was going to Russian companies?
A report published by Russian newspaper Kommersant on 7 October 2006 attributed a striking figure to the Accounts Chamber.
According to the newspaper, auditor Mikhail Beskhmelnitsyn expressed dissatisfaction that Russian companies had received only 39% of the value of contract work.
The figure was important because the original Sakhalin II production-sharing arrangements included a commitment to maximise Russian participation and achieve a reported 70% Russian-content level over the project’s lifetime.
But there was a complication.
The 39% figure concerned monetary value.
The operator’s later Russian-content statistics frequently used different measures.
They included working hours and the physical weight of materials and equipment.
By October 2007, Sakhalin Energy was reporting that Russian companies accounted for approximately 80% of cumulative labour hours and 91% of the quantity of materials used.
By 2016, the company was reporting Russian-content figures of 86% for labour and 94% for materials and equipment.
Its 2024 report identified even higher annual percentages.
Which figures were correct?
The available evidence does not establish that the statistics were necessarily contradictory.
They measured different things.
That distinction is at the centre of this investigation.
But a more revealing discovery emerges from the company’s own reporting.
The Sakhalin Energy Sustainability Report for 2016 contained a certificate of public assurance from the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.
At first glance, such a certificate might appear to provide independent verification.
Yet the accompanying opinion expressly stated that the authenticity of the factual data was outside the scope of the public endorsement process.
This was not an accusation against Sakhalin Energy.
It was a limitation openly acknowledged by the reviewing organisation.
And it exposes a distinction that matters far beyond Sakhalin.
A corporate report can undergo independent review without its underlying numerical claims being independently verified.
For Sakhalin II, that distinction affects the interpretation of a commitment extending across decades.
The project generated extraordinary quantities of procurement activity.
It employed thousands of Russian workers.
It awarded contracts worth tens of billions of dollars to Russian companies.
These achievements are documented.
But the central accountability question remains.
Who checked the underlying calculations against the original contract?
What did those checks establish?
And is a complete independently verified lifetime calculation publicly available?
The surviving record provides part of the answer.
It also reveals where the documentary evidence ends.
PART ONE: THE WARNING FROM 2001 1. Shell acknowledges the procurement difficultyThe immediate historical background was examined in yesterday’s instalment.
On 15 June 2001, Vedomosti published an interview with Rein Tambuzer, a senior Shell executive and co-chairman of the Sakhalin Energy Supervisory Board.
The interview took place as the project’s second development phase was being prepared.
The proposed investment included offshore facilities, pipelines and Russia’s first major LNG plant.
The estimated second-phase cost was approximately $8 billion at that time.
The interviewer questioned Tambuzer about concerns attributed to Russia’s Accounts Chamber.
These involved project expenditure and the use of foreign equipment suppliers.
Tambuzer responded that the production-sharing agreement contained a 70% Russian-supplier requirement extending across the project cycle.
He acknowledged that the technically complex LNG plant presented difficulties for domestic procurement.
But he expected participation by Russian contractors in pipeline construction and later operations to improve the overall result.
His explanation reflected an important distinction.
A company undertaking a long-term development might fail to achieve a particular percentage during one construction phase while still expecting to satisfy a lifetime commitment.
Whether that expectation was legally justified depended upon the original contractual terms.
The statement is significant because it came from senior Shell management.
It demonstrated that the local-content issue was known and discussed before the major confrontation with the Russian authorities in 2006.
But the interview did not provide the complete formula used to calculate compliance.
It did not identify every category included in the numerator or denominator.
And it did not provide an independently audited cumulative result.
The 2001 record therefore establishes awareness of the issue.
It does not settle the eventual compliance question.
Contemporaneous source: Vedomosti — Interview with Rein Tambuzer, 15 June 2001.
Ведомости
PART TWO: THE ACCOUNTS CHAMBER INTERVENES 2. October 2006: The 39% finding enters the public record
The Accounts Chamber controversy intensified in October 2006.
On 7 October, Kommersant published an investigation under the headline Sergei Stepashin Calculates Sakhalin II.
The report concerned the findings of Russia’s state auditors.
According to the newspaper, the Accounts Chamber had examined the financial terms under which Sakhalin II was being implemented.
Its criticism extended beyond contractor participation.
The auditors were concerned about the project’s escalating costs and the economic returns available to Russia.
The report attributed comments to auditor Mikhail Beskhmelnitsyn.
He criticised the growth of expenditure associated with the project.
He also questioned the original contractual framework.
One particularly important statement concerned Russian contractors.
According to Kommersant, the Accounts Chamber calculated that Russian companies had received only 39% of the value of contract work.
This is the most important contemporary monetary figure examined in the present investigation.
But its meaning must be carefully defined.
The figure was reported by Kommersant as an Accounts Chamber finding.
The complete original audit working papers and underlying procurement calculations have not been independently obtained.
The figure therefore cannot be presented as a newly verified result of an independent examination conducted by the Donovan–Shell Archive.
Nor does it establish that 61% of all labour hours or physical materials were foreign.
It concerns the reported monetary value of contractor work.
That is a different measurement.
Nevertheless, the finding demonstrates that Russian state auditors were scrutinising the economic distribution of procurement expenditure during the period when Shell controlled Sakhalin Energy.
It also establishes that the auditors were not necessarily satisfied with the commercial outcomes.
Contemporaneous source: Kommersant — Sergei Stepashin Calculates Sakhalin II, 7 October 2006.
Коммерсантъ
3. The wider audit concerned Russia’s financial interests
The October 2006 findings should not be isolated from their political and commercial context.
The Accounts Chamber was concerned principally with the economic implementation of the production-sharing agreement.
The project had experienced a dramatic increase in construction costs.
Because of the agreement’s cost-recovery provisions, expenditure was relevant to the timing and amount of Russia’s eventual profit-production receipts.
The auditors questioned whether the original arrangements adequately protected the Russian state’s financial interests.
Sakhalin Energy disputed the criticisms.
According to Kommersant, the company maintained that Russia could receive substantial revenues over the project’s lifetime.
It was therefore a contested economic argument.
The Accounts Chamber’s assessment was an official audit position.
The company’s response was the operator’s commercial position.
Neither should be silently converted into a judicial finding.
There was another complication.
The audit controversy unfolded during the confrontation that eventually resulted in Gazprom obtaining majority control of Sakhalin II.
Contemporary analysts interpreted several Russian regulatory and financial interventions as sources of pressure upon the foreign shareholders.
That interpretation is relevant historical context.
But it does not establish that every individual audit finding was fabricated or politically directed.
Equally, the existence of an official audit does not automatically establish that every criticism was correct.
The documentary approach requires the relevant claims to be examined on their evidence.
4. December 2006: The Accounts Chamber continues its pressureThe October findings were not the end of the matter.
On 13 December 2006, contemporary reporting recorded a further Accounts Chamber initiative.
The Chamber had asked the Russian government to consider measures to optimise Sakhalin II’s costs.
The request followed its examination of the production-sharing agreement’s implementation during 2005 and part of 2006.
The Accounts Chamber’s collegium had considered the findings on 6 October.
Information had subsequently been sent to the Russian president and government.
A report published on 14 December stated that the Chamber considered Sakhalin II to be operating under conditions disadvantageous to Russia.
It also recorded the Chamber’s support for the proposed participation of Gazprom in the project.
These statements demonstrate the significance of the state-audit controversy at the time.
But they must not be confused with a separate and definitive determination of Russian-content compliance.
The principal concerns concerned project costs, revenue-sharing and Russia’s economic interests.
The reported 39% contractor-work figure formed part of that larger controversy.
The records examined do not establish that the Accounts Chamber issued a final public certificate determining lifetime compliance with the project’s 70% Russian-content commitment.
They establish that Russian state auditors scrutinised the project and raised concerns.
That distinction is fundamental.
Sources: PortNews — Accounts Chamber Requests Optimisation of Sakhalin II Costs, 13 December 2006 and Fishnews — Accounts Chamber Criticises Sakhalin II Financial Arrangements, 14 December 2006.
Портньюс+1
PART THREE: THE OPERATOR’S OWN OVERSIGHT SYSTEM 5. The Joint Committee
Sakhalin Energy’s official website identifies a mechanism intended to support Russian-content commitments.
It is the Joint Committee.
The committee brings together representatives of the operator, Russian federal executive authorities and the Sakhalin regional government.
The company’s explanation links the committee to compliance with the production-sharing agreement and communication with the Russian side.
Its stated purpose includes facilitating Russian participation in project works and procurement.
This is significant.
It shows that the operator did not present Russian content merely as an internal procurement preference.
Government representatives were institutionally involved.
The committee provided a mechanism for communication between the operator and the Russian authorities.
That is evidence of formal oversight arrangements.
But the publicly available description does not answer every question about their operation.
It does not identify the dates of all committee meetings.
It does not provide complete minutes.
It does not publish a full series of cumulative Russian-content calculations approved by committee members.
Nor does it disclose whether committee members independently tested individual procurement entries against original supporting invoices, timesheets and supplier records.
The committee’s existence should therefore not be confused with proof of a completed independent audit.
The institutional machinery for oversight is documented. The complete evidential record of its verification work is not publicly established in the sources examined.
Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Russian Content and the Joint Committee.
Russian Content
6. Russian contractors received conditional preference
The operator’s official explanation also describes its procurement obligations.
Under the production-sharing agreement, Russian enterprises were to receive preference where Russian and foreign bids were technically and commercially equivalent.
Sakhalin Energy was also required to make its best efforts to maximise Russian labour and contractor participation.
This is important because the commitment did not exist in isolation from technical requirements.
The project required equipment and services capable of supporting demanding offshore and LNG operations.
Safety, quality and reliability were major considerations.
A Russian company might therefore receive preferential consideration when its bid satisfied the relevant technical and commercial standards.
But the public wording does not establish an unconditional obligation to award a contract to a Russian supplier regardless of capability, cost or safety.
This distinction is consistent with Rein Tambuzer’s explanation in June 2001.
The technically complex LNG plant required specialist equipment.
Some of that equipment was not readily obtainable domestically at the time.
Nevertheless, the operator’s obligation to maximise Russian participation remained important.
The question is how procurement decisions were documented and assessed.
Were comparable bids evaluated against consistent criteria?
Were technical objections recorded?
Were decisions to award contracts to foreign suppliers reviewed?
And did the resulting Russian-content calculations accurately reflect the applicable contractual definitions?
The published reports explain the general procedures.
They do not disclose the complete underlying procurement files.
PART FOUR: THE PAPER TRAIL INSIDE THE COMPANY 7. The 2016 report describes formal procurement controlsSakhalin Energy’s Sustainable Development Report 2016 contains a detailed description of its supply-chain management system.
The company identified a formal Supply Chain Management Policy.
It described procurement principles covering competition, safety, Russian content, cost effectiveness and contractor qualifications.
The report explained that the company’s procurement process involved creating lists of qualified suppliers.
Potential suppliers could be pre-qualified.
Competitive tenders were preferred where sufficient market capacity existed.
Invitations to tender were distributed.
Technical and commercial evaluations followed.
Contracts were awarded according to the applicable tender requirements.
The report also described contract management.
The company monitored contractor performance using agreed indicators and review meetings.
It stated that contractor-performance audits formed part of the supply-chain management process.
These procedures are relevant because they identify where the underlying evidence for Russian-content calculations would originate.
Contract awards create procurement records.
Contractor performance generates timesheets, delivery documentation and other supporting material.
Supplier qualifications establish eligibility for particular work.
These records potentially provide the foundation for calculating Russian participation.
But there is a distinction between having a control system and independently establishing its performance.
A company’s published description of its procurement procedures does not prove that every procedure operated correctly in every transaction.
Nor does it establish that an external auditor examined every Russian-content calculation.
The original documentation would be needed for that purpose.
Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016, pages 62–64.
sakhalinenergy.ru
8. Auditing suppliers is not the same as auditing the 70% calculation
The 2016 report identifies another programme.
Sakhalin Energy had begun examining Russian industrial companies as potential suppliers for a proposed third LNG production train.
The company described a programme of audits designed to identify technically acceptable Russian manufacturers.
During 2016, approximately one hundred Russian companies were covered by this initiative.
This demonstrates active efforts to develop domestic supplier capability.
But the term audit is being used in a different sense.
The programme evaluated potential vendors.
Its purpose was to determine whether companies possessed the technical capabilities needed to supply equipment or services.
That is not equivalent to an independent audit of the total Russian-content calculation under the production-sharing agreement.
A vendor audit might establish that a manufacturer possessed suitable quality systems.
It might determine whether a company qualified for inclusion on an approved supplier list.
It might identify improvements required before a company could tender successfully.
Those activities could support greater Russian participation.
But they do not automatically verify the percentage of Russian labour or materials already used across the entire project.
The distinction is particularly important in this case because several types of review appear in Sakhalin Energy’s documentation.
There were contractor-performance audits.
There were supplier-qualification audits.
There were broader corporate management and sustainability reviews.
And there was government scrutiny of the production-sharing agreement’s financial implementation.
These activities performed different functions.
An audit confirming that a supplier is technically qualified does not establish that the project has satisfied a lifetime procurement-content obligation.
PART FIVE: THE 2016 ASSURANCE DOCUMENT 9. A certificate that requires careful readingThe most revealing documentary finding appears near the end of Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 Sustainability Report.
The report includes a certificate issued through the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.
The certificate concerns public assurance of the company’s non-financial reporting.
The accompanying conclusion was prepared by the organisation’s Non-Financial Reporting Council.
The council examined the company’s report in February and March 2017.
Its review considered the relevance and completeness of information concerning responsible business practices.
The report addressed corporate governance, sustainability, stakeholder engagement and other non-financial matters.
The endorsement was positive.
It recognised the scope and quality of the company’s disclosures.
But the accompanying text also expressly limited the review’s purpose.
It was not presented as an independent examination of every underlying numerical claim.
The council explained that responsibility for the factual information remained with Sakhalin Energy.
And it included a statement of direct relevance to the present investigation:
The authenticity of the factual data provided in the Report is outside the scope of the public endorsement process.
That sentence is important.
It appears in the original published corporate document.
It is not an allegation made by a critic.
It is a limitation acknowledged within the assurance material itself.
The independent public endorsement did not certify the factual accuracy of every statistic in the sustainability report.
Consequently, the 2016 Russian-content figures should not be described as independently verified merely because the report received public assurance.
They remain company-reported figures unless further independent verification is identified.
Primary documentary source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016, Appendices 7–8, pages 156–157.
sakhalinenergy.ru
10. What the endorsement actually established
The distinction deserves emphasis.
The public endorsement was not meaningless.
The reviewing council considered whether the report addressed relevant subjects and provided sufficiently complete information concerning responsible business practices.
It also assessed the report’s development compared with earlier disclosures.
Those are legitimate forms of review.
They can improve transparency and encourage more useful non-financial reporting.
But they are different from verifying the underlying procurement database.
A factual audit of Russian-content performance would require examination of supporting records.
It would need to establish how labour hours were classified.
It would need to verify the origin and weight of materials and equipment.
It would need to examine how contractors and subcontractors were counted.
It would also need to apply the relevant calculation methodology across the required period.
The 2016 public endorsement does not state that the council completed those tasks.
Indeed, its express limitation concerning factual accuracy makes clear that such verification was outside its remit.
That does not demonstrate that the company-reported percentages were false.
It demonstrates that the endorsement cannot be relied upon as independent proof that they were true.
This is an important distinction in any investigation based upon corporate sustainability reporting.
PART SIX: WHY THE PERCENTAGES DIFFER 11. The problem of incompatible measurementsThe original 2006 controversy involved the monetary value of contract work.
The later company reports included measurements of Russian labour and materials.
These categories must remain separate.
The 2016 report provides an especially useful comparison.
For that year, Sakhalin Energy reported 86% Russian labour content.
The figure was measured in working hours.
It also reported 94% Russian content in materials and equipment.
That figure was measured by weight.
But the value of new contracts and amendments with Russian companies represented 59% of the total value of the relevant contracts.
All three percentages appeared in the same corporate report.
They were different because they measured different aspects of procurement.
The following comparison makes the problem clear.
Documentary record Reported figure Measurement Accounts Chamber finding reported in October 2006 39% Value of contract work awarded to Russian companies Sakhalin Energy 2016 report 86% Russian labour input, measured in working hours Sakhalin Energy 2016 report 94% Russian materials and equipment, measured by weight Sakhalin Energy 2016 report 59% Value of new contracts and amendments awarded to Russian companiesThe figures are not a single time series.
The 2006 calculation came from a state-audit controversy.
The 2016 figures came from a later corporate reporting period.
Their scope and methodology differed.
