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World falling short on 22 of 23 nature targets for 2030, says draft UN report

The Carbon Brief - Wed, 07/29/2026 - 08:00
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The global goal to halt and reverse nature loss by 2030 “will not be achieved” unless action by countries “accelerates rapidly”, says a draft UN report.

Countries are falling short on 22 of the 23 targets for 2030 they set under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature”.

That is according to a draft version of a global report prepared by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), published on 26 July.

The report will be finalised ahead of the next nature summit, COP17, taking place in Armenia in October of this year.

The second draft of the global report has undergone “peer review”, but will still be subject to “technical edits” before being formally published ahead of COP17.

The final version will inform a global review of countries’ progress towards meeting the world’s 2030 nature goals, which will take place in Armenia.

Below, Carbon Brief explains why the report has been produced and what it says about countries’ progress in areas such as restoring ecosystems and raising funds for biodiversity.

Article Contents Global report

In Montreal, Canada, in 2022, nearly every country in the world agreed to the GBF. The overall “mission” of the framework is to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. Its “vision” is to bring the world into “harmony with nature” by 2050.

The GBF includes a list of 23 targets for 2030. They cover an expansive range of topics, from restoring ecosystems, to addressing pollution and providing developing nations with finance to help cover the costs of protecting nature.

As part of the GBF and its underlying documents, countries agreed to a schedule for monitoring their progress towards achieving the 2030 targets.

This included the preparation of a “global report” of progress coordinated by the CBD, which will inform a “global review” undertaken by countries at COP17.

The global report draws on countries’ national reports, which were due to be submitted to the UN in February of this year. It also draws on countries’ national nature plans, known as “national biodiversity strategies and action plans” (NBSAPS) and national targets, which were both due in 2024.

Not all countries have met the call to publish these documents and targets. According to the UN, 45% of countries published NBSAPs in time to be considered for the report, 83% had submitted at least one national target and 66% had produced their new national report. 

The first draft of the global report was published on 29 June 2026. This draft was subject to a “peer review process”, which invited countries and observers, such as NGOs and businesses, to submit comments on all aspects of the report.

The second draft, which has been revised based on the peer review, was published on Sunday 26 July. (This was just ahead of COP17 preparatory talks being held in Nairobi from 27 July to 1 August.)

A final version of the global report will be formally published ahead of COP17, which will take place from 19-30 October.

Overall findings

The second draft of the global report says that the GBF has led to “unprecedented” interest in tackling biodiversity loss, but adds:

“However, unless collective implementation accelerates rapidly, the 2030 targets and mission will not be achieved.”

It says that countries have taken some action to address all 23 targets, but that “no target presents a fully positive picture”.

(The first draft has slightly softer language. It “concludes that the world is not yet on track to collectively meet the global ambitions that the parties to the convention set when they adopted the framework”.)

The report identifies “two distinct gaps in progress”, relating to ambition and implementation.

First, that the national targets and plans submitted by countries “do not yet fully reflect the scope and level of ambition” of the global targets in the GBF.

Second, countries are not taking sufficient action to achieve their targets, according to the report.

It adds that progress is “particularly lagging” for addressing the “indirect drivers of biodiversity loss”, such as harmful business practices and government subsidies promoting them.

In addition, countries are showing “consistent gaps” in making progress on taking action to protect “marine, coastal and inland water ecosystems”.

The report produces a “scorecard” assessing countries’ progress towards meeting each of the 23 targets of the GBF.

The scorecard includes an “overall score” of between 0 and 1 for each target. This is calculated by considering countries’ self-reported progress in their plans and targets, as well as an assessment of progress based on a set of agreed indicators.

The results are split into four categories: 0-0.25 is red, 0.25-0.5 is orange, 0.5-0.75 is yellow and 0.75-1 is green.

The report gives a “green” score for just one target, indicating overall positive progress. This is target 8, on “minimising” the impact of climate change on biodiversity, including through mitigation and adaptation.

Elsewhere, the draft says that countries have “reported gaps in the scale and timely provision” of “financial resources, capacity-building and development, technical and scientific cooperation, access to and transfer of technology, and knowledge sharing”. It adds:

“These barriers can result in uneven capacities and cause specific technical and financial constraints for all parties, but particularly for developing-country parties. It is likely these constraints are even more pressing for least developed countries and small island developing states.”

Protecting and restoring nature

Target 3 of the GBF is for countries to protect “30% of Earth’s land and sea for nature” by the end of the decade. 

This commitment – referred to as “30 by 30” – is widely considered the flagship target of the agreement.

Target 3 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD

The report says that countries are making “progress in expanding and managing protected areas, especially for marine and coastal areas”. But it adds that “current ambition and implementation remain insufficient to fully achieve all aspects of the target”.

It continues that, according to countries’ available national targets, “monitoring and reporting of some elements of the target remains low”. This includes “those relating to equitable governance of protected areas” and “recognition of Indigenous and local territories”.

The report adds that countries “face significant challenges in implementation, particularly related to lack of finance and capacity”.

(An investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian in 2025 revealed that more than half of nations that have submitted UN biodiversity plans do not commit to “30 by 30” within their borders.)

Another conservation measure included in the GBF is target 2, which aims to ensure that at least 30% of land and sea areas are under restoration by 2030. 

Target 2 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD

The report says that “restoration efforts are expanding”. However, it says that “current commitments to restore areas and implementation of those commitments remain below the level required” to achieve target 2.

It adds that countries’ national targets are “generally well aligned with target 2”, but that “addressing the effectiveness of restoration efforts is often absent”.

Moreover, the report adds that monitoring of progress is “constrained by inconsistent definitions and monitoring approaches for ecosystem degradation and restoration”.

Another “major barrier” is a lack of available finance for developing countries looking to restore ecosystems, it says.

Climate and biodiversity links

Target 8 of the GBF is the only one to specifically address climate change, one of the major drivers of biodiversity loss.

It says countries should “minimise the impact of climate change” on biodiversity through mitigation and adaptation, including “nature-based solutions” and “ecosystem-based approaches”.

Target 8 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD

Target 8 was the only one to achieve a “green” marking in the report’s scorecard of progress (see: Overall findings).

The report says that actions to make biodiversity more resilient against climate change are “progressing”. Yet “implementation remains constrained by data gaps, limited means of implementation and the need for stronger coherence between biodiversity, climate and disaster risk reduction planning”.

It continues that countries’ national targets “generally” show “good alignment” with target 8, across “all elements apart from efforts to minimise the impacts of ocean acidification”.

It adds that the deployment of nature-based solutions and ecosystem restoration is not yet at a “sufficient scale”.

Subsidies 

Overall progress is “insufficient” on target 18, which calls on countries to identify subsidies and other incentives that are harmful for biodiversity by 2025, says the GBF report. 

It also outlines that nations should “eliminate, phase out or reform” these subsidies in a “proportionate” way, reducing them by at least $500bn per year by 2030. 

Countries should first target the “most harmful” incentives, while simultaneously scaling up positive incentives for nature, it adds. 

Target 18 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

The report finds that countries have made some progress in assessing, compiling inventories and commissioning studies on harmful subsidies. 

But issues remain, such as incomplete data and the lack of agreed definitions on which subsidies are deemed “harmful”. 

Several national reports also note “entrenched interests and political barriers to subsidy reform”, says the report. 

Only one-quarter of countries’ national targets that are “highly aligned” with target 18 are “on track” to be met, it finds. Most show “insufficient progress”. 

It notes that 38% of countries have addressed the 2025 aim to identify harmful subsidies in their national targets “to some extent”. 

Countries’ national reports do not “provide a sufficient basis to determine” whether this goal was met, says the report, but available evidence “suggests” that it was not. 

Recent analysis by Carbon Brief found that just 16% of the 134 national reports submitted so far appear to meet the aim. 

The report outlines that half of countries have set national targets addressing plans to eliminate, phase out or reform harmful incentives. Almost 60% mention scaling up positive incentives, it adds. 

Just 27%, however, address the issue of reducing subsidies by at least $500bn annually by 2030. Also, only 5% set quantitative national targets to reduce subsidies.

There are two headline “indicators” to measure progress on target 18. The first shows that 30% of countries have outlined information on their nature-positive incentives.

The second indicator shows that 22 countries submitted the value of their biodiversity-harmful subsidies, which amounted to a total of $268bn spent on harmful subsidies over 2022 to 2025 – averaging $67bn each year. 

Carbon Brief’s analysis had identified an estimated $270bn each year, based on a wider list of submissions from 32 countries. (More countries submitted national reports since the CBD’s deadline to be included in the global report in February.) 

All of these figures remain well below the estimated trillions of US dollars spent annually. 

The report notes that different methodologies could lead to global subsidy estimate “inconsistencies”, meaning that reported values are likely “underestimates”. 

The amount of positive incentives in place is also likely underestimated, it adds. 

The report says that harmful subsidies may have declined by around 20% in recent years, based on figures consistently reported by a minority of countries over 2022-24. 

Despite this, the total value of subsidies “remains higher than the resources that parties reported mobilising for biodiversity”. (See: Mobilising finance.) 

Mobilising finance


Overall progress on raising biodiversity finance has been “insufficient”, according to the report. 

Goal D of the GBF, shown below, states that countries must close a $700bn biodiversity gap by 2030 through ending harmful subsidies ($500bn per year) and mobilising resources from the global north to south ($200bn per year). 

Goal D of the Global Biodiversity Framework refers to a $700bn biodiversity finance gap. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

This target aims to raise “at least $200bn per year” by 2030 from “all sources”, including domestic, international, public and private funding. 

In all, countries reported raising a cumulative total of $186.4bn over four years, according to the report. 

While it adds that it “is still too early to conclude”, the report states that the total finance mobilised so far “falls far short” of what is needed to close the biodiversity finance gap.

Target 19, shown below, states that developed countries and others should boost finance for nature to “at least $20bn” per year by 2025 and “at least $30bn” by 2030. This falls to developed countries and others that “voluntarily assume” the obligation of contributing.

However, the report suggests that the milestone of raising “at least $20bn per year by 2025” was “likely not achieved”. 

Target 19 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

Between 2020 and 2023, reporting countries cumulatively raised just $17.7bn in international public funding for biodiversity, according to the report. 

This amounts to an average of $4.4bn per year between 2020-23, with the total touching its highest at $5.2bn in 2023. 

The report cautions that this figure “should be read as a minimum”, as it does not account for all potential flows of biodiversity finance. 

Both estimates “fall below the $20bn milestone”, although the report adds that a “definitive assessment will only be possible” once data for 2024 and 2025 are included. 

An earlier draft of the report included language noting that biodiversity-related “official development assistance” remains “well below the agreed 2025 milestone”. This was cut from the summary in this latest iteration of the report.

References to the OECD reporting a “shortfall in funding” and projecting “a decrease for 2024 and 2025” – suggesting the $20bn target was “unlikely to be met” – were also removed from the latest draft. 

The chart below shows how international public funding for biodiversity has varied from 2020 to 2023, according to the report. 

The yearly sum of official development assistance provided by donor countries (blue) for biodiversity conservation (in billions) and the average share of national GDP (in %) represented by their national value (red). Source: UN CBD 2026

By comparison, domestic spending makes the largest cumulative contribution to biodiversity finance, at ($135.9bn) over the four years. However, spending has “declined” as a share of GDP. It also notes that spending varies “greatly”, from 0.1% to 2.7% of GDP. 

According to the report, many countries highlighted that national budget allocations for biodiversity are “far too low” and that biodiversity “frequently loses out to competing development priorities”, including “defence, food security and infrastructure”.

At COP15 in Montreal, the EU and several other countries pushed for the inclusion of “all sources” of finance in the final text – including private finance and “innovative” schemes. 

Private and “innovative” biodiversity finance – which spans a plethora of sources such biodiversity offsets and debt-for-nature swaps – was eventually included in target 19.

The report, however, notes that private finance “peaked in 2021 and fell afterwards” and “remains particularly undeveloped”, with a cumulative total of $32.7bn between 2020-23. 

At the same time, the report notes that only 26% of all countries had reported data on private biodiversity finance, making it harder to assess funding declines in 2022 and 2023.

Genetic resources

The report finds there has been limited progress on sharing genetic biodiversity data. 

”Digital sequence information” (DSI) refers to genetic data derived from biodiversity, which is often sourced from species in biodiversity-rich developing countries. 

These countries have long called for an international mechanism to ensure that the benefits of DSI are shared fairly with the people living where the resources were “discovered”, including Indigenous communities.

At COP16, countries agreed to the first-ever global fund, called the Cali Fund, for companies profiting from genetic data to contribute to conservation goals on a voluntary basis.

However, experts have cautioned that much rests on whether countries develop strong national laws to support the COP16 agreement. This could include incentivising companies in their regions to contribute to the fund. 

In the GBF, target 13 and goal C address elements of DSI, including the sharing of benefits from genetic resources and their digital derivatives.

Target 13 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

According to the report, 79% of countries submitted national targets that address legal, policy and administrative measures to enable benefit-sharing from DSI. Some 71% included measures to facilitate access to genetic resources. 

The report finds that the “strongest progress” has been in developing laws and policies, which are now at an intermediate stage. 

The “most fundamental regulatory barrier”, according to many countries cited, is the lack of a “dedicated” national framework to enable access to genetic resources and share benefits with communities. 

This would involve enacting laws compatible with the GBF, setting up digital registries to catalogue and trace genetic resources, as well as implementing tracking systems to monitor how they are used. It would also include a financial mechanism to pay communities for the use of their traditional knowledge. 

Goal C of the Global Biodiversity Framework covers benefit-sharing from genetic resources and DSI, as well as protection of traditional knowledge. Source: UN CBD (2022)

Progress in monitoring monetary and non-monetary benefits from DSI is “much weaker” and is “particularly limited” for measures related to the Cali fund.

According to the report, most parties have “no monitoring systems [for evaluating benefits from genetic resources] in place, or [are] still developing them”. It says they add that the benefits from genetic resources are hard to track “across borders and along value chains through to the final product”.

For those that have tracked benefits, it says that countries reported a cumulative $6.9m in receipts from the use of genetic resources between 2022 and 2025. It adds that “several parties reported that they had received no monetary benefits” to date. 

Countries also reported more than 960 non-monetary benefits, ranging from technical training to research participation. The report cautions that these “fluctuated over time rather than increasing consistently, and cannot be seen as indicative of global benefit-sharing”. 

In December 2025, Carbon Brief reported that the Cali fund had received only one contribution of $1,000 as an “icebreaker”. No other major companies have stepped up to fill the fund. 

Meanwhile, the report states that the formal protection of traditional knowledge held by Indigenous peoples and local communities remained “underdeveloped”. 

It says that a “significant number” of countries raised concerns about gaps in recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights and dedicated registries to document their traditional knowledge. 

The report says it is not yet possible to assess progress towards goal C:

“To date it is not possible to comment on whether benefits are being shared fairly and equitably nor on the role played by traditional knowledge and Indigenous peoples and local communities. Therefore, progress towards goal C cannot yet be assessed.”

Pollution

Target 7 of the GBF focuses on tackling pollution from pesticides, chemicals, plastic and other sources. 

It calls for countries to reduce pollution risks and negative impacts “from all sources” to “levels that are not harmful” to biodiversity and ecosystems by 2030. 

It also aims to reduce excess nutrients in the environment and overall risks from pesticides and hazardous chemicals by “at least half”. 

The draft report finds that there is no significant change or insufficient progress on 60% of national targets categorised as being highly aligned with target 7. Only one-third of these national targets (35%) are on track to be achieved by 2030. 

On average, it says countries have addressed around half of the various elements of target 7 “to some extent” in their national targets. 

The most frequently-mentioned aspect of the target – addressed by 72% of countries – refers to reducing pollution from all sources by 2030. 

One headline indicator related to target 7 focuses on the concentration of pesticides in the environment. 

Just five countries out of 125 submitted estimates on this, according to the report. It says only one country has met the aim of halving the overall risk from pesticides on a national basis so far.  

Measures to address plastic pollution are the most frequently reported actions by countries in relation to this target, including bans on single-use bags and straws. 

A number of countries in Europe and Asia have also implemented measures to reduce nutrient losses from fertilisers and slurry. 

A “major challenge” for countries in advancing pollution aims is “effectively and fairly considering and managing impacts on food security and livelihoods”, according to the report. 

Several countries point to a lack of national funding to implement measures towards achieving this target. 

Some developing countries also list poor wastewater-treatment infrastructure as a “persistent challenge” on this issue. 

Invasive species

Invasive alien species refers to those that have moved to and become established in a region outside their natural habitat, as a result of human activities. This has negative impacts for local biodiversity and ecosystems.

Target 6 of the GBF calls for countries to, among other things, reduce the rates of introduction and establishment of invasive alien species by 50% by 2030. 

The draft report says countries are “taking action” on this target, but progress is “difficult to assess”. 

Two-thirds of national targets aligned with target 6 show “no significant progress or insufficient progress”, it finds. Fewer than one-third are on track to be achieved by 2030 and just 1% of these national targets have already been achieved. 

But most countries have made progress in putting in place measures to manage invasive species – mostly focusing on reducing the introduction rate and impact of species. 

Countries have addressed around half of the different elements of the invasive species target “to some extent” in their national targets, finds the report. 

But fewer than one-third (30%) have set national targets that put a numeric goal on reducing invasive species. 

Island biosecurity programmes and measures to intercept invasive species at country borders are among the actions countries have put in place to tackle the issue. 

The report lists some barriers countries say stand in the way of achieving the target. These include a lack of baseline data from which to measure a 50% reduction rate, poor early-detection systems and a lack of funding for long-term reduction efforts. 

Some countries also cite capacity and technical challenges in monitoring invasive species, according to the report. 

They say many of these species “go unnoticed for years before impacts become apparent”, it adds, with countries arguing that setting a specific reduction target is “challenging”.

Related Factcheck: No, Europe is not having its ‘quietest’ year for wildfires 30.07.2026 Extreme weather Analysis: 84% of nations miss deadline to identify ‘nature-harming’ subsidies by 2025  28.07.2026 International policy UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo  15.07.2026 Nature Livestock heat deaths in transit doubled in UK record-hot summer of 2025 25.06.2026 Food and farming

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Categories: I. Climate Science

Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa

The Carbon Brief - Wed, 07/29/2026 - 08:00
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Rising temperatures are redistributing the risk of childhood malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in areas of “new risk” in the east and south of the continent, but also “relief hotspots” in western Africa.

This is according to a new study, published in Nature, which provides the “most comprehensive look to date at the impact of climate change on any infectious disease”.

The research finds that since the year 1900, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa on average. 

Over the 21st century, climate change is expected to drive down malaria rates across the continent on average, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes. 

However, the authors emphasise that continent-wide averages hide more detailed local trends. 

They find that cooler parts of Africa face an increase in malaria risk, as rising temperatures have made the regions more suitable for malaria-carrying mosquitoes, while warmer regions see a suppression in malaria cases.

The lead author tells Carbon Brief that this is the first study to use “attribution” – a field of climate science which uses models to compare conditions in a world with global warming to one without – to assess the impact of climate change on malaria.

The study also reveals that climate change is not the main driver of shifting malaria risk in Africa, with public health measures and government policy making a more significant impact.

The “most important” message from the study, according to another expert, is that to eliminate malaria entirely, “effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone”.

Childhood malaria

Malaria kills hundreds of thousands of people every year. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 610,000 people died due to the disease in 2024.

The disease is transmitted to humans by bites from mosquitoes infected with the malaria parasite. Malaria spreads most rapidly in warm, wet regions, where the parasite-carrying mosquitoes can live and breed.

However, malaria is preventable. A total of 42 countries – mainly in Europe and the Americas – have eliminated the disease entirely through a combination of measures including insecticide use, draining the swamplands that provide breeding habitats for mosquitoes and improving basic healthcare services .Global mortality from malaria declined by 90% over the 20th century. 

Today, the vast majority of malaria cases are recorded in Africa, which was home to 95% of malaria cases and deaths in 2024. Children under the age of five make up three-quarters of all African malaria deaths.

The malaria-causing parasite can be detected using a blood test. Over the last century, scientists, government officials and healthcare professionals have collected thousands of blood samples from people across sub-Saharan Africa and tested for the presence of the malaria parasite.

In 2017, scientists brought together more than 50,000 samples collected from sub-Saharan Africa over 1900-2016. This data provides a “snapshot” of the amount of malaria in the population in any year in the last century the study explains.

Dr Colin Carlson is an assistant professor of epidemiology at the Yale school of public health and lead author of the study. He tells Carbon Brief that malaria in Africa is “extraordinarily well documented”, as a result of academic interest and colonial rule in the continent.

The size and quality of the malaria dataset are “exceptionally rare”, Carlson says. He explains that the dataset stretches back to before the impacts of human-caused climate change were strongly felt, making it “extraordinarily” valuable for this analysis. 

The chart below shows the percentage of children between two and 10 years old who tested positive for the malaria parasite over 1900-2016. Each dot indicates one blood test result and the pink vertical bars indicate periods of “successful malaria prevention intervention”, such as the 1955-69 global malaria eradication programme.

The percentage of children between two to 10 years old who tested positive for the parasite that causes malaria between 1990 and 2016. Source: Carlson et al. (2026) Attribution

The authors use the blood test survey data to develop a statistical model separating out the climatic, social and economic factors that affect malaria, such as temperature, rainfall, economic development, healthcare and population changes. This allows the authors to isolate the effects of the climate on malaria.

They find that malaria prevalence in children peaks when average monthly temperatures reach 24.9C, dropping off in warmer and cooler climates. 

Mosquitoes also need stagnant or slow-moving water in which to lay their eggs. The authors find that periods of drought tend to decrease malaria prevalence one-to-two months later, whereas floods increase prevalence two-to-three months later. However, they conclude that rainfall is “less important than temperature” in predicting malaria rates.

They then combine the statistical models with climate models, to simulate childhood malaria rates in a range of past and future climates. 

First, the authors simulate malaria rates in the present day, by running the models using the climate of 2000-14. They then carry out the same analysis, using the climate of a hypothetical world without human-caused climate change.

By comparing the two, the authors were able to attribute the impact of climate change on malaria rates across Africa.

The link between climate change and malaria in Africa is complex and “surprisingly contentious”, according to the authors. For example, they write that “malaria resurgence in the east African highlands became a particular point of contention, with over a dozen studies arguing for or against climate change as a substantial driver”.

It adds:

“Today, malaria experts generally agree that climate change has contributed to elevational shifts in malaria epidemics and the geographical ranges of mosquito vectors. However, the cumulative effect of climate change on the burden of malaria is still an open question.”

Lead author Carlson says this paper is “one of the first impact attributions on infectious disease” and the first attribution study on climate change and malaria. He adds:

“I think it’s the most clarity we’ve had on the malaria question.”

Dr Teresa Yamana, an associate research scientist at Columbia University, who was not involved in the study, praises its “rigorous” methodology. She tells Carbon Brief that the work “demonstrates the potential of climate attribution methods to quantify the impacts of climate change on infectious diseases”. 

Warming world

The findings show that “climate change isn’t just making malaria worse or better – it’s moving it, says study author Prof Tamma Carleton, an assistant professor at UC Berkeley:

“Whether a place sees elevated malaria risks or reduced burdens under climate change depends on how hot it is today. We see relief in the hotspots and new risk nearly everywhere else.”

For example, in the Ethiopian highlands, low temperatures – which are unsuitable for mosquitoes to live and breed – have historically limited the spread of malaria. However, the region has seen childhood malaria rates increase by more than eight cases per 1,000 children since the year 1900 as rising temperatures have allowed the insects to expand their habitat.

The authors also found a similar increase in malaria prevalence in cooler southern African countries.

In contrast, global warming is pushing average temperatures above the ideal range for mosquitoes in many hotter parts of Africa, driving down malaria rates. The authors find that in western Africa, climate change has caused a reduction of four malaria cases per 1,000 children per year by 2014, reducing prevalence by 1-2%.

Overall, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa since the year 1900, the study says.

The authors also run their models for three future climate scenarios: low (SSP1-2.6), intermediate (SSP2-4.5) and very-high (SSP5-8.5) emissions pathways. Comparing these to the present-day model results shows how climate change could affect malaria cases over the coming century. 

They find that the trends observed so far will largely continue into the future – meaning climate change will lower the prevalence of malaria in warm regions and increase the prevalence in cool regions.

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The study concludes that under the intermediate scenario, which is broadly in line with current climate policies, warming will drive down childhood malaria cases by about three cases per 1,000 children in central Africa and 16 cases per 1,000 children in west Africa by the end of the century. 

By contrast, cases could increase by around 20% over the same period in regions such as the Rift Valley and coastal southern Africa – a rise of 30 cases per 1,000 children.

The maps below show changes in childhood malaria prevalence due to climate change in today’s climate (left) and the climate of 2096-2100 under the intermediate scenario (right). 

Red indicates an increase in malaria prevalence and blue indicates a decrease. Greyer colours indicate greater uncertainty in the model results. White indicates regions where no data was collected.

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Carlson tells Carbon Brief that this is “the first study to really confidently answer the highland East Africa debate”. 

Eradicating malaria

Healthcare workers, governments and scientists have been working to eliminate malaria for decades.

On average, the authors find that climate change will reduce the prevalence of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes. This effect is more pronounced at higher warming levels. 

Under the low emissions scenario, about 1 case per 1,000 children will be averted by the end of the century. Meanwhile under the highest emissions scenario, average prevalence falls by 20 cases per 1,000 children, marking a 9% reduction.

The graph below shows childhood malaria rates over 1990-2024 in the historical climate (blue) and in a world without climate change (grey). These estimates are shown relative to baseline prevalence across 1901-30.

After the year 2014, the plot shows projected future changes in malaria prevalence, relative to a 2015-20 baseline, in the low (purple), intermediate (pink) and high (green) scenarios.

Malaria prevalence in the historical climate (blue), historical climate without global warming (grey), low emissions scenario (purple), intermediate emissions scenario (pink) and very-high emissions scenario (green). Source: Carlson et al. (2026)

Carlson emphasises that this does not mean that climate change is “good news” for healthcare in sub-Saharan Africa. He explains that climate change will bring a wide range of negative health impacts that will strain healthcare systems, adding: 

“A world that is too hot for malaria is not a good world for the health of children.”

He also notes that climate change is “not the primary driving factor of malaria dynamics”. For example, he notes that malaria prevalence fell over 2000-15, by about 16 percentage points, after the disease was identified as a “critical global target of the Millennium Development Goals”.

This reduction is 200 times greater than the increase seen so far because of climate change, Carlson says. He adds: 

“It would not be tremendously hard both to keep malaria out of new places and to eliminate it where it is maybe going to get a little bit of an assist from climate change.”

Dr Adugna Woyessa is a senior researcher at the Ethiopian Public Health Institute and was not involved in the study. He has previously carried out research on malaria in eastern Africa.

Woyessa praises the study, telling Carbon Brief that the research could bring about a “paradigm shift” in efforts to eliminate malaria. He argues that the study is a “tool for engaging giant development partners”, adding that “future work will be needed to situate these global trends in local contexts”.

Dr Janey Messina is an associate professor in the school of geography and the environment at the University of Oxford and was also not involved in the study. She praises the paper’s “strong” method.

However, she cautions that the findings “should not be interpreted as forecasts of total future malaria burden”, because they only model the impact of climate change on malaria, while excluding “social, demographic and public-health determinants”, such as inequality, migration, conflict and changing access to malaria interventions.

She adds:

“One of the paper’s most important messages is this: effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone.”

Carlson, C. et al. (2026) The past and future impact of climate change on childhood malaria in Africa, Nature, doi:10.1038/s41586-026-10840-w

Related Q&A: Europe’s May and June heatwave deaths – and how they were counted 17.07.2026 Extreme weather Guest post: France’s June heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths 07.07.2026 Health and society Revealed: Floods have forced at least 67 closures at NHS hospitals since 2021 25.05.2026 Health and society Climate change could lead to 500,000 ‘additional’ malaria deaths in Africa by 2050 28.01.2026 Health and society

The post Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Categories: I. Climate Science

Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change?

