I. Climate Science

Open access notables

Historical Volcanic Eruptions Mitigated the Expected Rapid Arctic Sea Ice Decline Prior to 2000, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters

Arctic sea ice has declined at sharply contrasting rates over the past four decades—modest before 2000 and rapid thereafter. Using observational and model evidence, we show that large tropical volcanic eruptions can trigger decade-long Arctic sea ice recoveries, and that without the 1982 El Chichón and 1991 Pinatubo eruptions, Arctic sea ice would have declined approximately 1.5 times faster before 2000. We further show a model's sensitivity to volcanic aerosol forcing scales with its sensitivity to GHG forcing across CMIP6 models, offering a new strategy to identify models with realistic climate response to radiative forcing. Following this, a selected subgroup of models that accurately simulate long-term warming trend and decade-long post-Pinatubo recovery project ice-free Arctic summer up to 20 years earlier than the full ensemble. These findings underscore the critical, yet underappreciated, importance of evaluating climate models against anthropogenic and volcanic forcing when projecting the future of Arctic sea ice.

Legacy wells supporting net zero by screening carbon storage and geothermal potential in the United States, Rajput et al., Communications Earth & Environment

Depleted oil and gas reservoirs provide an opportunity to repurpose underperforming wells and reuse existing subsurface infrastructure to support Net Zero transitions. Here we present a United States wide screening analysis of underperforming wells to estimate upper bound technical potential for carbon storage and geothermal heat. Using public well inventories, county level carbon removal cost datasets, national scale storage resource maps, and geothermal resource data, and accounting for well integrity attrition and field scale constraints, we estimate carbon storage potential of approximately 0.024–1.17 gigatonnes per year and geothermal heat potential of approximately 1–35 gigawatts thermal across high potential regions. Avoided drilling and deferred abandonment may indicate upper bound cost benefits, although repurposing costs remain site-specific. Key constraints include well integrity and cooling during injection; a retrofittable downhole choke is evaluated to mitigate this during startup. These results highlight conditional potential and the need for site-specific assessment.

Northern permafrost represents a limit on the northward shift of climatically feasible agricultural frontiers under future warming, Xu et al., Communications Earth & Environment

Global warming is expected to shift crop suitability northward, but the role of permafrost remains unclear. Here we integrate permafrost degradation impacts to project the suitability of seven major crops across the Northern Hemisphere (30°N–83°N). By the end of the century, the northern boundary of crop climatic suitability zones shifts northward by ~331 km and ~739 km under the SSP1–2.6 and SSP5–8.5 scenarios, respectively. Considering this shift and permafrost degradation, zones with persistent near-surface permafrost remain limited (~5%) but vary widely (3–19%) across different permafrost degradation assumptions. By the end of the century, newly emerging frontiers of climatically feasible agriculture reach 4.86 and 11.64 million km² under SSP1–2.6 and SSP5–8.5, respectively, of which 29% and 18% may remain unsuitable for cultivation due to persistent permafrost thaw disturbances. Our results indicate that permafrost is a non-negligible constraint on the northward shift of climatically feasible agricultural frontiers.

Caught in the Fray. How Climate Scientists Navigate the Public Sphere, Abramov et al., Environmental Communication

Climate scientists are increasingly drawn into a polarized public sphere, challenging relations between science and society. In this study, we interviewed thirty-five climate scientists – diverse in discipline and seniority – working in the Netherlands about their perceptions of, and experiences with public engagement. Based on our empirical material, we construct an analytical framework with a politization and participation axis on which we position their statements. Demarcating their public activities along these dimensions, climate scientists highlight concerns for scientific credibility, political efficacy, normative responsibility and individual capacity. While there is a clear opposition between those compelled to advocate for stringent climate policies or tackle misinformation and those who believe their main role is to provide solid knowledge and leave the normative choices to activists or politicians, only few scientists collaborate with stakeholders. Letting different stakeholders speak and participate in knowledge productions, we argue, may provide a solution to the science vs politics stranglehold.

Widespread intensification of global river hydrograph flashiness under climate change, Zhu et al., Communications Earth & Environmen

Flooding poses an increasing threat to lives and infrastructure worldwide, yet how river flow responds under climate change remains uncertain. Here we assess future changes in river hydrograph flashiness, defined as the rate of increase in streamflow normalized by time and drainage area, using a numerical hydrological model driven by multiple climate model projections. We analyze 520 major river basins globally. Results show that flashiness is projected to increase by about 14%, 30%, and 79% by the late twenty-first century under low-, intermediate-, and high-emission scenarios, respectively, relative to 2014. Increases are greater in low-latitude basins than in high-latitude regions. These changes are mainly associated with larger differences between peak and base flow and shorter times to reach peak discharge. Overall, our findings suggest that river floods are likely to become faster and more intense in a warming climate, posing growing challenges for flood risk management and infrastructure design.

From this week's government/NGO section:

UPDATE: Colorado River Basin Storage Continues Slide Toward System Crash, Castle et al., Getches-Wilkinson Center, University of Colorado Law School

If the Colorado River Basin (Basin) experiences another dry year, similar to Water Year 2025, it is likely that reasonably accessible storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead would be mostly depleted, even if consumptive uses and losses are at or near historic lows. Run-of-the-river operations would shortly ensue. This would be an outcome with devastating consequences. In contrast, if next year is very wet, similar to Water Year 2023, the Basin’s largest federal reservoirs would recover somewhat, but would provide only about two years of cushion before we find ourselves again in the same position we are in today, unless consumptive use decreases further. This recovery would be welcome but would provide only a brief reprieve from crisis. Both scenarios demonstrate the need to adopt significant additional measures to permanently decrease consumptive uses across the entire Basin.

Americans Are Increasingly Pessimistic About Avoiding the Worst Effects of Climate Change, Brian Kennedy and Isabelle Pula, Pew Research Center

About six-in-ten Americans say countries around the world, including the U.S., will not do enough to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Among Democrats, this share has increased from 51% in 2022 to 69% in 2026. About half of U.S. adults say tech companies can do a lot to address climate change, but few expect technology to actually solve problems caused by climate change in the future. A majority of Americans, especially Democrats, say the federal government is doing too little on climate change. This overall share is slightly higher than it was during the Biden administration. 117 articles in 63 journals by 940 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Canadian wildfires are losing their climate-cooling influence from postfire snow albedo, Gerrevink et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2600434123

Observed Linkages Between Marine Heatwaves and Extreme Weather Over Land: A New Zealand Case Study, Chinappa et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70457

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Divergent Impacts of Evapotranspiration by Plant CO2 Physiological Forcing on the Mean and Variability of Water Availability, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2023jd040253 2 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

An attribution study of the impactful extreme heat across Asia in 2024, Marghidan et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100919

Asymmetric warming and rising atmospheric water demand in southern Zambia: long-term temperature change in the Ngwezi River Basin, Wankie et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1837008

Deoxygenation in inland freshwater systems, Shi et al., Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 10.1038/s43017-026-00795-x

Historical Increase in Hourly Heavy Precipitation Across Japan and Its Attribution to Anthropogenic Climate Warming, Sato et al., Atmospheric Science Letters Open Access 10.1002/asl2.70036

Warming and Aridification Amplify Extreme Fire Weather Elevating Population Exposure in China, Bai et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70440

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change impacts on Central Asia: Trends, extremes and future projections, International Journal of Climatology, 10.1002/joc.8519 51 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Direct observational evidence from space of the effect of CO 2 increase on longwave spectral radiances: the unique role of high-spectral-resolution measurements, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-6375-2024 6 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

21st century change in precipitation on the Greenland Ice Sheet using high resolution regional climate models, Boberg et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-2947-2026

A strengthened and southward-shifted westerly jet mitigates warming-induced drying across Asian drylands, Jiang & Zhou, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed7890

AMOC slowdown amplifies North Atlantic salinity variability to unprecedented levels, Iwakiri et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73838-y

An Ensemble Projection of ENSO to the End of 21st Century, Zhou et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl121816

Anthropogenic climate change accelerates the onset of global flood timing, Qi et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73839-x

Changes in ENSO Oscillatory Dynamics Associated with Zonal Shifts in Air–Sea Coupling Region, Molina et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0074.1

Forced Response in the Mean State and Interannual Variability of the Indian Summer Monsoon in Future Projections, Nithya et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70449

Future changes of coastal extremes from the regional wave-ocean coupled model system for the Northern European continental shelf, Nguyen et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1782346

Future drought intensification and socioeconomic exposure in Pakistan under different SSP scenarios, Baig et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.019

Hailstorms are predicted to hit harder with climate change, [authors did not process], Nature Open Access 10.1038/d41586-026-01639-w

High-Impact and Low-Likelihood Compound Hot and Dry Extremes in India, Malik et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0277.1

Hybrid Model–Based Forecasting of Temperature and Precipitation Changes in Iran, Ezati et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106852

Lake sediment heatwaves under global warming, Woolway et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01986-3

Widespread intensification of global river hydrograph flashiness under climate change, Zhu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03681-y

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Heat index historical trends and projections due to climate change in the Mediterranean basin based on CMIP6, Atmospheric Research, 10.1016/j.atmosres.2024.107512 20 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

A modified stratiform cloud microphysics parameterization: evaluation using the Community Atmosphere Model version 6 single-column model, Pant et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-7407-2026

Development of Grid Corrections to Mixing Parameterizations with Potential Application to Arctic Climate Change, McNider & Pour-Biazar, Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-25-0124.1

Exploring the impact of climate model accuracy and baseline conditions on estimates of future climate change, Power, Theoretical and Applied Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1007/s00704-026-06227-6

Machine learning workflows in climate modelling: design patterns and insights from case studies, Zheng et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rsta.2025.0254

Process-based evaluation of Eastern Mediterranean heatwave development in the CMIP6 models, KLIF et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100918

Sensitivity of Northern Hemisphere Extratropical Cyclone Properties to Atmospheric Resolution in the GFDL SPEAR Model, Lee et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0770.1

Soil Organic Matter Reduces Persistent Nighttime Surface Warm Bias in Convection-Permitting U.S. Simulations, Lin et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123274

Using Energetic Frameworks to Assess Artificial Heating in Coupled Model Sea Ice Loss Experiments, Kang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0746.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A perspective on the next generation of Earth system model scenarios: towards representative emission pathways (REPs), Geoscientific model development, 10.5194/gmd-17-4533-2024 39 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

Climate Warming and Ice Weakening Trigger Alpine Glacier Collapses: The Marmolada Case, Baroni et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121279

Estimating the thermodynamic contribution of post-industrial warming to recent Greenland ice sheet surface mass loss, Preece et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-2871-2026

Historical Volcanic Eruptions Mitigated the Expected Rapid Arctic Sea Ice Decline Prior to 2000, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123968

Identifying Energy Balance Drivers of Greenland Ice Sheet Surface Melt Using Causal Discovery, Yin et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119928

Increasing precipitation due to climate change could partially offset the impact of warming on glacier loss in the monsoon-influenced Himalaya until 2100 CE, Schlich-Davies et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3151-2026

The anomalously warm summer of 2023 over Greenland as compared to previous record melt summers of 2012 and 2019, Mchedlishvili et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-2895-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Coupled ice–ocean interactions during future retreat of West Antarctic ice streams in the Amundsen Sea sector, cryosphere, 10.5194/tc-18-2653-2024 17 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

An ice-sheet modelling framework to determine vulnerable regions of the Greenland Ice Sheet in the past, Keisling et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-2961-2026

Limited early-industrial warming and strong volcanic imprints in the Caucasus: the first temperature reconstruction based on maximum latewood density, Dhyani et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-22-989-2026

Newly recovered series of meteorological measurements in SW Greenland (Nuuk) in the period 1806–1813, Przybylak et al., Climate of the past Open Access 10.5194/cp-22-957-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate extremes in Svalbard over the last two millennia are linked to atmospheric blocking, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48603-8 15 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Earlier spring onset reduces ecosystem resilience to drought across the Northern Hemisphere, Liu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111282

Impact of global change on the distribution of mountain mammals and birds, Dragonetti et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.18389762

Introduced species will not save Caribbean coral reefs, Ritson-Williams et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2610820123

Mapping the Future Afforestation Distribution of China Constrained by National Afforestation Plan and Climate Change, Song et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-21-2839-2024

Marine particles and their remineralization buffer future ocean biogeochemistry response to climate warming, Maerz et al., Biogeosciences Open Access 10.5194/bg-23-1897-2026

Meta-analysis reveals asymmetric root and microbial phenology shifts under global change, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73761-2

Mountain Riparian Zones as Refugia for Rare and Endangered Plants Under Climate Change, Lei et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73769

Near-Term Climate Change Impacts on Kenyan Tree Cover, Warrier et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006647

Predicting the range expansion of larger benthic foraminifera under earth’s changing climate, Amao et al., Open Access CRIS of the University of Bern Open Access 10.48620/98304

Resilience of Breeding Boreal Waterbirds to Harsh Wintering Conditions: Could Climate Warming Smooth Population Declines?, Pöysä et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73718

Satellite observations reveal a reversal trend in African woody cover around 2010, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111267

Stream Temperature Response to Increased Shading Due To Riparian Shrubification in Northern Latitudes, Szeitz et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2025jg009465

Thermal stress impairs survival and immune responses in ant founding queens, Silva & Monnin, Biology Letters Open Access 10.1098/rsbl.2026.0072

Tree Cover and Temperature Shape the Distribution of Epiphytic Pleurozia in Asia: Forest Havens in a Warming Climate, Huang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73657

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biodiversity and Climate Extremes: Known Interactions and Research Gaps, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef003963 49 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Below- and above-canopy methane and nitrous oxide fluxes in a subalpine spruce forest, Krebs et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111261

Divergent vulnerabilities of soil carbon fractions to warming magnitude and extreme drought in alpine semi-arid mountain forests of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, Yan et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111276

Evolution and future trend of household carbon footprints in aging Japan, Yang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03612-x

Geospatial life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of coal electricity in the United States, Fortier et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access 10.1088/2634-4505/ae6e6b

Human amplification of climate-induced greenhouse gas emissions from global small water bodies, Zhuang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2537678123

Impact of air-ice CO2 fluxes on polar ocean carbon budgets from a bipolar data compilation, Crabeck et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73737-2

Large stocks of permafrost soil organic carbon and nitrogen in Arctic river deltas, Fuchs et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73092-2

Mangrove carbon dynamics: Sequestration potential and climate change resilience, Kumawat et al., Earth-Science Reviews 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105558

Melt period methane emissions in northern high latitude wetlands are governed by the length of the period and presence of permafrost, Hyvärinen et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-7555-2026

Methane Emission Reductions Slow Stratospheric Ozone Recovery by Amplifying the Potency of Ozone Depleting Substances, Weber et al., CentAUR (University of Reading) pmh:oai:centaur.reading.ac.uk:129449

Progressive release of long-stored carbon from tropical peatland disturbances, Koarashi et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72890-y

Satellite-based estimates of radiative forcing of long-lived halogenated gases from spectral observations, Whitburn et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03691-w

Season-dependent asymmetric responses of soil carbon emissions to long-term changes in precipitation timing in a semi-arid steppe, Wang et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111280

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Human activities shape global patterns of decomposition rates in rivers, Science, 10.1126/science.adn1262 31 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Atmospheric CO2 removal via enhanced weathering of steel slag in soil examined by experiments and geochemical modeling, Nakamura et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1802538

Legacy wells supporting net zero by screening carbon storage and geothermal potential in the United States, Rajput et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03667-w

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Converging Findings of Climate Models and Satellite Observations on the Positive Impact of European Forests on Cloud Cover, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2023jd039235 6 cites.

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Decarbonization

Aligning global shipping climate policies with life cycle perspective, Kanchiralla et al., Nature Energy Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41560-026-02080-z

Bird migration and wind-energy production across Western Europe, Bauer et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01853-4

Climate impacts of hydrogen emissions, Sun et al., Environmental Science & Technology Open Access pdf 10.1021/acs.est.3c09030

Driving a green energy transition with halide perovskite solar cells, Chen et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01844-5

Prospective environmental impact of solar energy communities in a decarbonised grid: insights from consequential life cycle analysis, Neves et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115415

Rethinking the economics and flexibility of U.S. nuclear power through hydrogen integration and policy support, Li et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73630-y

Systematic review of ferry decarbonization in the maritime sector, Kasepõld et al., Journal of Shipping and Trade Open Access pdf 10.1186/s41072-026-00241-7

When importance meets expectations: Determinants of local acceptance for wind and photovoltaic projects in Germany, Frank et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104765

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Demand-side strategies key for mitigating material impacts of energy transitions, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02016-z 86 cites.

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Geoengineering climate
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Abrupt reduction in shipping emission as an inadvertent geoengineering termination shock produces substantial radiative warming, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01442-3 68 cites.

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Black carbon
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Measurement report: Shipborne observations of black carbon aerosols in the western Arctic Ocean during summer and autumn 2016–2020: boreal fire impacts, , 10.5194/egusphere-2023-2315 1 citation.

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Aerosols

Global mineral constraints on dust shortwave radiative effects, Li et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01996-1

Global Tropical Cyclone Response to Anthropogenic Aerosol Changes, Zhao et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045902

Highland Pathways Shape Global Dust Vertical Transport and Its Climate Effects, Liu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123758

Pacific Walker Circulation strengthened by tropospheric aerosol forcing, Ying et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01442-4

Uncertainty in Contrail Physics and Climate Impacts: Roadmap to a ContrailMIP, Eastham et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-26-0121.1

Vertically-resolved source contributions to climate-relevant aerosol properties in Southern Greenlandic fjord systems, Alden et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-7165-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Aerosol-induced closure of marine cloud cells: enhanced effects in the presence of precipitation, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-6455-2024 10 cites.

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Climate change communications & cognition

Caught in the Fray. How Climate Scientists Navigate the Public Sphere, Abramov et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.32453978.v1

Climate action needs more than policy: The moral and spiritual foundations of sustainable change, Pinto & Vidal, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000946

Climate Change Reporting Frames and Discourse in African Media (2015–2025): A Mixed-Method Study, Xu et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2680140

Distinguishing climate change worry from state climate anxiety across 32 countries: implications for subjective wellbeing, Lee et al., Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1007/s13412-026-01120-0

Extreme weather salience as a climate crisis signal: Examining the role of extreme weather fear in adaptive and maladaptive responses to eco-anxiety, Lau et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103179

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Acting as we feel: Which emotional responses to the climate crisis motivate climate action, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 10.1016/j.jenvp.2024.102327 37 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

A systematic review on the impact of climate smart agricultural practices adoption on productivity in Ethiopia, Molla, Journal of Disaster Science and Management Open Access pdf 10.1007/s44367-026-00036-4

Carbon-removal opportunities and constraints of bioenergy crops on marginal croplands in China, Hua et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03588-8

Climate-driven shifts in soil microbiomes: implications for plant resilience in agriculture, Bhagat & Mishra, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1803685

Flood-induced livelihood vulnerability and migration as an adaptation strategy: evidence from farm households of the flood-prone region of Eastern India, Nag et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1695726

Northern permafrost represents a limit on the northward shift of climatically feasible agricultural frontiers under future warming, Xu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03702-w

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change impacts on small pelagic fish distribution in Northwest Africa: trends, shifts, and risk for food security, Scientific Reports, 10.1038/s41598-024-61734-8 40 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Asymmetric warming and rising atmospheric water demand in southern Zambia: long-term temperature change in the Ngwezi River Basin, Wankie et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1837008

Emerging Importance of Compound Flooding in Future Tropical Cyclone Hazard Profiles, Gori et al., Open MIND pmh:10.17615/ggmz-8m83

Historical Increase in Hourly Heavy Precipitation Across Japan and Its Attribution to Anthropogenic Climate Warming, Sato et al., Atmospheric Science Letters Open Access 10.1002/asl2.70036

Inter-model differences in 21st century glacier runoff for the world’s major river basins, Wimberly et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-19-1491-2025

Warming and vegetation greening drive recent surge in flash droughts, J et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aea8452

Widespread intensification of global river hydrograph flashiness under climate change, Zhu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03681-y

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global groundwater warming due to climate change, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01453-x 109 cites.

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Climate change economics

Incorporating air quality health impacts into the social cost of carbon, Kingdon et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02653-6

The impact of financial development on CO2 emissions in the framework of the environmental Kuznets curve, ÖNDES & KIZILGÖL, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1814255

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Economic quantification of Loss and Damage funding needs, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00565-7 10 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Does Decarbonisation lead to Psychological De-territorialisation? An Emerging Challenge for a Just Transition in Coal and Carbon-Intensive Regions across EU Countries, García-Mira et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103084

Emission ensemble approach to improve the development of multi-scale emission inventories, Thunis et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-17-3631-2024

Equitable transitions in ageing societies: how fairness perceptions transform carbon tax resistance, Ba et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2657445

Industrial decarbonization in a fragmented world: Carbon pricing with border adjustments using standardized values, Neuhoff et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115405

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
EU carbon prices signal high policy credibility and farsighted actors, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01505-x 69 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Governing climate migration: the right to a livable space, Benveniste & Capisani, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2678013

Structural challenges to effective climate adaptation: a critical assessment of planned relocation as an adaptation strategy, Bertana et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100830

The unpredictability of community priorities in planning for water-scarce futures in the Goulburn-Broken River Basin, Grupper et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104407

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Building resilience in Asian mega-deltas, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00561-x 48 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Enhanced Heatwaves Exacerbate Survival Risks for Vulnerable Populations, Dou et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100554

Optimizing U.S. Heat Alerts: A Multimetric Analysis of Heat-Related Mortality, Alexander et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0079.1

Quantifying the financial burden of heat-related hospital admissions in Switzerland under a changing climate: A scalable analytical framework, Vaghefi et al., BMC Global and Public Health Open Access pdf 10.1186/s44263-026-00275-w

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Health co-benefits and trade-offs of carbon pricing: a narrative synthesis, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2356822 6 cites.

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Other

Future water constraints on United States lithium mining under climate change, Trost et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03643-4

How climate risk shapes corporate greenwashing: the role of supply chain disruption and digital governance, Fang et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1844699

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Antarctic science operations must account for climate change and extreme environmental events, Siegert et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03629-2

The Transhumanist Anthropocene: From the climate crisis to upgrading humanity, Schütze & Latzer, The Anthropocene Review Open Access 10.1177/20530196261453840

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Toward an evidence-informed, responsible, and inclusive debate on solar geoengineering: A response to the proposed non-use agreement, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.903 14 cites.

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Book reviews

An Arctic community on the climate front lines, Boon, Science 10.1126/science.aeh0733

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Need for Speed: An Analysis of Speed to Market and Cost Results of Competitive Transmission, Kent Chandler and Olivia Manzagol, R Street

Over a decade ago, federal regulators overhauled the way transmission planning is conducted in the United States. As part of those changes, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determined it would no longer allow incumbent utilities to possess a right of first refusal (ROFR) to build all transmission traversing their state-determined service territories. Instead, certain significant regional transmission lines would be subject to competitive solicitations in which both incumbent and non-incumbent developers could submit proposals for inclusion in the regional transmission plan. This competition is notably different from merchant transmission, which recovers revenue from market prices or willing off-takers rather than through regulated rates. In order to determine the efficacy of FERC Order 1000’s removal of utilities’ federal ROFR to build transmission, the authors analyzed the length of time it takes to plan and develop competitive transmission. The authors compared competitive projects’ final results with the appropriate counterfactual: similar incumbent-developed transmission lines. While FERC’s initial rule opening up transmission development to competition was decided a decade and a half ago, most transmission planning regions have only seen a handful of competitive projects placed into service.

Split transition: BRICS breaks renewable records — and fossil records too, James Norman, Global Energy Monitor

2025 saw the largest power capacity expansion on record across the Brazil, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia and the United Arab Emirates (BRICS), with additions reaching new highs for coal, oil and gas, solar, and wind. Fossil power expansion accelerated, with 125 GW of new coal, oil, and gas capacity added and the largest net annual increase in fossil capacity on record (115 GW), after accounting for retirements. Renewable deployment also surged, with solar and wind additions totaling 497 GW in 2025, overwhelmingly concentrated in China and India. The BRICS’ utility-scale solar and wind project development pipeline expanded rapidly, growing by roughly one-quarter in 2025 to reach 2,317 GW — around 2.5 times the 927 GW fossil pipeline, which expanded by 12%.

Global Clean-Energy Trade Rebounds to $479 Billion in 2025 Despite Tariffs and Geopolitical Turmoil, BloombergNEF

Despite numerous tariffs targeting energy transition sectors and other global markets, US policy failed to stifle overall trade in products central to the energy transition. Persistent overcapacity, fueled by Chinese overinvestment, continues to compress margins for clean-tech manufacturers across batteries, solar and electric vehicles. Conflict in the Middle East has underscored the fragility of conventional fossil-fuel supply chains, and will likely accelerate the transition to lower-carbon technologies.

World Energy Investment 2026, Gould et al., International Energy Agency

World Energy Investment is the global benchmark for tracking investment trends across the energy sector. The authors present the latest data on capital flows to different types of energy projects, as well as the first set of full-year estimates for 2026. As energy security concerns continue to shape investment priorities, the authors explore the potential implications for different sectors and regions, particularly in light of the ongoing energy crisis stemming from the conflict in the Middle East. The authors highlight major investment milestones and opportunities from different energy sectors and regions. They also include expanded regional analysis and data on sources of investment and finance.

Pitches in Peril: A Climate Change and World Cup Analysis, Hosier et al., Comon Goal and Football for Future

Football is already on the frontline of the climate crisis. From flooded stadiums in Texas and Florida to unsafe heat in Mexico City, extreme weather is putting the future of the game at risk. Grassroots pitches where every legend took their first steps are even more vulnerable, especially in the Global South where resources for adaptation are scarce. 14 of 16 World Cup 2026 stadiums already exceed safe-play thresholds for major climate hazards, with nearly 90% projected to face unplayable heat by 2050. Two-thirds of grassroots pitches where icons like Messi and Salah grew up will face unsafe or unplayable heat conditions by mid-century. By 2050, Troost-Ekong’s childhood pitch in Nigeria will endure nearly five months of unplayable heat annually. Tim Cahill’s pitch in Sydney faces flood depths up to 7 meters during extreme events.

