I. Climate Science

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Heatwaves are becoming more likely and more intense due to climate change, impacting sources of power generation around the world as they work to meet increased demand.

When temperatures soared past 40C in parts of Europe in June and July 2026, nuclear reactors shuttered, gas plants’ efficiency fell, wind speeds dropped and electricity networks sagged.

Yet, while all types of electricity generation are affected variously by extreme heat, some commentators are quick to point the finger at “intermittent” wind and solar, while downplaying the impact on sources such as gas or nuclear power.

Extreme heat also drives up electricity demand, as people turn on air conditioning and fridges work harder. 

For example, in France, daily electricity demand rose by almost 20% during a two-week heatwave in June 2026. 

This often leads to an increase in power prices, as generation strains and demand rises, putting a premium on electricity. 

Below, Carbon Brief – amid a slew of misleading claims – explains how key power sources cope with extreme heat. 

• Nuclear
• Gas
• Wind
• Solar
• Storage

Nuclear

The impact of heatwaves on nuclear power generation is well documented, with a plethora of headlines often accompanying record temperatures in nations that rely on the technology. 

For example, around 70% of electricity is generated by nuclear power in France, leaving it vulnerable to the impacts of heatwaves. 

During the July 2026 heatwave, three of France’s 57 nuclear reactors had to shut down. Generation was reduced at another seven, causing an almost 9% dip in power production. 

(This is a well-known phenomenon – France has seen reductions in nuclear generation due to heatwaves in 2003, 2006, 2015, 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2025.)

A similar story is true across various countries in Europe. Low river levels on the Danube have hit nuclear reactors in Romania and Hungary this summer, while a Swiss nuclear reactor shuttered due to high river temperatures.

It is nuclear plants using river water to cool their reactors that are most significantly affected by heatwaves and droughts. These make up 14% of the global fleet. Around 60 of the world’s 440 reactors use once-through river cooling, of which eight are in France.

Nuclear power plants use fission to generate heat, which is used to create steam. This steam spins the blades of a turbine that is connected to a generator to create electricity. 

Following this process, the water is cooled to allow it to be recycled back through the system as steam again. Nuclear power plants generally use water from rivers or the sea to help cool and condense this steam. 

As such, when water temperatures rise due to a heatwave, their cooling capacity is reduced and the overall efficiency of the nuclear power station is affected. Similarly, if there is less water available due to drought, they cannot be cooled as effectively. 

Michael Tadrous, a researcher at McMaster University’s DeGroote School of Business in Canada, tells Carbon Brief that the “impact [of heatwaves] is real, but it is far smaller than many headlines suggest” and that the “effect [of heat] is gradual”. He adds: 

“Warmer intake water makes a reactor slightly less efficient. [But] even an extreme 15C rise in cooling-water temperature would cost a large reactor only about 6% of its output. 

“The real pressure point during a heatwave is usually legal rather than technical. Plants return their cooling water to the river a few degrees warmer than they drew it and the law limits how warm that water may be in order to protect aquatic life.” 

Henry Preston, a spokesperson for the industry body the World Nuclear Association, adds that reactor shutdowns due to high river temperatures are “typically an automatic response to comply with regulations to protect local ecosystems, rather than a technological fault”.

He notes that in some extreme heatwaves, these regulations are waived given the “essential need for electricity and taking a proportional approach to climate risks”. 

While nuclear power plants can generally return to standard operation quickly if they have been affected by high water temperatures, drought can cause a more significant impact. 

Preston tells Carbon Brief: 

“In contrast to high river temperatures, which can quickly return to acceptable levels once a heatwave passes, low river levels can persist for much longer, if drought conditions continue. As a result, low water levels may have a more prolonged impact on plant operations than elevated water temperatures.”

This is set to be the case in the current European drought, where multiple reactors in Hungary and Romania have shut down or reduced their output due to low water levels.

The Danube is not expected to return to normal water levels for “days or even weeks as no significant rainfall is forecast”, reported the Associated Press on 3 August 2026. It said this was “push[ing] some countries in eastern Europe to the brink of energy emergency”.

According to data company Montel, on Monday 3 August, around 2.44GW or 40% of south-east Europe’s nuclear capacity was offline due to drought in the Danube.

Similarly, on Monday, as much as 12% of the French nuclear fleet was offline due to heat-related reasons, although that had been expected to drop to 7% by Tuesday. 

While heatwaves and drought can produce significant short-term effects, their impact on the availability of nuclear power across a full year is generally minimal. 

On average, heatwaves cut annual nuclear generation by 0.6% between 2003 and 2022, according to a recent study that Tadrous co-authored.

He adds that, across the whole period studied, the only time a national nuclear fleet lost more than 1% of its nuclear power over a year to heat- and drought-related curtailments was France in 2003, which lost 1.3%. 

According to an article in Forbes, for every additional degree Celsius in temperature, a nuclear power plant loses around 0.6-1% in cycle efficiency. 

However, nuclear power’s exposure to heatwaves can prove particularly challenging given the large capacity of individual plants and the central role it plays in certain nations’ energy systems. 

For example, Romania’s only nuclear power plant, at Cernavodă, is responsible for 20% of the nation’s electricity generation. Therefore, the impact of low river levels in the Danube is having a particularly acute impact on Romania’s energy security.

To minimise the impact on both energy security and costs, governments and nuclear companies are looking at a range of solutions to adapt to heatwaves.

For example, French nuclear-plant operator EDF is looking at additional cooling towers for its sites that are the most exposed to the impacts of a warming climate, reported Bloomberg recently.

Tadrous says the nuclear power industry is already adapting to heatwaves that are “more frequent and more intense”, adding:  

“France’s river-cooled fleet lost 5.5 terawatt hours (TWh) of output to the 2003 heatwave. By 2022, one of the most severe heat-and-drought summers on record, losses had fallen to 0.5TWh, a reduction of roughly 90%, as utilities upgraded cooling systems, refined operating practices and scheduled maintenance around periods of extreme heat.” 

There remain challenges for adapting nuclear power – and the wider electricity systems in which it sits – to heatwaves. However, Tadrous notes that this is less about “technical feasibility than of economic prioritisation and timely implementation”. 

Gas

Gas power plants have a reputation for being reliable and able to switch on at any moment, sometimes referred to as “firm, dispatchable” capacity.

Yet, as a type of thermal generation, they are subject to many of the same stresses during heatwaves as nuclear power. 

An article by the science advocacy organisation Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) notes that the “purported ability of gas plants to be available at all times to generate electricity, particularly when the grid needs it most, is increasingly under scrutiny” due to heatwaves.

As a matter of physics, the efficiency of gas power plants drops as temperatures rise. At 40C, a gas-fired power station can expect its capacity to be reduced by 13% and its efficiency by 7% compared to when running at 20C, according to Electric Insights. 

Dr Iain Staffell, associate professor in sustainable energy at Imperial College London, tells Carbon Brief: 

“Simple gas turbines (the kind which turn on rapidly to meet peak demand) are hit harder [than solar, for example], with their power output falling by about 10% per 10C.”

(He adds that the transmission system struggles more than electricity generation during high temperature. Power line capacity can fall by up to 16% for a 10C rise in temperature, according to a report for the UK government.)

Several types of gas power plants require cooling as part of their process, including gas steam and combined cycle turbines (CCGTs). They usually rely on nearby bodies of water for this. 

Additionally, as the UCS article notes, hot air has a lower density than cool air. As gas CCGTs rely on burning a mix of gas and air, this lower density means air takes up more space, leaving less room for gas. 

Ultimately, this means that when the air is hot, gas power plants cannot generate as much electricity as normal. 

These effects are not just theoretical. For example, across two nights in August 2020, there were rolling blackouts in California, US, as demand exceeded supply amid a heatwave.

While a number of factors contributed to the blackouts, gas plants made up around 79% of the capacity that dropped off the system on 14 August and a similar share the following day.

Amid record-breaking heat in summer 2026, gas power plants have also seen their capacity cut in the UK, France and other countries.

Dr Staffell adds that gas power stations are thought of as “reliable, because of the way we use them” in the UK. 

Whereas  wind and solar are usually used to the maximum extent possible, he says that on average, only around 40% of the gas fleet is in use at any one time. As such, even if the efficiency of one gas power plant is affected by high temperatures, “we have a lot of slack to call on more of them to run”. He adds: 

“The issue is less that they can’t deliver, but we have to pay through the nose to persuade more to turn on at critical times, adding to sky-high energy bills.”

Wind

The impact of heatwaves on wind generation is less direct than for other technologies. 

However, wind speeds often drop during heatwaves, which tend to build during periods of sustained high pressure into extreme events such as “heat domes”. 

Dr Staffell, explains to Carbon Brief: 

“The very hottest days tend to create heat domes with very low wind speeds, which directly reduces the output that windfarms can produce. Air is also less dense the hotter it is, so it carries less energy within it, so there is a double impact on wind turbines.”

High temperatures are linked to low wind speeds across three-quarters of the globe, according to one recent study, looking at data from 1980 to 2023. 

The study found that, as a result, across Australia, northern Asia and Europe, wind power decreased by an average of 30-50% during heatwaves. 

This is inconsistent globally, however, with the Amazon, the Great Plains in North America and central Africa actually seeing a slight increase in wind during high temperatures.

As such, while the effect of heatwaves on wind generation is less direct than other generation technologies, it can have a significant impact. 

In the UK in June 2026, wind generation fell to around 15% of the electricity mix due to low wind speeds, from an average for the month of about 30%, according to Octopus. 

Low wind generation during this period was a key feature of the strain on the grid experienced during this time – in particular, as demand rose amid record-high temperatures. 

On Wednesday 24 June, for example, the National Electricity System Operator (Neso) had to pay high prices to balance supply and demand. This included paying as much as £1,400 a megawatt-hour to secure around 1.7 gigawatts (GW) of imported power, nearly 20 times the average price for electricity in June 2025. 

A Neso spokesperson said in a statement: “This is due to the impact of extremely high temperatures affecting Great Britain and the continent, and low wind.”

While reduced wind generation is common during a heatwave, it is not generally viewed as a concern for energy system operators. This is due to wind following well-established seasonal patterns – it generates less power in summer than in winter – as well as being complementary to other renewable technologies, such as solar. 

Dr Chris Rosslowe, senior energy analyst for Europe at Ember, tells Carbon Brief: 

“Power systems are less reliant on wind power in the summer months and its lower-than-average output is already expected and planned for. Heatwaves often bring still, but clear conditions, highlighting the benefit of wind and solar as a duo – poor conditions for one often mean good conditions for the other.”

As such, wind power remains one of very few technologies considered “resilient” to heatwaves by the UK government.

However, this did not stop the anti-renewables Daily Mail from attempting to blame the technology for strain on the UK grid on 24 June 2026, despite its own article acknowledging that gas plants had also been forced to cut their output by 2.5GW on the day.

Solar

Another common claim seen in the media is that solar “struggles” during heatwaves, with high temperatures pushing down the technology’s efficiency. 

Yet heatwaves tend to coincide with long, cloudless days, when solar generation is reliably above average – despite the impact of high temperatures.

While hot weather does reduce the efficiency of solar cells, the effect is relatively modest – and widely understood. Each 1C of temperature rise reduces output by around 0.4-0.5%, according to a recent study. 

This is in line with an evidence review for the UK government, which suggests the performance of solar panels falls by 0.2-0.5% for every degree of heat above 25C.

Generally, however, this effect is easily outweighed by high sunlight hours during hot spells. For example, across a four-day heatwave in the UK in June 2026, solar generated 484 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity – a 46% increase over the same period a week earlier.  

Similar generation highs were seen across Europe, amid record temperatures and dangerous heat that was pushing people towards the use of air conditioning. 

Solar generated a record 52TWh across the EU in June 2026, beating the high set just the month before of 47TWh. 

In fact, solar – especially when combined with battery storage – is a complementary technology to air conditioning, given their similar seasonal patterns. Over the course of the day, demand from air conditioning and generation from solar also marry up well. 

Dr Rosslowe says: 

“Solar, battery storage and air conditioning are a highly complementary trio of technologies during heatwaves. There’s a high overlap between solar output and demand from AC.”

For example, on the hottest day of the year so far in Great Britain (the island grid serving England, Wales and Scotland), on 26 June 2026, solar surged to 13.9GW in the middle of the afternoon, as demand also hit its highest point, as shown in the chart below. 

Generation on the 26 June in Great Britain, highlighting the match between solar power (yellow) and the demand profile for electricity (blue line). Source: Neso.

Across June 2026, homes with solar panels generated the equivalent of five hours of “free” self-supplied air conditioning, according to recent analysis.  

Despite the impact of heat on solar efficiency, the technology is, therefore, well placed to bolster energy systems during heatwaves. 

Indeed, as Dr Rosslowe tells Carbon Brief, solar suppresses power prices during daylight hours. But, even though it is predictable, there are still challenges around managing the dip in solar generation as the evening sets in. This is often compounded because it coincides with the usual evening increase in demand. 

Dr Rosslowe explains: 

“Problems arise when the sun goes down, but demand for cooling remains high. In the early evening hours, when gas power typically ramps up to replace solar, we have seen prices spike to extreme levels, made worse by high international gas prices.”

Storage

Energy storage systems are increasingly key to managing the impact of heatwaves on electricity systems. 

The category of technologies is dominated by batteries, with more than 108GW of battery storage added in 2025 alone, according to the International Energy Agency. 

Already, batteries have been used to take advantage of surges in solar generation during the daytime, amid high summer temperatures. 

This is particularly useful to meet evening peaks in electricity demand, as well as the need for air conditioning overnight when temperatures do not fall. 

In a statement, Pawel Czyzak , Europe programme director at Ember, said: 

“Heatwaves will not go away – they will only get more severe in the future. Solutions that can help mitigate their impacts, such as battery storage, interconnection, demand flexibility and dynamic tariffs, should become a key part of grid planning and power market design.”

However, batteries are not without their challenges during heatwaves. Battery performance also decreases as temperatures exceed their optimal level. 

Additionally, high temperatures can accelerate the degradation of components in lithium-ion batteries, which dominate the sector. 

Analysis for the UK government found that prolonged operation at very high temperatures could – at least in theory – “overwhelm” the cooling systems built into batteries, “posing risks such as thermal runaway and explosions”. However, it noted that in practice, these cooling systems are “routinely” designed to handle temperatures of up to 45C.

(The analysis added that “developers and manufacturers have a strong understanding of risk to [battery storage systems] from high temperature and mitigate risks through regular maintenance, design improvements, and passive cooling strategies”.)

Other storage technologies also face challenges during heatwaves. For example, pumped hydro storage can be significantly impacted by drought.

Australia – which now has 4.3GW of large-scale battery storage capacity – saw its fleet of batteries and pumped hydro storage tested at the beginning of 2026, amid the most severe heatwave in years. 

Temperatures above 40C posed “challenges” to storage technologies, reported Energy Storage News, which explained that their output and operating times were reduced by the increased need for their cooling systems to operate. 

Despite these challenges, the use of battery storage is helping to spread the ability of renewables to meet electricity demand during heatwaves. For example, a combination of solar and battery energy storage “kept the lights on” in California amid a heatwave in 2024. 

By storing abundant power during the day, it can be discharged during evening peaks, helping to minimise generation constraints and thereby keep power prices down. 

Dr Rosslowe says: 

“The extreme price spikes that we witness during heatwaves are a blaring signal for more power system flexibility. That could come from battery storage, demand response, or increased interconnection between countries or regions.”

Related Chart: The rise, fall and rise of UK nuclear power over eight decades 13.06.2025 Energy UK spending review 2025: Key climate and energy announcements 11.06.2025 Nuclear Q&A: How China is using nuclear power to reduce its carbon emissions 14.08.2023 China policy The Carbon Brief Profile: Russia 22.09.2022 Coal

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This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

Jim Hansen and I have spent much of this year making seemingly opposite predictions about where 2026 will end up in the global temperature record books. He has argued since the spring that 2026 will be the warmest year on record; I have made the case that it is more likely than not to end up in second place. And in a recent post he framed our disagreement in memorably equine terms:

Based on this scientific evidence, we expect that when the horse race comes down the stretch, in November and December of this year, we will be riding a thoroughbred, a strong young horse, and Zeke will be atop a fading old nag.

For the record, I am the fading old nag in this metaphor. I have been called worse.

But here is the fun part: when the race comes down the final stretch at the end of 2026, there is a good chance we will both be declared winners. Hansen’s prediction is about NASA’s GISTEMP record specifically. Mine is about the average across the major surface temperature datasets. And when I run my own forecast model separately on each of six datasets, it gives GISTEMP a ~65% chance of a new 2026 record even as the multi-dataset average only has a ~32% chance and is likely to come in second place.

First, where my forecast stands. Back in December I projected 2026 at 1.41C (1.27C to 1.55C) above preindustrial levels, and in early June I revised that up to 1.46C (1.36C to 1.59C) as forecast models converged on a doozy of an El Niño developing in the latter half of the year. Hansen, via the Washington Post, cited my June estimate of a 26.6% chance that 2026 sets a new record.

That number has continued to creep up. With observations through June and the latest El Niño forecast ensemble, my current central estimate for 2026 is 1.50C (1.44C to 1.57C) above the 1850-1900 baseline in the average of six surface temperature datasets.1 That translates into a ~32% chance that 2026 beats 2024’s record, a ~66% chance it comes in second, and almost no chance (<2%) it falls to third or below. The figure below shows where those projections sit against the observational record.

Observed annual global mean surface temperature (average of GISTEMP, HadCRUT5, NOAA GlobalTemp, Berkeley Earth, JRA-3Q, and ERA5; °C relative to 1850–1900) and the 2026 and 2027 forecast medians with 25–75% and 5–95% Monte Carlo ranges, alongside the 2024 record (dashed) and the 1.5C level (dotted). Forecast updated 30 July 2026 with observations through June and the July-initialized multi-model El Niño ensemble.

Here we see 2026 sitting just below the 2024 record line, with 2027 well above it. So the horse race (to continue the metaphor) is drifting in Hansen’s direction, though still short of the finish line. In the average of all the groups reporting global surface temperatures, second warmest remains my central call for 2026.

It is worth being clear about why my odds keep rising, because it is not that 2026 has been running unexpectedly hot. Year-to-date temperatures have actually drifted slightly down since March (a January-June mean of 1.39C, versus 1.41C for January-March). What changed is the El Niño forecast. To show this, I reran my forecast as it would have looked with each month’s information: that month’s multi-model El Niño plume plus observations through that month.

Left: probability that 2026 exceeds the 2024 record in the six-dataset composite, recomputed at each monthly forecast vintage (that month’s multi-model El Niño forecast plume plus year-to-date observations through that month). Right: additive decomposition of the March-to-now rise into an observations step (March plume held fixed, observations updated through June) and an El Niño forecast step (July plume swapped in). Updated 30 July 2026.

The odds of a 2026 record in the composite have risen from ~7% at the March vintage to ~35% now,2 and the decomposition on the right shows that the strengthening El Niño forecast accounts for ~84% of that rise; incoming observations contributed just over 4 points. In other words, my drift toward Hansen’s position is not the 2026 observations through June being particularly extraordinary. It is the ENSO models converging on an unprecedentedly large event. If that El Niño underdelivers, these odds will sag back down. If it holds, the odds will likely hold as well. But it seems unlikely (I hope!) that we see continued strengthening of the El Niño forecast beyond what already would blow past the prior record by a “truly mind-numbing margin”.

But “the warmest year on record” is not a single number that nature hands us; it depends on whose record you check. Hansen’s prediction is specifically about GISTEMP. So a natural question is: what does my model say if I fit it to each dataset individually, using each dataset’s own 2024 record as the bar to clear? The figure below shows the result for six datasets: the four traditional surface station products (GISTEMP, HadCRUT5, NOAA GlobalTemp, and Berkeley Earth) and two reanalysis products (Copernicus/ERA5 and JRA-3Q).

Probability that 2026 exceeds each dataset’s own 2024 record, from the same statistical forecast model (trend, ENSO, and observed 2026 months) fit to each of six datasets separately, with 10,000 Monte Carlo draws sampling a 14-model El Niño forecast ensemble. Observations through June 2026 (May for HadCRUT5). Updated 30 July 2026.

The same model, fed the same El Niño forecast, gives 2026 a ~65% chance of a record in GISTEMP and a ~66% chance in Berkeley Earth,3 but only ~35% in HadCRUT5, ~24% in NOAA, ~13% in ERA5, and ~9% in JRA-3Q. Conveniently, the average across the six (~35%) lands nearly on the blended estimate (32%), which is a reassuring consistency check.

Why the spread? It is not that the datasets disagree much about how warm 2026 will be; the projections are quite similar. They disagree about how high the bar is. The reanalysis products (ERA5 and JRA-3Q) ran exceptionally hot during the 2023-2024 event, so their 2024 records sit further above their long-term trend lines and are harder to beat. GISTEMP’s 2026 median projection sits ~0.02C above its 2024 record, while ERA5’s sits ~0.05C below its own and JRA-3Q’s ~0.07C below. When the margin is a few hundredths of a degree, structural differences between datasets could end up deciding the race.

So Hansen predicting a GISTEMP record and me predicting second warmest in the multi-dataset average are, oddly, compatible bets. If 2026 sets a record in GISTEMP but not in the dataset average (or in ERA5), expect a flurry of confused headlines in January as people try and explain how its the warmest or second warmest year depending on what dataset you look at.

I should concede the larger point plainly: Hansen made this call earlier and more confidently than I did, and the odds have moved steadily his way since. If 2026 ends up warmest across the board, he won outright, and a 32% chance is the kind of thing that happens all the time. I’d also gently note that a probabilistic forecast of “second warmest, with a one-in-three chance of a record” is a difficult thing to lose spectacularly.

What our agreement on 2026 does not settle is the more consequential disagreement about why. Hansen’s forecast rests on a specific physical story: his argument for a climate sensitivity of 4-5C per doubled CO2, a large forcing boost from falling aerosols, and a warming rate that has roughly doubled.4 My forecast is simpler: it just relies on the long-term trend, the state of ENSO, and the year-to-date observations and ends up in more or less the same place. When a statistical model based on the historical trend and an El Niño forecast lands on essentially the same 2027 number as Hansen (more on that in a moment), it tells you that a single warm year, or even two, cannot distinguish between “very rapid acceleration driven by aerosols and high sensitivity” and “the trend and more modest acceleration plus a very strong El Niño.” That debate will be settled by energy balance observations and the post-El-Niño years, not by whether 2026 clears 2024 by 0.03C in one dataset.

And on 2027 there will be no horse race at all: my model puts the odds of a new record next year at ~91%. Here I should give Hansen his due on a second count. Back in December he was already predicting a ~1.7C 2027, at a time when my own central estimate was 1.57C. Seven months and many rounds of strengthening El Niño forecasts later, my regression has drifted up to 1.70C (1.48C to 1.93C): essentially the number he wrote down at the start.

Ultimately both probabilistic forecasts and confident predictions can be validated by the same outcome, and the interesting scientific disagreement (how fast is warming accelerating, and why) will outlive whatever the December photo finish shows. Either way we are in for quite a wild climate ride in both the latter half of 2026 and 2027 due to a combination of accelerating warming and a super El Niño event.

1 The blended forecast uses the average of GISTEMP, HadCRUT5, NOAA GlobalTemp, Berkeley Earth, JRA-3Q, and ERA5, each rebaselined to 1850-1900 using its own pre-1900 offset. The model regresses annual temperature on the year, the prior year’s anomaly, observed and forecast ENSO conditions, the year-to-date anomaly, and the latest monthly value, trained on 1950-2025 excluding major volcanic years, with 10,000 Monte Carlo draws sampling both regression uncertainty and a ~650-member multi-model El Niño forecast ensemble. The headline numbers use a relative (RONI-style) ENSO index; using the raw ONI instead gives a slightly warmer 1.51C and a 37% record chance, because the forecast El Niño is strong enough to sit beyond the range of the historical ONI training data.

2 This figure only uses 13 of the 14 El Niño models in the live ensemble as the 14th (SINTEX-F) was only added to the tracker in June and cannot be used for the retrospective calculations, which is why it puts today’s odds at ~35% rather than the headline ~32%.

3 It's worth noting that my odds for Berkeley Earth are notably higher than those provided (~12%) in the official Berkeley Earth update. This is largely due to my statistical model including the ENSO predictions for the remainder of the year which does not improve the fit much for most years (start-of-year ENSO conditions tend to be a much stronger predictor) but does matter in the rare years where strong El Nino events are forming like 1997, 2015, 2023, and 2026.

4 It's worth noting that Hansen’s estimate of ECS is well within our very likely uncertainty range of 2C to 5C per doubling CO2 in the IPCC AR6. And there has been some compelling evidence in recent years that ECS might be higher, though I’d personally give a central estimate closer to 3.5C than Hansen’s ~4.5C, as well as a new preprint suggesting forcing from the 2020 IMO low sulfur shipping fuel regulations may end up somewhere between Hansen’s high and my low-end estimate.

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When carbon dioxide (CO2) is released from a factory or power plant, the gas can be captured and permanently stored underground, preventing it from driving climate change.

This is the idea underpinning carbon capture and storage (CCS), a technology that is at the heart of many nations’ net-zero plans.

Influential organisations, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), describe CCS as “critical” for cutting emissions from key sectors – and for helping to avoid dangerous global warming.

In particular, capturing CO2 is seen as one of the only viable options for decarbonising some of the world’s highest-emitting industries, such as cement production.

The UK, for example, has committed to investing as much as £21.7bn over the coming decades in its nascent CCS industry, as part of the nation’s net-zero strategy.

Yet, in the UK and elsewhere, there has been a backlash against plans for CCS.

Citing high costs, ties to the fossil-fuel industry and a “history of poor performance”, critics describe CCS as a “dangerous distraction” or a “false climate solution”. 

Time and again, the outlook for the roll-out of CCS has been scaled back, as the technology has failed to deliver as quickly as expected – and as policy support has wavered.

Furthermore, critics state that the technology remains “unproven” on the scale required to make a meaningful impact on global emissions.

In this Q&A, Carbon Brief explores the role CCS is expected to play in achieving net-zero, its record to date and the reasons it has been criticised, using the UK as an example.

• What is CCS?
• How much CCS capacity has been built so far?
• What role is CCS expected to play in reaching net-zero?
• Why is CCS controversial?
• What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?

Article Contents Expand menu

• What is CCS?
• How much CCS capacity has been built so far?
• What role is CCS expected to play in reaching net-zero?
• Why is CCS controversial?
• What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?

What is CCS?

CCS involves capturing CO2 emissions released from a large source, such as a gas power plant or a cement factory.

The CO2 is separated from the facility’s exhaust stream, generally using a chemical solvent, before being compressed into a liquid and transported via pipeline or vehicle. The CO2 is then stored by injecting it into underground reservoirs, such as depleted oil fields or saline aquifers.

The term “CCUS” is sometimes also used, referring to the “utilisation” of CO2 to make products, including fertilisers, fuels or building materials. Such uses do not necessarily lead to permanent emissions cuts, as the CO2 can end up later being released back into the atmosphere. 

(“CCS” is used in this Q&A, unless quoting another organisation that specifically refers to “CCUS”.)

The infographic below shows the stages of capturing CO2 and transporting it to be either stored or used in other applications.

Infographic adapted by Carbon Brief from the IEA.

Carbon capture technology was originally rolled out at US and Canadian oil wells in the early 1970s as a way to achieve “enhanced oil recovery”. This involves injecting captured CO2 into depleted wells – a process that stores CO2, but also helps to extract more oil.

This remains, by far, the most significant end use for captured CO2 worldwide, with around three-quarters of it used for this purpose. 

Moreover, most of the CO2 currently captured is a by-product of gas purification – the process by which fossil fuels such as methane are separated from other, unwanted substances. Selling this CO2 can make such gas projects more economically viable.

Therefore, as shown in the chart below, which is based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data, the majority of CO2 that is both captured and used today helps the fossil-fuel industry to extract and sell more oil and gas.

CCS was first proposed as a way to deal with CO2 emissions in a 1976 academic article, which imagined injecting the captured gas into the ocean.

It is only since the early 2000s that CCS has gained traction as a proposed climate solution, with a 2005 “special report” by the IPCC exploring the topic. At that time, the authors note there were just three small-scale projects trying to capture and permanently store CO2.

Installing CCS at factories or power plants and permanently storing the CO2 would mean that, in theory, such facilities could continue using fossil fuels without contributing to climate change. 

Such applications are often mentioned alongside two related technologies, both of which could be used to “suck” CO2 out of the atmosphere and, thus, deliver “negative emissions”.

One is bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Crops absorb CO2 as they grow and BECCS  involves a power plant burning these crops, then storing the resulting CO2. 

The other technology is direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS). 

These technologies are classed as “CO2 removal”, as they involve absorbing CO2 from the atmosphere using plants or machines and then storing it permanently.

By contrast, CCS installed at a factory is considered a way to avoid CO2 emitted by that specific facility from entering the atmosphere. This Q&A focuses on such applications, which account for the vast majority of existing and planned CCS.

First mention in the academic literature of capturing and storing CO2 for climate change mitigation. Source: Marchetti, C. (1977). How much CCS capacity has been built so far?

As of February 2026, there were a total of 75 operational CCS projects around the world. As noted above, almost all of them are at fossil-fuel extraction and processing sites, according to the IEA’s database. 

Together, these projects capture 62.5m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) each year. This is equivalent to the annual greenhouse gas emissions of Ecuador.

(This compares with the 22 CCS projects, promising to capture 40MtCO2 annually, that were operational or under construction as of 2014.)

As the chart below shows, the amount of CO2 currently being captured and stored is a tiny fraction of the total emissions from fossil-fuel use.

“CO2 captured and stored” includes all projects that capture CO2 and use it for enhanced oil recovery, store it permanently underground or use it “with significant climate benefits”, according to the IEA.

In a 2020 report, the IEA explained that the “story of CCUS has largely been one of unmet expectations: its potential to mitigate climate change has been recognised for decades, but deployment has been slow”.

A wave of interest in CCS in the 2000s, largely from countries in Europe and North America, focused on enabling coal power plants to continue operating with lower emissions. 

This interest largely petered out, as plummeting renewable energy costs weakened the case for coal plants with CCS. Today, there are only seven operating CCS-coal plants worldwide – five in China, one in the US and one in Canada.

Yet the Paris Agreement in 2015 – and the national net-zero targets that followed – highlighted the need for deep emissions cuts in sectors that previously expected to continue emitting for decades. This, once again, has fuelled interest in the use of CCS.

In recent years, there has also been growing interest in producing low-carbon “blue” hydrogen from gas with CCS. 

Hydrogen is widely seen as key for decarbonising certain sectors – particularly in industry – but analyses suggest that it may be difficult to make sufficient “green” hydrogen using renewable power on the timescales required.

As the map below shows, most CCS capacity is based in the US and Canada, with other major fossil-fuel producers such as Norway, Brazil and the Gulf states also contributing.

Projects listed in the IEA CCUS database as split between two countries are divided equally between them. This includes projects that only store CO2, but it excludes projects that only transport CO2. DACCS projects are excluded.

A surge of projects have entered the global CCS pipeline in recent years. According to the IEA, 93.7MtCO2 of capture or storage capacity is under construction as of February 2026 and another 1,279.6MtCO2 is in the “planning” stages.

“Planned” projects include any initiative at early concept, feasibility or engineering study stages and the industry has a long history of projects being cancelled or delayed. 

Nevertheless, this pipeline of projects could lead to a large expansion of facilities dedicated to permanent CO2 storage that does not involve extracting more oil.

The planned projects – if they are realised – would also include significant growth in sectors where CCS is virtually non-existent, such as steel, hydrogen and cement production, as shown in the chart below.

A project is considered “under construction” by the IEA if a final investment decision has been announced and construction is on-going or imminent. A project is considered “planned” if it is at concept, feasibility or engineering study stage. What role is CCS expected to play in reaching net-zero?

It will be impossible to stop dangerous climate change unless the world reaches net-zero emissions, according to the IPCC. The amount of global warming – and whether the Paris Agreement temperature target can be met – depends on when net-zero is reached.

Many global pathways that have been set out for achieving net-zero, including a majority of the IPCC-assessed pathways where global warming is limited to 1.5C, rely on the use of CCS at fossil-fuel plants and industrial sites.

“These models have been quite instrumental in bringing CCS back onto the agenda,” Lina Lefstad, an ecological economist at Lund University, tells Carbon Brief. 

Influential organisations relying on CCS in their net-zero scenarios range from the  International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) through to the oil company Shell. The IEA has stated that net-zero would be “virtually impossible” without CCS.

These scenarios often include 10s to 100s of times more CCS capacity being built in the coming decades. The IEA includes 1.7GtCO2 being captured by 2035 in its net-zero scenario – nearly 30 times more than is captured today.

(Some of the much higher numbers in scenarios assessed by the IPCC have been dismissed by experts as implausible, especially given the slow rollout of CCS to date.)

When considering CCS for both emissions cuts and removals, Dr Jennifer Roberts, a researcher at the University of Strathclyde and deputy director at the UK Carbon Capture and Storage Research Centre (UKCCSRC), tells Carbon Brief the situation is clear:

“From an IPCC climate modelling perspective…reaching net-zero without CCS is far more expensive, disruptive and potentially out of reach.”

This does not mean that it would be impossible to reach net-zero without using CCS. However, net-zero scenarios that use little or no CCS rely on dramatic changes elsewhere, such as much lower global energy demand.

Net-zero scenarios often include a crucial role for CCS in “hard-to-abate” sectors, referring to activities that lack available, low-cost options to fully decarbonise. In particular, CCS is widely seen as vital for decarbonising parts of heavy industry. 

The IPCC sixth assessment report (AR6) summary for policymakers calls CCS a “critical mitigation option” for some sectors, including cement and chemicals. The technical summary of the AR6 Working Group III report says that “CCS will be required to mitigate remaining CO2” in industrial sectors.

The IEA describes CCS as “virtually the only technology” that can significantly cut cement emissions, which account for around 7% of the global total. (Much of this CO2 comes from chemical processes, meaning it would still be released if the industry was electrified.)

Yet, the understanding of “hard-to-abate” emissions is changing, as alternatives to CCS become cheaper and increasingly available. As a result, CCS has become a less attractive option in some sectors, as well as being seen as less vital in some others.

Carbon Brief analysis shows that the IEA has reduced its outlook for CCS in the power sector by a third, compared to its expectations in 2021, as the chart below shows. 

This reflects both slow progress in deploying CCS and rapid cost reductions in renewables, which make running gas or coal power plants less attractive.

Data comes from IEA world energy outlooks between 2021-2025.

(Even prior to this adjustment, the IEA’s net-zero scenario was already at the lower end of CCS use, compared to those assessed by the IPCC.)

This declining role for CCS in the power sector would mean its use is more concentrated in industry. 

Industrial sectors – particularly cement, steel and chemicals – account for 60% of the CO2 captured in 2050 under the IEA’s net-zero scenario, as shown in the figure below. The remaining 40% is roughly split between electricity generation and blue hydrogen production.

Climate NGOs Bellona and E3G have stressed that with “limited public funding, infrastructure constraints and political attention, prioritisation is essential” for CCS. Their “CCS ladder” places CCS in cement and lime production at the top – with the highest “climate value” – while power CCS has “low and decreasing value”.

Despite this, the focus of the CCS sector so far has not been in heavy industry, which represents less than 10% of announced capacity.

Another key consideration is the role governments are assigning to CCS in their national net-zero strategies. 

One study found that 33 of the 67 long-term net-zero strategies submitted to the UN by governments, with a further 10 indicating some potential use. 

It concluded that high-income countries that produce a lot of oil and gas, such as Canada and Norway, showed the “firmest commitment” to capturing and storing CO2.

