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‘Concerning’ low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak
Antarctic sea ice has recorded its third-smallest winter peak extent since satellite records began 48 years ago, new data reveals.
Provisional data from the US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) shows that Antarctic sea ice hit its annual winter peak on 14 September, with an extent of 17.59m square kilometres (km2).
The organisation notes that the data is still preliminary, adding that “large fluctuations in extent are typical of Antarctic sea ice near the seasonal maximum”.
One expert tells Carbon Brief that it is “concerning to see these low values persisting”, but says that scientists need more time to determine whether this represents a “structural shift” in Antarctic sea ice extent.
Meanwhile, at the Earth’s other pole, Arctic sea ice reached its annual minimum on 12 September, ranking as the joint-10th lowest in the satellite record.
The NSIDC notes that the last 20 years have seen the lowest 20 Arctic sea ice extents in the satellite record.
Antarctic peakDr Lettie Roach, a polar climate scientist at the Alfred Wegener Institute in Germany, tells Carbon Brief that this year’s Antarctic sea ice maximum was “well below average for the season”. She warns that, “after several decades of stable or increasing winter Antarctic sea ice conditions, it is concerning to see these low values persisting”.
She adds:
“Compared with the Arctic, it’s less clear how recent changes in Antarctic sea ice are attributable to human-caused warming vs natural variability. We need more years of observations to better understand whether this is truly a structural shift.”
Dr Clare Eayrs, a postdoctoral researcher at the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), tells Carbon Brief that, since recording a “near-average February minimum” extent, Antarctic sea ice has “returned to unusually low winter coverage”.
She notes that Antarctic sea ice extent in July and August this year were the fifth and fourth lowest on record, respectively, adding that “all five of the lowest July extents have occurred since 2022 and all four of the lowest August extents since 2023”.
The chart below shows Antarctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2023 (mid blue), the year of the smallest winter sea-ice maximum on record.
Daily Arctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.Eayrs tells Carbon Brief that the regional pattern of Antarctic sea ice cover “changed substantially during the growth season”.
For example, she says that “in April, the Bellingshausen Sea remained almost entirely ice-free, while the neighbouring Amundsen Sea had more ice than usual”.
However, by late August, changes in atmospheric pressure and wind meant that “the Bellingshausen deficit had largely recovered, while ice was unusually scarce in the Amundsen Sea and across much of East Antarctica”.
Map showing the main regions of the Antarctic. Credit: Carbon BriefArctic minimum
Meanwhile, the Arctic recorded its minimum summer sea ice extent on 12 September. At 4.60m km2, this year ties with 2025, 2010 and 2008 as the 10th-lowest sea ice extent on record.
The chart below shows Arctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2012 (mid blue), the year of the smallest summer sea-ice minimum on record.
Daily Antarctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.Roach tells Carbon Brief that although this minimum is not “record setting”, it is still “lower than any sea ice minimum before 2007”. She adds:
“Human-caused climate change has reduced Arctic sea ice cover and thickness, so the region is fundamentally different compared to a few decades ago.”
Scientists have been tracking Arctic sea ice thickness using a reanalysis produced called the Pan-Arctic Ice Ocean Modeling and Assimilation System (PIOMAS) since 1979.
In March 2026, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) terminated a global dataset of air pressure that scientists relied upon to produce PIOMAS, forcing both datasets to stop publishing updates.
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.preheader p{ margin-top: 0; font-family: 'PT Sans', sans-serif; font-weight: var(--type--3--font-weight--bold); color: var(--button--color); font-size: var(--button--font-size, inherit); } .newsletter-inline{ display: flex; border: solid 1px #333333; padding: 1em; background: #ffffff; } .inline-email{ display:inline-block; margin-right:1em; margin-top:0 !important; margin-bottom:0.5em; } #field_submit{ display:inline-block; margin-top:0 !important; } .gform_wrapper .gfield+.gfield{ margin-top:0 } Email gform.initializeOnLoaded( function() {gformInitSpinner( 5, 'http://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/plugins/gravityforms/images/spinner.svg', false );jQuery('#gform_ajax_frame_5').on('load',function(){var contents = jQuery(this).contents().find('*').html();var is_postback = contents.indexOf('GF_AJAX_POSTBACK') >= 0;if(!is_postback){return;}var form_content = jQuery(this).contents().find('#gform_wrapper_5');var is_confirmation = jQuery(this).contents().find('#gform_confirmation_wrapper_5').length > 0;var is_redirect = contents.indexOf('gformRedirect(){') >= 0;var is_form = form_content.length > 0 && ! is_redirect && ! is_confirmation;var mt = parseInt(jQuery('html').css('margin-top'), 10) + parseInt(jQuery('body').css('margin-top'), 10) + 100;if(is_form){jQuery('#gform_wrapper_5').html(form_content.html());if(form_content.hasClass('gform_validation_error')){jQuery('#gform_wrapper_5').addClass('gform_validation_error');} else {jQuery('#gform_wrapper_5').removeClass('gform_validation_error');}setTimeout( function() { /* delay the scroll by 50 milliseconds to fix a bug in chrome */ jQuery(document).scrollTop(jQuery('#gform_wrapper_5').offset().top - mt); }, 50 );if(window['gformInitDatepicker']) {gformInitDatepicker();}if(window['gformInitPriceFields']) {gformInitPriceFields();}var current_page = jQuery('#gform_source_page_number_5').val();gformInitSpinner( 5, 'http://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/plugins/gravityforms/images/spinner.svg', false );jQuery(document).trigger('gform_page_loaded', [5, current_page]);window['gf_submitting_5'] = false;}else if(!is_redirect){var confirmation_content = jQuery(this).contents().find('.GF_AJAX_POSTBACK').html();if(!confirmation_content){confirmation_content = contents;}jQuery('#gform_wrapper_5').replaceWith(confirmation_content);jQuery(document).scrollTop(jQuery('#gf_5').offset().top - mt);jQuery(document).trigger('gform_confirmation_loaded', [5]);window['gf_submitting_5'] = false;wp.a11y.speak(jQuery('#gform_confirmation_message_5').text());}else{jQuery('#gform_5').append(contents);if(window['gformRedirect']) {gformRedirect();}}jQuery(document).trigger("gform_pre_post_render", [{ formId: "5", currentPage: "current_page", abort: function() { this.preventDefault(); } }]); if (event && event.defaultPrevented) { return; } const gformWrapperDiv = document.getElementById( "gform_wrapper_5" ); if ( gformWrapperDiv ) { const visibilitySpan = document.createElement( "span" ); visibilitySpan.id = "gform_visibility_test_5"; gformWrapperDiv.insertAdjacentElement( "afterend", visibilitySpan ); } const visibilityTestDiv = document.getElementById( "gform_visibility_test_5" ); let postRenderFired = false; function triggerPostRender() { if ( postRenderFired ) { return; } postRenderFired = true; gform.core.triggerPostRenderEvents( 5, current_page ); if ( visibilityTestDiv ) { visibilityTestDiv.parentNode.removeChild( visibilityTestDiv ); } } function debounce( func, wait, immediate ) { var timeout; return function() { var context = this, args = arguments; var later = function() { timeout = null; if ( !immediate ) func.apply( context, args ); }; var callNow = immediate && !timeout; clearTimeout( timeout ); timeout = setTimeout( later, wait ); if ( callNow ) func.apply( context, args ); }; } const debouncedTriggerPostRender = debounce( function() { triggerPostRender(); }, 200 ); if ( visibilityTestDiv && visibilityTestDiv.offsetParent === null ) { const observer = new MutationObserver( ( mutations ) => { mutations.forEach( ( mutation ) => { if ( mutation.type === 'attributes' && visibilityTestDiv.offsetParent !== null ) { debouncedTriggerPostRender(); observer.disconnect(); } }); }); observer.observe( document.body, { attributes: true, childList: false, subtree: true, attributeFilter: [ 'style', 'class' ], }); } else { triggerPostRender(); } } );} );The PIOMAS website says it will take “considerable effort and time” to find alternative data to use in their reanalysis. It adds that “we don’t yet have a good sense if that’s possible with available funds and if so, when we will be able to resume production of a new PIOMAS timeseries”.
Roach also notes that August saw record-breaking heat sweep across much of the world, explaining that high temperatures “extended into Arctic coastal regions, close to regions with substantial sea ice loss – particularly the Barents-Kara and East Siberian seas”.
Dr Zack Labe, a scientist at Climate Central, tells Carbon Brief that the absence of a new record does not mean that ice cover is becoming more “resilient”. He says:
“Local weather patterns across the Arctic play a really important role in year-to-year sea-ice extent, even as the long-term trend is clearly downward.”
Labe tells Carbon Brief that weather in the Arctic this summer was “influenced mainly by lower pressure toward the central Arctic, which brought cloudier and cooler conditions that limited surface melt and delayed the start of the melt season”.
He explains that this “was most obvious across parts of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas, where the melt season didn’t really kick off until after early July, which was more than two weeks later than normal”.
In contrast, he says, the Atlantic side of the Arctic “had a much more extreme summer”, with sea ice in the Barents Sea recording its “earliest melt-out on record”.
This was partly due to “unusually warm air and ocean temperatures”, Labe says. He notes, for example, that parts of western Siberia saw unusually persistent temperatures more than 5C above the 1981-2010 average for much of the summer, which extended out over the Kara Sea and contributed to substantial ice melt in this area”.
Map showing main regions of the Arctic. Credit: Carbon BriefLabe tells Carbon Brief that, going forward, scientists need “more data and observations of other sea-ice metrics, like ice thickness, which may give us better insight into the overall condition of the ice pack, especially during years like 2026 when it is very fragmented”.
(In March 2026, Arctic sea ice reached its peak extent for this winter, clocking in as the joint-smallest in a satellite record going back almost half a century.)
Related Guest post: Climate change has caused one-fifth of Pine Island glacier retreat 29.06.2026 Antarctica ‘Very alarming’ winter sees Arctic sea ice hit record-low for second year running 27.03.2026 Ice Q&A: How Trump is threatening climate science in Earth’s polar regions 20.02.2026 Antarctica Limiting warming to 2C is ‘crucial’ to protect pristine Antarctic Peninsula 20.02.2026 AntarcticaThe post ‘Concerning’ low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Skeptical Science New Research for Week #39 2026
The Increasing Incidence of Boreal and Western U.S. Forest Wildfires and Its Causes: An Overview, Wallace et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society
This overview of the voluminous wildfire literature addresses the following questions: “How seriously is the current spate of wildfires impacting the boreal forests and the forests of the western United States? Is the current rate of burning of these forests unprecedented? Has it been systematically increasing over the past few decades and, if so, is it in response to human-induced global warming?” The article contains diagrams and tables based on a suite of fire-related datasets: satellite measurements of burned area, fire-related carbon emissions, aerosol optical depth, dating back to around the year 2000, and longer ground-based records of area burned by fires in the western United States. The graphics and tables reveal the remarkable extent of the forested area burned. The average area burned per year has increased by roughly a factor of three since the year 2000. The area burned by severe fires with areas > 100 km2 has been increasing more rapidly than the area burned by smaller fires. Wildfire smoke has also increased appreciably over much of North America. Forested burned area and fire-related carbon emissions are highly sensitive to measures of aridity on time scales ranging from days to decades. Aridity has increased, mainly in response to the warming trend, which is comparable in magnitude to that in climate model simulations of the response to rising greenhouse gas concentrations. The evidence presented herein supports the widely held belief that the recent increase in wildfires is mainly due to human-induced global warming.
Net Groundwater Recharge in California Occurs Primarily During Above-Average Snowpack Years, Reager et al., Geophysical Research Letters
In a new application of GRACE and GRACE-FO satellite observations, we estimate basin-scale net groundwater recharge rates for the combined Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Tulare basins encompassing California's Central Valley aquifer. Net recharge is calculated as the temporal derivative of groundwater storage anomalies and compared with precipitation and snow water equivalent over a fixed study area. Net positive recharge is rare, occurring in only six water years since 2004, and is consistently associated with years of above-average Sierra Nevada snowpack. Across the observational record, net positive recharge is observed only in years when snow water equivalent exceeds approximately 21 km3 (17 MAF; ∼121% of the 20-year mean value), with the largest recharge event coinciding with the exceptionally wet winter of water year 2023. These results suggest that above-average snowpack conditions, rather than rainfall alone, are an important enabling condition for basin-scale groundwater recharge under a warming climate.
Concurrent Eurasian Heatwaves Will Intensify Beyond the Mean Warming, Xu et al., Geophysical Research Letters
Heatwaves occurring at the same time over Europe and North China are among the most common simultaneous climate extremes in the Northern Hemisphere. These events are linked by a large-scale atmospheric circulation pattern, the British–Baikal Corridor pattern, which produces high-pressure systems over both regions simultaneously. Using a large ensemble of climate model simulations, we find that these concurrent heatwaves will become much more severe in the future. Importantly, they intensify faster than average temperature increases due to global warming. Even after accounting for background warming, temperatures during these events exceed the regional mean warming by about 0.3°C on average and by more than 0.5°C locally. Surprisingly, the reasons for this additional intensification differ between the two regions. Over North China, the atmospheric circulation pattern strengthens, bringing clearer skies and greater solar heating. Over Europe, however, the circulation pattern weakens, but heatwaves still intensify because drier soils provide less evaporative cooling. These findings challenge the common assumption that the same weather pattern amplifies heat equally wherever it occurs. They also suggest that future heat risks may be underestimated if assessments rely only on average warming, particularly when heatwaves strike multiple regions simultaneously.
