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Alaska Wilderness League Announces 2026 Adam Kolton Alaska Storytelling Grant Recipient

Alaska Wilderness League - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 13:29
Alaska Wilderness League Announces 2026 Adam Kolton Alaska Storytelling Grant Recipient 

Koyukon Dené storyteller and filmmaker Brittany Woods-Orrison will receive $20,000 to document the traditions, knowledge, and relationships connecting Alaska Native communities to the land and wildlife 

 

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Alaska Wilderness League is pleased to announce Brittany Woods-Orrison as the 2026 recipient of the Adam Kolton Alaska Storytelling Grant, an annual award established in memory of AWL’s late executive director to support storytellers whose work brings Alaska’s wild lands, waters, wildlife, and communities to life. 

Woods-Orrison, a Koyukon Dené storyteller, filmmaker, and photographer raised on her family’s traditional homelands of Dleł Taneets along the Yukon River, will receive a $20,000 unrestricted grant to support the production of a documentary film exploring the importance of traditional hunting, hide tanning, and the intergenerational sharing of Indigenous knowledge. 

“At its heart, this is a film about a father handing down his knowledge to his daughter, and about our responsibility to the land and the animals that sustain us. I think that’s what makes this project particularly special to me,” said Sam Kolton, Adam Kolton’s son and AWL board member-elect. “So much of what I carry with me from my dad comes from the time we spent together and the things he passed down to me. And I think Brittney’s film captures just how important it is to preserve those stories and traditions for future generations. I know my dad would have loved it.” 

The Adam Kolton Alaska Storytelling Grant was established in 2022 to honor the legacy of Adam Kolton, who led Alaska Wilderness League from 2017 to 2021 and dedicated his career to protecting Alaska’s wild lands and waters. A passionate advocate for Alaska’s Indigenous communities, Adam recognized the importance of elevating the voices and stories of the people whose lives and cultures are inseparable from these landscapes. 

Made possible through generous contributions to the Adam Kolton Memorial Fund, the annual grant provides $20,000 in unrestricted funding to support an Alaska-based storytelling project, along with opportunities to collaborate with Alaska Wilderness League to share that work with audiences beyond the state. 

“Adam understood that protecting Alaska’s wild places was ultimately about protecting the people, cultures, and communities that call them home,” said Kristen Miller, executive director of Alaska Wilderness League. “He believed deeply in the power of storytelling to build connections and inspire people to take action. Brittany’s work embodies that spirit. By sharing a story rooted in cultural knowledge, family, and an enduring relationship with the land, she is helping preserve traditions while reminding all of us why these connections matter. We’re honored to support her work and help bring this important story to a wider audience.” 

As Woods-Orrison moves into production, she plans to work with a fluent Gwich’in speaker on narration and collaborate with Alaska Wilderness League on an impact campaign to bring the film to festivals, conferences, and communities. The goal is not only to preserve a family’s story, but to create opportunities for more people to understand, appreciate, and engage with the knowledge and traditions that continue to shape life in Alaska. 

To learn more about the Adam Kolton Alaska Storytelling Grant and its past recipients, visit AlaskaWild.org/storytelling-grant. 

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Categories: G2. Local Greens

Democrats should wield their power to return agency to ordinary people

Waging Nonviolence - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 12:25

This article Democrats should wield their power to return agency to ordinary people was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

Too often, we have seen a fundamental asymmetry at work: When Democrats win power, they might pass a modest minimum wage increase. When Republicans are in power, they do things like decimate public sector unions. In the long term, this is an imbalance that leads to ruin. 

Last week’s “blue tsunami” represented a resounding repudiation of the Trump agenda. While it is common that a sitting administration will lose seats in the midterm elections, swings of the magnitude that we have just witnessed are rare and important. For certain, Trump will still try to use the executive branch to wreak havoc on democracy and provide egregious giveaways for  the billionaire class. However, Democratic control of the Senate and the investigatory power of its majority in the House should provide an important check on his ability to do damage. 

Perhaps more importantly, progressive forces made critical gains at the state level. The Democrats won six new “trifectas”: in Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Now, if current leads in Kansas and Alaska hold, “about 75 percent of Americans will live in states with Democratic governors,” and roughly 53 percent will reside in places where Democrats control both chambers of the state legislature as well, Newsweek reports.

Of course, we should not assume that Democrats will use their newfound power effectively if left to their own devices. There are significant blocs of the Democratic Party wherein centrist politicians have made careers of “playing to the middle” and embracing pro-corporate neoliberal politics. Should this tendency prevail, the Democrats will have squandered a historic opportunity, to the detriment of social movements and the broader American public alike.

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Forging an alternative path will mean pushing newly empowered legislators to think and act differently. Passing policies that make a real difference in the lives of working people is critical; however, this is only a first step. For movements for social and economic justice to secure long-term wins, they need to be advocating for how they — and their allies in office — can pursue structural reforms. 

A few years ago, after the 2022 midterms, my brother Paul and I wrote an article looking at the trifecta power that Democrats had gained in multiple states and asking, “Will they actually use it?” More specifically, it asked whether they would use their mandate “to enact changes that increase democratic participation and build progressive power” over the long haul.

When Republicans have gained majorities at the state level “they have used their power to push through reforms that weaken left-leaning constituencies and undermine the Democratic base,” we wrote at the time. “In contrast, when Democrats have been in the majority, they often have failed to reverse these changes or enact meaningful structural reforms — the kind of changes that both improve people’s lives and build power for the grassroots groups that can help them govern on an ongoing basis.” 

Structural reforms can come in many varieties: labor rights, campaign finance issues, measures to encourage and expand voting, redistricting, preemption laws determining whether issues are handled at the state or local level, free speech protections, regulatory modifications that allow for community involvement, and changes to the tort system, to name just a few. More than the specific issue or need addressed by a policy, being attuned to structural reforms means paying attention to how a change gives grassroots forces greater room to maneuver and reach for more in the future.

For social movements, structural reforms are a key mechanism of inside-outside politics, through which grassroots organizations work to elect champions into office who then, in turn, use the power of government to strengthen democratic participation and boost outside campaigns for social justice. Unfortunately, the right often has a better understanding of this process than liberals do.

A dramatic example of how Republicans used statewide governing power to alter the balance of forces was how Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker, upon gaining a trifecta in 2010, sought to permanently kneecap unions. Recognizing the importance of organized labor as a foundational part of the Democratic coalition, conservatives made Wisconsin a so-called “right-to-work” state. They also passed the notorious Act 10, which severely restricted the bargaining rights of public sector unions and subjected them to an onerous series of requirements to even continue existing. As a result, these unions lost approximately 70 percent of their members by 2021.

In contrast, when it comes to fighting back, Democrats have a distressing track record of failure and self sabotage. When Iowa Gov. Chet Culver presided over a Democratic trifecta in 2008, he vetoed a bill restoring labor rights, despite having run on a promise to reverse right-to-work. In his fecklessness, he was joined by Colorado Gov. Bill Ritter, who similarly vetoed several pro-union measures, despite having heavily relied on the support of the labor movement to gain office. Both ended up being one-term governors.

In understanding the difference in outcomes, we need only consider what conservative anti-tax leader Grover Norquist chillingly wrote about the impact of Republican actions in Wisconsin: “Trump’s tweets attract attention,” he remarked. “Act 10 moves forward. Quietly. Inexorably. Changing the political landscape like a glacier.”

Previous Coverage
  • Making our demands both practical and visionary
  • Democrats commonly talk about reforms that might help people in their everyday lives, like improving public education or incentivizing developers to create more affordable housing, but they don’t focus on shifting power in the long term. “Even in trifecta states, Democrats’ strategy still amounts to playing defense,” Paul and I wrote. “Going on offense would entail learning from the Right’s unashamed boldness. It would mean using Democratic majorities to build social movements and redistribute power and resources in a more durable way — putting a premium on the types of changes sometimes discussed as ‘policy feedback loops’ or theorized by socialists as ‘non-reformist reforms.’”

    Which brings us to today. In the last two years, we have seen a relentless program from Trump not just to advance conservative policy objectives, but to punish social movements and shift the balance of power in favor of reactionaries. Much of this has happened at the federal level, although it has often been backed up by state-level action. The administration has continued the broader Republican strategy of systematically attacking unions, ending collective bargaining rights for over one million federal employees, and advancing a broad slate of anti-worker policies. 

    But while the labor movement is a critical pillar of support for the left that has been under siege, it is hardly the only one. Trump has systematically targeted social institutions perceived as refuges of progressive values, such as universities and the nonprofit sector. The administration launched an assault on large law firms that might once have filed lawsuits to help provide some accountability for administration misdeeds. He has likewise aggressively sought to restrict voting rights, encouraged Republicans to pursue new heights of gerrymandering, terrorized the immigrant community, and worked to criminalize dissent.

    Each of these moves has something in common. They do not merely aim to enact conservative policies; they seek to permanently consolidate the power of right-wing groups and weaken the ability of any opposing institutions to resist.

    In this election, the Republican attempts to entrench themselves failed to overcome the backlash generated by an unpopular war, high gas prices and increased cost of living, Trump’s brazen corruption, and the shocking federal occupation of major cities in the name of immigration enforcement. Movements worked hard to fuel this backlash, but we cannot count on such dramatic surges in public disgust to appear regularly. And we should not underestimate the impact of structurally minded maneuvers, which at times have protected conservatives from successful democratic challenge for decades.

    The need for progressive movements and their elected allies to pursue structural reforms is not about tit-for-tat retaliation. There is a fundamental difference between enacting changes designed to reinforce privilege, profit, minority rule and the power of the wealthy, and those designed to expand voting rights, bolster democratic participation, and increase the ability for ordinary people to have a voice in their workplaces and in the public sphere alike. The goal of structural reforms by progressives is not to consolidate the power of a tyrant like Trump, but to increase power that is wielded democratically. Indeed, the danger is that centrist Democrats — themselves beholden to wealthy donors and often susceptible to threats of capital flight — prove unwilling to challenge fundamentally anti-democratic forces when given the opportunity.

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    There have been some reasons for hope — and some examples of what the pursuit of structural changes can look like. Responding to a concerted campaign by organized labor, Michigan Democrats did, in fact, reverse their state’s “right-to-work” law in 2023, making Michigan the first to ever do so. The victories of progressives in Minnesota, who used inside-outside strategies to pass a variety of important gains, including expanded organizing and voting rights, is also a model that has become increasingly heralded in recent years. 

    In New York City, Mayor Zohran Mamdani has created an Office of Mass Engagement, meant to encourage people to actively involve themselves in city politics outside of elections, and an Office of Worker Power, designed to help workers exercise their rights to organize. These are important examples of how government can seek to strengthen grassroots movements, even as it delivers on issues of affordability. 

    Overall, the yardstick by which we measure Democratic progress should not just be whether the policies they pass provide immediate benefits, but how these initiatives serve to reduce corporate power and return political agency to ordinary people. 

    The damage that Trump has wrought will not be easily reversed. But if progressive movements are to revitalize democracy and reverse trends toward oligarchic rule, we must think structurally and push for the kind of reforms that build power that can last for more than one wave.

    This article Democrats should wield their power to return agency to ordinary people was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

    Categories: B4. Radical Ecology

    Shell’s Nigerian Gas Exit: An Independent Investigation into the Vaaris Deals, a $600 Million Financing and the Questions Left Unanswered

    Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 12:21
    Shell is selling the pipeline network supplying more than 130 Nigerian businesses. Meanwhile, a separately identified Vaaris company has completed an $800 million acquisition of interests in the former Shell-operated oil joint venture. Corporate announcements, legal advisers’ disclosures and Seplat Energy’s financial statements reveal important details — and equally important limits to what can be established.

    AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

    By the Donovan–Shell Archive

    10 November 2026

    Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, using original Shell and TotalEnergies corporate announcements, Nigerian Stock Exchange regulatory disclosures, financial statements, transaction advisers’ published records, contemporaneous Nigerian reporting and historical material preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.

    Shell is preparing to withdraw from a business that has connected Nigerian factories to natural gas for more than a quarter of a century. The proposed buyer is Vaaris Energy Limited. But the announcement comes amid another significant change in the country’s petroleum industry: a separately identified company, Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, has acquired interests in the former Shell-operated Niger Delta joint venture in an $800 million transaction supported by $600 million in secured borrowing facilities. The transactions concern different assets, different sellers and distinct legal entities. New regulatory documents establish some of the ownership relationships behind the larger acquisition, while leaving important questions about Shell’s own gas-network sale unanswered.

    Introduction: Two transactions, one familiar corporate name

    On 13 October 2026, Shell announced that it had agreed to sell its entire interest in the Shell Nigeria Gas Group.

    The proposed purchaser was Vaaris Energy Limited.

    The business being sold was not an offshore oilfield, an LNG export plant or an international gas trading operation.

    It was a Nigerian domestic gas distribution company.

    According to Shell, the business operated approximately 170 kilometres of pipelines across Ogun, Abia and Rivers states, supplying more than 130 connected industrial and commercial customers.

    For those customers, the business provides an important physical link between Nigeria’s gas supply system and the factories and commercial premises that depend upon it.

    Shell said the sale would allow it to concentrate on strategic deepwater and integrated gas activities.

    It also stated that the transaction remained subject to regulatory approvals.

    The financial consideration was not disclosed.

    Two weeks later, another major transaction attracted attention.

    On 27 October, TotalEnergies announced that it had completed the sale of its 10% non-operated interest in the Renaissance joint venture, formerly known as the Shell Petroleum Development Company joint venture.

    The purchaser was identified as Vaaris.

    The price was $800 million.

    Then, on 4 November, international law firm Bracewell disclosed that it had advised Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited on $600 million in secured borrowing-base facilities used to help finance that acquisition.

    An additional document provides an important piece of the corporate picture.

    Seplat Energy’s financial results, published on 29 October, identify Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited as controlled by Platform Petroleum, a shareholder of Seplat.

    The same filing identifies a director serving on both the Seplat and Vaaris Resources boards.

    Taken together, the documents reveal a substantial transfer of Nigerian petroleum interests from international companies to Nigerian-controlled businesses.

    But they also create a danger for journalists.

    Shell’s gas-network buyer and the purchaser of TotalEnergies’ oil interests must not be treated as the same legal company merely because both transactions involve the Vaaris name.

    The distinction is fundamental.

    And understanding it is the starting point for this investigation.

    Sources: Shell Nigeria

    1. What exactly is Shell selling?

    Shell Nigeria Gas Limited was established in 1998.

    Its business is supplying natural gas to industrial and commercial customers.

    It operates distribution pipelines and associated infrastructure connecting gas supplies to consumers.

    This is a different activity from discovering or producing natural gas.

    It is also different from liquefying gas for export.

    Shell’s announcement expressly states that Shell Nigeria Gas does not operate in upstream gas production, LNG or international gas trading.

    That distinction helps explain why the company can be sold while Shell continues participating in other Nigerian gas activities.

    The disposal includes Shell Nigeria Gas Holding B.V., a company established in 2019.

    According to Shell, the holding company owns all except one share in Shell Nigeria Gas Limited.

    The transaction therefore concerns an established operating business with infrastructure and customers, rather than a proposed development awaiting construction.

    Its network extends across three Nigerian states.

    Ogun contains major manufacturing centres.

    Rivers and Abia are also important locations for industrial and commercial gas consumption.

    For connected customers, gas distribution infrastructure can provide a direct alternative to generating heat and electricity from diesel or other fuels.

    Its usefulness depends upon reliable gas supply, maintained pipelines, suitable pressure and metering facilities, and the ability to deliver gas when customers require it.

    A change in corporate ownership does not remove those operational requirements.

    Shell’s announcement confirmed that the business would continue serving customers as usual pending completion of the sale.

    That assurance is relevant.

    The buyer is acquiring a business whose value depends substantially upon the continued operation of its physical network and customer relationships.

    The proposed sale is therefore not merely a transfer of shares. It would transfer ownership of an established industrial energy distribution business.

