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Climate change is coming for the cactus. Yes, the cactus.

Grist - Thu, 11/12/2026 - 01:15

The humble cactus is an icon of resiliency. Stuck in a desert with little rain and abundant searing sun, these plants don’t just survive — they thrive and in turn provide habitat for owls and other birds, and flowers for bats and other pollinators. 

Yet cacti are in serious trouble, due to habitat loss and the poaching of species for private collections. Now we can add worsening droughts to those woes, according to a new study in the journal Nature. Researchers modeled not just a future of relentlessly rising temperatures, but the attendant dry spells, finding that the majority of nearly 1,000 cactus species will lose habitat as the climate radically changes. More than a quarter of those species could lose at least 80 percent of that habitat by 2100. 

“The public perception of cacti tends to be of these organisms that are extremely drought-adapted and are just resilient, can handle anything that you can throw at them,” said Michiel Pillet, a conservation ecologist at the University of South Florida and lead author of the paper. “In reality, cacti are absolutely amazing — and they’re my favorite plant group, clearly — but they’re not that different from other plants.” 

That means cacti need water. In the deserts of the southwestern United States, for example, they rely on seasonal monsoon rains which tend to make July or August the wettest month in a given year. Because this is still a desert, cacti have evolved a range of adaptations to survive, like a waxy skin that helps them retain that bounty of rainwater. “Just like other plants, they evolved under conditions that they’re used to,” Pillet said. “When you take them outside of those conditions, they might not be able to handle that.”

Think of these cacti like sick hospital patients. Someone might be admitted for heat-related illness, as their body struggles to cool itself. At the same time, though, they might be dehydrated. Cacti are dealing with the same stresses, as global temperatures rise and dry spells intensify. “When we consider drought conditions, then it turns out that they’re much, much sicker than we previously thought,” Pillet said. “These results really do change the outlook of cacti, and most likely plants more broadly under climate change.”

Instead of simply modeling these threats going forward, the researchers turned to the citizen science platform iNaturalist, where people upload photos of plants and animals. This provided 650,000 observations of cacti in the wild, helping paint a clearer picture of how species might be faring.

Really, this isn’t a simple matter of cacti withering and dying. Sure, if relentless droughts take hold, individuals can’t get water. But the stress could be temporally complex, too. “Now we can move towards questions of: What life stages are most affected?” Pillet said. “Is it the adults or is it the seedlings? But also, which processes? Is it reduced growth or is it increased mortality? Or are plants failing to flower?”

Put another way: Cactus species could be suffering from sublethal effects of drought — the lack of water may not kill them immediately, but still interfere with their reproduction. And without procreation, populations shrink. In the Sonoran Desert, for example, the iconic, towering saguaro is reproducing less frequently during prolonged droughts, because they’re not always flowering. 

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Part of the problem is that while desert ecosystems may look tough and hardened overall, they’re in fact quite fragile. “They don’t recover quickly once they are disturbed, or once they are degraded, just because there’s so little water and such higher temperatures,” said Marcos Robles, the Nature Conservancy’s lead scientist in Arizona, who wasn’t involved in the research. “It takes multiple decades to recover, and in some cases, they don’t recover.”

Now drought is compounding with other stressors, like habitat loss and poaching, to drive cactus species to the brink. On the opposite end of the spectrum, too much water from rising seas has led to the local extinction of the Key Largo tree cactus in Florida. Higher nighttime temperatures are a problem, too, since that’s when saguaro and other cacti respire to avoid water loss. “If the nighttime temperatures are very high, they can’t do it,” said Rod Haenni, president of the nonprofit Cactus and Succulent Society of America, who wasn’t involved in the paper. “Then if you water on top of that, the plants just rot.”

Still, some cactus species may persist by picking up and leaving. Well, not individual plants, but populations could creep into areas with climates that more closely match what the species adapted to all those millennia ago. A similar thing is happening in the Arctic, actually, where some plants are marching farther north in “search” of increasingly agreeable weather and more water. 

In the end, the purpose of this sort of research is to better inform where conservation professionals might concentrate their efforts. They can’t stop droughts, of course, but they can evacuate enough cacti to establish populations in botanical gardens, where they can be cared for as the climate grows more unrecognizable to even the hardiest desert vegetation. Species can even be reintroduced to the wild in some cases, so long as drought and high temperatures don’t remain a threat to a population.

Governments, too, need to protect the lands where cacti are threatened, Haenni said. This new research, he added, could make that happen. “Hopefully, it’ll wake people up,” Haenni said. “But the problem is a lot of the governments involved are indifferent to this. There’s a lot of people in the countries that are not indifferent, but they’re not running the governments.”

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Climate change is coming for the cactus. Yes, the cactus. on Nov 12, 2026.

Categories: H. Green News

What Canadians could lose if Canada falls behind on EVs

Pembina Institute News - Thu, 11/12/2026 - 00:44
Electric vehicles (EVs) are selling faster around the world than expected. In July, the International Energy Agency raised its forecast for 2026, predicting EVs will make up 29% of all new cars sold globally this year, up from its earlier estimate of...

Real Solutions, Mapped from the Ground Up: Launching the Gender-Just Real Solutions Map at COP31

Global Forest Coalition - Thu, 11/12/2026 - 00:38

Communities around the world are already building the solutions we need to confront the intersecting social, ecological and climate crises we face. At COP31 in Antalya, Turkey, the Global Forest Coalition is launching a new tool to make these solutions visible: the Map of Gender-Just Real Solutions for Territories and Communities.

At a time when governments and corporations continue to promote false solutions such as carbon and biodiversity markets as answers to climate breakdown and biodiversity collapse, and UN processes become more and more captured by lobbyists, we need to look elsewhere for inspiration and concrete responses to overcome the crises.

The real solutions are already here

Across the Global South, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, youth, gender diverse people and grassroots organisations are protecting territories, restoring ecosystems, sustaining food systems, defending biodiversity and building more just and resilient economies. These initiatives are rooted in particular places, cosmovisions, cultures and relationships with nature. They are not commodities to be traded or generic models waiting to be scaled up.

The Map of Gender-Just Real Solutions brings some of these initiatives together in one place, helping to make visible the people, practices, values, rights and conditions that can underpin transformative change.

From the ground up

The map begins with six examples of gender-just, community-led real solutions.

They include the Nainu ancestral farming and agroforestry system of the Gunadule People in the Gunayala territory, in Panama, where traditional knowledge, food sovereignty, biodiversity protection and the active role of women and youth are central. In Zambia, the map features the Kamukolwe Multipurpose Cooperative Society, where women farmers are using agroecology, traditional seed saving and community-based alternatives while resisting the impacts of copper mining, as well as the Kapyanga Women’s Association, which combines agroecology, Indigenous seeds, forest restoration and local economic empowerment.

In Morocco, the map highlights the role of Amazigh Indigenous women in protecting argan forests, maintaining traditional ecological knowledge and strengthening women-led cooperatives and livelihoods. In Bangladesh, it documents Indigenous-led public interest litigation to protect the Madhupur Sal Forest, demonstrating how legal action, collective mobilisation and recognition of customary rights can contribute to forest protection.

And in the Bolivian Amazon, the map explores territories free from extractivism, where Indigenous Peoples, rural communities and agroecological organisations are working together to protect forests, rivers and livelihoods from gold mining.

These are only the beginning. The map is designed to grow.

Gender justice is at the heart of the map

A gender-just approach is essential because the defence and care of territories and ecosystems is deeply connected to gender relations and patriarchal structures. 

Women in all their diversity hold critical traditional knowledge of ecosystems, food systems, seeds and natural resources, while carrying a disproportionate share of unpaid care and domestic work. Yet they remain systematically excluded from decision-making, land ownership, access to resources and political power. Gender-diverse people, youth and people with disability are equally invisibilized from power spaces and excluded in policy design, while confronting multiple forms of violence in territories.   

The initiatives featured in the map demonstrate that gender justice is not simply about ensuring that women are represented. It is about who has power, who makes decisions, who controls land and resources, whose knowledge is valued, and who benefits from the protection of territories and ecosystems.

That is why gender justice and intersectionality are core criteria for inclusion in the map. Initiatives must demonstrate meaningful leadership and participation by women, youth, gender-diverse people and/or people with disabilities, alongside a human-rights-based and non-market approach.

What makes a real solution possible?

The map does not simply ask “What is the solution?” It also asks: What makes it possible? And what stands in its way?

Communities do not need another externally imposed blueprint for how to protect their territories. Their solutions are specific to their histories, cultures, ecosystems and forms of governance. Instead of trying to scale up a particular practice everywhere, we need to understand and strengthen the conditions that allow diverse real solutions to flourish.

Across the initial cases, these conditions include secure land and territorial rights, autonomous and community-led governance, traditional and local knowledge, collective organising, women’s leadership, supportive legal frameworks, access to public financing, and protection from extractivism.

At the same time, communities face systemic barriers including land grabbing, extractive industries, destructive infrastructure, corporate influence over policy, insecure land rights, inadequate financing, patriarchal structures and the continued marginalisation of Indigenous and local knowledge. Making these conditions and barriers visible is crucial for changing policy.

A methodology built collectively

The map itself has been built through a participatory process. Global Forest Coalition members and allies worked together to develop its political framing, inclusion and exclusion criteria and data collection approach. Through collective discussions, participants explored what distinguishes a real solution from a false one, how gender justice should be understood, and which social, political, ecological, economic and cultural conditions allow community-led initiatives to thrive. This collective process matters. A map about communities should not be designed for communities without their participation and control.

The methodology is therefore based on principles including collective ownership, community consent and control, shared power and responsibility, and non-commercial use. It is also deliberately evolving. As more communities and organisations contribute, the methodology will continue to be reviewed, challenged and strengthened.

The initial process brought together GFC members and allies working across the Global South, and the project now opens the door for many more communities and organisations to contribute.

From Antalya and beyond

We are launching the Map of Gender-Just Real Solutions at COP31 in Antalya, where we will also hold a workshop during the People’s Summit to introduce the map and its methodology to allies, members and partners. The workshop will be an opportunity to explore the initial cases, discuss how the map can support collective struggles against false solutions, and gather feedback to help shape its future development. This is particularly important because the map is intended to remain participatory and open to continued learning.

This launch is therefore not an endpoint. It is a beginning.

We invite Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, grassroots movements and civil society organisations to explore the map, share it with others and help us build it further.

If you know of a gender-just, community-led initiative that should be represented, we want to hear from you. You can contact us at contact@realsolutionsmap.org to find out more about the criteria and methodology and how to suggest an initiative for inclusion.

Together, we can make visible the solutions that are already protecting forests, biodiversity, territories and communities, and build the political power needed to remove the barriers that stand in their way.

Explore the Gender-Just Real Solutions Map at https://realsolutionsmap.org/

Categories: G1. Progressive Green

COP31 Bulletin Day 4: Emerging economies question need for COP31 cover decision

Climate Change News - Thu, 11/12/2026 - 00:33

A second set of world leaders give their speeches on Thursday before heading out of town and leaving their negotiators to it. After around 40 leaders spoke on Wednesday, on Thursday there just 25 or so including the UK’s Andy Burnham, Venezuela’s Delcy Rodriguez and Bangladesh’s Tarique Rahman spoke.

But Brazil’s President Lula was still there and expected to keep grabbing headlines, along with California’s Governor – and maybe next US president – Gavin Newsom – and Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg who has lost none of her star power, if the crowd around her in the press centre was anything to go by.

Here are the highlights from what they said today and other updates on issues like methane and clean cooking.

Russia, Saudi Arabia and LMDCs push back on cover text

Heading into COP31 amid geopolitical uncertainty, most delegates arrived in Antalya with the comfort of one near-certainty: the summit would produce a cover decision, the overarching text that carries its high-level political message.

But in the first rounds of consultations this week, a group made up mainly of large emerging economies has made it clear to the hosts that this is far from a done deal.

Russia, Saudi Arabia and the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), a group that includes India and China, have repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the process proposed by Australia and cast doubt on whether a cover decision is needed at all, according to sources familiar with the discussions.

Pacific leaves empty-handed from COP31 “pledging event” for new fund

COP watchers told Climate Home News the criticism stems from the unusual route taken by the COP31 presidency. Cover decisions are nothing new at UN climate summits, but they usually emerge late in the talks, as a way to elevate priorities that have no home in the formal negotiating tracks. This time, the presidency has led the process from the outset.

“They wanted to have full transparency and give countries a chance to prepare,” Cosima Cassel, climate diplomacy lead at E3G, told Climate Home News, “but it’s also opened them up for criticism”.

Andreas Sieber, head of political strategy at 350.org, said two things are clear: Russia, Saudi Arabia and the LMDCs are prepared to play hardball, and Türkiye and Australia may not have laid enough diplomatic groundwork.

Both analysts, however, agree that it is still too early to tell whether producing a cover decision is an actual red line or just negotiating leverage to pull in the early stages.

    Meanwhile, countries that support a cover text have used the consultations to set out what they want it to include.

    Climate Home News understands that many small island and European states, along with others, are calling for a strong response to the overshoot of the 1.5C warming limit.

    In September, a landmark UN Environment Programme (UNEP) report declared that the limit will inevitably be breached, at least temporarily. It set out the dramatic consequences of overshoot and possible pathways back to the Paris Agreement’s most ambitious temperature goal.

    But Cassel said some countries, including Saudi Arabia, are questioning the science behind that report and UNEP’s annual Emissions Gap Report and this may become a point of contention for the cover decision.

    “There are players in this process that want to stall the process and want to block progress particularly on the transition away from fossil fuels,” she added.

    Beyond overshoot, countries have also asked for language on cutting methane, protecting forests, improving access to climate finance and responding to loss and damage in the wake of the Nepal disaster, Climate Home News understands.

    Australia, which chairs the negotiations, is expected to publish a summary of the initial discussions on Friday and invite written submissions from countries until Saturday, when a first draft of the cover decision is likely to appear.

    Kenya plans to use January summit to close clean cooking finance gap

    Ahead of the second global clean cooking summit in Nairobi, the Kenyan government has called on  developed country governments, partners, private sector, development and multilateral finance institutions to work toward closing the clean cooking finance gap from the pledge made at the first summit in Paris in 2024.

    Speaking at the clean cooking leaders roundtable at COP31, Kenya’s climate envoy Ali Mohamed said his country is hosting the second clean cooking summit in January to move beyond political commitments to concrete investment and stronger partnerships that would lead to measurable progress.

    According to the IEA, investments of $4 billion a year would be needed for the rest of this decade to get every African access to clean cooking. At the Paris summit, up to $2.2 billion was pledged and in July the IEA said that unnamed countries had promised an additional $900 million in commitments. So far about $750 million of those earlier commitments have already been deployed across 22 African countries, supporting projects ranging from LPG gas storage in Tanzania, electric cooking in Kenya and new stove factories in Nigeria. 

    Woman cooks with firewood (Photo: IEA)

    These pledges still fall short of what is needed and Mohamed said it is important that as countries and partners congregate in Nairobi, they work to “see how we can reach that amount”. He added that success will be measured not just by commitments, but “by financing that is deployed and the partnerships that are delivered, and institutions and households gaining clean cooking”.

    Also speaking, Lesotho’s Deputy Prime Minister Nthomeng Majara, said a collective priority for Africa is the mobilisation of grants-based and concessional financing instruments that are innovative and results based and can make clean cooking technologies affordable, particularly for low income and rural households. 

    Sierra Leone’s environment minister Jiwoh Emmanuel Abdulai said his country is looking for partnerships it wishes to expand on its clean cooking gains through provision of capital for private sector players rolling out these cook stoves. And part of making this capital available, he said, would be through “having access to high integrity carbon markets because that’s how these investors make a return on their investment”. 

    Cookstove developer BURN has signed several deals with African governments at COP31 to develop clean cookstoves programmes and sell credits through the UN’s Article 6 carbon market. The developer has struck deals with Togo and Nigeria, it announced.

      Newsom warns Trump will “double down” on anti-climate policies

      The Governor of California Gavin Newsom spent Thursday morning meeting Turkish firefighters at the International Forestry Training Center before heading to the venue, where the US is represented by the ‘America is All In’ pavilion put together by civil society.

      There, he attracted interest. Other US Governors and Mayors posed for selfies on stage with him, delaying the start of his speech alongside the Dutch climate envoy Jan Versteeg – who joked that he was pleased such a crowd had come for him.

      Asked about the Democrats historic victory in the US-midterms, Newsom said that it would be a “mitigation of the damage” but, he warned: “I don’t want to romanticise it. Trump’s head is in sand soaked with oil. He’s a wholly-owned subsidiary of Big Oil”.

      Governor Gavin Newsom poses for selfies at the America is All In pavillion (Photo: Rasit Aydogan – Anadolu Agency)

      Newsom said that Trump’s Energy and Interior Secretaries will “double down” on their anti-climate policies, citing the appointment of Stephen Miller as Chief of Staff as an example of Trump moving further to the right since losing both houses of Congress.

      Asked about electrification, he stressed the importance of batteries, saying that California has more battery-storage than any country but China. He said that California had “moved away controversially from large subsidies for rooftop solar” but kept and enhanced the subsidies for rooftop solar plus batteries.

      After Versteeg said the Netherlands is building a new nuclear power plant to provide base load electricity, Newsom said that was “interesting” because “a few years ago [nuclear] was a four-letter word”. 

      He said that California’s Diablo Canyon power plant had been extended, and that decision had been popular “where again a decade ago I don’t think that was possible”. He said the change in public opinion was because people want reliable and affordable electricity.

        Andy Burnham: Electrification the answer to rising energy bills 

        The UK’s newish centre-left prime minister arrived in Antalya on Wednesday night, gave a speech to a mostly-empty room on Thursday morning and held some bilateral meetings. 

        According to Politico, he will spend just three hours at the climate conference before flying off to Dublin for an AI summit. It doesn’t scream climate leader but at least he – unlike most of his European and all his G7 counterparts – turned up. 

        In his COP31 speech, he said that after spending his first three weeks as prime minister “responding to the worst wildfires Britain has ever experienced” this summer, he decided to come to COP31 “to show British leadership in a world where climate issues have taken too much of a backseat”.  

        Andy Burnham addresses a mostly-empty room at COP31 on Thursday morning (Photo: Screenshot)

        He said fossil fuel dependence is both causing climate change and sending fuel and gas bills soaring. Electrification is a big part of the answer as it creates jobs and energy security and lowers bills, he added.

        He boasted of recent government approval for two new offshore wind farms, support for an electric arc furnace for green steelmaking in Wales and Rolls-Royce’s small modular nuclear reactors.

