I. Climate Science

Nations are “back on track” to adopt a framework for curbing global shipping emissions, following the latest International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) meeting in London, UK.

The proposed “net-zero framework” had been expected to be approved by countries at the IMO towards the end of 2025.

Instead, the Trump administration was accused of “bully-boy” tactics as the US led a concerted effort to reject the framework, leading to its approval being delayed.

Since then, the US, other fossil-fuel producers and some industry groups have called for the framework to be stripped of its carbon-pricing mechanism, or abandoned entirely.

At the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC84) meeting in London, UK, last week, nations tried once again to reach an agreement on the framework.

Opponents said they were trying to seek consensus, but supporters, such as Brazil, the EU and Pacific islands, pointed out the framework was already a “careful balance of interests”.

Liberia and Panama – “flag states” for a third of the world’s commercial shipping – led a counter-proposal, alongside Argentina, which effectively cut carbon pricing from the framework.

Ultimately, however, the meeting ended with a reconfirmation that delegations are committed to rebuilding consensus on global shipping emissions. 

The framework survived the negotiations and the committee will now try to adopt it at its December 2026 meeting.

Below, Carbon Brief explains why the framework has proved so contentious, who the major players have been and what the final outcome was at the latest IMO meeting.

• Why was the net-zero framework delayed last year?
• Why do some countries oppose the net-zero framework?
• What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?
• What do supporters of the net-zero framework want?
• What was the final outcome from the IMO meeting?

Why was the net-zero framework delayed last year?

In April 2025, nations at the IMO had agreed on a “net-zero framework” at their MEPC83 meeting in London, despite the US withdrawing halfway through.

Later that year, in October 2025, they failed to formally adopt the framework after a fraught “extraordinary session” that saw US negotiators accused of “bully-boy tactics”.

(The MEPC usually meets once a year, but additional meetings or intersessionals can be added to deal with an “extraordinary event or critical maritime environmental crisis”. The October session was organised specifically to consider the adoption of the framework and other draft amendments.)

The framework was meant to be a practical set of measures to achieve the global net-zero target for shipping, agreed at the IMO in 2023. The target is significant, as international shipping is responsible for more than 2% of emissions and is not covered by the Paris Agreement.

Following a week of negotiations at the April 2025 meeting, the remaining nations had voted on approving a compromise proposal for an emissions levy – effectively a carbon tax on global shipping – and a credit-trading system. 

A majority of nations had agreed to this framework that would have set a lower emissions-intensity reduction target of 4% in 2028, rising to 30% in 2035. It had also included an upper target that would have increased from 17% in 2028 to 43% in 2035.

Ships that failed to lower their emissions intensity in line with these limits would have needed to purchase “remedial units” for $380 per “tier two” unit. This would have fed into a new IMO “net-zero fund”. 

Those who met the lower target, but fell short of the more difficult upper target, would have had to pay into the IMO fund, but at the lower rate of $100 per “tier one” unit.

The number of compliant ships had been expected to grow under this framework, reducing the number of vessels reliant on buying units and helping to reduce emissions intensity by over 40%, as the chart below shows. 

Reduction in emissions intensity of shipping fuel compared to 2008 reference year, showing percentage made up of tier two (red), tier one (pale red) and compliant emissions (grey). Source: IMO.

The purchase of units to comply with the rules had been expected to raise $10-15bn annually in the initial years of the fund, as well as help with the development of zero and near-zero (ZNZ) greenhouse gas fuels and energy sources, according to thinktank IDDRI. 

In turn, the fund would have been used to support developing countries to decarbonise shipping.

A clear majority of 80% of the eligible voters – not including those who abstained or the US – approved the framework at the April 2025 meeting.  

The 63 countries that voted in favour included the EU, China, India and Brazil, while those that voted against included major fossil-fuel producers, such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 

Following this “landmark” agreement, countries had then been expected to formally adopt the framework at the next MEPC session in October 2025. 

However, the meeting proved challenging. The US “unequivocally rejected” the proposal and lobbied extensively against adoption, including by threatening governments, individual diplomats and shipping companies with sanctions, visa restrictions, tariffs and port fees.

During the October meeting, the US and its allies pushed for a shift from a “tacit” approval system for the net-zero framework to one that would require explicit acceptance by governments. This would mean it would only come into force if, six months later, two-thirds of nations actively accepted the deal, Climate Home News explained at the time. 

Negotiations continued throughout the week before Saudi Arabia called to adjourn the meeting, a move that was passed after it was backed by 57 countries. 

As such, the decision on the adoption of the net-zero framework was pushed back by a year.

Among the 63 countries that supported the IMO net-zero framework at MEPC83 in April 2025, 15 supported the adjournment and 10 abstained – showing that some nations that had previously supported the framework had softened on the deal, following lobbying by the US, Saudi Arabia and their allies.

Going into the April 2026 MEPC84 meeting, it was clear that agreement on the framework would not be straightforward. A report ahead of the meeting from University College London (UCL) noted: 

“The level of support is noticeably weaker than in April [2025] and likely reflects the effectiveness and efforts made by sides supporting or opposing the net-zero framework over the intervening period.”

In the week ahead of the MEPC84, US IMO delegation lead Wayne Arguin told a meeting that there was a “clear, strong and sizable bloc of countries opposed to the [net-zero framework]” and “no prospect of achieving consensus”, according to Politico. 

As the meeting kicked off on 27 April 2026, IMO secretary-general Arsenio Dominguez called on parties to engage in “engage in constructive and pragmatic exchanges”. 

Why do some countries oppose the net-zero framework?

A coalition of countries, including the US, Saudi Arabia and various fossil-fuel producers, strongly oppose the IMO net-zero framework that was agreed last year.

They were supported by a wider group of industry bodies and major flag states – countries where many ships are registered – which were instrumental in advancing “alternative frameworks” at the latest meeting. (See: What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?)

Documents submitted ahead of the April 2026 meeting laid out the basis for this opposition, with the US criticising the net-zero framework’s “significant shortcomings”, concluding:

“The most appropriate path forward is to end consideration of the IMO net-zero framework entirely.”

More nuance came in a statement from a group of primarily large fossil-fuel producers, including Saudi Arabia, Russia and Algeria, which was also backed by the US.

It stressed the need for “alternative” frameworks, with an emphasis on achieving consensus, as well as “practicability, equity and trust”. In practice, this meant a system without any carbon pricing, “top-down restrictions” or “international penalties”.

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Opposing countries said any outcome should be “technology-neutral”, meaning it should not disadvantage specific fuels, potentially including liquified natural gas (LNG) and other fossil fuels.

These nations also stressed what they claimed were the potential impact of additional net-zero costs on “food and energy security”.

Much of their criticism was based on supposed economic harm that the net-zero framework would cause, particularly in developing countries.

These arguments purported to be about fairness for these countries. Yet some opponents of the framework were also calling for the IMO fund to be abandoned.

If this IMO fund were lost, then developing countries could lose out on a potential source of support for their own maritime decarbonisation, as well as potentially their broader energy transitions.

As well as supporting the fossil-fuel producers’ call for “alternative frameworks”, the UAE filed its own submission questioning the legitimacy of the IMO in establishing a new fund. 

The US submission to the IMO stated that the fund would provide “pennies on the dollar compared to the economic hardship” brought about by the framework overall. 

US delegates distributed flyers at the IMO meeting, emphasising the financial burden they claimed the framework would place on developing countries. While low-carbon shipping will come with substantial costs, analysts said the US figures were “not credible”.

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Campaigners accused the US of “pretending to care about other countries’ economies”, pointing out that the energy crisis – triggered by the US-led war on Iran – is costing the shipping industry billions. 

Moreover, they stated that the Trump administration’s new port entry fees would be a far greater financial burden for the global shipping industry than the mooted net-zero rules. 

Analysis by UCL shipping researchers ahead of MEPC84 concluded that the Trump administration would potentially be less able to exert “soft power and influence” at the talks than last year. Additionally, it pointed to a Supreme Court ruling that limited the US’s capacity to impose punitive tariffs. 

In practice, the US was less vocal at the talks, choosing to support alternative framework ideas proposed by other IMO members.

What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?

There were two main alternatives to the net-zero framework considered at MEPC84. 

Japan suggested some ideas as a “possible basis for discussion”, which included removing the need for ships to pay into an IMO fund when they fail to meet emissions targets. 

It also suggested simply relaxing the emissions targets, in order to make them easier for shipping companies to meet.

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The second – and more significant – counter-proposal to the net-zero framework was not submitted by the US or its fossil-fuel producer allies. 

Instead, it came from Liberia, Panama and Argentina, three countries that have strong political and historical ties with the US.

This was particularly notable given Liberia and Panama’s status as the top two “flags of convenience”, as shown in the chart below. A third of the world’s commercial shipping is registered in these small states, giving them disproportionate significance within the talks.

Deadweight tonnage of the ten largest merchant fleets in 2025 by flag of registration, million tonnes. Source: UNCTAD.

Their proposal, offered in the spirit of “consensus‑building”, said that only fuels already considered “commercially viable” should be included in the IMO’s carbon-intensity targets. 

The Argentina-Liberia-Panama proposal was dismissed by observers as “business-as-usual”, as it removes incentives to develop clean fuels, any substantial means of enforcement and opportunities to raise funds to help developing countries.

Delaine McCullough, director of the shipping programme at the Ocean Conservancy, tells Carbon Brief:

“By removing the mandatory greenhouse gas price, you take away the ability to provide any kind of rewards or other incentives, and you also take away the regulatory incentive, so you just end up where we are today.”

This was the proposal that the net-zero framework’s most prominent opponents, including the US and the Gulf states, rallied around at MEPC84. 

Among those also backing the idea during the talks were some developing countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, that also said they wanted the IMO outcome to provide them with financial support. 

This came in spite of the proposal stating there should be “no establishment of an IMO fund”. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a small-island state delegate tells Carbon Brief: 

“Many countries that support the Liberia-Panama-Argentina submission also seek support for transition, capacity-building and mitigation of negative impacts. This support will not be available if [that] approach is taken.”

Some delegates questioned the decision by Liberia and Panama to lead this pushback against the net-zero framework. Both nations had previously supported an emissions levy on shipping, which would have been far more ambitious than the framework they now oppose. 

Observers noted ties between nations that opposed the framework and parts of the shipping sector – including US-based interests and LNG assets.

Among the industry voices arguing strongly against the net-zero framework have been the American Bureau of Shipping and a group of international shipping companies and registries – including the national registries of Liberia and Panama.

The latter group voiced “significant concerns” and called for “alternative proposals”. Rather than a domestic entity, the Liberian registry that issued this statement is a privately owned US company.

Reflecting on these issues, Prof Tristan Smith, an energy and transport expert at UCL, wrote on LinkedIn:

“Privately owned registries have leverage over their host governments because one angry shipowner’s personal wealth is more than the flag state’s GDP and governments of low-income countries can’t easily take risks with even small volume revenues.”

Major Greek shipowners, including some with US-linked LNG interests, also opposed the net-zero framework, citing the “absence of support from major and influential states representing a significant share of global tonnage”.

Greece itself had reportedly pushed back against the framework behind the scenes, despite the EU’s public, unified position of support.

What do supporters of the net-zero framework want?

There were many vocal supporters of the net-zero framework at MEPC84, including a broad range of developed and developing countries. 

Among them were the EU, Brazil, Mexico, Kenya, Pacific island states, Australia and the UK.

Having supported the net-zero framework last April, but voted to postpone its adoption in October, China expressed support for a carbon-pricing system and an IMO fund in a technical submission issued ahead of MEPC84.

The major shipping nation had remained quiet during the US-Saudi disruption in October last year, so its submission was viewed as a positive for backers of the framework.

Colombia, which was simultaneously hosting a global conference on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels, also emerged as a supporter of the net-zero framework.

There has also been support from some sections of the shipping industry, including a large coalition of ports, logistics companies and clean-fuel providers. 

Supportive nations pointed out that the net-zero framework was the result of years of talks and already represented what Pacific island states called a “fragile compromise”. They framed it as the “only politically viable option” for hitting the IMO’s net-zero goal.

Pacific islands and around 50 other nations had originally called for a universal carbon levy on shipping. Ultimately, they were forced to accept the net-zero framework as a compromise, but Pacific islands said they would revert to their call for a levy if they felt the framework was being “watered down”.  

The demand for a levy was strongly opposed by numerous countries, including some of the current framework’s supporters, such as Brazil and Australia.

In a bid to revive the net-zero framework, a submission by Brazil sought to “dispel any possible potential misunderstandings”, stressing that the approach is “flexible” and “should not be mistaken for a ‘global tax’”.

For example, Brazil notes that the framework “does not exclude any fuels” and that even existing “bunker” fuels and LNG could be used, as long as carbon intensity targets are met. (Ships could, for example, use carbon capture and storage to meet the goals.)

Michael Mbaru, a low-carbon shipping expert for the Kenya climate special envoy, told a briefing ahead of the conference that the net-zero framework was in developing countries’ interests: 

“If the global package unravels, pressure grows for more regional and unilateral measures instead, and this is particularly difficult for African and other developing countries, because fragmented regulation raises compliance, complexity [and] transaction costs.”

In response to the Argentina-Liberia-Panama proposal that opponents of the framework had coalesced around, the Solomon Islands pointed out that, in seeking “consensus”, this group was ignoring the numerous parties that wanted more ambition, rather than less. It stated in a submission:

“There is no reason to expect that a new proposal, that differs from the IMO net-zero framework, would find a majority, much less a consensus.”

Nevertheless, supporters of the net-zero framework also acknowledged that there were some areas where greater clarity might help countries to finalise the details.

These areas include clarifying technical considerations such as: how fuel intensity is calculated; addressing the potential impacts of net-zero rules on food security; the governance of the IMO fund; and regulation of sustainable fuel certification schemes.

Given this, there was broad support for more discussions at an extra “intersessional” meeting later this year, in order to hash out these final details before attempting to approve the net-zero framework once more.

What was the final outcome from the IMO meeting?

Ultimately, the IMO’s net-zero framework remains on the table and will now be negotiated further in the autumn, ahead of the next MEPC session in December 2026. 

The decision, as well as the general willingness to move forward noted by numerous observers, was broadly welcomed. IMO secretary-general Arsenio Dominguez said:

“We are back on track, but we have to rebuild trust. I encourage you to maintain this momentum through your intersessional work and to prepare submissions that can bring the membership together.”

MO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez speaking at the Marine Environment Protection Committee on 27 April 2026 at IMO Headquarters in London. Credit: IMO / Flickr

Over the week of negotiations, nearly 100 delegations took to the floor to voice their opinions on the adoption of the net-zero framework. 

As well as discussion of the previously proposed net-zero framework, Argentina and Japan put forward alternative proposals, although neither gathered significant support. 

The Argentinian proposal was substantially different from the net-zero framework and did not include either a greenhouse gas price or a fund. It saw support from just 24 member states and, even when combined with the Japanese proposal to form a “technical-only” compromise, it was unable to gain a majority. 

According to the UCL Shipping and Oceans Research group, despite numerous efforts to put forward options that would be more acceptable to the US and Saudi positions – such as technical-only proposals – these failed to find “viable ways forward”. 

This is important, as normally within the IMO, when two proposals have similar levels of support such as this, they can be merged or a compromise found. 

On the final day of negotiations, countries agreed to take forward the original net-zero framework, which was agreed in principle back in April 2025.  

More than half of the nations at the IMO meeting were in favour of it, including members such the EU, Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, Tuvalu and others. They accepted the framework, as originally agreed, as the basis for further work.

The countries that supported it remain largely unchanged from previous meetings, but there was additional support. 

Most of the supporters had opposed the adjournment at the IMO session in October, which pushed the adoption of the net-zero framework back. But five additional countries that had supported adjournment switched sides, along with 10 countries that had not taken a side, now clearly supporting the framework, according to UCL. 

Others pushed back against the net-zero framework and called for reopening it for substantial changes. This included the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Liberia and others, predominantly oil and gas exporters. 

According to UCL, two countries flipped from opposing adjournment to opposing the framework. UCL notes that “this indicates the fluidity of a portion of the positions and the sustained uncertainty around adoption later this year”.

The figure below shows supporters of the net-zero framework or other options at the latest meeting, colour-coded according to their position on the adjournment vote in October 2025.

Position on the next steps for the net-zero framework at the IMO’s latest meeting in April 2026. Credit: UCL

The net-zero framework was, ultimately, the only option in the final outcome text. While it has “survived”, “survival is not a victory and we cannot end up in a cycle of open-ended negotiations”, Em Fenton, senior director of climate diplomacy at Opportunity Green, tells Carbon Brief. They add: 

“We must now look forward to moving towards adoption of the framework later this year in a way that maintains urgency and ambition, and delivers justice and equity for countries on the frontlines of climate impacts.”

The IMO committee agreed to establish an intersessional working group to resolve a number of outstanding concerns and “drive broader convergence on a global measure” ahead of the next MEPC meeting. 

Member states will be able to submit new amendments and adjustments to the draft net-zero framework, to complement those already approved.

The two intersessional meetings will take place in September and November, ahead of MEPC85 in December. 

Christiaan De Beukelaer, senior lecturer in culture and climate at the University of Melbourne, tells Carbon Brief: 

“The ship is mostly built, though it’s obvious that more work needs doing on its interior. Right now, some are trying to finish the build while others are trying to scuttle it.”

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Were the 2022 whale deaths off the US East Coast caused by offshore wind development?

The 2022 whale deaths have not been linked to offshore wind surveys or construction. Research has found no evidence of wind farms driving whale deaths, and responsibly developed wind farms avert systemic harms of fossil fuels.

Bad practices like construction during peak migration, high-speed vessels, or not monitoring whale presence can increase risk. However, established regulations such as seasonal construction limits, population monitoring, and vessel-speed rules reduce exposure. Once operating, turbine noise is significantly less disruptive than ships. 

According to the NOAA, boat collisions and fishing gear entanglement account for most whale deaths, not wind turbines.

In contrast, fossil fuel drilling and burning routinely harm marine life. Oil and gas exploration uses highly disruptive sonar, oil spills kill marine animals, and emissions acidify oceans, weakening coral and shellfish. Warming causes population-level harms to marine mammals through altered migration routes and habitat loss.

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Sources

Yale Climate Connections Wind opponents spread myth about dead whales

NOAA Frequent Questions—Offshore Wind and Whales

U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Vineyard Wind 1 Offshore Wind Energy Project Final Environmental Impact Statement

The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America How loud is the underwater noise from operating offshore wind turbines?

Save the Sound Clearing the Air on Offshore Wind

Biological Conservation Population consequences of disturbance by offshore oil and gas activity for endangered sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus)

National Audubon Society More Than One Million Birds Died During Deepwater Horizon Disaster

NOAA What is Ocean Acidification?

Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

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A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, April 26, 2026 thru Sat, May 2, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

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• Why delaying climate action now means higher seas by 2100 The Conversation, Helen Millman, Martin Siegert, Richard Alley, Apr 24, 2026.
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• The world is getting too hot to feed itself A new UN report maps how extreme heat is tearing through every layer of the global food system — and mostly overlooks the people at the heart of it. Grist, Ayurella Horn-Muller, Apr 27, 2026.
• Red Alert: India Heat Index Turns Dangerous As Viral Reddit Post Shows 42-44°C Glow Red Amidst Urban Heat Crisis Record-breaking heat and urban heat islands intensify India's heatwave crisis, posing severe health risks International Business Times, Rohit David, Apr 27, 2026.
• Europe is warming more than TWICE as fast as the global average, report reveals - as scientists warn 'climate change is not a future threat, it is our present reality' Experts say that Europe's rapid warming is driving a wave of extreme weather, heat-related deaths, and devastating wildfires. Daily Mail UK, editorial@mailonline.co.uk (Editor), Apr 29, 2026.
• Major hurricanes in the Northeast are rare. Could climate change make them common? Nuanced analysis of possible changes in hurricane behavior by expert Jeff Masters Yale Climate Connections, Jeff Masters, Apr 29, 2026.
• Surgeon warns that climate change can disrupt cancer care Wildfires, storms, and floods can lead to missed appointments and hospital closures – with life-and-death consequences. Yale Climate Connections, YCC Team, Apr 30, 2026.
• Climate Change is Destroying Lives... Now ClimateAdam on Youtube, Adam Levy, Apr 30. 2026.

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• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #17 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, April 19, 2026 thru Sat, April 25, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler, John Hartz & Doug Bostrom, Apr 26, 2026.
• World `will not see significant return to coal` in 2026 - despite Iran crisis A much-discussed ''return to coal'' by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year. Carbon Brief, Josh Gabbatiss, Apr 28, 2026.
• What fossil fuels really cost us in a world at war 'Governments are under pressure to respond to rising fuel and food costs and deepening energy poverty. It’s time for a power shift'' Climate Home News, Megan Rowling, Apr 29, 2026.
• `A study showed…` isn`t enough - scientific knowledge builds incrementally as researchers investigate and revisit questions A professor of geography offers tips on how to make skepticism genuine and useful. The Conversation, Jeffrey A. Lee, Apr 30, 2026.

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• Rivers worldwide reveal greenhouse gas rise that's been overlooked for decades Researchers at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) quantify how rivers worldwide are under severe stress as they warm, losing oxygen and as a result emitting increasing amounts of greenhouse gases. Phys.org, KIT press office, Apr 27, 2026.
• Antarctica`s ice shelves are vulnerable to melting from below - knowing how far ocean heat reaches is crucial A rare dataset collected by instruments at the point where Antarctica’s largest ice shelf begins to float reveals ocean processes that drive melting at this critical part of the continent. The Conversation, Craig Stevens, Apr 28, 2026.
• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #18 2026 Skeptical Science's latest survey of climate research includes 114 academic research articles in 55 journals by 1150 contributing authors, and 14 government and NGO reports. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Apr 30, 2026.
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• How an army of volunteers is fighting climate misinformation online Instead of arguing with trolls, they’re amplifying the truth. Yale Climate Connections, YCC Team, May 01, 2026.

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• Colombia hosts talks on exiting fossil fuels as global energy crisis deepens More than 50 countries, including oil producers and major consumers, are converging in Colombia for a fossil-fuel exit conference. Los Angeles Times, Fabiano Maisonnave, Apr 26, 2026.
• Six nations at Santa Marta could shape fossil fuel futures A small but critical handful of countries attending the conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels remain deeply committed to expanding their fossil fuel output. Climate Home News, Megan Rowling, Apr 29, 2026.
• Santa Marta: Key outcomes from first summit on `transitioning away` from fossil fuels Countries attending a first-of-its-kind summit have walked away with plans to develop national roadmaps away from fossil fuels, along with new tools to address harmful subsidies and carbon-intensive trade. Carbon Brief, Daisy Dunne, Apr 30, 2026.

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• Germany`s climate U-turn is the worst possible response to the oil shock 'Prices at the pump have leapt since the start of the conflict – but clinging to fossil fuels will only prolong the pain.'' The Guardian, Tania Roettger, May 01, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

• Climate Science Under Siege: Dr. Michael Mann on Fighting Fossil Fuel Disinformation Youtube, David Fenton, Apr 19, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week Countries chart path away from fossil fuels

SANTA MARTA SUMMIT: Countries attending a first-of-its-kind summit have walked away with plans to develop national “roadmaps” to move away from fossil fuels, along with new tools to address subsidies and carbon-intensive trade. The first conference on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels, held in Santa Marta, Colombia, from 24-29 April, saw 57 countries – representing one-third of the world’s economy – debate practical ways to move away from coal, oil and gas. Carbon Brief has produced an in-depth summary of the talks.

‘REFRESHING’ APPROACH: Against the backdrop of a global oil and gas crisis, ministers and envoys from across the world sat side-by-side in small meeting rooms to have open and frank conversations about the barriers they face in transitioning from fossil fuels to clean energy. This new format – devised by co-hosts Colombia and the Netherlands – was described as “refreshing” (see below).

NEW SCIENCE PANEL: The event also featured a “science pre-conference” attended by 400 academics from around the world. This saw the launch of a new science panel that will aim to provide quick analysis to nations wanting to accelerate their transition away from fossil fuels. In addition, the academics gathered gave their backing to a new scientific report – first covered by Carbon Brief – advising nations to “halt all new fossil-fuel expansion”.

Around the world

UAE QUITS OPEC: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) on Tuesday said it was quitting OPEC, “dealing a blow to the oil producers’ group ​as an unprecedented energy crisis caused by the Iran war exposes discord among Gulf nations”, said Reuters.

IMO TENSIONS: With talks still ongoing today at the International Maritime Organization in London, the Guardian reported that “pressure” on the negotiations “appears to be linked to countries that have invested heavily in gas”.

OUTPOWERING TRUMP: US clean-energy installations are on track to hit “another record” this year and account for the vast majority of new power additions, despite facing policy opposition from the Trump administration, reported Bloomberg.

FOREST LOSS SLOWS: The loss of tropical forests slowed last year, “largely due to Brazil’s efforts to curb deforestation in the Amazon”, according to World Energy Institute and University of Maryland data covered by BBC News.

1.8%

The proportion, at most, that global coal-power output is expected to increase this year – tempering claims made by some that the energy crisis could cause a “return to coal”, according to new Carbon Brief analysis.

Latest climate research

• Mass incarceration can be viewed as a “climate justice issue”, as “incarcerated individuals are at a heightened risk of experiencing multiple climate-related events and “carceral infrastructure and policies worsen these impacts” | Environmental Research Letters
• Climate finance can promote stability in “conflict-affected” countries, through “the alleviation of water scarcity and the reduction of fossil-fuel dependence” | Climate Policy
• Land vertebrates will be increasingly exposed to heatwaves, wildfires, drought and river floods over the coming century due to climate change | Nature Ecology and Evolution

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

China’s exports of the “new three” clean-energy technologies surged by 70% year-on-year in March 2026, reaching $21.6bn, according to new analysis for Carbon Brief’s China Briefing newsletter. Exports of the three technologies – solar cells and panels, electric vehicles (EVs) and lithium-ion batteries – were also up 37% from February, the month before the Iran war. The conflict is one explanation for the surge, as it has caused several countries to emphasise the need to increase non-fossil energy supplies. However, a domestic policy deadline and falling silver prices were also behind solar exports almost doubling, analysts told Carbon Brief.

Spotlight The inside story of how countries came together in Colombia

This week, Carbon Brief reports on how a new “informal” approach helped countries to make progress on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels at talks in Santa Marta, Colombia.