    Original source: Shell’s announcement of the proposed sale, 13 October 2026. Shell Nigeria

    2. The price of Shell’s sale has not been disclosed

    One important fact must be established before considering the other transactions.

    Shell has not publicly identified the purchase price for its Nigerian gas distribution business in the original announcement examined.

    Nor does the announcement disclose the purchaser’s financing arrangements.

    The available documents do not establish whether the transaction will be funded through cash reserves, debt, investor contributions or some combination.

    The complete sale and purchase agreement has not been obtained for this investigation.

    Consequently, the public record examined does not establish the allocation of contractual risk between seller and purchaser.

    It also does not establish the exact treatment of outstanding obligations, investment commitments or other commercial arrangements.

    There is no basis for assigning the $800 million figure reported in the separate TotalEnergies transaction to Shell’s sale.

    There is likewise no basis for assuming that the $600 million financing announced by Bracewell was raised to purchase Shell Nigeria Gas.

    Those amounts belong to a different, expressly identified acquisition.

    The distinction matters because the two transactions have sometimes appeared in adjacent industry coverage during a period of rapid Nigerian petroleum divestment.

    The similarities in corporate naming do not establish common transaction values or identical financing arrangements.

    A credible account must preserve the distinction.

    PART TWO: THE OTHER VAARIS TRANSACTION 3. TotalEnergies completes an $800 million sale

    On 27 October 2026, TotalEnergies announced the completion of the divestment of its 10% non-operated interest in the Renaissance joint venture.

    The aggregate consideration was $800 million.

    The assets involved had a long history.

    They formed part of the joint venture previously operated by Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited.

    That business had been central to Shell’s onshore operations in the Niger Delta.

    In March 2025, Shell completed the sale of SPDC to Renaissance.

    The former SPDC joint venture subsequently became known as the Renaissance joint venture.

    The original ownership structure identified in TotalEnergies’ January 2026 announcement included NNPC Limited with 55%, Renaissance with 30% and operatorship, TotalEnergies EP Nigeria with 10%, and Agip with 5%.

    The joint venture held interests in 18 licences.

    TotalEnergies’ October announcement confirmed that its own divestment had been completed.

    But the details require care.

    The original January agreement distinguished 15 licences producing mainly oil from three licences producing mainly gas.

    For the 15 mainly oil-producing licences, TotalEnergies agreed to transfer its participating interest and associated rights and obligations.

    For the three mainly gas-producing licences, identified as OML 23, OML 28 and OML 77, TotalEnergies agreed to transfer its participating interest while retaining its full economic interest.

    Those gas licences were described as accounting for approximately half of Nigeria LNG’s gas supply.

    This was therefore not a straightforward transaction in which every economic interest associated with the 18 licences was transferred without qualification.

    The distinction between legal participation and retained economic interests is essential.

    It also demonstrates the sophistication of the underlying arrangements.

    The $800 million consideration relates to the TotalEnergies transaction, not the proposed acquisition of Shell Nigeria Gas.

    Sources: TotalEnergies’ original sale agreement, 14 January 2026 and TotalEnergies’ completion announcement, 27 October 2026. TotalEnergies.com

    4. The $600 million financing disclosed on 4 November

    The next important development appeared in a statement issued by international law firm Bracewell.

    On 4 November 2026, the firm announced that it had advised Vaaris Resources on the acquisition of TotalEnergies’ interest in the Renaissance joint venture.

    The statement identified the financing more precisely.

    Bracewell said it had advised Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited on $600 million in secured borrowing-base facilities.

    The facilities involved a syndicate of lenders.

    They were intended to part-finance the acquisition.

    A borrowing-base facility is a form of secured financing in which lending capacity is determined by reference to an agreed asset or collateral base, subject to the relevant contractual requirements.

    Such arrangements are commonly used in natural-resource financing.

    The precise terms depend upon the facility documentation.

    In this case, the public statement establishes the existence and announced amount of the facilities.

    It does not reproduce the executed loan agreements.

    Nor does it independently establish the complete allocation of security, lender participation, repayment obligations or financial covenants.

    The available evidence therefore supports a clear but limited conclusion.

    Vaaris Resources obtained substantial secured financing in connection with its acquisition from TotalEnergies.

    The financing was not described by Bracewell as funding the purchase of Shell Nigeria Gas.

    The two transactions should not be combined into one financing calculation.

    Primary transaction-adviser source: Bracewell’s announcement, 4 November 2026. Chambers

    PART THREE: WHAT SEPLAT’S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS REVEAL 5. The ownership disclosure that deserves attention

    The most revealing primary document in the latest reporting is contained in Seplat Energy Plc’s unaudited financial results for the nine months ended 30 September 2026.

    The document was published on 29 October.

    It includes a section headed Related party relationships and transactions.

    Within that section, Seplat identifies Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited.

    The disclosure concerns TotalEnergies’ former interest in the Renaissance joint venture.

    It explains that Seplat consented, through a deed of novation, to Vaaris replacing TotalEnergies EP Nigeria under the ANOH Unitization and Unit Operating Agreement.

    The relevant agreement concerned arrangements to which the Renaissance joint venture was a party.

    The filing then identifies the corporate relationship.

    Seplat states that Vaaris Resources is controlled by Platform Petroleum, a shareholder of Seplat.

    This is not an inference based upon similar company names.

    It is a statement contained in a published financial report from a listed Nigerian energy company.

    The document provides meaningful evidence of the ownership relationship behind the TotalEnergies purchaser.

    But it has an important limit.

    It identifies Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited.

    It does not, in the passages examined, establish that Platform Petroleum controls the separate company named by Shell as the purchaser of its domestic gas business, Vaaris Energy Limited.

    That relationship requires separate corporate documentation.

    The distinction is not a technicality that can be disregarded.

    Companies within the same commercial group may have different shareholders, financing arrangements and legal obligations.

    And companies using similar names are not necessarily under identical ownership.

    A public filing establishing control of one company must not be extended automatically to another.

    Primary regulatory source: Seplat Energy Plc — Unaudited Nine-Month 2026 Financial Results, 29 October 2026, page 71. Nigerian Stock Exchange

    6. The disclosed directorship relationship

    Seplat’s financial statements provide another relevant detail.

    They identify Kazeem Raimi as a non-executive director of Seplat.

    The same disclosure states that he is also a director of Vaaris Resources.

    The information appears in the financial statements’ related-party section.

    Seplat also reports that no transactions or outstanding balances arose from the relevant novation arrangement.

    These facts should be interpreted with care.

    A director serving on more than one company’s board is not, by itself, evidence of misconduct.

    Corporate groups, investment companies and joint ventures frequently have overlapping directors.

    The important issue is whether relevant interests are properly identified and managed under applicable governance requirements.

    Seplat’s published disclosure is an example of the relevant relationships being identified in the financial statements.

    It does not establish that a conflict was improperly managed.

    Nor does it demonstrate that Seplat financed the Vaaris acquisition.

    The filing concerns a specific relationship and contractual novation.

    It should not be expanded into a broader allegation unsupported by the evidence.

    What it does demonstrate is that the ownership and governance relationships associated with the TotalEnergies transaction are more complex than the simple description of a sale to an independent Nigerian company might initially suggest.

    The corporate relationships are relevant to understanding the transaction.

    Their existence is not evidence of wrongdoing.

    Source: . Nigerian Stock Exchange

    7. A historical connection preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive

    The name Platform Petroleum has appeared in Shell’s Nigerian divestment history before.

    The Donovan–Shell Archive preserves a Dow Jones Newswires report dated 29 January 2010.

    The report concerned an agreement by the then Shell-operated Nigerian joint venture to sell interests in three oil production licences.

    The proposed purchasers included Platform Petroleum Limited, Shebah Petroleum Development Company and France’s Maurel & Prom.

    At the time, the transaction was described as part of Shell’s portfolio management strategy.

    The report also discussed Shell’s wider reassessment of its Nigerian onshore activities.

    That earlier transaction provides useful historical context.

    It demonstrates that Platform Petroleum was identified in contemporary reporting as a participant in Nigerian acquisitions involving Shell-operated assets more than sixteen years ago.

    It does not establish that the 2010 proposed transaction and the 2026 acquisitions involved identical corporate structures.

    Nor does it establish that Platform Petroleum controls Vaaris Energy Limited, the proposed buyer of Shell Nigeria Gas.

    The historical continuity lies in the participation of Nigerian energy companies in acquiring interests formerly associated with international operators.

    The precise legal relationships must be established separately for each transaction.

    Historical source: Donovan–Shell Archive — Dow Jones Newswires Report, 29 January 2010. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

    PART FOUR: SHELL’S CHANGING NIGERIAN BUSINESS 8. The March 2025 divestment was not the same transaction

    Shell’s proposed disposal of its domestic gas business needs to be understood against its earlier exit from onshore oil operations.

    On 13 March 2025, Shell completed the sale of SPDC to Renaissance.

    Shell’s own completion statement distinguished the business being sold from its remaining Nigerian activities.

    It specifically identified Shell Nigeria Gas as outside the scope of the SPDC transaction.

    The statement also identified Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company, known as SNEPCo, and Shell’s interest in Nigeria LNG as businesses that remained within the Shell group.

    This matters because Shell’s October 2026 announcement concerns an additional disposal of a business it had deliberately retained when selling SPDC.

    The company is therefore continuing to reshape its Nigerian portfolio.

    But describing Shell as withdrawing entirely from Nigeria would be false.

    It retains significant interests.

    Those include its deepwater activities and its participation in Nigeria LNG.

    Shell’s own explanation is that it is concentrating investment in activities it regards as strategically competitive.

    That is a corporate strategy statement.

    It does not, by itself, establish whether the Nigerian gas-distribution business was profitable, underperforming or incapable of expansion.

    Those questions require financial information not disclosed in the sale announcement.

    Source: Shell — Completion of the SPDC Sale to Renaissance, 13 March 2025. Shell

    9. Shell continues investing in deepwater production

    An important counterpoint is Shell’s acquisition of a larger interest in the Bonga deepwater field.

    On 25 November 2025, Shell announced that SNEPCo had increased its interest in the OML 118 production-sharing contract.

    Its stake rose from 55% to 65%.

    Shell described the acquisition as part of its strategy to concentrate on competitive deepwater assets.

    The transaction demonstrates the distinction between a geographical withdrawal and a portfolio restructuring.

    Shell is reducing or disposing of particular Nigerian businesses while maintaining and expanding others.

    The company is not abandoning Nigerian petroleum production.

    Nor is it abandoning gas entirely.

    Its strategy gives priority to selected deepwater and integrated gas interests.

    The proposed Shell Nigeria Gas disposal is consistent with that stated direction.

    The business being sold serves Nigerian industrial customers through domestic distribution infrastructure.

    The interests being retained are associated with different positions in the energy value chain.

    That distinction creates an important question about Shell’s changing commercial relationship with Nigeria.

    The company intends to remain a major participant in Nigerian energy, but its direct ownership of the pipelines supplying domestic industrial consumers is expected to end if the sale completes.

    This is not necessarily a contradiction in Shell’s strategy.

    It is a choice about which businesses the company wants to own.

    Whether that choice benefits Nigerian customers and the new owner will depend upon the performance of the business after the transaction.

    Source: Shell — Increased Bonga Deepwater Interest, 25 November 2025. Shell

    PART FIVE: THE PIPELINE PROBLEM 10. A revealing statement from Shell Nigeria Gas

    The latest development provides a particularly timely reason to revisit Shell’s proposed disposal.

    At the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria’s Energy Security and Energy Efficiency Summit, held in Lagos on 3–4 November 2026, Shell Nigeria Gas representatives addressed the difficulties facing industrial energy consumers.

    According to Nigerian reporting, the company’s managing director, Ralph Gbobo, was represented by Samuel Ojo, an asset reliability and integrity manager.

    The presentation concerned the infrastructure required to supply manufacturers with gas.

    Shell Nigeria Gas argued that insufficient pipeline infrastructure remained a major obstacle to connecting gas resources with industrial demand.

    The company stressed the importance of reliable gas supplies and the physical infrastructure needed to deliver them.

    That is directly relevant to the business Shell is proposing to sell.

    A domestic gas distributor’s value depends not only upon access to gas but also upon connecting customers to that supply.

    Industrial demand cannot automatically be satisfied simply because Nigeria possesses substantial natural gas resources.

    Gas must be gathered, transported, distributed and delivered at the required pressure.

    Factories also need equipment capable of using it.

    The economics of gas therefore depend upon infrastructure.

    The November presentation placed that infrastructure challenge at the centre of Nigeria’s manufacturing competitiveness.

    The timing is striking: Shell Nigeria Gas was publicly emphasising the need for additional distribution infrastructure only weeks after its parent company announced plans to sell the business.

    That observation is about timing and strategy.

    It is not evidence that Shell acted improperly.

    Source: Daily Champion — Shell Nigeria Gas Calls for Closing the Manufacturing Pipeline Gap. Daily Champion

    11. The company’s cost-saving claims require qualification

    The same report attributed significant financial estimates to Shell Nigeria Gas.

    It stated that Nigerian manufacturers had spent approximately ₦1.34 trillion on alternative energy in 2025.

    The company also suggested that pipeline gas could reduce certain energy costs by as much as 70% compared with diesel-based self-generation.

    These figures are relevant to the company’s argument.

    They illustrate the potential economic importance of improved access to natural gas.

    But they must be attributed correctly.

    The investigation has not independently verified the underlying calculations.

    The reported saving is an estimate, not a guaranteed outcome for every manufacturer.

    Actual savings would depend upon gas tariffs, diesel prices, equipment efficiency, connection costs, operational requirements and the reliability of supply.

    A factory located near an established pipeline may face very different costs from one requiring a major new connection.

    The existence of gas reserves does not eliminate those infrastructure expenses.

    Nor does the use of natural gas eliminate greenhouse-gas emissions.

    Natural gas combustion produces carbon dioxide, and methane emissions associated with gas systems can affect their overall environmental performance.

    The financial and environmental consequences therefore require separate assessment.

    Nevertheless, the industry’s underlying infrastructure problem is real enough to warrant attention.

    Nigeria’s manufacturing sector needs dependable energy.

    Shell Nigeria Gas operates an existing distribution network serving industrial customers.

    The proposed purchaser would inherit that business and the associated commercial opportunities and operational responsibilities.

    The question is what investment and expansion programme will follow.

    The currently available sale announcement does not provide a definitive answer.

    PART SIX: WHAT REMAINS UNKNOWN 12. The financial terms of Shell’s sale

    The first significant gap concerns the purchase consideration.

    Shell has not disclosed the amount in the announcement examined.

    Nor has the buyer’s published legal adviser disclosed a transaction value.

    This means that the financial importance of the divestment to Shell cannot be measured precisely from the public documents.

    The size of the pipeline network and the number of customers establish the business’s physical and commercial scale.

    They do not establish its enterprise value.

    No reliable valuation should be inferred merely by comparing the transaction with the separate $800 million TotalEnergies sale.

    The assets are fundamentally different.

    One transaction concerns a domestic gas distribution company.

    The other concerns interests in oil and gas production licences.

    Their financial structures cannot be assumed to be comparable.

    13. The ownership of Vaaris Energy Limited

    The second gap concerns the proposed purchaser.

    Shell identifies Vaaris Energy Limited as a Nigerian energy company with an existing operational presence.

    Its legal adviser, ENR Advisory, also identifies Vaaris Energy Limited as the client in the proposed acquisition.

    That provides confirmation of the buyer’s name.

    But the announcements examined do not disclose the company’s complete ownership chain, ultimate beneficial owners or detailed financing arrangements.

    By contrast, Seplat’s regulatory filing supplies specific ownership information about Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, the purchaser involved in the TotalEnergies transaction.

    The distinction is important.

    It would be inaccurate to use the information about Vaaris Resources as conclusive evidence of who owns Vaaris Energy Limited.

    Further corporate registry material would be needed.

    The record should not be filled with assumptions.