The Carbon Brief - Wed, 07/29/2026 - 05:08
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China has released its “15th five-year plan for the development of renewable energy”, outlining key targets and policies for the sector in 2026-2030.

A key focus of the plan is boosting renewable generation and consumption as a share of China’s overall energy mix.

It calls for continued capacity additions of wind and solar – albeit at lower levels than previous years – as well as hydropower, biomass and other clean-energy sources.

Specifically, China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030,  2,800GW will be wind and solar. 

The country had previously pledged to install 1,200GW of wind and solar by 2030, a goal that China met six years early.

Another major theme is the provision of wind and solar supply that is “dependable” and “grid-friendly”.

Setting a target for “firm capacity” from wind and solar could help to entrench their role as a provider of “energy security”, according to analysts.

The government also aims to boost renewables consumption by developing non-power uses of renewable energy, in sectors such as steel and chemicals.

Below, Carbon Brief examines the key targets and policies outlined in the five-year plan and what they mean for China’s energy transition.

Article Contents Why are China’s five-year plans important?

Five-year plans are key to China’s political system. An overarching plan, covering all socioeconomic issues of importance to policy leaders, is published at the beginning of each five-year cycle. 

The plan for the 15th five-year period (2026-2030) was published in March 2026. 

It includes what the government considers to be the most important targets and policy signals for climate and energy. For example, binding targets for carbon intensity, the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption and total energy production capacity.

Following this overarching document, five-year plans focused on specific sectors or themes are then published over the course of the five-year plan period.

This year, the government has already published several five-year plans related to energy and climate change. One covers the development of the “new-type” energy sector more broadly. Another wraps climate goals together with other environmental targets under the “Beautiful China” programme.

By contrast, the renewables five-year plan focuses specifically on the development of hydropower, wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and wave energy.

It was published in late July by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the country’s top economic planning agency, and the National Energy Administration (NEA). 

It covers topics including capacity and generation targets, as well as efforts to increase integration and reliability of wind and solar. It also has policies to encourage “non-power use” of renewable energy and ways to strengthen innovation of clean-energy technologies.

What overarching renewables targets are in the plan? 

China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, according to the five-year plan.

Of this, 2,800GW will be wind and solar – a pledge reiterated from China’s action plan for peaking carbon emissions, which was released earlier this month. 

The goal more than doubles a previous 2030 target for wind and solar to reach 1,200GW, which China met six years early.

As of June 2026, the country has installed just under 2,000GW of wind and solar capacity, as well as 454GW of hydropower. Biomass, geothermal and wave energy hold very small shares of the overall energy mix. 

As such, China would need to build 160GW of wind and solar each year – and just under 220GW of renewable capacity in total – to meet the targets.

The country installed 277GW of new solar alone in 2024 – and 315GW in 2025. 

China’s total installed capacity of renewable energy from 2016-2025, and its target for 2030. Source: National Energy Administration, Carbon Brief.

A key part of meeting the targets will be the development of large-scale clean-energy bases in China’s northern regions. These will generate power to be exported elsewhere via ultra-high voltage lines. The plan also encourages greater “local consumption” and installations of distributed energy (see below).

The plan says that further research will be directed at increasing the renewable share of electricity generated by these large-scale energy bases to 100%.

A recent report by the thinktank Global Energy Monitor (GEM) finds that output from these bases “continues to be paired with coal-fired generation in the name of balancing and system flexibility”. It says that currently, coal generates 42% of the power transmitted to the rest of the country from these bases.

China will also add more hydropower, says the plan, with capacity rising from 448GW in 2025 to 570GW in 2030. Some 160GW of this will be pumped-storage hydropower.

Meanwhile, the plan sets a target for renewable power generation to reach 6,000 terawatt-hours (TWh), 4,000TWh of which would come from wind and solar. 

This would be a 50% increase in five years as renewables generated just under 4,000TWh of electricity in 2025, according to the National Energy Administration.

By 2030, the plan says that total consumption of renewable energy will stand at 1.8bn tonnes of coal equivalent (Gtce).

This would be up from 1.2Gtce in 2025, which represented about one-fifth of China’s total energy consumption of 6.2Gtce that year.

The renewable targets in the plan are lower than those suggested in a recent study by high-profile Chinese scholars.

The study, from the department of energy and power engineering and the Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development at Tsinghua University in Beijing, assessed the “likelihood of China attaining its carbon peak” under different pathways.

It found that, in order to meet its climate commitments, China would need to either install more than 4,000GW of “non-fossil energy capacity” before 2030, or to “maintain a total energy consumption” below 6.5Gtce.

The table below outlines some of the key renewables targets for 2030, as specified in the plan.

Key targets for 2030, adapted from 15th five-year plan for renewable energy  Type20252030Percentage changeRenewable energy use 1.2Gtce1.8Gtce53%Total renewables capacity2,340GW3,500GW50%Wind and solar capacity1,840GWMore than 2,800GW52%Of which: Solar thermal1.8GW15GW733%Hydro capacity450GW570GW27%Of which: Pumped storage hydropower66GW160GW142%Wave energy–0.4GW–Renewable generation4,000TWh6,000TWh50%Of which: Wind and solar2,300TWh4,000TWh74%Non-electricity use60Mtce150Mtce150%Renewable hydrogen0.25Mt2Mt700% Why does the plan focus on ‘firm capacity’ for renewables?

As well as increasing the overall size of China’s renewable power supply, the country must also maintain an “uninterrupted and reliable power supply”, officials from the NDRC and NEA told state news agency Xinhua in coverage of the new plan.

To support this goal, the plan says that the development of renewables will “enter a new stage”. This will mean that “improving quality and serving as a reliable alternative” to fossil fuels will be as important as “expanding scale”.

The plan, therefore, proposes targets for the “firm capacity” from wind and solar (置信出力). This is the amount plants or grids can be relied on to produce during critical supply periods, in conjunction with on-site storage.

The target for wind is a firm capacity of at least 11% of total installed capacity by 2030, while the equivalent goal for solar is 6%. 

Wind and solar will also be expected to supply more than 20% of total demand in peak periods during the summer and winter evenings, says the plan. It expects “reliable peak-shaving capacity from renewable sources” to reach more than 300GW.

The new targets are a “positive move”, says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, as it “only applies during peak load and critical supply periods, when coal power is typically used to stabilise the power supply”. 

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She adds that this could, theoretically, “prevent the construction of new coal-fired power projects that are proposed and approved for the reason of meeting peak demand”.

The new metrics mark a change in focus, says Lyu Wenbin, director general of the Energy Research Institute – a state thinktank under the NDRC – in an “explanatory reading” posted on BJX News. He says it “marks a shift in renewable energy development from the mere pursuit of installed capacity to…also taking into account system support capabilities”. 

The plan pledges to “accelerate the construction of grid-friendly wind and solar power stations”. It says this will enhance “reliable peak-load generation” and strengthen renewables’ ability to ensure “safe and stable operation” of the grid.

It says this will particularly be a focus in the energy-hungry east, central and south areas of China.

It sets out a slightly different focus for areas that already have a high share of renewables in their power mix, such as north-west China. Here, the aim will be to develop wind and solar parks that are “capable of providing voltage, frequency and inertia support”.

“This is a real challenge”, says James Norman, research analyst at GEM. He says these challenges are particularly acute in some circumstances:

“[For example], when the share of wind and solar is very high, relatively few synchronous generators (like coal) are online or large volumes of electricity are being transferred through high voltage DC lines.”

The plan mentions many technological solutions to address the problem, he tells Carbon Brief. However, he adds, there are no quantitative details for the issue. For example, he notes there is no target for “how many gigawatts of wind and solar must gain grid-forming capability”. This is in contrast to the goals for overall renewables capacity or generation.

Norman was a co-author on the recent GEM report, which identified further barriers to renewable uptake. It said these include transmission bottlenecks, alongside systemic features such as dispatching and power-contract mechanisms. 

As a result, said the report, renewable power – especially solar – is increasingly being “curtailed”, particularly in north-western and northern provinces.

Yao also notes that the plan does not “spell out specific measures to address systemic constraints” around the electricity grid and the role of coal in the power sector. 

“I interpret this as evidence that the vested interests are still strong in the policy debate,” she adds.

What does the plan say about ‘distributed’ energy?

Alongside gigawatt-scale clean-energy megabases, China also aims to expand construction of “distributed” energy. This means smaller-scale installations, such as rooftop solar.

More than 300GW of “distributed new energy” is to be added over 2026-30, some 60GW per year.

The plan aims for distributed new energy to be adopted in sectors such as industry, transport, buildings and agriculture. 

Applications include the use of distributed solar and wind in industrial parks, coal mines and oilfields, as well as encouraging residents to install solar panels on buildings and developing rural clean-energy grids.

In some regions, distributed solar and wind is “likely to meet a large proportion of local demand”, says Prof Pan Jiahua at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou). He tells Carbon Brief that micro- and mini-grids using such resources will be particularly important in central and coastal China.

The 60GW annual target for new distributed energy is not “overly ambitious”, says Isadora Wang, head of China at the thinktank Transition Asia. She tells Carbon Brief that distributed solar additions, alone, exceeded 100GW in both 2024 and 2025.

Cosimo Ries, analyst at the consultancy Trivium China, agrees that the target is reachable. The biggest question mark, he tells Carbon Brief, is whether it will continue to make sense for industry and utilities to build distributed power at the volumes seen during the 14th five-year plan period. 

He adds that market conditions for distributed solar have deteriorated sharply over the past two years. He says a range of factors have hit investor confidence:

“[Distributed solar faces] growing exposure to market trading, worsening returns in spot markets, growing risks of curtailment and new policies limiting or forbidding the selling of power back to the grid.”

What does the plan say about non-electricity use of renewables?

The plan also sets goals for renewable energy’s role in “non-electricity use”.

This means using renewable energy for purposes other than generating electricity, through converting it to other forms, such as heat or mechanical energy.

The government is aiming for non-power use to nearly triple from 60m tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) in 2025 to 150Mtce in 2030. 

Ries tells Carbon Brief that he thinks this target is “one of the main highlights” of the plan. However, he notes that limited available data means it is hard to assess the level of its ambition. He adds that, given the relative conservatism of China’s other recent clean-energy targets, this one may also be met relatively easily.

Key applications for non-power use of renewables include “green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol”, says the plan. It also points to using wind and solar for heat, as well as to biomass and geothermal for heating and cooling. 

Green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol are the “centrepiece” of the non-power push, according to state-owned newspaper Economic Information Daily.

For hydrogen alone, China plans to scale up renewable hydrogen production to 2m tonnes in 2030, up from 250,000 tonnes in 2025.

Today, non-power use of renewables accounts for only around 1% of China’s total energy consumption, NEA and NDRC officials said in a Q&A. They added that there is “considerable room for growth” in sectors such as industry, transport and buildings.

Potential new applications include the use of wind and solar for heat. This could see the use of centralised wind and solar heating stations in the chemicals, textiles, pharmaceuticals, papermaking and food sectors. 

New projects in the steel and cement sectors should use locally-generated wind and solar to power electric-arc furnaces and kilns, adds the plan.

Wang tells Carbon Brief that she believes the naming of individual sectors is a “clear indication” that they will be included in China’s renewable consumption quotas. These already cover aluminium and other heavy industry sectors.

She adds that power and heat demand from the named sectors may help absorb distributed renewable energy. It will also serve as a testing ground for matching demand with supply through increased grid flexibility and power price reforms.

To Ries, the growing focus on non-power use signals that China’s decarbonisation efforts are “now entering deeper waters”. That means regulators are turning from easier-to-abate sectors, such as aluminium, to more challenging industries, such as steel.

The plan could create a “second growth curve” for the new-energy industry, says He Zhao, in a commentary for China Power News Net. He, the vice-president of the China Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute (EPPEI). says this might begin with non-power use, before shifting to fuel, feedstock and heat substitution.

What does the plan say about China’s cleantech dominance? 

The next five years is a prime opportunity for China to “consolidate our leading position across the entire industrial chain” for clean-energy technologies, says the plan.

It adds that the government will “strengthen technological innovation” and accelerate the roll-out of new applications of artificial intelligence in China’s renewable-energy system. 

A particular focus for new R&D will be “cutting-edge, original and disruptive technologies”. It also points to technologies that “enhance the reliability of renewable energy” as a substitute for fossil fuels.

The plan names technologies for further development. For wind power, these include “reliable and low-cost” blades, ultra-tall towers and new types of floating platforms. It also mentions the development of “high-altitude wind power”. For solar, it points to the development of perovskite and other “high efficiency” solar cells, as well as space-solar technologies.

The plan also pledges to develop a power market that supports the “full entry” of renewable-energy companies. It underscores that companies should plan for an increasingly market-based and competitive environment.

Meanwhile, the government will also deepen cooperation with other countries on clean energy and “advance” global climate cooperation, it says.

A priority will be “strengthening” international coordination on investment and development in “green energy projects”. Another is “actively promoting the free circulation of China’s high-quality green technologies and products in global markets”.

Chinese exports of clean-energy technologies have been surging, especially since the closure of the strait of Hormuz. 

At the same time, Chinese investment in clean-energy projects in Belt and Road Initiative member states totalled $20bn in the first half of 2026. This is also driven by the crisis.

The US, EU and others have launched tariffs and pricing mechanisms to curb imports of Chinese cleantech. This has contributed to pushback from China, against what it and others refer to as “unilateral trade measures”. 

China is transitioning from a “major energy nation” (能源大国) to an “energy powerhouse” (能源强国), writes the Energy Research Institute’s Lyu in his explanatory reading. He says this will enable China to increasingly shift to building “systemic” advantages in developing clean-energy technologies.

He continues that, from 2026-2030, China will “move to the very forefront of the global stage” on clean energy, “venturing into uncharted territory”. This will create both “major new challenges and significant opportunities” for the country, he adds. 

Related Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change? 06.08.2026 China policy Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’ 09.07.2026 China policy Q&A: What do China’s provincial five-year plans say about climate and energy? 18.06.2026 China policy Analysis: Solar overtakes gas power in Asia for first time ever 12.06.2026 Oil and gas

The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Categories: I. Climate Science

Fact brief - Do solar plants require backup from fossil fuels?

Skeptical Science - Tue, 07/28/2026 - 08:41

Skeptical Science is partnering with Gigafact to produce fact briefs — bite-sized fact checks of trending claims. You can submit claims you think need checking via the tipline.

Do solar plants require backup from fossil fuels?

Solar plants require backup, but it doesn’t have to be from fossil fuels.

A combination of renewables, energy storage, and long-distance transmission can reliably power the majority of the U.S. without relying on coal, oil, or natural gas, as one 2017 research paper describes. Renewables like wind can generate under cloudy conditions, while surplus solar from brighter weather can be stored in utility-scale batteries for rainy days. Additionally, transmission from neighboring regions can assist solar capacity drops.

The Department of Energy and Princeton have outlined decarbonization scenarios projecting expansion of solar and decrease in fossil fuels while maintaining reliability. Analysis of real-world outcomes has found that renewables growth has actually outperformed projections.

California is an example of improving reliability while transitioning from fossil fuels to solar. From 2015 to 2025, in-state generation saw a jump in solar reliance from 8% to 27%, while natural gas dropped from 60% to 36%.

Go to full rebuttal on Skeptical Science or to the fact brief on Gigafact

This fact brief is responsive to quotes such as this one.

Sources

The Electricity Journal Reliably integrating variable renewables: Moving grid flexibility resources from models to results

The Alliance for Climate Transition Institute Solar energy requires 100% fossil fuel backup

Princeton University Net-Zero America

University of Virginia Decarbonization by 2050: Are We on Track?

California Energy Commission CA Electric Generation 2001-25

California Energy Commission California Energy Leaders Report Progress on Grid Reliability Ahead of Summer 2026

MIT The Future of Energy Storage

Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

Please use this form to provide feedback about this fact brief. This will help us to better gauge its impact and usability. Thank you!

About fact briefs published on Gigafact

Fact briefs are short, credibly sourced summaries that offer "yes/no" answers in response to claims found online. They rely on publicly available, often primary source data and documents. Fact briefs are created by contributors to Gigafact — a nonprofit project looking to expand participation in fact-checking and protect the democratic process. See all of our published fact briefs here.

Categories: I. Climate Science

Analysis: Wind and solar power overtake fossil fuels in Germany for first time ever

The Carbon Brief - Tue, 07/28/2026 - 04:49
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More of Germany’s electricity came from wind and solar power than fossil fuels for the first time ever in 2025.

Together, wind and solar power generated 225 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity – accounting for 44% of the total in 2025 – with just 217TWh (43%) coming from fossil fuels.

Solar and onshore wind have grown rapidly under Germany’s “Energiewende” strategy over the past two decades, as the nation transitions away from both coal and nuclear power.

Renewables have recently faced mounting opposition from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the current coalition government has been trying to develop new gas-power plants.

Nevertheless, Carbon Brief analysis of Energy Institute data – shown in the chart below – illustrates how wind and solar have continued growing, emerging as the nation’s largest power source.

The success of renewables in Germany mirrors the EU as a whole, which also saw wind and solar overtake fossil-fuel power generation in 2025 for the first time.

“Other renewables” includes hydropower, bioenergy, geothermal and other renewable sources not otherwise stated. Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy, 2026.

Germany has various targets in place that require a rapid expansion of wind and solar power, including cutting economy-wide emissions to net-zero by 2045. 

The nation is also aiming to increase renewables’ share of electricity consumption to 80% by 2030 to achieve a “largely climate neutral” power system by 2035.

Despite Germany’s rapid decline in coal power generation, the nation still relies far more on coal than most other European countries. It aims to decarbonise its electricity entirely once coal power has been phased out, which has a deadline of “no later than” 2038.

(The renewables targets also include electricity generated from hydropower and bioenergy. The latter produces a relatively large share of Germany’s power – roughly a tenth in 2025.)

Germany has to rely on renewables more than neighbours, such as France and the UK, to achieve its climate goals. This is due to its phaseout of nuclear power, which is a key part of the “Energiewende” strategy.

Nuclear power has long faced widespread public opposition in Germany. This year, the centre-right chancellor Friedrich Merz described the nuclear phaseout as a “strategic mistake”, but the government has ruled out a return to conventional nuclear power.

The country has an official coal phaseout date of 2038, but experts say the country is on track to eliminate coal from its power supply years earlier. This is despite some pressure to temporarily slow the transition away from coal during the recent energy crisis.

(Very few outside the AfD are calling to scrap the coal phaseout altogether, but the government will publish a review of the timelines in August.)

While coal generation has fallen quickly, even as nuclear was being phased out, some argue that coal could have been cut more quickly if nuclear had remained. 

Gas-power expansion has also been framed by the government in recent years as an essential component of Germany’s transition away from coal and nuclear power, to support a renewables-heavy grid.

The current government under Merz has tried to boost gas and recently adopted a law to provide state support for new gas-fired power plants. The plan is for these plants to be converted to run on “green hydrogen” by 2045, in order to meet the climate-neutrality goal.

Germany aims to install 115 gigawatts (GW) of onshore wind by 2030 and approved a record 20.8GW of new capacity in 2025. 

Meanwhile, solar generation has reached unprecedented levels during the hot summer of 2026.

However, the government’s planned grid reforms have been criticised by the renewables industry for risking slowing down the energy transition. Under the proposals, renewables developers would only be granted automatic grid connections in areas with limited grid capacity if they waive compensation for future curtailed generation.

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Categories: I. Climate Science

Analysis: 84% of nations miss deadline to identify ‘nature-harming’ subsidies by 2025 

The Carbon Brief - Tue, 07/28/2026 - 04:41
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Most countries failed to meet a 2025 target to identify all of their subsidies that could be “harmful” to biodiversity, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

The findings also reveal that 32 countries spend an estimated $270bn on biodiversity-harming subsidies and other incentives each year.

This is the “tip of the iceberg”, one expert notes, with “trillions” spent globally.  

In 2022, almost every country in the world agreed on a set of “goals” and “targets” aiming to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. 

One of these targets asked countries to identify all subsidies that damage biodiversity by 2025, before phasing out or reforming at least $500bn of these incentives by 2030. 

The subsidies can be found in a range of sectors, including fossil fuels, agriculture, forestry, mining and fishing.

Just 21 countries appear to have met the 2025 goal, Carbon Brief finds, based on analysis of 134 national reports submitted to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) by 1 July 2026. 

Five of the world’s 17 megadiverse countries were among those that met the deadline.

Country progress 

Carbon Brief’s analysis looks at the number of countries that have met the 2025 target to identify their use of nature-harming subsidies.

However, the metrics to determine which countries have “met” this target are not explicitly defined. 

Carbon Brief included any country that says it has completed the process of identifying its subsidies. In almost every case, these countries also included a total figure for the value of those subsidies. 

The analysis finds that 21 countries say they have identified their harmful subsidies, as shown in the map below (yellow). This amounts to 16% of the countries that have submitted national reports so far. 

A further 11 countries, plus the EU, have provided figures for some of their subsidies, such as only those in a specific sector (dark blue). 

Of the 134 national reports submitted to the CBD, 66 make reference to beginning the process (medium blue), while the remaining 68 do not (light blue). The final 62 countries party to the CBD have yet to submit a national report (light grey). 

(Every country in the world participates in the CBD, except for the US and the Holy See – the governing body of the Catholic church, which is seated in Vatican City.)

Countries that have identified all of their harmful subsidies (yellow); provided figures for some sectors (dark blue); begun the process, but not provided any numbers (medium blue); not begun the process (light blue); and not submitted a national report to the CBD (light grey). Credit: Carbon Brief analysis

The 32 countries that have identified some or all subsidies spend almost $270bn on nature-harming incentives annually, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis. 

This is based on a tally of the figures for the most recent available year listed in countries’ national reports, in US dollars using conversion rates at the end of the given year and adjusted for inflation. The analysis also includes figures from other reports cited in the country submissions.

The $270bn reported in country submissions to date is “just the tip of the iceberg”, notes Eva Zabey, the chief executive of Business for Nature. The global figure could be as high as $1.8tn, according to a 2022 estimate from non-profit group, the B Team. 

The figures identified by Carbon Brief are a “warning” that the “world is not moving fast enough” to tackle harmful subsidies, Zabey says, adding: 

“The positive news is that some countries have shown it can be done and this should embolden others to follow suit…Subsidy reform should be treated as an economic necessity, not an environmental checklist.”

Harmful subsidies are expected to be among the key priorities at the upcoming COP17 UN nature summit, being held in Armenia in October 2026. 

Subsidy target

There is no single definition of a “harmful” subsidy. (See: ‘Harmful’ subsidies.) 

The aim to identify these subsidies stems from target 18 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) – the global agreement containing a series of goals and targets for nature. 

Target 18 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

Target 18 calls on countries to identify subsidies and other incentives that are harmful for biodiversity by 2025. 

It also says that nations should “eliminate, phase out or reform” these subsidies in a “proportionate” way, reducing them by at least $500bn per year by 2030. 

It says countries should first target the “most harmful” incentives, while simultaneously scaling up positive incentives for nature. 

All 2030 targets in the GBF are global –  with countries each expected to outline how they will contribute nationally. So far, 169 countries have submitted these national targets. 

Only 38% of countries addressed the 2025 aim to identify harmful subsidies in their national targets “to some extent”, according to a draft version of an upcoming progress report.

Countries’ national reports do not “provide a sufficient basis to determine” whether the 2025 milestone was met, says the report, but available evidence “suggests” that it was not.  

‘Harmful’ subsidies  

There is no universally agreed-upon definition of a “biodiversity-harmful subsidy” – or how it differs from an environmentally harmful subsidy.

In general, “harmful” environmental subsidies impact humans’ surroundings, whereas those harmful to biodiversity directly affect species and ecosystems. Paul Elton, a PhD candidate at the Australian National University, tells Carbon Brief:

“If you were to do a study that focused on biodiversity-harmful subsidies versus one that focused on environmentally-harmful subsidies, there’d be a Venn diagram where a large percentage would overlap.”

A 2022 working paper on identifying subsidies harmful to biodiversity published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) depicted biodiversity as a subset of the environment, with climate and air falling outside the scope of “biodiversity”.

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However, the report also noted that climate change is one of the five key drivers of biodiversity loss, adding: 

“As such, subsidies that lead to larger greenhouse gas emissions, for example, will also indirectly impact on biodiversity.”

Distinction between the “environment” and “biodiversity”, according to an oft-cited working paper on identifying and assessing biodiversity-harming subsidies. Credit: OECD (2022)

Prof Jessica Dempsey, a political ecologist at the University of British Columbia, tells Carbon Brief that she would “absolutely” consider fossil-fuel subsidies to be biodiversity-harming – not only as a driver of climate change, but also because the extraction of fossil fuels can cause localised harms to biodiversity. She adds:

“I do think probably it is true that all harmful subsidies are not necessarily biodiversity-related. Some care in that is important, but subsidies to the sectors that are known drivers of biodiversity loss feel very obvious to me.”

Biodiversity-harming subsidies can be either direct or indirect. 

Direct subsidies refer to government expenditures that go towards a project that harms nature, such as construction of a new gas-fired power plant. Indirect subsidies could include tax exemptions that encourage a certain behaviour, such as lower tax rates on fuels for agricultural machinery. 

Subsidies in agriculture, fishery and energy sectors are most commonly deemed “harmful”, but damage can also be caused by support for forestry, infrastructure, transport, construction, water and other sectors. 

One recent estimate of the global total of biodiversity-harming subsidies put the figure at $1.7-3.2tn annually. An estimate of environmentally harmful subsidies put the figure at $2.6tn.

Elton tells Carbon Brief:

“It’s useful to contextualise the $500bn ambition of the GBF against those global estimates of how big [the total] actually could be, because that underscores the fact that so far, you’ve only got a subset of nations reporting about $250bn by your analysis, which is only half of the [phase-out target].

“It’s a significant lack of accountability.”

The chart below compares the $2.6tn estimated value of harmful subsidies to the $500bn phase-out target set in the GBF and the value of the subsidies identified so far in national reports.

Comparison of the harmful subsidies identified by countries in their national reports (light blue), the phase-out target for subsidies outlined in the GBF (medium blue) and a global estimate of environmentally harmful subsidies (dark blue). Credit: Carbon Brief analysis Sectoral breakdown

Many subsidies can have both negative and positive impacts on biodiversity, according to the 2022 OECD working paper. 

A subsidy on constructing dams for new hydropower can harm local biodiversity by disrupting water flows and flooding certain areas, for example. But it also reduces fossil-fuel dependence, lowering emissions and leading to a decrease in global warming. 

Ronald Steenblik, a subsidies expert and co-author of the report estimating $2.6tn of harmful subsidies, tells Carbon Brief:

“What’s harmful is somewhat in the eye of the beholder.”

Most experts agree that a few sectors receive the bulk of the world’s biodiversity-harming subsidies: fossil fuels, agriculture and infrastructure, with much smaller contributions from other sectors, such as forestry, mining and fisheries. 

Of the subsidies reported to the CBD, almost half were for the fossil-fuel sector, and around one-quarter for agriculture and fishing. 

Sectoral breakdown of identified subsidies. “Multiple” means a country either did not distinguish between sectors or reported one number encompassing several sectors. “Other” refers to specific sectors not named in the chart. Credit: Carbon Brief analysis.

Dempsey says it is “surprising” that mining “didn’t show up” in these figures. (Of the 32 countries that provided subsidy data, only one mentioned mining as an industry that received harmful subsidies.)

Limitations

One limitation of Carbon Brief’s analysis is the lack of standardisation of subsidy data.  

The methodology underlying the national reports lists several definitions of environmentally harmful subsidies, adding:

“[T]here is no standardised, globally agreed methodology for assessing the value of subsidies…nor is there a single global dataset providing this information.”