Over the past few days, ministers and climate envoys from 57 countries have been gathering in Santa Marta, a city along the Caribbean coast of Colombia, in a beach hotel that would not look far out of place in HBO’s White Lotus. 

For the first time, only one topic was up for conversation: how to “transition away” from fossil fuels, the main driver of human-caused climate change.

The end result – new plans for national fossil-fuel “roadmaps”, new tools to address subsidies and carbon-intensive trade, and a renewed commitment for countries to keep cooperating on energy transition – has been hailed as a “historic breakthrough”.

From the outset, the summit’s co-hosts – Colombia and the Netherlands – were keen to stress that the meeting would not be a space for more negotiations, but rather a forum for countries and other stakeholders to discuss practical steps to move away from fossil fuels.

This format was widely praised by countries in attendance, who described the conversational atmosphere at the conference as “refreshing”, “highly successful” and a “safe space for discussion”.

Closed-door discussions

The “high-level segment” of the conference was held from 28-29 April. 

Following the opening plenary, ministers and climate envoys spent much of the two days in closed-door “breakout sessions”, discussing issues ranging from “planned phase down and closure of fossil-fuel extraction” to “closing gaps in financial and investment systems”.

Carbon Brief understands that each session featured 12 ministers and envoys representing different countries sitting in an inner circle, with an outer circle made up of civil society members and other stakeholders. Each session was led by a different minister, appointed by the co-hosts.

In a departure from UN climate negotiations, the conversations that took place were free-flowing, with ministers and stakeholders given equal opportunities to contribute, observers told Carbon Brief.

All of the sessions were held under the Chatham House rule, meaning discussions were not attributable to individual speakers to encourage more open debate.

Ministers and climate envoys in a closed-door “break out session” in Santa Marta. Credit: Earth Negotiations Bulletin

UK special representative on climate, Rachel Kyte, was among policymakers praising the informal format, telling a huddle of journalists there was “real value” in speaking freely with other country officials. She added:

“I have to say that it is really nice to sit in a small circle…In a negotiation, it’s very, very fast-moving and transactional. But now we have had two days to think about [fossil-fuel transition issues] and this only.”

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Panama’s special representative on climate change, Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez, said the format was “groundbreaking”, adding:

“I’m going to be honest. [At] first I was like: ‘What the f*ck am I doing here? I don’t know where this is going.’

“But then, as the workshop started, I realised there were ministers, envoys, civil society leaders and Indigenous people. They put us in a format where we could not open our computers, so we had to speak from our minds and our hearts. That completely flipped my perception. That kind of space I haven’t seen in my 10-year history with the UNFCCC.”

Road to COP31

The findings of this conference are now due to be delivered to the Brazilian COP30 presidency, which is currently preparing a global fossil-fuel roadmap to present at COP31 in Turkey this November.

A large question mark remains over how the outcomes will affect proceedings at COP31, particularly among the more than 130 countries that were not in attendance in Santa Marta. 

Co-hosts Colombia and the Netherlands deliberately chose not to invite some countries to Santa Marta, saying the aim of this was to try to keep conversations focused on transitioning away from fossil fuels. (This approach split opinions among country officials and observers.)

During the summit’s final plenary, Dutch climate minister Stientje van Veldhoven stated that, going forward, it was the co-chairs’ wish to create an “open coalition”, including by extending an “invitation for others to join us” in the future.

Watch, read, listen

NATIONS TO WATCH: A comment piece in Climate Home News by decarbonisation analyst Christopher Wright named “six nations” present at the Santa Marta talks that could “shape fossil-fuel futures”.

REFORM’S FOSSIL LINKS: A new investigation by DeSmog detailed how more than two-thirds of the total income of the hard-right Reform UK party comes from fossil fuels.

ARCTIC REPORT: Climate journalist Alec Luhn has won a National Headliner Award for his piece on plans to “refreeze” the Arctic, during which his “right thumb got frostnip from hitting the record button”. Read Luhn’s original article in Scientific American.

Coming up

• 2 May: Niue general elections
• 3-8 May: European Geosciences Union general assembly 2026, Vienna, Austria
• 4 May: International Energy Agency (IEA) global methane tracker report launch

Pick of the jobs

• Lighthouse Reports, editor, climate and environment | Salary: €70,000-€80,000. Location: Amsterdam, Netherlands or remote
• Center for Strategic and International Studies, research associate or associate fellow – climate change and energy security | Salary: $63,000-$70,000. Location: Washington DC
• Quaker United Nations Office, programme assistant, human impact of climate change | Salary: CHF4,262 per month. Location: Geneva, Switzerland

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

DeBriefed 24 April 2026: Europe’s energy-crisis plan | Renewables overtake coal | Colombia’s fossil-fuel summit

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The post DeBriefed 1 May 2026: Countries chart path away from fossil fuels | China’s clean-tech surge | Global forest loss slows appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Countries attending a first-of-its-kind summit have walked away with plans to develop national roadmaps away from fossil fuels, along with new tools to address harmful subsidies and carbon-intensive trade.

The first conference on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels held in Santa Marta, Colombia, from 24-29 April saw 57 countries – representing one-third of the world’s economy – debate practical ways to move away from coal, oil and gas.

Against a backdrop of war, a global oil crisis and worsening extreme weather events, ministers and envoys from across the world sat side-by-side in small meeting rooms to have open and frank conversations about the barriers they face in transitioning from fossil fuels to clean energy.

This new format – devised by co-hosts Colombia and the Netherlands – was described as “refreshing”, “highly successful” and “groundbreaking” by countries attending the talks.

The event also featured a “science pre-conference” attended by 400 global academics, which included the launch of a new science panel that will aim to provide agile and bespoke analysis to nations wanting to accelerate their transition away from fossil fuels.

At the summit’s conclusion, Tuvalu and Ireland were announced as the co-hosts of the second transitioning away from fossil fuels summit, which will take place in the Pacific island nation in 2027.

Below, Carbon Brief outlines all of the key takeaways from the talks.

• Colombia and Netherlands leadership
• High-level segment
  • National statements and pledges
  • Closed-door discussions
  • Final outcomes
• Academic meeting
  • Science panel for global energy transition
  • Action insights report
  • Colombia’s fossil-fuel roadmap
• Indigenous and civil society participation

Colombia and Netherlands leadership

The idea for a specific fossil-fuel transition conference hosted in Colombia first emerged during tense end-game negotiations at the COP30 climate summit in Belém, Brazil.

Amid a push by a group of around 80 nations to refer to a “roadmap” away from fossil fuels in the formal COP30 outcome text, Colombia and the Netherlands jointly announced that they would co-host a summit in Santa Marta in April.

The calls for a fossil-fuel “roadmap” to be mentioned in COP30’s outcome text ultimately failed. However, the Brazilian COP30 presidency promised to bring forward an “informal” fossil-fuel roadmap, drawing on the discussions and debates in Santa Marta.

The Santa Marta conference took place from 24-29 April. It included a “science pre-conference” from 24-25, a day for subnational governments, parliamentarians and other stakeholders and a “high-level segment” with ministers and climate envoys from 28-29.

Colombian environment minister Irene Vélez Torres – herself a former academic – was particularly keen to emphasise the importance of science to the conference, telling journalists: “We need to go back to science and base our decisions on science.” (See: Academic meeting)

From the outset, the hosts stressed that the high-level segment was not a space for negotiations, but rather a forum for countries and other stakeholders to discuss practical steps to move away from fossil fuels.

This format was widely praised by ministers and climate envoys, who described the conversational atmosphere in break-out sessions as “refreshing”, “highly successful” and “groundbreaking”. (See: Closed-door discussions.)

A total of 57 countries participated in the conference, according to the Colombian government. 

These countries were: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, the EU, the Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malawi, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, México, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, the Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, the UK, Uruguay, Vanuatu, the Vatican and Vietnam.

At the summit’s opening press conference on 24 April, Vélez Torres confirmed that Colombia and the Netherlands had decided to only invite a select group of countries to the conference.

Vélez Torres told journalists that countries including China, Russia and the US were not invited. She suggested that they had not shown the necessary spirit to be part of the “coalition of the willing” and that Colombia wanted to avoid a rehashing of the lengthy debates at COP30. (Carbon Brief understands that India was also not invited.)

In a later press huddle, Dutch climate minister Stientje van Veldhoven clarified that the two co-hosts had partially based their invitation criteria on who showed support for the fossil-fuel roadmap at COP30, saying:

“It was a combination of what happened in Belém and all the existing initiatives that have been driving this agenda for a long time already.”

However, it is worth noting that some countries that had opposed a formal reference to a fossil-fuel roadmap in the COP30 outcome were invited to Santa Marta, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis of the “informal list” of those against the idea in Belém. 

For example, Tanzania was invited to take part in the Santa Marta talks, despite appearing on the list of countries opposed to the roadmap in Belém.

On the other hand, neither China nor India were invited, despite having rejected media coverage portraying them as the “blockers” of the fossil-fuel roadmap at COP30.

Country officials and observers expressed a range of views on whether excluding certain countries from the conference was the right approach.

Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez, Panama’s special representative on climate change, told a small group of journalists that he thought it was the “right decision”, adding:

“This first meeting had to be done with those that wanted something to be done. Otherwise, it would have been a repeat of a UNFCCC meeting.”

UK special representative for climate, Rachel Kyte, told a press huddle that China should feel “welcome to be here”, adding:

“China has to be part of this equation for multiple reasons.”

One veteran observer told Carbon Brief that their impression was that Colombia and the Netherlands had been “overly cautious” about who would have caused disruption if invited to the conference, saying:

“Yes, maybe there is an argument for not inviting countries that have a long history of blocking progress, such as the Gulf states. But, if we look at what countries are really doing on the ground – including JETP [Just Energy Transition Partnerships] initiatives – then more countries should have been here, including Indonesia, for example.”

However, they also urged caution on reading too much into which countries were and were not present, adding that this could also partially be explained by “scheduling and countries’ availability”.

During the summit’s final plenary, van Veldhoven stated that, going forward, it was the Netherlands and Colombia’s wish to create an “open coalition”, including by extending an “invitation for others to join us”.

Dr Maina Talia, the climate minister of Tuvalu, who will co-host the second transitioning away from fossil fuels summit alongside Ireland, told journalists that the island nations would “revisit” and “improve” the criteria used for inviting countries to the conference.

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High-level segment

[anchor]3"> National statements and pledges

The two-day high-level segment began with an opening plenary, which saw more than 20 countries put forward their views on the need to transition away from fossil fuels.

Developed and developing nations alike spoke of the need to transition away from fossil fuels not only to tackle worsening climate change, but also the high prices, insecurity and volatility associated with continued reliance on coal, oil and gas.

Opening the plenary alongside Colombia, Dutch climate minister Stientje van Veldhoven told countries:

“Price volatility and dependence on imports are structurally and unacceptably impacting our economies. We need to move away from fossil fuels not only because it is good for the climate, but because it strengthens our energy security. Investment in clean energy also lays the foundation for a more resilient and sustainable economy, capable of mitigating these shocks.”

First to speak in plenary was Nigerian minister, Abubakar Momoh, who said:

“Nigeria is actively diversifying its economy away from extracting oil, which accounts for around 80% of our exports. Nigeria strongly believes that it is not whether extraction should decline, but how to organise it so it is manageable, fair and politically viable across countries.”

Also speaking during the session, UK special representative for climate Rachel Kyte said it “would be irresponsible to ignore the second fossil-fuel crisis in five years”.

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Several nations also used their interventions to lament a lack of progress in addressing fossil-fuel use during the last 30 years of annual UN climate negotiations.

Dr Maina Talia, climate minister for Tuvalu, said that “for years, international climate negotiations have circled around fossil fuels without directly confronting the core issues”.

Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez, Panama’s special representative on climate change, told countries:

“For 34 years, we have negotiated the symptoms of the climate crisis and bulletproofed its cause. Thirty-four years of pledges. And where are we now?

“Economies built on fossil fuels are unravelling in real time. Fossil fuels are not just dirty. They are unreliable, they are dangerous and they must end.”

A small number of nations from the Pacific and Africa used their interventions to show their support for the Fossil Fuel Treaty initiative, an idea to negotiate a new legally binding agreement to control fossil-fuel use, currently supported by 18 countries. (The treaty did not feature in the summit’s final outcome.)

France’s special climate envoy, Benoît Faraco, used his intervention to announce that the nation has produced a new roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels.

Later on, on the first day, Colombian president Gustavo Petro also gave a speech at the summit, telling countries:

“What I see is resistance and inertia within the power structures and the economy of this archaic energy system. Today, fossil fuels bring death; undoubtedly, that form of capital could commit suicide, taking humanity and life itself. Humanity cannot allow that.”

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Closed-door discussions

Following the opening plenary, ministers and climate envoys spent much of the two-day high-level segment in closed-door “breakout sessions”, discussing issues ranging from “planned phase down and closure of fossil-fuel extraction” to “closing gaps in financial and investment systems”.

Carbon Brief understands that each session featured 12 ministers and envoys representing different countries sitting in an inner circle, with an outer circle made up of civil society members and other stakeholders. Each session was led by a different minister, appointed by the co-hosts.

In a departure from UN climate negotiations, the conversations that took place were free-flowing, with ministers and stakeholders given equal opportunities to contribute, observers told Carbon Brief.

Country representatives, including Panama’s special representative on climate change, Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez; the climate envoy for the Marshall Islands, Tina Stege; COP30 CEO, Ana Toni; UK special representative on climate, Rachel Kyte; and Tuvalu climate minister, Dr Maina Talia, participating in a closed-door breakout session. Credit: Earth Negotiations Bulletin

Many countries were highly complimentary of this informal format, describing it in the closing plenary as “refreshing”, “highly successful” and a “safe space for discussion”.

UK special representative on climate, Rachel Kyte, told a huddle of journalists that there was “real value” to having informal conversations with other country officials, saying:

“I have to say that it is really nice to sit in a small circle…In a negotiation, it’s very, very fast-moving and transactional. But now we have had two days to think about [fossil-fuel transition issues] and this only.”

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Panama’s special representative on climate change, Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez, said the format was “groundbreaking”, adding:

“I’m going to be honest. [At] first I was like: ‘What the f*ck am I doing here? I don’t know where this is going’.

“But then, as the workshop started, I realised there were ministers, envoys, civil society leaders and Indigenous people. They put us in a format where we could not open our computers, so we had to speak from our minds and our hearts. That completely flipped my perception. That kind of space I haven’t seen in my 10-year history with the UNFCCC.”

All of the sessions were held under the Chatham House rule, meaning discussions were not attributable to individual speakers to encourage more open debate.

Co-host nations Colombia and the Netherlands gave a broad overview of the topics and themes discussed during the sessions in a takeaways report. (See: Final outcomes.)

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Final outcomes

At the conference’s final plenary session on 29 April, co-host nations Colombia and the Netherlands presented a range of “key outcomes” from the summit.

The first outcome was confirmation of the news that Tuvalu and Ireland will co-host a second transitioning away from fossil fuels conference in the Pacific island nation in 2027.

The co-hosts also announced the establishment of three “workstreams” on issues to bring forward to the second summit. 

The first of these workstreams will focus on developing national and regional roadmaps away from fossil fuels.

Speaking in plenary, Vélez Torres said that the roadmaps should be “connected” to countries’ UN climate plans, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs). She added that it would be important for the roadmaps to be “very clear and honest” about “emissions exported from producing countries”.

The development of the roadmaps will be supported by the newly established science panel for global energy transition and the NDC Partnership, a global initiative helping nations prepare their NDCs, she added.

(At the final press conference, it was clarified that countries are not obligated to produce a new fossil-fuel roadmap and that participation in all of the work streams is voluntary.)

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The second workstream will be focused on changing the financial system to better facilitate the transition away from fossil fuels. 

This will include work to identify fossil-fuel subsidies and find solutions to “debt traps”. It will be supported by the International Institute for Sustainable Development thinktank, the co-hosts said.

Separately, Dutch climate minister van Veldhoven said that all countries would be invited via “email” to begin a process for identifying and reporting their fossil-fuel subsidies. (The Netherlands is the co-chair of COFFIS, a group of 17 nations that have pledged to remove fossil-fuel subsidies.)

The final workstream will address fossil-fuel-intensive trade, with the aim of “advancing progress towards a fossil fuel-free trade system”, Vélez Torres said. This workstream will be supported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) group of wealthy nations.

A document summing up the co-chair’s takeaways from the summit says that other key outcomes include the establishment of a “coordination group [to] ensure continuity towards the second and subsequent conferences”, adding:

“It will consist of countries leading different alliances and initiatives that are implementing elements of the transition away from fossil fuels, and of the co-hosts of the first and second conferences, Colombia, the Netherlands, Tuvalu and Ireland.”

The document adds that a key task will be delivering the findings of this conference to the COP30 presidency, which is currently preparing a global fossil-fuel roadmap to present at COP31 in November.

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Academic meeting

The summit kicked off with a “science pre-conference” attended by around 400 academics from across the globe from 24-25 April, held at the University of Magdalena in Santa Marta.

At the behest of the Colombian government, these scientists split into 11 different “workstreams” to debate a vast array of topics related to transitioning away from fossil fuels.

These ranged from “fossil-fuel phaseout policies” and the role of methane, to “just transitions and economic diversity” and the role of multilateralism.

Speaking on the summit’s first day, Colombian environment minister Irene Vélez Torres – herself a former academic – stressed the importance of science in political decision-making. She told a press conference:

“There has been a growing gap between science and governments, and governmental decisions, and it happens because there is a lot of denialism. There is a lot of economic and political lobbying as well. That is actually deviating [from] scientific rationale.

“The true belief of the countries that are here is that we need to go back to science and base our decisions on science, and back up our decision-making, processes and pathways with science.” 

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Science panel for global energy transition

The pre-conference saw the announcement of three new scientific initiatives.

The first was a new global science panel, calling itself the “science panel for global energy transition”, which was launched by Dr Johan Rockström, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany and Dr Carlos Nobre, an eminent researcher on the Amazon rainforest from the University of São Paulo in Brazil.

They announced at a public event in Santa Marta that the panel will involve “50-100 scientists” from around the world and will be based at the University of São Paulo.

The scientists on the panel will aim to provide rapid analysis on how to transition away from fossil fuels for countries and multilateral talks, including bespoke information for nations that request it, they said.

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Speaking at its launch, Rockström said the panel will be split into four working groups, focusing on “transition pathways”, “technology solutions”, “policy design and evaluation” and “finance instruments and governments”.

It will have three co-chairs: Dr Vera Songwe, an economist and climate finance expert from Cameroon; Prof Ottmar Edenhofer, chief economist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; and Prof Gilberto M Jannuzzi, professor of energy systems at Universidade Estadual de Campinas in Brazil.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Nobre said that he and Rockström were first approached with the idea for a new panel by Ana Toni, Brazilian economist and CEO of the COP30 climate summit, while the negotiations were taking place in Belém. He said:

“Johan and myself, we’re not energy transition scientists, but we were the creators of the planetary science pavilion at COP30, that’s why Ana Toni came to us. And we have already invited three top energy transition experts to join us.”

At the launch, Rockström said the panel would be different in several ways from the world’s existing global climate science panel, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

He said that, in comparison to the “seven-year cycle” for IPCC reports, this panel will “be able to come up with annual updates” and “be able to scale down to the national level”.

Nobre told Carbon Brief that he was among scientists who have grown “frustrated” with some aspects of the IPCC’s process, including the line-by-line approval of summaries for policymakers by all of the world’s governments. He said:

“A long time ago, when I was working as a scientist studying the Amazon, I wanted to include some information about the risks the Amazon faces in one of the summaries. But a representative from my own country [Brazil] said no.

“This panel is totally independent. There is no way for somebody to say ‘you can’t say that’ or ‘you can’t do that’.”

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Action insights report

The second new science initiative to emerge from the academic conference was a new “synthesis report”, offering “12 action insights” for how countries can transition away from fossil fuels.

First covered by Carbon Brief, the report contains some explicit “action recommendations” for countries, such as “halt all new fossil-fuel expansion” and “prohibit fossil fuel advertising…recognising fossil fuels as health-harming products”.

The report was first put together by an “ad-hoc” group of 24 scientists at the request of the Colombian government. It was then further debated and refined by many of the 400 scientists gathered at the academic pre-conference in Santa Marta.

A preliminary version of the report was circulated to governments attending the talks.

In addition, one of the report’s coordinating authors, Prof Andrea Cardoso Diaz, from the University of Magdalena, was given a two-minute slot in the opening plenary of the “high-level segment” to highlight its findings to gathered ministers.

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Colombia’s fossil-fuel roadmap

The final scientific initiative unveiled at the academic segment was a new roadmap for how Colombia can transition away from fossil fuels. This was drafted by a team led by Prof Piers Forster, head of the Priestley Centre for Climate Futures at the University of Leeds.

The roadmap says that Colombia can cut its emissions from energy use to 90% below 2015 levels by 2050, through ambitious policies to move away from fossil fuels and electrify its transport sector.

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This would require “considerable” upfront investment, with the roadmap estimating the cost to be an average annual investment of around $10bn above a business-as-usual scenario. 

However, by the 2040s, Colombia could see net economy-wide savings from transitioning away from fossil fuels, says the analysis, which could reach $23bn annually by 2050.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Forster said his experience as interim chair of the UK’s Climate Change Committee highlighted to him the importance of presenting national roadmaps in economic terms. He said:

“The biggest issues facing countries are economic and to do with the cost of living. To convince our own government back in the UK to sign up to our recommended carbon budget, we put a lot of work into the economic aspect. So that was also the focus of this work for Colombia.”

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Indigenous and civil society participation

In addition to holding a dedicated meeting for scientists, the Colombian government also organised a “People’s Assembly”. This brought together hundreds of Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendent peoples, peasant farmers, trade representatives, women and children and other civil society members.

The goal was to gather the thoughts from these groups on the summit’s main “pillars” of addressing fossil-fuel production, economic constraints and global governance and multilateralism.

According to Climate Lens News, Óscar Daza, the secretary general of the Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon, Karebaju people, told the gathering:

“The Indigenous peoples of the world have made historic demands, such as the non-extraction of natural resources from our territories, so that our resources that are there in the territory remain intact, remain still.

“As Indigenous peoples, we want those historic struggles to somehow be reflected and taken up here by the different states.” 

Participants at the People’s Assembly during the first conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels in Santa Marta. Credit: Ministerio de Ambiente de Colombia

Following on from the meetings, the Colombian government summarised the main talking points discussed by each of these groups in a series of “contributions” documents.

Indigenous peoples and civil society groups were also allocated opportunities to speak during the summit’s high-level segment.

In a departure from UN climate summits – where inputs from civil society are usually heard after countries have finished speaking – the Santa Marta summit invited a range of representatives to speak alongside ministers in the opening and closing plenary sessions.

This included an intervention in the opening plenary by Larissa Baldwin-Roberts, a climate leader from the Bundjalung Nations, who told countries:

“This is the last time we will be a token. You want our pictures, not our voices. You want our stories, not our struggles…True solidarity with each other is the prerequisite to a just transition.” 

Indigenous peoples and civil society members were also free to speak in closed-door discussions with ministers, Carbon Brief understands.

Separately from the events organised by the Colombian government, civil society also organised its own “people’s summit”, involving 900 organisations and networks, held in the city of Santa Marta from 24-26 April.

This summit also organised sessions for representatives from different groups to offer their thoughts and insights into the transition away from fossil fuels, ending in a joint “declaration”.

In a statement, Tasneem Essop, the executive director of Climate Action International, said: 

“Movements from across the globe and the region – Afro-descendants, feminists, youth, peasants and fisherfolk, social movements and Indigenous peoples converged in a three-day peoples summit in Santa Marta to build a collective consensus on our demands and solutions for the just transition away from fossil fuels.

“[We saw] the adoption of a powerful declaration that spells out our positions on ensuring that the transition has to be rights-based, funded and results in the dismantling of the systems that have caused harm and destruction driven by fossil fuel dependency.”

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments New documents ramp up pressure on coal

‘STRICTLY CONTROL’ FOSSIL FUELS: On 22 April, China issued a set of “guiding opinions” on energy conservation and carbon reduction that urged local governments to “strictly control fossil-fuel consumption”, according to the text published by state news agency Xinhua. Hu Min, director and co-founder of the the Beijing-based Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, said in comments to Carbon Brief that the document was a clear signal of China’s political leaders’ desire to reduce the country’s coal usage and a “way to move things forward” until more specific policies are published. Government officials noted that the opinions are of “great significance for building broader and stronger consensus across society”, reported information platform Tanpaifang.

INCREASED OVERSIGHT: The next day, the government announced new evaluation criteria for judging provinces on their efforts to meet China’s climate goals, including on raising “clean-energy consumption” and limiting “use of coal and oil”, reported Bloomberg. The 14 indicators underscore China’s “key priorities” and encourage broader carbon reduction efforts, said energy news outlet China Energy Net. They build on China’s existing inspection system to create a “much stronger accountability and compliance system”, Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told Carbon Brief. For more detail see Carbon Brief’s Q&A on what the two policies mean for China’s energy transition. 

‘RARE’ SIGNAL: Both documents were issued by the highest levels of the nation’s political system, which is “extremely rare” and “reflects the strategic importance” of China’s climate goals, Wu Hongjie, deputy secretary-general of the China Carbon Neutrality 50 Forum, told Jiemian News. In a comment article for finance news outlet Caixin, Chen Lihao – a member of the Jiusan Society, environment minister Huang’s political party – said the two documents “form the institutional foundation” for China’s “full-scale transition” to a “dual control of carbon” system.

Downpours in south China 

‘RECORD-BREAKING’ RAIN: Heavy rainfall is hitting central and southern China, with Hunan, Guizhou and Jiangxi provinces reporting record-breaking levels of precipitation last week, reported the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily. It added that the government is ramping up “flood control” measures in response. On 26-27 April, one part of Guangxi province received as much as 14cm of rain per hour, reported the state-supporting newspaper Global Times. Meanwhile, Chinese vice-premier Liu Guozhong met with the World Meteorological Organization secretary-general Celeste Saulo to discuss cooperation on global “meteorological governance”, said state news agency Xinhua, with the discussion touching on early warning systems and disaster relief.