Nations have agreed at UN climate talks to “phase down” coal power that is “unabated”. This is generally understood to mean coal power without CCS – leaving space to develop “abated” coal plants. This could allow China, for example, to continue using its sizable coal fleet with CCS to reduce emissions.

Why is CCS controversial?

Despite its role in many net-zero scenarios, CCS remains a highly contested technology. 

It has long been framed in some circles as a “false solution” to climate change, that is backed and lobbied for by fossil-fuel companies to “delay” the clean-energy transition. 

Critics argue that CCS is expensive – especially compared to increasingly cheap wind and solar power – in part because it significantly increases the energy requirements of a facility. 

A University of Oxford working paper published in 2023 concluded that a “low-CCS” pathway to net-zero emissions would cost around $1tn less a year compared to a “high-CCS” pathway. The researchers stated that “no evidence is found for technological learning or associated cost reductions” in the development of CCS to date. 

(They added that CCS is “still likely necessary” for cement and chemical production.)

Pointing to the limited progress in scaling up the technology so far, some question whether CCS can play the role envisaged in many net-zero scenarios.

Responding to the IPCC’s most recent report, for example, the Centre for International Environmental Law stated that “abated fossil fuels only exist in models”. 

Proponents of CCS contest the notion that CCS is “untested” or “unreliable”, pointing to some projects that have been operating for many years. Moreover, most of the component parts that make up a working CCS project are in wide use for other purposes.

Yet, another key criticism levelled at CCS projects is that they simply do not capture enough CO2, diminishing their role as a climate solution.

There is a widespread view that CCS projects should aim to capture at least 90% of the CO2 being emitted. UK guidelines are among those targeting a higher capture rate of 95%.

The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) has assessed the performance of existing projects. Its 2023 analysis is shown in the chart below.

The thinktank concluded that, in reality, most existing CCS projects are far below such capture rates, meaning they continue to emit significant amounts of CO2. (Capture is the most expensive part of the CCS process.)

Based on data analysed by IEEFA from the following projects: Petra Nova and Boundary Dam coal plants, US and Canada; Terrell, Lost Cabin, Shute Creek and Century Plant gas processing facilities, US, and Gorgon, Australia; Quest, Air Liquide and Air Products hydrogen production projects, US and Canada; Great Plains Synfuel and Coffeyville gasification projects, US; Enid and PCS Nitrogen fertiliser projects, US; Bonanza Bio Energy ethanol production, US; and Emirates Steel/Al Reyadah steel project, United Arab Emirates. 

Once the CO2 is captured, it must be stored. The IPCC says there is ample global geological storage available for CO2. It also says that, as long as sites are “appropriately selected and managed”, CO2 “can be permanently isolated from the atmosphere”.

Nevertheless, critics have noted that even relatively low rates of leakage along the transportation and storage chain could have a big climate impact when deployed at scale.

The continued use of gas in gas-CCS or blue hydrogen projects also brings risks of upstream emissions more broadly, such as methane leaks. (See: What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?)

Considering these factors, in 2023 Climate Analytics assessed a “high CCS pathway” from the IPCC database. It concluded that if CO2 was captured at rates seen in existing facilities – around 50% – and upstream emissions remain high, CCS use could see an extra 86GtCO2e emitted by 2050. 

The report found that even the IEA’s net-zero scenario, which relies on “more limited fossil CCS use”, could result in an additional 16GtCO2e due to “underperforming fossil CCS”.

All of this calls into question many uses of CCS, according to Andrew Reid, energy finance analyst at IEEFA: “Is there really any point in trying to decarbonise fossil fuels, which comes with significant technical, timing and additional cost risk?” Reid tells Carbon Brief:

“As for cement and chemicals, again, there are alternatives, but these are nascent and expensive. CCS may be a solution here and if investment is going to be made in any area, it most likely should be these.”

On the other hand, CCS advocates argue that gas, for example, is likely to be an important, “dispatchable” part of many electricity systems as nations transition to clean energy.

Prof Stuart Haszeldine, a CCS researcher at the University of Edinburgh, explains this position to Carbon Brief:

“If we’re going to burn gas, then we should be fitting CCS on that…Otherwise we’re just going to say it’s OK for us to burn lots of gas and carry on emitting.”

There is also a line of argument referred to – sometimes pejoratively – as “techno-optimism”, which often stresses CCS as a core climate solution. This was exemplified by a controversial report on climate action in 2025 by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (TBI), in which the former UK prime minister wrote that CCS should be “at the centre of the battle”.

This diverges from the IPCC’s conclusion that, while CCS will likely have a role in achieving net-zero emissions, its contribution will be dwarfed by that of renewables.

CCS also attracts criticism due to its connection to the fossil-fuel industry. Dr Jen Roberts at the UKCCSRC tells Carbon Brief that she agrees these links make for complicated messaging:

“CCS is critical for net-zero, but is intrinsically tied with an industry sector that is climate polluting and historically anti-climate lobbying.”

Roberts says careful policymaking, including the development of business models and standards, can support CCS in hard-to-abate sectors where it is most needed. 

Some experts suggest that governments should require companies to capture and store their emissions under the “polluter pays” principle.

Roberts also notes that fossil-fuel companies have the experience and the workforce needed to scale up CCS. “Oil and gas companies can evidence a track record in multi-million or billion-dollar subsurface engineering projects,” Roberts adds.

Despite the fossil-fuel industry’s apparent support for CCS, one 2021 study co-authored by Haszeldine noted that they had, in fact, invested relatively small amounts in the technology, compared to renewables and nature-based solutions.

Lina Lefstad at Lund University questions whether the fossil-fuel industry stands to benefit financially through the deployment of CCS as much as some critics imply:

“People seem really worried that the fossil-fuel industry is going to come out the winner again, but if that was the case I think we would have large-scale CCS by now.”

What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?

The UK government has committed “up to” £21.7bn of funding over 25 years to support the nation’s first five CCS projects and to make the nation an “early leader” in the sector.

This package, supported by both the former Conservative and current Labour governments, is intended to help create “clusters” of connected facilities across industrial areas of the UK.

Some have suggested that this represents a large pot of government spending, which could be raided to support more pressing priorities. Indeed, media coverage often points to CCS funding as a potential target for government cuts, or as a way to boost, say, military spending.

This is in spite of the fact that three quarters of the funding is expected to come from levies on consumers, rather than government budgets.

The first two CCS clusters, which are currently set to be deployed in the late-2020s, are the East Coast Cluster in north-east England and HyNet in north-west England and north Wales. The second two, scheduled for around 2030, are Acorn in north-east Scotland and Viking in the Humber.

The projects are expected to include blue-hydrogen production, gas power with CCS and industrial uses. The CO2 captured would be pumped into offshore saline aquifers and depleted gas fields.

Former UK energy secretary Ed Miliband has stated that CCS will “unlock” hard-to-abate sectors and play an “important role” in achieving clean power by 2030.

This position is supported by the UK government’s climate advisors at the Climate Change Committee (CCC), who have consistently stressed that CCS is “essential” for net-zero. 

In the CCC’s most recent net-zero pathway, released as part of its seventh carbon budget advice, CCS contributes 2% of emissions cuts in 2030 and 8% in 2050, as shown in the chart below. (If CO2 removals using BECCS are included, this increases to 15% in 2050.)

The CCC maintains that it “cannot see a route to net-zero that does not include CCS”. Nevertheless, the committee has downgraded its expectations for CCS in recent years. 

Between the CCC’s sixth and seventh carbon budget advice, its recommendations for power and industry CCS capacity dropped from 46MtCO2 to 41MtCO2. 

Dr Jamie Tarlton, the committee’s CCS lead, addressed this at a conference in March 2025, stating that it was “partly because we see more opportunities for decarbonising the other sectors and reducing those residual emissions than we saw five years ago”.

More recently, the UK government also scaled back its expectations for industrial CCS in its latest carbon budget delivery plan for 2035, bringing it more in line with the CCC’s net-zero pathway. It still describes CCS as “part of the most cost-effective route to net-zero”.

The UK’s CCS plans have drawn criticism. A September 2024 letter to Miliband signed by 22 scientists and activists expressed concern about “locking the UK into a fossil-fuel based pathway”. 

They note that the gas-CCS power plants and blue hydrogen facilities initially backed by the government would leave the UK reliant on gas imports, as North Sea production declines. This could be expensive and result in “upstream” emissions due to methane leaks.

(At the end of 2025, BP withdrew its involvement in one of the blue hydrogen facilities at the Teesside site. A data centre is planned for the site instead.)

Net Zero Teesside, a gas-CCS power plant in the East Coast Cluster run by BP and Equinor, has been unsuccessfully challenged in court over its emissions savings. The challenge was based on the idea that potential upstream emissions could significantly exceed any emissions cuts from CCS use.

According to a report by Carbon Tracker, the lifecycle emissions of Net Zero Teesside gas-CCS power plant would depend heavily on where it sources its fuel.

The project could cut emissions by around three-quarters, relative to an unabated gas plant, says the report. But it adds that if the plant relies on imported gas with high upstream emissions, then it might only cut emissions by a quarter.

(Most of the upstream emissions from imported gas would be released overseas, meaning they would not be counted in the UK’s official emissions inventory.)

Besides driving “gas dependence” in the UK, the government’s approach has drawn criticism for failing to ensure that CCS is prioritised in the industries that are hardest to decarbonise.

A report by the Public Accounts Committee in early 2025 took aim at the government’s cluster-based approach. It said this “does not ensure that financial support for CCUS is directed at the sectors which will need it most” – highlighting cement production.

(Of the CO2 captured in the CCC’s net-zero pathway in 2050, around 40% is in the industrial and waste sectors, while the remaining 60% is from gas power plants and the production of fuels such as hydrogen.)

Dr Andrew Boswell, the energy analyst who challenged Net Zero Teesside in court, says he is “more nuanced” when it comes to applications of CCS that do not involve gas. “There may be a case for cement, lime and waste…However, the case is unproven,” he tells Carbon Brief.

The Public Accounts Committee report also criticised the “high-risk” approach of using public funds for CCS projects, as well as slow progress in developing the technology. 

Enrique Cornejo, head of energy policy at fossil-fuel trade body Offshore Energies UK, tells Carbon Brief that the UK needs to maintain momentum and deploy CCS in order to “achieve economies of scale” and to reduce the cost of the technology more broadly:

“It is indeed necessary to streamline the cluster sequencing process to ensure that emitters in sectors such as cement have a clear route to the CCS market.”

related Q&A: What do China’s provincial five-year plans say about climate and energy? 18.06.2026 China policy Analysis: China’s CO2 climbs 2% in early 2026 due to ‘wasted’ wind and solar 04.06.2026 Coal Q&A: What does India’s new Paris Agreement pledge mean for climate action? 27.03.2026 Emissions Analysis: India’s CO2 emissions in 2025 grew at slowest rate in two decades 26.03.2026 Emissions

The post Q&A: Does the world need ‘carbon capture and storage’ to reach net-zero? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 26, 2026 thru Sat, August 1, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (7 articles)

• State of the climate: Rapidly developing El Niño raises chance of record-warm 2026 Chances of a record setting 2026 El Niño rapidly increase, taking us closer to an important warming threshold. Carbon Brief, Zeke Hausfather, Jul 24, 2026.
• Why is Germany building roads for yesterday's climate? As the Autobahn buckles under heat waves, Germany is still paving roads for a past climate. Engineers know how to fix that — so what's the holdup? DW, Tim Schauenberg, Jul 28, 2026.
• Summer of Heat, Fires and Storms Is a Reckoning for Europe on Climate Europe is experiencing some of its biggest fires and highest temperatures ever; residents are fleeing, leaders are struggling to respond and “it will get worse,” one climate expert said. NYT, Mark Landler and Chico Harlan, Jul 29, 2026.
• `The heat took him from me`: India`s death toll rises amid escalating heat crisis As extreme heat claims the lives of workers in India’s poorest areas, many fear the true mortality rate is being dangerously undercounted. The Guardian, Hannah Ellis-Petersen and Aakash Hassan, Jul 29, 2026.
• 4 things to know about cyclospora and climate change A fragile food system, uneven public health messaging, and global warming are all working to supercharge the parasite’s spread. Grist, Frida Garza, Jul 30, 2026.
• `Was this heatwave caused by climate change?` - we`re asking the wrong question The question is not whether climate change caused the heatwave, but how much hotter and more dangerous heatwaves have become because greenhouse gases, primarily from burning fossil fuels, have accumulated in the atmosphere. The Conversation, Prof. Haley J. Fowler & Prof. Ed Hawkins, Jul 31, 2026.
• Everything on fire DrGilbz on Youtube, Ella Gilbert, July 31, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (6 articles)

• Human-driven climate change largely responsible for last 50 years of worsening fire weather in Western North America, new study shows Just as detectives can find literal fingerprints at a crime scene, scientists can detect human and natural ‘fingerprints’ in climate and meteorological data like temperature, precipitation, and relative humidity— all factors that can influence fire behavior. Science Feedback, Science Feedback team, May 8, 2025.
• How do scientists know if climate change made a heat wave, extreme storm or wildfire worse? When a devastating heat wave, hurricane, flood or wildfire strikes, people often want to know: How much did human-caused climate change influence this event, if at all? The Conversation, Kevin T. Smiley, Deepti Singh, Jennifer Marlon, Jim Hurrell, Jul 24, 2026.
• Low-Level Cloud Loss Amplifies Global Warming A new study adds weight to concerns over the positive feedback effects of clouds on global warming. CalTech, Katie Neith, Jul 24, 2026.
• Canopy-mediated climate feedbacks in the boreal continuous permafrost zone A vast amount of carbon locked up in permafrost is protected by a thin and increasingly threatened layer of vegetation. Nature Climate Change, M. Langer, Jul 27, 2026.
• Rising CO2 Alters Upper Atmosphere Response to Stratosphere Sudden Warming A whole-atmosphere model simulation shows that rising CO2 changes how the upper atmosphere and ionosphere respond to a sudden stratospheric warming (SSW), with implications for future space weather.? Eos, Huixin Liu, Jul 29, 2026.
• Why Hansen may end up being right about 2026 Whether 2026 sets a new record is increasingly likely to be a split decision between different groups The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Jul 30, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (3 articles)

• American Nero: Why Trump is trying to burn down the National Academy of Sciences The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Benjamin Santer, July 26, 2026.
• Trump administration eyes massive coal reserves under federal lands Despite vast contrary scientific evidence, the US executive branch sees vast reserves of coal as a resource desirable to burn. Inside Climate News, Lisa Sorg, Jul 27, 2026.
• Do small climate habits help or hurt the bigger cause? Researchers tracked nearly 2,800 people's habits, protests, and policy views to test whether small green acts help or hurt the bigger fight. Neither, it turns out. Anthropocene, Sarah DeWeerdt, Jul 28, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (3 articles)

•  2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #30 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 19, 2026 thru Sat, July 25, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, July 26, 2026.
• Fact brief - Do solar plants require backup from fossil fuels? Solar plants require backup, but it doesn’t have to be from fossil fuels. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, Jul 28, 2026.
• The influencer teaching millions to fear solar Alexandra Fasulo says she’s protecting farms and wildlife. How much of her rhetoric is actually true? HEATED, Alex Hannaford, Jul 30, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

• `I can`t work in the farce of climate change cruise tourism anymore`: why Antarctic guides quit their dream jobs 'You’d see massive glacier calvings, and you’d just want to cry. But all the guests would be cheering. And you’d be like … ‘can you not put two and two together?’'' The Conversation, Zdenka Sokolickova, Christy Hehir, Elizabeth Cooper, Jul 21, 2026.
• Scientists decry Trump`s `blame game` after he claims Canada `poisoning` US air Trump told Mark Carney ‘you got to stop these fires from coming in’ as experts say wildfires symptom of climate crisis The Guardian, Oliver Milman, Jul 24, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (2 articles)

• Factcheck: No, Europe`s heatwaves are not being `caused` by declining air pollution Scientists tell Carbon Brief that the framing of heatwaves being “caused” by declining air pollution is “wrong”. Carbon Brief, Robert McSweeney, Jul 24, 2026.
• Hot days, cold thermometers A graph popular with climate change deniers is desconstructed by Zeke Hausfather, exposing its economy of truth. Skeptical Science, Zeke Hausfather, Jul 27, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 articles)

• Can we alter ocean chemistry to absorb carbon? Here are the pros and cons Procrastination on arresting fossil fuels leads to extreme measures; here are pros and cons of "ocean alkalinity enhancement" and pitfalls in public perceptions this technology will encounter should it require deployment. The Conversation, Harris Anderson, Andrew Lenton, Mathieu Mongin, Jul 23, 2026.
• U.S. Raises Threat of Steep Water Cuts in Lower Colorado River Basin A federal plan would impose drastic water cuts on Arizona, California and Nevada in dry years over the next decade. A legal battle could follow. NYT, Scott Dance, Jul 31, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (1 article)

• Wildfires: why media coverage doesn`t always make the climate connection Exploring how contradictory press coverage can sit on the same front page tells us a lot about how climate change is narrated in the UK, and why climate reporting differs so much from country to country. The Conversation, Doug Specht,, Jul 28, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

• Shell`s hidden climate knowledge under scrutiny as court battle looms As the company faces a landmark climate lawsuit, confidential documents show how British scientist James Lovelock warned executives of the risks of burning fossil fuels in the 1960s. DeSmog, Rebecca John, Jul 30, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (1 article)

• Trump Administration Is Undoing Plans to Boost Workplace Heat Protections The Biden administration took steps to shield workers from extreme temperatures. The Trump administration is taking a gentler approach with employers. NYT, Scott Dance, Aug 01, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

Open access notables

Observed Multi-Decadal Acceleration of Globally Averaged Abyssal Ocean Warming, Johnson, Geophysical Research Letters

Given sparse historical data in the deep and abyssal ocean, previously only multi-decadal temperature trends have been estimated from observations there on a global scale. Full-depth CTD sampling started circa 1970, with the first decadal global ship-based survey occupied in the 1990s, and the first regional pilot array of Deep Argo floats started circa 2016. Here we fit second-order polynomial functions versus time to all available full-depth CTD profile temperature data in local spatial bins to estimate changes in the rates of these multi-decadal temperature trends. We find a statistically significant increase of the heating rate of the abyssal (4,000–6,000 dbar) ocean, from 5.4 (±4.9) TW in 1988 to 20.2 (±3.9) TW in 2018. In contrast, we find no statistically significant change in the heating rate of the deep ocean, estimated at 29.4 (±22.1) TW in 1988 and 25.0 (±17.5) TW in 2018.

High-resolution simulations reveal positive global warming feedback from Pacific low clouds, Chammas et al., Science Advances

Uncertainty in marine low-level cloud feedbacks limits accurate climate projections. Using 7083 high-resolution simulations of tropical Pacific low clouds, we separated the impacts of sea surface warming from direct carbon dioxide (CO2) effects. Surface warming alone drives a positive low-cloud feedback of 0.14Wm-2K-1. While this changes little with doubled CO2, the total cloud radiative response strengthens markedly to 0.43Wm-2K-1 under quadrupled CO2, revealing a strong nonlinear interaction. Surface warming alone modifies the boundary layer through increased inversion strength and weakened subsidence, which buffers clouds by promoting higher liquid water content while cloud fraction decreases. Rapid adjustments to high CO2 concentrations counteract this protective cloud thickening. Consequently, a pronounced reduction in cloud fraction is no longer offset by an increase in cloud brightness, markedly strengthening the total radiative response under quadrupled CO2. Ultimately, our results suggest that climate sensitivity is more state-dependent than often assumed.

Canopy-mediated climate feedbacks in the boreal continuous permafrost zone, Stuenzi et al., Nature Climate Change

Boreal forests, covering approximately a quarter of the continuous permafrost zone, store relatively modest aboveground carbon, but thermally protect vast soil organic carbon (SOC) pools. Here, using a process-based model to compare seasonal thaw depths under forested and bare-ground scenarios, we quantify distinct canopy thermal insulation capacities of deciduous needleleaf, evergreen needleleaf and deciduous broadleaf canopies on permafrost thermal dynamics. Canopy buffering maintains approximately 59 Pg of carbon in a frozen state, which equals 32% of the total forested permafrost carbon pool and far exceeds boreal biomass stocks (7–19 Pg). Canopy changes could mobilize this frozen SOC through gradual thaw (40 Pg) and rapid thermokarst collapse (19 Pg). While forest loss sacrifices biomass carbon stocks, resulting thaw would expose orders of magnitude more SOC from previously frozen reservoirs, revealing a critical asymmetry. Forest conservation strategies in continuous permafrost zones must account for canopy-mediated thermal protection of frozen SOC, which far exceeds its biomass carbon sequestration capacity.

The 2026 western US snow drought was about four times more likely due to climate change, Marshall et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 

In the spring of 2026, anomalously low snow conditions in the western United States threatened winter recreation and water supplies. Here, we investigate: to what extent was this snow drought attributable to the climate change that has occurred since the pre-industrial period? We find that a snow drought this severe across the western United States was approximately 4.4 [95% CI: 2.6, 9.4] times more likely in the current climate than in the preindustrial period. In the Upper Colorado River Basin, the snow drought was approximately 14 times more likely [0.09, 4,300]. Given a projected increase in the frequency of snow droughts at least this severe in a moderately high emissions warming scenario, the lived experience of this event may help scientists, resource managers, and the public consider what western US snow might look like if greenhouse gas emissions are not aggressively reduced.

Feasibility of CO2 pipeline construction to enable gigaton-scale carbon dioxide removals: evidence from historical precedent, Roberts et al., Frontiers in Climate

In this analysis, we use the history of fossil fuel pipeline networks to assess the feasibility of rapidly building enough CO2 pipelines to enable gigaton-scale removals of CO2 from the Earth's atmosphere. We collect data on scenarios of CO2 pipeline construction, historical fossil fuel pipeline construction, and the historical context of this construction to answer four questions: (1) What length of pipeline network will be required to achieve the benchmarks of 1 Gt or 100 Mt of CO2 in 2050? (2) What have been the largest national and international fossil fuel pipeline buildouts achieved in a 25-year period? (3) Is it feasible to build enough CO2 pipelines to enable gigaton-scale carbon dioxide removals given these historical precedents? (4) Under what political, economic, and social circumstances have rapid pipeline build-outs occurred? We find that a pipeline network of roughly 8,000 km will be necessary to enable 100 Mt of carbon dioxide removal, and that roughly 100,000 km will be necessary for 1 Gt. There are 15 cases in the historical record of a country building 8,000 km of fossil fuel pipelines in 25 years, and only three cases of a country building 100,000km or more of pipelines in the same timescale. Rapid construction of fossil fuel pipelines has benefited from strong economic and institutional drivers, which may not apply to CO2 pipelines in the same way. Our findings are reason for caution about the likelihood of CO2 pipeline build outs keeping pace with CO2 removal targets.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Pay, Baby, Pay. Why Trump's Energy & AI Dominance Agenda Means Higher Bills For Everyone, Lorne Stockman, Oil Change International

U.S. wholesale fossil gas prices will likely double by the late 2030s relative to the 2020 to 2025 average if the Trump administration’s energy and AI policies succeed in pushing gas demand to levels that can only be met by more expensive gas production. Significant energy price volatility from 2020 to 2025 caused hardship in the U.S. and in LNG-importing countries, particularly in Asia and Europe. Costlier U.S. gas risks exacerbating the energy affordability crisis for U.S. and international consumers alike. The surge in gas demand – and gas prices – is being driven primarily by the Trump administration’s support for massive increases in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Trump’s hostility toward renewables and support for the poorly regulated AI data center boom aggravate the impending crunch. Lower-cost gas from the two biggest U.S. gas-producing regions, the Permian and Appalachian basins, will not be able to meet rising demand alone. To fill the gap between demand and production, gas producers will have to increase drilling in the significantly more expensive Haynesville shale play in Louisiana and Texas.

Interfacing science and policy: Exploring the role of scientific knowledge in the design of Voluntary Sustainability Standards, Loconto et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Through the concept of scientific cherry-picking, the authors analyze how Voluntary Sustainability Standards selectively incorporate particular strands of scientific knowledge that align with operational models and governance structures. This selective integration often leads to the promotion of interpretations of sustainability that are compatible with weak sustainability paradigms –emphasizing incremental improvements within existing systems – rather than fostering more systemic and transformative approaches. 181 articles in 66 journals by 1509 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Climate Coupling in the Western Hemisphere and 2023 El Niño Onset, Jury, ATMOSPHERE-OCEAN 10.1080/07055900.2026.2698635

Fast expansion and slow contraction of the ITCZ in response to CO2 forcing, Zhang, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.18164506

High-resolution simulations reveal positive global warming feedback from Pacific low clouds, Chammas et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aec8488

Key role of continental inorganic halogens in the evolution of global air quality, Li et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75932-7

Multi-century cooling after net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, Tarshish et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02700-2

Subtropical gyre expansion causes Southern Ocean salinification contrary to freshening predictions, Yu & Toole, Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75775-2

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A more quiescent deep ocean under global warming, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02075-2 20 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

Accelerating and Intensifying Dry-to-Wet Hydroclimate Whiplash Across the Contiguous United States, Yang & Li, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008646

Anthropogenic Warming Increases Extreme Precipitation in Huaihe River Basin, China in 1961–2020, Guo et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70525

Asymmetric Warming and Climate Regime Shift in Bhubaneswar: Evidence from a Rapidly Growing Tropical City (1950-2025), Beuria et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106922

Attribution of the Record-Breaking June 2024 Eastern Mediterranean Heatwave: Contrasting Roles of Soil Moisture in Anthropogenic Forcing and Natural Variability, Ma et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121002

Escalating heat waves and human thermal stress over semi-arid Bundelkhand region, India, Singh et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103035

Lengthening Summer in the Northern Hemisphere with the Declining Arctic Sea Ice, Cui et al., ATMOSPHERE-OCEAN 10.1080/07055900.2026.2695602

Observed Multi-Decadal Acceleration of Globally Averaged Abyssal Ocean Warming, Johnson, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124104

Opposite changes in comfortable days over tropical and mid-latitude lands due to anthropogenic warming, 1980-2020 and 2060-2100, Wang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.010

The 2026 western US snow drought was about four times more likely due to climate change, Marshall et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2612961123

Warming-Induced Increase in Flooding in the Taklimakan Desert, Su et al., Journal of Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.1007/s12583-025-2033-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Anthropogenic amplification of precipitation variability over the past century, Science, 10.1126/science.adp0212 218 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A multi-method Antarctic atmospheric blocking dataset (1979–2024), Bozkurt et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-5399-2026

A simplified method to calculate atmospheric CO2 equivalency for changing surface albedo, Akbari, Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102795

Climate scientists sharpen tools for linking global warming to extreme weather, Vaz, Science 10.1126/science.aek8030

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Causes of extreme events revealed by Rényi information transfer, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adn1721 9 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

European summer drying largely driven by atmospheric circulation changes since the 1980s, Dunkl et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-02050-w

Future tropical cyclone rainfall constrained by increased atmospheric dryness, Chen et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-02047-5

Identifying the Timing of Regional Summertime Minimum Temperature Threshold Crossings and the Potential Subsequent Climate Evolutions, Arcodia & Barnes, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008520

Imbalances in climate outcomes in net-zero pathways with fossil fuel CO2 emissions and reforestation-based CO2 removals, MacIsaac et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03329-x

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Indian Ocean Dipole in a warming world, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00573-7 52 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Added value of a priori bias correction for dynamical downscaling - A case study of Coastal British Columbia, Hingmire et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000717

Added value of a priori bias correction for dynamical downscaling - A case study of Coastal British Columbia, Hingmire et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000717

The Big Data paradox: how climate model authority becomes institutional mandates for climate extremes in the Anthropocene, Vijayakumar, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 10.1016/j.cosust.2026.101698

The TIPMIP Earth system model experiment protocol: phase 1, C. et al., Publication Database PIK (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)) Open Access pmh:oai:publications.pik-potsdam.de:item_32889

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
On the suitability of a convolutional neural network based RCM-emulator for fine spatio-temporal precipitation, Climate Dynamics, 10.1007/s00382-024-07350-8 16 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

Century-long data reveals complex trends in ice cover in the Laurentian Great Lakes, Cannon et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03866-5

Climate-driven tree failures: how extreme rainfall threatens the survival of monumental Araucaria angustifolia trees, Scipioni et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111168

Glacier loss in Central Caucasus from ICESat-2, using the SRTM baseline and crossover analysis, Mehrishi et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.012

Mass Loss From Thwaites Glacier Continues Even Without Ocean Melting, Williams et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122843

Observed responses of sea ice formation and decay in a mid-latitude marginal sea under dual-mode global warming, Qiu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105631

Rapid acceleration of ice-cover loss from Northern Hemisphere lakes above critical air temperature thresholds, Zhou et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2610752123

The 2026 western US snow drought was about four times more likely due to climate change, Marshall et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2612961123

The dynamic response of Pine Island Glacier to two decades of intermittent ice shelf regrounding, Stepney et al., White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) pmh:oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:243583

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Ships are projected to navigate whole year-round along the North Sea route by 2100, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01557-7 24 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

Observed thresholds in sea-level rise driving global tidal wetland loss, Luo et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76031-3

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Probabilistic reconstruction of sea-level changes and their causes since 1900, Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-3471-2024 31 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Broadly stable atmospheric CO2 and CH4 levels over the past 3 million years, Marks-Peterson et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-025-10032-y

Interplay of North Atlantic freshening and deep convection during the last deglaciation constrained by Iberian speleothems, Endres et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-22-797-2026

Wildfires rampaged across Europe in the dying days of the Triassic, [authors did not process], Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-02333-7

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Response of coastal California hydroclimate to the Paleocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum, Climate of the past, 10.5194/cp-20-1615-2024 2 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Larix gmelinii growth limitation shifts from nitrogen availability to drought under warming and permafrost degradation, Chen et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105395

Aftermath of marine heatwaves on the growth and physiological performance of Sargassum fusiforme and Sargassum thunbergii, Chu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107945

An integrated assessment of climate change on landscape adaptive capacity, vulnerability, and divergence in Avicennia species, Sheidai et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-42720-8

Analysis of the mechanism of MKK4 participating in heat stress response in Mytilus coruscus, Wei et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107956

Aragonite Saturation Horizon Variability Along North Pacific Seamounts and Implications for Deep-Sea Coral Reefs, Kassem et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023926

Assessing impacts of extreme climate and weather events on endangered pearl oysters Pinctada maxima, He et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2025.107821

Biogeochemical signal from marine heatwaves, cold spells, and transient warming events in a coastal upwelling system, Valdés et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-62941-1

Climate change alters biogeochemical cycles in oxygen-depleted and dead zones, Bourbonnais et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03756-w

Climate Change Enhances the Success of Marine Invasive Species, Smith & Cheung, Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71020

Climate-Driven Population Dynamics, Growth, and Phenology of the Moon Jellyfish Aurelia coerulea in the Mediterranean Thau Lagoon, Pigeon et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107977

Climate-Driven Restructuring of Phytoplankton Productivity and Community Composition in the South-eastern Black Sea: Insights from Seasonal CO2-Temperature Manipulation Experiments, A??rba? et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108029

Disentangling the effects of FPAR, CO2, and climate on terrestrial vegetation productivity trends over two decades (2001–2023), Pu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111122

Ecological novelty induced by climate change, Wright et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02697-8

Ecosystem services can persist in drowning macrotidal salt marshes, Mason et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108260

Establishing ring width and cell chronologies for predicting future growth of Thuja koraiensis under climate change, Park et al., Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2025.126423

First evidence of climate-driven modulation of octinoxate toxicity in the sea urchin Paracentrotus lividus, Costa et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107847

Global Change Reshapes Northern Lakes Towards Browner, More Nutrient-Depleted and Nitrogen-Limited Conditions With Contrasting Impacts on Phytoplankton Biomass, Bergström et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71008

Iceberg-driven constraints on colony–foraging connectivity result in severe decline in chick counts for the Coulman Island emperor penguin colony, Park et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03764-w

In-situ experimental evidence revealing how ocean warming promotes Aurelia coerulea polyps mediated by benthic ecosystem change, Zang et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107853

Landscapes heavily impacted by human activities amplify climate sensitivity of Aleppo pine growth, Cappelluti et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111364

Marine heatwaves disrupt germination and seedling physiology in Zostera marina, Pieraccini et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2025.107789

Microbial drought resistance is achieved at the expense of soil carbon loss, Pang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76033-1

Modelling and geospatial mapping of whitefly Bemisia tabaci population dynamics in cassava-growing areas of Sub-Saharan Africa in response to climate change, Ndjomatchoua & Gilligan, Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111059

Moisture limitation superseding thermal forcing: Elevational divergence in growth and physiological responses of Picea crassifolia to accelerated warming and drying on the Northeastern Tibetan Plateau, Wang et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111377

Ocean acidification effects on growth, survival and physiological immunity of farmed Larimichthys crocea, Zhang et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107869

Penguins on the Move: Mapping Priority Penguin Habitat Areas Under Climate Change, Ramirez et al., Diversity and Distributions Open Access 10.1111/ddi.70233

Physiology and behaviour of eastern oysters (Crassostrea virginica) and soft-shell clams (Mya arenaria) under hypoxic and heatwave conditions, Talevi et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107902

Predicting the water temperature effects and climate change impacts on gametogenesis of the sea urchin Mesocentrotus nudus using a DVI model, Takagi et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107941

Projected declines in zooplankton energy supporting Northwest European Shelf ecosystems, Tyldesley et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03840-1

Relationships Between Climatic Variation and Population Dynamics of the Threatened Mohave Ground Squirrel, Poessel et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.73952

Resilience of the macroalgae Gongolaria barbata under ocean acidification: physiological responses and restoration perspective, Ilaria et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107887

Responses of plant biomass to rising atmospheric CO2 concentration in the Yellow River Basin, Luan & Ma, Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105480

Strengthened resource limitation driven by accelerated microbial growth dampens response to elevated CO2 in a mature forest, Yuan et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03365-7

The Impact of Subglacial Drainage System Evolution and Glacier Lake Outburst on Arctic Fjord Macronutrient Dynamics, Alexander et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2023jg007969

Thermal responses and climate change implications of spring and autumn spawning Patagonian squid (Doryteuthis gahi) embryos, Grient et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107856

Tracing the imprints of dual stressors: eco-physiological and genotoxic insights from Mystus gulio under acidification and warming scenario, Mahapatra & Mandal, Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108290

Tree-Ring Based Precipitation Reconstructions Reveal Hydroclimatic Variability and a Recent Drying Trend in Northeastern Iran, Mazaherifar et al., Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126587

Understanding the resilience of Halophila ovalis to warming and nutrient enrichment for improved seagrass conservation policy, Yuxin et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2025.107824

Warming overwhelms CO2-driven drought mitigation in alpine vegetation on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, Lyu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03308-2

Widespread Increase in Global Plant Water Stress Obscured by Greening, Chang et al., AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025av002243

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Large potential impacts of marine heatwaves on ecosystem functioning, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17437 29 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Applying satellite observations to improve bottom-up national emission inventories for methane: application to Colombia, Hancock et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-10455-2026

Canopy-mediated climate feedbacks in the boreal continuous permafrost zone, Stuenzi et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02692-z

Carbohydrate-active enzymes of soil prophages enhance global carbon cycling potential, Liao et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75907-8

Carbon sink-source dynamics across ecuadorian coastal tropical dry forests: unraveling the seasonal balance of soil carbon inputs and CO2 efflux, Jarre-Castro et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.3389/fevo.2026.1824696

COVID-19 induced reduction of fossil-fuel emissions in 2020 altered the seasonal cycle of atmospheric CO2 at high latitudes, Gui et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111071

Extreme precipitation during the warm growing season amplifies methane emissions and reduces non-growing season contributions in a Tibetan alpine peatland, Lin et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111378

Floods Enhanced the Terrestrial and Marine Organic Carbon Burial in the East China Sea, Xu et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20278779

Global vessel carbon dioxide emission from navigable rivers, Lü et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02718-6

High-resolution land surface modeling of climate and CO2 effects on ecosystem carbon-water coupling across the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, Xi et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111195

Higher, but more variable, annual CO2 emissions from lakes in drier Arctic landscapes, Hazuková et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03275-8

Hydrological Threshold for Optimizing Wetland Climate Mitigation, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123743

Leveraging wide snapshot XCO2 pre-training to estimate urban fossil fuel CO2 emissions from space, Wang et al., Remote Sensing of Environment 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115260

Long-Term Urban Emission Trends in Salt Lake City: Examining CO, CO2, and NOX Enhancements, Humble et al., Atmospheric Environment 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.121883

Microbial Functional Gene Abundance-Integrated Modeling of Global Methane Sinks in Upland Soils Under Future Climate Change, Xiao et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71026

Migratory bird aggregation drives seasonal greenhouse gas hotspots in restored wetlands, Zhang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03853-w

Modeling the impact of drainage on peatland CO2 and CH4 fluxes and its underlying drivers, Liu, HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe) pmh:oai:HAL:hal-05574304v1

Multi-Year Continuous Lateral Fluxes of Dissolved Carbon From a Microtidal Saltmarsh, He et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg009760

Rapid microbial production of long-lived dissolved organic carbon in the global ocean, Cai et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2601044123

Soil moisture-induced changes in land carbon sink projections in CMIP6, Gabele et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-2729-2026

Spatio-temporal patterns and environmental controls of soil organic carbon stocks in global tidal wetlands since 2009, Yang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76092-4

Tall-tower isotope measurements to infer urban CO2 sources: a case study of Vienna, Austria, Meeran et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122245

The added value of new ground-based observations in improving China's methane emission quantification, Zhong et al., Atmospheric measurement techniques Open Access pdf 10.5194/amt-19-4759-2026

The Evidence for Linearly Scaling Ocean Gas Exchange With Sea Ice Needs Strengthening, Watts et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jg009346

The timing of warming matters as much as its intensity for the annual carbon balance of a degraded raised bog, Behrens et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-5071-2026

Thermogenic methane beneath the North Greenland Ice Sheet revealed by isotopic and geological evidence, Ketzer et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75951-4

Three-Fourths of Carbon Emissions From 2023 Record-Breaking Wildfires in Canada Traced to Soil and Peat Combustion, Zhong et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl123393

Transition of coastal marsh to mangrove forest: implications for Everglades CO2 and CH4 fluxes, Yannick et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.3389/fevo.2026.1890986

VOCs Impact Soil Carbon Transformations and Sequestration, Zhang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg010104

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Dual roles of microbes in mediating soil carbon dynamics in response to warming, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50800-4 92 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Bioinspired charge reservoir enables efficient CO2 photoreduction with H2O via tungsten valence oscillation, Huang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-68991-3

CO2 subsurface mineral storage by its co-injection with recirculating water, Oelkers et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10130-5

Electrified reversible surface mineralization of CO2 for direct air capture, Liu et al., Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-026-01989-9

Feasibility of CO2 pipeline construction to enable gigaton-scale carbon dioxide removals: evidence from historical precedent, Roberts et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1807933

Nanoscale greenhouse effect for promoting solar-driven CO2 reduction with water to CH4, Kang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-70960-9

Observationally constrained global warming hysteresis under CO2 removal, Song et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03484-1

Potential evaluation and favorable zone optimization of CO2 geological sequestration in deep coal reservoirs, Xue et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-42680-z

Reducing Uncertainties in Net Carbon Capture to Advance Wetlands as Natural Climate Solutions, Mistry et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009136

Reflecting on the politics and power dynamics of contested climate technologies, Fritz et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104448

Rethinking expertise on climate cooling technologies, Carabajal et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104446

The renaissance of carbon capture and storage in Germany and the politics of conditionality, Haas et al., Environmental Politics Open Access pdf 10.1080/09644016.2026.2700726

Translating insights from progress in photovoltaics to accelerate industrial-scale CO2 electroreduction, Choi et al., Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-025-01953-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Deployment expectations of multi-gigatonne scale carbon removal could have adverse impacts on Asia’s energy-water-land nexus, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50594-5 27 cites.