It adds that it is “important” for countries to identify harmful subsidies “within their national context”. Steenblik says:

“When you get down into the details, you can have lots of arguments of where you draw the line. And, so, the big question on this spreadsheet is where countries drew that line.”

For example, China’s national report says the country has already identified all biodiversity-harming subsidies and reformed them entirely.  

In Australia, a 2026 study – led by Elton from Australian National University – identified biodiversity-harmful subsidies worth $26.3bn over 2022-23, a number that amounts to just over 1% of the country’s GDP.

However, in its national report, Australia identified $155m worth of subsidies, largely in the agricultural sector. (The national report says that the identified agricultural subsidies are those that are “potentially most harmful to the environment”.)

Elton tells Carbon Brief that this discrepancy underscores the necessity of an independent assessment of harmful subsidies, “rather than this just being seen as a tick-the-box reporting exercise by officials in the environment department”.

When it comes to actually phasing out harmful subsidies, Dempsey says, focusing on the quality of the subsidy – and who benefits from it – is just as important as focusing on the numbers. She adds:

“If we don’t take this lens of understanding the beneficiaries and we only focus on the [numbers], we really risk having policy changes that then lead to increased affordability problems for everyday working people, and backlash.”

Methodology 

Carbon Brief analysed national reports submitted to the CBD by 134 parties – 133 countries and the EU – to assess which ones had identified all of their biodiversity-harmful subsidies and therefore met the 2025 deadline. 

The reports were submitted in 2026, with the analysis including those submitted by 1 July 2026. 

The figures for each country can be found in this spreadsheet. More than three-quarters of reports did not list any figures. 

To get the full tally for the amount listed, Carbon Brief used the figures for 2025 (or the nearest available year) and converted the local currency into US dollars, based on conversion rates in the given year using the currency exchange rates calculator from the US Treasury.

These figures were then adjusted for inflation to the year 2025. Numbers were rounded to the nearest $1,000.

In total, this amounted to $269,856,769,000 in subsidies across 32 countries.

Many countries listed the sector that each subsidy is going towards. Carbon Brief standardised these inputs using the following categories: 

  • Agriculture and fishing
  • Energy
  • Forestry  
  • Fossil fuels 
  • Infrastructure
  • Transport 
  • Other
  • Multiple sectors

“Multiple sectors” was assigned when a country provided only a partial sectoral breakdown of their subsidies or none at all. 

“Other” was selected to encompass sectors that were named more infrequently, including water, mining, tourism and construction.

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on the map in this article do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Carbon Brief concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo  15.07.2026 Nature Q&A: What England’s new ‘land-use framework’ means for climate, nature and food 20.03.2026 Food and farming Analysis: Half of nations meet UN deadline for nature-loss reporting 02.03.2026 Nature policy Brazil’s biodiversity pledge: Six key takeaways for nature and climate change 16.01.2026 Nature policy

The post Analysis: 84% of nations miss deadline to identify ‘nature-harming’ subsidies by 2025  appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Categories: I. Climate Science

Hot days, cold thermometers

Skeptical Science - Mon, 07/27/2026 - 08:20

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

A graph has been making the rounds on social media showing the average number of days per weather station above 95F, 100F, and 105F across the contiguous US since 1895. It comes from CFACT analyst Chris Martz, drawing on raw data from NOAA’s Global Historical Climatology Network daily dataset (GHCNd), and it shows the 1930s towering over everything since. The implication is that extreme heat in the US is nothing new, and that all the recent fuss about record temperatures is overblown.

It is a compelling figure. The 1930s Dust Bowl really was an extraordinary period of extreme heat in the US, and no amount of correction for changes in measurement techniques over time makes it go away. But the graph is also a case study in why you cannot naively count threshold exceedances in raw daily station data and call it a climate record. Its results rest on two well-documented thermometer problems that artificially depress modern hot day counts, plus a station network that happens to be oversampled where the Dust Bowl happened.

Reproducing the viral chart

To start with, let’s reproduce the figure properly. Rather than averaging whatever stations happen to be reporting in a given year (the station network grew from a few hundred stations in 1895 to many thousands today, with big shifts in where they are located), I selected the 543 GHCNd stations in the contiguous US with long, near-continuous maximum temperature records over the full 1895-2025 period,1 gridded them to 2x2 degree cells, and computed an area-weighted national average.

Average number of days per year at or above 95°F, 100°F, and 105°F over the contiguous US, 1895–2025, from 543 long-record GHCN-Daily stations (raw, unadjusted TMAX), averaged on a 2°×2° grid with cos(latitude) area weighting.

Here we see the same basic story as the viral version: a huge spike in the 1930s (1936 alone averaged 33 days at or above 95F across these stations), elevated values through the mid-1950s, and nothing since that comes close. So the Martz figure is not fabricated, and its shape is not an artifact of the changing station network. To be fair to its author, counting hot days in raw data really does produce this picture.

The problem is what “raw” means here.

Two thermometer problems, both pointing the same way

Raw sounds virtuous, like unfiltered honesty. But the US cooperative observer network has changed in two important ways over the past century, and both changes bias hot day counts downward in recent decades relative to earlier ones.

The first is time of observation bias. Volunteer observers read and reset their max/min thermometers once a day. In the early 20th century most did so in the late afternoon, near the hottest part of the day. An afternoon reset means a very hot afternoon can get counted twice: once for the day it happened, and again the next day if the following afternoon is cooler, since the thermometer still holds yesterday’s peak. Over the 20th century the network gradually shifted to morning observations (better for measuring precipitation), which does not double count heat. Vose et al (2003) documented how this shift alone imparts a spurious cooling trend of a few tenths of a degree in US records, and the double counting directly inflates hot day counts at afternoon-observing stations.

The second is the thermometer switch. In the mid-1980s NOAA replaced liquid-in-glass thermometers in wooden Cotton Region Shelters with electronic maximum-minimum temperature sensors (MMTS) at most cooperative stations. Quayle et al (1991) showed the new sensors read maximum temperatures around 0.4C (0.7F) cooler than the old shelters. This produced a one-time step change at thousands of stations that landed right at the start of the modern warming era. When your threshold is a hard cutoff like 95F, a step down of nearly half a degree C removes a lot of days.

Homogenization algorithms (like NOAA’s pairwise method, Menne and Williams 2009, or the Berkeley Earth approach, Rohde et al 2013) detect and correct these breakpoints by comparing each station to its neighbors. Our 2016 paper validated these adjustments against the pristine, purpose-built US Climate Reference Network and found they perform well. While NOAA does not have daily homogenized data (they only provide monthly homogenized data), Berkeley Earth does. So let’s compare the raw hot day count to the same metric computed from Berkeley Earth’s homogenized daily maximum temperature fields.

Days per year at or above 95°F over the contiguous US. Top: raw GHCN-Daily data from 543 long-record stations, gridded and area-weighted. Bottom: Berkeley Earth homogenized daily TMAX (1°×1°, area-weighted over CONUS), with the dashed line showing the same calculation restricted to the grid cells containing the long-record stations. Absolute values differ because gridded fields smooth out local extremes; the shapes are the meaningful comparison.

The two datasets agree that the 1930s were exceptional. Where they disagree is the modern era: in the homogenized data, recent decades rival the Dust Bowl years CONUS-wide, with 2011 (16.1 days) actually edging out 1936 (14.0 days) as the biggest year in the Berkeley Earth series.

We can make the comparison cleaner by putting each series relative to its own 1951-1980 average:

Days ≥95°F, 11-year running means, with each series shown relative to its own 1951–1980 average. Red: raw GHCN-Daily long-record stations. Blue solid: Berkeley Earth homogenized daily TMAX over the full CONUS. Blue dashed: Berkeley Earth restricted to the grid cells sampled by the long-record station network.

The raw and homogenized series track each other closely for the first 85 years, through the Dust Bowl peak and the cool 1960s and 70s. Then, right around 1980 (just when the MMTS transition began), they split. The homogenized data rises to around 1.4 times its mid-century baseline while the raw data stays flat at roughly 1.0. The raw data does not exaggerate the 1930s, but rather erases the last 40 years of increases in extreme heat.

The dashed and solid blue lines in the figure are also worth a closer look. The dashed line averages the Berkeley Earth data over only the 130 grid cells where our long-record stations actually sit; comparing it to the raw series is the fair like-for-like test, since the places are the same and data adjustments are the only difference. The solid line averages over the whole country, and the gap between the two exposes a sampling problem rather than a data problem. Century-old stations cluster in the Midwest and East, which is precisely where the 1930s heat was centered and where extreme daytime heat has increased the least since. Averaged over the long-lived station locations, even in homogenized data, puts the 1930s roughly 45% above the last two decades. If we average over the full contiguous US, however, that gap shrinks to about 10%.

Locations of long-lived weather stations used in the reproducing the viral Martz figure. Note that these tend to oversample the Midwest region where dust bowl temperature extremes were most pronounced. A Dust Bowl story, not a national one

There is a second, subtler issue with interpreting the viral graph: geography. Long-record stations are heavily concentrated in the Midwest and East (only 116 of our 543, around a fifth, sit west of 100W), which happens to be exactly where the 1930s heat was centered. Let’s break the country into NOAA’s nine US climate regions and look at each one separately, using the spatially complete Berkeley Earth data.

Days per year at or above 95°F for each of NOAA’s nine US climate regions, 1895–2023, from Berkeley Earth homogenized gridded daily TMAX (1°×1°), area-weighted within each region. Thin lines are annual values; bold lines are 11-year running means. Note that the y-axis scale differs by region.

The Dust Bowl turns out to be a story about three regions. In the Upper Midwest the 1930s averaged around 15 times as many 95F days as the last two decades (3.4 vs 0.2 per year), in the Northern Rockies and Plains around 9 times (2.8 vs 0.3), and in the Ohio Valley around 4 times (8.7 vs 2.1), with 1936 the record year in all three.

Everywhere else the present rivals or beats the past: the South is essentially tied (22.4 days in the 1930s vs 22.7 over 2000-2023, with 2011 the biggest year in the record), while the Southeast (14.7 vs 11.1 days), Southwest (4.9 vs 3.9), and West (4.6 vs 3.6) all see more 95F days now than in the 1930s, with the two western regions peaking in 2020. (The remaining two regions, the Northeast and Northwest, average less than one 95F day per year throughout the record, too few for meaningful comparisons.)

The mid-century spike in that average comes almost entirely from three regions in the middle of the country. This makes physical sense: the Dust Bowl heat was tied to a specific regional catastrophe, a multi-year drought amplified by human-induced land degradation (Cook et al 2009), with bare, desiccated soils driving daytime temperatures to levels those same fields have not approached since. A record set during an ecological disaster in one part of the country is not evidence that the whole country, much less the planet, was hotter. The national chart is really being driven by a distinct regional anomaly.2

Meanwhile, the thermometers all agree it is warming

Finally, it is worth stepping back from the hottest afternoons of the year, which are a noisy, bias-sensitive sliver of the temperature record, and looking at what US temperatures as a whole are doing. The figure below shows annual average maximum, minimum, and mean temperatures for the contiguous US from NOAA’s homogenized nClimDiv dataset.

Contiguous US annual average daily maximum (TMax), minimum (TMin), and mean (TAvg) temperature anomalies relative to 1901–2000, from NOAA nClimDiv, 1895–2025. Thin lines are annual values; bold lines are 11-year running means.

All three are unambiguous. Since 1970, maximum temperatures have warmed at 0.52F per decade, minimums at 0.51F per decade, and the average at 0.51F per decade (all p < 0.0001), with the last decade roughly 2F above the 20th century baseline. The 1930s show up here too, but as a modest bump in maximum temperatures far below present (as the dust bowl event was largely limited to summer TMax temperatures, with a much smaller effect on the remainder of the year). Extreme daytime heat in summer is one of the places where the US warming signal is weakest (a real and interesting scientific result, related in part to agricultural intensification and irrigation in the Midwest (Mueller et al 2016), but it is not representative of the climate system as a whole.

Zooming all the way out

One last piece of context. The contiguous US covers less than 2% of the Earth’s surface, and as we saw above, even within the US the Dust Bowl signal is regional. So what does the very same chart look like for the planet as a whole? The figure below reproduces the design of the viral graph (days at or above 95F, 100F, and 105F) using the Berkeley Earth daily data over global land. To avoid mixing climate changes with changes in the locations we measure (global station coverage grew from under 40% of land area in the 1890s to essentially complete today), I restrict the average to the grid cells with continuous century-long records, covering 42% of global land.3

Average number of days per year at or above 95°F, 100°F, and 105°F across global land, 1895–2023, from Berkeley Earth homogenized gridded daily TMAX (1°×1°), area-weighted by cos(latitude) and land fraction. Restricted to grid cells with complete data in at least 90% of years over 1895–2023 (42% of global land area), so that changing station coverage does not affect the trend.

Globally there is no 1930s spike at all: 1936, the year that towers over the US record, comes in at 15.1 days at or above 95F, less than a day above the surrounding years. The Dust Bowl, extraordinary as it was in Kansas, barely registers when averaged over the world’s land. Instead, hot days hold roughly steady until around 1980 and then climb: days at or above 95F are up around 70% between the early 20th century (1895-1924) and the last decade (12.8 to 22.1 per year), days at or above 100F have more than doubled (3.0 to 7.5), and days at or above 105F have nearly quintupled (0.3 to 1.6). The hotter the threshold, the faster the rise, which is exactly what you expect when a whole temperature distribution shifts upward. All ten of the warmest years by the 95F metric have occurred since 1998, and the six most recent years in the series (2018-2023) are all among them.

The US Midwest is one of the few places on Earth where the hottest days of the mid-20th century still stand; picking it as your yardstick for global warming is, to put it charitably, a choice.

So what are the takeaways here?

First, the Dust Bowl was real, and it remains the benchmark for multi-year extreme daytime heat in the central US, in adjusted and unadjusted data alike. Anyone claiming the 1930s heat is purely an artifact of bad data is simply wrong.

Second, it was a regional phenomenon. Break the country into NOAA’s nine climate regions and the 1930s is only exceptional in only three of them (the Upper Midwest, the Northern Rockies and Plains, and the Ohio Valley, at roughly 4 to 15 times recent levels). The four regions where hot days are the most common (the South, Southeast, Southwest, and West) all match or exceed the Dust Bowl today, with record years of 2011 and 2020, not 1936.

Third, raw daily data is the wrong tool for this question. Time of observation changes and the 1980s switch to MMTS sensors both suppress modern hot day counts relative to the past, and the raw and homogenized series diverge almost exactly when the instrument transition happened. In homogenized data, recent decades rival the 1930s even averaged nationally.

Fourth, hot days above a fixed threshold are a narrow and noisy way to look at the data. The overall US warming trend (around 0.5F per decade since 1970 in max, min, and mean temperatures) is robust in every dataset, raw or adjusted, satellite or surface. And globally, days above 95F have been climbing steadily for a century, with no Dust Bowl bump at all: the central US is one of the few spots on the planet where the mid-20th century still holds the record for extreme daytime heat.

The viral chart is built from real measurements, and the heat it shows was real too. But it takes a regional catastrophe, fails to account for changes in instruments and observation times, and presents the result as a national climate verdict. Accounting for the thermometers and the geography, and the US looks a lot like the rest of the planet: the hottest days on record are increasingly the ones we are living through now.

I’ve included a more detailed writeup of the methods and code to reproduce this analysis on my GitHub here.

1 Specifically: stations whose GHCNd TMAX record spans at least 1900 through 2024, keeping station-years where at least 80% of April-October days have a valid, quality-controlled observation, and keeping stations valid in at least 85% of years over 1895-2025. Hot day counts are averaged within 2°×2° grid cells and combined with cos(latitude) area weighting over the 130 cells with near-complete records. The results are insensitive to these choices: stricter completeness screens shrink the network but leave the series essentially unchanged (details and robustness checks are available in the methods writeup on my GitHub). A map of the station network is also available in the repo; note that coverage is much denser east of 100W, a point that becomes important later in the post.

2 This also explains most of the difference between the dashed and solid blue lines in the “days ≥95°F, 11-year running means” figure. The long-record station network oversamples the region where the 1930s were most extreme and undersamples the South and West where recent warming has added the most 95F days.

3 This matters a lot. Computed naively over whatever area has data each year, the global days above 95F triple from ~12 to ~37 days per year, but much of that rise is an artifact of hot regions (the Sahara, the tropics, interior Australia) entering the dataset over time. On the fixed network the increase is a still-substantial ~75% (from ~13 to ~22 days per year). The fixed-coverage region is disproportionately Northern Hemisphere midlatitude land, so this series should be read as “hot days where we have century-long records” rather than a true global land average.

Categories: I. Climate Science

Climate disruption, not China, is the key security threat facing Australia

Climate Code Red - Sun, 07/26/2026 - 15:42

by David Spratt

Download the submission

Climate disruption, not China,  is the key security threat facing Australia is the main message in the Safe Climate Australia submission to the AUKUS Public Inquiry.  This is the text.

Summary

  • Climate disruption presents Australia’s greatest long-term security threat.
  • AUKUS risks over-prioritising military competition over systemic climate risks.
  • Climate impacts threaten food, water, infrastructure, health and regional stability.
  • Security spending should better reflect the scale and certainty of climate risks.
  • Australia needs a climate-first national security framework focused on resilience and prevention.  
The biggest security threat  

The first duty of any government is to “protect the people”: their collective and individual safety, their health and well-being, their property and livelihoods, and their civil and democratic rights.
This should be the starting point for any government’s security policy: human security, including national, regional and global security.  

But this has not been the case in Australia. Security policy has been generally constructed as a national defence and border security issue with an emphasis on the state-security institutions: police, customs, military and intelligence services. Even from this narrow perspective, Australia has not released a national security strategy since 2013, nor has security responsibility been integrated across government. 

As a result there has been a de facto privileging of defence policy as a substitute for a broad approach to “protecting the people”. The National Defence Strategy has become a military-focussed stand-in for a security policy, and even the defence policy seems in practical terms to be often reduced to an acquisitions plan.  It has become a shopping list as a substitute for a policy, and AUKUS sits atop the list.

The AUKUS plan arrived without sufficient consideration of the biggest threats to Australia and Australians’ future safety.

To start at the beginning, the greatest threats are those that may be termed existential or catastrophic risks, that is, those that have the capacity to so disrupt human society from its present structures and course of development that it is unable to (fully) recover. In general, these risks include climate and Earth system disruption, pandemics, weapons of mass destruction, near-Earth asteroid collisions and the impacts of digital technology and artificial intelligence (including disinformation).

Each year, the World Economic Forum (WEF) surveys global leaders in the public and private spheres on their risk perceptions, and from that data compiles an annual report. This year, over the longer term (ten years), respondents rated climate disruption and Earth system degradation as the top four risks, and five of the top 10 (see Figure 1).  Misinformation, AI and cyber espionage account for another three places and the remaining two were inequality and social polarisation. State-based conflict and geopolitical confrontation (such  as war involving China) didn’t make the long-term list.

Figure 1: Global risks ranked by severity, World Economic Forum, 2026

AUKUS only makes sense if siding with the USA in a war with China is identified as the security priority in the medium term. However, many expert voices, including those of the Australian Security Leaders Climate Group, have repeatedly made the point that climate, not China, is the biggest threat.

Security assessment 

In a way, some of the Australian Government’s own actions support this view.  In 2022, shortly after coming to power, the Albanese government commissioned the Office of National Intelligence (ONI) to prepare Australia’s first climate and security risk assessment, with an emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region, and as an input into the Defence Strategic Review.  It was delivered to the Government’s National Security Committee of Cabinet in December 2022, where it was met with shock and awe, with ministers saying they had not heard anything like it before. The ONI report was immediately securitised and not even members of relevant parliamentary policy committees were briefed, nor was a declassified version made public. This was the opposite of the practice for the Defence Strategic Review, where a declassified version was available immediately. 

For the past three years, the government has barely spoken about climate–security threats. Consideration of these threats in both the Defence Security Review and the subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy and 2026 National Defence Strategy was cursory at best, more accurately tokenistic. The 2026 document contains no strategy in response to systemic climate–security risks.

The reasons for this secrecy seem obvious: the ONI report said things so drastic about the likely climate impacts on Australian and regional security that its narrative would have exposed Australia’s decisions to support and license new coal and gas exports as an act of gross climate vandalism that would undermine Australia’s future security.

This was made clear when the Government decided, for reasons that were not publicly explained, to brief a small number of independent members of the Parliament in late 2024.  One of those briefed, Senator David Pocock, called the ONI report “frankly terrifying”. “We’re woefully underprepared for what’s coming,” Pocock told The Saturday Paper, “It’s no surprise that the government has been sitting on this report from the Office of National Intelligence.” Others in attendance have made similar comments, and he and progressive independents in the House of Representatives say it is “recklessly negligent” not to let Australians know as well.

Global security risk assessment 

It is reasonable to assume that the ONI report was consistent with a similar piece of work issued two years earlier in the UK by that country’s premier security think tank, Chatham House. That report, Climate change risk assessment 2021, found that without a sharp emissions decline before 2030 (which current trajectories suggest is increasingly unlikely), impacts likely to be locked in for the period 2040–50 include:

  • A 30% drop in crop yields by 2050;
  • Food demand will be 50% higher; and
  • One-third of cropland will be affected by severe drought each year.

The assessment warned that the world is “dangerously off track” to meet the Paris Agreement goals, that the risks are compounding, and that “without immediate action the impacts will be devastating” in the coming decades, especially for food security. It concluded that the drop in crop yields and more severe and extensive droughts would contribute to cascading climate impacts and “drive political instability and greater national insecurity, and fuel regional and international conflict”.

Twenty years ago, Kurt Campbell, who was United States Deputy Secretary of State and National Security Council coordinator for the Indo-Pacific in the Biden administration, led a group of security analysts in producing a groundbreaking report on climate and security, The Age of Consequences. In it, they described a scenario in which the world had warmed by 3°C:

“Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to massive nonlinear societal events. In this scenario, nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervour to outright chaos. In this scenario, climate change provokes a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature’ (emphasis added).” 

This is the future Australia will face, but in our parliament it has not been a topic of serious conversation since a Senate inquiry on the topic eight years ago, despite growing evidence regarding escalating climate-related security risks.

It is no longer controversial that climate disruption is an existential threat. Pacific leaders, the UN Secretary-General, the former US Defence Secretary, and the current Australian climate minister have said it. Nobody says that China is an existential risk, and that represents the great inversion in Australian security policy: a secondary issue becomes primary policy, and the greatest threat is simply not spoken about. 

Like the WEF, the Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) also releases an annual report on the big risks to humanity. Their Global Catastrophic Risks 2026 report identified the key issues as:

  • Catastrophic climate change and responsibility in the age of Earth system tipping points; 
  • Ecological collapse and nature in global governance; 
  • Weapons of mass destruction and multi-domain escalation risk; 
  • AI in military decision-making and the global governance challenge; and
  • Near-Earth asteroids and how to protect Earth from the asteroid impact hazard

Regional impacts

Catastrophic climate change is coming to our region, given the present failure to rapidly reduce climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions. The world has reached 1.5°C of warming, the rate is accelerating, and Earth will hit 2°C in around fifteen years on current trajectories. A survey of climate scientists found that a majority think warming will exceed 3°C given the current level of global climate action. 
Scientists have described a zone of “near-unliveable” heat at 2.7°C of global average warming, which will exhibit levels of heat beyond that ever experienced by humans, currently only found on 0.8% of the world’s surface, and that would affect 22–39% of the global population, mainly in Asia (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Projected zone of heat of “near-unliveable conditions” at 2.7°C global average warming.

It is difficult to imagine the consequences of such a world, but these impacts will become perhaps the greatest security challenge to Australia. Part of the risk is northern Australia, which will also become practically unliveable for part of the year. 

This has direct implications for AUKUS, because Australia is already spending billions upgrading facilities in northern Australia, mainly for the purpose of making them de facto US bases (Figure 3). How these bases would operate in such conditions of extreme heat seems not to have been fully considered by the government in its security planning and spending. It is another example of how climate and security risks may collide.

Figure 3: Zone of extreme heat and defence bases in northern Australia at 2.7°C global average warming (ASLCG)

This reinforces the need for a comprehensive Australian security strategy, not an acquisitions shopping list with an eye-watering price tag that will do very little to protect Australia from the biggest threats.
Security policy has to be built on solid ground, not on the shifting sands of the AUKUS. 

Rebuilding security policy

If security policy is to be truly taken seriously, here are some initial steps:

Regular government catastrophic risk assessments. An initial step would be a comprehensive assessment by ONI, drawing on agencies across government and more broadly, of the catastrophic risks Australia faces, including those identified by global leaders in the 2026 risk reports of the WEF and GCF. Such an assessment could draw upon the valuable work done by ONI in the still-classified 2022 climate and security risk assessment. The new work on the ecology of catastrophic risks Australia faces should include a declassified public version. A forward-thinking and security-aware parliament would legislate a Catastrophic Risks Assessment Bill mandating such regular work as part of ongoing security policy review and development. 

A commitment to regular climate risk assessments that are comprehensive and integrated in looking at systemic risks. They need to avoid the pitfalls that have befallen the ONI report and the domestically-focussed National Climate Risk Assessment: siloed analysis, bottom-up methodologies, narrow terms of reference and secrecy.

Rebuilding Australia’s climate science capacity, which has been so run down that scientists are in despair that Australia’s climate model, the only one in the Southern Hemisphere, is now so lacking in staff and resources that it will cease to function properly in helping understand what climate warming and the security risks will look and feel like in the future. 

Based on these three actions, the production and regular updating of a National Security Strategy would reflect the commitment of a government which genuinely seeks to protect the people, their safety and well-being.

 

Categories: I. Climate Science

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #30

Skeptical Science - Sun, 07/26/2026 - 08:14
A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 19, 2026 thru Sat, July 25, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (11 articles)

Climate Policy and Politics (5 articles)

Climate Education and Communication (3 articles)

Climate Science and Research (3 articles)

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 articles)

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

  •  Hot days, cold thermometers Why a viral graph on US days above 95F is misleading and overstates regional warmth The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Jul 22, 2026.
If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!
Categories: I. Climate Science

Factcheck: No, Europe’s heatwaves are not being ‘caused’ by declining air pollution

The Carbon Brief - Fri, 07/24/2026 - 07:15

This summer has seen Europe suffer through a series of record-breaking heatwaves.

Amid widespread media coverage of the number of deaths and the influence of climate change, the UK’s Daily Telegraph reported on new research with the incorrect headline: “Heatwaves caused by fall in pollution.”

The article was shared on social media by Richard Tice – deputy leader of the hard-right, climate-sceptic Reform UK party – along with a number of prominent rightwing commentators.

Tice claimed that “net stupid zero is contributing to rising temperatures, not helping”, adding that “we have been gaslit and lied to”.

GB News followed up with its own article, incorrectly headlined: “Britain’s scorching heatwaves caused by falling pollution levels, researchers find.”

Scientists tell Carbon Brief that the framing of heatwaves being “caused” by declining air pollution is “wrong”.

While a drop in pollution has reduced the cooling impact it has had in the past, the scientists say, Europe’s summer heatwaves are primarily becoming more extreme “as a result of greenhouse-gas-induced warming”.

Another scientist adds that “any attempt” to link this research to net-zero policies is “simply wrong”.

Fast warming

The extensive reporting around Europe’s heatwaves in recent months has often mentioned that Europe is the world’s fastest-warming continent. 

The new study in question aims to unpack why Europe’s summer temperatures are rising more quickly than other regions of the northern hemisphere’s mid and high latitudes. 

The research – published in Geophysical Research Letters – explores the role of air pollution and, specifically, how it affects circulation patterns in the atmosphere. 

(The study focuses on long-term trends in European summers and does not include the very recent heatwaves.)

Human-caused emissions of aerosols – tiny, light‑scattering particles produced mainly by burning fossil fuels – have long acted to “mask” global warming. This is largely because they absorb or reflect incoming sunlight and influence the formation and brightness of clouds. 

