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Godzilla El Niño is coming Channel Comment brendan 5th October 2026 Teaser Media

Pranav Jani: Welcome to another episode of Together We Rise: Solidarity Stories from Central Ohio. I’m so happy to have today on our show my good friend and comrade, Kristen Guptil-Godfrey.

Kristen Guptill-Godfrey, who uses they/them pronouns, is a revolutionary socialist and organizer currently living in Arizona on unceded Tohono O’odham and Yoeme ancestral and traditional lands. Kristen’s mom was born and raised in Columbus, and although Kristen moved a lot growing up, they consider Columbus home.

They got the opportunity to live in Columbus from 2016 to 2018, and during that time, they became a revolutionary socialist and joined their first political home. Kristen also worked as a social worker and supported queer and trans young people.

They are a member of the Tempest Collective and a PhD student at the University of Arizona. Kristen strives to organize and be part of a growing imperfect Left that’s rooted in solidarity and internationalism to fight back against the authoritarianism and liberal capitulation we’re currently facing. Their local work includes organizing on campus for Palestinian liberation and fighting back against the attacks on DEI.

Do you want to talk a little bit about the work you’re doing right now in Arizona and start us off there?

Kristen Guptill-Godfrey: Yeah, for sure. In Arizona, I have been a part of an amazing group of people who have been building a branch for the Tempest Collective. The Tempest Collective is a revolutionary socialist organization with about eight branches across the country. We have been building that branch in Tucson and developing spaces for people to come together and find community and talk about the things that are happening around us, and then together debating a way forward. I’ve been building that branch over the last two years.

And then, recently on campus at the University of Arizona, I was the director of LGBTQ affairs. Since Trump was elected, the University of Arizona has just completely given in to his racist policies and basically renamed all of the cultural resource centers here. They’re no longer called centers. The LGBTQ Center cannot be called LGBTQ. And then they laid off all the directors, including myself. So, through everything that happened with these attacks on DEI, diversity, equity, and inclusion, some of us created an organization called UA Resist.

It’s a group of faculty, staff, students, and community members who are fighting for a liberatory campus. That includes Palestinian liberation, showing up for international students, and DEI. For example, tonight we’re facilitating an Organizing 101 training for students to come and learn the skills that it takes to develop relationships with people.

Also, Tempest is a part of the No Data Center Coalition. Amazon Web Services and the electric company here are creating a data center to store the cloud. And we know that cloud holds the data of people that then Amazon Web Services uses and sells to ICE.

We successfully won the first round. We convinced the city council to vote against it. It’s been nice to be a part of coalition like that. And, in a couple months, we’re going to start this political education series around data centers, what that means for environmental racism, imperialism, and attacks on indigenous people. It’s been fun to get a win. We don’t really get wins that often, so when you get a win you really gotta celebrate.

PJ: When you say you’re a revolutionary socialist, what do you mean by that?

KG: That’s a good question. I think it means, for me, is that the way out of this is revolution.

That the way out of this is masses of people recognizing, ordinary people recognizing, the power they have in themselves to act with other people. To get out of this mess—whatever it is, whatever we want to call it—this racism, this authoritarianism, this imperialism that we’re facing and that the Global South is facing, the only way out of that is through this revolutionary process. We have to take control of our future.

PJ: Thanks. People nowadays are either skittish about revolution or don’t know what it means when the right creates the meaning. Because revolution gets seen that way, how would you describe it for ordinary people who aren’t familiar with the far Left? What would revolution mean? What kind of change are you looking for?

KG: I think it means a change from the ground up. This doesn’t mean that reforms are not good. Sometimes there’s a battle between, do I fight for this reform or do I say, “Oh, that reform sucks. We’re going to be in the same place in ten years. Why not fight for something bigger?” I think reforms are important for revolution because really the end goal is learning how to trust other people and how to democratically make decisions together.

I can’t provide an answer for what revolution will look like, but I know it will only come if we know how to work together and trust each other in that process and make spaces easy for people to enter.