Enabling DOE Regional Energy–Water Technology Pilots, Committee on Enabling DOE Regional Energy–Water Technology Pilots, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

The authors present a vision for a Department of Energy pilot program grounded in regional realities, recognizing that challenges and solutions vary widely across the country. It emphasizes that while technological innovation is essential, it is not sufficient on its own. Successful solutions must incorporate a systems level perspective and consider governance, financing, regulatory, and institutional factors that shape implementation. Through a portfolio of regionally diverse pilot projects, the authors highlight the importance of proactive risk management, cross-sector collaboration, and strong partnerships among public and private stakeholders. They also underscore that collaboration, while essential, can be difficult within fragmented governance structures and requires intentional efforts to build alignment and trust. By embedding adaptive management, continuous learning, and knowledge sharing into program design, the proposed approach aims to evolve with changing conditions and scale effective solutions. Together, these strategies offer a pathway to reduce systemic risks, improve sustainability, and build a more secure and resilient energy-water future.

Americans Are Increasingly Pessimistic About Avoiding the Worst Effects of Climate Change, Brian Kennedy and Isabelle Pula, Pew Research Center

About six-in-ten Americans say countries around the world, including the U.S., will not do enough to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Among Democrats, this share has increased from 51% in 2022 to 69% in 2026. About half of U.S. adults say tech companies can do a lot to address climate change, but few expect technology to actually solve problems caused by climate change in the future. A majority of Americans, especially Democrats, say the federal government is doing too little on climate change. This overall share is slightly higher than it was during the Biden administration.

WMO Global Annual to Decadal Climate Update 2026 to 2035, World Meteorological Organization

Global average temperatures are likely to continue at or near record levels in the next five years, with Arctic temperature anomalies expected to continue to be higher than the global mean. The authors examine the observed climate over the past five years and provide regional predictions for temperatures and precipitation over the next five years. Annual global mean near-surface temperatures during 2026–2030 are predicted to vary between 1.3°C and 1.9°C above the 1850-1900 average. It is likely (86% chance) that one year between 2026 and 2030 will surpass 2024 as the warmest year on record, according to the update. It is very likely (91% chance) that the global mean near-surface temperature will temporarily exceed 1.5°C above the 1850-1900 average levels for at least one year between 2026 and 2030. This level was also temporarily exceeded in 2024.

Ruta Energetica (Energy Roadmap for Chile), Government of Chile

Chile se encuentra en una etapa decisiva de su transición energética, enfrentando el desafío de consolidar los avances alcanzados durante la última década y, al mismo tiempo, responder a nuevas exigencias en materia de seguridad energética, crecimiento económico y competitividad internacional. La presente Ruta 2026–2030 tiene por objetivo acelerar y robustecer la transición energética del país, promoviendo una agenda que combine seguridad del suministro, modernización institucional, competitividad económica, y desarrollo territorial equilibrado. Para ello, se busca impulsar una transición energética con foco en la seguridad, posicionando a la energía como un motor habilitante del crecimiento, inversión, empleo, productividad e innovación. En este marco, la Ruta define las prioridades estratégicas y lineamientos de acción que orientarán la gestión sectorial durante el período 2026–2030. (Chile is at a decisive stage in its energy transition, facing the challenge of consolidating the progress made during the last decade and, at the same time, respond to new demands in terms of energy security, economic growth, and international competitiveness. This roadmap 2026–2030 aims to accelerate and strengthen the energy transition of the country, promoting an agenda that combines security of supply, institutional modernization, economic competitiveness, and balanced territorial development. To this end, it seeks to promote a energy transition with a focus on security, positioning energy as an enabling engine growth, investment, employment, productivity and innovation. In this framework, the roadmap defines the strategic priorities and guidelines for action that will guide sectoral management during the period 2026–2030.)

Transforming food systems for a safe climate and health for all, Elisa Morgera, United Nations

The Special Rapporteur clarifies human rights obligations and responsibilities to transform food systems in order to effectively mitigate and adapt to climate change and respond to loss and damage. She recommends combining decarbonization, defossilization and detoxification of food systems to prevent localized and global human right harms. She also confirms that prioritizing Indigenous Peoples’ and peasants’ agroecology, small-scale ecosystem-based fisheries and pastoralism enhances the sustainability and resilience of food systems, planetary and human health, including nutrition, to the benefit of all.

Energy Vampires: The AI data centres draining Australia, Greenpeace Australia

The frenzied rollout of AI data centers in Australia is rushing through massive new projects, which will derail Australia’s energy transition unless the government urgently intervenes. Australia’s biggest proposed data center, the 1GW Mamre Road Data Centre Campus in Western Sydney, will generate peak annual grid emissions equivalent to that produced by 560,000 petrol cars for a year or all domestic flights within NSW in 2023. Data centers already fail to cover their own emissions with new renewables and their rollout will dramatically hold back Australia’s energy transition. No data center operator analyzed in the report adequately proves their claim of driving Australia’s renewable energy growth. Claims they are doing this through truly “additional” new power purchasing agreements for renewable energy are unsubstantiated. There are early signs of a data center-fueled gas boom in Australia which will come with massive, nationally significant climate costs. For example, the Tamboran proposal for the Northern Territory would effectively double the state’s emissions. In NSW, Cloud Carrier’s proposed gas-fired project would wipe out NSW’s entire projected 2028 emissions cuts.

UPDATE: Colorado River Basin Storage Continues Slide Toward System Crash, Castle et al., Getches-Wilkinson Center, University of Colorado Law School et al

If the Colorado River Basin (Basin) experiences another dry year, similar to Water Year 2025, it is likely that reasonably accessible storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead would be mostly depleted, even if consumptive uses and losses are at or near historic lows. Run-of-the-river operations would shortly ensue. This would be an outcome with devastating consequences. In contrast, if next year is very wet, similar to Water Year 2023, the Basin’s largest federal reservoirs would recover somewhat, but would provide only about two years of cushion before we find ourselves again in the same position we are in today, unless consumptive use decreases further. This recovery would be welcome but would provide only a brief reprieve from crisis. Both scenarios demonstrate the need to adopt significant additional measures to permanently decrease consumptive uses across the entire Basin.

The Race for Net Zero: The UK net zero economy and the transition to a competitive future, CBI Economics and the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit

The UK’s transition to net zero is reshaping the structure of the economy. What began as a decarbonization challenge has evolved into a system-wide economic transformation, influencing how energy is produced, how industries operate, and where economic activity is located. The authors assess the net zero economy’s scale, structure and economic significance, and its contribution to competitiveness and regional investment.

Cost of living, health, housing eclipse climate issue in people's priorities – Irish Examiner poll, Irish Examiner

Some 59% of people think the Government is not doing enough with the resources it has on climate change, with less than one in five (18%) deeming the current efforts adequate. A total of 71% of adults identify as environmentally conscious, but only 14% make significant behavioral changes. There is less support for higher carbon taxes (11%), higher petrol/diesel taxes (11%), and reducing the national herd (15%). Some 61% of people say Ireland is not prepared for the impacts of climate change. Of these impacts, 42% rated storms as one of their top three concerns, followed by food insecurity (37%), risks to public health (32%), extreme heat (28%), and rising sea/water levels (26%).

The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal, 3rd edition, Edwards et al., German Institute for International and Security Affairs et al

Both carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and emissions reductions are needed to reach the Paris temperature goal. There are many CDR methods, and they span large ranges in costs, potentials and social acceptance. Current removal is almost entirely from land-based, conventional CDR; novel CDR is growing quickly but still comprises a tiny fraction of total removal. A large and growing gap exists between the amount of CDR in country pledges and that in Paris-compatible scenarios; both conventional and novel CDR are deployed in every scenario. CDR sits in a broader context of multiple goals and side effects. Demand for CDR is crucial to closing the CDR gap. While innovative activity has grown, expectations of large and growing demand have become fragile. Important aspects of the CDR system are highly concentrated, create vulnerabilities, and would benefit from diversification across methods, actors and countries. Closing the CDR gap is urgent because deployment is a gradual process. The period 2026–2030 is thus critical for establishing CDR’s role in limiting climate damages. About New Research

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Claims that climate scientists have abandoned their most dire scenario have been widely misunderstood. While the highest emissions pathway is now considered unlikely, evidence suggests the climate system may still be tracking toward dangerously high levels of warming.

by David Spratt, first published at Pearls&Irritations

Figure 1: RCPs and SSPsOccasionally, climate science is big news. On 26 May, the New York Times headlined: “Why scientists retired the dire climate scenario used for over a decade”. A good story!

The Australian, true to form, went with “Climate doomsday scenarios just got a major rewrite”, and in Jeff Bezos’s Washington Post it was  “The climate apocalypse? Don’t count on it”. There were a host of similar headlines.

Climate deniers and Donald Trump used an old playbook to claim scientific fraud (surprise!), but were called out, with ‘Trump twisted a climate debate beyond recognition’ and ‘Factcheck: Trump’s false claims about the IPCC and ‘RCP8.5’ climate scenario’.

So what’s the real story? Did scientists get it wrong, and is warming now likely to be less severe than previously thought?

As in engineering and business and government, scenarios are used by climate scientists to think about plausible alternative futures and their risks. The commonly-used climate scenarios are based on different possible trajectories for human greenhouse gas emissions and the social path humanity takes, and the consequences. And remember, scenarios in the end are simply a product of the minds that imagined them.

Fifteen years ago, four scenarios called representative concentration pathways (RCPs) were developed for the fifth IPCC assessment report in 2014, with RCP2.6 the lowest and RCP8.5 the highest. The numbers are radiative forcing (RF) values in 2100 for each scenario, where RF is the difference between the incoming radiation energy and the outgoing radiation energy in a given climate system, which is an indicator of total expected warming.

In conventional climate science terms, each one unit of RF (in watts per square metre) would in the long run be expected to result in around 0.75°C of warming. This relationship between change in radiative forcing and change in temperature is known as climate sensitivity.

RCP8.5 was sometimes called a ‘business as usual’ scenario, but this was a misnomer, and it was based on an assumption of little or no curbing of  greenhouse gases. Modellers estimated it would result in the end of warming of 5 to 6°C, with a range of 3.0 to 12.6°C.

The sixth IPCC report in 2022 focused on a modified system called Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), where the scenarios more explicitly considered social, economic, and technological trends. The SSPs were again expressed as RF values. Figure 1 illustrates both the RCP and SSP scenarios as they relate to total emissions.

Now, in preparation for the modelling project for the next IPCC report due in 2029, known as ScenarioMIP,  scientists have suggested that the highest, ‘worse-case’ RCP8.5 scenario be dropped, because emissions were tracking more in line with one of the middle scenarios, RCP4.5. Hence all those headlines.

So, the ‘worse-case’ global warming case is no longer realistic. Big sighs of relief!

Not so quick. The big question in the end is not the amount of emissions but how hot it gets: the temperature. The focus on emissions in RCPs/SSPs is a bit to one side.

And on the future temperature, here’s the bomb. In a recent post, Ryan Katz-Rosene showed CERES data where the effective radiative forcing (ERF) at the moment is tracking above RCP8.5:

Effective radiative forcing and SSP scenarios.

 CERES is a NASA project that uses satellite and other data to measure the amount of sunlight absorbed by Earth and the amount of infrared energy emitted to space. As Katz says “current forcing observations from CERES really do appear to show a high current ERF value, which (at least at this point in time) does seem to be above the mean ERF expected in RCP8.5.”

[Technically, RF measures the immediate change in energy balance at the top of the atmosphere due to an external driver, while ERF accounts for adjustments in temperature and other factors after the initial change. ERF gives a more comprehensive understanding of the climate response to these changes.]

With the actual radiative forcing higher than the worst-case scenario, all those headlines about things getting better look like a lot of hot air.

So how can actual and future warming, indicated by RF, be tracking the worst case when the emissions trajectory is a middle-of-the-road scenario? The RCP/SSP scenarios were built around greenhouse gas emissions, not around the full suite of forcings and climate feedbacks that determine what the climate system actually does in terms of heating.

The assumptions about the relationship between emissions and temperatures have been too conservative. For example, what is not getting said is that the best estimate of the climate sensitivity has been rising, with perhaps the world’s most eminent climate scientist, Jim Hansen, taking it beyond the IPCC upper-range estimate. In fact, even the current range of modelling, known as CMIP6, produces a higher climate sensitivity than previously thought.

Other factors include reduced aerosol masking, ice-reflection loss, the release of permafrost carbon, and weakening ocean sinks that are not adequately captured by the IPCC or in model assumptions about future warming. Yet they’re showing up in the real-world numbers right now.

What is happening is way beyond IPCC projections. The rate of warming has accelerated by half over the last two decades, driven by reduced aerosols emissions and diminishing cloud cover. Warming has reached 1.5°C, and with an approaching strong El Nino, 2026-27 is likely to be around 1.7°C. Earth’s Energy Imbalance, an indicator of future warming, has doubled in the last 15 years and continues to increase, suggesting a warming trend of 2°C by 2040 is likely. Even global warming of 1°C, a threshold already passed, risks triggering some tipping points. At 1.5°C, six out of 10 studied climate subsystems already show large-scale abrupt shifts across multiple models.

Katz says: “We have such large uncertainty by end of century on climate sensitivity and carbon feedbacks, such that we can’t preclude mean warming of up to 4°C by 2100 even if we successfully pursue an emissions pathway resembling that in RCP4.5. So, again, if sensitivity or carbon feedbacks are not in our favour, there are plenty of scientific findings based on RCP8.5 which could turn out to be right on the mark in meteorological terms later this century, despite being way off on anthropogenic fossil emissions assumptions.”

Any reputable climate scientist over a drink at the bar will tell you that by far the majority of the human population would likely not survive 4°C. And that sounds like a worst case to me.

China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions grew by 2% in the first quarter of 2026, after a rise in the amount of “wasted” wind and solar power.

The country used more coal and gas to generate electricity than in the same quarter a year earlier, despite a record amount of new wind and solar capacity being built.

While the strait of Hormuz crisis has boosted China’s focus on energy security – including through clean energy and electrification – its electricity system is failing to keep up.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that, while China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry increased in the first part of 2026, they remain below the peak in early 2024.

Other key findings for the first quarter of 2026 include:

• There was a 23% year-on-year rise in wind-power capacity and 33% for solar.
• There was also a sharp rise in the amount of wind and solar output being “wasted”, as it was not accommodated by the current electricity system.
• As a result, emissions in the power sector increased by 4% year-on-year.
• Power-sector CO2 would have been flat without the rise in “wasted” wind and solar. 
• Emissions in other sectors of the economy grew by 1%.

The key reason for “wasted” wind and solar generation was the inflexible management of coal power plants and power grids, not a lack of grid infrastructure.

In the first quarter of 2026, China’s energy system also began to adjust to the surge in oil and gas prices due to the blockade of the strait of Hormuz.

This continued through April and May, with sharp reductions in oil imports and oil-based chemicals production, as well as the share of gas in electricity generation.

However, the inability to make full use of new wind and solar power plants left China more exposed to the closure of the strait of Hormuz, by increasing the need for other fuels.

This exposure could become more acute if the “super El Niño” that is forecast for later this year limits the electricity output of hydropower, while fossil-fuel supplies remain tight.

Nevertheless, the Hormuz crisis could result in China following a lower-CO2 trajectory than previously expected, if key policies in its 15th five-year plan are fully implemented.

Emissions plateau continues

Recent analysis for Carbon Brief showed that China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry had been “flat or falling” for nearly two years.

The latest analysis points to a rise of 2% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026, as shown in the figure below. For now, however, emissions remain below the peak in March 2024.

China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial processes, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals until March 2026. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and industrial products, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, IPCC default emission factors for metals process emissions and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2025. Chemical industry process emissions are estimated from fossil fuel use, subtracting carbon embedded in products. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly total sales reported by Sinopec.

In previous quarters, emissions had fallen in almost every sector of the economy, with the exception of the coal-based chemicals industry.

The latest quarter saw more widespread increases, with the power sector by far the largest source of emissions growth, as shown in the figure below.

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial processes, for the period January-March 2026, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and industrial products, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, IPCC default emission factors for metals process emissions and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2025. Chemical industry process emissions are estimated from fossil fuel use, subtracting carbon embedded in products. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly total sales reported by Sinopec.

Emissions from other sectors were relatively stable in aggregate, with some rising and others continuing to decline.

Coal consumption in the chemical industry continued strong growth, increasing by 20%, but showed no change in trend after the closure of the strait of Hormuz and surge in oil prices.

(This is contrary to some commentary arguing that the closure of the strait of Hormuz has resulted in a marked increase in the output of China’s coal-chemicals industry.)

The apparent consumption of oil products rebounded in January-February, driven by transportation, but declined slightly in March as oil prices surged.

Emissions from the cement and steel industries continued to fall, as real estate investment contracted another 11% in the first quarter of 2026, following a 17% reduction in 2025. Cement production fell 7% and crude steel output by 5%.

‘Wasted’ wind and solar power

After falling in 2025, power generation from coal and gas increased by 4% in the first quarter of the year.

Power demand grew at 5.2% and hydropower generation increased 9%. Under these circumstances, the record growth in solar and wind power capacity in 2025 should have covered demand growth and pushed fossil-power generation down.

The trend was accentuated in March, as power demand grew just 3.5%, hydropower output increased 9% and yet fossil-power generation increased 4.2%.

The reason for fossil-power generation growth was a sharp drop in the electricity output per unit of installed capacity for both solar and wind power, known as the “capacity factor”.

If capacity factors were stable, the increased solar and wind capacity would have been expected to result in 160 terawatt hours (TWh) of additional clean-power generation during the first quarter, compared with the same time last year, with nuclear and hydro bringing the total to 170TWh. This would have comfortably exceeded the 120TWh increase in power demand.

However, the actual increase in clean-power generation was just 60TWh, with wind showing almost no growth.

While wind power capacity grew by 23% from the first quarter of 2025 to the same period in 2026, an increase of 120GW, the average capacity factor fell from 27% to 22%, a reduction of 18%. This implies that power generation from wind only grew 1% year-on-year. In the case of solar, capacity grew by 33%, but the average capacity factor fell by 11%, resulting in 18% growth in solar-power generation.

It is normal for solar and especially wind capacity factors to vary year-to-year due to weather conditions, but the fall this year was an extension of a longer trend. The average capacity factors of solar and wind have fallen by 19% and 10%, respectively, from 2022 to 2025.

A quarter of the fall in capacity factors over the three-year period is explained by the increase in reported curtailment. This refers to the amount of electricity that is effectively “wasted”, or curtailed, because it cannot be accommodated by the power network.

Nor can the remainder of the fall in capacity factors be explained by the change in weather conditions, as both wind and solar conditions improved on a national-average basis from 2022 to 2025.

In the first quarter of 2026, approximately half of the drop in wind capacity factor and a quarter of the drop in solar capacity factor was explained by weather conditions, implying that the rest is due to increased curtailment resulting from inadequate grid management and integration. 

One clear symptom of increased curtailment is that in January-February, both solar and wind conditions were actually better than last year, but capacity factors still fell.

The fact that capacity factors have fallen significantly more than would be expected based on reported curtailment and weather conditions indicates that a lot of curtailment goes unreported, either because it is excluded from the statistical definition, or because there are gaps in reporting.

Market participants have long noted that actual curtailment is much higher than reported in official statistics.

Official data on curtailment only includes “system reasons”, while excluding some lost generation linked to market trading, grid-connection conditions and other “special” causes.

The figure below shows actual electricity generation from wind and solar plants (dark blue), the amount that would have been generated if reported curtailment had not taken place (light blue) and the level expected if the rate of curtailment had stayed the same (mid-blue).

In total, wind and solar could have generated an extra 170TWh of electricity in the first quarter of 2026, if the rate of curtailment had not gone up in the preceding years. This is more than the total power generation of France over the same period.

Electricity generation from solar (left) and wind power (right) in China, terawatt hours per 12-month period. Red: Electricity actually fed into the grid. Yellow: Generation before reported levels of “curtailment”, where some electricity is discarded due to grid congestion. Blue: Generation if the rate of curtailment had stayed constant. Source: China Electricity Council monthly data on installed capacity and utilisation; National New Energy Consumption Monitoring and Early Warning Center data on curtailment; utilisation at constant curtailment projected by fitting a regression model between historical utilisation data and weather data from NASA Power and CFSv2 for power plant locations taken from Global Energy Monitor data.

The largest reductions in capacity factors, after controlling for variations in weather conditions, came from Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Liaoning. In these northern provinces, the heating season is a challenging time for grid managers due to inflexible operation of plants that provide both heat and power.

More broadly, the key reason for curtailment is inflexible grid management. Flexible operation of coal and gas-fired power plants could very substantially increase the amount of solar and wind power the grid can accommodate.

Yet currently, coal-fired power generation is largely operated via medium- and long-term contracts to supply fixed amounts of electricity at fixed prices, meaning there is no incentive for adjustments in output to make space for solar and wind.

Similarly, electricity trading between provinces is predominantly contracted annually, preventing the variable output of solar and wind from being transmitted between jurisdictions in real time.

These issues have a clear impact on the amount of wind and solar that is curtailed. For example, power-system modeling carried out for the year 2023 indicates that flexible power-grid operation would have essentially eliminated the need for curtailment.

The government has also recognised solar and wind curtailment as one of the central challenges of the energy transition.

Recent policies have called for increased inter-province trading and improved flexibility of coal-power plants as the solutions, implicitly recognising these as key issues to address.

Recent large increases in storage capacity, including pumped hydro and batteries, should have improved the integration of wind and solar into the grid. But there is a lack of incentives for storage operators that limits the benefits the system can derive from the technology.

The government has implicitly recognised this and called for establishing electricity pricing that enables energy storage to “participate fairly”.

Meanwhile, China’s new renewable-pricing rules, which shifted existing solar and wind plants to selling electricity on the market, rather than being compensated directly by the grid operator, does not seem to have reduced curtailment so far.

Most provinces only finalised their plans for implementing the policy in late 2025, which left little time for the market and operators to adapt.

China is aiming to build a “new type power system”, capable of integrating large amounts of wind and solar into the grid by 2027. In the meantime, the government has also called for “reasonably pacing” utility-scale “new energy” capacity additions to match the pace at which provinces think they are able to improve the “regulation capacity” of their grids.

How the Hormuz crisis is affecting China’s energy sector

China’s energy system has started, since March, to adjust to the surge in oil and gas prices triggered by the closure of the strait of Hormuz. There have been sharp reductions in oil imports, the share of gas in thermal power generation and in oil-based chemical production.

The consumption of gas fell overall in March, even as consumption in the power sector increased. The power sector fuel mix shifted from gas to coal, but the increase in overall thermal power generation still pushed gas use up in the sector.

High gas prices had already been straining household finances before the current crisis. Millions of households were shifted from coal stoves to gas-based heating as a part of efforts to tackle air pollution during the past decade. However, the gas-price subsidies created to enable this shift have expired in recent years, leading to a rise in heating bills.

China’s oil imports started falling sharply immediately after oil prices surged, with net imports falling even further as exports were restricted. The fall has continued into May, with shipments falling by over 40% year-on-year in the first three weeks of the month.

In the first quarter of the year, state-owned oil major Sinopec reported oil product sales up 4.8%. Apparent consumption of oil products had increased 5.5% in January-February, but fell -0.3% in March, indicating an early impact of the price surge, although the late timing of the Chinese New Year also had an effect.

Electric vehicles have continued to gain market share in 2026, reaching 53% of vehicle sales in April, up from 47% a year ago.

Electricity demand for EV charging grew over 50% year-on-year in March. The large number of plug-in hybrid vehicles on the road means that drivers can switch from petrol to power quickly when there is more of an incentive to do so.

Moreover, 24% of highway trips during the 1 May holiday were made by EVs, even though they only make up 15% of all registered cars. This shows that EVs tend to be driven more than average, making a bigger dent in oil use than their share in the fleet would suggest.

Crude oil processing volumes fell by 2% in March and 6% in April, after growth in January-February. Plastics output growth moderated in March and turned into a decline in April.

The increase in oil prices has boosted the profitability of the highly carbon-intensive coal-to-chemicals industry. There has also been speculation that the industry would have forcefully increased output in response to the Hormuz crisis, enabling China to cut back on oil use. The industry was, however, already operating at high capacity utilisation before the current crisis, reported at an average of 87% in the first half of 2025. This means there was little headroom in the sector to raise output in the short term.

Coal use in the chemical industry increased 19% in January-February and 22% in March, showing a rapidly rising trend, but no step change after the start of the crisis.

The global fossil-fuel crisis is also affecting China’s clean-energy industry through overseas demand. Exports of solar, batteries and EVs recorded 56% growth year-on-year in the first quarter, reaching $55bn. This increase was partially driven by front-loading of shipments ahead of changes to tax rebates to solar and battery exports at the end of March, but the value of exports also grew 38% in April, an indication of strong underlying demand.

Implications of the crisis for China’s transition

The oil-and-gas crisis represents an opportunity for both clean energy and coal. The economics of electrification and clean-energy production, as well as of domestic coal production, have improved dramatically as imported fossil fuels have become more expensive.

At least as importantly, the closure of the strait of Hormuz and the resulting global fossil-fuel crisis closely mirror Chinese policymakers’ long-standing concern about reliance on seaborne fossil fuels. This is likely to reinforce their focus on energy security.

The previous fossil-fuel crisis, in 2021-2022, led to a new wave of coal-power plants, coal mines and coal-to-chemicals plants being built in China.

This time around, any expansion in coal mining is expected to be limited, both by the government’s “anti-involution” drive, which aims to stem harmful price competition, as well as by the carbon constraints in China’s climate goals.

Domestic coal production fell in the first four months of the year, despite a rise in oil and gas as well as coal prices. Rising coal prices will reduce the profitability of coal-fired power generation, at least for the next few months.

The perceived need for further new coal-power projects is also limited by the fact that, after record additions in 2025, there was still another 206GW of coal-fired capacity under construction in January, due to large volumes of permitting during the previous five years.

The energy regulator recently called on provinces to “strictly limit” the addition of new coal-power plants and other “regulating” power capacity in areas with sufficient firm capacity.

There is also a ceiling on the upside for coal in the current crisis, because gas plays a limited role in China’s energy system. This leaves little space for replacing gas with coal.

The exception is the coal-to-chemicals industry, which can replace oil and gas, albeit at the cost of very high carbon emissions. As a result, investment in the industry will likely get a further boost, even though the economic incentive is lower than it may seem.

While crude oil prices for delivery this summer have increased by more than $40 per barrel since the start of the year, 2030 prices are only up $5. This is a more relevant benchmark, given that a new coal-to-chemicals plant will take several years to build and commission.