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Decarbonization

An Analysis of Future Wind Energy Resources and Cost Uncertainties Across the United States, Buster et al., Wind Energy Open Access 10.1002/we.70144

Assessing potential impacts of offshore wind development on U.S. marine ecosystems using food web modeling, Lato et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-63407-0

Carbon-aware resource allocation and task offloading in EH-assisted edge-cloud systems, Fu et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-62950-0

Solar-driven co-production of C2H4 and H2O2 from CO2 and H2O, Xie et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-69277-4

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Geothermal energy in Kenya: Evaluating health impacts and environmental challenges, Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development, 10.1016/j.esd.2024.101522 23 cites.

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Geoengineering climate

Robust Solar Radiation Modification Strategy for Achieving Temperature Targets, Zheng et al., Risk Analysis 10.1111/risa.70312

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Effects of grain size and seawater salinity on magnesium hydroxide dissolution and secondary calcium carbonate precipitation kinetics: implications for ocean alkalinity enhancement, Biogeosciences, 10.5194/bg-21-3463-2024 13 cites.

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 Aerosols

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A model study investigating the sensitivity of aerosol forcing to the volatilities of semi-volatile organic compounds, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-8489-2024 6 cites.

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Climate change communications & cognition

Misperception of Extreme Weather Event Mortality Risk in the United States, Manware et al., GeoHealth Open Access 10.1029/2025gh001782

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Communicating the Links between Climate Change and Heat Waves with the Climate Shift Index, Weather Climate and Society, 10.1175/wcas-d-23-0147.1 13 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

A data-driven method for identifying climate drivers of agricultural yield failure from daily weather data, Sweet et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-6687-2026

Agroforestry protects arable crops from climate shock during critical early-season phenological stages, Tosh et al., Agronomy for Sustainable Development Open Access pdf 10.1007/s13593-026-01129-3

Attribution analysis of historical and future global staple crop yield shocks to climate stressors, Xiao et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111340

Balancing growth, resource efficiency and soil greenhouse gas emissions: optimal water-fertilizer coupling for Chukrasia tabularis seedlings, Quan et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1914270

Carbon fluxes and partitioning in Eucalyptus and Pinus plantations across a climatic gradient in Brazil, Cunha et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2025.110977

Designing agrivoltaic systems for plant protection, Vernier et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111361

Exposure risk of maize cropland under compound high-temperature and drought events over Northeast China in response to future warming, Yan et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.015

Ocean acidification effects on growth, survival and physiological immunity of farmed Larimichthys crocea, Zhang et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107869

Quantifying the impact of extreme heat events on net ecosystem exchange in a wheat-maize cropping system in North China, Pei et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111379

Reduced phosphorus bioavailability in rice paddies intensified by elevated CO2-driven warming, Wang et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01917-2

The economic dimension of climate-smart agriculture: bibliometric review of trends, challenges, and opportunities from an economic perspective, Jing et al., Environment Development and Sustainability 10.1007/s10668-026-07995-x

The occurrence of extreme heat events offset CO2 fertilization and deteriorate grain quality in double cropping rice systems under projected climate change, Liu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111184

Warmer growing seasons improve cereal yields in Northern Europe only with increasing precipitation, Tootoonchi et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-2583-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global assessment of production benefits and risk reduction in agroforestry during extreme weather events under climate change scenarios, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1379741 31 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Accelerating and Intensifying Dry-to-Wet Hydroclimate Whiplash Across the Contiguous United States, Yang & Li, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008646

Amazon Dry Season Will Lengthen Under Future Climate, Ferreira et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71018

Anthropogenic Warming Increases Extreme Precipitation in Huaihe River Basin, China in 1961–2020, Guo et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70525

Asynchronous Emergence of Water Scarcity Risks Amid Shifting Hydrological Regimes in High Mountain Asia, Zhao & Yang, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008373

Dominant Controls on Preferential Flow and Their Implications for Future Soil Water Fluxes, Li et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008296

Future tropical cyclone rainfall constrained by increased atmospheric dryness, Chen et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-02047-5

Global Terrestrial Water Storage Projections and Uncertainty Decomposition Under Multiple Warming Levels, Kim et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007835

Integrating climate projections and hydrological modeling for sustainable water management in a major indian peninsular basin, Thakur et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1835963

Intensifying Sub-Daily Rainfall Extremes in Tropical Cities: Projections From Downscaled Baselines in a Warming Climate, Blagojevi? et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007703

Marine heatwaves in the Northeast Pacific intensify landfalling atmospheric rivers on the west coast of North America, Renkl et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-62522-2

Nature-based solutions in arid and semi-arid countries: A review of best practices and lessons learned, Chiarelli et al., Urban Climate Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103060

Seasonal Asymmetry in Extreme Precipitation Intensification Across China's Drylands, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046518

U.S. rivers are transporting more suspended sediment, often in less time, Sigdel & Husic, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03847-8

Warming-Induced Increase in Flooding in the Taklimakan Desert, Su et al., Journal of Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.1007/s12583-025-2033-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Critical Effects of Precipitation on Future Colorado River Flow, Journal of Climate, 10.1175/jcli-d-23-0617.1 25 cites.

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Climate change economics

Climate change and high-quality economic development: Insights from the perspective of extreme temperatures, Li & Feng, Environment Development and Sustainability 10.1007/s10668-026-07996-w 

 

Climate change mitigation public policy research

2040 greenhouse gas reduction targets and energy transitions in line with the EU Green Deal, Rodrigues et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-71159-8

A simplified method to calculate atmospheric CO2 equivalency for changing surface albedo, Akbari, Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102795

Bricolage as an early-niche mechanism: Expectations and carbon lock-in in two Polish energy clusters, Stasik & Da?kowska, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104861

California's plan to decarbonize electricity omits key greenhouse gas emissions, Fortier et al., Energy Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115509

Cost-effective abatement of industrial sources of nitrous oxide with methane for urgent climate mitigation, Wu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75982-x

Eligibility interpreted as assurance and trust inflation in carbon credit markets, Kuwae, PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001001

Optimizing residential energy management through an integrated techno-economic evaluation of PV-battery systems, Kumar et al., Electrical Engineering 10.1007/s00202-026-03614-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Public acceptability of carbon pricing: unravelling the impact of revenue recycling, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2376747 29 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

A systematic global stocktake of evidence on human adaptation to climate change, Berrang?Ford et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-021-01170-y

Beyond adaptive capacity: Assessing how power relations shape household responses to climate impacts on water and sanitation, Dickin et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000906

Building climate-resilient development pathways in China: Evaluating environmental policy impacts, Zhou et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104456

Deep uncertainty analysis to characterise regional climate for building stock transition: A Nordic empirical study, Feng et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103057

Europe's transport infrastructure is not ready to face climate change, Deidda et al., Natural hazards and earth system sciences Open Access 10.5194/nhess-26-3345-2026

From devolution to distortion: political and fiscal constraints on locally led adaptation in Kenya, Mulwa & Gravesen, Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2703375

How urban system structure and land use dynamics jointly shape climate vulnerability in Northwestern China over the 21st century, Zhou et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103066

In search of climate migrants: a journey from crisis to opportunity, Ahmed et al., Climate and Development Open Access 10.1080/17565529.2026.2694724

Scenario Planning for Transformative Climate Adaptation, Mach et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change 10.1002/wcc.70084

Strategic streams of evolving climate policy and governance in Vietnam: Challenges and potentials for resilience, Doi et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104451

Unequal protection and sacrificial territories: climate governance and infrastructural exposure in Southern Italy, Terenzi & Paone, Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2704993

Unraveling the nuances of climate change maladaptation: A call for more verstehen perspectives, Ofosu, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000784

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Nature-based solutions in spatial planning and policies for climate change adaptation: A literature review, AMBIO, 10.1007/s13280-024-02052-1 28 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Climate change and health in the rural context: Vulnerability, capacity and outlook, Rose & Birchall, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000974

Climate regulation as cardiovascular prevention: Heart failure risks after the Endangerment Finding rollback, Nguyen et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001006

Divergent Heat Assessments Across Thermal Stress and Sensation Metrics, Huang et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008395

Drought amplifies the psychological burden of war, Döring et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41893-026-01882-z

On the compound effect of humidity and temperature on mortality in the Eastern Mediterranean, Tzyrkalli et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000821

Survival First: How Citizens Prioritize Competing Climate-Health Risk Countermeasures Under Fiscal Constraints, Tanaka & ??, Risk Analysis Open Access 10.1111/risa.70315

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Framework of street grid-based urban heat vulnerability assessment: Integrating entropy weight method and BPNN model, Urban Climate, 10.1016/j.uclim.2024.102067 40 cites.

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 Other

Fire weather waves drive extreme fires globally, Yin et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03858-5

Implementing a National Framework for Climate Services: Understanding Progress, Challenges, and Future Opportunities, Golding et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0281.1

Navigating optimal solar-wind trade-offs under climate change, Li et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75879-9

Projecting climate change impacts on Scottish River pollution, Corrochano-Fraile et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100856

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Evolution of the Climate Forcing During the Two Years After the Hunga Tonga=Hunga Ha'apai Eruption, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd041296 32 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Four years of PLOS Climate: Past, present and future, Boers et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000866

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
State of the UK Climate 2023, International Journal of Climatology, 10.1002/joc.8553 39 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

The Environmental Footprint of Emerging Technology and Artificial Intelligence. Data Centers, Community Health and Policy Responses, Emma Uridge and Jasmin Kamruddi, Kansas Health Institute

The rapid growth and use of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming many sectors, but it also has environmental implications that are complex and multifaceted. AI infrastructure drives increased demand for significant water use, greater energy consumption and expanded grid infrastructure, all of which require careful management to avoid environmental and community harm.

How Local Governments Can Use Communication to Drive Climate Action, Dwight et al., Yale University

The majority of constituents want local government climate action - 56% of registered voters want local government officials to do more to address climate change. With a duty to serve the public, local governments are well positioned to listen and respond — and the Yale Climate Opinion Maps include city- and county-level public opinion data to support your efforts. Know your audience and foster trust - To motivate climate action, governments must understand their communities and become trusted partners. Short surveys, message testing, and in-person engagement can help local governments understand what messages resonate and what issues are a priority for their audience. To build and retain trust, partnerships with community-based organizations, transparency, and frequent engagement are essential. Make climate action local - Many perceive climate change as a problem that is distant in time and space. Local governments can communicate local stories and social norms to help community members understand how climate change is impacting their community now — and that their neighbors are worried about it and taking action, even if they aren’t talking about it.

Protecting the nature of Texas, powering our clean energy future, Quentin Good and Luke Metzger, Frontier Group

Renewable energy developers in Texas have demonstrated many ways their siting practices and operations can minimize harm and even create new benefits from renewable energy projects. Texas should take steps to encourage the adoption of “best practices” by renewable energy developers that protect wildlife and landscapes while continuing the beneficial transition to clean energy. Operational changes and smart siting decisions can reduce the environmental impact of wind energy. The most serious environmental challenge posed by wind energy is its impact on birds and bats, but smart strategies – including those currently in use by Texas wind farm operators – have been proven to reduce collisions.

U.S. Can Cost-Effectively Supply One Third of Industrial Heat Demand Using Off-Grid Electric Thermal Storage and Heat Pumps, Dominguez et al., India Energy and Climate Center, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley

Industrial heat is a major source of U.S. emissions and is challenging to decarbonize due to the availability of low-cost natural gas keeping fossil fuel heating highly competitive. Emerging low cost and efficient options such as thermal electric storage and industrial heat pumps offer a promising alternative when combined with local low-cost solar and wind power. Using facility-level emissions data and a geospatial assessment of nearby buildable land, the authors evaluate 3,559 industrial sites and three temperature ranges: low (0–200°C), medium (200–850°C), and high (above 850°C). For each site, the authors estimate how much heat could be supplied using off=grid renewable systems, its' cost, and how their potential grows as clean energy costs fall. By 2035, the authors found that renewable-powered heat systems could economically supply up to one third of U.S. industrial heat demand—3,255 trillion BTU out of 9,530 trillion BTU in total. This includes more than half of temperature heat needs above 200°C, particularly in states with higher natural gas prices and strong renewable resources, such as California and parts of the northern and eastern U.S. Local off-grid systems also avoid multiyear grid interconnection delays while reducing integration costs for many facilities.

Coal Beneath Federal Lands in the United States— Mines, Reserves, and Resources, Shaffer et al., US. Geological Survey

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) compiled a list of coal mines and tabulated the coal reserves and available coal resources beneath Federal lands in the conterminous United States. Coal resources beneath Federal lands in Alaska are also discussed in this report. In 2024, the 34 coal mines on Federal lands produced more than 261 million short tons of coal. Surface mining is used at 23 of the coal mines, and underground mining is used at 11. These 34 coal mines control more than 4.2 billion short tons of reported coal reserves. Most of the coal mines (31) and more than 98 percent of the reported coal reserves are on Federal lands west of the Mississippi River. Of all the States, Wyoming has the most coal mines on Federal lands (14) and produces the most coal from Federal lands. The Powder River Basin has the most coal mines per basin or coal field operating on Federal lands (12 in Wyoming, 2 in Montana). Most of the available coal resources in the conterminous United States are also west of the Mississippi River. There are five basins or coal fields in the West that each contain available coal resources of more than 25 billion short tons. The USGS estimates that more than 355 billion short tons of available coal resources remain beneath Federal lands in the conterminous United States. Alaska contains substantial quantities of coal resources. The USGS estimates that Alaska has at least 140 billion short tons of identified available coal resources but may ultimately have as much as 5.5 trillion short tons of coal resources.

Americans with disabilities are more likely than those without disabilities to say global warming is harming their health, Ettinger et al., Yale Program on Climate Change Communication

Americans with disabilities are more likely to think global warming is harming their own health than Americans without disabilities. Americans with and without disabilities have similar views on whether some groups of people are more likely to experience the health harms of global warming. Americans with disabilities have lower trust in several information sources about the health harms of global warming.

Paying for Resilience in New York State, Rebuild by Design and The New York State Adaptation Practitioners Network

Climate change has catalyzed new and opportunities and risks within nearly every dimension of New York State’s economy – with the costs being passed onto New Yorkers in the form of tax increases, medical bills, insurance hikes, damages, home repairs, and business losses. The authors present a first-of-its-kind inventory of the cost to adapt to climate effects. New York State will need to spend over $519 billion to build, upgrade, or adapt infrastructure to prepare for climate impacts. This accounts for costs of proposed, in-progress, and completed adaptation investments. The per capita cost of adapting New York State’s infrastructure is approximately $26,000. The highest regional adaptation cost, $387 billion, is in New York City, where the approximate per capita need is $50,000. The most substantial costs include culvert replacements, sewer and stormwater upgrades, and coastal defense on Long Island and in New York City.

Transmission Planning with Large Loads: Current Practices and Recommendations, Large Loads Task Force, Energy Systems Integration Group

The authors trace the structural reasons why the growth in data centers, AI facilities, and other large loads is outpacing existing transmission planning processes, which were designed for slower and more dispersed demand growth. They lay out what planners, utilities, and regulators can start doing now and over the longer term, as large load and associated generator interconnection requests continue to arrive faster than current planning processes can accommodate. The authors identify three structural reasons current planning processes struggle to keep pace including planning functions are siloed by jurisdiction, time horizon, and study method; there is a fundamental timing mismatch between how fast large loads want to connect and how long transmission takes to plan and build; and planners face a radically different level of demand uncertainty that current planning methods were not designed to handle. The authors distinguish between actions planners can take now with immediate payoff, such as studies that make visible where the grid can serve new load, tools that quickly expand available grid capacity, and coordinating assumptions across planning functions and structural shifts in the planning process, including moving from project-by-project upgrades toward proactive, scenario-based, multi-value planning with longer-term benefits.

Electricity Mid-Year Update 2026, Çam et al., The International Energy Agency

Amid the energy shock triggered by the war in the Middle East, the world’s electricity consumption is set to increase strongly in 2026, driven by rising demand from industry, appliances, cooling needs, data centers and electrification. This mid-year update builds on the comprehensive Electricity 2026 report published in February, providing an assessment of recent market developments and updated outlooks through 2027. It incorporates updated data for 2025 and new forecasts for 2026 and 2027, covering global electricity demand, generation by fuel, and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from electricity generation, among other trends. The report also reviews the latest developments in major economies such as China, the European Union, India and the United States and provides updated tracking of wholesale electricity prices across markets worldwide.

Interfacing science and policy: Exploring the role of scientific knowledge in the design of Voluntary Sustainability Standards, Loconto et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Through the concept of scientific cherry-picking, the authors analyze how Voluntary Sustainability Standards selectively incorporate particular strands of scientific knowledge that align with operational models and governance structures. This selective integration often leads to the promotion of interpretations of sustainability that are compatible with weak sustainability paradigms –emphasizing incremental improvements within existing systems – rather than fostering more systemic and transformative approaches.

Food Security Green Bonds. Scaling finance for sustainable and climate-resilient agrifood systems, Mikell O’Mealy, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

The authors examine the growing pressures on global agrifood systems, where hunger and food insecurity remain widespread and are expected to intensify under climate change and population growth. They highlight the dual challenge of expanding production to meet rising demand while addressing the sector’s significant contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and increasing climate risks that threaten agricultural land and livelihoods. Despite strong recognition by countries of the need for climate-smart agriculture and agrifood systems transformation, progress is constrained by a large financing gap. Current investment levels fall far short of the estimated USD 1.1 trillion required annually by 2030, with particularly acute shortfalls affecting smallholder farmers and agri-Subject Matter Experts. Public finance continues to dominate, reflecting both its catalytic role and the barriers limiting private sector engagement. The authors identify public-led green bonds as a practical avenue to mobilize private and institutional capital at scale.

Pay, Baby, Pay. Why Trump's Energy & AI Dominance Agenda Means Higher Bills For Everyone, Lorne Stockman, Oil Change International

U.S. wholesale fossil gas prices will likely double by the late 2030s relative to the 2020 to 2025 average if the Trump administration’s energy and AI policies succeed in pushing gas demand to levels that can only be met by more expensive gas production. Significant energy price volatility from 2020 to 2025 caused hardship in the U.S. and in LNG-importing countries, particularly in Asia and Europe. Costlier U.S. gas risks exacerbating the energy affordability crisis for U.S. and international consumers alike. The surge in gas demand – and gas prices – is being driven primarily by the Trump administration’s support for massive increases in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Trump’s hostility toward renewables and support for the poorly regulated AI data center boom aggravate the impending crunch. Lower-cost gas from the two biggest U.S. gas-producing regions, the Permian and Appalachian basins, will not be able to meet rising demand alone. To fill the gap between demand and production, gas producers will have to increase drilling in the significantly more expensive Haynesville shale play in Louisiana and Texas. About New Research

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The general public often underestimate support for climate action, while overestimating the real-world actions taken by other people to address the problem, according to new research.

The study, published in Nature Climate Change, explores the differences between people’s support for climate change, their behaviour and their assumptions about other people’s behaviour.

It is based on multiple surveys of more than 5,000 people across Germany and the US.

The study expands on previous research on how the general public systematically underestimate the climate commitment of their peers.

The difference between actual and perceived support for climate action among the public is sometimes known as a “perception gap”. 

The surveys tested how people’s perceptions of climate attitudes and behaviours relate to their own willingness to contribute and undertake “climate-friendly” actions.

One of the authors tells Carbon Brief that this perception gap is not due to “ignorance or bias”, but because “people are just not good at making good estimations”.

The research also reveals that people’s opinions and behaviours are more “nuanced than previously assumed” and suggests that simply “correcting misperceptions” does not automatically lead to greater climate action.

Measuring climate actions

The study notes that correcting the perception gap is often seen as a “cost-effective” way to promote public engagement and drive action to reduce the intensification and impacts of climate change. 

Most studies that explore the perception gap have primarily focused on surveys that have asked people to report their willingness to support climate change. 

In other words, researchers have relied upon people saying they would support efforts to tackle climate change, rather than measuring people’s real-world actions, such as financial donations, attending protests or changing their behaviour.

To fill this gap, the researchers behind the new study surveyed a total of more than 5,000 people in Germany and the US over 2024-25. Surveys were split across five different experiments, each focused on public perceptions of climate attitudes and how they relate to individuals’ actual behaviour:

.cb-table tr td{ word-wrap: break-word; word-break: normal; font-size: 0.9em; } ExperimentWhat they didSurvey oneParticipants were asked if they were willing to donate 1% of their household income to WWF – and then were given the chance to do so. Follow-up questions asked participants to predict how many of their peers said “yes” and how many actually donated to the charity.Survey twoParticipants read a constitutional complaint against the German government, led by Greenpeace, which demands for stricter climate policies. They were asked if they were willing to participate as a claimant and/or donate to the cause – and then were given the chance to do so. Follow-up questions asked participants to predict how many of their peers said “yes” and how many went on to support the complaint.Survey threeParticipants were requested to complete an online “work for environmental protection task” where the more “pages” they completed  resulted in more donations to WWF. They then predicted how many pages their peers completed. Participants also rated their individual behaviours and support for eight climate policies and then estimated the same for other people.Surveys four and fiveParticipants were split into three groups that were either informed that 4% of participants had donated 1% of their household income to WWF, that “68% were willing to contribute” or given no information. They then had to state whether they were willing to support WWF and then were given the opportunity to do so. 

The authors note that Germany and the US are two of the “top 10 CO2 emitters” and are places where climate action is “especially necessary”. However, they add that the two countries are not reflective of “diverse cultural contexts” and further research is needed across the world.

The perception gap

The researchers find that most of their participants supported climate action, but much fewer actually performed verifiable behaviours. 

For example, survey one finds that 37% of participants said they were willing to donate to WWF, yet just 4% did when given the opportunity.

Participants generally overestimated the climate actions of their peers, predicting that 23% of other people donated. Willingness, on the other hand, was slightly underestimated with respondents averaging around 34%. 

The results from survey three suggest that this perception gap is likely due to general cognitive processes within the human brain that make accurate estimations about large groups difficult, say the authors. 

The chart below shows the actual percentage of people who supported different environmental policies and performed climate-friendly behaviours (blue dots) compared to average predictions from the surveys (red dots). 

They reveal a “consistent pattern” where “small proportions were overestimated and large ones were underestimated”, the authors say, driving predictions towards the middle. This phenomenon is known as “regression to the mean”.

In other words, where public support for a policy was high, participants in the survey estimated it was lower than it was. When the support was lower, estimates would be higher.

Comparison of actual percentage (blue dots) with the mean estimated percentage (red dots) across two main categories: policy support and individual behaviours. Source: Tiede, et al (2026).

The study finds that individual and environmental factors played a role in shaping people’s perceptions of their peers’ climate actions, which were distinct from general misestimations. 

For example, people who were already involved in climate action, had more frequent climate discussions and consumed more climate-focused news and media predicted a higher proportion of climate support “across the board”.  

The results from the fourth and fifth surveys show that knowing the context of other people’s beliefs and behaviour in surveys can impact the attitudes of participants.

Participants that were told that 68% of people were willing to donate 1% of their household income to the WWF were more willing to donate. 

In contrast, participants that were told that 4% of people actually donated did not report more willingness to “discuss climate change, sign petitions or donate” than the control group. 

However, there was no obvious impact on actual donations for any of the three groups, the study notes.

Lead study author Dr Kevin Tiede, scientific managing director of the Institute for Planetary Health Behaviour at the University of Erfurt, tells Carbon Brief that the findings suggest that “just telling people how many people support climate action is likely not enough to really change something”. 

However, Tiede adds that “direct comparability” between people saying they would donate and actually donating is “limited” and that giving people more time to answer and autonomy over where to donate might result in more people taking action. 

‘Pluralistic ignorance’ 

Tiede explains that the study findings demonstrate the existence of “pluralistic ignorance”, where a person believes their own views differ from the majority.

For climate change, this means that the “vast majority of people around the world support climate action, but people considerably underestimate the extent of this support”, the study says. 

However, the surveys reveal that pluralistic ignorance “in the climate domain” is more nuanced than previously thought, say the authors. 

Prof Madalina Vascleanu, an assistant professor at Stanford University’s Doerr School of Sustainability, who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that encouraging climate action is complex. 

It may take multiple and repeated “attempts” at effective communication, or for people to directly “experience” the “norm” that climate change is widely supported, she says, rather than simply being told.

“Observable” behaviours, such as “identity signalling” – which could involve anything from protesting to vegetarianism – might have more of an impact on encouraging climate action among peers than “private behaviours like donations”, she adds. 

The study is a “great addition to the literature”, Vascleanu says, because “correcting” the perception gap did not have an effect on climate-friendly behaviour, as “scholars had previously assumed”. She adds that it has “sparked several new hypotheses” that her “lab is now working on”.

Prof Mauro Bertolotti, associate professor of social psychology at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, explains that the “attitude-behaviour gap” revealed by the research is a “rather common finding”. 

However, he is “sceptical” of the “simplified and abstract” measures, warning that experiment environments often come with “assumptions and expectations” that are different from real life. 

As a result, they might not “replicate” the process people go through when choosing to “make a donation to an environmental cause”, he says.

‘Targeted’ communication strategies

The researchers argue that it is more effective to focus on “targeted” communication strategies – encouraging climate-friendly behaviours that aim to reach the majority who already support climate action, rather than trying to convert climate sceptics.

They call for attention to be paid to the attitude-behaviour gap between people saying they support efforts to tackle climate change and following up with real-world climate actions. 

The study suggests strategies for decision-makers to reduce the attitude-behaviour gap, such as “facilitating climate-friendly behaviour” with “convenience and subsidies”. They also recommend ensuring environmental policy prioritises fairness to gain visible and widespread public support. 

They add that the public would benefit from understanding the “effectiveness and co-benefits” of climate action.

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Tiede, K.E. et al. (2026) People systematically under- and overestimate public engagement in climate action, Nature Climate Change, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-026-02668-z

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In recent days, prominent climate sceptics and rightwing commentators have shared charts on social media incorrectly implying that Europe is having its “quietest” year for wildfires in 2026.

These include Dr Matthew Wielicki, a former University of Alabama geochemist and self-described “professor in exile”, who was recently appointed by the Trump administration to lead the US Global Change Research Program.

However, these charts paint a misleading picture as they are skewed by encompassing the entirety of Russia in the data – including the vast plains of Siberia.

These charts also use data that include fires that are deliberately lit to manage cropland, which is a declining practice across much of Europe.

In this factcheck, Carbon Brief shows that the area burned by wildfires across the European Union in 2026 is second only to 2022 for this time of year.

The latest data from the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) also shows that France has set a new modern record for area burned and Spain’s wildfire season is among the worst on record.

The fires have displaced more than a third of a million people across south-western Europe, while an impending heatwave has also raised fears of the fires worsening in the coming days. 

‘Quietest year’

On 27 July, as wildfires raged across multiple European countries, former Conservative peer and climate-sceptic commentator Matt Ridley posted on Twitter that “2026 is the quietest year for wildfires in Europe by some distance”.

.cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }

Ridley, who sits on the academic advisory council of the Global Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF), a UK-based climate-sceptic lobby group that refuses to reveal the sources of its funding, was responding to an article by Daily Telegraph columnist Tim Stanley.

Stanley’s column, headlined: “Climate change is real – and the right needs to get serious about it”, warned:

“This is no longer a matter of speculation: the wildfires of Europe, pitiless and persistent, are the way we live now.”

Ridley included a chart from Our World In Data, showing the cumulative area burned by wildfires by week for Europe. The chart puts 2026 as having the smallest area for this time of year in a dataset going back to 2012.

Ridley’s post was widely shared by prominent rightwing figures – including Richard Tice, deputy leader of the hard-right, climate-sceptic Reform UK party, former Conservative cabinet minister Jacob Rees-Mogg and multiple commentators.

Ridley repeated the claim of Europe having a “quiet” year for wildfires in an article for the Spectator, which was reprinted in the Daily Mail.

Separately, Wielicki also shared a chart on Twitter to imply that wildfires in Europe are declining. Wielicki has previously claimed that the “science is not settled on climate change”.

Author and self-styled “sceptical environmentalist” Bjorn Lomborg has also shared similar charts on Twitter. 

These charts all use data from the Global Wildfire Information System (GWIS). The GWIS category for “Europe” encompasses all the countries on the continent and includes the whole of Russia.

As a result, Russia accounts for about 74% of the area included in the GWIS definition of “Europe”.

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Wildfires in Russia typically account for 80-90% of the burned area in the GWIS Europe dataset. In 2026, fires in Russia are substantially below average. Therefore, including Russia in this comparison creates the false impression that wildfire activity across Europe is unusually low.

Dr Calum Cunningham, a research fellow at the University of Tasmania’s Fire Centre, says that such claims are “highly misleading”, noting that “they rely on aggregating fire activity across an enormous and climatically diverse region”. He tells Carbon Brief:

“A relatively quiet season in Russia can easily mask an exceptionally active season in France or Spain. If the analysis is focused on the regions actually experiencing the current fires, the picture is very different.

“The reality is that western Europe has experienced an extraordinary sequence of climate conditions this year.”

In contrast, the EFFIS provides a subset of wildfire data specifically for the area covered by the 27 nations of the EU, which, therefore, excludes Russia. 

Another difference between the two datasets is that GWIS monitors all fires – including those on agricultural land that are intentionally set alight. The burned area as measured by GWIS contains significant cropland area. 

By contrast, EFFIS uses land-cover data and other information to filter specifically for forest fires. 

Looking at the EU-only data from EFFIS reveals that Europe is far from having its “quietest” year. The bloc’s burned area, as of 29 July, is almost 435,000 hectares (ha) – second only to 2022 for this time of year.

Notably, Wielicki has actually continued to post charts based on GWIS data, even after acknowledging that “includ[ing] all of Russia, including vast areas of Siberia…isn’t a good proxy for Europe”.

French fires

Even looking at EU-wide data misses the scale of this year’s wildfires for some individual countries.

The chart below shows the surge in burned area in France since mid-July.

For much of the first half of the year, the country was having a wildfire season that was only slightly above average in terms of total burned area. However, a notable uptick began in the first week of July.

The third week of the month saw France break its previous cumulative annual record by more than 19,000ha. That gap has widened as the fires continue to burn; as of 29 July, the cumulative burned area in France during 2026 was nearly 24,700ha above the previous record. 

The fires in France follow a record-breaking June heatwave that “dried out vegetation across the region, allowing fires to spread quickly”, wrote the New York Times. 

On 27 July, French president Emmanuel Macron called a “crisis cabinet meeting” in order to address the fires “ravaging several areas of south-west France”, said France 24.

More than 220,000 people have been evacuated due to the Gironde fire, west of Bordeaux, in “what may be France’s largest peacetime evacuation”, reported the Associated Press.

In the Conversation, Cunningham and two other University of Tasmania researchers write that evacuation orders “protec[t] human lives, but makes it more likely houses and other structures will burn if there’s no one to defend them”. They add:

“There is little doubt climate change has made France and Spain’s wildfires worse. They represent yet another reason to redouble our efforts to tackle climate change and stabilise our climate.”

Central Spain scorched

While Spain’s fire season has not broken records in the same way that France’s has, it is on track to be among the worst since EFFIS began reporting data in 2006. 

The chart below shows the rapid increase in burned area in Spain since 8 July. The latest data from EFFIS reveal that, as of 29 July, Spain has almost matched its previous record at this point in the year. It is also nearly five times the average area burned for this time of year.

In Spain, the wildfires have been concentrated in the central part of the country, near Madrid. 

BBC News reported that the fires outside the capital have burned “an area more than twice as large as the city itself”.

Nearly 90,000 people were forced from their homes in central Spain by the fires, said the Associated Press. 

Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s prime minister, called the fires a “painful expression” of climate change.