To understand how the climate of Europe – or any region – is changing, scientists need to take into account a whole range of factors, says Prof Bjørn Samset, a research professor at Norway’s Center for International Climate Research (CICERO), who was not involved in the work.

This includes “greenhouse gases, aerosols, land-use change, natural variability and how they all interact”, he says, adding:

“The effects of air pollution on circulation, which is the topic here, has long been difficult to pin down.”

As European countries improved their air quality through the second half of the 20th century, the cooling effect of aerosols has gradually been removed.

This can boost heatwaves in two ways – directly, by letting more sunlight reach the land surface and, indirectly, by influencing the jet stream.

Using hundreds of simulations from nine climate models, the new study finds that a decline in aerosols is resulting in more frequent “quasi-stationary Rossby waves”. 

Rossby waves are huge meanders in the jet stream. Occasionally, they become slow-moving – or “quasi-stationary” – which allows weather systems to get stuck over one region, leading to prolonged heatwaves.

These circulation changes have contributed to Europe’s rapidly warming summers.

However, while Europe’s heatwaves are being influenced by declining aerosols, it is “wrong” to say they are being “caused” by them, says Prof Erich Fischer, a climate scientist at ETH Zurich.

Headline in the Daily Telegraph, 22 July 2026.

Fischer, who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief:

“Heatwaves are caused by high-pressure systems and are now much more frequent and intense because they are happening in a climate that is much warmer than 100 years ago as a result of greenhouse-gas-induced warming. 

“The paper shows that the greenhouse-gas-induced summer warming had been temporarily masked by air-polluting aerosols. The full extent for European summers only becomes visible now as the air-polluting aerosols have declined.”

Samset adds:

“Air pollution never causes or removes global warming, it only temporarily moderates it.”

Study lead author Dr Pedro Roldán‐Gómez, an associate researcher at the Barcelona Supercomputer Centre, is quoted in the Daily Telegraph saying that “most” of the “excess warming” in Europe, beyond that of comparable regions in the northern hemisphere, can be linked to declining aerosols.

But, earlier in the article, the newspaper interprets this as, simply, “most of the extra heat experienced in Britain and Europe” is down to air pollution. 

GB News uses a similar phrasing, reporting that “much of the additional warming across Britain and western Europe since the 1980s is linked to the sharp decline in airborne particles known as aerosols”.

This is “misleading”, says Fischer, while Roldan-Gomez tells Carbon Brief that this is a “tricky point”, which “could lead to wrong interpretations if not properly explained”. He adds:

“The contribution of greenhouse gases is, in any case, the most important factor.”

Headline on GB News, 23 July 2026.
Cleaner air

The Daily Telegraph’s article was seized upon by Reform’s Richard Tice to claim that “cleaner air” was causing higher temperatures, rather than CO2.

This continued his position – refuted by long-established climate science – that CO2 does not drive global warming. 

Tice also claimed in his post that net-zero policies are “contributing to rising temperatures”. Tice appears to be linking declining air pollution to a shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy.

Samset points out that net-zero became a goal “decades later” than the cumulative efforts to reduce air pollution since the 1980s and that it is “simply wrong” to link it to the study. 

“The scientific community will keep working to understand how greenhouse gas warming and air pollution interact,” he says, but “nothing we do will change the fact that the consequences of global warming are due to human-induced CO2 emissions”.

Fischer adds:

“Let us not forget that cleaning up air-polluting aerosols is highly desirable. According to the World Health Organisation, 7 million people still die prematurely every year due to air pollution.”

Clean air legislation

Finally, the Daily Telegraph article and the study itself both attribute Europe’s declining air pollution from the 1980s onwards to the Montreal Protocol.

This is a “glaring error”, Samset says, and it is “surprising that it wasn’t picked up” in the peer-review process for the study. He explains:

“The Montreal Protocol did not deal with air pollution. It dealt with ozone-depleting gases and has been an extremely successful multi-national effort against environmental damage. “

Clean air legislation was already in place in many European countries by the time the Montreal Protocol was signed in 1987, says Samset. 

In response, Roldán‐Gómez says that while the protocol did not target aerosols specifically, it “boosted the clean air policies”.

Related Eight facts about air conditioning amid an overheated global debate 10.07.2026 Energy Factcheck: What the UK car industry is not saying about EV targets 02.06.2026 Industry Factcheck: Trump’s false claims about the IPCC and ‘RCP8.5’ climate scenario 19.05.2026 AR7 Factcheck: US and Iran are world’s only major emitters without net-zero targets 18.05.2026 International policy

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Categories: I. Climate Science

Access to finance ‘strengthens climate resilience’ among sub-Saharan women

The Carbon Brief - Fri, 07/24/2026 - 04:29

Empowering women through greater access to finance could “strengthen” households’ resilience to “climate shocks”, according to a new study.  

Published in Climate Risk Management, it analyses the impact of financial access on “women-headed households” in sub-Saharan Africa. 

The study finds that where women had formal financial access – such as through owning a bank account – households were more able to withstand short-term shocks.

It adds that “climate shocks”, such as extreme weather events and the impacts of climate change, can cause economic crises, which destabilise communities and households. 

However, the authors say that in order to protect households from long-term climate vulnerabilities – including “droughts, floods and sea-level rise” – financial access would need to be paired with wider efforts to tackle gender inequality. 

They add that the findings could have important implications for policy in sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries and households are vulnerable to climate disasters. 

Financial inclusion 

The study highlights that entrenched gender disparities mean many women still have unequal access to financial services in sub-Saharan Africa

For example, women are still less likely to have their own bank accounts and instead are often dependent on male relatives for access to finance. 

The number of women with access to an account in the region had risen to 52% as of 2024, according to data from World Bank Group.

However, as shown in the chart below, the gap between men and women has also increased, rising from just under 5 percentage points in 2011 to 12 in 2024. 

Share of population with bank accounts by gender over 2011-2024, %. Source: Global Findex Database, World Bank Group

Using survey data from Afrobarometer, the new study analyses 25,511 women-headed households across 37 sub-Saharan countries. 

The authors use the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) framework to measure “financial inclusion”. This looks at factors such as having a bank account, owning a mobile phone and having internet access. 

Francis Anaisie, a co-author on the study, tells Carbon Brief the researchers were motivated by the UN’s sustainable development goals (SDGs). Anaisie, an economist at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana, says the study specifically looked at SDGs five and 13, on gender equality and addressing climate issues. He adds: 

“Financial inclusion is one of the key policy tools for empowering women or for empowerment. But as to whether this actually translates into better climate outcomes for women is not known or is limited; this study seeks to address that gap.”

The study finds households with higher levels of financial access for women had higher levels of women’s empowerment, when this is defined as the ability to make choices and have control over economic and social outcomes. 

This was checked by cross-comparing financial access against different measures of women’s empowerment, such as financial security, voting rights and connection to communities.

In particular, the study found that “financially included” women had greater political and economic empowerment, such as financial security and voting rights. On some measures of social empowerment, however, the link was weaker – financial access alone was not enough to erase cultural and social barriers to gender equality. 

Women and climate change 

It has been well documented that women are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change than men. 

Environmental shocks affect women disproportionately due to a range of factors. These include income disparities, higher rates of displacement and unequal access to land.

Financial inequality and barriers to economic resources, such as needing internet access to make digital payments, play a key role in climate vulnerability, says Tracy Kajumba. She is director for the Least Developed Countries initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR) interim secretariat at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). 

Kajumba, who was not involved in the study, explains to Carbon Brief:

“Women are on the front line doing farming, planting, harvesting and these things that are all impacted [by climate change]. If they don’t have the income to invest either in drought-resistant crops or water-saving technologies, it becomes difficult for households to adapt.”

Calculating climate resilience 

The new study measures the impact of financial inclusion on women’s empowerment and, in turn, on climate resilience.  

It evaluates a household’s ability to withstand and recover from “shocks and stressors” by using a UN Food and Agriculture Organization metric for “resilience index measurement and analysis” (RIMA). 

For example, questionnaires are used to gather information about households in certain areas. The data is then used, together with key indicators, to quantify a household’s resilience to food insecurity, climate variability and economic crisis, amongst other risks. 

The 25,511 households surveyed across sub-Saharan Africa were found to be relatively resilient overall and had a high capacity to bounce back from climate shocks. However, they had much lower ability to adapt, in order to build protective capacity in advance of extreme events.

In addition, the study finds that women’s financial empowerment had a positive impact on a household’s ability to “absorb” a climate shock, suggesting that financial access is critical for responding to climate change. 

Community garden and climate adaption project, focusing on women’s empowerment, Niger. Credit: Joerg Boethling / Alamy Stock Photo

Increased empowerment through financial access enables women to make decisions about planting crops, to access credit in emergencies and to buy or sell food at a better price, the study notes. 

For example, it says increased financial access and women’s empowerment help households to deal with the immediate consequences of an extreme weather event, such as a drought. This could be through building community mutual-support networks and by enabling access to savings, to keep the household running. 

Anaisie says the study shows women’s empowerment has a significant impact on climate resilience. He tells Carbon Brief: 

“If we include women in the financial system, in the case of any climate issue they can save, they can be independent, they can rely on investment to absorb these shocks. This empowerment will help them to be more resilient to climate shocks…We can make progress because SDG goals are all about inclusiveness. It’s all about inclusive growth.”

However, the study notes that financial access does not necessarily create long-term change, which would make the household less vulnerable to extreme weather in the first place. 

The authors suggest that lasting structural and cultural change is important for bringing about long-term resilience. They say that policies to address gender inequalities would help bring this about.

They say such policies could include gender-sensitive agricultural credit schemes, subsidised climate insurance for women farmers in drought-prone regions, joint land-titling programmes and quotas for women in local climate-adaptation committees. 

Such policies would have helped women impacted by recent severe floods in Ghana to protect their savings, Anaisie explains. He tells Carbon Brief: 

“Women are engaged in economic activities, especially informal activities. They have resources and money, but when the flood came in, many women lost that. If they had access to insurance, this flood wouldn’t have cost them that much. 

“So, if the government comes out with financial initiatives, training, civic education and gender-focused initiatives, leadership training, women will be empowered and this will translate into their resilience with regards to climate change.”

Addressing climate vulnerability in sub-Saharan Africa 

The study could have policy implications for sub-Saharan Africa, a region particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The region faces increasingly extreme weather, heatwaves, droughts, wildfires and floods, as well as food scarcity and threats to crops. 

The study suggests that policies to address structural and cultural barriers to women’s financial autonomy could be a key way to build climate resilience across the region. 

However, it recognises that even where financial access is expanded, gender norms and cultural constraints continue to shape women’s social empowerment. This, in turn, affects their ability to adapt to climate change in the long term. 

Ultimately, addressing structural inequalities is needed to minimise climate vulnerability, says Kajumba. She adds that supporting adaptation with financial access can allow households to absorb shocks without falling into poverty – and to rebuild after climate impacts. 

Kajumba says that supporting adaptation with women’s financial access can allow households to absorb shocks without falling into poverty – and to rebuild after climate impacts. She adds:

“When they are supported [with] microloans, savings and all that, you will see change in income, change in households, change in health and education for the children as well.”

However, Kajumba notes that structural inequalities still “amplify” women’s vulnerability to climate impacts and make it harder for them to exercise agency and leadership. She adds:

“The tools that are being used are not always favourable for women…When we look at women in leadership and participation, you cannot lead or you cannot participate unless you have some level of income.”

Article information

Essossinam, A. et al. (2026) Effect of financial inclusion and women empowerment on climate resilience: Evidence from sub-Saharan African households, Climate Risk Management, doi:10.1016/j.crm.2026.100848

Related UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo  15.07.2026 Nature Climate change and La Niña made ‘devastating’ southern African floods more intense 29.01.2026 Attribution Climate change could lead to 500,000 ‘additional’ malaria deaths in Africa by 2050 28.01.2026 Health and society Guest post: How climate science is – and is not – shaping adaptation planning in southern Africa 01.05.2025 Adaptation

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Categories: I. Climate Science

State of the climate: Rapidly developing El Niño raises chance of record-warm 2026

The Carbon Brief - Fri, 07/24/2026 - 03:59

As 2026 passes its halfway point, the world is watching one of the most rapidly intensifying El Niño events in the modern record take shape in the tropical Pacific.

The developing El Niño is boosting expectations for global temperatures, both this year and next.

El Niño is the warm phase of a recurring climate pattern in the tropical Pacific that releases heat from the ocean into the atmosphere, temporarily raising global temperatures and reshaping rainfall and extreme weather around the world.

Carbon Brief’s “state of the climate” report in April gave 2026 a 19% chance of setting a new global temperature record. 

That chance now stands at 35% – a near-doubling in four months – with virtually all of the change driven by ever-stronger El Niño forecasts.

The key findings from the first half of 2026 include:

  • The first six months of 2026 were the third-warmest start to a year on record – around 1.4C above pre-industrial levels – behind only 2024 and 2025. 
  • While the first few months of the year came in as the fourth or fifth warmest, both May and June were the second-warmest ever recorded as El Niño conditions took hold.
  • El Niño conditions arrived in April and reached the threshold for a “strong” event by June, when the Niño3.4 index reached 1.6C. Of the 667 model runs Carbon Brief examined, 91% project a peak later this year that is above the strongest El Niño in history.
  • The chance that 2026 beats 2024 as the warmest year on record has risen to 35%. Carbon Brief’s central estimate remains that 2026 will be the second-warmest year, at around 1.51C above pre-industrial levels.
  • Whether 2026 sets a record will depend on the dataset: the odds range from around two-in-three in NASA and Berkeley Earth data to around two-in-10 in ERA5 and one-in-10 in the JRA-3Q reanalyses.
  • June 2026 was western Europe’s hottest June on record, amid a heatwave that set hundreds of individual records. Nearly 9% of the world’s surface saw record June warmth.
  • The developing El Niño will have its largest impact on 2027, which Carbon Brief projects to be around 1.7C above pre-industrial levels – this would comfortably set a new record for the warmest year.
  • Arctic sea ice has spent 39 days of 2026 so far at, or below, record daily lows following its joint-lowest winter maximum in the satellite era.
Third-warmest start to a year

Carbon Brief analyses records from six different groups that report global surface temperatures: NASA GISTEMP, NOAA GlobalTemp, Hadley/UEA HadCRUT5, Berkeley Earth, Copernicus/ECMWF ERA5 and the JMA JRA-3Q reanalysis.

The first half of 2026 was the third warmest on record in every one of the six datasets, behind only 2024 and 2025. The figure below shows annual temperatures since 1970, along with the 2026 year-to-date average (January-June) for each group.

Annual global average surface temperatures from the six groups (lines), along with 2026 temperatures so far (January-June, coloured dots). Note that HadCRUT5 and ERA5 dots reflect January-May, as their June values were not yet published. Chart by Carbon Brief.

January 2026 was only the fourth- or fifth-warmest January on record, as lingering weak La Niña conditions suppressed temperatures. Since then, each month has climbed the rankings.

La Niña is the cool phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). It typically brings wetter conditions to Australia, Indonesia and equatorial South America and drier conditions to the southern US.

March was second-to-fourth warmest across datasets, April the third and both May and June were the second warmest ever recorded, behind only the corresponding months of 2024.

The chart below shows how June 2026 (thick red line) came in around 0.08C below the June record set in 2024 in the average of the six datasets.

Meanwhile, Copernicus reported that global sea surface temperatures over the ice-free oceans set a new June record.

Average global surface temperatures for each month from 1940 to June 2028 from six forecasting groups, with lines coloured by decade. Chart by Carbon Brief. A record-breaking El Niño 

ENSO is the largest source of year-to-year variability in global temperatures. 

The most common way to assess the strength of an El Niño or La Niña event is by looking at the sea surface temperature anomaly in the “Niño3.4” region of the tropical Pacific. 

El Niño and its sister La Niña occur when temperatures in the tropical Pacific are more than 0.5C (El Niño) or less than 0.5C (La Niña) below normal, where normal is defined by removing the effects of long-term climate change. 

The thresholds for defining the strength of an El Niño or La Niña are above/below 1C for “moderate” events, 1.5C for “strong” events and 2C for “very strong” (or “super”) events.

After two years dominated by La Niña conditions, the tropical Pacific flipped decisively in April when the Niño3.4 index crossed the 0.5C El Niño threshold. It subsequently reached 1C in May and hit 1.6C in June, marking one of the fastest onsets in the observational record. 

In the first few weeks of July, the index shot above 2C, significantly outpacing the speed at which any prior El Niño events developed.

Forecast models expect even more to come. 

An analysis by Carbon Brief of the median of 667 model runs from 14 different modelling groups suggests that sea surface temperatures in theNiño3.4 region could peak at 3.59C between July and December. 

More than 91% of runs predict the strongest El Niño event in the modern record. The previous record was set during the event of 2015-16, when temperatures peaked around 2.75C.

This is shown in the chart below, which features a histogram of the likelihood of different possible 2026 El Niño peaks across all the models on the top. The forest plot beneath shows the best estimate and range of outcomes predicted by each individual model.

Top panel: Model-weighted distribution of each member’s peak Jul-Dec 2026 Niño3.4 anomaly (red bars), with the dotted yellow line indicating the weighted median (+3.6C) and the dotted blue line the prior record peak (2015-16, 2.75C). Bottom panel: median and 10th-90th percentile peak for each modelling group, with its typical peak month. The figure includes 667 model runs from 14 different modelling groups (from the CFS, NMME, C3S, CanSIPS and SINTEX-F systems). Chart by Carbon Brief.

The median forecast in every one of the 14 models suggests a peak that exceeds the 2C “super” El Niño threshold, with most models peaking in November or December.

Some caution here is warranted, however. Raw model Niño3.4 anomalies are measured against a fixed climatology. Because the entire tropical ocean has warmed due to human-caused greenhouse gas emissions, the models tend to overstate event strength relative to the historical record. 

A cleaner comparison uses the relative Niño3.4 index (RONI), which subtracts the average tropical ocean warming.

This relative measure suggests the median forecast peak for El Niño in the latter half of 2026 is 3.1C. The prior record stands at a lower 2.69C, set in 1982-83. 

Nevertheless, 77% of model runs still show a new record event occurring. This is shown in the chart below.

Top panel: Model-weighted distribution of each member’s peak Jul-Dec 2026 RONI (red bars), with the dotted yellow line indicating the weighted median (+3.1C) and the dotted blue line the prior record peak (1982-83, 2.69C). Bottom panel: median and 10th-90th percentile peak for each modelling group, with its typical peak month. The figure includes 667 model runs from 14 different modelling groups (from the CFS, NMME, C3S, CanSIPS and SINTEX-F systems). Chart by Carbon Brief.

In summary, on both indexes, the central expectation is now for the strongest El Niño in the observational record. 

Model forecasts made in the spring and early summer have historically shown some bias toward overpredicting event strength. However, forecasts made after the spring are considerably more reliable.

Widespread record warmth and a massive European heatwave

The map below shows the temperature anomaly for the first half of 2026 in the ERA5 dataset, relative to a 1981-2010 baseline period.

Global mean surface temperatures for January-June 2026 compared to a 1981-2010 baseline, using data from ERA5.

It shows how the largest warm anomalies were found across the Arctic – particularly north of Scandinavia and Svalbard – as well as western Europe, the western US, northern Mexico, central Asia, western China, eastern Russia and the Antarctic Peninsula region. 

The developing El Niño is clearly visible as a tongue of warm anomalies stretching along the equatorial eastern Pacific. Only a few regions – central Canada, Alaska and parts of the Southern Ocean – saw temperatures below the 1981-2010 average.

Where 2026 ranks against history is even more striking. The map below shows where the period of January-June 2026 ranked among all 87 years in the ERA5 record, which stretches from 1940 to 2026. Grid cells marked in red saw temperatures in the first half of the year that were in the top-five warmest years.

January-June 2026 per-gridcell ranks in ERA5. 30% of the global surface saw a top-five warmest first half of the year; 7.1% saw record warmth. No areas (0.0%) saw top-five cold.

More than 30% of the global surface had a top-five warmest start to the year and 7.1% saw its warmest on record, including much of western Europe, the eastern equatorial Pacific and the seas around Japan. 

Not a single grid cell had a top-five coolest start to the year. In June alone, 8.9% of the world’s surface saw record warmth for the month. This is illustrated in the map below, where grid cells marked in red saw temperatures that were in the top-five warmest years and grid cells in blue in the top-five coolest.

June 2026 per-gridcell ranks in ERA5.

The standout regional temperature event was a heatwave that struck Europe in late June. 

Western Europe had its hottest June on record, recording an average temperature of 3.05C above the 1991-2020 average and beating the record set only a year earlier, according to Copernicus. A heat dome over 22-30 June broke 10 all-time national heat records and around 400 long-record station records. 

France set a new June national record of 44.3C, while the UK broke its June record on three consecutive days, reaching 37.3C. The humid heat drove a death toll estimated in the thousands. 

A separate heat dome also brought record June temperatures to parts of North America in late June.

On track to be second warmest, but a real chance at first

Carbon Brief’s updated projection for 2026 as a whole combines the observed January-June temperatures with the latest El Niño forecast. It uses a statistical model trained on the historical relationship between the first half of the year, ENSO conditions and annual temperatures observed over 1950-2025, excluding major volcanic eruption years.

Carbon Brief estimates that 2026 will be around 1.51C above pre-industrial levels, with a 90% range of 1.45C to 1.57C, shown by the yellow dot in the chart below. 

This is up from 1.47C in the projection set out in April – and is notably more certain now that half the year has passed. 

This central estimate would make 2026 the second-warmest year on record, just below 2024 (1.52C) and ahead of 2023 (1.43C) and 2025 (1.41C).

Annual composite temperatures over 1970-2025, the 2026 year-to-date value (January-June, red dot), and Carbon Brief’s 2026 annual estimate (yellow dot with the 5th to 95th percentile range). Chart by Carbon Brief.

Carbon Brief’s modelling puts the chance that 2026 beats 2024 as the warmest year on record at 35%, using the average of the six different surface temperature records assessed. It puts the chance that 2026 comes in above 1.5C at around 63%.

If it does, 2026 would be the second calendar year – after 2024 – where warming averaged above 1.5C, in a further sign that the world is rapidly approaching the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit.

A single year above 1.5C does not by itself constitute a breach of the goal, which refers to the longer term average temperature of the planet. This is defined as the midpoint of a 20-year period by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

These likelihood of a record have been climbing rapidly throughout 2026. 

Global temperatures so far throughout the year have run well below the record-setting levels of 2024 – around 0.13C cooler over the first six months. 

On their own, temperatures observed so far in 2026 would make a new annual record unlikely. 

However, rerunning the projection using only the data available at the end of each month since March – including both the year-to-date observations and the El Niño forecast issued that month – shows a shifting picture.

Using March data, 2026 had just a 7% chance of setting a new record. That rose to 16% in April, 24% in May, 27% in June and 35% using the latest data in mid-July.

This is shown in the chart below.

Columns show the probability that 2026 exceeds 2024 as the warmest year on record, based on data available at the end of each month; the line shows the corresponding forecast of July-December ENSO conditions (relative Niño3.4 index). Chart by Carbon Brief.

Notably, this rise has little to do with observed temperatures. The year-to-date anomaly has actually drifted slightly down, from 1.41C after March to 1.39C after June.

Observed temperatures and fewer remaining months of the year contributed only around four percentage points of the 28-point rise in the likelihood; the remaining ~84% of the change comes from successive upward revisions to the El Niño forecast for late 2026.

However, whether 2026 ends up becoming the warmest year on record may end up depending on which dataset is used.

Running the same projection gives odds of a 2026 record of around two-in-three for Berkeley Earth (66%) and NASA GISTEMP (65%), but only 35% for HadCRUT5, 24% for NOAA and just 13% and 9% for the ERA5 and JRA-3Q reanalyses, respectively. 

This is shown below.

Observed annual temperatures since 1990, with each dataset’s own 2024 record (dashed line) and the 2026 projection (median, 25-75% bar and 5-95% whisker), with the per-dataset chance of a 2026 record in each panel’s title. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The divergence between projections mostly reflects how exceptional each dataset’s 2024 was. 

The reanalysis approaches recorded a particularly warm 2024, leaving 2026 more ground to make up. GISTEMP and Berkeley, on the other hand, project 2026 modestly above their 2024 values. 

A repeat of the situation in 2015 where different groups disagreed on record rankings is a real possibility. Headlines in January 2027 may hinge on choices of dataset.

2027 likely to be the warmest year in human history

The biggest climate story of the developing super El Niño may not be 2026 at all. 

Global temperatures typically lag in the tropical Pacific by around three months. So, an El Niño event peaking in November and December 2026 will have its largest warming influence on 2027. 

We saw this same pattern occur in 1997-98, 2015-16 and 2023-24 – where the year in which the El Niño developed was warm, but the following year was record-smashing.

Carbon Brief has extended its projection into 2027 by using the historical relationship between year-over-year temperature changes and ENSO conditions in the preceding autumn. 

This yields a best estimate for 2027 of around 1.71C above pre-industrial levels, with a 90% range of 1.49C to 1.93C. This is shown by a yellow square on the chart below.

Observed annual composite temperatures 1970-2025 and Carbon Brief’s projections for 2026 and 2027 (medians and 5th to 95th percentile ranges). Chart by Carbon Brief.

That would give 2027 a 92% chance of setting a new global temperature record and a 94% chance of exceeding 1.5C. 

Taking 2026 and 2027 together, there is a 93% chance that at least one of the two years sets a new record. 

The 2027 estimate is more uncertain than the 2026 one. As with 2026, there are uncertainties in the projection due to unknowns around exactly how strong the El Niño peak proves to be and how quickly it decays. 

However, even the low end of the 2027 range would put it among the warmest years on record and the central estimate of 1.71C would exceed 2024 by nearly 0.2C.

If these projections bear out, the 2020s will have delivered new global temperature records in 2023, 2024 and 2027 – and potentially 2026 too – with a number of individual years well above the 1.5C threshold. 

The long-term warming trend, driven by human emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, has increased from around 0.18C per decade in the early 2000s to around 0.27C per decade today. El Niño and La Niña play a big role in determining which years along that rising path stand out as records.

Arctic sea ice at record lows 

Arctic sea ice has spent much of 2026 in record-low territory. 

Following the joint-lowest winter maximum in the satellite record in mid-March, daily extent has set or tied record lows for the date on 39 days so far this year, including extended spells in mid-to-late March and in early-to-mid June. 

The most recent record-low days were in early July.

The chart below shows how Arctic sea ice in 2026 (dark red line) has been below the historical range (shaded red). 

It also shows how Antarctic sea ice (dark blue), meanwhile, has remained below the 1979-2010 range for almost all of 2026 to date.

Daily 2026 sea ice extent (bold lines) compared to the 1979-2010 historical range (shaded) and the record daily low from any prior year (dotted). Chart by Carbon Brief using data from NSIDC

As of mid-July, Arctic extent is a bit below the 1979-2010 historical range for the date, though it remains around 0.6m square kilometres (km2) larger than the record low for the date set during 2020’s exceptional summer melt season. 

The trajectory over the coming two months will determine whether 2026 challenges 2012’s record September minimum. Early-summer conditions are a poor predictor of the September minimum, which depends heavily on summer weather.

Antarctic sea ice, meanwhile, is currently around 300,000km2 below the historical envelope, but has stayed well clear of the record lows set in 2023 and has not set any new daily records yet this year.