The coal-to-chemicals expansion will also be limited by the new system to control carbon emissions. In particular, the requirement for local governments to compensate for carbon emissions from new industrial projects by closing down existing capacity, if these controls are implemented effectively.

Since the previous fossil-fuel crisis, the concept of energy security has become broader, encompassing clean energy and electrification, rather than being limited to coal and fossil fuels. This shift is also clear from how state media has been covering energy security in the wake of the war on Iran.

As such, the oil-and-gas crunch is likely to speed up the electrification of transportation and buildings. It also strengthens the case for “green fuels”, referring to green hydrogen and synthetic gaseous and liquid fuels produced from it, which are an important priority in the new five-year plan.

Solar and wind also become more attractive, economically and politically, as a result of the crisis. The upside may be limited by the dominant narrative that they have grown faster than the grid can manage, rather than being limited by institutional constraints. Nevertheless, they will benefit from fossil fuels – including coal – becoming more expensive and volatile.

Still, curtailment has become a key issue affecting the pace of China’s energy transition. It both reduces the immediate benefits of clean energy and undermines further investment in clean capacity, by increasing investment risks and cutting into returns.

The flipside of the current rise in curtailment is that when the installed wind, solar and energy storage capacity is put to full use, the supply of clean energy will increase substantially.

As noted, a key priority for the government in the next few years is to build a “new type of power system”, capable of integrating large amounts of variable renewable capacity.

The balance between how much the current crisis benefits coal or clean energy will depend on implementation of key climate and energy provisions in the 15th five-year plan.

If power-system reforms that benefit solar, wind and storage are implemented, while carbon-emission controls limit the expansion of coal-to-chemicals, then China is likely to follow a lower-CO2 emission trajectory than expected before the crisis.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.

Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data. 

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.

For oil, apparent consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is taken from Sinopec quarterly results, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use.

Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated from refinery throughput, with the production of the transport fuels and the net exports of other oil products subtracted.

Estimated non-energy use of fossil fuels is subtracted from total chemical industry fossil fuel consumption, and process emissions are calculated based on fossil fuel consumption with carbon retained in products subtracted. Emissions from the incineration of plastics are based on a peer-reviewed estimate of plastics incineration in 2022, combined with growth rates in the overall power generation from waste-to-energy plants. Metals industry process emissions are calculated using industrial output data and IPCC default emission factors.

Reported curtailment, and capacity utilisation in the absence of reported curtailment, is calculated as the complement of the “offtake rates” (利用率) reported by National New Energy Consumption Monitoring and Early Warning Center monthly by province for solar and wind.

Total curtailment is estimated by comparing solar and wind capacity utilisation predicted based on weather conditions, and in the absence of curtailment, to reported utilisation. Utilisation is predicted by fitting regression models to reported monthly utilisation and weather conditions in 2020-2023.

Weather data used for predicting utilisation are hourly wind speed, temperature, solar irradiation and humidity at solar and wind power plant locations in each province from NASA Power and CFSv2. Locations are taken from Global Energy Monitor data.

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The post Analysis: China’s CO2 climbs 2% in early 2026 due to ‘wasted’ wind and solar appeared first on Carbon Brief.

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Andrew Dessler

I’ve long been struck by how hard it is to predict the evolution of our energy system, even a few years in advance, never mind 25 or 30 years. I still remember the “peak oil” craze in the mid 2000s, when people were telling me the end of oil was nigh. It sounded convincing right up until it turned out to be wrong.

In this post, let me show you how bad previous predictions have been for the electricity sector.

evolution of our energy system in 6 charts

Each plot below shows annual predictions of how a particular source of electricity will evolve as well as what actually happened. The data come from the Energy Information Administration and cover the U.S. electricity sector.

We’ll start with coal. In the first plot, the black line shows actual U.S. coal-fired electricity generation. The colored lines are predictions made each year since 2008.

In 2008, coal was expected to produce increasing amounts of electricity into the future. Instead, it immediately started to decline and it took until 2023 before the EIA began to predict a long-term decline in coal, despite the fact that coal had been declining for 15 years.

Natural gas, by contrast, has generated an increasing share of U.S. electricity. This is largely due to the tidal wave of cheap natural gas from fracking. The predictions, on the other hand, did not anticipate this.

The takeaway here is that predicting the evolution of our energy system is not just hard in the long run, e.g., thirty years from now, but it’s hard even in the short run.

If we combine coal and gas, the forecasts look better. This reflects the fact that natural gas was replacing coal, so that the overestimate for coal was cancelled to some extent by the underestimate for natural gas.

But even for the combined category, the forecasts vary widely.

Here’s solar (including both utility and residential solar):

And here’s wind:

For both energy sources, predictions before 2015 were really bad.

Across all energy sources, the 2023 and 2025 forecasts differ sharply from the 2026 forecast. The predictions made for 2023/2025 assume Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, while 2026 predictions assume the reversal of those policies.

The difference between 2023/2025 and 2026 is an estimate of the role that politics plays in the future evolution of our electricity sector. Because we cannot confidently predict who will win future elections or what their policies will be, this is a very good reason why it’s so hard to predict the future of our energy system.

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the cost of energy

Why is it so hard to predict the energy mix in our electricity system? One big reason is that it is hard to predict the future rate of innovation. We can see this in a plot of the cost of energy1:

You can see that the price of wind and solar plummeted in the early 2010s, reflecting enormous innovation in the production of renewable energy. That was not predicted by most mainstream forecasts (as confirmed by predictions of wind and solar above).

There has also been a lot of innovation in fossil fuel production, most importantly hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. These technologies drove down the cost of natural gas in the late 2000s and changed the economics of electricity generation almost overnight. Coal plants that had looked like safe long-term investments suddenly faced a cheaper competitor. Yet this, too, was largely missed. In the late 2000s, many utilities were still trying to build coal plants, unable to see that coal was entering a precipitous decline.

TXU didn’t see the end of coal coming. Most of these plants were never built.

And, as wind and solar costs fell, renewables began taking market share too. Coal was not beaten by a single technology; it was beaten by a sequence of technologies that forecasters failed to anticipate.

Based on economics, coal is now a stone-cold loser. Its remaining advantage is not cost, speed of construction, or flexibility. It is politics. The Trump Administration is forcing coal-fired plants to stay open and some recent reporting suggests these interventions are raising costs for consumers.

In the competition between solar, wind, and natural gas, solar and wind are the cheapest. The combination of low costs, short construction times, and natural gas’ price volatility gives wind and solar a huge market advantage, explaining their exponential growth. Yes, solar and wind are coming for natural gas.

The plot also shows the profound disadvantage nuclear faces. Nuclear energy costs nearly $200/MWh, around four times the cost of wind and solar. And it takes a decade or two to get it online. Without government mandates or heavy policy support, I believe there is little likelihood that we will see a nuclear renaissance.

what are the implications of this?

Much of the debate in climate policy centers on the cost, difficulty, and timeline for phasing out fossil fuels in order to achieve net zero. You constantly hear pundits and analysts throwing around eye-popping numbers, confidently claiming, e.g., that “it will cost XXX trillions of dollars to reach net zero in our economy by 2050.”

from McKinsey

But if the forecasting failures of the last twenty years have taught us anything, it’s this: we simply have no idea how much decarbonization will cost.

You should treat numbers like McKinsey’s estimate above as guesses. They could be right, but historically speaking, they probably aren’t. To summarize, here are the reasons why the true cost of reaching net zero remains so uncertain:

• We can’t predict the foundational energy mix: As the charts above show, our ability to forecast the trajectory of the electricity sector even a few years out is abysmal. If forecasters cannot accurately predict the baseline scenario (how much wind, solar, or natural gas will be on the grid), it seems unlikely they will be able to make accurate predictions of how much additional solar and wind will be needed in 2050 to reach net zero.

• Innovation shatters financial models: Long-term cost forecasts rely heavily on estimates of how fast innovation will occur. Such predictions are incredibly hard to make. Almost no one foresaw the exponential drop in the price of solar energy since the late 2000s, nor did experts predict the current plummeting costs of battery storage. Falling battery costs could reshape the electricity system.

• Geopolitics rewrites the math: External shocks can alter energy economics overnight. Few energy forecasts anticipated wars in Ukraine and Iran, both of which are going to have an enormous impact on our energy mix going forward.

Overall, the uncertainty in these long-term forecasts is enormous. And if history is any guide, the errors are not random. They usually point in the same direction: they overestimate the cost of the energy transition.

One reason is that traditional forecasting models tend to assume slow, steady technological progress. But energy technologies do not always improve that way. Solar, wind, batteries, and fracking all show that costs can change fast when conditions line up. Most models, which assume gradual change, will miss these breaks.

Another problem is that fossil fuels are often treated as stable, low-risk alternatives. They are not. Their prices can swing wildly, and their supply chains are exposed to wars, political instability, and global market shocks. Those costs are real and hard to predict, so they are left out of these estimates.

That is the central point: estimates of the cost of the energy transition should be treated as conditional guesses built on assumptions about technology, fuel prices, politics, and geopolitics, all of which have repeatedly surprised us.

The lesson of the last twenty years is not that the energy transition will be easy or hard — we really don’t know. Anyone claiming to know the cost decades in advance should be treated with skepticism.

Code to reproduce the plots can be found here.

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related things

Is nuclear energy the answer? Nope.

Is renewable energy cheaper than fossil fuels? Yup.

An explanation of how renewable energy saves you money. It’s not that complicated unless you’re being paid to push fossil fuels. Then it’s very complicated.

If you’re looking for a new Substack on energy, check out Bright Spots by Jan Rosenow. This recent post discusses how renewables change the price of energy.

Do you want to see how each U.S. state’s mix of electricity has changed? Brendan Pierpont has you covered here.

1 I’m using levelized cost of energy (LCOE) as my measure of the cost to produce power from each source. I understand the limitations of LCOE, but for an energy developer, LCOE is the number that counts. Yes, wind and solar are intermittent, but that’s a grid problem. All that matters to the developer is which low-LCOE energy source they can build.

We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter.
Subscribe for free here.

Key developments Amazon updates

RECORD-LOW LOSS: Amazon deforestation rates have fallen to their lowest level since 2019, according to a report covered by Agence France-Presse. The newswire called the figures “good news” for president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, but said the rate of deforestation is still “breathtaking”, with five trees felled every second, on average. Separately, a report from Rainforest Foundation Norway found that the “currently anticipated growth in Brazilian beef production may lead to deforestation of ~57,000km2 in the Amazon by 2034”.

ROAD AND RAIL: The Brazilian government will invest $75m into a new highway “cutting through the Amazon rainforest”, reported Deutsche-Welle. The Associated Press said the administration also announced an environmental protection plan to “safeguard the forest from potential impacts from the highway”, but added that environmentalists still fear the move “could speed up Amazon deforestation”. Separately, Inside Climate News reported on a Brazilian supreme court ruling that has brought a 965km railway through the Amazon “one step closer to reality”.

BANNED IMAGES: Mongabay reported that “Brazil’s Congress has passed a bill prohibiting environmental agencies from using satellite images to restrict the commercial use of illegally deforested lands”. According to the outlet, supporters say that “satellite-only enforcement infringes upon farmers’ right to a fair defense”, while critics argue that the bill will “weaken environmental protection” and “create unsafe conditions” for Brazil’s federal environmental police. Separately, the Brazilian government has committed more than $600m (£446m) to “foster ecological investment in the Amazon region”, according to the Associated Press. 

El Niño forecast and extreme heat

‘SUPER’ STRESSED: The predicted “super” El Niño event would add stress to an “already dysfunctional and fragile global food system”, wrote the University of Sussex’s Prof Benjamin Selwyn in a commentary in the Conversation. He added that “El Niño alters rainfall, shifts jet streams and raises global temperatures”, all of which could damage harvests this summer. Reuters noted that the forecast for the phenomenon is “particularly worrying”, due to the predicted strength of the event and the contribution of climate change. 

HEAT BURDEN: “Scorching temperatures” in India have “disrupted daily life across several northern states”, said the Washington Post. The outlet added: “Some farmers have switched to nighttime work to avoid scorching temperatures as a heatwave grips large parts of India.” The heatwave is also affecting Nepal, as high temperatures have “added burdens to public health, education, agriculture, livestock, environment, employment and public infrastructure”, reported Nepal News.

‘MIND-BOGGLING’ HEAT: Meanwhile, a “heat dome” over western Europe broke UK temperature records for the month of May. Carbon Brief summarised how the “mind-boggling” heatwave was covered in both national and international press. Agence France-Presse wrote that parts of Italy approved rules limiting work in conditions “with prolonged exposure in the sun” during the hottest part of the day. The newswire added: “Farmers reported accelerated harvests as temperatures went beyond 30C across the region.”

News and views

• SNAKEBITE DANGER: “The risk of snakebites is increasing across the world as reptiles shift their habitats to cope with rising temperatures and growing human pressures,” according to new research covered in the Guardian. It added that human-snake interactions are “forecast to become more pronounced”.
• RICE RISK: “Several parts” of China are experiencing heavy rains early this year, “raising risks for agriculture and disaster management”, wrote Bloomberg. This includes “key grain-producing provinces”, as well as areas that grow rice, vegetables and fruit, added the outlet.
• DATA DROUGHT: Chile’s Quilicura wetland, just north of Santiago, is drying up as “datacentres have drained water from drought-stricken wetlands, consuming billions of litres annually”, said the Guardian. It noted that the area is home to Latin America’s “largest concentration of datacentres”. 
• ACCOUNTING TRICK: A group of scientists have called on the Irish government to reject a proposal that would allow the livestock to use a metric called GWP* to measure methane emissions, reported Inside Climate News. According to the outlet, they warned that this “accounting trick” would “downplay” the industry’s emissions. (See Carbon Brief’s explainer on GWP* for more information.)

Spotlight Three key findings on the state of carbon dioxide removal

This week, Carbon Brief unpacks three key findings from the third edition of the “state of carbon dioxide removal” report. 

Global carbon dioxide removal (CDR) will need to increase fourfold by 2050 if the world is to have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C by 2100, said a new report.

Nearly all pathways to meeting the Paris Agreement’s highest ambition of keeping global temperatures to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in 2100 involve CDR techniques – ranging from tree-planting to sucking CO2 from air with machines.

This is in addition to steep and immediate emissions cuts.

Scientists expect carbon emissions to push warming beyond 1.5C in the decade ahead, meaning that the target can only be achieved via large-scale CDR.

Here, Carbon Brief pulled out three key findings from the third state of CDR report.

‘Novel’ CDR is small, but growing

The report said that, at present, “99.9%” of existing CDR is conventional, land-based techniques, such as tree-planting and ecosystem restoration.

The world currently removes 2.2bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) per year, equivalent to around 5% of gross global CO2 emissions.

The largest contributors to removing CO2 from the atmosphere are China, the US, the EU, Brazil and Russia, largely through tree-planting (afforestation) and forest restoration (reforestation).

“Novel” CDR, such as biochar and direct air capture, currently removes just 2m tonnes of CO2 annually at present, according to the report.

These methods have been growing at a rate of 40% per year – which is “insufficient for the scale-up required to meet the Paris temperature goal”, said the report.

Current ambition will not lead to net-zero

The report examined several scenarios where global temperature rise is limited to “well below” 2C by 2100, including a current ambition scenario and a highest-possible ambition scenario.

The current ambition scenario was based on “nationally determined contributions”, or NDCs, which countries submit periodically to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Under this scenario, the report projected a total of 5.9GtCO2 of CDR by 2050 and 12GtCO2 by 2100. This scenario would result in end-of-century warming of 1.7-2.7C. 

Importantly, the report said, current ambition does not result in the world reaching net-zero CO2 levels, “meaning that global temperatures would continue to rise” – albeit more slowly – beyond 2100.

Under the highest-possible ambition scenario, CDR scales up to 8.8GtCO2 by mid-century and 15.3GtCO2 by the end of the century. This results in global temperatures peaking at 1.7-1.8C around 2050 and the world achieving net-zero emissions around that time. 

Reducing emissions now lowers the need for future CDR

While many countries include some amount of CDR in their NDCs, there is currently a large gap between the amount of CDR pledged and the amount that will be needed to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C by the end of the century, said the report.

This quantity is referred to as the “CDR gap” – the difference between what is pledged and what is needed. 

The size of the CDR gap is dependent on both the pledges made by countries and the choice of the “benchmark” scenario against which they are measured.

Current NDCs and other country submissions to the UNFCCC total 2.5GtCO2 per year of removals in 2030 and 3.6GtCO2 per year in 2050. Using the highest-ambition scenario as a benchmark, this gives a CDR gap of 0.3GtCO2 in 2030 and 5.2GtCO2 in 2050, according to the report. 

By comparison, a 10-year delay in implementing ambitious emissions reductions will result in the need to remove at least an additional 150GtCO2 from the atmosphere, compared to the most ambitious scenario.

This Spotlight is adapted from Carbon Brief’s Q&A on the state of CDR report. You can read the article in full here.

Watch, read, listen

‘DEVASTATING’ DATA: Grist reported on a proposed Utah datacentre that could be “devastating” to the ecology of the Great Salt Lake – the largest saline lake in the world. 

ECO-OIL: The Times explained how a new synthetic oil, grown in a lab in north-west England, could be used as a substitute for palm oil. 

EL NIÑO IMPACTS: An interactive piece from BBC News described how the forecasted “super” El Niño could impact global climate and weather in the coming months.

‘BATTERY COWS’: The Guardian covered work from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism that found a “huge rise” in factory-style dairy farming of “battery cows” in the UK.

New science

• Greenhouse gas emissions from rice paddies have doubled globally over the past six decades | Nature Food
• Climate change will shift the timing and location of hailstorms – increasing the risk of damage to winter crops, such as wheat, but decreasing the risk to summer crops, such as maize | Nature Climate Change 
• Wind turbines in western Europe put more than 100m migratory birds “at risk” of collision annually, but this number can be lowered through limiting energy production at strategic times | Nature Sustainability

In the diary

• 2-5 June: UN expert meeting on food and agriculture | Rome
• 5 June: World environment day
• 8-18 June: Subsidiary body meetings of the UNFCCC | Bonn, Germany
• 15-19 June: Meeting of the parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea | New York City
• 16-18 June: Our Ocean Conference | Mombasa, Kenya

Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne and Orla Dwyer.  Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org

The post Cropped 3 June 2026: Highway through the Amazon | El Niño impact | State of CO2 removal appeared first on Carbon Brief.

The Labour government wants to cut UK greenhouse gas emissions to 87% below 1990 levels by 2040, which it says will deliver £865bn in economic benefits.

The target has been set out in draft legislation for the seventh “carbon budget”, a legally binding limit on emissions during the five-year period from 2038-2042.

The government says this would protect billpayers from “fossil-fuel shocks”, boost energy security, improve quality of life and help tackle climate change, by getting the country on track for net-zero by 2050.

The UK would need to invest around £880bn over 25 years to meet the budget, but doing so would yield benefits worth £1,620bn, according to a government impact assessment.

Pointedly, the government presents these benefits and costs relative to a policy of “no net-zero”, as the opposition Conservatives and hard-right Reform UK have both pledged to abandon the 2050 goal.

The 137-page impact assessment mentions energy security more than 30 times and says the seventh carbon budget would help save £445bn up to 2050 from ever decreasing fossil-fuel imports.

Moreover, the assessment is based on fossil-fuel price projections published in 2024, before the cost of oil and gas surged earlier this year after the effective closure of the strait of Hormuz.

The document says that the UK’s climate goals would be even more beneficial – worth £1,035bn, relative to “no net-zero” – if the country is exposed to “persistently high fossil-fuel prices”.

The seventh carbon budget must be approved by parliament before the end of June and the government must then publish a plan to meet it “as soon as reasonably practicable”.

• What is the UK’s seventh ‘carbon budget’?
• What target is the government aiming for?
• How could the UK meet the seventh carbon budget?
• What are the benefits and costs of reaching this target?
• What happens next?

What is the UK’s seventh ‘carbon budget’?

The UK’s efforts to tackle and respond to global warming are governed by the Climate Change Act, which was passed with near-unanimous cross-party support in 2008, by 463 votes to five.

In 2019, the then-Conservative government amended the Act to set a long-term goal for cutting emissions to 100% below 1990 levels by 2050, known as the net-zero target.

(The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has affirmed that reaching net-zero is the only way to stop global warming from getting worse – and that emissions would need to reach net-zero by 2050 globally to have a chance of limiting the rise in temperatures to 1.5C.)

To stay on track for the 2050 target, the act requires the government to set a series of “carbon budgets”. These are binding limits on the UK’s emissions covering successive five-year periods.

The UK met its first three carbon budgets, covering 2008-2022. It is currently just over half way through the fourth “carbon budget”, covering 2023-2027.

Under the act, the government is required to set the level of the seventh carbon budget, covering 2038-2042, by the end of June this year.

Before setting the budget, the government must take advice from the Climate Change Committee (CCC). In turn, this advice must take into account a range of factors, including the latest scientific evidence, technological trends, the state of the economy and public finances.

No government has ever gone against the advice of the CCC when setting carbon budgets. However, the government could have chosen not to do so, if it had explained why.

What target is the government aiming for?

The CCC recommended last year that the UK should aim to cut its emissions to 87% below 1990 levels under the seventh carbon budget for 2038-2042 – equivalent to a three-quarters reduction on current levels.

The government has followed this advice, setting a draft seventh carbon budget of 535m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e), some 107MtCO2e per year.

The proposed 2040 target is shown in the figure below, alongside previously legislated budgets and the UK’s international climate pledges for 2030 and 2035 under the Paris Agreement.

UK greenhouse gas emissions including international aviation and shipping (IAS), MtCO2e. Lines show historical emissions (black) and the pathway to reaching net-zero. Legislated carbon budgets levels are shown as grey steps. The first five budgets did not include IAS, but left “headroom” to allow for these emissions (darker wedges). Source: CCC progress reports, Carbon Brief analysis.

In a written statement to parliament, energy secretary Ed Miliband said the target would reduce the UK’s exposure to “volatile international fossil-fuel markets and protect bill-payers”, as well as delivering benefits for jobs, growth, health and the natural environment. Miliband wrote:

“Against the backdrop of heightened geopolitical instability, including the ongoing crisis in the Middle East and its implications for global energy markets, the case for setting a clear and credible long-term pathway for the UK on clean energy and climate action is stronger than ever.”

Echoing a 2023 review commissioned by the then-Conservative government, Miliband also wrote that “clean energy and climate action is the economic opportunity of the 21st century”.

(On the day of the draft budget, the Guardian reported findings that the UK’s “net-zero economy” was worth “more than £100bn a year”, according to consultancy CBI Economics.)

The impact assessment sets out the climate-change “case for action”. It says the “science is clear” that the UK is becoming wetter and warmer, with increasing floods, droughts, heatwaves and wildfires. This is “unequivocally” due to human-caused greenhouse gas emissions. It continues:

“Without action, climate change will continue to endanger the UK’s food and water security, exacerbate global population displacement and pose national security risks.”

The document adds that the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) found the “costs of climate damage are getting higher, while the cost of the net-zero transition is getting lower”.

In its impact assessment, the government also outlines a less ambitious goal to cut emissions to 83% below 1990 levels by 2040 and a tighter target for 89%.

In what may be an attempt to pre-empt future legal challenges (see: What happens next?), the government outlines why it is not choosing to pursue either greater or lesser ambition for 2040.

It says the low end of ambition “increases the risk of underinvestment”, while the highest target could face “deliverability risks [that] may undermine [the UK’s] credibility”.

Note that the sixth and seventh budgets were set in line with the net-zero target, whereas previous budgets were set on a pathway to 80% by 2050 – hence, the step change in the figure above.

The sixth and later carbon budgets include the UK’s share of emissions from international aviation and shipping. These emissions relate to journeys that start or finish at UK ports and airports. Draft legislation to make this change was laid in parliament earlier this year.

The UK’s legally binding climate goals do not include the “imported” emissions associated with the production of goods and services in other countries. Among other reasons, this is because the UK does not have legal jurisdiction over activities taking place outside its borders.

The UK’s imported emissions were growing until around 2008, but have remained relatively flat since then. This means that the UK’s overall “carbon footprint”, including imported emissions, has been falling by a similar amount as the territorial emissions within its own borders.

How could the UK meet the seventh carbon budget?

To date, UK emissions cuts have largely come from the power sector, as the country has stopped burning coal to generate electricity and shifted from gas towards clean power.

In order to meet the seventh carbon budget, the UK will need to cut emissions across the economy. According to the CCC’s advice, the biggest contributions would come from electrifying transport, heat and industry, driven by a massively expanded supply of clean electricity.

It said at the time of its advice:

“In many key areas, the best way forward is now clear. Electrification and low-carbon electricity supply make up the largest share of emissions reductions in our pathway.”

This would mean shifting to electric vehicles (EVs), electric heat pumps and electrified industrial processes on a massive scale, reducing the need for fossil fuels.

Since electrified technologies are far more efficient than those based on fossil-fuel combustion, this shift would also dramatically cut the need for oil and gas imports, the CCC said.

In broad terms, the government backs a similar path to cutting UK emissions through mass electrification. In its release on the seventh carbon budget, it says:

“Half of the UK’s recessions since 1970 have been caused by fossil-fuel shocks. The government is investing in renewable and nuclear energy to get the UK off the rollercoaster of fossil-fuel prices…By 2050, the UK could cut its reliance on fossil fuels from around three quarters of our energy today to around 15%, while avoiding around £445bn in fossil-fuel spending over the next 25 years.”

In its “delivery plan” for the sixth carbon budget, covering 2033-2037, it said roughly a third of UK homes should have heat pumps by 2035 and around half of cars on the road should be EVs.

There is one key difference between the CCC’s suggested approach to meeting the UK’s carbon budgets and that of the government. Specifically, the CCC suggested there would be an important role for behaviour change in relation to diets and efforts to limit the rise in the number of flights.

In contrast, the government has placed much less emphasis on these areas. This means that it relies to a greater extent on expensive technologies that can remove CO2 from the atmosphere.

Despite this context, some right-leaning newspapers have misleadingly focused their coverage on the perceived need to alter diets to meet the seventh carbon budget.

What are the benefits and costs of reaching this target?

The government says that the proposed seventh carbon budget would “deliver the benefits of clean energy and climate action for jobs and growth, health and our natural environment”, as well as aligning with the 1.5C target of the Paris Agreement to “avoid climate disaster”.