        He didn’t mention that the UK has just rejected a big solar farm near Oxford, approved gas drilling in the Jackdaw field in the North Sea, and is considering weakening electric vehicle rules and approving oil drilling at Rosebank.

        UK approves gas drilling despite admitting blow to “climate leadership” status

        His main announcement was the appointment of a special representative for climate security, which the UK says is a world-first in creating such a position. The job goes to Madeleine Allesandri, a veteran diplomat who chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee. It wrote a report on the risks to national security from climate-driven food shortages, mass migration and conflicts.

        Burnham also pledged UK support for a programme called Amplify, which aims to secure 5 billion pounds (over $6.6 billion) of new private finance for clean energy projects around the world. 

        On Wednesday, Norway’s prime minister announced separately that the UK, Norway and Canada have launched a partnership with a joint ambition to provide and mobilise $10bn in international climate finance by 2030, including private capital.

        Burnham also promised he would use next year’s G20 presidency to “put climate resilience back on the agenda, with debt, development and insurance as key issues”.

        Reaction to the UK leader’s speech was mixed. Eminent British economist Nicholas Stern praised it but Friends of the Earth chief executive Asad Rehman said “if this is all the UK has to offer, then the questions piling in about his climate credibility are more than justified”.

        “Committing to real, grant-based climate finance, rejecting the Rosebank oil field and saying no to a third runway at Heathrow are just some of the ways he can put the UK on track,” Rehman said.

        Andy Burnham speaks to Mayor of London Sadiq Khan, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband and COP31 President Murat Kurum (Photo: Lauren Hurley/No.10 Downing Street) Greta says world leaders “detached from reality” and calls for Israeli energy embargo

        Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg has criticised world leaders gathered at COP31 in Antalya for being “completely detached from reality” in the face of the worsening climate crisis which she said has already become “a matter of life and death”.

        Speaking to a crowd of journalists gathered around her at the media centre, with protection from the UN security, Thunberg said that “the planet is not dying, it is being killed” by “the very same people often thought to come to our rescue”.

        “No one is coming to our rescue,” she said, and unless everyone else, especially the privileged, takes it as a duty to fight back, these disastrous trends unfolding all over the world are going to continue to exponentially get worse and unfold faster than predicted, she said. 

        Flanked by campaigners from war-torn and climate fragile countries, she warned that the climate crisis has become a crisis of injustice with human rights being threatened by states and institutions. She added that the world is headed “towards a future of more genocides and ecocides and the complete compromise of our basic rights and where basic necessities become luxury”.

        The media throngs around Greta Thunberg and fellow activists in the COP31 press centre (Photo: Matteo Civillini)

        She called on COP31 host country of Turkey to heed the global calls for an energy embargo to stop its transfer of oil to Israel, which she said fuels  genocide in Palestine. 

        On Wednesday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also criticised Israeli “ecocide” in Palestine and called for Israel to allow more humanitarian aid to reach Gaza. Turkiye claims to have stopped exporting fossil fuels to Israel but analysts have said that Azerbaijani oil is still passing through Turkish port of Ceyhan on its way to Israel.

        Palestinian prime minister Mohammed Mustafa received a standing ovation before and after his leaders speech on Thursday, in which he said that “no people should be deprived of the right declined of the right [to climate justice] because of occupation”. Israel has not sent a leader to the talks.

        Standing alongside Thunberg, a young Palestinian campaigner called Mohammad Usrof said the militarised fossil economy continues to profit off of the genocide, with fossil fuel supplies to Israel coming from the US, UK, Turkiye, Colombia and South Africa.

        Usrof, who called the war an intentional act of ecocide and environmental devastation, said he has lost 20 family members and that thousands of families continue to be displaced by rainfall and climate disasters because they are all living in makeshift tents. 

          Rikki Dank, a campaigner and Indigenous person from the Gudanji and Wakaya peoples of northern Australia, said the Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who during his COP31 speech, claimed to be speaking on behalf of the people who need urgent action, needs to stop speaking and listen instead. 

          The traditional owner, who is taking the Australian government to the UN Human Rights Committee on fossil fuel exports, said Albanese needs to start listening to calls for no more fracking in communities, poisoning of drinking water and sacred lands as well as calls for “no more new coal, oil and gas and the climate harms that they bring with them”. 

          Similarly, Nepal MP Sagar Dhakal and Rwanda-DRC climate advocate Celine Isimbi called for support for vulnerable countries especially for research and early warning to prevent disasters such as the recent Nepal floods. 

          Asked why she attended COP31 after describing COP26 as “blah blah blah”, Thunberg said journalists’ questions should be addressed to all speakers and did not respond directly but gave closing remarks saying that “we are heading to a future of more genocides and more ecocides”.

          Small island state becomes first to contribute to Green Climate Fund

          With many leaders highlighting the inadequacy of climate finance for vulnerable countries in their COP31 speeches but few stepping up with fresh cash, the Solomon Islands decided to take matters into its own hands.

          It has become the first small island nation to pledge to the UN’s Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the first country to kickstart the fund’s forthcoming replenishment. The GCF has so far backed 379 projects and programmes with $22.3 billion across Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East.

          In the last couple of years, wealthy governments have pulled back on the amounts they are offering for international climate finance, and the UK cut its current GCF contribution in half. That has cast a shadow over the GCF’s third replenishment, which will resource the fund from 2028-2031. 

          New promises of money are due to come in over the coming year, with the first of these announced at COP on Wednesday evening from a non-traditional donor. The Solomon Islands – which is both a small island nation and one of the world’s least developed countries – pledged $400,000.

          A GCF press statement said this is the first time a country falling into either of these categories has donated money to the GCF, describing it as “a historic moment for international climate finance”. 

          Other higher-income developing countries have contributed over the 12 years the GCF has operated, including South Korea, Indonesia and Mongolia.

          Solomon Islands leader Matthew Wale speaks at a COP31 event where his country pledged to the Green Climate Fund, the first small island nation to do so. (Photo: Brylle James Galang) Solomon Islands leader Matthew Wale speaks at a COP31 event where his country pledged to the Green Climate Fund, the first small island nation to do so. (Photo: Brylle James Galang)

          Matthew Wale, prime minister of the Solomon Islands, said the people of his Pacific country live with climate change every day as saltwater creeps into wells, king tides wash through homes, and families face the painful question of whether they can remain on their land.

          “We may be a small island nation with limited resources, but we are determined to show leadership,” Wale said. “Our contribution [to the GCF] reflects the strength of our commitment, but our message is clear: we have stepped forward, and now we call on the world’s largest economies to do the same.” 

          The Solomon Islands is also a recipient of GCF funding for projects to strengthen community resilience and expand access to renewable energy through hydropower.

          Mafalda Duarte, executive director of the GCF, said its contribution sent “a powerful message to the world”. “Solomon Islands has set the bar; now it is time for others to follow the lead and ensure this replenishment is a turning point in how the world delivers climate finance,” she added in a statement.

          At its most recent meeting last month, the GCF board decided to widen the pool of donors that can contribute to its third replenishment, to mobilise contributions from non-government and alternative sources for the first time.

            Countries call for methane process towards global stocktake

            As Australia leads negotiations on what the main negotiated outcome in Antalya could include – known in technical jargon as a “cover decision” – some countries are increasingly calling for it to mention clear mandates addressing methane, a short-lived climate pollutant almost 90 times more potent than carbon dioxide.

            Speaking at a ministerial event this Thursday, France’s environment minister Monique Barbut said COP31 could become “decisive” if it delivers a strong decision on methane, as cutting these emissions is one of the most efficient ways of mitigating warming.

            “This cover decision must incorporate a strong and substantive mention to methane,” she said, adding that a deal in Antalya should call on oil and gas companies to cut methane intensity in their operations to “almost zero” by the end of the decade and eliminate gas flaring and venting. Flaring is when methane gas is burned as a by-product of oil production and venting is when it is leaked into the atmosphere.

            A family prepare tapioca, which is derived from cassava paste, behind sand barriers surrounding a gas flaring furnace at a flow station in Ughelli, Delta State, Nigeria, on September 17, 2020. (Photo: REUTERS/Afolabi Sotunde)

            Barbut also said she expects COP31 to start a process that will allow for a “strong reference” to methane in the next global stocktake in 2028, which is a key five-year review of climate policies that will take place at COP33.

            About 40% of methane emissions come from the agriculture sector – mostly from livestock – and over 20% from waste in landfills. A third of global emissions come from oil and gas, but these emissions can be lowered at a profit by preventing overproduced gas from being released into the atmosphere. In 2021, countries launched a global pledge to cut these emissions by 30% by 2030.

            At the leaders speech event, Barbados’ Prime Minister Mia Mottley went even further and insisted on a proposal first made last year on reaching a legally-binding global agreement on methane, rather than voluntary commitments made at COP.

            “We believe that the best way to force it is first and foremost by an international treaty. The structure of these negotiations does not admit of that in one go, and therefore we need to plot out carefully what is the route to an international treaty,” she said.

            She suggested a meeting of heads of state, even if it is a summit of a coalition of the willing, because “what we need now is the momentum to bring others along”. 

            Australia’s climate minister Chris Bowen – who is under pressure from farmers at home to avoid signing commitments on methane – said the country would sign up to a voluntary pledge to achieve near-zero methane emissions in the fossil fuel sector.

              The post COP31 Bulletin Day 4: Emerging economies question need for COP31 cover decision appeared first on Climate Home News.

              Categories: H. Green News

              Marx and Luxemburg in an age of crisis and war

              Tempest Magazine - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 21:54

              Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the Tempest Collective. For more information, see “About Tempest Collective.”
              Featured Image credit: Gaston Vuillier, Jowinix; modified by Tempest.

              The post Marx and Luxemburg in an age of crisis and war appeared first on Tempest.

              Categories: D2. Socialism

              How Do You Fight Big Car? A New Group Fuels Pro-Transit Campaigns

              Streetsblog USA - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 21:05

              A first-of-its-kind organization is offering support — and cutting checks — to campaigns that challenge car dependency, and helping level the scales against the the highway lobby and its grip on U.S. transportation culture.

              The new Center for American Mobility launched this week with the vision of becoming “the Emily’s List of transportation,” new president and CEO Shelley Brindle said, referring to the pro-choice group that helps elect Democrat women. Unlike that organization, though, the Center for American Mobility will fuel bipartisan efforts to give Americans better mobility options beyond cars alone, starting with down-ballot measures and eventually scaling up to support pro-transit candidates, too.

              “There are lots of incredible organizations that do amazing work in terms of advocating for expansive transit and safe streets,” Brindle added. “But there really haven’t been any that bring the political firepower to actually bring that advocacy to fruition.”

              And in a political environment where they’re badly outgunned, transportation advocates could use all the help they can get.

              A study by the Union of Concerned Scientists earlier this year found that organizations belonging to the “highway lobby” collectively spend more than $100 million every year to “keep us all in a car dependent transportation system” — and that research only quantified the impact of the eight trade associations that most directly benefit from building roads, not the universe of other private interests who make money off keeping Americans trapped behind the wheel for hours every day.

              Much of that money flows to candidates who are happy to protect the car-dependent status quo, or to defeat ballot measures aimed at expanding public transit. And when transportation reform wins anyway — which it often does — lobbyists pour even more money into shifting public opinion through media campaigns.

              Too often, Brindle says America’s overwhelming support for sustainable modes gets drowned out in all the noise.

              “One of the things we’d like to do as an organization is to help connect all those dots around the country,” she added. “Those wins seem to happen in isolation, but they’re [everywhere.]”

              Brindle fought some of those battles herself as the two-term mayor of Westfield, New Jersey, to which she was elected after retiring from a 27-year career as an executive at HBO. She organized a coalition of “32 bipartisan ticked-off mayors” across Jersey’s Raritan Valley to fight for better and more-direct service along the commuter rail line she rode to New York City for decades, including a protest at Newark’s Penn Station (above) that drew swarms of local electeds in signature orange shirts.

              From there, her passion for transportation reform only compounded.

              “I just became an urbanist by default,” Brindle added. “I became obsessed with things like parking minimums, and how the whole ecosystem works together with transportation and economic development.”

              Brindle’s Center had its first chance to put those obsessions into practice this midterms, when the organization helped fund two local campaigns: a ballot measure to fund a new transit authority in Yampa Valley, Colorado, and one to increase bus service levels by 50 percent in Pierce County, Washington. Both won by strong margins.

              “That’s good news for a valley whose towns have come to depend on one another, and for workers, families and seniors, whether or not they ever ride the bus,” said Luke Philips, a spokesperson for the Yampa Valley campaign. “We’re grateful to the Center for American Mobility for its contribution to our campaign, and to everyone who voted, yes or no.”

              “CAM was a crucial supporter of our campaign and helped us with strategy and funding to get it over the top,” added Andrew Austin of Keep Pierce Moving. “They were an excellent partner.”

              CAM says it’s supporting campaigns in other ways, too, including creating a research arm to measure the economic impact of transit investment on families and communities, with the goal of creating more bipartisan support. The Center also aims to provide messaging and other resources to help advocates win, as well to serve as a gathering place for advocates with similar goals to join forces and compare notes.

              Eventually, Brindle says the organization will move up the ballot, too, and provide support for pro-transit candidates at the local and state levels — and maybe even someday at the federal level as well. And if candidates don’t make good on their transportation-related campaign promises, they’ll lose the CAM stamp of approval.

              “We want to be a place where [candidates] are striving to get and maintain an endorsement from us,” she added. “Hopefully that becomes a badge of credibility for them.”

              Recommended How To Train an Army of Sustainable Transportation Advocates Streetsblog June 6, 2023

              Whether CAM can achieve that vision, of course, depends on how widely it can scale. Brindle hopes its initial major sponsors — transit tech company Via and philanthropy Arnold Ventures — will someday make up just a “small percentage of our funders,” with a larger share coming from the grassroots.

              “We have large-scale national ambition to be the voice for transportation in America,” Brindle added. “We want to be a place that can amplify everybody [else] that’s already out there. Our goal is to help broaden the coalition … [so we can] make transit and transportation something that everybody cares about.”

              This story has been updated with additional comment from Keep Pierce Moving.

              GET OUT: E-Bike Battery Fires are a Crisis We Can No Longer Ignore 

              Streetsblog USA - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 21:04

              Back-to-back mass-death fires in Brooklyn and the Bronx have rocked the city these past two weeks, taking ten lives and ripping apart countless more, as reported in the Times, News, Post, Hell Gate, City Reporter, Gothamist, and of course Streetsblog. Substandard e-bike batteries likely triggered both conflagrations, an all-too-common occurrence that should shock street-safety and cycling champions into action.

              Over the past decade, e-bike battery fires in New York City have killed dozens of residents and injured many more. They have rendered hundreds of apartments uninhabitable. Yet micromobility advocates have had little to say, treating this as an anomaly and not a core problem.

              Recommended Sunset Park Blaze Kills 6 As Lithium-ion Battery Fire Crisis Rages On  Sophia Lebowitz November 5, 2026

              City government is complicit, too. On Oct. 28, three teens and their mother died from burns after their father’s e-bike erupted in flames in their Mott Haven apartment. The next day, Mayor Mamdani and Fire Commissioner Lillian Bonsignore offered up pablum: don’t leave e-bikes in doorways, don’t charge them overnight and try to store them outdoors. We might just as well dispense with highway lane markers and beseech drivers to take it easy.

              Officials took a similar tack after the Nov. 5 Brooklyn disaster, when another fast-moving fire, also apparently sparked by an e-bike battery, killed six residents of a two-story frame house in Sunset Park. The blaze marked the greatest loss of life from a single fire in New York City since the 2022 Twin Parks fire in the Bronx. Mamdani vowed to find a solution but omitted any specifics. Bonsignore was out of town and did not comment.

              Even before the Mott Haven and Sunset Park blazes, e-bike-related fires across the five boroughs rose 41 percent from 2025. Batteries caused at least 406 fires this year, versus 241 over the same period in 2025 — a 68-percent increase. 

              “Every single New York City resident should be furious,” said Brooklyn-based street-safety advocate and battery-swap entrepreneur Baruch Herzfeld. He’s right. We cyclists assert the moral high ground as we battle car and truck drivers and their elected enablers. We solemnly memorialize New Yorkers whom motorists kill on our contested streets. Yet this adjacent conflagration finds us largely silent.

              Recommended ‘Everyone Should Be Furious’: Lithium-Ion Battery Fires Are Up 41% As Public Fix Stalls Sophia Lebowitz October 14, 2026

              This problem has persisted for so long that multiple mayors have “cracked down” on it, at multiple times in multiple ways, with little evident change. Between August and mid-September, the city’s Department of Consumer and Worker Protection inspected more than 200 bicycle and micromobility shops and issued 136 violations that led to 77 summonses. But it was insufficient: the agency’s sweep primarily targeted vehicles equipped to exceed the city’s speed limit of 20 mph for scooters and 20 mph for e-bikes — not hazardous batteries.

              This infernal calamity traces to the uncertified lithium-ion batteries that power thousands of e-mobility devices on the city’s streets. Extravagantly distant food delivery — enabled by the lack of a mileage surcharge — compounds the disaster by requiring longer and more frequent charging cycles. 

              What Sets UL-Certified E-bike Batteries Apart

              We think of batteries as mundane pieces of technology. Nobody fears the small metal disc that powers their wristwatch or the slightly larger cylinder in their television remote. E-bike batteries, by comparison, are complex devices that must operate over variegated conditions for long periods of time. That led Underwriters Laboratory to publish their first light-vehicle electric-battery safety standard, known as UL 2271, in 2013.

              William Henry Merrill, an M.I.T.-educated electrical engineer and electrical inspector for the Boston Board of Fire Underwriters, founded UL in 1894. Now a multinational conglomerate with $3 billion in annual revenue, UL maintains safety standards for e-bike batteries. It is one of a few firms authorized by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration to certify their safety.

              Recommended The History of a Movement, Part I: Hazmat Suits and Street Memorials Charles Komanoff December 6, 2021

              To win UL certification — those upper-case initials in a circle you’ve probably seen a thousand times but never really noticed — batteries must demonstrate that they can interrupt overheating, cut off power to battery elements in the event of over-charging or over-discharging, and prevent short circuits from triggering high-energy fires or explosions. In contrast, many uncertified batteries lack automatic shutoff controls or employ generic chargers that can overpower battery cells. They’re also less protected from damage from road jostling, moisture ingress and everyday wear-and-tear.