Meanwhile, the UK, French and Spanish governments have issued joint statements this week in response to the fires. The UK/Spain statement begins:

“This summer’s wildfires demonstrated that climate change was now a national security emergency facing Europe and threatening our way of life.”

updated

This article was updated on 31/07/2026 to include Matt Ridley’s Spectator and Daily Mail articles.

Related Mapped: How climate change affects extreme weather around the world 19.03.2026 Attribution Climate change made ‘fire weather’ in Chile and Argentina three times more likely 11.02.2026 Attribution Global wildfires burned an area of land larger than India in 2024 16.10.2025 Land and soils Analysis: Record UK wildfires have burned an area twice the size of Glasgow in 2025 08.08.2025 Extreme weather

The post Factcheck: No, Europe is not having its ‘quietest’ year for wildfires appeared first on Carbon Brief.

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Neha Pathak

Most of us sense it without being told why: A walk in the woods or an hour in the park leaves us calmer, clearer, and restored. Increasingly, modern science agrees. A growing body of evidence links time in nature to better physical and mental health – and a major new effort is working to document exactly what that evidence shows.

That effort is called the Nature Record, and its survival is a story in itself. It began as the National Nature Assessment, a federal undertaking modeled on the long-running National Climate Assessment and mandated by a Biden-era executive order. Roughly 180 scientists volunteered to develop about a dozen chapters. The project had reached an early public-comment draft when the Trump administration canceled it. Rather than abandon the work, the authors decided to finish it independently under a new name, with foundation funding and National Academy of Sciences review.

Howard Frumkin, a physician-epidemiologist and a professor emeritus at the University of Washington, led the assessment’s chapter on human health. Yale Climate Connections spoke with him about how the report survived, what the science says about nature’s health benefits, why those benefits aren’t shared equally, and what it all means for communities and the healthcare system.

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Yale Climate Connections: The connection between nature, health, and climate change pulls together fields that don’t usually sit at the same table. How do you frame that intersection?

Howard Frumkin: This intersection of the natural world and human health – in the context of climate change – draws on three different lineages intellectually.

The first is the scientific evidence on the health benefits of nature contact, which is what the Nature Record is focusing on. So if you or I take a walk in a forest or in a park, we have nature contact, and something about that is good for us. We don’t fully understand. It might be the visual appreciation of beautiful nature; it might be phytoncides – biogenic chemicals that we’re inhaling. It could be the quiet, could be the physical activity. But nature also delivers benefits without direct contact: The upstream ecosystem in the watershed that delivers clean water is good for health. We may never go up there, but we still benefit from it.

The second is the whole literature on climate solutions, indicating that coastal mangrove forests and sponge cities and tree canopy deliver benefits both in terms of climate mitigation and adaptation: We can store carbon, reduce temperatures of neighborhoods, we can manage storm water.

Then there’s a third line of thinking, which has to do with the human relationship with the natural world. In Indigenous and tribal wisdom, there’s talk of reciprocity, the shared relationship that we have as part of nature, the obligations for stewardship, the legal concepts of the rights of nature. All of that is related to, but different than, the climate benefits piece because it’s explicitly not instrumental; it’s not transactional; it’s relational. You come into that thinking about the right relationship that we as humans should have with the natural world – not because of what it gets us.

Yale Climate Connections: So how did the Nature Record come to be, and how did the project survive after the federal government withdrew its support?

Frumkin: It was a pretty simple concept: the idea that you can’t take good care of what you don’t know. There was a perception that if we were to be good stewards of our natural heritage in this country, we needed an inventory. We needed to take stock of what we had, and not just at a fixed moment in time but over time to understand the trends that were affecting nature and the benefits it delivers. The model for doing that was the National Climate Assessment, which is the every-four-year assessment of climate change in the U.S. – how it’s unfolding, what the impacts are on humans – mandated by federal legislation back in the 1990s. It comes with lots of federal procedures, in terms of scientific rigor, transparency, public review, and so on. Out of that conceptual commitment to taking stock of what we have, and using the model of the National Climate Assessment, an executive order in the Biden administration mandated the creation of the National Nature [Assessment].

It got as far as a “zero order draft,” – what regular people call an outline – that was published in the Federal Record and made available for public comment. And no sooner did that happen than the Trump inauguration happened, and the Trump administration killed the National Nature Assessment.

By then we had rostered around 12 chapters with around 15 authors each, so we had 180 authors all volunteering time, representing academic institutions and agencies and NGOs across the country. And pretty much in the blink of an eye, everybody said, “Let’s do it anyway … This work is so important, and the value is so clear that we don’t need to be a federal undertaking.”

There were some legal issues, like we couldn’t use the same name; federal employees could no longer participate because of potential risks to them and to the project. We found foundation support in early 2025, and by mid-2025 [it was] clear that we had enough money, energy, and commitment that we could continue. We landed on the Nature Record, and we’re proceeding almost in some ways as if it were a federal document – with transparency, National Academy of Sciences review, very careful documentation of all factual claims – partly because rigor will give a lot of credibility to the report, and partly because it would be a good thing for this to return to being a federal effort. If we have followed all the rules, dotted all the i’s, and crossed all the t’s, this can be reimported into government.

That said, being nonfederal offers some advantages. We can be more flexible and nimble, more creative in the ways we undertake outreach and build partnerships, and publicize and disseminate what we find. In some ways, this is a blessing in disguise. We have, for example, a national poetry effort running alongside the Nature Record, and we’ve published a book of poetry. We’ve engaged young people in graphic arts related to the benefits of nature. Bringing that creativity to bear has been a really nice part of the project.

Yale Climate Connections: When you dug into the evidence for the health chapter, what were the biggest takeaways or trends you saw?

Frumkin: The first key message is that, in general, nature contact is good for people; it’s health-promoting. The second is that those benefits are unequally distributed across society. Some of us have much better or easier access to nature than others. It’s an equity issue, because poor people and people of color disproportionately tend to have less access to parks and high-quality park programming, through the legacies of redlining and other historical trends.

But it’s not just that conventional form of equity that’s important. People with disabilities have difficulty accessing natural places. Older people have difficulty because too many parks lack accessible trails and shade, and children often lack access because safe, easy access to green space is rare in many communities.

Another trend is more screen time and less green time. People are spending less time outdoors. On the other hand, there are some emerging technologies that may facilitate nature contact, such as Merlin [the birdsong identification app], which may help deepen people’s appreciation of nature, and there’s reason to think that being more familiar with it deepens nature connectedness.

Four takeaways about health and nature from the Nature Record

• Nature contact is broadly good for human health.
• Those benefits are unequally distributed – by race, income, age, and disability.
• Long-term trends, such as rising screen time and falling green time, are reshaping how people benefit – for better and worse.
• Evidence-based interventions, like well-designed park programming, can reliably strengthen nature’s health benefits.

Yale Climate Connections: If the evidence that nature helps is solid, how much do we actually know about why – and about how much nature is enough?

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Frumkin: One of the most interesting parts of this is that although we have pretty solid evidence that nature contact benefits health, we know precious little about how it works. So you may walk through a forest and benefit from seeing the natural beauty of the forest. We have lab evidence that T cells do better after contact with natural compounds than they otherwise would. It may be that the benefit comes from the fact that you’re walking through the forest with friends, and social contacts in natural settings are soothing and restorative. It may be that natural settings call on us just to get out there and take a walk, and the physical activity is a really effective promoter of good health.

Not knowing the pathways and mechanisms of benefits makes it a little difficult to prescribe. And we don’t know a lot about the varieties of nature and which ones are more or less effective. Do you need trees, or do shrubs do the trick? Do you need immersion, or viewing nature out the window? Do you need the real thing, or might virtual nature provide some of the same benefits? Do you need to get out every day, or does a few times a week suffice? So these are a lot of questions we still need to try to answer.

The potential benefits of nature contact are strong, much less expensive than pharmaceuticals, free of side effects, and don’t need to be prescribed by a licensed healthcare provider. The cost-benefit implications are potentially enormous if we get it right and understand best how to optimize those benefits.

Yale Climate Connections: As a physician, I hear a real fear of nature from patients: ticks and mosquito-borne disease, allergies, wildfire smoke, and extreme weather – and climate change is heightening those risks. How do you balance nature’s benefits against these threats?

Frumkin: Rarely in life can you eliminate risk altogether, but you can manage risk.

The risks of being outside: Well, there’s a risk of sunburn – but we can manage that risk with sunblock and with protective clothing. The risk of ticks – that’s a real risk. But we can manage that risk: inspecting ourselves after we’ve been in tick-infested areas and using bug repellent to keep the ticks away. So for each risk, we can reduce the risk by managing it well.

Yale Climate Connections: How do you hope communities will use the Nature Record?

Frumkin: So for communities, here’s an example. Almost every community in the country now has a housing shortage, and there is a need to build more housing. And to do that in economically and environmentally efficient ways generally means density. Density can collide with protecting nature. This report will make it clear that balancing the protection of nature with fulfillment of other human needs – like housing – is a key set of trade-offs we need to tackle and be explicit about.

Using the insights from this report, design strategies that both protect nature and provide nearby nature contact and also provide housing and transportation – which means in many cases nonmotorized transportation, active transport, cycling, and walking. The design of communities needs to take into account all these needs: environment, human, and equity.

Yale Climate Connections: Hospitals and health systems have a natural connection to health, not only through the care they provide but also through the spaces they create. As they consider land use decisions, including parking needs and opportunities for green space, what should they keep in mind?

Frumkin: Two thoughts. One is that we know a lot about how to build green, and that means the buildings themselves, with biophilic principles. It means the environmental performance of the buildings – what are called green buildings – and it means the situation of buildings in lots, protecting nearby nature. That’s a good way to build; it’s economical. There may be increased up-front costs, but they’re generally recoverable in a short number of years, and they deliver health benefits to patients and staff.

The second message is that nonprofit hospitals are required to carry out community health needs assessments and to invest in community health based on the findings of those assessments.

Nature deficit is a community health need, and in my view ought to be a part of every community health needs assessment. To the extent that it’s documented, hospitals can consider investing funds in local parks, either for developing parks or planning programming in parks that we know improve community health.

I would urge hospitals to think about nature deficit as one of those community health needs and then consider investments in nature contact for people in their catchment areas as a means of promoting public health.

Yale Climate Connections: Finally, what makes you most hopeful?

Frumkin: For me, one of the biggest potential sources of despair is the polarization and ideological hysteria that seems to be sweeping our country and many others as well. But this topic offers a counterbalance, because across the political spectrum people love the natural world and appreciate it.

Hunters and anglers and campers may be far right politically, but they have common cause with environmentalists who may be on the political left. There aren’t too many domains that can unite us across the ideological divide that bedevils the country now, but this is one.

I think the fact that we’re approaching this entire Nature Record in an apolitical way, and framing it in terms of benefits that all Americans can enjoy, gives me hope that we may be able to help overcome one of the biggest challenges we face.

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The global goal to halt and reverse nature loss by 2030 “will not be achieved” unless action by countries “accelerates rapidly”, says a draft UN report.

Countries are falling short on 22 of the 23 targets for 2030 they set under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature”.

That is according to a draft version of a global report prepared by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), published on 26 July.

The report will be finalised ahead of the next nature summit, COP17, taking place in Armenia in October of this year.

The second draft of the global report has undergone “peer review”, but will still be subject to “technical edits” before being formally published ahead of COP17.

The final version will inform a global review of countries’ progress towards meeting the world’s 2030 nature goals, which will take place in Armenia.

Below, Carbon Brief explains why the report has been produced and what it says about countries’ progress in areas such as restoring ecosystems and raising funds for biodiversity.

• Global report
• Overall findings
  • Protecting and restoring nature
  • Climate and biodiversity links
  • Subsidies
  • Mobilising finance
  • Genetic resources
  • Pollution
  • Invasive species

Article Contents Expand menu

• Global report
• Overall findings
• Protecting and restoring nature
• Climate and biodiversity links
• Subsidies 
• Mobilising finance
• Genetic resources
• Pollution
• Invasive species

Global report

In Montreal, Canada, in 2022, nearly every country in the world agreed to the GBF. The overall “mission” of the framework is to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. Its “vision” is to bring the world into “harmony with nature” by 2050.

The GBF includes a list of 23 targets for 2030. They cover an expansive range of topics, from restoring ecosystems, to addressing pollution and providing developing nations with finance to help cover the costs of protecting nature.

As part of the GBF and its underlying documents, countries agreed to a schedule for monitoring their progress towards achieving the 2030 targets.

This included the preparation of a “global report” of progress coordinated by the CBD, which will inform a “global review” undertaken by countries at COP17.

The global report draws on countries’ national reports, which were due to be submitted to the UN in February of this year. It also draws on countries’ national nature plans, known as “national biodiversity strategies and action plans” (NBSAPS) and national targets, which were both due in 2024.

Not all countries have met the call to publish these documents and targets. According to the UN, 45% of countries published NBSAPs in time to be considered for the report, 83% had submitted at least one national target and 66% had produced their new national report. 

The first draft of the global report was published on 29 June 2026. This draft was subject to a “peer review process”, which invited countries and observers, such as NGOs and businesses, to submit comments on all aspects of the report.

The second draft, which has been revised based on the peer review, was published on Sunday 26 July. (This was just ahead of COP17 preparatory talks being held in Nairobi from 27 July to 1 August.)

A final version of the global report will be formally published ahead of COP17, which will take place from 19-30 October.

Overall findings

The second draft of the global report says that the GBF has led to “unprecedented” interest in tackling biodiversity loss, but adds:

“However, unless collective implementation accelerates rapidly, the 2030 targets and mission will not be achieved.”

It says that countries have taken some action to address all 23 targets, but that “no target presents a fully positive picture”.

(The first draft has slightly softer language. It “concludes that the world is not yet on track to collectively meet the global ambitions that the parties to the convention set when they adopted the framework”.)

The report identifies “two distinct gaps in progress”, relating to ambition and implementation.

First, that the national targets and plans submitted by countries “do not yet fully reflect the scope and level of ambition” of the global targets in the GBF.

Second, countries are not taking sufficient action to achieve their targets, according to the report.

It adds that progress is “particularly lagging” for addressing the “indirect drivers of biodiversity loss”, such as harmful business practices and government subsidies promoting them.

In addition, countries are showing “consistent gaps” in making progress on taking action to protect “marine, coastal and inland water ecosystems”.

The report produces a “scorecard” assessing countries’ progress towards meeting each of the 23 targets of the GBF.

The scorecard includes an “overall score” of between 0 and 1 for each target. This is calculated by considering countries’ self-reported progress in their plans and targets, as well as an assessment of progress based on a set of agreed indicators.

The results are split into four categories: 0-0.25 is red, 0.25-0.5 is orange, 0.5-0.75 is yellow and 0.75-1 is green.

The report gives a “green” score for just one target, indicating overall positive progress. This is target 8, on “minimising” the impact of climate change on biodiversity, including through mitigation and adaptation.

Elsewhere, the draft says that countries have “reported gaps in the scale and timely provision” of “financial resources, capacity-building and development, technical and scientific cooperation, access to and transfer of technology, and knowledge sharing”. It adds:

“These barriers can result in uneven capacities and cause specific technical and financial constraints for all parties, but particularly for developing-country parties. It is likely these constraints are even more pressing for least developed countries and small island developing states.”

Protecting and restoring nature

Target 3 of the GBF is for countries to protect “30% of Earth’s land and sea for nature” by the end of the decade. 

This commitment – referred to as “30 by 30” – is widely considered the flagship target of the agreement.

Target 3 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD

The report says that countries are making “progress in expanding and managing protected areas, especially for marine and coastal areas”. But it adds that “current ambition and implementation remain insufficient to fully achieve all aspects of the target”.

It continues that, according to countries’ available national targets, “monitoring and reporting of some elements of the target remains low”. This includes “those relating to equitable governance of protected areas” and “recognition of Indigenous and local territories”.

The report adds that countries “face significant challenges in implementation, particularly related to lack of finance and capacity”.

(An investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian in 2025 revealed that more than half of nations that have submitted UN biodiversity plans do not commit to “30 by 30” within their borders.)

Another conservation measure included in the GBF is target 2, which aims to ensure that at least 30% of land and sea areas are under restoration by 2030. 

Target 2 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD

The report says that “restoration efforts are expanding”. However, it says that “current commitments to restore areas and implementation of those commitments remain below the level required” to achieve target 2.

It adds that countries’ national targets are “generally well aligned with target 2”, but that “addressing the effectiveness of restoration efforts is often absent”.

Moreover, the report adds that monitoring of progress is “constrained by inconsistent definitions and monitoring approaches for ecosystem degradation and restoration”.

Another “major barrier” is a lack of available finance for developing countries looking to restore ecosystems, it says.

Climate and biodiversity links

Target 8 of the GBF is the only one to specifically address climate change, one of the major drivers of biodiversity loss.

It says countries should “minimise the impact of climate change” on biodiversity through mitigation and adaptation, including “nature-based solutions” and “ecosystem-based approaches”.

Target 8 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD

Target 8 was the only one to achieve a “green” marking in the report’s scorecard of progress (see: Overall findings).

The report says that actions to make biodiversity more resilient against climate change are “progressing”. Yet “implementation remains constrained by data gaps, limited means of implementation and the need for stronger coherence between biodiversity, climate and disaster risk reduction planning”.

It continues that countries’ national targets “generally” show “good alignment” with target 8, across “all elements apart from efforts to minimise the impacts of ocean acidification”.

It adds that the deployment of nature-based solutions and ecosystem restoration is not yet at a “sufficient scale”.

Subsidies 

Overall progress is “insufficient” on target 18, which calls on countries to identify subsidies and other incentives that are harmful for biodiversity by 2025, says the GBF report. 

It also outlines that nations should “eliminate, phase out or reform” these subsidies in a “proportionate” way, reducing them by at least $500bn per year by 2030. 

Countries should first target the “most harmful” incentives, while simultaneously scaling up positive incentives for nature, it adds. 

Target 18 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

The report finds that countries have made some progress in assessing, compiling inventories and commissioning studies on harmful subsidies. 

But issues remain, such as incomplete data and the lack of agreed definitions on which subsidies are deemed “harmful”. 

Several national reports also note “entrenched interests and political barriers to subsidy reform”, says the report. 

Only one-quarter of countries’ national targets that are “highly aligned” with target 18 are “on track” to be met, it finds. Most show “insufficient progress”. 

It notes that 38% of countries have addressed the 2025 aim to identify harmful subsidies in their national targets “to some extent”. 

Countries’ national reports do not “provide a sufficient basis to determine” whether this goal was met, says the report, but available evidence “suggests” that it was not. 

Recent analysis by Carbon Brief found that just 16% of the 134 national reports submitted so far appear to meet the aim. 

The report outlines that half of countries have set national targets addressing plans to eliminate, phase out or reform harmful incentives. Almost 60% mention scaling up positive incentives, it adds. 

Just 27%, however, address the issue of reducing subsidies by at least $500bn annually by 2030. Also, only 5% set quantitative national targets to reduce subsidies.

There are two headline “indicators” to measure progress on target 18. The first shows that 30% of countries have outlined information on their nature-positive incentives.

The second indicator shows that 22 countries submitted the value of their biodiversity-harmful subsidies, which amounted to a total of $268bn spent on harmful subsidies over 2022 to 2025 – averaging $67bn each year. 

Carbon Brief’s analysis had identified an estimated $270bn each year, based on a wider list of submissions from 32 countries. (More countries submitted national reports since the CBD’s deadline to be included in the global report in February.) 

All of these figures remain well below the estimated trillions of US dollars spent annually. 

The report notes that different methodologies could lead to global subsidy estimate “inconsistencies”, meaning that reported values are likely “underestimates”. 

The amount of positive incentives in place is also likely underestimated, it adds. 

The report says that harmful subsidies may have declined by around 20% in recent years, based on figures consistently reported by a minority of countries over 2022-24. 

Despite this, the total value of subsidies “remains higher than the resources that parties reported mobilising for biodiversity”. (See: Mobilising finance.) 

Mobilising finance

Overall progress on raising biodiversity finance has been “insufficient”, according to the report. 

Goal D of the GBF, shown below, states that countries must close a $700bn biodiversity gap by 2030 through ending harmful subsidies ($500bn per year) and mobilising resources from the global north to south ($200bn per year). 

Goal D of the Global Biodiversity Framework refers to a $700bn biodiversity finance gap. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

This target aims to raise “at least $200bn per year” by 2030 from “all sources”, including domestic, international, public and private funding. 

In all, countries reported raising a cumulative total of $186.4bn over four years, according to the report. 

While it adds that it “is still too early to conclude”, the report states that the total finance mobilised so far “falls far short” of what is needed to close the biodiversity finance gap.

Target 19, shown below, states that developed countries and others should boost finance for nature to “at least $20bn” per year by 2025 and “at least $30bn” by 2030. This falls to developed countries and others that “voluntarily assume” the obligation of contributing.

However, the report suggests that the milestone of raising “at least $20bn per year by 2025” was “likely not achieved”. 

Target 19 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

Between 2020 and 2023, reporting countries cumulatively raised just $17.7bn in international public funding for biodiversity, according to the report. 

This amounts to an average of $4.4bn per year between 2020-23, with the total touching its highest at $5.2bn in 2023. 

The report cautions that this figure “should be read as a minimum”, as it does not account for all potential flows of biodiversity finance. 

Both estimates “fall below the $20bn milestone”, although the report adds that a “definitive assessment will only be possible” once data for 2024 and 2025 are included. 

An earlier draft of the report included language noting that biodiversity-related “official development assistance” remains “well below the agreed 2025 milestone”. This was cut from the summary in this latest iteration of the report.

References to the OECD reporting a “shortfall in funding” and projecting “a decrease for 2024 and 2025” – suggesting the $20bn target was “unlikely to be met” – were also removed from the latest draft. 

The chart below shows how international public funding for biodiversity has varied from 2020 to 2023, according to the report. 

The yearly sum of official development assistance provided by donor countries (blue) for biodiversity conservation (in billions) and the average share of national GDP (in %) represented by their national value (red). Source: UN CBD 2026

By comparison, domestic spending makes the largest cumulative contribution to biodiversity finance, at ($135.9bn) over the four years. However, spending has “declined” as a share of GDP. It also notes that spending varies “greatly”, from 0.1% to 2.7% of GDP. 

According to the report, many countries highlighted that national budget allocations for biodiversity are “far too low” and that biodiversity “frequently loses out to competing development priorities”, including “defence, food security and infrastructure”.

At COP15 in Montreal, the EU and several other countries pushed for the inclusion of “all sources” of finance in the final text – including private finance and “innovative” schemes. 

Private and “innovative” biodiversity finance – which spans a plethora of sources such biodiversity offsets and debt-for-nature swaps – was eventually included in target 19.

The report, however, notes that private finance “peaked in 2021 and fell afterwards” and “remains particularly undeveloped”, with a cumulative total of $32.7bn between 2020-23. 

At the same time, the report notes that only 26% of all countries had reported data on private biodiversity finance, making it harder to assess funding declines in 2022 and 2023.

Genetic resources

The report finds there has been limited progress on sharing genetic biodiversity data. 

”Digital sequence information” (DSI) refers to genetic data derived from biodiversity, which is often sourced from species in biodiversity-rich developing countries. 

These countries have long called for an international mechanism to ensure that the benefits of DSI are shared fairly with the people living where the resources were “discovered”, including Indigenous communities.

At COP16, countries agreed to the first-ever global fund, called the Cali Fund, for companies profiting from genetic data to contribute to conservation goals on a voluntary basis.

However, experts have cautioned that much rests on whether countries develop strong national laws to support the COP16 agreement. This could include incentivising companies in their regions to contribute to the fund. 

In the GBF, target 13 and goal C address elements of DSI, including the sharing of benefits from genetic resources and their digital derivatives.

Target 13 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

According to the report, 79% of countries submitted national targets that address legal, policy and administrative measures to enable benefit-sharing from DSI. Some 71% included measures to facilitate access to genetic resources. 

The report finds that the “strongest progress” has been in developing laws and policies, which are now at an intermediate stage. 

The “most fundamental regulatory barrier”, according to many countries cited, is the lack of a “dedicated” national framework to enable access to genetic resources and share benefits with communities. 

This would involve enacting laws compatible with the GBF, setting up digital registries to catalogue and trace genetic resources, as well as implementing tracking systems to monitor how they are used. It would also include a financial mechanism to pay communities for the use of their traditional knowledge. 

Goal C of the Global Biodiversity Framework covers benefit-sharing from genetic resources and DSI, as well as protection of traditional knowledge. Source: UN CBD (2022)

Progress in monitoring monetary and non-monetary benefits from DSI is “much weaker” and is “particularly limited” for measures related to the Cali fund.

According to the report, most parties have “no monitoring systems [for evaluating benefits from genetic resources] in place, or [are] still developing them”. It says they add that the benefits from genetic resources are hard to track “across borders and along value chains through to the final product”.

For those that have tracked benefits, it says that countries reported a cumulative $6.9m in receipts from the use of genetic resources between 2022 and 2025. It adds that “several parties reported that they had received no monetary benefits” to date. 

Countries also reported more than 960 non-monetary benefits, ranging from technical training to research participation. The report cautions that these “fluctuated over time rather than increasing consistently, and cannot be seen as indicative of global benefit-sharing”. 

In December 2025, Carbon Brief reported that the Cali fund had received only one contribution of $1,000 as an “icebreaker”. No other major companies have stepped up to fill the fund. 

Meanwhile, the report states that the formal protection of traditional knowledge held by Indigenous peoples and local communities remained “underdeveloped”. 

It says that a “significant number” of countries raised concerns about gaps in recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights and dedicated registries to document their traditional knowledge. 

The report says it is not yet possible to assess progress towards goal C:

“To date it is not possible to comment on whether benefits are being shared fairly and equitably nor on the role played by traditional knowledge and Indigenous peoples and local communities. Therefore, progress towards goal C cannot yet be assessed.”

Pollution

Target 7 of the GBF focuses on tackling pollution from pesticides, chemicals, plastic and other sources. 

It calls for countries to reduce pollution risks and negative impacts “from all sources” to “levels that are not harmful” to biodiversity and ecosystems by 2030. 

It also aims to reduce excess nutrients in the environment and overall risks from pesticides and hazardous chemicals by “at least half”. 

The draft report finds that there is no significant change or insufficient progress on 60% of national targets categorised as being highly aligned with target 7. Only one-third of these national targets (35%) are on track to be achieved by 2030. 

On average, it says countries have addressed around half of the various elements of target 7 “to some extent” in their national targets. 

The most frequently-mentioned aspect of the target – addressed by 72% of countries – refers to reducing pollution from all sources by 2030. 

One headline indicator related to target 7 focuses on the concentration of pesticides in the environment. 

Just five countries out of 125 submitted estimates on this, according to the report. It says only one country has met the aim of halving the overall risk from pesticides on a national basis so far.  

Measures to address plastic pollution are the most frequently reported actions by countries in relation to this target, including bans on single-use bags and straws. 

A number of countries in Europe and Asia have also implemented measures to reduce nutrient losses from fertilisers and slurry. 

A “major challenge” for countries in advancing pollution aims is “effectively and fairly considering and managing impacts on food security and livelihoods”, according to the report. 

Several countries point to a lack of national funding to implement measures towards achieving this target. 

Some developing countries also list poor wastewater-treatment infrastructure as a “persistent challenge” on this issue. 

Invasive species

Invasive alien species refers to those that have moved to and become established in a region outside their natural habitat, as a result of human activities. This has negative impacts for local biodiversity and ecosystems.

Target 6 of the GBF calls for countries to, among other things, reduce the rates of introduction and establishment of invasive alien species by 50% by 2030. 

The draft report says countries are “taking action” on this target, but progress is “difficult to assess”. 

Two-thirds of national targets aligned with target 6 show “no significant progress or insufficient progress”, it finds. Fewer than one-third are on track to be achieved by 2030 and just 1% of these national targets have already been achieved. 

But most countries have made progress in putting in place measures to manage invasive species – mostly focusing on reducing the introduction rate and impact of species. 

Countries have addressed around half of the different elements of the invasive species target “to some extent” in their national targets, finds the report. 

But fewer than one-third (30%) have set national targets that put a numeric goal on reducing invasive species. 

Island biosecurity programmes and measures to intercept invasive species at country borders are among the actions countries have put in place to tackle the issue. 

The report lists some barriers countries say stand in the way of achieving the target. These include a lack of baseline data from which to measure a 50% reduction rate, poor early-detection systems and a lack of funding for long-term reduction efforts. 

Some countries also cite capacity and technical challenges in monitoring invasive species, according to the report. 

They say many of these species “go unnoticed for years before impacts become apparent”, it adds, with countries arguing that setting a specific reduction target is “challenging”.

Related Factcheck: No, Europe is not having its ‘quietest’ year for wildfires 30.07.2026 Extreme weather Analysis: 84% of nations miss deadline to identify ‘nature-harming’ subsidies by 2025  28.07.2026 International policy UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo  15.07.2026 Nature Livestock heat deaths in transit doubled in UK record-hot summer of 2025 25.06.2026 Food and farming

The post World falling short on 22 of 23 nature targets for 2030, says draft UN report appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Rising temperatures are redistributing the risk of childhood malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in areas of “new risk” in the east and south of the continent, but also “relief hotspots” in western Africa.

This is according to a new study, published in Nature, which provides the “most comprehensive look to date at the impact of climate change on any infectious disease”.

The research finds that since the year 1900, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa on average. 

Over the 21st century, climate change is expected to drive down malaria rates across the continent on average, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes. 

However, the authors emphasise that continent-wide averages hide more detailed local trends. 

They find that cooler parts of Africa face an increase in malaria risk, as rising temperatures have made the regions more suitable for malaria-carrying mosquitoes, while warmer regions see a suppression in malaria cases.

The lead author tells Carbon Brief that this is the first study to use “attribution” – a field of climate science which uses models to compare conditions in a world with global warming to one without – to assess the impact of climate change on malaria.

The study also reveals that climate change is not the main driver of shifting malaria risk in Africa, with public health measures and government policy making a more significant impact.

The “most important” message from the study, according to another expert, is that to eliminate malaria entirely, “effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone”.

Childhood malaria

Malaria kills hundreds of thousands of people every year. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 610,000 people died due to the disease in 2024.

The disease is transmitted to humans by bites from mosquitoes infected with the malaria parasite. Malaria spreads most rapidly in warm, wet regions, where the parasite-carrying mosquitoes can live and breed.

However, malaria is preventable. A total of 42 countries – mainly in Europe and the Americas – have eliminated the disease entirely through a combination of measures including insecticide use, draining the swamplands that provide breeding habitats for mosquitoes and improving basic healthcare services .Global mortality from malaria declined by 90% over the 20th century. 

Today, the vast majority of malaria cases are recorded in Africa, which was home to 95% of malaria cases and deaths in 2024. Children under the age of five make up three-quarters of all African malaria deaths.

The malaria-causing parasite can be detected using a blood test. Over the last century, scientists, government officials and healthcare professionals have collected thousands of blood samples from people across sub-Saharan Africa and tested for the presence of the malaria parasite.

In 2017, scientists brought together more than 50,000 samples collected from sub-Saharan Africa over 1900-2016. This data provides a “snapshot” of the amount of malaria in the population in any year in the last century the study explains.

Dr Colin Carlson is an assistant professor of epidemiology at the Yale school of public health and lead author of the study. He tells Carbon Brief that malaria in Africa is “extraordinarily well documented”, as a result of academic interest and colonial rule in the continent.

The size and quality of the malaria dataset are “exceptionally rare”, Carlson says. He explains that the dataset stretches back to before the impacts of human-caused climate change were strongly felt, making it “extraordinarily” valuable for this analysis. 

The chart below shows the percentage of children between two and 10 years old who tested positive for the malaria parasite over 1900-2016. Each dot indicates one blood test result and the pink vertical bars indicate periods of “successful malaria prevention intervention”, such as the 1955-69 global malaria eradication programme.

The percentage of children between two to 10 years old who tested positive for the parasite that causes malaria between 1990 and 2016. Source: Carlson et al. (2026) Attribution

The authors use the blood test survey data to develop a statistical model separating out the climatic, social and economic factors that affect malaria, such as temperature, rainfall, economic development, healthcare and population changes. This allows the authors to isolate the effects of the climate on malaria.

They find that malaria prevalence in children peaks when average monthly temperatures reach 24.9C, dropping off in warmer and cooler climates. 

Mosquitoes also need stagnant or slow-moving water in which to lay their eggs. The authors find that periods of drought tend to decrease malaria prevalence one-to-two months later, whereas floods increase prevalence two-to-three months later. However, they conclude that rainfall is “less important than temperature” in predicting malaria rates.

They then combine the statistical models with climate models, to simulate childhood malaria rates in a range of past and future climates. 

First, the authors simulate malaria rates in the present day, by running the models using the climate of 2000-14. They then carry out the same analysis, using the climate of a hypothetical world without human-caused climate change.

By comparing the two, the authors were able to attribute the impact of climate change on malaria rates across Africa.

The link between climate change and malaria in Africa is complex and “surprisingly contentious”, according to the authors. For example, they write that “malaria resurgence in the east African highlands became a particular point of contention, with over a dozen studies arguing for or against climate change as a substantial driver”.

It adds:

“Today, malaria experts generally agree that climate change has contributed to elevational shifts in malaria epidemics and the geographical ranges of mosquito vectors. However, the cumulative effect of climate change on the burden of malaria is still an open question.”

Lead author Carlson says this paper is “one of the first impact attributions on infectious disease” and the first attribution study on climate change and malaria. He adds:

“I think it’s the most clarity we’ve had on the malaria question.”

Dr Teresa Yamana, an associate research scientist at Columbia University, who was not involved in the study, praises its “rigorous” methodology. She tells Carbon Brief that the work “demonstrates the potential of climate attribution methods to quantify the impacts of climate change on infectious diseases”. 

Warming world

The findings show that “climate change isn’t just making malaria worse or better – it’s moving it, says study author Prof Tamma Carleton, an assistant professor at UC Berkeley:

“Whether a place sees elevated malaria risks or reduced burdens under climate change depends on how hot it is today. We see relief in the hotspots and new risk nearly everywhere else.”

For example, in the Ethiopian highlands, low temperatures – which are unsuitable for mosquitoes to live and breed – have historically limited the spread of malaria. However, the region has seen childhood malaria rates increase by more than eight cases per 1,000 children since the year 1900 as rising temperatures have allowed the insects to expand their habitat.

The authors also found a similar increase in malaria prevalence in cooler southern African countries.

In contrast, global warming is pushing average temperatures above the ideal range for mosquitoes in many hotter parts of Africa, driving down malaria rates. The authors find that in western Africa, climate change has caused a reduction of four malaria cases per 1,000 children per year by 2014, reducing prevalence by 1-2%.

Overall, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa since the year 1900, the study says.

The authors also run their models for three future climate scenarios: low (SSP1-2.6), intermediate (SSP2-4.5) and very-high (SSP5-8.5) emissions pathways. Comparing these to the present-day model results shows how climate change could affect malaria cases over the coming century. 

They find that the trends observed so far will largely continue into the future – meaning climate change will lower the prevalence of malaria in warm regions and increase the prevalence in cool regions.

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The study concludes that under the intermediate scenario, which is broadly in line with current climate policies, warming will drive down childhood malaria cases by about three cases per 1,000 children in central Africa and 16 cases per 1,000 children in west Africa by the end of the century. 

By contrast, cases could increase by around 20% over the same period in regions such as the Rift Valley and coastal southern Africa – a rise of 30 cases per 1,000 children.

The maps below show changes in childhood malaria prevalence due to climate change in today’s climate (left) and the climate of 2096-2100 under the intermediate scenario (right). 

Red indicates an increase in malaria prevalence and blue indicates a decrease. Greyer colours indicate greater uncertainty in the model results. White indicates regions where no data was collected.

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Carlson tells Carbon Brief that this is “the first study to really confidently answer the highland East Africa debate”. 