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EL NIÑO RISK: Officials at China’s National Climate Center (NCC) have said that an El Niño weather pattern is “likely to set in around May” and “intensify during the summer and autumn”, said China Daily. The state-run newspaper also quoted NCC chief forecaster Chen Lijuan saying it was “premature” to conclude that the El Niño could be at its strongest in 140 years, or that it could lead to record-breaking heat, although he added that the risks of such weather are “clearly increasing”. Wang Yaqi, a senior engineer at NCC, noted that the phenomenon “could hit hydropower-dependent regions hard, pushing them to burn more fossil fuels”, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.

Solar capacity growth slows

CLEAN CAPACITY: China’s clean-energy grid capacity now exceeds 2,400 gigawatts (GW), as of March 2026, or 60% of the total power mix, said state broadcaster CGTN in coverage of comments from energy officials at a press conference. It added that, within this, total wind and solar capacity reached 1,900GW. Energy news outlet International Energy Net cited the officials saying that China’s operational capacity for “green hydrogen” stands at 250,000 tonnes, with another 900,000 tonnes under construction. 

SOLAR SLOWS: However, a data release showed that China added 41GW of new solar capacity in the first three months of 2026, reported BJX News, down from 60GW of new capacity in January-March 2025. Bloomberg noted that new solar capacity additions “slowed sharply to hit a four-year low” in March, adding that wind and thermal capacity growth also both slowed. 

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‘MOST AMBITIOUS GOAL’: In a separate press conference, Chinese officials confirmed to Bloomberg that a pledge in the 15th five-year plan to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years referred to energy capacity – not generation or consumption – and would run from 2025-2035. These details were “unclear” in the five-year plan itself, the outlet added. The economic news outlet Economic Daily said that the doubling goal was “one of the most ambitious goals in China’s energy transition history”, adding that “accelerating” the energy transition would allow the country to both reduce its reliance on the international energy market and “seize the high ground in the global race” to develop low-carbon industries.

More China news

• NEW BLEND: China has begun a project to blend gas supplies with 10% hydrogen in a part of Shandong province, reported the South China Morning Post, which added that the shift could cut China’s annual carbon emissions by “roughly 30m tonnes”.
• SKY-HIGH: China launched a “high-precision” satellite to monitor greenhouse gas emissions, said Xinhua.
• SUNNY SPAIN: Chinese automaker SAIC plans to build an electric vehicle (EV) factory in Spain, reported Bloomberg.
• MING YANG: Bloomberg also said that wind turbine maker Ming Yang is considering Spain after plans for a factory in the UK were blocked. 
• FORMAL COMPLAINT: China has “formally submitted a complaint” to the EU about its Industrial Accelerator Act, said China Daily.
• EU TARIFFS: China’s commerce minister said he reached a “soft landing” with EU officials on EU tariffs on imports of Chinese-made EVs, according to Reuters.

Spotlight  How war, silver and taxes propelled China’s cleantech exports

China’s export of clean-energy technologies surged in March, driven by a doubling in solar shipments, according to analysis by Carbon Brief of Chinese customs data. 

The spike can be explained in part by the impact of the conflict in the Middle East, but analysts argue that a newly enacted solar export policy is also behind the figures.

In this issue, Carbon Brief explores the factors behind the export spike and whether or not it will be sustained. 

China’s exports of the “new three” clean-energy technology surged by 70% year-on-year in March 2026,  reaching $21.6bn, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

Exports of the three technologies – solar cells and panels, electric vehicles (EVs) and lithium-ion batteries – were also up 37% from February, the month before the Iran war.

The conflict in the Middle East is one explanation for the surge, as it has caused several countries to emphasise the need to increase non-fossil energy supplies.

However, there are also other important drivers, revealed by Carbon Brief analysis of customs data showing differences in exports between solar, EVs and batteries.

Solar exports were notably higher in March 2026 than in the previous two months, jumping 99.2% compared to February. 

By contrast, neither batteries’ nor EVs’ March figures came close to the surge in solar cells. 

China’s March exports of batteries rose 37% compared with the previous month, while month-on-month EV shipments increased just 1.4%. 

(Figures from the China Passenger Car Association suggest a larger rise in percentage terms, but this is based on a narrower scope that does not capture all exports.)

This may be because both technologies saw strong export performance throughout the first quarter of 2026. According to the customs data, more than one million EVs were exported from China between January and March, up 73% compared with the same period last year.

These quarterly exports may have helped meet growing interest in EVs due to the conflict, with BloombergNEF estimating that sales of EVs rose to 1.1m – up 2% year-on-year –  in March. (Bloomberg said, within this total, sales “cooled” in China and the US but “surged” in Europe and parts of Asia.)

Solar surge

The chart below shows the export volumes of solar cells, EVs and batteries in March 2025, plus the first three months of 2026. 

March’s solar exports were capable of generating 68 gigawatts (GW), equivalent to Spain’s entire installed solar capacity, according to energy thinktank Ember. 

Exports of solar cells, EVs and batteries in March 2025 and January-March 2026. “Electric vehicles” includes hybrid and battery electric buses with 10 seats or more; plug-in and non-plug-in hybrid electric passenger cars; and battery electric passenger cars. Source: General Administration of Customs China.

The Ember analysis showed that 50 countries set all-time records for Chinese solar imports in March, with another 60 reaching their highest levels in six months. 

Exports to Asia doubled to 39GW, while shipments to Africa surged 176% to 10GW. Combined, these two regions accounted for three-quarters of the overall increase in exports. 

The Middle East conflict has boosted demand, but a domestic policy deadline was a more immediate driver, analysts told Carbon Brief.

The Chinese government removed export tax rebates for solar products on 1 April, prompting manufacturers to rush out shipments before the change took effect. 

Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told Carbon Brief that such policy deadlines “can create a very sharp one-month jump in shipments”.

Batteries and EVs currently continue to receive export rebates. 

Falling silver prices are another potential factor, as silver paste is used to make a key component in solar panels. The reversal of a recent price rally that had raised costs helped manufacturers make more panels ahead of the export switch, Marius Mordal Bakke, head of solar research at consultancy Rystad Energy told Reuters. 

Temporary spike

Analysts predict that China’s April solar exports are unlikely to repeat March’s surge. Moreover, February exports were depressed by the Chinese New Year public holiday, making the March comparison unusually unfavourable. 

“A month-on-month drop in April would not be surprising,” said Qin.

But she remains optimistic that global solar capacity additions outside China will continue to grow in 2026 due to energy supply concerns sparked by the Middle East conflict.

Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, said the removal of the export rebate will not “dramatically change demand”, especially as the conflict continues.

He argued that the policy could be positive, telling Carbon Brief: “This is what the global market needs: a more level playing field with China.” 

This spotlight is by freelance China analyst Lekai Liu for Carbon Brief.

Watch, read, listen

TARGET ‘DIFFICULTIES’: Two researchers at the Energy Research Institute, a state thinktank, wrote in Economic Daily that China faces several “difficulties” in meeting its new carbon-intensity targets, including already-high renewable capacity installations and high levels of energy efficiency.

COMPARE AND CONTRAST: The US-China Podcast interviewed Prof Alex Wang on China’s approach to environmentalism and his view on the country’s energy transition.

GOVERNMENT CALLOUT: State broadcaster CCTV published a segment critiquing the massive investments and special treatment that local governments gave to their EV industries, fuelling intense competition.

‘THIN ARGUMENT’: A comment in Lawfare argued that the US should focus more on the “genuine geopolitical risks of climate change and [geoengineering] development”, rather than “thin” arguments around China weaponising weather modification technologies. 

22.6%

The rate of “environmental health literacy” – or “recognition of the value of the ecological environment and its impact on health” – among China’s citizens, according to a government survey covered by Xinhua.

New science 

• China will need to build more pipelines and push its carbon price above $100/tonne to make “green” ammonia a cost-competitive option for marine fuel | One Earth
• Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from China’s lakes increased from 41m tonnes to 51m tonnes of CO2 per year between 2000 and 2021, coinciding with “rapid lake expansion” across the country | Science Advances

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China Briefing is written by Anika Patel, with contributions from Lekai Liu, and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

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24 June | London

Join ClientEarth, Carbon Tracker and a panel of experts for an energising morning discussion during London Climate Action Week.

From the Strait of Hormuz to the North Sea, oil and gas markets are shaped by chokepoints. Some are physical; others are legal, regulatory and financial.  

Amid shifting market dynamics and significant legal developments, this event will explore the complex and changing path through which oil and gas projects are approved, financed, and retired in the UK.  

As policymakers balance energy security with a commitment not to issue new exploration licences in the declining North Sea basin, and as legal requirements tighten around project consent and asset retirement, the discussion will examine whether current capital raising rules are fit for purpose. 

ClientEarth and Carbon Tracker will also launch a pivotal new report, testing whether fossil reserves valuations are matching changes in the legal landscape, or leaving investors blind to climate-related risk. 

Bringing together leading voices from law, finance, academia and civil society, the expert panel will explore structural pressure points across the oil and gas lifecycle. And lay out the context for further action. 

This is an in-person event at the Inner Temple in London. If you are unable to attend in person and would like to join remotely please email events@clientearth.org to request a Zoom link. Thank you! 

The post Disruption on the horizon: consent, capital and clean-up in the oil and gas sector appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

Open access notables

Unprecedented 2024 East Antarctic winter heatwave driven by polar vortex weakening and amplified by anthropogenic warming, Tang et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science

During July–August 2024, East Antarctica experienced the most intense winter heatwave in the 46-year satellite era, with regional mean surface air temperatures across Dronning Maud Land exceeding the climatological mean by more than 9°C for 17 consecutive days. To explore the physical drivers and quantify the anthropogenic contribution to this unprecedented event, we propose a multi-model, multi-method attribution framework integrating regional climate model-based storyline attribution, circulation analogues, and large-ensemble probabilistic attribution. The results show that a pronounced weakening of the stratospheric polar vortex initiated a quasi-barotropic high-pressure anomaly, which enhanced meridional heat and moisture transport and accounted for approximately 50% of the observed surface warming. Across different models and attribution methods, synthesis of the attribution results indicates that anthropogenic warming intensified the event by approximately 0.7°C and more than doubled the likelihood of such exceptional winter heatwaves in the current climate. Probabilistic attribution further indicates that, compared to a natural climate without human influence, the likelihood of such events increases from 2–3 times today to ~6 times under moderate emissions and up to 26 times under high emissions by 2100. These findings reveal how human-induced warming is transforming even the coldest regions, with implications for ice shelf stability and predictability of future Antarctic extremes.

A recent stabilization in the lengthening of the Arctic sea ice melt season into a highly variable regime, Boisvert et al., Communications Earth & Environment

The melt season length of the Arctic sea ice is an important indicator and driver of large changes occurring in the climate system. Since 1979 the melt season has lengthened by ~40 days, driven mostly by delayed freeze onset (~ 34 days) compared to earlier melt onset (~ 7 days). However, since 2010 the melt season length has stabilized (~ 108 days), showing no consistent change over the years, instead becoming highly variable (+/− 11 days), largely driven by a loss of multi-year ice in 2000–2009 and a small change in the freeze onset (~ 2 days). There is a stark difference between the decades, where the largest changes in the melt season occurred between 2000–2009 (+ 25 days) and the smallest occurred between 2010–2023 (−2 days). This leads us to believe that, while there might be some periodicity in the processes that control the decadal variations in the melt season length, anthropogenic forcing has altered the Arctic background state and led to a new Arctic melt season that is much longer with a much thinner ice pack that is more susceptible to external forcings.

Field Observations of Sea Ice Thickening by Artificial Flooding, Hammer et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans

Arctic sea ice is retreating at a high rate, also due to the positive ice-albedo feedback loop: as ice melts and disappears, it reflects less sunlight, further accelerating ocean warming. One proposed way to slow the retreat is by thickening sea ice in winter, increasing its chances of surviving summer melt. This could be achieved by artificially flooding existing sea ice with seawater pumped from below, allowing it to freeze at the surface through exposure to cold air and thicken the ice layer. However, the effectiveness of this approach remains uncertain, as numerical models show contrasting results and few field experiments have been conducted. This study examines the growth and melt of ice through spring and summer after artificial flooding covering , resulting in thickened (+26 cm) snow-covered first-year sea ice. Observations were carried out in Vallunden Lagoon (Van Mijenfjord), Svalbard, from 20 March to 24 June 2024, with flooding and intensive in situ measurements from 11–15 April. Artificial flooding significantly heated the upper two-thirds of the original 90 cm thick ice, increasing salinity. Surface albedo evolution was influenced by specific events such as slush formation, snow drift, and a major meltwater drainage event in spring. Artificial flooding resulted in thicker ice and delayed rotten ice formation by 6 days, but did not delay the disappearance of ice in summer compared to a non-flooded reference site. Experiments at other scales and locations could help reveal how local conditions and flooded area size influence results and the potential of this method.

The achievability of low-emission IPCC sea-level rise scenarios, Millman et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) AR6 report (2021) provides a range of projections on greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, and the consequential impact on global sea level through thermal expansion of sea water and by glacier and ice-sheet mass loss. This paper assesses the likelihood of lower IPCC sea-level rise scenarios (SSP1–1.9 and SSP1–2.6) in light of current ice-sheet observations and model limitations, alongside today’s emissions trends and current shortfall of climate commitments. We conclude that ‘low-end’ projections may underestimate the true pace and magnitude of future sea-level rise and, if we continue on today’s mid-higher emissions pathway (SSP3–7.0), sea-level outcomes of more than 1 m by 2100 should be planned for. The worst can still be avoided through rapid deep emissions reductions, but it is essential that the IPCC continues to reflect these true risks for decision-makers, with rises of more than 2 m this century and several metres thereafter a real possibility.

Audience engagement with climate change content on YouTube: an analysis of video attributes and user interactions, Aharonson et al., Frontiers in Climate

Results indicate that videos presented by scientists are significantly more likely to elicit positive audience attitudes than those presented by politicians or other public figures. Solution-focused framing is strongly associated with positive engagement, while blame-oriented framing is associated with negative responses. Additionally, threaded comment discussions show a higher proportion of positive attitudes than independent comments, suggesting that conversational interaction enhances constructive engagement. These findings highlight the importance of expertise-based communication, solution-oriented narratives, and interactive discourse in digital sustainability communication. The study contributes both methodological tools and practical insights for designing climate change communication strategies that foster informed and constructive public engagement.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Trust, Media Habits, and Misperceptions Shape Public Understanding of Climate Change, Marryam Ishaq and M. Speiser, ecoAmerica

A hidden climate majority exists. Most Americans are concerned about climate change, but they do not realize how widely that concern is shared. This perception gap (pluralistic ignorance) masks a strong hidden consensus on climate concern. Trust in information and personal concern about climate change reinforce each other. Americans who trust the information they see or hear are far more likely to be concerned about climate change (79%) — and those who are climate-concerned report higher trust. This creates a reinforcing loop between trust and concern. Media ecosystems shape climate beliefs. Where Americans get their news influences what they believe about climate and energy. While mainstream national media, local news, and social media remain the most widely used sources overall, partisan and age differences shape which sources are most relied on, which in turn shapes climate beliefs. Americans trust the information they encounter but doubt others’ ability to recognize climate misinformation. While many Americans trust the information they personally consume, they are far less confident in others’ ability to distinguish climate fact from fiction — especially when they perceive others as less concerned about climate change. Mistrust of others and misperceptions are core barriers to climate action. Rather than a lack of concern, some of the biggest barriers include eroded trust and misperceptions. Misperceptions about energy sources and others’ climate beliefs, combined with low confidence in the public’s ability to navigate climate misinformation, suppress visible engagement and slow individual and collective action.

People and Climate Change, Ipsos

As temperatures rise, the individual responsibility to act has fallen. The past 11 years have been the warmest in the modern era, but people increasingly place less responsibility in needing to act. In the last five years, all countries surveyed in the report in both 2021 and 2026 have seen falls in the proportion who agree that individuals would be failing future generations by not acting against climate change. Short-term fear is countering long-term preparation. While climate concern remains present – 59% on average across 31 countries say they country should be doing more in the fight against climate change - more immediate risks are seen as greater priorities. Our What Worries the World survey finds concern about climate change in 11th place, behind more tangible, immediate worries issues like crime, unemployment, and inflation. The energy transition is at a crossroads. Public support for transitioning to clean energy is increasingly conditional, contingent on affordability, reliability, and security trade-offs. The Ipsos Energy Transition Barometer finds one in two (50% across 31 countries) support governments prioritizing low energy prices even if emissions increase.

Climate Change and Migration from Central America: Insights from Migrants in Mexico, Kerwin et al., UC Berkeley School of Law

The authors examine how climate-related harms intersect with and exacerbate violence, exclusion, discrimination, and weak state protection to drive migration from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Drawing on interviews, desk research, and surveys with people on the move in Mexico, the authors show that climate change rarely operates as a single cause of displacement. Instead, migrants consistently describe how environmental shocks—such as droughts that destroy crops, storms that damage homes and livelihoods, and deforestation and extreme heat that undermine health and economic stability—exacerbate existing insecurity and hardship. The authors focus on Mexico as both a transit and destination country for Central American migrants impacted by these dynamics. The findings demonstrate that better understanding how climate change intensifies vulnerabilities to violence, insecurity, and loss of livelihood—and integrating that analysis into refugee and immigration representation and adjudication— can improve access to protection and to regular migration status under Mexico’s existing legal framework. The authors also offer specific recommendations to strengthen institutional responses to climate migration by the Mexican government and civil society actors to climate migration. 114 articles in 55 journals by 1150 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Climate feedback of forest fires amplified by atmospheric chemistry, Chen et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-01926-1

Differences in actual evapotranspiration and responses of pure and mixed forests to climate change on the Chinese Loess Plateau, Wu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111210

Imbalance Trajectories of GPP–TER Coupling Under Global Warming, Yang et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70857

Influence of Sea Surface Temperature Patterns and Mean Warming on Past and Future Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Activity, Levin et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0635.1

Mechanisms for Decadal Variability of Ocean Heat Uptake Inferred From Adjoint Sensitivities, Köhl & Fernández, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119283

Meteorological drivers of the low-cloud radiative feedback pattern effect and its uncertainty, Tam et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-4289-2026

Ocean Meridional Heat Transport Estimated from Energy Budget Constraint, Pan et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0522.1

Poleward migration of warm Circumpolar Deep Water towards Antarctica, Lanham et al., Apollo (University of Cambridge) Open Access pmh:oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/400387

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Asymmetric impacts of forest gain and loss on tropical land surface temperature, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01423-3 53 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

Climatology and Trends in Spatial Scales of Extreme Precipitation Over Land in the Contiguous US, Chatterjee et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120662

Indicators of Global Climate Change 2022: Annual update of large-scale indicators of the state of the climate system and the human influence, Forster et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-15-2295-2023

Persistent 2023–2025 Wildfire Extremes in Canada Produced Unprecedented Emissions and Air-Quality Impacts, Chen et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70891

Rising atmospheric carbon dioxide ignites metal mobilization in acid mine drainage, Wang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03551-7

Spatiotemporal Trends and Urban-Climate Interactions of Land Surface Temperature Dynamics Across Bangladesh, Haque et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100547

Unprecedented 2024 East Antarctic winter heatwave driven by polar vortex weakening and amplified by anthropogenic warming, Tang et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01392-x

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Increasing Risk of a “Hot Eastern?Pluvial Western” Asia, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef004333 14 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

An observational record of global gridded near surface air temperature change over land and ocean from 1781, Morice et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-17-7079-2025

ENSO contribution to the assessment of long-term cloud feedback on global warming, Liu et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-5589-2026

Global open-ocean daily turbulent heat flux dataset (1992–2020) from SSM/I via deep learning, Wang et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-2929-2026

Mapping sea ice concentration using Nimbus-5 ESMR and local dynamical tie points, Tellefsen et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-2891-2026

Reanalyses in the Age of Machine Learning: Why Dataset Curation Matters Now More than Ever, Abel et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0149.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Russian collaboration loss risks permafrost carbon emissions network, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02001-6 15 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Identifying atmospheric rivers and their poleward latent heat transport with generalizable neural networks: ARCNNv1, Mahesh et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-17-3533-2024

Large and projected increases in compound heatwaves-extreme precipitation events driven by anthropogenic emissions, Liu et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100908

Projected Future Changes of Atmospheric Rivers by a High- and Low-Resolution CESM, Wang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0377.1

Rising Temperatures Will Amplify the Risk of Future Compound Dry–Hot Events over the Mongolian Plateau, Kang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0592.1

Seasonality and scenario dependence of rapid Arctic sea ice loss events in CMIP6 simulations, Sticker et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-19-3259-2025

The burden of El Niño–Southern Oscillation-related dengue attributable to anthropogenic climate change: a multicountry modelling study, Li et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101454

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Emergent Constraints on Future Projections of Tibetan Plateau Warming in Winter, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108728 16 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

A Signal-to-Noise Problem in Model Simulation of Decadal Climate Modes, Clement et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0190.1

CMIP7 Data Request: atmosphere priorities and opportunities, Dingley et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-2945-2026

Comments on “Mediterranean Drying by a Positive North Atlantic Oscillation Trend over the Last 65 Years Is an Extreme Outlier in the CMIP6 Multimodel Ensemble”, Vicente-Serrano et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0055.1

Development of the global chemistry-climate coupled model BCC-GEOS-Chem v2.0: improved atmospheric chemistry performance and new capability of chemistry-climate interactions, Sun et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-2111-2026

Enhancing Urban Near-Surface Temperature Simulations through Anthropogenic Heat Parameters Adapted to Local Climate Zones, LV et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-25-0224.1

Physics-based models outperform AI weather forecasts of record-breaking extremes, Zhang et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.18929001

Reply to “Comments on ‘Mediterranean Drying by a Positive North Atlantic Oscillation Trend over the Last 65 Years Is an Extreme Outlier in the CMIP6 Multimodel Ensemble’”, Seager et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0138.1

Successes and Failures of Current AI Climate Models, Scaife, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122615

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global 1 km land surface parameters for kilometer-scale Earth system modeling, Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-2007-2024 27 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

A recent stabilization in the lengthening of the Arctic sea ice melt season into a highly variable regime, Boisvert et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03534-8

Antarctic grounding zone and bedrock: the interplay shaping Antarctic sea-level contribution, Nowicki & Seroussi, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rsta.2024.0544

Assessment of snow model uncertainty in relation to the effect of a 1 °C warming using the snow modelling framework openAMUNDSEN, Rottler et al., SHILAP Revista de lepidopterología Open Access pmh:oai:doaj.org/article:6ac18b8f1acb47c891ce634ea62de79e

Far-reaching effects of Tibetan warming amplification on polar sea?ice retreat, M et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03542-8

Field Observations of Sea Ice Thickening by Artificial Flooding, Hammer et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc022738

Glacier-level and gridded mass change in the rivers' sources in the eastern Tibetan Plateau (ETPR) from 1970s to 2000, Zhu et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-17-1851-2025

Hard rocks and deep wetlands beneath Thwaites Glacier in Antarctica, Zeising et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03502-2

Results of the second Ice Shelf–Ocean Model Intercomparison Project (ISOMIP+), Jordan, Cronfa (Swansea University) pmh:oai:cronfa.swan.ac.uk:cronfa71766

The impact of ice structures and ocean warming in Milne Fiord, Bonneau et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-19-2615-2025

Uncertain ground: impact of bed topography on Antarctic Ice Sheet projections, Caillet et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rsta.2024.0543

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate projections of the Adriatic Sea: role of river release, Frontiers in Climate, 10.3389/fclim.2024.1368413 31 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

The achievability of low-emission IPCC sea-level rise scenarios, Millman et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rsta.2024.0565

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Assessing coastal flood risk under extreme events and sea level rise in the Casablanca-Mohammedia coastline (Morocco), Natural Hazards, 10.1007/s11069-024-06624-y 6 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

East Antarctic Ice Sheet Variability In The Central Transantarctic Mountains Since The Mid Miocene, Bromley et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-21-145-2025

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Stable isotope evidence for long-term stability of large-scale hydroclimate in the Neogene North American Great Plains, Climate of the past, 10.5194/cp-20-1039-2024 7 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

A Modern Ghost Story: Increased Selective Mortality of Salmon Under Climate Extremes, Sturrock et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70854

Adapting Species Risk Assessments to a Changing Climate: The Underestimated Vulnerability of Foundational Trees, McLaughlin et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70866

Amazonian understory forests change phosphorus acquisition strategies under elevated CO2, Martins et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72098-0

Estimating the total mortality of seabirds following a marine heat wave, Lavers et al., Conservation Biology Open Access 10.1111/cobi.70273

Evolutionary conservation hotspots: key areas for threatened Neotropical glassfrogs under climate change scenarios, Vega-Yánez et al., PeerJ Open Access 10.7717/peerj.21165

Global Conservation Status of Key Areas for Climate Diversity, Junjun, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.17744471

Imbalance Trajectories of GPP–TER Coupling Under Global Warming, Yang et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70857

Interacting Effects of Sea-Level Rise and Ocean Warming Reshape Thermal Environments on a Coral Reef, Rogers et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120406

Phragmites australis and Argyrogramma albostriata Suppress the Invasion of Solidago canadensis in China Under Future Climate Change, Zhang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73573

Predators Can Reverse the Effects of Warming on a Marine Ecosystem Engineer, Malakooti et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70846

Relationships Between Water-Use Efficiency and Climatic Factors in Conifers From Different Genera in China, Qin et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg009734

Shifting snake ranges in a warming world, Wan et al., Conservation Biology 10.1111/cobi.70293

Warming advanced leaf senescence in alpine plants through advancing leaf emergence and increasing soil drought, Chen et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70325

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Interactions between climate change and urbanization will shape the future of biodiversity, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-01996-2 69 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

A top-down evaluation of bottom-up estimates to reduce uncertainty in methane emissions from Arctic wetlands, Basso et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-2815-2026

Canadian net forest CO2 uptake enhanced by heat drought via reduced respiration, Dong et al., MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) pmh:oai:pure.mpg.de:item_3686498

Carbon dioxide release driven by organic carbon in minerogenic salt marshes, Kainz et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-2865-2026

Climate benefits of lake nutrient management in China, Zhao et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01971-w

Designing National Forest Inventories for Accurate Estimation of Soil Carbon Change, Buchkowski et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70868

Disproportionate Belowground Carbon Loss and Ecotone Sensitivity in Boreal Peatland Wildland Fires: Insights From LiDAR and Field Data, Nelson et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb008982

Diurnal versus spatial variability of greenhouse gas emissions from an anthropogenic modified German lowland river, Koschorreck et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-21-1613-2024

First global carbon dynamics from an observational and process-informed hybrid perspective: Oversimplified respiration representation likely drives divergence in terrestrial carbon sequestration across models, Zhu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111197

Global blue carbon losses from salt marshes exceed restoration gains, Zheng et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-70158-z

Global CO emissions and drivers of atmospheric CO trends constrained by MOPITT satellite measurements, Tang et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-5531-2026

Greenhouse gas accounting in urban digital twins, Lylykangas et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access 10.1088/2634-4505/ae5a57

Methane leakage thresholds for net climate benefits of wastewater biogas recovery, Li et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41893-026-01818-7

Microbial Responses to Warming Reduce Deep Blue Carbon Storage, Xiao et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70883

Phosphate scarcity governs methane production in the global open ocean, Wang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2521235123

Priority research questions in global peatland science, Milner et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03321-5

Seasonal Drought Reduces Carbon Sequestration in Coastal Wetlands, Jia et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70865

Tracing carbon dynamics during vegetation succession in a subtropical forest, Chen et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70319

Why both trees and technology are important in the race to mitigate carbon emissions, Walker, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-01300-6

Wintertime production and storage of methane in thermokarst ponds of subarctic Norway, Pismeniuk et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-1497-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
High-resolution US methane emissions inferred from an inversion of 2019 TROPOMI satellite data: contributions from individual states, urban areas, and landfills, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-5069-2024 56 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Hemispheric contrast in summer season duration responses to CO2 removal, Park et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.31898308

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The performance of solvent-based direct air capture across geospatial and temporal climate regimes, Frontiers in Climate, 10.3389/fclim.2024.1394728 18 cites.