Overall, it says that the net-zero target for 2050 “continues to represent value for money, with strong net benefits relative to alternative pathways”.

The detailed impact assessment sets out the benefits and costs of meeting the proposed seventh carbon budget in monetary terms, in line with Treasury guidance under the “green book”.

The results are presented in terms of “net present value” (NPV). This takes into account the human preference for enjoying benefits today, rather than in the future. When measuring NPV, future costs and benefits are “discounted”, to reflect their lower value in the present moment.

Specifically, meeting the proposed seventh carbon budget would have net benefits worth £865bn to the UK, relative to a world where the net-zero target is abandoned and existing technology continues to be used. For example, in this “no net-zero” alternative, gas boilers and petrol cars would be replaced like-for-like when they reach the end of their life.

It says that a lower bill for fossil fuels is a “major component” of the net benefits, with savings reaching £445bn over 25 years if the seventh carbon budget is met, relative to “no net-zero”.

The “vast majority” of these savings result from electrification – in other words, swapping those boilers and petrol cars for heat pumps and EVs.

However, the largest benefit of the proposed budget comes from avoided climate-change damages, which amount to £1,495bn over 25 years, according to the document. This benefit relates to lower UK emissions limiting climate impacts, such as extreme heat and flooding.

The government also acknowledges that significant investments would be required to meet the seventh carbon budget. It puts the cost of these investments at £880bn over 25 years, including financing, relative to the alternative of “no net-zero”.

These benefits and costs of the proposed budget are shown in the figure below. In aggregate, these add up to the headline net benefits of £865bn over 25 years.

Net benefits and costs of meeting the UK’s seventh carbon budget, measured over the period 2025-2050 in present-value terms, £bn. Source: Department of Energy Security and Net Zero.

In addition to the “no net-zero” baseline, the impact assessment compares the proposed budget with a continuation of current policies. The results are directionally similar to, but slightly lower than, the net benefits relative to “no net-zero”.

The document also considers a range of “sensitivities” to explore the impact of higher or lower technology costs and fossil-fuel prices, as well as to consider alternative pathways that use less carbon capture and storage (CCS), fewer EVs or a reduced number of heat pumps.

Finally, the impact assessment also considers the ongoing benefits and costs of meeting the seventh carbon budget when looking out to 2060.

This roughly doubles the net benefits of meeting the target from £865bn by 2050 to £1,520bn by 2060, because the upfront investments yield ongoing savings, such as lower fossil-fuel bills.

Notably, the impact assessment is based on fossil-fuel price projections published in 2024, when the average cost of wholesale gas was around 80p per therm.

These projections envisaged gas prices of 75p/therm in 2025, falling to 70p by 2030. A “high” case, explored in the impact assessment, had prices of up to around 110p/therm.

In reality, prices climbed to around 85p/therm in 2025 and gas is currently trading at 115p, having reached as high as 150p/therm in the immediate aftermath of the US-Israel attack on Iran in February. This was still well below the 640p peak seen during the global energy crisis in 2022.

In the “high” case for fossil-fuel prices – in which prices are below current levels – the net benefit of the seventh carbon budget climbs to £1,035bn over 25 years.

The impact assessment does not consider the potential for “feedback and system loops, which have potential to decrease costs faster than estimated”.

Setting aside the benefits of meeting the UK’s climate goals, the government analysis says that the net investment costs of the transition would be equivalent to around 1.2% of GDP per year, with a range of 0.8-1.6% reflecting uncertainty in fossil-fuel prices and technology costs.

It says that investing 1.2% of GDP in meeting the seventh carbon budget would not mean the UK’s GDP being 1.2% lower. On the contrary, it says the impact on GDP could be positive. It says:

“The investment in home-grown clean energy and electrification and the reduced reliance on fossil fuels has the potential to generate positive impacts on GDP over time.”

It goes on to compare this figure with the cost of the 2022 global energy crisis, which it says hit the economy by around 2-3% of GDP, including taxpayer-funded bill support of £42bn.

Citing recent analysis by the CCC and its own modelling, it says the seventh carbon budget would leave the economy around £90bn better off, if a fossil-fuel price shock were to hit again in 2040.

In addition, the assessment notes figures from the OBR, suggesting that climate damages resulting from global warming of 3C could wipe around 8% off UK GDP.

Notably, the government assessment of net abatement costs is significantly higher than the equivalent figure published by the CCC, of just 0.2% of GDP. It says this reflects two main factors.

First, the government’s reduced emphasis on behaviour change, which as noted above results in a greater need for expensive CO2 removal technologies. Second, it says the CCC “expects a more rapid decline in the costs of technology” than the government assumes.

For example, whereas recent government analysis has assumed that EVs will never be cheaper to buy than petrol cars, the CCC assumes that “price parity” will be reached within a few years. In fact, the latest data indicates that EVs are already cheaper to buy than petrol cars, on average.

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Under the Climate Change Act, there is a deadline of 30 June 2026 to legislate for the seventh carbon budget, subject to parliamentary approval.

In setting out the draft target, the UK government has already taken into account the views of the devolved administrations for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The impact assessment notes that none of them had made “representations” on the level of the seventh carbon budget.

The draft carbon budget legislation is subject to the “affirmative procedure”, which means it must be debated and voted through by both houses of parliament.

For the sixth carbon budget, which was legislated under the then-Conservative government in 2021, this vote took place during the “committee stage”.

The government statement says that its delivery plan for the sixth carbon budget, published in October 2025, will “drive substantial abatement into the carbon budget seven period”. It adds:

“These policies will continue to deliver the bulk of emissions savings needed for carbon budget seven. This provides a strong and credible starting point…reducing delivery risk and giving confidence that the transition can be delivered in an affordable and manageable way.”

Specifically, the impact assessment says that the existing CB6 delivery plan “would get the UK to 84% emissions reduction” by 2040, only just shy of the proposed 87% target.

The government commits to publishing a new delivery plan for the seventh carbon budget “as soon as reasonably practical”, in line with the wording with the Climate Change Act. It says:

“This statutory sequencing recognises the time needed to develop and agree an ambitious and robust package of policies to deliver the target.”

The impact assessment notes that the delivery plan will determine how the UK meets the seventh carbon budget, as well as the implications for different regions and sectors of the UK economy.

Two earlier delivery plans, published by previous Conservative governments, were subject to successful legal challenge in the High Court. These cases, brought by groups including Friends of the Earth and ClientEarth, resulted in the latest delivery plan, published last October.

A separate group, calling itself “Carbon Reckoning”, is attempting to crowdfund a fresh legal challenge to the government’s plans for the seventh carbon budget. In late May 2026, it wrote to Miliband arguing that the 87% by 2040 target “fails to comply with international obligations”.

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Do electric vehicles almost always have a lower carbon footprint than gasoline-powered cars?

The EPA, IPCC, and many independent studies have found that electric vehicles have lower lifetime emissions than gas-powered vehicles in nearly all cases.

“Lifetime” calculations include emissions released during EV manufacture, as well as the generation of electricity used to charge the car. An average 300-mile range EV produces less than half the lifetime emissions of a conventional 30 miles per gallon car.  

This is mainly because EVs are significantly more energy efficient than gasoline cars: over 77% of electricity input is converted to power at the wheels, compared to a conversion of 12-30% of energy in gasoline to wheel power. Meanwhile, the lack of tailpipe emissions offsets an electric sedan or SUV’s initial manufacture emissions within just 1.5-2 years of regular use.

As the U.S. power grid becomes increasingly renewables-based, EVs’ emissions superiority vis-a-vis gas-powered vehicles will continue to grow.

Go to full rebuttal on Skeptical Science or to the fact brief on Gigafact

This fact brief is responsive to quotes such as this one.

Sources

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Electric Vehicle Myths

U.S. Department of Energy Electric Vehicle Benefits and Considerations

IPCC Sixth Assessment Report Chapter 2: Emissions trends and drivers

U.S. Department of Energy All-Electric Vehicles

Environmental Research Letters The role of pickup truck electrification in the decarbonization of light-duty vehicles

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Power Sector Evolution

Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

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Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies will need to be deployed at rates even faster than those seen for solar power, if the world is to have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C by 2100, says a new report.

Nearly all pathways to meeting the Paris Agreement’s highest ambition of keeping global temperatures to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in 2100 involve CDR techniques – ranging from tree-planting to sucking CO2 from air with machines.

This is in addition to steep and immediate emissions cuts.

Scientists expect carbon emissions to push warming beyond 1.5C in the decade ahead, meaning that the target can only be achieved “from above” via large-scale CDR that brings down global temperatures.

These temperature trajectories are known as “overshoot” pathways.

The third “state of CDR” report, written by more than 50 scientists, says that countries’ current CDR plans would fall short of what is needed to limit warming to 1.5C by more than 5bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) per year by 2050.

Global CDR would have to increase fourfold – from 2.2GtCO2 in 2026 to 8.75GtCO2 by 2050 – to have a chance of meeting the 1.5C target by 2100, according to the report.

It adds that deploying CDR can be a “gradual process”, making the period 2026-30 “crucial” for “establishing CDR’s role in limiting climate damages” in the future.

Below, Carbon Brief covers the key findings of the third state of CDR report. (This follows from Carbon Brief’s coverage of the first report in 2023 and second report in 2024.)

• What is CDR?
• What are current levels of CDR?
• How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?
• What does the science say about the potential and costs of CDR?
• What have governments pledged on CDR?
• What is the current funding and research landscape for CDR?
• How is policy impacting CDR demand?

What is CDR?

According to the report, the definition of CDR is:

“Human activities capturing CO2 from the atmosphere and storing it durably in geological, terrestrial or ocean reservoirs, or in products. This includes human enhancement of natural removal processes but excludes natural uptake not directly caused by anthropogenic [human-caused] activities.”

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In addition to this, the report includes “three key principles” for CDR, which are:

1. The captured CO2 must come from the atmosphere, not from “fossil sources”.
2. The subsequent storage “must be durable”, so that the CO2 is not soon reintroduced to the atmosphere.
3. The removal must result from human intervention that is in addition to Earth’s natural processes.

In this report, a CDR method is considered durable if it is able to lock up carbon for “decades or more”.

The report classifies CDR techniques as either “conventional” or “novel”.

“Convential” CDR techniques are “well established, already deployed at scale and widely reported by countries as part of [land-use] activities”.

The methods included in this group are tree-planting, ecosystem restoration, agroforestry (trees in agriculture), improving soil carbon in croplands and natural lands, and durable wood production.

“Novel” CDR techniques have “lower level of readiness for deployment and, as a consequence, are currently deployed at smaller scales”, says the report.

Some examples of different CDR methods are listed on the graphic below.

The graphic also shows whether carbon is captured through biological or chemical processes, as well as how “ready” the method is and for how long it can store carbon, among other features.

CDR techniques and their characteristics. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report says that CDR is “needed alongside deep and rapid emissions reductions” to give Earth a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C. It continues:

“It should play a smaller role than emissions reductions given uncertainty around the feasible levels of scaling, sustainability limits, storage availability and the risk of reversal, among other constraints. 

“In general, CDR should be seen as a limited resource that will need to be used prudently.”

It adds that CDR can “fulfil three major functions”. 

In the near term, CDR can help reduce “net emissions”, it says.

In the medium term, CDR can “counterbalance residual emissions” to achieve net-zero CO2 or net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, the report continues. 

(“Residual emissions” are those that cannot be eradicated through technologies or societal changes, such as methane emissions from rice production.)

Research suggests that global warming is likely to stop, more or less, once net-zero is achieved globally.

In the long term, CDR can “help achieve net-negative emissions”, a state where CO2 removal exceeds emissions, says the report.

In this state, humans could lower global temperatures. This may allow the world to limit global warming to 1.5C by 2100, even if the temperature target is surpassed earlier on in the century. 

Future trajectories where temperatures exceed the 1.5C limit before being brought back down again through CDR techniques are known as “overshoot” pathways.

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What are current levels of CDR?

The report says that, at present, “99.9%” of existing CDR is conventional, land-based techniques such as tree-planting and ecosystem restoration.

The world currently removes 2.2GtCO2 per year, equivalent to around 5% of gross global CO2 emissions, it continues.

The largest contributors to removing CO2 from the atmosphere are China, the US, the EU, Brazil and Russia.

The chart below shows the amount of CO2 removed each year over 2014-23 by the largest contributors, through tree-planting (afforestation) and forest restoration (reforestation).

CO2 removed via afforestation and reforestation each year by the world’s largest contributors to current CDR. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

“Novel” CDR, such as biochar and direct air capture, currently removes just 2m tonnes of CO2 annually at present, according to the report.

However, these methods have been growing at a rate of 40% per year – “similar to successful technologies like solar energy, but insufficient for the scale-up required to meet the Paris temperature goal”, says the report.

The graphic below illustrates how the contribution of conventional CDR currently dwarfs novel CDR, but how the latter techniques are quickly growing.

A graphic illustrating the contribution of “conventional” and “novel” to current CDR methods. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report says that investment in CDR companies recovered in 2025 following a dip – and its “share of all climate-tech funding” grew to 2.6%.

The report also notes that, at present, most CDR efforts are unevenly distributed across the world.

For example, two-thirds of conventional CDR in voluntary carbon markets is in Latin America, according to the report. (Voluntary carbon markets are where companies can buy credits for carbon-reducing or removing projects, such as tree-planting, to claim that they have “offset” some of their own emissions.)

In addition, most pilot projects that aim to demonstrate novel CDR methods are located in only a few countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and the US, says the report.

The chart below shows the location and timeline of demonstration projects that have been announced, are under construction or in operation globally.

Location and timeline of demonstration projects that have been announced, are under construction or in operation globally. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report continues:

“While first-movers play important roles, if their actions do not diffuse more widely, vulnerability emerges, as evidenced by the impact of US climate policy dismantling.”

(For more, see: How is policy impacting CDR demand?)

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How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?

The report examines three scenarios where global temperature rise is limited to “well below” 2C by 2100:

• A current ambition scenario, based on national climate pledges (but omitting the US);
• A highest-possible ambition scenario;
• A delayed ambition scenario, which is consistent with current targets until 2035 and then switches to the highest ambition scenario.

The pledges considered in the report are “nationally determined contributions”, or NDCs, which countries submit periodically to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). NDCs lay out a country’s climate ambition.

Under the current ambition scenario, the report projects a total of 5.9GtCO2 of CDR by 2050 and 12GtCO2 by 2100. 

This scenario would result in end-of-century warming of 1.7-2.7C. Importantly, the report says, this scenario does not result in the world reaching net-zero CO2 levels, “meaning that global temperatures would continue to rise, albeit at a much more gradual pace, beyond 2100”.

Under the highest-possible ambition scenario, CDR scales up to 8.8GtCO2 by mid-century and 15.3GtCO2 by the end of the century.

This scenario assumes “full buy-in by all nations”, with economics, scale-up and sustainability providing the main constraints on CDR deployment, the report says. 

The highest ambition scenario results in global temperatures peaking at 1.7-1.8C around 2050 and the world achieving net-zero emissions around that time. 

Under the delayed ambition scenario, CDR would scale up to 7GtCO2 by 2050 and 23.6GtCO2 by 2100. This scenario shows global temperatures peaking between 1.7C and 2.0C. 

This scenario requires larger CDR deployment in the long term than the highest-ambition scenario does, due to the larger cumulative emissions caused by delaying deep emissions reductions.

In both the high ambition and delayed ambition scenarios, the world reaches “deeply net-negative CO2 emissions” by 2100, the report says. This continued deployment of CDR will further draw CO2 from the atmosphere, lowering global temperatures back down to 1.5C.

The chart below shows annual global greenhouse gas emissions through the end of the century under current ambition (red), highest ambition (green) and delayed ambition (blue) scenarios.

Annual emissions, in GtCO2e per year, for the three scenarios: current ambition (red), highest ambition (green) and delayed ambition (blue). Source: Edwards et al. (2026)

While global CDR capacity scales up more slowly in the first and third scenarios, the report notes that, in all three cases, “novel CDR reaches gigatonne-scale deployment by 2050”.

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What does the science say about the potential and costs of CDR?

There is a wide range of both carbon-removal potential and associated costs between different methods of CDR, according to the report.

However, it also notes that these numbers “range widely” in the scientific literature. 

The discrepancies in estimates of carbon-removal potential are due to a number of factors, the report says, including a lack of available scientific data, inconsistencies in the assumptions made in assessing technical feasibility and a lack of agreement on what, exactly, “potential” means.

These elements also influence the cost of different CDR methods, but additional factors – such as deployment costs in different areas, technological approaches and scope – also play a role in establishing price differences. Because of this, the report says, “cost estimates are often difficult to compare across methods, complicating design and policy decisions”.

The chart below shows the reported range of mitigation potential (left) and reported range of costs (right) for different CDR methods. The top four rows indicate conventional CDR methods, while bottom 11 rows show novel CDR methods. The chart refers to “mitigation potential”, rather than removal potential, because some estimates do not distinguish between removals and avoided emissions.

(Avoided emissions refers to the difference in emissions from carrying out a project, compared to a hypothetical alternative – such as the reduced emissions from halting deforestation.)

The darker colours indicate estimates that are more constrained, meaning that they are either based on stricter assumptions or there is more agreement between different estimates.

Annual mitigation potential (left) and cost range per tonne of CO2 (right) for conventional and novel CDR methods. Orange bars indicate the range of values reported, with darker colours indicating less uncertainty about the estimates. Source: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report notes that for most removal methods, the low end of the potential is around 1GtCO2 per year, while the upper limit of costs is more than $200/tCO2.

The least expensive CDR approaches are forestry-based methods, soil-carbon sequestration and biomass burial. For forestry-based methods, the report puts the cost of CDR at $5-$53 per tonne of CO2 removed. Soil-carbon sequestration costs reach as high as $150 per tonne of CO2 removed, but could have negative overall costs “when accounting for crop yield increases potentially resulting” from changed farm-management practices, the report says.

However, it adds that “these CDR methods are typically associated with lower levels of permanence” than other methods.

Other relatively low-cost methods include coastal wetland restoration, biochar, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and enhanced rock weathering, while ocean alkalinity enhancement is a medium-cost option. 

The most expensive methods include direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and direct ocean carbon capture and storage (DOCCS).

The report also notes that a total estimate of CDR removals cannot be obtained by adding up the removal potential of all of the separate methods, since different methods can compete for scarce resources. For example, BECCS, biochar, biomass burial and biomass sinking all rely on the same base input – biomass – and therefore cannot all be maximised at the same time.

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What have governments pledged on CDR?

While many countries include some amount of CDR in their national climate plans, there is currently a large gap between the amount of CDR pledged in these plans and the amount that will be needed to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C by the end of the century, says the report.

This quantity is referred to as the “CDR gap” – the difference between what is pledged and what is needed. 

The size of the CDR gap is dependent not just on the pledges made by countries, but also the choice of the “benchmark” scenario against which the pledges are measured. Lower – or delayed – emissions reductions lead to larger shortfalls in the long term, meaning “CDR must subsequently be scaled to very high levels”, says the report.

Current NDCs and other country submissions to the UNFCCC total 2.5GtCO2 per year of removals in 2030, 2.7GtCO2 per year in 2035 and 3.6GtCO2 per year in 2050. 

This gives a CDR gap of 0.3GtCO2 in 2030, 1.2GtCO2 in 2035 and 5.2GtCO2 in 2050, according to the report. These figures are obtained using assumed “immediate, ambitious action at all levels to reduce emissions” and the most-ambitious estimates of CDR set out in national pledges. Together, this provides a “lower bound” for the CDR gap, says the report.

By comparison, a 10-year delay in implementing ambitious emissions reductions will result in the need to remove at least an additional 150GtCO2 from the atmosphere, compared to the most ambitious scenario. (See: How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?)

The report says that the CDR gap has widened since the second state of CDR report was released in 2024, due to the US leaving the Paris Agreement. It adds that other countries have “not delivered a step change in ambition” in their latest round of climate pledges.

It also cautions that “credibility issues with national pledges may mean that the CDR gap is actually larger than what we assess here”.

The report notes that current CDR pledges by companies are “substantially higher than country pledges”, at 5GtCO2 per year in 2050. However, it adds, “credibility in these announcements is low”.

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What is the current funding and research landscape for CDR?

Funding of CDR research and development – as well as investment in CDR companies – has continued to increase in recent years.

In total, there has been around $5.6bn in grant funding distributed to CDR research since 2005, according to the report’s analysis. Roughly one-third of this has come in the past three years.

Funding for CDR research grants grew 13% each year between 2022 and 2025, the report says, and the corresponding number of research publications grew at a similar rate.

Funding was largely targeted at a handful of key areas, notably soil carbon sequestration, biochar and forest-based CDR. 

DACCS and BECCS only make up a small number of active grants, but together account for around two-fifths of all funding due to “substantially larger” project sizes.

Despite the growth of research grants and scientific publications, the report concludes that early-stage innovation in CDR is “uneven” and says there is “no strong evidence of a step-change”. 

It notes that much of the support for CDR has come from projects with a broader focus, rather than those that focus specifically on CDR.

The authors also point to a decline in “inventive activity”, as measured by patenting of CDR-related innovations. While patenting for emissions-cutting technologies in general has been on an upward trajectory, CDR patenting peaked in 2011.

Meanwhile, the report highlights the “remarkable” sustained investment in CDR companies, against a backdrop of falling investment in climate-related technologies. It notes that CDR now accounts for around 3% of overall “climate-tech funding”.

Yet, again, it says future developments remain “uncertain”. Since the previous 2024 “state of CDR” report, companies have scaled back their ambitions and policy reversals – notably in the US – “underscore that funding uncertainty remains a key barrier”. (See: How is policy impacting CDR demand?)

An upward tick in funding in 2025 was driven primarily by a “surge” in grants from predominantly public institutions, as well as $0.5bn in debt financing for a single BECCS project in Sweden. 

Reliance on such funding sources “highlight[s] the volatility of the CDR innovation ecosystem”, according to the report.

The report also has a chapter focusing on the voluntary carbon market, which it describes as “propelling most of the current demand for novel CDR”.

The scale of this market remains fairly small, with contracts for 0.04GtCO2 of removals signed last year. 

Moreover, the concentration of sales within a small number of buyers – particularly Microsoft – remains a “critical vulnerability”, the authors note. 

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How is policy impacting CDR demand?

The report analyses CDR policies in G20 nations – which together account for three-quarters of global emissions – to assess how they are acting to support CDR across their economies.

In total, 140 countries have announced net-zero targets, including virtually all of the world’s major emitters. In doing so, the report points out that the governments of these nations have “implicitly included a role for CDR in their climate plans”.

However, this does not always translate into measures specifically designed to scale up CDR. 

Only the EU has adopted a binding, quantified removals target into law – namely, the goal to reach 310m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) of annual net removals in the land sector by 2030.

Overall, conventional CDR is the main focus of policy, with various governments focusing on tree planting to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere.

Among G20 nations, only the UK and Australia have set specific goals to scale up novel CDR, such as BECCS and DACCS, over the coming decade.

The report highlights some nations, including Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the UK, as taking proactive steps to incentivise CDR. 

The authors point to national strategies, financial support for CDR and efforts to integrate it into emissions trading systems (ETS) as examples of effective policy making.

(The report also stresses that the US, which was previously a “leader” on CDR, has now “frozen or dismantled funding and support” for CDR under the Trump administration.)

Most of the successful policies highlighted in the report focus on supporting the supply of CDR, with “less attention so far on creating demand”. 

This is significant because CDR “generally lacks a natural market”, meaning there are not automatically buyers willing to spend money on emissions removals. Therefore, the authors say, policy interventions are important to create markets and boost demand.

“Compliance” carbon credits – referring to credits that can be used to meet legally mandated emissions targets – provide a way to support demand, according to the report authors. 

Only some ETSs, such as those used in New Zealand and Australia, allow the use of credits based on forest-related removals for compliance. (It is worth noting that such credits are controversial, as removals by forests are not always permanent.)

The report also highlights the need for “foundational policies to create a governance framework for CDR, including rules for quantification of removal, guidelines for community engagement and the minimisation of negative environmental impacts”.

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Carbon Tracker analysis finds widespread under-reporting of automaker emissions creating hidden transition risks for investors

LONDON, 2 June, 2026 

New research from financial think tank Carbon Tracker shows that several legacy automakers carry climate-related financial risks comparable to traditional oil and gas producers. The findings are particularly relevant for Japanese OEMs ahead of the country’s AGM season, given their continued reliance on hybrid vehicles and their outsized role in global vehicle production.

The research, from financial think tank Carbon Tracker, finds that major automakers are systematically understating the emissions linked to their vehicles. Across a sample of 17 of the world’s largest OEMs, representing 80% of passenger vehicle sales, Carbon Tracker found an average discrepancy of 33% between reported and real-world emissions from vehicle use.

This “Carbon Gap” stems from widespread use of unrealistic lifetime mileage assumptions, optimistic plug-in hybrid vehicle (PHEV) usage estimates, and the exclusion of upstream fuel-production emissions.

Using a standardised methodology designed to reflect real-world vehicle usage, Carbon Tracker found that several automakers exhibit carbon intensity levels higher than major oil and gas companies when measured on the basis of emissions as a proportion of enterprise value (tCO₂e/EVIC).

Ben Scott, Head of Energy Demand at Carbon Tracker and co-author of the report, said: 

“Automakers are the gatekeepers of future oil consumption. Passenger vehicles are the largest source (27%) of global oil demand and every ICE or hybrid vehicle sold today locks in 10-20 years of additional consumption.  

Automakers’ flawed emissions reporting masks the reality that a dollar invested in legacy automotive firms is in many cases just as carbon intensive as a dollar invested in oil and gas.” 

Leaders and laggards 

The analysis identifies major differences both in transition strategy and emissions disclosure practices across the automotive sector, with some automakers aligning more closely with electrification trends and transparent reporting than others.

Renault and Stellantis emerged as relative leaders on emissions transparency, with reported Scope 3 emissions closely aligned with Carbon Tracker’s estimates, while companies such as BYD and BMW demonstrated substantially higher BEV sales shares than hybrid-heavy peers.

These issues are particularly relevant to Toyota, whose AGM falls on June 17. As the world’s largest automotive manufacturer by volume, with more than 10 million annual vehicle sales, Toyota maintains a hybrid-heavy strategy, selling approximately 27 hybrids for every battery electric vehicle in 2024.