The only way that process can happen is if we win these reforms together and learn about how they work. Like in winning the no data center fight, the trust that was built between those comrades in those organizing rooms really is what we’re fighting for, those relationships.

I can’t provide an answer for what revolution will look like, but I know it will only come if we know how to work together and trust each other in that process and make spaces easy for people to enter.

Maybe next time, it’s not fighting back against a data center. Maybe it’s fighting back against something bigger. And your politics, they move left as you’re in struggle. As you’re winning various reforms, it makes it easier to tie the connections between data centers and the border, or data centers and Palestine.

It’s not just like revolution is this thing that’s in the future, but it’s the revolutionary insight that you must have that really carries disciplined hope along, like I have to be in this for the long haul, and we have to really create change from the ground up, because this isn’t working for masses of people. Like capitalism, the racism that upholds capitalism is not working for so many people—even when they think it’s working for them.

PJ: So as a revolutionary socialist, if you’re fighting for this no data coalition, if you’re fighting around DEI—and I’m really sorry that you and others lost your jobs— if we’re trying to hold our line on those things, that’s not inherently revolutionary. It’s the process of us ourselves taking charge of things. I wanted to ask you about your work in Columbus. What are some of the memories you have of that time and the things that stand out for you about those experiences here in Columbus?

KG: Oh my gosh, that period was so important for me. I met you during that time. When I moved to Columbus, it was like I had this radicalization period during the Black Lives Matter movement. I don’t know if others listening had the same experience, but you realize that stuff is really messed up, and that there are a few people in charge, and they are running everything. As an alienated person, as an isolated person, you find other things to blame.

I had moved to Columbus from the University of Tennessee. I got my master’s in social work, and I helped organize stuff there. But I didn’t know where to place my anger. I didn’t know who the enemy was, and I didn’t know who to trust. I think this is true for a lot of Black, Brown, and Indigenous folks.

So, I moved to Columbus angry. I saw a flyer in a coffee shop, and I think it said something about socialist politics. And so I went.

I went to the talk, and I thought, “Oh, wow, this is really answering a lot of questions for me.” Anybody can organize. But people need training, people need revolutionary love to be organizers. There needs to be a shared vision, and people need to feel like they’re a part of that vision. So, we would go to coffee shops, and we would talk about all of these issues and we would read things.

I remember reading Party and Class with you, and that was foundational for me. I remember one time we were at the coffee shop, and you just went through all of the [communist] internationals and what that meant for the internationalist Left. I’m like, my mind’s just being blown everywhere.

You were a good mentor because we were reading things together. But we also were in this moment of heightened struggle. I was also going to protests with you. We were actually seeing on the ground what the stuff we were reading meant. It was nice to be doing both of those things with you as a mentor in a socialist organization.

PJ: That’s an honor when you say mentor. But I think at the end of the day, you can’t be in an organization that claims to be grassroots if you’re not meeting new people who get what you’re saying from their own experience and their own knowledge. And for us to pair up like that, those were invigorating meetings for me. It was fantastic to be able to go from those study groups to stuff on the ground and have those discussions in person with people in the middle of a time when things were really intense, in the Black Lives Matter movement. It doesn’t matter how long people have been around the movement—we were all getting educated.

KG: It was exhilarating. It was a moment—when previously you just couldn’t say that the police are bad—and it was like this ideological shift that we really had to figure out and bring people with us. It’s like after the encampment movement on college campuses, just second-guessing Zionism is not weird anymore.

There are these moments in history when organizers really have to take the moment, to meet strangers and to connect their personal experiences to an analysis of what’s happening in a way that they can easily understand and easily grasp onto. Sometimes it’s tough. It’s a lifelong process.

PJ: In Columbus, you were also doing work with trans kids. What was that work like and what did you take from it?

KG: Even before I worked there, I started working in social work in the foster care system. I managed a group home for boys in foster care.

It was at that group home that I noticed that the state was sending me trans girls to put in this home with boys. And so it was in that moment that I recognized that these systems are not set up for queer and trans people.