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Decarbonization

A straightforward trajectory strengthens support for the transition away from natural gas: a population-based survey experiment in the Netherlands, Noordzij et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104699

End of life electric vehicle batteries in China to 2060 and related resource management implications, Li et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03555-3

Life cycle assessment across three generations of photovoltaic systems: Insights from net-zero perspective, Tan et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102012

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Impact of electric vehicle charging demand on power distribution grid congestion, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2317599121 84 cites.

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Aerosols

Desert dust exerts twice the longwave radiative heating estimated by climate models, Kok et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-70952-9

Size-resolved condensation sink as an approach to understand pathways how gaseous emissions affect health and climate, Lepistö et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-4215-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Aerosol forcing regulating recent decadal change of summer water vapor budget over the Tibetan Plateau, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-46635-8 25 cites.

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Climate change communications & cognition

Audience engagement with climate change content on YouTube: an analysis of video attributes and user interactions, Aharonson et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1803829

Beyond broken homes: Why climate resilience must start with the human psyche, Sahu & Basu, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000908

Beyond Memory and Experimenter Demand: Scientific Consensus Messages Correct Misperceptions, Geiger et al., Open Science Framework Open Access 10.17605/osf.io/s8zgh

Narratives of youth climate activism: exploring the diversity of meaning-making on climate change and citizenship, Fonseca & Castro, Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103044

Obstructing change: political inertia and the maintenance of climate inaction in Australia, Bowden et al., Environmental Politics Open Access 10.1080/09644016.2026.2664291

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Generative AI tools can enhance climate literacy but must be checked for biases and inaccuracies, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01392-w 48 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Agrivoltaic System Potential to Mitigate Effects of Climate Change in Viticulture, Meier et al., JuSER (Forschungszentrum Jülich) pmh:oai:juser.fz-juelich.de:1050469

Deep learning model anticipates climate change induced reduction in major commodity crop yields for Canada in 2050, Bhullar et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1748516

Escalating Compound Drought-Heatwaves and Demographic Shifts Threaten Simultaneous Global Breadbasket Failures, Sabut & Mishra, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118650

Fast Net Carbon Balance Recovery After Clear-Cutting but Uncertain Long-Term Carbon Accumulation in Eucalyptus Plantations, Guillemot et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70881

Harmonized European Union subnational crop statistics reveal climate impacts and crop cultivation shifts, Ronchetti et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-16-1623-2024

Integration of SEBAL-Derived Evapotranspiration With Climate Change Projections to Assess Basin-Scale Water Resources and Crops Yield, Mikaeili & Shourian, International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70398

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate-smart agriculture: adoption, impacts, and implications for sustainable development, Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 10.1007/s11027-024-10139-z 114 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

A tale of two coasts: Unveiling US Gulf and Atlantic coastal cities at high flood risk, Dey & Shao, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aec2079

Climatology and Trends in Spatial Scales of Extreme Precipitation Over Land in the Contiguous US, Chatterjee et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120662

Future Changes in the Atmospheric Water Cycle Over the Tibetan Plateau, Zou et al., Climate Dynamics 10.1007/s00382-026-08094-3

Impact of climate change on future flood susceptibility using different climatic parameters and deep learning algorithms in eastern Himalayan region, Paramanik et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1729457

Impacts of climate change on groundwater resources: a comprehensive review, Kunwar et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1606354

Projected Future Changes of Atmospheric Rivers by a High- and Low-Resolution CESM, Wang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0377.1

Rising Temperatures Will Amplify the Risk of Future Compound Dry–Hot Events over the Mongolian Plateau, Kang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0592.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Impact of Soil Moisture Dynamics and Precipitation Pattern on UK Urban Pluvial Flood Hazards Under Climate Change, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef004073 10 cites.

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Climate change economics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Higher education’s impact on CO2 mitigation: MENA insights with consideration for unemployment, economic growth, and globalization, Frontiers in Environmental Science, 10.3389/fenvs.2024.1325598 11 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Promising climate progress from net-zero ambitions to the Paris Agreement goal, Tagomori et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02615-y

Strategic retrenchment in the energy transition: Shell Pernis and the emergence of second-order carbon lock-in, Unruh et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104718

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Catalysts for sustainable energy transitions: the interplay between financial development, green technological innovations, and environmental taxes in European nations, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-023-04081-4 34 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Disentangling urban vulnerability to rising temperatures, Achebak et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101451

Weave framework: harnessing local knowledge in donor-funded climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction projects, Yukich et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2661681

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Governance, institutions, and climate change resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: assessing the threshold effects, Frontiers in Environmental Science, 10.3389/fenvs.2024.1352344 23 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Heatwaves Constrain the Future Persistence of Mosquito Vectors in Europe, Kramer et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70876

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Analysing health system capacity and preparedness for climate change, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-01994-4 31 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The challenges of the increasing institutionalization of climate security, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000402 7 cites.

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Other

Artificial intelligence to support cross-disciplinary climate change research, Ou et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02624-x

Iron and Manganese Cycling in the Atlantifying Barents Sea: Concentrated Inputs and Emerging Limitations, Hawley et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb009031

Research on the impact of climate risk attention on enterprise energy efficiency, Song, Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115325

Strengthening Climate Action through Career Aspirations: A Life-Course Perspective on Circular Citizenship Behaviours, Pribadi, Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103055

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Extreme hydrometeorological events induce abrupt and widespread freshwater temperature changes across the Pacific Northwest of North America, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01407-6 14 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Avoid Sacrificing Nature to Truly Achieve Net Zero, Rigolot et al., Conservation Letters Open Access 10.1111/con4.70046

Potential futures for the IPCC’s approach to artificial intelligence, Buck et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03514-y

Scientific coherence in climate change research: a meta-research perspective to accelerate scientific progress and climate justice, Acosta-Monterrosa et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1766738

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Earth Virtualization Engines (EVE), Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-2113-2024 36 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Managing Natural Hazards and Climate Risks in Elections, Asplund et al., International IDEA

Elections are the cornerstone of democracy, but like all public functions they are vulnerable to disruption by events in the natural world, including earthquakes, floods, wildfires and heatwaves. As the climate changes, many natural hazards are increasing in frequency and severity, prompting electoral practitioners to seek ways to protect the vote from such phenomena. The authors survey the risk that meteorological and geological events pose to elections and offers an analysis of the strategies that electoral management bodies (EMBs) around the world have put in place to safeguard electoral processes. The authors draw on a rich database of more than 100 cases of disaster-disrupted elections between 2006 and 2025 to document the various effects that events in the natural world can have on all aspects of the electoral cycle and to delineate the range of strategies that are available to electoral administrators to minimize their adverse consequences.

Solar Permitting Scorecard. Grading all 50 states on removing obstacles to rooftop solar and home batteries, Elizabeth Ridlington and Johanna Neumann, Frontier Group and Environment America Research & Policy Center

The authors reviewed policies relating to the permitting and inspection of residential solar energy systems and battery storage in all 50 states. They found that a majority of states have done little to adopt common-sense practices that reduce the costs and delays that permitting and inspection requirements impose on families wishing to install solar panels and batteries. Only two states – California and Texas – received a “B” in the scorecard, two received a “C,” 24 received a “D” and the remaining 22 received an “F.”

People and Climate Change, Ipsos

As temperatures rise, the individual responsibility to act has fallen. The past 11 years have been the warmest in the modern era, but people increasingly place less responsibility in needing to act. In the last five years, all countries surveyed in the report in both 2021 and 2026 have seen falls in the proportion who agree that individuals would be failing future generations by not acting against climate change. Short-term fear is countering long-term preparation. While climate concern remains present – 59% on average across 31 countries say they country should be doing more in the fight against climate change - more immediate risks are seen as greater priorities. Our What Worries the World survey finds concern about climate change in 11th place, behind more tangible, immediate worries issues like crime, unemployment, and inflation. The energy transition is at a crossroads. Public support for transitioning to clean energy is increasingly conditional, contingent on affordability, reliability, and security trade-offs. The Ipsos Energy Transition Barometer finds one in two (50% across 31 countries) support governments prioritizing low energy prices even if emissions increase.

Extreme Heat and Agriculture, Simpson et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization

Extreme heat refers to situations where daytime and nighttime temperatures rise above their usual ranges for a protracted period, leading to physiological stress and direct physical damages to food crops, livestock, fish, trees and human beings. The authors examine how extreme heat ripples through agricultural systems and how heatwaves can interact with other climatological variables, including rain, solar radiation, humidity, wind and drought – to trigger compound effects that wreak havoc on individuals and entire ecosystems.

The 2026 Europe report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: narrowing window for decisive health action, Kriit et al., The Lancet Public Health

This third iteration of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change in Europe report systematically tracks the health effects of climate change adaptation and mitigation action, economics and finance, and the engagement of various societal actors with the climate change and health nexus, drawing on data up to 2025. The report features seven new indicators, methodological updates, extended time series for existing indicators, and highlights inequalities in health risks and impacts where possible.

Global Electricity Review 2026, Fulghum et al., Ember

75%=Share of global electricity demand growth met by solar power in 2025. 33.8%=Share of renewables in global power generation in 2025 – above a third for the first time, overtaking coal. -0.2%=Year-on-year change in fossil generation.

Climate Change and Migration from Central America: Insights from Migrants in Mexico, Kerwin et al., UC Berkeley School of Law

The authors examine how climate-related harms intersect with and exacerbate violence, exclusion, discrimination, and weak state protection to drive migration from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Drawing on interviews, desk research, and surveys with people on the move in Mexico, the authors show that climate change rarely operates as a single cause of displacement. Instead, migrants consistently describe how environmental shocks—such as droughts that destroy crops, storms that damage homes and livelihoods, and deforestation and extreme heat that undermine health and economic stability—exacerbate existing insecurity and hardship. The authors focus on Mexico as both a transit and destination country for Central American migrants impacted by these dynamics. The findings demonstrate that better understanding how climate change intensifies vulnerabilities to violence, insecurity, and loss of livelihood—and integrating that analysis into refugee and immigration representation and adjudication— can improve access to protection and to regular migration status under Mexico’s existing legal framework. The authors also offer specific recommendations to strengthen institutional responses to climate migration by the Mexican government and civil society actors to climate migration.

High Voltage. The global potential for industrial electrification, Cassandra Etter-Wenzel and Jan Rosenow, Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford

Industrial electrification is becoming a matter of economic security as well as decarbonization. The authors argue that continued reliance on fossil fuels leaves 75% of global industry exposed to recurring price shocks, while electrification offers a pathway to stable and resilient energy costs.

Trust, Media Habits, and Misperceptions Shape Public Understanding of Climate Change, Marryam Ishaq and M. Speiser, ecoAmerica

A hidden climate majority exists. Most Americans are concerned about climate change, but they do not realize how widely that concern is shared. This perception gap (pluralistic ignorance) masks a strong hidden consensus on climate concern. Trust in information and personal concern about climate change reinforce each other. Americans who trust the information they see or hear are far more likely to be concerned about climate change (79%) — and those who are climate-concerned report higher trust. This creates a reinforcing loop between trust and concern. Media ecosystems shape climate beliefs. Where Americans get their news influences what they believe about climate and energy. While mainstream national media, local news, and social media remain the most widely used sources overall, partisan and age differences shape which sources are most relied on, which in turn shapes climate beliefs. Americans trust the information they encounter but doubt others’ ability to recognize climate misinformation. While many Americans trust the information they personally consume, they are far less confident in others’ ability to distinguish climate fact from fiction — especially when they perceive others as less concerned about climate change. Mistrust of others and misperceptions are core barriers to climate action. Rather than a lack of concern, some of the biggest barriers include eroded trust and misperceptions. Misperceptions about energy sources and others’ climate beliefs, combined with low confidence in the public’s ability to navigate climate misinformation, suppress visible engagement and slow individual and collective action.

Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Analysis for the United States 1990-2024, Desai et al., Center for Global Sustainability, University of Maryland

The authors present a comprehensive picture of greenhouse gas (GHG) sources and sinks covering the geographical region of the United States. The data are presented for each year from 1990 through 2024, the latter being the most recent year when comprehensive data are available for the entire economy. Along with detailed results for single years and analyses of trends over time, the authors present methodological descriptions, data inputs, a characterization of uncertainties, recalculations, and improvements. The report was developed to supports comparability and continuity with past official U.S. inventories prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

From energy crisis to energy security: Actions for policy makers, Walker et al., The International Renewable Energy Agency

The current energy crisis stemming from the conflict in the Middle East re-iterates the inherent structural weakness and vulnerability of national energy systems that remain reliant upon fossil fuels, and markets where the costs of oil and gas are highly influential on electricity prices. There is an immediate opportunity, however, to urgently reassess these fundamentals and prioritize reactions that enhance long-term energy stability. The authors provide key short- medium- and long-term actions for policy makers responding to the present crisis. Policy makers must urgently consider intervening to direct investment and emergency responses to accelerate the deployment of renewable power generation capacity, and the electrification of energy-consuming processes and sectors.

State of Energy Policy 2026, Cozzi et al., International Energy Agency

The authors provide a unique review of policy progress made in 2025 across all energy sectors and instruments, with a special focus on government spending, energy efficiency regulations, and the contribution of the energy sector to nationally determined contributions and long-term net zero pledges. This year’s report brings an extensive examination of energy security policies to the period 1973-2025, from oil and natural gas to clean energy technology supply chains and critical minerals. It also spotlights the policy momentum around energy access, most particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, taking stock of the policy progress since the IEA Summit on Clean Cooking in Africa in 2024.

2025 State of the Heat Pump Water Heater Market Report, New Buildings Institute and the Advanced Water Heating Initiative

The authors discuss how residential and commercial manufacturers released more new and updated products in 2025 than any other year in the heat pump water heater's (HPWH) history. Five new residential manufacturers brought HPWHs to market, and many other established manufacturers brought updated and increasingly innovative products to market. New configurations and form factors also emerged, from flexible voltage (120-volt and 240-volt in the same unit) products, to split systems (where the compressor and tank are separated), to high temperature commercial and industrial HPWHs, to HPWHs with thermal storage.

Climate Change & Adaptation. Rethinking climate risk integration across business, finance and policy, Holloway et al., FTI Consulting

Financial institutions, corporate executives and investors are operating with climate risk models that systematically underestimate exposure by a factor of two to four times. This is not a compliance issue, instead it represents one of the most significant mispricing phenomena in modern capital markets, materializing today across credit spreads, equity valuations and capital allocation decisions. The authors analyzed 148 global companies representing $31.4 trillion in market capitalization to test whether current climate risk models provide decision-useful intelligence. The findings are stark: conventional platforms project approximately 2.0% portfolio losses, while the author's integrated analysis reveals 7.7% average exposure – a four-fold gap that stems from systematically underweighting transition risks relative to physical climate impacts. About New Research

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WASHINGTON (AP) — Burning time for North American wildfires is going into overtime. Flames are lasting later into the night and starting earlier in the morning because human-caused climate change is extending the hotter and drier conditions that feed fires, a new study found.

Fires used to die down or even die out at night as temperatures dropped and humidity increased, but that’s happening less often. The number of hours in North America when the weather is favorable for wildfires is 36% higher than 50 years ago, according to a study published earlier this month in Science Advances.

Places such as California have 550 more potential burning hours than in the mid-1970s. Parts of southwestern New Mexico and central Arizona are seeing as many as 2,000 more hours a year when the weather is prone to burning fires, the highest increase seen in the study, which looked at Canada and the United States. The research looked at times when conditions were ripe for fire, but that didn’t mean fires occurred during all that time.

Recent big fires in LA and Hawaii burned at night

Fires that surge at night are tougher to fight and included the Lahaina, Hawaii fire in 2023, the Jasper fire in Alberta in 2024, and the Los Angeles fires in 2025, the study said. Maui’s fire ignited at 12:22 a.m.

It’s not just the clock that is getting extended. The calendar is too. The number of days with fire-prone weather increased by 44%, which effectively added 26 days over the past half-century.

It’s mostly from warmer, drier nighttime weather, with a bit of extra wind, the study authors said.

“Fires normally slow down during the night, or they just stop,” said study co-author Xianli Wang, a fire scientist with the Canadian Forest Service. “But under extreme fire hazard conditions, fire actually burns through the night or later into the night.”

And Wang said Earth’s warming atmosphere means it’s like to get worse.

Tougher to fight fires at night

Fires that don’t “go to sleep” get a running start the next day, making it harder to knock them down, University of California, Merced fire scientist John Abatzoglou, who wasn’t part of the study, said in an email.

“Nights aren’t what they used to be — that is, more reliable breaks for wildfire,” he added. “Widespread warming and lack of humidity is keeping fires up at night.”

Wildland firefighter Nicholai Allen, who also founded a firm that makes home fire prevention tools, said it’s very difficult to fight fires at night.

“You have to understand that you have snakes and bears and mountain lions and all the stuff you have in daytime,” Allen said, noting a colleague was bitten by a bear. “But at night, they’re really scared, and they’re running away from the fire.”

The Canadian researchers analyzed nearly 9,000 larger fires from 2017 to 2023 using a weather satellite and other tools to get hour-by-hour data on atmospheric conditions during the fires, such as humidity, temperature, wind, rain, and fuel moisture levels. They created a computer model that correlated weather conditions and fire status and applied to historical data in Canada and the United States from 1975 to 2106.

Nights are warming faster than days

Scientists have long said heat-trapping gases from the burning of coal, oil, and natural gas make nights warm faster than days because of increased cloud cover that absorbs and re-emits heat down to Earth at night like a blanket. Since 1975, summers in the contiguous U.S. have seen nighttime lowest temperatures warm by 2.6 degrees Fahrenheit (1.4 degrees Celsius), while daytime highest temperatures have gone up 2.2 degrees Fahrenheit (1.2 degrees Celsius), according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Humidity at night “doesn’t rebound” from its daytime dryness like it used to, said study lead author Kaiwei Luo, a fire science researcher at the University of Alberta.

Wildfires often coincide with drought, especially extreme drought, which means not only drier air, but hotter, drier air that sucks up more moisture from the ground and plants, making fuels for fire more flammable, Wang said. In a drought, there’s often a vicious circle of drying and when it is quite dry, a warmer atmosphere has more power to suck moisture out of fuels.

Just as warmer nights, especially in heat waves, don’t let the body recover, the warmer nights are not allowing forests to recover, Wang said. It can take weeks for dead fuel to recover its lost moisture and be less fire-prone, he said.

“It’s just a stress to the plants,” Wang said. “That also increases fuel load.”

From 2016 to 2025, wildfires in the United States on average burned an area the size of Massachusetts each year, slightly more than 11,000 square miles (28,500 square kilometers). That’s 2.6 times the average burn area of the 1980s, according to the National Interagency Fire Center. Canada’s land burned on average for the last 10 years is 2.8 times more than during the 1980s, according to the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre.

Syracuse University fire scientist Jacob Bendix, who wasn’t part of the research, called the study a sobering reminder of climate change’s role in driving “increased fire potential across almost all of the fire-prone environments of North America.”

Computer models that use artificial intelligence (AI) cannot forecast record-breaking weather as well as traditional climate models, according to a new study.

It is well established that AI climate models have surpassed traditional, physics-based climate models for some aspects of weather forecasting.

However, new research published in Science Advances finds that AI models still “underperform” in forecasting record-breaking extreme weather events.

The authors tested how well both AI and traditional weather models could simulate thousands of record-breaking hot, cold and windy events that were recorded in 2018 and 2020.

They find that AI models underestimate both the frequency and intensity of record-breaking events.

A study author tells Carbon Brief that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.

AI weather forecasts

Extreme weather events, such as floods, heatwaves and storms, drive hundreds of billions of dollars in damages every year through the destruction of cropland, impacts on infrastructure and the loss of human life. 

Many governments have developed early warning systems to prepare the general public and mobilise disaster response teams for imminent extreme weather events. These systems have been shown to minimise damages and save lives.

For decades, scientists have used numerical weather prediction models to simulate the weather days, or weeks, in advance. 

These models rely on a series of complex equations that reproduce processes in the atmosphere and ocean. The equations are rooted in fundamental laws of physics, based on decades of research by climate scientists. As a result, these models are referred to as “physics-based” models.

However, AI-based climate models are gaining popularity as an alternative for weather forecasting.

Instead of using physics, these models use a statistical approach. Scientists present AI models with a large batch of historical weather data, known as training data, which teaches the model to recognise patterns and make predictions.

To produce a new forecast, the AI model draws on this bank of knowledge and follows the patterns that it knows.

There are many advantages to AI weather forecasts. For example, they use less computing power than physics-based models, because they do not have to run thousands of mathematical equations.

Furthermore, many AI models have been found to perform better than traditional physics-based models at weather forecasts.

However, these models also have drawbacks. 

Study author Prof Sebastian Engelke, a professor at the research institute for statistics and information science at the University of Geneva, tells Carbon Brief that AI models “depend strongly on the training data” and are “relatively constrained to the range of this dataset”. 

In other words, AI models struggle to simulate brand new weather patterns, instead tending forecast events of a similar strength to those seen before. As a result, it is unclear whether AI models can simulate unprecedented, record-breaking extreme events that, by definition, have never been seen before. 

Record-breaking extremes

Extreme weather events are becoming more intense and frequent as the climate warms. Record-shattering extremes – those that break existing records by large margins – are also becoming more regular.

For example, during a 2021 heatwave in north-western US and Canada, local temperature records were broken by up to 5C. According to one study, the heatwave would have been “impossible” without human-caused climate change. 

The new study explores how accurately AI and physics-based models can forecast such record-breaking extremes.

First, the authors identified every heat, cold and wind event in 2018 and 2020 that broke a record previously set between 1979 and 2017. (They chose these years due to data availability.) The authors use ERA5 reanalysis data to identify these records. 

This produced a large sample size of record-breaking events. For the year 2020, the authors identified around 160,000 heat, 33,000 cold and 53,000 wind records, spread across different seasons and world regions. 

For their traditional, physics-based model, the authors selected the High RESolution forecast model from the Integrated Forecasting System of the European Centre for Medium-­Range Weather Forecasts. This is “widely considered as the leading physics-­based numerical weather prediction model”, according to the paper. 

They also selected three “leading” AI weather models – the GraphCast model from Google Deepmind, Pangu-­Weather developed by Huawei Cloud and the Fuxi model, developed by a team from Shanghai.

The authors then assessed how accurately each model could forecast the extremes observed in the year 2020.

Dr Zhongwei Zhang is the lead author on the study and a researcher at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. He tells Carbon Brief that many AI weather forecast models were built for “general weather conditions”, as they use all historical weather data to train the models. Meanwhile, forecasting extremes is considered a “secondary task” by the models. 

The authors explored a range of different “lead times” – in other words, how far into the future the model is forecasting. For example, a lead time of two days could mean the model uses the weather conditions at midnight on 1 January to simulate weather conditions at midnight on 3 January.

The plot below shows how accurately the models forecasted all extreme events (left) and heat extremes (right) under different lead times. This is measured using “root mean square error” – a metric of how accurate a model is, where a lower value indicates lower error and higher accuracy.

The chart on the left shows how two of the AI models (blue and green) performed better than the physics-based model (black) when forecasting all weather across the year 2020.

However, the chart on the right illustrates how the physics-based model (black) performed better than all three AI models (blue, red and green) when it came to forecasting heat extremes.

Accuracy of the AI models (blue, red and green) and the physics-based model (black) at forecasting all weather over 2020 (left) and heat extremes (right) over a range of lead times. This is measured using “root mean square error” (RMSE) – a metric of how accurate a model is, where a lower value indicates lower error and higher accuracy. Source: Zhang et al (2026).

The authors note that the performance gap between AI and physics-based models is widest for lower lead times, indicating that AI models have greater difficulty making predictions in the near future. 

They find similar results for cold and wind records.

In addition, the authors find that AI models generally “underpredict” temperature during heat records and “overpredict” during cold records.

The study finds that the larger the margin that the record is broken by, the less well the AI model predicts the intensity of the event.

‘Warning shot’

Study author Prof Erich Fischer is a climate scientist at ETH Zurich and a Carbon Brief contributing editor. He tells Carbon Brief that the result is “not unexpected”.

He adds that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.

AI models are likely to continue to improve, but scientists should “not yet” fully replace traditional forecasting models with AI ones, according to Fischer.

He explains that accurate forecasts are “most needed” in the runup to potential record-breaking extremes, because they are the trigger for early warning systems that help minimise damages caused by extreme weather.

Leonardo Olivetti is a PhD student at Uppsala University, who has published work on AI weather forecasting and was not involved in the study. 

He tells Carbon Brief that “many other studies” have identified issues with using AI models for “extremes”, but this paper is novel for its specific focus on extremes.

Olivetti notes that AI models are already used alongside physics-based models at “some of the major weather forecasting centres around the world”. However, the study results suggest “caution against relying too heavily on these [AI] models”, he says.