              Many deliveristas ride cheaper e-bikes and scooters manufactured by obscure Chinese brands with cheap and swappable batteries. New York City has never recorded a fire caused by a UL-certified e-bike or other micromobility device. From all appearances, replacing the off-brand batteries with UL-certified batteries is both necessary and sufficient for fire-safe micromobility.

              How to rid the city of substandard e-bike batteries

              I propose a two-step solution:

              1. Enact a municipal ordinance authorizing the immediate seizure and confiscation of non-UL-certified lithium-ion batteries from residential, commercial and institutional buildings in the five boroughs. 
              2. Impose a steep surcharge on food deliveries administered by food-delivery app companies such as Doordash and Uber Eats. The levies will pay for a new FDNY-DCWP task force to hunt down the non-compliant batteries.

              How big a surcharge? I approached this question by estimating the annual societal cost of e-bike battery fires and dividing that figure by the number of annual deliveries via e-bike. The result is a fee of $15 per delivery. (Yes, there would be parallel surcharges for deliveries by car or truck; and yes, the charge should graduate by distance.) 

              To be sure, my $15 estimate is much less finely drawn than is my wont, owing to inexact figures on the frequency and societal costs of e-bike battery fire deaths, injuries and dwellings destroyed. It’s also a broad-brush figure, since not every e-bike is used for food-delivery. Case in point: the burning e-bike in Mott Haven was apparently gifted to the father — who remains in a medically induced coma — and probably wasn’t used for business purposes. 

              Still, most deadly New York City e-bike fires are tied to the delivery sector. Moreover, that industry’s pockets are deep enough to pay for a municipal strike force to ferret out the thousands of non-compliant lithium-ion batteries used for micro-mobility — commercial or otherwise. The policy question is whether the entire calculated $15-per-delivery “fire externality” should be added to delivery prices, or a smaller amount.

              Surcharge Calculations and Assumptions

              If passed on to customers, a $15 surcharge would translate to a 40-percent rise from the average pre-tip, pre-tax price of $35-40. An increase of that magnitude would cut the demand for food delivery by half.1 That would be tough news for deliveristas, but good tidings for most New Yorkers, who for years have endured enormous collateral damage — both fire-related and street safety-related — from the sector’s unpriced dangers. Lesser surcharges would soften both the customer price increase and the impact on the delivery sector.

              My calculations, assumptions and data sources are spelled out in a simple Excel sheet, available here, covering the past three years. For 2026, the largest damage cost, $144 million, stems from the 10 fatalities in the Mott Haven and Sunset Park fires. I arrived at this figure by multiplying U.S. DOT’s standard measure for the “valuation of a statistical life” — which was $14.2 million last year ($14.4 million with inflation) — by the number of deaths.

              The second largest cost, $67 million, covers the far greater number of injuries. For the purposes of my calculation, I assessed the cost of each injury as five percent of the cost of a fatality, corresponding to U.S. DOT’s assessment of “moderate” injury costs. (The agency assesses serious, severe and critical injuries at roughly 10, 27 and 60 percent of fatal injury costs, respectively.)

              The third largest cost, $16 million, concerns lost housing. I derived this figure from a 2024 report on “the economic, human and community toll” from e-mobility battery fires in New York City by Oxford Economics for UL Standards and Engagement, the non-profit arm of Underwriters Laboratory that devises safety standards.2

              The three categories sum to $159 million for 2024, $193 million for 2025, and $227 million for this year. I have used the middle (2025) figure of $193 million and divided it by the annual rate of 13 million food deliveries. The result is $14.85, or $15 rounded.

              If New York City were to surcharge app-operated food deliveries by that amount, the annual take would be close to the $193 million figure. That level of revenue could staff a thousand-person enforcement office, assuming fully loaded costs of $200,000 per employee. (The surcharge, and the task force, would shrink as the number of non-certified batteries diminished.) Alternatively, some of the revenue could support a trade-in program (as has been done with guns). The City could buy certified batteries at a bulk discount and give them to deliveristas in exchange for uncertified ones. 

              Would this throw deliveristas under the bus?

              In the short run, deliverista work-hours would surely shrivel along with the size of their industry. That shrinkage would be temporary, pending the eventual bounceback as non-UL-certified batteries disappear and the gross fire-damage figure dwindles — and, with it, the delivery surcharge. Authorities should press for a federal ban on the manufacture and importation of uncertified batteries, but that likely would take years — time the city doesn’t have.

              Admittedly, this scheme is unabashedly draconian, at least at the “full price,” and stands in marked contrast to the “essential” designation of food-delivery in the Covid pandemic. As the strike force retrenched, the city could redirect some of the surcharge revenue to retraining and resettlement.

              But when the smoke clears, we should see the facts clearly: what arose as a pandemic-era stopgap has transformed our streets to service some of the wealthiest New Yorkers. Requiring them to bear the true costs of their expensive and maladaptive habit isn’t exactly the French Revolution. It’s a way of prioritizing a safer city over extreme convenience.

              Externality pricing can be a stern taskmaster. But what’s good in the case of congestion pricing should also be good for snuffing out e-bike fires that are hurting, and haunting, New Yorkers. 

              1. I calculated a 50 percent downturn in the number of deliveries by exponentiating 1.4 to the -2 power. The 1.4 figure corresponds to the 40 percent increase in the average order price (calculated by adding $15 to the base price of around $38, premised on the maximum surcharge rate). The negative two figure is the price-elasticity often applied to luxury goods. The result (expressed as 1.4^(-2)), is 0.51, indicating “survival” of 51 percent of untaxed deliveries. The other 49 percent disappear.

                ︎
              2. Specifically, I calculated the geometric mean of Oxford’s range of affected housing units, and extrapolated their 2024 numbers into 2026. That gives us 121 affected housing units. I then derived an estimated cost of rebuilding each unit, based on figures published by the New York City Housing Authority and the National Fire Protection Association. With inflation, that gives us a cost-per-unit of $130,000. Multiplying that by 121 yields slightly less than $16 million.

                ︎

              Families To Unite in Loss and Hope for World Day of Remembrance This Sunday

              Streetsblog USA - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 21:04

              When I arrive at Butler Square in Philadelphia this Sunday, Nov. 15 for World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims, I expect to feel a mix of strong emotions. 

              Sadness, of course. My son, Damien, was killed two and a half years ago in a hit-and-run. He was only 17 years old. He was coming back from the gym and less than three blocks from our home when the driver of an SUV, who was speeding, struck him. Damien was my only child. 

              Outrage, certainly. Like thousands of people mobilizing on World Day of Remembrance, I know we can prevent tragedies like the one that took my son’s life. I will be calling on our state leaders to do more to deter dangerous, high-end speeding, by supporting Stop Super Speeders legislation and expanding the use of speed safety cameras.

              The author’s son Damien, pictured, was killed by a speeding driving when he was 17 years old.

              And I’ll be feeling something new this year: A sense of hope. I see that I’m not alone in my grief, nor my belief that we can make our streets safe. I see our advocacy community growing and making a difference.

              This World Day of Remembrance, a record number of more than 80 communities across the nation are demanding that leaders invest in safety on our streets – not speed. 

              It’s a fact that speed is a top cause of traffic deaths. But most people don’t realize that we know how to deter dangerously high speeds. On this World Day of Remembrance, we’ll be urging leaders to use the tools that work: designing streets to encourage safe speeds, adjusting speed limits, and using proven technologies, such as speed safety cameras and Intelligent Speed Assistance in vehicles.

              We’re seeing these tools work in my own city and others to manage speeds and improve safety. Now we need to scale this work up to make a bigger difference. Examples include:

              • Philadelphia reduced traffic deaths by 26 percent between 2024 and 2025. City leaders point to investments in traffic calming measures, bike lanes, more time for pedestrians to cross streets and speed safety cameras, which have helped reduce high-end speeding by up to 95 percent.
              • Austin’s investments in lower speed limits and safer street designs are working. On traffic-calmed streets, 78 percent fewer vehicles are traveling 10+ mph over the limit on streets, and fatal and serious injury crashes are down 33 percent. And Austin reports saving $11 million in annual comprehensive crash cost savings.
              • Madison has reduced speeds on hundreds of miles of streets and added hundreds of safety improvements, resulting in 58% fewer traffic deaths in 2024 compared to 2020, when it started its Vision Zero work.
              • Cleveland reduced average speeds by nearly 8 mph on streets where it added low-cost speed tables. This is no small deal: research shows that reducing average speed by 1 mph is associated with a 5 percent reduction in crashes.
              • In San Francisco, the number of drivers traveling 10+ mph above the speed limit has dropped 80% where speed safety cameras were added, meaning 42,000 fewer instances of speeding each day. 

              My optimism is growing because we know what works to prioritize safety over speed in our communities. And people want this, as evidenced by so many wins across the nation for safe, sensible transportation in last week’s election. I’m also encouraged by growing bipartisan support for Stop Super Speeders bills allowing Intelligent Speed Assistance to rein in repeat, dangerous speeders. Recently, eight states and Washington DC have passed such legislation with a dozen more queued up.

              At the federal level, I’m working to support the Pedestrian Protection Act, introduced by my U.S. Rep. Mary Gay Scanlon of Pennsylvania. This would establish federal safety standards for motor vehicles, desperately needed to address the dangerous super-sizing of cars.

              Another chance for federal leadership is the Sarah Debbink Langenkamp bill, which would make it easier for states and local governments to build safe walking and biking infrastructure. The bill’s sponsor Congressman Jamie Raskin of Maryland plans to attend the World Day of Remembrance Ride for your Life in Washington, D.C., where hundreds of people will ride and rally for road safety on the National Mall.

              I know it’s going to take a lot of work and time to turn this nation around after a century of investing in speed over safety. But I know that nothing will change without us setting the vision we deserve – Vision Zero, safe mobility for all – and working toward it at every level – local, state and federal.

              That’s why I’m showing up and demanding change this World Day of Remembrance. Traffic deaths change lives permanently. The pain of Damien’s absence will never go away. But I know we can do better and help your loved ones get home safely

              I hope you’ll join me in taking a stand to prevent road deaths and injuries. You can attend an event near you or organize your own, because even small actions can make a difference. Help us get the word out about World Day of Remembrance and our call for leaders to invest in safety solutions, not deadly speed. 

              ‘The Olympics of Train Drivers’: Inside Warsaw’s Tram EM Competition

              Streetsblog USA - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 21:01

              The sound of a train taking off. The rumbling of the ground under your feet. A three-car PESA Jazz train barreling down the street at a high speed, the hiss of the operator hitting a quick brake, and the train smashing a giant grey bouncy ball into a gaggle of inflatable orange and white pins. The crowd around you erupts.

              This might not be an average sight on your regular train commute, but it was a scene straight from the 12th European Tram Driver Championship (Tram EM) in Warsaw this past September, where Streetsblog was on the scene.

              Warsaw’s transit history

              Affectionately nicknamed the “Paris of the North”, Warsaw boasts a robust transit system, with heavy rail, light rail, and buses that come with such high frequency and predictability that it made my head spin. 

              Left: One of the Warsaw’s M-shaped subway entrances; right: a modern tram passes the Polonia Palace Hotel.

              For anyone familiar with the Green Line getting stuck behind double-parked delivery vans on Huntington Ave., or waiting for red lights going down Commonwealth, Warsaw felt like a look into the future – though born out of a deeply resilient past.

              Warsaw was developing a seven-line metro in the late 1930s, but World War II halted the work. During the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, the city’s tram cars were still in operation and being used as barricades to block advancing German forces. Only about 200 out of 710 tram cars survived the war, and the system was virtually destroyed. But through the perseverance of the Polish people, the city and tram network were rebuilt and transformed. A few streets downtown still memorialize pre-war tram tracks. 

              Today, Warsaw’s tram network is one of the largest, fastest-growing light rail networks in Europe. The city-owned Tramwaje Warszawskie spans over 180 miles of track across 25 lines, carrying nearly 250 million riders a year.

              With priority signaling, minimal vehicle delay, and grass-covered rails that absorb noise and rainwater, trams moved through the city corridors past gridlocked cars with ease. Even someone with almost zero Polish comprehension (like me) could find the system easy to navigate and convenient to get around (minus a missed bus or two from waiting at the wrong stop).

              Commuters and cyclists easily navigate Warsaw’s modern multimodal streets.

              But that seamlessness doesn’t end with the transit system. Warsaw’s protected, wide bike lanes carry across the city alongside its main transit corridors, and are open to personal wheels or an e-scooter from Lime, or an e-bike from Vetrulio, the city’s bike-share network.

              I got involved with pierogi fillings I had never heard of before, and explored the other ethnic enclaves local to the area, Vietnamese (Viet Street Food Bistro) and Georgian (Rusiko). I went into restaurant after restaurant, asking, “What’s the most [insert cuisine here] thing I could order?” And the locals’ recommendations never disappointed.

              Clockwise from top left: Sogard Park, the Palace of Culture and Science at sunset, Market Square in the Old Town, Rusiko restaurant, and the riverfront Vistula Boulevards. Warsaw cuisine. The main event

              The atmosphere in the plaza of the Pałac Kultury i Nauki, or Palace of Culture and Science, on the morning of Tram EM was overcast, temperate, and significant. 

              Not only was it the day of the competition, it was also European Mobility Week celebrating mobility for all with a focus on intergenerational equity, and Warsaw’s annual Dni Transportu Publicznego (Public Transport Days) festival, celebrating the 160th anniversary of the public transportation network in Poland.

              The festival featured vintage trains and buses, a train driving simulator, activities for children, pierogi food trucks, and interactive exhibits and booths where passersby could win prizes. Following the sounds of the announcer introducing the event led you out to Marszałkowska (Marshal) Street, where the main event was taking place.

              Historic vehicles at the Dni Transportu Publicznego (Public Transport Days) festival in Warsaw.

              The tram line was shut down, with two cars on the east end acting as a barrier, flashing the words “Tram EM 2026” in place of a destination, and a giant ball and inflatable pins on the west end. One train car occupied each of the two parallel tracks, with people flanking any open spot by the barricade perimeter of the event. 

              Some folks sat on the street around screens capturing all the action, and some were in the multi-story TK Maxx across the street watching from the window – though I’m not positive if they were just curious shoppers in the right place at the right time or experienced spectators with an elaborate game plan.

              Twenty-five teams from cities across 24 countries from Europe and Australia, pairings of male and female tram drivers from each municipality, one goal: to win the Tram EM. 

              Teams from Barcelona, Bratislava, Edinburgh, Gorzów (Poland), Gothenburg, Istanbul, Kyiv, Luxembourg, Lyon, Milan, Oradea (Romania), Oslo, Prague, Riga, Rotterdam, Tampere (Finland), Zagreb, and Zurich competed in this year’s contest. 

              London, Odense (Denmark), Melbourne, and Sofia were new to the stage, while defending champion Budapest, host city Warsaw, and world champion Vienna went into the day as ones to watch. 

              The stage was set. But first, I have to explain the stage itself.

              Not only was it Tram EM competition day, but also the160th anniversary of public transportation in Warsaw. How Tram EM works

              I originally understood the contest to be a number of different events throughout the day, but it was actually a number of different events in one beautifully absurd obstacle course, where drivers compete on the same train under identical conditions to make the contest a pure test of skill. 

              The first contest, the “Stop and Go”, requires competitors to advance and stop with precision in three target areas with a glass bowl of water on its back; the less water spilled, the more points gained. 

              Then, once the bowl is removed, operators move to “Speed and target braking”, kicking the train to 25 km/h without a speedometer, then attempting to try to stop quickly and accurately on a target area on the ground. 

              Following this, the drivers play a round of “Tram Bowling”, which is exactly how it sounds – the tram has to hit a very large grey ball into the pins, but no points are awarded if the tram itself hits a pin. 

              Lateral distance Tram bowling

              The doors of the train open, and the driver team comes sprinting out to switch trams. One driver stays on the street, lining up a cardboard cutout just so that their partner driving the tram forward gets as close as possible without side swiping it during the “Lateral Distance” challenge. From there, the driver leans out of the passenger window, trying to score 5 basketballs into a nearby hoop about an arm’s length away, in what is so aptly named “Tram Basketball”. 

              In the last stretch of the course, the driver advances forward for another “Exact Stop” stop test, trying to brake the train to open the second door as close to the middle of a target area on the ground, and to bring it on home in “Precision Reversing”, where one team member directs the driver by whistle as they back up into the target area just before a striped gate.

              And did I mention that this is all timed? 

              Drivers had to move with accuracy and speed, with keen-eyed judges around the track measuring distance down to the millimeter, and penalties for spilled water and missed targets.

              Stop and Go A successful run! Scenes from the competition

              Some teams like Sofia, Kyiv, and Prague stood out in executing dominating runs that shot each of them to the top slots of the leaderboard.

              Others stood out for all the wrong reasons, like the first-timer London team who sent the glass bowl flying to the ground right out the gate, or Lyon’s team, where both drivers ran to the second car forgetting to get the cardboard cutout set up for the Lateral Distance event.

              The audience, much like Poland’s transit fleet, was electric – and at times, backseat drivers, if you will.

              Die-hard transit fans bring their whimsy to Warsaw.

              “That’s not good,” a woman with a British accent pointed out to me as we watched one contestant set up the cardboard cutout. “We’ve been standing here all day so we know at this point what’s going to work and what’s not.”

              “Move it closer!” another man from America yelled.

              Every time someone made a basket, the fans, almost in a cult-like fashion, all would cheer a short and polite “Woo!’ in unison after each basket was made.

              Friends from three separate countries met up to attend Tram EM, giggling about their trip.

              Once all the teams went, the program took a lunch break before going again. The competitors ran the course a second time to try to learn from their mistakes or hold onto their lead. 

              Fans supporting Team Tampere (Finland) cheer on their operators from the barricades. The final Tram EM leaderboard showing Prague taking 1st place overall with 6,000 points, followed closely by Oradea (2nd) and Sofia (3rd).

              52 competition runs later, the final score (a combination of both point totals), revealed how teams ended their competition day. Prague rose to the top while London remained at the bottom of the list, and host city Warsaw finished right in the middle at 13th.

              Participants and spectators alike flocked back to the plaza for the subsequent awards ceremony, where the announcer presented prizes to the top three best Female Drivers, Male Drivers, and the Overall Teams.

              The best three overall teams – Prague, Oradea, Sofia – took the stage to claim their titles. Best female driver winners (Hilda Polamo, Tampere, Anina Lara Knecht, Zurich, Vendula Tmejová, Prague), best male driver winners (Andrii Bichev, Kyiv, Zdeněk Rychtář, Prague, Mihail Antoniev, Sofia) were also awarded.