Factcheck: No, Europe’s heatwaves are not being ‘caused’ by declining air pollution 24.07.2026 Heatwaves Q&A: Europe’s May and June heatwave deaths – and how they were counted 17.07.2026 Extreme weather Guest post: France’s June heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths 07.07.2026 Health and society Guest post: Climate change has caused one-fifth of Pine Island glacier retreat 29.06.2026 Antarctica

The post State of the climate: Rapidly developing El Niño raises chance of record-warm 2026 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Categories: I. Climate Science

Skeptical Science New Research for Week #30 2026

Skeptical Science - Thu, 07/23/2026 - 11:52
Open access notables

Record-low 2025 and 2026 ice extents restore Arctic winter sea-ice decline, Chan et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Recent analyses have suggested that the decadal rate of Arctic winter sea-ice extent decline weakened in the early 2020s, with 20-y trends becoming statistically insignificant. Here we show from more up-to-date observations that the exceptionally low 2025 and 2026 ice extent winters reversed this picture, with sea-ice extent during the growth and peak phases returning to record lows and 20-y decline trends becoming significant again. Further analysis of CMIP6 model analogues shows that the observed 2025 decline was unusual but physically plausible under comparable Arctic warming, and is more consistent with ongoing winter sea ice reduction than with a return to values seen in the early 2020s.

As the planet heats, public doubt grows: The social structure behind rising climate change scepticism in Germany, Gies & Deutschmann, Global Environmental Change

In 2024, global heating exceeded 1.5 °C for the first time. Paradoxically, as the climate crisis becomes ever more evident, climate change scepticism (CCS) has recently grown (rather than declined) in Germany, a high-emissions country with enormous responsibility. Past research has not systematically studied which social groups and characteristics are behind this shift. We address this gap by examining the social structure of rising CCS in Germany, taking its multidimensionality into account. Drawing on GESIS Panel data that is representative of the German adult population, we detect a strong and consistent increase across a comprehensive set of 14 CCS indicators between 2022 and 2023. We find that this rise in scepticism is not driven by a small and ‘loud’ minority but rather constitutes a mass phenomenon: on average across all items, CCS increased among 59% of respondents, and for 93% of respondents at least one indicator rose. Regression models reveal a complex picture with socio-structural effects depending on the dimension of CCS, but right-wing political orientation, government distrust, and hierarchical worldviews are most consistently associated with increases in CCS. Overall, political attitudes – which are flexible and have shifted substantially in recent years – relate far more strongly to rising CCS than stable socio-structural factors like income or gender. These findings demonstrate an urgent need to restore trust in political institutions and to foster inclusive, participatory climate dialogue to secure broad public support for the transition towards a carbon-neutral society.

Climate Obstruction in the Digital Far-Right: Mapping the Climate Countermovement in German-, Danish-, and Swedish-Speaking Digital Information Environments, Henriksen et al., Environmental Communication

This article examines how climate obstruction narratives circulate in far-right digital information environments in Austria, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. We analyzed 41 million social media posts published across multiple social media platforms from 2019 to 2022. Using multilingual text classification and actor–source mapping, we identified which posts contained climate obstruction narratives, which actors produced them, and which sources they cited. The results revealed three configurations. In the German-speaking environment (Germany and Austria), obstruction is mainly driven by far-right citizen accounts embedded in a hyperpartisan media ecosystem. In Sweden, far-right grassroots actors coexist with climate-focused organizations that bridge mainstream and alternative sources. In Denmark, obstruction is comparatively mainstream-embedded and anchored in organizations and citizen groups drawing on legacy news. The article discusses how national media systems, political fields, and far-right actor constellations make certain forms of obstruction communicatively viable and thereby shape the digital climate countermovement.

Mapping climate change coverage: Causes, consequences, and solutions in German news media, 2010–2024, Dablander et al., Energy Research & Social Science

The media shapes how political leaders and the public understand the causes, impacts, and solutions to climate change. Here, we provide the most extensive analysis to date of how German news media report on climate change between 2010 and 2024. We develop and validate a methodology based on large language models to analyze the contents of over 50,000 articles from seven major newspapers across the political spectrum. We found that aspects relating to causes, impacts, and mitigation were all covered substantially more often than aspects relating to adaptation. While most articles identified climate change as human-caused, coverage about causes was dominated by fossil fuels, with agriculture, overconsumption, carbon inequality, and economic growth rarely mentioned. Left-leaning outlets more frequently reported that climate change is human-caused, highlighted fossil fuels as a cause, emphasized the need to reduce their use, and discussed systemic and social drivers more often. Coverage patterns have remained largely stable over time, except for growing attention to net-zero targets and carbon taxes. Our findings highlight opportunities for more comprehensive climate journalism to better support public understanding and policy debate by reflecting the scientific consensus and the full range of societal transformations needed to address climate change.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Attribution of Extreme Weather and Climate Events and Their Impacts, National Research Council, The National Academies Press

Decades of data and research indicate that human-caused climate change is altering the frequency and intensity of several types of extreme events, such as heat waves and extreme rainfall events. Even as those trends become clearer, extreme event attribution (EEA) seeks to assess the degree to which climate change contributed to any specific event. EEA studies provide information that can be useful for public understanding, planning and risk management, policy and legal contexts, and scientific research. The authors evaluate the state of EEA science, updating a National Academies report published in 2016. The authors also assess the emerging field of extreme event impact attribution (EEIA). The number of EEA studies has grown substantially over the past decade as scientific tools, observational datasets, and methods have advanced, enabling attribution studies to be completed within days of an event. However, challenges remain, including limited model capabilities for small-scale regional events, representation of key atmospheric processes, and attribution of compounding, cascading, and record-breaking events. The authors examine these advances and remaining challenges and provide recommendations for strengthening attribution science, improving collaboration with local experts and stakeholders, and advancing research, data, and modeling capabilities worldwide.

Early Warnings: Government Knowledge of Climate Change and Legal Responsibility for Climate Harm, Lindsay Fenlock and Nikki Reisch, Center for International Environmental Law

The authors examine publicly available government records, scientific evidence, and historical archives to document when major emitting States became aware of the causes and foreseeable consequences of climate change. They demonstrate that many governments understood the risks decades earlier than they have claimed, strengthening the evidentiary foundation for climate litigation, human rights, and climate advocacy, and the implementation of the International Court of Justice climate advisory opinion. By tracing the history of government knowledge, the report provides a critical resource for advancing climate accountability and ensuring that high-emitting States are held responsible for failing to prevent the climate crisis. 284 articles in 105 journals by 2495 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

A 21-Year Global Daytime Satellite Climatology of Cirrus Cloud Cover and Its Links to Upper-Tropospheric Conditions and Aviation Over Europe and the North Atlantic, Huu et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70506

A Reconciled Satellite Record Reveals a Negative Low Cloud Feedback Over the Past 47 Years, Cesana & Arouf, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124158

Distinct Characteristics of Contiguous Heatwaves Across Terrestrial, Marine, and Coastal Environments, Bekris et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118531

Explaining the Equatorial Pacific Thermocline Response to Climate Change With a Model Hierarchy, Luongo et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023559

Heating the land cools the eastern and equatorial Pacific, Günther et al., Science Advances Open Access pdf 10.1126/sciadv.aeb7004

How Clear-Sky Spectral Overlap Shapes Radiation in Cloudy Atmospheres, Czarnecki & Pincus, Journal of Climate pdf 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0589.1

Marine Heatwave Imprints on Salinity in the Northwest Atlantic, Stamper et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124293

Nordic overturning increases as AMOC weakens in response to global warming, Roewer et al., Ocean science Open Access pdf 10.5194/os-22-1195-2026

On the Utility of the Transient Climate Response, Jeevanjee et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121354

Post-1990s Warming of Circumpolar Deep Water Off West Antarctica and Its Drivers, Damini et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023856

Projected Arctic Ocean Warming Accompanied by a Restructuring of the Overturning at the Fram Strait and the Barents Sea Opening, Oldenburg et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0735.1

The remarkable inefficiency of stratocumulus, Hernandez et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-9337-2026

Trans-basin linkages prolong Northwestern Pacific marine heatwaves through a circumglobal wave pattern, Zhao & Yu, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz4647


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate and Tropospheric Oxidizing Capacity, Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 10.1146/annurev-earth-032320-090307 21 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

Climate Warming Intensifies Cascading Risks Along the Heatwave-Drought-Wildfire Hazard Chain in Northeast Asia, Liu et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70507

Decadal Shifts Towards Higher Riverine Silicon Relative to Nitrogen and Phosphorus Across High Latitudes, Carey et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb008926

Distribution characteristics of newly formed glacial lakes across High Mountain Asia during 2000–2020, YIN et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.007

Drought, heatwave, and fires: The impact on air quality during São Paulo's record-breaking fire season in 2024, Silva et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103045

Frequent, Intense and Prolonged Human-Perceived Heat Waves Over the Arabian Peninsula in Recent Decades, Ullah et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70510

Increasing Tropical Cyclone Activity Over the North China Plain, Liu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046567

Indicators of Global Climate Change 2025: annual update of key indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence, Forster et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-3889-2026

Indicators of Global Climate Change 2025: annual update of key indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence, Forster et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-3889-2026

Precipitation Over the Contiguous United States Is Coming From Farther Away Than in the Past, Aerenson et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122565

Record-low 2025 and 2026 ice extents restore Arctic winter sea-ice decline, Chan et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2614134123

Time series forecasting of climate variables in three selected major cities in Nigeria, Ibrahim et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103014

Warming Trends in Basin-Scale Heatwaves Across Ethiopia: An Observational Analysis Using Crossing Theory, Gebremariam et al., International Journal of Climatology pdf 10.1002/joc.70477


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Impact of an unprecedented marine heatwave on extremely hot summer over Northern Japan in 2023, Scientific Reports, 10.1038/s41598-024-65291-y 41 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A four-decade global Lagrangian air-parcel trajectory dataset for atmospheric moisture and heat analysis, Deman et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-4593-2026

Attribution of 2022 and 2023 extreme heat in China using conditional and unconditional frameworks, Zhang et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100937

CoCO2-MOSAIC 1.0: a global mosaic of regional, gridded, fossil and biofuel CO2 emission inventories, Urraca et al., TNO Repository Open Access pdf pmh:oai:oai-pmh.tno.nl:58273

FORMS: Forest Multiple Source height, wood volume, and biomass maps in France at 10 to 30 m resolution based on Sentinel-1, Sentinel-2, and GEDI data with a deep learning approach, Schwartz et al., HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe) Open Access pmh:oai:HAL:hal-04499509v1

Modeling air temperature from snow-buried sensors to refine multi-decadal warming trends in Great Basin National Park, NV, USA, Mazan et al., Theoretical and Applied Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1007/s00704-026-06436-z

Multidecadal reconstruction of terrestrial water storage changes by combining pre-GRACE satellite observations and climate data, Hacker et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-1747-2026

PolyU2025 SLA: a global 0.25°  ×  0.25° monthly sea-level anomaly dataset (1993–2024) determined from satellite altimetry for sea-level and climate change research, Yuan et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-4155-2026

Robustness of Radiative Kernel Methods in Reproducing Arctic Outgoing Longwave Radiation Variability, Liu & Jin, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd046213

Satellite estimation of global air sea CO2 flux from 2000 to 2020, Ji et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-51215-5

Sensitivity of marine heatwaves metrics to SST products, focusing on the Tropical Pacific, Chevillard et al., Ocean science Open Access 10.5194/os-22-1213-2026

Temporal Heterogeneity of In Situ Ocean Observing Capacity Could Cause an Artificial Intensification of Extreme Warm Water Events Globally, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123043

Wikimpacts 1.0: a new global climate impact database based on automated information extraction from Wikipedia, Li et al., Natural hazards and earth system sciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/nhess-26-2609-2026


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
ClimaMeter: contextualizing extreme weather in a changing climate, Weather and Climate Dynamics, 10.5194/wcd-5-959-2024 39 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Assessing projected changes in meteorological drought severity and frequency under future climate scenarios: Insights from CMIP5 Models in Eastern Tigray, Northern Ethiopia, Rubangakene et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000944

Enhanced ENSO-driven potential predictability over the Euro-Atlantic under greenhouse warming, Santuy et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access 10.1038/s41612-026-01482-w

Enhanced response of extreme compound events to cumulative CO2 emissions, Li et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10544-1

Future Shifts in Severe Storm Environments Revealed through Profile-Based Clustering, Hua, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20469719

Heterogeneous future Arctic Ocean primary productivity changes projected in CMIP6, Champiot-Bayard et al., Biogeosciences Open Access 10.5194/bg-23-4735-2026

Impact of Continental Configuration on the Climate Response to Greenhouse-Gas Forcing in an Idealized GCM, Bonan et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120128

Irreversible climate changes driven by degree-years of temperature overshoot, Dickau et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03761-z

Responses of the Tropical Easterly Jet to Different Global Warming Patterns and Implications for Future Tropical Cyclone Activity, Zhan et al., Advances in Atmospheric Sciences 10.1007/s00376-026-5865-3

Small Tropical Islands Also Exposed to Extreme Humid Heat by the End of the Century, Bald et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122466

Spatiotemporal variation and future projections of air freezing and thawing indices in China–Mongolia–Russia under CMIP6 warming scenarios, JIANG et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.009

The Destination Earth digital twin for climate change adaptation, Doblas-Reyes et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-2821-2026


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Asymmetries in the Southern Ocean contribution to global heat and carbon uptake, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02066-3 23 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Application and Evaluation of a Novel Python-Based Ensemble Data Assimilation Framework NEDAS in Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model (WACCM), Liu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres pdf 10.1029/2025jd045622

Climate models with moderate climate sensitivity best simulate the magnitude of Earth's energy imbalance, Bimpiri et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/esd-17-877-2026

CMIP7 data request: Earth system priorities and opportunities, McPartland et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-2849-2026

CMIP7 data request: ocean and sea ice priorities and opportunities, Fox-Kemper et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-6043-2026

Contribution of physical latent knowledge to the emulation of an atmospheric physics model: a study based on the LMDZ Atmospheric General Circulation Model, Crossouard et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-5907-2026

Developing Guidelines for working with Multi-Model Ensembles in CMIP, Katzenberger et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/esd-17-495-2026

Ecosystem climate sensitivities drive the divergence in aerosol-induced carbon uptake across CMIP6 models, Zhang et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-5363-2026

EXSoDOS 1.0: downscaling of weather extremes shifts for ensemble climate projections using ground-based measurements, reanalysis and stochastic modelling, Wouters et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-5805-2026

Future Global Warming Constrained by Observed AMOC Strength, Hao et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118802

Global climate modeling with improved precipitation characteristics by learning physics (GRIST-MPS v1.0) from global storm-resolving modeling, Wang et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-5553-2026

Hacking Kilometer-Scale Models: A Participative Model for Climate Information, Gettelman et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0183.1

North Atlantic influence reconciling model-observation discrepancy in the tropical Pacific warming pattern, Lin & Watanabe, Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73763-0

Past, present, and future arctic radiative states simulated by Polar-WRF, Bertossa et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-3653-2026

Stratospheric Subtropical Transport Barriers in CESM1-WACCM and Observations: Climatology, Variability, and Trends, Ivaniha et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045069

The coupled Southern Ocean–Sea ice–Ice shelf Model (SOSIM v1.0): configuration and evaluation, Liu et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-2985-2026

The Influence of Tropopause Temperature Biases on Climate Model Simulations of Tropical Cyclones, Mahoney et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gl120545

The Radiative Forcing Model Intercomparison Project (RFMIP2.0) for CMIP7, Kramer et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-4447-2026

The Scenario Model Intercomparison Project for CMIP7 (ScenarioMIP-CMIP7), Vuuren et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-2627-2026

Winter Arctic polynyas in CMIP6 models, Heuzé et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3643-2026


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Comparison of three reanalysis-driven regional climate models over New Zealand: Climatology and extreme events, International Journal of Climatology, 10.1002/joc.8578 11 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

An improved 15-year record of ice sheet elevation from CryoSat-2 radar altimetry, Huang et al., Remote Sensing of Environment 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115561

Brief communication: Temperature-driven shrinkage of a disappearing Himalayan glacier, Fujita & Kayastha, cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-4005-2026

Climate change induces rapid growth of dead ice in Asian glaciers, Wang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.008

Increased Frequency, Duration, and Area of Winter Polynyas North of Greenland in a Warming Climate, Shu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121125

Increasing Winter Storminess in the Southern Ross Sea, Antarctica, and Its Impact on Land-Fast Sea-Ice, Radlwimmer et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123090

Learning to melt: Emulating Greenland surface melt from a polar RCM with machine learning, Schlager et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3313-2026

Mass changes of the Antarctic Peninsula ice sheet and peripheral glaciers, 2007–2021, Bernat et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3025-2026

Observation-constrained explainable reconstruction of Antarctic sea ice snow depth reveals strong regional asymmetry during 1993–2021, Cao et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.008

Record-low 2025 and 2026 ice extents restore Arctic winter sea-ice decline, Chan et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2614134123

The Greenland GNSS Network (GNET): geodetic grade GNSS measurements of Greenland's 3D bedrock displacement from 1995–2025, Solgaard et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-5117-2026

Three Decades of Glacial Changes on the Western Antarctic Peninsula Revealed by Historical Aerial and High-Resolution Satellite Imagery, Thota et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122660

Unveiling the Role of Sea-Ice Loss in Early-20th-Century Arctic Warming, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121178

Wintertime evolution of landfast ice stability in Alaska from InSAR, Einhorn & Mahoney, cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3683-2026


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Stability of Ice Shelves and Ice Cliffs in a Changing Climate, Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 10.1146/annurev-earth-040522-122817 38 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

PolyU2025 SLA: a global 0.25°  ×  0.25° monthly sea-level anomaly dataset (1993–2024) determined from satellite altimetry for sea-level and climate change research, Yuan et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-4155-2026

Quantifying UK coastal flood exposure under future sea-level rise to 2300, Palmer et al., Explore Bristol Research pmh:oai:research-information.bris.ac.uk:openaire_cris_publications/62032aef-becd-4ddc-a902-ff39b2c8a275

Sea level rise and fall north of Greenland reorganize Arctic freshwater export to North Atlantic, Wang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75610-8

The economically optimal mix and timing of coastal adaptation in Europe to 2150, Völz et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74042-8

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Implications of Variability and Trends in Coastal Extreme Water Levels, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108864 14 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Climate-extreme-driven genesis of a cretaceous dinosaur Lagerstätte, Fanti et al., Global and Planetary Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105589

Continental-scale fern savannah wildfires during end-Triassic greenhouse warming, Hollaar et al., Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) Open Access pmh:oai:nottingham-repository.worktribe.com:66232704

Dynamic Deglacial Evolution of Interior Seaways and Ice Streams in the Weddell Sea Embayment, Bollen et al., Paleoceanography and Paleoclimatology Open Access 10.1029/2026pa005438

Ice core nitrogen isotopes archive dramatic changes in West Antarctic Ice Sheet thinning, King et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-22-1291-2026


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The 4.2 ka BP event in western Anatolia: Tracing the impact of climatic change, The Holocene, 10.1177/09596836241259774 4 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Adaptational lag at high elevations depends on life stage in a California wildflower, Quarles et al., Journal of Ecology pdf 10.1111/1365-2745.70379

Additive Dominance and Context-Dependent Nonlinearities in Soil Greenhouse Gas Responses to Concurrent Global Change, Ding et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2026gb009164

Biogeography of Stress: Graded and Threshold Phenological Responses in European Beech-Dominated Forests Under Disruptive Heatwaves, Cesaretti et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70986

Body Size Decline in an Endangered Bat Is Associated With Climate Change at a Continental Scale but Varies by Phenophase and Region, Zuben et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70983

Climate change is likely to negatively affect a marine apex predator (Steno bredanensis, Cetacea) and its prey on the coast of Brazil, Ferreira et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108065

Climate Crisis in the Mediterranean Hotspot: Conservation Challenges for Endangered Salamanders in Southern Türkiye, Ananymous, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.19074814

Climate physical risks, ecological resilience, and spatial spillovers: evidence from China, He et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1879596

Climate-driven distribution dynamics of the teak defoliator Hyblaea puera under current and future climate scenarios, Mahanta et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1843989

Climate-induced forest destabilization and shrub stabilization in Africa, Cheng et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105627

Climate-Driven Changes in Resources Shift Reproductive Season and Effort of Insectivorous Montane Bird Species, Whelan & Garfinkel, Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71013

Climatic stress and species interactions shape tree vitality decline in Iberian pine species, Aguirre et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111333

Current and future thermal habitat suitability of the European clam Ruditapes decussatus (Linnaeus, 1758) in Mediterranean coastal lagoons, Palmas et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108139

Differential responses of trees to heatwaves in a desert-oasis ecotone: the role of isohydric/anisohydric stomatal regulation, Huang et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111362

Diurnal cycles of cloud and rainfall over North-East Queensland during the coral bleaching season, Chapman et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/wcd-7-1265-2026

Effects of ocean acidification on radular tooth material properties in Littorina littorea (Gastropoda, Mollusca), Krings et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108096

Global analysis suggests nitrogen deposition as an underestimated driver of vegetation greening, Trepel et al., Ecography Open Access 10.1002/ecog.08631

Here Comes the Heat: Urban Warming Increases Abundance but Compromises Fitness in the Common Woodlouse, Jame et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73654

Intact coastal nursery rearing amid climate-driven phenological shifts in threatened salmon, Munsch et al., Conservation Biology Open Access 10.1111/cobi.70355

Long-Term Population Monitoring Reveals Changes in Mesocarnivore Occupancy in Response to Severe Drought, Tucker et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.73960

Mass flowering of the seagrass Posidonia oceanica after 2022 record-breaking marine heatwaves, a Pan-Mediterranean study, Astruch et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03631-8

Masting Breakdown in European Beech Reduces Fitness Benefits of Masting, Partly Explained by Climate Change, Jantzen et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73809

Metabolic trade-offs shape acute thermal responses in the marine predator Rapana venosa, Xu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108249

No apparent impact of moderate temperature increase on growth and fecundity in the sea star Asterias rubens, Bourg & Keraudran, Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108072

Ocean acidification influence on Cymodocea nodosa seedling development, Crobu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108272

Past Acropora mortality on the Great Barrier Reef linked to climate variability and anthropogenic impacts, Clark et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03800-9

Projecting seasonal and future thermal suitability of the invasive and commercially valuable Manila clam Ruditapes philippinarum (A. Adams and Reeve, 1850) in a warming Mediterranean sea, Chiappi et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108263

Range-edge asymmetry in growth responses of English yew to climate warming: Stronger responses near the northern limit, Camarero et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111354

Seabird range contraction and dispersal under climate change, Avaria-Llautureo et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access 10.1038/s41558-026-02655-4

Shifts in climate-growth relationships of Pinus kwangtungensis in a warming subtropical forest of China, Yu et al., Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126574

Shifts in growth phenology of Tsuga dumosa in the central Himalayas under climate warming, Rai et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111307

Temporal Autocorrelation Increases Temperature-Driven Extinction Risk by Clustering Stressful Conditions, Robey et al., Ecology Letters pdf 10.1111/ele.70441

The North Atlantic Subpolar Gyre and Phytoplankton Bloom Under Potential Future Climate Scenarios, Oliver et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023561

Water-use strategy shift mediates C4 plant response to altered precipitation seasonality, Zhou et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105616


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Whole-genome duplication in an algal symbiont bolsters coral heat tolerance, bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory), 10.1101/2022.04.10.487810 28 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

A Top-Down View of Global and Regional Carbon Budgets From an Ensemble of Atmospheric Inversions, Woude et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb008779

Abiotic CO2 cycling in a desert soil: Linking surface fluxes and subsurface dynamics across seasons, Bekin et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111250

Adapter-enhanced CLIP for railway brake shoe anomaly detection, Shehzad et al., Complex & Intelligent Systems Open Access 10.1007/s40747-026-02377-2

Addition of brackish water to tundra soils does not inhibit methane production: implications for Arctic coastal methane production, Roy-Lafontaine et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-3777-2026

Airborne Observations Reveal Underestimated Riverine Methane Emissions Across the Amazon, Ort et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122310

Anthropogenic perturbations to atmospheric methane reflected in Greenland firn air clumped isotope measurements, Sivan et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb2203

Body mass index, sedentary lifestyle, and HbA1c predict cardiac autonomic neuropathy in type 2 diabetes, Haji et al., Cardiovascular Diabetology – Endocrinology Reports Open Access 10.1186/s40842-026-00308-1

Briefing Chat: Sweet! Elusive sugar molecules found in space, Thompson & Howe, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-02263-4

Capturing the Global Variability of Marine Particulate Organic Carbon Flux: A Hierarchical Bayesian Approach, Edwards et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123203

Carbon input manipulation significantly alters soil CO2 and CH4 fluxes across stand ages in boreal birch forests of China, Gao et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111212

Comparative effects of A-site ionic radius and disorder on structure, magnetism, and transport in perovskite La0.8Sr0.1A0.1MnO3 (A=Ca, Sr, Ba), Zhang et al., Journal of Materials Science Materials in Electronics 10.1007/s10854-026-18036-8

Disease landscape–guided design of neutrophil-specific reporters for early and accurate pneumonia detection in vivo and in urine, Li et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb4417

Divergent long-term trends in vegetation carbon turnover between mature and young forests, Ren et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70396

Dynamical analysis of a discrete reaction-diffusion-convection predator-prey model based on coupled map lattices, Du & Han, Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computing 10.1007/s12190-026-02860-6

Effects of hummock-hollow microtopography on CO2 and CH4 emissions from sedge peatlands in the Changbai Mountains, Northeast China, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111220

Environmental controls and temporal trends of CO2 and CH4 emissions in a former cultivated peatland under rewetting, Pullens et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111363

Evaluation of a Decade of Methane Observations From a Tower Network in Indianapolis, Indiana, Barkley et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2026jd046734

Fatigue Properties of WAAM-Fabricated 2209 Duplex Stainless Steel Evaluated by Temperature Measurement and Heat Source Reconstruction, Viola et al., Experimental Mechanics 10.1007/s11340-026-01354-7

Filtering of Second Order Generalized Stochastic Processes Corrupted by Additive Noise, Wahlberg, Journal of Fourier Analysis and Applications Open Access 10.1007/s00041-026-10282-y

Geochemistry of CO2-rich gas emissions in the Carpathians: Multiscale geological sources and implications for orogenic degassing, Kis et al., Earth-Science Reviews Open Access 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105528

GHGPSE-Net: a method towards spaceborne automated extraction of greenhouse-gas point sources using point-object-detection deep neural network, Pang et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-1683-2026

Global burden and temporal trends of colorectal cancer in East Asia based on the global burden of disease 2023 study, Qin et al., Discover Oncology Open Access 10.1007/s12672-026-05561-5

Global warming makes nitrogen oxide abatement key to ozone pollution mitigation, Wang et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aea4124

High-performance multijunction perovskite LEDs with reduced interconnection loss, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75756-5

Hybrid Neuro-Symbolic Models for Transparent and Adaptive Decision-Making in Dynamic Real-World Environments, Welekar et al., National Academy Science Letters 10.1007/s40009-026-02325-1

Incorporating observed fire severity in refined emissions estimates for boreal and temperate forest fires in the carbon budget model CBM-CFS3 v1.2, Thompson et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-3617-2026

Increasing Warming May Inhibit Land Carbon Uptake in Northern High Latitudes, Madani et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122135

Insights of climate-driven changes in CH4 and CO2 source contributions at European coastal observatories, Adame et al., Atmospheric Research Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109076

Iron overload suppresses LKB1 and induces IL36G anti-tumor immunity in PDAC metastasis, Biancur et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz8681

Leader as the “Glue” that holds the teams together: examining how identity leadership influences intra-team cooperation and inter-team knowledge sharing, Feng et al., Current Psychology 10.1007/s12144-026-09780-5

Livestock grazing, plant community and abiotic factors shape blue carbon stocks in Nordic coastal marshes, Richard et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-4583-2026

Methane and Ethane Emission Rates, Intensities, and Trends: Aircraft Mass Balance Insights Over the Denver-Julesburg Basin, Fall 2021, Daley et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd044370

Methane and Nitrous Oxide Reshape the Air-Water Greenhouse Gas Budget of a Tropical Estuarine Delta, Cotovicz et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2026jg009956