Defending the status quo: The role of system justification in public opposition to ambitious climate policy and energy system change, Lloyd et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology
In recent years, environmental psychologists have argued that our field must conduct more solutions-focussed and system-level research if we want to contribute to ambitious and effective climate action. In this paper, we propose that system justification offers a promising pathway towards achieving both of these goals, and investigate its influence on three societally-impactful outcomes: support for climate policy, support for a just energy transition, and endorsement of climate delay discourses. We also test whether experimentally inducing hope could offer a solution to these proposed deleterious effects. We conduct this research in small-to-medium sized communities in Western Canada, many of which are dependent upon fossil-fuels for their continued existence, and thus strongly oppose decarbonization. Using an online survey of these communities (N = 3,400) we find that system justification consistently predicts lower support for climate policies, greater endorsement of climate delay discourses, and lower support for a just energy transition. Additionally, moderation analyses reveal that this relationship is stronger for those with greater proximity to the fossil-fuel industry, and that our hope manipulation had no effect. We explore the policy implications of these findings, arguing that policymakers should (1) aim to narratively detach the status quo from the economic system, and (2) design just transitions policies which act to maintain fossil-fuel communities’ current way of life, rather than trying to improve it. These findings extend system justification theory to three new societally-impactful outcomes; demonstrate its utility for policymaking; and highlight its potential to contribute to transformation-oriented research in environmental psychology.
From this week's government/NGO section:Findings from a 2026 Survey of Adults Age 18 and Older, Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago and the AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research
The authors found that 53% of Americans are extremely or very concerned about the environmental effects of AI, up from 41% who said the same in 2025. Younger adults ages 18-29 have become particularly concerned, increasing from 38% last year to 60% today and moving from levels similar to other age groups to the highest level of concern. Forty-seven percent of Americans think AI will do more to hurt rather than help the environment, up from 33% who said the same in 2025. The authors also explored attitudes toward climate change, energy policy, and electric vehicles (EVs). Most Americans agree that climate change is happening and is caused by human activity, a trend that has remained stable in recent years. There is a large partisan divide in these attitudes, however, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to believe climate change is occurring (92% vs. 55%) and is caused mostly by human activity (68% vs. 34%). About 2 in 3 believe that oil and gas companies, the federal government, and large businesses and corporations have a lot of responsibility to address climate change, while just 4 in 10 say the same about developing countries and individual people.In Hottest Summer on Record, 2 in 3 Americans Say Climate Change Is Increasing Heat-Related Illnesses, Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania
Nearly two-thirds of the American public say climate change is increasing the risk of respiratory diseases and heat- and insect-related illnesses. The author's survey, which was conducted Aug. 4-17, 2026, among 1,904 empaneled U.S. adults, found that 76% report that extreme outdoor heat affected their daily activities at least sometimes in the past year and 38% say poor air quality resulting from wildfire smoke did so. Extreme heat is affecting the everyday lives of most Americans. Nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) say that climate change is increasing the risk of heat-related illnesses, respiratory diseases, and insect-borne diseases. This is unchanged from August 2025 (65%) and July 2024 (67%) but is significantly higher than 58% in November 2023. Americans generally recognize that heat waves are on the rise. Nearly two-thirds (62%) say U.S. heat waves are becoming more frequent and intense than in the past, statistically unchanged from 61% in August 2025, 65% in July 2024, and 58% in November 2023. Of the four extreme weather events measured in the survey, more Americans report that their daily activities were impacted at least sometimes by extreme outdoor heat (76%) and poor air quality resulting from wildfire smoke (38%). As one would expect, fewer say they were impacted at least sometimes by flooding (20%) and tornadoes/hurricanes (11%), since these events are less frequent. 87 articles in 46 journals by 618 contributing authorsPhysical science of climate change, effects
Amplified Cloud-Phase Responses Over Global Mountain Regions Under Climate Warming, Zhang et al., AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002380
Anthropogenic Warming Weakens Mild Offshore Winds in Southern California but Not the Extreme Fire-Weather Winds, Madakumbura et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008422
Emerging Divergence Between Dry- and Humid-Heat in China Under Weakening Temperature-Humidity Coupling, Zhu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046959
Future Reduction of North Pacific Subtropical Mode Water: Its Impacts on Physical and Biogeochemical Conditions in the North Pacific Subtropical Gyre, Sugimoto, Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2026jc024776
On the Timescales of Atmospheric Adjustments to Contrail Cirrus Formation, Quarroz et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125935
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A holistic platform for accelerating sorbent-based carbon capture, Nature, 10.1038/s41586-024-07683-8 95 cites.
Observations of climate change, effects
Earthquake-triggered cascading hazards under Arctic amplification, Melo et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2617210123
Long-term weakening of extreme cold stress in eastern China, Li et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100960
Observational Evidence for Accelerated Warming and Salinification Propagating Into the Deep Mediterranean, Terzi? & Vilibi?, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124518
Spatiotemporal variations in snowline altitude across the High Mountain Asia from 1990 to 2024 Based on Landsat Data, Wang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.007
The Increasing Incidence of Boreal and Western U.S. Forest Wildfires and Its Causes: An Overview, Wallace et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0193.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Sketching the spatial disparities in heatwave trends by changing atmospheric teleconnections in the Northern Hemisphere, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52254-0 42 cites.
Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
A deep learning framework for gridding daily climate variables from a sparse station network, Dumitrescu, Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-8895-2026
Attribution estimates for similar extremes are robust across event definitions, Otto et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04053-2
Improving global and regional ocean heat content by consistently combining GRACE gravity, satellite altimetry and Argo profile observations in a joint inversion framework, Uebbing et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-6945-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Are Our Climate Data Fit for Your Purpose?, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 10.1175/bams-d-23-0295.1 10 cites.
Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects
Concurrent Eurasian Heatwaves Will Intensify Beyond the Mean Warming, Xu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123850
Future Redistribution of North Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Risk in Two Contrasting CMIP6 Scenarios, Lele et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl123424
Projected Changes in Reference Evapotranspiration Across Indian Climate Regimes Using Bias-Corrected CMIP6 Simulations, Nayak et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70603
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Abrupt increase in Arctic-Subarctic wildfires caused by future permafrost thaw, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-51471-x 42 cites.
Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection
A new Earth Observation–based WRF configuration for urban regional climate simulations over Paris, Kyriakidis et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-8709-2026
Downscaling of Temperatures Over the Eastern Mediterranean for the 21st Century, Gelman et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70519
New Constraint on Future Ocean Heat Uptake Revealed by Considering Model Spread of Radiative Forcing, Wu & Gregory, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123530
The Cloud Feedback Model Intercomparison Project (CFMIP) contribution to CMIP7, Ceppi et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-8693-2026
Using Rapid Temperature Falls to Estimate Future Strong Cold Front Frequency in CMIP6 Climate Projections, Corrales et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124031
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A Comprehensive Evaluation of Mean and Extreme Climate for the Conformal Cubic Atmospheric Model (CCAM), Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology, 10.1175/jamc-d-24-0004.1 16 cites.
Cryosphere & climate change
Accelerated mass loss of glaciers across Alaska since the Little Ice Age, Carrivick et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-70307-w
Cross-Basin Synergistic Effects Stall Summer Sea Ice Decline in the Chukchi Sea, Dong et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd047482
Enhanced Erosion Across a Transition From Continuous to Discontinuous Permafrost in Alaska, Özpolat et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007889
Feedbacks and timescales in the modelled transient response of debris-covered glaciers, Hardmeier et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5365-2026
Modelling climate-induced instability of ice-rich permafrost slopes, Aga et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-5225-2026
Net Groundwater Recharge in California Occurs Primarily During Above-Average Snowpack Years, Reager et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122396
Parameterizing tidal-water intrusions in long-term Antarctic ice-sheet projections, Juárez-Martínez et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5345-2026
Seasonal Response of the Arctic Sea Ice to Meltwater Runoff from the Greenland Ice Sheet, Liang et al., Journal of Physical Oceanography 10.1175/jpo-d-26-0025.1
Spatiotemporal variations in snowline altitude across the High Mountain Asia from 1990 to 2024 Based on Landsat Data, Wang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.007
Temporal evolution of the Petermann Ice Shelf estuary constrained by satellite remote sensing observations, Savignano et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5247-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Lake ice quality in a warming world, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00590-6 33 cites.
Sea level & climate change
Anatomy of Interannual to Decadal Sea Level Changes in the GECCO3 Ocean Synthesis, Stammer et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2026jc024340
Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A 485-million-year history of Earth’s surface temperature, Science, 10.1126/science.adk3705 242 cites.
Biology & climate change, related geochemistry
Climate change affects the distribution of cacti species of the genus Melocactus in the Brazilian Caatinga, Cavalcante et al., Tropical Ecology Open Access 10.1007/s42965-026-00444-w
Detection of emergent multiple predator effects in a warming world, Davidson et al., Biology Letters Open Access 10.1098/rsbl.2026.0257
Escalating Ecological Droughts Driven by Compound Soil and Atmospheric Dryness, Song et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71102
Global Projections of Coral Reef Sediment Dissolution in the 21st Century, Yan et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125720
GROWTH RESPONSES OF CHIHUAHUA PINE (PINUS LEIOPHYLLA) OVER 128 YEARS OF WARMING AND PRECIPITATION REGIME SHIFTS, Todd et al., Dendrochronologia Open Access 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126614
Identifying future climate refugia in central European mountain forests, Berre et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access 10.1111/1365-2745.70439
Increasingly synchronous water limitation portends resilience declines for whitebark pine, Friedman & Germain, Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126615
Reforestation Under Climate Change—A Cross-Regional Deadwood Retention Experiment to Develop Multifunctional Forests on Disturbed Norway Spruce Areas, Putzenlechner et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.74357
Spatial Variability in Phytoplankton Response to Projected Increases in Iron and Temperature in the Ross Sea, Cristi et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jc024364
Summer Heat Stress Downregulates Photochemistry in Coast Redwoods, Klinek et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2026jg010052
Synthesis of scale-dependent plant biodiversity change in climate warming experiments, Korell et al., Ecology Open Access 10.1002/ecy.70486
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Nonanthropocentric climate ethics, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.131 72 cites.
GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry
Abundance of Fe/Al Oxides Governs Soil Organic Carbon Stability in Wetlands Under Drying Conditions, Yao et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71109
Climate and penguin-mediated carbon burial hotspots in coastal lakes of East Antarctica, Zhao et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105730
Forest Carbon Exchange Dynamics and Integrated Carbon Budget of a Subtropical Island Ecosystem, Han et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg010032
Heterogeneity in Permafrost Organic Matter Molecular Composition With Depth and Ramifications Upon Thaw in the Western Siberian Lowlands, Anderson et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg010169
Modeling forest soil organic carbon dynamics under seasonal freeze–thaw cycles: implications for carbon sequestration in cold-region forest ecosystems, Gao et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1939588
Natural wetland methane emissions simulated by ICON-XPP, Wilkenskjeld et al., Biogeosciences Open Access 10.5194/bg-23-6583-2026
Net carbon losses in Central African forests revealed by high-resolution biomass change maps, Wan et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77531-y
Nonlinear thermal responses of soil respiration temperature sensitivity under climate change, Yang et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105727
Seven-year continuous measurement of CO2 and CH4 at Atlas Mohammed V atmospheric research station in Northwest Africa, Ouchen et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122365
Structural Diversity Amplifies the Effects of Functional Diversity on Forest Carbon Storage Across Stand Development, Wang et al., Global Ecology and Biogeography Open Access pdf 10.1111/geb.70309
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Emerging multiscale insights on microbial carbon use efficiency in the land carbon cycle, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52160-5 119 cites.
CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
Carbon sequestration potential of tree planting under future climate scenarios in the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area, China, Zhao et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103128
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Feasible deployment of carbon capture and storage and the requirements of climate targets, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02104-0 170 cites.
Decarbonization
Flash energy droughts in solar and wind resources under climate change, Lin et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02753-3
Hydrogen Storage Technologies: Materials Innovation and System-Level Challenges for a Carbon-Neutral Future, Pranto et al., Advanced Energy and Sustainability Research Open Access 10.1002/aesr.70256
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Diverse decarbonization pathways under near cost-optimal futures, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52433-z 43 cites.
Geoengineering climate
Mapping justice claims for solar geoengineering, Jinnah et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001054
Uneven Responses of Regional Terrestrial Ecosystem Carbon Turnover Time to Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, Park et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.21390921
Black carbon
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The politics of knowledge in black carbon mitigation: Policy entrepreneurship of Finnish actors and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103881 3 cites.
Aerosols
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global aerosol retrieval over land from Landsat imagery integrating Transformer and Google Earth Engine, Remote Sensing of Environment, 10.1016/j.rse.2024.114404 45 cites.
Climate change communications & cognition
Affective divisions and climate policy polarization, Bäck et al., Environmental Politics Open Access pdf 10.1080/09644016.2026.2731596
Future Before My Eyes: How Psychological Distance and Immersive Presentations Relate to Climate Emotions, Schroeder et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103213
Simple logic warnings improve climate argument evaluation across beliefs and partisanship, Bagó & Purcell, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02754-2
Simple logic warnings improve climate argument evaluation across beliefs and partisanship, Bagó & Purcell, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02754-2
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with AI, Science, 10.1126/science.adq1814 305 cites.
Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change
Genetically engineered crops increase climate resilience of US fields, [authors did not process], Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02750-6
Historical dynamics of agricultural carbon emissions in the North China plain over the past 300 years, Ye et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1831579
Long-Term Sustainability of Direct Straw Return Challenged by Soil Carbon Saturation and Emission Trade-Offs, Liu et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71120
Stage-Specific Associations Between Extreme Climate Events and Crop Failures Across China, Huang et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008789
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Nexus among climate change, food systems, and human health: An interdisciplinary research framework in the Global South, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103885 23 cites.
Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change
Future changes and drivers of socioeconomic exposure to extreme precipitation in the Huai River Basin, Jiang et al., Natural Hazards 10.1007/s11069-026-08417-x
Governance barriers to climate change adaptation in regional catchment management, Kennedy et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104491
Net Groundwater Recharge in California Occurs Primarily During Above-Average Snowpack Years, Reager et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122396
The 2025–2026 Iberian Atmospheric Rivers Exhibited Moisture Transport Resembling the Early SSP5-8.5 Climate Response, Fernández-Alvarez et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123799
Variability and response to climate change of precipitation recycling ratio in the water source conservation area of the upper Yellow River, Yang et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109333
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Spatiotemporal patterns in persistent precipitation extremes of the Chinese mainland (1961–2022) and association with the dynamic factors, Atmospheric Research, 10.1016/j.atmosres.2024.107600 14 cites.
Climate change economics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The ocean carbon sink enhances countries’ inclusive wealth and reduces the cost of national climate policies, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01674-3 9 cites.
Climate change mitigation public policy research
Affective divisions and climate policy polarization, Bäck et al., Environmental Politics Open Access pdf 10.1080/09644016.2026.2731596
Australian Elected Representatives Underestimate Public Support for Climate Action, Wilkinson & Klebl, Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103217
Climate action disclosure among companies: Implications for achieving global efforts to limit average global temperature rise to below 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, Shimwela et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000951
Defending the status quo: The role of system justification in public opposition to ambitious climate policy and energy system change, Lloyd et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103214
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Progress from Chicken Genetics to the Chicken Genome, Poultry Science, 10.1093/ps/85.12.2050 55 cites.
Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research
Adapting the emergency management Enterprise to manage the climate emergency: a critical review, Preston et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100885
Cross-sectoral perspectives on strategies to address climate adaptation and health in cyclone-prone Sofala province, Mozambique, Marrufo et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1912968
Governance barriers to climate change adaptation in regional catchment management, Kennedy et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104491
Mapping the urban heat island and climate risk in Padua (Italy): Trends in extremes and perspectives for climate justice in adaptation planning, Ceppi et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103143
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Elevated urban energy risks due to climate-driven biophysical feedbacks, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02108-w 37 cites.
Climate change impacts on human health
Beyond resolution: An integrated framework for selecting climate data for urban heat-risk assessment, Shin et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103150
Climate Informed Dengue Prediction and Future Risk Under a Changing Monsoon Climate in Kerala, India, Yacob & Koll, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20096919
Heatstroke in Japan: current status, future risks, and prevention measures under a changing climate, Oka, Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100887
Long-term weakening of extreme cold stress in eastern China, Li et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100960
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rising cause-specific mortality risk and burden of compound heatwaves amid climate change, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02137-5 100 cites.
Climate change & geopolitics
Mapping and quantifying engagement levels of governments in IPCC approval meetings by topic from text, Bayer et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001057
Other
Climate urgency enables political alignment for Latin American power integration, Ramírez et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77772-x
Dialogue framework for climate justice: bridging social and environmental justice, Thiele, Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2732173
Extreme North American heatwaves in 1941 and 2021 drove widespread but contrasting impacts, Anderson & Chartrand, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04055-0
Internal Variability Dominates the Spatial Heterogeneity of Recent Trends in Eurasian Winter Cold Extremes, Liu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124591
Kinetic study of global-scale O3 pollution under 2060s climate and emission scenarios, Hata et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122367
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climatic controls of fire activity in the red pine forests of eastern North America, Agricultural and Forest Meteorology, 10.1016/j.agrformet.2024.110219 7 cites.
Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives
A global safety net for climate-risk intelligence is urgently needed, Bashir & Adil, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-02995-3
Adaptation as a catalyst for social change, Adams et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001052
Protecting tropical forests is more cost-effective for biodiversity and climate than restoration, Miranda et al., Science 10.1126/science.adx9928
Research Priorities for Robust Climate Assessments in the United States, Kenney et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007336
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A just world on a safe planet: a Lancet Planetary Health–Earth Commission report on Earth-system boundaries, translations, and transformations, The Lancet Planetary Health, 10.1016/s2542-5196(24)00042-1 173 cites.
Making California’s Electricity Cheaper: An Affordability Agenda for the Golden State, Boyle et al., Grid Lab and Energy Innovation
More than 80% of Californians rank lowering bills as a top or important priority for state leaders, and the state’s elected officials have a duty to address these intertwined problems for their constituents. In response, the authors participated in a workshop of more than 20 California electricity experts to diagnose what is causing rising costs and develop actionable policy solutions that address the scale of the challenge. The authors were informed by but not limited by that workshop; they define a policy roadmap to stabilize and ultimately reduce electricity rates for California’s incoming governor, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), the legislature, utilities, and other stakeholders, that will allow California to sustain its clean energy leadership.Understanding the linkage between transmission deliverability and resource adequacy, Stenclik et al., GridLab and Telos Energy
The authors wanted to bridge the gap between interconnection studies and resource adequacy assessments, two processes that are deeply interrelated, but have historically been treated as separate analytical exercises. Most of the recent attention on generator interconnection has focused on interconnection costs, queue timelines, and transmission cost allocation, while the resource adequacy implications have remained largely unexamined. Despite the central role of deliverability assumptions in resource adequacy assessments, there has been limited research into whether they accurately reflect how resources perform during periods of elevated resource adequacy risk outside of narrowly defined peak-load windows. Inaccurately assumed generator deliverability can have a large affect on resource adequacy outcomes.Assessing Electricity Resource Adequacy in Pennsylvania and PJM, Knight et al., Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
The authors developed load projections and evaluated resource adequacy under a set of likely possible futures for PJM's grid and its' Pennsylvania service area. The authors used capacity expansion and resource adequacy scenario modeling to (a) develop projections of future resources through the long term (2040) in light of different load projections and (b) assess system reliability performance through the near term (2030) to better understand the kinds of stresses Pennsylvania’s electric system and the wider PJM grid face. Three scenarios were used. In both the Reference scenario and the High Load And Low Supply scenario, the authors found that from 2027 through 2030, the PJM planning criterion for resource adequacy (loss of load expectation or “LOLE” of 0.1) is not met by PJM. Meanwhile, in the No New Data Centers scenario, LOLE is below this 0.1 threshold.State of Mind: Mapping Values and Climate Perceptions, Maharashtra Edition, Ek Kutumb Solutions
If technical infrastructure enables the delivery of climate solutions, relational infrastructure enables their acceptance, adoption, and endurance. It comprises the social foundations that shape whether people engage with transitions: the values they hold, the degree of agency they feel, the priorities they seek to protect, the institutions they trust, and the ways in which they make sense of change. To address this missing layer, Ek Kutumb is building the first and largest state-by-state, values-based segmentation of citizens in India. The research seeks to surface the deeply held values and perceptions of climate change, along with experiences of agency, priorities, and trust factors that shape how people respond to climate-related issues and interventions. The first state examined is Maharashtra. Four themes emerge from the Maharashtra findings including the primacy of everyday economic pressures, a deep but locally rooted relationship with nature, broad acceptance of climate change expressed in the language of lived experience rather than scientific terminology, and a trust vacuum in which no institution has yet earned the mandate to lead on climate. The authors segment the population into seven value-based groups, each defined by a distinct configuration of core values. For each segment, they examined their relationship to family and community, as well as their understanding of the environment, climate, and institutions.State of Global Water Resources 2025, World Meteorological Organization
The authors provide a comprehensive quantitative overview of global water resources, with a focus on hydrological variability and trends. The report's information supports countries, decision makers and stakeholders in understanding the current state of water resources, identifying areas with significant anomalies and supporting effective water management strategies. The authors found that 2025 was one of driest years for river discharge in 35 years. The past seven years have seen abnormal river flows. Water storage on Earth’s land surface has decreased in past 10 years. Widespread glacier loss occurred across all regions for the fourth consecutive year. Asia and Africa are the regions most affected by water-related disasters. Water data availability has improved, but gaps remain in hard hit areas.State-Led Planning, Development, and Procurement, Spokas et al., Clean Air Task Force
The authors identify how establishing state-led planning and procurement can help state governments in deregulated electricity markets meet their power sector decarbonization goals and lays out the components needed to put that planning in action.Findings from a 2026 Survey of Adults Age 18 and Older, Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago and the AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research
The authors found that 53% of Americans are extremely or very concerned about the environmental effects of AI, up from 41% who said the same in 2025. Younger adults ages 18-29 have become particularly concerned, increasing from 38% last year to 60% today and moving from levels similar to other age groups to the highest level of concern. Forty-seven percent of Americans think AI will do more to hurt rather than help the environment, up from 33% who said the same in 2025. The authors also explored attitudes toward climate change, energy policy, and electric vehicles (EVs). Most Americans agree that climate change is happening and is caused by human activity, a trend that has remained stable in recent years. There is a large partisan divide in these attitudes, however, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to believe climate change is occurring (92% vs. 55%) and is caused mostly by human activity (68% vs. 34%). About 2 in 3 believe that oil and gas companies, the federal government, and large businesses and corporations have a lot of responsibility to address climate change, while just 4 in 10 say the same about developing countries and individual people.In Hottest Summer on Record, 2 in 3 Americans Say Climate Change Is Increasing Heat-Related Illnesses, Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania
Nearly two-thirds of the American public say climate change is increasing the risk of respiratory diseases and heat- and insect-related illnesses. The author's survey, which was conducted Aug. 4-17, 2026, among 1,904 empaneled U.S. adults, found that 76% report that extreme outdoor heat affected their daily activities at least sometimes in the past year and 38% say poor air quality resulting from wildfire smoke did so. Extreme heat is affecting the everyday lives of most Americans. Nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) say that climate change is increasing the risk of heat-related illnesses, respiratory diseases, and insect-borne diseases. This is unchanged from August 2025 (65%) and July 2024 (67%) but is significantly higher than 58% in November 2023. Americans generally recognize that heat waves are on the rise. Nearly two-thirds (62%) say U.S. heat waves are becoming more frequent and intense than in the past, statistically unchanged from 61% in August 2025, 65% in July 2024, and 58% in November 2023. Of the four extreme weather events measured in the survey, more Americans report that their daily activities were impacted at least sometimes by extreme outdoor heat (76%) and poor air quality resulting from wildfire smoke (38%). As one would expect, fewer say they were impacted at least sometimes by flooding (20%) and tornadoes/hurricanes (11%), since these events are less frequent.Energy Crossroads: Why managing fossil fuel decline is key to Australia’s green export future, Malbrain et al., WWF-Australia
The authors warn that the Australia's bid to be both a renewable energy superpower and a major fossil fuel exporter is putting its economic future at risk. This dual energy strategy is sending mixed signals to investors and trading partners just as countries across the Indo-Pacific accelerate clean energy investments. Australia could lose up to $70 billion in fossil fuel export value by 2035 as global demand shifts. Yet, findings show Australian governments still provide an estimated $20.1 billion a year in support to fossil fuels, compared with just $4.6 billion for renewable energy.Understanding Oregon’s Data Center Industry, Wirkkala et al., Center for Nonprofit and Philanthropic Insight at ECOnorthwest and the University of Virginia
The authors establishes a common foundation for understanding Oregon’s data center industry. They examine the location, scale, and characteristics of existing and planned facilities; electricity and water implications; workforce and economic contributions; property taxes and incentive programs; land use and host-community characteristics; and Oregon’s position relative to selected peer markets. The analysis draws on facility-level data, confidential employment records, economic modeling, county property tax records, geospatial analysis, public utility and water-resource information, and other state, federal, and industry sources. The authors also identify areas where data are insufficient to understand impacts, and further research or reporting is needed. Electricity demand is one of the industry’s most significant infrastructure considerations. Water use depends heavily on facility technology and local conditions. Data centers have a distinct economic profile; relatively few operational jobs, but substantial economic activity. Land-use effects are small statewide, but can be more significant locally.From Opportunity To Infrastructure: Scaling Rooftop Solar In Commercial Real Estate (UK), Cush and Wakefield, Real Estate:UK, Forsters, and Push Power
The authors found that the UK’s untapped commercial rooftops could become a major new source of solar energy generation with enough output to match that of 20 Hinkley Point C nuclear power stations. This, if used correctly, could massively increase UK renewable energy production, fast-track the UK’s path to net zero, improve national energy security, reduce the need for solar deployment on agricultural land, and drastically reduce energy costs for occupiers amid ongoing energy price uncertainty. The authors used data and responses from 70 real estate organizations with combined assets under management of over £500bn. The authors found that less than 10% of suitable commercial building roof space has been used for solar generation to date, providing just 3-5GW of solar capacity. While solar technology is widely championed in principle, its deployment remains significantly below its technical potential, particularly across the industrial and logistics real estate sector.The Dirty Truth. They promised you clean energy, but there's a Dirty Truth behind your rising utility bills, Ver Beek et al., Sierra Club
The authors studied the 50 parent companies that own the most fossil fuel generation, comprised of 76 operating companies, which collectively own half of all remaining coal and gas generation in the U.S. They analyzed their plans to retire coal by 2030, not build new gas plants through 2035, and build clean energy to replace fossil generation and serve new load by 2035. The utilities studied scored 7/100, earning an F, worsening their overall score by 11 points since 2021.Stored Potential. The impacts of utility-scale battery energy storage systems on communities and the grid, Draklellis et al., RMI
The authors examine large-scale battery energy storage system (BESS) projects across the United States, drawing on available data to assess their reliability contributions, economic impacts, community benefits, and improving safety performance. Batteries help keep the lights on during grid stress. Battery storage can lower electricity costs during high-demand periods. BESS projects can provide meaningful local economic benefits. About New ResearchClick here for the why and how of Skeptical Science New Research.