              The crowd was colored with spectators and participating teams waving their respective flags, holding signs repping their cities, and even a couple people dressed up as a train. Cheering on their operators like not only the elite athletes they are, but the vital public sector professionals that literally keep the city moving.

              But amid all the whimsy were some key takeaways – the joy and liberation that public transit facilitates, and the intergovernmental partnership needed to promote it. It is not lost on me that a governmental body such as the EU has such a robust network of transit that moves travelers within cities, across countries, and throughout much of the continent, creating civic culture that connects and infects the entire continent.

              To witness such international unity felt regrettably unfamiliar these days, but also so light and inspiring. To see people from different countries celebrating their own home countries with painted faces and jerseys, but also celebrating each other, cheering for one another, commiserating together, and dancing.

              You can relive all the action of the second run of the course (and maybe see me bobbing and weaving around the course to get good shots) here.

              A case for transit unity

              The tradition is poised to continue, as next year’s host city, Luxembourg, premiered their video to announce their contest, featuring two old women talking about Luxembourg’s culture, food, and – what elicited the most cheers – free public transit.

              Luxembourg will take on hosting duties next year, and Melbourne takes the reins in 2028, opening up the contest to a worldwide group, similar to 2025’s contest in Vienna.

              One big question that continues to be top of mind for me following the experience is: what’s it going to take to get one of these going in North America? 

              San Diego represented America in the 2025 World Competition in Vienna, and the American Public Transportation Association and the T host events for bus drivers like APTA’s International Bus Roadeo or the T’s own Bus Rodeo, which took place just a few weeks ago.

              But North America currently lacks a public, festival-scale spectacle for rail operators. We saw how some of those networks rose to the occasion during this summer’s World Cup surge, and there’s no reason we can’t highlight them here.

              Recommended

              Smooth Rides, No Hooliganism: A Review of the MBTA’s World Cup Service
              Jaime Moore-Carrillo

              July 1, 2026

              While Tram EM focuses on street-running light rail, a North American offering could have operators across light and heavy rail in similar speed and accuracy challenges. Imagine bringing drivers and riders together from across the continent to compete for glory, display driver skill, and look back on how far transit has gone in North America, and celebrate where our cities have delivered – a true cross-continental showcase of driver talent and civic pride. 

              Imagine vital services new and old, sprawling and small, from urban cores to small cities, going head-to-head. Legacy networks like the T here at home, the Chicago “L”, New Orleans’ historic St. Charles Streetcar Line, Mexico City’s STC Metro, and Toronto’s TTC streetcars sharing the track with modern systems like Charlotte’s LYNX Blue Line, Dallas’s DART Light Rail, Phoenix’s Valley Metro Rail and Calgary’s CTrain. Taking on the course, representing transit across the continent, showcasing their drivers, and sharing their civic pride. 

              Recommended

              Una Ciudad, Un Sistema (One City, One System): A Mexico City Travel Guide
              Meghan Volcy

              February 10, 2025

              A rotating host city across North America would bring fans together to explore local culture and cuisine, inspire ridership and hometown pride, and spotlight ongoing expansion – whether that’s efforts within city limits like expanding the Metro in LA, new light rail corridors in Canada, or efforts to restore and expand regional Amtrak routes. 

              I might be biased, but if the T’s operators can survive Boston winters, a whole track replacement, aging infrastructure, and a couple fires, I think they could easily take home the gold. 

              Who can I call to get this going? Until then, I’ll just keep watching my footage and start planning my trip to Luxembourg for the next one.

              Thursday’s Headlines Power Up

              Streetsblog USA - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 21:01
              • With just 4 percent of the global fleet made up of electric vehicles, they’re already saving more than 1 million barrels of oil a day, making EVs the best hope to curb dependence on fossil fuels and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 24 countries decided at climate summit COP26. (Transport & Environment)
              • The ideal, of course, is going car-free, but that’s not easy in most cities. New York is the only city in the U.S. where a majority of people commute by transit, bike or walking, and the figures fall quickly from there, down to 15 percent for No. 10 Minneapolis. (New York Times)
              • More than two-thirds of Northern Ireland residents refuse to even consider biking because it’s too dangerous. (Velo Disco)
              • Smaller cities in the U.S. compare favorably to their European counterparts in People for Bikes‘ rankings. That’s not the case for big cities, though.
              • Toyota will start selling a tiny kei truck in the U.S. next year, but it’s only allowed on low-speed streets, and will only be available to fleets, not individuals. (Jalopnik)
              • Traffic congestion seems immune to advances in technology and computing power that theoretically should be able to improve it. (City Nerd)
              • Speaking of technology, Tesla’s misleadingly named Full Self-Driving function — which still requires an alert driver ready to take the wheel — routinely exceeds the speed limit and tries to pass cyclists in areas where that’s prohibited. (Momentum)
              • Apparently the old Tesla-Edison AC vs. DC debate is still alive and well when it comes to rail electrification. (Railway Age)
              • A Houston landscape architecture firm creating a set of design templates for cooling pedestrians while they walk. (Dezeen)
              • The new Democratic attorney general in Texas is likely to end Ken Paxton’s quest to cancel light rail in Austin. (KXAN)
              • The midterm elections have ended a partisan standoff in Pennsylvania over transit funding. (State Affairs; paywall)
              • Why does it always seem like cities wait for a driver to kill a child before they improve an intersection? (Charlotte Observer)
              • Destin and Fort Walton Beach are planning a 2,000-space parking deck at the airport they share. (Get the Coast)
              • Former NFL coach and noted foot-lover Rex Ryan was charged with several misdemeanors in Nashville when, ironically, two pedestrians accused him of running over their feet with his SUV. (WSMV)

              CFS Advisory Group and Bureau meeting | 23 November 2026

              Cover photo: © FAO /  Giulio Napolitano

              On 23 November 2026 the CFS Bureau and Advisory Group will hold their first joint meeting since CFS 54. Members will begin with a round-table reflection on the outcomes of the Plenary and its side events. The meeting will also address the the current funding gap and its potential impact on the Committee’s work, and possible short-term actions; the follow-up actions ahead of CFS 55 in October 2027; and updates from the different workstreams.

              Provisional agenda

              Background documents

              The post CFS Advisory Group and Bureau meeting | 23 November 2026 appeared first on CSIPM.

              Categories: A3. Agroecology

              Shell’s $400 Million Namibia Setback Meets a New Deepwater Test — An Independent Investigation

              Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 13:52

              AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

              By the Donovan–Shell Archive

              11 November 2026

              Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, using Shell corporate statements, Namibian government and petroleum-company records, published environmental documentation, contemporaneous energy-industry reporting and historical material from the Donovan–Shell Archive.

              Shell is returning to the same offshore licence where commercial expectations previously collapsed. A new drilling campaign follows the most promising geological results yet, but important questions about commercial viability, environmental oversight and the benefits to Namibia remain unanswered.

              In January 2025, Shell acknowledged a major disappointment in Namibia.

              After years of exploration, several hydrocarbon discoveries and considerable international excitement, the company concluded that resources discovered in its offshore Petroleum Exploration Licence 39 could not then be confirmed for commercial development.

              Approximately $400 million in exploration expenditure was to be written off.

              For a country hoping to establish itself as a significant oil producer, the announcement was an unwelcome reminder that finding hydrocarbons and producing them economically are two very different achievements.

              Now Shell is preparing to try again.

              On 4 November 2026, Namibian energy publication Mining & Energy reported that Shell was approaching the commencement of another ultra-deepwater drilling campaign using the Stena DrillMAX drillship.

              Shell Namibia Country Chair Eduardo Rodriguez Tamayo said that five months of preparation had brought the operation close to drilling readiness.

              The development follows the company’s Merlin-1X exploration well, which delivered what Shell described in June as its most promising subsurface results on the licence to date.

              The question is whether those results represent a genuine turning point or merely another encouraging discovery that will prove difficult to develop commercially.

              Source: Mining & Energy Namibia — Shell prepares to drill new ultra-deepwater well, 4 November 2026.

              miningandenergy.com.na+2

               

              The original disappointment: a discovery is not necessarily an oilfield

              Shell’s exploration programme in Namibia’s Orange Basin attracted international attention following the Graff discovery in 2022.

              Other wells subsequently encountered hydrocarbons, raising hopes that the waters off southern Namibia might contain a commercially attractive new petroleum province.

              But the geology presented difficult problems.

              The discoveries were located in very deep water, far offshore, and Shell encountered challenges involving reservoir characteristics and the composition of the discovered hydrocarbons.

              One particularly important difficulty concerned permeability.

              A reservoir may contain substantial quantities of oil while still being difficult to produce economically if the rock does not allow hydrocarbons to flow readily towards production wells.

              The presence of associated natural gas can complicate commercial development further, depending on its quantity, composition and the facilities needed to process or transport it.

              These are not minor engineering considerations.

              They influence the number of wells required, the design of production facilities, development expenditure, operating costs and ultimately whether an investment can generate an acceptable commercial return.

              By January 2025, Shell had reached the conclusion that the discovered resources could not then be confirmed for commercial development.

              The company planned an exploration write-off of approximately $400 million.

              That did not mean that no oil existed. Nor did it mean that every prospect within PEL 39 had been exhausted.

              It meant that the particular expenditure and discoveries concerned could no longer be supported on the previously assumed commercial basis.

              That distinction is essential to understanding what followed.

              Contemporaneous accounts: Reuters reporting reproduced by Mining Weekly, 9 January 2025 and S&P Global Energy’s subsequent examination of Shell’s exploration plans.

              Mining Weekly+1

               

              Namibia’s national oil company refused to write off the future

              Shell was not the only organisation affected by the disappointing assessment.

              The National Petroleum Corporation of Namibia, NAMCOR, is a participant in PEL 39 alongside Shell and QatarEnergy.

              On 10 January 2025, NAMCOR issued an official statement concerning the licence.

              It acknowledged that the joint venture had already drilled six exploration wells and three appraisal wells.

              It also recognised that ultra-deepwater conditions and reservoir complexities remained obstacles.

              Nevertheless, NAMCOR maintained that the accumulated geological data indicated continuing hydrocarbon potential and that the partners were evaluating further exploration and appraisal opportunities.

              This was an important statement of the Namibian position.

              The country’s national petroleum company did not deny the technical difficulties. It argued that the available information still justified further investigation.

              That position has now acquired renewed significance.

              The 2026 campaign should therefore be viewed not simply as Shell returning to a failed project, but as the continuation of a joint-venture effort to determine whether the licence contains a commercially workable development opportunity.

              Primary document: NAMCOR — Position on PEL Block 39, 10 January 2025.

              namcor.com.na+1

               

              Merlin-1X: the well that changed the geological outlook

              On 9 June 2026, Shell announced encouraging results from Merlin-1X.

              The well had begun drilling on 8 April and was the tenth drilled within PEL 39.

              According to Shell, it penetrated the Coniacian geological interval and encountered good reservoir quality containing light oil with limited associated gas.

              The company described the results as its most promising subsurface findings yet within the licence.

              This was a potentially meaningful change from the geological difficulties that had previously undermined commercial expectations.

              The composition of the discovered hydrocarbons matters.

              Light oil can be commercially attractive, while a lower proportion of associated gas may reduce some of the infrastructure and processing challenges that complicated earlier discoveries.

              But the announcement left crucial matters unresolved.

              Shell did not disclose a commercially recoverable reserve estimate for Merlin-1X.

              It did not announce a final investment decision for an oil development.

              Nor did it establish that the new reservoir could support sustained production at a commercially acceptable cost.

              The result improved the available geological information.

              It did not eliminate the need for further appraisal, engineering studies and economic evaluation.

              Shell’s Executive Vice President for Exploration, Strategy and Portfolio, Eugene Okpere, described the results as encouraging while emphasising that the company would continue assessing commercial potential.

              That careful language deserves attention.

              Shell was not declaring that its Namibian difficulties had been solved.

              It was reporting that new evidence justified continuing the investigation.

              Primary source: Shell Namibia — Shell advances exploration in Namibia’s Orange Basin with latest well results, 9 June 2026.

              Shell Namibia

               

              The new drilling campaign: what is actually confirmed?

              The latest development provides evidence that Shell and its partners are moving beyond geological interpretation towards another physical exploration programme.

              According to the 4 November report in Mining & Energy, preparations involving the Stena DrillMAX drillship have been completed to the point where drilling is approaching commencement.

              The vessel departed Las Palmas in the Canary Islands in October.

              Stena Drilling had previously confirmed its voyage to Namibia, with industry reports linking the assignment to Shell’s PEL 39 programme.

              Local reporting indicates that the relevant exploration and appraisal window extends from November 2026 into February 2027.

              Shell’s country chair has acknowledged the extensive preparations and thanked the Namibian government, joint-venture partners, contractors and employees involved.

              There are, however, important limits to what has been publicly established.

              The available reports do not identify the precise target of the forthcoming well.

              They do not establish whether Shell intends to drill directly into the Merlin discovery, appraise an existing structure or investigate a different prospect.

              Nor do the sources reviewed establish that the new well had actually been spudded by 11 November.

              It would therefore be premature to describe the drilling campaign as having discovered additional oil.

              For now, the confirmed development is operational readiness for another exploration campaign.

              Sources: Mining & Energy Namibia, 4 November 2026; Offshore Energy — Stena DrillMAX deployment, 12 October 2026.

              miningandenergy.com.na+2

               

              Who owns the licence — and who stands to benefit?

              PEL 39 covers approximately 12,000 square kilometres offshore southern Namibia, in waters more than 250 kilometres from the coast.

              The ownership structure is straightforward.

              Shell operates the licence with a 45% participating interest.

              QatarEnergy holds another 45%.

              NAMCOR, Namibia’s national petroleum company, holds the remaining 10%.

              That gives Namibia a direct participation through its state petroleum company.

              However, ownership percentages alone cannot establish the eventual economic benefits to the country.

              Those would depend on whether a commercially viable discovery is developed, the applicable fiscal regime, expenditure, production performance, contractual arrangements and the government’s wider revenue entitlements.

              No commercial development decision has been announced for PEL 39.

              Consequently, projected production revenues should not be treated as secured national income.

              The distinction matters because offshore discoveries can generate considerable optimism well before the underlying commercial and engineering questions have been resolved.

              Namibia has a legitimate interest in developing its natural resources.

              It also has an interest in ensuring that expectations are based on evidence rather than assumptions about future wealth.

              Primary source: Shell Namibia — PEL 39 licence and joint-venture information.

              shell.com.na

               

              The environmental regulatory record deserves examination

              There is another dimension to Shell’s renewed exploration programme.

              Deepwater drilling requires environmental assessment, operational safeguards and regulatory oversight.

              Namibia’s Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Tourism maintains a public environmental-assessment system containing records of Shell’s applications concerning PEL 39.

              One official record relates to a previous application to amend the environmental clearance for exploration and appraisal drilling.

              It describes an original authorisation covering up to five wells and a subsequent application to allow up to ten additional exploration or appraisal wells within the established area of interest.

              The public project register identifies the amendment application as approved.

              Related documentation is preserved by Namibia’s Environmental Information Service, including an environmental assessment amendment report and environmental management material prepared by SLR Environmental Consulting.

              These records demonstrate that the regulatory framework and environmental-assessment process have a documentary history extending back several years.

              They should not, however, be misrepresented.

              The older environmental approval record does not by itself establish the precise conditions applying to the November 2026 drilling campaign.

              Nor does a historic environmental clearance demonstrate that every relevant operational requirement has been satisfied for every subsequent well.

              Shell’s Namibia country chair has publicly acknowledged government support in meeting regulatory requirements for the latest campaign.

              That is evidence of the company’s account of the preparations, not a substitute for examining the actual current approvals.

              The appropriate questions are therefore documentary.

              What environmental clearances and amendments govern the latest drilling operation?

              What conditions apply to well control, waste management, potential discharges and emergency response?

              What monitoring and reporting obligations have been imposed?

              And how much of the resulting compliance information will be publicly available?

              These are legitimate questions concerning accountability for a complex offshore industrial activity.

              Their existence does not imply that Shell or its contractors have breached any environmental requirement.

              Sources: Namibian environmental assessment register — PEL 39 drilling project; Environmental Information Service — supporting PEL 39 documents; SLR Consulting — Shell PEL 39 seismic environmental-clearance documentation.

              eia.meft.gov.na+2

               

              The promise of local employment — and the information still missing

              The latest drilling preparations have also been presented as an opportunity for Namibian participation.

              Shell’s country chair has acknowledged the involvement of Namibian employees and local suppliers in offshore and shore-based operations.

              That is welcome in principle.

              Major offshore projects require marine services, logistics, equipment, training, maintenance, accommodation and specialist technical assistance.

              Some of that expenditure can support local businesses and develop skills.

              But the public reports examined do not establish how many Namibian workers have been employed in the latest campaign, the total value of contracts awarded to Namibian suppliers, or the proportion of expenditure retained within the national economy.

              Nor do they provide a quantified account of longer-term employment opportunities arising from PEL 39.

              These omissions should not be interpreted as evidence that promised benefits do not exist.

              They mean that the benefits cannot yet be measured from the available disclosures.

              For a country hoping to develop a new petroleum industry, those distinctions are important.

              A drilling campaign can create temporary employment and demand for services without necessarily leading to a producing oilfield.

              A producing oilfield, if eventually developed, could generate further benefits, but the scale and distribution of those benefits would depend on arrangements not yet established by the documents examined.

              The public-interest issue is not whether Shell should be discouraged from employing Namibians.

              It is whether future claims concerning national economic benefits can be independently assessed against disclosed figures.

              Source: Mining & Energy Namibia — comments by Shell Namibia Country Chair Eduardo Rodriguez Tamayo.

              miningandenergy.com.na

               

              What does the new campaign say about Shell’s wider strategy?

              Shell’s continued interest in Namibia is consistent with its wider emphasis on major, potentially competitive oil and gas resources.

              The company is prepared to invest in exploration where management believes the available geological evidence justifies additional expenditure.

              But the Namibian history demonstrates why that strategy carries uncertainty.

              Large companies can possess sophisticated geological expertise, substantial financial resources and extensive offshore engineering experience while still encountering discoveries that fail to meet commercial requirements.

              The $400 million write-down was an accounting recognition of that difficulty.

              The Merlin-1X results subsequently improved the geological outlook.

              The forthcoming drilling campaign represents a further attempt to resolve what remains uncertain.

              It is tempting to portray this sequence either as an embarrassing reversal for Shell or as an impressive corporate recovery.

              Neither conclusion is yet justified.

              The original assessment concerned the commercial viability of resources discovered before Merlin.