Prof Martin Schultz, a professor in computational earth system science at the University of Cologne who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that the results of the analysis are “very interesting, but not too surprising”.

He adds that the study “justifies the continued use of classical numerical weather models in operational forecasts, in spite of their tremendous computational costs”. 

Advances in forecasting

The field of AI weather forecasting is evolving rapidly. 

Olivetti notes that the three AI models tested in the study are an “older generation” of AI models. In the last two years, newer “probabilistic” forecast models have emerged that “claim to better capture extremes”, he explains.

The three AI models used in the analysis are “deterministic”, meaning that they only simulate one possible future outcome. 

In contrast, study author Engelke tells Carbon Brief that probabilistic models “create several possible future states of the weather” and are therefore more likely to capture record-breaking extremes.

Engelke says it is “important” to evaluate the newer generation of models for their ability to forecast weather extremes. 

He adds that this paper has set out a “protocol” for testing the ability of AI models to predict unprecedented extreme events, which he hopes other researchers will go on to use.

The study says that another “promising direction” for future research is to develop models that combine aspects of traditional, physics-based weather forecasts with AI models. 

Engelke says this approach would be “best of both worlds”, as it would combine the ability of physics-based models to simulate record-breaking weather with the computational efficiency of AI models.

Dr Kyle Hilburn, a research scientist at Colorado State University, notes that the study does not address extreme rainfall, which he says “presents challenges for both modelling and observing”. This, he says, is an “important” area for future research. 

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The post Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts appeared first on Carbon Brief.

As geopolitical shocks drive jet fuel price volatility and emissions rebound, alternative aviation fuels are increasingly presented as the solution. But can they realistically hedge fuel risk and deliver decarbonisation—or do they introduce new financial and policy vulnerabilities?

This webinar cuts through the hype, using market data, policy analysis, and lifecycle evidence to assess the true scale, cost, and sustainability of alternative jet fuels. The goal is not to dismiss them, but to recalibrate expectations, challenge overreliance, and position alternative fuels as one tool among many in aviation’s transition.

What you’ll leave with:

• A clear understanding of why truly sustainable fuels face structural limits.
• Insight into where alternative fuel investment makes sense—and where it doesn’t.
• A stronger basis for allocating capital and policy across aviation decarbonisation options.

The post Fuel Disclosure appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Andrew Dessler

I am finalizing a textbook on climate risk and am posting chapters as I finish them. I’d previously posted chapters about embedded energy and physical climate risk; this post is a chapter on transition risk, the economic and social risks of the transition to a clean-energy economy.

Introduction

In the context of climate risk, transition risk encompasses the economic and social risks associated with a shift towards a low-carbon economy. Such an effort would fundamentally reshape our world and create critical financial uncertainty for assets and industries tied to the old, carbon-intensive system.

Net zero

Reaching “net zero” is the ultimate goal of most climate policy. This means reducing greenhouse gas emissions as much as possible, with any remaining emissions that are too difficult or costly to eliminate are canceled out by an equivalent amount of “negative emissions” — processes that actively pull carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. These negative emissions are the “net” part of net zero and it acknowledges the practical reality that some sectors, like long-distance air travel or ocean shipping, may be incredibly difficult to decarbonize in the near future.

What are these negative emissions technologies? The two primary methods discussed are Direct Air Capture (DAC), which uses machines to filter carbon dioxide directly from the air, and Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Sequestration (BECCS), which involves growing crops, burning them for energy, and capturing and burying the resulting carbon dioxide. However, both technologies face significant hurdles, including high costs, large energy requirements, and, in the case of BECCS, immense land use needs that could compete with food production and biodiversity.

Once we reach net zero, global temperatures will stabilize — although they won’t recover to pre-industrial levels for tens of thousands of years. Getting the climate to actually cool on time scales we care about (decades to centuries) would would require pulling even more carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere, or deploying some type of climate engineering approach like injecting aerosols into the stratosphere.

The scale of the net zero transformation means that reaching net zero will fundamentally overhaul vast parts of the global economy. Many big sectors of our economy — energy, transportation, industry, agriculture — must be reshaped, and that reshaping will create enormous opportunities as well as painful dislocations. The transition to a low-carbon economy is not simply a matter of swapping one energy source for another; it requires rebuilding infrastructure, retraining workers, and redirecting trillions of dollars in investment.

Some industries are poised to prosper. Renewable energy is the most obvious example: in 2025, the world added over 700 GW of new capacity, and sustaining that pace for decades will require ongoing investment in manufacturing, installation, and maintenance of wind turbines and solar panels. The profits for those well positioned will be enormous.

The electric vehicle industry and its supply chains — from battery manufacturers to mining operations for lithium and cobalt — also stand to grow dramatically. Companies that build and manage electrical grid infrastructure, including new transmission lines and energy storage systems, will see surging demand. So too will firms specializing in energy efficiency, building retrofits, and emerging technologies like green hydrogen and sustainable aviation fuels. Even agriculture could see new revenue streams as farmers are paid to adopt practices that sequester carbon in soil.

Other industries, however, face serious decline. Fossil fuel producers (coal, oil, and natural gas) confront the prospect of their core product becoming obsolete, stranding assets worth trillions of dollars. Workers in these industries, from coal miners to oil rig operators, risk losing their livelihoods.

The effects extend well beyond extraction: refineries, pipelines, and petrochemical plants all face an uncertain future. The automotive sector will also see significant disruption, as the shift to electric vehicles renders the internal combustion engine and its complex supply chain of transmissions, exhaust systems, and fuel injection components irrelevant. Communities built around these industries may face economic devastation if the transition is not carefully managed.

This uneven distribution of winners and losers will create difficult economic and political challenges, particularly during the transition period. The enormous capital investment required — in renewable generation, grid modernization, EV charging infrastructure, industrial retooling, and carbon removal — must be mobilized quickly, creating the risk of supply chain bottlenecks, inflation in key materials, and financial instability. Managing this transition in a way that is both fast enough to meet climate targets and equitable enough to maintain broad public support is one of the defining policy challenges of our time.

Stranded assets

A core concept in transition risk is the “stranded asset”. A stranded asset is defined as an asset that loses significant value well before the end of its expected economic life. This loss is often sudden and unexpected, driven by changes in market conditions, technology, or policy. While this can happen for many reasons, it is a particularly potent risk in the context of climate change, arising from both direct physical impacts and the economic shifts of the energy transition.

For example, here is a house that literally fell into the ocean in North Carolina in Sept. 2025:

link

From Zillow.com, this was a pricey house:

link

 

This house could have stood for another few decades, but it collapsed into the ocean due to coastal erosion that was certainly made worse by sea level rise. When that happened, its value instantly dropped to zero, a stark, nonlinear impact that produced a stranded asset.

While physical risks can strand assets, the concept first gained prominence in discussions about transition risk and the fossil fuel industry. Oil and gas companies are valued in the trillions of dollars, with much of that valuation based on their proven reserves—oil and gas that is in the ground and ready to be produced. The transition to a net-zero economy, however, requires that a significant portion of these reserves be “left in the ground” and never burned. Once the market fully accepts that these assets cannot be produced due to climate policies, their value could drop to zero rapidly.

The danger of these fossil fuel assets becoming stranded extends far beyond the energy companies themselves. It poses a systemic risk to the broader economy because large swaths of the general public have financial exposure to these companies through their investments, including 401k programs, pensions, and mutual funds. The sudden devaluation of these energy assets could negatively affect many people’s investment and retirement funds, which in turn could have a widespread and devastating impact on the financial security of the general public.

This same principle applies to the real estate sector. Consider a commercial office building with a low energy efficiency rating located in a city that passes a new ordinance mandating high-performance standards for all buildings. The owner is suddenly faced with a difficult choice: either undertake a costly, large-scale retrofit to meet the new legal requirements or risk being unable to legally rent the space. If the retrofit is too expensive, the building’s value is stranded, as its primary function — generating rental income — has been eliminated by a policy change aimed at reducing emissions.

Another often-overlooked category of risk lies in intangible assets. For companies in the S&P 500, these assets — such as brand value, reputation, and intellectual property (IP) — can represent up to 90% of their total market value. Their non-physical nature makes them vulnerable to rapid devaluation. For example, imagine a company that holds a highly valuable portfolio of patents for a new, efficient diesel engine technology. If a major country or region, aiming to meet climate targets, decides to ban the sale of all new diesel cars, the market for that technology disappears. The intellectual property, once a significant asset, has its value evaporate almost overnight. This is a direct parallel to the risk facing fossil fuel companies, whose reserves — a tangible asset on paper — could become worthless if they cannot be produced.

A final critical category that is often overlooked is human capital. Human capital represents the skills, knowledge, and expertise that workers have developed over their careers — assets that can suddenly lose their value in the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Consider a mechanic who has spent 30 years perfecting the art of repairing internal combustion engines. This individual has accumulated expertise in diagnosing problems, understanding the mechanical systems, and maintaining gasoline-powered vehicles. As the world shifts to electric vehicles — which require fundamentally different maintenance skills — this expertise becomes obsolete. The mechanic’s human capital, built over decades, is stranded.

The scale of this challenge is enormous. Huge numbers of workers have built their careers in fossil fuel industries. Coal miners possess specialized knowledge about underground operations, safety protocols, and extraction techniques. Oil field workers understand drilling technologies, reservoir management, and petroleum systems. Pipeline operators and refinery technicians have invested years developing skills specific to a carbon-intensive economy. As these industries contract or disappear entirely, these workers face the prospect of their expertise becoming rapidly becoming worthless.

This creates both an economic and social crisis. Unlike a stranded power plant that can be written off a company’s books, stranded human capital represents real people with families, mortgages, and communities that depend on their income. A 50-year-old coal miner cannot simply retrain as a software developer overnight. The geographical concentration of these industries compounds the problem — entire regions have been built around fossil fuel extraction, creating communities where the primary source of skilled employment may disappear.

The human dimension of stranded assets also creates political risk for the climate transition itself. Workers facing the loss of their livelihoods can become powerful opponents of climate action, slowing the transition for everyone. The fear and anger generated by the transition can translate into political movements that resist or reverse climate policies, as workers vote to protect their immediate economic interests over longer-term economic reality.

The TCFD Framework: Four Key Drivers of Transition Risk

To better understand and manage transition risks, the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) developed a framework that organizes these risks into four distinct categories. This framework has become the global standard for how companies and investors think about and report climate-related financial risks.

1. Policy and Legal Risks

Policy and legal risks emerge when governments and courts take action to address climate change. These interventions can fundamentally alter the economic landscape, often with little warning.

Carbon pricing represents one of the most direct policy tools. When governments implement a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system, they make it more expensive to emit CO2. For instance, a carbon price of $50 per ton of carbon dioxide would add around $20 to the cost of a barrel of oil, fundamentally changing the economics of oil production and consumption. Companies that built their business models around cheap fossil fuels suddenly face dramatically higher operating costs.

Efficiency standards create another layer of policy risk. The UK’s Minimum Energy Efficiency Standard (MEES) provides a clear example: it prohibits landlords from renting properties with poor energy efficiency ratings. A landlord who owns an older, inefficient building faces a stark choice — invest heavily in retrofits or watch the property become unrentable, thereby creating a stranded asset.

The legal dimension adds another layer of risk through climate litigation. There are many lawsuits winding through the courts where people are taking fossil fuel companies to court because they have been or expect to be harmed by climate-change-driven extreme weather. This potential climate liability could expose fossil fuel companies to enormous financial risk, much like tobacco companies faced when the health impacts of their products became legally actionable.

2. Technology Risks

Technology risk represents the classic story of disruption — when a new, cheaper, or better technology makes existing technologies obsolete. In the climate context, this risk is accelerating as clean technologies have reached critical tipping points.

The most dramatic example is the drop in renewable energy costs. Solar power costs have fallen nearly 90% over the past 15 years. In most parts of the world, building a new solar or wind farm is now cheaper and faster than building a new coal or gas plant — even without subsidies. This is rapidly reordering energy economics and energy markets. Coal plants that were expected to operate profitably for 40 years are being shut down early not because of regulation, but because they simply can’t compete economically with cheaper energy sources. Natural gas plants will be next.

Electric vehicles present another technological disruption. As battery costs decline and performance improves, EVs are becoming not just environmentally preferable but superior products — they accelerate faster, require less maintenance, and increasingly cost less to own and operate than internal combustion engines. This technological shift threatens not just automakers who are slow to adapt, but entire ecosystems built around gasoline vehicles: gas stations, oil change shops, parts suppliers, and even dealerships whose business models depend heavily on service revenue from complex internal combustion engines.

3. Market Risks

Market risks encompass the shifts in supply, demand, and investor sentiment that can rapidly revalue assets and companies.

As an example, demand for transition minerals like lithium, cobalt, and copper is soaring as the world builds batteries and renewable energy infrastructure. Companies that secured supply chains for these materials early have gained significant competitive advantages, while those arriving late face production bottlenecks and inflated costs. Conversely, demand for thermal coal is collapsing in many regions, leaving coal mining companies with reserves that may never be extracted.

Perhaps more significant is the shift in investor perceptions. For decades, oil companies were valued based on their proven reserves — the oil and gas they had rights to extract. Now, many investors view these same reserves as worthless, unburnable carbon that will never generate revenue. This shift in perception led BP to write down its assets by $17.5 billion in 2020, with Shell following with a $22 billion write down. These companies acknowledged that much of their oil would likely remain in the ground forever.

The power of changing investor sentiment was dramatically demonstrated in 2021 when Engine No. 1, a tiny activist hedge fund, successfully won three board seats at ExxonMobil. Their argument wasn’t environmental but purely financial: Exxon’s failure to plan for the energy transition was destroying long-term shareholder value. This showed that transition risk has moved from the margins to the center of corporate governance.

4. Reputational Risks

Reputational risk reflects the changing expectations of consumers, employees, and society at large. As public concern about climate change grows, companies associated with high emissions face damage to their brands and their social license to operate.

The financial sector illustrates how reputational concerns translate into business decisions. In 2019, Goldman Sachs announced it would no longer finance new thermal coal mines or Arctic oil exploration. While framed partly in risk management terms, the bank explicitly cited reputational considerations and changing client expectations as key drivers. They recognized that being associated with these projects was becoming bad for business, potentially costing them clients and talented employees who increasingly consider environmental factors in their career choices.

Consumer pressure is also reshaping entire industries. The rapid growth of plant-based milk alternatives like Oatly directly responds to, among other things, consumer concerns about dairy’s environmental impact. Traditional dairy companies, seeing their market share erode, are scrambling to launch their own non-dairy alternatives. This shift isn’t driven by regulation or technology costs but by changing consumer preferences that make high-emission products less desirable, regardless of price or quality.

5. Putting it together

These four categories of risk — policy and legal, technology, market, and reputation — don’t operate in isolation. They interact and amplify each other, creating feedback loops that can accelerate the transition and magnify risks for unprepared economies.

Consider how technological advances in renewable energy trigger cascading effects across all risk categories. As solar and wind become cheaper than fossil fuels (technology risk), governments gain political cover to implement stricter emissions standards and carbon pricing (policy risk), knowing these policies won’t dramatically increase energy costs for voters. These policies, in turn, shift investor capital away from fossil fuels and toward renewables (market risk), further driving down clean energy costs through economies of scale. Companies slow to adapt find themselves not just technologically obsolete but facing reputational damage for clinging to outdated, polluting technologies (reputational risk), which makes it even harder to attract capital, customers, and talent.

The automotive industry provides another vivid example of these interconnected risks. As electric vehicles improve and battery costs fall (technology risk), governments implement EV mandates and phase out internal combustion engines — Norway by 2025, the UK by 2030 (policy risk). These policies signal to investors that traditional automakers without credible EV strategies are poor long-term investments, triggering capital flight (market risk). Meanwhile, young consumers increasingly view gas-powered vehicles as environmentally irresponsible, especially luxury gas vehicles (reputational risk). Each risk reinforces the others: technological improvements justify stricter policies, which shift market dynamics, which shape public perception, which in turn creates pressure for even more aggressive policies and faster technological development.

Understanding these interconnections is essential for understanding transition risk. A company cannot address one type of transition risk while ignoring the others — they must recognize that these risks compound and prepare for the systemic changes that result from their interaction.

The “Just Transition”

The recognition that the shift to a low-carbon economy will create winners and losers, particularly among workers and communities reliant on fossil fuel industries, has given rise to the concept of a just transition. A just transition is an effort to ensure that the benefits of a green economy are shared broadly and that the costs do not fall unfairly on those who can least afford them.

The core idea is to provide support, retraining, and new economic opportunities for workers and communities whose livelihoods are threatened by the phase-out of carbon-intensive industries. This is not merely an ethical consideration; it is a pragmatic one. The threat of widespread job losses can create powerful political opposition to climate action, potentially slowing down or even derailing the transition for everyone. Therefore, managing the human side of the transition is critical to its success.

In a just transition, we would repurpose skills: For example, the skills required to build an offshore oil rig are similar to those needed for constructing an offshore wind platform. A just transition would facilitate this shift through targeted programs.

The private market is unlikely to manage this process efficiently or equitably. Government action is therefore needed to fund retraining programs and help workers seamlessly switch to new jobs in the growing green economy.

Germany’s approach to phasing out coal mining in its Lausitz region serves as a prominent example. The German government is investing €40 billion to manage the process by funding new infrastructure, research institutes, and extensive retraining programs. The goal is not just to compensate for lost jobs but to actively build a new, sustainable economic future for the region.

Conclusion

Transition risk represents a fundamental restructuring of the global financial and social order. As this chapter has detailed, the journey toward a net-zero economy is far more than a simple technological swap. It is a complex, multi-dimensional shift driven by the interplay of policy, technology, and market and social dynamics. While this transition offers immense opportunities for innovation and growth in green sectors, it simultaneously creates the systemic threat of stranded assets — devaluing not just physical infrastructure and fossil fuel reserves, but also intangible intellectual property and the human capital of millions of workers.

Ultimately, the success of this overhaul hinges on the ability to manage these risks. Because the private market is not naturally equipped to solve the social dislocations caused by such rapid change, proactive governance and strategic investment are essential to ensure a just transition, so that the shift to sustainability does not leave vulnerable communities behind. Balancing the urgent need for decarbonization with the economic security of the workforce is not just a moral imperative, but a practical necessity to maintain the political and social stability required to reach our climate goals.

This is a draft of a section of my climate risk textbook (slightly edited & reformatted to make it appropriate for Substack). I’d very much like to identify errors now, so if you see any, please let me know in the comments.

A much-discussed “return to coal” by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year.

The new analysis by thinktank Ember, shared exclusively with Carbon Brief, is a “worst-case” scenario and the reality could be even lower.

Separate data shows that, to date, there has been no “return to coal” in 2026.

While some countries, such as Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines, have responded to disrupted gas supplies with plans to increase their coal use, the new analysis shows that these actions will likely result in a “small rise” at most.

In fact, the decline of coal power in some countries and the potential for global electricity demand growth to slow down could mean coal generation continues falling this year.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that “the big story isn’t about a coal comeback” and any increase in coal use is “merely masking a longer-term structural decline”. 

Instead, they say clean-energy projects are emerging as more appealing investments during the fossil-fuel driven energy crisis.

‘Return to coal’

The conflict following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran has disrupted global gas supplies, particularly after Iran blocked the strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint in the Persian Gulf.

A fifth of the world’s liquified natural gas (LNG) is normally shipped through this region, mainly supplying Asian countries. The blockage in this supply route means there is now less gas available and the remaining supplies are more expensive.

(Note that while the strait usually carries a fifth of LNG trade, this amounts to a much smaller share of global gas supplies overall, with most gas being moved via pipelines.)

With gas supplies constrained and prices remaining well above pre-conflict levels, at least eight countries in Asia and Europe have announced plans to increase their coal-fired electricity generation, or to review or delay plans to phase out coal power.

These nations include Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Germany and Italy. Many of these nations are major users of coal power.

Such announcements have triggered a wave of reporting by global media outlets and analysts about a “return to coal”. Some have lamented a trend that is “incompatible with climate imperatives”, while others have even framed this as a positive development that illustrates coal’s return “from the dead”.

This mirrors a trend seen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which many commentators said would lead to a surge in European coal use, due to disrupted gas supplies from Russia. 

In fact, despite a spike in 2022, EU coal use has returned to its “terminal decline” and reached a historic low in 2025.

Gas to coal

So far, the evidence suggests that there has been no return to coal in 2026.

Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air found that, in March, coal power generation remained flat globally and a fall in gas-fired generation was “offset by large increases in solar and wind power, rather than coal”.

However, as some governments only announced their coal plans towards the end of March, these figures may not capture their impact.

To get a sense of what that impact could be, Ember assessed the impact of coal policy changes and market responses across 16 countries, plus the 27 member states of the EU, which together accounted for 95% of total coal power generation in 2025.

For each country, the analysis considers a maximum “worst-case” scenario for switching from gas to coal power in the face of high gas prices.

It also considers the potential for any out-of-service coal power plants to return and for there to be delays in previously expected closures as a result of the response to the energy crisis.

Ember concludes that these factors could increase coal use by 175 terawatt hours (TWh), or 1.8%, in 2026 compared to 2025.

(This increase is measured relative to what would have happened without the energy crisis and does not account for wider trends in electricity generation from coal, which could see demand decline overall. Last year, coal power dropped by 63TWh, or 0.6%.)

Roughly three-quarters of the global effect in the Ember analysis is from potential gas-to-coal switching in China and the EU.

Other notable increases could come from switching in India and Indonesia and – to a lesser extent – from coal-policy shifts in South Korea, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

However, widely reported policy changes by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines are estimated to have very little, if any, impact on coal-power generation in 2026. The table below briefly summarises the potential for and reasoning behind the estimated increases in coal generation in each country in 2026.

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Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, stresses that the 1.8% figure is an upper estimate, telling Carbon Brief:

“This would only happen if gas prices remained very high for the rest of the year and if there were sufficient coal stocks at power plants. The real risk of higher coal burn in 2026 comes not from coal units returning…but rather from pockets of gas-to-coal switching by existing power plants, primarily in China and the EU.”

Moreover, Jones says there is a real chance that global coal power could continue falling over the course of this year, partly driven by the energy crisis. He explains:

“If the energy crisis starts to dent electricity demand growth, coal generation – as well as gas generation – might actually be lower than before the crisis.”

‘Structural decline’

Energy experts tell Carbon Brief that Ember’s analysis aligns with their own assessments of the state of coal power.

Coal already had lower operation costs than gas before the energy crisis. This means that coal power plants were already being run at high levels in coal-dependent Asian economies that also use imported LNG to generate electricity. As such, they have limited potential to cut their need for LNG by further increasing coal generation.

Christine Shearer, who manages the global coal plant tracker at Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief that, in the EU, there is a shrinking pool of countries where gas-to-coal switching is possible:

“In Europe, coal fleets are smaller, older and increasingly uneconomic, while wind, solar and storage are becoming more competitive and widespread.”

In the context of the energy crisis, Italy has announced plans to delay its coal phaseout from 2025 to 2038. This plan, dismissed by the ECCO thinktank as “ineffective and costly”, would have minimal impact given coal only provides around 1% of the country’s power. 

Notably, experts say that there is no evidence of the kind of structural “return to coal” that would spark concerns about countries’ climate goals. There have been no new coal plants announced in recent weeks.

Suzie Marshall, a policy advisor working on the “coal-to-clean transition” at E3G, tells Carbon Brief:

“We’re seeing possible delayed retirements and higher utilisation [of existing coal plants], as understandable emergency measures to keep the lights on, but not investment in new coal projects…Any short-term increase in coal consumption that we may see in response to this ongoing energy crisis is merely masking a longer-term structural decline.”

With cost-competitive solar, wind and batteries given a boost over fossil fuels by the energy crisis, there have been numerous announcements about new renewable energy projects since the start of war, including from India, Japan and Indonesia. 

Shearer says that, rather than a “sustained coal comeback” in 2026, the Iran war “strengthens the case for renewables”. She says:

“If anything, a second gas shock in less than five years strengthens the case for renewables as the more secure long-term path.”

Jones says that Ember expects “little change in overall fossil generation, but with a small rise in coal and a fall in gas” in 2026. He adds:

“This would maximise gas-to-coal switching globally outside of the US, leaving no possibility for further switching in future years. Therefore, the big story isn’t about a coal comeback. It’s about how the relative economics of renewables, compared to fossil fuels, have been given a superboost by the crisis.”

Santa Marta: Key outcomes from first summit on ‘transitioning away’ from fossil fuels

International policy

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30.04.26

Iran war analysis: How 60 nations have responded to the global energy crisis

International policy

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08.04.26

Q&A: Why does gas set the price of electricity – and is there an alternative?

Oil and gas

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Q&A: What does the Iran war mean for the energy transition and climate action?

International policy

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10.03.26

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The post World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters

October 28, 2025, was a very bad day to be in Jamaica. That morning, Category 5 Hurricane Melissa intensified into the strongest hurricane ever observed in the Atlantic: 190 mph (305 km/h) winds, a tie with Hurricane Allen of 1980. That afternoon Melissa powered ashore in Jamaica, causing a catastrophic $8.8 billion in damage, equivalent to 41% of Jamaica’s GDP.

Melissa came close to its maximum potential intensity

The maximum potential intensity of a tropical cyclone is the maximum strength a storm can achieve based on the existing atmospheric and oceanic conditions. Potential intensity theory was pioneered in 1987 by MIT hurricane scientist Kerry Emanuel, who showed that human-caused global warming will increase the maximum strength that a hurricane can achieve. Hurricanes are heat engines that take heat energy out of the ocean and convert it to the kinetic energy of wind, so it makes sense that the winds of the strongest hurricanes will get stronger as the oceans heat up.

Melissa’s 190-mph winds were very close to its maximum potential intensity: The hurricane’s maximum potential intensity was about 197 mph (317 km/h), according to the SHIPS model, and about 200 mph (320 km/h), according to a graphic available at the University of Wisconsin’s CIMSS (Fig. 1). It is quite rare for a hurricane to come this close to its maximum potential intensity — all conditions have to be perfect, and the atmosphere and ocean make up a complex system where perfection is rarely achieved.