Michael Wells CFA, Analyst at Carbon Tracker and co-author of the report, said: 

“Toyota’s hybrid emissions are an outlier in the sector, exceeding the total emissions of entire manufacturing groups such as BMW. Its hybrid-heavy resource allocation indicates a commitment to technology that faces obsolescence. As major markets move toward outright bans on internal combustion components, Toyota’s hybrid-heavy portfolio risks becoming a fleet of stranded assets.” 

Ken Maeda, Founder of Undertones Consulting, said:  

“Toyota’s heavy reliance on hybrids has delivered short-term sales success but carries significant long-term financial and market risks for both Toyota and the wider Japanese automotive industry. By locking in long-term oil consumption, this strategy heightens stranded asset risks at a time when global peers are accelerating electrification.”  

Mazda and Mitsubishi display the highest emissions intensities, of 10.2 and 9.9 tCO₂e/EVIC, respectively, compared with 4.0 for Shell, the highest intensity oil and gas firm featured in the report.

General Motors exhibits the sector’s largest absolute emissions gap, driven by a high-intensity product mix heavily weighted toward trucks and SUVs in the North American market, combined with the most significant disclosure deficit in the peer group. 

Subaru showed the largest relative reporting gap, with emissions potentially understated by more than 200% due to reporting assumptions that fail to reflect the high-mileage reality of its predominantly US-based fleet. 

Geopolitical Uncertainty and Consumer Lock-in

The financial risks of delaying the EV transition are being compounded by global energy shocks. The ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz underscores the extreme vulnerability of the legacy automotive business model. Automakers persisting with ICE and hybrid technology are effectively locking consumers into highly volatile, inflated fuel costs for decades to come.

This exposure is particularly acute for the Japanese automotive sector. Japan is overwhelmingly dependent on foreign energy, importing more than 90% of its oil, largely from the Middle East through vulnerable chokepoints like Hormuz. By continuing to build vehicles that rely entirely on liquid fossil fuels, domestic giants like Toyota expose both their global consumer base and their home economy to structural macroeconomic instability.

Scott added: “The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is a stark reminder that the real-world cost of driving a legacy vehicle isn’t static. When an OEM sells a hybrid or an ICE vehicle today, they aren’t just selling hardware – they are anchoring a consumer to the oil tap for the next fifteen years. In an era of acute geopolitical supply shocks, failing to decouple transport from crude oil is no longer just an environmental misstep; it is active destruction of consumer value and an unhedged risk for investors.”

Investor implications  

Carbon Tracker argues that that inconsistent and potentially understated emissions reporting creates material challenges for investors attempting to assess automaker transition risk and carbon exposure accurately.

The report finds that differing assumptions around vehicle lifetime mileage, hybrid usage and fuel-cycle emissions can materially distort reported Scope 3 Category 11 emissions, reducing comparability across issuers and potentially leading to the mispricing of carbon-intensive business models.  

Giuseppe (Joseph) Jacobelli, Managing Partner at Bourne Impact Capital Ltd and Founder of actE, said: 

“As for many other industries, carmakers failing to transition from carbon-intensive legacy assets to bankable ones face significant financial liabilities. Institutional portfolios must navigate this ‘bumpy flight’ by prioritising the economic inevitability of the green shift to prevent systemic capital erosion and asset stranding.” 

Carbon Tracker said that investors should move beyond headline emissions disclosures and scrutinise the assumptions underpinning automaker climate reporting, particularly ahead of key shareholder votes and transition-related engagements, such as Toyota’s AGM on 17 June. 

In particular it urges investors to focus on BEV Sales Share as the core transition KPI and incorporate carbon intensity (tCO₂e/EVIC) into corporate valuation models to avoid mispricing high-emission business models. 

 

Notes to editors  

The report, Oil Companies in Disguise, can be downloaded free of charge from here. 

 To arrange an interview please contact:   

Conor Quinn conor.quinn@greenhouse.agency  +44 7444 696 214 

Greenhouse Communications  TrackerGroup@greenhouse.agency     

A Japanese version of the press release is available here.

The post Legacy automakers are just as carbon-intensive as oil and gas firms, new analysis shows appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections

Thanks to the transition from fossil fuels to clean technologies, what used to be considered the worst-case climate change scenario now appears to be outside the realm of plausibility, climate scientists said in a recent study.

That study made headlines in May when President Donald Trump falsely claimed that climate scientists had admitted that their projections had been wrong, a claim akin to an anti-vaxxer gloating that the official end of the pandemic proved that COVID was never a problem.

And the study contained sobering news: The best-case climate scenario is close to slipping out of reach, and a business-as-usual scenario is still a very dangerous one, with high risks of widespread species extinctions, extreme heat-related illnesses and deaths, and expanding vector-borne diseases like malaria.

World makes progress on climate change

Scientists developed the worst-case climate change scenario known as RCP8.5 nearly 20 years ago.

A 2010 paper described RCP8.5 as representing the 90th percentile of plausible climate-warming emissions, cautioning that the RCPs “are neither forecasts nor policy recommendations, but were chosen to map a broad range of climate outcomes.” A 2011 paper summarizing RCP8.5 noted that this scenario envisioned a world with high population growth, slow improvements in energy efficiency, and a heavy reliance on fossil fuels, including a nearly tenfold increase in coal consumption.

Although the U.S. government under Trump favors high birth rates, has dismantled energy efficiency programs, and supports coal and other fossil fuels, policies implemented around the world over the past decade have shifted us away from the characteristics of RCP8.5, leading scientists to say it is now implausible.

Spurred by the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and dramatically falling costs of clean energy technologies, many countries have increasingly transitioned away from climate-warming fossil fuels. All global growth in electricity demand last year was met by clean sources – predominantly solar panels – European energy think tank Ember and the International Energy Agency recently reported.

Change in annual global electricity demand (blue line) and the amount met by fossil fuels (gray bars), solar power (dark green bars), and other clean sources (light green bars) between 2000 and 2025. (Graphic: Ember)

Clean energy has gotten a boost from the Iran conflict, which spiked prices of fossil fuels and spurred many countries to accelerate their efforts to wean themselves off oil and natural gas. China’s exports of solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles to many regions, including Southeast Asia and Latin America, have surged. And the International Energy Agency has said that the world has reached peak coal consumption.

Read: What the Iran conflict means for gas prices, clean energy, and the climate

Annual electric vehicle sales in China (red), Europe (dark blue), the U.S. (light blue), and the rest of the world (green). (Data: International Energy Agency. Graphic: Dana Nuccitelli)

New climate scenarios

Because the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is heading into its next cycle of climate change reports, a group of scientists called the Scenario Model Intercomparison Project was tasked with establishing an updated set of emissions scenarios. In the new paper, they outline six new scenarios ranging from a best-case “very low emission scenario” to a worst-case “high-emission scenario.”

Their scenarios show that meeting the climate targets set in the 2015 Paris Agreement is becoming increasingly difficult as the years pass and global emissions continue to rise. A middle-of-the-road scenario involving continued climate policies would result in high risks of dangerous outcomes like extreme weather-related deaths and widespread species extinctions.

And a new worst-case scenario involving a Trump-style rollback of climate policies would likely result in catastrophic climate change.

The good, the bad, and the ugly

The new high-emission scenario envisions that many countries could weaken or abandon climate policies. The researchers’ description of this scenario may sound familiar to some Americans, suggesting that “a rollback of climate policies could result from a lack of public support for the energy transition. This could be related to, for instance, local opposition to building new wind farms or concerns about impacts on fossil industries related to jobs and national energy security.”

Climate scientists Zeke Hausfather, Glen Peters, and Piers Forster described this scenario as “a more Trumpian future where current policy is rolled back and clean energy deployment slows.”

In this scenario, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations rise from about 430 parts per million today to around 700 parts per million in 2100, when temperatures reach about 3.5°C above preindustrial levels, up from about 1.3°C today. That outcome would still likely represent a climate catastrophe, but it’s less severe than the 936 parts per million and nearly 5°C global warming that would have resulted from RCP8.5 by 2100.

The new medium-emission scenario and very-low emission scenario have fairly similar carbon dioxide and global warming trajectories to their previous counterparts, called RCP4.5 and RCP2.6, respectively.

Global average surface temperature change in the old scenarios (solid lines) and new scenarios (dashed lines). (Graphic: Dana Nuccitelli).

The new medium-emission scenario envisions that climate policies continue at the current level. Climate pollution declines slightly into the middle of the century and then remains flat thereafter, resulting in an extremely dangerous 3°C global warming by 2100.

And the new very-low emission scenario illustrates the increasingly difficult challenge of meeting the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to “well below 2°C above preindustrial levels.” Achieving that goal would require rapid reductions in global climate pollution starting today, reaching net-zero emissions around 2050. The previous best-case scenario allowed for a more gradual emissions reduction, not approaching net zero until the 2070s, because there was more time left when it was developed.

 

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, May 24, 2026 thru Sat, May 30, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (7 articles)

• Malnourished Gray Whales of the Eastern North Pacific Are in `Serious Trouble` The population has plummeted over the past seven years as climate change triggers mass starvation in warming Arctic waters. Inside Climate News, By Blaine Harden, May 24, 2026.
• An Unusually Early Heat Wave Breaks Temperature Records Across Western Europe 'This is an unprecedented event with a one in 1,000 chance of happening at this time of year based on the climate from 1979 to 2025 and virtually impossible in the preindustrial era,'' Christophe Cassou, a climate scientist, told Le Monde. Inside Climate News, Kiley Price, May 26, 2026.
• UK heatwave has `fingerprints of climate change all over it` It’s clearly exceptional when the May temperature record falls not once but twice in two days’ The Independent News, Nick Ferris, May 26, 2026.
• It's so friggin' hot Dr Gilbz on Youtube, Ella Gilbert, May 26, 2026.
• `Mind-bogglingly crazy`: climate experts alarmed by deadly spring heatwaves searing Europe Scientists warn of ‘new reality’ of heat extremes that claim three times more lives than car crashes and 16 times as many as murderers The Guardian, Ajit Niranjan, May 27, 2026.
• Western Europe is roasting in unprecedented spring heat - and it`s not alone Climate scientist Christophe Cassou said the heat in France would have been virtually impossible in the preindustrial era. Yale Climate Connections, Bob Henson, May 27, 2026.
• An Arctic community on the climate front lines | Science The harsh realities of global warming are becoming difficult to ignore in Norway’s Longyearbyen Science, Sarah Boon, May 28, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (5 articles)

• How the jet-setting commissaries of the climate change quango use dodgy statistics to peddle hysteria - and justify their own existence: MATT RIDLEY Op-ed is a display of classic climate-denier tactics intended to change the subject and swerve public attention from what's important. Mail Online, Matt Ridley, May 22, 2026.
• Twenty Years After His Film, Al Gore Tweaks the Climate Script Mr. Gore is still giving the slide show that ''An Inconvenient Truth''” was built around, but with changes that reflect a shift in the discussion of climate change. NYT, Chico Harlan, May 25, 2026.
• Which of your climate actions make the biggest difference? Here`s how to find out The Conversation, Charlotte A. Kukowski and Kimberly Nicholas, May 27, 2026.
• Translating Climate Awareness Into Action at New York High Schools State of the Planet, Emma Kyzivat, Aynsley Kretschmar and Laurel Zaima-Sheehy, May 28, 2026.
• Ask a Climate Therapist: Is it still `catastrophizing` if the threat is real? Psychotherapist Leslie Davenport breaks down some of the tools that can help manage anxiety in the face of mounting climate catastrophe. Grist, Leslie Davenport, May 29, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (4 articles)

• UK bets on private investors to fill climate aid gaps after cuts Humanitarian organisations say the needs of private investors and developing countries are not always aligned. The Independent News, Nick Ferris, May 23, 2026.
• When Will Emissions From Air Travel Start to Fall? Perhaps we will fly less when we accept that ''bored and restless'' is less important than ''don't cook the planet.'' NYT > Climate and Environment, Claire Brown, May 26, 2026.
• Deadly Europe Heatwave Linked to Multiple Deaths as Temperatures Continue Rising Officials have warned that without major adaptation efforts, future heatwaves could place even greater pressure on health systems and urban infrastructure. IBT, Rosemarie Zamora, May 27, 2026.
• Backlash is often swift when authorities try to plan retreat from the coast. There`s a better way Research shows why planned retreat can become divisely emotional and how planners and communities can tackle this backlash. The Conversation, Anne Maree Kreller, May 28, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (4 articles)

• TikTok’s Climate Pledges Collide with Sponsorship of Climate Deniers By backing a right-wing Canadian conference featuring anti-climate speakers, experts warn TikTok has “abandoned” its commitments to combat climate misinformation. Desmog, Rei Takver, May 22, 2026.
• Once A Climate Leader, Canada Is Now Doubling Down On Oil The reversal reveals a stark truth about the direction of global climate action: Despite the rapid deployment of clean energy, even countries and politicians once seen as climate leaders are turning to fossil fuels to protect against the turmoil of Trump’s trade disputes and the war in Iran. Grist, Jake Bittle, May 25, 2026.
• Why Kate Marvel left NASA The former NASA climate scientist explains how pronouns have become more important than the planet at the nation's space agency. HEATED, Emily Atkin, May 28, 2026.
• EPA rollbacks could raise air conditioning, refrigeration costs despite promise of lower prices A new Trump administration rule will likely cost consumers more money while creating higher emissions of climate-warming superpollutants, industry and environmental groups warn. Inside Climate News, EHN Curators, May 29, 2026.

Miscellaneous (4 articles)

• The Paradox of AI and Climate State of the Planet, Renée Cho, May 21, 2026.
• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #21 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, May 17, 2026 thru Sat, May 23, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, May 24, 2026.
• Document leak at Australia's richest company shows how it put off going green Mining giant BHP quietly shelved billions of dollars of green projects despite promising the public it was committed to cutting emissions, and telling its board climate action was "urgent" and any delays would "risk" its reputation. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Angus Grigg, Alex McDonald, and Jade Toomey, May 25, 2026.
• Environmentalists Turn Out in Force to Oppose Trump Coal Ash Rollbacks Proposed new regulations from the EPA would loosen requirements for protecting groundwater near power plants where the toxic residue from burning coal is stored. Inside Climate News, Arcelia Martin, May 28, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (1 article)

• Solar, wind, and EVs have knocked out a doomsday climate scenario Explosive growth in clean technologies has pushed an old coal-heavy scenario out of the realm of plausibility, according to a recent study. But there’s more work to be done. Yale Climate Connections, Dana Nuccitelli, May 29, 2026.

Geoengineering (1 article)

• With geoengineering, a fringe climate solution moves into the mainstream A decade before Exxon’s scientists warned the company’s executives about the likely fallout of burning fossil fuels, White House scientists were already advising then-president Lyndon B. Johnson on a theoretical technology that might curb the impacts of global warming: geoengineering. Atmos, Miranda Green, May 28, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (1 article)

• Climate change could significantly worsen summer air quality in future decades The Conversation, Rebecca Kaarina Saari, May 25, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

• One Nation says it`s the only party in Australia to question climate science. It should ask itself why | Temperature Check Climate change denial has become untenable yet Hanson’s party digs in – with conspiracy theories, cherrypicking and claims that are easy to refute The Guardian, Graham Readfearn, May 21, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week UK, Europe and India battle heatwaves

‘MIND-BOGGLING’ MAY: The UK and continental Europe have set “mind-boggingly crazy”  temperature records for May amid a deadly heatwave, reported the Financial Times. According to the Associated Press, the UK “smashed a century-old temperature record for the second time in 24 hours on Tuesday”. The newswire added that records “also fell in France, where temperatures reached 36C on Monday in the country’s south-west”. On Wednesday, Portugal hit a record May temperature of 40.3C, said BBC News.

‘BRUTAL REMINDER’:  In parts of Italy, the heatwave triggered blackouts, reported Reuters. The heatwave has also been linked to more than a dozen deaths in the UK and France, including from people drowning and suffering heat-related deaths while competing in sporting events, said ABC News. Simon Stiell, the executive secretary of UN Climate Change, said the intense heatwaves were a “brutal reminder” of the cost of global warming, reported Politico. Carbon Brief has in-depth coverage of the record-shattering heatwave.
INDIA’S DEADLY HEAT: In the southern Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, more than 100 people died within three days following an intense heatwave, reported the Khaleej Times. The publication noted that authorities urged people to stay indoors and avoid direct exposure to the heat. Meanwhile, some parts of India are “grappling with power cuts as record-breaking heat has pushed electricity demand ​to an all-time high”, reported Reuters.

Around the world

• CRUDE DIPS: The International Energy Agency (IEA) said global investments in oil projects will fall below $500bn in 2026, continuing a three-year decline, reported Bloomberg. Carbon Brief’s analysis of the data shows the US’s “data-centre boom” means it is now investing more in fossil-fuel power than China.
• DODGING NET-ZERO: The world’s biggest miner, Australian giant BHP, has backtracked on climate action by halting or delaying projects to cut “vast” amounts of emissions, according to a Guardian investigation.
• SOLAR SLIP: China’s new solar installations dropped for a fourth straight month, reflecting weakening domestic demand, said Bloomberg. 
• NO LOGGING: Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon fell last year to its lowest level since 2019, according to a new report, said Agence France-Presse.
• EXECUTIVE ACTION: Puerto Rico’s governor announced a state of emergency to fight a surge in coastal erosion, citing the need to protect natural resources and vulnerable communities, reported the Associated Press.

Four million

The number of homes in the UK with air conditioning, double the figure from three years ago, reported the Guardian. There are 29m households in the UK.

Latest climate research

• Carbon Brief will soon be launching a new fortnightly newsletter focused on climate research. Sign up for free today.
• LGBTQ+ households in the US are “significantly more likely” to face energy poverty and insecurity than the general population | Energy Research & Social Science
• Global rice-paddy greenhouse gas emissions have doubled over the past six decades | Nature Food
• Vegetation greening and human-caused warming are the “main drivers” of a surge in flash floods over the last decade | Science Advances

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

A Carbon Brief investigation has shed light on the impact of weather-related flooding on National Health Service (NHS) facilities across the UK. At least 67 NHS hospital wards, departments and other sites have been forced to temporarily close or relocate due to weather-related flooding. The chart above shows sites of weather-related flooding incidents at NHS facilities. The size of the circles indicates the number of incidents reported at each site.

Spotlight How solar mini-grids can ‘help boost’ Nigeria’s economy

This week, Carbon Brief covers a new report on Nigeria’s solar mini-grid industry.

Amid the impact of the US-Iran war on the Nigerian economy, a new report has argued that solar-mini grids can help to reduce the country’s reliance on fossil fuels and create more than 200,000 jobs.

In Nigeria, Africa’s third-largest economy, the war has led to an increase in energy prices and a decrease in petrol consumption. Petrol is one of the country’s main sources of transport and household fuel. According to one estimate, prices have surged by up to 40% since the conflict commenced in February.

Although the Nigerian treasury has benefited from rising crude oil prices – the country is a major exporter of oil and gas – the impact has been most visible on the wider population.

Rising energy prices “have affected the purchasing power of workers”, Agnes Funmi Sessi, a labour union leader in Lagos, told Carbon Brief. 

However, scaling the deployment of solar “mini-grids” could help the country move away from fossil fuels, stimulate rural economies and improve livelihoods, according to the new report authored by the thinktank, the Africa Policy Research Institute.

“We estimate that, by deploying over 10,000 mini-grids, the sector could create 212,688 direct full-time informal and productive-use jobs across the off-grid and under-grid market segments,” the report said.

A nascent industry

Solar “mini-grids” are small-scale, localised electricity generation and distribution systems powered by solar panels.

The report positioned Nigeria’s mini-grid sector as one of the fastest-growing in Africa, with the country having just 11 mini-grids in 2015 and 155 by 2024, along with at least 42 active developers.

Many of the companies within the sector are young and apply novel local techniques in their deployment of solar technology, the report said.

However, access to finance remains a huge barrier. According to the report, the sector may require up to $8bn to connect 35.4 million people to mini-grids.

“Most Nigerians want solar power in their homes, but it is a capital intensive business for vendors and customers,” Dr Ben Iheagwara, a renewable energy entrepreneur and policy analyst, told Carbon Brief.

The report urged the Nigerian government and its international partners to “attract private capital by de-risking investments and ensuring regulatory clarity and long-term planning”.

Other key recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders include investment in skills development and paying attention to the gender gap.

Powering rural communities

Many rural communities, which make up about 37% of the country, are disconnected from the national grid system, so often have to generate their own electricity through mini-grid systems.

According to Nigeria’s electricity regulator, NERC, a mini-grid is defined as a power generating system with an installed capacity of up to 10 megawatts.

A mini-grid can be powered by fossil fuels such as diesel or petrol, but solar power is now considered a cheaper and cleaner source.

With more than 80 million people lacking access to electricity in Nigeria, solar mini-grids are increasingly viewed as the lowest-cost electrification solution, the report said.

Watch, read, listen

MOVING FORWARD: The Energy Transition Show dug into electricity reform in South Africa, discussing the country’s coal legacy and the role of renewables.

ENERGY POVERTY: In an opinion article for Project Syndicate, executive director of the African Climate Foundation, Saliem Fakir, argued that the energy transition in emerging and developing economies is driven by economics and security rather than emissions targets.
VANISHING CITY: BBC News reported on a coastal community in Nigeria where the ocean has “already swallowed more than half of the town”.

Coming up

• 31 May: Colombia presidential elections
• 31 May-5 June: Global Environment Facility council meeting, Samarkand, Uzbekistan
• 2-5 June: The Venice Agreement for Peatlands workshop, Kisumu, Kenya

Pick of the jobs

• National Oceanography Centre, engagement assistant (external communications) | Salary: £28,254. Location: Southampton, UK
• Dangote Industries, decarbonisation specialist | Salary: Unknown. Location: Lagos, Nigeria
• City of New York, chief decarbonization officer | Salary: $261,469. Location: New York City
• Climate Central, writer and associate editor | Salary: $72,000-$75,000. Location: US (Remote)

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

DeBriefed 22 May 2026: UN adopts landmark resolution | Trump takes on ‘RCP8.5’ | Climate migration

DeBriefed

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22.05.26

DeBriefed 15 May 2026: Trump-Xi talk energy | ‘Supercharged’ El Niño | India’s first ‘heat lounges’

DeBriefed

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15.05.26

DeBriefed 8 May 2026: EU eyes fossil-fuel exemptions | Wind and solar save UK ‘£1.7bn’ | Amazon ‘tipping point’

DeBriefed

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08.05.26

DeBriefed 1 May 2026: Countries chart path away from fossil fuels | China’s clean-tech surge | Global forest loss slows

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01.05.26

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The post DeBriefed 29 May 2026: Europe’s ‘mind-boggling’ May | Indian heat deaths | Nigeria’s solar mini-grids appeared first on Carbon Brief.

The “data-centre boom” is driving a surge in gas investment in the US, pushing its fossil-power spending ahead of China, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

A rapid expansion of data centres across the nation is at the heart of the US tech sector’s plans to continue “dominat[ing]” the global artificial intelligence (AI) industry.

High demand for electricity to power these data centres has led to companies rushing to build new gas-fired power plants across the country.

This trend, combined with “soaring” gas-turbine prices, drove a threefold increase in US gas‑power investment in 2025 – and the IEA expects this to continue throughout 2026.

As the chart below shows, Chinese investment in coal- and gas-fired power is expected to drop this year, amid domestic policy changes and the Iran war sending gas prices spiralling.

Together, these trends mean the IEA expects US investment in fossil-fuelled power plants to overtake China’s in 2026.

Annual investment in fossil-fuel power in China and the US, $bn. The figure for 2026 is an IEA estimate, based on current trends. Source: IEA.

The IEA’s latest world energy investment report shows that spending on renewables and electricity grids continues to dominate at the global scale.

In the US, Trump administration policies such as the phase-out of tax credits for renewables has led to the IEA revising its forecast for new wind and solar power downwards.

At the same time, US electricity demand is expected to rise by an average of 2% per year from 2026 to 2030, with data centres contributing half of the overall increase. 

This is leading to what the IEA calls an “AI-driven push” to build new gas-power plants in the US, the world’s largest data-centre market and largest gas producer.

Globally, orders for new gas-power plants increased to 130 gigawatts (GW) in 2025 – a 25-year high – and US demand was a “major factor” in this, according to the IEA.

Much of the demand is coming from tech companies in the US seeking to bypass grid connection queues by building “captive” gas-power plants.

As the chart below shows, since the start of 2025 these US captive data centres alone have signed off on more investment in new gas turbines than any country in the world – aside from the US itself.

Total value of new gas generation final investment decisions by country, region or use-case, between 2025 and the first quarter of 2026, $bn. Source: IEA.

Overall, investment in grid upgrades, power equipment and electricity generation to support the buildout of data-centre infrastructure around the world hit $105bn in 2025, according to the IEA. 

This is more than the total invested in the energy sector across the whole of Africa – a continent where more than 600 million people do not have access to electricity.

The IEA notes that strong demand for gas-power plants for data centres in the US – and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East – is “limiting the availability of turbines for near-term deployment elsewhere in the world”.

The agency also points out that as the tech sector becomes a “major energy investor”, accounting for around 40% of all corporate power-purchase agreements, it is also “underpinning momentum” for emerging clean technologies, such as small modular nuclear reactors and advanced geothermal.

Q&A: What does Trump’s repeal of US ‘endangerment finding’ mean for climate action?

Policy

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16.02.26

Analysis: Trump has overseen larger coal decline than any other US president

Coal

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12.02.26

Analysis: World’s biggest historic polluter – the US – is pulling out of UN climate treaty

Emissions

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08.01.26

Factcheck: Trump’s climate report includes more than 100 false or misleading claims

Factchecks

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14.08.25

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The world’s most comprehensive disaster database – relied on by thousands of climate scientists and policymakers – is at risk of closing as a result of cuts to US foreign aid by the Trump administration.

The “emergency events” database (EM-DAT) has for 30 years provided free-to-use information on the size and impact of extreme weather events and other disasters around the world.

Its data underpins a vast range of scientific research, government policymaking, humanitarian response efforts and environmental investigations.

However, Trump’s dismantling of the federal Agency for International Development (USAid) – which provided 90% of the funding for EM-DAT – has left the future of the database in jeopardy, scientists tell Carbon Brief.

An open letter coordinated by climate scientists and signed by more than 4,000 academics and students is calling on governments, multilateral development banks and philanthropy to step in to stop the database from closing.