Methane oxidation in African and European rivers depends on stream size and wetland connectivity, Borges et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb8250

Microstructural Evolution and Acid Corrosion Mechanism of Laser-Clad FeCoNiCrx High-Entropy Alloy Coatings, Xiao et al., Metallurgical and Materials Transactions A 10.1007/s11661-026-08305-w

Neoadjuvant Chemoradiotherapy on Postoperative Complications of Rectal Cancer: A Retrospective Study Integrating MRI Radiomics and Deep Learning, Bu et al., Journal of Imaging Informatics in Medicine 10.1007/s10278-026-02137-1

Organic carbon oxidation state shapes fermentative methanogenic microbiomes and controls greenhouse gas fluxes, Hu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73281-z

Organic Matter Stoichiometry Regulates the Continental Shelf Carbon Pump Efficiency of the Northwest European Shelf Seas, Demir et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb008724

Peatlands Have the Potential to Emerge as Significant Contributors to Future Climate Warming, Chaudhary et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009540

Permafrost carbon release scales linearly with overshoot warming mediated by AMOC tipping, Steinert et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73612-0

Physics-constrained machine-learning surrogates for the colebrook friction factor: monotonic gradient boosting, uncertainty quantification, and open benchmarking, Müftüo?lu, Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-62231-w

Plants are a powerful proxy for global tidal marsh methane fluxes, Wilson et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2530848123

PLATO on the footsteps of Kepler for transit timing, Maltagliati, Nature Astronomy 10.1038/s41550-026-02933-3

Projected future warming induces a long-term loss in global dissolved organic carbon pool, Tjiputra et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03809-0

Quantifying facility-scale CO2 emissions using spaceborne hyperspectral imageries, Han et al., Remote Sensing of Environment 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115478

Rademacher-type exact formula and higher order Turán inequalities for cubic overpartitions, Agarwal et al., Research in Number Theory pdf 10.1007/s40993-026-00765-8

Rapid and sensitive NO2 detection using optimized flower-like ZnO nanorods synthesized via chemical bath deposition, Ambi et al., Journal of Materials Science Materials in Electronics 10.1007/s10854-026-18001-5

Reversed functional gradient in primate prefrontal cortex: Posterior dominance and frontopolar task-related deactivation, Watanabe et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aea1094

Revising the Magnitude and Trends of the Global Methane Soil Sink With Process-Based, Machine-Learning, and Atmospheric Inversion Modeling Approaches, Oh et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009668

Rock weathering can counteract river CO2 emissions induced by permafrost thaw, Zhang et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10664-8

Satellite estimation of global air sea CO2 flux from 2000 to 2020, Ji et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-51215-5

Shoreline exposure controls teal carbon accumulation in boreal lakes, Dauner et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-3637-2026

Short-Term Effects of PM2.5 Exposure on Hematological and Biochemical Blood Indices in the Middle-Aged and Elderly, Dinh et al., Aerosol and Air Quality Research Open Access 10.1007/s44408-026-00131-4

Simultaneous measurements of translation rate and transcriptome uncovers linked regulation within an active bacterial cell population, Baumann et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz1707

Soil Carbon Saturation Constrains Long-Term Sequestration Under Revegetation on China's Loess Plateau, Zhang et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006739

The RhMPK3-RhLOB41-RhWRKY9 module orchestrates ethylene-induced petal abscission via dual control of ROS homeostasis in rose, Zhang et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adu6821

The spliceosome component SNRPC promotes glioma progression by sustaining mitochondrial function and TNFAIP2 signaling, Ma et al., Cell Death and Disease Open Access 10.1038/s41419-026-09065-6

Towards operational automated greenhouse gas plume detection and delineation, Bue et al., Remote Sensing of Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115506

TundraFlux: A database of ecosystem respiration with biotic and abiotic metadata from Arctic and alpine tundra warming experiments, Schwieger et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-4965-2026

Understanding the resilient carbon cycle response to the 2014–2015 Blob event in the Gulf of Alaska using a regional ocean biogeochemical model, Abe et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-3871-2026

Urban CO2 and CH4 pilot atmospheric measurements in the Milan city area (Northern Italy), Cristofanelli et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122124

Varicose projection astrocytes: Conserved reactive cells in brain pathology, Ciani et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.ady8204

When trust building looks like surveillance: Public polarization toward Chicago policing, Cheng & Liu, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb7575


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Trends and Drivers of Terrestrial Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide: An Overview of the TRENDY Project, Global Biogeochemical Cycles, 10.1029/2024gb008102 121 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Contrasting first-year and tenth-year responses of soil CO2 efflux and soil carbon storage indicators to biochar addition in plantation forests, Yu et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1879259

Global quantification of the eco-hydrological co-benefits of soil carbon sequestration, Vanderkelen et al., Biogeosciences Open Access 10.5194/bg-23-3829-2026

Hydrogen bond network disruption enables efficient direct reactive capture of CO2 from flue gas, Liu et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74647-z

Insights lost at points of vulnerability in UK policy evidence gathering on carbon dioxide removal, Hope & Vaughan, Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104412

Mapping CO2 Migration Pathways: Interactions With Geological Structures, Ashmore et al., Edinburgh Research Explorer Open Access pmh:oai:pure.ed.ac.uk:openaire/0386afc5-3b2c-436f-b35d-44a153274556

Naturalness catalyzes public support for carbon dioxide removal and low-carbon energy technologies, Coffin & Boven, Open MIND pmh:10.17605/osf.io/g37ku

Unobserved confounders cannot explain over-crediting in avoided deforestation carbon projects, Guizar-Coutiño et al., Nature Ecology & Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41559-026-03049-7


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Cost-effectiveness of natural forest regeneration and plantations for climate mitigation, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02068-1 75 cites.

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Decarbonization

A global feasibility gap in resilient island energy transitions, Huang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75606-4

Accuracy, robustness and comprehensibility – Challenges in bottom-up energy system models, Prina & Noussan, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000890

Beyond lithium: how sodium-ion batteries could change the world, Castelvecchi, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-02150-y

Climate change reshapes resource adequacy risks and optimal renewable energy siting in wind and solar energy systems, Qiu et al., Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-026-02109-3

Climatic Impacts of Large-Scale Wind Farms in Arid and Semi-Arid Region in China: A Case Study of the Huitengxile Wind Farm in Inner Mongolia, Su et al., Wind Energy Open Access 10.1002/we.70141

Energy transition in India and the race for renewable energy to outpace fossil fuels in carbon reduction, Noor et al., Discover Sustainability Open Access 10.1007/s43621-026-04129-1

Ensemble-based projections of future climate extremes and their implications for photovoltaic power potential in China, Ma et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.011

Optimized decarbonization pathway coupled with carbon trading mechanism for China's steel industry towards carbon neutrality, Sun et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115428

Stakeholder perspectives on decarbonizing Thailand's power sector: A SWOT-fuzzy AHP approach towards net zero, Altaf et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102084

The trade route to renewables: Import as a catalyst for the diffusion of renewable energy technology, Rabbani & Quaiyyum, Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115390

Toward net-zero water systems: mechanisms and challenges in low- and middle-income Asian countries, Ahmed et al., Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 10.1016/j.cosust.2026.101681

Urban decarbonization needs strategic reserves for critical materials, Allam et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03819-y


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Critical mineral mining in the energy transition: A systematic review of environmental, social, and governance risks and opportunities, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103672 85 cites.

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Geoengineering climate

Intended and unintended consequences of atmospheric methane oxidation enhancement, Horowitz, Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-9471-2026

Ocean alkalinity enhancement reduces silica ballasting during export due to amplified dissolution, Suessle et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-4691-2026

Reflecting on the politics and power dynamics of contested climate technologies, Fritz et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104448

Black carbon

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Changes in the Direct Climate Effect of Black Carbon Aerosols in East Asia Under the “Dual Carbon” Goal of China, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd040874 5 cites.

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Aerosols

Global Characterization of Stratospheric Sulfate Aerosols by the Atmospheric Chemistry Experiment (ACE), Bernath et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd046214

Rising dust pollution across Europe in a changing climate, Vasilakos et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10743-w


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Assessment of aerosol-cloud interactions over the Northern Indian Ocean, Atmospheric Research, 10.1016/j.atmosres.2024.107601 4 cites.

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Climate change communications & cognition

As the planet heats, public doubt grows: The social structure behind rising climate change scepticism in Germany, Gies & Deutschmann, Global Environmental Change Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103202

Climate Change Advocacy in Libraries: Practices, Challenges and Future Research Directions, Oladokun et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2702627

Climate change concerns and perceived intergenerational mobility, Gugushvili & Präg, Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103119

Climate Obstruction in the Digital Far-Right: Mapping the Climate Countermovement in German-, Danish-, and Swedish-Speaking Digital Information Environments, Henriksen et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.1080/17524032.2026.2701866

Confident judgments of (mis)information veracity are more, rather than less, accurate, Ak et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag186

Lagos Is Drowning: Media, Resistance, and Climate Coloniality in Flooding Narratives, Ogungbemi, Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2706163

Listening to climate change: sound, imagination and environmental sociology, Clark, Environmental Sociology Open Access 10.1080/23251042.2026.2704790

Mapping climate change coverage: Causes, consequences, and solutions in German news media, 2010–2024, Dablander et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104833

Medical students’ perspectives on climate change, climate-health education, and professional identity: a qualitative study, Loh et al., BMC Medical Education Open Access 10.1186/s12909-026-09775-7

Temporal horizons in US climate change news, Wozniak, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02716-8

The Digital Representation of Greta Thunberg in Internet Memes: Gender, Ideology, and Digital Violence, Lucena & Colacios, Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2701872


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Patterns of climate-change coping among late adolescents: Differences in emotions concerning the future, moral responsibility, and climate-change engagement, Climatic Change, 10.1007/s10584-024-03778-3 19 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Paphia undulata enhances sedimentary CH4 and N2O emissions via divergent microbial mechanisms, Zhong et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108103

Climate stressor projections inform adaptation needs in South Asian oilseed systems, Barik et al., npj Sustainable Agriculture Open Access pdf 10.1038/s44264-026-00170-9

Crop migration is not a viable long-term strategy for mitigating climate change impacts on winter wheat production in the North China Plain, GUO et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.006

Decoding Heat Tolerance in Rice: Physiological Mechanisms, Genetic Architecture, and Breeding Innovations, Saha et al., Plant Molecular Biology Reporter 10.1007/s11105-026-01743-1

Depicting the response of crop photosynthesis to elevated CO2: the unique role of sun-induced chlorophyll fluorescence, Ye et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111211

From perception to action: attitudes and climate change adaptation practices among smallholder farmers in Nakivale refugee settlement, Mohamed et al., Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/feart.2026.1868338

Modeling short- and long-term climatic and non-climatic drivers of wheat yield in Somalia (1986–2019): Evidence from an ARDL approach, Osman et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000804

Regional flooding enhances N2O and CH4 emissions from agricultural fields: Evidence from a single extreme event across the North China Plain, Ge et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111284

Simulating Agroecology Policy Options for the Resilience of Smallholder Food Security to Climate Shocks, Dagunga et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access 10.1002/cli2.70055

Sizing blue carbon risks and benefits from bivalve aquaculture, Gentry et al., npj Ocean Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1038/s44183-026-00199-w

Tibetan Pasture Restoration Causes Additional Cooling by Reflecting Solar Radiation, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2025jg009479


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Land use modulates resistance of grasslands against future climate and inter-annual climate variability in a large field experiment, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17418 29 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Exceptionally Warm Event in the Tropical South Atlantic in 2023–24: Physical Drivers and Impacts on South American Rainfall, Hounsou-Gbo et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023901

North American Winter Precipitation Extremes: Changes in Variability and Driving Mechanisms in a Warming Climate, Jeong et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008659

Precipitation Over the Contiguous United States Is Coming From Farther Away Than in the Past, Aerenson et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122565

Quantifying UK coastal flood exposure under future sea-level rise to 2300, Palmer et al., Explore Bristol Research pmh:oai:research-information.bris.ac.uk:openaire_cris_publications/62032aef-becd-4ddc-a902-ff39b2c8a275

Rethinking future flood hazard: Hourly data challenge daily flood projections in Alpine catchments, Astagneau et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed6012

Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Extreme Hourly Rainfall in the Hawaiian Islands, Gayte et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70501

Uncertainty in California Winter Precipitation Linked to Future Projections of North Pacific Large-Scale Atmospheric Circulation, Choi et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres pdf 10.1029/2025jd045669

Understanding changes in Iceland's streamflow dynamics in response to climate change, Helgason et al., Hydrology and earth system sciences Open Access 10.5194/hess-30-3979-2026

Unraveling daily dynamics of supraglacial lakes in response to hydrological pulses and anomalous climate signals, Song et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75669-3


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The increasing water stress projected for China could shift the agriculture and manufacturing industry geographically, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01560-y 49 cites.

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Climate change economics

Carbon pricing, economic resilience, and transport decarbonization: evidence from Finland, Msefula et al., Humanities and Social Sciences Communications Open Access 10.1057/s41599-026-08428-w

Climate-induced loss and damage in Nepal: attribution analysis and institutional readiness for international support, Dhakal et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1782991

How the money flows: analyzing international finance for climate change adaptation in Ethiopia, Kidane et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103201

Inequality in flood insurance arrangements to finance flood recovery under climate change, Tesselaar & Botzen, Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100850

Prioritizing the welfare of vulnerable nations promotes equitable achievement of Paris target, Biswas et al., npj Climate Action Open Access 10.1038/s44168-026-00385-z

Research on the impact of climate risk on corporate cost of debt financing, Yang et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1763661

Statistical learning for climate-GDP panels: Data cleaning, flexible trend controls, and predictive validation, Schötz et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000962

Views of EU citizens on economic growth and implications for climate policy, Savin et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73323-6


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Towards a more transformative approach to climate finance, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2377730 27 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Improvement of ambient air quality and the synergistic governance of CO2 and pollutant emissions in Shenyang, Zhao et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-50803-9

The impact of conventional policy instruments on climate change mitigation in China, Matutinovi? & Borozan, The Anthropocene Review 10.1177/20530196261464201

Waste and CO2, an intricate relationship. Metrics, policy and technology in the climate-framing of waste, Rocher, Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104443

“Mitigation + adaptation” climate policy synergy and urban ecological resilience: Evidence from China, Zhang & Dou, Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103046


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Power supply disruptions deter electric vehicle adoption in cities in China, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50447-1 53 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

A battleground of climate change: Summer air temperatures in social housing, Pfautsch et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103051

Assessing the vulnerability of livelihoods and ecosystems during the KwaZulu-Natal floods and their implications for climate resilience, Anekwe, Climate and Development Open Access 10.1080/17565529.2026.2696367

Economic optimization of climate adaptation for water security: an integrated water–energy nexus risk assessment framework, Ran et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1817765

Inequality in human development amplifies climate-related disaster risk, Teber et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73873-9

Instrumentalizing ‘uninhabitability’ at a time of climate change: the case of Barbuda after Hurricane Irma, ???????? et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2696370

Maladaptation can contribute to aggregated, amplified, compounded, and cascading climate risks, Shah, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 10.1016/j.cosust.2026.101689

Producing resilience: governance, social relations, and climate risk in coastal communities, Nurhayati et al., Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2699296

Promises and pitfalls of climate adaptation tools across the Mediterranean, Koutroulis et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03795-3

Rethinking urban climate adaptation: A degrowth perspective for policy and practice, Acuña & Fernández-Baldor, Environmental Science & Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104445

The Destination Earth digital twin for climate change adaptation, Doblas-Reyes et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-2821-2026

The national knowledge politics of monitoring and evaluating adaptation to climate change: processes of repair, theatrical performance and legitimacy, Adhikari & Fisher, Environmental Politics Open Access pdf 10.1080/09644016.2026.2700733

Women and climate adaptation in South Africa: a gender-responsive policy review, Baloyi et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1821218


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Weaving scientific and local knowledge on climate change impacts in coastal Kenya, Western Indian Ocean, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103846 10 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Assessing and Refining the Heat Index for Subdaily Heat Conditions, Liu, Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-25-0250.1

Climate change, hygiene, and health: A research roadmap for climate adaptation, Gerard et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000907

Environmental suitability of Coccidioides in the USA under climate change scenarios: a modelling study, Deshpande et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101481

Feeling the heat: Socio-spatial inequalities in indoor overheating and heat adaptation in Greater London, Assan, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104868

Global climate risks for outdoor sports under CMIP6 scenarios: A multi-indicator assessment based on WBGT, Heat Index, heavy rainfall, and heatwaves, Defrance & Lescure, PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000969

Local drivers in accelerating North American heat stress, Prein et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72795-w

Mental health experiences amid climate change and sexual and reproductive health challenges: A scoping review focused on low-and middle-income countries, Vahedi et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000984

Recognizing the human health impacts of marine heatwaves, Falkenberg & Russell, Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01892-x

The science of climate heat risks has a metric problem, Jay & Jahan, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03804-5


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Indoor overheating: A review of vulnerabilities, causes, and strategies to prevent adverse human health outcomes during extreme heat events, Temperature, 10.1080/23328940.2024.2361223 87 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics

Critical misalignments in climate pledges reveal imbalanced sustainable development pathways, Larosa et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73564-5

Defragmenting Mangrove Law Towards Coherent Global Governance, Lorber & Cappa, Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73721

Other

AI-assisted longitudinal comparison of scenario knowledge representation in IPCC synthesis reports, Warin & Bisson, PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000965

Co-Producing Climate Services for California's Energy Sector, Freitas et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef005959

Extreme Weather in the Southern Hemisphere in Early 2022, Vries et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society Open Access 10.1175/bams-d-23-0141.1

From continental to street scales: climate change impacts on atmospheric composition over Europe and London, Doherty et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-10115-2026

Mercury mobilization and export from the Greenland Ice Sheet using an ice-to-ocean approach, Youssef et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03818-z

Modelling the anthropocene: A brief and partial history, Turnbull, The Anthropocene Review Open Access 10.1177/20530196261472817

Resource consumption in global concrete production, Kane et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01858-z

The true impacts of the built environment, [authors did not process], Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01910-y


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
How Has the Ferrel Cell Contributed to the Maintenance of Antarctic Sea Ice at Low Levels From 2016 to 2022?, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108801 2 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Missing Western Pacific moorings threaten weather and climate forecasting and research, Cravatte et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1861050

U.S. researchers express outrage over proposed changes to managing federal grants, Mervis, Science 10.1126/science.aek5959

‘Climate free fall’: why the biggest risk to our economies is yet to be recognized, Levermann, Nature Open Access pdf 10.1038/d41586-026-02154-8


Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Science-based targets miss the mark, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01535-z 30 cites.

buffer/IOPN Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Early Warnings: Government Knowledge of Climate Change and Legal Responsibility for Climate Harm, Lindsay Fenlock and Nikki Reisch, Center for International Environmental Law

The authors examine publicly available government records, scientific evidence, and historical archives to document when major emitting States became aware of the causes and foreseeable consequences of climate change. They demonstrate that many governments understood the risks decades earlier than they have claimed, strengthening the evidentiary foundation for climate litigation, human rights, and climate advocacy, and the implementation of the International Court of Justice climate advisory opinion. By tracing the history of government knowledge, the report provides a critical resource for advancing climate accountability and ensuring that high-emitting States are held responsible for failing to prevent the climate crisis.

Bait and Switch. The Impacts of Trump Administration Policies at the Intersection of Clean Energy, Manufacturing, and Labor, BlueGreen Alliance

The authors found that largely due to the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), 223 manufacturing, clean energy, and industrial projects are already facing cancellations and delays representing at least $82.8 billion in capital investment which could cost 111,765 jobs. Additionally, more than 3,034 manufacturing, clean energy, and industrial sites face tax restrictions due to OBBBA, putting at risk $695.2 billion in capital investment and 1,184,996 jobs.

Attribution of Extreme Weather and Climate Events and Their Impacts, National Research Council, The National Academies Press

Decades of data and research indicate that human-caused climate change is altering the frequency and intensity of several types of extreme events, such as heat waves and extreme rainfall events. Even as those trends become clearer, extreme event attribution (EEA) seeks to assess the degree to which climate change contributed to any specific event. EEA studies provide information that can be useful for public understanding, planning and risk management, policy and legal contexts, and scientific research. The authors evaluate the state of EEA science, updating a National Academies report published in 2016. The authors also assess the emerging field of extreme event impact attribution (EEIA). The number of EEA studies has grown substantially over the past decade as scientific tools, observational datasets, and methods have advanced, enabling attribution studies to be completed within days of an event. However, challenges remain, including limited model capabilities for small-scale regional events, representation of key atmospheric processes, and attribution of compounding, cascading, and record-breaking events. The authors examine these advances and remaining challenges and provide recommendations for strengthening attribution science, improving collaboration with local experts and stakeholders, and advancing research, data, and modeling capabilities worldwide.

Military Escalation in the Middle East: Cushioning the Global Shock, Molina et al., United Nations Development Program

The economic, fiscal and social impacts of the recent Middle East military escalation are expected to persist despite the June 18 Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the United States. Since April, many developing economies have sought to shield households and businesses from rising energy costs through subsidies, price caps, tax reductions and demand-management measures. While these policies have softened the immediate affect of higher prices, they have come at a significant fiscal cost. Without such interventions, poverty is projected to increase substantially. Under an adverse global growth scenario, an additional 17 million people could fall into poverty by upper-middle-income standards, rising to 45 million under a severe scenario. Global fossil fuel subsidies are projected to exceed $1 trillion in 2026 and could reach $1.43 trillion if oil prices rise to $110 per barrel. The effects of the shock differ across regions. Remittances have helped cushion affects in South Asia, fertilizer disruptions risk worsening food insecurity in Africa, and energy subsidies in East Asia have contained inflation while increasing fiscal exposure. These pressures come at a time when nearly half of the world’s poorest countries are already in or at high risk of debt distress. As debt service costs continue to rise and fiscal buffers are exhausted, many governments are being forced to divert resources away from health, education and infrastructure. Sustained multilateral support will be essential to help vulnerable countries manage the crisis and protect development gains.

Disproportionate Regulation of Residential Plug-in Solar, Stephen Smith and Amanda Arthur, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy

The authors examine the scientific and regulatory basis for the differential treatment of residential plug-in solar photovoltaic (PIPV) units and portable gas/diesel generators with respect to line-worker safety. The authors use documented fatality records from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), peer-reviewed electrical injury science, utility industry safety publications, applicable federal inverter safety standards, a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) funded national laboratory barrier analysis, and the emerging bipartisan legislative consensus in multiple states. They noted that A DOE-funded Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory study (2025) systematically catalogued the technical, interconnection, and regulatory barriers to plug-in solar adoption in the United States, confirming that interconnection requirements—not technical safety limitations—are the primary barrier to deployment.

Washington State Climate Action Plan, Washington State Departments of Commerce and Ecology

Washington already has a strong set of policies to advance climate action. However, the state can and must do more The Comprehensive Climate Action Plan (CCAP) is designed to meet this need and be a far-reaching, implementable, equitable, and thorough roadmap to ensure a sustainable future for the state. The CCAP identifies opportunities across all sectors of the economy to further reduce emissions and provide direct benefits to communities and businesses such as cleaner air, healthier communities, boosting the economy, and protecting vulnerable populations.

Retail Electricity Price Trends and Drivers: Data Update−2026 Edition, Wiser et al., Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Prices largely tacked inflation; all-sector average prices are only up 3% since 2019 in real dollars. Real prices are down in 29 states; A majority of states saw a decline in inflation-adjusted prices (2019-2025). Electricity burdens are lower that in 2019 in most regions; total bills as a fraction of income are near all-time lows.

The 2025 small island developing states report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: building resilience in the face of rising heat, Gordon-Strachan et al., The Lancet Global Health

In this second iteration of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) report, the authors present the findings of 28 indicators from five thematic areas: health hazards, exposures, and impacts; adaptation, planning, and resilience for health; mitigation actions and health co-benefits; economics and finance; and public and political engagement in health and climate change. General statements about SIDS were only made for indicators with data coverage of at least 70%, with the number of SIDS with available indicator data explicitly stated when this threshold was not met. The 2025 report includes a dedicated chapter on financing with a deep dive into international climate financing for SIDS.

A Majority of Voters Support Worker Protections Against Extreme Heat, Ayseli Karabekmez, Data for Progress

Rising global temperatures are causing more frequent and severe extreme heat, droughts, and flooding across the United States. Last week, a dangerous heat wave with temperatures of 103–105 degrees Fahrenheit prompted heat alerts across multiple states. As climate-driven extreme weather events become more common, a majority of Americans are connecting the dots between climate change and extreme weather like heat waves. Recent polling finds that a majority of voters (61%) believe that extreme weather events — like hurricanes, flash floods, droughts, and heat waves — have become more frequent over the past five years. This includes majorities of Democrats (72%) and Independents (63%). Republicans are more divided, with a plurality (46%) saying extreme weather events have become more frequent, and 42% saying the frequency has stayed the same. Perceptions of extreme weather also vary by age. Half of voters under 45 (50%) believe the number of extreme weather events has increased over the past five years, compared with 66% of voters over 45 – a 16-point difference.

Heat, health and increasing cost of living. A call for action, Mathilde Wilkens and Dennis Tänzler, Adelphi Global

The authors recommend embedding heat-health effects into UNFCCC processes, including the Global Goal on Adaptation indicators and the Belem Health Action Plan (BHAP); linking national adaptation plans to concrete social protection measures, including compensation for lost working time and state-supported insurance schemes; extending formal labor protections to cover heat-related losses, particularly for informal workers, and addressing the gender dimensions of heat vulnerability; and mobilizing adaptation finance specifically for health, with clear guidance on how funding can be deployed to protect living standards.

Grid Action Report – July 4th Heat Wave. How clean energy provides cost savings and boosts grid reliability during extreme heat, Will Taylor and Jamie Dickerson, Acadia Center

The authors provide a response to recent extreme weather events affecting energy systems and consumers in the Northeast. The region’s experience with last week’s heatwave again points to the power of a portfolio approach to deliver savings and resource adequacy: a combination of clean energy resources helped the region ride through a period of significant grid stress – periods which will only increase in frequency, duration, and cost under a changing climate. This portfolio of resources – including solar, energy efficiency, demand response, battery storage, interregional transmission, and on/offshore wind – will serve as the foundation for a less volatile, more affordable, and more secure energy system. For example, distributed solar drives major savings during heat wave. The authors estimate 6+ gigawatts (GW) of distributed solar saved New England ratepayers $130-149 million in wholesale electricity (energy) costs during the week of June 28 through July 4, 2026. Distributed solar output exceeded 25% of all demand on the grid at times and contributed more to the grid mix than the region’s nuclear fleet between 2PM and 7PM on the peak heatwave day of July 2.

Modernizing New Jersey’s Electric Utility Business Model, Patel et al., New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

Electricity bills in New Jersey have risen faster than most household essentials, which makes affordability the central concern of this study. Most of a typical bill (supply and transmission) is set in federal and regional markets with limited ability at the state level to influence those costs. Utility business-model reform that is regulated at the state level can act mainly on the distribution and programmatic portion of the bill, roughly a quarter of the bill, though some reforms may indirectly lower exposure to supply and transmission costs. The jurisdictional review and evidence show that no single reform or modernization option is a silver bullet. The most reliable near-term gains could come from “cost-discipline” measures available under existing state authority. More ambitious financing, incentive, and performance-based reforms could follow as data, baselines, and customer protections mature.

China's wind and solar mega-bases face a coal test, Yu et al., GEM

China is building more wind and utility-scale solar than the rest of the world combined, concentrated in northwestern and northern regions. Over 500 gigawatts (GW) of China's vast 1,360 GW of prospective utility-scale solar and wind capacity is already under construction. Six provinces and autonomous regions — Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Shaanxi — hold 714 GW, or more than half of China’s prospective wind and utility-scale solar pipeline. China’s wind and solar deployment has moved from an installation race to a system-integration test. China’s wind and solar mega-bases constitute the largest renewable-energy deployment project in the world, but grid bottlenecks and electricity market arrangements that limit system flexibility are preventing that capacity from being fully used. The result is rising curtailment: wind and solar output that could have been generated under prevailing weather conditions, but was instead reduced or withheld. The question is no longer whether China can build renewable capacity at scale, but whether it can transmit, store, price, and consume that power in ways that reduce coal use.