              The later positive results concern additional geological evidence.

              The new drilling programme is intended to generate still more information.

              Each development belongs to a different stage of exploration and appraisal.

              Further drilling does not automatically reverse a previous impairment.

              Nor does a promising reservoir automatically become a commercially recoverable reserve.

              The decisive question is whether sufficient evidence ultimately supports a development capable of producing hydrocarbons economically, safely and within the applicable regulatory framework.

              That answer has not yet been announced.

              DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

              Established by primary corporate and public records

              Shell operates Namibia’s PEL 39 with a 45% interest, alongside QatarEnergy with 45% and NAMCOR with 10%.

              In January 2025, Shell’s commercial assessment of previously discovered resources resulted in an approximately $400 million exploration write-off.

              NAMCOR acknowledged the geological challenges but continued to support evaluation of the licence.

              Shell announced encouraging results from Merlin-1X on 9 June 2026, describing it as the most promising subsurface result yet in PEL 39.

              Contemporaneous Namibian reporting on 4 November confirmed preparations for a further ultra-deepwater drilling campaign involving Stena DrillMAX.

              Public environmental records document earlier assessments and approvals relating to exploration and appraisal activities within the licence.

              Established by attributed contemporary reporting, but not independently verified from the underlying operational records

              Shell’s Namibia country chair said that five months of preparations had brought the latest campaign close to drilling readiness.

              Local workers and suppliers are participating in preparations, although the publicly reported information does not quantify the economic benefits.

              Not established by the documents examined

              The precise target of the latest well has not been identified.

              Commencement of drilling by 11 November 2026 has not been independently confirmed.

              No new commercial reserve estimate, final investment decision or production timetable for PEL 39 has been verified.

              The specific current environmental-clearance conditions applicable to the latest well have not been independently established from the older public regulatory files.

              No evidence examined establishes unlawful conduct, environmental non-compliance or misrepresentation by Shell or its joint-venture partners.

              EDITORIAL ANALYSIS: A second chance is not yet a commercial success

              Shell’s renewed drilling preparations demonstrate that the company has not abandoned the exploration potential of PEL 39 following its earlier write-down.

              That is significant.

              An offshore licence that attracted considerable excitement in 2022, suffered a commercial setback in 2025 and produced more encouraging geological evidence in 2026 is entering another consequential stage.

              For Shell, the objective is to determine whether additional subsurface evidence can support a commercially attractive opportunity.

              For QatarEnergy, the licence represents another element of its international upstream portfolio.

              For NAMCOR and Namibia, it represents a possible route towards future petroleum production and associated national economic benefits.

              But those interests are not necessarily identical, and none guarantees success.

              The test will be whether Shell and its partners can turn encouraging geological results into a credible development proposal supported by demonstrable economics, appropriate environmental safeguards and transparent arrangements for the host country.

              The exploration programme is sufficiently important to deserve scrutiny.

              It is not sufficiently advanced to justify declaring either victory or failure.

              The central finding is therefore straightforward: Shell is preparing to spend more effort evaluating a Namibian licence after recognising a major commercial setback. The new geological evidence explains why it is continuing, but it does not yet establish that an economically viable oilfield has been found.

              That is what the next well may help determine.

              PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

              This investigation is based on publicly available corporate announcements, Namibian official records, environmental-assessment documentation and contemporaneous reporting reviewed up to 11 November 2026.

              Statements about the forthcoming drilling operation are attributed to identifiable published sources. They do not represent independent confirmation that a new well has commenced drilling or discovered additional commercially recoverable hydrocarbons.

              Historical environmental-clearance records are distinguished from the unverified current conditions governing the latest campaign.

              Shell plc, Shell Namibia Upstream B.V., QatarEnergy and NAMCOR are separate organisations with their respective roles and responsibilities. References to the joint venture do not imply that every partner exercises the same operational control.

              Geological findings, accounting impairments, forecasts and editorial analysis are distinguished from one another.

              No allegation is made that Shell, any joint-venture partner, contractor or Namibian authority has acted unlawfully or improperly.

              The Donovan–Shell Archive is independent of Shell plc and its subsidiaries. Shell and other interested parties are invited to provide factual corrections, additional documentary material or comments. Substantiated corrections will be considered and reflected fairly.

              Shell’s $400 Million Namibia Setback Meets a New Deepwater Test — An Independent Investigation was first posted on November 11, 2026 at 10:52 pm.
              ©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

              Let the Good Times Roll: PPT’s 2026 Winter Party!

              Pittsburghers for Public Transit - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 12:58

              Celebrate a year of transit organizing in style with an inclusive roller disco!

              2026 has been a big year for the PPT community: growth, change, and big wins, with more on the horizon. After all that work, it’s time to celebrate: PPT is partnering with PGH SK8 to host an inclusive roller disco for the transit justice community! What better way to ring in a new year of transformative work than boogieing down with the best comrades in town? 

              This event may sell out. Pre-register to reserve your spot!

              Get your ticket now! What to expect When & where

              Sunday, December 13th

              Velum Fermentation
              2120 Jane St., Pittsburgh, PA, 15203

              4:30 – 5:00 PM: Welcome, connect, and reflect on 2026 together

              5:00 – 7:30 PM: Open skate and celebrate! 

              After 7:30 PM, Velum requires all guests to be 21 or older. PPT’s party will officially conclude, but adults are welcome to stick around and skate the night away! 

              No one who pre-registers will be turned away for lack of funds, but this event will likely sell out—so get your tickets to ensure your spot!

              Wait, we’re skating?!

              Yes! It’ll be a blast, whether you’re a pro roller skater or have never hit the rink. 

              All ages, abilities, and experience levels are welcome here! This includes folks with mobility aids like wheelchairs or power chairs. All wheels are welcome at this roller rink! 

              The kind folks at PGH SK8 will kick off the open skate period with a brief skate lesson. They will also be around during open skate for questions and help. 

              PGH SK8 specializes in accessible roller skating programs, encouraging all abilities, ages, races, bodies, and genders to participate. No matter your comfort level, you can join the disco if you choose. 

              Skates and safety equipment rentals are included in your ticket cost–but they will be first-come, first serve, so if you have your own, bring them! Wear socks if you would like to skate. (The rink floor is polished concrete, so helmets, elbow pads, and knee pads are encouraged.)

              Every attendee must sign a waiver. Sign the waiver as you RSVP!

              But what if I don’t want to skate?

              That’s cool, too! There will be plenty of space and tables to hang out with PPT pals, plus arcade games, snacks, a food truck, and a bar. 

              Even if you’re not able to skate, or are uncomfortable skating, you are welcome here.

              Accessibility

              Velum is an accessible venue, with accessible parking in the lot out front, and an accessible restroom. 

              The pre-skate instruction session will be live interpreted into ASL. ASL interpreters will be available outside the rink, but will not be able to interpret what happens inside the rink.

              PGH SK8 specializes in accessible skating programming, and will facilitate you having fun on the rink—no matter your ability level. 

              Lighting will be dimmed during open skate, and there may be colorful party lights. There will likely be some loud portions of the evening, as music plays during open skate, and folks have lively conversations over snacks and drinks. 

              Food

              There will be a food truck at Velum, with burgers and bar food available for purchase. PPT will provide substantial snacks and non-alcoholic beverages, like sandwiches and soda. Velum is a brewery, and will have alcoholic beverages available for adults to purchase.

              Getting there

              Velum is about a 4 minutes’ walk/roll from bus stops serving East Carson Street, including the 48, 54, 81, and 83. 

              About 7 minutes’ walk/roll away are stops along S. 18th Street, serving the 51 and 54.

              Velum’s parking lot on Jane St. holds about 20 cars, including accessible spots. There is additional street parking available on neighboring streets.

              RSVP to join the fun!

              The post Let the Good Times Roll: PPT’s 2026 Winter Party! appeared first on Pittsburghers for Public Transit.

              Categories: Z. Transportation

              Oil companies spent over $2 million on Meta ads in the lead-up to the midterms

              Skeptical Science - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 12:17

              This article by Samantha Harrington first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. 

              Climate change was conspicuously absent from the campaign trail this year as Democratic candidates largely kept quiet on the issue. 

              But one group didn’t stay silent during the lead-up to the November 3 U.S. elections: big oil companies.  

              Together, Shell, Exxon, and Chevron spent $2.1 million on “social issue” ads on Facebook and Instagram between late July and late October 2026. In the same period, three of the top climate and environmental groups – the League of Conservation Voters, the Sierra Club, and Greenpeace – spent just over $846,000, less than half the amount spent by oil companies. 

              Both the oil companies and the environmental groups directed much of their spending toward states with competitive Senate races, plus California. In all but two states – Ohio and New Hampshire – the oil companies outspent the environmental organizations. 

              It’s unclear how much advertising influenced the outcome, if at all. Many of the ads sponsored by oil companies didn’t mention the elections, though Exxon ran three ads encouraging people in New Mexico to register to vote. Shell took a different tack and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars promoting videos about shifts in the company’s brand aesthetic over the last century. 

              Meanwhile, Democratic candidates across the country won their elections in a landslide. The party gained at least seven Senate seats, 28 House seats, and several governorships and statehouses. A Democrat even won a seat on the Railroad Commission of Texas, which regulates the state’s oil and gas industry. Exxon put the largest share of its Meta ad spend into Texas.

              In Colorado, the state that got the third-highest amount of the Chevron Advocacy Network’s ad money, voters rejected a constitutional amendment that would have protected a right to buy and sell natural gas, which is composed largely of methane, a potent climate-warming gas. 

              Votes from California, the state where the oil companies as a group spent the largest share of their social issues ad budget, are still rolling in. But a proposition that could create loopholes for building pipelines, data centers, and more is currently losing.

              Voters also passed 33 ballot measures to restrict the building of data centers. Data center buildout is deeply tied to oil and gas interests, as the buildings require enormous energy resources.

              Read more: How bad is AI for the environment? 

              In polling, most Americans continue to say they are worried about climate change and want their elected leaders to take climate action. It remains to be seen if the candidates silent on climate on the campaign trail will start acting on it once in office. 

              “They could decide that confronting a crisis of this magnitude requires saying ‘climate change’ a lot – and convincing voters that ambitious legislation is good and necessary,” climate journalist Sammy Roth wrote. “Even if we won’t have a president willing to sign it until at least 2029.”

              Inside the Meta ads machine 

              Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, is one of two major players in online advertising – Google being the other. About 26.8% of global digital ad spending and 70% of total social advertising dollars go to Meta. 

              A look at Meta’s social issues advertising database shows that Shell, Exxon, and Chevron have long outspent the three environmental groups. Since 2019, the oil companies have spent $11.3 million more than the League of Conservation Voters, the Sierra Club, and Greenpeace. 

              The spending discrepancy may be even more uneven than it appears. Meta provides public reporting only for ads that fall into its social issues, elections, or politics category. Advertisements in this category are subject to more restrictions than other kinds of ads. And ads sponsored by environmental groups and those that mention climate change – including those from Yale Climate Connections – are almost always tagged as social issues. 

              In contrast, a 2021 analysis by Influence Map, a climate and sustainability nonprofit, found several examples in which pro-fossil-fuel advertisements were not tagged as social issues. The group noted that in July 2021, Chevron was running ads promoting the company’s investment in “renewable diesel.” 

              “None of these ads have disclaimers on them, and once expired, will not be stored in the ad library,” Influence Map reported.

              A few years later, Media Matters found an ad from the Ohio Propane Gas Association that referred to propane buses as “clean, quiet, and safe.” The ad was originally labeled as a social issues ad when it first ran in November 2023, but not when it ran in March 2024. Bottom line: The oil and gas industry could be spending lots of money on ads without leaving a digital trail. 

              Spending goes well beyond Meta 

              Ad spending on Meta can give a glimpse into the decades-long advertising push to advance fossil fuels, but it’s not the whole picture. Oil companies have also spent billions on TV advertisements, donations to the arts, lobbying elected officials, and contributing to political action committees that fund election campaigns. 

              Read: The fossil fuel industry spent $219 million to elect the new U.S. government

              The world’s five biggest oil companies spent over $3.6 billion in advertisements alone between 1986 and 2015, according to researchers at Brown University. This spending rose during times of controversy – like the BP oil spill – and also when climate legislation was in progress. For example, spending spiked when the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was being written and in 2010 when Congress was considering a national cap-and-trade program for carbon emissions, according to analysis by Grist. 

              “The rise and fall of oil spending on promotional ads over the last three decades roughly tracks the federal government’s interest in taking climate action,” Grist reporter Katie Yoder wrote.

              Climate action is popular with the American public, despite the money

              Though big oil, gas and coal companies, and fossil fuel trade organizations have spent billions to influence public opinion, surveys consistently show that Americans are worried about climate change and want climate action.

              Fifty-eight percent of registered voters say they would prefer to vote for a political candidate who supports action on global warming, while only 14% would prefer to vote for a candidate who opposes climate action, according to a 2026 survey by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, the publisher of this website. 

              Regardless of the outcome of this particular election, people everywhere continue to experience extreme weather and economic shocks supercharged by climate change. If opinion data is anything to go by, they want elected officials and corporations to act. 

              //
              Categories: I. Climate Science

              How Brazilians pulled off Lula’s surprise win

              Waging Nonviolence - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 12:01

              This article How Brazilians pulled off Lula’s surprise win was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

              On Oct. 25, Brazilians made history by resisting hopelessness and achieving, for the first time since the return to democracy in 1985, a comeback in the runoff of a presidential election. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won reelection by more than 4 million votes after losing the first round to opponent Flávio Bolsonaro by over 2 million votes.

              Lula, a former metalworker and union leader who co-founded the left-wing Workers’ Party, was seeking his fourth term as president. Flávio, by contrast, was the candidate of the far-right Liberal Party and was running as the successor to his father, former president Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally who was convicted and imprisoned for attempting a coup d’état.

              The first round suggested that Flávio and his party were on track to gain an enormous amount of power. The party won more seats in Congress than any other — nearly a quarter of the lower house and more than a third of the Senate — which, together with other right-wing parties, gave the right a majority in both houses.

              Two days after the vote, Flávio said he would use that majority to “change the Constitution” and “re-democratize” the country. Asked what he meant, he proposed limiting the powers of Supreme Court justices, lowering the age of criminal responsibility and ending presidential reelection, and he left open the possibility of extending the presidential term from four to five years.

              “I really think the desperation and fear after the first round changed everything. There was a need to act with more urgency, and this desire to organize.”

              In addition, whoever won in October would be able to appoint up to four of the 11 justices of the federal Supreme Court, the same court that convicted Jair Bolsonaro. A Flávio victory would have given the far right control over all three branches of government, amid the advance of the far right in Latin America and the United States.

              As a result, after the first-round results came in on the night of Oct. 4, the mood among Lula’s supporters was one of deep discouragement and fear. But this fear quickly turned into forms of popular organizing that were diverse, complementary and consistently nonviolent — and they changed the course of the race. The mobilizations included a large-scale effort by politicians, activists, content creators and ordinary supporters to organize and amplify pro-Lula content on social media, and an equally massive occupation of the country’s streets in peaceful demonstrations.

              Students took center stage in the street mobilizations, with thousands turning out for protests such as one led by the National Union of Students, or UNE, at the Candelária church in Rio de Janeiro, and one led by UNE and the University of Brasília’s student council on the Esplanade of Ministries in Brasília. People in the streets and on social media acted together and complemented each other.

              Beyond protests and online activism, people organized to make sure that those who had not voted in the first round would go to the polls, including elderly people and those who live far from their polling places. They also got off the internet and talked in person with undecided voters who had not yet made up their minds, a process that had a name: vira voto, or flip the vote.

              For Gabriel Rochlin, a director, actor and teacher who took part in a vira voto group in Rio de Janeiro, this was a way to get out of the social media bubble. “The work of vira voto has a lot to do with breaking through the algorithm,” he said. “The street has this real quality of not having an algorithm that separates people: you’re going to meet people you would never meet on your feed.” He saw the fear engendered by the first round as the turning point: “I really think the desperation and fear after the first round changed everything. There was a need to act with more urgency, and this desire to organize.”

              From demoralization to esperançar

              Given the collective feeling of fear and hopelessness after the first round of voting, the first challenge was to shift the mood of the left. It was on Oct. 5, the day after the results, that popular mobilization began in earnest.

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              “When we got hit with the news that Flávio had more votes, there was a kind of desperation,” said Nayara Ruiz, a social media strategist with 280,000 followers on Instagram. “A huge shock, a feeling of fear, and a replay in our heads of 2018 [when Jair Bolsonaro was elected].” At first, Ruiz recorded a video about that fear. “And while I was editing it, I started to feel really bad. And I said: I’m not going to post this video, this is not the path I need to take.” She came across a news story about how online fandoms dedicated to Brazilian and international musical artists like Taylor Swift, BTS and Anitta were putting their networks at the service of Lula’s campaign. “The moment I saw that, I said: ‘That’s it, I have to talk about this, about esperançar.’”

              “Esperançar,” was a term used by Brazilian educator Paulo Freire to mean “hope in action,” as opposed to “esperar,” which in Portuguese means both to hope and to wait.

              Ruiz then recorded a video talking about the fandoms and about esperançar, and why it matters for organizing. She explained that esperançar demands three things: seeing a possible future, understanding that there is a path to that future, and feeling that you can do something to make that path a reality. She wanted to show that there was a path to defeat Flávio if people came together.

              The video was viewed 5 million times, the most of any she had posted, and brought her 40,000 new followers, Ruiz said. It was one of many videos and posts in the days after the first-round vote that spoke to people’s discouragement and helped turn it into a willingness to act.

              Social media activism may have been one of the left’s most innovative strategies in this campaign. A WhatsApp channel called Exército do Lula, or Lula’s Army, was created by André Janones, a federal congressman from the state of Minas Gerais. What set it apart was its scale and its structure. It quickly grew from 50,000 to more than 10 million followers in less than three weeks, in a country where WhatsApp had been the far right’s most effective tool since Jair Bolsonaro’s 2018 campaign.

              “We learned together, we mobilized together, we practiced esperançar together, we believed together, and Lula’s Army was a place that brought all of that together.”

              The channel’s growth came as the Lula campaign charged that Meta, which owns Instagram, Facebook and WhatsApp, had limited the reach of Lula’s posts and favored Flávio’s. (Leaked communications from inside Meta supported this, and Meta acknowledged “technical problems” with the Lula campaign’s paid promotions, but denied any bias.) For Lula’s Army, the WhatsApp channel had the advantage of delivering messages directly to its followers without an algorithm throttling their reach.