    There may be commercial relationships between the companies.

    The available primary documents examined here do not establish their complete legal structure.

    That is a documentary limitation, not an allegation of concealed wrongdoing.

    Sources: ENR Advisory’s announcement, 16 October 2026 and Seplat’s regulatory filing, 29 October 2026. ENR Advisory

    14. Completion, investment and customer obligations

    The third gap concerns the next stage of Shell’s transaction.

    Shell’s 13 October announcement expressly made completion subject to regulatory conditions and approvals.

    Its published statement confirmed that the business would remain part of Shell until completion.

    No independently verified announcement establishing completion of that specific sale had been identified by 10 November 2026.

    It would therefore be premature to state that Vaaris Energy already owns Shell Nigeria Gas.

    The transaction has been agreed.

    Its completion remains a separate matter.

    The full agreement has not been examined.

    Consequently, the documentary record does not establish whether the purchaser has accepted specific capital expenditure commitments or expansion targets.

    Nor does it establish whether customers will face changes to contractual pricing, connection terms or other commercial arrangements after completion.

    There is also insufficient information to make definitive statements about the treatment of employees beyond the general assurances contained in Shell’s announcement.

    Those are legitimate questions for subsequent reporting.

    But they cannot be answered by inventing provisions that may or may not appear in the executed agreement.

    EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 15. Nigeria’s petroleum ownership is changing — but the businesses are not all alike

    The most significant conclusion arising from these documents concerns the changing structure of Nigeria’s petroleum industry.

    International companies have been selling interests in long-established onshore operations.

    Nigerian-controlled investors have been acquiring some of those assets.

    Shell’s former onshore subsidiary passed to Renaissance in March 2025.

    TotalEnergies has now disposed of its interest in the former SPDC joint venture to Vaaris.

    Shell has separately agreed to sell its domestic gas distribution business.

    But treating these transactions as interchangeable would conceal their different commercial purposes.

    An oil production interest carries exploration, development, production and other upstream obligations.

    A gas distribution company operates infrastructure and customer-facing delivery systems.

    The financing requirements can differ substantially.

    So can the associated regulatory responsibilities.

    The most useful analysis therefore begins with the specific assets being transferred.

    Shell’s proposed transaction concerns the pipelines that deliver gas to Nigerian businesses.

    That makes the sale directly relevant to the country’s industrial energy infrastructure.

    16. The question for Shell shareholders

    For Shell shareholders, the proposed disposal raises a straightforward governance question.

    Why is Shell selling this particular business?

    Shell’s stated explanation is portfolio simplification and a concentration on deepwater and integrated gas activities.

    That explanation is commercially coherent.

    A multinational energy group cannot be expected to retain every business it has developed.

    Divestments may release capital for activities management considers more attractive.

    But assessing the transaction requires more information than the announcement provides.

    The sale price remains undisclosed.

    The business’s recent earnings and capital requirements are not set out in the announcement.

    The expected financial effect on Shell has not been independently established.

    Nor does the available evidence permit a comparison between the return Shell expected from retaining the distribution network and the return anticipated from reinvesting elsewhere.

    These are matters of corporate financial analysis, not grounds for unsupported allegations.

    The established fact is that Shell has agreed to sell the business.

    The commercial judgement underlying that decision cannot be fully assessed from the public announcement alone.

    17. The question for Nigerian manufacturers

    For connected manufacturers, the central issue is different.

    It concerns continuity and future access to gas.

    A distribution network is valuable because it connects infrastructure to actual consumers.

    Its performance matters to industrial operations.

    A failure of supply may affect production schedules.

    Inadequate capacity may prevent new factories from obtaining connections.

    Pipeline maintenance and expansion may require substantial capital.

    Those considerations remain regardless of the owner’s nationality.

    Nigerian ownership may provide opportunities for local investment, management and commercial expansion.

    But domestic ownership alone does not guarantee improved reliability or lower prices.

    Those outcomes depend upon operational performance, financing, regulation and commercial arrangements.

    The November industry summit highlights the scale of the challenge.

    Shell Nigeria Gas’s representatives argued that more infrastructure is needed.

    The proposed buyer would inherit a business positioned to address part of that demand.

    Whether it expands the network is a question for future evidence.

    18. What the Vaaris financing does — and does not — establish

    The separate $600 million financing announcement provides useful evidence of the ability of Nigerian energy investors to assemble substantial acquisition financing.

    It also demonstrates that major international lenders and advisers are participating in the restructuring of Nigeria’s petroleum ownership.

    But the evidence must remain attached to the transaction it concerns.

    The financing was disclosed in connection with Vaaris Resources’ acquisition from TotalEnergies.

    It does not establish the funding available to Vaaris Energy Limited for the Shell Nigeria Gas transaction.

    Nor does it establish that the latter business will benefit from the former transaction’s assets or borrowing facilities.

    The same caution applies to the ownership information in Seplat’s accounts.

    It identifies Platform Petroleum’s control of Vaaris Resources.

    It does not conclusively identify the ownership of every other company using the Vaaris name.

    The key issue is not whether the similar names invite further investigation.

    They do.

    The issue is whether documentary evidence supports a particular conclusion.

    At present, the identified primary records support a precise account of the TotalEnergies purchaser.

    They support a more limited account of Shell’s purchaser.

    That distinction should remain explicit.

    DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

    The investigation establishes that Shell Petroleum B.V. announced an agreement on 13 October 2026 to sell its interest in the Shell Nigeria Gas Group to Vaaris Energy Limited.

    Shell Nigeria Gas is an operating domestic gas distribution business established in 1998, with approximately 170 kilometres of pipelines and more than 130 connected customers.

    Shell stated that the sale was subject to regulatory approvals and that the business would remain within the Shell group until completion.

    The transaction’s financial consideration was not disclosed in the original announcement.

    Separately, TotalEnergies announced on 27 October 2026 that it had completed the sale of its 10% non-operated interest in the Renaissance joint venture to Vaaris for $800 million.

    The TotalEnergies transaction contained specific arrangements concerning three mainly gas-producing licences in which TotalEnergies retained its economic interests.

    On 4 November, Bracewell disclosed $600 million in secured borrowing-base facilities for Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited to part-finance the TotalEnergies acquisition.

    Seplat Energy’s financial results published on 29 October identify Platform Petroleum as controlling Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited.

    Those results also identify Kazeem Raimi as a director of both Seplat and Vaaris Resources.

    The Seplat disclosure states that no transactions or outstanding balances arose from the relevant novation arrangement.

    The historical Donovan–Shell Archive contains contemporary reporting identifying Platform Petroleum among participants in a proposed acquisition of Shell-operated Nigerian oil interests in 2010.

    At the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria summit on 3–4 November 2026, Shell Nigeria Gas representatives emphasised the need for greater gas distribution infrastructure to support industrial consumers.

    These findings are supported by corporate announcements, regulatory material and attributed contemporaneous reporting.

    They do not establish that Vaaris Energy Limited and Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited have identical beneficial ownership, that the $600 million financing funds Shell’s gas business sale, or that the $800 million consideration relates to Shell Nigeria Gas.

    No allegation of unlawful conduct by Shell, Vaaris, Platform Petroleum, Seplat or their directors is established by the evidence examined.

    CONCLUSION: SHELL IS SELLING THE PIPELINES, NOT ITS ENTIRE NIGERIAN FUTURE

    The proposed sale of Shell Nigeria Gas represents another stage in the restructuring of Shell’s Nigerian business.

    The company has already transferred its former onshore operating subsidiary to Renaissance.

    It has retained important deepwater and LNG interests.

    It has increased its participation in the Bonga deepwater development.

    Now it intends to sell an established domestic gas distribution network.

    For Shell, the transaction is consistent with a strategy of concentrating on selected parts of the energy value chain.

    For Nigeria, it represents the proposed transfer of another substantial business to Nigerian ownership.

    For the purchaser, it offers an established network serving industrial and commercial customers.

    And for those customers, the important question will be whether the business continues to operate reliably and obtains the investment required for future expansion.

    The wider developments involving Vaaris Resources demonstrate that Nigerian-controlled companies are also participating in major upstream acquisitions.

    The $800 million TotalEnergies transaction is substantial.

    The $600 million financing is substantial.

    Seplat’s regulatory filing supplies important evidence about the ownership relationships associated with that acquisition.

    But those developments must remain separate from Shell’s domestic gas sale.

    The financial terms of Shell’s transaction remain undisclosed.

    Its completion depends upon the necessary approvals.

    The complete ownership and financing arrangements of the company identified as the Shell buyer have not been independently established from the available primary documents.

    That leaves legitimate questions for future documentary examination.

    The most immediate concern is commercial and practical.

    Shell Nigeria Gas has spent more than twenty-five years connecting Nigerian businesses to natural gas.

    Its representatives have recently argued that Nigeria needs significantly more pipeline infrastructure to support manufacturing.

    Shell now proposes to transfer the business to another owner.

    The pipelines already exist. The customers already depend upon them. What remains to be established is how the new ownership will finance and deliver the network’s next stage of development.

    For shareholders, the unresolved issue is the value and commercial rationale of the disposal.

    For Nigerian manufacturers, it is the future of their energy supply.

    For the public record, it is the need to distinguish clearly between two different transactions involving companies bearing the Vaaris name.

    One deal concerns Shell’s industrial gas distribution network. The other concerns an $800 million acquisition of former Shell-operated oil interests. The documents support examining them together — but not confusing them.

    That distinction is essential to an accurate account.

    PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES
    1. Shell Nigeria — 13 October 2026. Original announcement of the proposed sale of Shell Nigeria Gas to Vaaris Energy Limited, including the network’s scale, the identity of the purchaser and the requirement for regulatory approval. Shell Signs Agreement to Sell Nigeria Domestic Gas Business
    2. ENR Advisory — 16 October 2026. Announcement by the law firm advising Vaaris Energy Limited on the proposed Shell Nigeria Gas acquisition. ENR Advisory — Shell Nigeria Gas Acquisition
    3. TotalEnergies — 14 January 2026. Original sale agreement announcement identifying the Renaissance joint venture licences and arrangements concerning the mainly gas-producing fields. TotalEnergies Signs Agreement to Divest Renaissance Joint Venture Interest
    4. TotalEnergies — 27 October 2026. Original completion announcement confirming the $800 million consideration for its separate divestment to Vaaris. TotalEnergies Completes Nigerian Oil Interest Divestment
    5. Bracewell — 4 November 2026. Original legal-adviser announcement identifying Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited and $600 million in secured borrowing-base facilities associated with the TotalEnergies acquisition. Bracewell Advises Vaaris Resources on Acquisition and Financing
    6. Seplat Energy Plc — 29 October 2026. Unaudited financial results for the nine months ended 30 September 2026. Page 71 identifies Platform Petroleum’s control of Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited and the relevant directorship and contractual relationships. Seplat Energy — Original Financial Statements, PDF
    7. Shell plc — 13 March 2025. Confirmation that the sale of SPDC to Renaissance had completed, identifying Shell Nigeria Gas as outside the scope of that transaction. Shell Completes SPDC Sale to Renaissance
    8. Shell plc — 25 November 2025. Original announcement confirming SNEPCo’s increased interest in the Bonga deepwater development. Shell Increases Nigerian Deepwater Bonga Interest
    9. Daily Champion — November 2026. Reporting of statements made by Shell Nigeria Gas representatives at the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria summit on 3–4 November. Shell Nigeria Gas Calls for Improved Industrial Pipeline Infrastructure
    10. Donovan–Shell Archive — 29 January 2010. Preserved Dow Jones Newswires report concerning a proposed disposal of Shell-operated Nigerian oil interests to a consortium including Platform Petroleum. Shell Sells Three Nigerian Oil Blocks to Local Companies — Historical Archive
    DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

    This investigation examines Shell’s proposed sale of its Nigerian domestic gas distribution business and separate transactions involving the acquisition of interests in the former Shell-operated Renaissance joint venture.

    It draws upon original corporate announcements, regulatory disclosures, financial statements, published transaction-adviser material, contemporary reporting and historical documents preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.

    The legal entities involved in the transactions are distinguished throughout.

    Vaaris Energy Limited, identified by Shell as the proposed purchaser of Shell Nigeria Gas, is not treated as legally identical to Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, identified in documents concerning the acquisition from TotalEnergies.

    The complete ownership and beneficial-control arrangements of Vaaris Energy Limited have not been independently authenticated.

    Seplat Energy’s published statement that Platform Petroleum controls Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited is not represented as proof of ownership of Vaaris Energy Limited.

    The $800 million consideration disclosed by TotalEnergies concerns its divestment of interests in the Renaissance joint venture.

    It is not presented as the purchase price for Shell Nigeria Gas.

    The $600 million secured borrowing-base facilities disclosed by Bracewell concern financing for the separate TotalEnergies acquisition.

    They are not presented as financing for Shell’s proposed gas distribution disposal.

    Shell’s announcement of 13 October 2026 is correctly identified as an agreement to sell, rather than a completed disposal.

    The transaction remains subject to the applicable regulatory conditions and approvals.

    No independently verified completion announcement for that specific sale had been identified by 10 November 2026.

    The complete Shell Nigeria Gas sale and purchase agreement has not been obtained.

    Accordingly, no definitive conclusions are offered concerning the purchase price, financing arrangements, allocation of liabilities, future capital expenditure obligations, customer contract terms or treatment of employees.

    Statements concerning the potential financial benefits of wider industrial gas access are attributed to Shell Nigeria Gas representatives.

    The reported estimates of manufacturing energy expenditure and potential savings have not been independently audited for this investigation.

    The financial statements published by Seplat Energy are unaudited interim results.

    The identified director relationships and contractual novation are described as disclosed.

    They are not treated as evidence of improper related-party transactions or unlawful conflicts of interest.

    The historical 2010 archive item is identified as contemporary reporting of a proposed transaction.

    It is not treated as proof of the later legal ownership or financing of the 2026 purchasers.

    No allegation is made that Shell, Vaaris Energy Limited, Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, Platform Petroleum, Seplat Energy, TotalEnergies or their directors acted unlawfully in connection with the transactions examined.

    Editorial interpretation concerning corporate strategy, industrial energy security and the consequences of changing ownership is distinguished from the established documentary record.

    Shell plc, Shell Nigeria Gas Limited, Vaaris Energy Limited, Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, Platform Petroleum, Seplat Energy, TotalEnergies and other interested parties are invited to provide factual corrections, relevant primary documents or responses for consideration and publication.

    The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

    Shell’s Nigerian Gas Exit: An Independent Investigation into the Vaaris Deals, a $600 Million Financing and the Questions Left Unanswered was first posted on November 10, 2026 at 9:21 pm.
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    THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 10 NOVEMBER 2026

    Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 12:07

    THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 10 NOVEMBER 2026

    Archive reference: SLF-2007-114

    The Sakhalin Papers CIV: The Half-Million-Tonne Question — Sakhalin’s Forgotten Gas-Chemical Ambition A 1997 agreement envisaged supplying Sakhalin with at least 500,000 tonnes of light hydrocarbon fractions annually, beginning in 2005. Shell’s engineers subsequently designed sophisticated gas-processing facilities, but the documented commercial system directed recovered condensate towards oil exports. Nearly thirty years after the original agreement, Sakhalin’s authorities are still discussing major new gas-chemical and condensate-processing industries. Original contractual material, Shell technical publications, operating-company records and contemporary Russian government reporting reveal what was envisaged, what was actually constructed and what remains unproven.

    AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

    By the Donovan–Shell Archive

    Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, using contemporaneous technical material authored by Shell personnel, published contractual records, original project-contractor documentation, Sakhalin Energy operating-company disclosures, Russian regional government statements and independent reporting.

    Publication date: 10 November 2026

    Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia

    Previous instalment: SLF-2007-113 — The Sakhalin Gas Promise: What the Island Was Supposed to Receive, and Why Moscow Looked Elsewhere

    INTRODUCTION: THE OTHER PROMISE BENEATH SAKHALIN

    In April 1997, the Russian federal government and the administration of Sakhalin Oblast agreed upon arrangements for distributing benefits from the enormous offshore oil and gas development known as Sakhalin II.