‘World’s memory of disasters’

For the past three decades, a small team of researchers at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain in Belgium have maintained EM-DAT.

It is the world’s most comprehensive database of extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, floods and tropical storms, along with other disasters. It offers information such as the timing and length of an event, how many people were killed or displaced and the economic cost.

Since 1988, this continuous record has been free to use and independently verified by the researchers at CRED.

When considered in its entirety, the database provides more than just a list of disasters – it acts as a “memory” of how extreme weather events and their impacts on people are changing, says Prof Niko Speybroeck, an epidemiologist and director of EM-DAT. He tells Carbon Brief:

“EM-DAT can be considered the world’s memory of disasters. It contains more than 27,000 natural and technological disasters. It’s not just a database. It makes it possible to know who was affected, when, where and with what consequences.”

The database is frequently used by climate scientists. It is often cited in research papers and underpinned analysis in the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on the impacts of climate change.

It is also used by government officials and environmental organisations.

The database is particularly important for global-south nations, which are less likely to have comprehensive national or regional records of disasters than those in the global north.

For example, the Indonesian government used EM-DAT to develop a national strategy against disasters, says Speybroeck.

The database has also been used to document the “disproportionate climate burden” borne by small-island nations, he adds, which “prompted the UN to release more funding” for these states.

EM-DAT is of critical importance to national and multinational initiatives tracking extreme weather in Africa, says Prof Dewald van Niekerk, head of the African Centre for Disaster Studies at North-West University in South Africa. Van Niekerk was one of the climate scientists who authored the open letter calling for EM-DAT to be protected from closure. He tells Carbon Brief:

“We use it on various levels, from sub-national straight up to continental level.”

Since 2018, van Niekerk has utilised EM-DAT to prepare reports on extreme weather events in Africa for the African Union. These efforts are to meet goals agreed under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, a voluntary international agreement to prevent disasters from upending development.

Without EM-DAT, it would not be possible to conduct such analyses, he says:

“Not all [African] governments can compile these databases. Where they do, they are extremely fragmented. You can’t compare apples with apples.”

(Carbon Brief has also used EM-DAT data to investigate the impact of extreme weather on Africa, finding that such events killed at least 15,000 people on the continent in 2023.)

Uncertain future

Despite having a global impact, EM-DAT’s small team of researchers require just €300,000 ($350,000) a year to maintain operations.

For decades, EM-DAT obtained 90% of this funding from USAid, the US’s federal agency for foreign aid, says Speybroeck:

“[USAid] allowed us to work in an independent and neutral way, so we were not influenced by any politics. That was one of the strengths of the database. They only asked for us to leave it open access, meaning that anyone can use it.”

USAid was dismantled by Donald Trump after he became US president for the second time in January 2025. By July, the agency officially closed its doors.

Speybroeck received a letter in February 2025 informing him that his team were to lose their funding. 

“I decided for a long time to keep silent,” he tells Carbon Brief. However, by the end of 2025, he chose to start speaking out about the impact of USAid cuts on EM-DAT.

Learning of the threats to the database, four leading climate scientists published an open letter in March calling for other governments, multilateral development banks and philanthropy to step in to stop the database from closing. It has attracted more than 4,000 signatures.

One of the letter authors, Prof Gabriele Messori, director of the Swedish Centre for Impacts of Climate Extremes at Uppsala University in Sweden, tells Carbon Brief:

“It’s very worrying that a long-term dataset that has become a reference for many different sectors, when looking at the impacts of a wide range of natural and technological events on society and the economy, could be suddenly interrupted.” 

(The cuts to EM-DAT’s funding come as the Trump administration has laid off thousands of scientists and frozen research grants worth billions of dollars in the US. For more on how these actions are impacting climate science, see Carbon Brief’s explainer on how Trump is threatening polar research.)

Since going public about EM-DAT’s funding crisis, Speybroeck says he has had some “positive signals” from potential new funders, but “there is nothing on paper yet”.

Another letter author, Prof Dewald van Niekerk, says he hopes to see EM-DAT move towards a model of using multiple funding sources, to create a “more robust structure” where “no one can just pull the plug” on its work.

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Open access notables

Climate Change Communication in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Schäfer et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Chang

Artificial intelligence (AI), and especially generative AI (GenAI), is rapidly reshaping climate change communication (CCC). Once dominated by news coverage and public campaigns, CCC now extends across scientists, NGOs, corporations, journalists, influencers, and citizens—all increasingly encountering and adopting AI tools. This article provides a comprehensive review of scholarship on the nexus of AI and CCC, synthesizing insights scattered across disciplines from social and computer science, and interdisciplinary fields like environmental and science studies. It identifies robust patterns alongside significant gaps, highlighting areas where future research is needed. Based on existing evidence, it shows that AI—as of now—functions less as a disruptive replacement of established communication and information-seeking practices rather than as an assistive layer in CCC: accelerating routine newsroom tasks, enabling personalized and multilingual outreach, and generating new textual, visual, and multimodal representations of climate change. Stakeholders use AI to monitor discourse, expose greenwashing, and broaden access to climate information, though systematic research on uptake and effects remains limited. Journalists experiment cautiously with AI, emphasizing human oversight, while influencers and content creators are understudied despite their growing role. The potential of AI-driven systems for fact-checking, policy analysis, and creative engagement has been explored, yet studies remain heavily English-centric and focused on text. Citizen studies reveal promises and risks: generative dialogues can reduce skepticism and foster engagement, but biases, misinformation, and equity concerns persist. Advancing the field requires comparative and interdisciplinary agendas that integrate computational and traditional methods, foreground transparency and inclusion, and address how AI can equitably support awareness, trust, and climate action.

Vacuuming the Sky? Metaphorical Framing in News Coverage of Carbon Dioxide Removal Methods, Bruggen et al., Environmental Communication

Discussions of proposed climate solutions, such as carbon dioxide removal (CDR), are multi-layered and contested. This study examines the role that metaphors play as frame devices in news coverage (2018–2024) about CDR. Using critical metaphor analysis, we examined 257 articles from major UK, US, and Canadian news outlets to identify and interpret contrasting metaphorical expressions from journalists and their sources, including industry, science, and civil society. We find that a wide range of source domains, including references to, e.g. historical events, household objects, crime, religion, and medical analogies, is used to metaphorically frame CDR. These metaphors reflect actors’ competing ideologies and interests, rooted in hopeful rational-optimist and socio-ecological visions. We also discuss how metaphor use could influence public engagement and policy and reflect on how language might oversimplify or obscure critical aspects of the technology.

Consensus Messaging Shifts Beliefs About Climate Change in a Field Experiment, Rode et al., Science Communication

Previous research on climate change consensus messaging has mostly taken place in controlled lab settings. In this field experiment, we engaged U.S. residents (N = 158) in brief doorstep conversations on climate change. Research assistants read a script about the scientific consensus (treatment) or basic facts about climate change (control) and then provided participants with a magnet containing the same information. The consensus message had a significant positive effect on consensus estimates (β = 0.45) and belief in climate change (β = 0.41), but not on other downstream attitudes or behavior. These results mostly align with theory and have implications for consensus messaging.

From this week's government/NGO section:

24/7 renewables. The economics of Firm Solar and Wind, Dardour et al., The International Renewable Energy Agency

The authors show that the cost of firm renewable electricity has declined rapidly across all major technologies and markets. In high-quality solar and wind resource regions, co-located hybrid systems can already deliver round-the-clock electricity at costs competitive with - and in many cases below - those of new fossil-fuel generation. China currently defines the global cost floor, while costs in Brazil, India, South Africa, Australia, and the Gulf region are declining rapidly towards fossil-fuel cost parity. The authors identify key drivers of firm renewable costs – technology performance, resource quality and system configuration – and examine the policy levers that are proving decisive in translating cost competitiveness into deployment at scale. They conclude that the technologies are maturing, the costs are falling and the commercial demand is growing. The pace at which firm renewable electricity is deployed will be among the most consequential determinants of the global energy transition in the decade ahead.

Climate Promises, Industry Handouts. Canada’s Fossil Fuel Funding in 2025, Environmental Defence Canada

The Government of Canada has provided at least $10.2 billion in fossil fuel subsidies and public financing in 2025. Since Environmental Defence began tracking fossil fuel subsidies in 2020, the federal government has provided at least $85.2 billion in subsidies to the fossil fuel industry. This figure includes government direct spending as well as public financing through Crown corporations, such as Export Development Canada. In addition to fossil fuel subsidies, the Government of Canada provided at least $405.53 million dollars in subsidies for carbon capture and fossil fuel hydrogen projects in 2025. These technologies have failed to deliver on their promises to reduce emissions and have instead locked in further fossil fuel production. Furthermore, this figure excludes the estimated cost of the carbon capture investment tax credit, which is estimated to cost Canadians up to $5.7 billion by 2028, and up to $12.4 billion by 2035. The changes introduced in the Budget 2025 could increase the cost to Canadians by an additional $3.75 billion. In 2025, the cost of pollution from oil and gas companies operating in Canada was an estimated $56.4 billion. This figure was calculated by taking the most recent oil and gas emissions figures and multiplying with the social cost of carbon. Climate pollution created by oil and gas companies has massive costs, including health costs, property damage from extreme weather events, and decreased agricultural productivity due to changing weather patterns. The social cost of carbon helps to estimate what those costs to society are. 76 articles in 46 journals by 755 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Intensified Stratosphere–Troposphere Ozone Transport over Asia under a High-End Climate Trajectory, Luo et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0426.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global aviation contrail climate effects from 2019 to 2021, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-6071-2024 68 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

Abrupt stream acidification and metal mobilization from permafrost degradation, Skierszkan et al., Science 10.1126/science.aea2898

Increasing exposure to compound heatwave and drought events in China during 1961–2020, Qin et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109099

Two decades of urban heat intensification and exposure across 1400 cities, Naserikia et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03665-y

Wildfire Hazard in Poland in a Warming Climate: Past and Future Impact of Extreme Weather, Pi?skwar et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70439

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Multivariate extremes in lakes, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49012-7 29 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

Assessing winter climate change using cumulative sub-zero temperatures, HE et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.008

Critical dependence of global ocean heat monitoring on the ocean observing system, Zhu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02661-6

Increasing Power When Controlling Multiple Hypothesis Testing with Climate Data via Covariate Smoothing, McEvoy & McKinnon, Journal of Agricultural Biological and Environmental Statistics Open Access 10.1007/s13253-026-00738-5

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biogeographic patterns of daily wildfire spread and extremes across North America, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1355361 19 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Evolution of Compound Drought and Extreme Precipitation Events on the Tibetan Plateau, Sun et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0306.1

Statistical-dynamical downscaling of EURO-CORDEX projections to 50 m resolution: characteristic days for Baden-Württemberg under climate change, Kermarrec et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1778467

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Central-Pacific El Niño-Southern Oscillation less predictable under greenhouse warming, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48804-1 14 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty quantification in weather and climate models, Mansfield & Christensen, Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society Open Access 10.1002/qj.70219

Evaluating Nex-GDDP CMIP6 Models for Extreme Wet and Dry Events Over Indonesia, Kurniadi et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70437

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Is Bias Correction in Dynamical Downscaling Defensible?, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2023gl105979 24 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

An Extreme Antarctic Event; 2025 Was Record Low Seasonal Sea Ice and Record High Iceberg Scouring, Barnes et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70938

Abrupt stream acidification and metal mobilization from permafrost degradation, Skierszkan et al., Science 10.1126/science.aea2898

Constrained simulation of permafrost thermal changes from 1980 to 2018 on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, Ji et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105542

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Widespread seawater intrusions beneath the grounded ice of Thwaites Glacier, West Antarctica, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2404766121 52 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

Estimating the cost of sea level rise, Sugiyama et al., DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Open Access pdf pmh:oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/38529

Improved closure of the global mean sea level budget from observational advances since 1960, Zheng et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aea0652

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Diminished Ross Ice Shelf and West Antarctic Ice Sheet during Last Interglacial warming, Carter et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01988-1

Multi-model assessment of the deglacial climatic evolution at high southern latitudes, Obase et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-21-1443-2025

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Acute temperature effects on cilia beating increase coral deoxygenation, Pacherres et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeg0950

An Extreme Antarctic Event; 2025 Was Record Low Seasonal Sea Ice and Record High Iceberg Scouring, Barnes et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70938

Climate and land use change potentially drives southern range contraction and latitudinal shift in Caucasian Lynx, Shahsavarzadeh et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-54072-4

Climate change accelerates global forest deadwood dynamics, Edelmann et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03651-4

Climate-driven vegetation vulnerability in a monsoon-dominated dryland: a dual-index (kNDVI–VHI) assessment for Pakistan, Mehmood et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1745938

Flood events from climate extremes drastically shift prey energy densities, Nitschke et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108136

Hot days increase the risk of heat-stress-related deaths in endangered koala populations, Mella et al., Biology Letters Open Access 10.1098/rsbl.2026.0117

Resilient nekton composition in the face of climate-driven foundation species shifts, Leavitt et al., Ecology Open Access 10.1002/ecy.70397

Taxonomic and functional diversity of benthic foraminifera as a promising proxy for tidewater glacier retreat, Fossile et al., Boreas Open Access 10.1111/bor.70068

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Asymmetrical Impact of Daytime and Nighttime Warming on the Interannual Variation of Urban Spring Vegetation Phenology, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef004127 20 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

An Upper Bound on Carbon Emissions of Drained Peat Soil Grasslands From Satellite Radar Interferometry, Conroy & Hanssen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl115732

Forest carbon protocols underestimate climate-driven carbon loss risks, Wu et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10571-y

Lowland tropical forests remain a methane sink under warming and long-term hurricane disturbance recovery, Conte et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111225

Machine-learning-based estimates of global natural vegetated wetland methane emissions (2000–2025), Li et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-3507-2026

Reduction of tropical cyclone-induced ocean carbon outgassing since 1993, Ye et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01985-4

Widespread peat carbon losses driven by the 2025 Scottish megafire, Schoenecker et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01994-3

Winter Mixing Controls Carbon Sequestration by the Biological Pump in the Subpolar North Atlantic, Fogaren et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023822

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Whole-soil warming leads to substantial soil carbon emission in an alpine grassland, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48736-w 65 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Concerns and Questions About Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies, Luczak, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70063

Determinants community involvement in a forest carbon sequestration initiative: a study case in Indonesia, Triana et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1770765

Economic costs of global forest protection may be overstated, Nepal et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73569-0

Impact on oysters in first-of-its-kind field trial of marine Enhanced Rock Weathering (mERW) with olivine as carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategy, Jankowska et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1851765

Vacuuming the Sky? Metaphorical Framing in News Coverage of Carbon Dioxide Removal Methods, Bruggen et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.1080/17524032.2026.2673348

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Taking stock of carbon dioxide removal policy in emerging economies: developments in Brazil, China, and India, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2353148 14 cites.

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Decarbonization

An energy scenario for Japan towards 2040: Focused on efficiency improvements and renewable energy, Takase et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115398

Averting the steel carbon lock-in through strategic green investments, Bachorz et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access 10.1038/s41558-026-02635-8

High-impact weather effects on wind and solar power systems under future climate scenarios in China, Sun et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73427-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biological fermentation pilot-scale systems and evaluation for commercial viability towards sustainable biohydrogen production, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48790-4 68 cites.

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Geoengineering climate

Artificial Flooding Leads to Thicker and Brighter Arctic Sea Ice, Blanchard?Wrigglesworth et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007894

Contrasting Changes in Rainfall Structure Between Monsoon and Adjacent Dry Regions Under Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, Jiang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046329

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rethinking the Susceptibility?Based Strategy for Marine Cloud Brightening Climate Intervention: Experiment With CESM2 and Its Implications, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108860 13 cites.

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Black carbon

Sediment records reveal elevated black carbon emissions potentially amplifying Arctic snowmelt, Gong et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03654-1

Aerosols
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Constraining effects of aerosol-cloud interaction by accounting for coupling between cloud and land surface, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adl5044 25 cites.

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Climate change communications & cognition

Climate Change Communication in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Schäfer et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70073

Consensus Messaging Shifts Beliefs About Climate Change in a Field Experiment, Rode et al., Science Communication Open Access 10.1177/10755470261442409

From cognition to action: climate risk perception and corporate capital structure optimization, Fu et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1826872

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Trust in climate science and climate scientists: A narrative review, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000400 34 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Assessing rainfall and temperature trends to guide agricultural adaptation, Msangi & Deus, Discover Agriculture Open Access pdf 10.1007/s44279-026-00607-2

Contextualizing the marginal returns of regenerative agriculture on maize performance under climate change in Nigeria, Kolapo & Sieber, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1767448

Dolomite in conjunction with straw application increased straw-derived CO2 emission while depressed soil organic carbon mineralization in two acidic paddy soils, Xu et al., Biology and Fertility of Soils 10.1007/s00374-026-02017-4

Effect of organic mulches in vineyards: CH4 and N2O emissions and their contribution to the GWP and carbon balance, Rodrigo et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1846259

Evaluating the Intercropping Systems in the Context of Agroecological Resilience in the Current Era of the Changing Climate: A Scenario of Scientific Analysis of Last Decade Data, Maitra et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access 10.1002/cli2.70050

Nonlinear temperature change responses shape soil organic carbon loss-gain transitions in global Mollisol croplands, Meng et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73759-w

Uncertainties in global hydrological and climate models challenge future estimates of crop water use and sustainability, Sun et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03621-w

Viral mediation of anaerobic methane oxidation to carbon sequestration in paddy soil, Tong et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01998-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate-resilient agricultural ploys can improve livelihood and food security in Eastern India, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-023-03176-2 21 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Decoupling Between Heavy Precipitation Expansion and Population Exposure in a Warming World, Zhou et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007771

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Widespread societal and ecological impacts from projected Tibetan Plateau lake expansion, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01446-w 131 cites.

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Climate change economics

Achieving climate justice: climate finance and income inequality in developing countries, Li et al., Open MIND Open Access pmh:10.6084/m9.figshare.31389871

Estimating the cost of sea level rise, Sugiyama et al., DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Open Access pdf pmh:oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/38529

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Has climate change promoted the high-quality development of financial enterprises? Evidence from China, Frontiers in Environmental Science, 10.3389/fenvs.2024.1332748 1 citation.

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Climate change and the circular economy Climate change mitigation public policy research
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Integrated assessment modeling of a zero-emissions global transportation sector, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48424-9 99 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

An institutional perspective on integrating climate and societal challenges in urban areas, Wöhler et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100829

Reframing climate adaptation and societal collapse: governance pathways for systemic risk in the Anthropocene, Granberg & Glover, Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1825767

The public mandate for equitable climate adaptation: Evidence from Aotearoa New Zealand, Parsons et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104398

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Multi-Scalar Inequities of Climate Adaptation Finance: A Critical Review, Current Climate Change Reports, 10.1007/s40641-024-00195-7 29 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Associations between climatic variables and dengue incidence in high-burden countries: a systematic review and meta-analysis, James et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1804553

Climate Change Elevates the Risk of Antibiotic Resistance in Global Surface Ocean, Yuan et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70929

Differentiated associations of daytime and nighttime heatwaves with long-term survival: A nationwide population-based cohort in China, Liu et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.009

Eroding heat resilience in South Asian cities under observed warming trends, Yadav et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-55172-x

Health Impact of Climate Change on Older Adults Living With Dementia: A Scoping Review, Gurung et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change 10.1002/wcc.70071

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate Change, Environment, and Health: The implementation and initial evaluation of a longitudinal, integrated curricular theme and novel competency framework at Harvard Medical School, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000412 23 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics

Climate Legislation and Global Green Development Transition: The Role of International Environmental Engagement and Government Readiness, Liu & FENG, Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0140.1

Climate change impacts on human culture Other

Northern Hemisphere Wintertime Stratospheric Circulation Response to Smoke Injection From a Regional Nuclear Conflict, Yook et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122395

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Increasing frequency and lengthening season of western disturbances is linked to increasing strength and delayed northward migration of the subtropical jet, , 10.5194/egusphere-2023-1778 1 citation.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

The subnational wedge in Paris-aligned pathways, Hsu et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000921

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
‘Mind the Gap’—reforestation needs vs. reforestation capacity in the western United States, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1402124 28 cites.

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Book reviews

Book Review: Loss and Damage in Climate Politics, Tirivangasi, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2677325

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Data Centers in California, Mark Specht and Vivian Yang, Union of Concerned Scientists

California already has many large data centers, and the state is expecting to see a surge of new data centers over the next decade. While data centers and the proliferation of AI pose a wide range of potential effects on the economy, the environment, and society, the authors focus specifically on the effects on the state’s electricity system and its ratepayers, along with policy solutions to mitigate those effects. If left unaddressed, data center growth could undermine grid reliability, slow the clean energy transition, and raise costs for ratepayers. Policymakers should require data centers to provide more transparency into their operations and pay their fair share of electricity costs. The state should additionally implement guardrails to minimize the harmful air quality effects from data center backup generation and ensure the growth of data centers does not stall clean energy progress or threaten grid reliability.

2026 State of the Market. Corporate Demand, Market Evolution, and Buyer Leadership, Corporate Energy Buyers Association

Corporate energy buyers continue to play a defining role in the evolution of clean energy markets. Despite higher power purchase agreement (PPA) and energy prices, reliability risks, and growing complexity, corporate demand for clean energy reached new heights in 2025 and early 2026. Since CEBA’s tracking began in 2014, corporate buyers have announced more than 143 gigawatts (GW) of new large-scale clean energy capacity in the United States, with back-to-back record-setting years in 2024 and 2025. Corporate buyers are no longer simply participating in the energy transition — they are shaping it.

Powering Canada Strong: A National Strategy for an Electrified Canadian Economy, Natural Resources Canada, Government of Canada

The national strategy will enable Canada to meet two initial challenges including building new infrastructure to double Canada’s electricity supply by 2050 and meet growing demand; and, accelerating electrification across the economy to support competitiveness and address climate change.

Boom and Bust Coal 2026. Tracking the global coal plant pipeline, Shearer et al., Global Energy Monitor

Boom and Bust Coal is an annual survey of the global coal fleet by Global Energy Monitor and partners. The authors analyze key trends in coal power capacity and track various stages of capacity development including planned retirements. This provides key insights into the status of the global phaseout of coal power and evaluates progress towards the world’s climate targets and commitments. The data come from GEM’s Global Coal Plant Tracker, an online database updated biannually that identifies and maps every known coal-fired generating unit and every new unit proposed since January 1, 2010 (30 MW and larger). In 2025, the world built more coal and used it less. New coal power capacity additions increased by 3.5% to reach one of the highest levels on record, even as coal-fired electricity generation declined by 0.6%. This gap was particularly pronounced in China and India, where wind and solar met most or all new demand, driving down coal generation even as coal plant commissioning reached decade highs. Coal capacity is increasingly maintained not as a primary source of generation, but as a form of system insurance. The U.S. stood out as the only major economy in 2025 to increase coal generation, and the total number of countries pursuing new coal development is shrinking. The central challenge heading into 2026 is not the availability of alternatives to coal, but the persistence of policy frameworks that continue to treat coal as necessary even as power systems move increasingly beyond it.

Proposed Amendments to the Cap-and-Invest Program, Legislative Analysts Office, California State Legislature

California has established statutory goals for reducing statewide GHG emissions—down to at least 40 percent below the 1990 level by 2030, and to at least 85 percent below the 1990 level by 2045. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) sets a declining, aggregate cap on the amount of GHGs allowed to be emitted under the program. CARB issues a set number of allowances each year equal to the annual cap. Entities covered by the program can comply with the program by (1) reducing their emissions, (2) purchasing allowances, or (3) purchasing offsets. Each allowance is essentially a permit to emit one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. In September 2025, the Legislature extended and made various changes to the cap-and-invest program. These changes: (1) modified the program’s design features and allowance allocations; (2) changed the allocation of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund revenues; and (3) added reporting, evaluation, and oversight provisions. April proposed amendments include establishing the total number of allowances through 2045, including removing 118 Million allowances through 2030, but adds back up to 118 million allowances above the cap for a larger and broader Manufacturing Decarbonization Incentive.

Build Here: How Targeted State Investment in Geothermal Can Fill California’s Clean Firm Gap, Wilson Ricks and Ann Garth, Clean Air Task Force

The authors found that next-generation geothermal energy could dramatically reduce the cost of achieving California’s clean energy goals, but only if the state acts now to remove critical development barriers. The authors call on California to fund an in-field testbed program to explore and map the subsurface across high-potential geologic regions, generating the data needed to unlock large-scale private investment in next-generation geothermal development. The authors point to a proven model for unlocking next-gen development: the U.S. Department of Energy’s Utah FORGE testbed drilled a series of wells in rural Utah and publicly released the resulting subsurface data. Billions of dollars in private investment followed, including the world’s first commercial-scale enhanced geothermal systems facility, Fervo Energy’s Cape Station project, located directly adjacent to the Utah FORGE site. California now imports that zero-emission power to satisfy its own electricity demand but does not receive the economic advantages. California has the opportunity, and the geology, to direct development inside the state.

From Paper to Practice : A Practical Guide to Formulating and Institutionalizing Long-term Climate Strategies (World Bank), Sutherland et al., World Bank

This guidance note is designed to equip governments and practitioners with implementable insights and a practical how-to framework for formulating and institutionalizing long-term strategy. It focuses on formulating technically sound LTSs and addresses their institutional integration, which involves embedding long-term low-emission, climate-resilient pathways in planning, budgeting, and decision-making processes across the government so that they can be operationalized through existing policy and fiscal instruments.

Climate Promises, Industry Handouts. Canada’s Fossil Fuel Funding in 2025, Environmental Defence Canada

The Government of Canada has provided at least $10.2 billion in fossil fuel subsidies and public financing in 2025. Since Environmental Defence began tracking fossil fuel subsidies in 2020, the federal government has provided at least $85.2 billion in subsidies to the fossil fuel industry. This figure includes government direct spending as well as public financing through Crown corporations, such as Export Development Canada. In addition to fossil fuel subsidies, the Government of Canada provided at least $405.53 million dollars in subsidies for carbon capture and fossil fuel hydrogen projects in 2025. These technologies have failed to deliver on their promises to reduce emissions and have instead locked in further fossil fuel production. Furthermore, this figure excludes the estimated cost of the carbon capture investment tax credit, which is estimated to cost Canadians up to $5.7 billion by 2028, and up to $12.4 billion by 2035. The changes introduced in the Budget 2025 could increase the cost to Canadians by an additional $3.75 billion. In 2025, the cost of pollution from oil and gas companies operating in Canada was an estimated $56.4 billion. This figure was calculated by taking the most recent oil and gas emissions figures and multiplying with the social cost of carbon. Climate pollution created by oil and gas companies has massive costs, including health costs, property damage from extreme weather events, and decreased agricultural productivity due to changing weather patterns. The social cost of carbon helps to estimate what those costs to society are.