Figure 1. The maximum potential intensity (MPI) of Hurricane Melissa on Oct. 28, 2025, was about 175 knots (200 mph). (Image credit: University of Wisconsin’s CIMSS)

Given the less-than-ideal conditions for intensification – light to moderate wind shear of 5-15 knots, a very slow forward speed of less than 5 mph that allowed upwelling of cooler water from the depths to affect it, and interaction with the rugged terrain of Jamaica – Melissa came remarkably close to its maximum potential intensity. (The formula for maximum potential intensity does not include wind shear and slow hurricane motion.)

So how strong could Melissa have gotten if everything were going its way? Melissa formed in late October, when ocean temperatures were about 30 degrees Celsius (86°F). Six weeks earlier, during the early- to mid- September peak of sea surface temperatures, ocean temperatures in the central Caribbean were near 31 degrees Celsius (88°F). According to a 2023 paper, the maximum potential intensity increases 5-7% per degree Celsius of sea surface temperature increase. Thus, Melissa’s maximum potential intensity would have increased by about 11-15 mph (18-25 km/h) had it formed during the September peak in sea surface temperatures. If we assume the other factors limiting its intensification were not present, Melissa could have peaked with 215 mph (345 km/h) winds.

This is the same intensity achieved by the strongest known hurricane in world history, 2015’s Hurricane Patricia. Patricia formed off the Pacific coast of Mexico over record-warm waters of 30.5-31 degrees Celsius (87-88°F). And though the difference between 180 mph and 215 mph may not seem like much, it would actually represent about a fourfold increase in damage potential, according to NOAA.

Figure 2. The strongest tropical cyclones observed globally, 1972-2025, using windspeed ratings from the National Hurricane Center for the Atlantic and Eastern Pacific and from the Joint Typhoon Warning Center elsewhere.

How strong can a hurricane get?

The global list of tropical cyclones during the satellite era (1972-present) with winds as strong or stronger than Melissa is a short one: just 11 storms (Fig. 2). (There were 19 Western Pacific typhoons from 1955-1966 that “officially” have winds of 195 mph or higher, but hurricane experts agree that the intensities assigned to typhoons during that pre-satellite period suffered from a high bias and are not reliable.)

For most of the Northern Hemisphere’s tropical cyclone-prone areas, September will be the month with the highest possible maximum potential intensity, since that is when sea surface temperatures peak. Emanuel, the MIT hurricane scientist, created maps of the top 10% maximum potential intensity expected within 1,000 km of a given point during September, using climate data from the period 1982-1995 (Fig. 3). In the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and western Caribbean have the highest values: 224 mph (100 m/s) or higher. In the Pacific, the southern Philippines, Mexico, and most of Central America also have a top 10% maximum potential intensity of 224 mph (100 m/s) or higher.

Figure 3. Top 10% maximum potential intensity winds within 1,000 km of a given point for tropical cyclones expected during September, using climate data from the period 1982-1995. The only places with an MPI in excess of 110 m/s (246 mph) are the ocean areas of the Middle East. (Image credit: Kerry Emanuel)

Emanuel also created a table showing the top-10% maximum potential intensities for individual cities across the globe. All of these numbers (and the ones in Fig. 3) need to be adjusted upward because the climate has warmed significantly since the 1995 cutoff of the historical data used. A 2022 paper, A potential explanation for the global increase in tropical cyclone rapid intensification, reported that between 1982 and 2017, potential intensity during August-September-October in the Northern Hemisphere tropics increased by 2.3-2.4 mph per decade, or 8.6 mph over the 36-year period (1.02-1.06 m/s per decade). During that same period, Northern Hemisphere tropical sea surface temperatures increased by 0.17-0.23 degree Celsius per decade, or 0.6-0.8 degree Celsius over the 36-year period. A 2021 paper, Poleward expansion of tropical cyclone latitudes, reported similar numbers, with larger increases in potential intensity observed in the eastern Caribbean and western Gulf of Mexico.

These results suggest that the maximum potential intensity numbers in Fig. 3 and in Emanuel’s table should be adjusted upward by about 9 mph (4 m/s). Here are the adjusted numbers for the U.S. from Emanuel’s table showing the top-10% maximum potential intensities for individual cities:

Boston: 78 mph (35 m/s), Cat 1
Honolulu: 186 mph (84 m/s), Cat 5
Miami: 226 mph (101 m/s), Cat 5
Galveston: 220 mph (98 m/s), Cat 5
New Orleans: 231 mph (103 m/s), Cat 5
New York City: 112 mph (50 m/s), Cat 2
San Diego: 72 mph (32 m/s), Tropical Storm
Washington D.C.: 105 mph (47 m/s), Cat 2

Note that for cities like Boston and Washington, D.C., fast-moving storms coming from the south – where they typically move over warmer waters – can arrive at these cities at a strength higher than the local maximum potential intensity. This is why there is a separate entry in Emanuel’s table for the highest maximum potential intensity within 1,000 km of each city. I didn’t show this quantity in the list above, though it is plotted in Fig. 3.

A 300-mph (134 m/s) tropical cyclone is possible in the Persian Gulf

Globally, the highest maximum potential intensities are found in the ultrahot waters of the Middle East. There has never been a tropical cyclone observed in the Persian Gulf because it is narrow and prone to high wind shear and dry air. 

Figure 4. Category 1 Tropical Cyclone Gulab makes a bid at entering the Persian Gulf on Oct. 3, 2021. (Image credit: NASA World View)

However, for their eye-popping 2015 paper, Grey swan tropical cyclones, Ning Lin and Kerry Emanuel performed modeling showing that strong tropical cyclones can move through the Persian Gulf, representing an underappreciated threat to major cities like Dubai. The modeling showed that a sea surface temperature of 35 degrees Celsius (95°F) can create a maximum potential intensity of 296 mph (132 m/s) in the Persian Gulf. Their worst-case 1-in-30,000-year storm was a 257 mph (115 m/s) Category 5 beast with a central pressure of 784 mb that brought a colossal storm surge of 24 feet (7.5 meters) to Dubai.

The study used the climate of 1980-2010, and sea surface temperatures in the Persian Gulf have warmed significantly since then. Over the period 1981-2012, the Persian Gulf had peak summer sea surface temperatures of 32-35 degrees Celsius (90-95°F). But in July 2020, those temperatures hit 37.6 degrees Celsius (99.7°F). More recently, in August 2023, sea surface temperatures above 36 degrees Celsius (97°F) were measured over portions of the Persian Gulf. Thus, an even stronger storm – with winds over 300 mph (134 m/s) – would be possible in today’s climate.

There has been a recent close call for a strong tropical cyclone entering the Persian Gulf: In 2021, Category 1 Tropical Cyclone Gulab (Fig. 4) entered the Gulf of Oman, which connects to the Persian Gulf. A four-day forecast from the HWRF model (Fig. 5) predicted Gulab would pass over Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, enter the Persian Gulf, and then intensify into a Category 2 storm with a central pressure of 958 mb. Fortunately, Gulab ended up weakening into a tropical storm and making landfall in Oman, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

Figure 5. Four-day windspeed forecast from the HWRF model made on Oct. 1, 2021, for Tropical Cyclone Gulab. The model predicted Gulab would be a Category 2 storm with a central pressure of 958 mb in the Persian Gulf. Purple colors correspond to Category 1 winds (74 mph or greater). (Image credit: Levi Cowan, Tropical Tidbits)

Sources of real-time maximum potential intensity data

Kerry Emanuel’s website
University of Wisconsin CIMSS (for active storms)
SHIPS model (for active storms)

 by David Spratt, first published at Pearls&Irritations

Australia’s defence and foreign policy settings are focused on geopolitical rivalry, while far greater systemic risks – especially climate disruption – receive little strategic attention.

Blinded to the greater risks, the Albanese Government and the security commentariat have spent four, unrelenting years making the case that China is the biggest threat to Australia’s future.

Defence and foreign policy, encapsulated in the AUKUS agreement, tie Australia to a nation currently engaged in what the historian Timothy Snyder calls “Superpower Suicide”: “a systematic undoing of American power by Americans” in which “fighting a war for no reason we can name, losing it, and covering our defeat with genocidal and apocalyptic propaganda” had led to ”rapid and catastrophic decline as the result of specific choices in the last year”.

The AUKUS cargo cult – with Labor, the LNP and One Nation marching arm in arm – means the Parliament and the nation have spent little time even considering what may be the greatest threats to our future.

In risk management, there are potential events so destructive that they are termed catastrophic because of their capacity for human death or suffering on a massive scale, such that societies may never fully recover. This may be called existential risk or in actuarial terms, the “risk of ruin”, which colloquially in financial and gambling circles is the risk of “losing everything”. Catastrophic events include nuclear war, climate change, biosecurity threats including pandemics, and disruptive digital technologies.

Every year the World Economic Forum surveys private and public sector global leaders on the big risks. The 2025 WEF Global Risk Report lists the ten most severe risks on a 10-year horizon. The top four, and five of the ten, are related to climate-change and nature degradation: extreme weather, biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, critical change to Earth systems, natural resource shortages, and pollution.

Of the other five, three are digital disruption: misinformation and disinformation, adverse outcomes of AI technologies, and cyber espionage and warfare. Rounding out the top ten are inequality and social polarisation. State-based armed conflict and geoeconomic confrontation don’t make the top ten, though they are in short-term (two-year) listing.

So is China or climate disruption the biggest threat? Global leaders understand what the Australian Government denies.

What would climate-disruption look like on a geo-political scale, given the warming is accelerating and is likely to exceed 3 degrees Celsius? Two decades ago, American security analysts noted that  “nonlinear climate change will produce nonlinear political events… beyond a certain level climate change becomes a profound challenge to the foundations of the global industrial civilisation that is the mark of our species”.

They produced a 3-degree scenario, in which “the internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible.”

In Chatham House’s Climate change risk assessment 2021, the security think-tank found that impacts likely to be locked in for the period 2040–50 unless emissions rapidly decline – which they are not – include a global average 30 per cent drop in crop yields by 2050, and the average proportion of global cropland affected by severe drought exceeding 30 per cent a year. They concluded that cascading climate impacts will “drive political instability and greater national insecurity, fuelling regional and international conflict”.

The consequences of climate disruption will strike everywhere. Last November, Iceland designated the potential collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) a national security concern and an existential threat, so that it could plan for worst-case scenarios and preventative action.

A disturbing new research paper finds it is likely that AMOC will have slowed by half this century, and scientists fear it is close to a tipping point. Peter Ditlevsen of the University of Copenhagen calls AMOC collapse a going-out-of-business scenario for north-west European agriculture. In addition, the monsoons that typically deliver rain to West Africa and South Asia would become unreliable, and huge swaths of Europe and Russia would plunge into drought.

AMOC collapse would challenge European foundations, including the viability of nations and states, and of the EU and NATO, moving climate from the realm of environmental and culture wars to the heart of the matter: human security, social breakdown, mass displacement and death.

And it is not a security threat par excellence in 50 years time, but right now, as the Icelandic Government has recognised, because systemic changes now under way will make such an outcome inevitable unless the world applies strategic focus, resources and collective political will to trying to avert such a catastrophe right now.

Yet a search of Hansard finds no mention of AMOC in either house of Australia’s Parliament, from any MP or Senator, over the term of the Albanese government. That is depressing, but not unexpected. The government ordered a climate and security risk assessment from the Office of National Intelligence when it came to power, and immediately suppressed the report, refusing to articulate ‘frankly terrifying’ security risks.

And of course AMOC is but one in an array of climate-security risks: the northern quarter of Australia – where the government is spending billions upgrading military bases – will become unliveably hot in three or four decades from now. And declining crop yields: researchers estimate that beyond 2°C warming, which is perhaps only 15 years away, “the declines in suitable areas for the 30 crops [analysed] become more pronounced – in some cases approaching and passing 50 per cent”.  That in itself would cause global chaos. There are scores more, including Himalayan water wars, mass people displacement, and drowned states.

A recognition that climate poses an existential – and perhaps the most pressing – risk to Australians’ future would mean that any Australian foreign policy, defence or strategic review would place it at the centre of concern. Instead the government has done the opposite, barely giving climate a token tick in such recent documents.

Epitomised by the tedious performances of the Defence Minister, Australia is doggedly pressing on with its “America first, Earth last” strategy. But this moment requires clarity about the existential nature of the climate threat to humanity’s future; and a collective regional commitment to strategic action.

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, April 19, 2026 thru Sat, April 25, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (10 articles)

• A more troubling picture of sea level rise is coming into view Scientists have uncovered a “blind spot” in the research on rising seas, revealing that tens of millions of people thought safe from coastal flooding are at risk of inundation. Grist, Fred Pearce, Apr 18, 2026.
• Wildfires used to 'go to sleep' at night. Climate change is turning them into prime burning hours Phys.org, Seth Borenstein, Apr 18, 2026.
• The Guardian view on Japan`s cherry blossom: when spring slips out of time | Editorial A 1,200-year dataset shows the ‘peak bloom’ is arriving earlier. Global heating is unsettling nature’s rhythms – and their cultural meaning The Guardian, Editorial, Apr 19, 2026.
• Lost millennium of Galapagos deep-sea corals linked to major Pacific climate shift Phys.org, University of Bristol, Apr 20, 2026.
• State of the climate: Strong El Niño puts 2026 on track for second-warmest year The first three months of 2026 have been the fourth warmest on record, with each successive month surpassing historical averages by a greater margin. Carbon Brief, Zeke Hausfather, Apr 21, 2026.
• What`s driving the catastrophic wildfires in Georgia Drought conditions have been worsening for months in the Southeast. Now tens of thousands of acres are burning, displacing people and destroying dozens of homes. Grist, Emily Jones, Apr 22, 2026.
• As Climate Disasters Create an Insurance Crisis, a California Bill Seeks to Make Fossil Fuel Companies Pay Premiums “have gone through the roof” and insurers have been leaving the state as the costs of disasters soar amid worsening extreme weather. Inside Climate News, Steven Rodas, Apr 23, 2026.
• Hot, dry and hurricane-scarred: How climate change fueled wildfires in Georgia and Florida Widespread drought in the Southeast is largely to blame for the fires, but their spread has also been fueled by leftover debris from past hurricanes that swept across the region. NBC News, Denise Chow, Apr 24, 2026.
• The “grim news” that isn’t making headlines Dr Gilbz on Youtube, Anna Gilbert, Apr 24, 2026.
• The Next El Niño Could Lock Earth Into a Hotter Climate The Pacific heat pulse is temporary, but scientists warn that its climate impacts are not. Inside Climate News, Bob Berwyn, Apr 25, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (3 articles)

• Clean energy pushes fossil-fuel power into reverse for `first time ever` Renewable energy has overtaken coal to become the world’s largest source of electricity in 2025, according to thinktank Ember. Carbon Brief, Molly Lempriere, Apr 20, 2026.
• Why Climate Work Is Community Work State of the Planet, Eve Kaplan-Walbrecht, Apr 23, 2026.
• Transition risk: The human cost of net zero Stranded assets and ghost factories The Climate Brink, Andrew Dessler, Apr 23, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (3 articles)

• Climate Change, the Courts and US policy - a Critical Perspective From a Former Judge of the UK Supreme Court Climate Law Blog, Robert Carnwath, Apr 22, 2026.
• Republicans introduce extreme bill to ban lawsuits against Big Oil forever HEATED, Emily Atkin, Apr 23, 2026.
• Criminalisation of climate protesters in UK is counterproductive, research finds Study of 1,300 campaigners finds arrests, fines and jail terms increase determination of activists to take direct action The Guardian, Damian Carrington, Apr 25, 2026.

Miscellaneous (3 articles)

• Big Oil Breaks Everything The planet, our democracy, our courts... The Crucial Years, Bill McKibben, Apr 19, 2026.
• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #16 A listing of 26 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, April 12, 2026 thru Sat, April 18, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler, John Hartz and Doug Bostrom, Apr 19, 2026.
• EGU2026 - My plans for attending virtually The European Geoscience Union's General Assembly will take place from May 4 to 8 in Vienna and online. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler, Apr 22, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (2 articles)

• Madagascar's ancient baobabs store 700 years of climate secrets-what they reveal The Conversation, Estelle Razanatsoa, Lindsey Gillson, Malika Virah-Sawmy, Apr 20, 2026.
• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #17 2026 2026''s 17th edition of Skeptical Science's weekly climate research introduces a new regular feature: scoreboarding citations of previously listed articles. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Apr 23, 2026.

International Climate Conferences and Agreements (2 articles)

• Revealed: Scientists tell Colombia fossil-fuel transition summit to `halt new expansion` Countries attending a first-of-its-kind fossil-fuel summit have been asked to consider “action recommendations” such as “halting all new fossil-fuel expansion” and “reject[ing] gas as a bridging fuel”, according to a preliminary scientific report seen by Carbon Brief. Carbon Brief, Daisy Dunne, Apr 20, 2026.
• New global panel aims to accelerate move away from fossil fuels Scientists and economists will help countries develop plans to reduce dependence on oil, gas and coal The Guardian, Jonathan Watts and Fiona Harvey, Apr 25, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (2 articles)

• This Growing Climate Threat Could Be Increasing Your Blood Pressure Lede: A growing body of research suggests that saltwater leaching into freshwater supplies is increasing the risk of human health problems. Inside Climate News, Kiley Price, Apr 21, 2026.
• Pollen season in UK and mainland Europe extended by climate breakdown Research finds global heating has already lengthened the pollen season in addition to worsening heatwaves and droughts The Guardian, Ajit Niranjan, Apr 22, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (1 article)

• The really big picture, in four pictures If you had to explain climate change in 10 seconds, what would you say? Climate Trunk, John Lang, Apr 22, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (1 article)

• Q&A: What Magyar`s defeat of Orbán in Hungary means for climate and energy The right-wing populist Hungarian government led by Viktor Orbán has suffered a landslide electoral defeat to the centre-right Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar. Carbon Brief, Josh Gabbatiss, Apr 17, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 article)

• Trust, Media Habits, and Misperceptions Shape Public Understanding of Climate Change Most Americans are concerned about climate change, but they don’t think most others share that concern. That quiet misunderstanding is one of the biggest barriers to climate action in the United States. This report explores how trust in information, media consumption patterns, and perceptions of others shape how people think about climate change. The findings point to a striking paradox: while many Americans trust the information they encounter and are concerned about climate change, they believe others are far less concerned and less able to recognize accurate information. ecoAmerica, Marryam Ishaq , Apr 09, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

This is a guest blog post by John Lang about his new "Climate Trunk" graphics project and website. He will add one graphic per week for about 2 years rounding out the big picture of human-caused climate change graphic by graphic.

If you had to explain climate change in 10 seconds, what would you say? 

Climate scientists Katharine Hayhoe and Kimberly Nicholas have long boiled it down to five phrases: It’s real. It’s us. It’s bad. We’re sure. And we can fix it.

This framing has helped millions cut through a topic swamped by jargon, acronyms and complexity. The first four Climate Trunk graphics owe a debt to that tradition. 

You’ll notice below I leave one off: we’re sure. Not because scientific certainty doesn’t matter. It does. The evidence is overwhelming. Scientists have passed the gold standard of certainty on human-caused climate change: the five-sigma level. The scientific consensus is as solid as gravity – and like gravity, it doesn’t care what you believe. 

I just don’t want to start on the defensive. I want to start by showing the big picture as simply as possible – ‘we’re sure’ will get its own graphic later. 

With that caveat out of the way, here’s the Trunk version of the really big picture:

1. It’s real.

Earth is heating.

Global temperatures are rising, and faster than most people realise. The planet has heated by around 1.3°C since the late 19th century, with the bulk of that increase concentrated in the last 50 years. Land – where people tend to live – has heated by about 2°C on average already. (Ocean takes longer to heat up than land.)

In 2024, the global average reached 1.53°C above the pre-industrial baseline. That doesn’t mean the 1.5°C temperature goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement has been breached, since that threshold refers to the long-term average, not a single year. But it’s a warning that we’re inching closer.

2. It’s us.

And it's 'unequivocal'.

Modern global heating is overwhelmingly caused by human activity. The best estimate of the human contribution is around 100%, and possibly a little more, because natural factors have likely had a slight cooling influence over the last 50 years or so.

Our greenhouse gas emissions, namely CO2, acts like an extra blanket, trapping more heat. Meanwhile, air pollution has removed a little of that blanket by reflecting some sunlight back to space, but only temporarily. Natural factors like the sun and volcanoes do not explain the long-term heating trend.

As the IPCC puts it: ‘It’s unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land.’

3. It’s bad.

The future has not been written.

Climate change is not just a gradual rise in temperature. It is a destabilisation of the conditions under which human civilisation developed. Food systems, water supplies, infrastructure, ecosystems and political institutions were built under, and for, a relatively stable climate. That stability is now being disrupted at speed.

The risks rise with every increment of heating: more extreme heat, heavier rainfall, worsening droughts, greater strain on nature and growing odds of ‘double whammy’ shocks across societies. The future is far from pre-written, but it will branch according to the choices made by societies over the next decade or so.

4. We can fix it: net zero

Net zero is the only way to stabilise rising temperatures.

This is the part that sometimes gets lost, between ‘it’s too late’ and ‘everything’s fine’. Or, as the late scientist Stephen Schneider put it: ‘the “end of the world” or “good for you” are the two least likely [climate] outcomes.’

We know that achieving net zero CO2 is the only way to stabilise rising temperatures, and the first step towards net zero greenhouse gases. Net zero means cutting emissions as far and as fast as possible, then using durable removals to counterbalance what’s left – the ‘residual’ emissions we can’t eliminate entirely. Net zero also means protecting the land and ocean sinks that already absorb about half of our CO2 emissions.

Durable removals will help, they have to. But emission cuts will do the heavy lifting. Cutting emissions now is almost always easier and cheaper than trying to remove them from the atmosphere later.

In a nutshell, the practicalities of net zero are almost as simple as Hayhoe and Nicholas’s five climate basics:

• replace fossil fuels with clean energy
• electrify energy systems as fast as possible
• protect, restore and strengthen land and ocean sinks
• scale up durable carbon removal to industrial levels.

The good news is the first two above are underway, and moving faster than many expected.

Clean energy is beginning to grow in line with — and at times faster than — energy demand: the key to squeezing fossil fuels out over time. Slowly at first. Then all of a sudden. 

Solar has gone bananas. Together with wind, it now accounts for more than 90% of new power capacity. Clean electricity has surged past 40% of global generation, helping put a brake on CO2 emissions growth since 2015.

Yes, the norm-wrecking ball in the White House has dented investment confidence. But global spending on clean energy is roughly double that of fossil fuels – and growing. Meanwhile the Iran crisis is rewriting energy policy in real time: away from imports and volatility, and towards energy sovereignty, stability and lower fuel import bills.

As veteran energy analyst Michael Liebreich reminds us, we’re now about one-third through the energy transition in final energy terms. We're also close to a tipping point, where a China-led plateau in emissions should turn into a structural global decline.

Which brings us back to the most important of Hayhoe and Nicholas’s basics: we can fix it. We’re making progress – even if you can’t always see it.

Net zero isn’t a political slogan or culture war football. It’s physics and chemistry. And it’s the only way to stop global heating.

Want to get a notification when a new graphic gets published? Then subscribe to John Lang's newsletter!

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week Europe’s energy plan

ENERGY CUSHION: On Wednesday, the European Commission set out a package of measures to offset surging energy prices caused by the Iran war, reported Reuters. The draft “actions” include cutting electricity taxes and coordinating the filling of fossil-gas storage this summer, the newswire explained. It added that the package stopped short of “major market interventions”, such as ​capping gas prices or taxing the windfall profits of energy companies. (Carbon Brief published an interactive table of the 44 actions.)

‘BAD SCENARIO’: The newswire quoted EU energy commissioner Dan Jorgensen, who said to expect higher gas prices ​for a “couple of years”, adding: “We really do need to get rid of our dependency on gas as fast as possible. So, for us, this means speeding up more clean energy.” Legal proposals to change tax rules are expected in May, the article said, noting: “Tax changes require unanimous approval from EU countries, making them difficult to pass.”

FLIGHT RISK: The 16-page “AccelerateEU” document also includes plans to coordinate on jet fuel and diesel supplies “to fend off a looming shortage”, said Politico. Jorgensen told Sky News that European summer holidays were “very likely” at risk of “flight cancellations or very, very expensive tickets”. The Financial Times reported that German airline Lufthansa has already “cancelled 20,000 flights between May and October to save fuel”.

Around the world

• RENEWABLES RECORD: Renewable energy overtook coal last year to become the world’s largest source of electricity, according to analysis by thinktank Ember, covered by Carbon Brief.
• ‘PRIORITISE UNITY’: France chose to omit climate change from the agenda of a G7 meeting in Paris this week in order to “avoid a row with the US”, said Agence France-Presse.
• CHINA WARNING: China has pledged to “strictly control” coal use and will grade local authorities on how well they meet the country’s climate goals, according to two new policies covered in a Q&A by Carbon Brief. 
• ‘DOUBLE  DOWN’: The UK government said it will “move…to break [the] link between gas and electricity prices” in response to the spike in fossil-fuel prices, reported Carbon Brief.
• EXTREME HEAT: A report from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) warned that global food systems are being “pushed to the brink” by increasingly common and severe heatwaves on land and at sea, reported the Guardian.
• WHAT’S IN A NAME: In a national vote, Japan selected “kokushobi” – translated as “cruelly hot” – as the new term to describe days that hit 40C, reported BBC News.

£785

The amount that a new electric vehicle is cheaper, on average, than a new petrol car, according to car sales website Autotrader. The Guardian described this as a “significant milestone in Britain’s transition away from fossil fuels”.

Latest climate research

• Climate-driven extremes in temperature and pH put “underwater cultural heritage”, such as shipwrecks in the Taiwan strait, at greater risk of corrosion | Climate Services
• As many as 98% of environmental claims and commitments made by meat and dairy companies over 2021-24 could be categorised as “greenwashing” | PLOS Climate
• Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is “unlikely to generate negative emissions within 150 years” and is “likely to increase electricity costs by ~3.5-fold” | Nature Sustainability

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

With a strong – or even “super” – El Niño event expected to develop later this year, Carbon Brief estimated that 2026 is on track to be the second-warmest year on record. The prediction puts global average temperature in 2026 at between 1.37C and 1.58C above pre-industrial levels, with a best estimate of 1.47C. This means that 2024 is “virtually certain” to be one of the top-four warmest years, but there is still a 19% chance that 2026 will be the warmest year on record – beating the prior record set in 2024.