    The agreement addressed revenues, taxation, royalties and the Russian state’s share of production.

    It also contained provisions concerning supplies of natural gas for the island’s domestic needs.

    Yesterday’s Sakhalin Papers investigation examined those gas-supply expectations.

    But the document included another provision that deserves independent scrutiny.

    Beginning in 2005, Sakhalin was to receive no less than 500,000 tonnes annually of a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons.

    The same section explicitly contemplated construction of a gas-chemical complex.

    These provisions suggested an industrial ambition extending beyond the production and export of natural gas.

    The island was not merely being considered as a location from which hydrocarbons could be extracted and shipped overseas.

    Its authorities also envisaged using some of those resources to support local processing and industrial development.

    Nearly thirty years later, the distinction between the original ambition and the infrastructure actually constructed has become particularly revealing.

    Sakhalin II became an internationally significant liquefied natural gas development.

    Shell’s engineering expertise helped establish Russia’s first major LNG export plant.

    The project also incorporated substantial facilities for processing gas, separating hydrocarbon liquids and stabilising condensate.

    Those facilities were real.

    They operated.

    They formed part of an enormous industrial system.

    But the publicly documented product flows tell a more complicated story.

    An important technical paper published in October 2001 by two Shell Global Solutions specialists explained how hydrocarbons separated during LNG production would be treated.

    Some light components would be recovered for use in the refrigeration process.

    Others would be returned to the LNG stream.

    Stabilised condensate would be directed towards the neighbouring oil export terminal.

    The operating company’s current documentation confirms that recovered condensate is mixed with oil for export.

    This provides an unusually clear distinction between processing hydrocarbons and developing a separate regional gas-chemical industry.

    Meanwhile, in September 2025, Sakhalin officials were still discussing the construction of major gas-processing and gas-chemical facilities.

    Their plans extended into the 2030s.

    In June 2026, Governor Valery Limarenko indicated that another proposed development — a gas-condensate refinery — would not begin construction until after 2030.

    That facility would depend upon resources from the separate Sakhalin III development.

    These records do not establish that Shell breached the 1997 agreement.

    They do not demonstrate that all the original industrial proposals were abandoned.

    But they raise an important documentary question.

    What happened to the industrial development envisaged when Moscow and Sakhalin agreed to allocate 500,000 tonnes of light hydrocarbon fractions annually to the region?

    The surviving evidence allows the question to be examined without confusing proposals, actual infrastructure and contractual obligations.

    PART ONE: THE ORIGINAL 1997 DOCUMENT 1. The agreement that recorded the industrial ambition

    The starting point is the agreement dated 3 April 1997 between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Administration of Sakhalin Oblast.

    Its purpose was to distribute the Russian side’s revenues and resources arising from the development of the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye fields.

    The underlying Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement had been signed on 22 June 1994.

    The 1997 document was a separate arrangement between two Russian governmental parties.

    An archival reproduction survives on the website of Sakhalin Environment Watch.

    The original Russian text is particularly important because it identifies the financial and physical benefits the regional authorities expected from the project.

    Section 5 addresses the allocation of natural gas for domestic purposes.

    It recognises Sakhalin as a preferred area for domestic supplies.

    The provision expressly takes account of the anticipated construction of a gas-chemical complex.

    It then identifies minimum quantities of natural gas for regional requirements.

    The volumes increase from 2.5 billion cubic metres annually in 2005 to 6.25 billion cubic metres annually in 2015.

    But a separate sentence concerns liquid hydrocarbons.

    It provides for annual supplies of at least 500,000 tonnes of a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons from 2005.

    The distinction is significant.

    Natural gas and light hydrocarbon fractions are not interchangeable commodities.

    The former can be supplied through pipelines for heating, electricity generation and industrial use.

    The latter can serve as feedstock for processing and petrochemical industries.

    The document therefore envisaged more than one category of regional hydrocarbon supply.

    It suggested the possibility of developing a broader downstream industrial economy.

    Primary historical source: Agreement Between the Russian Government and Sakhalin Administration, 3 April 1997 — Sakhalin Environment Watch. Sakhalin Environment Watch

    2. What are light hydrocarbon fractions?

    The Russian expression used in the agreement is commonly abbreviated as ШФЛУ.

    It refers to a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons.

    Such material generally comprises a mixture of hydrocarbons that can be separated from natural gas during processing.

    Depending upon its composition, it may contain ethane, propane, butanes and heavier components.

    Further processing can separate these materials into commercially useful products.

    Propane and butanes may be marketed as liquefied petroleum gas.

    Ethane can serve as feedstock for ethylene production.

    Other light hydrocarbons can be used in chemical manufacturing or fuel-related processes.

    A broad hydrocarbon fraction therefore represents potential industrial feedstock.

    But its commercial value depends upon several factors.

    The material must be produced in a suitable form.

    Its composition must be known.

    Appropriate processing and transportation facilities must exist.

    And there must be commercial customers or industrial users.

    A region receiving a large annual supply of such material might develop petrochemical or other downstream activities.

    But the availability of feedstock does not automatically create a viable manufacturing industry.

    A separate investment programme may be required.

    That distinction becomes central to interpreting the 1997 agreement.

    The agreement identified an anticipated supply of raw material. It did not, in the reproduced passage examined, provide a complete financed construction plan for a particular petrochemical plant.

    3. The half-million-tonne figure was substantial

    The quantity envisaged was considerable.

    Five hundred thousand tonnes annually represents half a million metric tonnes of hydrocarbon material every year.

    If the intended supplies had commenced in 2005 and continued at that level, they could have supported a significant industrial operation.

    But there is a critical limitation.

    The figure in the agreement does not identify the precise composition of the hydrocarbon mixture.

    It does not specify the final products that a proposed gas-chemical complex would manufacture.

    Nor does it disclose the investment cost, commercial ownership or planned location of such a complex.

    Those matters cannot be reconstructed by assumption.

    A light-hydrocarbon supply obligation is not equivalent to a requirement to build a polypropylene plant, an ethylene plant or any other specified facility.

    Such conclusions would require additional documentation.

    The original figure nevertheless demonstrates that the regional authorities were contemplating substantial volumes of material beyond natural gas supplied for ordinary consumption.

    The intended benefit was industrial as well as fiscal.

    That makes the subsequent development of the project worth examining closely.

    4. The qualification that prevents a simple allegation of breach

    Section 5 of the reproduced agreement includes an important qualification.

    It provides that the dates and quantities may be changed by agreement between the parties, depending upon the commencement of work and the achievement of relevant hydrocarbon production levels.

    This provision must be considered alongside the original numerical targets.

    It means that the 2005 date cannot automatically be interpreted as an unconditional deadline.

    Nor can the annual quantity be treated as legally immutable.

    The federal and regional authorities anticipated the possibility of adjustments.

    The surviving public reproduction does not establish whether those adjustments were subsequently made.

    It also does not reproduce every provision of the original 1994 production-sharing agreement governing the Russian state’s entitlement to particular hydrocarbon products.

    Therefore, the evidence does not establish that Shell was personally or directly bound to supply the entire 500,000 tonnes to a specified regional chemical plant by 2005.

    The 1997 document governed the relationship between Russian public authorities.

    Its obligations must be distinguished from those imposed upon Sakhalin Energy under the original production-sharing agreement.

    That distinction is essential.

    The document establishes an industrial aspiration incorporated into a governmental agreement. It does not, without the complete contractual record, establish a breach by Shell or Sakhalin Energy.

    PART TWO: WHAT SHELL ACTUALLY DESIGNED 5. October 2001: Shell engineers publish the technical design

    One of the most useful contemporaneous documents appeared in Oil & Gas Journal on 1 October 2001.

    Its title was:

    Unusual Design Considerations Drive Selection of Sakhalin LNG Plant Facilities.

    The paper was written by Wim Dam and Siew-mung Ho.

    Both were associated with Shell Global Solutions International.

    Dam was a principal technologist in Shell’s LNG and gas-processing group in The Hague.

    Ho had been seconded to Shell Global Solutions in 1999.

    The authors described the engineering arrangements being developed for Sakhalin II’s second phase.

    Their paper provides unusually detailed evidence of Shell’s original technical intentions.

    The proposed LNG plant would comprise two production trains.

    Each would have a design capacity of 4.8 million tonnes annually.

    The combined capacity would therefore be 9.6 million tonnes per year.

    The project would use Shell’s Double Mixed Refrigerant technology.

    That technology was selected partly because of Sakhalin’s demanding climate.

    The process needed to operate efficiently across substantial seasonal temperature variations.

    But the most important part of the paper for this investigation concerns the treatment of natural gas liquids.

    The authors described an integrated fractionation system.

    It would separate hydrocarbon components from the gas entering the liquefaction process.

    Those components would then be handled according to the requirements of the LNG plant.

    This is direct technical evidence from Shell personnel concerning the design of facilities intended for the project.

    It is more valuable than a retrospective general description because it records the engineering approach while the development was still being planned.

    Contemporaneous Shell-authored technical source: Oil & Gas Journal — Unusual Design Considerations Drive Selection of Sakhalin LNG Plant Facilities, 1 October 2001. Oil & Gas Journal

    6. The fractionation system was real — but its purpose matters

    The technical paper describes a sequence of processing units.

    The fractionation system included equipment for separating methane, ethane, propane and butane-related fractions.

    Some recovered components were required for refrigeration.

    The LNG plant depended upon carefully controlled refrigerant mixtures to cool natural gas to liquefaction temperatures.

    Other light hydrocarbon components were returned to the LNG stream.

    Heavier material was stabilised.

    The paper explains that the resulting condensate would be routed towards the adjacent oil export terminal.

    This is the central technical distinction.

    The fractionation system was not merely an imaginary proposal.

    It formed part of the engineering design for the LNG plant.

    But the published design did not describe a separate regional petrochemical complex receiving 500,000 tonnes annually of the broad hydrocarbon fraction envisaged in the 1997 agreement.

    The process described by Shell was integrated with LNG production and oil exports.

    Its immediate objectives included gas conditioning, refrigerant recovery and condensate stabilisation.

    Those are essential activities in a major LNG development.

    They are not necessarily equivalent to manufacturing petrochemicals for regional industries.

    The distinction is not semantic.

    It concerns the physical destination and commercial use of the recovered material.

    A project can include a sophisticated fractionation facility while directing the resulting products towards export rather than a separate local manufacturing industry.

    The 2001 engineering paper demonstrates that such an export-oriented arrangement was contemplated.

    It does not establish that every possible alternative industrial arrangement was permanently excluded.

    7. Why the design was commercially understandable

    The Sakhalin II project required substantial capital expenditure.

    The development involved offshore platforms, pipelines, an onshore processing facility, liquefaction trains and marine export infrastructure.

    The project was intended to produce LNG for international customers.

    The associated oil and condensate streams would also be marketed.

    An integrated design offered practical advantages.

    Hydrocarbon components recovered during gas treatment could be used within the liquefaction process.

    Stabilised condensate could be transported through the project’s existing export infrastructure.

    That could avoid the need for a separate downstream processing and distribution system.

    These considerations are commercially understandable.

    They do not establish that the design was the only economically viable option.

    Nor do they prove that a regional gas-chemical complex would necessarily have been uneconomic.

    Such a comparison would require a feasibility study covering feedstock composition, capital costs, markets, infrastructure and competing investment alternatives.

    No complete feasibility study for the originally envisaged regional gas-chemical complex has been authenticated for this instalment.

    The available evidence therefore explains the system Shell designed.

    It does not establish why every alternative proposal was accepted or rejected.

    PART THREE: WHAT WAS ACTUALLY CONSTRUCTED 8. The onshore processing facility became operational

    The project moved from engineering design to construction.

    One of the principal contractors was ENKA, working in a joint venture with Bechtel.

    ENKA’s own project record identifies the contract for Sakhalin II’s onshore processing facility.

    It states that the joint venture received the relevant contract in May 2003.

    The facility was designed to process gas, condensate and oil arriving from the offshore fields.

    ENKA describes a processing capacity of approximately 51 million cubic metres of gas per day.

    It also identifies substantial condensate and oil-processing capacity.

    According to the contractor, the first phase was completed in 2006.

    The second phase, involving additional work and modifications, was commissioned in 2008.

    These are not merely prospective construction plans.

    They are statements by a principal contractor concerning facilities it helped construct.

    They establish that substantial gas-processing infrastructure was delivered.

    But the contractor’s description also identifies the principal purpose of the installation.

    The processed gas and liquids were transported towards the LNG plant and oil export facilities in southern Sakhalin.

    The onshore processing facility was therefore an essential component of the integrated export development.

    The record does not identify it as the separate gas-chemical complex contemplated in the regional industrial-development ambitions of 1997.

    Source: ENKA — Sakhalin Projects, Original Contractor Project Record. ENKA İnşaat ve Sanayi A.Ş.

    9. The operator confirms condensate processing

    The current Sakhalin Energy website provides further evidence.

    The company describes the onshore processing facility near the landfall of the pipeline from the Lunskoye platform.

    The installation includes equipment for gas processing and compression.

    It also includes condensate stabilisation units.

    The operator identifies a daily design capacity exceeding 7,200 tonnes of condensate.

    That figure demonstrates the scale of the processing infrastructure.

    But it is a design-capacity figure.

    It does not establish how much material was actually processed during a particular year.

    Nor does it establish that an equivalent quantity was supplied to regional chemical manufacturers.

    The same operating-company page describes the role of Booster Station 1.

    The station combines stabilised condensate with processed oil from the offshore platforms.

    Its purpose includes transporting the resulting hydrocarbon mixture towards the Prigorodnoye production complex.

    The material is therefore integrated into the project’s oil and condensate export system.

    This is important evidence because it describes operating infrastructure rather than only the original engineering design.

    Source: Sakhalin Energy — Onshore Processing Facility, Official Technical Description. Sakhalin Energy

    10. The decisive evidence: Where the condensate goes

    The strongest operational evidence appears on Sakhalin Energy’s official page describing the Prigorodnoye production complex.

    The complex includes the LNG plant and oil export terminal.

    Its oil-handling system receives production from the offshore fields through the Trans-Sakhalin pipelines.

    The operator explains that the oil is mixed with condensate recovered through gas fractionation.

    The resulting mixture is then transferred to storage and loaded onto tankers.

    This establishes an important physical destination.

    Condensate recovered through the project’s gas fractionation system forms part of the oil and condensate export stream.

    That is not speculation about Shell’s commercial intentions.

    It is the operating company’s own description of the production system.

    The finding is also consistent with the engineering arrangement described by Shell’s technical specialists in 2001.

    The original design contemplated stabilised condensate being routed towards the oil export terminal.

    The operating company’s current description confirms that condensate from gas fractionation is incorporated into the exported hydrocarbon mixture.

    The two records are unusually consistent.

    One describes the engineering plan.

    The other describes the operating system.

    But an important qualification remains.

    The condensate incorporated into the export stream is not automatically identical in composition, quantity or contractual classification to the broad fraction of light hydrocarbons identified in the 1997 agreement.

    The 1997 provision referred to a specific category of regional hydrocarbon supply.

    The operating company’s description concerns material handled by the export system.

    Establishing whether they were legally or chemically interchangeable would require more detailed product specifications and contractual documentation.

    Nevertheless, the operating record does not demonstrate that the originally envisaged 500,000 tonnes were being delivered to a separate regional gas-chemical complex.

    That remains an unanswered question.

    Primary operating-company evidence: Sakhalin Energy — Prigorodnoye Production Complex, Official Asset Description. Sakhalin Energy

    PART FOUR: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPORT BUSINESS 11. February 2009: The LNG plant begins operation

    Sakhalin II became Russia’s first major LNG export development.

    The plant at Prigorodnoye was inaugurated in February 2009.

    Its original design capacity was 9.6 million tonnes of LNG annually.