Building Europe’s alternative fuels industry for military resilience, Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop, The Hague Center for Strategic Studies

Europe’s military readiness is increasingly tied to the resilience of its fuel supply chains. The authors warn that Europe risks replacing one strategic dependency with another unless it scales up domestic production of alternative fuels for defense. The authors examine how the 2026 Middle East oil disruption exposed Europe’s vulnerability to fuel supply shocks. Around half of the EU’s jet fuel imports originate from the Middle East, while military operations remain heavily dependent on liquid fuels such as jet fuel and diesel. The authors argue that “drop-in” fuels such as sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), hydrotreated vegetable oil (HVO), e-SAF and e-diesel offer the most viable pathway to strengthen resilience in the short to medium term because they can be integrated into existing military infrastructure without technical modifications. However, the study finds that current production levels remain far too limited to support military needs during crisis scenarios. Existing civilian-driven expansion plans would cover only a fraction of potential wartime demand, leaving armed forces exposed to shortages and competition with civilian consumers. The authors identify three priorities for policymakers including developing a coordinated civil-military strategy for alternative fuel scale-up; treating alternative fuel plants as dual-use strategic infrastructure eligible for defense and EU funding; and establishing minimum domestic production benchmarks for fuels critical to defense readiness.

Climate change makes Arctic operations ever more complex, Lin Alexandra Mortensgaard, Danish Institute for International Studies

Climate change is already making Arctic planning and operations more complex. The notion that climate change multiplies existing threats increasingly falls short when it comes to understanding the scale, processes and the unknowns of climate change. Drawing on ongoing knowledge exchange with climate scientists, security actors could instead practice thinking in terms of types of change to avoid assuming foresight of operational and infrastructural consequences based on existing, known threats.

Built to Endure. A Smart Guide for US Cities To Build Resilient Infrastructure That Lasts, Losos et al., Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability, Duke University

Resilience is needed for every community to thrive in a world at increased risk of natural disasters. But small and medium-sized communities do not need expensive analyses or teams of people to get started. Resilience is achievable—even for lean municipal teams—when people, sound governance, and systems thinking are supported by increasingly accessible digital tools that help inform decisions and strengthen community outcomes. The authors offer practical, step-by-step advice for small and midsized communities to integrate resilience into their infrastructure systems. Featuring eight case studies from cities in the United States and abroad, the guidebook is meant for immediate use in the real world. The guidebook also includes a separate section—Getting Started: Practical Entry Points for Local Governments—that will jump-start the systems thinking needed to truly achieve resilience.

24/7 renewables. The economics of Firm Solar and Wind, Dardour et al., The International Renewable Energy Agency

The authors show that the cost of firm renewable electricity has declined rapidly across all major technologies and markets. In high-quality solar and wind resource regions, co-located hybrid systems can already deliver round-the-clock electricity at costs competitive with - and in many cases below - those of new fossil-fuel generation. China currently defines the global cost floor, while costs in Brazil, India, South Africa, Australia, and the Gulf region are declining rapidly towards fossil-fuel cost parity. The authors identify key drivers of firm renewable costs – technology performance, resource quality and system configuration – and examine the policy levers that are proving decisive in translating cost competitiveness into deployment at scale. They conclude that the technologies are maturing, the costs are falling and the commercial demand is growing. The pace at which firm renewable electricity is deployed will be among the most consequential determinants of the global energy transition in the decade ahead.

The AI Data Center Race and Big Tech Monopoly Power. A Policy Framework for Community Self-Determination and Democratic Accountability, Stacy Mitchell and John Farrell, The Institute for Local Self-Reliance

To consolidate control over generative AI and deepen their monopoly power, dominant tech firms are driving a wave of hyperscale data center construction that is colliding with communities nationwide. In response, the authors developed a policy framework to help communities reassert public authority, curb monopoly power, prevent public cost-shifting, and ensure digital infrastructure is developed transparently and in the public interest.

A Water Renaissance for California, Restore the Delta et al., Restore the Delta et al

California must create a new urban water renaissance: a new approach to prioritize local water and local communities in developing the reliable water supplies needed for the future. To accomplish this, California must choose to invest in local water supplies, reject sending billions of ratepayer dollars to take an ever-diminishing supply of water from the San Francisco Bay and Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay-Delta (Bay-Delta) and the Colorado River, and ensure adequate water to restore the Bay-Delta ecosystem and protect water quality. Following these improvements, interested parties must be brought together to work towards solutions to repair the aging levees in the Delta and the aging infrastructure of the State Water Project (SWP). Southern California and the Bay-Delta must move from conflict to collaboration to create a sustainable and reliable water supply for people and the environment. Create local drought-resistant water supplies and create resiliency. Reject costly new imported water projects. Local water supplies provide numerous benefits.

Rethinking insects as alternative protein, Verkuijl et al., Stockholm Environment Institute

Insect farming often falls short of its environmental promise. Greenhouse gas emissions generated per kilogram of protein from insect production in temperate climates vary, but they can approach those of chicken and pork, and exceed those of soymeal and fishmeal. Favorable environmental results depend on conditions rarely met in practice. Low-emission insect farming requires organic waste as feed, minimal heating and renewable energy – a combination seldom achieved in temperate countries. Insect farming reinforces conventional animal agriculture rather than replacing it. A substantial proportion of insects are farmed for feed for farmed animals and aquaculture, not to substitute for meat in human diets. The sector poses underexamined risks. Insect farming introduces potential biodiversity threats from accidental releases and emerging animal welfare concerns, given growing evidence that at least some insect species may be capable of suffering. Investment in insect farming carries opportunity costs. To date, major companies, accounting for more than a third of total investment, have failed or have entered restructuring. Resources directed towards insect protein may divert funding, policy attention, and public goodwill from plant-based, fermentation-derived, and cultivated proteins: alternatives that may offer clearer sustainability benefits, with fewer drawbacks. About New Research

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments Several dead as record rainfall hit several provinces

DEADLY DOWNPOUR: Multiple rounds of heavy rainfall have hit central and eastern China, with Agence France-Presse reporting that at least 25 people were killed in the first round, which affected provinces including Guangxi, Guizhou, Hunan and Hubei. Shortly afterwards, nine people died in south-western Chongqing province, reported finance news outlet Caixin, after receiving “nearly 300mm of rain in just two hours, a deluge local residents described as the worst in more than 60 years”. The government has dedicated 280m yuan ($41m) to support affected provinces, reported state news agency Xinhua. The Communist party-backed newspaper China Youth Daily reported that more than 20 provinces have been affected so far, with rains expected to continue throughout June. 

CLIMATE CONTRIBUTION: National rainfall over 11-23 May was 46% higher than the seasonal norm, said Xinhua. Nearly 500 weather stations nationwide have logged record rainfall levels, according to state-sponsored newspaper Guangming Daily. The rains were described as “quite unusual”, according to Xinhua, with the National Climate Centre’s chief forecaster Gao Hui telling the agency that the heavy rains were caused by a combination of factors. These included a convergence of several climate systems carrying in strong flows of moisture from nearby marine regions, as well as “rapid global warming, compounded by a fast-developing El Niño” increasing the atmosphere’s moisture content. 

The EU ‘overcapacity’ debate

‘CONCERNS’ REGISTERED: The EU will debate proposals in June to “step up efforts” to reduce economic reliance on China and protect its industries, including “safeguard investigations” for at-risk sectors and an “overcapacity instrument”, reported Politico. Finance news outlet Yicai said China in turn has registered its “concerns” with the World Trade Organization over the EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which includes local content requirements for industries including clean-energy technologies.

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PATIENCE ‘WEARING THIN’: A report by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post cited “some observers” as saying a trade war characterised by the EU “clos[ing] its market down to Chinese imports” may be the “only” way in which the EU can get China to fully engage with its concerns. A China Daily editorial states that China’s “patience” over the EU’s “politicisation and over-securitisation of trade and economic issues” is “wearing thin”. An editorial in the state-supporting Global Times says “erecting higher trade barriers” against Chinese cleantech is “clearly unwise”, given the Iran conflict, adding: “China will never sit idly by while the EU unreasonably suppresses Chinese companies.”

MISSING AGREEMENTS: Meanwhile, Bloomberg covered US president Donald Trump’s claims that his counterpart Xi Jinping “likes the idea of buying more US oil”, following Trump’s state visit to China. [None of the Chinese government readouts or press briefings covering trade outcomes have mentioned any energy agreements so far.] Similarly, the “Kremlin said…a general understanding” had been reached on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline following Russian president Vladimir Putin’s visit to China, according to Reuters, but that there was “no mention of any oil and gas deals among documents signed” during his meeting with Xi. A joint statement published by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said China and Russia will “deepen” cooperation around oil and gas, coal, nuclear and renewable energy, adding that they will “strengthen cooperation in addressing climate change”.

Coal-power generation rose in April

‘INFLEXIBLE’ COAL: Thermal power generation in China “grew for a fourth straight month in April”, rising 3.1% year-on-year in the face of reduced wind and nuclear generation, reported Bloomberg. “Unfavorable weather” was not the only reason for weaker clean-energy generation, wrote Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air lead analyst Lauri Myllyvirta on Bluesky, with “grid congestion due to inflexible operation of coal plants and transmission lines” also a factor. Separately, research by Global Energy Monitor found that Chinese coal-plant developers “requested approval for 51 gigawatts (GW)” of new capacity in January-March 2026, reported Bloomberg.

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SOLAR SLOWDOWN: Total power demand grew 6% year-on-year in April, according to Xinhua. Total capacity rose 14% by the end of April, reported energy news outlet International Energy Net, with China’s total solar-power capacity now exceeding 1,250 gigawatts (GW) and wind reaching 661GW, while thermal capacity rose 7% to 1,556GW. However, the growth rate of new solar installations continued to fall for a “fourth straight month”, said Bloomberg, with 9.5GW added in April 2026 compared to 45.2GW the year before.

POLICY EXPANDS: Meanwhile, the government has expanded its renewable power “direct connection” policy to allow clean-energy generators to supply multiple users directly “through dedicated [power] lines”, rather than just one consumer, reported finance news outlet Caixin. It cited a government official saying the policy is “intended to support cleaner energy use in industrial parks…and other large energy-consuming facilities”, which comprise more than two-thirds of total energy demand. Economic news outlet Jiemian quotes an expert saying the policy enables both “lower electricity prices” and “higher utilisation rates” for renewables, “reducing curtailment rates”. 

More China news

• ‘SOLIDARITY AND RESOLVE’: China voted in favour of a UN general assembly resolution to back the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) landmark 2025 opinion on states’ legal obligations to tackle climate change. The Chinese embassy to Vanuatu said on Facebook this displayed its “solidarity and collective resolve”.
• BOND DISCLOSURE: According to a disclosure report by China’s finance ministry, the country raised 6bn yuan in “green sovereign bonds” in 2025, said finance news outlet EastMoney ($884m), of which 700m ($103m) was spent on clean-energy retrofitting.
• WAR ON SAND: The central government has pledged to “improve” and expand its ecological compensation mechanism, including to now provide compensation for building solar farms in desertified areas, said power news outlet BJX News.
• SPACE-BASED SOLAR: Chinese scientists have begun “initial experiments” in a project to “collect [solar] energy in orbit and beam it wirelessly to Earth”, said PV Magazine.
• MINERAL STRATEGY: China has pledged to “accelerate the construction of strategic mineral-reserve ​sites”, reported Reuters. It will also work with the US on “reasonable” concerns around its rare-earth export controls, Reuters also reported.

Captured

Hydrogen in China continues to be mostly produced from coal, according to a National Energy Administration report. A new Carbon Brief article explored how a series of new policies in China could help scale hydrogen, particularly “green” hydrogen made with renewable power.

Spotlight  China’s new carbon metric leaves Germany-sized gap in its emissions

A major change in the way that China measures its core climate goal has effectively halved the growth in the country’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions over the past five years.

The revised measure of “carbon intensity” implies that China’s emissions have only gone up by 7% from 2020-2025, just half of the 14% rise indicated by previous official statistics.

This spotlight is an excerpt of an analysis explaining how the metric appears to have shifted and its implications for China’s climate goals. The full article can be found on the Carbon Brief website.

Germany-sized gap

Reducing carbon intensity – CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – has been China’s key climate commitment since the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009.

Neither China’s international climate pledges nor other official documents have ever set out a definition of carbon intensity. 

However, until this year, it was possible to closely reproduce the reported numbers, based on a straightforward interpretation of what carbon intensity means – combining official GDP data with estimates of emissions from the use of fossil fuels.

Now, the types of emissions that are included in the carbon-intensity metric have changed.

The previous carbon-intensity measure apparently included emissions from the use of fossil fuels to generate energy and as chemical feedstocks, so-called “non-energy uses”. It did not include non-fossil fuel CO2 emissions from industrial processes, such as the production of cement.

Based on reported progress against this old scope, China’s carbon intensity had fallen by 12.4% from 2020-2025, well short of its 18% target under the 14th five-year plan.

Yet the 15th five-year plan reported that China had cut its carbon intensity by 17.7% over the same period, indicating a major shift in which types of emissions are included.

A footnote in China’s latest statistical communique indicates that carbon intensity now includes industrial process emissions and excludes non-energy uses of fossil fuels.

The shift has implications for estimates of the country’s emissions. 

China’s total emissions were 11.2bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2020. Based on the original methodology, its fossil-fuel CO2 emissions had grown 14% by 2024, an increase of 1,430m tonnes (MtCO2).

In contrast, the newly reported carbon-intensity figures imply that China’s CO2 emissions only grew by 7% between 2020 and 2025, up just 690MtCO2.

The gap between these figures amounts to 730MtCO2, equivalent to the annual emissions of Germany or South Korea.

Decoding the new methodology

The methodology change could have significant implications, making it important to understand how it is being calculated.

The new scope includes industrial-process emissions. One of the largest sources of these emissions, the cement industry, has been contracting, helping explain the improvement to carbon intensity under the new scope.

In addition, the new scope excludes non-energy use of fossil fuels – largely relating to the chemicals industry – which have seen rapid growth in the past five years. 

One way to make the numbers add up would be to assume that the amount of carbon embedded in chemical-industry products has increased by the equivalent of 500MtCO2.

However, the reported output of major chemical-industry products cannot account for this level of embedded carbon.

Neither the change in scope of the carbon-intensity calculation, nor the change in the amount of carbon retained in products, can explain the size of the revision in the newly reported numbers. There must be another explanation.

Either the new scope broadly aligns with the explanation outlined above, but also excludes a subset of the CO2 emissions. Or the scope does not exclude any of the CO2, but there are gaps in the monitoring of some energy or industrial-process emissions.

Either explanation would mean China is not accounting for some of its CO2 emissions. 

Implications for China’s targets

This change has the effect of weakening China’s climate targets and introducing more uncertainty into tracking progress.

The new numbers means it will require less effort to hit the 2030 carbon-intensity target in its Paris pledge. This target can now be met even if emissions rise, whereas the previous metric would have required a reduction.

It will also require less effort to hit the carbon-intensity target in China’s 15th five-year plan. 

In addition, China would be able to officially meet its target to peak emissions by 2030, even if its overall CO2 emissions do not actually peak. The change could also affect delivery of China’s targets to cut emissions by 2035.

While China may use any definition it wants for carbon intensity under the UN climate framework, retrospective changes or inconsistent accounting could erode the value of its commitments.

Moreover, it will ultimately have to close any gaps in its emissions data and reporting, under the transparency rules of the Paris Agreement.

This spotlight is adapted from an article by Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air lead analyst Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

Watch, read, listen

MINING ACCIDENT: A column in Bloomberg argued that “continuing to veer…toward cleaner [energy] development” could avoid coal-mine accidents such as the one that claimed 82 lives in Shanxi province.

INDONESIAN NICKEL: The European Guanxi Podcast recorded a discussion with Ember’s Dr Muyi Yang about the role China plays in Indonesia’s coal-reliant nickel industry.

INDUSTRIAL HURDLES: A new article in Yicai investigated the reasons why companies are holding back on relocating to zero-carbon industrial parks.
NEGATIVE PRICES: The Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily published a widely-read article on how the emergence of “negative electricity prices” signals a need for a more “coordinated” buildout of clean energy.

163

In billion tonnes, the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) that China could avoid between 2025-2060 by transitioning to clean energy, according to a new study published by several leading academic institutions in Nature Reviews Earth & Environment. Scientists estimate that the remaining global budget for keeping temperatures below 1.5C is 130bn tonnes of CO2.

New science 

• Population exposure to heatwave-drought events “increased markedly” across China during between 1961-90 and 1991-2020, driven by a combination of population growth and more frequent heatwave-drought events | Atmospheric Research
• Fossil-fired power generation accounts for three-quarters of China’s total water consumption for energy production | Mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change

Recently published on WeChat

• 大西洋经向翻转环流：全球变暖是否正将关键洋流推向“崩溃”？
• 在极端天气预报方面，传统模型仍“优于AI”

China Briefing is written by Anika Patel, with contributions from Lekai Liu, and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

China Briefing 30 April 2026: Fossil fuel ‘strict controls’ | El Niño approaches | Why cleantech exports have surged

China Briefing

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30.04.26

China Briefing 16 April 2026: Billions for grid | Petrochemical plan | China’s high-seas bid

China Briefing

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16.04.26

China Briefing 2 April 2026: EV profits rise | Ming Yang rejected | Iran war

China Briefing

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02.04.26

China Briefing 19 March 2026: China joins nuclear pledge | Energy approach ‘vindicated’ | New ecological code

China Briefing

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19.03.26

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The post China Briefing 28 May 2026: Deadly rains | China pushes back | Examining China’s carbon intensity metric  appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Europe has been hit by a searing heatwave, which has shattered temperature records across France, Spain and the UK.

In London, for example, the mercury hit a record high for May of 35.1C at Kew Gardens on Tuesday 26 May, breaking the former record-high May temperature by more than 2C.

Multiple people have died as a result of the high temperatures, including 14 people across the UK and France who drowned.

The heatwave was driven by a “heat dome”, in which warm air moving up from northern Africa has become trapped under a high-pressure system over western Europe.

Experts have been quick to point out the link between extreme heat and global warming, with one saying it was “beyond a shadow of a doubt” that climate change was making such events “more likely and more severe”.

In this article, Carbon Brief examines the impacts of the heatwave and the role of climate change.

• What is happening with the May heatwave in Europe?
• What is driving the record-shattering heat?
• What are the impacts of the extreme heat?
• How has the media responded?

What is happening with the May heatwave in Europe?

Europe has been hit by “mind-bogglingly crazy” temperature records in May, according to the Financial Times, quoting Peter Thorne, director of the ICARUS Climate Research Centre at Maynooth University in Ireland. 

In London, on Tuesday 26 May, temperatures hit a record high for May of 35.1C at Kew Gardens – breaking the previous record of 34.8C, set just the day before. 

This was more than 2C above the previous May temperature high of 32.8C recorded in 1922 and again in 1944, reported the Times. 

The Associated Press added that the UK capital also recorded a rare “tropical night”, when temperatures did not fall below 20C overnight. 

The Daily Telegraph reported that Wales and Northern Ireland also saw record-high temperatures, of 27.4C in Cardiff and 23.4C in Armagh, on Sunday.

As with the UK record, these were quickly surpassed. BBC News reported that temperatures hit 32.9C in Bute Park, Cardiff and 24.5C in Thomastown, County Fermanagh, on Tuesday. 

BBC News quoted a spokesperson from the Met Office, who said:

“This heat would be exceptional in the UK even in mid-summer, let alone in May.”

The broadcaster added that the average temperature in the UK at the end of May is usually 14-20C. 

The Associated Press reported that temperature records have also fallen across Europe. 

This includes in France, where temperatures reached 36C on Monday in the country’s south-west and remained above 20C at night across much of the country. The newspaper Libération declared that “it has never been so hot, so early, in France”.

The Guardian reported that the weather agency Météo France said the heatwave could last through the week and bring temperatures as high as 39C in some areas in the country. 

As well as the UK and France, other nations have been seeing temperatures soar. France24 reported that temperatures in Spain were expected to reach 38C, with Italy also facing high temperatures. 

The Irish Times reported that the May high-temperature record was broken twice in Ireland on the same day, with 29.7C recorded in Carlow and then 30.5C at Shannon Airport on Tuesday. 

Le Monde explained that a “heat dome” of warm air from northern Africa is behind the high temperatures across Europe. (See: What is driving the record-breaking heat?)

The Financial Times quoted ICARUS’s Thorne saying that the records being set in Europe, “particularly in the UK and France, are mind-bogglingly crazy”. He added: 

“We have more than 100 years of observational records. To break the all-time May record by more than 2C…is hard to comprehend.” 

Back to top

What is driving the record-shattering heat?

The immediate driver of the extreme heat seen over Europe this week is a “heat dome”, according to Politico. 

The outlet explained that the phenomenon is driven by “warm air moving up from northern Africa [that] has become trapped under a high-pressure system over western Europe”. It added:

“The effect is similar to that of a lid on a pot, with warm air forced downward and baking affected regions with prolonged, blistering heat.”

Spain’s El Correo explained that the phenomenon is “not a simple heatwave”, adding that such “high-pressure systems trapped over Europe are not usually seen before summer”.

However, many publications have linked the severity of the extreme heat to climate change. The Associated Press quoted ICARUS’s Thorne, who said:

“We know beyond a shadow of a doubt that heatwave events such as this have been made more likely and more severe due to climate change arising from our emissions of heat-trapping greenhouse gases.” 

The Guardian quoted Dr Chloe Brimicombe, a researcher at the University of Oxford, who said:

“The record-breaking heat is a reminder of how climate change is impacting our lives in the UK. It highlights the urgency of recent calls for heat adaptation.”

France’s Le Figaro described the event as an “unequivocal sign of global warming”. 

The Independent reported that the heatwave “has the fingerprints of climate change all over it”. Other outlets, including Inside Climate News and Scientific American, also covered the links between extreme heat and climate change.

BBC News noted that over the last 30 years, Europe has been warming by 0.56C per decade – more than twice the global average. 

The outlet quoted Prof Erich Fischer, professor at the Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science at ETH Zurich in Switzerland, who compared the record-breaking temperatures to setting a new record in sports.

He explained that “if someone beats a world record in high jump, you would expect them to beat it by one centimetre and not suddenly by 20, 30 centimetres”. Similarly, he said that in the case of temperature, you would expect new records to be broken by a fraction of a degree, rather than 2 or 3C.

However, the broadcaster explained that “when a relatively rare weather system, such as this week’s heat dome, comes around in a warming climate, the margin of record can be huge”.

Simon Stiell, the executive secretary of UN Climate Change, called the heatwave a “brutal reminder of the cost of global warming”, according to Politico. 

The Guardian also quotes Stiell, who said:

“The science is clear that human-induced climate change is making these heatwaves more frequent and extreme”.

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What are the impacts of the extreme heat?

The heatwave has already been linked to multiple deaths.

This included seven people in France, five of whom died by drowning and two who suffered heat-related deaths while competing in sporting events, said the Guardian.

Separately, the Guardian reported that at least nine people have died in the UK from “water-related incidents” during the heatwave.

France24 reported that “restrictions on outdoor work were imposed in parts of Italy” and that “farmers reported accelerated harvests as temperatures went beyond 30C across [south-west France]”. 

The Guardian reported that tennis players at the French Open were “forced to adjust their games while trying to find their best level through obvious discomfort”, amid 33C temperatures in Boulogne-Billancourt, Paris, on Monday.

CNN added that, in the UK, “a wildfire broke out near Arthur’s Seat, a hill in Edinburgh, Scotland, and hundreds of properties in south-east England were left without water as demand spiked”.

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BBC News reported on a warning from a chief nurse that hospitals in the south-west of England were busier than usual amid the heatwave. 

BBC News reported that the UK saw a surge in emergency calls on Tuesday. The Daily Telegraph added that “Britain’s roads started melting and rail commuters were left stranded for hours”. 

Meanwhile, the Guardian reported on a warning from climate campaigners that the government “urgently” needs to start installing air conditioning units in schools and care homes.
The extreme heat has also affected Europe’s renewable energy generation. Bloomberg said that “the heat dome has blocked clouds and fueled booming solar generation”, but added that “by clearing clouds and calming the atmosphere, the heat dome has had the opposite effect on wind speeds”.

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How has the media responded?

The unseasonably high temperatures have caught the attention of news outlets in the UK, France and other affected nations. 

Often, news stories were accompanied by photos of people relaxing at the beach, eating ice cream and swimming in the sea. 

Such images of “fun in the sun” have often drawn criticism from climate researchers for “misrepresenting” the risks of heatwaves.

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This choice of imagery – and the way right-leaning newspapers in the UK tend to focus on the positive aspects of hot weather – was highlighted by journalist and media critic Mic Wright in a Substack post. He wrote:

“Most British newspapers write about extremely hot weather with the tone of a frog in a boiling pot pretending it’s a jacuzzi.”

Despite blanket news coverage of the record heat in media outlets across western Europe, there has been relatively little commentary from their opinion pages.

No major UK newspapers have published editorials about the heat and there has been no space dedicated to it in the comment sections of the largest French and Spanish newspapers.

One exception in UK media was the Daily Mail’s climate-sceptic columnist Richard Littlejohn writing an article mocking heat-safety measures and warnings issued by the Met Office and the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA).

In contrast, the Guardian published an article by Bill McGuire, professor emeritus of geophysical and climate hazards at University College London, warning of the dangers facing the UK as extreme heat becomes “the norm”. He wrote:

“We need, then, to face the fact that life in the 2050s is going to be very different from today, and act now. The sooner we recognise this and begin – as a nation – to prepare and adapt accordingly, the better we will be able to meet these enormous challenges to our everyday lives.”

Oliver Duff, editor-in-chief of the i newspaper, wrote that the UK is “emotionally underprepared”, as a nation, for the heat:

“Worries about climate change are forgotten in the giddy determination to enjoy our brief, unreliable summers, whichever month of the year they deign to visit.”