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Interactive: What China’s dozens of ‘five-year plans’ say about climate and energy
Almost three-quarters of the 72 five-year plans published by China this year include policies or targets related to climate change and energy, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Five-year plans are an important part of China’s policymaking process, signalling key priorities and setting targets for the coming years.
The post Interactive: What China’s dozens of ‘five-year plans’ say about climate and energy appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: EVs are now nine times cheaper than petrol or diesel to drive in the UK
The latest surge in fossil-fuel prices means it is now up to nine times cheaper in the UK to drive an electric vehicle (EV) than a petrol or diesel car, shows Carbon Brief analysis.
Since February, when the US first attacked Iran, the average price of diesel has increased by 38% to £1.96 a litre, according to Carbon Brief analysis of government figures.
Following the attack on the Kapotnya oil refinery in Russia on 20 September and with tensions in the Middle East growing, this is expected to pass a record £2 a litre.
(Russia was the second-largest exporter of diesel in the world, but its refineries have been hit every three days on average in the first six months of 2026.)
Similarly, petrol prices have surged by 31% since February to £1.72, based on government figures, with some locations reaching nearly £2 per litre, according to BBC News.
These increases have been driven by oil prices jumping to more than $100 per barrel as the conflict between Yemen’s Houthis and Saudi Arabia escalates – a roughly 50% increase from June.
As such, it now costs an estimated 21p per mile to drive a diesel car and 20.1p per mile for petrol, according to Carbon Brief analysis of the latest figures from the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).
In contrast, it is currently nine times cheaper to drive an EV charged using an off-peak tariff, at 2.3p per mile, as shown in the chart below.
Even if charging with electricity bought at the domestic price cap – the maximum amount a supplier can charge for a unit of energy and standing charge, set by the regulator Ofgem every three months – it still only costs around 7p per mile to drive an EV, three times cheaper than the price for petrol or diesel cars.
The price cap is set to increase in October, but almost all of the increase is for gas, with the unit rate of electricity only expected to rise by less than 1% from 26.1p per unit to 26.3p.
A larger 20% increase in electricity unit rates under the price cap is expected in January 2027, as higher gas costs filter through to an increase in wholesale electricity prices. Nevertheless, EVs would still remain far cheaper to drive than petrol or diesel cars.
UK drivers could save around £80 by charging an EV at home, in comparison with filling up a petrol car at the pump, as shown in the figure below. This is based on comparing the cost of an average full tank of petrol with the cost of enough electricity to drive the same distance.
Despite their much higher running costs, petrol still dominates the UK’s roads, making up 55% of all cars on the road. Only 6% of the roughly 35m cars on the road are fully electric battery EVs, with a further 3% being plug-in hybrids that can run on fuel or electricity.
However, sales of EVs are continuing to increase, with around 30% of new cars sold in August being battery EVs, according to the Society of Motor Manufacturers & Traders (SMMT). This is up from 26.5% in August 2025.
Separate analysis from Carbon Brief in June suggested that the UK’s EV drivers were saving £1,100 a year in fuel costs, compared to petrol car drivers. Following the latest hike in fuel prices, these savings would now be even higher at £1,200 a year.
Compared with average pump prices of £1.72 per litre of petrol or £1.96 per litre of diesel, it would cost as little as 20p – around nine times cheaper than petrol – for an equivalent amount of electricity using off-peak charging.
As shown in the figure below, even charging at the household price cap would only cost the equivalent of 60p per litre, making EVs still significantly cheaper to drive.
Public charging points remain significantly more expensive than domestic rates. However, the UK government estimates that around 90% of electric car charging takes place at home.
In addition, the government plans to introduce a pay-per-mile tax on EVs from April 2028. This would add 3p per mile to the cost of driving an EV. Yet the considerably lower fuel costs mean they will remain far cheaper to drive than petrol or diesel cars.
related Analysis: Global fossil-fuel emissions set to fall in 2026 amid Hormuz crisis 16.09.2026 Emissions CCC: Heathrow expansion could push flights to ‘80% of UK emissions by 2050’ 16.09.2026 Emissions El Niño: Indonesia fire emissions in 2026 ‘on track’ to match record for this century 11.09.2026 El Niño and La Niña UK aviation emissions to be 50% higher than thought by 2050, government admits 10.09.2026 Aviation and shippingThe post Analysis: EVs are now nine times cheaper than petrol or diesel to drive in the UK appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Fact brief - Does wind power require backup from fossil fuels?
Skeptical Science is partnering with Gigafact to produce fact briefs — bite-sized fact checks of trending claims. You can submit claims you think need checking via the tipline.
Does wind power require backup from fossil fuels?Most power grids still combine fossil fuels with renewables, but some already run entirely on renewable energy and offer models others could follow.
The majority of 100% renewable grids rely primarily on hydropower, though certain nations have significantly incorporated wind in their portfolios. Costa Rica and Uruguay have achieved 99-100% renewable power with around 17% and 35% coming from wind, respectively.
Several U.S. municipalities meet electricity demands using diverse portfolios of renewables, including wind. Burlington, Vermont’s 2024 supply was 99.9% renewable, mainly via hydropower, biomass, and wind; Seattle, Washington was 95% renewables powered in 2024. In Kansas and South Dakota, wind alone comprises 60% of generation.
Energy storage is also rapidly expanding as a solution to intermittency, with the U.S. ranking second globally and achieving record growth in 2025. Such combinations of renewable resources, storage, and transmission continue to enable more reliable, renewable grids.
Go to full rebuttal on Skeptical Science or to the fact brief on Gigafact
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Sources
Climate Council 11 countries leading the charge on renewable energy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Denmark #1 in share of renewables in net electricity generation for 2024 in the EU
IEA Lithuania
City of Burlington Electric Department Our Energy Portfolio
City of Seattle Power Supply and Delivery
Analysis of EIA data Share of electricity gen by wind, by state, 2025
U.S. Energy Information Administration Electricity Data Browser
U.S. Grid Energy Storage Factsheet University of Michigan
Princeton University Net-Zero America
NREL NREL Report Redefines Wind as a Grid Stabilizer, Not a Liability
Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles
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Fact briefs are short, credibly sourced summaries that offer "yes/no" answers in response to claims found online. They rely on publicly available, often primary source data and documents. Fact briefs are created by contributors to Gigafact — a nonprofit project looking to expand participation in fact-checking and protect the democratic process. See all of our published fact briefs here.
Explainer: How sea level rise poses an ‘existential threat’ to humans, heritage and nature
For millions of people around the world, rising sea levels are already reshaping economies, livelihoods and cultures.
The world’s oceans are currently rising at a faster rate than at any time in at least the past three millennia, with human influence the “dominant cause” of sea level rise since at least 1970.
At the UN general assembly in New York this week, world leaders are set to adopt a high-level declaration on the “existential threats” posed by sea level rise.
The declaration notes: “Sea level rise is not a distant scenario, but a real and lived experience for many.”
On average, global sea levels rose by 20 centimetres (cm) between 1901 and 2018.
This is due to both the melting of glaciers and ice sheets and the expansion of seawater as it warms, as well as changes in land-water storage.
The rate of the rise has accelerated in recent years, with ocean levels rising 10.6cm since 1993.
Sea level rise can vary locally due to seismic and volcanic activity, groundwater extraction and changes to the Earth’s surface resulting from ice melt.
Under a moderate-emissions scenario, scientists predict that global average sea level will rise an additional 56cm by 2100, relative to a 1995-2014 baseline.
Here, Carbon Brief unpacks some of the key ways that sea level rise threatens both societies and ecosystems.
- Cities and coastal communities
- Biodiversity and coastal ecosystems
- Small island developing states
- Coral reefs
- Heritage sites
- Cities and coastal communities
- Biodiversity and coastal ecosystems
- Small island developing states
- Coral reefs
- Heritage sites
Around 770 million people – 10% of the world’s population – are at “acute risk” of negative impacts from sea level rise, according to a report from the UN secretary general released last month.
(The report defines locations at acute risk as those that are less than five metres above the high-tide line.)
The people at risk include the residents of several of the world’s largest cities, including Mumbai and Kolkata in India and Shenzhen and Guangzhou in China. It also encompasses the entire populations of many island nations. (See: Small island developing states.)
There are two ways to consider sea level rise.
Global-average sea level rise is the amount the ocean surface has moved upwards, on average, relative to a baseline.
Relative, or local, sea level rise, is how much the ocean has risen in a given place. This can vary from the global average due to a number of factors, including land motion and ocean circulation, as well as changes to the Earth’s surface, rotation and gravitational pull due to the melting of the ice sheets.
Higher sea levels bring with them myriad dangers for coastal communities: they can increase persistent flooding and inundation, strengthen dangerous storm surges and erode beaches and cliffs. Sea level rise also causes the water table of coastal land to rise, which exacerbates flood risk.
The frequency of 100-year “extreme sea level events” has already increased 12-fold since 1900. These are events where high tides, storm surges and relative sea level rise combine to produce exceptionally high sea levels. Under a moderate-emissions scenario, these events are likely to occur at least annually – and, potentially, even more frequently – in many places by the end of the century.
In addition to damage to homes and other buildings, critical infrastructure – such as water systems and wastewater management projects – is increasingly vulnerable to flooding as a result of sea level rise. Flooding can cut communities off from essential services, such as hospitals and markets, with low-income and other marginalised groups disproportionately affected.
Inland encroachment of seawater leads to the saltwater intrusion and threatens agriculture in low-lying coastal areas.
Vertical land motion can also amplify the risk of rising seas. This includes a shifting of the land in response to seismic or volcanic activity or to land sinking, known as subsidence. The changes in local sea level due to these types of vertical motion can equal or surpass the contributions of climate-driven sea level rise.
Many of the coastal cities experiencing the largest changes in their relative sea level are located in east and south-east Asia. One notable example is Jakarta, Indonesia, which has been sinking by up to 15cm per year over the past decade, due largely to the overextraction of groundwater, which leads to the collapse of underground aquifers.
But even as the risks from sea level rise increase, population growth in coastal areas continues to outstrip that of inland areas. Between 2000 and 2018, the global population grew by slightly more than 23%. The population living within 5km of a coast increased by 28% over that same time.
The associated development of coastal areas means that, even without future sea level rise, global losses from flooding in the world’s largest 136 coastal cities could reach up to $52bn per year by 2050 – up from $6bn in 2005.
In response to the growing threats posed by sea level rise, communities around the world have implemented a number of adaptive actions.
Venice’s MOSE 1 flooding protection system, Italy. Credit: James Hancock / Alamy Stock PhotoIn 2003, the Italian city of Venice began a years-long project to construct three floodgates that could be raised during high tide events to protect the city’s lagoon from the encroachment of the Adriatic Sea. The system was engaged for the first time in October 2020 and then another 48 times in the following two years.
Other communities have opted for less technologically intensive adaptations, including constructing seawalls, restoring mangrove forests and marshes, disincentivising development in high-risk areas and relocating residents, buildings and infrastructure to higher ground or inland areas.
However, existing adaptations may not be sufficient to protect communities. Under a low-emissions scenario, these protections may be breached 10 times as frequently over the next 30 years as they currently are.
Biodiversity and coastal ecosystemsThe world’s coastal ecosystems are rapidly being destroyed due to both development and sea level rise.
This combination of pressures is called “coastal squeeze”, where ecosystems that may have otherwise shifted inland in response to sea level rise find their paths blocked by human-made structures.
Coastal squeeze has contributed to the widespread loss of the world’s wetlands.
Globally, nearly 28m hectares of coastal wetlands – including estuaries, tidal flats, mangroves and seagrass – have disappeared since 1970, according to the 2025 “global wetland outlook” report. This is an area equivalent to roughly the size of Ecuador.
Although the report names conversion to agriculture as the largest driver of wetland loss, it notes:
“Climate change is increasingly exacerbating the impact of other drivers on wetlands and human wellbeing through changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, associated fires, floods and droughts and through sea level rise.”
In the continental US, just 16% of coastal wetlands are migrating inland at rates that exceed local sea level rise. Nearly three-quarters of sites are moving at rates that do not outpace sea level rise, while 11% are submerging.
Low-lying islands are particularly threatened by sea level rise, due to their large amounts of coastline relative to their land areas. At the same time, islands are often “hotspots” of biodiversity, with many home to species found nowhere else in the world. More than 20% of the Earth’s known plant species are found only on islands.
A 2013 study modelled the impact of different amounts of sea level rise on 10 island biodiversity hotspots, comprising nearly 4,450 individual islands. It found that in a future with one metre of sea level rise, around 6% of the island habitat area would be completely submerged, while more than 11% of the hotspot islands would see their land area reduced by at least half. This could put dozens of species at risk of extinction, the study said.
Beach spectaclepod (Dithyrea maritima). Credit: piemags/nature / Alamy Stock PhotoIn 2024, researchers documented the first known extirpation, or local extinction, of a plant species in the US due to sea level rise. Hurricanes and storm surges – amplified by sea level rise – began to kill off the only US population of the Key Largo cactus in the 2010s.
The remaining cacti suffered from soil erosion and saltwater intrusion and the final remaining specimens were removed in 2021 in an effort to cultivate them in greenhouses. (Other Caribbean islands, including Cuba, do still have surviving populations of the cactus.)