A comparison therefore does not establish a precise increase or decrease in contractual compliance.
It demonstrates why a single headline percentage can be misleading when the underlying measurement is not identified.
12. A tonne of steel and a tonne of specialised equipmentConsider the difference between physical weight and monetary value.
A construction project may require enormous quantities of ordinary materials.
Steel, concrete and other heavy materials can represent substantial tonnage.
A relatively small quantity of sophisticated industrial equipment may represent far greater monetary value.
For a technologically advanced LNG project, that distinction is particularly important.
The project required specialised machinery and engineering systems.
Some equipment was imported.
Other materials and services were obtained in Russia.
A high Russian-content percentage measured by weight could therefore coexist with a lower percentage measured by contract value.
Neither calculation would necessarily be incorrect.
But they would answer different questions.
The weight-based calculation concerns the physical quantity of materials or equipment meeting the applicable definition.
The value-based calculation concerns expenditure.
The labour calculation concerns working hours.
To establish compliance with the production-sharing agreement, it is necessary to know which calculation the agreement required and how the relevant components were combined or assessed.
Sakhalin Energy’s reports provide information about the measurement categories.
They do not publish the complete lifetime audit ledger required to reconstruct every calculation independently.
PART SEVEN: THE LATER OPERATOR’S RECORD 13. The 2024 report demonstrates continuing internal controlsSakhalin Energy’s Non-Financial ESG Report 2024 provides evidence of the procurement controls operating after Shell’s withdrawal from Russia.
The report again describes formal contract and procurement procedures.
It identifies the Supply Chain Manager’s responsibility for implementing appropriate contractual terms and assurance measures.
It also describes supplier qualification, tender evaluation and contract-performance monitoring.
Russian content remains a procurement objective.
The company reports continued efforts to develop Russian suppliers and identify domestic alternatives to imported equipment.
For 2024, the operator reported Russian-content indicators of 97% by labour hours and 95% by material and equipment weight.
The report also stated that the cumulative value of contracts with Russian companies had reached approximately $31.9 billion by the end of 2024.
During 2024, Russian companies received contracts and amendments worth approximately $1.381 billion.
That represented 86% of the relevant contract value for the year.
These are substantial figures.
They demonstrate the extent of reported Russian participation under the replacement operator.
But they cannot be attributed to Shell’s management.
The original ownership structure was fundamentally altered in 2022.
The operator’s subsequent procurement policies reflected different corporate and political circumstances.
The 2024 report is therefore useful evidence of continuity in the Russian-content framework and the existence of corporate controls.
It is not evidence that Shell personally directed the later results.
Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024, pages 76–81.
sakhalinenergy.ru
14. The company still describes a lifetime obligation
The current operator’s website continues to identify a 70% Russian-content commitment applying over the life of Sakhalin II.
Its language is important.
The commitment concerns labour, materials, equipment and contract services.
The operator must use its best efforts to maximise Russian participation.
Russian enterprises receive conditional preference where bids are technically and commercially equivalent.
The Joint Committee remains identified as a mechanism supporting participation by Russian enterprises.
The 2024 report describes Russian-content measurement in terms of labour hours, the weight of materials and equipment, and associated cost equivalents.
This provides a useful statement of the operator’s interpretation of the continuing framework.
But a lifetime commitment cannot necessarily be verified through the percentages reported for one year.
The distinction remains relevant even when the annual figures are substantially above 70%.
A complete calculation would require the relevant cumulative measurements and a clear statement of the applicable methodology.
The available reports do not supply every underlying record necessary to perform that calculation independently.
This is not a finding of non-compliance.
It is a statement about the limits of public verification.
PART EIGHT: FINANCIAL AUDITS AND PROCUREMENT AUDITS 15. The Russian state continued examining Sakhalin II expenditureThe Accounts Chamber’s involvement did not end in 2006.
Russian public reporting subsequently described further examinations of the production-sharing arrangements.
In May 2016, EastRussia reported findings attributed to the Accounts Chamber’s annual report for 2015.
According to the report, earlier control activities had resulted in Sakhalin Energy reimbursing approximately three billion roubles in underpaid royalties.
The reporting also stated that approximately $81 million in unjustified expenditure had been excluded from recoverable costs.
These figures concern financial and production-sharing obligations.
They are not Russian-content percentages.
Nor do they establish a separate procurement-content breach.
The distinction is nevertheless important.
The reported findings demonstrate that Russian state audits could lead to financial adjustments concerning the project’s implementation.
They also illustrate the difference between auditing the financial consequences of the production-sharing agreement and determining the precise share of Russian participation.
An audit may establish that certain expenditure should not be recoverable.
That does not establish whether the equipment associated with the expenditure was Russian-made.
Similarly, an audit may establish that a contractor performed work satisfactorily without resolving whether the work should count towards a particular Russian-content formula.
The same underlying procurement system may be relevant to several audits.
But their purposes and conclusions differ.
The original complete Accounts Chamber documentation supporting the reported 2015 outcomes has not been independently authenticated for this instalment.
The figures are therefore attributed to the published contemporary report.
eastrussia.ru
EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 16. Five different forms of scrutiny
The documentary record reveals several distinct forms of oversight associated with Sakhalin II.
The first was governmental financial scrutiny.
Russia’s Accounts Chamber examined aspects of the production-sharing agreement, expenditure and the financial interests of the state.
The second was contractual and institutional oversight.
The Joint Committee provided a mechanism involving the operator and Russian governmental representatives in the implementation of Russian-content objectives.
The third was corporate procurement control.
Sakhalin Energy maintained policies concerning supplier qualification, tender evaluation, contract management and performance audits.
The fourth was supplier-development assessment.
The company examined Russian manufacturers to determine whether they possessed the technical capability to participate in the project.
The fifth was public review of corporate reporting.
The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs examined the relevance and completeness of Sakhalin Energy’s sustainability disclosures.
These different mechanisms should not be conflated.
They had different purposes.
They involved different participants.
And they did not necessarily verify the same information.
The strongest documentary distinction concerns the 2016 public endorsement.
The reviewing organisation explicitly excluded the factual accuracy of the report’s underlying data from the scope of its work.
That is not evidence that Sakhalin Energy lacked internal controls or that the Russian government performed no audits.
It is evidence that the public assurance certificate was not itself an independent certification of the reported Russian-content statistics.
17. The missing evidence is specificThe outstanding question can be defined more precisely than simply asking whether the 70% target was achieved.
A conclusive assessment would require the complete executed production-sharing agreement and relevant amendments.
It would require identification of the applicable Russian-content measurement formula.
It would require the cumulative labour records used in the calculation.
It would require records establishing the relevant origin and quantities of equipment and materials.
It would require the corresponding financial measurements where applicable.
It would require the rules used to classify contractors, subcontractors and suppliers.
And it would require evidence identifying which independent or governmental authority examined the calculations and what conclusion it reached.
These are not necessarily documents suitable for unrestricted public disclosure.
Commercial confidentiality, contractual rights and other legitimate restrictions may apply.
But the absence of publicly available supporting material limits what an independent investigator can establish.
It would be inappropriate to infer that the documents do not exist.
It would also be inappropriate to treat their possible existence as proof of a result that has not been independently demonstrated.
The correct conclusion concerns public verification.
The published evidence establishes extensive Russian participation and several layers of oversight. It does not provide a complete independently reproducible lifetime compliance calculation.
18. The political setting does not invalidate every audit findingThe 2006 controversy occurred during a period of intense political pressure upon Sakhalin Energy and its foreign shareholders.
That context matters.
Accounts Chamber criticism, environmental investigations and negotiations concerning Gazprom’s participation occurred against a background of escalating conflict.
The resulting transfer of majority control to Gazprom was one of the defining events in Sakhalin II’s history.
It would therefore be naïve to examine the financial audit controversy without recognising its political setting.
But political context does not automatically invalidate the underlying evidence.
An audit conducted during a political confrontation may identify genuine issues.
Equally, its conclusions may be contested.
The appropriate response is to examine the original records, methods and supporting calculations.
The same standard must be applied to the company’s rebuttals.
Sakhalin Energy’s disagreement with Russian state auditors does not, by itself, disprove every finding.
Nor does an official criticism prove that the company acted unlawfully.
The evidence requires independent assessment.
That principle is particularly important in a documentary archive intended to remain useful long after the political circumstances have changed.
19. A positive achievement can still require verificationSakhalin II plainly generated substantial opportunities for Russian companies.
The project employed large numbers of Russian workers.
It involved extensive domestic construction activity.
It awarded contracts worth tens of billions of dollars to Russian enterprises.
The company described programmes intended to improve local supplier qualifications.
These are important achievements.
The archive should not minimise them.
But acknowledging substantial Russian participation does not eliminate the need to understand the contractual commitment.
A company can report impressive procurement statistics without publishing every record needed for independent verification.
A government can conduct financial audits without completing a publicly available lifetime local-content audit.
A sustainability report can receive public endorsement without its factual data being independently authenticated.
None of those situations automatically demonstrates wrongdoing.
They demonstrate the need to distinguish between evidence of activity, evidence of controls and evidence of verified compliance.
That is the central lesson of the present investigation.
DOCUMENTARY FINDINGSThe investigation establishes several important points.
The original procurement concern was genuine. In June 2001, a senior Shell executive publicly acknowledged difficulties in meeting the reported 70% Russian-content requirement during the construction phase.
The Russian Accounts Chamber challenged the project’s financial arrangements. In October 2006, contemporary reporting attributed to its auditors a finding that Russian companies had received 39% of the monetary value of contract work.
The 39% figure is not directly comparable with later labour and materials indicators. The relevant categories and reporting periods differed.
Sakhalin Energy established a formal Russian-content oversight mechanism. Its published documentation identifies a Joint Committee involving the operator and Russian governmental representatives.
The operator maintained procurement controls. Its reports describe supplier qualification, competitive tender procedures, technical and commercial evaluations, contract monitoring and performance audits.
Vendor audits did occur. The 2016 report describes technical evaluations of approximately one hundred Russian manufacturers associated with the proposed third LNG train.
Those vendor audits are not evidence of a completed lifetime Russian-content audit. They served a different purpose.
The 2016 public assurance certificate has an express limitation. The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs stated that verification of the factual accuracy of the sustainability report’s underlying data was outside the endorsement’s scope.
The operator reported substantial Russian participation. The 2016 report identified 86% Russian labour content and 94% Russian materials and equipment content, alongside a 59% share of relevant contract value awarded to Russian companies.
The post-2022 operator reported further substantial participation. Its 2024 figures included 97% Russian labour content and 95% materials and equipment content.
The Russian state undertook other financial scrutiny. Contemporaneous reporting described Accounts Chamber examinations leading to adjustments involving royalties and recoverable expenditure.
The complete independently verified lifetime calculation remains unestablished in the publicly examined material. The original contractual formula, cumulative records and any final certification have not been produced together.
No judicial finding establishing that Shell breached the Sakhalin II Russian-content commitment has been identified in the records examined.
The evidence therefore supports scrutiny of the verification process.
It does not support an allegation that Shell falsified the Russian-content figures or deliberately evaded the original agreement.
CONCLUSION: WHO CHECKED THE NUMBERS?The Sakhalin II procurement history provides a useful illustration of the difference between a contractual commitment and the evidence needed to establish its fulfilment.
In June 2001, Shell’s senior management acknowledged that meeting the Russian-content requirement would be challenging.
The development required equipment and technology that could not necessarily be obtained from domestic manufacturers.
But Shell expected Russian participation to increase over the project’s lifetime.
Five years later, Russia’s Accounts Chamber challenged the project’s financial arrangements.
The 39% figure attributed to its auditors concerned the value of contract work awarded to Russian companies.
That figure became part of a much larger controversy involving project expenditure, the production-sharing agreement and the interests of the Russian state.
The subsequent corporate record contains extensive evidence of Russian involvement.
By October 2007, Sakhalin Energy was reporting substantial labour and material participation.
By 2016, the company was publishing detailed procurement statistics and describing formal policies governing supplier selection, contract monitoring and Russian-content development.
By 2024, the replacement operator was reporting even higher annual Russian-content indicators.
These figures establish that Russian participation was substantial.
But they do not all measure the same thing.
The original 70% obligation was described as applying across the lifetime of the project.
The public reports frequently provide annual figures.
Some use labour hours.
Others use physical quantities.
Still others concern monetary contract values.
And the independent public endorsement of the 2016 sustainability report expressly excluded verification of the underlying factual data.
That final distinction is particularly important.
It does not mean the reported statistics were false.
It means the endorsement cannot be used as independent proof of their accuracy.
Similarly, the existence of the Joint Committee demonstrates an institutional oversight mechanism.
It does not, without the committee’s records, establish precisely which cumulative calculations were independently checked.
The Russian Accounts Chamber’s financial examinations demonstrate official scrutiny.
They do not automatically provide the missing lifetime Russian-content reconciliation.
The documentary conclusion must therefore be precise.
Sakhalin II generated substantial Russian employment, materials procurement and contract expenditure. The operator documented multiple mechanisms for managing and reviewing procurement. But the published records examined do not establish a complete, independently reproducible calculation proving the final performance of every lifetime Russian-content obligation.
That is neither an allegation of misconduct nor an exoneration.
It is a statement about the available evidence.
The missing material is identifiable.
It concerns the original contractual formula, the cumulative data and the records of independent or governmental verification.
Those documents could materially strengthen the historical record.
If they demonstrate full compliance, the archive should report that result.
If they establish qualifications, exceptions or unresolved discrepancies, those findings should also be reported.
The standard should be the same in either case.
A promise measured in percentages can only be properly assessed when the numerator, denominator, reporting period and verification procedure are known.
The Sakhalin II project offers an important case study in the practical difficulties of applying that principle to an enormous international energy development.
Shell was central to the project’s original engineering and commercial success.
Russian companies performed extensive work.
The state maintained important oversight interests.
And the operator continued reporting Russian-content performance for decades.
But reporting a percentage and independently verifying the contractual result are different activities.
The distinction is central to corporate accountability.
It is also central to the purpose of the Donovan–Shell Archive.
The task is not to presume that Shell’s historical claims were false.
Nor is it to accept every company or governmental statement without examination.
It is to establish what the original documents demonstrate, identify the evidence still required and preserve the distinction between established fact and unresolved questions.
The Russian-content promise was documented. The Russian participation was substantial. The complete public audit trail remains to be established.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES1. Vedomosti — 15 June 2001
Original interview with Shell executive Rein Tambuzer concerning Sakhalin II’s second development phase, Russian suppliers, project costs and the reported 70% Russian-content requirement.
Read the original Vedomosti interview
2. Kommersant — 7 October 2006
Contemporaneous investigation into the findings of Russia’s Accounts Chamber.
Includes the reported 39% monetary share of contract work awarded to Russian companies, attributed to auditor Mikhail Beskhmelnitsyn.
Read the original Kommersant report
3. PortNews — 13 December 2006
Contemporaneous report of the Accounts Chamber’s request for government consideration of measures to optimise Sakhalin II costs, following its examination of the production-sharing arrangements.
4. Fishnews — 14 December 2006
Report based upon information attributed to Russia’s Accounts Chamber concerning the October 2006 examination and its subsequent conclusions.
5. Sakhalin Energy — Russian Content
Official company description of its Russian-content obligations, conditional preference for Russian suppliers and the Joint Committee.
Read Sakhalin Energy’s official explanation
6. Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016
Original company report describing procurement controls, Russian-content measurement, contractor-performance audits and vendor-development activities.
Of particular relevance are pages 62–64.
7. Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs — Public Endorsement of Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 Report
Original certificate and accompanying review included in the 2016 Sustainability Report.
The review expressly excludes verification of the factual accuracy of the underlying report data.
See Appendices 7–8, pages 156–157.
Read the original assurance material in the 2016 report (PDF)
8. Sakhalin Energy — Vendor Development Programme
Official description of the company’s programme to improve supplier qualifications, technical capabilities and Russian industrial participation.
Read the Vendor Development Programme
9. EastRussia — 18 May 2016
Contemporaneous reporting concerning the Russian Accounts Chamber’s financial audit findings and subsequent royalty and recoverable-cost adjustments.
10. Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024
Original report from the replacement Russian operator.
Describes continuing procurement controls, Russian-content requirements, reported annual performance and cumulative contracts awarded to Russian companies.
Particularly relevant are pages 76–81.
11. Sakhalin Energy — Production-Sharing Agreement
Official explanation of the original Sakhalin II production-sharing arrangement signed in 1994.
12. Russian Federal Law No. 225-FZ
The general Russian production-sharing legislation, including the provisions relevant to agreements concluded before its enactment.