              Rather than relying on a few official accounts to broadcast the Lula campaign’s message, it turned millions of ordinary supporters into active participants. It also gamified the organizing for the second round. Because voting is compulsory in Brazil, the goal was less to get out the vote than to reduce abstention and win over undecided voters. Through frequent audio messages, videos and texts, Janones handed out missions to participants, calling on them to share content, boost posts, promote hashtags, invite new members and amplify messages supporting the campaign. Everyone was given a rank and could advance up the ladder by completing these tasks. Janones “promoted” Ruiz from soldier to captain of the Army in a lighthearted video because of the explainer videos she made about the channel.

              She believes one of the initiative’s contributions was fostering a kind of political digital literacy among supporters. Janones taught the channel’s followers how platform algorithms work, so that messages from Lula and critical information about Flávio would rank higher on social media. Until then, the far right had dominated social media, partly because of the high engagement its posts generated. Participants in Lula’s Army came to understand that part of that engagement came precisely from their reacting to far-right content that bothered them.

              Previous Coverage
            • How a strong messaging strategy helped defeat Brazil’s Bolsonaro
            • Janones’ strategic directive to Lula’s supporters was that they should stop interacting with opponents’ posts and concentrate their collective strength on producing and circulating their own content. To that end, participants were instructed to watch videos to the end, and to like, comment on, save and share posts, using the platforms’ different features to expand their reach.

              “Maybe Lula wouldn’t have won without this, without the Army, without this feeling that swept over people, without the sense that we weren’t fighting alone,” Ruiz said. “We learned together, we mobilized together, we practiced esperançar together, we believed together, and Lula’s Army was a place that brought all of that together.”

              Ruiz credits Janones with turning that collective energy into a coordinated effort. “Janones calls himself a general, but I also see him very much as a conductor who led an orchestra that was disorganized, who tuned the instruments and managed to set the rhythm and organize the whole mobilization that took place and that is now being replicated around the world,” Ruiz said.

              Taking to the streets

              Social media also played an important role in spreading the word about and organizing the occupation of the streets during the weeks before the runoff. In the three weeks between Oct. 4 and Oct. 25, massive peaceful protests brought together hundreds of thousands of demonstrators across the country. These protests featured politicians, renowned Brazilian musicians like Chico Buarque, Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil, and grassroots artistic groups. Together, the iconic faces and grassroots artists helped bring in a very broad diversity of people.

              “As we saw the big street protests, the power we had, not only inside the university but also in the streets, on social media too, it started creating a movement of hope.”

              University students played a fundamental role in this occupation of the streets. They were the ones who kicked things off on Oct. 5, and throughout the three weeks between the first and second round of voting, they were a major force calling people to the protests, often organizing through their own social media.

              The first street protest of the runoff campaign took place in Niterói in the state of Rio de Janeiro on Oct. 5, organized by students from Fluminense Federal University. Those students set an example, according to Gabriel Shpielman, a mathematics student and activist with the Rebellious Youth Union. “I think if that hadn’t happened on the first day, it would have been totally different,” he said.

              Student mobilization quickly spread to other universities, including the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, or PUC-Rio, which also began organizing the day after the first round. Shpielman and a classmate created an Instagram profile and called on students at the university to attend an assembly, from which the PUC-Rio Antifascista movement was born. Around 200 students packed the auditorium, heard from a representative of the National Union of Students and decided to go together to the protest in downtown Rio the following day.

              According to Shpielman, this helped “put people in the position of seeing themselves building the comeback.” For him, it was in this experience with their collective strength that fear gave way to organizing: “At first it reflected despair, but as we saw the big street protests, the power we had, not only inside the university but also in the streets, on social media too, it started creating a movement of hope.”

              The call for student protest started by word of mouth, in classrooms and WhatsApp groups, and gained reach through PUC-Rio Antifascista’s Instagram account. The account shared collaborative posts — Instagram posts that appear on several accounts at once — with other accounts, like Protesto Estudantil (a page run by high school students from Colégio Pedro II), the PUC-Rio Graduate Students’ Association, and with public figures such as Dani Balbi, Anielle Franco, Wagner Moura and Chico Buarque.

              Students march in a rally for Lula at PUC-Rio on Oct. 22, 2026. (Photo by Tatiana Chain)

              Shpielman called the process cyclical: The more visibility PUC-Rio Antifascista gained, the more partnerships it secured, and those partnerships increased its visibility. The page has now reached over 30,000 followers. Even so, for him, social media was at the service of the streets. “What really turned the election around were the streets, the protests,” he said. “Social media reflected that mobilization. It’s so much better to see a protest with a million people than a page with 10 million people.”

              Getting voters to the polls

              Another point of concern in the first round was the abstention rate, which was the highest since 1998: Over 21 percent of eligible voters, or 33.4 million people, simply didn’t vote. In light of this, much of civil society’s mobilization sought to make sure people went to vote. This took place through crowdfunding drives to arrange transportation for those living far from their polling places, ride-sharing initiatives, providing information for undecided voters in the streets and vira voto campaigns.

              Diego Zuculin is one of the founders of Casa Marighella, a cultural and artistic production company and organization in São Paulo that put all of its work on hold to get out the vote. After the first-round results, “everyone looked at each other and said: ‘Wow, we’re screwed. What are we going to do?’,” Zuculin said. The next morning, the team decided “almost everything could be postponed in the face of the end of democracy.”

              The first idea was simple: He would offer his own car to neighbors whose grandparents had no way to get to the polls, and a friend would offer his motorcycle. They soon realized that many people were probably thinking the same thing and decided to create a platform connecting those who could offer rides on election day with those who needed them. That’s how Carona Solidária, or Solidarity Ride, was born.

              The team developed the first version of the platform in-house in two or three days. As word spread, partner collectives, artists, tech people and lawyers joined to help with legal issues and with outreach. The platform circulated on Instagram and WhatsApp, and in a second phase, the group reached out to journalists and pages in Brazil’s North region, where there were still few ride offers.

              “The heart of vira voto is its humanity. It’s a place for building bonds, for looking people in the eye.”

              “We had an idea, we put it to work, then it went to social media and it spread across all of Brazil,” Zuculin said. A total of 22,000 rides were offered, in every state and the Federal District, and the real reach was even greater. “Some people told us: ‘I registered two people, but I took two, and on the way back I took three more, and then five more.’ One person posted a video saying they drove 13 people, another 15, and only registered one or two.”

              He also says that the reasons users gave when requesting a ride — such as a distant polling place, no nearby buses, advanced age or having to work on election day — could serve as a basis for public policy. In the second round, abstention fell to 19.22 percent, the lowest for a runoff since 2006, the result of an effort of which, Zuculin acknowledges, Carona Solidária was only one part.

              Complementing these efforts, numerous vira voto campaigns took place across the country, in which people organized in groups to go out on the streets and talk to voters, especially those who were undecided or planning to abstain. Lula himself issued this call in a video posted on Oct. 7: “Come on, everyone, to the streets, let’s talk to people.” 

              In Rio de Janeiro, the local WhatsApp group that Gabriel Rochlin belonged to started with fewer than 10 people and ended with 60. Over two and a half weeks, according to the group’s own count, they flipped 181 votes. “Thinking of vira voto as collective action gives you a much greater sense of accomplishment,” he said. The group set up at Largo do Machado square and in front of the Catete Palace because, according to Rochlin, Workers’ Party congressman-elect Marcelo Freixo had indicated that there were many undecided voters there. WhatsApp was used to organize the actions and to make sure volunteers were always together and in safe places, given the risk of violence.

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              In their conversations, they used QR codes linking to informational materials, such as videos from Revelando, an investigative documentary series launched in September by the Brazilian podcast Calma Urgente in which well-known Brazilian figures voiced criticisms of Flávio. They also encouraged people to search Google for information about Flávio, something that Lula’s Army also urged voters to do. More than the information, however, Rochlin believes that “the heart of vira voto is its humanity. It’s a place for building bonds, for looking people in the eye.”

              Oct. 25, the day of the runoff vote, went down in history. Brazilians achieved the unprecedented: They overturned the first-round result, elected Lula and halted the far right’s advance in just three weeks. The internet was flooded with powerful images — streets completely packed with peaceful demonstrations by Lula voters, the elderly voting, people journeying long distances to cast their votes, and entire Indigenous communities traveling to reach their polling places.

              Ultimately, the movement to reelect Lula succeeded through a diverse range of civil resistance tactics. Right away, Lula supporters saw that to contain the far right’s advance, it was necessary to occupy the streets, deluge social media and create support structures so that people would vote and could reach the polls. They also saw the importance of mass participation: People from a broad range of social groups — of different ages, genders, social classes and regions of Brazil — acted together. In “Why Civil Resistance Works,” Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan identify mass participation like this as one of the key factors explaining why civil resistance is more likely to succeed than armed struggle.

              But one insight runs through all these actions: People need esperançar, the capacity to transform fear into action. Millions organized and, following Paulo Freire’s advice, resisted when it felt hopeless. The far right, which has been advancing in many parts of the world, constantly uses hopelessness as a tool. Brazil’s civil mobilizations shows that esperançar is political, capable of acting as an engine of organization, social action and transformation.

              This article How Brazilians pulled off Lula’s surprise win was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

              Categories: B4. Radical Ecology

              THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 11 NOVEMBER 2026

              Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 11:27
              THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 11 NOVEMBER 2026

              Archive reference: SLF-2007-115

              The Sakhalin Papers CV: The 70 Percent Question — Shell, Russian Suppliers and the Local-Content Promise Behind Sakhalin II In June 2001, a senior Shell executive acknowledged that Sakhalin II could not achieve its reported 70% Russian-content target during construction of the technically complex LNG plant. He expected Russian participation to increase over the project’s lifetime. Twenty-five years later, original company disclosures reveal contracts worth tens of billions of dollars, sharply differing measures of Russian participation and an important legal distinction between the original 1994 agreement and Russia’s subsequent production-sharing legislation. The evidence establishes substantial Russian involvement. Whether every original obligation was ultimately fulfilled is a separate question.

              AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

              By the Donovan–Shell Archive

              Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, using contemporaneous statements by Shell management, original Sakhalin Energy corporate disclosures, Russian production-sharing legislation, published sustainability reports, contemporaneous industry reporting and historical material preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.

              Publication date: 11 November 2026

              Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia

              Previous instalment: SLF-2007-114 — The Half-Million-Tonne Question: Sakhalin’s Forgotten Gas-Chemical Ambition

              INTRODUCTION: A PROMISE MEASURED IN PERCENTAGES

              On 15 June 2001, Russian business newspaper Vedomosti published an interview with Rein Tambuzer, a senior Shell executive involved in the development of Sakhalin II.

              Tambuzer was head of Shell Exploration & Production Services in Russia and co-chairman of the Sakhalin Energy Supervisory Board.

              The project was approaching a decisive stage.

              Its shareholders were preparing to embark upon an enormous second phase of development.

              The plans included offshore platforms, pipelines and Russia’s first major liquefied natural gas plant.

              Shell then held a controlling 55% interest in Sakhalin Energy.

              Mitsui held 25%.

              Mitsubishi held 20%.

              The estimated cost of the second phase was approximately $8 billion at the time of the interview.

              One question concerned the role of Russian contractors and suppliers.

              The Russian Accounts Chamber had raised concerns about expenditure and the involvement of foreign equipment suppliers.

              The interviewer asked Tambuzer to explain the position.

              His answer was unusually revealing.

              He acknowledged that the project’s production-sharing agreement included a 70% Russian participation requirement concerning equipment supplies over the life of Sakhalin II.

              He also acknowledged that the project would not necessarily achieve that percentage during its initial major construction phase.

              The LNG plant was technically complicated.

              Some equipment could not readily be obtained from Russian manufacturers.

              But Tambuzer expected the project to increase Russian participation through other activities and subsequent operations.

              It was an important statement from a senior Shell executive.

              It recognised a contractual commitment.

              It admitted an immediate practical difficulty.

              And it anticipated that subsequent procurement and operating expenditure would improve the overall result.

              The statement is preserved in the original Vedomosti interview.

              It provides the starting point for a documentary investigation extending from 2001 to the present.

              The central question is straightforward.

              Did Sakhalin II eventually achieve the Russian participation envisaged when Shell helped negotiate and implement the original production-sharing agreement?

              The answer is more complicated than a single percentage.

              Russian content could be measured through labour hours, quantities of materials and equipment, contract expenditure and the nationality or legal status of suppliers.

              Those measures do not necessarily produce the same result.

              The evidence also reveals an important legal distinction.

              Russia’s general production-sharing legislation contains requirements concerning Russian equipment measured by value.

              But Sakhalin II’s original agreement was signed in 1994, before the relevant federal legislation entered into force.

              Its particular contractual provisions therefore require separate examination.

              Later disclosures provide substantial evidence of Russian participation.

              In October 2007, Sakhalin Energy reported that contracts worth more than $10 billion had been awarded to Russian companies.

              Its 2016 Sustainability Report recorded cumulative awards of approximately $24.2 billion.

              Its 2024 report recorded approximately $31.9 billion.

              The annual Russian-content indicators were also substantial.

              But whether these figures conclusively demonstrate lifetime compliance with every provision of the original agreement remains a different question.

              This investigation examines the evidence without treating corporate statistics as a substitute for the underlying contract.

              PART ONE: WHAT SHELL SAID IN 2001 1. The interview of 15 June 2001

              The original Vedomosti interview was conducted by journalist Mikhail Yenukov.

              Its Russian headline was:

              Инвесторы должны самостоятельно выбирать, с кем работать.

              In English, the headline means approximately:

              Investors Must Choose for Themselves Whom to Work With.

              The interview covered several significant issues.

              The Sakhalin Energy Supervisory Board had approved the proposed second-phase development plan.

              The project required further negotiations with the Russian authorities.

              Potential LNG customers in Japan and South Korea were being approached.

              International financing was being considered.

              The legal and regulatory framework for production-sharing projects remained controversial.

              Tambuzer also discussed the proposed pipeline route across Sakhalin.

              But the procurement question is especially relevant to this instalment.

              The interviewer referred to findings attributed to Russia’s Accounts Chamber concerning expenditure exceeding estimates by more than $80 million and the proportion of foreign equipment suppliers.

              Tambuzer explained that the project’s expenditure estimates were subject to approval by the Russian side.

              He also maintained that Sakhalin Energy had a commercial interest in controlling costs.

              His comments then turned to Russian participation.

              According to his account, the 70% Russian-supplier requirement applied over the entire project cycle.

              He acknowledged that obtaining such a proportion of equipment for a technologically complex LNG facility was not immediately feasible.

              But he identified pipeline construction as an activity that could be undertaken by Russian contractors.

              He expected the Russian proportion to increase during later operations.

              The distinction matters.

              Tambuzer was not asserting that Sakhalin II had already achieved 70% participation in every procurement category.

              He was discussing a long-term contractual objective and the practical difficulties of meeting it during a particular construction stage.

              The statement establishes Shell management’s contemporary understanding of the requirement. It does not independently establish the complete legal wording of the agreement or the project’s eventual compliance.

              Original contemporary source: Vedomosti, 15 June 2001 — Interview with Rein Tambuzer.

              Ведомости

               

              2. What did Tambuzer mean by 70%?

              The wording of the original interview is important.

              Tambuzer referred to Russian equipment suppliers and the entire period of project implementation.

              That statement could easily be misunderstood.

              It should not be interpreted as proof that precisely 70% of the value of every individual contract had to be awarded to a Russian company.

              Nor does the interview establish that 70% of every category of equipment installed in the LNG plant had to be manufactured in Russia.

              The project included multiple forms of expenditure.

              There were offshore platforms.

              There were gas and oil pipelines.

              There were processing facilities.

              There was the LNG plant.

              There were construction works, transportation services and ongoing operations.

              Different categories required different technical capabilities.

              A substantial share of pipeline construction could be performed by Russian contractors while specialised liquefaction technology came from international suppliers.

              The resulting overall Russian-content percentage would depend upon the applicable measurement method.

              That measurement method is therefore fundamental to assessing performance.

              Later company documents provide a much clearer explanation.

              PART TWO: THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT AND RUSSIAN LAW 3. The production-sharing agreement came first

              Sakhalin II’s production-sharing agreement was signed on 22 June 1994.

              It was concluded between Sakhalin Energy and the Russian side, represented by the federal government and the Sakhalin regional administration.

              The agreement preceded Russia’s principal federal legislation governing production-sharing arrangements.

              That legislation was Federal Law No. 225-FZ, dated 30 December 1995.

              The difference in dates is crucial.

              The federal law established general requirements for production-sharing agreements.

              But it also recognised the special position of agreements already concluded before it came into force.

              Article 2(7), as amended in 1999, addresses those earlier agreements.

              It provides that they are to be performed according to their own terms.

              It also limits the application of subsequent legislative provisions where their application would conflict with the original agreements or restrict rights already acquired and exercised by investors.

              That provision is highly relevant to Sakhalin II.

              The original agreement was signed approximately eighteen months before the general federal legislation.

              It would therefore be legally unsafe to assume that every requirement subsequently introduced into the general legislation automatically governed Sakhalin II in precisely the same form.

              The project must be assessed according to its actual contractual provisions and applicable law.

              Primary legal source: Russian Federal Law No. 225-FZ — Article 2, Production-Sharing Agreements.

              Consultant Plus

               

              4. The later law contains a different 70% measure

              Article 7 of Russia’s production-sharing legislation contains detailed provisions concerning Russian participation.

              Among them is a requirement concerning equipment and materials of Russian origin.

              The law refers to a minimum proportion measured by the monetary value of specified equipment and materials acquired for project operations.

              It also contains provisions concerning the employment of Russian nationals.

              The relevant statutory requirements have been amended over time.

              The provision concerning Russian equipment uses a 70% threshold based on value, subject to the detailed statutory conditions.

              This is not necessarily the same calculation as Sakhalin Energy’s reported Russian-content indicators.

              The distinction is particularly important because Sakhalin Energy’s own disclosures describe a different method involving labour hours and physical quantities of materials and equipment.

              Both the statute and the original project arrangements involve Russian participation.

              Both refer to percentages.

              But they cannot be treated as legally or mathematically identical without examining the relevant provisions.

              Furthermore, the later law’s transitional treatment of earlier production-sharing agreements must be considered.

              The fact that Article 7 contains a 70% requirement does not establish that Sakhalin II breached the law whenever a particular year’s expenditure by value fell below 70%.

              That conclusion would require analysis of the original agreement, relevant amendments and the applicable legal framework.

              Primary legal source: Russian Federal Law No. 225-FZ — Article 7, Conditions for Performing Work.