After I got my master’s, I got to work at an after-school program in Columbus. It was the first time that I got to think about political education with young people. That job was the first time I identified as an educator. Of course, young people need safe spaces to be and find friendship, but it was also political. Assata Shakur had just died and I did Assata’s chant with a group of young people.

I got to talk to queer and trans young people about Assata and what that meant for our own liberation as trans people. When I was at that job, I was also reckoning with my own gender. It was also a personal experience. In reckoning with my gender, I was uplifted by 13-year-olds who told me, “You can do this.” I have a video on my phone and it’s facing downwards to not record the young people, but we did Assata’s chant together.

I still do that to this day when I’m in a room full of young people because it really does influence the space that you’re in.

PJ: In memory of Assata, we should do the chant right now. Maybe go back and forth.

KG: It is our duty to fight for our freedom.

PJ: It is our duty to win.

KG: We must love each other and support one another.

PJ: We have nothing to lose but our chains.

KG: Yeah.

PJ: Yeah.

KG: May she rest in paradise.

PJ: We have been talking about bringing together Black Lives Matter and systemic racism, police violence, questions of gender, and questions of trans kids. In the shift to broader politics, what are some of the things that made you ready for that shift—made you a person who, when things are happening in the world, when these questions come, you didn’t just, say, “Wow, there’s a lot that needs to change,” or, “We ought to do something.”

You took steps toward changing this. “I have to be part of the solution.” What were some of those things that drove you to that?

KG: I think becoming a socialist made me aware of things that I didn’t think of before, like the material analysis of Marxism and the class-consciousness that is so necessary. I was also in Columbus in one of my big kid jobs when I got to really think of myself as an exploited worker, as a social worker. I thought about what was required of me as a worker and being alienated in that workplace. And I remember being in an International Socialist Organization meeting asking that question about how workers are exploited. What does that look like for educators and social workers?

I was putting together those pieces, and then it became clear to me that everything was connected, like the paycheck I had or where I lived or the gentrified neighborhood that my grandma lives in Columbus, where now her house is worth $500,000 and white people are asking to buy her house. That’s all material things we can touch and feel. It made it clear that life doesn’t have to be this way, that, as a worker, as a Black worker, I deserve more. I understood racism. But to really confront racism as it plays out in your everyday life is for you as a working-class person.

PJ: So that resonated with things you already knew but also put them in a new light.

KG: There’s this assumption in mainstream society, and even in the history classes that we’re in, that things just get better.

You know how people say, “I can’t believe you said that word. It’s 2025.” Like things just get better. And people are even now, “How are they going after same-sex marriage? It’s 2025.” And it’s like no, this is a battle, and if we whatever we want to call ourselves, the Left, progressives, if we don’t join together and fight that battle, we lose.

What we’re seeing is this back and forth of winning and losing, and when we lose, we are not organized. We are not talking to each other. We are not bringing new people into the movement. The Marxist analysis of history convinced me that I have to play a role in that history, that I’m just not going to wake up tomorrow and Black liberation will come. I think I read somewhere that there are more Black men in prison now than were enslaved. It’s a real thing you can touch to know that things don’t just get better. We have to fight for the things that we deserve, and they’re not just going to come to us, and we can’t rely on anybody but ourselves and other ordinary people to make that happen.

This is a battle, and if we whatever we want to call ourselves, the Left, progressives, if we don’t join together and fight that battle, we lose. . . . We have to fight for the things that we deserve, and they’re not just going to come to us, and we can’t rely on anybody but ourselves and other ordinary people to make that happen.

PJ: You’ve seen not only in Ohio but everywhere, these attacks on trans rights that are actually attacks on trans people. It’s not even been abstract, like you can’t have this right. It’s been like, why do you exist.

KG: Exactly—the demonization of a whole group of people.

PJ: As a cisgender person, I’m in solidarity in the fight against that, but I don’t feel it in the same way that a trans person would feel it. I don’t want to ask an unfair question, but how do you look at this moment? How are you experiencing this moment? You’ve been through a lot of moments, in your life as an activist and as a person where you’ve said this is a really bad time. This is a really hard time. How does this time feel to you?

KG: It feels rough because it feels unorganized.