Read Article 2 of the legislation
13. Donovan–Shell Archive — 11 November 2026
The preceding Sakhalin Papers instalment examining the original Russian-content commitment and the operator’s published participation figures.
The Shell Leaks Files — 11 November 2026
DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMERThis investigation examines the oversight and verification of Russian-content commitments associated with the Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement.
It relies upon contemporaneous statements by Shell management, Russian Accounts Chamber findings reported in the contemporary press, original Sakhalin Energy corporate disclosures, published Russian legislation, procurement documentation and historical material preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.
The original Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement was signed in June 1994.
The complete executed agreement and all amendments have not been independently examined together for this investigation.
Consequently, no definitive legal conclusion is reached concerning the complete lifetime calculation or ultimate discharge of every Russian-content obligation.
The June 2001 comments by Rein Tambuzer are attributed to his original interview with Vedomosti.
The concerns raised by the interviewer are distinguished from independently established findings.
The October 2006 figure of 39% is attributed to Russia’s Accounts Chamber through contemporary reporting by Kommersant.
The complete underlying audit workpapers and procurement calculations have not been obtained.
That figure is identified as a reported monetary measure of contract work.
It is not represented as a calculation of Russian labour hours or materials by weight.
The contemporaneous dispute between the Accounts Chamber and Sakhalin Energy is acknowledged.
The Accounts Chamber’s criticisms are not treated as final judicial findings.
The company’s rebuttals are identified as its own position.
The investigation distinguishes procurement-content audits from examinations concerning royalties, recoverable expenditure, environmental compliance, contractor performance and supplier qualifications.
These reviews may concern related operations but have different purposes.
The Joint Committee is identified according to Sakhalin Energy’s official explanation.
Its existence is not treated as proof that it independently audited every lifetime Russian-content calculation.
The 2016 Sustainability Report is an authenticated corporate publication.
The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs’ public assurance and accompanying conclusion are examined according to their stated scope.
The review’s express limitation concerning factual verification is acknowledged.
This limitation is not treated as evidence that Sakhalin Energy deliberately published inaccurate statistics.
The Russian-content percentages reported for 2016 and 2024 are attributed to the respective operator disclosures.
They are not represented as independently audited cumulative compliance determinations.
The 2024 figures concern activities after Shell’s withdrawal from the replacement Russian operating company.
They are not attributed to Shell’s management.
The monetary value of contracts awarded to Russian companies is distinguished from cash expenditure, the manufacture of equipment within Russia, Russian beneficial ownership and the ultimate financial benefits retained within Sakhalin Oblast.
The investigation does not allege that Shell deliberately manipulated Russian-content calculations.
It does not allege that Sakhalin Energy falsified procurement records.
Nor does it conclude that the project breached the original production-sharing agreement.
No court judgment establishing such a breach has been identified in the records examined.
The absence of a publicly identified complete lifetime audit does not establish that no such audit was performed or that relevant records do not exist.
The investigation identifies the limits of independently verifiable public evidence.
The discussion of corporate assurance, procurement transparency and the relationship between contractual commitments and published performance indicators is editorial analysis.
Shell plc, former Sakhalin Energy personnel, the present operator, Gazprom, Russian governmental authorities, the Russian Accounts Chamber, contractors and other interested parties are invited to submit original documents, factual corrections, independent audit results or other relevant evidence for consideration and publication.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-117 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CVII The Russian Supplier Test: What Counts as Russian-Made in a Global Energy Project?The Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement contained provisions intended to maximise Russian involvement.
The operator reported major contracts awarded to Russian companies.
Its statistics measured labour hours, material quantities and the financial value of procurement.
But those categories conceal another important distinction.
A company can be registered in Russia while selling equipment manufactured abroad.
A foreign-controlled company can establish a Russian subsidiary.
A Russian contractor can employ Russian workers while using imported machinery.
And equipment can be assembled domestically using components sourced internationally.
These distinctions matter when a project is subject to local-content requirements.
The Sakhalin Energy reports describe supplier qualification, procurement controls and efforts to increase Russian manufacturing capability.
The 2024 report also documents attempts to replace imported equipment with domestic alternatives.
But the precise classification of individual supplies may depend upon contractual definitions, manufacturing records and evidence of origin.
The next instalment will investigate those distinctions.
It will examine the operator’s published Russian-content requirements, the role of approved vendor lists and the treatment of Russian suppliers of imported equipment.
It will also explore how changing industrial conditions after 2022 affected the incentives to source equipment domestically.
The investigation will distinguish Russian legal registration from Russian manufacture and domestic assembly from the origin of individual components.
It will not assume that a supplier’s nationality establishes the origin of every product it sells.
The central documentary question is deceptively simple.
When Sakhalin Energy reports that a particular percentage of equipment or materials is Russian, what evidence is needed to establish that classification?
A contract may identify the supplier.
An invoice may identify the purchaser and seller.
But manufacturing origin requires its own supporting evidence.
And the distinction may determine whether the original production-sharing commitment has been fulfilled.
The next file will follow that evidence.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
Editorial note: This instalment advances the local-content investigation beyond the percentages examined on 11 November. Its principal new findings are the October 2006 Accounts Chamber controversy concerning the monetary share of contracts awarded to Russian companies, the distinction between different procurement and supplier audits, and the express factual-verification limitation contained in the independent public endorsement of Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 Sustainability Report.
The strongest documentary conclusion is that substantial Russian participation and several layers of oversight are established, but the published material examined does not permit independent reconstruction of the complete lifetime contractual calculation.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 12 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 12, 2026 at 9:34 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Government methane plan in court
Government plans to cut methane emissions are being challenged in court next week by a group campaigning against onshore oil and gas in southern England.
Methane emissions from the Horndean oilfield in Hampshire.Photo: Clean Air Task Force
The Weald Action Group, which won a landmark Supreme Court climate case in 2024, will seek a judicial review at the High Court of the UK Methane Action Plan.
The campaigners will argue that the plan fails to address properly the risks to delivering the UK’s carbon budgets under the Climate Change Act. They will also say it omits meaningful policies for onshore oil and gas methane emissions.
The campaigners will also argue that the Methane Action Plan is government policy and so it must comply with environmental principles designed to prevent harm and protect the environment.
Methane is a potent but short-lived climate pollutant. Its warming potential is 80 times more powerful than carbon dioxide over a 20-year period. It is responsible for about a third of global warming.
One of the key sources of methane from the oil and gas industry is flaring (inefficient burning of methane), venting (releasing unburnt methane) or leaks.
The Weald Action Group said:
“Cutting methane pollution is one of the fastest and most cost-effective ways to slow climate breakdown this decade and reducing emissions of this gas has the added benefit of protecting public health by improving air quality.
“Yet in the UK onshore oil and gas sector, leaking, venting and flaring of gas are common, inspections infrequent, and leak detection is sporadic. Methane is poorly regulated and largely hidden from public scrutiny.”
The group’s methane campaigner, Emily Mott, said:
“As UK leaders take to the global stage at COP31 to champion methane action, the UK must show real commitment by tackling emissions at home.
“We are calling on the UK Government to urgently address methane emissions from onshore oil and gas operations.
“Taking action now—robust methane regulation and policy that includes the onshore sector would deliver rapid climate benefits, strengthen public health protections and close the gap between the UK’s international climate ambitions and its domestic regulatory approach.”
The hearing at the Royal Courts of Justice in London is on Wednesday 18 November (time to be confirmed).
Horndean challengeThis is the second judicial review sought by Weald Action Group on methane emissions.
It also challenged the Environment Agency for an environmental permit that allowed methane emissions from the Horndean oil field in Hampshire without adequate limits. The group also alleged that the EA failed to assess properly better methane mitigation options and approved the permit without sufficient transparency or public consultation.
A judge refused the case at a recent hearing, but Weald Action Group has appealed against this decision.
Historic Southwest Flooding Doesn't Fix the Colorado River's Problems
Reclaiming an Urban Forest for Birds and People in Baltimore
How Alternative Proteins Can Advance Global Sustainability
Alternative proteins are one way innovators are creating effective solutions to the climate crisis, global food insecurity, and biodiversity loss. Animal agriculture accounts for nearly a fifth of global emissions, with meat consumption projected to increase 50 percent by 2050, according to the United Nations (UN).
“I think advocacy around farm systems is critically important. I think alternative proteins… [are] an essential complement,” Bruce Friedrich tells Food Tank. Friedrich is the co-founder and president of The Good Food Institute (GFI), a nonprofit working to advance alternative protein innovation.
Plant-based, cultivated, and fermentation-derived products are all types of alternative proteins that aim to provide an environmentally friendly and higher-welfare substitute for traditional meat. Investment in the sector exploded in 2020 and reached a high of $US5.1 billion in 2021, before eventually dropping to $US881 million in 2025, according to GFI. While enthusiasm from the private sector has waned, Friedrich says that it has only increased for those working across climate, hunger and malnutrition, and global health. Governments, too, are seeing the value of investing in the technology, which is still relatively new, he adds.
“You’d be amazed by how much progress we have made just in the last five years in terms of scaling technology, starting to bring down the cost, and starting to make products that really taste good,” Rohan Shirwaiker tells Food Tank. Shirwaiker is the principal investigator and co-director of the Bezos Center for Sustainable Protein at NC State University, where he works on advancing sustainable protein technologies from the lab to practical applications.
Friedrich points out that the more than $US3 billion invested into cultivated meat has been spread across more than 100 companies over the span of a decade, with only a small portion dedicated to research and development. He says that the media has largely misrepresented the sector as a failure, but really, it’s just getting started.
Friedrich and Shirwaiker both agree that the industry needs to focus on taste and price parity for alternative proteins to appeal to consumers. “I think the sector started with an animal welfare and climate sustainability angle, which is important to many people, but at the end of the day, consumers don’t make their buying decisions based on that,” Shirwaiker says.
He mentions the possibility of using opportunity crops to improve products’ taste, texture, and nutritional quality. Opportunity crops are traditional and indigenous plants that are nutrient-rich, climate-resilient, and underutilized. They also provide the possibility to support smallholder farmers and encourage biodiversity, according to an article published in Nature Communications.
For small livestock producers and ranchers, the threat is not alternative protein, but rather large agribusinesses, Friedrich tells Food Tank. In fact, alternative protein may present them with an opportunity to shift to crop production for direct human consumption, with the support of government and policy. According to Friedrich, transforming land used for intensive animal agriculture to grow crops for direct human consumption, restore natural ecosystems, and increase regenerative agriculture can bring us closer to food self-sufficiency. “So, who better to be the stewards of that repurposing than farmers and ranchers,” he says.
Listen to the full conversation with Bruce Friedrich and Rohan Shirwaiker on “Food Talk with Dani Nierenberg” to hear more about the future of alternative protein in mitigating the environmental and climate crisis, developing and scaling technology to meet the needs of consumers, and ensuring that farmers and policymakers are part of the conversation.
Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.
Photo courtesy of LikeMeat, Unsplash
The post How Alternative Proteins Can Advance Global Sustainability appeared first on Food Tank.
The Platte River Does More Than Support Wildlife
Commentary: Oversight for Transit, but Not for Freeway Widenings?
The Regional Transit Measure (RTM) has passed. Its most prominent opponent, former BART director Debora Allen, wrote on Nov. 5 that SB 63, the law behind it, created “an oversight process that lacks meaningful independence and enforceable financial reforms.”
But the 101 express lanes, a ~$600 million highway project voters here also paid for, have even less oversight, and no law ever required them to have more.
Her October op-ed in the SF Standard spelled out what she means. The committee reviewing BART, Muni, Caltrain and AC Transit gives four of its nine seats to those same agencies and the other five to the Metropolitan Transportation Commission. Funding depends on agencies carrying out cost-saving plans they choose themselves, not on total costs going down. The review happens once, then the committee disbands, while the tax runs 14 years. VTA, which gets 84% of Santa Clara County’s revenue from the measure, is exempt. And there is no regional inspector general.
Several of these points are fair. The Phase One efficiency review counted deferred liabilities and cancelled planned raises as “savings” while total operating costs rose at all four agencies. BART’s costs grew faster than inflation while it carried 46% of its pre-pandemic riders.
Nobody is required to check, after the review ends, whether the agencies do what they promised, so I built a tracker that follows each of the Phase One review’s 35 recommendations against board actions and other public records. As of Nov. 4 the agencies have adopted 32 and none is yet marked implemented, and the review attached no dollar savings to any of them. The data is downloadable, and the tracker has an RSS feed for anyone who wants to follow along.
Now apply Allen’s test to the US 101 express lanes in San Mateo County.
Photo: Max Mautner
The project’s $514 million budget came mostly from state gas taxes, Bay Area bridge tolls and San Mateo County’s Measure A sales tax.
Allen’s test Measure RTM 101 express lanes Overseers independent of the spenders No No Oversight beyond an audit No No Funding tied to lower total costs No No Efficiency review Once, flawed Never Oversight for the life of the tax No, review ends Advisory committee only Permanent inspector general No State and federal share onlyThe lanes are governed by a joint powers authority of three Transportation Authority board members and three City/County Association of Governments of San Mateo County board members, the agencies that sponsored the project. Measure A, the county sales tax in the project, answers to a 15-member volunteer committee that gives the Transportation Authority board input on its projects. That is less than the “math-checking” Allen dismisses in SB 63. No efficiency review was ever required. No funding was conditioned on costs. Streetsblog put the finished project near $600 million.
The lanes do better than RTM on only one test, and only by accident. Because state and federal money passed through Caltrans, its Inspector General can audit that share. No inspector general covers the bridge tolls or the local money, $178.5 million between them. None of this shows the lanes are badly run. It shows transit is held to a test the highway was never asked to pass.
The people who built the lanes also grade the results. A 2024 report to the county’s cities found the regular lanes next to the express lanes slowing, below 30 mph at some times and places. The express lanes authority’s own 2026 performance study found faster speeds in both kinds of lanes, measured against traffic before the extra lane was added, and its authors told the Transportation Authority board the next version would be peer reviewed.
The last regional transportation measure had the same double standard. RM3, the 2018 bridge toll increase, funds $4.45 billion in highway and transit projects, including $300 million for express lanes. It created an independent inspector general for one recipient: BART.
The lanes’ one real defense is that they pay their way. Tolls now cover their operating costs with room to spare, and the express lanes authority is paying down its construction loan ahead of schedule. That loan is also where the sales tax comes back in. Its $100 million came from Transportation Authority bonds secured by the county’s sales taxes, due by 2049, so if tolls fall short, San Mateo County shoppers cover the gap for 29 years, twice as long as RTM’s tax runs.
The defense also leaves the regular lanes beside the express lanes out of the accounting. Caltrans expects to have ~59% of what it needs to keep the state’s highways in repair over the next 10 years, a $45.5 billion gap, and part of the money it does have is federal highway money that Congress keeps refilling from income taxes. BART fares covered ~23% of BART’s operating costs in fiscal 2025. One of these gaps gets called a fiscal cliff, and the other doesn’t get called anything.
I don’t think either one needs an inspector general. But anyone who calls RTM’s oversight too weak should say the same about the 101 express lanes, which have less. A standard applied only to transit isn’t an accountability standard. It’s a double standard against transit.
The charts are generated by this code, which lists every input and its source.
***
Max Mautner is a San Mateo advocate. A version of the post above appeared on his own blog and is republished here with permission.
As coal burn declines, rising power demand will be primarily met by renewables: EIA
The electric power sector could install more than 26 GW of battery storage next year, helping support a renewable resource base that is expected to supply almost a quarter of 2027 consumption, EIA said.
State adds $4,000 “discount” to energy upgrade scheme, targeting low-income households and renters
Low-income households can now apply for thousands of dollars in discounts on energy upgrades that will make a "lasting difference" to cost of living and comfort.
The post State adds $4,000 “discount” to energy upgrade scheme, targeting low-income households and renters appeared first on Renew Economy.
Global Nurses United congratulates member union, Irish Nurses and Midwives Organisation, on its recent bargaining victory
CAREER OPPORTUNITY: Communications and Marketing Associate (Eugene/Portland/Santa Fe/Helena)
Career Opportunity: Communications and Marketing Associate
Reports to: Communications Director
Location: Physical WELC office in Eugene or Portland, OR; Santa Fe, NM; or Helena, MT. Remote candidates will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Timeline: Job opening posted November 12, 2026; we will review applications on a rolling basis beginning on November 25, 2026, until the position is filled.
Note: Information is available below. Please apply through the WELC Job Board.