              Consultant Plus

               

              5. The operator’s own description provides the clearest explanation

              Sakhalin Energy’s official website contains a page devoted specifically to Russian content.

              It describes the company’s obligations under the production-sharing agreement.

              The page identifies a target of 70% Russian content over the lifetime of Sakhalin II.

              It also describes the relevant categories.

              These include Russian labour, manufactured equipment, materials and services.

              The company states that the production-sharing agreement requires preference to be given to Russian enterprises when Russian and foreign bids are technically and commercially equivalent.

              It also refers to the operator’s responsibility to make its best efforts to maximise participation by Russian workers, contractors and manufacturers.

              This is a significant qualification.

              A preference for Russian contractors where bids are equivalent is not necessarily an unconditional obligation to award contracts to Russian companies regardless of their technical or commercial suitability.

              The company also identifies a formal oversight mechanism.

              A Joint Committee brings together representatives of Sakhalin Energy, Russian federal authorities and the Sakhalin regional government.

              Its purpose includes facilitating Russian participation in procurement and project work.

              That establishes that Russian content was not merely an informal corporate aspiration.

              It formed part of the production-sharing framework and was addressed through a mechanism involving the Russian authorities.

              But the public description does not reproduce every original contractual definition, formula or verification procedure.

              The company’s explanation is therefore valuable evidence of its interpretation and reported practice.

              It is not a substitute for the complete executed agreement.

              Source: Sakhalin Energy — Russian Content, Official Corporate Explanation.

              Russian Content

               

              PART THREE: THE FIRST MAJOR RESULTS 6. October 2007: Russian contracts exceed $10 billion

              One of the most important contemporaneous records was published on 12 October 2007.

              The Donovan–Shell Archive preserved an industry report based upon a Sakhalin Energy announcement.

              The company stated that contracts worth more than $10 billion had been awarded to Russian companies since the project began.

              It also reported cumulative participation statistics dating from 1996.

              Russian companies had accounted for approximately 191 million working hours.

              That represented 80% of the reported total.

              The company also identified approximately 9.7 million tonnes of Russian materials.

              Those materials represented 91% of the total reported quantity.

              At the project’s peak construction period in 2007, approximately 20,000 Russian workers were employed.

              These were substantial figures.

              They demonstrate that Russian participation in the development was not merely theoretical.

              Local and national contractors had undertaken major quantities of work.

              The project generated considerable demand for labour and materials.

              But the financial and physical measurements must be distinguished.

              The $10 billion figure concerned contracts awarded to Russian companies.

              The 80% figure concerned labour hours.

              The 91% figure concerned material quantities.

              They were not three separate calculations of the same economic measure.

              And the financial figure was a cumulative amount, not the percentage of all contracts awarded to Russian companies.

              The report also contained an important acknowledgment.

              Sakhalin Energy explained that the production-sharing agreement’s Russian-content methodology was based upon quantities of materials and equipment and the number of working hours.

              The company nevertheless sought to maximise Russian participation in monetary terms as well.

              This demonstrates that Sakhalin Energy itself recognised a distinction between the formal content calculation and the value of contracts.

              Its Deputy Chief Executive, Andrey Galaev, welcomed the achievements of Russian contractors.

              The report identified FIAS Amur Ltd as an example of a company awarded a procurement-services contract.

              The announcement was clearly favourable corporate publicity.

              Its figures should be attributed to Sakhalin Energy rather than treated as independently audited findings.

              Nevertheless, the original statement is valuable documentary evidence.

              It recorded the company’s own account at a time when the project’s construction phase was approaching completion.

              Historical source: Donovan–Shell Archive — Sakhalin Energy Announces More Than $10 Billion in Russian Contracts, 12 October 2007.

              Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

               

              7. The significance of the 2007 figures

              The 2007 figures broadly support Tambuzer’s earlier expectation that Russian participation would become substantial.

              He had acknowledged difficulties in sourcing specialised LNG equipment locally.

              But he had anticipated considerable opportunities for Russian participation elsewhere in the project.

              By 2007, Sakhalin Energy was reporting high levels of Russian labour input and material quantities.

              The company had also awarded contracts worth more than $10 billion to Russian enterprises.

              Those outcomes should not be discounted.

              But the results do not establish that every Russian-content obligation had already been fulfilled.

              The 80% and 91% figures were cumulative measurements to that date.

              The project had not completed its entire operating life.

              Nor did the published announcement provide the complete underlying procurement ledger.

              It did not identify every contract and subcontract.

              It did not establish the Russian-manufactured component of every item of equipment.

              And it did not provide an independent reconciliation of reported content against every applicable contractual requirement.

              The defensible conclusion is that Sakhalin Energy reported extensive Russian participation by October 2007, supported by substantial cumulative labour, material and contract figures.

              A conclusive compliance determination requires a different level of evidence.

              PART FOUR: THE 2016 REPORT PROVIDES A MORE DETAILED TEST 8. The operator publishes its measurement methodology

              The most useful authenticated report for examining the methodology is Sakhalin Energy’s Sustainable Development Report 2016.

              It contains a section devoted to Russian content and supply-chain management.

              The report explains that the production-sharing agreement’s measurements involve labour input in working hours and materials and equipment expressed in weight.

              It also refers to associated cost equivalents.

              The report states that the company would make its best efforts to achieve a 70% Russian-content level over the life of Sakhalin II.

              The language is significant.

              It confirms the lifetime nature of the target.

              It also demonstrates that the calculation involves more than the monetary value of contracts.

              In 2016, Sakhalin Energy reported:

              Russian labour content

              86%

              Measured by working hours

              Russian materials and equipment

              94%

              Measured by weight

              These figures were above 70%.

              But they were the indicators reported for 2016.

              They cannot automatically be treated as a complete lifetime calculation covering every year since the beginning of the project.

              This distinction is essential.

              A company may exceed 70% during one reporting year without establishing that its cumulative performance over the project’s entire life has reached the required threshold.

              Conversely, a particular year’s result below 70% would not necessarily demonstrate a breach of a lifetime target.

              The underlying contractual formula and cumulative records would determine the position.

              Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016, pages 62–63 (PDF).

              sakhalinenergy.ru

               

              9. The financial percentage was much lower

              The same report contains another significant figure.

              During 2016, the value of new contracts and amendments to existing contracts with Russian companies totalled approximately $947.7 million.

              That represented 59% of the total value of the relevant contracts.

              This is considerably lower than the 86% labour figure and the 94% materials-and-equipment figure.

              The difference does not establish wrongdoing.

              The figures measure different things.

              The 59% calculation concerns contract values.

              The 86% calculation concerns labour input.

              The 94% calculation concerns material and equipment quantities.

              A labour-intensive project may involve many Russian working hours without generating an equivalent percentage of total contract expenditure.

              Similarly, a very expensive specialised item of imported equipment may represent a relatively small amount of physical weight but a large amount of monetary value.

              The distinction matters because material tonnage and monetary value are not interchangeable measures.

              A tonne of ordinary construction material and a tonne of highly specialised machinery may have radically different costs.

              The 2016 report therefore provides an unusually informative example of why the Russian-content requirement cannot be understood through one figure.

              The same company’s disclosure shows 94% participation by material and equipment weight, but only 59% by the value of that year’s relevant contracts.

              These results are not contradictory. They demonstrate the importance of understanding what each statistic measures.

              10. Russian contract awards had reached $24.2 billion

              The 2016 report also provides a cumulative financial figure.

              From the beginning of the project through the end of 2016, Sakhalin Energy reported awarding approximately:

              $24.2 billion in contracts to Russian companies.

              This was more than twice the cumulative value reported in October 2007.

              But the figures should not be used to claim that the company’s Russian-content percentage had doubled.

              The increase concerned the nominal value of contracts awarded over a longer period.

              It was affected by additional years of operations, maintenance, services and development activity.

              The report did not establish that the increase represented an equivalent increase in the proportion of Russian participation.

              Nor should the award values be treated as identical to cash payments.

              Contracts may be amended, performed over several years or subject to other commercial conditions.

              The figure measures the company’s reported cumulative procurement commitments to Russian counterparties.

              It is evidence of substantial economic involvement.

              It is not a complete calculation of the net financial benefits retained by the Russian economy.

              That would require additional information concerning subcontracting, imported components, profits, wages and other factors.

              PART FIVE: WHAT HAPPENED AFTER SHELL’S WITHDRAWAL? 11. The 2022 restructuring changed the ownership context

              Any assessment of Sakhalin II’s later statistics must account for Shell’s withdrawal from Russia.

              Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Shell announced its intention to withdraw from its Russian joint ventures.

              In June 2022, President Vladimir Putin issued Decree No. 416.

              The decree provided for the transfer of the original Sakhalin Energy operator’s rights and obligations into a replacement Russian company.

              Shell declined to participate in that replacement operating structure.

              The project subsequently continued under Russian control, with Gazprom and the Japanese shareholders Mitsui and Mitsubishi remaining involved.

              The result was a fundamental change in the corporate context.

              Statistics reported by the new Russian operating company in 2024 cannot simply be attributed to Shell’s management.

              They may be relevant to the project’s continuing lifetime commitments.

              But they describe performance after Shell’s operational withdrawal.

              That distinction is particularly important because the new operator’s procurement strategy increasingly reflects Russian industrial and technological priorities.

              The report refers to greater use of Russian service providers, equipment and technical solutions.

              It also discusses domestic alternatives to imported products.

              These developments belong to the post-2022 operating environment.

              They should not be presented as achievements directed by Shell.

              Contemporaneous source: Interfax — Sakhalin II to Transfer from Bermuda-Registered to Russian Operator, 1 July 2022.

              interfax.com

               

              12. The 2024 report records further increases

              Sakhalin Energy’s Non-Financial ESG Report 2024 provides a further documentary checkpoint.

              The report continues to describe Russian-content obligations under the production-sharing agreement.

              It identifies the lifetime 70% target.

              It also explains the use of working hours and material and equipment weight in calculating Russian participation.

              For 2024, the operator reported:

              Russian labour content

              97%

              Working hours, 2024

              Russian materials and equipment

              95%

              Weight, 2024

              Both figures were substantially above 70%.

              The report also stated that the company’s 2024 turnaround had been completed by Russian contractors.

              It described measures to identify Russian alternatives to imported equipment, materials and services.

              These included efforts to develop domestic suppliers and support the company’s long-term operational requirements.

              The figures demonstrate the extent of Russian participation under the replacement operator.

              But they must not be retroactively credited to Shell.

              Nor do they establish, without the corresponding cumulative reconciliation, that every lifetime commitment under the original agreement has been discharged.

              Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024, pages 78–79 (PDF).

              sakhalinenergy.ru

               

              13. The cumulative contract figure reaches $31.9 billion

              The 2024 report contains additional procurement figures.

              It states that the cumulative value of contracts with Russian companies, from the beginning of the project through the end of 2024, reached approximately:

              $31.9 billion.

              During 2024 alone, the company reported contracts and amendments with Russian companies worth approximately $1.381 billion.

              That represented 86% of the value of the relevant new contracts and changes to existing agreements.

              The report also identified 8,788 contracts and orders awarded during the year.

              Of those, 8,443 were awarded to Russian companies.

              A further breakdown stated that 5,933 of the relevant contracts and purchase orders went to Russian companies registered on Sakhalin.

              These figures reveal several different levels of local participation.

              A supplier might be a Russian company.

              It might be registered specifically on Sakhalin.

              It might employ local workers.

              And it might supply materials manufactured within Russia.

              Those characteristics can overlap.

              But they do not necessarily mean the same thing.

              For example, a company registered on Sakhalin might supply imported equipment.

              A foreign-controlled enterprise incorporated in Russia might employ Russian workers.

              A company registered elsewhere in Russia might manufacture equipment used on Sakhalin.

              To determine exactly how much economic value remained on the island, one would need more detailed information than the total number of contracts or the registered addresses of suppliers.

              The report nonetheless establishes substantial procurement activity involving Russian companies and a significant share involving businesses registered in the host region.

              Source: Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024, pages 80–81 (PDF).

              sakhalinenergy.ru

               

              PART SIX: WHAT THE FIGURES ACTUALLY SHOW 14. Three historical checkpoints

              The available records permit a comparison across three periods.

              Sakhalin Energy’s reported Russian-content indicators

              ■ Labour input (hours)

              ■ Materials/equipment (weight)

              2007 is cumulative since 1996; 2016 and 2024 are annual indicators. Percentages use different denominators for labour and materials.

              Sources: Sakhalin Energy’s October 2007 announcement, its 2016 Sustainability Report and its 2024 ESG Report. These are company-reported measurements; the different reporting periods prevent a strict like-for-like trend calculation.

              The figures show high levels of reported Russian participation.

              They also show why a simple lifetime compliance conclusion cannot be drawn.

              The 2007 figures concerned cumulative activity from the project’s early years.

              The 2016 figures described that reporting year.

              The 2024 figures described another reporting year, after Shell’s withdrawal.

              The data points are not methodologically identical.

              The values should not simply be averaged.

              Nor should the annual figures be combined without the underlying denominators.

              The relevant contracts, hours and quantities would need to be examined over the entire reporting period, according to the contractual methodology.

              That distinction is important because the operator’s 70% commitment is described as applying over the lifetime of Sakhalin II.

              The published indicators support a finding of substantial Russian participation. They do not, by themselves, constitute an independently verified final lifetime compliance certificate.

              15. Contract value tells another story

              The monetary record provides an additional perspective.

              Sakhalin Energy’s published cumulative contract awards to Russian companies progressed from more than $10 billion in 2007 to approximately $24.2 billion in 2016 and $31.9 billion by the end of 2024.

              These are significant figures.

              They demonstrate the scale of opportunities provided to Russian companies over the project’s history.

              However, the monetary totals are different from the content percentages measured by labour hours and weight.

              The distinction can be illustrated through the company’s own annual financial data.

              In 2016, Russian companies accounted for 59% of the reported value of new contracts and amendments.

              In 2024, they accounted for 86%.

              Those figures concern contract value during two separate reporting years.

              They do not establish the percentage of total lifetime expenditure.

              Nor are they directly equivalent to the 2007 cumulative contract figure.

              The documents therefore permit several positive conclusions about Russian participation.

              But they do not produce a single universally applicable percentage.

              EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 16. Shell’s 2001 statement was more candid than a simple success claim

              The most revealing feature of the original Vedomosti interview is that Tambuzer did not claim immediate compliance across every procurement category.

              He recognised the technical difficulty of constructing an LNG facility using equipment from a market that had not previously produced comparable industrial systems at the required scale.

              He expected the overall Russian contribution to rise through pipeline construction and later activity.

              That was a commercial and technical explanation.

              It was not, in itself, an admission of contractual breach.

              The original commitment was presented as applying across the project’s lifetime.

              But Tambuzer’s explanation also illustrates a potential weakness in assessing such commitments.

              If a company expects to compensate for low participation during one phase through higher participation during later phases, a meaningful assessment requires cumulative measurements.

              Otherwise, the public may be presented with isolated annual percentages that do not establish whether the overall obligation has been fulfilled.

              The later sustainability reports provide substantial information.

              But they also demonstrate why the full calculation matters.

              The formal commitment, company-reported indicators and monetary procurement figures must be reconciled through the actual contractual methodology.

              That is the central accountability question.

              17. Russian participation was not a single economic benefit

              There is another reason the percentages require careful interpretation.

              Russian content can generate several kinds of benefits.

              Russian workers can obtain employment and technical experience.

              Russian contractors can win major service and construction contracts.

              Russian manufacturers can gain opportunities to supply equipment.

              Local businesses can develop qualifications needed for more demanding industrial work.

              Those benefits are not interchangeable.

              A project could generate very high Russian employment while continuing to import much of its specialised machinery.

              Another project could use extensive Russian-manufactured equipment while employing comparatively fewer workers.

              The economic consequences would differ.

              The distinction is especially important in the Sakhalin context.

              The original development involved sophisticated offshore engineering and liquefaction technology.

              It also involved extensive civil works, pipelines, transportation and construction.

              The technical requirements were not uniform.

              Therefore, the proportion of Russian labour could be substantially different from the proportion of Russian-manufactured specialist equipment.

              The available corporate records demonstrate that such differences existed in the reported measurements.

              They do not establish the full value added in each category.

              18. The question of economic benefit to Sakhalin itself

              The distinction between Russian national participation and Sakhalin regional participation is also important.

              A contract awarded to a company registered in Moscow is not the same as a contract awarded to a company based on Sakhalin.

              Both may qualify as Russian participation.

              But their regional economic effects may differ.

              Employment, training, profits and investment may flow to different locations.

              The 2024 report is informative because it provides a separate figure for companies registered on Sakhalin.

              But company registration is only one indicator of regional economic participation.

              It does not establish the residence of every worker, the origin of every manufactured component or the final destination of all profits.

              The wider question is therefore more demanding than whether the Russian-content target was met.

              How much lasting industrial capability was created within Sakhalin Oblast itself?

              That question connects this instalment with the preceding investigations into regional gas supply and industrial development.

              The project generated substantial Russian procurement activity.

              Whether those opportunities created the full regional economic development originally envisaged is a broader issue.

              It cannot be resolved by a single procurement statistic.

              19. The post-2022 figures introduce another complication

              The 2024 report reflects a fundamentally different operating environment from that of 2001.

              Shell was no longer participating in the replacement operating company.

              Russian industry faced a changed international sanctions and trading environment.

              The operator described efforts to increase technological self-sufficiency and identify domestic alternatives to imported materials and equipment.

              Those developments may have affected the composition of procurement.

              But the available figures do not establish how much of the increase in particular Russian-content indicators resulted from those changes.

              They also do not establish the comparative cost, quality or reliability of Russian and imported equipment.

              A higher percentage of Russian content should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of improved operating efficiency.

              Equally, it should not automatically be treated as evidence of reduced technical capability.

              Those conclusions require operational data.

              What the 2024 report establishes is that the replacement operator continued pursuing Russian procurement and technological localisation.

              Its reported Russian-content indicators were high.

              The historical interpretation must recognise the changed ownership and political circumstances.

              20. The important legal distinction

              A further editorial lesson arises from the comparison between the original contract and subsequent Russian legislation.

              The 1995 production-sharing law contains detailed requirements concerning Russian participation.

              Some provisions were introduced or amended after Sakhalin II’s original agreement was signed.

              Article 2(7) recognises the rights and obligations established under earlier agreements.

              Consequently, an allegation of non-compliance cannot responsibly be made simply by comparing a later statutory percentage with an unrelated annual corporate statistic.