As native flora and fauna are diminished or even eliminated by rising sea levels, coastal ecosystems may become vulnerable to colonisation by invasive alien species, further harming biodiversity.
And as coastal communities are forced to relocate due to sea level rise, there are knock-on effects for biodiversity as they develop on new lands. These secondary biodiversity impacts are likely to be particularly prevalent in south-east Asia, due to the large number of people living in low-lying areas who may be forced to migrate due to sea level rise.
Small island developing statesSea level rise poses an “acute and disproportionate” threat to small island developing states, says the recent UN report. It adds:
“Even under moderate scenarios, rising seas will render many low-lying coastal zones and small island developing states increasingly uninhabitable without extraordinary adaptation.”
Climate change is already resulting in loss and damage to small island nations, which are particularly vulnerable to both climate change in general and sea level rise specifically.
This vulnerability is in large part due to the geography of these countries. Several small island Pacific states are made up of atolls – ring-shaped coral or sandy islands that encircle lagoons. These often have average elevations of 1-2 metres above sea level and maximum elevations of 3-5 metres above sea level.
Panoramic aerial view of Kanton Island. Kiribati. Credit: Galaxiid / Alamy Stock PhotoSome modelling evidence has shown that reef islands can grow vertically in response to sea level rise, as waves washing over the islands transport sediment from the ocean onto the surface. However, the strength of such waves would likely make these islands unsuitable for building on.
Other research has shown that Pacific islands respond in many different ways to rising sea levels, with “complex” outcomes, both positive and negative.
In addition, most of the small-island nations in the Pacific Ocean are located in a region where relative sea level rise from the melting of the Antarctic ice sheet is projected to be 11-33% higher than the global average rise in 2100 – regardless of emissions scenario.
The effects of this higher-than-average sea level rise is already evident.
In 1999, Kiribati lost two small, uninhabited islands to the rising seas. Several uninhabited islands in the Solomon Islands had vanished by 2014, while a further six islands had been severely eroded by the ocean, necessitating the relocation of some communities.
In addition, most small island developing states are located in parts of the ocean that are often hit by tropical cyclones. Sea level rise can enhance storm surge, leading to greater destruction during such storms.
However, small island developing states are also vulnerable “because they lack the means to address the impacts on their own”, reads the UN report.
According to the UN, these countries will require up to $6bn annually by 2035 in order to adapt to climate change. However, they received just $1.2bn in public adaptation finance in 2022-23.
Aerial view of the damage caused by hurricane Dorian, Bahamas. Credit: AC NewsPhoto / Alamy Stock PhotoCurrently, small island developing states experience “expected” annual climate damages of $1.64bn due to coastal flooding, equivalent to 0.13% of their cumulative GDP. But, even if warming were limited to 1.5C above pre-industrial temperatures, these annual damages are projected to grow to $24bn.
In the international policy arena, questions have arisen over what should happen to island nations’ maritime boundaries as their land is enveloped by the sea. This is because maritime holdings, such as exclusive economic zones, are determined based on a country’s land borders.
However, a 2025 report by the UN International Law Commission considered the legal implications of sea level rise. It concluded that international law allows for countries’ borders to stay the same, “notwithstanding changes to the coastline as a result of climate change-related sea level rise”. It also noted:
“There is a need to develop legal and practical solutions to better protect persons affected by sea level rise, including those who remain in situ and those who are internally or externally displaced by it.”
Other small islands also face similar issues in their exposure to threats posed by sea level rise.
Coral reefsCoral reefs are among the ecosystems that are most vulnerable to climate change.
They are also being visibly affected already – almost entirely due to ocean warming. Even though these ecosystems are completely submerged to begin with, they are also impacted by sea level rise.
As the ocean rises, the water over shallow ecosystems deepens.
The effects of this are twofold. Deeper water reduces the temperatures experienced by reefs. This can act as a buffer against marine heatwaves and global ocean warming.
At the same time, the increased depth reduces the amount of light that can reach the coral communities, which can impact their survival.
In addition, sea level rise-assisted erosion will add more sediment to the near-shore waters. These particles can settle on corals, impeding their ability to feed and reproduce, as well as interfering with photosynthesis by the zooxanthellae algae that live symbiotically with corals. Together, this leads to slower coral growth and increased stress on reefs.
So far, reefs in some parts of the world have been able to “keep pace” with sea level rise, growing vertically at accelerated rates and therefore maintaining suitable levels of light availability.
However, modelling has shown that few reefs have the capacity to continue to maintain their distance from the surface under a moderate-emissions scenario.
Coral reef. Credit: imageBROKER.com / Alamy Stock PhotoAs coral reefs degrade, the seafloor below them can wear away. This erosion is contributing to greater apparent levels of sea level rise on coral reefs in the Caribbean, as well as the US states of Florida and Hawaii.
Sea level rise may also have the ability to spur reef growth in shallow environments previously thought to be uninhabitable for corals. In Sanya Bay in the northern South China Sea, sea level rise since the mid-1980s has allowed for the recolonisation of a reef that had been dormant for more than five millennia.
But the opportunities for such recolonisation are far outstripped by the loss of coral elsewhere. Since 1980, the world has lost nearly 10% of its coral cover due to climate change-induced ocean warming. The UN declaration reads:
“Every fraction of a degree of global warming increases the risks to coral reefs.”
Heritage sitesThroughout human history, many societies developed along rivers and coastlines, due to the abundance of food and ease of transportation. However, their proximity to the sea means that many of these sites are now at risk of being damaged or destroyed by sea level rise.
Cultural heritage includes “physical sites, living heritage, traditional lands, burial grounds, underwater cultural heritage, archaeological and sacred sites and culturally significant coastal landscapes”, according to the UN sea level rise report.
Tongariki, Rapa Nui, Chile. Credit: Robert Wyatt / Alamy Stock PhotoSeveral studies have mapped the cultural and natural heritage sites that are most at risk from flooding and erosion due to sea level rise.
There are 49 Unesco world heritage sites located at low elevations along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Nearly every one of these is already at risk from erosion or severe flooding events – 42 face issues with erosion, while 37 are at risk from a 100-year flood event. Both of these risks will increase over the remainder of the century as sea levels continue to rise.
The locations at risk include the archaeological sites of the ancient cities of Carthage in present-day Tunisia and Ephesus in Turkey, the ruins of Pompeii and Herculaneum in Italy and the medieval Cathedral of St James in Šibenik, Croatia.
The sea level rise associated with warming of 3C above pre-industrial temperatures would impact nearly one-fifth of all Unesco cultural world heritage sites. The sites at risk include Japan’s Hiroshima Peace Memorial, South Africa’s Robben Island, Chile’s Rapa Nui and the Sydney Opera House. Many of these become vulnerable at lower levels of global warming.
In Africa, 56 out of 284 cultural and natural heritage sites already face threats from flooding or erosion due to sea level rise. This number is expected to nearly triple – to 191 threatened sites – by 2050 under a moderate-emissions scenario. However, mitigating emissions could reduce the number of very-highly exposed sites – those with at least 75% of their area vulnerable – by one-quarter.
Globally, there are 386 Unesco heritage sites along the coast that are, at most, 20 metres above sea level and are therefore potentially affected by coastal erosion and flood hazards.
These threatened sites include 289 cultural heritage sites and 91 natural heritage sites, as well as six “mixed” sites that are recognised for both their cultural and natural significance.
The UN declaration calls for action to mitigate damage to significant sites, saying:
“Protection, preservation and documentation of cultural heritage is a priority.”
Mombasa: Key outcomes from the Our Ocean Conference in Kenya 24.06.2026 Marine life Guest post: How a record-high ‘energy imbalance’ is driving global warming 10.06.2026 Climate system AMOC: Is global warming tipping key Atlantic ocean currents towards ‘collapse’? 24.04.2026 AMOC Guest post: The challenges in projecting future global sea levels 17.02.2026 GreenlandThe post Explainer: How sea level rise poses an ‘existential threat’ to humans, heritage and nature appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Nepal’s $20m ‘loss-and-damage’ claim only covers 0.7% of flood costs
The Nepali government has requested $20m from the UN fund for “loss and damage”, following the devastating floods that hit the country in late August.
This amounts to just 0.7% of the $2.7bn it has estimated in “physical damage” to infrastructure and “economic losses” from the flooding, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
The $20m request would, nevertheless, make Nepal the fourth-largest claimant to the UN loss-and-damage fund, which is intended to help deal with climate-related disasters.
Developing countries have already made 176 applications to the UN fund for responding to loss and damage, requesting, in total, $2.8bn to help recover from a variety of damaging events, such as drought, floods and storms.
Yet, to date, predominantly developed nations have only pledged $0.8bn to support the fund.
This means requests to the fund are already three times larger than the total amount pledged, raising questions about its potential to respond to emergencies.
As yet, no funding has been paid out of the fund to developing countries grappling with intensifying and more frequent climate change-induced disasters since it was established in 2023.
Nepal’s needsOn 26 August, Nepal was hit by flash floods following a catastrophic rock-ice avalanche in the Himalayan border region. The flooding has killed more than 1,400 people, with thousands still missing.
Days later, the Nepali government sought an “urgent response” from the board of the UN fund for climate-driven loss and damage.
It subsequently requested $20m in “financial compensation” from the fund. This is the maximum amount that can currently be requested for a single project.
“Loss and damage” is a term used to describe how climate change is causing serious and, in many cases, irreversible impacts around the world. Nations established the UN fund in 2023, after decades of effort by climate-vulnerable nations.
Nepal’s national disaster management authority has now released an extensive rapid preliminary assessment of “damage and needs” from the floods.
As the chart below shows, Nepal’s $20m loss-and-damage claim would only cover 0.7% of what authorities describe as $2.7bn in “total damage and loss” from the floods.
When accounting for another $4.8bn in “recovery and reconstruction” costs – part of how loss and damage is internationally defined – then Nepal’s $20m claim would be just 0.3% of the needs it estimates.
Reacting to the analysis, Nepal’s climate negotiator Raju Pandit Chhetri tells Carbon Brief that the country’s $20m request was for “rapid response”, adding:
“That money is going to be a peanut if it was to be invested into reconstruction.”
Requests vs pledgesVulnerable, developing countries have long argued that developed nations should be held responsible for loss and damage, while countries such as the US have blocked moves that could have led to them being liable for climate-related damages
From December 2025 until July 2026, developing countries made 176 applications to the loss-and-damage fund, requesting over $2.8bn in assistance.
So far, predominantly developed countries have pledged only $822m to the fund. (Some nations that are not categorised as “developed” under the UN, such as the UAE and South Korea, have also committed funds.)
Funding requests from developing countries to date are, therefore, more than triple what has been pledged.
Apart from Nepal’s new request, “requested” data is based on the project pipeline as of 29 June 2026. Analysis by Carbon Brief.Moreover, only around half of the money pledged so far has been paid into the fund by donor nations, with large sums from France, Italy and the UAE still outstanding.
The fund has made $342m available in its initial funding round in July 2026. However, as of September, no money from the fund has been distributed to any countries facing climate-related disasters.
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.preheader p{ margin-top: 0; font-family: 'PT Sans', sans-serif; font-weight: var(--type--3--font-weight--bold); color: var(--button--color); font-size: var(--button--font-size, inherit); } .newsletter-inline{ display: flex; border: solid 1px #333333; padding: 1em; background: #ffffff; } .inline-email{ display:inline-block; margin-right:1em; margin-top:0 !important; margin-bottom:0.5em; } #field_submit{ display:inline-block; margin-top:0 !important; } .gform_wrapper .gfield+.gfield{ margin-top:0 } Email gform.initializeOnLoaded( function() {gformInitSpinner( 4, 'http://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/plugins/gravityforms/images/spinner.svg', false );jQuery('#gform_ajax_frame_4').on('load',function(){var contents = jQuery(this).contents().find('*').html();var is_postback = contents.indexOf('GF_AJAX_POSTBACK') >= 0;if(!is_postback){return;}var form_content = jQuery(this).contents().find('#gform_wrapper_4');var is_confirmation = jQuery(this).contents().find('#gform_confirmation_wrapper_4').length > 0;var is_redirect = contents.indexOf('gformRedirect(){') >= 0;var is_form = form_content.length > 0 && ! is_redirect && ! is_confirmation;var mt = parseInt(jQuery('html').css('margin-top'), 10) + parseInt(jQuery('body').css('margin-top'), 10) + 100;if(is_form){jQuery('#gform_wrapper_4').html(form_content.html());if(form_content.hasClass('gform_validation_error')){jQuery('#gform_wrapper_4').addClass('gform_validation_error');} else {jQuery('#gform_wrapper_4').removeClass('gform_validation_error');}setTimeout( function() { /* delay the scroll by 50 milliseconds to fix a bug in chrome */ jQuery(document).scrollTop(jQuery('#gform_wrapper_4').offset().top - mt); }, 50 );if(window['gformInitDatepicker']) {gformInitDatepicker();}if(window['gformInitPriceFields']) {gformInitPriceFields();}var current_page = jQuery('#gform_source_page_number_4').val();gformInitSpinner( 4, 'http://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/plugins/gravityforms/images/spinner.svg', false );jQuery(document).trigger('gform_page_loaded', [4, current_page]);window['gf_submitting_4'] = false;}else if(!is_redirect){var confirmation_content = jQuery(this).contents().find('.GF_AJAX_POSTBACK').html();if(!confirmation_content){confirmation_content = contents;}jQuery('#gform_wrapper_4').replaceWith(confirmation_content);jQuery(document).scrollTop(jQuery('#gf_4').offset().top - mt);jQuery(document).trigger('gform_confirmation_loaded', [4]);window['gf_submitting_4'] = false;wp.a11y.speak(jQuery('#gform_confirmation_message_4').text());}else{jQuery('#gform_4').append(contents);if(window['gformRedirect']) {gformRedirect();}}jQuery(document).trigger("gform_pre_post_render", [{ formId: "4", currentPage: "current_page", abort: function() { this.preventDefault(); } }]); if (event && event.defaultPrevented) { return; } const gformWrapperDiv = document.getElementById( "gform_wrapper_4" ); if ( gformWrapperDiv ) { const visibilitySpan = document.createElement( "span" ); visibilitySpan.id = "gform_visibility_test_4"; gformWrapperDiv.insertAdjacentElement( "afterend", visibilitySpan ); } const visibilityTestDiv = document.getElementById( "gform_visibility_test_4" ); let postRenderFired = false; function triggerPostRender() { if ( postRenderFired ) { return; } postRenderFired = true; gform.core.triggerPostRenderEvents( 4, current_page ); if ( visibilityTestDiv ) { visibilityTestDiv.parentNode.removeChild( visibilityTestDiv ); } } function debounce( func, wait, immediate ) { var timeout; return function() { var context = this, args = arguments; var later = function() { timeout = null; if ( !immediate ) func.apply( context, args ); }; var callNow = immediate && !timeout; clearTimeout( timeout ); timeout = setTimeout( later, wait ); if ( callNow ) func.apply( context, args ); }; } const debouncedTriggerPostRender = debounce( function() { triggerPostRender(); }, 200 ); if ( visibilityTestDiv && visibilityTestDiv.offsetParent === null ) { const observer = new MutationObserver( ( mutations ) => { mutations.forEach( ( mutation ) => { if ( mutation.type === 'attributes' && visibilityTestDiv.offsetParent !== null ) { debouncedTriggerPostRender(); observer.disconnect(); } }); }); observer.observe( document.body, { attributes: true, childList: false, subtree: true, attributeFilter: [ 'style', 'class' ], }); } else { triggerPostRender(); } } );} );According to Carbon Brief analysis, off the 176 loss-and-damage fund requests received from 118 countries, more than 60% are from least developed countries – such as Nepal – and small-island nations. So far, each individual funding request is capped at $20m.