ABOUT THE WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER
The Western Environmental Law Center is a leading nonprofit, public-interest environmental law firm rooted in the lands and communities of the western U.S. We use the power of the law to foster thriving, resilient western U.S. lands, waters, wildlife, and communities in the face of a changing climate. Founded in 1993, WELC has been celebrated as an Outside Magazine Best Place to Work, Oregon Business Best Nonprofit to Work For and Best Green Workplace, NonProfit Times Best Nonprofit to Work For, Law360 Environmental Group of the Year, and Better Business Bureau Torch Award winner for ethics.
We envision a thriving western U.S., abundant with protected and interconnected ecosystems, powered by renewable energy, and cared for by communities brought together in an ecology of kinship. We achieve this vision with steady, strategic, and bold legal advocacy that turns the wheels of power at all levels of government.
WELC seeks a Communications and Marketing Associate to join our team. We strongly encourage people of color, persons with disabilities, women, LGBTQ+ applicants, and people of diverse lived experience to apply.
POSITION SUMMARY
The Communications and Marketing Associate is a non-exempt, full-time, salaried position responsible for creating digital and printed communications about our organization and its work for the public, our partner organizations, policymakers, and supporters across all WELC programmatic areas to promote our impact and advocacy.
The Communications and Marketing Associate will create digital content that is engaging, easy to understand, visually appealing, and aligned with our core values, branding, and image. In addition, the Communications and Marketing Associate will create digital content and implement an audience engagement strategy that uses organic and paid promotion to reach existing and prospective WELC supporters as well as key policymakers on Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Bluesky. These responsibilities include designing social media content and graphics, interpretation of social media and website analytics to improve our reach and engagement, and occasional website maintenance. This position will work closely with the communications director and will also occasionally work with our development team to promote WELC’s fundraising efforts on social media and be involved in several online fundraising initiatives. Opportunities exist for occasional press work to include drafting, editing, and distributing press releases.
Within these responsibilities, the Communications and Marketing Associate will coordinate with WELC program staff and, where appropriate, serve as an active representative of WELC in coalitions and relationships with clients, partners, and allies to develop and implement digital communications strategies in support of these campaigns.
WELC offers a supportive team setting and the opportunity to experiment with new, creative digital media and swag including stickers and shirts to contribute to and grow our communications advocacy and impact. This position requires strong attention to detail, a demonstrated ability to work independently, and the ability to develop and maintain strong, trusting, and effective relationships with WELC clients, partners, and allies.
The Communications and Marketing Associate is a normal 40-hour week position, primarily working during Monday to Friday business hours, though some night and weekend hours may be required depending on case needs. Staff meetings occur on Zoom and in person. Limited travel is required, including overnight and weekend travel. The position also involves standard office physical demands. WELC will provide all reasonable accommodations to the extent possible or required pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act and applicable state law.
QUALIFICATIONS
We are keenly interested in considering a range of applicants with diverse lived experiences who approach the world with kindness, imagination, and vision. We will happily consider applicants who offer an equivalent or alternative set of qualifications to fulfill this position’s responsibilities.
- Bachelor’s degree in communications, journalism, or other related field and 2+ years of relevant work experience or equivalent. We are open to consider entry-level candidates, especially those with diverse lived experience.
- Knowledge of western U.S. climate, conservation, and environmental justice advocacy issues.
- Lived experience within or past work in partnership with frontline or resource-dependent communities is a significant plus.
- A commitment to conceptualizing and implementing digital communications strategies that further equity, inclusion, and justice, including through the just treatment and meaningful involvement of clients, partners, and frontline community groups and individuals.
- Excellent writing skills and knowledge of AP style.
- Experience with:
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- Social media (primarily Facebook and Instagram) content generation and campaigns including messaging using an organization’s voice, targeting, A/B testing, metrics analysis, strategic advertising, and executing the respective best practices for these platforms. Experience with LinkedIn and Bluesky preferred.
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- Collaborating with partners and clients to create social media posts and carry out joint campaigns, including coordinating messaging, timing and collaborative posting.
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- Creating social media graphics and data-based infographics. Design skills with Canva/Adobe Creative Suite strongly desired.
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- Creating basic video content.
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- Website content management systems (we use WordPress), including search engine optimization and Google Analytics a plus.
- Solid project and time management skills with strong ability to work independently and proactively, both in online and in-person settings.
- Highly organized and intellectually curious.
- Willingness to be flexible and adaptive when needed.
- Demonstrated commitment to WELC’s mission and strategies and the public interest as well as a love for the land, waters, wildlife, and communities of the western U.S.
BENEFITS AND COMPENSATION
The Western Environmental Law Center is an equal opportunity employer. We offer a flexible, friendly, team-based environment with immediate opportunities to shape organizational strategies, competitive salaries ($68,000 – 75,000 for this position, depending on experience and location).
WELC offers an excellent benefits package, including health, vision, dental, life, and disability coverage (with WELC paying 100% of an employee’s premiums), a 401(k) retirement plan with a 4% WELC match, 22 days of combined paid annual vacation and personal leave on top of 13 days of paid holiday leave, paid sick leave, and a paid long-term leave policy (3 months sabbatical leave for every 5 years of employment).
TO APPLY
Please apply at the WELC Job Board. Please include the following as a PDF attachment, preferably in one document:
- 1-2-page cover letter addressed to Brian Sweeney, Communications Director;
- Resume;
- 2-4 professional references; and
- 3-4 work samples with at least one sample of content you created for a social media campaign, one sample exemplifying experience creating web content (interactive features a plus), and one sample of graphic design for social media.
Cover letters should demonstrate the applicant’s commitment to WELC’s mission and their motivation to work in this position and public interest environmental law generally. Applicants are strongly encouraged to tell us who they are as a human being, why they care about conservation work, and why they are interested in this position.
The post CAREER OPPORTUNITY: Communications and Marketing Associate (Eugene/Portland/Santa Fe/Helena) appeared first on Western Environmental Law Center.
Skeptical Science New Research for Week #46 2026
A horizon scan of global catastrophic risks, Turchin & Green, Cell One Earth
A number of global catastrophic risks—nuclear war, pandemics, global food-system collapses, and more—threaten sustainable human life on Earth. These risks often share drivers and emerge from many interrelated factors. Which contributors to prioritize for research and policy has not yet been systematically assessed. Here, we present a horizon scan of contributors to global catastrophic risk, with an emphasis on new or neglected threats. 25 academics from diverse disciplinary backgrounds submitted 96 issues, which were then cut down to 15 priority issues through a structured expert elicitation procedure. Themes included the integration of artificial intelligence into military and security systems, fragile global trade networks, climate change impacts, and institutional failures undermining risk reduction efforts. Our findings provide a prioritized agenda for reducing global catastrophic risk that highlights the diversity of risk factors and the importance of addressing drivers that underpin numerous individual risks.
Manage derailment risks to avoid Hothouse Earth, Dyke et al., Environmental Research Letters
The risk of a ‘Hothouse Earth’ trajectory has become increasingly prominent in debates about Earth system stability and climate overshoot. Existing analyses primarily focus on biophysical feedbacks that may amplify warming beyond direct anthropogenic forcing. We argue the concept has not previously incorporated how social destabilisation lowers the effective threshold at which biophysical tipping dynamics become self-sustaining, independently of further anthropogenic forcing and so undermines the capacity for planetary stewardship. We define ‘derailment risk’ as the possibility that escalating Earth system disruption weakens the social, political, and economic conditions required to sustain mitigation, adaptation, and ecological restoration. Such risks emerge when climate impacts contribute to a wide range of challenges, including debt crises, institutional erosion, political fragmentation, supply-chain instability, and declining public support for environmental action. These reinforcing feedbacks may reduce humanity’s capacity to respond even before biophysical tipping thresholds are crossed. We therefore extend the Hothouse Earth framework by incorporating social dynamics into the Earth system stability landscape. We propose a three-stage framework for assessing and managing derailment risks: conceptual mapping of socio-biophysical feedbacks; anticipatory resilience-building interventions; responsive governance strategies for periods of escalating instability. We conclude that planetary stewardship should prioritise maintaining and expanding collective agency under worsening Earth system stress.
All IPCC AR6 regions are close to their 1.5 °C- and 2 °C-equivalent warming limits, Li et al., Nature Climate Change
Global temperatures have averaged 1.2 °C above pre-industrial levels over the past decade, yet regional warming patterns and remaining warming budgets under Paris Agreement limits remain uncertain owing to insufficient historical observations. Here we quantify and attribute warming across all IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) regions since pre-industrial times using a Bayesian framework combining multi-model simulations with observations, enabling robust estimates in data-sparse regions. Regional warming is already pronounced. By 2025, attributed regional warming had reached about 90–94% of the levels expected at 1.5 °C global warming and 65–76% of those expected at 2 °C. Attribution confidence is the highest in tropical regions, including much of Africa, where low internal variability enables robust results. Attributed warming is the greatest in northern high-latitude regions, exceeding 2.5 °C. Greenhouse gases dominate, partially offset by aerosol cooling. These results reveal that current warming is already indistinguishable from a 1.5 °C world, highlighting the shared urgency of adaptation across all regions.
Zero emissions commitment depends on warming level, Gibbs et al., Nature Climate Change
When anthropogenic CO2 emissions cease, global temperature does not stabilize immediately. The resulting global temperature change, the zero emissions commitment, is central to carbon budget assessments and understanding reversibility of global warming, yet its dependence on prior warming levels remains unclear. Here we show, using zero-emission simulations with the UK Earth System Model (UKESM1.2) across global warming levels of 1.5–5 K, that the zero emissions commitment stays near zero up to 2 K but becomes positive at higher warming levels, reaching 0.4–0.6 K after ~ 150 years. This dependence indicates that stabilizing or reversing warming becomes progressively more difficult as peak temperature rises. We identify the mechanism behind this behaviour: stronger warming from higher radiative disequilibrium and weakening carbon sinks, driven by saturated land carbon uptake and the reduced radiative impact of CO2 drawdown at higher background CO2 concentrations. Higher peak warming therefore commits the planet to additional warming, limiting temperature-overshoot reversibility.
A further acceleration of clean energy is needed for global CO2 emissions to peak and decline, Quéré et al., Nature Climate Change
Global fossil fuel CO2 emissions have grown 0.8% per year on average between 2019 and 2025. Here we project a decrease of 0.4% in 2026, probably as a short-term response to the energy shock triggered by the Iran conflict. Electric vehicles and solar and wind power offset about 64–79% of increasing emissions from demand growth through 2028; acceleration in clean technology deployment is needed to guarantee emissions peak and subsequent decline.
From this week's government/NGO section:Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet:Somalia, Seyuba et al., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
The authors focus on Somalia and the series of conflict- and climate-related issues that face the region. The authors offer a range of recommended actions for the international community to address these issues effectively. Somalia continues to grapple with increasingly severe and frequent climate shocks that impede people’s livelihoods, worsen the existing humanitarian crisis and influence local conflict dynamics over access to natural resources. In November 2025, after four consecutive failed rainy seasons had affected millions of people, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) declared a national drought emergency. Strong El Niño conditions are forecast to bring wetter-than-usual conditions during the October–December 2026 deyr rainy season, with a high risk of floods in central and southern Somalia. Some communities experience successive periods of drought and flooding without sufficient time to recover between shocks. These adverse effects of climate change are interacting with a volatile security situation, influenced by political competition and fragmentation, as well as continued clashes with al-Shabab, which contribute to deepening an already dire humanitarian crisis.No Escape III - Displaced voices from the frontlines of the climate crisis, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Millions of people across the globe continue to be forced to flee their homes because of violence, conflict, and climate-related hazards. In fact, the number of forcibly displaced people in the world today has never been higher – doubling to more than 120 million people over the past 10 years. While conflict remains the primary driver of displacement, climate change can aggravate an already devastating reality. Its effects disproportionately affect the world’s most vulnerable populations – including refugees, internally displaced people and the communities hosting them. Often lacking critical resources such as stable housing, financial security, institutional support, or access to essential services, displaced people now also struggle to prepare for, adapt or recover from disasters like floods, droughts and heatwaves. While the situation is dire, this report demonstrates sustainable solutions are within reach. Worst-case scenarios can be avoided, through integrated approaches that are climate-smart, protection- and gender-centered, human rights-based, conflict-sensitive, and peace-responsive. The report therefore concludes with a strong call to action including: PROTECT displaced people fleeing in the context of climate change impacts and disasters by applying and adapting existing legal tools, INCLUDE the voices and specific needs of displaced populations and host communities in climate finance and policy decisions, INVEST in building climate resilience where needs are greatest, especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings, and ACCELERATE the reduction of carbon emissions to prevent climate disaster and to avert and minimize further displacement. 118 articles in 61 journals by 793 contributing authorsPhysical science of climate change, effects
A moisture dynamics perspective on robust changes in characteristics of the tropical circulation under warming, Tomassini, Royal Society Open Science Open Access 10.1098/rsos.260963
Correct use of radiative efficiencies in calculating global warming potentials and other emission metrics, Collins et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-15757-2026
Enhanced influence of the North Pacific Meridional Mode on the western North Pacific tropical cyclones in a warming climate, Liu et al., Environmental Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1088/1748-9326/aebbd5
Manage derailment risks to avoid Hothouse Earth, Dyke et al., Environmental Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1088/1748-9326/aeb1de
Projected Amazon forest loss alters tropical Atlantic circulation and surface heat exchange through reduced freshwater input, Gouveia et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-79941-w
Redistribution of Light Absorption by Chlorophyll Decline Delays Warming by Up to a Decade, Meng et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jc023451
Three-way circulation–soil moisture–temperature feedbacks amplify the most extreme mid-latitudinal heat waves, Tian et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeh9111
What Sets the AMOC's Sensitivity to CO2 Forcing? The Role of Background Mean-State and Density Balance, Ferster, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.21889993
Zero emissions commitment depends on warming level, Gibbs et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access 10.1038/s41558-026-02776-w
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Comparing the Atmospheric Responses to Reduced Arctic Sea Ice, a Warmer Ocean, and Increased CO2 and Their Contributions to Projected Change at 2°C Global Warming, Journal of Climate, 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0104.1 17 cites.
buffer/PWSEObservations of climate change, effects
All IPCC AR6 regions are close to their 1.5 °C- and 2 °C-equivalent warming limits, Li et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02790-y
Climate Variability for a 150-Year (1862–2011) Meteo-Hydrological Series in the Italian Alps at Different Time Scales, Eccel & Ranzi, International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70657
Consistent Sea-Level and Energy Budget Residuals Suggest Enhanced Deep-Ocean Heat Uptake Since the Mid-2010s, Cha et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl125563
Divergent hydroclimatic responses across Eurasia: Evidence from multiple datasets and CMIP6 projections, Liu et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.11.002
Examining climate trends and extremes in Janamora District Ethiopia from 1982 to 2024, Chekol et al., Discover Sustainability Open Access 10.1007/s43621-026-05218-x
Geographical Distribution of Exposure to Fires in the United States Between 2004 and 2023, Sakka et al., GeoHealth Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gh001455
Higher prevalence of rising climate-driven snowmelt potential of rain-on-snow events in the Eastern continental US, Salvi et al., Environmental Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1088/1748-9326/aebbd2
Influence of natural and anthropogenic forcings on western US winter fire weather and the 2025 Los Angeles wildfires, Srivastava et al., Environmental Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1088/1748-9326/aeb710
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Emerging Climate Change Signals in Atmospheric Circulation, AGU Advances, 10.1029/2024av001297 72 cites.
buffer/OBMEInstrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
Daily global sea surface ageostrophic current dataset from 1993–2023 via physics-informed deep learning, Cui, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.23901901
Definition- and dataset-dependent characterization of global compound drought–heat extremes, Wu et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100972
Estimating the resilience of non-stationary systems, Smith et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78489-7
TurboMeter: an attribution framework for aviation turbulence events in a changing climate, Alberti et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/wcd-7-2229-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: A Mystery of the Inconsistency Between Microwave Polarimetric Observations and Radiative Transfer Simulations, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl111553 2 cites.
buffer/WINSModeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects
Boreal autumn to winter North Atlantic atmosphere–ocean coupling in large ensemble climate simulations, Anderson et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/wcd-7-2155-2026
Divergent hydroclimatic responses across Eurasia: Evidence from multiple datasets and CMIP6 projections, Liu et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.11.002
Extratropical Forcing of Tropical Subsurface Oxygenation Under Future Warming, Gao et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gb009285
Hailstorm responses to climate change across diverse synoptic environments in South Korea: A pseudo-global warming study, Choi et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109432
Mountains Modulate the Response of Precipitation Flashiness to Warming in High-Resolution Simulations Over the Western US, Koszuta et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125264
Near-Future Strengthening of ENSO-Related Sea Ice Variability in West Antarctica, Kim et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0028.1
Post-Fire Surface Energy Partitioning and Thermal Responses in Arctic Boreal Forests and Tundra, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125479
Recent extreme heatwaves are no match for future events, Aglas-Leitner et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76809-5
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Emergence of a climate oscillation in the Arctic Ocean due to global warming, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02171-3 18 cites.