              The legal question depends upon the actual agreement.

              It also depends upon the relevant measurement provisions and subsequent amendments.

              The original contract has not been fully reproduced and authenticated for this investigation.

              The company has published its understanding of the Russian-content commitment.

              The public reports provide substantial statistical evidence.

              But the complete contractual audit trail remains necessary for a definitive conclusion.

              This is not an argument against scrutiny.

              It is an argument for scrutiny based upon the correct evidence.

              DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

              The principal findings of this investigation can be stated with reasonable confidence.

              The original Shell statement is authentic. On 15 June 2001, Vedomosti published an interview in which Rein Tambuzer discussed the Sakhalin II Russian-supplier requirement and acknowledged difficulties in achieving the target during construction of the LNG plant.

              The 70% commitment concerned the project over time. Sakhalin Energy’s subsequent official explanations describe the Russian-content target as applying over the project’s lifetime.

              The measurement method is important. The operator identifies labour input measured in working hours and materials and equipment measured by weight, alongside associated financial measurements.

              The original agreement predates the general production-sharing legislation. Sakhalin II’s agreement was signed in June 1994. Russia’s Federal Law No. 225-FZ was enacted in December 1995.

              The later legislation contains additional Russian-participation requirements. Its Article 7 includes equipment requirements measured by value. The transitional provisions governing earlier agreements must therefore be considered.

              The 2007 results were substantial. Sakhalin Energy reported contracts worth more than $10 billion awarded to Russian companies, with cumulative Russian participation of 80% by labour hours and 91% by material quantities.

              The 2016 results were also substantial. The operator reported annual Russian content of 86% by labour hours and 94% by materials and equipment weight.

              The financial figure differed. Russian companies accounted for 59% of the reported value of new contracts and amendments during 2016.

              The cumulative contract value continued to increase. By the end of 2016, the operator reported approximately $24.2 billion in contracts awarded to Russian companies.

              The post-Shell operator reported further increases. For 2024, Sakhalin Energy identified Russian content of 97% by labour hours and 95% by materials and equipment weight.

              The 2024 financial figures were significant. The company reported approximately $1.381 billion in contracts and amendments with Russian companies during the year, representing 86% of the relevant contract value.

              The cumulative total reached $31.9 billion. That was the reported value of contracts with Russian companies from the beginning of the project through the end of 2024.

              The figures do not all measure the same thing. Labour input, physical quantities, contract values and the number of awards have different denominators.

              The change in ownership matters. Statistics reported after the 2022 Russian restructuring cannot simply be attributed to Shell’s management.

              A final lifetime compliance assessment remains unverified. The public documents examined do not provide a complete independently audited reconciliation against every relevant provision of the original production-sharing agreement.

              No judicial finding establishing that Shell breached the Sakhalin II Russian-content commitment has been identified in the records examined.

              CONCLUSION: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PROMISE AND ITS PROOF

              The Sakhalin II development presented an unusual opportunity for Russian industry.

              It was one of the largest energy investments undertaken in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

              Its construction required enormous quantities of labour, equipment and materials.

              It also required sophisticated technologies that were not readily available from every domestic supplier.

              The original production-sharing arrangements therefore involved a difficult balance.

              The investors required technical and commercial flexibility.

              The Russian government wanted domestic industry to benefit.

              Sakhalin’s regional authorities wanted employment and economic development.

              The 70% Russian-content commitment reflected part of that wider bargain.

              In June 2001, Shell executive Rein Tambuzer acknowledged the practical problem.

              The LNG plant was too complex for the project to rely exclusively upon Russian suppliers at that stage.

              But he anticipated that the overall target could be achieved through other procurement and operating activities.

              The subsequent record establishes substantial Russian involvement.

              By October 2007, Sakhalin Energy was reporting more than $10 billion in contracts awarded to Russian companies.

              Its labour and material figures were high.

              By 2016, cumulative contract awards had reached approximately $24.2 billion.

              The operator continued reporting high Russian-content indicators.

              By the end of 2024, the cumulative contract figure had reached approximately $31.9 billion.

              The replacement operator’s annual content indicators were again above 70%.

              These are significant findings.

              They demonstrate that Russian participation was a substantial part of Sakhalin II’s development and operation.

              But they also demonstrate that the evidence must be interpreted carefully.

              A percentage measured by working hours is not a percentage measured by contract value.

              A percentage measured by material weight is not a measure of the economic value of specialised equipment.

              An annual percentage is not necessarily a lifetime percentage.

              And the number of contracts awarded to companies registered in Russia does not establish how much financial value ultimately remained in Sakhalin Oblast.

              The original legal framework also matters.

              Sakhalin II’s production-sharing agreement predated Russia’s general production-sharing legislation.

              Its specific terms cannot simply be replaced by assumptions derived from subsequent statutory requirements.

              The available record therefore supports a substantial positive conclusion concerning Russian participation.

              It does not support an allegation that Shell systematically excluded Russian contractors.

              Nor does it establish that Shell or Sakhalin Energy unlawfully failed to meet the original local-content obligations.

              Equally, the published corporate statistics do not amount to a complete independently audited determination of lifetime compliance.

              That requires the original contractual definitions, detailed procurement records and the relevant cumulative calculations.

              The question remains legitimate.

              It is also more precise than the familiar debate about whether Sakhalin II benefited Russia.

              The project plainly generated extensive Russian employment and procurement activity.

              The unanswered documentary question concerns how those benefits were measured against the obligations originally negotiated.

              Shell promised substantial Russian participation. Sakhalin Energy subsequently reported tens of billions of dollars in contracts with Russian companies and high levels of labour and material content. What remains to be established is whether the entire record satisfies the precise contractual test agreed at the project’s beginning.

              The distinction is fundamental to documentary accountability.

              A corporate commitment should be evaluated according to its actual terms.

              A reported achievement should be assessed according to its actual measurement.

              And a historical conclusion should rest upon the evidence rather than assumptions about what a percentage must mean.

              The 70% question is therefore not simply a dispute over procurement.

              It is a test of how an international energy project measures and demonstrates the economic benefits promised to the country hosting it.

              The Sakhalin Papers continue.

              PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

              1. Vedomosti — 15 June 2001

              Original interview with Rein Tambuzer, Shell Exploration & Production Services, discussing the Sakhalin II development plan, Russian supplier participation, construction difficulties and the reported 70% requirement.

              Read the original interview in Russian

              2. Sakhalin Energy — Russian Content

              Official corporate explanation of Russian-content commitments under the production-sharing agreement.

              Identifies the lifetime 70% target, the categories of Russian participation, conditional preference for Russian contractors and the role of the Joint Committee.

              Read Sakhalin Energy’s Russian-content explanation

              3. Russian Federal Law No. 225-FZ — Article 2

              Primary legislative text addressing production-sharing agreements and the treatment of agreements concluded before the law came into force.

              Read Article 2

              4. Russian Federal Law No. 225-FZ — Article 7

              Primary legal text concerning Russian participation, domestic equipment procurement and related obligations.

              Read Article 7

              5. Sakhalin Energy — 12 October 2007

              Original company-sourced announcement preserved by the Donovan–Shell Archive, recording more than $10 billion in contracts awarded to Russian companies and cumulative labour and materials indicators.

              Read the preserved 2007 announcement

              6. Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016

              Original corporate report identifying Russian-content methodology, annual performance indicators and cumulative contract awards.

              Particularly relevant: pages 62–63.

              Read the 2016 report (PDF)

              7. Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024

              Original operating-company report recording Russian-content indicators, procurement awards, localisation activity and regional supplier participation.

              Particularly relevant: pages 78–81.

              Read the 2024 report (PDF)

              8. Sakhalin Energy — Production-Sharing Agreement

              Official explanation of the original 1994 agreement, the Russian parties and the project’s contractual framework.

              Read the operator’s PSA explanation

              9. Interfax — 1 July 2022

              Contemporaneous reporting of the Russian presidential decree establishing a replacement operator for Sakhalin II.

              Read the Interfax report

              10. Donovan–Shell Archive — 10 November 2026

              The preceding Sakhalin Papers instalment examining the regional industrial-development ambitions recorded in the 1997 federal-regional agreement.

              The Shell Leaks Files — 10 November 2026

              DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

              This investigation examines the Russian-content commitments associated with the Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement and the corresponding records of Russian contractor, supplier and labour participation.

              The investigation is based upon contemporaneous statements by Shell management, Russian legislation, original Sakhalin Energy publications, authenticated company reports and historical material preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.

              Rein Tambuzer’s statements are attributed to his interview published by Vedomosti on 15 June 2001.

              The interview is evidence of his contemporary explanation of the project’s commitments.

              It is not treated as a substitute for the complete executed production-sharing agreement.

              The original agreement was signed in June 1994, before the enactment of Federal Law No. 225-FZ in December 1995.

              The law’s transitional provisions are acknowledged.

              The general statutory requirements concerning Russian-manufactured equipment are distinguished from the original project’s reported Russian-content measurement methodology.

              The complete executed Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement and all relevant amendments have not been independently examined together for this investigation.

              Accordingly, no definitive legal conclusion is reached concerning the precise interpretation or ultimate discharge of every contractual Russian-content obligation.

              The 2001 reference to Accounts Chamber concerns is identified as a matter raised in the contemporary interview.

              The underlying complete Accounts Chamber audit report has not been independently authenticated for this investigation.

              The 2007 figures are attributed to Sakhalin Energy’s announcement preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.

              The 2016 and 2024 statistics are attributed to the corresponding company reports.

              These figures are not presented as independently audited lifetime compliance determinations.

              The investigation distinguishes Russian labour hours, physical material quantities, financial contract values and the number of contracts awarded.

              The different reporting periods and denominators are acknowledged.

              The 2007 cumulative indicators are not represented as methodologically identical to the annual results reported in 2016 and 2024.

              Contracts awarded to Russian companies are not assumed to represent equivalent amounts of cash expenditure, Russian-manufactured equipment or economic value retained within Sakhalin Oblast.

              The registered location of a supplier is not treated as conclusive evidence of beneficial ownership, the origin of components or the ultimate distribution of profits.

              The distinction between Shell’s participation before 2022 and the replacement operator’s activities after Russia’s restructuring is maintained.

              The 2024 Russian-content results are not attributed to Shell’s management.

              The investigation does not allege that Shell deliberately excluded Russian companies from procurement opportunities.

              It does not allege that Sakhalin Energy falsified Russian-content figures.

              Nor does it conclude that Shell or the operator breached the production-sharing agreement.

              No independently verified judicial finding establishing such a breach has been identified in the records examined.

              The publicly available corporate statements demonstrate substantial Russian participation.

              Whether the project’s complete lifetime performance satisfies every applicable contractual requirement remains an issue requiring the original agreements, amendments, cumulative calculations and relevant audit records.

              Editorial analysis concerning local economic benefits, procurement measurement and the distinction between contractual commitments and reported outcomes is identified separately from established documentary findings.

              Shell plc, Sakhalin Energy, Gazprom, former Sakhalin Energy personnel, Russian governmental authorities, relevant suppliers and other interested parties are invited to submit factual corrections, original contractual documents, independent audit findings or other relevant evidence for consideration and publication.

              The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

              NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-116 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CVI The Procurement Audit Trail: Who Checked Sakhalin II’s Russian-Content Figures?

              The 70% question cannot be fully answered from public percentages alone.

              The next investigation will examine how Russian-content commitments were monitored, verified and enforced.

              Sakhalin Energy’s official documentation identifies a Joint Committee involving the operator and representatives of the Russian authorities.

              Its sustainability reports describe procurement controls, contractor evaluations and the measurement of Russian labour and materials.

              But the underlying records raise further questions.

              What information was provided to Russian government representatives?

              Did the Joint Committee regularly examine the cumulative Russian-content calculation?

              What role did external auditors play?

              How were Russian manufacturers distinguished from Russian-registered suppliers of imported equipment?

              And what happened when the project could not obtain technically suitable equipment from domestic producers?

              The investigation will also return to the controversy surrounding Russia’s Accounts Chamber and the concerns raised in the 2001 Vedomosti interview.

              It will examine contemporaneous procurement arrangements and contractor records, distinguishing reported concerns from verified findings.

              One particular question deserves attention.

              When a production-sharing agreement promises a long-term percentage of domestic participation, who has the documentary evidence necessary to determine whether that promise has been fulfilled?

              The Sakhalin II project offers an unusually valuable case study.

              The operator reported substantial Russian employment, materials and procurement expenditure.

              The relevant companies published detailed statistics.

              Government representatives participated in oversight arrangements.

              But the evidence necessary for an independently verified lifetime compliance determination remains more demanding than those headline figures.

              The next file will follow that audit trail.

              The Sakhalin Papers continue.

              Editorial note: This instalment establishes a stronger evidential foundation for the local-content strand by bringing together the original 15 June 2001 Shell interview, the production-sharing legislation, Sakhalin Energy’s own account of the contractual measurement method, contemporaneous 2007 procurement data, and the operator’s detailed 2016 and 2024 reporting.

              The central finding is that Sakhalin II generated substantial Russian participation, but the 70% lifetime commitment cannot responsibly be judged from isolated annual percentages or nominal contract values. The original contractual measurement and cumulative audit record remain decisive.

              THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 11 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 11, 2026 at 8:27 pm.
              ©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

              GTA Assembly

              Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 11:23
              GTA Assembly Next assembly: 25/11/2026 About the GTA Assembly The Assembly is the space for dialogue, exchange and debate where the actions, strategies and public position of the Global are shared and discussed. It's also a space of connection for new collaborations emerge among the different organizations taking part in the threads of the tapestryTapestryGTA

              Asamblea del TGA

              Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 11:21
              Asamblea del TGA Próxima asamblea: 25/11/2026 Acerca de la Asamblea La Asamblea de TGA es el espacio de diálogo, intercambio y debate donde se ponen en comun las acciones, estrategias y posicionamientos públicos del Tejido Global. También funciona como un espacio donde pueden surgir nuevas colaboraciones entre miembros del tejido. Las asambleas tienen lugar, aproximadamente, cada 3 meses.

              FEMA’s disaster buyout program is working — but there’s a catch

              Grist - Wed, 11/11/2026 - 11:00

              For nearly four decades, the federal government has funded a program that buys out homeowners who live in disaster-prone areas as a way of encouraging them to relocate to safer ground. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has spent over $6 billion on more than 53,000 properties nationwide through its Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. But the question has long been: To what extent does this approach work? 

              A study published today in Science Advances is the latest to offer an answer. Author Rachel Young, an environmental economist at the University of Minnesota, found that the buyout program has largely succeeded in its objective of relocating people and has mostly paid for itself by avoiding future damages. But it isn’t helping everyone equally. 

              “The program is extremely effective at helping people not only move but also move to lower-risk places,” said Young, whose paper makes clear that the “benefits are not evenly distributed.”

              FEMA started doing buyouts in 1988 with the aim of encouraging people to move out of harm’s way. The idea was to avoid repeatedly paying federal disaster aid or insurance claims at the same location. ProPublica reported, for example, that in one extreme case, a single home in northeast Houston received 18 federal flood insurance payments totalling $1.8 million — roughly 15 times its market value.

              Residents apply through their local or state government, which requests federal funding that typically covers 75 percent of the property’s cost. If approved, the government offers to buy the property at its pre-disaster market value, and the homeowner decides whether to accept.

              Using a mix of private and public data, the paper found that program participants were about 20 percentage points more likely to relocate in the first five years than others who were similarly impacted. While that difference dropped a bit over time, it persisted for at least 15 years. The research also showed that participants tended to move to areas with higher incomes and higher rates of education and employment. Moreover, their debt levels fell, at least in the short term.

              From the government’s perspective, it’s been a win, too. Young said that “as long as we’re targeting people and ensuring that they move to less risky properties,” the federal investment tends to pay for itself in fewer claims and lower disaster costs. 

              That said, the study found significant demographic differences. Participants from higher-income neighborhoods were more likely to relocate and move to areas with greater economic opportunity, while households from majority-Black or low-­income neighborhoods moved less frequently and experienced smaller improvements.  

              “This work is super important,” Jim Elliott, a sociologist at Rice University who focuses on inequities in disasters and recovery, said of the study. A.R. Siders, director of the University of Delaware’s Climate Change Science and Policy Hub, agreed. “This is something people have shown at smaller scales,” she said. “It’s good to see it on the national level.” 

              Read Next Climate change is destroying American homes. Who should have to move?

              Neither Elliot nor Siders were involved in the study, which they said confirms and adds to previous research on buyouts — a body of work that points to a program that works but needs improving, they added. Reducing wait times and paying greater attention to equity are key, Elliott said, noting that some of the disconnect rests in how the government and homeowners view the role of the buyout effort. “The government looks at it as a property acquisition program” and “a way to look out for other taxpayers,” he said. “But if you’re from a damaged home, you’re looking at this as disaster recovery.”

              The buyout process can take years, leaving disaster victims in a precarious position as they await a decision. Even if a buyout is approved, Elliott said, using pre-disaster market values can amplify existing inequality: Homes in marginalized communities tend to be worth less from the start, which means their owners then have less money to relocate. In some cases, the government’s offer falls short of what another home costs, making it impossible to move somewhere safer.

              These disparities show up in Young’s paper. The average buyout payment was $40,583 in areas with majority Black populations, compared to $93,977 in high-proportion white census tracts. And the estimated increase in relocation was approximately 18 percentage points in tracts with smaller Black populations, compared to 6 percentage points in majority-Black tracts.

              The buyout program “should do better and be more equitable,” said Elliott. But he said the larger problem is the program isn’t reaching millions of people living in disaster-prone homes.

              “This is important, but it’s not insufficient,” he said of the fix. “It’s buying us some time”

              Young hopes that research like this can help policymakers improve, and potentially expand, buyouts as a climate adaptation tool, though President Donald Trump has repeatedly curbed FEMA’s spending. Elliott pointed to programs in Europe, New Zealand, and elsewhere that could offer lessons for the United States. Siders said this work also highlights the need to consider long-proposed changes to the FEMA program, such as using a home’s replacement cost rather than the market value to help marginalized groups relocate.

              All three researchers agreed that more needs to be done to understand why these inequities occur and how to address them — work they say the government should be doing.

              “The federal government doesn’t do anything to assess where people go after the program,” said Young. Elliott noted that work often falls to academics, who have limited access to the data needed to do it.  

              “It was sort of left to us to figure out what the implication of the policy is,” said Elliot. “That’s backwards.”

              This story was originally published by Grist with the headline FEMA’s disaster buyout program is working — but there’s a catch on Nov 11, 2026.

              Categories: H. Green News

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