The flood-related request is Nepal’s fourth appeal to the fund and, as the chart below shows, this makes it the fourth-largest claimant overall.
Apart from Nepal’s new request, data is based on the project pipeline as of 29 June 2026. Analysis by Carbon Brief.Nine other countries have made multiple requests to the fund. Madagascar – hit by back-to-back cyclones after a prolonged drought – has made six requests in total.
Drought-ravaged Suriname, Ecuador, Brazil and Barbados have specified that their funding requests are part of an “emergency response”.
‘Rapid response’Nepal’s $20m claim has sparked a conversation on climate justice and the ability of the loss-and-damage fund to deliver, in the face of increasingly frequent extreme-weather events.
In a letter sent five days after the disaster, Nepal’s finance minister Dr Swarnim Wagle appealed to the fund’s board to mobilise an “urgent response” that would “signal” that the fund:
“[I]s capable of responding with humanity, speed, flexibility and solidarity when climate-vulnerable countries face losses and damages beyond their capacity to address alone.”
Board members from Asia-Pacific and African countries wrote a letter in support of the Himalayan country in crisis, urging the board to convene and “potentially agree to a provisional set-aside allocation of resources to support rapid response funding for Nepal”.
They pointed out that the board’s response to Nepal could offer “procedural lessons” in how to strengthen its “rapid-response” to sudden-onset extreme-weather events. Such support is explicitly part of the fund’s mandate.
On 14 September, developed-country members of the fund’s board wrote that they supported a “consultation” on Nepal, but made no commitments in terms of actual funding.
Harjeet Singh, loss-and-damage expert and global convenor of the Fill the Fund campaign, tells Carbon Brief that the fund’s board deals with most funding requests as regular projects, rather than emergencies. Singh continues:
“Developed countries gave a really cold response to Nepal’s request. They have not addressed it because they know that if this happens once, they are going to be under pressure all the time. This is unacceptable.”
Meanwhile, BBC News reported that Nepal plans to use climate attribution studies to strengthen its claim.
According to a rapid attribution study by World Weather Attribution and climate experts who spoke to Carbon Brief, factors such as glacial retreat and permafrost thaw that played a key role in the disaster have been linked to climate change. A full attribution study is pending.
Nepal’s prime minister Balendra Shah will address the UN general assembly on 24 September and is expected to raise issues around climate justice, loss and damage and the vulnerability of mountain countries.
The next board meeting of the loss and damage fund is on 15 December, two months from now, and a fortnight after the conclusion of COP31 in Turkey.
Pandit Chhetri tells Carbon Brief:
“It’s a shame that, until now, the fund has not been able to even give a penny to developing countries. And, starkly, the event in Nepal only demonstrates why this kind of fund is so important for highly vulnerable, poor, developing countries.”
Pandit Chhetri adds that, after nearly three weeks since the disaster, there is yet to be a decision on the request and that the country has “only received messages of solidarity”, with no assurance of rapid response funds. He says that it is “quite an interesting scene for [us] to observe”, adding:
“If the fund cannot respond in a crisis like this for a country like Nepal – when you have this massive destruction and devastation – then what is the use of the fund itself? That’s why it is a test for the fund, though the resources are limited.”
Related Analysis: India’s power-sector emissions flat for two years due to clean-energy surge 17.09.2026 Emissions World falling short on 22 of 23 nature targets for 2030, says draft UN report 29.07.2026 International policy Analysis: 84% of nations miss deadline to identify ‘nature-harming’ subsidies by 2025 28.07.2026 International policy Access to finance ‘strengthens climate resilience’ among sub-Saharan women 24.07.2026 International policyThe post Analysis: Nepal’s $20m ‘loss-and-damage’ claim only covers 0.7% of flood costs appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Rapid Warming in the Himalaya Exacerbates Geohazard Cascades Beyond Adaptation Limits
This is a re-post from World Weather Attribution
A catastrophic rock-ice avalanche that transitioned into a debris flood in the Himalayas along the Nepal–China border on 26 August 2026 has caused widespread destruction across Nepal and neighbouring regions. In Nepal, at the time of writing (14 September 2026) the disaster has resulted in over 1,300 confirmed deaths, with only a small fraction of victims identified and returned to their families. Over 5,000 people remain missing, around 13,700 people have been rescued and more than 8,600 people have received medical treatment (NDRRMA, 2026e). About 3,400 people are currently sheltering in holding centres (NDRRMA, 2026a) and an estimated 84,270 people across 17 local levels in the six districts of Rasuwa, Nuwakot, Dhading, Gorkha, Chitwan and Tanahu are affected, with the government declaring 15 municipalities as disaster crisis-hit areas for three months (UNDP, 2026a; MOHA, 2026).
While initial reports suggested that the event may have been caused by an earthquake, later evidence indicates that the recorded seismic activity was actually linked to the rapid collapse of roughly 2 square kilometers of rock wall and glacier ice (US Geological Society Earthquake Hazards Program, August 26, 2026; Center for Hydrology and Water Resources Research, 2026). The collapsing material fell approximately 1,400 m, from around 5,150 m above sea level to the valley floor at about 3,750 m. This released a huge amount of energy and produced seismic waves that were initially detected as an earthquake-like signal.
The rock-ice avalanche then triggered a series of processes. As the ice, rock and debris moved rapidly down the mountain, friction and mechanical energy probably caused some of the glacier ice to melt, producing large amounts of meltwater (Le Page, 26 August 2026 [NewScientist]). When the avalanche reached the valley floor, it also hit buried ice, which probably melted and added more water to the debris flood.
Figure 1: Climate-sensitive processes potentially contributing to failure. Conceptual representation of the main mechanisms through which climate variability and climate change may have influenced the stability of the Rasuwa rock wall.
The resulting debris flood was therefore likely caused by several sources of water, including melting glacier ice, water stored beneath the glacier and in permafrost, ice and water carried within the debris (see fig. 1), and river water pushed ahead of the flow. A wall of water, ice, rock and sediment reached the Rasuwagadhi border, 22 km downstream, within seven minutes, moving at an average speed of 188 km per hour, and wiped out the border facilities, the town of Timure and the Syabrubesi market town within the next quarter of an hour, catching pilgrims, border staff and hydropower workers (CHWRR, 2026; Lord, 2026). Within a further half hour it was in the Trishuli valley at Betrawati, and still moving boulders and pulling multi-storey buildings into the river in Betrawati and Trishuli Bazaar far downstream (CHWRR, 2026; Lord, 2026). The flood travelled 200 km to Devghat in under seven hours, where river flow more than doubled to about 5,850 cubic metres per second, and an estimated 20 million cubic meters of excess water passed in under four hours before the flood continued into India (CHWRR, 2026; Lord, 2026). The water deposited 30.5 million cubic meters of sediment and debris along the corridor, burying agricultural fields, settlements and hydropower plants (NDRRMA, 2026d).
This mixture of water, ice, rock and sediment created a highly destructive debris flood that swept away families, homes, settlements, roads, bridges and other infrastructure along the corridor, leaving survivors stranded and cut off, many having also lost family members and everything they owned more than 35 km downstream while the water travelled much further, at Glachi, 88 km downstream the water level of the river Trishuli rose by 8.5m (Center for Land Surface Hazards, 2026). The extent of the humanitarian catastrophe is still being assessed.
Researchers from Nepal, Pakistan, the UK, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the US, New Zealand and the Netherlands, including experts in glaciology, mountain hydrology, climate science, humanitarian aid, seismology and social science, have come together to examine the range of factors that may have contributed to this event. While the underlying geological structure controlled where and how the slope failed, longer-term warming and changing precipitation phase from snow to rain may have reduced its stability by weakening ice-filled fractures and rock–ice contacts and increasing water pressure. Climate change is thus best understood as a destabilising factor acting on a pre-existing geological predisposition, rather than the fundamental cause of the failure. Therefore, rather than conducting a conventional attribution study which is typically focused on a single, well-defined weather event, we are bringing together the available scientific knowledge on known and potential drivers, while also investigating how these drivers have changed in a warming climate.
Main Findings- Nepal has established early warning systems and adaptation measures that can help reduce impacts from more conventional and forecastable riverine floods, and have demonstrably helped save lives, including among communities downstream. However, the event was fundamentally different in its magnitude, speed and complexity. It was beyond the design and predictive limits of existing risk reduction measures, and no existing early warning system could have provided sufficient lead time or prevented the scale of impacts observed in the worst-affected areas, highlighting the limits of adaptation. In a rapidly warming Himalaya, increasingly extreme and complex hazards are exceeding adaptation capacity, resulting in loss and damage. This is occurring against a baseline of a high frequency of large earthquakes, which both destabilises slopes and hampers recovery from successive disasters.
- The immediate impacts of this cascading hazard were almost entirely dependent on exposure to hazard, whereas longer-term impacts (e.g. related to recovery, long-term health effects) are likely to vary based on socioeconomic vulnerability characteristics of the populations affected. In a high mountain context where habitable land is constrained, population is increasing, and economic activity is dependent on rivers, it would be very socially, economically and politically difficult to eliminate or even substantially reduce exposure in riverine valleys, representing a soft limit to adaptation.
- The 26 August 2026 Rasuwa disaster was triggered by a large rock wall collapse from the Langtang Lirung mountain at 5,150 m asl., which also caused part of the overlying glacier to collapse. The resulting rock–ice avalanche rapidly transformed into a debris flood and then a water-dominated flash flood that traveled downstream at average speeds of 188 km/hr, causing extensive erosion and sediment deposition. The failure involved an exceptionally large volume of rock and ice that on impact with the ground released energy equivalent to a M5.5 earthquake. There are several possible contributing causes, as outlined in the following points.
- In 2015 an earthquake of magnitude 7.8 triggered a catastrophic rock–ice avalanche at Langtang Lirung and caused widespread damage across the region. Subsequent monitoring shows persistently elevated and, at high elevations, increased landslide activity, suggesting that earthquake shaking may have weakened the underlying rock mass over the long term. Although its specific contribution to the 2026 failure cannot yet be confirmed, the earthquake may have preconditioned the slope for failure, alongside geological and climatic factors.
- Warming and permafrost degradation likely weakened the source rock wall by increasing bedrock temperatures and thawing ice within fractures. Loss of ice bonding reduces fracture strength, while meltwater can increase water pressure and further destabilise pre-existing geological weaknesses. Thus, permafrost degradation may have acted as an additional climate-related factor preconditioning the slope for failure.
- Glaciers in the region have been losing mass for decades at a rate equivalent to more than half a metre of thinning per year. Since 2010 the rate of recession of the Langtang-Lirung glacier extent has accelerated, increasing from 0.5% per annum over the previous two centuries to 1-2.3% per annum in the past 16 years. Glacier thinning and retreat can reduce buttressing and alter stresses within adjacent rock walls, potentially weakening existing fractures and increasing slope instability. Combined with increased meltwater, these processes may have interacted to amplify the compound event.
- Precipitation can provide an additional short-timescale forcing. As temperatures rise, the rain–snow transition moves upward, increasing the fraction of rain falling as snow at higher elevations. Rain produces an immediate liquid-water input to the slope, whereas snowfall temporarily stores water at the surface. Intense or prolonged rainfall can therefore rapidly increase water supply to fractures and potentially increase fracture-water pressure. At the rock-ice-avalanche location, stations recorded exceptionally high precipitation during October 2025, which combined with subsequent warmth may have been a source for meltwater during the following spring and monsoon seasons. There is also a tendency of the greater fraction of precipitation falling as rain than snow in recent years. This means there can be an increase in the amount of water stored in the land under the avalanche site, even in the absence of anomalously high total precipitation.