buffer/MSWEAdvancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection
Enhanced Land-Surface Processes Sustain Evapotranspiration and Improve Tropical Climate Variability in a Coupled Earth System Model, Rajesh et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd047646
Exploring Recent Changes in Tornado Activity via an Environment-Based Tornado Count Model for CMIP6 Applications, Malloy et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0441.1
Forcing dataset updates impact regional but not global Earth radiation budget trends in the GFDL AM4 climate model, Wang et al., Advances in Atmospheric Sciences 10.1007/s00376-006-0431-5
Performance of Earth System Models in Representing Vegetation Functional Response to Heat and Water Stresses, Chen et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jg009423
The Impact of Lakes in North American Regional Climate Simulations, Mahdinia et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0146.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: An extensible perturbed parameter ensemble for the Community Atmosphere Model version 6, Geoscientific model development, 10.5194/gmd-17-7835-2024 62 cites.
buffer/GCMACryosphere & climate change
A Prospective Cooling Machine for the Svalbard Branch of Norwegian Atlantic Water in a Future Climate, Wu et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef009526
Higher prevalence of rising climate-driven snowmelt potential of rain-on-snow events in the Eastern continental US, Salvi et al., Environmental Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1088/1748-9326/aebbd2
Ice–ocean albedo feedback as a key mechanism driving recent Antarctic summer sea-ice decline, Nihashi & Ohshima, Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-70282-2
Impact of Wildfire-Emitted Black Carbon on Snowmelt Across Western North America, Jaisawal et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046919
Loss of snow persistence during late season drives snow-season shortening in Northeast China under global warming, Xiao et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04156-w
No Longer Polar Opposites: The Arctic and the Antarctic Are Converging toward a Seasonally Dominated Sea Ice Regime, Spira et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society Open Access 10.1175/bams-d-25-0340.1
Vanishing Winters and Shrinking Ice: Ecosystem Services and Societal Impacts in the Laurentian Great Lakes, Xenopoulos et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef009213
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Sensitivity of the future evolution of the Wilkes Subglacial Basin ice sheet to grounding-line melt parameterizations, The Cryosphere, 10.5194/tc-18-5117-2024 9 cites.
buffer/CRYOSea level & climate change
Forecasting legal coastline based on highest astronomical tide as a predictive model for land–sea integration, Setiyadi et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-79942-9
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The curve: An ethnography of projecting sea level rise under uncertainty, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102947 5 cites.
buffer/SLCCPaleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
Early pliocene warming and ocean circulation: Non-linear responses to CO2 and Central American Seaway changes in HadCM3, Tindall et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105788
Elevated early Eocene atmospheric CO2 tied to reduced Southern Ocean biological pump efficiency, Moretti et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-02142-7
Glacial abrupt transitions in ocean circulation were much slower than ice-core records imply, Dong et al., Science 10.1126/science.aed4270
Repeated loss of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet’s Amundsen Sea sector during late Pleistocene interglacials, Hillenbrand et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77004-2
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Coupled decline in ocean pH and carbonate saturation during the Palaeocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01579-y 31 cites.
buffer/PCIMBiology & climate change, related geochemistry
Behavioural Plasticity Is Associated With Climate Tracking in Birds, Yu et al., Global Ecology and Biogeography Open Access pdf 10.1111/geb.70327
Climate change threatens ecosystem services: Global assessment of urban forest vulnerability, Wang & ?, Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103170
Climate Warming Reduces Seed Mass in European Beech Through Altered Resource Dynamics and Drought, Bogdziewicz et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71196
Climate-driven compositional shifts across a temperate–subtropical island ecotone, Kim & Jung, Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08884
Climate-Driven Oceanographic Changes Shape Larval Dispersal Success in the Southern Ocean, Ouzoulias et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71168
Combining satellite-derived standing deadwood estimates and vegetation modelling to predict climate change impacts on Norway spruce forests in Germany, Anders et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111581
Dissolution and Heterotrophy at a Florida Coral Reef One Year After Severe Bleaching, Morris et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jc024333
Do Leaf Temperatures Determine Endophyte Composition and Richness in Florida Native Plant Species?, Tserej et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.74615
Marine Heatwave and Extreme Hypoxia Coincide With Rapid Coral Bleaching and Mortality on a Central Red Sea Coral Reef, Klein et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.74606
Projected Climate Change Impacts on Deep-Sea Corals of the Red Sea, Nolan et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71169
Revealing the Widespread Bias of Extinction Risk in the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean, Farrant et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71170
Stony coral symbioses show variable responses to future ocean conditions, Souza et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed4599
Temporal dynamics and season-dependent warming responses of reactive soil silicon fractions in a subtropical oak forest, Cheng et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.2018571
Thermal baselines and climate-space geometry mediate systematic terrestrial biodiversity responses to warming, Gao et al., Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08765
Thermal ecology drives alternate responses to rising temperatures in Caribbean anoles, Domínguez-Guerrero et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2537152123
Using Artificial Intelligence to Optimize Ecological Restoration for Climate and Biodiversity, Silvestro et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71165
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Contributions of ecological restoration policies to China’s land carbon balance, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-54100-9 115 cites.
buffer/BIOWGHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry
A national baseline for methane sink habitats and methanotroph diversity, Knudsen et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-79316-9
Correct use of radiative efficiencies in calculating global warming potentials and other emission metrics, Collins et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-15757-2026
Dual Constraints of Microbial Carbon Use Efficiency and Mineral Protection Govern Necromass Accrual, Xiao et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71162
Elevated CO2 mitigated warming-enhanced carbon loss from northern peatland, Zhou et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aek1491
Emissions Poised to Rocket: Modeling the Environmental Impacts of Low Earth Orbit Satellite Constellations, Kukreja et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef006511
Global Carbon Budget 2026, Zhao et al., Global and Planetary Change Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2021.103542
Nocturnal Trapping of Agricultural Emissions Drives Persistent Methane Enhancements at the Southern Great Plains, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd047976
Past fire use in deforested land limits secondary forest carbon gains in Amazonia with implications for emissions reduction goals, Haddad et al., Carbon Balance and Management Open Access 10.1186/s13021-026-00542-1
Precipitation-driven plant community stability enhances wetland net ecosystem CO2 exchange, Song et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111592
Projection of the Status and Future Shifts of Topsoil Organic Carbon Stocks in Northern Hemisphere Permafrost Regions: Patterns and Drivers, Wang et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef007478
Quantifying the near-term response of the ocean CO2 sink to reduced atmospheric carbon concentrations, Ogden, BioScience 10.1525/bio.2013.63.5.3
Regional land carbon shifts strengthen atmospheric carbon dioxide–land carbon flux coupling, Luo et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02136-5
Restored but Still Emitting: High CO2 Fluxes From a Mediterranean Wetland Challenge Inundation-Based Restoration Strategies, Helman et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009794
Snowpack decouples thermal and hydrologic regimes of coarse woody material from the winter atmosphere in northern hardwood forests, Woodall et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111588
Sparing use of phosphorus in an acidifying ocean, Li et al., Progress In Oceanography 10.1016/j.pocean.2018.08.001
Tropospheric oxidation chemistry and methane growth: a process-based attribution of OH variability (2003–2022), Gaubert et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-15683-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Dynamic Responses of Soil Organic Carbon to Urbanization: A Global Perspective, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17573 26 cites.
buffer/GHSSCO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
Enhanced weathering of glacial rock flour drives coupled inorganic and organic carbon sequestration in a five-year field experiment, Dietzen et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-7727-2026
Experimental Evidence of Reaction-Driven Fracturing and Ultramafic Rock Weakening Induced by CO2 Mineralization, Wood et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124491
Managing risk in carbon portfolios, Lee et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02785-9
Mediation of soil aggregate stability and carbon sequestration by meadow steppe soil microorganisms under long-term nitrogen and phosphorus nutrient additions, Wu et al., Soil Ecology Letters 10.1007/s42832-026-0473-9
The carbon at risk measure for managing carbon removal risk and guiding portfolio construction, Lee et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02785-9
Urban Development Impacts on Ecosystem Services: Modeling and Valuation of Carbon Storage in the Tehran Metropolis, Malekzadeh et al., International Journal of Environmental Research 10.1007/s41742-026-01291-2
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Tree planting is no climate solution at northern high latitudes, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01573-4 42 cites.
buffer/CENGDecarbonization
A new iron age? The potential role of iron fuel in Europe’s clean energy transition, Schuler et al., Chem Circularity Open Access 10.1016/j.checir.2026.100047
Bridge fuels and climate policy integration: The case of low-carbon hydrogen in the European Union, Bruch, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115688
Decadal variability reveals contrasts in solar-resource stability across China, Meng et al., Environmental Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1088/1748-9326/aebbd8
Harnessing India's wind and solar potential: A spatially optimized transition pathway to 2050, Krishna et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115702
Retrofit: The Fast Track to Hydrogen in Short-sea Shipping, Rosenberg et al., MTZ worldwide 10.1007/s38313-026-2267-y
Solar photovoltaics and hydrogen energy as pathways to a sustainable future, Yusuf et al., Chemical Papers 10.1007/s11696-026-05692-7
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Current-Day and Future Dunkelflaute Risks for Belgium, Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology, 10.1175/jamc-d-24-0007.1 12 cites.
buffer/DCRBGeoengineering climate
Revisiting the additionality and durability of carbon uptake in large-scale ocean iron fertilization, Noh et al., Science Advances Open Access pdf 10.1126/sciadv.aed1631
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Mapping the global variation in the efficiency of ocean alkalinity enhancement for carbon dioxide removal, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02179-9 91 cites.
buffer/GENGBlack carbon
Impact of Wildfire-Emitted Black Carbon on Snowmelt Across Western North America, Jaisawal et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046919
Aerosols
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: CREST: a Climate Data Record of Stratospheric Aerosols, Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-5227-2024 20 cites.
buffer/AESOClimate change communications & cognition
Exploring advocacy of Dutch government climate researchers: an interview study, Koppelaar et al., Geoscience Communication Open Access pdf 10.5194/gc-9-525-2026
More than just a one-hit-wonder? analyzing the meso level institutionalization of the climate movement in Germany (2019–2025), Laux, Environmental Sociology Open Access pdf 10.1080/23251042.2026.2759817
When Scientific Uncertainty is Linked to Lower Information Avoidance: Motivational Pathways to Public Engagement With Climate Risk Information, Hong, Risk Analysis Open Access pdf 10.1111/risa.70411
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Communicating consensus among climate scientists increases estimates of consensus and belief in human-caused climate change across the globe, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 10.1016/j.jenvp.2024.102480 12 cites.
buffer/CSCCAgronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change
Assessing rural household food security in flood-prone areas: An integrated FAO–IPCC framework-based analysis in Iran, Radshirali-Bolati et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100912
Farmers’ everyday political work at the nexus of climate and conflict in Eastern DR Congo, Baker et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2754752
Nocturnal Trapping of Agricultural Emissions Drives Persistent Methane Enhancements at the Southern Great Plains, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd047976
Spatiotemporal variations of carbon-water-hydraulic risk for Pinus tabuliformis Carrière Plantations on the Loess Plateau under future climate change, Guo et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-7871-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Changes in the Yield Effect of the Preceding Crop in the US Corn Belt Under a Warming Climate, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17556 15 cites.
buffer/AGCCHydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change
Climate Change Forces Hydrological Regime Shifts in Australian Wetlands, John et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef007857
Record warmth in the Sea of Japan amplified the September 2024 Noto heavy rainfall associated with a mesoscale low-pressure disturbance, Shimoda & Sugimoto, Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-79294-4
Tree Rings Indicate Potential for Severe Soil Moisture Drought in California Is Much Greater Than Observations Suggest, Jones & Williams, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125616
Climate change economics
Count the climate losses we prevent, A, Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-79128-x
From the 2026 Hormuz disruption to renewable resilience: energy security and decarbonization governance in import-dependent economies, Levi & Barnett-Itzhaki, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1985153
From the 2026 Hormuz disruption to renewable resilience: energy security and decarbonization governance in import-dependent economies, Levi & Barnett-Itzhaki, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1985153
Managing risk in carbon portfolios, Lee et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02785-9
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Fission for funds: The financing of nuclear power plants, Energy Policy, 10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114382 32 cites.
buffer/ECCCClimate change mitigation public policy research
Cost-effective climate change mitigation through land sector contributions, Grossi et al., Animal Frontiers Open Access pdf 10.1093/af/vfy034
Latin America's governance of the energy transition: Why some policy mixes succeed and most stall, Velástegui, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104999
Policy bundling and the political economy of climate policymaking, Bernards, Development and Change Open Access pdf 10.1111/dech.12788
The impact of the Swiss CO2 levy on residential heating emissions and energy demand, Schäfer, Energy Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115696
Urban thermal environment and carbon emissions in an arid urban agglomeration: spatial mismatch and cross-city variation in NDBI contribution thresholds, Abulizi et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103211
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Participation in Energy Transitions: A Comparison of Policy Styles, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103743 119 cites.
buffer/GPCCClimate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research
AI-Enabled Climate and Environmental Resilience in Cities: Technical Progress and Network Expansion, Tang et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-26-0311.1
Inclusive climate adaptation through intersectional co-production: gender- and disability-disaggregated evidence from southern Africa, Vincent et al., Climate and Development Open Access pdf 10.1080/17565529.2026.2754757
Intersectionality and Climate Adaptation Justice: A Systematic-Narrative Review, Rublee et al., The Journal of Climate Change and Health Open Access 10.1016/j.joclim.2023.100209
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The Promise of Resistance: A New Lens for Climate Change Adaptation Research and Practice, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.922 32 cites.
buffer/CCADClimate change impacts on human health
A vulnerability-informed framework for assessing annual-scale heatwave–mortality association in China, Wu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105793
Climate Indices and Atmospheric Circulation Patterns Linked to East Asian Summer Wet-Bulb Temperatures, ??? et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70650
Support for climate-health adaptation policy among German citizens: The role and limits of trust in government and scientists, Groeve & Prettenthaler, Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103282
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Hot and cold: Policy perspectives on overheating and cooling in United Kingdom homes, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103803 17 cites.
buffer/CCHHClimate change & geopolitics
Arrow's shadow over climate governance, George, Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2753246
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Climate migration management? Contrasting international policy approaches with evidence from Ghana, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2411326 6 cites.
buffer/CCGPClimate change impacts on human culture
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Spatiotemporal changes in tourism climate comfort in Sichuan Province from 1961 to 2022, International Journal of Climatology, 10.1002/joc.8626 3 cites.
buffer/HDGWOther
Environmental justice asymmetries in carbon management research, Nobar et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.34926014
From carbon footprint to climate lifeprint: Comparison and accounting model for ultra-rich social influencers, Salekpay & Bergh, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.105075
Multi-centennial ocean biogeochemical responses to extended Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, Kobayashi et al., Biogeosciences Open Access 10.5194/bg-23-7807-2026
Tropopause shift during the ozone transition in multiple reanalyses over East Antarctica, Wu et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109437
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Gender-based climate (in)justice: An overview, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103934 18 cites.
buffer/OTHRInformed opinion, nudges & major initiatives
A further acceleration of clean energy is needed for global CO2 emissions to peak and decline, Quéré et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02821-8
A horizon scan of global catastrophic risks, Turchin & Green, Cell One Earth 10.1108/fs-04-2018-0031
Manage derailment risks to avoid Hothouse Earth, Dyke et al., Environmental Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1088/1748-9326/aeb1de
Start cryosphere flood warnings at the source, Song, Science 10.1126/science.ael8929
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Planetary Boundaries guide humanity’s future on Earth, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00597-z 276 cites.
Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate ChangeClimate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Somalia, Seyuba et al., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
The authors focus on Somalia and the series of conflict- and climate-related issues that face the region. The authors offer a range of recommended actions for the international community to address these issues effectively. Somalia continues to grapple with increasingly severe and frequent climate shocks that impede people’s livelihoods, worsen the existing humanitarian crisis and influence local conflict dynamics over access to natural resources. In November 2025, after four consecutive failed rainy seasons had affected millions of people, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) declared a national drought emergency. Strong El Niño conditions are forecast to bring wetter-than-usual conditions during the October–December 2026 deyr rainy season, with a high risk of floods in central and southern Somalia. Some communities experience successive periods of drought and flooding without sufficient time to recover between shocks. These adverse effects of climate change are interacting with a volatile security situation, influenced by political competition and fragmentation, as well as continued clashes with al-Shabab, which contribute to deepening an already dire humanitarian crisis.The Case for a Public Renewable Energy Developer in New York City, Jason Kowalski and Johanna Bozuwa, Climate and Community Institute
The climate crisis has reached New York City. As record-breaking heat and storms strain the City’s infrastructure, utility costs burden working class New Yorkers. By establishing a public renewable energy developer, the City can deliver meaningful affordability benefits to all New Yorkers, create good union jobs, and offer a practical model for climate action that can be replicated nationwide. PowerNYC Development Corporation (PowerNYC), a public renewable energy developer, would be a financially self-sustaining engine of decarbonization that delivers clean energy projects including distributed battery storage, distributed solar, and thermal energy networks (TENs) at no upfront cost to New Yorkers. PowerNYC can deliver substantial citywide affordability benefits across its portfolio of projects. Examining battery storage alone, the authors found that an initial deployment of 200 MW of publicly developed distributed batteries could save New York City ratepayers at least $170 million per year.California Wildfire 2026: Emerging Trends & Policy Insights, Ahumada-Paras et al., Stanford Climate & Energy Policy Program
The authors provide a broad view of California’s ongoing wildfire crisis, detailing direct effects, such as lives lost and homes destroyed, as well as downstream effects, such as higher electricity bills, insurance premiums and smoke exposure. Among the takeaways: big investments in safer communities and fire-resilient landscapes to reduce future losses are key to durable and affordable solutions.Global benefits and costs of prioritized actions on climate change and health, Campbell-Lendrum et al., World Health Organization
The authors present a global assessment of the health, environmental and economic benefits and costs of scaling up six prioritized climate–health actions. Using a welfare economic approach, they evaluate heat–health warning systems, climate-resilient drinking-water, basic sanitation and hand hygiene, cleaner household energy sources, and fiscal policies to efficiently price fossil fuels. The analysis quantifies potential reductions in mortality and greenhouse gas emissions, economic benefits, implementation costs and returns on investment across countries and regions. The authors indicate that scaling up these interventions could avert approximately 1.6 million deaths annually, prevent 17 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions and generate economic benefits of approximately US$ 4 trillion and fiscal benefits of approximately US$ 5 trillion annually. For the five interventions assessed through benefit–cost analysis, estimated benefits amount to US$ 24 for every US$ 1 invested. Despite uncertainties associated with long-term projections and ambitious scale-up scenarios, the authors provide quantitative evidence to inform the prioritization, financing and implementation of climate–health actions worldwide.No Escape III - Displaced voices from the frontlines of the climate crisis, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Millions of people across the globe continue to be forced to flee their homes because of violence, conflict, and climate-related hazards. In fact, the number of forcibly displaced people in the world today has never been higher – doubling to more than 120 million people over the past 10 years. While conflict remains the primary driver of displacement, climate change can aggravate an already devastating reality. Its effects disproportionately affect the world’s most vulnerable populations – including refugees, internally displaced people and the communities hosting them. Often lacking critical resources such as stable housing, financial security, institutional support, or access to essential services, displaced people now also struggle to prepare for, adapt or recover from disasters like floods, droughts and heatwaves. While the situation is dire, this report demonstrates sustainable solutions are within reach. Worst-case scenarios can be avoided, through integrated approaches that are climate-smart, protection- and gender-centered, human rights-based, conflict-sensitive, and peace-responsive. The report therefore concludes with a strong call to action including: PROTECT displaced people fleeing in the context of climate change impacts and disasters by applying and adapting existing legal tools, INCLUDE the voices and specific needs of displaced populations and host communities in climate finance and policy decisions, INVEST in building climate resilience where needs are greatest, especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings, and ACCELERATE the reduction of carbon emissions to prevent climate disaster and to avert and minimize further displacement.Renewables 2026. Analysis and forecasts to 2031, The International Energy Agency
Renewables 2026 is the IEA's main annual report on the sector, covering hydropower, solar, wind, geothermal, biofuels and biogases. The authors present the latest forecasts and analysis, based on recent policy and market developments, while also exploring key challenges and opportunities facing the renewables sector. This year’s edition provides forecasts for the deployment of renewable energy technologies across electricity systems, transport, heating and biogases through 2031. The authors also examines the energy security implications of key trends, policy changes, the manufacturing of renewable technologies, and the financial health of different parts of the industry. Renewables are already delivering major energy security benefits. Without their growth since 2010, global annual demand for fossil fuels would have been around 8% higher in 2025, an amount equivalent to India’s total energy consumption. Renewables have also displaced natural gas consumption equivalent to 11% of global demand. This has lowered the influence of gas-fired power plants on wholesale electricity prices and helped limit price increases during the crisis in many countries. In addition, the growth of biofuels and other renewables since 2010 has displaced 2.4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day – comparable to Canada’s total oil demandLandscape Assessment: EU Food Security and Climate Resilience, Tristan Norman, Center for Climate and Security
The European Union’s food security is increasingly threatened by the convergence of climate change, geopolitical instability, and vulnerabilities across global supply chains and critical infrastructure networks. While the European Union has made progress in strengthening preparedness and crisis response, significant gaps remain in policy coordination, policy and operational readiness, and national implementation. The author presents a landscape assessment of EU food security and climate resilience policies, along with a current overview of resilience efforts by key EU Member States. The author reveals a Europe of diverging capacities and preparedness levels across food security and climate resilience policies. However, an enabling policy environment is emerging.COP30 Presidency Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Energy Systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science, COP 30 Brasil Amazonia, Belem
Announced at the closing plenary of COP30 in Belém, the Roadmap was developed through broad international consultations. The Roadmap is a voluntary, non-prescriptive contribution from the COP30 Presidency. The Roadmap outlines three proposals for advancing implementation: encouraging countries, subnational governments and sectors to start now, using the Belém Readiness Approach to assess their circumstances and identify priorities; launching a collective agenda to accelerate coordinated action in this critical decade, through 2033; and sustaining international dialogue and cooperation, including through future COP Presidencies and the Global Stocktake, to assess progress and address shared implementation challenges. This COP30 Presidency Roadmap concludes that transitioning away from fossil fuels is urgent, inevitable and yet possible, and that every country can begin taking action, regardless of its starting point.The Storage Solution: How Batteries Can Enhance Grid Reliability, Affordability, and Decarbonization in the Data Center Era, Nate Burnand and Ian Hitchcock, Georgetown Climate Center, the Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment and Sustainability at Duke University, and the Deep Tech Initiative at Duke’s Sanford School of Public Policy
The authors suggest that widespread deployment of energy storage systems, including batteries, has the potential to alleviate some of the major challenges associated with data centers and other large electric loads. However, the benefits of energy storage will only be realized with an enabling policy environment that recognizes the values that batteries and other energy storage systems can provide to the grid, including state-level policy.Advisory Parameters for Arctic Climate Intervention Assessments. A framework for assessing climate interventions in the Arctic, Philip Steinberg & Romain Chuffart, Durham University and Arctic Studies at the University of Akureyri
Proposals to intervene in the Arctic climate have multiplied in recent years and the scientific literature on their feasibility is now substantial. Questions of who should evaluate Arctic climate interventions, against what standards, and with whose consent, remain however largely unanswered. The authors set out parameters for designing an assessment instrument. While it is not intended as a toolkit, the toolkit can serve as a bridge between the statements of geoengineering principles that have accumulated since 2009 and the practicable assessment tools that will eventually be needed.LNG in Maritime Decarbonisation, Nesrine Souissi, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
The author asks what structural role LNG will play in maritime decarbonization. Drawing on an assessment of regulatory developments, fleet investment, and infrastructure convertibility, supported by an illustrative comparison of penalty-inclusive fuel costs against e-ammonia, e-methanol, and e-methane, the author found that LNG retains a compliance advantage, but that this advantage is narrowing. For vessels at the FuelEU default intensity for Otto-cycle engines, LNG costs including policy penalties could overtake e-fuel costs in the early-to-mid 2030s, depending on e-fuel cost assumptions. However, the crossover is highly sensitive to vessel trading pattern, engine technology and methane-slip performance, and remains conditional on unresolved regulatory design choices around methane’s global warming potential and the International Maritime Organization’s zero/near-zero reward mechanism. The longer-term outcome will also depend on whether the capital currently flowing into LNG infrastructure is used to prolong the commercial life of LNG or to accelerate the methane-based pathway to non-fossil alternatives, such as biomethane and e-methane.Community Resilience as a Strategic Asset: Strengthening Arctic Sovereignty and Defence Readiness in a Climate Changed North, Hosken et al., The Conference of Defence Associations Institute
Canada’s North is warming far faster than the global average, and the resulting coastal erosion, flooding, permafrost thaw, and wildfires are outpacing the civilian systems meant to manage them. Federal response has increasingly defaulted to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF): Operation LENTUS activations have broadly doubled every five years since 2010, and the CAF has shifted from last resort to routine backstop. This dependency is a defence and security problem, not only an emergency management one: repeated military substitution imposes readiness and opportunity costs while suppressing the local capacity that most determines disaster outcomes. Drawing on disaster research, parliamentary and departmental evidence, Nordic total defence practice, and Canadian Arctic policy sources, the authors treat community-level resilience as a strategic asset: in the Arctic, everyday presence sustains jurisdiction more durably than episodic demonstrations of force. The authors assess the hazard landscape, the limits of the current approach, the contribution of social capital and Indigenous leadership, and available science and technology enablers, then adapts Nordic total defence lessons to Canadian geography, federalism, and reconciliation commitments. The authors set out seven five-year recommendations: strengthen hazard monitoring and adaptive infrastructure; rebalance the CAF’s role through a whole-of-community surge mechanism; invest in Indigenous-led resilience hubs and governance; strengthen social capital and volunteer networks; expand community access to locally usable science and technology, with improved connectivity and digital literacy; improve coordination through a northern-focused governance mechanism informed by Nordic practices; and sustain sovereignty by investing in housing, services, and stable population presence.Stop Big Tech's Climate Destruction, Newell et al., Climate Action Against Disinformation
The authors detail what policymakers can do about Big Tech’s betrayal of its' climate goals in pursuit of AI as the total reported electricity consumption of Amazon, Microsoft, and Google has risen 240%, resulting in 2.4 times more pollution than their targets, an estimated collective 311 megatons of carbon dioxide equivalent between 2022 and 2025. Google’s unadjusted emissions were more than 4 times bigger than their target, going over by 304%. Google overshot its' emissions target for 2022-2025 by 71 MTCO2-e, which is 23,610 more, or 24 times greater than it claims to have avoided through its AI-assisted ‘contrail avoidance’ for aircraft. Microsoft’s emissions were 2.5 times bigger than their target, exceeding their pollution goal by 150%. Microsoft missed its' target by 63 MTCO2-e, which is 630 times greater than the expected emissions reductions from a sustainable aviation fuel transaction touted in its latest sustainability report. Amazon’s emissions were double their target, 110% over their commitment and the largest of Big Tech’s compared emissions by volume. The authors found that “once operational, a single Amazon data center will in one year wipe out the efforts of signatories to the ‘climate pledge’ 22 times over.” If they stay on this course, by 2030 Google, Meta and Amazon will emit 381 megatons of carbon dioxide equivalent, 12.5 times larger than their 2030 targets and nearly the total annual emissions of Iraq.Climate change-driven extreme heat, occupational health and productivity: A need for human-centered policy in the UK, Addison et al., Extreme Heat in the Workplace Steering Group
The authors examine the effects of extreme heat on workers, occupational health and productivity. The authors specifically focus on how physiological research and insights can inform policies to prevent heat-related health impacts. They conclude with recommendations for the UK Government on how it can make better progress to protect the health, wellbeing and productivity of the workforce from the impacts of extreme heat.What happens in Vegas should inform the rest of the country: Lessons learned from Nevada’s heat complaints database, Alahmad et al., Natural Resources Defense Council
The authors explore the limitations of Nevada's workplace heat standard, particularly its' lack of specific temperature thresholds for implementing protective measures. Instead, employers are required to assess heat-related hazards and determine appropriate protections. The analysis places Nevada's approach within the broader context of occupational heat regulations in the United States, where protections vary significantly between states and no federal heat standard had been adopted at the time of publication. The findings challenge Nevada’s approach, which does not set temperature thresholds and leaves employers to decide when heat protections are needed. The authors suggest that clear thresholds are feasible and align with those used in several other state standards. Complaints are indicators of reported hazards, not a complete count of heat-related illness or injury; workers who fear retaliation or face other barriers may not report, and the dataset does not represent all workplace exposures.Plan de Accion Olas de Calor (Heat Wave Action Plan)(Argentina), Municipalidad de Córdoba, Municipalidad de Córdoba (Argentina)
The second edition of Córdoba’s municipal Heat Wave Action Plan builds on the city’s first plan and aims to make heat preparedness a long-term local policy rather than a one-season response. It sets out how the municipality prevents, anticipates and responds to extreme heat, including a local heat-wave threshold, colour-coded alert levels linked to Argentina’s national early warning system, and a coordinated response across city departments. The plan focuses on people most at risk, such as older adults living alone, children, outdoor workers and people in inadequate housing. It also covers public communication, cooling and hydration spaces, tree planting and shade, and the need to coordinate across the wider metropolitan area.WHO Global Preparedness and Response to El Niño-Related Public Health Risks and Emergencies - Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan, World Health Organization
The authors set out WHO’s global strategy and operational framework for October 2026–September 2027. They translate WHO’s Grade 3 response into coordinated action across headquarters, Regional Offices and Country Offices, while supporting nationally led preparedness and response. The plan is structured around four strategic objectives: Detection and Monitoring; Protection and Prevention; Care and Support; and Health Leadership and Coordination, implemented through an Anticipate–Mitigate–Respond approach driven by local risks, triggers and operational deadlines. It prioritizes anticipatory action, continuity of essential health services, protection of vulnerable populations, climate-informed surveillance, preparedness, logistics and coordinated support to Member States. The initial resource requirement is approximately US$35 million, covering the first six-month operational period, with the plan designed to be reviewed and adapted as the El Niño risk picture evolves.Burning Questions Series: A Decision-maker’s Guide to Heat and Health, Ebi et al., Global Heat Health Information Network
This series of two-page guides answers key policy-relevant guiding questions from the Extreme Heat and Health: Global Evidence for Action report (in press). The report is the result of the invaluable contributions of experts and reviewers from around the world who worked on its development, provided technical content and participated in the peer review process.Energy transition outlook 2026-27, Sharma et al., Wood Mackenzie
For governments and businesses, the challenge is no longer simply how quickly to decarbonize. It is how to balance security, affordability, resilience and sustainability in an increasingly fragmented world. The authors reveal an important consequence: energy security and decarbonization do not always pull in opposite directions. As countries seek to reduce dependence on imported fuels, greater electrification, renewables, nuclear, storage and domestic infrastructure can strengthen energy security while lowering emissions as a by-product. But there is no single path ahead. Three nations account for over half of power demand growth over the next three decades, led by technology and data center load in the US and rising incomes in India and China. Chokepoint disruptions demonstrate how geopolitical shocks cascade beyond price spikes into physical shortages. Demand rises for fossil fuels in Growth First scenario, while other scenarios see a shift from oil and gas towards renewables and nuclear. Near-term expansion is anchored by industrial load and data centers, placing global power demand on track to reach 71 PWh by 2060 in our base case.UN Women fact sheet on ‘Gender Equality in the Age of Climate Crisis’, UN Women
Climate change is intensifying inequalities and reshaping the lives of women and girls across the world, particularly in climate hotspots where high climate exposure, precarious livelihoods, and gender inequality intersect. Drawing on new evidence from Progress of the World's Women 2026: Gender Equality in the Age of Climate Crisis, to be published in 2027, the authors of this fact sheet show how unequal patterns of wealth, consumption, and emissions fuel a crisis whose greatest costs fall on those least responsible. At the same time, they demonstrate how feminist climate justice can drive a gender-just transition that strengthens resilience, expands access to quality jobs, and accelerates climate action. The authors then set out priorities for transformative adaptation, gender-responsive climate finance, stronger social protection systems, and investments in care to advance a more equal and sustainable future for people and the planet. About New ResearchClick here for the why and how of Skeptical Science New Research.
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Pacific leaves empty handed from COP31 “pledging event” for new fund
Australia’s much-anticipated session to help Pacific nations lift off a new regional fund went by without a single new cent pledged, despite it being a key moment to achieve its target of $500 million promised by the end of the year.
In only a year since its adoption, the island states have operationalised the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF) – a regional fund that disburses small grants directly to local communities. The fund has approved 14 projects so far, including on water security, coastal restoration, renewable energy and community resilience.