Eradicating malaria

Healthcare workers, governments and scientists have been working to eliminate malaria for decades.

On average, the authors find that climate change will reduce the prevalence of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes. This effect is more pronounced at higher warming levels. 

Under the low emissions scenario, about 1 case per 1,000 children will be averted by the end of the century. Meanwhile under the highest emissions scenario, average prevalence falls by 20 cases per 1,000 children, marking a 9% reduction.

The graph below shows childhood malaria rates over 1990-2024 in the historical climate (blue) and in a world without climate change (grey). These estimates are shown relative to baseline prevalence across 1901-30.

After the year 2014, the plot shows projected future changes in malaria prevalence, relative to a 2015-20 baseline, in the low (purple), intermediate (pink) and high (green) scenarios.

Malaria prevalence in the historical climate (blue), historical climate without global warming (grey), low emissions scenario (purple), intermediate emissions scenario (pink) and very-high emissions scenario (green). Source: Carlson et al. (2026)

Carlson emphasises that this does not mean that climate change is “good news” for healthcare in sub-Saharan Africa. He explains that climate change will bring a wide range of negative health impacts that will strain healthcare systems, adding: 

“A world that is too hot for malaria is not a good world for the health of children.”

He also notes that climate change is “not the primary driving factor of malaria dynamics”. For example, he notes that malaria prevalence fell over 2000-15, by about 16 percentage points, after the disease was identified as a “critical global target of the Millennium Development Goals”.

This reduction is 200 times greater than the increase seen so far because of climate change, Carlson says. He adds: 

“It would not be tremendously hard both to keep malaria out of new places and to eliminate it where it is maybe going to get a little bit of an assist from climate change.”

Dr Adugna Woyessa is a senior researcher at the Ethiopian Public Health Institute and was not involved in the study. He has previously carried out research on malaria in eastern Africa.

Woyessa praises the study, telling Carbon Brief that the research could bring about a “paradigm shift” in efforts to eliminate malaria. He argues that the study is a “tool for engaging giant development partners”, adding that “future work will be needed to situate these global trends in local contexts”.

Dr Janey Messina is an associate professor in the school of geography and the environment at the University of Oxford and was also not involved in the study. She praises the paper’s “strong” method.

However, she cautions that the findings “should not be interpreted as forecasts of total future malaria burden”, because they only model the impact of climate change on malaria, while excluding “social, demographic and public-health determinants”, such as inequality, migration, conflict and changing access to malaria interventions.

She adds:

“One of the paper’s most important messages is this: effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone.”

Carlson, C. et al. (2026) The past and future impact of climate change on childhood malaria in Africa, Nature, doi:10.1038/s41586-026-10840-w

Related Q&A: Europe’s May and June heatwave deaths – and how they were counted 17.07.2026 Extreme weather Guest post: France’s June heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths 07.07.2026 Health and society Revealed: Floods have forced at least 67 closures at NHS hospitals since 2021 25.05.2026 Health and society Climate change could lead to 500,000 ‘additional’ malaria deaths in Africa by 2050 28.01.2026 Health and society

The post Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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China has released its “15th five-year plan for the development of renewable energy”, outlining key targets and policies for the sector in 2026-2030.

A key focus of the plan is boosting renewable generation and consumption as a share of China’s overall energy mix.

It calls for continued capacity additions of wind and solar – albeit at lower levels than previous years – as well as hydropower, biomass and other clean-energy sources.

Specifically, China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030,  2,800GW will be wind and solar. 

The country had previously pledged to install 1,200GW of wind and solar by 2030, a goal that China met six years early.

Another major theme is the provision of wind and solar supply that is “dependable” and “grid-friendly”.

Setting a target for “firm capacity” from wind and solar could help to entrench their role as a provider of “energy security”, according to analysts.

The government also aims to boost renewables consumption by developing non-power uses of renewable energy, in sectors such as steel and chemicals.

Below, Carbon Brief examines the key targets and policies outlined in the five-year plan and what they mean for China’s energy transition.

• Why are China’s five-year plans important?
• What overarching renewables targets are in the plan?
• Why does the plan focus on ‘firm capacity’ for renewables?
• What does the plan say about ‘distributed’ energy?
• What does the plan say about non-electricity use of renewables?
• What does the plan say about China’s cleantech dominance?

Article Contents Expand menu

• Why are China’s five-year plans important?
• What overarching renewables targets are in the plan? 
• Why does the plan focus on ‘firm capacity’ for renewables?
• What does the plan say about ‘distributed’ energy?
• What does the plan say about non-electricity use of renewables?
• What does the plan say about China’s cleantech dominance? 

Why are China’s five-year plans important?

Five-year plans are key to China’s political system. An overarching plan, covering all socioeconomic issues of importance to policy leaders, is published at the beginning of each five-year cycle. 

The plan for the 15th five-year period (2026-2030) was published in March 2026. 

It includes what the government considers to be the most important targets and policy signals for climate and energy. For example, binding targets for carbon intensity, the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption and total energy production capacity.

Following this overarching document, five-year plans focused on specific sectors or themes are then published over the course of the five-year plan period.

This year, the government has already published several five-year plans related to energy and climate change. One covers the development of the “new-type” energy sector more broadly. Another wraps climate goals together with other environmental targets under the “Beautiful China” programme.

By contrast, the renewables five-year plan focuses specifically on the development of hydropower, wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and wave energy.

It was published in late July by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the country’s top economic planning agency, and the National Energy Administration (NEA). 

It covers topics including capacity and generation targets, as well as efforts to increase integration and reliability of wind and solar. It also has policies to encourage “non-power use” of renewable energy and ways to strengthen innovation of clean-energy technologies.

What overarching renewables targets are in the plan? 

China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, according to the five-year plan.

Of this, 2,800GW will be wind and solar – a pledge reiterated from China’s action plan for peaking carbon emissions, which was released earlier this month. 

The goal more than doubles a previous 2030 target for wind and solar to reach 1,200GW, which China met six years early.

As of June 2026, the country has installed just under 2,000GW of wind and solar capacity, as well as 454GW of hydropower. Biomass, geothermal and wave energy hold very small shares of the overall energy mix. 

As such, China would need to build 160GW of wind and solar each year – and just under 220GW of renewable capacity in total – to meet the targets.

The country installed 277GW of new solar alone in 2024 – and 315GW in 2025. 

China’s total installed capacity of renewable energy from 2016-2025, and its target for 2030. Source: National Energy Administration, Carbon Brief.

A key part of meeting the targets will be the development of large-scale clean-energy bases in China’s northern regions. These will generate power to be exported elsewhere via ultra-high voltage lines. The plan also encourages greater “local consumption” and installations of distributed energy (see below).

The plan says that further research will be directed at increasing the renewable share of electricity generated by these large-scale energy bases to 100%.

A recent report by the thinktank Global Energy Monitor (GEM) finds that output from these bases “continues to be paired with coal-fired generation in the name of balancing and system flexibility”. It says that currently, coal generates 42% of the power transmitted to the rest of the country from these bases.

China will also add more hydropower, says the plan, with capacity rising from 448GW in 2025 to 570GW in 2030. Some 160GW of this will be pumped-storage hydropower.

Meanwhile, the plan sets a target for renewable power generation to reach 6,000 terawatt-hours (TWh), 4,000TWh of which would come from wind and solar. 

This would be a 50% increase in five years as renewables generated just under 4,000TWh of electricity in 2025, according to the National Energy Administration.

By 2030, the plan says that total consumption of renewable energy will stand at 1.8bn tonnes of coal equivalent (Gtce).

This would be up from 1.2Gtce in 2025, which represented about one-fifth of China’s total energy consumption of 6.2Gtce that year.

The renewable targets in the plan are lower than those suggested in a recent study by high-profile Chinese scholars.

The study, from the department of energy and power engineering and the Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development at Tsinghua University in Beijing, assessed the “likelihood of China attaining its carbon peak” under different pathways.

It found that, in order to meet its climate commitments, China would need to either install more than 4,000GW of “non-fossil energy capacity” before 2030, or to “maintain a total energy consumption” below 6.5Gtce.

The table below outlines some of the key renewables targets for 2030, as specified in the plan.

Key targets for 2030, adapted from 15th five-year plan for renewable energy  Type20252030Percentage changeRenewable energy use 1.2Gtce1.8Gtce53%Total renewables capacity2,340GW3,500GW50%Wind and solar capacity1,840GWMore than 2,800GW52%Of which: Solar thermal1.8GW15GW733%Hydro capacity450GW570GW27%Of which: Pumped storage hydropower66GW160GW142%Wave energy–0.4GW–Renewable generation4,000TWh6,000TWh50%Of which: Wind and solar2,300TWh4,000TWh74%Non-electricity use60Mtce150Mtce150%Renewable hydrogen0.25Mt2Mt700% Why does the plan focus on ‘firm capacity’ for renewables?

As well as increasing the overall size of China’s renewable power supply, the country must also maintain an “uninterrupted and reliable power supply”, officials from the NDRC and NEA told state news agency Xinhua in coverage of the new plan.

To support this goal, the plan says that the development of renewables will “enter a new stage”. This will mean that “improving quality and serving as a reliable alternative” to fossil fuels will be as important as “expanding scale”.

The plan, therefore, proposes targets for the “firm capacity” from wind and solar (置信出力). This is the amount plants or grids can be relied on to produce during critical supply periods, in conjunction with on-site storage.

The target for wind is a firm capacity of at least 11% of total installed capacity by 2030, while the equivalent goal for solar is 6%. 

Wind and solar will also be expected to supply more than 20% of total demand in peak periods during the summer and winter evenings, says the plan. It expects “reliable peak-shaving capacity from renewable sources” to reach more than 300GW.

The new targets are a “positive move”, says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, as it “only applies during peak load and critical supply periods, when coal power is typically used to stabilise the power supply”. 

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She adds that this could, theoretically, “prevent the construction of new coal-fired power projects that are proposed and approved for the reason of meeting peak demand”.

The new metrics mark a change in focus, says Lyu Wenbin, director general of the Energy Research Institute – a state thinktank under the NDRC – in an “explanatory reading” posted on BJX News. He says it “marks a shift in renewable energy development from the mere pursuit of installed capacity to…also taking into account system support capabilities”. 

The plan pledges to “accelerate the construction of grid-friendly wind and solar power stations”. It says this will enhance “reliable peak-load generation” and strengthen renewables’ ability to ensure “safe and stable operation” of the grid.

It says this will particularly be a focus in the energy-hungry east, central and south areas of China.

It sets out a slightly different focus for areas that already have a high share of renewables in their power mix, such as north-west China. Here, the aim will be to develop wind and solar parks that are “capable of providing voltage, frequency and inertia support”.

“This is a real challenge”, says James Norman, research analyst at GEM. He says these challenges are particularly acute in some circumstances:

“[For example], when the share of wind and solar is very high, relatively few synchronous generators (like coal) are online or large volumes of electricity are being transferred through high voltage DC lines.”

The plan mentions many technological solutions to address the problem, he tells Carbon Brief. However, he adds, there are no quantitative details for the issue. For example, he notes there is no target for “how many gigawatts of wind and solar must gain grid-forming capability”. This is in contrast to the goals for overall renewables capacity or generation.

Norman was a co-author on the recent GEM report, which identified further barriers to renewable uptake. It said these include transmission bottlenecks, alongside systemic features such as dispatching and power-contract mechanisms. 

As a result, said the report, renewable power – especially solar – is increasingly being “curtailed”, particularly in north-western and northern provinces.

Yao also notes that the plan does not “spell out specific measures to address systemic constraints” around the electricity grid and the role of coal in the power sector. 

“I interpret this as evidence that the vested interests are still strong in the policy debate,” she adds.

What does the plan say about ‘distributed’ energy?

Alongside gigawatt-scale clean-energy megabases, China also aims to expand construction of “distributed” energy. This means smaller-scale installations, such as rooftop solar.

More than 300GW of “distributed new energy” is to be added over 2026-30, some 60GW per year.

The plan aims for distributed new energy to be adopted in sectors such as industry, transport, buildings and agriculture. 

Applications include the use of distributed solar and wind in industrial parks, coal mines and oilfields, as well as encouraging residents to install solar panels on buildings and developing rural clean-energy grids.

In some regions, distributed solar and wind is “likely to meet a large proportion of local demand”, says Prof Pan Jiahua at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou). He tells Carbon Brief that micro- and mini-grids using such resources will be particularly important in central and coastal China.

The 60GW annual target for new distributed energy is not “overly ambitious”, says Isadora Wang, head of China at the thinktank Transition Asia. She tells Carbon Brief that distributed solar additions, alone, exceeded 100GW in both 2024 and 2025.

Cosimo Ries, analyst at the consultancy Trivium China, agrees that the target is reachable. The biggest question mark, he tells Carbon Brief, is whether it will continue to make sense for industry and utilities to build distributed power at the volumes seen during the 14th five-year plan period. 

He adds that market conditions for distributed solar have deteriorated sharply over the past two years. He says a range of factors have hit investor confidence:

“[Distributed solar faces] growing exposure to market trading, worsening returns in spot markets, growing risks of curtailment and new policies limiting or forbidding the selling of power back to the grid.”

What does the plan say about non-electricity use of renewables?

The plan also sets goals for renewable energy’s role in “non-electricity use”.

This means using renewable energy for purposes other than generating electricity, through converting it to other forms, such as heat or mechanical energy.

The government is aiming for non-power use to nearly triple from 60m tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) in 2025 to 150Mtce in 2030. 

Ries tells Carbon Brief that he thinks this target is “one of the main highlights” of the plan. However, he notes that limited available data means it is hard to assess the level of its ambition. He adds that, given the relative conservatism of China’s other recent clean-energy targets, this one may also be met relatively easily.

Key applications for non-power use of renewables include “green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol”, says the plan. It also points to using wind and solar for heat, as well as to biomass and geothermal for heating and cooling. 

Green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol are the “centrepiece” of the non-power push, according to state-owned newspaper Economic Information Daily.

For hydrogen alone, China plans to scale up renewable hydrogen production to 2m tonnes in 2030, up from 250,000 tonnes in 2025.

Today, non-power use of renewables accounts for only around 1% of China’s total energy consumption, NEA and NDRC officials said in a Q&A. They added that there is “considerable room for growth” in sectors such as industry, transport and buildings.

Potential new applications include the use of wind and solar for heat. This could see the use of centralised wind and solar heating stations in the chemicals, textiles, pharmaceuticals, papermaking and food sectors. 

New projects in the steel and cement sectors should use locally-generated wind and solar to power electric-arc furnaces and kilns, adds the plan.

Wang tells Carbon Brief that she believes the naming of individual sectors is a “clear indication” that they will be included in China’s renewable consumption quotas. These already cover aluminium and other heavy industry sectors.

She adds that power and heat demand from the named sectors may help absorb distributed renewable energy. It will also serve as a testing ground for matching demand with supply through increased grid flexibility and power price reforms.

To Ries, the growing focus on non-power use signals that China’s decarbonisation efforts are “now entering deeper waters”. That means regulators are turning from easier-to-abate sectors, such as aluminium, to more challenging industries, such as steel.

The plan could create a “second growth curve” for the new-energy industry, says He Zhao, in a commentary for China Power News Net. He, the vice-president of the China Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute (EPPEI). says this might begin with non-power use, before shifting to fuel, feedstock and heat substitution.

What does the plan say about China’s cleantech dominance? 

The next five years is a prime opportunity for China to “consolidate our leading position across the entire industrial chain” for clean-energy technologies, says the plan.

It adds that the government will “strengthen technological innovation” and accelerate the roll-out of new applications of artificial intelligence in China’s renewable-energy system. 

A particular focus for new R&D will be “cutting-edge, original and disruptive technologies”. It also points to technologies that “enhance the reliability of renewable energy” as a substitute for fossil fuels.

The plan names technologies for further development. For wind power, these include “reliable and low-cost” blades, ultra-tall towers and new types of floating platforms. It also mentions the development of “high-altitude wind power”. For solar, it points to the development of perovskite and other “high efficiency” solar cells, as well as space-solar technologies.

The plan also pledges to develop a power market that supports the “full entry” of renewable-energy companies. It underscores that companies should plan for an increasingly market-based and competitive environment.

Meanwhile, the government will also deepen cooperation with other countries on clean energy and “advance” global climate cooperation, it says.

A priority will be “strengthening” international coordination on investment and development in “green energy projects”. Another is “actively promoting the free circulation of China’s high-quality green technologies and products in global markets”.

Chinese exports of clean-energy technologies have been surging, especially since the closure of the strait of Hormuz. 

At the same time, Chinese investment in clean-energy projects in Belt and Road Initiative member states totalled $20bn in the first half of 2026. This is also driven by the crisis.

The US, EU and others have launched tariffs and pricing mechanisms to curb imports of Chinese cleantech. This has contributed to pushback from China, against what it and others refer to as “unilateral trade measures”. 

China is transitioning from a “major energy nation” (能源大国) to an “energy powerhouse” (能源强国), writes the Energy Research Institute’s Lyu in his explanatory reading. He says this will enable China to increasingly shift to building “systemic” advantages in developing clean-energy technologies.

He continues that, from 2026-2030, China will “move to the very forefront of the global stage” on clean energy, “venturing into uncharted territory”. This will create both “major new challenges and significant opportunities” for the country, he adds. 

Related Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change? 06.08.2026 China policy Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’ 09.07.2026 China policy Q&A: What do China’s provincial five-year plans say about climate and energy? 18.06.2026 China policy Analysis: Solar overtakes gas power in Asia for first time ever 12.06.2026 Oil and gas

The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Skeptical Science is partnering with Gigafact to produce fact briefs — bite-sized fact checks of trending claims. You can submit claims you think need checking via the tipline.

Do solar plants require backup from fossil fuels?

Solar plants require backup, but it doesn’t have to be from fossil fuels.

A combination of renewables, energy storage, and long-distance transmission can reliably power the majority of the U.S. without relying on coal, oil, or natural gas, as one 2017 research paper describes. Renewables like wind can generate under cloudy conditions, while surplus solar from brighter weather can be stored in utility-scale batteries for rainy days. Additionally, transmission from neighboring regions can assist solar capacity drops.

The Department of Energy and Princeton have outlined decarbonization scenarios projecting expansion of solar and decrease in fossil fuels while maintaining reliability. Analysis of real-world outcomes has found that renewables growth has actually outperformed projections.

California is an example of improving reliability while transitioning from fossil fuels to solar. From 2015 to 2025, in-state generation saw a jump in solar reliance from 8% to 27%, while natural gas dropped from 60% to 36%.

Go to full rebuttal on Skeptical Science or to the fact brief on Gigafact

This fact brief is responsive to quotes such as this one.

Sources

The Electricity Journal Reliably integrating variable renewables: Moving grid flexibility resources from models to results

The Alliance for Climate Transition Institute Solar energy requires 100% fossil fuel backup

Princeton University Net-Zero America

University of Virginia Decarbonization by 2050: Are We on Track?

California Energy Commission CA Electric Generation 2001-25

California Energy Commission California Energy Leaders Report Progress on Grid Reliability Ahead of Summer 2026

MIT The Future of Energy Storage

Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

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About fact briefs published on Gigafact

Fact briefs are short, credibly sourced summaries that offer "yes/no" answers in response to claims found online. They rely on publicly available, often primary source data and documents. Fact briefs are created by contributors to Gigafact — a nonprofit project looking to expand participation in fact-checking and protect the democratic process. See all of our published fact briefs here.

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More of Germany’s electricity came from wind and solar power than fossil fuels for the first time ever in 2025.

Together, wind and solar power generated 225 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity – accounting for 44% of the total in 2025 – with just 217TWh (43%) coming from fossil fuels.

Solar and onshore wind have grown rapidly under Germany’s “Energiewende” strategy over the past two decades, as the nation transitions away from both coal and nuclear power.

Renewables have recently faced mounting opposition from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the current coalition government has been trying to develop new gas-power plants.

Nevertheless, Carbon Brief analysis of Energy Institute data – shown in the chart below – illustrates how wind and solar have continued growing, emerging as the nation’s largest power source.

The success of renewables in Germany mirrors the EU as a whole, which also saw wind and solar overtake fossil-fuel power generation in 2025 for the first time.

“Other renewables” includes hydropower, bioenergy, geothermal and other renewable sources not otherwise stated. Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy, 2026.

Germany has various targets in place that require a rapid expansion of wind and solar power, including cutting economy-wide emissions to net-zero by 2045. 

The nation is also aiming to increase renewables’ share of electricity consumption to 80% by 2030 to achieve a “largely climate neutral” power system by 2035.

Despite Germany’s rapid decline in coal power generation, the nation still relies far more on coal than most other European countries. It aims to decarbonise its electricity entirely once coal power has been phased out, which has a deadline of “no later than” 2038.

(The renewables targets also include electricity generated from hydropower and bioenergy. The latter produces a relatively large share of Germany’s power – roughly a tenth in 2025.)

Germany has to rely on renewables more than neighbours, such as France and the UK, to achieve its climate goals. This is due to its phaseout of nuclear power, which is a key part of the “Energiewende” strategy.

Nuclear power has long faced widespread public opposition in Germany. This year, the centre-right chancellor Friedrich Merz described the nuclear phaseout as a “strategic mistake”, but the government has ruled out a return to conventional nuclear power.

The country has an official coal phaseout date of 2038, but experts say the country is on track to eliminate coal from its power supply years earlier. This is despite some pressure to temporarily slow the transition away from coal during the recent energy crisis.

(Very few outside the AfD are calling to scrap the coal phaseout altogether, but the government will publish a review of the timelines in August.)

While coal generation has fallen quickly, even as nuclear was being phased out, some argue that coal could have been cut more quickly if nuclear had remained. 

Gas-power expansion has also been framed by the government in recent years as an essential component of Germany’s transition away from coal and nuclear power, to support a renewables-heavy grid.

The current government under Merz has tried to boost gas and recently adopted a law to provide state support for new gas-fired power plants. The plan is for these plants to be converted to run on “green hydrogen” by 2045, in order to meet the climate-neutrality goal.

Germany aims to install 115 gigawatts (GW) of onshore wind by 2030 and approved a record 20.8GW of new capacity in 2025. 

Meanwhile, solar generation has reached unprecedented levels during the hot summer of 2026.

However, the government’s planned grid reforms have been criticised by the renewables industry for risking slowing down the energy transition. Under the proposals, renewables developers would only be granted automatic grid connections in areas with limited grid capacity if they waive compensation for future curtailed generation.

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Most countries failed to meet a 2025 target to identify all of their subsidies that could be “harmful” to biodiversity, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

The findings also reveal that 32 countries spend an estimated $270bn on biodiversity-harming subsidies and other incentives each year.

This is the “tip of the iceberg”, one expert notes, with “trillions” spent globally.  

In 2022, almost every country in the world agreed on a set of “goals” and “targets” aiming to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. 

One of these targets asked countries to identify all subsidies that damage biodiversity by 2025, before phasing out or reforming at least $500bn of these incentives by 2030. 

The subsidies can be found in a range of sectors, including fossil fuels, agriculture, forestry, mining and fishing.

Just 21 countries appear to have met the 2025 goal, Carbon Brief finds, based on analysis of 134 national reports submitted to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) by 1 July 2026. 

Five of the world’s 17 megadiverse countries were among those that met the deadline.

Country progress 

Carbon Brief’s analysis looks at the number of countries that have met the 2025 target to identify their use of nature-harming subsidies.

However, the metrics to determine which countries have “met” this target are not explicitly defined. 

Carbon Brief included any country that says it has completed the process of identifying its subsidies. In almost every case, these countries also included a total figure for the value of those subsidies. 

The analysis finds that 21 countries say they have identified their harmful subsidies, as shown in the map below (yellow). This amounts to 16% of the countries that have submitted national reports so far. 

A further 11 countries, plus the EU, have provided figures for some of their subsidies, such as only those in a specific sector (dark blue). 

Of the 134 national reports submitted to the CBD, 66 make reference to beginning the process (medium blue), while the remaining 68 do not (light blue). The final 62 countries party to the CBD have yet to submit a national report (light grey). 

(Every country in the world participates in the CBD, except for the US and the Holy See – the governing body of the Catholic church, which is seated in Vatican City.)

Countries that have identified all of their harmful subsidies (yellow); provided figures for some sectors (dark blue); begun the process, but not provided any numbers (medium blue); not begun the process (light blue); and not submitted a national report to the CBD (light grey). Credit: Carbon Brief analysis

The 32 countries that have identified some or all subsidies spend almost $270bn on nature-harming incentives annually, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis. 

This is based on a tally of the figures for the most recent available year listed in countries’ national reports, in US dollars using conversion rates at the end of the given year and adjusted for inflation. The analysis also includes figures from other reports cited in the country submissions.

The $270bn reported in country submissions to date is “just the tip of the iceberg”, notes Eva Zabey, the chief executive of Business for Nature. The global figure could be as high as $1.8tn, according to a 2022 estimate from non-profit group, the B Team. 

The figures identified by Carbon Brief are a “warning” that the “world is not moving fast enough” to tackle harmful subsidies, Zabey says, adding: 

“The positive news is that some countries have shown it can be done and this should embolden others to follow suit…Subsidy reform should be treated as an economic necessity, not an environmental checklist.”

Harmful subsidies are expected to be among the key priorities at the upcoming COP17 UN nature summit, being held in Armenia in October 2026. 

Subsidy target

There is no single definition of a “harmful” subsidy. (See: ‘Harmful’ subsidies.) 

The aim to identify these subsidies stems from target 18 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) – the global agreement containing a series of goals and targets for nature. 

Target 18 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

Target 18 calls on countries to identify subsidies and other incentives that are harmful for biodiversity by 2025. 

It also says that nations should “eliminate, phase out or reform” these subsidies in a “proportionate” way, reducing them by at least $500bn per year by 2030. 

It says countries should first target the “most harmful” incentives, while simultaneously scaling up positive incentives for nature. 

All 2030 targets in the GBF are global –  with countries each expected to outline how they will contribute nationally. So far, 169 countries have submitted these national targets. 

Only 38% of countries addressed the 2025 aim to identify harmful subsidies in their national targets “to some extent”, according to a draft version of an upcoming progress report.

Countries’ national reports do not “provide a sufficient basis to determine” whether the 2025 milestone was met, says the report, but available evidence “suggests” that it was not.  

‘Harmful’ subsidies  

There is no universally agreed-upon definition of a “biodiversity-harmful subsidy” – or how it differs from an environmentally harmful subsidy.

In general, “harmful” environmental subsidies impact humans’ surroundings, whereas those harmful to biodiversity directly affect species and ecosystems. Paul Elton, a PhD candidate at the Australian National University, tells Carbon Brief:

“If you were to do a study that focused on biodiversity-harmful subsidies versus one that focused on environmentally-harmful subsidies, there’d be a Venn diagram where a large percentage would overlap.”

A 2022 working paper on identifying subsidies harmful to biodiversity published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) depicted biodiversity as a subset of the environment, with climate and air falling outside the scope of “biodiversity”.

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However, the report also noted that climate change is one of the five key drivers of biodiversity loss, adding: 

“As such, subsidies that lead to larger greenhouse gas emissions, for example, will also indirectly impact on biodiversity.”

Distinction between the “environment” and “biodiversity”, according to an oft-cited working paper on identifying and assessing biodiversity-harming subsidies. Credit: OECD (2022)

Prof Jessica Dempsey, a political ecologist at the University of British Columbia, tells Carbon Brief that she would “absolutely” consider fossil-fuel subsidies to be biodiversity-harming – not only as a driver of climate change, but also because the extraction of fossil fuels can cause localised harms to biodiversity. She adds:

“I do think probably it is true that all harmful subsidies are not necessarily biodiversity-related. Some care in that is important, but subsidies to the sectors that are known drivers of biodiversity loss feel very obvious to me.”

Biodiversity-harming subsidies can be either direct or indirect. 

Direct subsidies refer to government expenditures that go towards a project that harms nature, such as construction of a new gas-fired power plant. Indirect subsidies could include tax exemptions that encourage a certain behaviour, such as lower tax rates on fuels for agricultural machinery. 

Subsidies in agriculture, fishery and energy sectors are most commonly deemed “harmful”, but damage can also be caused by support for forestry, infrastructure, transport, construction, water and other sectors. 

One recent estimate of the global total of biodiversity-harming subsidies put the figure at $1.7-3.2tn annually. An estimate of environmentally harmful subsidies put the figure at $2.6tn.

Elton tells Carbon Brief:

“It’s useful to contextualise the $500bn ambition of the GBF against those global estimates of how big [the total] actually could be, because that underscores the fact that so far, you’ve only got a subset of nations reporting about $250bn by your analysis, which is only half of the [phase-out target].

“It’s a significant lack of accountability.”

The chart below compares the $2.6tn estimated value of harmful subsidies to the $500bn phase-out target set in the GBF and the value of the subsidies identified so far in national reports.

Comparison of the harmful subsidies identified by countries in their national reports (light blue), the phase-out target for subsidies outlined in the GBF (medium blue) and a global estimate of environmentally harmful subsidies (dark blue). Credit: Carbon Brief analysis Sectoral breakdown

Many subsidies can have both negative and positive impacts on biodiversity, according to the 2022 OECD working paper. 

A subsidy on constructing dams for new hydropower can harm local biodiversity by disrupting water flows and flooding certain areas, for example. But it also reduces fossil-fuel dependence, lowering emissions and leading to a decrease in global warming. 

Ronald Steenblik, a subsidies expert and co-author of the report estimating $2.6tn of harmful subsidies, tells Carbon Brief:

“What’s harmful is somewhat in the eye of the beholder.”

Most experts agree that a few sectors receive the bulk of the world’s biodiversity-harming subsidies: fossil fuels, agriculture and infrastructure, with much smaller contributions from other sectors, such as forestry, mining and fisheries. 

Of the subsidies reported to the CBD, almost half were for the fossil-fuel sector, and around one-quarter for agriculture and fishing. 

Sectoral breakdown of identified subsidies. “Multiple” means a country either did not distinguish between sectors or reported one number encompassing several sectors. “Other” refers to specific sectors not named in the chart. Credit: Carbon Brief analysis.

Dempsey says it is “surprising” that mining “didn’t show up” in these figures. (Of the 32 countries that provided subsidy data, only one mentioned mining as an industry that received harmful subsidies.)

Limitations

One limitation of Carbon Brief’s analysis is the lack of standardisation of subsidy data.  

The methodology underlying the national reports lists several definitions of environmentally harmful subsidies, adding:

“[T]here is no standardised, globally agreed methodology for assessing the value of subsidies…nor is there a single global dataset providing this information.”

It adds that it is “important” for countries to identify harmful subsidies “within their national context”. Steenblik says:

“When you get down into the details, you can have lots of arguments of where you draw the line. And, so, the big question on this spreadsheet is where countries drew that line.”

For example, China’s national report says the country has already identified all biodiversity-harming subsidies and reformed them entirely.  

In Australia, a 2026 study – led by Elton from Australian National University – identified biodiversity-harmful subsidies worth $26.3bn over 2022-23, a number that amounts to just over 1% of the country’s GDP.

However, in its national report, Australia identified $155m worth of subsidies, largely in the agricultural sector. (The national report says that the identified agricultural subsidies are those that are “potentially most harmful to the environment”.)

Elton tells Carbon Brief that this discrepancy underscores the necessity of an independent assessment of harmful subsidies, “rather than this just being seen as a tick-the-box reporting exercise by officials in the environment department”.

When it comes to actually phasing out harmful subsidies, Dempsey says, focusing on the quality of the subsidy – and who benefits from it – is just as important as focusing on the numbers. She adds:

“If we don’t take this lens of understanding the beneficiaries and we only focus on the [numbers], we really risk having policy changes that then lead to increased affordability problems for everyday working people, and backlash.”

Methodology 

Carbon Brief analysed national reports submitted to the CBD by 134 parties – 133 countries and the EU – to assess which ones had identified all of their biodiversity-harmful subsidies and therefore met the 2025 deadline. 

The reports were submitted in 2026, with the analysis including those submitted by 1 July 2026. 

The figures for each country can be found in this spreadsheet. More than three-quarters of reports did not list any figures. 

To get the full tally for the amount listed, Carbon Brief used the figures for 2025 (or the nearest available year) and converted the local currency into US dollars, based on conversion rates in the given year using the currency exchange rates calculator from the US Treasury.

These figures were then adjusted for inflation to the year 2025. Numbers were rounded to the nearest $1,000.

In total, this amounted to $269,856,769,000 in subsidies across 32 countries.

Many countries listed the sector that each subsidy is going towards. Carbon Brief standardised these inputs using the following categories: 

• Agriculture and fishing
• Energy
• Forestry  
• Fossil fuels 
• Infrastructure
• Transport 
• Other
• Multiple sectors

“Multiple sectors” was assigned when a country provided only a partial sectoral breakdown of their subsidies or none at all. 

“Other” was selected to encompass sectors that were named more infrequently, including water, mining, tourism and construction.

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on the map in this article do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Carbon Brief concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo  15.07.2026 Nature Q&A: What England’s new ‘land-use framework’ means for climate, nature and food 20.03.2026 Food and farming Analysis: Half of nations meet UN deadline for nature-loss reporting 02.03.2026 Nature policy Brazil’s biodiversity pledge: Six key takeaways for nature and climate change 16.01.2026 Nature policy

The post Analysis: 84% of nations miss deadline to identify ‘nature-harming’ subsidies by 2025  appeared first on Carbon Brief.

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

A graph has been making the rounds on social media showing the average number of days per weather station above 95F, 100F, and 105F across the contiguous US since 1895. It comes from CFACT analyst Chris Martz, drawing on raw data from NOAA’s Global Historical Climatology Network daily dataset (GHCNd), and it shows the 1930s towering over everything since. The implication is that extreme heat in the US is nothing new, and that all the recent fuss about record temperatures is overblown.

It is a compelling figure. The 1930s Dust Bowl really was an extraordinary period of extreme heat in the US, and no amount of correction for changes in measurement techniques over time makes it go away. But the graph is also a case study in why you cannot naively count threshold exceedances in raw daily station data and call it a climate record. Its results rest on two well-documented thermometer problems that artificially depress modern hot day counts, plus a station network that happens to be oversampled where the Dust Bowl happened.

Reproducing the viral chart

To start with, let’s reproduce the figure properly. Rather than averaging whatever stations happen to be reporting in a given year (the station network grew from a few hundred stations in 1895 to many thousands today, with big shifts in where they are located), I selected the 543 GHCNd stations in the contiguous US with long, near-continuous maximum temperature records over the full 1895-2025 period,1 gridded them to 2x2 degree cells, and computed an area-weighted national average.

Average number of days per year at or above 95°F, 100°F, and 105°F over the contiguous US, 1895–2025, from 543 long-record GHCN-Daily stations (raw, unadjusted TMAX), averaged on a 2°×2° grid with cos(latitude) area weighting.

Here we see the same basic story as the viral version: a huge spike in the 1930s (1936 alone averaged 33 days at or above 95F across these stations), elevated values through the mid-1950s, and nothing since that comes close. So the Martz figure is not fabricated, and its shape is not an artifact of the changing station network. To be fair to its author, counting hot days in raw data really does produce this picture.

The problem is what “raw” means here.

Two thermometer problems, both pointing the same way

Raw sounds virtuous, like unfiltered honesty. But the US cooperative observer network has changed in two important ways over the past century, and both changes bias hot day counts downward in recent decades relative to earlier ones.

The first is time of observation bias. Volunteer observers read and reset their max/min thermometers once a day. In the early 20th century most did so in the late afternoon, near the hottest part of the day. An afternoon reset means a very hot afternoon can get counted twice: once for the day it happened, and again the next day if the following afternoon is cooler, since the thermometer still holds yesterday’s peak. Over the 20th century the network gradually shifted to morning observations (better for measuring precipitation), which does not double count heat. Vose et al (2003) documented how this shift alone imparts a spurious cooling trend of a few tenths of a degree in US records, and the double counting directly inflates hot day counts at afternoon-observing stations.