- Observations show unusually warm conditions before the failure, supporting enhanced snow and ice melt and more precipitation falling as rain rather than snow. The slope failure on August 26th occurred against the backdrop of a warm 12 month period from September 2025-August 2026, with the warmest two months of the year (July and August) directly preceding the event also substantially warmer than the climatological average. These conditions were anomalous at the location of the slope failure itself and across the wider Himalayan region.
- We also analysed the height of the 0°C isotherm, finding that it has shifted to higher elevations consistent with global warming, with particularly strong trends observed during the Monsoon and Postmonsoon seasons. This progressive upward retreat of the freezing threshold is on the order of 100m/decade in recent decades in the Monsoon and Postmonsoon season. This is highly relevant as it can contribute to the degradation of high-elevation permafrost, glacial thinning and retreat, the snowfall-rainfall transition, and associated slope instability.
- When analysing how these conditions were different in a 1.4°C cooler preindustrial climate, using the standard WWA attribution framework that compares possible weather in today’s climate with possible weather in a 1.4°C cooler preindustrial climate using climate models and statistical models based on weather observations. We find in all datasets a significant increase in the likelihood and intensity of the very warm July-August temperatures at the gridcell nearest to the slope failure as well as in the wider region with an increase in temperature attributable to human-caused climate change during July and August of about 1.5°C, comparable to the level of global warming. Annually, the attributable increase is larger than global warming, at about 2°C. In individual winter months, the observed increase is as high as 3°C.
- We have not assessed whether this specific rock-ice avalanche would have occurred in the absence of human-induced climate change. Such a direct attribution requires additional evidence linking atmospheric conditions to subsurface temperatures, fracture-water pressures and the mechanical evolution of the slope. However, rapidly rising temperatures at a rate beyond the global mean as a result of fossil fuel emissions increase the likelihood and severity of such hazards in the Himalayas.
- Significant progress in adaptation is needed, particularly through strengthened high Himalaya earth observation, hazard monitoring, risk communication and transboundary data and knowledge sharing. But events of this magnitude ultimately exceed the limits of adaptation. Addressing unfolding and imminent loss and damage, through recovery and reconstruction support in impacted communities, has now become an unavoidable part of climate response.
- Minimising future risk requires a rapid transition away from fossil fuel use and delivering on climate finance commitments for adaptation. This is particularly important in the Himalaya and other high mountains, where glacier decline and permafrost degradation are expected to continue even without further warming, meaning that some of the impacts of past warming have yet to fully emerge.
Analysis: ‘Super El Niño’ reaches ‘remarkable’ all-time record
This year’s so-called “super El Niño” is entering into record-breaking territory.
Sea surface temperatures in the tropical Pacific now equal the previous daily record set in 2015 and will likely keep rising in the days ahead.
El Niño is a naturally occurring climate phenomenon in the Pacific that reshapes weather patterns around the world and temporarily boosts global temperatures.
The current El Niño event – which has been underway since June and is expected to last until next year – has been developing faster than any previous event on record.
The strength of an event is tracked using the “Niño 3.4 anomaly”, which measures how much warmer sea surface temperatures in a section of the central Pacific are than average.
As of 19 September, the daily anomaly in the Niño 3.4 region stands at 3.07C, putting it in a statistical tie with the previous record of 3.08C.
Some scientists, using a different baseline for calculating the anomaly, have already called the new record.
Either way, this is remarkable, in part because of how early in the calendar year it is occurring. El Niño typically peaks in the winter months, most commonly in November or December.
Every strong El Niño on record has continued to strengthen after mid-September – and there is every reason to think that this one will as well.
(For more on El Niño, see Carbon Brief’s recent interactive explainer.)
Record territoryEl Niño events are typically classed as “weak” when the Niño 3.4 anomaly reaches 0.5C, “moderate” above 1C, “strong” above 1.5C and “very strong” above 2.0C.
For this year’s event, the Niño 3.4 anomaly has now reached 3.07C, which puts it in a statistical tie with the record set on 18 November 2015, set during a “very strong” El Nino event.
The chart below shows how the strength of the current El Niño (red line) is dramatically outpacing both 2015-16 (blue) and another “very strong” event in 1997-98 (light blue).
Daily Niño 3.4 sea surface temperature anomalies, 1982-2026, each relative to a centred 30-year climatology (ONI convention). Chart by Carbon Brief.To analyse the developing El Niño, Carbon Brief followed the convention of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Oceanic Niño index (ONI).
ONI is calculated by subtracting the latest 30-year average temperature in the Nino 3.4 region from daily sea surface temperatures. This approach allows for the most recent years to be compared against the most recent 30-year period. It removes much of the influence of longer-term, human-driven warming from the index.
(While meteorological organisations typically track changes to ONI on a three-month rolling average basis, Carbon Brief’s analysis looked at how the metric is changing on a daily basis.)
If ONI is calculated using a baseline of 1991-2020 then the current El Niño has already set a new record.
Since the start of June, El Niño’s strength has been greater than any other year. In early September in both 1997 and 2015, anomalies were around 1.9C – more than one degree below where they are this year.
An alternative indexThere is another commonly used metric – the relative Oceanic Niño index (RONI) – used to study El Niño.
Introduced by NOAA in 2024, the RONI index adjusts for tropical ocean warming linked to human-caused climate change. To do this, it takes sea surface averages in the Nino 3.4 region and subtracts out temperature anomalies observed across the tropical oceans (between the latitudes of 20 degrees north and south).
This approach may better remove the influence of climate change in this specific region, but can also diminish the apparent strength of strong El Niño events, such as the current one, which extend well outside the Niño 3.4 region.
The chart below shows daily RONI values, which are record setting for this time of year, but remain below an all-time daily record set during the 1982-83 El Niño event.
Daily relative Niño 3.4 (RONI) anomalies for every year, 1982-2026. Chart by Carbon Brief.RONI stood at around 2.5C in mid-September, some 0.7C below the 1982 record.
However, that record was set in late December, at the peak of the event.
The 1982-83, 1997-98 and 2015-16 events added between 0.5C and 1.9C to their RONI values between mid-September and their peaks.
On track to smash monthly and seasonal recordsBecause daily El Niño values are noisy, scientists typically turn to monthly or seasonal averages to compare El Niño events.
The latest full calendar month for which data is available – August 2026 – had a Niño 3.4 anomaly of around 2.45C. This is higher than the peak of every prior El Niño event on record except 2015-16 – where the anomaly reached 2.75C – and 1877-78, when the anomaly sat at around 2.7C, based on a reconstruction of sea surface temperatures using sparse ship data.
The figure below shows the monthly evolution of the five strongest El Niño events on record alongside 2026, as well the current forecast from 14 seasonal forecast models.
Monthly Niño 3.4 anomaly (degrees C) for the five strongest El Niño events on record, for 2026 through August and the 2026-27 forecast across 14 models, each relative to a centred 30-year climatology (ONI convention). Data from NOAA CPC, Copernicus C3S, ECCC and JAMSTEC. Chart by Carbon Brief.Taken together, the models project a peak monthly anomaly later this year of around 4.1C, with 80% of the 674 individual model runs falling between 3.4C and 4.6C.
Every single model run peaks above the 2015-16 record. The projected margin over that record, some 1.3C, is larger than the entire gap between the strongest and fifth-strongest El Niño of the past 150 years.
Some caution here is warranted, however. No seasonal forecast system has ever been verified against an event of this size, because none has ever occurred. The models also predicted temperatures slightly warmer than observed this summer, with real-world observations for August coming in around 0.3C below forecasts.
However, all strong El Niño events on record have continued to strengthen well into the winter – and the models are in near-unanimous agreement that this one will, too. If the forecast holds, the current event will peak between November and January at a level far beyond any event previously observed in the instrumental record.
El Nino’s effect on global temperatures typically lags rising ocean temperatures in the Pacific by several months, so most of the impact will be felt in 2027 rather than 2026.
Carbon Brief’s most recent “state of the climate” quarterly analysis found 2026 on track to be the warmest or second-warmest year on record. The next update in early October will examine what a record El Niño means for 2027.
El Niño: Indonesia fire emissions in 2026 ‘on track’ to match record for this century 11.09.2026 El Niño and La Niña Explainer: How the ‘super El Niño’ will reshape the world’s weather 18.08.2026 El Niño and La Niña Analysis: What are the causes of recent record-high global temperatures? 10.12.2025 Climate pollutants State of the climate: First quarter of 2020 is second warmest on record 20.04.2020 Climate modellingThe post Analysis: ‘Super El Niño’ reaches ‘remarkable’ all-time record appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: India’s power-sector emissions flat for two years due to clean-energy surge
- Flatlining fossils
- Clean-energy growth matches power demand
- Which states led the clean-power shift?
- Fall in oil and gas consumption continues
- Rapid emission growth from heavy industry continues
- New investments in coal
- Outlook for India’s emissions
- About the data
A surge in clean energy has kept carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in check across India’s power sector, with no growth from the first half of 2024 to the same period in 2026.
This guest post is by:Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA)
Anubha Aggarwal, India analyst at CREA
This is the first time in more than 50 years that there has been no growth in India’s coal power over a two-year period, even as electricity demand grew overall.
At the same time, both oil and gas consumption have fallen across the nation for two years in a row, helping alleviate the shock of the Hormuz crisis.
Nevertheless, the new six-monthly analysis for Carbon Brief shows that India’s emissions grew by 3.7% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, due to increases from steel, cement and other sectors.
Other key findings for the first half of 2026 include:
- India’s power-sector emissions flatlined at 2024 levels, after a 2.2% decline in the first half of 2025 and a 2.3% rise in the same period this year.
- Clean energy met all of the 7% rise in India’s electricity demand over the two years, adding 63 terawatt hours (TWh), equivalent to the total demand of Switzerland.
- India has added 77 gigawatts (GW) of solar in this two-year period, helping meet 60% of the rise in electricity demand overall.
- While fossil-fuel generation stagnated, generators added 8.5GW of new coal capacity, leading to fewer running hours and increased costs to electricity consumers.
- CO2 emissions from oil and gas fell by 7% year-on-year, extending a reduction that began in 2025, despite higher demand for road transport fuels.
- Steel and cement emissions grew by 8% year-on-year, reaching a 23% share of India’s total CO2 in the first half of 2026.
If the pace of India’s clean-energy expansion is to continue, it will need to upgrade its electricity grid, rapidly build out energy storage and boost the flexibility of coal power.
While clean-energy expansion is covering most or all of India’s power-demand growth, the fossil-fuel industry continues to pursue major capital investments.
This includes large amounts of new coal-power capacity, ambitious plans for the conversion of coal-to-chemicals and efforts to boost domestic coking coal production for the steel sector.
While CO2 output from the power sector is flat, with oil and gas in decline, India’s emissions still went up due to the contribution from industry.
India lags behind its competitors – including most large emerging economies – when it comes to electrifying its industrial sector.
Faster progress would enable clean electricity to substitute for fossil fuels in industry, as well as for power, offering the potential for India to cut its emissions overall.
Flatlining fossilsLast year, India’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement grew at their slowest pace in two decades, according to previous analysis for Carbon Brief.
This sharp slowdown was due to rapid clean-energy growth and flat oil demand, combined with rising emissions from steel and cement.
The first half of 2026 marks a continuation of these trends.
Most strikingly, the ongoing surge in clean-energy generation means that emissions have flatlined in India’s power sector for two years, as shown in the figure below.
Power-sector CO2 was the same in the first half of 2026 as two years earlier, with a small decline in 2025 having been reversed over the same period this year.
For further details, see: About the data.Beyond electricity generation, India’s key emitting sectors continued to see divergent trends in the first half of 2026, as some saw ongoing decline while others reached new heights.
This is shown in the figure below, which compares year-on-year changes in emissions during the first half of 2026 with the same periods in 2025, 2024 and the average for 2021-23.
Specifically, emissions grew by 2.3% in the power sector, reversing last year’s decline, while demand for gas and oil products fell for another year.
The biggest increases were for steel and cement, where emissions growth accelerated to 8% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, well above the recent trend.
For further details, see: About the data. Clean-energy growth matches power demandThe period from the first half of 2024 to the first half of 2026 saw the largest increase in non-fossil power generation on record in India.
This enabled fossil-fuel consumption and CO2 emissions from the sector to stay flat, even as electricity consumption increased.
Indeed, this is the first time in more than 50 years that there has been no growth in coal power over a two-year period, even as electricity demand grew overall, as shown below.
For further details, see: About the data.Over this two-year period, India’s total power generation increased by 7%, some 63TWh, equal to the total consumption of Singapore or Switzerland.
The additional power requirement of 63TWh was met entirely by clean energy. Solar grew by 44TWh, alongside growth from wind (13TWh), nuclear (7TWh) and hydro (8TWh).
Together, clean-energy sources added 70TWh over two years, more than the net increase in demand.
(For comparison, China’s nuclear, wind and solar output increased by 485TWh in 2025.)
The figure below shows that new investments are more than sufficient to maintain this trend, as added power generation from new clean power capacity has stayed above average demand growth for the past 18 months.
For further details, see: About the data.Over the past two years, India added 77GW of new solar capacity, 11GW of wind, 5GW of hydro and 0.6GW of nuclear capacity.
Solar power continues to dominate clean-energy growth, but, collectively, the other non-fossil sources still contributed 40% of the overall increase in generation.