The fund was launched in May seeking to enhance the region’s access to international finance, as large climate funds tend to have red tape which is hard for small governments, like those in the Pacific, to overcome. Palau’s president Surangel Whipps Jr said at the event that the PRF “bridges the gap in global finance”.
Yet at the pledging session – where developed countries were expected to ramp up their pledges to close the gap on the $500-million target – none of the participating countries announced new money. The Minderoo Foundation announced $5 million.
The Netherlands ($1m), the UK (£10m or $13m), Canada (CAD$7.5m or US$5m) and Ireland (€5.6m or $6.2m) all announced pledges they had already publicly announced before, leaving the total amount in the PRF pot at over $200 million – a gap of about $300m in this year’s target.
Fiji’s minister of Foreign Affairs Sakiasi Ditoka told Climate Home News after the event that he is still hopeful that developed countries will announce new funds by the end of COP31, either by getting commitments from new nations or ramping up commitments from existing donors.
“I believe that we have pulled on some heartstrings and that maybe helps them make their decision, maybe increasing their contributions if they’ve already given,” he said. “Even if not, we will press on ahead.”
The largest donors to the fund are Australia (US$67m) and Saudi Arabia (US$50m). Speaking at the event, Australia Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said “the PRF matters because it connects global finance with local action” and urged other nations to join.
Other developing countries have pledged to the fund, including Taiwan ($3m) and China ($1m). Some Pacific islands have pledged funds themselves, including Fiji ($10m) and Solomon Islands ($1m).
“We are putting our own skin in the game. We are investing in our own future,” said Whipps Jr during the pledging session.
The post Pacific leaves empty handed from COP31 “pledging event” for new fund appeared first on Climate Home News.
Reno nurses to protest the abrupt closure of oncology unit
COP31: How Ed Miliband answered Carbon Brief readers’ questions
UK foreign secretary and COP veteran Ed Miliband spoke with Carbon Brief earlier today at COP31 in Antalya, Turkey, to answer readers’ questions.
Carbon Brief readers submitted questions via CB Connect on topics including the UK’s “climate leadership”, the COP31 electrification target, as well as the roadmaps on deforestation and fossil fuels.
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Despite recent criticism over the approval of the Jackdaw gas field, Miliband argued that the UK is still seen as a climate leader, due to its “ambitious targets on net-zero”.
Pushing back on a question about COP reform, Miliband explained how he is “quite pro the institution of the COP”, given its role in bringing countries together for climate action.
He emphasised the importance of action on methane and the UK’s “support” for the “35×35” electrification pledge.
Carbon Brief: Well, thanks very much for joining us. I know you’re very busy and we’ve got some reader questions. It’s great that you’ve got time to answer some.
Ed Miliband: Can I just say how much I love Carbon Brief?
CB: Thanks. Lovely to hear.
EM: Like, comment and subscribe!
CB: How, in your experience at COP31 so far, has the UK’s decision to approve the Jackdaw gas field and the rumoured rollback of its EV targets affected the UK’s standing as a climate leader?
EM: People see us as showing leadership. People don’t see us as rolling back, and I think what people see is a government that is driving the agenda on electrification and clean power. Because after all, we have a clean power 2030 target, which is world-leading.
[We] have the most ambitious targets on net-zero, the [nationally determined contributions] NDCs, of frankly, any country in the world. [We] are legislating for no new oil and gas licences.
And what I’m trying to do here is also bring a new dimension to this, which is the whole national security dimension. Because I think, if you’re serious about national security, you need to be serious about climate. And those parties – and those people – who aren’t serious about climate, I don’t think they’re serious about national security. Because this is a national security issue for, I think – frankly – every government across the world.
So I think, look, people see British leadership. People are looking forward to our [presidency of the] G20 [in 2027], where climate resilience [and] debt development will be central to the agenda as well.
CB: Are you confident that the UK can still meet its 2030 NDC target [to cut emissions 68% below 1990 levels]?
EM: Absolutely, we’re going to go all out to meet it. I think that’s so important, and that is the whole principle of the NDCs, is [that] you drive towards seeking to meet them. Obviously, it’s stretching. We inherited, from 2024, a difficult situation from the previous government, but we’re going to go all out to do what we can.
CB: Great. With the UK and other developed countries facing increasing fiscal pressures, how can you go about ensuring developing countries receive the financial and technical support that they need?
EM: Look, I think the biggest thing we need to do, cognisant of those fiscal pressures and the situation facing developing countries, is multilateral development bank (MDB) reform. So making sure that the MDBs work to the maximum for developing countries.
There’s lots of evidence out there and I was speaking about this at the World Bank annual meetings about the fact that the MDBs could do more to leverage their balance sheets. You know, potentially hundreds of billions of pounds – dollars – more that could be helping developing countries. Helping developing countries with climate resilience, helping them with relieving the debt burden in terms of the financing of the debt.
And, you know, one of the things that we’re going to be doing as part of our G20 is convening those MDBs to, in a friendly way, you know, point to the best practice of some of them, push the others to do more. I feel from our discussions that this is absolutely possible – for us to do more.
So yes, there are more fiscal constraints in developed countries, including in Britain, but it doesn’t mean we can’t make a difference. And I think it’s really, really important to say to your viewers: we are serious about, not just our national leadership on climate, but our international leadership as well, and we believe we can make a difference.
CB: It’s become part of the narrative that the COP process has run its course, and that people should focus more on mini-coalitions, groups of middle powers. What would you say to that, and how would you like to see the COP process reformed?
EM: I mean, I’m quite pro the COP process – not the process, but I’m quite pro the institution of the COP – and I’d say that in two respects.
One, if you look at the sweep of history, I was at the Copenhagen COP of 2009, [which] ended in acrimony. We were heading for a 4C world back then. Now, we’re heading for a 2.5C, 2.6C world, according to the latest UNEP emissions gap report – one of my favourite publications.
And look, 2.6C is bad, right? And we’ve got to do a lot more as a world, but we have made progress. And why? Because of multilateralism, because of the institution, being part of the COP, driving people forward.
That’s one part of it. The second part of it is [that the COP is] a place where these “coalitions of the willing” are formed. If I think about what I’ve done while I’ve been here [in Antalya] – I was at an event on forests, coalitions of the willing acting on the forest leaders’ partnership, acting to protect the forest. An event on electrification, a big focus of the Turkish presidency. An event on industrial policy, green industrial policy. Countries working together. An event this morning on methane, really crucial. We’re trying to, with a coalition of the willing, get it onto the COP agenda. And then, an event on climate security.
So that gives people, your viewers, a sense of why I think this [COP process] matters. You know, it’s not simply a talking shop. I think it is also a place where action happens.
CB: You mentioned the electrification pledge put forward by the Turkish presidency. Is the UK a signatory to that yet?
EM: We support the electrification pledge, absolutely, and you know we want to drive forward. It’s stretching for the UK, but we think it’s the right thing to do. And why? Because – it’s really important to say this – because electrification is a way of getting off the fossil-fuel rollercoaster. Clean-energy electrification is the way I think about it.
[Three hours after Carbon Brief’s interview with Ed Miliband, the UK government confirmed its endorsement of the 35×35 electrification pledge.]
UK foreign secretary and COP veteran Ed Miliband, at COP31 in Antalya, Turkey. Credit: Carbon Brief.And if there’s one lesson we’ve got to learn from these two wars that we’ve seen – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Iran war – it’s [that] you can’t have security on the basis of fossil fuels. It’s not even – even [for a] country like America, a massive fossil-fuel producer is affected by higher prices. But for fossil-fuel importers, covering 75% of the world’s population [including the UK], we are price takers. And you know the fossil-fuel rollercoaster is terrible for the cost of living. That’s why clean energy, clean electrification, is the answer. Electrify now!
CB: The UN climate convention and the Paris Agreement both commit countries, including the UK, to implement “climate-change education, training, public awareness and participation”. Why doesn’t the UK have a national programme on this, particularly given the flood of misinformation in this area?
EM: We need to do more. You’re completely right. Look, I am always ambitious to do more, and more climate education – well, more public information – is important.
I did the first annual climate and nature statement in 2025. It was repeated in 2026 by [environment secretary] Mary Creagh. I was in the House of Commons for that, and that whole institution was part of me believing, as energy secretary, that it was important to find ways to inform the public.
And I fully acknowledge we need to do more. We need to do more. But we need to do more to both tell people about what is happening, in terms of climate and nature, but also say there are answers, because it can’t just be a council of despair. It’s also got to be a council of hope – not false hope – but a council of honesty, but also hope.
CB: Great. How would you like to see the Brazilian roadmaps on fossil fuels and deforestation taken forward? Are you keen to see those as part of the formal negotiated outcome [at COP31]?
EM: I think what’s interesting about this goes back to your question about the coalition of the willing. Look, there’s obviously no secret that there are countries that are obstacles to the fossil-fuel roadmap being part of – central – to the COP decision. And we took a decision last year that there was a big enough coalition of the willing – I think there are 80 countries or more – to drive this forward.
I think the Brazilians are to be incredibly commended for having produced this fossil-fuel roadmap. I think we should now be thinking, as individual countries, how can we build on that work ourselves? Because it’s doing exactly what I hoped it would do, which is to grapple with the important issues that we face.
I think we have to accept there are some countries – in a world where you have to operate by consensus – where not every decision is going to get into the COP decision. But it doesn’t mean we can’t make progress on it, and I think that’s really true in this case.
CB: Great. One final question from my end, if I may. What’s an outcome that you’re going to be looking for at the end of this COP, that you’re going to be happy to take home to the UK?
EM: I think the most important thing is action to drive forward the climate agenda, and that’s what I want to see. You know, it goes back to the point about the cost. Some of it is about the formal decision-making, but a lot of it is about the real, tangible outcomes that have happened over a couple of weeks.
And if I think about what I’ve done here, you know, if we can get methane and the importance of methane – which, as you know, and as your viewers will know – is such an important short-term difference we can make in terms of preventing the rise in temperatures, and we can get that onto the agenda of the COP. If we can show progress on other aspects of the real economy – what’s happening in the real economy – all of those things are going to be important.
I think there’s something else, though, which is, these events of countries coming together. They contradict those people who say, you know, people are giving up on climate. Because you’ve got more than 190 countries that are coming together [at the COP], reaffirming their belief in the Paris Agreement, reaffirming their belief that they need to make efforts, as part of the Paris Agreement, to meet the climate goals – and working together on these issues.
It doesn’t mean they aren’t hard, but it does show that there is really important global commitment, which I’ve been hearing, to this agenda.
CB: Brilliant. Thanks very much, Ed.
EM: Thank you.
This interview was conducted by Simon Evans at the COP31 in Antalya, Turkey, on 12 November 2026. Filming by Leo Hickman, Josh Gabbatiss and Daisy Dunne, and editing by Joe Goodman.
RELATED Analysis: Climate-finance pledges fall 70% as countries meet at COP31 11.11.2026 COP31 Antalya Analysis: Which countries have sent the most delegates to COP31? 10.11.2026 COP31 Antalya Q&A: What is the Belém-Antalya mechanism for a ‘just transition’? 09.11.2026 COP31 Antalya Interactive: Tracking negotiating texts at the COP31 climate summit 05.11.2026 COP31 AntalyaThe post COP31: How Ed Miliband answered Carbon Brief readers’ questions appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Shell Wins the Battle Over 68 Whistleblower Documents — An Independent Investigation into Legal Privilege, Corporate Secrecy and the Kent Quinlan Case
AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION
By the Donovan–Shell Archive
12 November 2026
Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT.
A Queensland Supreme Court judge has upheld Shell’s claim to legal professional privilege over 68 documents sought by former ERM Power executive Kent Quinlan. Fifty of the documents identified him as a whistleblower. The judgment is a clear legal victory for Shell on disclosure — but it leaves the underlying allegations of corporate misconduct and whistleblower retaliation unresolved.
A significant victory for Shell — and a consequential ruling for whistleblowersThe long-running legal confrontation between Australian whistleblower Kent Quinlan and Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd has produced another important judgment.
On 11 November 2026, Justice Soraya Ryan of the Supreme Court of Queensland dismissed Quinlan’s application for disclosure of 68 documents withheld by Shell on grounds of legal professional privilege.
The decision, Quinlan v Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] QSC 265, follows a hearing on 15 September and resolves an unusually contentious question concerning the relationship between Australia’s former corporate whistleblower protections and the confidentiality of communications between companies and their lawyers.
The judge inspected all 68 documents herself.
She concluded that legal professional privilege applied to all of them and that none fell within the crime/fraud exception relied upon by Quinlan.
The immediate result is that Shell successfully resisted the application to compel production of the disputed material.
But the decision must be understood accurately.
It is not a judgment finding that Quinlan’s substantive allegations are false.
It does not decide whether he suffered unlawful retaliation.
Nor does it establish that the financial transactions and other corporate conduct about which he complained were lawful.
Those questions belong to the wider proceedings.
Primary source: Supreme Court of Queensland — Quinlan v Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] QSC 265, particularly paragraphs 1–16 and 125–131.
The 68 documents — and the 50 that identify QuinlanOne of the most striking features of the judgment is established in its opening paragraph.
Of the 68 documents over which Shell asserted privilege, 50 identified Quinlan as a whistleblower.
The documents included communications between ERM Power, the business subsequently acquired by Shell, and its external lawyers. Others were internal communications recording or referring to legal advice.
This distinction matters.
Quinlan’s argument was not simply that he wanted access to potentially useful evidence.
He contended that identifying him as a whistleblower in communications could itself breach the confidentiality provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 as those provisions stood before 1 July 2019.
On that interpretation, certain communications might fall within the crime/fraud exception to legal professional privilege.
In broad terms, that exception prevents privilege from protecting communications made to further criminal, fraudulent or sufficiently improper conduct.
The issue was whether communications referring to a protected whistleblower could lose privilege because the act of communicating his identity was itself prohibited.
Shell resisted that interpretation.
Justice Ryan ultimately accepted that the former legislation implicitly allowed relevant confidential disclosures to lawyers for legitimate legal advice.
The ruling therefore draws an important distinction between identifying a whistleblower in a protected legal consultation and unlawfully disclosing that person’s identity for another purpose.
The fact that a document identifies a whistleblower does not, by itself, establish an unlawful disclosure.
That is central to the court’s reasoning.
Source: Official judgment, paragraphs 1–16 and 96–115.
The allegations behind the litigationQuinlan’s dispute reaches back to his employment with ERM Power between March 2008 and July 2014.
ERM Power was subsequently acquired by Shell in 2019. The company involved in the proceedings is now Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd, formerly ERM Power Ltd.
The historical distinction is essential: the relevant events largely predate Shell’s acquisition.
According to the judgment’s account of Quinlan’s pleaded case, he says he made protected disclosures between 2012 and 2014 about suspected corporate misconduct.
The allegations included concerns about electricity transactions involving ERM Retail Power and counterparties including Stanwell Corporation and Macquarie Group.
Quinlan claimed that certain transactions had the effect of shifting costs between financial reporting periods and improving ERM’s reported financial results for 2012.
He also raised suspicions concerning share transactions involving Empire Oil & Gas and information allegedly unavailable to the public.
These remain allegations. The November judgment does not determine their accuracy.
Quinlan further alleges that information relating to his protected disclosures was improperly communicated to others on multiple occasions and that he subsequently suffered detrimental treatment.
His pleaded complaints include alleged financial disadvantage, loss of employment and non-payment of certain employment-related benefits.
Shell disputes the allegations.
The proceedings therefore concern both the original matters reported by Quinlan and his claims about how he was treated after raising them.
The judgment does not convert those allegations into established findings.
Source: Official judgment, paragraphs 21–24, incorporating the earlier judicial summary of Quinlan’s case.
Why the pre-2019 law matteredThe legal argument turned on a particular version of Australia’s corporate whistleblower legislation.
Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 contained provisions designed to encourage reporting of suspected corporate misconduct and protect qualifying whistleblowers.
Among those protections were confidentiality requirements concerning whistleblowers’ identities and the information they disclosed.
The legislation was substantially amended in 2019.
Under the amended regime, legislation expressly addresses certain disclosures connected with obtaining legal advice or representation.
However, the disputed communications in this application arose under the earlier statutory framework.
That created the interpretative problem before Justice Ryan.
Did the absence of an express provision authorising disclosure to lawyers mean that a company could not identify a whistleblower when seeking legal advice without potentially committing an offence?
Quinlan’s legal team argued that disclosure in circumstances prohibited by the former legislation could prevent privilege from attaching.
During the hearing, his counsel, Tony Morris KC, advanced a narrower alternative: disclosure might be implicitly permitted when essential to obtaining proper legal advice.