The second is the thermometer switch. In the mid-1980s NOAA replaced liquid-in-glass thermometers in wooden Cotton Region Shelters with electronic maximum-minimum temperature sensors (MMTS) at most cooperative stations. Quayle et al (1991) showed the new sensors read maximum temperatures around 0.4C (0.7F) cooler than the old shelters. This produced a one-time step change at thousands of stations that landed right at the start of the modern warming era. When your threshold is a hard cutoff like 95F, a step down of nearly half a degree C removes a lot of days.

Homogenization algorithms (like NOAA’s pairwise method, Menne and Williams 2009, or the Berkeley Earth approach, Rohde et al 2013) detect and correct these breakpoints by comparing each station to its neighbors. Our 2016 paper validated these adjustments against the pristine, purpose-built US Climate Reference Network and found they perform well. While NOAA does not have daily homogenized data (they only provide monthly homogenized data), Berkeley Earth does. So let’s compare the raw hot day count to the same metric computed from Berkeley Earth’s homogenized daily maximum temperature fields.

Days per year at or above 95°F over the contiguous US. Top: raw GHCN-Daily data from 543 long-record stations, gridded and area-weighted. Bottom: Berkeley Earth homogenized daily TMAX (1°×1°, area-weighted over CONUS), with the dashed line showing the same calculation restricted to the grid cells containing the long-record stations. Absolute values differ because gridded fields smooth out local extremes; the shapes are the meaningful comparison.

The two datasets agree that the 1930s were exceptional. Where they disagree is the modern era: in the homogenized data, recent decades rival the Dust Bowl years CONUS-wide, with 2011 (16.1 days) actually edging out 1936 (14.0 days) as the biggest year in the Berkeley Earth series.

We can make the comparison cleaner by putting each series relative to its own 1951-1980 average:

Days ≥95°F, 11-year running means, with each series shown relative to its own 1951–1980 average. Red: raw GHCN-Daily long-record stations. Blue solid: Berkeley Earth homogenized daily TMAX over the full CONUS. Blue dashed: Berkeley Earth restricted to the grid cells sampled by the long-record station network.

The raw and homogenized series track each other closely for the first 85 years, through the Dust Bowl peak and the cool 1960s and 70s. Then, right around 1980 (just when the MMTS transition began), they split. The homogenized data rises to around 1.4 times its mid-century baseline while the raw data stays flat at roughly 1.0. The raw data does not exaggerate the 1930s, but rather erases the last 40 years of increases in extreme heat.

The dashed and solid blue lines in the figure are also worth a closer look. The dashed line averages the Berkeley Earth data over only the 130 grid cells where our long-record stations actually sit; comparing it to the raw series is the fair like-for-like test, since the places are the same and data adjustments are the only difference. The solid line averages over the whole country, and the gap between the two exposes a sampling problem rather than a data problem. Century-old stations cluster in the Midwest and East, which is precisely where the 1930s heat was centered and where extreme daytime heat has increased the least since. Averaged over the long-lived station locations, even in homogenized data, puts the 1930s roughly 45% above the last two decades. If we average over the full contiguous US, however, that gap shrinks to about 10%.

Locations of long-lived weather stations used in the reproducing the viral Martz figure. Note that these tend to oversample the Midwest region where dust bowl temperature extremes were most pronounced. A Dust Bowl story, not a national one

There is a second, subtler issue with interpreting the viral graph: geography. Long-record stations are heavily concentrated in the Midwest and East (only 116 of our 543, around a fifth, sit west of 100W), which happens to be exactly where the 1930s heat was centered. Let’s break the country into NOAA’s nine US climate regions and look at each one separately, using the spatially complete Berkeley Earth data.

Days per year at or above 95°F for each of NOAA’s nine US climate regions, 1895–2023, from Berkeley Earth homogenized gridded daily TMAX (1°×1°), area-weighted within each region. Thin lines are annual values; bold lines are 11-year running means. Note that the y-axis scale differs by region.

The Dust Bowl turns out to be a story about three regions. In the Upper Midwest the 1930s averaged around 15 times as many 95F days as the last two decades (3.4 vs 0.2 per year), in the Northern Rockies and Plains around 9 times (2.8 vs 0.3), and in the Ohio Valley around 4 times (8.7 vs 2.1), with 1936 the record year in all three.

Everywhere else the present rivals or beats the past: the South is essentially tied (22.4 days in the 1930s vs 22.7 over 2000-2023, with 2011 the biggest year in the record), while the Southeast (14.7 vs 11.1 days), Southwest (4.9 vs 3.9), and West (4.6 vs 3.6) all see more 95F days now than in the 1930s, with the two western regions peaking in 2020. (The remaining two regions, the Northeast and Northwest, average less than one 95F day per year throughout the record, too few for meaningful comparisons.)

The mid-century spike in that average comes almost entirely from three regions in the middle of the country. This makes physical sense: the Dust Bowl heat was tied to a specific regional catastrophe, a multi-year drought amplified by human-induced land degradation (Cook et al 2009), with bare, desiccated soils driving daytime temperatures to levels those same fields have not approached since. A record set during an ecological disaster in one part of the country is not evidence that the whole country, much less the planet, was hotter. The national chart is really being driven by a distinct regional anomaly.2

Meanwhile, the thermometers all agree it is warming

Finally, it is worth stepping back from the hottest afternoons of the year, which are a noisy, bias-sensitive sliver of the temperature record, and looking at what US temperatures as a whole are doing. The figure below shows annual average maximum, minimum, and mean temperatures for the contiguous US from NOAA’s homogenized nClimDiv dataset.

Contiguous US annual average daily maximum (TMax), minimum (TMin), and mean (TAvg) temperature anomalies relative to 1901–2000, from NOAA nClimDiv, 1895–2025. Thin lines are annual values; bold lines are 11-year running means.

All three are unambiguous. Since 1970, maximum temperatures have warmed at 0.52F per decade, minimums at 0.51F per decade, and the average at 0.51F per decade (all p < 0.0001), with the last decade roughly 2F above the 20th century baseline. The 1930s show up here too, but as a modest bump in maximum temperatures far below present (as the dust bowl event was largely limited to summer TMax temperatures, with a much smaller effect on the remainder of the year). Extreme daytime heat in summer is one of the places where the US warming signal is weakest (a real and interesting scientific result, related in part to agricultural intensification and irrigation in the Midwest (Mueller et al 2016), but it is not representative of the climate system as a whole.

Zooming all the way out

One last piece of context. The contiguous US covers less than 2% of the Earth’s surface, and as we saw above, even within the US the Dust Bowl signal is regional. So what does the very same chart look like for the planet as a whole? The figure below reproduces the design of the viral graph (days at or above 95F, 100F, and 105F) using the Berkeley Earth daily data over global land. To avoid mixing climate changes with changes in the locations we measure (global station coverage grew from under 40% of land area in the 1890s to essentially complete today), I restrict the average to the grid cells with continuous century-long records, covering 42% of global land.3

Average number of days per year at or above 95°F, 100°F, and 105°F across global land, 1895–2023, from Berkeley Earth homogenized gridded daily TMAX (1°×1°), area-weighted by cos(latitude) and land fraction. Restricted to grid cells with complete data in at least 90% of years over 1895–2023 (42% of global land area), so that changing station coverage does not affect the trend.

Globally there is no 1930s spike at all: 1936, the year that towers over the US record, comes in at 15.1 days at or above 95F, less than a day above the surrounding years. The Dust Bowl, extraordinary as it was in Kansas, barely registers when averaged over the world’s land. Instead, hot days hold roughly steady until around 1980 and then climb: days at or above 95F are up around 70% between the early 20th century (1895-1924) and the last decade (12.8 to 22.1 per year), days at or above 100F have more than doubled (3.0 to 7.5), and days at or above 105F have nearly quintupled (0.3 to 1.6). The hotter the threshold, the faster the rise, which is exactly what you expect when a whole temperature distribution shifts upward. All ten of the warmest years by the 95F metric have occurred since 1998, and the six most recent years in the series (2018-2023) are all among them.

The US Midwest is one of the few places on Earth where the hottest days of the mid-20th century still stand; picking it as your yardstick for global warming is, to put it charitably, a choice.

So what are the takeaways here?

First, the Dust Bowl was real, and it remains the benchmark for multi-year extreme daytime heat in the central US, in adjusted and unadjusted data alike. Anyone claiming the 1930s heat is purely an artifact of bad data is simply wrong.

Second, it was a regional phenomenon. Break the country into NOAA’s nine climate regions and the 1930s is only exceptional in only three of them (the Upper Midwest, the Northern Rockies and Plains, and the Ohio Valley, at roughly 4 to 15 times recent levels). The four regions where hot days are the most common (the South, Southeast, Southwest, and West) all match or exceed the Dust Bowl today, with record years of 2011 and 2020, not 1936.

Third, raw daily data is the wrong tool for this question. Time of observation changes and the 1980s switch to MMTS sensors both suppress modern hot day counts relative to the past, and the raw and homogenized series diverge almost exactly when the instrument transition happened. In homogenized data, recent decades rival the 1930s even averaged nationally.

Fourth, hot days above a fixed threshold are a narrow and noisy way to look at the data. The overall US warming trend (around 0.5F per decade since 1970 in max, min, and mean temperatures) is robust in every dataset, raw or adjusted, satellite or surface. And globally, days above 95F have been climbing steadily for a century, with no Dust Bowl bump at all: the central US is one of the few spots on the planet where the mid-20th century still holds the record for extreme daytime heat.

The viral chart is built from real measurements, and the heat it shows was real too. But it takes a regional catastrophe, fails to account for changes in instruments and observation times, and presents the result as a national climate verdict. Accounting for the thermometers and the geography, and the US looks a lot like the rest of the planet: the hottest days on record are increasingly the ones we are living through now.

I’ve included a more detailed writeup of the methods and code to reproduce this analysis on my GitHub here.

1 Specifically: stations whose GHCNd TMAX record spans at least 1900 through 2024, keeping station-years where at least 80% of April-October days have a valid, quality-controlled observation, and keeping stations valid in at least 85% of years over 1895-2025. Hot day counts are averaged within 2°×2° grid cells and combined with cos(latitude) area weighting over the 130 cells with near-complete records. The results are insensitive to these choices: stricter completeness screens shrink the network but leave the series essentially unchanged (details and robustness checks are available in the methods writeup on my GitHub). A map of the station network is also available in the repo; note that coverage is much denser east of 100W, a point that becomes important later in the post.

2 This also explains most of the difference between the dashed and solid blue lines in the “days ≥95°F, 11-year running means” figure. The long-record station network oversamples the region where the 1930s were most extreme and undersamples the South and West where recent warming has added the most 95F days.

3 This matters a lot. Computed naively over whatever area has data each year, the global days above 95F triple from ~12 to ~37 days per year, but much of that rise is an artifact of hot regions (the Sahara, the tropics, interior Australia) entering the dataset over time. On the fixed network the increase is a still-substantial ~75% (from ~13 to ~22 days per year). The fixed-coverage region is disproportionately Northern Hemisphere midlatitude land, so this series should be read as “hot days where we have century-long records” rather than a true global land average.

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 19, 2026 thru Sat, July 25, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (11 articles)

• Insane': Republicans Push To Punish Canada For Wildfires “We will not tolerate this incompetence,” vowed Ohio Sen. Bernie Moreno, who may not understand how climate change works. Huffington Post, Jennifer Bendery, Jul 17, 2026.
• UN to list more sites as 'in danger' from conflict or climate change Phys.org, Simon Valmary and Celia Lebur, Jul 18, 2026.
• As mosquito ranges expand, better monitoring is key to preventing disease Monitoring is expensive and labor intensive. But it helps public health officials stop outbreaks. Ars Technica, Madeline Shaw, Jul 19, 2026.
• Climate Scientists Say The Dice Are Loaded. Here's Why "Just have a Think" on Youtube, Dave Borlace, July 19, 2026.
• Opinion: Is the Colorado River in a climate doom loop? We caused a problem, and our efforts to fix the problem make it worse Colorado Newsline, Gary Wockner, Jul 20, 2026.
• Rising seas magnify the dangers of coastal Georgia`s industrial past The state’s first Superfund research center is looking into how climate change is resurfacing industrial pollution. Grist, Emily Jones, Jul 20, 2026.
• Extreme heat morphs into a major economic shock for an unprepared Europe Europe’s status as the planet’s fastest-warming continent is becoming a serious drag on its economic prospects. The Business Standard, Laura Millan, Jul 21, 2026.
• What Happens to Our Brains in a Warming World? In this era of advancing AI, when everyone is debating the nature of 'intelligence,' we have forgotten that our brains run well only within a narrow band of temperature. What happens to the brain once that temperature threshold is crossed is often overlooked in discussions of climate change. State of the Planet, Marco Tedesco and Burcin Ikiz, Jul 22, 2026.
• The year climate change came for the Tour de France Record heat, wildfire threats, and an unprecedented stage modification highlighted the growing challenge global warming poses to endurance sports. Grist, Tik Root, Jul 23, 2026.
• Climate change to obliterate $1.5 trillion in U.S. home values Climate change will wipe out about $1.47 trillion in U.S. home values over the next three decades and hasten economic gaps in U.S. communities, a report released on Monday finds. CBS News, Kate Gibson , Jul 23, 2026.
• This El Niño is set to be the largest on record by a ‘mind-blowing margin’ Forecasters predict that the monster climate pattern will combine with global warming to push global temperatures in 2027 to new heights. Nature, James Dinneen, Jul 23, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (5 articles)

• How Companies Have Abandoned Their Climate Goals and Let Themselves Off the Hook Big business made big promises about saving the planet. Following through hasn’t been easy. New York Times, David Gelles, Jul 17, 2026.
• Trump threatens new Canada tariffs over fires sending 'filthy' air into US cities US President Donald Trump has threatened to impose new tariffs on Canada after hundreds of wildfires have left much of the northern US covered by a blanket of smoke. BBC News, Nadine Yousif, Jul 18, 2026.
• Majority of US voters link extreme weather to climate crisis, study finds Top Democrat says findings show public ‘way ahead of the politicians’ as Trump dismisses global heating as ‘hoax’ The Guardian, Dharna Noor with graphics by Andrew Witherspoon, Jul 19, 2026.
• Trump Lashes Out at National Academies of Sciences Over Climate Guide For Judges Trump claimed without evidence that the manual was “fraudulent, biased, and misleading.” Inside Climate News, Dennis Pillion, July 20, 2026.
• Q&A: What the EU`s carbon market review means for climate action The European Commission has put forward new plans to cut emissions under the EU carbon market more slowly, from 2031 onwards. Carbon Brief, Orla Dwyer, Jul 20, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (3 articles)

• Why Earth is reflecting less sunlight Climate change is first and foremost an emissions problem. It’s also fast becoming a reflection problem. Climate Trunk, John Lang, Jul 21, 2026.
• The climate crisis onscreen: 14 films that made waves Climate-themed films matter more than ever as the Trump administration weakens environmental protections. Here are some of the best and most meaningful ones. Capital & Main, Alex Demyanenko, Jul 22, 2026.
• Trump calls climate change a hoax. Americans aren`t buying it New polling finds broad agreement that the climate crisis is worsening heat, floods, and wildfires. Mother Jones, Dharna Noor, Jul 24, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (3 articles)

• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #29 2026 A regular weekly survey of climate-related research from academic, government and NGO sources. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Jul 16, 2026.
• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #30 2026 Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Jul 23, 2026.
• France orders total evacuation of Cap Ferret peninsula as wildfire spreads ‘Unpredictable’ blaze forces evacuation of holiday spot Cap Ferret and Spain declares emergency over fires near Madrid The Guardian, Jon Henley in Paris and Sam Jones in Madrid, Jul 24, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 articles)

• Lake Powell shrinks and marinas must adapt “The Colorado River is in full-blown crisis mode,” said John Berggren, regional policy manager with Western Resource Advocates, an environmental nonprofit. AP News, DORANY PINEDA and JOHN LOCHER, Jul 22, 2026.
• Air conditioning is not enough to keep people cool — can scientists find an alternative? Air conditioning can end up as a climate maladaptation due to installation and operation expenses as well as serious side-effects, but advances in methods to passively cool buildings hint at solutions without drawbacks. Nature, Rachel Fieldhouse, Jul 22, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #29 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 12, 2026 thru Sat, July 18, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Jul 19, 2026.
• Oil Firms Knew for Decades of Methane’s Danger to Planet, Documents Suggest The companies knew they were releasing more of the greenhouse gas than they publicly reported, according to industry files cited by the Center for Climate Integrity, an activist organization. NYT, Hiroko Tabuchi, Jul 21, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

• Trump Attacks National Academies Over Climate Chapter in Judges` Manual The president joined Republican officials who slammed the National Academies of Sciences for a chapter about climate science in an educational guide for judges. NYT, Karen Zraick, Jul 20, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

•  Hot days, cold thermometers Why a viral graph on US days above 95F is misleading and overstates regional warmth The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Jul 22, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

Open access notables

Record-low 2025 and 2026 ice extents restore Arctic winter sea-ice decline, Chan et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Recent analyses have suggested that the decadal rate of Arctic winter sea-ice extent decline weakened in the early 2020s, with 20-y trends becoming statistically insignificant. Here we show from more up-to-date observations that the exceptionally low 2025 and 2026 ice extent winters reversed this picture, with sea-ice extent during the growth and peak phases returning to record lows and 20-y decline trends becoming significant again. Further analysis of CMIP6 model analogues shows that the observed 2025 decline was unusual but physically plausible under comparable Arctic warming, and is more consistent with ongoing winter sea ice reduction than with a return to values seen in the early 2020s.

As the planet heats, public doubt grows: The social structure behind rising climate change scepticism in Germany, Gies & Deutschmann, Global Environmental Change

In 2024, global heating exceeded 1.5 °C for the first time. Paradoxically, as the climate crisis becomes ever more evident, climate change scepticism (CCS) has recently grown (rather than declined) in Germany, a high-emissions country with enormous responsibility. Past research has not systematically studied which social groups and characteristics are behind this shift. We address this gap by examining the social structure of rising CCS in Germany, taking its multidimensionality into account. Drawing on GESIS Panel data that is representative of the German adult population, we detect a strong and consistent increase across a comprehensive set of 14 CCS indicators between 2022 and 2023. We find that this rise in scepticism is not driven by a small and ‘loud’ minority but rather constitutes a mass phenomenon: on average across all items, CCS increased among 59% of respondents, and for 93% of respondents at least one indicator rose. Regression models reveal a complex picture with socio-structural effects depending on the dimension of CCS, but right-wing political orientation, government distrust, and hierarchical worldviews are most consistently associated with increases in CCS. Overall, political attitudes – which are flexible and have shifted substantially in recent years – relate far more strongly to rising CCS than stable socio-structural factors like income or gender. These findings demonstrate an urgent need to restore trust in political institutions and to foster inclusive, participatory climate dialogue to secure broad public support for the transition towards a carbon-neutral society.

Climate Obstruction in the Digital Far-Right: Mapping the Climate Countermovement in German-, Danish-, and Swedish-Speaking Digital Information Environments, Henriksen et al., Environmental Communication

This article examines how climate obstruction narratives circulate in far-right digital information environments in Austria, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. We analyzed 41 million social media posts published across multiple social media platforms from 2019 to 2022. Using multilingual text classification and actor–source mapping, we identified which posts contained climate obstruction narratives, which actors produced them, and which sources they cited. The results revealed three configurations. In the German-speaking environment (Germany and Austria), obstruction is mainly driven by far-right citizen accounts embedded in a hyperpartisan media ecosystem. In Sweden, far-right grassroots actors coexist with climate-focused organizations that bridge mainstream and alternative sources. In Denmark, obstruction is comparatively mainstream-embedded and anchored in organizations and citizen groups drawing on legacy news. The article discusses how national media systems, political fields, and far-right actor constellations make certain forms of obstruction communicatively viable and thereby shape the digital climate countermovement.

Mapping climate change coverage: Causes, consequences, and solutions in German news media, 2010–2024, Dablander et al., Energy Research & Social Science

The media shapes how political leaders and the public understand the causes, impacts, and solutions to climate change. Here, we provide the most extensive analysis to date of how German news media report on climate change between 2010 and 2024. We develop and validate a methodology based on large language models to analyze the contents of over 50,000 articles from seven major newspapers across the political spectrum. We found that aspects relating to causes, impacts, and mitigation were all covered substantially more often than aspects relating to adaptation. While most articles identified climate change as human-caused, coverage about causes was dominated by fossil fuels, with agriculture, overconsumption, carbon inequality, and economic growth rarely mentioned. Left-leaning outlets more frequently reported that climate change is human-caused, highlighted fossil fuels as a cause, emphasized the need to reduce their use, and discussed systemic and social drivers more often. Coverage patterns have remained largely stable over time, except for growing attention to net-zero targets and carbon taxes. Our findings highlight opportunities for more comprehensive climate journalism to better support public understanding and policy debate by reflecting the scientific consensus and the full range of societal transformations needed to address climate change.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Attribution of Extreme Weather and Climate Events and Their Impacts, National Research Council, The National Academies Press

Decades of data and research indicate that human-caused climate change is altering the frequency and intensity of several types of extreme events, such as heat waves and extreme rainfall events. Even as those trends become clearer, extreme event attribution (EEA) seeks to assess the degree to which climate change contributed to any specific event. EEA studies provide information that can be useful for public understanding, planning and risk management, policy and legal contexts, and scientific research. The authors evaluate the state of EEA science, updating a National Academies report published in 2016. The authors also assess the emerging field of extreme event impact attribution (EEIA). The number of EEA studies has grown substantially over the past decade as scientific tools, observational datasets, and methods have advanced, enabling attribution studies to be completed within days of an event. However, challenges remain, including limited model capabilities for small-scale regional events, representation of key atmospheric processes, and attribution of compounding, cascading, and record-breaking events. The authors examine these advances and remaining challenges and provide recommendations for strengthening attribution science, improving collaboration with local experts and stakeholders, and advancing research, data, and modeling capabilities worldwide.

Early Warnings: Government Knowledge of Climate Change and Legal Responsibility for Climate Harm, Lindsay Fenlock and Nikki Reisch, Center for International Environmental Law

The authors examine publicly available government records, scientific evidence, and historical archives to document when major emitting States became aware of the causes and foreseeable consequences of climate change. They demonstrate that many governments understood the risks decades earlier than they have claimed, strengthening the evidentiary foundation for climate litigation, human rights, and climate advocacy, and the implementation of the International Court of Justice climate advisory opinion. By tracing the history of government knowledge, the report provides a critical resource for advancing climate accountability and ensuring that high-emitting States are held responsible for failing to prevent the climate crisis. 284 articles in 105 journals by 2495 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

A 21-Year Global Daytime Satellite Climatology of Cirrus Cloud Cover and Its Links to Upper-Tropospheric Conditions and Aviation Over Europe and the North Atlantic, Huu et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70506

A Reconciled Satellite Record Reveals a Negative Low Cloud Feedback Over the Past 47 Years, Cesana & Arouf, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124158

Distinct Characteristics of Contiguous Heatwaves Across Terrestrial, Marine, and Coastal Environments, Bekris et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118531

Explaining the Equatorial Pacific Thermocline Response to Climate Change With a Model Hierarchy, Luongo et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023559

Heating the land cools the eastern and equatorial Pacific, Günther et al., Science Advances Open Access pdf 10.1126/sciadv.aeb7004

How Clear-Sky Spectral Overlap Shapes Radiation in Cloudy Atmospheres, Czarnecki & Pincus, Journal of Climate pdf 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0589.1

Marine Heatwave Imprints on Salinity in the Northwest Atlantic, Stamper et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124293

Nordic overturning increases as AMOC weakens in response to global warming, Roewer et al., Ocean science Open Access pdf 10.5194/os-22-1195-2026

On the Utility of the Transient Climate Response, Jeevanjee et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121354

Post-1990s Warming of Circumpolar Deep Water Off West Antarctica and Its Drivers, Damini et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023856

Projected Arctic Ocean Warming Accompanied by a Restructuring of the Overturning at the Fram Strait and the Barents Sea Opening, Oldenburg et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0735.1

The remarkable inefficiency of stratocumulus, Hernandez et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-9337-2026

Trans-basin linkages prolong Northwestern Pacific marine heatwaves through a circumglobal wave pattern, Zhao & Yu, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz4647

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate and Tropospheric Oxidizing Capacity, Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 10.1146/annurev-earth-032320-090307 21 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

Climate Warming Intensifies Cascading Risks Along the Heatwave-Drought-Wildfire Hazard Chain in Northeast Asia, Liu et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70507

Decadal Shifts Towards Higher Riverine Silicon Relative to Nitrogen and Phosphorus Across High Latitudes, Carey et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb008926

Distribution characteristics of newly formed glacial lakes across High Mountain Asia during 2000–2020, YIN et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.007

Drought, heatwave, and fires: The impact on air quality during São Paulo's record-breaking fire season in 2024, Silva et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103045

Frequent, Intense and Prolonged Human-Perceived Heat Waves Over the Arabian Peninsula in Recent Decades, Ullah et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70510

Increasing Tropical Cyclone Activity Over the North China Plain, Liu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046567

Indicators of Global Climate Change 2025: annual update of key indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence, Forster et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-3889-2026

Indicators of Global Climate Change 2025: annual update of key indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence, Forster et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-3889-2026

Precipitation Over the Contiguous United States Is Coming From Farther Away Than in the Past, Aerenson et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122565

Record-low 2025 and 2026 ice extents restore Arctic winter sea-ice decline, Chan et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2614134123

Time series forecasting of climate variables in three selected major cities in Nigeria, Ibrahim et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103014

Warming Trends in Basin-Scale Heatwaves Across Ethiopia: An Observational Analysis Using Crossing Theory, Gebremariam et al., International Journal of Climatology pdf 10.1002/joc.70477

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Impact of an unprecedented marine heatwave on extremely hot summer over Northern Japan in 2023, Scientific Reports, 10.1038/s41598-024-65291-y 41 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A four-decade global Lagrangian air-parcel trajectory dataset for atmospheric moisture and heat analysis, Deman et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-4593-2026

Attribution of 2022 and 2023 extreme heat in China using conditional and unconditional frameworks, Zhang et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100937

CoCO2-MOSAIC 1.0: a global mosaic of regional, gridded, fossil and biofuel CO2 emission inventories, Urraca et al., TNO Repository Open Access pdf pmh:oai:oai-pmh.tno.nl:58273

FORMS: Forest Multiple Source height, wood volume, and biomass maps in France at 10 to 30 m resolution based on Sentinel-1, Sentinel-2, and GEDI data with a deep learning approach, Schwartz et al., HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe) Open Access pmh:oai:HAL:hal-04499509v1

Modeling air temperature from snow-buried sensors to refine multi-decadal warming trends in Great Basin National Park, NV, USA, Mazan et al., Theoretical and Applied Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1007/s00704-026-06436-z

Multidecadal reconstruction of terrestrial water storage changes by combining pre-GRACE satellite observations and climate data, Hacker et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-1747-2026

PolyU2025 SLA: a global 0.25°  ×  0.25° monthly sea-level anomaly dataset (1993–2024) determined from satellite altimetry for sea-level and climate change research, Yuan et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-4155-2026

Robustness of Radiative Kernel Methods in Reproducing Arctic Outgoing Longwave Radiation Variability, Liu & Jin, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd046213

Satellite estimation of global air sea CO2 flux from 2000 to 2020, Ji et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-51215-5

Sensitivity of marine heatwaves metrics to SST products, focusing on the Tropical Pacific, Chevillard et al., Ocean science Open Access 10.5194/os-22-1213-2026

Temporal Heterogeneity of In Situ Ocean Observing Capacity Could Cause an Artificial Intensification of Extreme Warm Water Events Globally, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123043

Wikimpacts 1.0: a new global climate impact database based on automated information extraction from Wikipedia, Li et al., Natural hazards and earth system sciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/nhess-26-2609-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
ClimaMeter: contextualizing extreme weather in a changing climate, Weather and Climate Dynamics, 10.5194/wcd-5-959-2024 39 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Assessing projected changes in meteorological drought severity and frequency under future climate scenarios: Insights from CMIP5 Models in Eastern Tigray, Northern Ethiopia, Rubangakene et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000944

Enhanced ENSO-driven potential predictability over the Euro-Atlantic under greenhouse warming, Santuy et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access 10.1038/s41612-026-01482-w

Enhanced response of extreme compound events to cumulative CO2 emissions, Li et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10544-1

Future Shifts in Severe Storm Environments Revealed through Profile-Based Clustering, Hua, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20469719

Heterogeneous future Arctic Ocean primary productivity changes projected in CMIP6, Champiot-Bayard et al., Biogeosciences Open Access 10.5194/bg-23-4735-2026

Impact of Continental Configuration on the Climate Response to Greenhouse-Gas Forcing in an Idealized GCM, Bonan et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120128

Irreversible climate changes driven by degree-years of temperature overshoot, Dickau et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03761-z

Responses of the Tropical Easterly Jet to Different Global Warming Patterns and Implications for Future Tropical Cyclone Activity, Zhan et al., Advances in Atmospheric Sciences 10.1007/s00376-026-5865-3

Small Tropical Islands Also Exposed to Extreme Humid Heat by the End of the Century, Bald et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122466

Spatiotemporal variation and future projections of air freezing and thawing indices in China–Mongolia–Russia under CMIP6 warming scenarios, JIANG et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.009

The Destination Earth digital twin for climate change adaptation, Doblas-Reyes et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-2821-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Asymmetries in the Southern Ocean contribution to global heat and carbon uptake, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02066-3 23 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Application and Evaluation of a Novel Python-Based Ensemble Data Assimilation Framework NEDAS in Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model (WACCM), Liu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres pdf 10.1029/2025jd045622

Climate models with moderate climate sensitivity best simulate the magnitude of Earth's energy imbalance, Bimpiri et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/esd-17-877-2026

CMIP7 data request: Earth system priorities and opportunities, McPartland et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-2849-2026

CMIP7 data request: ocean and sea ice priorities and opportunities, Fox-Kemper et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-6043-2026

Contribution of physical latent knowledge to the emulation of an atmospheric physics model: a study based on the LMDZ Atmospheric General Circulation Model, Crossouard et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-5907-2026

Developing Guidelines for working with Multi-Model Ensembles in CMIP, Katzenberger et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/esd-17-495-2026

Ecosystem climate sensitivities drive the divergence in aerosol-induced carbon uptake across CMIP6 models, Zhang et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-5363-2026

EXSoDOS 1.0: downscaling of weather extremes shifts for ensemble climate projections using ground-based measurements, reanalysis and stochastic modelling, Wouters et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-5805-2026

Future Global Warming Constrained by Observed AMOC Strength, Hao et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118802

Global climate modeling with improved precipitation characteristics by learning physics (GRIST-MPS v1.0) from global storm-resolving modeling, Wang et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-5553-2026

Hacking Kilometer-Scale Models: A Participative Model for Climate Information, Gettelman et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0183.1

North Atlantic influence reconciling model-observation discrepancy in the tropical Pacific warming pattern, Lin & Watanabe, Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73763-0

Past, present, and future arctic radiative states simulated by Polar-WRF, Bertossa et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-3653-2026

Stratospheric Subtropical Transport Barriers in CESM1-WACCM and Observations: Climatology, Variability, and Trends, Ivaniha et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045069

The coupled Southern Ocean–Sea ice–Ice shelf Model (SOSIM v1.0): configuration and evaluation, Liu et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-2985-2026

The Influence of Tropopause Temperature Biases on Climate Model Simulations of Tropical Cyclones, Mahoney et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gl120545

The Radiative Forcing Model Intercomparison Project (RFMIP2.0) for CMIP7, Kramer et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-4447-2026

The Scenario Model Intercomparison Project for CMIP7 (ScenarioMIP-CMIP7), Vuuren et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-2627-2026

Winter Arctic polynyas in CMIP6 models, Heuzé et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3643-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Comparison of three reanalysis-driven regional climate models over New Zealand: Climatology and extreme events, International Journal of Climatology, 10.1002/joc.8578 11 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

An improved 15-year record of ice sheet elevation from CryoSat-2 radar altimetry, Huang et al., Remote Sensing of Environment 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115561

Brief communication: Temperature-driven shrinkage of a disappearing Himalayan glacier, Fujita & Kayastha, cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-4005-2026

Climate change induces rapid growth of dead ice in Asian glaciers, Wang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.008

Increased Frequency, Duration, and Area of Winter Polynyas North of Greenland in a Warming Climate, Shu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121125

Increasing Winter Storminess in the Southern Ross Sea, Antarctica, and Its Impact on Land-Fast Sea-Ice, Radlwimmer et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123090

Learning to melt: Emulating Greenland surface melt from a polar RCM with machine learning, Schlager et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3313-2026

Mass changes of the Antarctic Peninsula ice sheet and peripheral glaciers, 2007–2021, Bernat et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3025-2026

Observation-constrained explainable reconstruction of Antarctic sea ice snow depth reveals strong regional asymmetry during 1993–2021, Cao et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.008

Record-low 2025 and 2026 ice extents restore Arctic winter sea-ice decline, Chan et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2614134123

The Greenland GNSS Network (GNET): geodetic grade GNSS measurements of Greenland's 3D bedrock displacement from 1995–2025, Solgaard et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-5117-2026

Three Decades of Glacial Changes on the Western Antarctic Peninsula Revealed by Historical Aerial and High-Resolution Satellite Imagery, Thota et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122660

Unveiling the Role of Sea-Ice Loss in Early-20th-Century Arctic Warming, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121178

Wintertime evolution of landfast ice stability in Alaska from InSAR, Einhorn & Mahoney, cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3683-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Stability of Ice Shelves and Ice Cliffs in a Changing Climate, Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 10.1146/annurev-earth-040522-122817 38 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

PolyU2025 SLA: a global 0.25°  ×  0.25° monthly sea-level anomaly dataset (1993–2024) determined from satellite altimetry for sea-level and climate change research, Yuan et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-4155-2026

Quantifying UK coastal flood exposure under future sea-level rise to 2300, Palmer et al., Explore Bristol Research pmh:oai:research-information.bris.ac.uk:openaire_cris_publications/62032aef-becd-4ddc-a902-ff39b2c8a275

Sea level rise and fall north of Greenland reorganize Arctic freshwater export to North Atlantic, Wang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75610-8

The economically optimal mix and timing of coastal adaptation in Europe to 2150, Völz et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74042-8

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Implications of Variability and Trends in Coastal Extreme Water Levels, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108864 14 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Climate-extreme-driven genesis of a cretaceous dinosaur Lagerstätte, Fanti et al., Global and Planetary Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105589

Continental-scale fern savannah wildfires during end-Triassic greenhouse warming, Hollaar et al., Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) Open Access pmh:oai:nottingham-repository.worktribe.com:66232704

Dynamic Deglacial Evolution of Interior Seaways and Ice Streams in the Weddell Sea Embayment, Bollen et al., Paleoceanography and Paleoclimatology Open Access 10.1029/2026pa005438

Ice core nitrogen isotopes archive dramatic changes in West Antarctic Ice Sheet thinning, King et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-22-1291-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The 4.2 ka BP event in western Anatolia: Tracing the impact of climatic change, The Holocene, 10.1177/09596836241259774 4 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Adaptational lag at high elevations depends on life stage in a California wildflower, Quarles et al., Journal of Ecology pdf 10.1111/1365-2745.70379

Additive Dominance and Context-Dependent Nonlinearities in Soil Greenhouse Gas Responses to Concurrent Global Change, Ding et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2026gb009164

Biogeography of Stress: Graded and Threshold Phenological Responses in European Beech-Dominated Forests Under Disruptive Heatwaves, Cesaretti et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70986