    The project subsequently increased production through operational improvements.

    Its commercial orientation was towards international energy markets.

    Long-term LNG contracts supported the development.

    The project’s customers were principally located in the Asia-Pacific region.

    This was a major achievement for Shell and its partners.

    The development required substantial engineering expertise and investment.

    It also generated employment, procurement opportunities and public revenues.

    Those achievements should be recognised.

    But they do not resolve the separate question concerning the original regional industrial ambitions.

    An LNG export facility produces a different commercial result from a gas-chemical complex manufacturing downstream products.

    Both involve processing natural gas.

    Both may use sophisticated equipment.

    Both may generate substantial economic benefits.

    But the products, customers and industrial relationships differ.

    The fact that Sakhalin II successfully produced LNG does not establish that a proposed separate gas-chemical industry was also created.

    That distinction is central to assessing what was envisaged in 1997.

    12. The export system remains important in 2026

    The operating company’s current records demonstrate that Sakhalin II remains an important LNG and oil producer.

    Its description of the project identifies the offshore platforms, pipeline system, processing facilities, LNG plant and export terminal.

    For 2025, the company reported that Sakhalin LNG accounted for approximately 2.4% of global LNG demand.

    It also reported substantial continuing sales into Asia-Pacific markets.

    The project’s oil export product, Sakhalin Blend, incorporates oil and gas condensate.

    These statements confirm the continuing economic significance of the integrated development.

    But they also illustrate what the operator publicly identifies as the principal products.

    LNG is marketed internationally.

    Oil and condensate are blended and exported.

    Natural gas is also delivered through arrangements supporting domestic consumption.

    The official infrastructure description does not identify a completed separate regional gas-chemical complex fulfilling the particular 1997 half-million-tonne provision.

    That absence is significant but must be interpreted carefully.

    A corporate infrastructure summary is not necessarily a comprehensive inventory of every downstream facility operated by another company.

    Nor is it an audit of every historical obligation.

    It cannot conclusively establish that no relevant processing operation existed elsewhere on Sakhalin.

    The defensible conclusion is that the documented Sakhalin II operating infrastructure does not itself demonstrate fulfilment of the original regional gas-chemical ambition.

    Source: Sakhalin Energy — General Information and Current Project Infrastructure. Sakhalin Energy

    PART FIVE: THE INDUSTRIAL AMBITION RETURNS 13. September 2025: Sakhalin again discusses major gas-processing industries

    The contemporary record becomes particularly interesting in September 2025.

    During the international Far Eastern Energy Forum, officials from Sakhalin Oblast discussed plans for new industrial facilities.

    On 25 September 2025, regional publication Sakh.online reported statements by Timur Rizvanov, a deputy minister responsible for investment, industry and external relations.

    The proposed developments included major gas-processing and gas-chemical facilities.

    Other projects under consideration included production of hydrogen, ammonia and additional industrial products.

    The regional authorities linked these ambitions to future development of the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye gas-condensate field.

    That field forms part of Sakhalin III.

    The development was not presented as an immediate completed project.

    Regional officials discussed the possibility of major processing facilities becoming operational in the 2030s.

    The report also explained the importance of identifying viable markets and processing capacities.

    This is valuable contemporary evidence.

    Nearly three decades after the 1997 agreement, regional officials were still discussing substantial new downstream hydrocarbon industries.

    The original and later projects cannot automatically be described as identical.

    The available documentation does not establish a continuous development programme extending directly from the 1997 gas-chemical proposal to the projects discussed in 2025.

    The resource bases also differ.

    But the broad economic ambition is recognisable.

    Sakhalin continues seeking ways to convert offshore hydrocarbon resources into local industrial activity beyond the established export business.

    Contemporaneous source: Sakh.online — Major Gas-Processing Plants Not Expected Before 2033, 25 September 2025. Sakh

    14. The proposed facilities are not evidence that the original plant was built

    The 2025 announcements require careful interpretation.

    A proposal to construct a new gas-chemical complex does not establish that an earlier project failed.

    A region can develop several gas-processing facilities over time.

    Different plants can serve different customers.

    New projects may use technologies unavailable when earlier facilities were planned.

    But the continued discussion of major processing facilities demonstrates that significant downstream industrial development remains an active policy objective.

    The original 1997 agreement already contemplated the possibility of using hydrocarbon resources for regional industrial purposes.

    The 2025 proposals show that similar ambitions remain relevant.

    The documentary gap lies between those dates.

    The available records do not establish a complete chronology of the original proposed gas-chemical complex.

    They do not identify a verified final investment decision for that specific 1997 proposal.

    They do not establish that the contemplated plant began commercial production.

    And they do not provide authenticated annual delivery records demonstrating that the particular 500,000-tonne commitment was fulfilled.

    That does not justify a definitive claim that the original project never progressed beyond an idea.

    It justifies identifying the absence of the necessary proof.

    For a documentary investigation, that distinction is important.

    PART SIX: THE NEW SAKHALIN REFINERY PROPOSAL 15. February 2026: A proposed 100-billion-rouble development

    Another significant announcement followed in February 2026.

    Regional reporting described plans for a major gas-condensate processing facility on Sakhalin.

    On 12 February, EastRussia reported information attributed to the Sakhalin regional government’s press service.

    The proposed investment was approximately 100 billion roubles.

    The facility was expected to process substantial quantities of gas condensate.

    Its products would include aviation kerosene, diesel fuel, marine fuel and naphtha.

    The aim was to support regional fuel requirements and potentially establish feedstock supplies for further industrial activities.

    This was a different project from the 1997 gas-chemical ambition.

    It involved a proposed refinery using gas condensate associated with Sakhalin III.

    The original 1997 provision concerned supplies of light hydrocarbon fractions associated with the Sakhalin II arrangements.

    Those distinctions should not be blurred.

    Nevertheless, the proposed refinery illustrates the continuing regional interest in processing hydrocarbons locally.

    Rather than relying entirely upon external supplies of refined petroleum products, Sakhalin’s authorities were considering a substantial new manufacturing facility.

    The original February reporting contemplated construction beginning in 2028 if an investment decision was reached.

    That was a conditional timetable.

    It was subsequently revised.

    Source: EastRussia — Sakhalin Condensate Refinery Estimated at Approximately 100 Billion Roubles, 12 February 2026. Eastrussia

    16. June 2026: The timetable moves beyond 2030

    On 27 June 2026, RBC reported further comments by Governor Valery Limarenko.

    The governor stated that the proposed hydrocarbon-processing plant would be constructed after 2030.

    He explained that the development depended upon the commissioning of production facilities at the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field.

    The anticipated initial production period was 2028–2029.

    According to his explanation, the composition of the produced hydrocarbons would need to be established through further analysis.

    Only then could detailed engineering design proceed.

    The governor indicated that design work would begin around 2029.

    Construction was expected during the 2030s.

    This was a significant qualification to the earlier anticipated timetable.

    The reporting shows that the project remained prospective.

    It also identifies a practical reason for the delay.

    The processing facility’s design depended upon the quantity and composition of the feedstock expected from the associated field.

    This is a conventional but important consideration in downstream petroleum investment.

    Industrial facilities cannot be designed reliably without adequate knowledge of the raw materials they will process.

    The June 2026 statement therefore provides useful evidence of the project’s actual status.

    It was not an operating refinery.

    It remained a proposed development requiring further production data, engineering and investment decisions.

    Source: RBC — Governor Limarenko Says Sakhalin Refinery Construction Is Planned After 2030, 27 June 2026. РБК

    PART SEVEN: THREE DIFFERENT INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS 17. The original proposal, the operating export system and the new plans

    The evidence now permits three distinct categories to be identified.

    The first is the 1997 regional industrial ambition.

    The federal-regional agreement contemplated substantial supplies of natural gas and a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons for Sakhalin.

    It referred expressly to the anticipated construction of a gas-chemical complex.

    The surviving document records the planned quantities and dates, subject to amendment.

    It does not provide a complete construction and financing history.

    The second is the Sakhalin II system actually constructed.

    Shell’s engineers described an integrated LNG plant incorporating gas treatment, liquefaction and fractionation facilities.

    The contractor record confirms construction of the onshore processing facility.

    Sakhalin Energy’s current documentation confirms that condensate is processed, stabilised and incorporated into the oil export stream.

    These are established operating facilities.

    They should not be dismissed merely because they do not demonstrate the existence of the originally envisaged separate gas-chemical complex.

    The third is the later regional industrial-development programme.

    Sakhalin’s authorities have discussed additional gas-processing, gas-chemical and condensate-refining facilities.

    Some of these plans depend upon Sakhalin III.

    Their proposed completion dates extend into the 2030s.

    They remain distinct from the original Sakhalin II arrangements.

    The three categories overlap in their broader economic purpose.

    But they are not interchangeable.

    That distinction prevents an industrial-development aspiration from being treated as proof of a completed facility.

    It also prevents the existence of major operating gas infrastructure from being wrongly dismissed as evidence of no regional economic development.

    18. What became of the original feedstock?

    This is the central unanswered question.

    The 1997 document identified at least 500,000 tonnes annually of a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons.

    The technical and operating records establish that Sakhalin II processes substantial quantities of gas and condensate.

    But the records examined do not provide a direct reconciliation between the original contractual category and the actual annual disposition of the relevant hydrocarbon fractions.

    Several questions remain open.

    What precise chemical composition was intended in 1997?

    Was the specified material to be supplied directly from Sakhalin II facilities or through subsequent processing arrangements?

    Which Russian governmental party was responsible for arranging onward delivery?

    Did the parties amend the quantity or commencement date?

    Was any portion of the material delivered to regional industrial consumers?

    If so, to which facilities?

    What annual volumes were supplied?

    And did any part of the original programme become incorporated into a different industrial or commercial arrangement?

    These questions cannot be answered by examining LNG production figures alone.

    Nor can they be resolved merely by examining the total quantity of exported Sakhalin Blend.

    The physical and contractual categories differ.

    A reliable answer requires source-specific records.

    Those would include the executed production-sharing agreement, the federal-regional agreement and amendments, product specifications, production-accounting statements and records of deliveries to the Russian side.

    Until those records are obtained, the fate of the particular half-million-tonne provision remains unverified.

    EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 19. The difference between extracting resources and developing an industry

    The broader economic issue is familiar in resource-producing regions.

    Major oil and gas developments can generate substantial export revenues.

    They can also create employment, support contractors and provide public income through taxation and royalties.

    Those benefits are important.

    But resource extraction does not automatically establish a diversified local manufacturing economy.

    A region may export raw or partly processed hydrocarbons while importing manufactured products derived from similar materials.

    Creating local processing industries requires additional investment.

    It requires infrastructure, technical expertise and markets.

    It also requires reliable access to feedstock under commercially workable arrangements.

    The 1997 Sakhalin agreement appears to have recognised that opportunity.

    Its reference to a gas-chemical complex suggests that regional authorities were looking beyond the immediate revenue generated by offshore production.

    The specified supply of light hydrocarbon fractions potentially provided part of the required industrial foundation.

    But the later technical documentation establishes that the principal Sakhalin II development was designed around an integrated LNG and oil export system.

    That difference is not automatically evidence of wrongdoing.

    The original industrial ambition may have encountered commercial, technological or financial difficulties.

    The regional authorities may have revised their plans.

    The relevant parties may have agreed alternative arrangements.

    The documents examined do not establish which explanation is correct.

    The important point is that the industrial ambition and the completed export system should be evaluated separately.

    20. Shell’s responsibility must be assessed against the actual contracts

    Shell played a central role in Sakhalin II’s development.

    By the early 2000s, it held a controlling interest in Sakhalin Energy.

    Its engineers helped design the LNG facilities.

    The company’s expertise was important to the project’s eventual commercial success.

    But that participation does not mean Shell was personally responsible for implementing every industrial objective discussed between Russian federal and regional authorities.

    The 1997 document was an agreement between two Russian governmental parties.

    The original production-sharing agreement established the obligations of Sakhalin Energy and the Russian side.

    Those contractual arrangements must be distinguished.

    Without examining the relevant provisions together, it would be inappropriate to conclude that Shell was required to finance or construct the particular gas-chemical complex mentioned in the 1997 text.

    It would also be inappropriate to conclude that Shell was entitled to ignore any applicable obligations.

    The correct position is that the specific contractual responsibilities remain to be established.

    The current evidence supports scrutiny of the original industrial promises and their subsequent implementation.

    It does not support an allegation of contractual breach by Shell.

    21. The engineering record is more informative than speculation

    The 2001 technical paper is particularly valuable because it explains how Shell intended the LNG plant to operate.

    It describes actual processing arrangements.

    It identifies the function of the fractionation system.

    It explains the use of recovered hydrocarbon components within the liquefaction process.

    And it describes the route by which stabilised condensate would reach the oil export terminal.

    The current operating-company documentation provides a corresponding account of the completed infrastructure.

    This combination of records is stronger than a retrospective allegation unsupported by technical evidence.

    It demonstrates that recovered hydrocarbons were integrated into the export production system.

    The records do not establish that the particular 1997 regional feedstock allocation was satisfied through that arrangement.

    But they provide an important basis for asking where the relevant material ultimately went.

    That is the appropriate documentary question.

    It is more precise than alleging that Shell simply took everything abroad.

    And it is more informative than assuming that any fractionation facility automatically fulfilled the original regional gas-chemical ambition.

    22. Nearly thirty years later, the ambition remains recognisable

    The 2025 and 2026 announcements introduce an important historical comparison.

    Sakhalin’s current authorities continue to consider downstream industrial developments based upon the region’s hydrocarbon resources.

    The proposed facilities include gas-processing and refining operations.

    They are expected to support regional economic development and provide products for local consumption or further manufacturing.

    These objectives resemble the broad industrial ambitions contemplated in 1997.

    But the similarities should not obscure important differences.

    The proposed resource base is often Sakhalin III rather than Sakhalin II.

    The intended products are not necessarily the same.

    The commercial circumstances have changed.

    The technologies and markets are different.

    The proposed projects are therefore not automatically continuations of an uncompleted 1997 programme.

    Nevertheless, the repetition of the underlying economic objective is striking.

    The island has spent decades participating in major offshore hydrocarbon developments.

    It has become internationally important as an LNG producer.

    Yet the development of additional local processing industries remains a subject of future planning.

    That is a legitimate matter for documentary scrutiny.

    DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

    The available evidence supports the following conclusions.

    First, the published reproduction of the agreement dated 3 April 1997 contemplated supplying Sakhalin Oblast with substantial quantities of natural gas and light hydrocarbon fractions.

    Second, the document identified a minimum annual quantity of 500,000 tonnes of a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons beginning in 2005.

    Third, the same section expressly referred to anticipated construction of a gas-chemical complex.

    Fourth, the agreement permitted changes to specified dates and quantities by agreement between the Russian governmental parties, depending upon project progress and production levels.

    Fifth, an authenticated technical paper published in October 2001 by Shell Global Solutions personnel described the planned Sakhalin LNG plant and its hydrocarbon fractionation system.

    Sixth, the technical design contemplated recovering components for use in refrigeration, returning some hydrocarbons to the LNG stream and routing stabilised condensate towards the oil export terminal.

    Seventh, contractor ENKA records the construction and commissioning of substantial onshore gas-processing infrastructure during the development of Sakhalin II.

    Eighth, the current Sakhalin Energy operating-company records confirm the presence of gas-processing, condensate-stabilisation and fractionation facilities.

    Ninth, the operator expressly describes condensate from gas fractionation being mixed with oil for export through the Prigorodnoye complex.

    Tenth, the documented export-processing arrangements do not, by themselves, establish that the original 500,000-tonne regional feedstock provision was fulfilled.

    Eleventh, Sakhalin officials discussed substantial new gas-processing and gas-chemical developments in September 2025.

    Twelfth, those later plans included prospective facilities associated with the separate Sakhalin III resource base.

    Thirteenth, regional reporting in February and June 2026 identified a proposed gas-condensate refinery whose construction was expected after 2030 according to the governor’s later timetable.