The judge considered that proposed limitation but did not accept it as the correct boundary.
Her reasoning was that the former legislation should be interpreted consistently with its purposes and with the established importance of confidential legal advice.
Preventing a company from fully informing its lawyers about a whistleblower matter could undermine its ability to comply with the law and address the reported concerns.
The court therefore concluded that disclosure to lawyers for legitimate legal advice was implicitly authorised under the former statutory regime.
That conclusion was not limited to circumstances in which identifying the whistleblower was strictly essential to obtaining advice specifically about whistleblower legislation.
Source: Official judgment, paragraphs 96–117.
The critical distinction: seeking advice is not the same as furthering wrongdoingJustice Ryan’s reasoning did not give companies unrestricted immunity simply because lawyers were involved.
The crime/fraud exception remains available where the relevant legal test is satisfied.
A communication genuinely made for legal advice about lawful conduct, potential liability or an appropriate response to allegations may attract privilege.
A communication made to facilitate or advance criminal or fraudulent activity may not.
The distinction depends on the purpose and circumstances of the communication.
A document does not lose privilege merely because it concerns alleged wrongdoing or could be relevant to proving an allegation.
The necessary connection is more demanding: the communication must further or assist the improper activity.
That principle was particularly important in Quinlan’s application.
His legal team sought to argue that communications identifying him as a whistleblower could themselves constitute prohibited conduct, or could have been made in furtherance of such conduct.
Justice Ryan rejected the application after examining the documents.
She found that the documents supported the privilege claims and did not establish the basis necessary to engage the crime/fraud exception.
This finding must be respected.
But the ruling should not be described as an unrestricted endorsement of corporate secrecy.
It protects legitimate legal communications under established principles. It does not abolish whistleblower confidentiality duties or exclude the possibility that other disclosures, in different circumstances, could be unlawful.
Source: Official judgment, paragraphs 107–115 and 118–131.
Shell’s difficulty proving privilege from historical witnessesAnother important aspect of the judgment concerns the evidence Shell relied upon to support its privilege claims.
The documents were historical, arising principally during ERM Power’s independent existence.
The company had subsequently changed ownership, and individuals involved in the communications had moved on.
Shell faced difficulties obtaining first-hand evidence from people able to explain the precise circumstances in which some documents had been created.
The court considered the requirements of rule 213 of Queensland’s Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, which places particular evidential demands on claims to legal professional privilege.
In ordinary circumstances, direct evidence from someone involved in a communication may be important in establishing its confidential character and dominant legal purpose.
The absence of such evidence can create difficulties.
The judgment records Shell’s efforts to identify or contact relevant former personnel and the circumstances surrounding other potential witnesses.
Some individuals were no longer employees. Others had invoked rights against self-incrimination or exposure to penalties in relation to giving evidence about privilege issues.
This was not, however, treated as evidence that they had committed an offence.
Nor did the court conclude that Shell should automatically lose privilege because first-hand testimony was unavailable.
Instead, Justice Ryan exercised her discretion to inspect the documents.
This was an important procedural safeguard.
The judge did not simply accept Shell’s characterisation of the material without examination.
She conducted her own inspection and assessed the contents against the legal principles governing privilege.
The result favoured Shell.
Nevertheless, the difficulties involved in reconstructing the context of historical corporate communications underline a broader practical issue: lengthy litigation can become increasingly dependent on documentary records after witnesses, personnel structures and corporate ownership have changed.
Source: Official judgment, particularly paragraphs 39–56 and 118–129.
What was actually contained in the disputed material?The documents themselves remain protected, but the judgment provides some information about their general subjects.
It identifies communications involving ERM and external law firms including McCullough Robertson, Clayton Utz and Allens.
The matters addressed included internal trading issues, a proposed transaction involving ERM and Empire, corporate directorship questions, Quinlan’s nomination for election as an ERM director, and legal responses to communications and claims made by him.
These are broad descriptions of the subject matter of legal advice, not judicial findings that the transactions or conduct under discussion were unlawful.
The judgment refers to 45 documents which, on their face, appeared to involve seeking or receiving external legal advice.
The other 23 recorded the content of legal advice or requests for it.
Justice Ryan found that the requisite dominant legal purpose was established.
She also considered advice from ERM’s in-house lawyer, Philip Davis, and stated that she had no concerns about his independence in the relevant legal-advice role.
The decision also addressed redacted ERM meeting minutes, finding that the portions over which privilege was claimed were appropriately protected.
One narrow issue concerning a document appearing in different redacted and unredacted forms was identified for further discussion with the parties.
That observation should not be presented as a finding that privilege was generally defective or that wrongdoing had occurred.
Source: Official judgment, paragraphs 119–131.
The ruling should not be mistaken for a verdict on the whistleblower’s claimsThere is an important danger in reporting this decision as either the complete vindication of Shell or the defeat of the entire whistleblower case.
Neither description is supported.
The order was made in an interlocutory disclosure application.
The judge was deciding whether Quinlan could obtain the 68 documents despite Shell’s privilege claims.
She was not conducting the substantive trial of his allegations.
The court did not determine whether the transactions about which Quinlan complained were improper.
It did not determine whether qualifying whistleblower disclosures were unlawfully communicated outside legitimate legal-advice arrangements.
It did not determine whether Quinlan suffered prohibited retaliation or whether damages are payable.
The distinction is particularly important because the judgment records the allegations in considerable detail.
A judicial description of what a claimant alleges is not equivalent to a judicial finding that the conduct occurred.
Shell has successfully defended its privilege claims in this application.
The broader controversy remains unresolved.
Why the ruling matters beyond ShellThe wider significance of the decision lies in the relationship between two important principles.
The first is the protection of corporate whistleblowers.
The second is legal professional privilege.
Whistleblower protection depends partly upon preserving confidentiality and preventing retaliation.
Legal professional privilege protects confidential legal communications and enables individuals and organisations to seek advice without exposing every communication to subsequent adversarial disclosure.
Both principles have substantial public-interest justifications.
Conflicts arise when a whistleblower alleges that communications involving lawyers formed part of the conduct against which the legislation was intended to protect them.
The central legal question is not whether lawyers should automatically shield wrongdoing.
They should not, and the crime/fraud exception remains important.
The question is how courts distinguish communications legitimately seeking advice from communications genuinely furthering misconduct.
Justice Ryan has now provided an authoritative first-instance ruling concerning that distinction under Australia’s pre-July 2019 whistleblower regime.
It would be premature to claim that the judgment settles every issue arising under the modern statutory provisions.
Nevertheless, it provides an important example of how a court may reconcile whistleblower confidentiality obligations with the established right to obtain confidential legal advice.
For employers, lawyers, employees and regulators, that reasoning deserves careful attention.
The parliamentary dimension: ASIC was asked to examine the matterThe litigation has attracted attention beyond the Queensland Supreme Court.
On 4 September 2026, Senator Paul Scarr raised Quinlan’s case during a hearing of Australia’s Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services.
He questioned ASIC Chair Sarah Court concerning the regulator’s attention to allegations arising in the litigation and urged that the circumstances be examined.
The exchange was recorded in the official parliamentary transcript and subsequently examined by the Donovan–Shell Archive.
The intervention is relevant because Quinlan’s underlying allegations concern suspected corporate misconduct as well as his treatment as a whistleblower.
However, the parliamentary exchange must not be exaggerated.
A senator asking questions about a case does not establish that its allegations are correct.
An undertaking by ASIC’s chair to consider the matter does not, without further evidence, establish that a formal enforcement investigation has commenced.
Nor does the latest privilege ruling determine whether ASIC should take any particular action.
The November judgment and parliamentary scrutiny concern related but distinct questions.
One addresses disclosure obligations in litigation.
The other concerns the potential regulatory examination of allegations involving corporate conduct and whistleblower protections.
Both belong in the public documentary record.
Previous investigation: Official Hansard Confirms Senator Paul Scarr Urged ASIC to “Take a Serious Look” at Quinlan v Shell Energy — Donovan–Shell Archive, 7 October 2026.
A dispute that predates Shell’s acquisition of ERM PowerThe corporate chronology is fundamental to responsible reporting.
Quinlan’s employment, his original disclosures and many of the communications now subject to privilege occurred before Shell acquired ERM Power in 2019.
Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd is the successor corporate entity involved in the proceedings.
That explains why Shell is defending litigation involving historical ERM documents.
But it does not justify automatically attributing every alleged act of ERM’s former directors, officers or employees to Shell plc or to current Shell management.
Corporate succession, legal responsibility and the conduct of individual defendants must be assessed separately.
The present judgment concerns privilege claims advanced by the defendant company in the proceedings.
It does not establish that Shell plc directed the original conduct alleged by Quinlan.
Equally, Shell’s later acquisition of ERM does not remove the historical allegations from legitimate scrutiny merely because the relevant transactions occurred under different ownership.
The proper approach is to follow the documentary record, respect the corporate chronology and avoid imputing liability without evidence.
What happens next?The court dismissed Quinlan’s application concerning the 68 documents.
The published order also states that the parties will be heard concerning costs and an outstanding application.
Justice Ryan’s reasons identify a separate Shell application involving inadvertent disclosure of allegedly privileged material.
The November judgment does not dispose of that application.
Nor does it determine the remaining substantive claims.
Earlier reporting indicated that arrangements had been made for Quinlan to give evidence in December 2026 as part of the wider proceedings.
That timetable was reported before the latest judgment and should be checked against subsequent case-management directions.
The next potentially significant developments will therefore concern the remaining applications, the treatment of evidence and the eventual judicial determination of the allegations themselves.
The present decision is important, but it is not the end of the litigation.
DOCUMENTARY FINDINGSEstablished by the judgment delivered on 11 November 2026
The Queensland Supreme Court dismissed Quinlan’s application seeking disclosure of 68 documents over which Shell claimed legal professional privilege.
Fifty of those documents identified Quinlan as a whistleblower.
Justice Ryan personally inspected the disputed material.
She concluded that the privilege claims were properly made and that the crime/fraud exception did not apply.
The court interpreted the whistleblower confidentiality provisions applicable before 1 July 2019 as implicitly allowing relevant disclosures to lawyers for legitimate legal advice.
The court did not confine that permission to disclosures strictly essential to obtaining advice about the whistleblower legislation itself.
The order left costs and another application for further consideration.
Allegations not determined by this judgment
Quinlan alleges that he disclosed suspected corporate misconduct and subsequently suffered prohibited retaliation.
His allegations include concerns about historical ERM transactions, alleged improper disclosure of protected information and alleged financial and employment detriment.
Those allegations remain contested.
The November ruling is not a substantive determination of their truth.
Editorial assessment
Shell’s successful assertion of privilege is a significant procedural victory.
The decision also illustrates a practical tension in whistleblower litigation: documents potentially relevant to a claimant’s account may remain inaccessible where legitimate legal privilege applies.
That observation does not mean privilege was improperly claimed in this case. Justice Ryan examined the disputed material and upheld the claims.
The wider question is how legal systems preserve both meaningful whistleblower protections and the ability of organisations to obtain confidential legal advice.
This judgment addresses that tension under the historical legislation.
CONCLUSION: SHELL HAS WON THIS APPLICATION, NOT THE ENTIRE CASEThe Queensland Supreme Court has given Shell a clear victory concerning 68 disputed documents.
That outcome should be reported without qualification or insinuation.
The judge considered the legal arguments, inspected the material and concluded that the documents were privileged and that the crime/fraud exception did not apply.
It would be wrong to suggest that Shell lost the application or that the court established an unlawful cover-up.
It would be equally wrong to portray the ruling as a final vindication of every historical transaction and employment decision challenged by Quinlan.
The substantive allegations remain matters for the continuing proceedings.
For the Donovan–Shell Archive, the central lesson is straightforward.
Corporate accountability depends on distinguishing allegations from evidence, evidence from judicial findings, and procedural victories from final determinations of responsibility.
This judgment is an important part of that record.
It is not the final chapter.
PRIMARY SOURCES AND RELATED DOCUMENTARY RECORD1. Supreme Court of Queensland — 11 November 2026
Quinlan v Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] QSC 265 — Full judgment
The principal source for this investigation. The judgment addresses all 68 disputed documents, legal professional privilege, the crime/fraud exception and the interpretation of the former whistleblower confidentiality legislation.
2. Supreme Court of Queensland — 10 June 2026
Quinlan v Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd [2026] QSC 115 — Case summary and link to judgment
The earlier disclosure ruling concerning document searches, redactions and related interlocutory applications.
3. Donovan–Shell Archive — 18 September 2026
Shell Whistleblower Case: Queensland Court Weighs Legal Privilege Against Whistleblower Protection
Previous coverage of the privilege hearing before judgment was delivered.
4. Donovan–Shell Archive — 7 October 2026
Analysis of the parliamentary questioning of ASIC Chair Sarah Court.
5. Michael West Media — 18 September 2026
Court to Decide if Legal Privilege Loophole Trumps Whistleblower Protections
Contemporaneous reporting from the September privilege hearing.
6. Law360 Australia — 12 November 2026
Shell Keeps Privilege Over Whistleblower Disclosure Docs
News coverage of Justice Ryan’s ruling. Subscription access may be required.
DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMERThis investigation is based principally on the published reasons of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Quinlan v Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] QSC 265, delivered on 11 November 2026, together with earlier judicial decisions, published parliamentary material and identified contemporaneous reporting.
The judgment concerns an interlocutory application for disclosure of documents subject to legal professional privilege. It does not determine the ultimate merits of Kent Quinlan’s substantive allegations.
Allegations concerning corporate transactions, insider trading, market manipulation, whistleblower confidentiality breaches, victimisation, retaliation or financial loss are attributed to the claimant or the relevant source. They are not presented as established wrongdoing.
Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd was formerly ERM Power Ltd. Historical events predating Shell’s acquisition of ERM Power in 2019 are distinguished from the conduct and responsibilities of subsequent Shell ownership and management.
The Donovan–Shell Archive is independent of Shell plc and its subsidiaries. Shell, the other defendants, Kent Quinlan and their respective representatives are invited to provide factual corrections, clarifications or relevant documentary material. Substantiated corrections will be considered and reflected fairly.
This article is an independent documentary investigation, not a finding of legal liability or legal advice.
The most important documentary references are paragraphs 1–16, 96–115 and 118–131 of the official judgment. Those establish the central outcome and the limits of the ruling.
Caselaw+2
This is a substantive judicial development, supported by a freely accessible primary judgment and sufficiently distinct from our September coverage.
Shell Wins the Battle Over 68 Whistleblower Documents — An Independent Investigation into Legal Privilege, Corporate Secrecy and the Kent Quinlan Case was first posted on November 12, 2026 at 5:51 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Talking Headways Podcast: Dig It! (No, Really)
This week on the podcast, we’re joined by Josh Mackanic, founder of CivilGrid, a company that helps construction teams locate underground infrastructure and utilities for quicker project delivery. We chat about the difficulty of building infrastructure, public utilities, and facilitating connections between all the possible companies that might be digging up streets.
Now, you know the Talking Headways drill:
- Listen to the podcast by clicking on the player below.
- Read the full transcript by clicking here.
- Or read an edited excerpt below the player to get the gist.
Jeff Wood: All the things that are underground are water pipes, electrical infrastructure, telecommunications, wastewater infrastructure, all that stuff that we can’t see. It’s not easy to know where it is, so you all are trying to make that legible.
Josh Mackanic: Yeah, so I think one of the shorthands for CivilGrid is “Google Maps for the underground.” I think it’s evocative in that one of the first things we’ve started doing with CivilGrid is consolidate what do we know about the built world, and/or what constraints need to inform how we build in the built world.
And I think a big piece of that is underground utilities. I tell folks, “If you want to know where the gas, water, sewer line on the street in front of your house, there’s no one place you can go for that.” And people are like, “What?” I’m like, “Yeah.” You know, it’s scattered into, like, six different databases, and it’s not obvious which database it’s held in.
Throw a dart at the United States; nobody can tell you what utilities operate there. Some really basic things that we would think in 21st century would be very clearly solved are not necessarily solved. But it is more than just utilities. In order for us to build things effectively — like the Second Avenue Subway — we need to know what infrastructure needs to move out of the way for this new tunnel.
But also what about soil? How easy will it be to dig through? What types of tools will I need? And what about the land rights? Who owns what property? If I’m going to build, I need to understand the easements on a given property that would affect where, say, I can put the structure, where I can put potentially EV chargers, etc.
ConEd joins utilities seeking to loosen New York restrictions on owning generation
The company says reforms would boost renewables and help it achieve resource adequacy and environmental compliance targets. It has also asked regulators to expand distribution and transmission-connected storage options.
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