Spotlight Countries mull fossil-fuel transition in Colombia

This week, Carbon Brief reports from a first-of-its-kind summit on transitioning away from fossil fuels being held in Santa Marta, Colombia.

Around 60 countries are arriving in Santa Marta, Colombia today where – against a backdrop of white-sand beaches, rolling forested hills and stifling humidity – they will consider ways to move away from fossil fuels.

The first global summit on transitioning away from fossil fuels comes after a large group of nations campaigned for – but, ultimately, failed – to get all countries to formally agree to a “roadmap” away from coal, oil and gas at the COP30 climate summit in Brazil last November.

The nations gathering in Santa Marta for the summit, co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands, call themselves the “coalition of the willing”.

Together, they account for one-third of global fossil-fuel demand and one-fifth of global production, according to the Colombian government.

The group includes major oil-and-gas producers such as the UK, Canada, Australia, Brazil and Norway. Some big emitters – such as the US, China and India – are not expected to attend. (There is a question mark over whether China and India were invited.)

Academics to advise

In a departure from COP summits, the six-day event, from 24-29 April, will begin with a “science pre-conference”, where academics from across the world will present and discuss the latest scientific evidence on ways to transition away from fossil fuels.

Ahead of this, countries attending the talks have already been handed a draft scientific report with “action recommendations”, such as “halting all new fossil-fuel expansion” and “reject[ing] gas as a bridging fuel”, as revealed by Carbon Brief.

The report will be further debated and refined by scientists attending the academic segment of the Santa Marta talks, before a final version is made public towards the end of April, Carbon Brief understands.

The science pre-conference will also separately see the launch of a new advisory panel on fossil-fuel transition and a scientifically led roadmap for how Colombia can transition away from fossil fuels, sources tell Carbon Brief.

Alongside the science pre-conference, dialogues will also be held with Indigenous peoples, environmental organisations and other stakeholders.

‘High-level segment’

The science pre-conference will be followed by a “high-level segment” from 28-29 April, where ministers and other policymakers will meet to consider ways to transition away from fossil fuels. (Colombia’s president Gustavo Petro Urrego is expected to speak.)

At the end of the conference, countries are due to release a report featuring a “menu of solutions” for transitioning away from fossil fuels, according to Colombia’s environment minister Irene Vélez Torres.

This report is, in turn, set to inform a global “roadmap” on transitioning away from fossil fuels being developed by the Brazilian COP30 presidency, which is due to be presented at COP31 in Turkey this November.

The Brazilian COP30 presidency offered to bring forward a “voluntary” fossil-fuel transition “roadmap” outside of the official COP process, after countries failed to formally agree to one during negotiations in Belém.

Watch, read, listen

‘SHADOW DOCKET’: The New York Times obtained the “secret memos” behind the US supreme court’s decision in 2016 to block the Obama administration’s clean-power plan.

EGREGIOUS ENGAGEMENT: DeSmog identified multiple social media accounts in Sri Lanka posting AI-generated “energy policy rage bait” to UK Facebook feeds (as first revealed by Carbon Brief’s Leo Hickman).

CHINA ‘DOMINANCE’: A “Bloomberg originals” video looked at the “race to challenge China’s EV lead”.

Coming up

• 24-29 April: First conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels, Santa Marta, Colombia
• 28-29 April: Innovation Zero world congress, London, UK
• 29 April: Stop food waste day
• 6-7 May:GLF Africa 2026: stewarding our rangelands, Nairobi, Kenya

Pick of the jobs

• Natural England, chief executive officer | Salary: circa £130,000. Location: UK
• ETH Zurich, postdoctoral position in climate science | Salary: Unknown. Location: Zurich, Switzerland
• International Energy Agency, partnership manager – clean energy ministerial | Salary: €97,180. Location: Paris, France
• Greenpeace, media diversification press officer | Salary: £48,396-£55,644. Location: London, UK (hybrid)
• Our World In Data, writer | Salary: £80,000-£120,000. Location: Oxford, UK or remote

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

DeBriefed 1 May 2026: Countries chart path away from fossil fuels | China’s clean-tech surge | Global forest loss slows

DeBriefed

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01.05.26

DeBriefed 17 April 2026: Fossil-fuel power slumps | ‘Super’ El Niño warning | Afghanistan’s climate struggle

DeBriefed

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17.04.26

DeBriefed 10 April 2026: Worst energy crisis ‘ever’ | India withdraws COP33 bid | Drag artists and climate change

DeBriefed

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10.04.26

DeBriefed 2 April 2026: Countries ‘revive’ energy-crisis measures | Record UK renewables | Plug-in solar savings

DeBriefed

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02.04.26

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The post DeBriefed 24 April 2026: Europe’s energy-crisis plan | Renewables overtake coal | Colombia’s fossil-fuel summit appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Chinese government leaders published a policy document on 22 April – Earth Day – calling for stricter controls on fossil-fuel consumption and greater oversight of heavy emitters.

It has been interpreted by experts as a signal of China’s ongoing commitment to climate action and a bridging policy between the 15th five-year plan, published in March, and future thematic and sectoral five-year plans expected to be published in the months and years ahead. 

While the policy document – known as “guiding opinions” – is not strictly binding, it bears the stamp of the two highest bodies in China’s political system, conveying a strong sense of authority.

One expert tells Carbon Brief that this is the first high-level document to explicitly link decarbonisation efforts with energy security and industrial development.

It was also followed on 23 April by a second document, which is binding, that strengthens environmental inspections of provincial governments and creates new metrics for future evaluations, such as total emissions and coal consumption. 

Below, Carbon Brief examines how the policies could impact China’s approach to peaking its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.

• Why are ‘guiding opinions’ important?
• What does the new ‘opinions’ document say about fossil fuels?
• How have climate evaluation rules been strengthened?
• What does the ‘opinions’ document say about energy security?

Why are ‘guiding opinions’ important?

Documents play an important role in disseminating political messages through China’s vast government bureaucracy. There is a well-defined hierarchy for different types of policies, each of which infer a different level of importance and flexibility.

“Opinions” are officially defined by the Chinese government as the “presentation of views and proposed solutions regarding important issues”.

They outline broad principles and general policy directions for lower levels of government to incorporate into more concrete policies. 

Policy recommendations included in an opinion are implied to be non-binding, allowing officials more discretion in how they are implemented on the ground.

Prof Yuan Jiahai from the North China Electric Power University in Beijing previously told Carbon Brief that naming a document “guiding opinions” means it will have a “long-term, directional and systematic impact”.

An example is a set of opinions on a “green and low-carbon circular development economic system” issued in February 2021, which laid out broad policy recommendations across several economic sectors to spur “green planning, green design, green investment, green construction, green production, green circulation, green life and green consumption”.

“Following these opinions, China’s green growth accelerated significantly,” Prof Christoph Nedopil, professor at the University of Queensland, tells Carbon Brief. He adds: 

“This is not to say that some of the developments would not have happened without such a guidance, but the guidance provided the clear direction and authority to various government departments and businesses to strengthen the support for the green and low-carbon transition.”

The new “opinions” document, on energy saving and carbon reduction, carries additional weight because of the bodies that issued it. Specifically, it was issued jointly by the general offices of the central committee of the Communist party of China (CCCPC), the highest party organ and headed by President Xi Jinping, and the state council, the highest government body and headed by Premier Li Qiang. This indicates that it has the approval of all of China’s most senior policymakers.

The document “signals China’s increasing confidence in its clean-energy sector”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst for Asia at thinktank Ember.

The timing also makes the document important, says Hu Min, director and co-founder for the Beijing-based thinktank Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress.

She notes that the document, published soon after the close of the “two sessions” in March, is a “way to move things forward” in energy and climate policy. Hu adds that it sends a signal of the direction likely to be taken in upcoming thematic and sectoral five-year plans on topics such as peaking carbon emissions, renewable energy and coal.

“I’m quite excited about it,” she tells Carbon Brief.

What does the new ‘opinions’ document say about fossil fuels?

The opinions document includes a plethora of recommendations across several sectors, from promoting energy-saving measures in data centres and clean heating solutions to developing “integrated steel-to-chemicals” projects and “zero-carbon transport corridors”.

But some of the most interesting language was reserved for the use of coal.

China’s carbon reduction “situation…remains relatively severe”, says a government statement summarised by carbon-market information platform Tanpaifang, with the energy system still “reliant” on coal. 

The “opinions” document is, therefore, of “great significance for building broader and stronger consensus across society”, it adds.

In 2025, developers in China submitted new or reactivated proposals to build a total of 161 gigawatts of new coal-fired power plants, as shown in the figure below.

Amount of new coal-power capacity being proposed in China each year, GW, 2015-2025. Source: The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and Global Energy Monitor.

The new document acknowledges the need to “strictly control fossil-fuel consumption”, in language significantly stronger than the 15th five-year plan published after the two-sessions meeting in March.

The five-year plan only pledged to “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use.

The document also outlines several other measures for managing fossil-fuel CO2 emissions, including “deepening efforts to reduce coal and oil use”, “actively promoting the clean replacement” of coal-fired equipment and “advancing” the replacement of “dispersed coal” use in an “orderly” manner.

However, it stops short of a complete rejection of coal-fired power, saying, for example, that policymakers should “reasonably control the scale of coal-fired power generation capacity and output”.

Nevertheless, Hu tells Carbon Brief, the document represents efforts by China’s leaders to “articulate” what controlling fossil fuels might look like.

Yang agrees, saying that the shift in the language on coal was “encouraging”. 

She notes the granularity of the recommendations around coal, such as a line urging policymakers to “determine the dispatch sequence and load regulation for coal-fired power”.

“It is very interesting that, at this high level [of government], they have so clearly outlined this obstacle in coal’s [changing] role…from baseload to flexibility,” she says.  

Experts interviewed by Carbon Brief said the language on renewable energy, which signalled ongoing support for China’s clean-energy buildout, was positive but unsurprising. 

The document urges officials to “vigorously develop non-fossil energy sources and new-energy storage technologies”, highlighting the need for technologies such as pumped-storage hydropower and microgrids to boost consumption.

For Hu, market conditions, investment and local policies are now more important than central government signals for China’s clean-energy buildout.

The main debate is fossil fuels, she says, and any signals that encourage limiting coal use will “make a difference”.

How have climate evaluation rules been strengthened?

The guiding opinions document also dedicates significant space to outlining measures for reviewing and evaluating carbon-reduction efforts. 

It states that local officials should undertake “comprehensive” evaluations of the energy consumption, coal consumption and carbon emissions of new projects, with plans to reduce or offset emissions becoming a “key component” of evaluating the project.

Similarly, the plan pledges to strengthen the review by the central government of local governments’ annual reports on energy use and carbon emissions, with warnings issued to local governments for “lagging progress” or “unreasonable increases in indicators”.

The central government will also strengthen supervision through “regular special inspections”, the “opinions” document says.

For regions that are “severely” falling behind on targets or are found to have “insufficient” ability to run their own inspections, the opinions threaten to “adjust or suspend their authority” for conducting evaluations and “delay or restrict” approvals for new projects.

The document also makes “local party committees and governments” responsible for their jurisdictions’ carbon reduction work. Party members and state-owned enterprises must “lead by example”, it adds.

The day after the opinions were released, the CCCPC and state council also issued a series of measures for “comprehensive evaluation” of local efforts to peak and reduce carbon emissions. 

Unlike the guiding opinions, this document is considered binding policy – in this case overseen primarily by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s powerful economic planning agency.

Under the new rules, central government officials – led by the NDRC with significant input from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), National Energy Administration (NEA) and other departments – will grade local governments on their carbon-reduction efforts. 

The measures largely align provinces’ emissions reduction evaluations with China’s existing climate pledges for 2030. 

Key targets include reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% by 2030, compared to 2005 levels, “reasonably” controlling coal-fired power generation, achieving a “25% share of non-fossil energy consumption by 2030” and “gradually” covering all new power demand with clean energy. 

The government also sets out 14 indicators, shown in the table below. At the top of the list are five key “control indicators”: total carbon emissions; reductions in carbon intensity; total coal consumption; total oil consumption; and the share of non-fossil energy consumption. 

Table listing the 14 indicators to be assessed under the new evaluation regime. The five “control” indicators are total carbon emissions; reductions in carbon intensity; total coal consumption; total oil consumption; and the share of non-fossil energy consumption. The nine “supporting” indicators are the decrease in energy consumption per unit of regional GDP; the proportion of new clean energy additions in overall annual additions of energy capacity; reductions in energy consumption and carbon emissions per unit of added value in industrial enterprises above designated size; carbon offsetting and implementation status of energy conservation and carbon reduction evaluation outcomes in “dual high” industrial programmes; the green and low-carbon transformation of urban and rural buildings; the green and low-carbon transformation of transport; reductions in the carbon intensity of public institutions; aims by sectors covered in China’s national carbon market to control carbon emissions; and increases in forest stock. Source: Xinhua.

The NDRC is responsible for evaluating all five of the key indicators, with the MEE also overseeing the first three.

Provinces that fail to meet any of the control indicators will receive an “unsatisfactory” rating, leading to “corrective measures”, according to solar news outlet Zhihui Photovoltaic.

In a comment article in finance news outlet Caixin, Chen Lihao says that the two documents together “form the institutional foundation” for China’s “full-scale transition” to a dual control of carbon system.

Chen is the deputy director of the special committee on resources and environment at the Jiusan Society, the political party that environment minister Huang Runqiu belongs to. 

The measures build on China’s existing inspection system to create a “much stronger accountability and compliance system”, says Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. 

The “real step forward”, she adds, is how climate and carbon targets – including China’s international commitments – have now been explicitly placed inside a “party-backed assessment framework” that uses pass-or-fail judgements on each indicator, rather than letting weak performance disappear inside a broad score.

Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the new policy represents a “helpful step toward implementation, bringing greater clarity on tasks and responsibilities”.

Inspections are regarded as a powerful tool for the MEE in enforcing climate policy, allowing it to publicly identify non-compliant bodies, with state media often announcing results. 

In 2021, inspection teams even publicly criticised the NEA, scolding it for “falling behind” on developing low-carbon energy in a move described at the time as “unprecedented”.

The emphasis that the opinions document places on evaluations and the stronger requirements that it represents “shows…the whole system that this is very important…it’s not just talk”, says Hu. (Hu spoke with Carbon Brief before the evaluation framework was released.) 

However, both Li and Qin note that much depends on how the evaluations are enforced.

The strength of the system will “inevitably involve further political bargaining within the Chinese system”, says Li, shaped both by differences in the priorities of different ministries and geopolitical developments – particularly the outcomes of the conflict in the Middle East.

Qin highlights the greater capacity that the measures give the MEE to enforce inspections.

“The ministry has a more formal standing to push back on coal expansion and to speak on climate policy in a more direct way,” she says, but adds that the NDRC will still be the “central driver” of evaluating emissions.

She also notes that, while earlier central government inspections incorporated explicit instructions about making evaluation results public, the new measures place more emphasis on “internal” mechanisms, rather than public disclosure.

What does the ‘opinions’ document say about energy security?

The opinions document also settles a debate on energy security that has been playing out in the Chinese media since the start of the conflict in the Middle East. 

It opens with a statement that “energy conservation and carbon reduction are key” both for China’s “dual-carbon” goals and energy transition and for “safeguarding national energy security”.

“The first sentence connects directly decarbonisation with energy security and industrial development, which is, if I’m not mistaken, the first time…that this has been linked and recognised [in such a high-level policy],” Yang tells Carbon Brief.

Although not always explicitly referencing the conflict, several outlets have run stories highlighting the importance of various energy technologies to China’s energy security. 

Some outlets, including state broadcaster CCTV and the Communist Youth League’s official newspaper, China Youth Daily, focused on the positive role low-carbon energy plays in China’s energy system. Others have underscored the importance of fossil fuels, including state news agency Xinhua, which has run a series on becoming an “energy powerhouse” interviewing representatives of the fossil fuel industry.

On 20 April, NDRC head Zheng Shanjie wrote in the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily that China should further strengthen energy security, including by increasing oil and gas reserves and production, reinforcing the role of coal-fired power as a “base-load guarantee” and expanding Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation. He flagged “disruptions” in the Strait of Hormuz as a cause for concern.

Zheng’s article came out on the same day that Chinese premier Li Qiang held a “study session” meeting with other high-level officials discussing the need to implement a “new strategy for energy security”, deepening energy system reforms to support the country’s low-carbon transition. 

The guiding opinions specifically instruct the NDRC, the country’s powerful economic planning agency, to “conscientiously fulfill its duties” in achieving China’s carbon goals, including across planning, implementation and evaluation. 

It adds that “all relevant [government] departments shall perform their respective duties, cooperate closely and form a concerted effort”.

However, experts had differing opinions on whether this signalled heightened scrutiny of the NDRC, or if it emphasised its importance to emission reduction efforts.

“The mention…seems to highlight an elevated scrutiny of its work on energy transition”, says Nedopil, but “does not seem to signal an increase of its responsibilities in the energy transition, considering the mention of [the responsibilities of other departments]”.

Analysis: How Chinese media is covering the Iran energy crisis

China Policy

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07.04.26

Guest post: How changes to coal mining have affected China’s methane emissions

China energy

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19.03.26

Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?

China energy

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06.03.26

Ma Jun: ‘No business interest’ in Chinese coal power due to cheaper renewables 

China energy

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19.02.26

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The post Q&A: China’s leadership calls for ‘strict control’ of fossil fuels appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Technical note: new feature in New Research

Every article we list here is eyeball-scanned by a real human but we do lean on bibliographic catalogs (publication databases) to supply article metadata for assembly of each edition of our weekly research surveillance scan. A little in-house software on our end connected via an API to a rich suite of upstream bibliographic information makes regular production possible.

While recently making API changes to improve our background tooling for New Research, we found ourselves unable to resist tapping into a little more information to include in our regular product. There's one key metric to help us all better understand what practicing scientists find most useful (and stimulating) in the torrent of climate-related research reports we sample here each week: "how many investigators cite a work in their own inquiries?" Our knowledge boundaray inexorably expands past any given report, but older results may well be foundational to newer exploration. So, we've added an little retrospective to each domain section in our weekly listing. For each section, we query our data, asking "what paper listed here 2 years ago has been most cited since it appeared?" This new feature appears at the end of each section:

There's a vast wealth in our bibliographic resources of ways to see how fresh information travels and effloresces after publication. For instance, by looking at raw cite statistics one might think that Springer-Nature is the center of mass of the entire academic publishing world. But by other metrics quite likely better describing concentration of thought and new insight, the barycenter of cutting-edge human intellect may well lie elsewhere. Given enough effort it's possible to "see" such things in diagram form— but there are not 36 hours in a day, unfortunately. Hopefully we'll have time to explore more!

After this round of tinkering, we now rely entirely on OpenAlex for bibliographic catalog API services. While this speeds internal production, we continue to recommend Unpaywall, and particularly the Unpaywall browser extension which for readers denied institutional privileges affords much handier access to many research articles.

Open access notables

Increasing Population and Cropland Exposure to Human-Induced Sequential Heatwave-Downpour Events, Guan et al., Earth s Future

Compound sequential heatwave-downpour (SHD) events, characterized by abrupt shifts from heatwaves to heavy rainfall, pose serious threats to health, infrastructure, and agriculture. However, the anthropogenic influence on the increasing trend of SHD events is poorly understood, and projections also exhibit large uncertainties. Our study revealed that the affected area of SHD events has grown notably across the Northern Hemisphere. The anthropogenic influences account for approximately 82.2% of the increase in affected areas of SHD events, with greenhouse gas emissions contributing the most. The constrained projection found that the exposure of population and cropland will increase nearly 8-fold under a high-emission scenario in the long term (2081–2100), compared to the current climate baseline (1991–2020). Notably, climate change, rather than population or land use change, is identified as the dominant driver of this increased exposure. Our finding highlights that reducing greenhouse gas emissions can mitigate the impacts of SHD on populations and croplands. 

Dramatic increase in ecosystem respiration causes record-breaking atmospheric CO2 growth rate in 2024, Dong et al., Nature Communications

2024 is the hottest year on record, accompanied by extreme precipitation, droughts and fires. The global atmospheric CO2 growth rate in 2024 reached a historic high of 3.73 ppm yr-1, significantly surpassing the previous record set during the 2015/16 El Niño event. Here, we investigate the causes and underlying mechanisms of this record-high growth rate by combining satellite-based atmospheric inversions and estimates of gross primary production and fire emissions. We find that the record-high CO2 growth rate is due to large reductions in the land CO2 sink. This is dominated by a dramatic increase in total ecosystem respiration, which occurred primarily in grass and shrub lands, owing to compound hot-wet climatic conditions in 2024. Given the projected increase in the frequency and intensity of compound pluvial-hot extremes under warming, changes in ecosystem respiration will become more drastic and cause positive feedback to climate warming.

Climate futures require politics, Leininger et al., Nature Communications [commentary]

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) seventh assessment cycle (AR7) has begun. Scientists have started to assess the literature on feasible and just climate and sustainability scenarios. The recommendations of the IPCC Workshop on the lessons learnt from the use of scenarios in AR6 point to the need for political science expertise to improve scenarios1. One key aspect highlighted in this report is political development2, including the quality and effectiveness of institutions, rule of law, and maintenance of peace. These factors have not yet been incorporated systematically and quantitatively into the Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) used to generate pathways of climate action that are assessed in the IPCC. Findings of the IPCC have substantially influenced global climate action. If the omission of political development biases the conclusions drawn from scenario analysis, then the real-world merit of the scenario-based findings is called into question. Therefore, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest steps to improve the incorporation of political development in scenarios during the AR7 assessments and beyond.

A weakened diurnal weather constraint leads to longer burning hours in North America, Luo et al., Science Advances

Contemporary North American wildfires exhibit increasingly erratic intraday burning, posing immediate operational and socioeconomic challenges. Here, we show that climate-driven weakening of day-night (diurnal) weather constraints extends and intensifies burning hours, a key mechanism behind broader fire regime transformations. Analyzing hourly geostationary satellite observations for ~9000 fires (>200 hectares; 2017–2023), we found western mountains and boreal forests experienced the longest active burning hours, with approximately one-third of active days exceeding 12 hours. About 60% of fires reached peak intensity within 24 hours of detection, while 14% of active days peaked at night. On the basis of fire weather, annual potential burning hours were estimated to rise 36% over 1975–2024, with pronounced increases in western regions and spring/fall (48 to 57%). Regions with significant changes gained 26 more potential active days annually and 1.2 additional potential burning hours daily, while extreme days (≥12 or 24 potential burning hours) rose 81 to 233% in fire-prone biomes. Future management requires adaptation to wildfires that increasingly defy diurnal norms.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Climate Change Concern Near Its High Point in U.S, Jeffery Jones, Gallup

Americans’ concern about global warming or climate change remains elevated compared with what it had been prior to 2017. At least four in 10 U.S. adults have expressed “a great deal” of concern about the matter throughout the past decade except for a 39% reading in 2023. Between 2009 and 2016, worry was typically in the low-to-mid 30% range but dropped to as low as 25% in 2011. Currently, 44% of U.S. adults worry a great deal about global warming or climate change, among the highest in the full trend since 1989, along with 46% measured in 2020 and 45% in 2017.