    Fourteenth, the later projects cannot automatically be treated as either fulfilment or continuation of the original 1997 industrial proposal.

    Fifteenth, no authenticated delivery records establishing the annual supply of the particular 500,000-tonne quantity to regional industrial consumers have been identified in the documents examined.

    Sixteenth, the available evidence does not establish that Shell or Sakhalin Energy breached a contractual obligation concerning the proposed gas-chemical complex.

    These conclusions distinguish original contractual provisions, engineering intentions, completed infrastructure, current operating arrangements and future industrial plans.

    CONCLUSION: THE INDUSTRIAL AMBITION THAT SURVIVED THE DECADES

    The Sakhalin II development transformed Russia’s position in international LNG markets.

    Shell helped design and develop an industrial system of exceptional scale.

    Offshore platforms produced oil and gas.

    Pipelines transported those resources across Sakhalin.

    Onshore facilities treated the production streams.

    The LNG plant liquefied natural gas for international customers.

    Condensate was processed and incorporated into the oil export system.

    The resulting development became one of the most significant energy projects in Russia’s Far East.

    Those achievements are established.

    But the original federal-regional agreement envisaged benefits that extended beyond the export operation.

    Its provisions concerning natural gas and light hydrocarbon fractions reflected an ambition to use Sakhalin’s resources for regional economic development.

    The half-million-tonne provision is particularly revealing.

    It identified a substantial quantity of potential industrial feedstock.

    The accompanying reference to a gas-chemical complex placed that quantity within a broader development vision.

    The subsequent engineering records show what Shell designed.

    The contractor records show what was built.

    The operating-company documentation explains where recovered condensate goes.

    And the contemporary regional announcements show that major additional processing industries remain under consideration.

    The records do not establish a simple narrative of betrayal.

    They do not show that Shell was legally required to construct a particular petrochemical plant and deliberately failed to do so.

    They do not demonstrate that the original 500,000 tonnes were unlawfully withheld.

    Nor do they establish that every industrial objective recorded in 1997 was abandoned.

    What they reveal is a more complicated distinction.

    Sakhalin II successfully developed an internationally important LNG and hydrocarbon export system. The separate ambition of creating a substantial regional gas-chemical industry remains incompletely documented and cannot be treated as fulfilled merely because the export facilities were constructed.

    The outstanding evidence matters.

    The original agreements and amendments could clarify the applicable obligations.

    Production records could establish the relevant quantities.

    Delivery documents could identify the recipients.

    And historical investment decisions could explain whether the contemplated industrial complex was revised, postponed, replaced or abandoned.

    Until those records are available, the half-million-tonne question remains open.

    Nearly thirty years after the original agreement, Sakhalin’s authorities are again discussing major gas-processing facilities.

    The proposed developments involve different resources and different commercial circumstances.

    But they reflect a familiar aspiration.

    The island should not merely produce hydrocarbons.

    It should also obtain lasting industrial benefits from processing them.

    That was part of the economic vision recorded in 1997.

    It remains relevant in 2026.

    The offshore resources were developed. The export industry was built. The unresolved documentary question is what became of the separate industrial benefits originally envisaged for Sakhalin itself.

    The Sakhalin Papers continue.

    PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

    1. Russian Government and Sakhalin Oblast — 3 April 1997

    Archival reproduction of the federal-regional agreement governing the distribution of revenues and resources from Sakhalin II.

    Section 5 records the anticipated natural gas supplies, the reference to a gas-chemical complex and the proposed annual supply of 500,000 tonnes of light hydrocarbon fractions.

    Read the Original Russian Agreement — Sakhalin Environment Watch

    2. Shell Global Solutions Personnel — 1 October 2001

    Wim Dam and Siew-mung Ho, Unusual Design Considerations Drive Selection of Sakhalin LNG Plant Facilities.

    Published in Oil & Gas Journal.

    The paper describes the planned LNG plant, Shell’s liquefaction technology, gas treatment, natural gas liquids fractionation and the destination of stabilised condensate.

    Read the Original Technical Paper

    3. Vedomosti — 15 June 2001

    Interview with Shell Exploration & Production Services executive Rein Tambuzer concerning the development of Sakhalin II.

    The interview discusses the project’s investment requirements, gas markets, Russian participation and contractual arrangements.

    Vedomosti — Investors Must Choose for Themselves Whom to Work With

    4. ENKA — Sakhalin Projects

    Original contractor description of the Sakhalin II onshore processing facility.

    Records the construction arrangements, processing capacities and commissioning history.

    ENKA — Sakhalin Projects, Contractor Record

    5. Sakhalin Energy — Onshore Processing Facility

    Official technical description of the facility’s gas-treatment, condensate-stabilisation and compression systems.

    Sakhalin Energy — Onshore Processing Facility

    6. Sakhalin Energy — Prigorodnoye Production Complex

    Official operating-company description of the LNG plant and oil export terminal.

    The document expressly describes condensate recovered through gas fractionation being incorporated into the oil export system.

    Sakhalin Energy — Prigorodnoye Production Complex

    7. Sakhalin Energy — General Project Information

    Current operating-company overview identifying Sakhalin II’s production facilities, LNG exports, condensate handling and domestic gas deliveries.

    Sakhalin Energy — General Information

    8. Sakh.online — 25 September 2025

    Contemporaneous reporting of statements by Sakhalin regional officials concerning prospective gas-processing, gas-chemical and other industrial facilities.

    Major Gas-Processing Plants Not Expected Before 2033

    9. EastRussia — 12 February 2026

    Reporting based upon information from the Sakhalin regional government concerning the proposed gas-condensate refinery and its estimated investment requirements.

    Sakhalin Refinery Project Estimated at Approximately 100 Billion Roubles

    10. RBC — 27 June 2026

    Reporting of Governor Limarenko’s explanation that refinery construction was now envisaged after 2030, following further development of the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field.

    Governor Limarenko Discusses the Revised Sakhalin Refinery Timetable

    11. Donovan–Shell Archive — 9 November 2026

    The preceding Sakhalin Papers investigation examining the natural gas-supply expectations recorded in the 1997 agreement and the subsequent arrangements for domestic gasification.

    The Shell Leaks Files — 9 November 2026

    DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

    This investigation examines the industrial-development provisions contained in the published reproduction of the agreement dated 3 April 1997 between the Russian federal government and the Administration of Sakhalin Oblast.

    The investigation also examines contemporaneous Shell technical publications, project-contractor records, Sakhalin Energy operating-company information and reporting concerning subsequent regional industrial-development proposals.

    The reproduced 1997 agreement has not been independently compared with a certified executed original and all subsequent amendments.

    Its terms are therefore attributed to the surviving archival reproduction.

    The provision concerning annual supplies of 500,000 tonnes of light hydrocarbon fractions is not represented as an unconditional obligation imposed directly upon Shell.

    The qualification permitting changes to quantities and dates by agreement between the Russian governmental parties is expressly acknowledged.

    The original 1994 production-sharing agreement and the separate 1997 federal-regional agreement are distinguished.

    No conclusion is reached concerning the ultimate legal effect of the half-million-tonne provision without examination of the complete contractual record.

    The investigation distinguishes broad fractions of light hydrocarbons, stabilised gas condensate, liquefied natural gas and blended export crude.

    These products are not assumed to be chemically or contractually interchangeable.

    The existence of a fractionation facility is not treated as proof that a separate regional gas-chemical complex was constructed.

    Equally, the absence of an identified regional delivery record is not treated as proof that no relevant deliveries occurred.

    The Shell-authored October 2001 technical paper is identified as evidence of the engineering design then contemplated.

    Its descriptions are distinguished from the later operating-company records concerning completed facilities.

    ENKA’s contractor statements are attributed to the company.

    The current operating-company descriptions are treated as evidence of the assets and production arrangements reported by Sakhalin Energy.

    They are not treated as an exhaustive inventory of every industrial facility operated by every company on Sakhalin Island.

    The regional industrial proposals reported in September 2025 and February–June 2026 are identified as prospective developments.

    They are not described as completed facilities.

    The distinction between Sakhalin II and Sakhalin III is maintained.

    No allegation is made that Shell directed or improperly influenced decisions concerning the proposed Sakhalin III-related refinery.

    The investigation does not allege that Shell unlawfully withheld light hydrocarbon fractions from Sakhalin Oblast.

    It does not allege that Shell deliberately prevented construction of a regional gas-chemical complex.

    Nor does it conclude that Sakhalin Energy breached the original production-sharing agreement.

    No court judgment establishing such misconduct has been identified in the records examined.

    The fate of the specific 1997 regional feedstock provision remains unverified.

    Editorial commentary concerning the distinction between resource extraction, exports and regional industrial development is identified separately from the underlying documentary findings.

    Shell plc, former Sakhalin Energy personnel, Gazprom, the present Sakhalin Energy operator, Russian federal and regional authorities and other interested parties are invited to provide factual corrections, authenticated contractual amendments, production records and relevant responses for consideration and publication.

    The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

    NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-115 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CV The 70 Percent Question: Shell, Russian Suppliers and the Local-Content Promise Behind Sakhalin II

    In June 2001, a senior Shell executive gave an unusually revealing interview to Russian business newspaper Vedomosti.

    The interview concerned Sakhalin II’s second development phase.

    The executive was Rein Tambuzer, head of Shell Exploration & Production Services in Russia.

    He discussed the project’s anticipated expenditure, construction arrangements and the relationship between foreign contractors and Russian suppliers.

    The conversation contained a striking statement.

    According to Tambuzer, the Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement required Russian suppliers to account for 70% of equipment supplies over the life of the project.

    He acknowledged that achieving such a proportion during construction of the technically complex LNG plant would be difficult.

    But he anticipated that the project would compensate through other procurement and operating activities.

    Those statements raise important questions.

    What did the original production-sharing agreement actually require?

    Did the reported 70% figure concern the value of equipment, the value of total procurement or a more complicated contractual measure?

    How much work was awarded to Russian companies?

    How much was performed by international contractors?

    And did the project ultimately satisfy the applicable requirements?

    The next investigation will examine Tambuzer’s contemporaneous statements alongside original procurement records, contractor disclosures and Sakhalin Energy’s published accounts of Russian participation.

    It will distinguish legally binding requirements from corporate targets and political expectations.

    It will also distinguish Russian-owned suppliers from work merely performed within Russia by foreign-controlled companies.

    Shell helped build an LNG export industry on Sakhalin. The next file will investigate how much of the industrial opportunity was intended to go to Russian suppliers — and what the documentary record establishes about the results.

    The Sakhalin Papers continue.

    Documentary starting point: Vedomosti — Interview with Shell Executive Rein Tambuzer, 15 June 2001

    Editorial note: This instalment follows SLF-2007-113 and introduces an important additional category of evidence: a contemporaneous technical paper authored by Shell personnel describing the original fractionation design, corroborated by the present operator’s account of the completed condensate export system.

    The central documentary finding is that the 1997 regional feedstock ambition cannot be equated with the LNG and condensate infrastructure that was ultimately built. The precise disposition of the originally envisaged 500,000 tonnes annually remains unverified.

    THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 10 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 10, 2026 at 9:07 pm.
    ©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

    Statewide Ads Press NC Governor to Freeze Data Center Development — NC WARN News Release

    NC WARN - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 12:00

    NC WARN criticizes Josh Stein for aiding the recruitment of power-guzzling A.I. data centers to the state

    Though he has retreated on publicly praising A.I. data centers as backlash has accelerated across NC and the nation, Governor Josh Stein is among those who have celebrated the influx of the polluting developments into the state. 

    Stein was “damn excited” about Amazon’s plans to construct a data center in Richmond County in 2025. 

    That line is featured in a new 30-second video ad by NC WARN. The watchdog says it’s time for the governor to make amends and enact a 2-year freeze on the development of data centers. These massive projects are now notorious for air, water and noise pollution and repeatedly driving up power bills, among a host of other noxious impacts.

    NC WARN started calling on the Governor in June for a data center moratorium and to halt Duke Energy’s recruitment of those energy-guzzling facilities to the state. The power giant has used the hype around data centers to plan a nation-leading expansion of fossil fuels.

    Duke Energy gained deceptive headlines and gushing praise last month after claiming falsely that its recent deal with tech oligarchs would protect other customers from the costs of providing power to data centers. 

    NC WARN filed a demand on October 1 for all records from the Governor’s Office and Commerce Department pertaining to their assistance to Duke Energy in the recruiting activities. And last month, NC WARN launched a statewide petition drive calling on Stein to use his authority and political power to implement a 2-year moratorium.

    The Governor helped fuel the data center frenzy. Now, it’s on him to freeze current data center development and protect North Carolinians from further toxic projects borne from deceptive and backroom scheming.

    ###

    Now in its 38th year, NC WARN is building people power in the climate and energy justice movement to persuade or require Charlotte-based Duke Energy – one of the world’s largest climate polluters – to make a quick transition to renewable, affordable power generation and energy efficiency in order to avert climate tipping points and ongoing rate hikes. 

    The post Statewide Ads Press NC Governor to Freeze Data Center Development — NC WARN News Release appeared first on NC WARN.

    Categories: G2. Local Greens

    The Newsroom In a Tent – Flamingo Park

    Global Justice Ecology Project - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:49
    While Nixon’s RNC played to prime time, the underground press filed a different story. A simple banner, made from an old bedsheet, lashed to the front of a sagging canvas tent. Its message was defiant: THE ALTERNATIVE MEDIA IS THE ONLY MEDIA YOU CAN TRUST.
    Categories: B4. Radical Ecology

    Trump Administration Continues Systematic Dismantling of Public Lands – 11.10.26

    Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:25

    November 10, 2026 – FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

    Trump Administration Continues Systematic Dismantling of Public Lands – 11.10.26 Proposed Rule Would Shut the Public Out and Allow the Administration to Make Sweeping Decisions About 250 Million Acres of Western Public Lands Behind Closed Doors

    Contacts:
    Grant Stevens, Communications Director, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA); (319) 427-0260; grant@suwa.org

    Washington, DC – Yesterday, the Trump Administration announced a proposed Bureau of Land Management (BLM) rulemaking that would drastically weaken the public’s involvement in land use planning and gut protections for Areas of Critical Environmental Concern (ACECs), one of BLM’s primary conservation designations, across 245 million acres of Western public lands. The rule proposes to stifle the voices of local communities by significantly shortening public comment periods and cutting out robust environmental analysis. These changes would make it easier for the BLM to fast-track the sale, transfer, or use of public lands for oil and gas drilling, mining, data centers, and other industrial or commercial development, all while shutting out the American people. The announcement kicks off a 60 day comment period (January 9th deadline). 

    The public lands overseen by the BLM contain crucial wildlife corridors, critical habitat, cultural resources and landscapes, watersheds, historic sites, and access to nature and scenery.  The rule threatens to strip vital safeguards for ACECs and environmental review that protect these values, leaving the West’s most sensitive lands vulnerable to irreparable harm.

    The new rule will (Brief Analysis):

    • Attempt to eliminate mandatory Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) for land use plans;
    • Eliminate the 90-day public comment period;
    • Allow BLM to eliminate written comment opportunities in favor of public meetings;
    • Eliminate key planning and analysis requirements;
    • Bypass normal planning procedures by creating new emergency authority and making broad programmatic amendments potentially easier;
    • Weaken area of critical environmental concern (ACEC) designation and protection procedures
    • Reduce state, local, and Tribal government participation.

    This aggressive regulatory rollback is the latest chapter in a coordinated, systematic dismantling of America’s public lands. It directly connects to a broader pattern of hostility toward balanced stewardship, which includes the recent rescission of the landmark Public Lands Rule, stated intention to roll back the Roadless Rule and Wilderness policies, the evisceration of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) standards, and repeated attempts to give away public lands to corporations and developers. This rulemaking contributes to this administration’s singular focus: fast-tracking industrial exploitation and drilling at the expense of our shared heritage, tribal sovereignty and the outdoor recreation economies that sustain rural Western communities.