Body Size Decline in an Endangered Bat Is Associated With Climate Change at a Continental Scale but Varies by Phenophase and Region, Zuben et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70983

Climate change is likely to negatively affect a marine apex predator (Steno bredanensis, Cetacea) and its prey on the coast of Brazil, Ferreira et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108065

Climate Crisis in the Mediterranean Hotspot: Conservation Challenges for Endangered Salamanders in Southern Türkiye, Ananymous, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.19074814

Climate physical risks, ecological resilience, and spatial spillovers: evidence from China, He et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1879596

Climate-driven distribution dynamics of the teak defoliator Hyblaea puera under current and future climate scenarios, Mahanta et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1843989

Climate-induced forest destabilization and shrub stabilization in Africa, Cheng et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105627

Climate-Driven Changes in Resources Shift Reproductive Season and Effort of Insectivorous Montane Bird Species, Whelan & Garfinkel, Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71013

Climatic stress and species interactions shape tree vitality decline in Iberian pine species, Aguirre et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111333

Current and future thermal habitat suitability of the European clam Ruditapes decussatus (Linnaeus, 1758) in Mediterranean coastal lagoons, Palmas et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108139

Differential responses of trees to heatwaves in a desert-oasis ecotone: the role of isohydric/anisohydric stomatal regulation, Huang et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111362

Diurnal cycles of cloud and rainfall over North-East Queensland during the coral bleaching season, Chapman et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/wcd-7-1265-2026

Effects of ocean acidification on radular tooth material properties in Littorina littorea (Gastropoda, Mollusca), Krings et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108096

Global analysis suggests nitrogen deposition as an underestimated driver of vegetation greening, Trepel et al., Ecography Open Access 10.1002/ecog.08631

Here Comes the Heat: Urban Warming Increases Abundance but Compromises Fitness in the Common Woodlouse, Jame et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73654

Intact coastal nursery rearing amid climate-driven phenological shifts in threatened salmon, Munsch et al., Conservation Biology Open Access 10.1111/cobi.70355

Long-Term Population Monitoring Reveals Changes in Mesocarnivore Occupancy in Response to Severe Drought, Tucker et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.73960

Mass flowering of the seagrass Posidonia oceanica after 2022 record-breaking marine heatwaves, a Pan-Mediterranean study, Astruch et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03631-8

Masting Breakdown in European Beech Reduces Fitness Benefits of Masting, Partly Explained by Climate Change, Jantzen et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73809

Metabolic trade-offs shape acute thermal responses in the marine predator Rapana venosa, Xu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108249

No apparent impact of moderate temperature increase on growth and fecundity in the sea star Asterias rubens, Bourg & Keraudran, Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108072

Ocean acidification influence on Cymodocea nodosa seedling development, Crobu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108272

Past Acropora mortality on the Great Barrier Reef linked to climate variability and anthropogenic impacts, Clark et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03800-9

Projecting seasonal and future thermal suitability of the invasive and commercially valuable Manila clam Ruditapes philippinarum (A. Adams and Reeve, 1850) in a warming Mediterranean sea, Chiappi et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108263

Range-edge asymmetry in growth responses of English yew to climate warming: Stronger responses near the northern limit, Camarero et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111354

Seabird range contraction and dispersal under climate change, Avaria-Llautureo et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access 10.1038/s41558-026-02655-4

Shifts in climate-growth relationships of Pinus kwangtungensis in a warming subtropical forest of China, Yu et al., Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126574

Shifts in growth phenology of Tsuga dumosa in the central Himalayas under climate warming, Rai et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111307

Temporal Autocorrelation Increases Temperature-Driven Extinction Risk by Clustering Stressful Conditions, Robey et al., Ecology Letters pdf 10.1111/ele.70441

The North Atlantic Subpolar Gyre and Phytoplankton Bloom Under Potential Future Climate Scenarios, Oliver et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023561

Water-use strategy shift mediates C4 plant response to altered precipitation seasonality, Zhou et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105616

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Whole-genome duplication in an algal symbiont bolsters coral heat tolerance, bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory), 10.1101/2022.04.10.487810 28 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

A Top-Down View of Global and Regional Carbon Budgets From an Ensemble of Atmospheric Inversions, Woude et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb008779

Abiotic CO2 cycling in a desert soil: Linking surface fluxes and subsurface dynamics across seasons, Bekin et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111250

Adapter-enhanced CLIP for railway brake shoe anomaly detection, Shehzad et al., Complex & Intelligent Systems Open Access 10.1007/s40747-026-02377-2

Addition of brackish water to tundra soils does not inhibit methane production: implications for Arctic coastal methane production, Roy-Lafontaine et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-3777-2026

Airborne Observations Reveal Underestimated Riverine Methane Emissions Across the Amazon, Ort et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122310

Anthropogenic perturbations to atmospheric methane reflected in Greenland firn air clumped isotope measurements, Sivan et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb2203

Body mass index, sedentary lifestyle, and HbA1c predict cardiac autonomic neuropathy in type 2 diabetes, Haji et al., Cardiovascular Diabetology – Endocrinology Reports Open Access 10.1186/s40842-026-00308-1

Briefing Chat: Sweet! Elusive sugar molecules found in space, Thompson & Howe, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-02263-4

Capturing the Global Variability of Marine Particulate Organic Carbon Flux: A Hierarchical Bayesian Approach, Edwards et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123203

Carbon input manipulation significantly alters soil CO2 and CH4 fluxes across stand ages in boreal birch forests of China, Gao et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111212

Comparative effects of A-site ionic radius and disorder on structure, magnetism, and transport in perovskite La0.8Sr0.1A0.1MnO3 (A=Ca, Sr, Ba), Zhang et al., Journal of Materials Science Materials in Electronics 10.1007/s10854-026-18036-8

Disease landscape–guided design of neutrophil-specific reporters for early and accurate pneumonia detection in vivo and in urine, Li et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb4417

Divergent long-term trends in vegetation carbon turnover between mature and young forests, Ren et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70396

Dynamical analysis of a discrete reaction-diffusion-convection predator-prey model based on coupled map lattices, Du & Han, Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computing 10.1007/s12190-026-02860-6

Effects of hummock-hollow microtopography on CO2 and CH4 emissions from sedge peatlands in the Changbai Mountains, Northeast China, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111220

Environmental controls and temporal trends of CO2 and CH4 emissions in a former cultivated peatland under rewetting, Pullens et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111363

Evaluation of a Decade of Methane Observations From a Tower Network in Indianapolis, Indiana, Barkley et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2026jd046734

Fatigue Properties of WAAM-Fabricated 2209 Duplex Stainless Steel Evaluated by Temperature Measurement and Heat Source Reconstruction, Viola et al., Experimental Mechanics 10.1007/s11340-026-01354-7

Filtering of Second Order Generalized Stochastic Processes Corrupted by Additive Noise, Wahlberg, Journal of Fourier Analysis and Applications Open Access 10.1007/s00041-026-10282-y

Geochemistry of CO2-rich gas emissions in the Carpathians: Multiscale geological sources and implications for orogenic degassing, Kis et al., Earth-Science Reviews Open Access 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105528

GHGPSE-Net: a method towards spaceborne automated extraction of greenhouse-gas point sources using point-object-detection deep neural network, Pang et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-1683-2026

Global burden and temporal trends of colorectal cancer in East Asia based on the global burden of disease 2023 study, Qin et al., Discover Oncology Open Access 10.1007/s12672-026-05561-5

Global warming makes nitrogen oxide abatement key to ozone pollution mitigation, Wang et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aea4124

High-performance multijunction perovskite LEDs with reduced interconnection loss, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75756-5

Hybrid Neuro-Symbolic Models for Transparent and Adaptive Decision-Making in Dynamic Real-World Environments, Welekar et al., National Academy Science Letters 10.1007/s40009-026-02325-1

Incorporating observed fire severity in refined emissions estimates for boreal and temperate forest fires in the carbon budget model CBM-CFS3 v1.2, Thompson et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-3617-2026

Increasing Warming May Inhibit Land Carbon Uptake in Northern High Latitudes, Madani et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122135

Insights of climate-driven changes in CH4 and CO2 source contributions at European coastal observatories, Adame et al., Atmospheric Research Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109076

Iron overload suppresses LKB1 and induces IL36G anti-tumor immunity in PDAC metastasis, Biancur et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz8681

Leader as the “Glue” that holds the teams together: examining how identity leadership influences intra-team cooperation and inter-team knowledge sharing, Feng et al., Current Psychology 10.1007/s12144-026-09780-5

Livestock grazing, plant community and abiotic factors shape blue carbon stocks in Nordic coastal marshes, Richard et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-4583-2026

Methane and Ethane Emission Rates, Intensities, and Trends: Aircraft Mass Balance Insights Over the Denver-Julesburg Basin, Fall 2021, Daley et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd044370

Methane and Nitrous Oxide Reshape the Air-Water Greenhouse Gas Budget of a Tropical Estuarine Delta, Cotovicz et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2026jg009956

Methane oxidation in African and European rivers depends on stream size and wetland connectivity, Borges et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb8250

Microstructural Evolution and Acid Corrosion Mechanism of Laser-Clad FeCoNiCrx High-Entropy Alloy Coatings, Xiao et al., Metallurgical and Materials Transactions A 10.1007/s11661-026-08305-w

Neoadjuvant Chemoradiotherapy on Postoperative Complications of Rectal Cancer: A Retrospective Study Integrating MRI Radiomics and Deep Learning, Bu et al., Journal of Imaging Informatics in Medicine 10.1007/s10278-026-02137-1

Organic carbon oxidation state shapes fermentative methanogenic microbiomes and controls greenhouse gas fluxes, Hu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73281-z

Organic Matter Stoichiometry Regulates the Continental Shelf Carbon Pump Efficiency of the Northwest European Shelf Seas, Demir et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb008724

Peatlands Have the Potential to Emerge as Significant Contributors to Future Climate Warming, Chaudhary et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009540

Permafrost carbon release scales linearly with overshoot warming mediated by AMOC tipping, Steinert et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73612-0

Physics-constrained machine-learning surrogates for the colebrook friction factor: monotonic gradient boosting, uncertainty quantification, and open benchmarking, Müftüo?lu, Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-62231-w

Plants are a powerful proxy for global tidal marsh methane fluxes, Wilson et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2530848123

PLATO on the footsteps of Kepler for transit timing, Maltagliati, Nature Astronomy 10.1038/s41550-026-02933-3

Projected future warming induces a long-term loss in global dissolved organic carbon pool, Tjiputra et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03809-0

Quantifying facility-scale CO2 emissions using spaceborne hyperspectral imageries, Han et al., Remote Sensing of Environment 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115478

Rademacher-type exact formula and higher order Turán inequalities for cubic overpartitions, Agarwal et al., Research in Number Theory pdf 10.1007/s40993-026-00765-8

Rapid and sensitive NO2 detection using optimized flower-like ZnO nanorods synthesized via chemical bath deposition, Ambi et al., Journal of Materials Science Materials in Electronics 10.1007/s10854-026-18001-5

Reversed functional gradient in primate prefrontal cortex: Posterior dominance and frontopolar task-related deactivation, Watanabe et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aea1094

Revising the Magnitude and Trends of the Global Methane Soil Sink With Process-Based, Machine-Learning, and Atmospheric Inversion Modeling Approaches, Oh et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009668

Rock weathering can counteract river CO2 emissions induced by permafrost thaw, Zhang et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10664-8

Satellite estimation of global air sea CO2 flux from 2000 to 2020, Ji et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-51215-5

Shoreline exposure controls teal carbon accumulation in boreal lakes, Dauner et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-3637-2026

Short-Term Effects of PM2.5 Exposure on Hematological and Biochemical Blood Indices in the Middle-Aged and Elderly, Dinh et al., Aerosol and Air Quality Research Open Access 10.1007/s44408-026-00131-4

Simultaneous measurements of translation rate and transcriptome uncovers linked regulation within an active bacterial cell population, Baumann et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz1707

Soil Carbon Saturation Constrains Long-Term Sequestration Under Revegetation on China's Loess Plateau, Zhang et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006739

The RhMPK3-RhLOB41-RhWRKY9 module orchestrates ethylene-induced petal abscission via dual control of ROS homeostasis in rose, Zhang et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adu6821

The spliceosome component SNRPC promotes glioma progression by sustaining mitochondrial function and TNFAIP2 signaling, Ma et al., Cell Death and Disease Open Access 10.1038/s41419-026-09065-6

Towards operational automated greenhouse gas plume detection and delineation, Bue et al., Remote Sensing of Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115506

TundraFlux: A database of ecosystem respiration with biotic and abiotic metadata from Arctic and alpine tundra warming experiments, Schwieger et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-4965-2026

Understanding the resilient carbon cycle response to the 2014–2015 Blob event in the Gulf of Alaska using a regional ocean biogeochemical model, Abe et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-3871-2026

Urban CO2 and CH4 pilot atmospheric measurements in the Milan city area (Northern Italy), Cristofanelli et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122124

Varicose projection astrocytes: Conserved reactive cells in brain pathology, Ciani et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.ady8204

When trust building looks like surveillance: Public polarization toward Chicago policing, Cheng & Liu, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb7575

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Trends and Drivers of Terrestrial Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide: An Overview of the TRENDY Project, Global Biogeochemical Cycles, 10.1029/2024gb008102 121 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Contrasting first-year and tenth-year responses of soil CO2 efflux and soil carbon storage indicators to biochar addition in plantation forests, Yu et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1879259

Global quantification of the eco-hydrological co-benefits of soil carbon sequestration, Vanderkelen et al., Biogeosciences Open Access 10.5194/bg-23-3829-2026

Hydrogen bond network disruption enables efficient direct reactive capture of CO2 from flue gas, Liu et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74647-z

Insights lost at points of vulnerability in UK policy evidence gathering on carbon dioxide removal, Hope & Vaughan, Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104412

Mapping CO2 Migration Pathways: Interactions With Geological Structures, Ashmore et al., Edinburgh Research Explorer Open Access pmh:oai:pure.ed.ac.uk:openaire/0386afc5-3b2c-436f-b35d-44a153274556

Naturalness catalyzes public support for carbon dioxide removal and low-carbon energy technologies, Coffin & Boven, Open MIND pmh:10.17605/osf.io/g37ku

Unobserved confounders cannot explain over-crediting in avoided deforestation carbon projects, Guizar-Coutiño et al., Nature Ecology & Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41559-026-03049-7

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Cost-effectiveness of natural forest regeneration and plantations for climate mitigation, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02068-1 75 cites.

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Decarbonization

A global feasibility gap in resilient island energy transitions, Huang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75606-4

Accuracy, robustness and comprehensibility – Challenges in bottom-up energy system models, Prina & Noussan, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000890

Beyond lithium: how sodium-ion batteries could change the world, Castelvecchi, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-02150-y

Climate change reshapes resource adequacy risks and optimal renewable energy siting in wind and solar energy systems, Qiu et al., Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-026-02109-3

Climatic Impacts of Large-Scale Wind Farms in Arid and Semi-Arid Region in China: A Case Study of the Huitengxile Wind Farm in Inner Mongolia, Su et al., Wind Energy Open Access 10.1002/we.70141

Energy transition in India and the race for renewable energy to outpace fossil fuels in carbon reduction, Noor et al., Discover Sustainability Open Access 10.1007/s43621-026-04129-1

Ensemble-based projections of future climate extremes and their implications for photovoltaic power potential in China, Ma et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.011

Optimized decarbonization pathway coupled with carbon trading mechanism for China's steel industry towards carbon neutrality, Sun et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115428

Stakeholder perspectives on decarbonizing Thailand's power sector: A SWOT-fuzzy AHP approach towards net zero, Altaf et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102084

The trade route to renewables: Import as a catalyst for the diffusion of renewable energy technology, Rabbani & Quaiyyum, Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115390

Toward net-zero water systems: mechanisms and challenges in low- and middle-income Asian countries, Ahmed et al., Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 10.1016/j.cosust.2026.101681

Urban decarbonization needs strategic reserves for critical materials, Allam et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03819-y

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Critical mineral mining in the energy transition: A systematic review of environmental, social, and governance risks and opportunities, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103672 85 cites.

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Geoengineering climate

Intended and unintended consequences of atmospheric methane oxidation enhancement, Horowitz, Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-9471-2026

Ocean alkalinity enhancement reduces silica ballasting during export due to amplified dissolution, Suessle et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-4691-2026

Reflecting on the politics and power dynamics of contested climate technologies, Fritz et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104448

Black carbon

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Changes in the Direct Climate Effect of Black Carbon Aerosols in East Asia Under the “Dual Carbon” Goal of China, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd040874 5 cites.

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Aerosols

Global Characterization of Stratospheric Sulfate Aerosols by the Atmospheric Chemistry Experiment (ACE), Bernath et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd046214

Rising dust pollution across Europe in a changing climate, Vasilakos et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10743-w

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Assessment of aerosol-cloud interactions over the Northern Indian Ocean, Atmospheric Research, 10.1016/j.atmosres.2024.107601 4 cites.

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Climate change communications & cognition

As the planet heats, public doubt grows: The social structure behind rising climate change scepticism in Germany, Gies & Deutschmann, Global Environmental Change Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103202

Climate Change Advocacy in Libraries: Practices, Challenges and Future Research Directions, Oladokun et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2702627

Climate change concerns and perceived intergenerational mobility, Gugushvili & Präg, Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103119

Climate Obstruction in the Digital Far-Right: Mapping the Climate Countermovement in German-, Danish-, and Swedish-Speaking Digital Information Environments, Henriksen et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.1080/17524032.2026.2701866

Confident judgments of (mis)information veracity are more, rather than less, accurate, Ak et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag186

Lagos Is Drowning: Media, Resistance, and Climate Coloniality in Flooding Narratives, Ogungbemi, Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2706163

Listening to climate change: sound, imagination and environmental sociology, Clark, Environmental Sociology Open Access 10.1080/23251042.2026.2704790

Mapping climate change coverage: Causes, consequences, and solutions in German news media, 2010–2024, Dablander et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104833

Medical students’ perspectives on climate change, climate-health education, and professional identity: a qualitative study, Loh et al., BMC Medical Education Open Access 10.1186/s12909-026-09775-7

Temporal horizons in US climate change news, Wozniak, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02716-8

The Digital Representation of Greta Thunberg in Internet Memes: Gender, Ideology, and Digital Violence, Lucena & Colacios, Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2701872

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Patterns of climate-change coping among late adolescents: Differences in emotions concerning the future, moral responsibility, and climate-change engagement, Climatic Change, 10.1007/s10584-024-03778-3 19 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Paphia undulata enhances sedimentary CH4 and N2O emissions via divergent microbial mechanisms, Zhong et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108103

Climate stressor projections inform adaptation needs in South Asian oilseed systems, Barik et al., npj Sustainable Agriculture Open Access pdf 10.1038/s44264-026-00170-9

Crop migration is not a viable long-term strategy for mitigating climate change impacts on winter wheat production in the North China Plain, GUO et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.006

Decoding Heat Tolerance in Rice: Physiological Mechanisms, Genetic Architecture, and Breeding Innovations, Saha et al., Plant Molecular Biology Reporter 10.1007/s11105-026-01743-1

Depicting the response of crop photosynthesis to elevated CO2: the unique role of sun-induced chlorophyll fluorescence, Ye et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111211

From perception to action: attitudes and climate change adaptation practices among smallholder farmers in Nakivale refugee settlement, Mohamed et al., Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/feart.2026.1868338

Modeling short- and long-term climatic and non-climatic drivers of wheat yield in Somalia (1986–2019): Evidence from an ARDL approach, Osman et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000804

Regional flooding enhances N2O and CH4 emissions from agricultural fields: Evidence from a single extreme event across the North China Plain, Ge et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111284

Simulating Agroecology Policy Options for the Resilience of Smallholder Food Security to Climate Shocks, Dagunga et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access 10.1002/cli2.70055

Sizing blue carbon risks and benefits from bivalve aquaculture, Gentry et al., npj Ocean Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1038/s44183-026-00199-w

Tibetan Pasture Restoration Causes Additional Cooling by Reflecting Solar Radiation, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2025jg009479

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Land use modulates resistance of grasslands against future climate and inter-annual climate variability in a large field experiment, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17418 29 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Exceptionally Warm Event in the Tropical South Atlantic in 2023–24: Physical Drivers and Impacts on South American Rainfall, Hounsou-Gbo et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023901

North American Winter Precipitation Extremes: Changes in Variability and Driving Mechanisms in a Warming Climate, Jeong et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008659

Precipitation Over the Contiguous United States Is Coming From Farther Away Than in the Past, Aerenson et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122565

Quantifying UK coastal flood exposure under future sea-level rise to 2300, Palmer et al., Explore Bristol Research pmh:oai:research-information.bris.ac.uk:openaire_cris_publications/62032aef-becd-4ddc-a902-ff39b2c8a275

Rethinking future flood hazard: Hourly data challenge daily flood projections in Alpine catchments, Astagneau et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed6012

Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Extreme Hourly Rainfall in the Hawaiian Islands, Gayte et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70501

Uncertainty in California Winter Precipitation Linked to Future Projections of North Pacific Large-Scale Atmospheric Circulation, Choi et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres pdf 10.1029/2025jd045669

Understanding changes in Iceland's streamflow dynamics in response to climate change, Helgason et al., Hydrology and earth system sciences Open Access 10.5194/hess-30-3979-2026

Unraveling daily dynamics of supraglacial lakes in response to hydrological pulses and anomalous climate signals, Song et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75669-3

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The increasing water stress projected for China could shift the agriculture and manufacturing industry geographically, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01560-y 49 cites.

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Climate change economics

Carbon pricing, economic resilience, and transport decarbonization: evidence from Finland, Msefula et al., Humanities and Social Sciences Communications Open Access 10.1057/s41599-026-08428-w

Climate-induced loss and damage in Nepal: attribution analysis and institutional readiness for international support, Dhakal et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1782991

How the money flows: analyzing international finance for climate change adaptation in Ethiopia, Kidane et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103201

Inequality in flood insurance arrangements to finance flood recovery under climate change, Tesselaar & Botzen, Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100850

Prioritizing the welfare of vulnerable nations promotes equitable achievement of Paris target, Biswas et al., npj Climate Action Open Access 10.1038/s44168-026-00385-z

Research on the impact of climate risk on corporate cost of debt financing, Yang et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1763661

Statistical learning for climate-GDP panels: Data cleaning, flexible trend controls, and predictive validation, Schötz et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000962

Views of EU citizens on economic growth and implications for climate policy, Savin et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73323-6

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Towards a more transformative approach to climate finance, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2377730 27 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Improvement of ambient air quality and the synergistic governance of CO2 and pollutant emissions in Shenyang, Zhao et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-50803-9

The impact of conventional policy instruments on climate change mitigation in China, Matutinovi? & Borozan, The Anthropocene Review 10.1177/20530196261464201

Waste and CO2, an intricate relationship. Metrics, policy and technology in the climate-framing of waste, Rocher, Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104443

“Mitigation + adaptation” climate policy synergy and urban ecological resilience: Evidence from China, Zhang & Dou, Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103046

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Power supply disruptions deter electric vehicle adoption in cities in China, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50447-1 53 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

A battleground of climate change: Summer air temperatures in social housing, Pfautsch et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103051

Assessing the vulnerability of livelihoods and ecosystems during the KwaZulu-Natal floods and their implications for climate resilience, Anekwe, Climate and Development Open Access 10.1080/17565529.2026.2696367

Economic optimization of climate adaptation for water security: an integrated water–energy nexus risk assessment framework, Ran et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1817765

Inequality in human development amplifies climate-related disaster risk, Teber et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73873-9

Instrumentalizing ‘uninhabitability’ at a time of climate change: the case of Barbuda after Hurricane Irma, ???????? et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2696370

Maladaptation can contribute to aggregated, amplified, compounded, and cascading climate risks, Shah, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 10.1016/j.cosust.2026.101689

Producing resilience: governance, social relations, and climate risk in coastal communities, Nurhayati et al., Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2699296

Promises and pitfalls of climate adaptation tools across the Mediterranean, Koutroulis et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03795-3

Rethinking urban climate adaptation: A degrowth perspective for policy and practice, Acuña & Fernández-Baldor, Environmental Science & Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104445

The Destination Earth digital twin for climate change adaptation, Doblas-Reyes et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-2821-2026

The national knowledge politics of monitoring and evaluating adaptation to climate change: processes of repair, theatrical performance and legitimacy, Adhikari & Fisher, Environmental Politics Open Access pdf 10.1080/09644016.2026.2700733

Women and climate adaptation in South Africa: a gender-responsive policy review, Baloyi et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1821218

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Weaving scientific and local knowledge on climate change impacts in coastal Kenya, Western Indian Ocean, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103846 10 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Assessing and Refining the Heat Index for Subdaily Heat Conditions, Liu, Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-25-0250.1

Climate change, hygiene, and health: A research roadmap for climate adaptation, Gerard et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000907

Environmental suitability of Coccidioides in the USA under climate change scenarios: a modelling study, Deshpande et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101481

Feeling the heat: Socio-spatial inequalities in indoor overheating and heat adaptation in Greater London, Assan, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104868

Global climate risks for outdoor sports under CMIP6 scenarios: A multi-indicator assessment based on WBGT, Heat Index, heavy rainfall, and heatwaves, Defrance & Lescure, PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000969

Local drivers in accelerating North American heat stress, Prein et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72795-w

Mental health experiences amid climate change and sexual and reproductive health challenges: A scoping review focused on low-and middle-income countries, Vahedi et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000984

Recognizing the human health impacts of marine heatwaves, Falkenberg & Russell, Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01892-x

The science of climate heat risks has a metric problem, Jay & Jahan, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03804-5

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Indoor overheating: A review of vulnerabilities, causes, and strategies to prevent adverse human health outcomes during extreme heat events, Temperature, 10.1080/23328940.2024.2361223 87 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics

Critical misalignments in climate pledges reveal imbalanced sustainable development pathways, Larosa et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73564-5

Defragmenting Mangrove Law Towards Coherent Global Governance, Lorber & Cappa, Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73721

Other

AI-assisted longitudinal comparison of scenario knowledge representation in IPCC synthesis reports, Warin & Bisson, PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000965

Co-Producing Climate Services for California's Energy Sector, Freitas et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef005959

Extreme Weather in the Southern Hemisphere in Early 2022, Vries et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society Open Access 10.1175/bams-d-23-0141.1

From continental to street scales: climate change impacts on atmospheric composition over Europe and London, Doherty et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-10115-2026

Mercury mobilization and export from the Greenland Ice Sheet using an ice-to-ocean approach, Youssef et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03818-z

Modelling the anthropocene: A brief and partial history, Turnbull, The Anthropocene Review Open Access 10.1177/20530196261472817

Resource consumption in global concrete production, Kane et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01858-z

The true impacts of the built environment, [authors did not process], Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01910-y

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
How Has the Ferrel Cell Contributed to the Maintenance of Antarctic Sea Ice at Low Levels From 2016 to 2022?, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108801 2 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Missing Western Pacific moorings threaten weather and climate forecasting and research, Cravatte et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1861050

U.S. researchers express outrage over proposed changes to managing federal grants, Mervis, Science 10.1126/science.aek5959

‘Climate free fall’: why the biggest risk to our economies is yet to be recognized, Levermann, Nature Open Access pdf 10.1038/d41586-026-02154-8

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Science-based targets miss the mark, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01535-z 30 cites.

buffer/IOPN Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Early Warnings: Government Knowledge of Climate Change and Legal Responsibility for Climate Harm, Lindsay Fenlock and Nikki Reisch, Center for International Environmental Law

The authors examine publicly available government records, scientific evidence, and historical archives to document when major emitting States became aware of the causes and foreseeable consequences of climate change. They demonstrate that many governments understood the risks decades earlier than they have claimed, strengthening the evidentiary foundation for climate litigation, human rights, and climate advocacy, and the implementation of the International Court of Justice climate advisory opinion. By tracing the history of government knowledge, the report provides a critical resource for advancing climate accountability and ensuring that high-emitting States are held responsible for failing to prevent the climate crisis.

Bait and Switch. The Impacts of Trump Administration Policies at the Intersection of Clean Energy, Manufacturing, and Labor, BlueGreen Alliance

The authors found that largely due to the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), 223 manufacturing, clean energy, and industrial projects are already facing cancellations and delays representing at least $82.8 billion in capital investment which could cost 111,765 jobs. Additionally, more than 3,034 manufacturing, clean energy, and industrial sites face tax restrictions due to OBBBA, putting at risk $695.2 billion in capital investment and 1,184,996 jobs.

Attribution of Extreme Weather and Climate Events and Their Impacts, National Research Council, The National Academies Press

Decades of data and research indicate that human-caused climate change is altering the frequency and intensity of several types of extreme events, such as heat waves and extreme rainfall events. Even as those trends become clearer, extreme event attribution (EEA) seeks to assess the degree to which climate change contributed to any specific event. EEA studies provide information that can be useful for public understanding, planning and risk management, policy and legal contexts, and scientific research. The authors evaluate the state of EEA science, updating a National Academies report published in 2016. The authors also assess the emerging field of extreme event impact attribution (EEIA). The number of EEA studies has grown substantially over the past decade as scientific tools, observational datasets, and methods have advanced, enabling attribution studies to be completed within days of an event. However, challenges remain, including limited model capabilities for small-scale regional events, representation of key atmospheric processes, and attribution of compounding, cascading, and record-breaking events. The authors examine these advances and remaining challenges and provide recommendations for strengthening attribution science, improving collaboration with local experts and stakeholders, and advancing research, data, and modeling capabilities worldwide.

Military Escalation in the Middle East: Cushioning the Global Shock, Molina et al., United Nations Development Program

The economic, fiscal and social impacts of the recent Middle East military escalation are expected to persist despite the June 18 Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the United States. Since April, many developing economies have sought to shield households and businesses from rising energy costs through subsidies, price caps, tax reductions and demand-management measures. While these policies have softened the immediate affect of higher prices, they have come at a significant fiscal cost. Without such interventions, poverty is projected to increase substantially. Under an adverse global growth scenario, an additional 17 million people could fall into poverty by upper-middle-income standards, rising to 45 million under a severe scenario. Global fossil fuel subsidies are projected to exceed $1 trillion in 2026 and could reach $1.43 trillion if oil prices rise to $110 per barrel. The effects of the shock differ across regions. Remittances have helped cushion affects in South Asia, fertilizer disruptions risk worsening food insecurity in Africa, and energy subsidies in East Asia have contained inflation while increasing fiscal exposure. These pressures come at a time when nearly half of the world’s poorest countries are already in or at high risk of debt distress. As debt service costs continue to rise and fiscal buffers are exhausted, many governments are being forced to divert resources away from health, education and infrastructure. Sustained multilateral support will be essential to help vulnerable countries manage the crisis and protect development gains.

Disproportionate Regulation of Residential Plug-in Solar, Stephen Smith and Amanda Arthur, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy

The authors examine the scientific and regulatory basis for the differential treatment of residential plug-in solar photovoltaic (PIPV) units and portable gas/diesel generators with respect to line-worker safety. The authors use documented fatality records from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), peer-reviewed electrical injury science, utility industry safety publications, applicable federal inverter safety standards, a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) funded national laboratory barrier analysis, and the emerging bipartisan legislative consensus in multiple states. They noted that A DOE-funded Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory study (2025) systematically catalogued the technical, interconnection, and regulatory barriers to plug-in solar adoption in the United States, confirming that interconnection requirements—not technical safety limitations—are the primary barrier to deployment.

Washington State Climate Action Plan, Washington State Departments of Commerce and Ecology

Washington already has a strong set of policies to advance climate action. However, the state can and must do more The Comprehensive Climate Action Plan (CCAP) is designed to meet this need and be a far-reaching, implementable, equitable, and thorough roadmap to ensure a sustainable future for the state. The CCAP identifies opportunities across all sectors of the economy to further reduce emissions and provide direct benefits to communities and businesses such as cleaner air, healthier communities, boosting the economy, and protecting vulnerable populations.

Retail Electricity Price Trends and Drivers: Data Update−2026 Edition, Wiser et al., Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Prices largely tacked inflation; all-sector average prices are only up 3% since 2019 in real dollars. Real prices are down in 29 states; A majority of states saw a decline in inflation-adjusted prices (2019-2025). Electricity burdens are lower that in 2019 in most regions; total bills as a fraction of income are near all-time lows.

The 2025 small island developing states report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: building resilience in the face of rising heat, Gordon-Strachan et al., The Lancet Global Health

In this second iteration of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) report, the authors present the findings of 28 indicators from five thematic areas: health hazards, exposures, and impacts; adaptation, planning, and resilience for health; mitigation actions and health co-benefits; economics and finance; and public and political engagement in health and climate change. General statements about SIDS were only made for indicators with data coverage of at least 70%, with the number of SIDS with available indicator data explicitly stated when this threshold was not met. The 2025 report includes a dedicated chapter on financing with a deep dive into international climate financing for SIDS.

A Majority of Voters Support Worker Protections Against Extreme Heat, Ayseli Karabekmez, Data for Progress

Rising global temperatures are causing more frequent and severe extreme heat, droughts, and flooding across the United States. Last week, a dangerous heat wave with temperatures of 103–105 degrees Fahrenheit prompted heat alerts across multiple states. As climate-driven extreme weather events become more common, a majority of Americans are connecting the dots between climate change and extreme weather like heat waves. Recent polling finds that a majority of voters (61%) believe that extreme weather events — like hurricanes, flash floods, droughts, and heat waves — have become more frequent over the past five years. This includes majorities of Democrats (72%) and Independents (63%). Republicans are more divided, with a plurality (46%) saying extreme weather events have become more frequent, and 42% saying the frequency has stayed the same. Perceptions of extreme weather also vary by age. Half of voters under 45 (50%) believe the number of extreme weather events has increased over the past five years, compared with 66% of voters over 45 – a 16-point difference.

Heat, health and increasing cost of living. A call for action, Mathilde Wilkens and Dennis Tänzler, Adelphi Global

The authors recommend embedding heat-health effects into UNFCCC processes, including the Global Goal on Adaptation indicators and the Belem Health Action Plan (BHAP); linking national adaptation plans to concrete social protection measures, including compensation for lost working time and state-supported insurance schemes; extending formal labor protections to cover heat-related losses, particularly for informal workers, and addressing the gender dimensions of heat vulnerability; and mobilizing adaptation finance specifically for health, with clear guidance on how funding can be deployed to protect living standards.

Grid Action Report – July 4th Heat Wave. How clean energy provides cost savings and boosts grid reliability during extreme heat, Will Taylor and Jamie Dickerson, Acadia Center

The authors provide a response to recent extreme weather events affecting energy systems and consumers in the Northeast. The region’s experience with last week’s heatwave again points to the power of a portfolio approach to deliver savings and resource adequacy: a combination of clean energy resources helped the region ride through a period of significant grid stress – periods which will only increase in frequency, duration, and cost under a changing climate. This portfolio of resources – including solar, energy efficiency, demand response, battery storage, interregional transmission, and on/offshore wind – will serve as the foundation for a less volatile, more affordable, and more secure energy system. For example, distributed solar drives major savings during heat wave. The authors estimate 6+ gigawatts (GW) of distributed solar saved New England ratepayers $130-149 million in wholesale electricity (energy) costs during the week of June 28 through July 4, 2026. Distributed solar output exceeded 25% of all demand on the grid at times and contributed more to the grid mix than the region’s nuclear fleet between 2PM and 7PM on the peak heatwave day of July 2.

Modernizing New Jersey’s Electric Utility Business Model, Patel et al., New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

Electricity bills in New Jersey have risen faster than most household essentials, which makes affordability the central concern of this study. Most of a typical bill (supply and transmission) is set in federal and regional markets with limited ability at the state level to influence those costs. Utility business-model reform that is regulated at the state level can act mainly on the distribution and programmatic portion of the bill, roughly a quarter of the bill, though some reforms may indirectly lower exposure to supply and transmission costs. The jurisdictional review and evidence show that no single reform or modernization option is a silver bullet. The most reliable near-term gains could come from “cost-discipline” measures available under existing state authority. More ambitious financing, incentive, and performance-based reforms could follow as data, baselines, and customer protections mature.