One factor in electricity demand growth in 2026 is the El Niño, which delayed the monsoon and intensified heatwaves, driving up cooling demand.
India is accelerating investment in energy storage, which will support further growth in clean power. The National Electricity Plan projected a requirement of 82 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of energy storage capacity by 2026-27 and 411GWh by 2031-32.
As of May 2026, the government has issued tenders for around 272GWh of energy storage capacity, including 142GWh of pumped hydro and 133GWh of battery storage systems. Current capacity is 7.5GWh of battery storage and around 60GWh of pumped hydro.
Which states led the clean-power shift?The fall in power generation from fossil fuels from the first half of 2024 to the same period in 2026 was concentrated in a few states.
Gujarat saw both the largest reduction in fossil-fuel generation and the largest expansion in clean power, as shown in the figure below.
For further details, see: About the data.After Gujarat, the largest increases in clean-power generation were seen in Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu, which also saw reductions in power generation from fossil fuels.
Several other states saw declines in fossil-fuel generation due to higher net imports, rather than local clean power. These included Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Punjab.
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh also succeeded in increasing clean-power generation faster than power demand, thereby contributing to keeping fossil fuel-based power generation stable nationwide across the two-year period. However, they exported much of the increase and consequently saw local increases in power generation from fossil fuels.
The two states with the largest increases in power demand, Maharashtra and Telangana, managed to almost match the rise with growth in clean-power generation.
Fall in oil and gas consumption continuesIndia’s oil consumption continued to fall during the first half of 2026, dropping 1.3% year-on-year, a slight acceleration from the 0.7% reduction in the same period last year.
While diesel and petrol consumption continued to grow, oil consumption was pulled down overall by declines in liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), petcoke (a solid derivative of oil used in the cement industry) and industrial feedstocks. Growth of aviation fuel use eased.
Diesel consumption growth accelerated from 1.8% to 4.1% in the first half of the year, supported by higher freight movement and increased agricultural demand, as the delayed monsoon led to greater use of diesel-powered irrigation.
Petrol consumption returned to growth, increasing 6.9% year-on-year after zero growth in the same period in 2025, reflecting sustained growth in passenger and two-wheeler mobility.
A significant increase in ethanol blending shaved a full percentage point off the growth of petrol consumption. India achieved its 20% ethanol blending target five years ahead of schedule in 2025-26. (Ethanol blending has faced public opposition.)
Electric vehicle (EV) adoption in India is also gaining momentum, with EVs adopted in a widening range of categories.
In Delhi, an EV policy was launched to accelerate electrification of the vehicle fleet, with a particular focus on two-wheelers, three-wheelers (auto rickshaws), commercial vehicles and high-mileage segments, alongside expanded charging infrastructure. Higher EV adoption rates will moderate the growth in emissions from petrol consumption in India.
In contrast, aviation fuel demand growth slowed down from 5% to 2%. The slowdown coincided with the strait of Hormuz and wider crisis, which disrupted international aviation through temporary airspace closures and flight cancellations to several Middle Eastern destinations. Elevated aviation fuel prices also increased airline operating costs, contributing to lower fuel demand.
LPG consumption contracted by 7%, after 5.7% growth in the same period last year, amid disruptions in global LPG markets following the Hormuz crisis.
Petcoke consumption fell 9.9%, more than reversing a 9.3% increase in the same period last year. Rising petcoke prices encouraged cement manufacturers to switch to coal.
Consumption of other petroleum products continued to drop, although the pace of decline moderated from 14% in 2025 to 9% in 2026.
Industrial feedstock use was affected by shortages and price increases.
Naphtha demand contracted as import prices nearly doubled and domestic prices increased by around 60%, prompting petrochemical manufacturers to reduce operating rates and suppress demand for imported naphtha.
Bitumen consumption remained subdued due to slower road construction, driven by persistent land acquisition challenges and higher bitumen costs.
Meanwhile, higher light diesel oil (LDO) prices and shortage of LPG led some industrial consumers to switch back to furnace oil in boilers and heaters, despite the higher air pollutant emissions. Supply of fuel oil to industry increased for the same reason.
Rapid emission growth from heavy industry continuesSteel and cement output in India grew by 8% and 9%, respectively, year-on-year in the first half of 2026, despite rising input prices and weakening profitability.
The growth in steel and cement was supported in part by increased investment in India’s real estate sector, especially in the second quarter. Steel consumption growth outpaced production, implying that inventories built up last year were tapped.
Despite domestic demand growth, profit margins of Indian steel and cement manufacturers remained under pressure for much of the period due to elevated raw material costs – particularly imported coking coal – and higher freight costs stemming from the Hormuz crisis.
The pressure on prices could dampen growth. Cement prices are expected to rise to levels last seen in the 2021-22 financial year, when Russia’s decision to cut back gas exports to Europe drove a sharp increase in fossil-fuel prices.
Outside the steel, cement and power sectors, coal-consumption growth accelerated to 14% in the first half of 2026, up from 3% last year, as the LPG shortage prompted a shift to coal.
Gas shortages resulted in some additional burning of coal for cooking in March and April. The government officially authorised the hospitality industry to use coal, refuse-derived fuel pellets, biomass and kerosene for one month.
The ceramic and tile industry also requested that the government allow the use of coal gasifiers amid the gas shortage. State governments including Delhi NCR, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Maharashtra also allowed industries to temporarily use alternative fuels, including coal.
India’s industrial energy use is dominated by fossil fuels, particularly coal. Indian industry has the second-lowest electrification rate in the G20, as shown in the figure below. The share of electricity in total energy consumption in the sector also lags the world average, in terms of both current levels and the rate of increase.
For further details, see: About the data.The current low rates of electricity use in Indian industry imply that there is major potential for electrification, using technologies and processes already in place in other countries.
New investments in coalWhile the clean-power expansion is starting to meet most or all of India’s electricity demand growth, there are still large investment plans across the coal supply chain.
Some 43GW of coal-power capacity was under construction at the end of June. Additional coal-power capacity is seen as necessary to meet increasing peak loads, even as solar power and energy storage are already playing a role in covering daytime and evening peak demand, respectively. The expansion of energy storage will increase this contribution.
Outside the power sector, India has major ambitions to produce chemical-industry products, such as fertiliser and plastic feedstock, from coal through coal gasification, in pursuit of energy security.
The government is targeting a capacity to process 100m tonnes of coal per year in the next four years, despite the technology for coal gasification still being nascent in India. At present, the only operational use of coal gasification is at Jindal Steel Limited, which is reportedly using syngas in its steel-making process.
Meanwhile, India plans to reduce its average CO2 emissions per tonne of steel by 25% by 2025-26, mainly by reducing the share of coal-based steelmaking.
At the same time, the government is aiming to increase the use of domestic coking coal, which it notified in January this year as a “critical and strategic mineral”. Coal miners and steel companies are reportedly planning to establish additional washeries for coking coal to make it suitable for blending with imported coal for use in steel production.
India is also looking to invest in new coal mines in the near future.
These continued investments in coal gasification, domestic coking coal and new coal mining capacity could lock in coal use across industry for several decades.
Outlook for India’s emissionsOver the two-year period from the first half of 2024 to the same period in 2026, India has achieved its largest clean-energy expansion on record.
As a result, power-demand growth has been met entirely by clean electricity and CO2 emissions in the sector have flatlined.
This expansion of clean energy also allowed a reduction in fossil-fuel imports for power generation, with the use of imported coal falling 38% and the use of gas by 35%, supporting the energy security aims of the government and reducing exposure to the Hormuz shock.
In order to keep the clean-energy growth going, India would need to overcome multiple obstacles, including expansion of the electricity transmission network, improvements in grid flexibility to accommodate variable renewables and the timely completion of new projects.
For example, renewable power projects totalling 5.3GW missed completion deadlines and are having to pay penalties to the grid operator in order to retain network access.
Curtailment has emerged as an issue, particularly for projects relying on interstate power transmission, pointing to the need to upgrade the network. (Curtailment refers to electricity generation that is “wasted” because it cannot be accommodated by the power network.)
Another obstacle to be overcome if clean energy is to keep growing will be making coal-power plants more flexible, so they can ramp down during high renewable output.
A flexibility plan for coal-power plants has been delayed by more than a year due to persistent regulatory bottlenecks, contributing to the curtailment of renewable energy.
Expanding energy storage has the potential to ease grid and flexibility constraints, while reducing or eliminating the need for adding thermal-power capacity to meet peak loads.
The Central Electricity Authority has proposed that, after June 2027, all new government-owned solar and wind projects would have “mandatory” two-hour battery storage. (This mirrors a policy that was in place in China until early 2025 and was subsequently scrapped, in favour of more market-based approaches.)
For oil and gas, India’s consumption has been flatlining for the past two years, after half a century of continuous growth that was only briefly interrupted by Covid-19.
This has reduced the impacts of the Hormuz crisis on the country’s trade balance, helping close the gap between supply and consumption. But it has entailed disruptive shifts in many oil-dependent sectors.
For example, high prices and fuel shortages due to the Hormuz crisis led state governments to reverse their orders banning the use of dirtier fuels such as fuel oil, kerosene and coal in industries and commercial establishments.
Meanwhile, EV adoption has also begun to influence oil consumption.
Despite the progress in the power sector and reductions in oil consumption, India’s total emissions went up over the past two years due to a major increase in industrial emissions.
Low levels of electricity use in industry mean that growing industrial output results in increasing direct fossil-fuel use and emissions.
Unless the rate of industrial electrification picks up, increases in heavy industry output will continue to translate into increases in fossil-fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.
About the dataThis analysis is based on official monthly data for fuel consumption, industrial production and power generation from different ministries and government institutes.
Coal-power emissions are estimated by combining plant-level coal consumption from the Central Electricity Authority’s (CEA) monthly coal reports with data on the calorific value and emission factors of coal used at different power plants from the CEA’s CO2 baseline database.
For each station and month, total coal consumption is split into domestic and imported coal using the imported share of coal receipts over a trailing two-month window, found to best reproduce the actual split in data available for 2023.
Consumption is converted to CO2 using each plant’s station-specific gross calorific value from the CEA database and IPCC emission factors for domestic coal, imported coal and lignite. The national-average calorific value is used for recently added plants, for which data is not available in the baseline database.
Coal use at steel and cement plants, as well as process emissions from cement production, are estimated using production indices from the index of eight core industries released monthly by the Office of Economic Adviser, assuming that changes in total fossil-fuel use follow production volumes. These production indices were used to scale fuel use by the sectors in 2022.
To form a basis for using the indices, monthly coal-consumption data for 2022 was constructed for the sectors by combining the annual total coal and petcoke consumption reported in IEA World Energy Balances with monthly production data. This work was set out in a paper by Robbie Andrew, a researcher at Norwegian research institute CICERO, on monthly CO2 emission accounting for India. Monthly petcoke consumption was available from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, while coal consumption by the cement industry was calculated by subtracting petcoke use from total fossil-fuel use.
Annual cement-process emissions up to 2025 were also taken from Andrew’s work and scaled using the production indices. This approach better approximated changes in energy use and emissions reported in the IEA World Energy Balances, than did the amounts of coal reported to have been dispatched to the sectors, showing that production volumes are the dominant driver of short-term changes in emissions.
For other sectors – including aluminium, auto, chemical and petrochemical, paper and plywood, pharmaceutical, graphite electrode, sugar, textile, mining, traders and others – coal consumption is estimated based on data on despatch of domestic and imported coal to end users from statistical reports and monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal, as consumption data is not available.
Coal consumption by “captive” coal-power plants – those supplying power to industrial sites, not to the public electricity network – was calculated based on capacity changes from Global Energy Monitor, assuming constant utilisation, as utilisation has been very stable year-to-year, as calculated from Central Electricity Authority data.
The difference between coal consumption and dispatch is stock changes, which are estimated by assuming that the changes in the amount of coal stored at end-user facilities mirror those at coal mines, with end-user inventories excluding power, steel and cement assumed to be 70% of those at coal mines, based on comparisons between our data and the IEA World Energy Balances.
Stock changes at mines are estimated as the difference between production at and dispatch from coal mines, as reported by the Ministry of Coal.
Coal consumption is estimated in two ways for sectors beyond power, steel and cement. Consumption of domestic coal in these other sectors is taken from the monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal. Their consumption of imported coal is estimated from the total imports of thermal coal reported by consultancy Kpler, by subtracting demand for imports at coal-power plants. The basis for this assumption is that steel and cement industries use little imported thermal coal, according to Ministry of Coal data.
Product-by-product consumption data for petroleum products, as well as gas use by sector, is from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.
As the fuel dispatch and consumption data is reported as physical volumes – such as tonnes or litres – calorific values are taken from IEA’s World Energy Balance and CO2 emission factors from 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.
The emissions factor for motor oil or petrol was updated, based on the blending percentage of ethanol each year. The ethanol-blending percentage is as reported by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.
Calorific values are assigned separately to different fuel types, including domestic and imported coal, anthracite and coke, as well as to petrol, diesel and several other oil products.
related Explainer: The CMIP7 emissions scenarios – and how they explore future climate change 01.09.2026 Climate modelling UNEP: New country climate plans ‘barely move needle’ on expected warming 04.11.2025 Climate pollutants Analysis: India’s power-sector CO2 falls for only second time in half a century 18.09.2025 Emissions World’s electricity supply close to ‘peak emissions’ due to growth of wind and solar 05.10.2023 ElectricityThe post Analysis: India’s power-sector emissions flat for two years due to clean-energy surge appeared first on Carbon Brief.
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