    The proposal comes as Congress debates permitting legislation that would also weaken public participation in decisions affecting shared lands and give more power to development interests. Planning serves as the foundational blueprints governing public lands for decades; eroding these processes is a profound threat to the long-term health of the West. Making robust environmental review optional and weakening ACEC standards intentionally ties the agency’s hands, preventing it from effectively responding to the compounding threats of climate change, drought, and habitat fragmentation. This action rejects the unmistakable demand from the American public, including local leaders, Tribal representatives, and local elected officials, who have consistently called for public lands to be managed transparently and protected for future generations.

    Quotes

    “The Trump administration is attempting to undermine conservation, remove the public from public lands, and make it easier to turn these lands over to extractive industries,” said Neal Clark, Wildlands Director at the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA). “Minimizing public engagement and comprehensive environmental analysis does nothing to streamline public land management and is only intended to prioritize private profit at the expense of ecosystem health and public land users.”   

    “Gutting transparency, review, and public engagement requirements within the West’s most ecologically sensitive wildlife corridors, watersheds, and cultural resources are the actions of cowards trying to fast-track industrial development at any and all social costs,” said Kara Matsumoto, senior policy director at the Conservation Lands Foundation. “Resource management plans are the blueprints for keeping public lands and waters healthy, and weakening them will weaken local economies and fragile ecosystems. We’ll continue to fight this corporate greed because the overwhelming majority of Americans want more nature protected, not less.”

    “The opportunity to review and comment on land management actions keeps the public in public lands.” said Hilary Eisen, federal policy director at Wild Montana. “Resource management plans provide the long-term framework for how vast swaths of public land across the West are managed and it is essential that these plans be crafted with robust public engagement. This proposed rule sidelines the public, as well as local, state, and tribal governments, in BLM land use planning.”

    “Resource management planning is meant to provide the public a real say in how BLM manages our shared public lands, and Areas of Critical Environmental Concern are how the agency turns that input into on-the-ground protections for special places and important wildlife habitat,” said Maddy Munson, senior policy and planning specialist at Defenders of Wildlife. “Cutting back public participation and narrowing the agency’s analysis isn’t streamlining, but rather stacking the deck against the places and species that need protection the most.”  

    “For Nevadans public land is our way of life. Whether we have jobs dependent on mining, grazing, the outdoor industry or just love taking our families camping, these public lands in Nevada are a huge part of who we are. We want to have an active role in determining how these lands are managed and efforts to take the public out of this planning process and weaken protections are just wrong,” said Shaaron Netherton, Executive Director at Friends of Nevada WIlderness. “We need to stand up and keep the public in our public lands.” 

    “The Trump Administration is once again plotting to undermine our world-renowned system of shared lands and the public processes that guide their management,” said Jackie Feinberg, Sierra Club’s National Lands Conservation Manager. “Weakening protections and public participation would fast-track the industrialization and privatization of places essential for wildlife, clean water, cultural and historic preservation, and access to nature. We stand firmly against these attempts to cut out the “public” from public lands for the benefit of corporate polluters and profiteers.” 

    “The Trump administration continues to eliminate tools that the Bureau of Land Management has relied on for decades for conserving wildlife habitat, protecting clean water, and working with local communities. The objective is clear: replace the multiple uses and values of our public lands with the singular use of fossil fuel development. That agenda has no footing in Colorado, where 96% percent of Coloradans support conserving public lands and open space and 81% believe oil and gas development is not an acceptable use of public lands,” said Juli Slivka, Senior Director of Policy and Programs at Wilderness Workshop.

    “These are the plans that decide whether a valley gets drilled or a trout stream gets protected, and this proposal is built to make those decisions faster and with fewer people in the room,” said Bobby McEnaney, Senior Lands Analyst at NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council). “Cutting the public’s time to weigh in by two thirds, scrapping the full environmental review, and letting a political appointee invoke an emergency to skip the rest is not modernization. It is a way to lock in drilling and mining decisions before anyone can object. Governors get 30 days and no appeal, Tribal plans drop out of the review entirely, and the agency gives itself the power to shrink or erase existing protected areas. Interior should withdraw this proposal and keep the public’s seat at the table.”

    “These lands are called “public lands” for a reason: They are owned by the people of the United States. The Bureau of Land Management’s job is to manage them in the public’s interest, for the common good. By so severely restricting opportunities for the public—including, importantly, Tribal Nations—to be involved in planning for their management, the BLM is depriving all of us of our rights as the owners,” said Michael Painter, Coordinator, Californians for Western Wilderness.

    “The Trump administration continues its relentless agenda of handing over public lands to corporations,” said Thomas Delehanty, senior attorney with Earthjustice’s Rocky Mountain Office. “Cutting the public out of land management benefits no one except the extractive industries hellbent on controlling these shared resources for their own private gain. Anyone who values public lands must be loud and clear: these attacks end now.”

    “Public lands belong to all Americans, and decisions about their future should be made through transparent processes informed by science, meaningful public participation and consultation with Tribes and others in the community. This proposed rule would give us less of a say in the management of 245 million acres of our shared lands and weaken areas of critical environmental concern, the BLM’s primary tool for protecting important natural and cultural sites. It is another clear attempt to give drilling, mining and other development interests more influence over our public lands, in the same spirit as rescission of the BLM Public Lands Rule—and only days after voters delivered a stinging rebuke to this administration’s agenda of doing favors for oil and gas companies and other powerful corporations. Our public lands deserve better, and so do future generations that will inherit them.” said Michael Carroll, BLM Campaign Director, The Wilderness Society.

    “In New Mexico, the BLM planning process gives communities, Pueblos, Tribes, acequias, recreationalists, conservation organizations, ranchers, hunters and anglers a real say in what happens to the 13.5 million acres of public land that the agency manages here,” said Sally Paez, senior staff attorney for New Mexico Wild. “Places like the Greater Chaco landscape, the Permian Basin’s remaining wildlife habitat, and our desert grasslands have protections today because New Mexicans showed up and spoke out during planning. New Mexicans shouldn’t be shut out of decisions about their own public lands.” 

    “In Oregon, the BLM manages 2.6 million acres of Oregon and California Lands that are home to imperiled wildlife, endemic botanical resources, wild rivers, and climate change-mitigating ancient forests that provide outstanding recreational opportunities and socioeconomic benefits to Oregonians and all Americans,” said Susan Jane Brown, attorney with Silvix Resources. “The public and other stakeholders must have a central role in the science-informed stewardship of these cherished resources, all of which will be placed at risk of existential loss with BLM’s proposed rulemaking.”

    “Oregon’s high desert community has modeled a long, successful history of federal planners, tribal interests, ranchers, hunters and anglers, recreationists, and conservationists working together to craft management strategies that balance land use and promote conservation across 12 million acres of our shared public lands,” said Mark Salvo, Senior Conservation Advisor for Oregon Natural Desert Association. “Now the Trump administration is recklessly dismissing these decades of collaboration and compromise, trampling public processes, and sidelining those who have worked to protect these lands and resources for future generations–all to advance a narrow agenda of exploitation at the expense of the public interest.”

    “The public lands are the people’s lands and the American people have spoken loud and clear. The Bureau’s proposal to cut public participation, reduce protections for cultural sites and critically important habitat, and shortcut environmental analysis is just one more indication that the Trump Administration isn’t listening and will do anything to silence the public, Tribes, and scientists and ignore the reality of what’s happening on the ground,” said Josh Osher, public policy director for Western Watersheds Project. “Millions of acres of climate-stressed Bureau-managed lands are already being degraded by extractive industries, and we need planning rules that include thorough and honest science-based assessments and as many voices as possible to help improve ecological conditions and resilience.”  

    This is just the latest attempt from the Trump Administration to dismantle our public lands piece by piece,” said Sandra Schubert, Executive Director of Tuleyome. “The proposed Planning Rule undermines protections that ensure that our public lands and wild forests remain accessible and are used sustainably. Resource management plans are built on science and centuries of management experience. They give local land managers and communities the ability to maintain healthy ecosystems while supporting the diverse ways communities depend on public lands. Undermining planning undermines our public lands”

    “Once again, Doug Burgum is doing everything in his power to cut the public out of public lands,” said Aaron Weiss, executive director of the Center for Western Priorities. “This new rule gives political appointees in DC more power to shrink protected places and ignore local voices. Public lands belong to all of us, and good land use planning means giving everyone the chance to weigh in.”

    “America’s national parks are supported by the public lands that surround them, and this proposal is another blatant attempt to unravel decades of conservation progress that the public overwhelmingly supports,” said Beau Kiklis, associate director of energy and landscape conservation at the National Parks Conservation Association. “Roughly 80 national park sites share a border with BLM lands, and Areas of Critical Environmental Concern have helped protect Dinosaur National Monument from impacts of oil and gas development, support Joshua Tree’s wildlife by protecting the neighboring Pinto Mountains, and protect ancestral sites near Hovenweep among countless others. This is another attempt to sell off and sell out our public lands, and the public deserves a real say before more is lost.”  

    ### 
    The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) is a nonprofit organization with members and supporters from around the country dedicated to protecting America’s redrock wilderness. From offices in Moab, Salt Lake City, and Washington, DC, our team of professionals defends the redrock, organizes support for America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act, and stewards a world-renowned landscape. Learn more at www.suwa.org. 

    The post Trump Administration Continues Systematic Dismantling of Public Lands – 11.10.26 appeared first on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.

    Categories: G2. Local Greens

    Eventos

    Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:06
    Eventos Próximos eventos El experimento kurdo de democracia radical y autonomía: luchas y riesgos - 13 de noviembre Como parte de la serie de seminarios web para la construcción de una Alianza Global por la Democracia Radical y la Autonomía (GARDA), el Tejido Global de Alternativas (TGA) te invita a una conversación sobre la experiencia kurda de democracia radical y autonomía, con enfoque en sus luchas y riesgos.GTAGTAGTAGTAGTAGTATapestryAlternativesTapestryAlternativesTapestryAlternativesG…

    Portada

    Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:05
    [ Tejedores] TGA es una “red de redes”. Cada una de esas redes actúa en diferentes partes del planeta identificando y conectando Alternativas. Son los Tejedores. [ Apoyos] Diversas organizaciones progresitas, post-desarrollo y/o anti-capitalistas apoyan esta iniciativa. Tambien lo hacen académicos, activistas y referentes.GTAGTAGTA

    Events

    Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:04
    Events Upcoming events Kurdish Experiment in Radical Democracy and Autonomy: Struggles and Risks - November 13th As part of the webinar series for building a Global Alliance for Radical Democracy and Autonomy (GARDA), the Global of () invites you to a conversation on the Kurdish experience of radical democracy and autonomy, focusing on its struggles and risks.GTAGTATapestryAlternativesGTAalternativesTapestryAlternativesAlternativesalternativesTapestryAlternativesGTAGTATapestryAlternatives…

    Main page

    Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:03
    Global of [Weavers] GTA is a “network of networks”. Each of those networks acts in different parts of the planet by identifying and connecting Alternatives. They are the Weavers. [Endorsements] Many progressive, post-developent and anticapitalist organizations around the world endorse this initiative. Also many academics, activists and referents do so.GTAGTAWeaversGTAGTAalternativesAlternatives

    Is Big Food influencing the debate over ultra-processed food?

    Environmental Working Group - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:58
    Is Big Food influencing the debate over ultra-processed food? Anthony Lacey November 10, 2026

    Many researchers who criticize a common classification of ultra-processed food have ties to the food industry, a recent study finds. 

    Those researchers frequently fail to disclose these relationships, and some go so far as to promote the benefits of ultra-processed foods, the study shows.

    How UPF are classified is worthy of scientific debate – but this particular pattern is causing experts to draw comparisons between Big Food and Big Tobacco. Beginning in the 1950s, the tobacco industry funded a steady stream of research designed to manufacture doubt about the links between cigarettes and cancer, often calling for more research as a way to delay action.

    Food industry ties in ultra-processed food research

    The new study examined 69 academic articles that either questioned the widely used Nova system or highlighted the potential benefits of UPF. 

    The Nova system, which categorizes food by how much and why it’s processed, is prevalent in major studies examining links between UPF and health harms. 

    The study was published in the American Journal of Public Health.

    The papers analyzed were published between 2009 and 2025, years when ultraprocessed food and its associated health harms moved into public awareness. The researchers then examined food industry connections among the 232 paper authors. They found that articles by people with industry ties were more likely to critique the Nova system or even promote potential benefits of UPF.

    Most of the articles, or 91%, had at least one author with food industry ties. Of the 232 authors, about two-thirds, or 69%, had connections to the food industry. 

    Many of these ties were not reported in the articles reviewed. For 71% of the authors with industry connections, those ties came to light only when the study’s authors searched publicly available information.

    Arguments in favor of ultra-processed food appeared in two-fifths of articles with direct industry ties, and three-fifths of articles with organizational or governmental industry ties.

    The same defense of UPF was made in just 17% of articles with no apparent industry ties.

    Is Big Food using Big Tobacco’s playbook?

    A researcher’s ties to industry don’t automatically invalidate their research. But failure to disclose them raises questions about how much they may influence a study’s findings.

    The tobacco industry spent decades funding research and “manufacturing academic doubt about its products’ harms.” The authors of the new study warn that food companies are adopting the same tactics to raise concerns about potential UPF health risks. 

    What you can do

    With an estimated 70% of packaged food sold in the U.S. being ultra-processed, it can be difficult to choose a product that isn’t. 

    The federal government has failed to define or regulate ultra-processed food.

    But states are taking steps to make healthier food choices easier. 

    California in 2025 established the nation’s first legal definition of ultra-processed food. That law, which EWG co-sponsored, requires California public schools to gradually remove the most harmful UPF from their meals.

    In September, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law another food bill co-sponsored by EWG. It creates a voluntary certification program that will allow qualifying foods to carry a “non-ultra-processed certified” label, with the goal of making it easier for shoppers to identify healthier alternatives.

    Other states have followed suit, introducing or passing scores of bills in the past several years that would protect consumers from harmful food chemicals. 

    You can consult our interactive food regulation tracker to get the latest updates. Until these laws take effect – and as long as the federal government leaves us without protection from the harmful food chemicals in UPF – EWG’s Food Scores database can help. It rates thousands of food products based on nutrition, ingredients and processing, making it easier to compare options and find healthier foods for your family. 

    Food Scores also flags unhealthy UPF and can help you identify alternatives.

    Nicole Pajer is a freelance journalist.

    Areas of Focus Food Ultra-Processed Foods Guest Authors Nicola Pajer (for EWG) November 12, 2026
    Categories: G1. Progressive Green

    Blue wave clears a path for stronger clean energy policy

    Climate Solutions - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:57
    Blue wave clears a path for stronger clean energy policy Jonathan Lawson Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:57 am
    Categories: G2. Local Greens

    Grocery Stores as Community Anchors: Investing in Food, Families, and Local Economies

    For more than two decades, Mountain Association has prioritized financing grocery stores and local agricultural production because strong food systems support children, families, and the long-term strength of the region. Since 2000, we’ve invested more than $16 million in nearly 150 supermarket, grocery, and food service projects.

    Rural communities often struggle to access local, affordable, and high-quality food. More than 20% of the population of Appalachia regularly experiences hunger, and approximately 1 in 3 children are food insecure. Additionally, many residents must drive 20 miles or more to reach a grocery store.

    By investing in grocery stores, we improve access to healthy food and strengthen food security—outcomes closely tied to education, health, and overall well-being. At the same time, these stores serve as both community and economic anchors. In many rural towns, they can be one of the few consistent sources of employment, with a single store supporting a dozen or more jobs, contributing to local supply chains, and driving activity for surrounding businesses.

    Yet grocery is an extremely low-margin industry, and even small challenges—rising electricity costs, new competition, employee turnover, or fluctuations in government food benefits—can make it difficult to remain open.