Writing in the Independent, journalist Kat Brown reflected on the Climate Change Committee’s recent advice to the UK government on adapting to climate change. She stressed the need to “take heatwaves seriously”.

James Wallace, chief executive of the charity River Action, was given a guest column in the Daily Express in which he wrote: “As the nation swelters in record-breaking temperatures, England is sleepwalking into a water crisis.”

In reference to water shortages and increasingly extreme weather, Wallace also emphasised that “this is climate breakdown in real time”.

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The post Media reaction: UK and Europe’s ‘mind-boggling’ May heat and climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters

In brief:

• Scientists expect dramatic swings between active and inactive hurricane seasons in the future.
• The risk of back-to-back hurricanes is growing. 
• Hurricanes are expected to get more damaging and deadly. 

Wild year-to-year swings — from punishing hyperactive seasons to quiet years with little activity — could well become the norm for future Atlantic hurricane seasons, according to recent climate change research. 

The latest science paints a complex but alarming future, as the unprecedented amount of heat that humans are supplying to the climate system disrupts the fundamental atmospheric circulation pattern in which we designed our civilization. 

During the coming busy seasons, death and destruction from unprecedented hurricane catastrophes will probably grow much more commonplace, because even as risks grow, people have continued to build in risky flood-prone regions. But eventually, the coming hurricane catastrophes will pose an increasing threat to the viability of living in many coastal areas, particularly in the Caribbean.

Hurricane seasons will likely grow more erratic

The year-to-year variability of Atlantic basin hurricane activity already is the largest of any of the globe’s tropical cyclone basins. And climate change will make extreme swings between active and inactive hurricane seasons the norm, according to a 2024 paper, Projected increase in the frequency of extremely active Atlantic hurricane seasons. 

The high-resolution climate models used in the study projected a 36% increase by 2050 in the variance of Atlantic tropical cyclone activity. The main causes: an increase in the variability of wind shear (strong upper-level winds that tend to tear a storm apart), and major swings in how stable the atmosphere is in the tropical Atlantic. One good thing is that the study found that the increased activity during hyperactive seasons would be focused farther from land over the eastern and central Atlantic, with less activity over the Caribbean.

A 2022 study, Extreme Atlantic hurricane seasons made twice as likely by ocean warming, found that ocean warming from 1982 to 2020 doubled the probability of extremely active hurricane seasons over that time period. However, the authors did not clearly separate out how much of that change resulted from increased heat-trapping greenhouse gases and how much was caused by a reduction in planet-cooling air pollution particles called aerosols. These particles are not likely to change much in the future, while greenhouse gases will be increasing, so it is important to know their relative impacts on ocean warming.

More double whammies: back-to-back hurricane threats are increasing

The worst sequential hurricane disaster on record for the Atlantic occurred in 2020 in Nicaragua and Honduras. 

Hurricane Eta made landfall in northern Nicaragua on Nov. 3, 2020, as a Category 4 storm. Moving slowly at landfall, Eta lingered for three days over Central America and the adjacent waters, dropping catastrophic amounts of rain. 

Just two weeks later, Hurricane Iota made landfall as a Category 4 storm in Nicaragua only 15 miles from where Eta hit. Iota brought torrential rains that inundated flooded regions still struggling to recover from Eta, with the combined tolls from the two storms exceeding 300 people dead or missing. 

There was no precedent in the Atlantic for two such powerful hurricanes to make landfall so close together in space and time. The combined impact of the two hurricanes on Nicaragua was estimated at $738 million – about 6% of that nation’s GDP. 

But the twin Category 4 hurricanes left behind an even more extreme catastrophe in Honduras. The U.N. estimated that total damages from Hurricane Eta and Hurricane Iota in Honduras exceeded $2 billion – 8% of the poverty-stricken nation’s GDP.

In the future, an increase in hyperactive hurricane seasons will boost the threat of two hurricanes striking the same place within a few weeks of each other. Overlapping disasters could threaten the Gulf of Mexico region with a cycle of “perpetual disaster recovery” — making communities vulnerable to worse outcomes with every subsequent event, researchers at the National Academies wrote in a 2024 report.

A 2022 paper, Increasing sequential tropical cyclone hazards along the US East and Gulf coasts, found that in the current climate, two named storms hitting the same location within 15 days along the U.S. East and Gulf coasts and bringing significant hazards (strong winds, heavy rainfall and storm surges) could be expected to occur once every 10 to 92 years. But under a moderate emissions scenario, this return period could be expected to shrink to just one to three years because of sea-level rise and a change in storm climatology. The odds of a Katrina-like hurricane and a Harvey-like hurricane impacting the U.S. within 15 days of each other — which was non-existent in the historical period they simulated — was projected to have a one-in-650-year return period (or a 5% chance over 30 years) by the end of the century.

A massive 633% increase in hurricane damages to come?

It is widely acknowledged that higher weather disaster losses result primarily from an increase in exposure: more people with more stuff moving into vulnerable places, including those at risk of floods. 

Martin Bertogg, Swiss Re’s head of catastrophic peril, said in a 2022 AP interview that two-thirds, perhaps more, of the recent rise in weather-related disaster losses — including from hurricanes — is the result of more people and things in harm’s way. 

But this balance will likely shift in the coming decades. For example, a 2025 study led by Avantika Gori of Rice University, Sensitivity of tropical cyclone risk across the US to changes in storm climatology and socioeconomic growth, looked at how damages from wind, rainfall, and storm surge would change under a moderate global warming scenario. The study found that the fraction of increased hurricane damages because of climate change would grow by the end of the century to be roughly equal to the increased damages from higher exposure (assuming a 2% annual growth in GDP). The combined increased costs for hurricane damage for the future (2070-2100) period compared to the historical (1980-2005) period would be truly extraordinary, if no additional adaptation measures are taken: a 633% increase, the paper said.

Gori’s prediction is by no means a worst-case outcome, because the study assumed a moderate global warming scenario. Even in a best-case scenario — which I’ll explore in a future post — development is going to continue in flood-prone places. And there are at least four ways that hurricane scientists are very confident that climate change will make hurricanes worse:

• The strongest hurricanes will get stronger.
• Hurricanes will rapidly intensify more quickly and more often.
• Hurricanes will dump more rain.
• Storm surge damage will rise because of rising sea levels.

Highest U.S. hurricane total death tolls (direct plus indirect deaths) since the National Hurricane Center began tracking indirect deaths in 1963.
Expect hurricanes to get more deadly

Accompanying the shocking increases in hurricane damages in our future will likely be sharply increased risks of high death tolls. Stronger, wetter, slower-moving storms will dump more rain, causing increased flood risk. Higher sea levels and stronger hurricanes will bring more dangerous storm surges and compound flood events. Post-storm power outages will coincide with heat waves more frequently, increasing heat mortality. More hurricanes will rapidly intensify just before landfall, leaving vulnerable populations unprepared, further increasing mortality risk.

Read: ‘Deadliest in generations’: The Texas floods are the latest in a disturbing pattern

Fortunately, steadily improving hurricane forecasts over the past 20 years have significantly lowered the risk of death, and the recent emergence of AI forecast models has been an exciting step forward. In some places, improved building codes have also reduced the hurricane damage and presumably, mortality risk. Nevertheless, it is concerning that the U.S. has suffered five hurricanes since 2005 that were deadlier than any hurricane since 1972.

A staggering indirect death toll from hurricanes: as high as 5% of the U.S. population?

In a stunning paper released in 2024, Mortality caused by tropical cyclones in the United States, Rachel Young and Solomon Tsiang found that the average U.S. hurricane that made landfall between 1930 and 2015 caused 24 direct deaths. 

However, they observed an increase in excess deaths – mortality beyond what would otherwise be expected in that period – that lingered for 15 years, totaling 7,000-11,000 excess deaths per storm. This burden is 300-480 times greater than government estimates of direct deaths and was equivalent to an astounding 3.2-5.1% of all deaths across the contiguous United States.

The largest single category of deaths was from cardiovascular disease (36%), while 12% of the deaths were from cancer, “consistent with some evidence of stress from extreme weather affecting long-run health,” the authors wrote. Between 1950 and 1995, monthly excess tropical cyclone deaths ranged from 4,500 to 6,000, then rose to about 7,500 per month by 2003. In 2004, an onslaught of landfalling hurricanes brought a sharp rise in the death rate, which peaked at approximately 13,000 per month in 2013.

Read: The hidden health toll of hurricanes

a). Total incidence of tropical cyclone excess mortality in the contiguous U.S by month. Bar height is sum of average maximum wind speeds for all state-by-storm events. Colors correspond to decades. b) Stacked overlapping excess mortality responses to each storm for all of the contiguous U.S. Outline colors correspond to the decade when the storm occurred. The upper envelope is the total estimated mortality burden resulting from all tropical cyclones occurring during the prior 172 months (14.3 years). c) Official direct tropical cyclone deaths by month according to NOAA. The y-axis scale is the same for b and c. (image credit: Young, R., Hsiang, S. Mortality caused by tropical cyclones in the United States. Nature 635, 121–128 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07945-5, open access)

Young and Tsiang hypothesized five ways that hurricanes may have triggered excess mortality:

1. Economic disruption might change household economic decisions, eventually translating into worsened health outcomes. For example, a person who loses a job might lose health insurance, too. Or retirement savings could be drawn down to repair property damage, both of which could reduce future spending on health care.
2. Social network changes could affect future health. For example, working-age people might move away, changing the social support for older people who remain behind.
3. Fiscal adjustments by state or local governments in response to the disaster may impact future health outcomes. For example, restructuring budgets to support recovery might reduce spending on healthcare infrastructure.
4. Heightened physical and mental stress may alter health in the long term.
5. Changes in the natural environment could harm health — for example, ecological changes could redistribute disease vectors, or flooding may expose populations to harmful chemicals.

Many of these factors can be expected to grow worse in the future, resulting in higher hurricane excess mortality.

China has said that hydrogen is a key “future industry”, important to both its energy transition and its industrial policy.

Hydrogen frequently goes through hype cycles, most recently driven by rising oil and gas prices due to the conflict in the Middle East.

Yet, even in China, the world’s largest producer and consumer of the fuel, hydrogen remains expensive and inefficient to produce.

This is especially the case for “green” hydrogen derived from renewables.

Moreover, there is limited supporting infrastructure and there is little incentive to use hydrogen over other energy sources.

As a result, uptake in China of hydrogen as an alternative fuel remains low.

Nevertheless, these challenges echo the early circumstances of another key clean-energy technology – electric vehicles (EVs).

In China, EVs benefited from a policy environment that included consistent signals of support, financial aid and the development of supporting infrastructure.

Many similar policies are now being deployed – and in some cases improved upon – to support the development of China’s hydrogen industry.

This article examines China’s approach to developing hydrogen and how its evolving industrial policy could make the fuel viable.

How is China using hydrogen and where does it come from?

Electrification and rising installations of solar and wind power have been the biggest drivers of China’s decarbonisation story so far. However, how China will address the more energy-intensive, hard-to-electrify segments of its economy remains an open question.

Hydrogen is seen by some in China as a potential solution for reducing emissions in a range of “hard-to-abate” industries, from steel and chemicals to aviation and shipping.

The country is the world’s foremost producer and consumer of hydrogen. It produced 36.5m tonnes of the gas in 2024, with maximum production capacity standing at 50m tonnes that year.

It also consumed nearly a third of the world’s hydrogen in 2024, as shown below.

Share of global hydrogen consumption in select regions in 2024, %. Source: IEA.

Most of China’s production capacity is in regions with potential for high demand, such as Shandong, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Shanxi and other provinces with significant heavy industry.

In 2024, the vast majority of China’s hydrogen – around 78% – was produced using fossil fuels, predominantly coal and gas, as shown in the figure below.

Another 21% was produced as an industrial by-product, while only 1% – just 320,000 tonnes – was derived from renewable-powered electrolysis of water. 

Production of hydrogen in China by energy source in 2024, %. Source: National Energy Administration.

One study found that, for every kilogram of hydrogen produced, 38.6kg of carbon dioxide (CO2) is emitted if the hydrogen is produced using coal-fired power. Hydrogen made through coal gasification results in 28.5kg of CO2 for every kilogram of hydrogen, while gas-based hydrogen creates 13kg of emissions. 

By contrast, one kilogram of renewables-based hydrogen results in 0.5kg of CO2.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) calculates that hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels could help China avoid close to 16bn tonnes of CO2 cumulatively by 2060 – but only if it comes from low-carbon sources. 

The biggest reductions, it adds, would come from heavy industry, particularly chemicals and steel, with the maritime and shipping sectors also seeing some benefit. 

Currently, around half of the hydrogen produced in China is used in synthetic ammonia and methanol production. 

Ammonia is primarily used to manufacture fertiliser and is seen as a possible fuel technology for shipping. Methanol is used as a fuel for the transport industry, as well as for heating. 

Another quarter of China’s current hydrogen usage is consumed by the oil refining and coal-to-chemical sectors. The remaining amount is used in other industries, including transport, heating and metallurgy.

What are the barriers to scaling up hydrogen?

Although China is the largest producer and consumer of hydrogen globally, the industry faces several barriers to becoming a viable clean-energy technology.

Agora Energiewende, a thinktank focused on the energy sector, says that, in order to make hydrogen a practical clean-energy solution, China would need to expand the scale and range of its application, as well as improving the conversion efficiency of production and use.

Both BloombergNEF and the IEA highlight the importance of China creating demand for hydrogen, such as through quotas for industrial usage.

Hydrogen “suffers from a relatively large efficiency loss during various conversion processes”, adds Agora. For example, it notes that only around 22% of the energy put into hydrogen fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) is converted into motion, compared to 73% for battery electric vehicles. Producing hydrogen with renewable energy is also less efficient than coal-to-hydrogen processes.

Cui Chuansheng, technical director at East China Engineering Science and Technology, tells state news agency Xinhua that the variability of wind and solar power often leads to low utilisation of electrolysers, resulting in “efficiency losses”.

Meanwhile, the cost of producing hydrogen – particularly green hydrogen – remains high.

One study placed the cost of hydrogen produced through alkaline water electrolysis (AWE), the most common method for producing green hydrogen in China, at $4-6 per kilogram, compared with $1.20-2.50/kg for steam methane reforming and $1.30-2 for coal gasification.

In some specific cases, such as blending hydrogen with gas, researchers find that hydrogen prices would need to fall to one-third of gas prices to incentivise uptake. 

These constraints are all “interdependent”, Kevin Tu, managing director of Agora Energy China, tells Carbon Brief, with the need to ensure “bankable demand” while also reducing costs and developing infrastructure. He adds:

“Without credible offtake in the right sectors, costs will not fall; without lower costs and better logistics, downstream users will not commit.”

The IEA says that green hydrogen “could become cost-competitive by the end of this decade due to low technology costs and cost of capital”.

For now, however, the China Hydrogen Bulletin Substack reports that China’s four listed hydrogen equipment manufacturers all reported significant losses in 2025.

Meanwhile, a senior executive at a Chinese hydrogen company told economic news outlet Jiemian that he expected 40% of companies in the sector to have closed down by the end of 2026, with surviving companies only turning a profit in 2029 at the earliest.

The industry also lacks refueling and pipeline infrastructure. China’s development of a pipeline network for hydrogen remains in its early stages, with around 400km of pipelines currently in operation. By contrast, its long-distance gas network stands at 128,000km. Similarly, storage remains expensive and inefficient, creating a further obstacle to wider uptake. 

How is China supporting hydrogen development?

China began considering the use of hydrogen as an energy source in earnest in the early 2000s, to address concerns around pollution and dependence on imported oil for the transport sector. 

A clearer signal of its importance came in 2015, when the State Council included the technology in a 10-year national industrial strategy known as the “Made in China” initiative. This pitched hydrogen as a way to contribute to electrification of China’s road-transport system through the development of FCEVs. 

Yuki Yu, founder of research firm Energy Iceberg, tells Carbon Brief that, from 2018-2021, hydrogen was treated as a “FCEV and manufacturing technology challenge”. 

This has since evolved, she says, given that battery electric vehicles have emerged as the more popular technology. 

Shen Xinyi, senior advisor at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), agrees, telling Carbon Brief that recent policy documents suggest the aim is now for hydrogen to be targeted at areas where direct electrification is harder, such as hydrogen-based chemicals, hydrogen metallurgy and some heavy-duty transport applications.

This is in line with the “hydrogen ladder”, an analysis of how likely different possibilities for applying hydrogen as a clean alternative are to become significant. The ladder sees significant future use of hydrogen in these hard-to-electrify areas as much more likely than for light vehicles. 

Notable policy moves are being made in “three layers”, says Agora’s Tu, which are combining to improve the technology’s chances of scaling up. These are: the “legal and institutional” layer; “application-oriented” policies; and targeted measures to address “practical bottlenecks” at the local level.

One of the documents underpinning this pivot was the “medium- and long-term plan for the development of the hydrogen energy industry (2021-2035)”, issued in March 2022.

According to a report by the National Energy Administration (NEA), the plan is an attempt to develop an “industrial ecosystem” for hydrogen that features “diverse stakeholders, coordinated innovation and clustered development”.

The plan was the first government document to “lay out a long-term vision for China’s hydrogen economy”, unifying a previously disparate policy push into one document, according to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, a UK-based thinktank.

Following on from the 2022 plan, the importance of hydrogen as a broad clean-energy solution has been emphasised in a number of policies. These include its classification being changed from a hazardous chemical to an energy carrier in China’s Energy Law, a 2024 action plan to “accelerate” the use of low-carbon hydrogen in industry and a new pilot scheme offering subsidies for projects that achieve specific targets. 

The table below sets out the timeline and content of China’s hydrogen-related policies over the past 25 years.

PolicyYear publishedKey features 10th five-year plan (2001–2005)2001Calls for “actively developing” low-emission vehicles, understood to include hydrogen vehicles Made in China 20252015Pledges to “continue to support” development of fuel cell vehicles and “master core technologies” for low-carbon vehicles Notice on implementation of demonstration projects for fuel cell vehicles2020Creates a dedicated subsidy programme for finding breakthroughs in FCEV core technologies and industrial applications 14th five-year plan (2021-2025)2021Hydrogen listed as a future industry Medium- and long-term plan for the development of the hydrogen energy industry (2021–2035)2022Aims to reach 100,000-200,000 tonnes of green hydrogen production [this target has been met]. Also aims to get 50,000 FCEVs on the road by 2025, leading to a “diversified” hydrogen industry by 2035 Opinions on accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development2024Promotes further development of hydrogen production, transport, storage and applications Implementation plan for accelerating the application of clean and low-carbon hydrogen in the industrial sector2025Outlines tasks to promote use of low-carbon hydrogen to reduce emissions in heavy industries, such as steel and chemicals Energy law2025Sees hydrogen included in national legislation for the first time, re-classifies it from a hazardous chemical to an energy carrier 15th five-year plan (2026-2030)2026Again lists as a future industry, and calls for the development of green fuels derived from green hydrogen Notice on the implementation of pilot projects for the comprehensive application of hydrogen energy2026Provides subsidies to projects to reduce hydrogen costs to 15-25 yuan/kilogram ($2.20-3.67/kg) and help develop a fleet of 100,000 FCEVs Key policies in the development of China’s hydrogen sector.

In addition, the NEA said in 2025 that local governments across China had issued more than 560 hydrogen-related energy policies by the end of 2024. 

Tu notes that these local policies cover everything from permitting reforms and pipeline planning to exempting FCEVs from paying road toll.

Different provinces across China adopt distinct strategies for developing hydrogen industries, based on local conditions, says the US-based Center on Global Energy Policy, such as energy mix, availability of coal and industrial needs.

However, these local policies and targets are frequently more ambitious than the “conservative” national-level targets, it adds.

Could a new pilot programme boost hydrogen’s prospects?

A new pilot programme, announced in March 2026, aims to commercialise the country’s hydrogen industry by funding projects to reduce the cost of the fuel to 15-25 yuan/kilogram ($2.20-3.67/kg) by 2030, as well as other targets.

Unlike the 2020 subsidies, which focused on FCEVs, the new programme reaffirms China’s interest in a broader series of sectoral applications for hydrogen, including in clean heating, production of low-carbon iron and steel, and production of “green fuels” and other chemicals.

This new pilot is the “strongest financial instrument ever released for China’s green hydrogen application” in terms of creating a comprehensive hydrogen policy that covers a broad swathe of the economy, supporting it with financial backing and targeting application scenarios, Yu says.

However, she argues that strict grant caps – 240m yuan ($35m) per project and 1.6bn yuan ($235m) per selected region across only five regions – limited the overall funding scale available to the industry.

Energy Iceberg has calculated that only around 60-70 projects nationally could receive funding under the current rules, out of more than 670 active green hydrogen proposals in China.  

Shen agrees that the pilot programme is significant and that it will expand the use of hydrogen in China’s climate strategy, particularly green hydrogen.

She notes a provision that “explicitly states that coal-based ammonia and methanol projects cannot be labelled as ‘green’ ammonia or methanol”, suggesting that policymakers are increasingly paying attention to the “integrity” of definitions for hydrogen and hydrogen-derived fuel. 

The “real value” of the pilot scheme, says Tu, is that it focuses on developing “integrated city-cluster ecosystems linking supply, transport, infrastructure and end-use demand”, rather than only supporting individual projects.

This “should help identify viable business models, accelerate cost discovery and concentrate support on applications with stronger scale potential”, as well as boost investor confidence, adds Tu. 

However, he continues that the broader effect it will have on boosting production of hydrogen will “depend on how quickly the selected clusters can translate the programme into real offtake and lower delivered hydrogen prices”.

How does this compare to China’s EV policy push?

The debate around the viability of hydrogen is reminiscent of critiques of EVs.

Until recently, EVs were seen as too expensive for consumers, inefficient and challenging to use without supporting infrastructure. As a result, many western automakers chose to temper their focus on EVs, while continuing to develop internal combustion engines.

However, China has managed to develop a competitive EV industry with products that top global sales.

Part of the playbook that spurred China’s success on EVs included consistent policy signalling in favour of the technology, including mentions in high-level documents and committing resources to building charging infrastructure.

“The defining features of China’s industrial-policy success are its persistence and adaptability,” says Kyle Chan, fellow at the Brookings Institution, adding that “long before the technology and economics of EVs and batteries were proven, China was making long-term investments and policy bets [in the sectors]”.

More tangible measures included direct and indirect subsidies and policy support in the shape of favourable loan rates and low-cost land. One estimate by US-based thinktank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) pegs the amount of support allocated to the EV industry between 2009-2023 at $230.9bn.

This coupled with the success of private Chinese manufacturers in creating innovative, nimble companies that “forc[ed] policymakers to adapt”, as well as growing links between the automotive and information technology industries, according to a separate CSIS report.

But this progress on EVs also reportedly came with significant fraud. In 2016, one investigation found that 33 companies were involved in subsidy fraud totalling 9.2bn yuan ($1.3bn).

(It should also be noted that profitability in the industry lags far behind the average for downstream industrial sectors, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, which says that “only a handful” of nearly 50 EV makers have reported profits.)

Being the subject of an industrial policy push alone does not guarantee success, states CSIS. It says the strength of the EV industry “was neither inevitable nor the result of a single master plan” and that China’s aims to develop globally-competitive industries in areas such as commercial aviation remain unaccomplished.

China’s approach to hydrogen has been markedly different.

Instead of offering blanket subsidies, the fuel cell demonstration programme it established in 2020 focused on performance-based rewards.

To avoid the subsidy issues seen in the solar and EV industries, the ministry of finance deliberately chose this indirect funding model, says Yu.

However, Yu argues, the programme did not work as well as hoped, due to the funding ceiling and the siloed attempts made by different regional governments to develop hydrogen ecosystems . 

But Chinese policy thinking is becoming more selective and pragmatic for hydrogen compared with EVs, says Shen. She says:

“Electrification remains the primary decarbonisation pathway [for road transport], while hydrogen is increasingly positioned for applications where direct electrification is more difficult.”

Tu echoes this, adding that China is “clearly moving toward a more supportive policy environment for hydrogen”. 

But its approach is “unlikely to replicate the EV story one-for-one”, he adds.

China’s concerted hydrogen push is also unlikely to echo the EV story at a global level, according to the IEA.

In terms of green hydrogen, around 60% of global electrolyser manufacturing capacity is currently in China, prompting concerns from the EU about a repeat of China’s global dominance in the solar and EV sectors.

However, the IEA says, electrolysers made in China “might not supply other markets at scale in the short term”, due to difficulties transporting the bulky technology globally, expectations that costs will only fall gradually, uncertainty around global demand and questions over how well Chinese electrolysers perform against global alternatives.

China’s industrial focus on hydrogen is centred more on domestic use, Shen argues. “It is less about near-term export competitiveness and more about building domestic industrial ecosystems,” she says.

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The post Q&A: Can China turn hydrogen into its next clean-energy industry? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

24 June | London | Online

Carbon Tracker and Confluence Philanthropy welcome you: 

Join us during London Climate Action Week for a timely discussion on the global shift away from fossil fuels – and what it means for investors navigating an increasingly volatile energy landscape. 

Investors are at a critical inflection point. Recent geopolitical tensions and market shocks have underscored the fragility of the global fossil fuel system. At the same time, clean energy and electrification are scaling rapidly, reshaping long-term oil and gas demand. International climate dialogues, including those from the recent Santa Marta process, are also sending increasingly clear signals about the direction and pace of fossil fuel phaseout. 

The session will explore how shifting demand and global policy alignment are reshaping fossil fuel markets and redefining risk, returns and capital allocation. 

Limited space in person, join us online 

This session will unpack: 

• Key takeaways from the Santa Marta process and what they signal for policy and capital markets 
  • Official conference takeaways can be found here 
• The latest evidence on the global scaling of clean energy 
• How Middle Eastern stakeholders are navigating the transition and what this means for global supply, pricing and risk 
• What structural shifts in fossil fuel demand mean for investors and capital allocation 

Opening Welcome:  Dana Lanza, Confluence Philanthropy 

Speakers:  

• Sandrine Dixson-Declève, Club of Rome 
• Jules Kortenhorst, Energy Transitions Commission 
• Mark Campanale, Carbon Tracker Initiative 
• [Additional speaker TBC] 

The post LCAW 2026: From Santa Marta to Crisis in the Middle East: Fossil Fuel Phaseout, Energy Transition and Implications for Investors appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.