A Global Fleet Under Wind: Scaling Wind Propulsion for Emission Reduction, Energy Demand and Equity, Mason et al., Seas at Risk

The authors present a first-ever study showcasing the benefits of wind propulsion when scaled up to the global fleet. Drawing on 1.74 billion kilometers of real voyage data – the equivalent distance from Earth to Saturn – wind propulsion could, conservatively, reduce modelled wind ship fuel use by 6.3-9.4%, with an even greater potential if paired with other optimization measures such as weather routing, slowing down speeds, and hull cleaning. By 2050, it could deliver up to 762 million tons of cumulative CO2 savings, getting us closer to our climate targets. The technology is here, but is policy willing? 173 articles in 70 journals by 1545 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Can Large-Scale Clustering of Tropical Precipitation Be Used to Constrain Climate Sensitivity?, Blackberg & Singh, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd045282

Global warming intensifies pantropical coupling and its control on northern hemisphere tropical cyclones, Zhao et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01412-w

Large Overestimation of Projected Western U.S. Wildfire Burned Forest Area With Warming, Cheng et al., AGU Advances Open Access 10.1029/2026av002350

Response of Ocean Mesoscale Coherent Eddies to Global Warming, Yang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120228

The combined role of sea surface temperature and sea ice in the summer heatwaves over Pakistan, Li et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.108977

The Emergence of a Human Fingerprint in the Boreal Winter Extratropical Zonal Mean Circulation, Blackport & Sigmond, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl121773

The role of upper ocean stratification in resurgent marine heatwaves in the East/Japan Sea, Kim et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-47541-3

Weakening sensitivity of China’s terrestrial evapotranspiration to vegetation greening in a warmer world, Guo et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111183

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Hydrologic cycle weakening in hothouse climates, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.ado2515 13 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

A weakened diurnal weather constraint leads to longer burning hours in North America, Luo et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed0725

Declines in Autumn Precipitation in Southwestern China and the Yangtze River Basin Linked to the Tropical Pacific and Atlantic Warmings, Deng et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0479.1

Dramatic increase in ecosystem respiration causes record-breaking atmospheric CO2 growth rate in 2024, Dong et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72189-y

Global glacier mass change in 2025, Network et al., Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 10.1038/s43017-026-00777-z

Heatwave Characteristics and Trends Across Eight Japanese Cities, Mcgregor & Suzuki-Parker, Durham Research Online (Durham University) Open Access pmh:oai:durham-repository.worktribe.com:5179207

Increasing Population and Cropland Exposure to Human-Induced Sequential Heatwave-Downpour Events, Guan et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007442

Large-scale aggregation of humid heatwaves exacerbated by coastal oceanic warming, Cai et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01952-z

Ocean warming weakens the sea–land breeze in coastal megacities, Xiao et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2022ef003341

Tropical precipitation response to anthropogenic climate change in recent decades, Joseph et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-71187-4

Warming and snow loss increase reliance on old groundwater in a Colorado River headwater, Siirila-Woodburn et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-01945-y

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Record-breaking fire weather in North America in 2021 was initiated by the Pacific northwest heat dome, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01346-2 36 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A harmonized 2000–2024 dataset of daily river ice concentration and annual phenology for major Arctic rivers, Qiu et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-2703-2026

ALTICAP: a new global satellite altimetry product for coastal applications, Cancet et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-2319-2026

Annually resolved atmospheric CO2 growth rate over the past nine centuries, Zhang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72220-2

From Extreme Days to Event-Scale Persistence: Characterizing for Persistent Extreme Precipitation Across Multisource Datasets, Zhao et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100905

Improvements and limitations of the new Climate Hazards Center Infrared Precipitation with Stations (CHIRPSv3) dataset: Insights from multiple spatio-temporal scales in Colombia, Valencia et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.108971

Precipitation observing network gaps limit climate change impact assessment, Su et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10300-5

Sampling Biases in Daily Average Temperatures From Greenland Climate Records, Rapp et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70317

Warming-induced positive age trends challenge MXD detrending, Esper et al., Dendrochronologia Open Access 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126529

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Data Drought in the Humid Tropics: How to Overcome the Cloud Barrier in Greenhouse Gas Remote Sensing, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108791 22 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Air Quality Penalty in Southeast Asia Driven by AMOC Slowdown, Vella et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121309

Amplified European Future Warming Under Mesoscale-Resolving Sea Surface Temperature Forcing, Moreno?Chamarro & Ortega, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120578

Climate change affects future sea-bed mobility via storms and sea level rise, Rulent et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03500-4

Emerging Importance of Compound Flooding in Future Tropical Cyclone Hazard Profiles, Gori et al., Open MIND pmh:10.17615/ggmz-8m83

Enhanced Decadal Variance in Nordic Seas With AMOC Weakening in CESM, Patrizio et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118635

Impact attribution of the March 2022 Antarctic heatwave reveals amplification by cloud feedbacks and increased future meltwater, González et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03485-0

Mediterranean and Global Sea Surface Temperature Trends to 2100: An ARIMAX Time-Series Forecasting Approach, Yildirim et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106810

Multi-Model Evaluation and Future Projections of Radio Refractivity over West Africa Using CMIP6, Israel et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106811

Multidecadal Oscillation Masks Ocean Wave Climate Trends in 75-Year Global Wave Hindcast, Shimura et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc022340

The Hydroclimate Paradox of the Indian Summer Monsoon Projections: Dual Amplification of Deficit and Excess Rainfall in CMIP6 Models, Kulkarni et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70401

Twenty-First Century Projections and Trends of JJAS Rainfall Over the Greater Horn of Africa Under CMIP6 Shared Socioeconomic Pathways Scenarios, Jima et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70390

Widespread shift toward extreme dominated precipitation with pronounced trends in arid and mediterranean regions, Zaerpour et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-47708-y

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Characteristic changes in compound drought and heatwave events under climate change, Atmospheric Research, 10.1016/j.atmosres.2024.107440 49 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Advancing Weather and Climate Science in Mesoamerica and the Caribbean: A Novel Regional Multiweek Convection-Permitting Simulation, Ocasio et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0023.1

CMIP7 Data Request: atmosphere priorities and opportunities, Dingley et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-2945-2026

Evaluating model uncertainty in critical threshold estimations from time series data: application to the Atlantic meridional Overturning Circulation, Cotronei et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1761461

Modeling snowpack dynamics and surface energy budget in boreal and subarctic peatlands and forests, Nousu et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-18-231-2024

Three decades of simulating global temperature patterns with coupled global climate models, Brunner et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03497-w

Towards improved Euro-Mediterranean discharge simulations in regional coupled climate models: a comparative assessment of hydrologic performance, Hamitouche et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-2881-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Projected changes in compound hot-dry events depend on the dry indicator considered, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01352-4 29 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

A harmonized 2000–2024 dataset of daily river ice concentration and annual phenology for major Arctic rivers, Qiu et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-2703-2026

Antarctic Meltwater-Stratification Feedback Is Less Pronounced Under High Climate Forcing, Kreuzer et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118643

Atmospheric Teleconnections as Potential Drivers of Ross Ice Shelf Basal Melt, Xiahou, Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2026jc024241

Giant iceberg behaviour impacts regional biogeochemical cycling in the Southern Ocean, Taylor et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03440-z

Glacier mass balance and its response to 2022 heatwaves for Kangxiwa Glacier in the eastern Pamir: insights from time-lapse photography, Xie et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-2279-2026

Global glacier mass change in 2025, Network et al., Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 10.1038/s43017-026-00777-z

Ice front positions for Greenland glaciers (2002–2021): a spatially extensive seasonal record and benchmark dataset for algorithm validation, Lu et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-2635-2026

Permafrost tipping point triggered by warming-driven loss of old carbon, Wei et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72122-3

Recent extremes in Antarctic sea ice extent modulated by ocean heat ventilation, Wilson et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2530832123

Regional extreme Antarctic sea-ice retreat linked to tropical forcing, Liang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03488-x

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Geometric amplification and suppression of ice-shelf basal melt in West Antarctica, , 10.5194/egusphere-2023-1587 8 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

Rapid Intensification and Relative Sea-Level Rise Amplify Compound Flooding From Hurricanes Harvey and Beryl, Lee et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007678

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Sustained increase in suspended sediments near global river deltas over the past two decades, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-47598-6 61 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Climate and ocean circulation changes toward a modern snowball Earth, Obase et al., arXiv (Cornell University) Open Access pdf pmh:oai:arXiv.org:2603.26700

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Ocean cavity regime shift reversed West Antarctic grounding line retreat in the late Holocene, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-47369-3 9 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Biogeochemistry of climate driven shifts in Southern Ocean primary producers, Fisher et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-22-975-2025

Bumble bee species display contrasting phenological responses to climate variation, Elshoff et al., Ecology 10.1002/ecy.70385

Climate change and non-climatic drivers jointly enhanced the NDVI of alpine grassland in the Source Region of the Yellow River (2000–2022), An et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.3389/fevo.2026.1748078

Climate change dominates blue-green water shifts in China’s Arid Northwest: Evidence from the Heihe River Basin, Ma et al., Environmental Earth Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1007/s12665-026-12940-2

Climate modes can be leveraged to forecast coral bleaching months in advance, Galochkina et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03438-7

Climate warming and drought modify galling effects on tall goldenrod, Parker et al., Oecologia Open Access pdf 10.1007/s00442-026-05889-3

Dramatic increase in ecosystem respiration causes record-breaking atmospheric CO2 growth rate in 2024, Dong et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72189-y

Drivers of Thermal Habitat Use in Turtles Studied Under Semi-Natural Conditions, White et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73325

Ecological Divergence Governs Plant Resilience to Compound Salinity–Waterlogging Stress Under Global Change, Qiu et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70875

Fire and Snow: Effects of Snowpack Variation and Wildfire on Small Mammal Dynamics in Sub-Alpine Habitats, Green et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73525

Fish and Zooplankton Co-Responses to Environmental Gradients Under Different Climate Change Scenarios, Paquette et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70845

Frequent Dry–Hot Extremes Slow the Loss of Semi-Arid Ecosystem Resilience, Shi et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70835

Gene-to-Population Level Responses to Multiple Stressors on the Rocky Shore, Wilson et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73368

Giant iceberg behaviour impacts regional biogeochemical cycling in the Southern Ocean, Taylor et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03440-z

Global Warming Amplifies Nitrogen Over Phosphorus Limitation in Aquatic Ecosystems: A Multi-Trophic Meta-Analysis, Zhong et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70832

Hyperdominant Trees Reveal Savanna Vulnerability Under Climate Change, Alvarez et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70859

Mesothermic fishes face high fuel demands and overheating risk in warming oceans, Payne et al., Science Open Access 10.1126/science.adt2981

Monitoring Coral Reef Metabolism Under Changing Oceans–Novel Insights From Seawater Stable Carbon Isotopes, Bolden et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009416

Permanence Risks to Biodiversity and Nature-Based Carbon Offsets, Dhond et al., Conservation Letters Open Access 10.1111/con4.70044

Predicted Range Shifts of Non-Native Grasses in Response to Climate Change Are Influenced by Photosynthetic Pathway: A Case Study in the Hawaiian Islands, Daehler et al., Diversity and Distributions Open Access 10.1111/ddi.70190

Projected heatwave-related excess mortality under climate change scenarios across 2288 communities in Australia: a nationwide ecological projection modelling study, Chen et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101446

Quantifying Under-Ice Phytoplankton Blooms in the Changing Arctic and Southern Oceans, Payne et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl121750

Reconsidering the role of introduced species in the climate-affected and highly invaded eastern Mediterranean, Katsanevakis et al., Conservation Biology Open Access 10.1111/cobi.70288

Temperature-Related Changes in Avian Nestling Provisioning: A Global Analysis, Molenaar et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70871

Temporal shifts in kelp forest structure and distribution largely reflect recent ocean warming trends, Salland et al., Ecography Open Access 10.1002/ecog.08280

The effect of trait choice on hybrid species distribution model projections under climate change, Delva et al., Ecography Open Access 10.1002/ecog.08355

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Mechanisms, detection and impacts of species redistributions under climate change, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00527-z 165 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

2019–2024 trends in African livestock and wetland emissions as contributors to the global methane rise, Balasus et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-4601-2026

Annually resolved atmospheric CO2 growth rate over the past nine centuries, Zhang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72220-2

Deadwood carbon pool and uncertainty estimates: effects of decay status and vegetation types, Masanja et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1706865

Diurnal versus spatial variability of greenhouse gas emissions from an anthropogenic modified German lowland river, Koschorreck et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-21-1613-2024

Drivers and implications of declining fossil fuel CO2 concentrations in Chinese cities revealed by radiocarbon measurements, Li et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-5085-2026

Hydrological Control on Soil Redox Condition and Carbon Loss of Coastal Wetland Under Sea-Level Rise, Chen et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007528

 Permafrost tipping point triggered by warming-driven loss of old carbon, Wei et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72122-3

Quantifying urban and landfill methane emissions in the United States using TROPOMI satellite data, Wang et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz9308

Soil texture prevails over vegetation change in determining soil organic carbon storage in an African savanna, Zhou et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access 10.1111/1365-2745.70307

Space-based observation of global increase in urban methane emissions from 2019–2023, Whiting et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2504211123

Tidal Wetland Soil Carbon Accumulation Rates for Coastal California, Holmquist et al., Scientific Data Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41597-026-06935-8

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
An Assessment of CO2 Storage and Sea?Air Fluxes for the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea Between 1985 and 2018, Global Biogeochemical Cycles, 10.1029/2023gb007862 23 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Achieving carbon neutrality in China via carbon capture and storage with onshore-offshore geological storage, Wen et al., Global Environmental Change 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103158

Current and potential carbon storage in soils of Chilean Patagonia, Figueroa et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1789707

Decades of increased emissions from forest-fuelled BECCS, Searchinger et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01817-8

Hydrological Mismatch in Arid Planted Shrublands: Non-Responsiveness to Precipitation Changes and Unsustainable Water Use, You et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg009715

Machine learning reveals insufficient carbon capture storage deployment to meet climate goals, Li et al., Global Environmental Change 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103157

Rethinking carbon dioxide removal: a justice-centred analysis of CDR perspectives research, Pues et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.31864323

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Public perceptions on carbon removal from focus groups in 22 countries, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-47853-w 56 cites.

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Decarbonization

Aligning offshore wind deployment with local priorities to accelerate power system decarbonization, Peng et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03533-9

Does rail transportation matter for climate outcomes? evidence from public transport systems in Asia, Choudhary et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1807635

Exponential AI growth and the physical limits of renewable energy systems, Henni & Mohammed, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115314

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Artificial intelligence-aided wind plant optimization for nationwide evaluation of land use and economic benefits of wake steering, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01516-8 39 cites.

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Geoengineering climate
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Potential of Stratospheric Aerosol Injection to Reduce the Climatic Risks of Explosive Volcanic Eruptions, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2023gl107702 8 cites.

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Aerosols

Contrail Formation Within Cirrus: Contrail Induced Perturbations and Cirrus Adjustments, Verma & Burkhardt, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd045269

Isotopic apportionment of sulfate aerosols between natural and anthropogenic sources in the outflow of South Asia, Clarke et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-5333-2026

Significant Radiative Absorption of Brown Carbon Aerosols From Residential Fuel Combustion in Developing Regions, Gao et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl121829

Substantial aircraft contrail formation at low soot emission levels, Voigt et al., Nature Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41586-026-10286-0

Climate change communications & cognition

Apocalyptic Climate Change Conspiracy Theories and Misinformation in White-Nationalist Communities Online: An Analysis of 25 Years of Discourse on Stormfront, Ophir et al., Environmental Communication  10.6084/m9.figshare.31832763.v1

Heatwaves and online climate sentiment: evidence from Chinese social media, Feng et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.32032693

How Communication of Scientific Uncertainty Affects Trust in Science—A Systematic Review, Schuster & Scheu, Risk Analysis 10.1111/risa.70233

Questioning Net Zero: a case study of the UK’s national press coverage, Painter et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2649378

The convergence of barriers: why people resist personal carbon account?, Wu et al., Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 10.1007/s11027-026-10308-2

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
“This community will grow” — little concern for future wildfires in a dry and increasingly hotter Swedish rural community, Regional Environmental Change, 10.1007/s10113-024-02227-2 10 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

A land-based pathway to carbon neutrality in rural districts, Pizzileo et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1792209

Adaptive Sowing Helps Mitigate Future Wheat Losses Globally, Qiao et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006554

Asymmetric Shifts in Precipitation Alter Nitrogen Use Strategies in Global Croplands, Cui et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70863

Enhanced weathering leads to substantial C accrual on crop macrocosms, François, Open Science Framework Open Access 10.17605/osf.io/ah75t

Food sovereignty and climate resilience through regional development assistance programs: insights from the Pacific region, Platts & Yoon, Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2654672

From heterogeneity factors to targeted policy: an application of econometrics and machine learning to Climate-Smart Agriculture adoption in maize production, Zhao et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.32016933

Hydrological Mismatch in Arid Planted Shrublands: Non-Responsiveness to Precipitation Changes and Unsustainable Water Use, You et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg009715

Increasing Population and Cropland Exposure to Human-Induced Sequential Heatwave-Downpour Events, Guan et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007442

Interactive effects of heat and drought on wheat yield change from synergistic to antagonistic as their severity increases, Chisaka et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111189

Mapping current and future coffee suitability in Peru under climate change: implications for restoration and deforestation-free development, Zabaleta-Santisteban et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1777634

Measuring carbon sequestration and climate change mitigation potential of croplands under different climatic scenarios using RothC model, Adeel et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1801916

Peak carbon sequestration rate reached on the Loess Plateau plantations, Jia et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03419-w

Phosphorus enrichment does not enlarge the predicted CO2 fertilization effect on forest carbon sequestration, Wang et al., Open Access CRIS of the University of Bern Open Access 10.48620/97012

Polish Agriculture in the Face of Climate Change: Better or Worse?, Szwed & Holka, International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70387

Positive effects of species mixing on soil carbon sequestration and water retention in global forest plantations, Huang et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70321

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rethinking the social license to operate? A theoretical exploration of its synergies with social acceptance and energy justice for a just transition, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103552 26 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Declines in Autumn Precipitation in Southwestern China and the Yangtze River Basin Linked to the Tropical Pacific and Atlantic Warmings, Deng et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0479.1

From Extreme Days to Event-Scale Persistence: Characterizing for Persistent Extreme Precipitation Across Multisource Datasets, Zhao et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100905

Green water will deviate the planetary boundary twice by the end of the 21st Century, Yang et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105482

Precipitation observing network gaps limit climate change impact assessment, Su et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10300-5

Rapid Intensification and Relative Sea-Level Rise Amplify Compound Flooding From Hurricanes Harvey and Beryl, Lee et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007678

Regional drying over the Western U.S. driven by enhanced atmospheric subsidence amid global moistening from 1980 to 2020, Ding et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-71818-w

Towards improved Euro-Mediterranean discharge simulations in regional coupled climate models: a comparative assessment of hydrologic performance, Hamitouche et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-2881-2026

Transpiration Changes With Soil Warming: Insights From a Mechanistic Model, Luo et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120046

Tropical precipitation response to anthropogenic climate change in recent decades, Joseph et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-71187-4

Twenty-First Century Projections and Trends of JJAS Rainfall Over the Greater Horn of Africa Under CMIP6 Shared Socioeconomic Pathways Scenarios, Jima et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70390

Warming and snow loss increase reliance on old groundwater in a Colorado River headwater, Siirila-Woodburn et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-01945-y

Widespread shift toward extreme dominated precipitation with pronounced trends in arid and mediterranean regions, Zaerpour et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-47708-y

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Dynamic pathway linking Pakistan flooding to East Asian heatwaves, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adk9250 62 cites.

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Climate change economics

Achieving climate justice: climate finance and income inequality in developing countries, Li et al., Open MIND Open Access pmh:10.6084/m9.figshare.31389871

Digital economy-driven decarbonization pathways: analyzing how digital economy and globalization impact climate change in the top-10 digital economies, Bashir et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1784967

Fixed climate feedback assumptions systematically underestimate policy-relevant economic risks: Implications for climate resilience, SHEN et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.04.004

Loss and damage fund and countries’ incentives to compensate for climate-related damages, Silipo et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115300

Making expertise in international environmental governance: establishing loss and damage expert groups in the UNFCCC, Johansson, Environmental Sociology Open Access 10.1080/23251042.2026.2657318

Public support for climate finance to developing countries: a contingent valuation study in South Korea, Shin & Huh, Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.32054467.v1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The relationship between CO2 emissions and macroeconomics indicators in low and high-income countries: using artificial intelligence, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-024-04880-3 18 cites.

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Climate change and the circular economy

Water–energy–food nexus in the circular economy: implications for climate mitigation, Papadas et al., Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability Open Access 10.1016/j.cosust.2026.101649

,Climate change mitigation public policy research

Aligning climate change mitigation strategies with policy objectives beyond cost savings, [authors did not process], Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02617-w

Humanitarian blind spots in Western climate change policy and discourse, Qamar & Baig, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02613-0

Regional priorities in implementing forestation and wind energy as climate solutions in facing their trade-offs, Zhang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-71674-8

Sector-specific climate policies for a green industrial transition with public support, Hansen & Koslowski, Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.31939110.v1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Modeling V2G spot market trading: The impact of charging tariffs on economic viability, Energy Policy, 10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114109 44 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Adapting to what? Regional climate policy in Russia, Andreeva, Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2643215

Assessing walkability and climate adaptive capacity in relation to urban morphology and historical development, Shartova & Mironova, GeoJournal 10.1007/s10708-026-11635-2

Centring Power in Climate Adaptation Politics Through Cross-Scale Governmentalities: A Systematic Review of High-Income Countries, Garland et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70057

Gender and climate change: differential risks and resilience among internal migrants at their urban destination in coastal Bangladesh, Brisebois & Hoffmann, Climate and Development Open Access 10.1080/17565529.2026.2651955

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Challenges for climate change adaptation in Latin America and the Caribbean region, Frontiers in Climate, 10.3389/fclim.2024.1392033 27 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

A global research and evaluation agenda for centering health and equity in city Climate Action Plans, Adlakha et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000891

Association Between Observed Climate Change and Cardiovascular Disease in the United States, Yeager et al., GeoHealth Open Access 10.1029/2025gh001588

Climate and health at a critical juncture, Lokmic-Tomkins et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000895

Global hotspots of compound extreme heat-pollution linked to local surface and atmospheric conditions, Huang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03460-9

Projected heatwave-related excess mortality under climate change scenarios across 2288 communities in Australia: a nationwide ecological projection modelling study, Chen et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101446

Weather forecasts become more important for reducing mortality as the climate warms, Shrader et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2523372123

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Mapping urban heatwaves and islands: the reverse effect of Salento’s “white cities”, Frontiers in Earth Science, 10.3389/feart.2024.1375827 4 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics

Global climate cooperation under the 2 °C goal: Mechanisms and pathways via a coupled CGE–ABM framework, Chen et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.04.002

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:

Transparency is what states make of it: whose climate priorities are reflected in the Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency framework?, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2341945 10 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human culture

Climate Influences on Intangible Cultural Heritage in China over Two Millennia and its SDG Implications, Zhang et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100543

Extreme heat and humidity reduce the recreational value of urban green spaces, WANG et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03389-z

Other

Do scientometric studies serve climate research?, Dyachenko et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2652538

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Diversity in global environmental scenario sets, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102839 6 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Climate futures require politics, Leininger et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-71711-6

Editorial: Assessing greenhouse gas emissions at city and regional levels: challenges and methods, Hu et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1839415

Why more fossil fuels won’t fix the Iran energy crisis, Wagner, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-01197-1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Human influence can explain the widespread exceptional warmth in 2023, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01391-x 19 cites.

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Book reviews

What does the future hold for the thawing Arctic?, Gehrke, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-01258-5

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Climate Change Concern Near Its High Point in U.S, Jeffery Jones, Gallup

Americans’ concern about global warming or climate change remains elevated compared with what it had been prior to 2017. At least four in 10 U.S. adults have expressed “a great deal” of concern about the matter throughout the past decade except for a 39% reading in 2023. Between 2009 and 2016, worry was typically in the low-to-mid 30% range but dropped to as low as 25% in 2011. Currently, 44% of U.S. adults worry a great deal about global warming or climate change, among the highest in the full trend since 1989, along with 46% measured in 2020 and 45% in 2017.

Utility Spending is Rising: A Review of Utility Capital Expenditure Plans, Powerlines

PowerLines found that investor-owned utilities are planning to spend at least $1.4 trillion over the next five years through 2030 on capital expenditures (CapEx)—a more than 21 percent increase over the $1.1 trillion over a five-year period outlined last year. Capital expenditures include expenses on physical assets such as power plants, transmission lines, and distribution poles and wires. This planned spending comes at a time when utility bills are rapidly rising. PowerLines analysis has shown that utility bills have increased approximately 40 percent since 2021, with no signs of slowing down. In 2025 alone, utilities requested $31 billion in rate increases, while electricity and gas became the fastest drivers of inflation. Most utilities expect high levels of capital spending to continue through 2030, a trend that promises to intensify growing affordability pressures. While these proposed spending amounts do not necessarily equate on a one-to-one basis to rate increases, utility CapEx plans are often a leading indicator of incoming rate increase requests. These growing costs could become the key driver behind utility rate increase requests over the next five years.

Delivering on Adaptation: An Assessment of International Adaptation Finance Flows, INKA Consult, DanChurchAid

The authors map and analyze international public adaptation finance, providing a better understanding for how progress toward the goal of tripling adaptation finance by 2035 can be achieved. The authors used publicly available data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Climate-Related Development Finance (CRDF) database. There have been some estimates to enable the analysis.

Measure twice, cut once: A state-level framework for effective wildfire risk mitigation, Wara et al., Milliman

The authors present a risk-based framework guiding states to focus their efforts where they are more likely to see results: the built environment, particularly existing structures and surrounding vegetation, and electricity infrastructure. The framework consists of six steps including inventory the universe at risk; establish metrics for quantifying risks and damages; determine the key physical risks to mitigate and the appropriate actions needed to address each of them; assess the cost of mitigations and potential funding source; secure stakeholder buy-in; and create an action plan prioritizing mitigation methods and targets.

2026 Heat Safety Awareness Toolkit, Shivank Jhanji, The Alliance for Heat Resilience and Health

The author developed a new toolkit to help organizations and individuals take meaningful action around the national Heat Safety Week. It is designed for anyone who wants to raise awareness about extreme heat and support policies that protect the people most at risk. The toolkit is structured around three levels of engagement: Level 1: Social Media Amplify heat safety messages during NIHHIS Heat Safety Week (May 18–22). Share content, use #HeatSafety, and help spread the word. Level 2: Proclamation Request an official proclamation from your mayor or governor recognizing Heat Safety Week, using our step-by-step guide and templates. Level 3: Legislation Explore local and state policy options to protect your community from extreme heat, with real-world examples.

Stop Greed, Build Green: A Working Class Climate Strategy, Bigger et al., Climate and Community Institute

The US is staring down deepening cost-of-living and climate crises. A framework that focuses on immediate relief, robust regulation, state capacity, and massive investment can move us towards a stable, green economy that works for everyone. Enter Green Economic Populism (GEP), an intellectual framework and political strategy for a new era of climate and economic urgency. GEP recognizes that the affordability crisis is not a temporary setback but a structural challenge that will be intensified by the climate crisis. Therefore, any attempt to solve or even to alleviate the affordability crisis must, in tandem, address the climate crisis. The Green Economic Populism has four key planks including provide immediate economic relief to the cost-of-living crisis; regulate the industries and corporations driving economic and climate catastrophe; build a public sector that works for everyone; and mobilize massive green investments in communities, infrastructure, and industry.

A Global Fleet Under Wind: Scaling Wind Propulsion for Emission Reduction, Energy Demand and Equity, Mason et al., Seas at Risk

The authors present a first-ever study showcasing the benefits of wind propulsion when scaled up to the global fleet. Drawing on 1.74 billion kilometers of real voyage data – the equivalent distance from Earth to Saturn – wind propulsion could, conservatively, reduce modelled wind ship fuel use by 6.3-9.4%, with an even greater potential if paired with other optimization measures such as weather routing, slowing down speeds, and hull cleaning. By 2050, it could deliver up to 762 million tons of cumulative CO2 savings, getting us closer to our climate targets. The technology is here, but is policy willing?

The State(s) of Distributed Solar — 2025 Update, Ingrid Behrsin, The Institute for Local Self-Reliance

Distributed solar, which can be owned by individuals, small businesses, and public entities, is turning the electricity industry upside down as individuals choose to generate their own solar power on their rooftop or through participation in community solar. In 2025, of the 36 new gigawatts of solar capacity installed, 19% (6.8 GW) was distributed throughout communities. Many individuals who cannot go solar themselves can subscribe to a community solar garden. These solar arrays offer the same electric bill stability and savings as rooftop solar, but operate remotely under a subscription model. In 25 states and the District of Columbia, there’s sufficient distributed solar to serve one in every 25 households (a state distributed solar saturation of more than 100 watts per capita). This is the same as last year, although the average watts per capita among these leading states has risen from 273 to 329, suggesting that leading states continue to progress.

Mayor Bass' Climate Action Plan for Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles

Los Angeles is working to address the growing impacts of climate change and build a safer and more sustainable city. Developed in partnership with City departments, the roadmap outlines the actions, investments, and measurable targets needed to reduce emissions, strengthen infrastructure, and protect communities. Taking action now is critical to improving public health, reducing climate risks, and ensuring a more resilient and equitable future for all Angelenos. About New Research

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