    Mountain Association helps grocers navigate these pressures by lowering operating costs and improving access to capital. Through hands-on technical assistance with energy efficiency and solar projects, we help businesses reduce expenses while making long-term investments in their operations. We’ve financed 11 energy projects at grocery stores, investing $2.48 million. Additionally, we have helped grocers secure $1.54 million in grant funding to lower project costs. Across a total of 28 stores, our energy work is already generating $629,700 in annual savings—freeing up capital that these businesses can reinvest in equipment, wages, and growth.

    We are proud of the partnerships and innovations we’ve made in supporting our grocery partners over the years, and of the impact these stores have in providing food access, employment, and community.

    A few client features from our 50 Years of Impact report: Pikeville Fresh Market

    Pikeville, KY

    Mountain Association has supported Cox Food Group over the decades with affordable financing and energy savings expertise. Most recently, we worked with Tate Cox on his acquisition and major renovation of a store in Pikeville. This included provided support for their USDA Rural Energy for America Program (REAP) grant for more efficient lighting and upgraded refrigeration for expanded fresh options in the produce, deli and meat departments.

    Isom IGA

    Isom, KY

    After owner Gwen Christon participated in our WINGS business program early in her career, we have continued to partner over the decades. Mountain Association has helped the store navigate rising utility costs by providing technical expertise, financing, and grant support for energy efficiency upgrades and solar. These efforts have reduced the store’s annual electric costs by more than $68,000 — allowing Gwen to reinvest in 10 jobs, overcome a devastating flood, and maintain essential services.

    The Markets

    Martin, Frenchburg & Salyersville, KY

    Jed Weinberg has worked with the Mountain Association to bring upgrades to multiple rural grocery stores he owns or manages. With Mountain Association’s financing, technical support, and help securing significant USDA REAP grants, Weinberg has found energy savings that have been critical to maintain operations, invest in improvements, and continue providing essential food access and employment in three small communities. Flexible and affordable Mountain Association capital allowed for the Market at Salyersville to move into a new building, doubling the size and expanding its fresh options.

    Long’s Pic Pac

    Pineville, KY

    Grocery stores’ power bills often face large power bills in part due to their high energy draws that happen at certain times of day. Mike Long of Long’s Pic Pac has reduced these high electric costs by installing solar and a first-of-its-kind 60 kWh battery storage system, significantly cutting the power bill. Supported with Mountain Association capital and technical support to navigate federal grants, the project is expected to save at least $15,000 annually and pay for itself within four years. These savings help sustain the small, family-run grocery founded by Long’s father in 1964, while allowing continued investment in staffing and improvements.

    My IGA

    Beattyville, KY

    At My IGA, resilience and reinvestment have helped preserve a critical community grocery store. Following a devastating fire and ongoing flooding, the store was rebuilt and relocated to a higher ground site with the Mountain Association providing financing support through the transition. Most recently, we also provided financing as the owner’s grandson took over the family-run business.

    For 50 years, the Mountain Association has invested in people and places throughout Eastern Kentucky and Appalachia. To learn more stories of our history, visit mtassociation.org/fifty.  

    The post Grocery Stores as Community Anchors: Investing in Food, Families, and Local Economies appeared first on Mountain Association.

    Two ‘forever chemicals’ linked to an aggressive type of breast cancer, NIH study finds

    Environmental Working Group - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:34
    Two ‘forever chemicals’ linked to an aggressive type of breast cancer, NIH study finds Anthony Lacey November 10, 2026

    Women with higher levels of two toxic “forever chemicals” in their blood were more likely to develop an aggressive form of breast cancer, according to a new study.

    The paper, from the National Institutes of Health, reported that women with the highest blood levels of PFOA had a 67% higher rate of estrogen-receptor-negative breast cancer than women with the lowest levels. For PFOS, the rate was 93% higher, or nearly double. The paper looked at the association between 17 PFAS and three types of cancer, finding that only PFOA and PFOS were associated with the estrogen-receptor-negative breast cancer.

    The study was published earlier this month in the Journal of Clinical Oncology.

    The authors state it is the largest study yet of PFAS exposure and breast cancer. It was published just as the Environmental Protection Agency moves to delay and weaken national limits on PFAS in drinking water.

    Estrogen-receptor-negative tumors are characterized by their ability to grow without estrogen. They tend to advance more aggressively, with more serious outcomes than hormone-driven breast cancers. But scientists know little about what raises the risk.

    Study with robust design

    The research drew on the Sister Study, led by NIH’s National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. It enrolled 50,884 women ages 35 to 74 in the U.S. and Puerto Rico between 2003 and 2009. None had breast cancer when they joined the study, but each had a sister or half-sister who had been diagnosed with the disease.

    The Sister Study is a large prospective cohort study of environmental and genetic risk factors for breast cancer. Since researchers measured 17 PFAS in blood collected years before diagnosis, in a large group of women followed over time, this evidence is stronger than studies that test blood after cancer is found. They looked at 1,609 women who later developed breast cancer with 2,269 women in a comparison group, adjusting for other risk factors, such as hormone therapy, alcohol use and body weight.

    The researchers also combined the results of their analysis with six earlier studies, which measured PFAS in blood before diagnosis. Their combined analysis also linked PFOA to estrogen-receptor-negative breast cancer, with weaker but consistent evidence for PFOS.

    ‘Phased out’ doesn’t mean gone

    The study relies on samples from 2003-2009, when PFAS levels were much higher, according to Centers for Disease and Prevention reports. 

    The chemical industry often points out that PFOA and PFOS have largely been taken out of use in products like fast food wrappers and nonstick pans. In some cases, PFAS have been removed completely but in other instances, different PFAS chemicals are used in the place of PFOA or PFOS. But these chemicals linger in the environment and in our bodies for years. As recently as 2024, PFAS are still found in the blood of 98% of Americans.

    The replacements for PFAS raise their own uncertainties about the link to health harms. That’s why EWG has long urged regulators to address PFAS as a class rather than review their safety one chemical at a time.

    Adding to the evidence about PFAS and cancer

    The study extends and builds on earlier studies that suggest how harmful PFAS are. 

    The International Agency for Research on Cancer classifies PFOA as carcinogenic to humans and PFOS as possibly carcinogenic. A 2020 peer-reviewed study led by EWG scientists found that PFAS share key characteristics with known cancer-causing chemicals. PFAS exposure is also linked to reproductive harm, high blood pressure during pregnancy, and immune system damage, even at low levels.

    And last month, EWG reported on a Silent Spring Institute analysis finding that hundreds of chemicals linked to breast cancer in lab and animal studies turn up in everyday products, food, drinking water and air.

    A warning as EPA retreats

    PFAS are everywhere, precisely because they are designed not to break down. PFAS can be found in drinking water, soil and consumer products like nonstick pans or cosmetics. They are also found in the bodies of virtually everyone. The EPA in 2024 set first-time limits for six PFAS in drinking water.

    This May, the agency then proposed revoking the drinking water limits for PFHxS, PFNA and GenX chemicals, along with a limit on PFAS mixtures. 

    The EPA plans to retain the two other PFAS drinking water limits, for PFOA and PFOS. But in May, the EPA also proposed letting water utilities request two more years, until 2031, to meet those limits. 

    The agency is pursuing those actions even though roughly 197 million people in the U.S. drink tap water contaminated with the toxic “forever chemicals” known as PFAS, according to test data released by the EPA and recent state test results.

    The number aligns with findings from another 2020 paper by EWG scientists that estimated PFAS was in the water of 200 million Americans. 

    How to lower your exposure Areas of Focus Women's Health PFAS Chemicals Largest study yet on the association comes as the EPA moves to delay, scrap tap water limits Authors Monica Amarelo Alexa Friedman, Ph.D. November 10, 2026
    Categories: G1. Progressive Green

    Not much COP

    Ecologist - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:15
    Not much COP Channel News brendan 10th November 2026 Teaser Media
    Categories: H. Green News

    Incineration Is Not Climate Action: Experts Call for Zero Waste Solutions at COP31

    Climate advocates warn against false solutions and urge governments to invest in waste prevention, reuse, and locally led zero waste systems.

    ANTALYA, TÜRKİYE (November 11, 2026)– As world leaders gather at COP31 to advance climate action, climate advocates, researchers, youth leaders, and local government representatives are calling on governments and climate financiers to reject incineration and invest in real zero waste solutions.

    At the press conference “Zero Waste COP – Incinerators Out. Zero Waste In.”, speakers highlighted why addressing the climate impact of waste requires moving upstream through waste prevention, reuse, repair, redesign, and composting—not expanding disposal infrastructure.

    “Zero waste is climate action—but only when we address the problem at its source. We cannot solve the waste crisis by building more infrastructure to burn or dispose of what we produce,” said Mariel Vilella, Climate Program Director at GAIA. “Preventing waste, expanding reuse and composting organic materials are practical and proven solutions that can cut emissions while delivering benefits for communities.”

    The climate impacts of waste extend beyond disposal. Plastic production is deeply tied to fossil fuels, with emissions occurring across its lifecycle. Mohamed Kamal, Coordinator, Climate Action Network Arab World (CANAW), emphasized: “We cannot tackle climate change while allowing plastic production to keep expanding. Reducing plastic production and scaling reuse must be part of any credible climate strategy.”

    The growing promotion of waste-to-energy incineration is another concern. A new report by the GAIA Africa examines 15 incineration projects and proposals across 10 African countries, raising questions about their viability and long-term impacts.

    “Incineration can lock municipalities into costly infrastructure, expose communities to harmful pollution, and divert resources from more inclusive zero waste alternatives,” said Weyinmi Okotie, Executive Director of Green Knowledge Foundation.“ Africa needs solutions that respond to its actual waste realities—not expensive technologies that create new problems.”

    The financing imbalance is also a major barrier to the zero waste transition. Jacob Johnson Attakpah, Zero Waste Director of the Green Africa Youth Organisation, called for a shift in investment priorities: “Governments and climate financiers must correct this imbalance and make climate finance accessible to the communities and cities already delivering solutions.”

    Cities are already demonstrating what practical action can look like. Shahriar Hossain from the Government of Bangladesh, highlighted the role of local governments. Cities are on the frontlines of the waste and climate crises, but they are also where many of the solutions can happen. What cities need is strong political support, consistent public investment and policies that make zero waste systems possible at scale.

    Moderated by Yogi Tujuliarto of CNN Indonesia   the press conference will call for climate commitments to translate into implementation, with policies and financing that prioritize prevention over disposal.

    The message to COP31 is clear: Incinerators out. Zero waste in.

    ABOUT GAIA

    GAIA is a global network working toward a just, zero waste world, where resources are conserved and communities are protected from pollution and harmful waste practices. no-burn.org

    MEDIA CONTACT:
    Sonia Astudillo | Global Climate Communications Lead, GAIA
    sonia@no-burn.org | +63 917 596 9286

    Carissa Marnce | GAIA Africa
    carissa@no-burn.org 

    The post Incineration Is Not Climate Action: Experts Call for Zero Waste Solutions at COP31 first appeared on GAIA.

    Tres Rios Watershed Coalition is Back: Partners in Embudo Valley Restoration

    La Jicarita - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 09:55

    By KAY MATTHEWS

    The Tres Rios Watershed Coalition was founded in 2019 to identify priority areas for forest treatments that would protect communities from the danger of wildfire. Named for the three rivers that make up the greater Embudo Valley watershed—Rio Santa Barbara, Rio del Pueblo, and Rio de Las Trampas—the knowledge of local residents supported by county, state, and federal agencies would be essential in the thinning and restoration projects identified as a priority. The lead organizer was J.R. Logan of Taos County Wildland/Urban Interface, who was also instrumental in organizing the Taos Valley Watershed Coalition.

    While The Tres Rios Watershed Coalition held public meetings to keep folks informed and sponsored several field trips to see the damage from the El Valle Fire and the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire, the coalition never formally organized as a non-profit or entity that could apply for funding for identified forest treatments. For the past few years the Coalition has been dormant.

    But sometimes things don’t die, they evolve. Now, in 2026, the Tres Rios Watershed Coalition has sprung back to life under the leadership of Santa Barbara Land Grant and Acequia Association members in the Peñasco area. Gabriel Lopez, Antonio Gurule, and Michal Headerle invited community leaders and activists to a working group that would expand the focus of the Coalition to include restoration of all forest resources, especially the waters that feed our acequias. The working group meets monthly at the Peñasco Valley Historical Preservation Society.

    To help introduce the Coalition to the wider public, a meeting was held at the Peñasco Community Center on November 6. Notice was sent out to all the names that were on the original Tres Rios Watershed Coalition listserve, and there was a good turnout of community people, forestry groups, forest workers, government agencies, and forest related non-profits.

    Daniel Sam told the group that the Rio del Pueblo, its tributaries, and its springs  from Serpent Lake downstream are all sacred to Picuris Pueblo.

    Speakers at the meeting provided some history, an overview of current projects in the valley, new projects on the horizon, and possible funding sources to fund these projects.

    • Around 2015 a group of activists decided to give the Forest Service “a nudge” with identified projects ready to be treated. The Cerro Negro Forest Council initiated a leñero program for local people to earn money thinning one-acre units in a Wildland/Urban Interface (WUI) thinning project near San Cristobal. Local contractors like Watershed Dynamics and Wood Sharks had crews ready to thin other WUI areas near Taos Valley communities. The Taos Valley Watershed Coalition was formed to help organize and help fund these projects.

    • The Tres Rios Watershed Coalition will explore various options on how to formalize: become a 501c3 non-profit; seek a fiscal sponsor; or form a Watershed District. Mark Schuetz of Forest Dynamics volunteered that under Community Wildfire Protection Plans the Coalition could better partner with county, state, and federal agencies. The Tres Rios Watershed Coalition is covered by the Taos County Wildfire Protection Plan, which will be updated in the next six months. The Coalition will also benefit under the Good Neighbor agreements between the Forest Service, Taos County, and Taos County Soil and Water Conservation District to work together on forest projects.

    • Camino Real District Ranger Michael Lujan provided an overview of current Forest Service projects. In 2021 the Sangre de Cristos between Taos and Colfax counties were designated an Enchanted Circle Priority Landscape, one of the highest priority landscapes in terms of vulnerability to wildfire. The Carson National Forest, with state and county partners, began to develop plans to identity and prioritize areas within the Enchanted Circle for restoration. In a threatened landscape, if 20 or 40 percent has been thinned, there’s a better chance against wildland fire. By 2025, after funding became available, the Carson had thinned 20,000 acres, focusing on areas where water, access, and WUI are extant. Projects include: 850 acre Las Trampas Watershed Project (where the prescription was written by the partners, not the Forest Service); 10,000 acre Pueblo Ridge; and 30,000 acre McGaffey Ridge. The target for next year is 6,400 acres of mechanical treatment and prescribed burn. 8,000 cords of wood have been delivered to communities from the restoration project on the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire. The proposed Truchas to Costilla Headwaters Active Management Project will expand treatments to over 300,000 acres during a 10-year period. As sawmills close across the country, we need to innovate, and the next presenter is an example of that.

    Orange is fires. Gray is completed treatments. Green and yellow are current/proposed treatments on Carson NF lands.

    • Arnold Lopez, a member of the Tres Rios Watershed Coalition working group and treasurer of the Las Trampas Land Grant, discussed the land grant’s projects. In a MOU with Carson National Forest the grant will develop a 12-acre forestry woodlot on Forest Service land near Ojito. The land grant, pressed by the Forest Service to help distribute the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire firewood, decided to expand that into a larger project that will include pellet processing, a portable sawmill, and a mulcher. Another agreement, an MOA with the state, will allow the land grant to work on private land near Forest Service and BLM lands that need treatment. The land grant also oversees a leñero project near Vallecitos where over 40 leñeros are paid $1,200 upon satisfactory treatment of their acres.

    If you’re interested in more information, you can contact Gabriel Lopez at gplopez@unm.edu; Michael Headerle at haederle@gmail.com, and Antonio Gurule at tgurule56.pena@gmail.com.

    Categories: G2. Local Greens

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