The Fraud of “Clean” Natural Gas. How Big Oil and Gas Created the Myth that Natural Gas is a Climate Solution, John et al., The Center for Climate Integrity

For decades, the oil and gas industry has perpetuated the fraud that natural gas is clean and a climate solution, despite knowing that it is a significant source of air pollution and a major contributor to climate change. The gas industry knew as early as 1907 that natural gas was a source of respiratory problems when burned indoors, and by the 1950s it knew that gas caused problems in outdoor air. Beginning in the 1960s, the oil and gas industry learned of another threat — emerging science showed that natural gas was a potentially significant contributor to methane in the atmosphere. As companies and their representatives closely monitored scientific developments on methane, the chemical name for natural gas, they also learned that it was a potent greenhouse gas and damaging for the climate, About New Research

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Categories: I. Climate Science

Canada's boreal wildfires aren't just bad forest management

Skeptical Science - Wed, 07/22/2026 - 14:03

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

Over the past week smoke from Canadian wildfires has once again poured into cities across Canada and the northern US. Toronto briefly had the worst air quality of any major city on Earth, Thunder Bay’s readings went off the top of Canada’s air quality health index scale, and unhealthy air alerts stretched from Minneapolis to New York City.

This smoke-pocalypse has renewed a long-standing debate online that these fires aren’t really about climate change at all, but about forest mismanagement. Decades of aggressive fire suppression, the argument goes, have let fuel pile up. We don’t log enough, thin enough, or do enough prescribed burning The forests are overgrown tinderboxes and we have only ourselves to blame. Climate is a distraction from a problem we created by listening to Smokey Bear’s insidious propaganda.

I want to take this argument seriously, because it has a real kernel of truth. The fire-deficit story is a genuine phenomenon in the dry conifer forests of the western United States. But most of what’s burning in Canada is boreal forest, and the boreal is a fundamentally different beast. So in this piece I’ll try to explain why the management argument, largely valid in a California pine stand, mostly falls apart when you move it a couple of thousand kilometers north, and explore what the fire data actually shows.

Here’s the short version. Canada’s area burned has surged, and it has surged in step with warming: hot, dry fire seasons burn far more forest, with area burned rises roughly 80% for each 1C increase in fire-season temperature (with a correlation coefficient of 0.61). This relationship is robust to a variety of statistical tests and controlling for confounding variables. The boreal burns in rare, high-intensity crown fires on a natural cycle measured in a century or more, across enormous remote areas that have never been logged, thinned, or effectively suppressed. Only about a fifth of Canada’s burned area over the past four decades was even inside forest regions that have ever been actively managed. You cannot have a fuel-buildup from forest mismanagement in a forest you were never managing.

Forest mis-management?

The forest-mismanagement argument was, in fairness, based on real evidence from some regions. In the frequent-fire dry forests of the western US that are dominated by ponderosa pine and mixed conifers the natural fire regime is low-to-moderate intensity surface fire returning every 5 to 30 years, historically stoked in part by Indigenous burning. A century of fire exclusion in those forests really did remove that frequent fire, let stands grow denser and more continuous, and build up a “fire deficit” that raises the odds of severe fire (Hagmann et al. 2021). And in that setting, fuel treatments work: Prichard et al. (2021) find wide agreement that mechanical thinning combined with prescribed burning measurably reduces subsequent fire severity. If you’re arguing about the Sierra Nevada, the management story is as important if not more important than the climate one.

The problem is that the Canadian boreal is not the Sierra Nevada. It burns in infrequent, high-intensity, stand-replacing crown fires that kill the whole stand on natural fire cycles measured in many decades to centuries (commonly a century or more, and two centuries or longer in the east), not 5 to 30 years. It is, ecologically speaking, supposed to burn this way; black spruce is practically built for it. Fire in this system was never the gentle recurring ground-clearing that suppression interrupted in California. And the burning is astonishingly concentrated: across the boreal, something like 3% of fires account for about 97% of the area burned. This is not a landscape full of many small fires that “used to clean out the fuel.” Rather, its a landscape that waits, and then burns catastrophically under extreme weather.

Why do we know that Canadian boreal forest fires are not being driven by mismanagement?

First, and most importantly, most of the boreal was never being managed in the first place. As University of Alberta fire scientist Jen Beverly has pointed out, only about one-fifth of Canada’s total burned area from 1986 to 2023 occurred within long-term forest tenure (the land that’s actually logged and managed). The vast majority burns in remote forest with no timber operations. In Canada’s so-called “extensive” fire-management zones there has been no serious suppression efforts historically. Fires there are monitored and largely left to burn unless they threaten people or infrastructure. You can’t blame overgrown, over-suppressed forests for fires in places nobody was suppressing.

Second, the fuel-buildup mechanism doesn’t fit the recent fires. If decades of suppression had loaded the forest with excess old fuel, you’d expect the big fire years to preferentially consume the oldest, most fuel-laden stands. But in Alberta’s brutal 2023 season, fires burned stands of essentially all ages in proportion to how much of each was on the landscape. That’s the signature of fire driven by weather, which doesn’t care how old the trees are, not by fuel accumulation.

Third, the proposed fixes don’t scale to the boreal even if you wanted them. This is the conclusion of the very scientists who documented Canada’s fire deficit. Coogan, Parisien and colleagues (2020) state it flatly: mechanical fuel treatments “require continued maintenance over time, are too expensive to apply across large boreal landscapes, and are usually not designed to halt extreme wildfires.” The boreal is on the order of three million square kilometers. You are not going to thin or prescribe-burn your way across it, and the crown fires that produce the smoke wouldn’t stop at a fuel break anyway.

So if it’s not mismanagement, what is it? Let’s look at the data.

The Canadian fire record

To start with, here is the long-term record of area burned, combing the satellite-mapped NBAC composite from 1972 on with the less-complete point-based records before that shown in grey (note that this is primarily for illustration; I don’t compute any statistics across the 1972 splice to avoid potential bias from changing measurement approaches).

Annual forest area burned in Canada, 1959–2026. Grey bars show the point-based record (1959–1971); red bars the NBAC satellite composite (1972–2025); the hatched bar is 2026 through mid-July (CIFFC, preliminary). Data: NRCan CNFDB/NBAC; CIFFC.

2023 stands out like a sore thumb with 14.8 million hectares in the satellite-mapped data (Canadian agency tallies actually run higher at 17–18 Mha as different products count differently),1 roughly 2.5 times the previous record. 2025 came in second at ~7.3 Mha in the satellite data. And 2026 so far is about 2.8 Mha by mid-July, a bit above the typical pace for this date, but far below the last few extreme years.

One caveat around how unprecedented this actually is. A recent tree-ring reconstruction back to 1800 (Danneyrolles et al. 2025) found that while 2023 itself was off the charts in most regions they studied, the decadal burn rate for 2014–2023 still sits within the range of the past two centuries in several zones, especially in the eastern boreal. We are not necessarily seeing more fire than ever everywhere, but rather a rapid rate of increase with the increasing prevalence of fire weather driving it. In addition, parts of the northwestern boreal are now burning at rates that do appear to exceed anything in thousands of years.

One important driver: higher temperatures Change in fire-season (May–September) mean temperature, 1959 to 2025, computed as a per-gridcell LOWESS trend. Canada-wide mean change is +2.2C, exceeding +3C in parts of the high Arctic. Data: ERA5-Land (ECMWF/Copernicus) via Google Earth Engine.

Canadian fire seasons (May through September) have warmed about 2.2C on average since 1959. Canada warms at roughly twice the global rate, and its north at roughly three times. That warming matters for fire through a well-understood mechanism: warmer air is exponentially “thirstier” (saturation vapor pressure rises ~7% per degree), so it pulls moisture out of live vegetation and dead fuels alike, priming the landscape to burn. It’s the same fuel-drying pathway that Abatzoglou and Williams (2016) found had roughly doubled cumulative forest area burned in the western US.

Hanes et al. (2019), examining the Canadian record from 1959 to 2015, found fire seasons starting earlier and ending later, more days with conditions suitable for fire spread, and increases in both annual area burned and the frequency of large fires. They found that these trends were consistent with human-caused warming, not with changes in forest management (which have been broadly stable since the 1980s even as the fire seasons have gotten dramatically worse).

Hot and dry years burn

A few years ago my Berkeley Earth colleague Robert Rohde made a lovely figure plotting each California fire season by its temperature and precipitation. Here is my Canadian version: every year from 1959 to 2025 placed in climate space, with dot size proportional to national area burned and the ten largest fire years outlined in black.

Each dot is one year (1959–2025), positioned by its fire-season (May–Sep) mean temperature and total precipitation averaged over burnable land, sized by national area burned (NBAC). Adapted from Robert Rohde’s California fire season weather chart. Data: ERA5-Land; NRCan CNFDB/NBAC.

The pattern is hard to miss. The biggest fire years pile up in the hot-and-dry corner with 2023 really standing out, and the recent era (red dots, 2011–2025) has shifted visibly toward that corner relative to the black dots of the 1960s. Canada’s fire seasons are migrating into the part of weather-space where the big burns happen.

We can also try and more directly quantify the relationship between area burned and temperature. Nationally, fire-season temperature correlates with log area burned at r = 0.61 (1972–2025), which means that a fire season 1C warmer sees ~80% more area burned. I want to be careful about what this does and doesn’t show, so I stress-tested it: the correlation survives detrending (r = 0.57), first-differencing (r = 0.46), and partialling out precipitation (r = 0.58). It isn’t just two things drifting upward together, and it isn’t a rebranded precipitation effect.2

Correlation of fire-season mean temperature with log annual area burned by province/territory, 1972–2025, with 95% moving-block bootstrap intervals. Red dots are significant after false-discovery-rate correction. Data: NRCan CNFDB/NBAC; ERA5-Land.

The relationship is strongest in the western and northern boreal – Yukon, BC, the Northwest Territories, the Prairie provinces, Ontario – and weak to non-significant in Nunavet, Quebec, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick, matching the literature’s finding that eastern boreal fire is generally less temperature-limited.

Lightning in the middle of nowhere Cumulative area burned by ignition cause, 1990–2023. Data: National Forestry Database (agency-reported).

About 71% of Canada’s area burned over 1990–2023 came from lightning-ignited fires, and in the record 2023 season it was ~93%. These are remote boreal megafires, ignited by lightning far from any road, timber lease, or fuel-treatment crew. This is worth considering in the context of the management debate: the fires driving the smoke are not escaped campfires or mismanaged plantations. They are lightning strikes into a drying landscape, often burning in exactly the places no one was managing. And because warming is expected to increase high-latitude lightning, climate change can contribute to both the fuel dryness and the ignition side of the equation.

What attribution science actually says

This week the National Academies released a major report on the attribution of extreme weather events and their impacts, updating their influential 2016 assessment. Its wildfire findings are careful, and they land almost exactly on the distinction I’ve been trying to make in this piece.

On the general question, the report concludes it is very likely that climate change has increased the likelihood and severity of extreme fire weather: the hot, dry, windy conditions that let fires ignite and spread. At the same time it assigns low confidence to attributing any specific individual wildfire, because fires are irreducibly multivariate: ignition, fuels, land management, and suppression all mediate the on-the-ground relationship between fire weather and hectares burned. Notably, the report also flags that no attribution study has yet isolated the role of fuel or ignition changes, precisely because those human factors are so entangled. The science is much stronger on “climate change made conditions like these more likely” than on “climate change, specifically, caused this fire.”

For Canada’s exceptional 2023 fire year the evidence is unusually strong, and the report devotes a whole box to it. Kirchmeier-Young et al. (2024) found the record burned area was 2–5 times more likely thanks to human influence in Canada’s eastern and western ecozones, and the extraordinarily long fire season more than 5 times more likely. World Weather Attribution found the cumulative fire-weather severity at least 7 times more likely and ~50% more intense. Jones et al. (2024) put the fire-weather likelihood increase at ~2.9–3.6x and burned area ~10% higher (95% CI: 3-40%) than without warming. And Barnes et al. (2025) found the James Bay severity rating at least 32% more intense, while noting the season was amplified by an extreme run of atmospheric blocking (~50 blocking days versus an average of 15), a reminder that in any single year the weather still matter enormously.

Where management does matter

The prior sections are about the physical science of what’s driving the fire trend. What we should do about it is a policy question, and here the management crowd is not wrong so much as aiming at the wrong target.

There genuinely is a fire deficit in parts of boreal Canada — but it’s local, and it’s about people, not country or regional fire totals. Parisien, Coogan and colleagues (2020) found that of 160 boreal communities they studied, 54% were surrounded by less recently-burned forest than their fire regime would predict reflecting a suppression legacy that leaves older, more flammable forest ringing towns. This is a place where thinning, fuel breaks, and prescribed burning could genuinely help.

Fuel management is valuable around communities, but is essentially useless across the remote boreal. But in Canada it does not explain and cannot reverse the rise in area burned that’s filling the sky with smoke. Treating the wildland-urban interface and cutting the emissions that are drying the forest should be seen as complementary rather than as competitors.

Why the smokey skies

One last point on the thing thats actually dominating the news a the moment. Even a year like 2026 that appears not to be headed for a top-5 record for area burned in Canada can still have catastrophic air pollution impacts.

Large-fire footprints (≥200 ha) across Canada, 2015–2024 (grey, ~39 Mha total), with the 878 fires still active as of 17 July 2026 (red, sized by area). Data: NRCan CNFDB large-fire polygons; CIFFC year-to-date feed.

Whether a given city chokes on smoke depends on where fires burn, how high their plumes loft, which way the wind blows, and how many people live downwind, not on total hectares burned nationwide. This July, fires across northwestern Ontario, the Prairies, and Quebec have sat upwind of the Great Lakes population corridor under a persistent transporting flow. A modest fire season in the wrong place can choke tens of millions, while a record season in the remote north can have much smaller impacts on populated regions. While overall area burned is the climate-linked trend, who breathes the smoke on a given week in July is mostly driven by the weather.

A few takeaways

So what are the takeaways here?

First, the forest-mismanagement explanation is borrowed from the wrong forest. Its a real problem in the frequent-fire dry forests of the western US, but the Canadian boreal is a rare-crown-fire system, mostly unmanaged and unsuppressed, where only about a fifth of the burned area is even on managed land and where the fire scientists themselves say landscape-scale fuel treatments can’t scale or stop the megafires.

Second, the surge in Canadian burning tracks temperature with striking consistency, and hotter, drier fire seasons burn far more forest (+80% per 1C), the biggest fire years are almost universally hotter and drier, over 90% of the record 2023 burn was remote lightning fire, and the attribution studies tie these extremes to a warmer atmosphere without needing to invoke forest management at all.

And third, where management does matter like for the forests ringing communities it’s a genuine and worthy fix. But here it just protects towns; it doesn’t solve the underlying factors driving area burned or wildfire smoke pollution.

So next time someone tells you Canada’s fires can be solved by raking the forests, you can point out that the thing filling their sky with smoke is a lightning-struck, drought-primed boreal forest doing what a warming climate is making it do more and more often.

In case its helpful, I’ve put the code and data to reproduce this analysis on my GitHub here.

1 Burned-area products genuinely differ: the National Burned Area Composite (NBAC) maps fire perimeters from satellite imagery and is more conservative, while agency/CIFFC tallies are reported figures with different cutoff dates (2023 is 14.8 Mha in NBAC vs ~17–18 Mha in agency totals). I use NBAC as the primary series and avoid computing statistics across the 1972 data-source splice; the 2026 number is a preliminary CIFFC year-to-date figure.

2 The gory methodological details: correlations use the homogeneous NBAC record (1972–2025), with effective sample sizes adjusted for autocorrelation (Bretherton et al. 1999), 95% moving-block bootstrap confidence intervals, and Benjamini–Hochberg false-discovery-rate control across jurisdictions. The national relationship also holds when refit excluding 2023 and 2025 (r = 0.52), so it is not an artifact of the two recent extreme years. Temperature and precipitation are area-weighted over each jurisdiction’s forested/woody land (MODIS IGBP classes 1–9) from ERA5-Land. Fire-season precipitation correlates with area burned at r = −0.49.

Categories: I. Climate Science

Dangerous and historic wildfire smoke pollution event engulfs the U.S. and Canada

Skeptical Science - Tue, 07/21/2026 - 14:19

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters

As climate change bakes forests across North America, dense smoke from dozens of out-of-control wildfires burning in northern Minnesota and adjacent portions of Ontario is blanketing tens of millions of people with hazardous pollution.

The fires are bringing the worst air quality on record to much of the Great Lakes, mid-Atlantic, and Northeast United States. Pollution from small particles called PM2.5 — the fine particles less than 2.5 microns in diameter are the primary air pollution killers — has been far into the “Hazardous” range across five states since Wednesday morning.

The award for worst air in the nation on July 16 went to the city that has in the past billed itself as a climate haven: Duluth, Minnesota. The city’s 24-hour air quality index, or AQI, for PM2.5 particle pollution hit 934, over three times the threshold for “Hazardous” pollution. This shattered Duluth’s previous all-time AQI record of 159 set July 20, 2021. EPA pollution records go back to 1999.

The award for worst air in the nation on July 16 went to the city that has in the past billed itself as a climate haven: Duluth, Minnesota. The city’s 24-hour air quality index, or AQI, for PM2.5 particle pollution hit 934, over three times the threshold for “Hazardous” pollution. This shattered Duluth’s previous all-time AQI record of 159 set July 20, 2021. EPA PM 2.5 pollution records go back to 1999.

Record 24-hr PM 2.5 air quality on July 16, 2026

Duluth, MN: 934 AQI for PM2.5 (Old record: 159, July 20, 2021)
Toledo, OH (5 monitors): 624 (Old record: 190, June 28, 2023)
Chicago. IL (42 monitors): 511 (Old record: 246, June 28, 2023)
Detroit, MI: 490 (Old record: 226, June 28, 2023)
Cleveland, OH: 297 (Old record: 285, June 28, 2023)
Milwaukee, WI: 414 (Old record: 270, June 27, 2023)
Flint, MI: 343 (Old record: 178, June 27, 2023)
Minneapolis, MN (39 monitors): 251 (Old record: 193, July 29, 2021)
Green Bay, WI (5 monitors): 372 (Old record: 179, June 29, 2023)
Grand Rapids, MI (4 monitors): 482 (Old record: 227, June 27, 2023)
Lansing, MI (2 monitors): 408 (Old record: 194, June 29, 2023)
Buffalo, NY (11 monitors): 206 (Old Record: 176, June 7, 2023)

Record 24-hr PM 2.5 air quality on July 17, 2026

Washington D.C. (21 monitors): 246 AQI at Ashburn, VA, and 234 at Springfield, VA (Old record: 222, June 8, 2023, at Franconia Park, VA)
Pittsburg, PA (25 monitors): 261 (Old record: 237, June 29, 2023)
Dover, DE (2 monitors): 223 (Old record: 207, June 8, 2023)
Columbus, OH (8 monitors): 272 (Old record: 210, June 28, 2023)

Because of the huge number of people affected, and since this is occurring at the same time as a severe humid heat wave, this extreme and widespread pollution event — which will be followed by many months of repeated wildfire smoke incursion into the U.S. — will undoubtedly cause hundreds and perhaps thousands of premature deaths. The only comparable wildfire smoke event affecting this portion of North America occurred in 2023; a 2025 study blamed that event for 33,000 premature deaths in the United States, 8,300 in Canada, and 23,000 in Europe. According to the EPA, a premature air pollution death is one that occurs on average 14 years before a person would have otherwise died.

The climate change connection to the wildfires

As the climate warms, fire danger increases, mostly because the atmosphere gets “thirstier” – more water vapor can evaporate into warmer air. This results in more water vapor evaporating from plants, which dries them out and creates an increased risk of large and intense fires that can generate huge smoke plumes. Most of the fires grew out of control under extreme heat conditions made up to five times more likely by climate change (Fig. 1). According to Climate Central, the heat that helped fuel these fires would have been “highly unlikely” to have occurred in a world without climate change.

Figure 1. Climate Shift Index for Monday, July 13, 2026, showing the factor increase in high temperatures because of human-caused climate change. (Image credit: Climate Central)

Five states recorded “Hazardous” air quality on Thursday

On Thursday, July 16, portions of Ontario and five states — Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio — experienced 24-hour levels of PM2.5 with an air quality index in the “Hazardous” (brown) range. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, these conditions necessitate health warnings of emergency conditions, with the entire population more likely to be affected. Purple “Very Unhealthy” air was observed in three other states — New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana. This level of pollution triggers a health alert, and everyone – not just people with vulnerabilities – may experience more serious health effects.

Figure 2. Observed 24-hour air quality index (AQI) for PM2.5 pollution for Jul. 16, 2026. Fifty monitors in five states had “Hazardous” air, plus an additional nine monitors in Ontario. (Image credit: EPA)

According to air pollution scientist Ryan Stauffer, yesterday’s air pollution event blows away the previous most extreme wildfire smoke event in this region — in June 2023 — for extremity. During the 2023 event, only about three EPA monitors, all in Pennsylvania, recorded a 24-hour AQI in the hazardous range. But on Thursday, 50 official EPA monitors recorded a 24-hour AQI in the “Hazardous” range (Fig. 2), plus an additional nine monitors in Ontario. According to rankings at iqair.com, Detroit was the most polluted major city worldwide for most of Thursday, with Chicago bumping Detroit out on Thursday night. On Friday morning, the top five most polluted cities in the world were all in North America: Detroit, Chicago, Washington D.C., Toronto, and New York City.

On an hourly scale, some truly extreme AQI readings above 1,000 were recorded Thursday in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. The “Hazardous” (brown) range is for an AQI in above 300, so these readings were more than three times beyond the “Hazardous” threshold. The most extreme readings occurred in northern Minnesota downwind of the fires burning in the Boundary Waters park, where an AQI of 3,567 was measured by a purpleair.com sensor.

How the trouble started: record heat and a record-strong high-pressure system

The wildfire event began on Monday, when the strongest upper-level ridge of high pressure ever observed in the north-central U.S. baked the region. All-time record heat exceeding 100 degrees Fahrenheit (37.8°C) was observed, worsening existing moderate to severe drought conditions. Thunder Bay, Ontario, on the north shore of frigid Lake Superior, hit 39.5 degrees Celsius (103.1°F), smashing its all-time heat record by over 2°C. To the north, Armstrong hit 40.7°C (105.3°F), the hottest temperature observed in all of Ontario since the great Dust Bowl heat wave of July 1936.

Strong winds moved in with the heat, fanning multiple wildfires that feasted on the dry fuels, which featured plenty of dead trees from a spruce budworm infestation and a 1999 derecho event that felled thousands of trees. Extreme fires with a rapid rate of spread resulted and created at least two massive pyrocumulus clouds — giant thunderstorms spawned by the heat of intense fires that reached the stratosphere. Tomer Burg has an excellent thread explaining the meteorology that led up to the wildfire event:

How to interpret PM 2.5 readings at airnow.gov and purpleair.com

You can access EPA’s real-time PM2.5 NowCast AQI numbers at https://www.airnow.gov (note that you can’t just type in “airnow.gov” to get to the website, since they haven’t configured it to allow that). The AQI numbers are updated once per hour (shortly after the top of the hour). Because the EPA standard is based on a 24-hour average, the raw hourly data is not reported. Instead, EPA’s NowCast AQI numbers are computed using a 12-hour weighted average from the past 12 hours of data.

When air quality is highly variable (e.g., during a wildfire or a sudden wind shift), the algorithm heavily weights the past 1-3 hours. Otherwise, the past 12 hours are weighted nearly equally, and the AQI number is a 12-hour average. At the end of a day, the official daily AQI is calculated using a true arithmetic 24-hour average.

Don’t miss out: If you sign up by August 1 to support our extreme weather coverage with a monthly donation, you’ll be invited to an exclusive conversation with our meteorologists later this season. Become a monthly supporter of Jeff Masters, Bob Henson, and Irene Sans’s extreme weather coverage today.  Donate

In contrast, the AQI numbers at purpleair.com update every few seconds, so you get a much better idea of rapid changes in air quality. Clicking on a dot will bring up a graph of the past few days of data; the default averaging time for this graph is 10 minutes, but you can change this to a longer time span. Important: you need to choose “US EPA” in the “Apply Conversion” setting, or else the PM 2.5 readings will be too high.

The current situation: over 20 large fires out of control

As of Friday, there were 193 active fires covering 1.7 million acres (673,000 ha) in Ontario, with the vast majority of these considered to be “out of control,” according to the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre. Of the 22 large fires in over 2,000 acres burning nearest the U.S. border, 18 were receiving a full fire-fighting response, and four were not being fought. In the U.S., the National Interagency Fire Center reported six large fires in northern Minnesota, all 0% contained, covering 60,000 acres.

Figure 3. Monthly fire assessment for North America for July 2026 (left) and August 2026 (right). Red shading indicates areas where conditions would favor increased fire activity. Green shading indicates areas where conditions would favor decreased fire activity. (image credit: National Interagency Fire Center).

The forecast: relief coming by Saturday for the worst-affected states

Thunderstorms moved over the Minnesota/Ontario fire area Friday morning, bringing up to two inches of rain. This water will help firefighting efforts, but the fire danger index in Ontario is still high to very high, and the thunderstorms may have sparked additional fires.

The cold front accompanying this storm will bring westerly winds that should flush the worst of the smoke out of Chicago and Wisconsin by Friday afternoon, and out of Michigan by early Saturday morning. However, a renewed invasion of smoke is predicted for Michigan and Wisconsin Saturday night into Sunday, bringing more “Hazardous” AQI conditions. Another pulse of smoke is predicted to move deep into the central U.S. on Wednesday, perhaps reaching Arkansas and Missouri.

We can anticipate that some of the major smoke-emitting fires in Minnesota/Ontario will continue to burn for an extended period, with some lasting until the first snows come in October. The long-range fire assessment (Fig. 3) calls for above-average fire risk over much of the forested areas of northern Canada and the western U.S. this summer, and we should anticipate frequent bouts of poor air quality from wildfire smoke across much of North America. July and August are usually the peak months of fire season, which typically extends well into September. A potent North American Monsoon is now bringing heavy rains to parts of the southwest U.S., so the overall fire risk in that region may decrease to average levels by August.

Many lightning-caused fires occurred in the Pacific Northwest yesterday. With hot, windy weather expected to move in during the coming week, some of these fires may well become significant smoke producers.

Climate change predicted to further worsen wildfires

The number of people in the U.S. who experienced at least one day each year with smoke-related fine particle pollution levels at three times over the EPA standard has increased 27-fold over the last decade, and we can expect climate change to significantly worsen wildfire smoke problems in North America in the coming years.

For example, the frequency and magnitude of extreme wildfires around the globe have doubled in the past 21 years because of climate change, according to a study published last year in the journal Nature Ecology & Evolution. Rising temperatures have ushered in an era of hotter and drier weather, lending the right conditions for wildfires to erupt, the researchers found.

Here are some additional resources on climate change and wildfires:

Categories: I. Climate Science

Q&A: What the EU’s carbon market review means for climate action

The Carbon Brief - Mon, 07/20/2026 - 09:22
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The European Commission has put forward new plans to cut emissions under the EU carbon market more slowly, from 2031 onwards. 

On 17 July, the commission presented its long-awaited proposal for reform of the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS). 

It recommended a number of changes, including giving companies free allowances to cover their emissions for longer than previously planned, conditional on climate investment plans. 

The proposal would result in around 2bn tonnes of extra emissions from sectors that are part of the trading system, say WWF and other analysts.  