China's wind and solar mega-bases face a coal test, Yu et al., GEM

China is building more wind and utility-scale solar than the rest of the world combined, concentrated in northwestern and northern regions. Over 500 gigawatts (GW) of China's vast 1,360 GW of prospective utility-scale solar and wind capacity is already under construction. Six provinces and autonomous regions — Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Shaanxi — hold 714 GW, or more than half of China’s prospective wind and utility-scale solar pipeline. China’s wind and solar deployment has moved from an installation race to a system-integration test. China’s wind and solar mega-bases constitute the largest renewable-energy deployment project in the world, but grid bottlenecks and electricity market arrangements that limit system flexibility are preventing that capacity from being fully used. The result is rising curtailment: wind and solar output that could have been generated under prevailing weather conditions, but was instead reduced or withheld. The question is no longer whether China can build renewable capacity at scale, but whether it can transmit, store, price, and consume that power in ways that reduce coal use.

The Fraud of “Clean” Natural Gas. How Big Oil and Gas Created the Myth that Natural Gas is a Climate Solution, John et al., The Center for Climate Integrity

For decades, the oil and gas industry has perpetuated the fraud that natural gas is clean and a climate solution, despite knowing that it is a significant source of air pollution and a major contributor to climate change. The gas industry knew as early as 1907 that natural gas was a source of respiratory problems when burned indoors, and by the 1950s it knew that gas caused problems in outdoor air. Beginning in the 1960s, the oil and gas industry learned of another threat — emerging science showed that natural gas was a potentially significant contributor to methane in the atmosphere. As companies and their representatives closely monitored scientific developments on methane, the chemical name for natural gas, they also learned that it was a potent greenhouse gas and damaging for the climate, About New Research

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This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

Over the past week smoke from Canadian wildfires has once again poured into cities across Canada and the northern US. Toronto briefly had the worst air quality of any major city on Earth, Thunder Bay’s readings went off the top of Canada’s air quality health index scale, and unhealthy air alerts stretched from Minneapolis to New York City.

This smoke-pocalypse has renewed a long-standing debate online that these fires aren’t really about climate change at all, but about forest mismanagement. Decades of aggressive fire suppression, the argument goes, have let fuel pile up. We don’t log enough, thin enough, or do enough prescribed burning The forests are overgrown tinderboxes and we have only ourselves to blame. Climate is a distraction from a problem we created by listening to Smokey Bear’s insidious propaganda.

I want to take this argument seriously, because it has a real kernel of truth. The fire-deficit story is a genuine phenomenon in the dry conifer forests of the western United States. But most of what’s burning in Canada is boreal forest, and the boreal is a fundamentally different beast. So in this piece I’ll try to explain why the management argument, largely valid in a California pine stand, mostly falls apart when you move it a couple of thousand kilometers north, and explore what the fire data actually shows.

Here’s the short version. Canada’s area burned has surged, and it has surged in step with warming: hot, dry fire seasons burn far more forest, with area burned rises roughly 80% for each 1C increase in fire-season temperature (with a correlation coefficient of 0.61). This relationship is robust to a variety of statistical tests and controlling for confounding variables. The boreal burns in rare, high-intensity crown fires on a natural cycle measured in a century or more, across enormous remote areas that have never been logged, thinned, or effectively suppressed. Only about a fifth of Canada’s burned area over the past four decades was even inside forest regions that have ever been actively managed. You cannot have a fuel-buildup from forest mismanagement in a forest you were never managing.

Forest mis-management?

The forest-mismanagement argument was, in fairness, based on real evidence from some regions. In the frequent-fire dry forests of the western US that are dominated by ponderosa pine and mixed conifers the natural fire regime is low-to-moderate intensity surface fire returning every 5 to 30 years, historically stoked in part by Indigenous burning. A century of fire exclusion in those forests really did remove that frequent fire, let stands grow denser and more continuous, and build up a “fire deficit” that raises the odds of severe fire (Hagmann et al. 2021). And in that setting, fuel treatments work: Prichard et al. (2021) find wide agreement that mechanical thinning combined with prescribed burning measurably reduces subsequent fire severity. If you’re arguing about the Sierra Nevada, the management story is as important if not more important than the climate one.

The problem is that the Canadian boreal is not the Sierra Nevada. It burns in infrequent, high-intensity, stand-replacing crown fires that kill the whole stand on natural fire cycles measured in many decades to centuries (commonly a century or more, and two centuries or longer in the east), not 5 to 30 years. It is, ecologically speaking, supposed to burn this way; black spruce is practically built for it. Fire in this system was never the gentle recurring ground-clearing that suppression interrupted in California. And the burning is astonishingly concentrated: across the boreal, something like 3% of fires account for about 97% of the area burned. This is not a landscape full of many small fires that “used to clean out the fuel.” Rather, its a landscape that waits, and then burns catastrophically under extreme weather.

Why do we know that Canadian boreal forest fires are not being driven by mismanagement?

First, and most importantly, most of the boreal was never being managed in the first place. As University of Alberta fire scientist Jen Beverly has pointed out, only about one-fifth of Canada’s total burned area from 1986 to 2023 occurred within long-term forest tenure (the land that’s actually logged and managed). The vast majority burns in remote forest with no timber operations. In Canada’s so-called “extensive” fire-management zones there has been no serious suppression efforts historically. Fires there are monitored and largely left to burn unless they threaten people or infrastructure. You can’t blame overgrown, over-suppressed forests for fires in places nobody was suppressing.

Second, the fuel-buildup mechanism doesn’t fit the recent fires. If decades of suppression had loaded the forest with excess old fuel, you’d expect the big fire years to preferentially consume the oldest, most fuel-laden stands. But in Alberta’s brutal 2023 season, fires burned stands of essentially all ages in proportion to how much of each was on the landscape. That’s the signature of fire driven by weather, which doesn’t care how old the trees are, not by fuel accumulation.

Third, the proposed fixes don’t scale to the boreal even if you wanted them. This is the conclusion of the very scientists who documented Canada’s fire deficit. Coogan, Parisien and colleagues (2020) state it flatly: mechanical fuel treatments “require continued maintenance over time, are too expensive to apply across large boreal landscapes, and are usually not designed to halt extreme wildfires.” The boreal is on the order of three million square kilometers. You are not going to thin or prescribe-burn your way across it, and the crown fires that produce the smoke wouldn’t stop at a fuel break anyway.

So if it’s not mismanagement, what is it? Let’s look at the data.

The Canadian fire record

To start with, here is the long-term record of area burned, combing the satellite-mapped NBAC composite from 1972 on with the less-complete point-based records before that shown in grey (note that this is primarily for illustration; I don’t compute any statistics across the 1972 splice to avoid potential bias from changing measurement approaches).

Annual forest area burned in Canada, 1959–2026. Grey bars show the point-based record (1959–1971); red bars the NBAC satellite composite (1972–2025); the hatched bar is 2026 through mid-July (CIFFC, preliminary). Data: NRCan CNFDB/NBAC; CIFFC.

2023 stands out like a sore thumb with 14.8 million hectares in the satellite-mapped data (Canadian agency tallies actually run higher at 17–18 Mha as different products count differently),1 roughly 2.5 times the previous record. 2025 came in second at ~7.3 Mha in the satellite data. And 2026 so far is about 2.8 Mha by mid-July, a bit above the typical pace for this date, but far below the last few extreme years.

One caveat around how unprecedented this actually is. A recent tree-ring reconstruction back to 1800 (Danneyrolles et al. 2025) found that while 2023 itself was off the charts in most regions they studied, the decadal burn rate for 2014–2023 still sits within the range of the past two centuries in several zones, especially in the eastern boreal. We are not necessarily seeing more fire than ever everywhere, but rather a rapid rate of increase with the increasing prevalence of fire weather driving it. In addition, parts of the northwestern boreal are now burning at rates that do appear to exceed anything in thousands of years.

One important driver: higher temperatures Change in fire-season (May–September) mean temperature, 1959 to 2025, computed as a per-gridcell LOWESS trend. Canada-wide mean change is +2.2C, exceeding +3C in parts of the high Arctic. Data: ERA5-Land (ECMWF/Copernicus) via Google Earth Engine.

Canadian fire seasons (May through September) have warmed about 2.2C on average since 1959. Canada warms at roughly twice the global rate, and its north at roughly three times. That warming matters for fire through a well-understood mechanism: warmer air is exponentially “thirstier” (saturation vapor pressure rises ~7% per degree), so it pulls moisture out of live vegetation and dead fuels alike, priming the landscape to burn. It’s the same fuel-drying pathway that Abatzoglou and Williams (2016) found had roughly doubled cumulative forest area burned in the western US.

Hanes et al. (2019), examining the Canadian record from 1959 to 2015, found fire seasons starting earlier and ending later, more days with conditions suitable for fire spread, and increases in both annual area burned and the frequency of large fires. They found that these trends were consistent with human-caused warming, not with changes in forest management (which have been broadly stable since the 1980s even as the fire seasons have gotten dramatically worse).

Hot and dry years burn

A few years ago my Berkeley Earth colleague Robert Rohde made a lovely figure plotting each California fire season by its temperature and precipitation. Here is my Canadian version: every year from 1959 to 2025 placed in climate space, with dot size proportional to national area burned and the ten largest fire years outlined in black.

Each dot is one year (1959–2025), positioned by its fire-season (May–Sep) mean temperature and total precipitation averaged over burnable land, sized by national area burned (NBAC). Adapted from Robert Rohde’s California fire season weather chart. Data: ERA5-Land; NRCan CNFDB/NBAC.

The pattern is hard to miss. The biggest fire years pile up in the hot-and-dry corner with 2023 really standing out, and the recent era (red dots, 2011–2025) has shifted visibly toward that corner relative to the black dots of the 1960s. Canada’s fire seasons are migrating into the part of weather-space where the big burns happen.

We can also try and more directly quantify the relationship between area burned and temperature. Nationally, fire-season temperature correlates with log area burned at r = 0.61 (1972–2025), which means that a fire season 1C warmer sees ~80% more area burned. I want to be careful about what this does and doesn’t show, so I stress-tested it: the correlation survives detrending (r = 0.57), first-differencing (r = 0.46), and partialling out precipitation (r = 0.58). It isn’t just two things drifting upward together, and it isn’t a rebranded precipitation effect.2

Correlation of fire-season mean temperature with log annual area burned by province/territory, 1972–2025, with 95% moving-block bootstrap intervals. Red dots are significant after false-discovery-rate correction. Data: NRCan CNFDB/NBAC; ERA5-Land.

The relationship is strongest in the western and northern boreal – Yukon, BC, the Northwest Territories, the Prairie provinces, Ontario – and weak to non-significant in Nunavet, Quebec, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick, matching the literature’s finding that eastern boreal fire is generally less temperature-limited.

Lightning in the middle of nowhere Cumulative area burned by ignition cause, 1990–2023. Data: National Forestry Database (agency-reported).

About 71% of Canada’s area burned over 1990–2023 came from lightning-ignited fires, and in the record 2023 season it was ~93%. These are remote boreal megafires, ignited by lightning far from any road, timber lease, or fuel-treatment crew. This is worth considering in the context of the management debate: the fires driving the smoke are not escaped campfires or mismanaged plantations. They are lightning strikes into a drying landscape, often burning in exactly the places no one was managing. And because warming is expected to increase high-latitude lightning, climate change can contribute to both the fuel dryness and the ignition side of the equation.

What attribution science actually says

This week the National Academies released a major report on the attribution of extreme weather events and their impacts, updating their influential 2016 assessment. Its wildfire findings are careful, and they land almost exactly on the distinction I’ve been trying to make in this piece.

On the general question, the report concludes it is very likely that climate change has increased the likelihood and severity of extreme fire weather: the hot, dry, windy conditions that let fires ignite and spread. At the same time it assigns low confidence to attributing any specific individual wildfire, because fires are irreducibly multivariate: ignition, fuels, land management, and suppression all mediate the on-the-ground relationship between fire weather and hectares burned. Notably, the report also flags that no attribution study has yet isolated the role of fuel or ignition changes, precisely because those human factors are so entangled. The science is much stronger on “climate change made conditions like these more likely” than on “climate change, specifically, caused this fire.”

For Canada’s exceptional 2023 fire year the evidence is unusually strong, and the report devotes a whole box to it. Kirchmeier-Young et al. (2024) found the record burned area was 2–5 times more likely thanks to human influence in Canada’s eastern and western ecozones, and the extraordinarily long fire season more than 5 times more likely. World Weather Attribution found the cumulative fire-weather severity at least 7 times more likely and ~50% more intense. Jones et al. (2024) put the fire-weather likelihood increase at ~2.9–3.6x and burned area ~10% higher (95% CI: 3-40%) than without warming. And Barnes et al. (2025) found the James Bay severity rating at least 32% more intense, while noting the season was amplified by an extreme run of atmospheric blocking (~50 blocking days versus an average of 15), a reminder that in any single year the weather still matter enormously.

Where management does matter

The prior sections are about the physical science of what’s driving the fire trend. What we should do about it is a policy question, and here the management crowd is not wrong so much as aiming at the wrong target.

There genuinely is a fire deficit in parts of boreal Canada — but it’s local, and it’s about people, not country or regional fire totals. Parisien, Coogan and colleagues (2020) found that of 160 boreal communities they studied, 54% were surrounded by less recently-burned forest than their fire regime would predict reflecting a suppression legacy that leaves older, more flammable forest ringing towns. This is a place where thinning, fuel breaks, and prescribed burning could genuinely help.

Fuel management is valuable around communities, but is essentially useless across the remote boreal. But in Canada it does not explain and cannot reverse the rise in area burned that’s filling the sky with smoke. Treating the wildland-urban interface and cutting the emissions that are drying the forest should be seen as complementary rather than as competitors.

Why the smokey skies

One last point on the thing thats actually dominating the news a the moment. Even a year like 2026 that appears not to be headed for a top-5 record for area burned in Canada can still have catastrophic air pollution impacts.

Large-fire footprints (≥200 ha) across Canada, 2015–2024 (grey, ~39 Mha total), with the 878 fires still active as of 17 July 2026 (red, sized by area). Data: NRCan CNFDB large-fire polygons; CIFFC year-to-date feed.

Whether a given city chokes on smoke depends on where fires burn, how high their plumes loft, which way the wind blows, and how many people live downwind, not on total hectares burned nationwide. This July, fires across northwestern Ontario, the Prairies, and Quebec have sat upwind of the Great Lakes population corridor under a persistent transporting flow. A modest fire season in the wrong place can choke tens of millions, while a record season in the remote north can have much smaller impacts on populated regions. While overall area burned is the climate-linked trend, who breathes the smoke on a given week in July is mostly driven by the weather.

A few takeaways

So what are the takeaways here?

First, the forest-mismanagement explanation is borrowed from the wrong forest. Its a real problem in the frequent-fire dry forests of the western US, but the Canadian boreal is a rare-crown-fire system, mostly unmanaged and unsuppressed, where only about a fifth of the burned area is even on managed land and where the fire scientists themselves say landscape-scale fuel treatments can’t scale or stop the megafires.

Second, the surge in Canadian burning tracks temperature with striking consistency, and hotter, drier fire seasons burn far more forest (+80% per 1C), the biggest fire years are almost universally hotter and drier, over 90% of the record 2023 burn was remote lightning fire, and the attribution studies tie these extremes to a warmer atmosphere without needing to invoke forest management at all.

And third, where management does matter like for the forests ringing communities it’s a genuine and worthy fix. But here it just protects towns; it doesn’t solve the underlying factors driving area burned or wildfire smoke pollution.

So next time someone tells you Canada’s fires can be solved by raking the forests, you can point out that the thing filling their sky with smoke is a lightning-struck, drought-primed boreal forest doing what a warming climate is making it do more and more often.

In case its helpful, I’ve put the code and data to reproduce this analysis on my GitHub here.

1 Burned-area products genuinely differ: the National Burned Area Composite (NBAC) maps fire perimeters from satellite imagery and is more conservative, while agency/CIFFC tallies are reported figures with different cutoff dates (2023 is 14.8 Mha in NBAC vs ~17–18 Mha in agency totals). I use NBAC as the primary series and avoid computing statistics across the 1972 data-source splice; the 2026 number is a preliminary CIFFC year-to-date figure.

2 The gory methodological details: correlations use the homogeneous NBAC record (1972–2025), with effective sample sizes adjusted for autocorrelation (Bretherton et al. 1999), 95% moving-block bootstrap confidence intervals, and Benjamini–Hochberg false-discovery-rate control across jurisdictions. The national relationship also holds when refit excluding 2023 and 2025 (r = 0.52), so it is not an artifact of the two recent extreme years. Temperature and precipitation are area-weighted over each jurisdiction’s forested/woody land (MODIS IGBP classes 1–9) from ERA5-Land. Fire-season precipitation correlates with area burned at r = −0.49.

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters

As climate change bakes forests across North America, dense smoke from dozens of out-of-control wildfires burning in northern Minnesota and adjacent portions of Ontario is blanketing tens of millions of people with hazardous pollution.

The fires are bringing the worst air quality on record to much of the Great Lakes, mid-Atlantic, and Northeast United States. Pollution from small particles called PM2.5 — the fine particles less than 2.5 microns in diameter are the primary air pollution killers — has been far into the “Hazardous” range across five states since Wednesday morning.

The award for worst air in the nation on July 16 went to the city that has in the past billed itself as a climate haven: Duluth, Minnesota. The city’s 24-hour air quality index, or AQI, for PM2.5 particle pollution hit 934, over three times the threshold for “Hazardous” pollution. This shattered Duluth’s previous all-time AQI record of 159 set July 20, 2021. EPA pollution records go back to 1999.

The award for worst air in the nation on July 16 went to the city that has in the past billed itself as a climate haven: Duluth, Minnesota. The city’s 24-hour air quality index, or AQI, for PM2.5 particle pollution hit 934, over three times the threshold for “Hazardous” pollution. This shattered Duluth’s previous all-time AQI record of 159 set July 20, 2021. EPA PM 2.5 pollution records go back to 1999.

Record 24-hr PM 2.5 air quality on July 16, 2026

Duluth, MN: 934 AQI for PM2.5 (Old record: 159, July 20, 2021)
Toledo, OH (5 monitors): 624 (Old record: 190, June 28, 2023)
Chicago. IL (42 monitors): 511 (Old record: 246, June 28, 2023)
Detroit, MI: 490 (Old record: 226, June 28, 2023)
Cleveland, OH: 297 (Old record: 285, June 28, 2023)
Milwaukee, WI: 414 (Old record: 270, June 27, 2023)
Flint, MI: 343 (Old record: 178, June 27, 2023)
Minneapolis, MN (39 monitors): 251 (Old record: 193, July 29, 2021)
Green Bay, WI (5 monitors): 372 (Old record: 179, June 29, 2023)
Grand Rapids, MI (4 monitors): 482 (Old record: 227, June 27, 2023)
Lansing, MI (2 monitors): 408 (Old record: 194, June 29, 2023)
Buffalo, NY (11 monitors): 206 (Old Record: 176, June 7, 2023)

Record 24-hr PM 2.5 air quality on July 17, 2026

Washington D.C. (21 monitors): 246 AQI at Ashburn, VA, and 234 at Springfield, VA (Old record: 222, June 8, 2023, at Franconia Park, VA)
Pittsburg, PA (25 monitors): 261 (Old record: 237, June 29, 2023)
Dover, DE (2 monitors): 223 (Old record: 207, June 8, 2023)
Columbus, OH (8 monitors): 272 (Old record: 210, June 28, 2023)

Because of the huge number of people affected, and since this is occurring at the same time as a severe humid heat wave, this extreme and widespread pollution event — which will be followed by many months of repeated wildfire smoke incursion into the U.S. — will undoubtedly cause hundreds and perhaps thousands of premature deaths. The only comparable wildfire smoke event affecting this portion of North America occurred in 2023; a 2025 study blamed that event for 33,000 premature deaths in the United States, 8,300 in Canada, and 23,000 in Europe. According to the EPA, a premature air pollution death is one that occurs on average 14 years before a person would have otherwise died.

The climate change connection to the wildfires

As the climate warms, fire danger increases, mostly because the atmosphere gets “thirstier” – more water vapor can evaporate into warmer air. This results in more water vapor evaporating from plants, which dries them out and creates an increased risk of large and intense fires that can generate huge smoke plumes. Most of the fires grew out of control under extreme heat conditions made up to five times more likely by climate change (Fig. 1). According to Climate Central, the heat that helped fuel these fires would have been “highly unlikely” to have occurred in a world without climate change.

Figure 1. Climate Shift Index for Monday, July 13, 2026, showing the factor increase in high temperatures because of human-caused climate change. (Image credit: Climate Central)

Five states recorded “Hazardous” air quality on Thursday

On Thursday, July 16, portions of Ontario and five states — Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio — experienced 24-hour levels of PM2.5 with an air quality index in the “Hazardous” (brown) range. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, these conditions necessitate health warnings of emergency conditions, with the entire population more likely to be affected. Purple “Very Unhealthy” air was observed in three other states — New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana. This level of pollution triggers a health alert, and everyone – not just people with vulnerabilities – may experience more serious health effects.

Figure 2. Observed 24-hour air quality index (AQI) for PM2.5 pollution for Jul. 16, 2026. Fifty monitors in five states had “Hazardous” air, plus an additional nine monitors in Ontario. (Image credit: EPA)

According to air pollution scientist Ryan Stauffer, yesterday’s air pollution event blows away the previous most extreme wildfire smoke event in this region — in June 2023 — for extremity. During the 2023 event, only about three EPA monitors, all in Pennsylvania, recorded a 24-hour AQI in the hazardous range. But on Thursday, 50 official EPA monitors recorded a 24-hour AQI in the “Hazardous” range (Fig. 2), plus an additional nine monitors in Ontario. According to rankings at iqair.com, Detroit was the most polluted major city worldwide for most of Thursday, with Chicago bumping Detroit out on Thursday night. On Friday morning, the top five most polluted cities in the world were all in North America: Detroit, Chicago, Washington D.C., Toronto, and New York City.

On an hourly scale, some truly extreme AQI readings above 1,000 were recorded Thursday in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. The “Hazardous” (brown) range is for an AQI in above 300, so these readings were more than three times beyond the “Hazardous” threshold. The most extreme readings occurred in northern Minnesota downwind of the fires burning in the Boundary Waters park, where an AQI of 3,567 was measured by a purpleair.com sensor.

How the trouble started: record heat and a record-strong high-pressure system

The wildfire event began on Monday, when the strongest upper-level ridge of high pressure ever observed in the north-central U.S. baked the region. All-time record heat exceeding 100 degrees Fahrenheit (37.8°C) was observed, worsening existing moderate to severe drought conditions. Thunder Bay, Ontario, on the north shore of frigid Lake Superior, hit 39.5 degrees Celsius (103.1°F), smashing its all-time heat record by over 2°C. To the north, Armstrong hit 40.7°C (105.3°F), the hottest temperature observed in all of Ontario since the great Dust Bowl heat wave of July 1936.

Strong winds moved in with the heat, fanning multiple wildfires that feasted on the dry fuels, which featured plenty of dead trees from a spruce budworm infestation and a 1999 derecho event that felled thousands of trees. Extreme fires with a rapid rate of spread resulted and created at least two massive pyrocumulus clouds — giant thunderstorms spawned by the heat of intense fires that reached the stratosphere. Tomer Burg has an excellent thread explaining the meteorology that led up to the wildfire event:

How to interpret PM 2.5 readings at airnow.gov and purpleair.com

You can access EPA’s real-time PM2.5 NowCast AQI numbers at https://www.airnow.gov (note that you can’t just type in “airnow.gov” to get to the website, since they haven’t configured it to allow that). The AQI numbers are updated once per hour (shortly after the top of the hour). Because the EPA standard is based on a 24-hour average, the raw hourly data is not reported. Instead, EPA’s NowCast AQI numbers are computed using a 12-hour weighted average from the past 12 hours of data.

When air quality is highly variable (e.g., during a wildfire or a sudden wind shift), the algorithm heavily weights the past 1-3 hours. Otherwise, the past 12 hours are weighted nearly equally, and the AQI number is a 12-hour average. At the end of a day, the official daily AQI is calculated using a true arithmetic 24-hour average.

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In contrast, the AQI numbers at purpleair.com update every few seconds, so you get a much better idea of rapid changes in air quality. Clicking on a dot will bring up a graph of the past few days of data; the default averaging time for this graph is 10 minutes, but you can change this to a longer time span. Important: you need to choose “US EPA” in the “Apply Conversion” setting, or else the PM 2.5 readings will be too high.

The current situation: over 20 large fires out of control

As of Friday, there were 193 active fires covering 1.7 million acres (673,000 ha) in Ontario, with the vast majority of these considered to be “out of control,” according to the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre. Of the 22 large fires in over 2,000 acres burning nearest the U.S. border, 18 were receiving a full fire-fighting response, and four were not being fought. In the U.S., the National Interagency Fire Center reported six large fires in northern Minnesota, all 0% contained, covering 60,000 acres.

Figure 3. Monthly fire assessment for North America for July 2026 (left) and August 2026 (right). Red shading indicates areas where conditions would favor increased fire activity. Green shading indicates areas where conditions would favor decreased fire activity. (image credit: National Interagency Fire Center).

The forecast: relief coming by Saturday for the worst-affected states

Thunderstorms moved over the Minnesota/Ontario fire area Friday morning, bringing up to two inches of rain. This water will help firefighting efforts, but the fire danger index in Ontario is still high to very high, and the thunderstorms may have sparked additional fires.

The cold front accompanying this storm will bring westerly winds that should flush the worst of the smoke out of Chicago and Wisconsin by Friday afternoon, and out of Michigan by early Saturday morning. However, a renewed invasion of smoke is predicted for Michigan and Wisconsin Saturday night into Sunday, bringing more “Hazardous” AQI conditions. Another pulse of smoke is predicted to move deep into the central U.S. on Wednesday, perhaps reaching Arkansas and Missouri.

We can anticipate that some of the major smoke-emitting fires in Minnesota/Ontario will continue to burn for an extended period, with some lasting until the first snows come in October. The long-range fire assessment (Fig. 3) calls for above-average fire risk over much of the forested areas of northern Canada and the western U.S. this summer, and we should anticipate frequent bouts of poor air quality from wildfire smoke across much of North America. July and August are usually the peak months of fire season, which typically extends well into September. A potent North American Monsoon is now bringing heavy rains to parts of the southwest U.S., so the overall fire risk in that region may decrease to average levels by August.

Many lightning-caused fires occurred in the Pacific Northwest yesterday. With hot, windy weather expected to move in during the coming week, some of these fires may well become significant smoke producers.

Climate change predicted to further worsen wildfires

The number of people in the U.S. who experienced at least one day each year with smoke-related fine particle pollution levels at three times over the EPA standard has increased 27-fold over the last decade, and we can expect climate change to significantly worsen wildfire smoke problems in North America in the coming years.

For example, the frequency and magnitude of extreme wildfires around the globe have doubled in the past 21 years because of climate change, according to a study published last year in the journal Nature Ecology & Evolution. Rising temperatures have ushered in an era of hotter and drier weather, lending the right conditions for wildfires to erupt, the researchers found.

Here are some additional resources on climate change and wildfires:

• Explore how climate change has worsened wildfire smoke.
• Explore how fire weather has changed in your area on Climate Central’s interactive map.
• Visit their More U.S. Fire Weather analysis for science background and methodology.
• Explore our guide to staying safe from wildfires and smoke.

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

I’m generally pretty measured in how I discuss climate data. There has been only one time in recent years when I was truly shocked: when global temperatures came in for September 2023 at a full 0.5C warmer than any prior September on record.1 Once until today, that is. With the July runs now in from 667 ensemble members across 14 different seasonal forecast models, it looks like this year’s El Niño is not only very likely to be the strongest event since reliable records began – it may end up the strongest by a truly mind-blowing margin.

The multi-model median for the event’s peak (measured as detrended sea surface temperature anomalies in the Niño 3.4 region of the tropical Pacific) currently stands at 3.6C, roughly 0.8C hotter than the prior record of 2.75C set in 2015-16. For context, the gap between the strongest and the fifth strongest El Niño of the past 150 years is only about 0.5C. The models are forecasting something outside the envelope of anything we have ever observed.

Peak monthly Niño 3.4 anomaly for every El Niño event since 1877, with each event measured against its own era’s centered 30-year climatology (the ONI convention, applied at monthly resolution to match the forecasts’ monthly values). Events after 1950 (blue) use ERSSTv5; earlier events (open gold) use the HadISST reconstruction. The 2026-27 forecast shows the weighted median of 667 ensemble member peaks from 14 models (July 2026 initializations, members weighted so each model counts equally), with the bar spanning the middle 80% of members.

A few things stand out in this figure. First, no event in a century and a half of observations has ever pushed meaningfully past 2.75C. The legendary 1877-78 event comes closest, in a statistical dead heat with 2015-16 (2.73C vs 2.75C, well within the uncertainty of 19th-century ship data). Second, the middle 80% of this year’s forecast ensemble sits entirely at or above that all-time record: even the low end of the plume (2.8C) grazes it. Around 91% of ensemble members exceed the 2015-16 record at their peak.

To see what this would look like as the event unfolds, we can compare the forecast trajectory against the five strongest events ever observed, month by month through the development year and into the following spring.

Monthly Niño 3.4 anomaly trajectories for the five strongest observed El Niño events across their development year and decay, against the 2026-27 multi-model forecast. Note that the expected peak (3.6C) sits slightly above the top of the dashed median trajectory (3.5C): individual models peak in different months (e.g. CFSv2 in November, ECMWF in December) so the median of the individual model peaks runs a bit higher than the peak of the median line.

What is remarkable here is not just the level but the trajectory. The 2026 event is developing faster than 1997-98, the previous gold standard for explosive El Niño onsets. And unlike 2015 which started its year already warm from a precursor event, this one launched from genuinely La Niña-ish conditions in January.

Of course, a multi-model median can hide a lot of disagreement, so it is worth looking at where each individual model puts the peak. The figure below shows the distribution of member peaks across all 14 models.

Peak 2026 Niño 3.4 forecast: model-weighted histogram of each ensemble member’s July-December 2026 maximum (top) and per-model medians with 10-90% member ranges (bottom).

Every single model’s median peak lands at very strong (”super”) El Niño intensity, and all but one (JAMSTEC’s SINTEX-F, at 2.2C) put their median above the 2015-16 record. Model agreement this strong is unusual, though I’d note that agreement is not the same thing as skill as I discuss later on.

Long-time readers may recall that in a warming world, the raw Niño 3.4 anomaly risks conflating El Niño with the broader ocean warming trend. NOAA’s answer is the relative ONI (RONI), which subtracts the tropical-mean SST anomaly to isolate the ENSO signal. In RONI terms the record holder is actually 1982-83 (a peak monthly value of 2.69C), not 2015-16. However, even using RONI the multi-model median in 11 of the 14 models shows a record event.

As above, but for the relative Niño 3.4 index (RONI): Niño 3.4 anomaly minus the 20S-20N tropical-mean anomaly, with the L’Heureux et al. (2024) variance-restoration scaling applied. The record event in RONI terms is 1982-83 (a peak monthly value of 2.69C).

Putting the two together: models give a ~91% chance of a record peak in Niño 3.4 terms and ~77% in RONI terms this year. Whichever way you slice the index, the forecast says the same thing: this is more likely than not to be the strongest El Niño ever observed.

So how did we get here? The forecast has been building all spring. The figure below shows how each model’s projection evolved from its March run through its July run, against observed monthly conditions.

Ensemble-mean Niño 3.4 forecast from each model’s March, April, May, June and July 2026 runs (blues deepening with recency; July in red with its full member range shaded), against observed monthly means from the daily OISSTv2.1 series (black). One corrupted NCAR-CESM1 ensemble member is excluded from the July run for clarity.

Nearly every panel shows the same thing: each successive run warmer than the last, across five months and thirteen independent modeling systems.2 This pattern of sustained revision as initialization improves is the classic signature of a real intensifying event rather than model noise. The reason is visible in the black line: observed conditions kept outrunning the forecasts. (Though credit where credit is due: NCAR’s CESM1 was calling ~4C back in March when that looked absurd, and I and others called it out as unrealistic at the time. The ensemble has since converged toward it.)

The combined multi-model picture makes the same point more concisely.

The model-weighted median Niño 3.4 forecast from each monthly initialization, March through July 2026 (July with its 10-90% member band), against observed monthly OISSTv2.1.

The peak median has climbed from ~2.8C in the March runs to 3.6C in July — though notably the revisions are decelerating (+0.5C, +0.14C, +0.14C over the last three cycles), suggesting the forecast is converging rather than still escalating.

It is also worth looking at what this event looks like spatially. The figure below maps each model’s SST anomaly field at its own forecast peak month.

Sea surface temperature anomaly forecasts at each model’s own 2026 peak month (the July-December month maximizing its Niño 3.4 mean), from the July 2026 initializations of 6 NMME models, 7 C3S centres, and SINTEX-F (seasonal mean, June initialization). Niño 3.4 region boxed; panels ordered warmest first.

The classic east-Pacific El Niño tongue is there in every model. I’d flag CMCC as the outlier to discount: its 5.3C peak sits a full 1.3C above the next warmest model. Because we are looking at the multi-model median, even discounting CMCC doesn’t change the overall forecast meaningfully.

Meanwhile, the ocean is not waiting for the models. Daily SSTs in the Niño 3.4 region are already running around 2C above their era-adjusted average – the threshold for a very strong (”super”) El Niño if sustained – and it is only mid-July. The figure below puts this in context, showing the daily Niño 3.4 anomaly for every year in the satellite record, with each year measured against its own era’s climatology so the long-term warming trend doesn’t mess up the comparison.

Daily Niño 3.4 SST anomaly for every year since 1982, from NOAA OISSTv2.1 (final plus near-real-time) via NOAA CoastWatch ERDDAP. Each year is referenced to its own centered 30-year day-of-year climatology (the ONI convention), removing the long-term warming trend. 2026 is shown in red; the great El Niño development years 2015 and 1997 are highlighted for comparison.

No prior year in the 45-year record has been anywhere near this warm this early: not 1997 (+1.6C at this date), the previous benchmark for an explosive onset, and not 2015 (+1.3C). And El Niño almost always peaks near the end of the calendar year – typically between November and January, occasionally as early as October – so the physics of ENSO’s seasonal phase-locking says there is likely a good deal of intensification still to come.3

What does all this mean for global temperatures? Because global temperature lags ENSO by around three to five months, most of this event’s warming will land in 2027, which is now shaping up to be a genuinely alarming year and the warmest on record by a sizable margin. But a strengthening El Niño does load the dice for late 2026: our dashboard currently gives this year a non-trivial chance (~28%) of edging out 2024 as the warmest on record, up from ~13% at the start of the month..

I want to end with an important caveat about these numbers: the models have never been verified in this territory. Seasonal forecast systems have real, demonstrated skill at this lead time for ordinary events, but no ensemble has ever forecast (and then verified against) a 3.6C El Niño, because one has never happened. Model agreement is reassuring, but it is not proof. But the uncertainties can cut both ways, and the observed ocean, not just the models, is already in uncharted waters.

As always, for daily updates on the El Niño forecast and global temperatures head over to our Climate Dashboard.

1 I referred to it as “absolutely gobsmackingly bananas” at the time, which might be the only time something I said ever went properly viral online.

2 The SINTEX-F model is not included in this plot as I only began tracking it in July.

3 The lone exception in the modern record is the unusual two-year 1986-88 event, which reached its ONI maximum in August 1987. Every other strong event since 1950 peaked between October and January.