This means other sectors would need to pick up the slack in order for the EU to stick to its climate goals overall. 

The plan offers a more business-friendly and “savvy” approach, argued EU climate commissioner Wopke Hoekstra in a press conference.

In this Q&A, Carbon Brief outlines the details of the new ETS proposal – which is subject to negotiation with member states – and explores what it could mean for climate action. 

Article Contents

What is the EU Emissions Trading System? 

The EU ETS is a carbon market, which puts a price on the greenhouse gas emissions of companies in power generation, industry, aviation and other sectors.  

It covers everything from electricity generation to steel production, as well as flights within the EU and a handful of other European countries. 

Emissions in these sectors have halved since the ETS launched in 2005, according to the European Commission. 

A European parliament briefing describes the system as a “cornerstone” of EU climate policy, covering around 40% of the bloc’s overall emissions. 

It applies to emissions in all 27 EU countries alongside Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and electricity generation in Northern Ireland. (The UK established its own ETS after Brexit.)

The ETS operates as a “cap and trade” system, which puts a limit on the amount of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) that can be emitted within the sectors it covers. 

The “cap” on emissions gradually decreases each year until, eventually, they are expected to reach zero. 

The currency of trade within the system is “allowances”. One allowance is equal to one tonne of CO2-equivalent emissions. 

At present, around 57% of these allowances are bought by companies in auctions. The EU generated around €43bn in revenue from these auctions in 2025.

The remaining 43% of allowances are given to companies for free, to cover some or all of their emissions. 

This is intended to prevent “carbon leakage” – the idea that companies operating in countries with strict climate policies will relocate to countries with looser rules.  

The amount of free allowances varies by sector, depending on factors including the level of competition with overseas firms that do not face a carbon price. 

What did companies and countries want from the ETS review?

Countries and companies have been divided on how they wanted the ETS to evolve. 

Some pushed for more ambition to help meet European climate goals. Others called for it to be rolled back, amid rising costs for businesses. 

In March, 10 countries including Italy, Hungary and Poland wrote a letter to the commission calling the ETS an “existential risk” for key industrial sectors, reported Euronews. 

Italy had earlier even called for the system to be suspended outright. 

France and other countries favoured introducing a slower descent towards bringing the emissions cap to zero by 2039. 

Some steel and chemical companies also criticised the cost burden of the ETS. 

Other organisations focused on calls for stability and predictability in the system. 

In recent weeks, Spain, the Netherlands and five other countries called on the commission to “resist gutting” the ETS in its review, said E&E News. They said the ETS should be strengthened to “ensure long-term investment predictability and regulatory stability”. 

Weakening the system could “undermine investment signals and leave Europe more exposed to fossil-fuel shocks”, said a March 2026 briefing from climate thinktank E3G.

Another E3G briefing said the “risk” is that politicians weaken the system as a short-term economic fix, “undermining one of the EU’s main tools for delivering on its industrial transformation ambitions”. 

Dozens of investment organisations called on EU countries to facilitate a “robust and predictable” ETS. They said that “policy stability is the cheapest investment stimulus available to the EU”. 

In its list of priorities for ETS reform, the NGO Carbon Market Watch said that “now is not the time to backslide” on its aims and terms. 

What is in the new proposal from the European Commission?

The commission’s proposal outlines a number of changes to the ETS, to bring it in line with the EU’s climate goal to cut emissions to 90% below 1990 levels by 2040. 

The review will “bring relief to industry”, the commission says, while also continuing the ETS’ “essential” role in climate action. 

However, others are more sceptical about the impacts it could have on climate action. 

Below, Carbon Brief details the main aspects of the proposal. 

Free allowances extended 

The European Commission proposes to extend free allowances beyond a previously agreed date. 

Free allocations were due to reduce from this year and be fully removed by 2034. 

However, the commission has proposed to extend this to 2038, on the condition that companies receiving free allowances set out how they will invest in decarbonising their EU operations. 

It proposes that from 2031 onwards, 80% of free allowances in the system would be given to companies that have submitted plans for investment in EU decarbonisation. 

The remaining 20% of free allowances would only be allocated to those that can prove they followed through with planned investments and achieved the emissions reductions they had previously outlined. 

This move is a “step in the right direction”, says Dr Kirsten Scholl, the director for EU affairs at thinktank Epico, but it must not “impose excessive administrative burdens”.

The EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) was designed to replace the existing system of free allowances in the ETS. 

It is a tax applied to certain imported goods, based on the amount of CO2 emissions released during their production. It began to be phased in at the start of 2026. 

As a result, free allocation is being gradually phased out from 2026-38.

However, the commission has proposed that 15% of free allocations due to be removed  because of CBAM should be reintroduced from 2028, to “reduce the speed at which CBAM is phased-in and mitigate the remaining carbon leakage risk”. 

The commission says that preventing carbon leakage “remains a crucial element” of the ETS.

Pushing back the phase-out of free allowances and the full implementation of CBAM “risks squandering the EU’s credibility with investors and trading partners alike”, says Francesco Lombardi Stocchetti, a policy advisor on sustainable economy at the Bellona Foundation, an environmental NGO. 

“Europe cannot lead the clean industrial transition just by moving the goalposts,” he adds in a statement.

Slowing path to reach zero emissions by a decade

The commission has proposed to cut emissions in the ETS more slowly from 2031 onwards.

This could mean new allowances are able to enter the scheme into the 2040s, instead of ending in 2039 as previously planned. 

But the planned changes are still “aligned” with the EU’s 2040 climate target and net-zero requirement by 2050, says the commission. 

The overall ETS cap on emissions was reduced by 1.7% each year up to 2020 and then by 2.2% annually since 2021. 

It is then agreed to drop by 4.3% over 2024-27 and 4.4% from 2028 onwards. 

Maintaining similar rates after 2030 would not be “realistic”, says the commission’s proposal. 

Instead, it suggests that the cap should fall by 3.7% per year over 2031-35 and by just 1.7% annually over 2036-40. The chart below outlines how this would look.

Different trajectories for allowances in the EU Emissions Trading System over 2030-50, in MtCO2e. Source: Oeko-Institut analysis.

This will make the path to zero emissions within the ETS “more gradual and aligned with domestic climate ambition level”, claims the commission. 

But WWF says that the proposal would allow an extra 2bn tonnes of CO2e to be emitted. (See: What could the changes mean for greenhouse gas emissions?) 

Aviation 

The commission has proposed plans to incorporate more airline emissions into the ETS. 

The plan outlines that, from 2029, all flights departing from the European Economic Area (EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and landing in other countries within 5,000km of a point in central Europe should be added to the ETS.

This distance means that the changes would not apply to flights landing in China or the US. (Both the US and China have opposed the expansion of ETS coverage for flights.)

The commission also proposes including emissions from private jets and other “business flights” in the ETS. 

It notes that aviation currently accounts for 14% of EU transport emissions. This is expected to skyrocket to around 90% by 2050, given it is more difficult to decarbonise than other modes of transport. 

Some aviation emissions have been included in the ETS since 2012. This included emissions from air travel within the EEA and flights departing from Switzerland and the UK.

The airline industry did not respond favourably to reports of plans to expand beyond this scope. 

On 8 June, the biggest airlines in Europe urged commission president Ursula von der Leyen not to extend the ETS to cover international flights, saying that it would raise ticket prices. 

A study commissioned by Carbon Market Watch found that the ETS encompassing all flights departing from the EEA, not just those within it, would result in a “very small impact on ticket prices and passenger demand”.  

Auction money 

Under the proposed changes, EU countries would need to funnel half of the money they receive from ETS auctions towards decarbonising sectors covered by the system. 

This would amount to more than €100bn in investment for decarbonisation before 2030, says the commission. 

Around three-quarters of the money generated by the ETS has been allocated to EU countries since 2013, the proposal notes.

Since 2023, countries have been required to spend all of this money on climate and energy-related activities – at least on paper. 

But the proposal says the “transparency and effectiveness” of this mechanism has been “insufficient”. 

Currently, only around 5% of the ETS money “directly supports industrial decarbonisation in sectors such as steel, chemicals and fertilisers”, it adds. 

Going forward, the proposal says that 50% should be put towards actions aiding clean-energy plans, industrial decarbonisation and improved waste management, as some examples. 

A briefing by thinktank Institut Montaigne noted that the money generated within the system for EU countries to help finance the energy transition should be “at the heart” of ETS discussions, amid budget constraints in many EU countries at the moment. 

CO2 removals 

The commission has proposed integrating permanent carbon removals into the ETS to “give additional flexibility” for certain sectors that struggle to decarbonise. This action was previously agreed within the terms of the EU’s 2040 climate target.

“Permanent” removals refer to direct air capture with carbon storage and similar measures, rather than temporary removals such as planting trees. 

The removals would be integrated into the system by increasing the allowance cap by an amount equivalent to the number of removals purchased. 

This will set up “additional emission space” for hard-to-abate sectors and also support the “scale-up of the carbon removals industry”, outlines the proposal. 

It also proposes that certain companies, such as shipping and aircraft operators, could compensate for their emissions with their own certified carbon removals. 

These emissions would not be permitted to “go beyond zero”, adds the proposal.

Sven Harmeling, the head of climate at Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe, says that adding carbon removals “would weaken the ETS impact, undermine the carbon price and create new loopholes for polluters instead of accelerating the transition away from fossil fuels”. 

The proposal “fails to ensure that only high-integrity removal technologies would be considered”, he adds in a statement. 

However, the director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Prof Ottmar Edenhofer, describes the move as “an important step”, saying: 

“For the first time, it creates a credible and long-term investment framework for carbon-removal technologies in Europe.”

International credits 

The commission proposes that firms covered by the ETS could make use of “high-integrity” credits bought on the global carbon market from 2036 onwards. 

This relates to the EU’s 2040 climate target, in which up to 5% of the 90% reduction in GHGs can come from global carbon credits. 

Amélie Laurent, a policy advisor in carbon accounting at the Bellona Foundation, says in a statement that these credits “should be in a strategic last resort reserve, not an excuse to avoid doing our homework”. 

Aurora D’Aprile, the EU policy director at the International Emissions Trading Association, notes in a statement: 

“For international credits, early preparation on governance and procurement and greater certainty around a pilot from 2031, will be essential to establish a credible demand signal.” 

Other sectors extended 

The commission has outlined plans to expand the inclusion of the maritime sector in the ETS. 

Maritime accounts for around 4% of the EU’s total emissions. The new proposals for the sector include adding certain small ships of 400-5,000 tonnes to the system.

The proposal also outlines plans to incorporate more waste incineration into the ETS on a gradual basis from 2031. 

Since 2024, some waste-burning companies have been required to monitor and report their emissions under the ETS. But they did not have to purchase credits. 

Now, the commission proposes introducing the sector on a gradual basis. 

Under the proposals, companies would require allowances for 25% of their emissions in 2031, 50% in 2032, 75% in 2033 and 100% from 2034 onwards. 

Market stability reserve review 

The market stability reserve was added to the ETS in 2019 to help stabilise the flow of allowances. 

It acts like an overflow container holding extra allowances. If the number of allowances in the market falls below a certain threshold, more are brought out from the reserve to balance things out. 

Equally, if the market is flooded with too many allowances, depressing prices, then some are removed and put into the reserve. 

The commission has proposed a reform of the reserve, including changing the upper and lower limits for when allowances are released or removed. 

It wants to reduce the rate at which allowances are withdrawn from auctions when they exceed a certain threshold from 24% to 12% from 2028. 

This means that the permits would be able to stay in the market for longer. 

As shown in the chart below, the price of carbon in the EU increased tenfold over 2017-2021, exceeding €80 (£68) per tonne of CO2.  

Carbon price in the EU ETS over 2012-26, in € per tonne of CO2. Credit: Carbon Brief, based on data from Energy Instrat and EEX

Nevertheless, the commission proposal says the reserve was “effective in mitigating price shocks” on the ETS caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the surge in energy prices after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2021. 

UK-EU ties

The EU and UK have agreed in principle to link their carbon markets, but the commission’s proposal says negotiations are still “under progress”.

It adds that the commission “foresees” future financial contributions from the UK to the EU’s ETS, if a final agreement is reached. 

Many companies have called for the systems to be linked. In June, dozens of carbon-capture organisations and industry groups signed a letter calling for greater certainty on EU-UK links to ensure cross-border carbon-capture and storage projects are covered, for example. 

Switzerland’s ETS has been linked to the EU since 2020. 

What could the changes mean for greenhouse gas emissions? 

The European Commission says the ETS plays a “crucial role” in meeting its climate targets “cost-effectively”.

Emissions in the sectors included in the ETS have halved since its launch in 2005, according to the European Commission. 

(Roughly three-quarters of this reduction has come from the power sector, according to Carbon Brief analysis of data compiled by the thinktank Bruegel.)

As highlighted in the chart below, the EU’s overall GHG emissions have dropped by 40% since 1990. 

Greenhouse gas emissions in the EU over 1990-2025 (solid line) and projections out to 2050 (dotted line). The red dots indicate climate targets for 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050. Credit: Carbon Brief, based on data from the European Environment Agency

Climate commissioner Hoekstra told a press briefing that the proposal is “fully aligned” with the EU’s target to cut GHGs to 90% below 1990 levels by 2040. He called the plan “completely climate-law proof”.

He also noted that no other EU policy has contributed to reducing emissions on the scale of the ETS, describing it as a “phenomenal asset”. 

But campaigners and experts are concerned that the proposed changes could slow decarbonisation and put the EU’s climate goals at risk. 

Carbon Market Watch says the plans would “severely weaken” the ETS and “risk undermining the achievement of the EU’s 2040 and 2050 climate targets”. 

The proposals “would represent a major setback for EU climate ambition, weakening incentives to cut emissions, extending reliance on fossil fuels and putting the 2040 climate target at risk”, says a statement from WWF. 

WWF estimates that 2bn extra tonnes of CO2 would be emitted if the proposals were approved in the EU. 

This is similar to analysis by Ingmar Rentzhog, chief executive of the We Don’t Have Time platform and published in Forbes, which puts the figure at around 2.4bn tonnes by 2050. A figure of 2.4bn tonnes is also given in analysis by Benjamin Görlach, the EU climate economics and finance lead at thinktank Agora Energiewende.

Michael Bloss, a German member of the European parliament (MEP) for the European Greens, says the plans would release around 1.4bn tonnes of extra CO2 [likely due to considering a shorter time period]. He describes the proposal as “climate vandalism”. 

Chiara Martinelli, the director of CAN Europe, says:

“Every extra tonne of CO2 allowed under the ETS makes Europe’s climate challenge harder and more expensive. Weakening the ETS now is a gift to polluters that have prioritised shareholder payouts instead of investing in cleaner production.”

How was the proposal received? 

The European Commission’s new ETS proposal has been met with a mixed response. 

Scholl from Epico says the proposal has “important flexibilities that can help address competitiveness challenges and provide greater certainty for industrial investment”. But she adds in a statement: 

“Concerns remain about whether the proposed changes preserve the long-term investment signal of the ETS and sufficiently recognise companies that have already committed to ambitious decarbonisation pathways.”

Edenhofer from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research adds that the proposals provide “clarity on the contribution that emissions trading is intended to make towards the 2040 climate target”. 

Elisa Giannelli, a programme lead at E3G, says in a statement: 

“Today’s proposal might please some, but it risks increasing both the long-term cost and the time needed to deliver the EU’s growth strategy.”

Pepe Escrig, a senior researcher, also at E3G, adds that the commission held onto some of the ETS’ “essential foundation”, but “yielded to political pressure to weaken it as a quick fix to broader challenges”. 

This has left the plan “pull[ing] in two directions: strengthening support for industrial investment while weakening parts of the framework meant to drive it”, says Escrig. 

Andrea Spignoli, the policy manager of sustainable markets at Bellona Europa, says the proposal risks “weakening green investments”.

It also means “more efforts will be needed in other sectors…which come with their own political and economic challenges”, says Agora’s Görlach on LinkedIn. 

Greg Van Elsen, a senior industrial policy coordinator at CAN Europe, says in a statement:

“Free pollution permits were never meant to become a permanent subsidy. Extending them until 2038 rewards delay instead of industrial decarbonisation.”

Lobby groups also had mixed reactions to different aspects of the proposal. 

The International Air Transport Association says it is “deeply frustrated” with the proposal. 

The organisation’s director general, Willie Walsh, claims the consequences will be “harmful”, “sowing acrimony over extraterritoriality, slowing global decarbonisation and sapping European competitiveness”. 

WindEurope says the proposal risks “slowing decarbonisation and failing to channel billions in ETS revenues to industrial electrification”. 

BusinessEurope’s director general, Markus J Beyrer, says some aspects “raise concerns”. For example, he says the “new conditionalities for free allocations risk increasing bureaucratic complexity and the uncertain role for international carbon credits”. 

What is ‘ETS2’? 

ETS2 is a separate emissions trading system to the main ETS. It is due to take effect in 2028 and is not affected by the current ETS review or resultant proposals. 

It will operate under a similar system as the existing ETS, covering emissions from transport, buildings and smaller industries in other sectors.

One key difference, however, is that ETS2 will not provide any allowances for free. They will all be auctioned and bought by companies. 

On 15 July, 10 countries, including Italy and Poland, had urged the commission to also reconsider the ETS2 during this review. They were unsuccessful. 

Similar to the original ETS, the commission believes the carbon price under the new ETS2 system will “provide a market incentive for investments in building renovations and low-emissions mobility”. 

However, in June, member-state governments and the European parliament agreed on a number of “safeguards” to support price stability. 

For example, if allowance costs under the ETS2 exceed €45 per tonne of CO2, they agreed that 40m allowances will be put into the system from a reserve to normalise the supply – double the amount previously agreed.  

A European Environment Agency briefing said the ETS2 will “affect fuel prices and mobility costs” and that money will be syphoned into a social climate fund to “support vulnerable households and investments”. 

What happens next? 

EU countries will now negotiate over the terms of the commission’s proposal before it goes to a vote in the European parliament.

Ireland, which recently took over the six-monthly rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, has stated that it wants the ETS proposals to be signed off by the end of this year. 

A previous document from the council, which represents member-state governments, outlined a target to agree a deal by the first quarter of 2027.

Clean Energy Wire says that this would be an “unusually ambitious timetable for one of the bloc’s most technically complex pieces of climate legislation”. 

Politico notes that “months of arguing” is likely to occur.

Related Eight facts about air conditioning amid an overheated global debate 10.07.2026 Energy Iran war: EU strategy sets out 44 actions to limit ‘fossil-fuel price shocks’ 23.04.2026 EU policy Q&A: What the EU’s new industry and ‘Made in Europe’ rules mean for climate action 05.03.2026 EU policy Analysis: EVs just outsold petrol cars in EU for first time ever 27.01.2026 Energy

The post Q&A: What the EU’s carbon market review means for climate action appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Categories: I. Climate Science

The Strongest El Niño Ever

Skeptical Science - Mon, 07/20/2026 - 08:38

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

I’m generally pretty measured in how I discuss climate data. There has been only one time in recent years when I was truly shocked: when global temperatures came in for September 2023 at a full 0.5C warmer than any prior September on record.1 Once until today, that is. With the July runs now in from 667 ensemble members across 14 different seasonal forecast models, it looks like this year’s El Niño is not only very likely to be the strongest event since reliable records began – it may end up the strongest by a truly mind-blowing margin.

The multi-model median for the event’s peak (measured as detrended sea surface temperature anomalies in the Niño 3.4 region of the tropical Pacific) currently stands at 3.6C, roughly 0.8C hotter than the prior record of 2.75C set in 2015-16. For context, the gap between the strongest and the fifth strongest El Niño of the past 150 years is only about 0.5C. The models are forecasting something outside the envelope of anything we have ever observed.

Peak monthly Niño 3.4 anomaly for every El Niño event since 1877, with each event measured against its own era’s centered 30-year climatology (the ONI convention, applied at monthly resolution to match the forecasts’ monthly values). Events after 1950 (blue) use ERSSTv5; earlier events (open gold) use the HadISST reconstruction. The 2026-27 forecast shows the weighted median of 667 ensemble member peaks from 14 models (July 2026 initializations, members weighted so each model counts equally), with the bar spanning the middle 80% of members.

A few things stand out in this figure. First, no event in a century and a half of observations has ever pushed meaningfully past 2.75C. The legendary 1877-78 event comes closest, in a statistical dead heat with 2015-16 (2.73C vs 2.75C, well within the uncertainty of 19th-century ship data). Second, the middle 80% of this year’s forecast ensemble sits entirely at or above that all-time record: even the low end of the plume (2.8C) grazes it. Around 91% of ensemble members exceed the 2015-16 record at their peak.

To see what this would look like as the event unfolds, we can compare the forecast trajectory against the five strongest events ever observed, month by month through the development year and into the following spring.

Monthly Niño 3.4 anomaly trajectories for the five strongest observed El Niño events across their development year and decay, against the 2026-27 multi-model forecast. Note that the expected peak (3.6C) sits slightly above the top of the dashed median trajectory (3.5C): individual models peak in different months (e.g. CFSv2 in November, ECMWF in December) so the median of the individual model peaks runs a bit higher than the peak of the median line.

What is remarkable here is not just the level but the trajectory. The 2026 event is developing faster than 1997-98, the previous gold standard for explosive El Niño onsets. And unlike 2015 which started its year already warm from a precursor event, this one launched from genuinely La Niña-ish conditions in January.

Of course, a multi-model median can hide a lot of disagreement, so it is worth looking at where each individual model puts the peak. The figure below shows the distribution of member peaks across all 14 models.

Peak 2026 Niño 3.4 forecast: model-weighted histogram of each ensemble member’s July-December 2026 maximum (top) and per-model medians with 10-90% member ranges (bottom).

Every single model’s median peak lands at very strong (”super”) El Niño intensity, and all but one (JAMSTEC’s SINTEX-F, at 2.2C) put their median above the 2015-16 record. Model agreement this strong is unusual, though I’d note that agreement is not the same thing as skill as I discuss later on.

Long-time readers may recall that in a warming world, the raw Niño 3.4 anomaly risks conflating El Niño with the broader ocean warming trend. NOAA’s answer is the relative ONI (RONI), which subtracts the tropical-mean SST anomaly to isolate the ENSO signal. In RONI terms the record holder is actually 1982-83 (a peak monthly value of 2.69C), not 2015-16. However, even using RONI the multi-model median in 11 of the 14 models shows a record event.

As above, but for the relative Niño 3.4 index (RONI): Niño 3.4 anomaly minus the 20S-20N tropical-mean anomaly, with the L’Heureux et al. (2024) variance-restoration scaling applied. The record event in RONI terms is 1982-83 (a peak monthly value of 2.69C).

Putting the two together: models give a ~91% chance of a record peak in Niño 3.4 terms and ~77% in RONI terms this year. Whichever way you slice the index, the forecast says the same thing: this is more likely than not to be the strongest El Niño ever observed.

So how did we get here? The forecast has been building all spring. The figure below shows how each model’s projection evolved from its March run through its July run, against observed monthly conditions.

Ensemble-mean Niño 3.4 forecast from each model’s March, April, May, June and July 2026 runs (blues deepening with recency; July in red with its full member range shaded), against observed monthly means from the daily OISSTv2.1 series (black). One corrupted NCAR-CESM1 ensemble member is excluded from the July run for clarity.

Nearly every panel shows the same thing: each successive run warmer than the last, across five months and thirteen independent modeling systems.2 This pattern of sustained revision as initialization improves is the classic signature of a real intensifying event rather than model noise. The reason is visible in the black line: observed conditions kept outrunning the forecasts. (Though credit where credit is due: NCAR’s CESM1 was calling ~4C back in March when that looked absurd, and I and others called it out as unrealistic at the time. The ensemble has since converged toward it.)

The combined multi-model picture makes the same point more concisely.

The model-weighted median Niño 3.4 forecast from each monthly initialization, March through July 2026 (July with its 10-90% member band), against observed monthly OISSTv2.1.

The peak median has climbed from ~2.8C in the March runs to 3.6C in July — though notably the revisions are decelerating (+0.5C, +0.14C, +0.14C over the last three cycles), suggesting the forecast is converging rather than still escalating.

It is also worth looking at what this event looks like spatially. The figure below maps each model’s SST anomaly field at its own forecast peak month.

Sea surface temperature anomaly forecasts at each model’s own 2026 peak month (the July-December month maximizing its Niño 3.4 mean), from the July 2026 initializations of 6 NMME models, 7 C3S centres, and SINTEX-F (seasonal mean, June initialization). Niño 3.4 region boxed; panels ordered warmest first.

The classic east-Pacific El Niño tongue is there in every model. I’d flag CMCC as the outlier to discount: its 5.3C peak sits a full 1.3C above the next warmest model. Because we are looking at the multi-model median, even discounting CMCC doesn’t change the overall forecast meaningfully.

Meanwhile, the ocean is not waiting for the models. Daily SSTs in the Niño 3.4 region are already running around 2C above their era-adjusted average – the threshold for a very strong (”super”) El Niño if sustained – and it is only mid-July. The figure below puts this in context, showing the daily Niño 3.4 anomaly for every year in the satellite record, with each year measured against its own era’s climatology so the long-term warming trend doesn’t mess up the comparison.

Daily Niño 3.4 SST anomaly for every year since 1982, from NOAA OISSTv2.1 (final plus near-real-time) via NOAA CoastWatch ERDDAP. Each year is referenced to its own centered 30-year day-of-year climatology (the ONI convention), removing the long-term warming trend. 2026 is shown in red; the great El Niño development years 2015 and 1997 are highlighted for comparison.

No prior year in the 45-year record has been anywhere near this warm this early: not 1997 (+1.6C at this date), the previous benchmark for an explosive onset, and not 2015 (+1.3C). And El Niño almost always peaks near the end of the calendar year – typically between November and January, occasionally as early as October – so the physics of ENSO’s seasonal phase-locking says there is likely a good deal of intensification still to come.3

What does all this mean for global temperatures? Because global temperature lags ENSO by around three to five months, most of this event’s warming will land in 2027, which is now shaping up to be a genuinely alarming year and the warmest on record by a sizable margin. But a strengthening El Niño does load the dice for late 2026: our dashboard currently gives this year a non-trivial chance (~28%) of edging out 2024 as the warmest on record, up from ~13% at the start of the month..

I want to end with an important caveat about these numbers: the models have never been verified in this territory. Seasonal forecast systems have real, demonstrated skill at this lead time for ordinary events, but no ensemble has ever forecast (and then verified against) a 3.6C El Niño, because one has never happened. Model agreement is reassuring, but it is not proof. But the uncertainties can cut both ways, and the observed ocean, not just the models, is already in uncharted waters.

As always, for daily updates on the El Niño forecast and global temperatures head over to our Climate Dashboard.

1 I referred to it as “absolutely gobsmackingly bananas” at the time, which might be the only time something I said ever went properly viral online.

2 The SINTEX-F model is not included in this plot as I only began tracking it in July.

3 The lone exception in the modern record is the unusual two-year 1986-88 event, which reached its ONI maximum in August 1987. Every other strong event since 1950 peaked between October and January.

Categories: I. Climate Science

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #29

Skeptical Science - Sun, 07/19/2026 - 08:38
A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 12, 2026 thru Sat, July 18, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (7 articles)

Climate Science and Research (6 articles)

Climate Policy and Politics (4 articles)

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (3 articles)

Miscellaneous (3 articles)

Climate Education and Communication (2 articles)

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

  • He sued the oil industry for $51B. Now he faces Republicans in a private grilling. The fossil fuel industry and its allies have targeted the science that factors into many of the climate lawsuits for nearly a decade; with attribution science showing how fossil fuel companies supercharge extreme weather the industry claims that the growing field exists solely to propel litigation. Politico, Lesley Clark, Hailey Fuchs, Corbin Hiar and Chelsea Harvey, Jul 15, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 article)

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!
Categories: I. Climate Science

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