In different meetings that I’m in, whether it’s a big coalition meeting or whether it’s a small Tempest meeting, it’s hard to even think about strategies and tactics. It’s like a lot of bad things are happening to us, but there’s not necessarily thousands of people going into the streets.

So then as a revolutionary, as someone who knows that we need people in this, we need people to take action, I think that is what honestly scares me the most.

And I think Trump is really good at this. He was good at this his first time around, but putting so much on us so quickly. It’s like you learn about one thing, and then he throws something else at you, so it’s too hard to keep up. And I know people feel that way, but it just feels like we don’t have enough people on our side doing active things every day to fight back.

And that’s not to say that people are not active. People are. And they are really giving their all. But I think it’s when we are unorganized, it is easier for people to be hopeless and move away if they have that privilege, or to just hold their ground and to see where it’s going to go.

Even now, it’s hard to offer someone a vision, and I think that’s what Trump is good at. He gave people a wrong vision, but he did give people a vision and an answer to why they can’t afford groceries. An inaccurate one, but the U.S. is founded on racism and enslavement and genocide, so when you tell somebody, “You don’t live a good life because of immigrants,” it’s easy to understand that.

What is our vision, and how do we share that with other people? It feels different from the Black Lives Matter movement. There were some parts of it that were unorganized, but there just seemed to be this force of people into the streets. People saying, “I’m going to do something about it.” It might be unorganized, and it might be tactically strong with no strategy. But people were doing something. And now it feels like we need that pressure. And we saw some of that for Palestine, but even that has died down, especially in the U.S.

PJ: So there needs to be this revival of this sense of vision, I think that’s a good word. There are a lot of people fighting, and a lot of us have been very busy. But we are missing this sense of collectively are we going to take this on or not?

Even people say fascism is this. That’s fine. People can say whatever word they want. But what are we going to do? That’s the question—and are we going to do it together? It’s about solidarity. Different people are at the front lines of different kinds of attacks, and that’s undeniable. At the same time, we’re in this together. No individual group is going to liberate themselves. What does that look like for you? What does solidarity in practice look like for you? How do we get this diverse group of people, who share a lot but also have differences, together?

I’m not asking you for a formula, but what I’m asking you for, how do we do it? If you have it, you should share it. But what I’m asking is, what have some of your experiences have been of those moments of solidarity, experiencing it and organizing around it?

KG: I think a couple things. I think one is connecting struggles, and two is not just connecting struggles, but also—I’m trying to think of a way to phrase it. For cis people to care about trans folks, for example. Why would a cis person want to show up for trans folks? Let’s say you don’t have any trans family members, you don’t have any trans kids. You’ve just heard about them on the news, and now you’re trying to figure out which way to go. I think the way to do that is to think about your own struggles that you’re facing and then having this material analysis and asking, what will I lose if trans people keep losing rights?

I think we saw this coming when they got rid of Roe v. Wade, right? That is an attack on trans folks and cis women. But it’s tough to see that attack happen without a huge movement to fight back against it. Now we’re seeing the demonization of trans people. This attack on a person’s ability to have an autonomous body where they make decisions for themselves. And that should be the number one thing we’re all fighting for. And that has everything to do with cis men, right? Cis men oftentimes, I think, don’t have autonomy over their bodies in that you get to only be emotional and express a certain type of emotion in a certain setting, if any.

You’re judged for how you express yourself; you’re judged if you don’t express yourself the right way. So that has everything to do with trans rights. That has everything to do with the medical industry and what services that we can be provided with, whether it’s hormones or abortion rights. I think that’s one way in terms of thinking about how this affects me. I could go my whole life not meeting a trans person, let’s say, but what does that trans person’s experience have to do with me? And if I don’t show up for that trans person, my own material rights are going to be taken away.

I’m not going to have abortion rights, or I’m not going to be able to think differently about my masculinity. I think those two things are very connected. Like with the border—not being allowed to move your body where you need to, whether it’s for your family to live or because you want to go somewhere else. That is an issue of autonomy about what you can do for you and your family,

PJ: And then there is the kind of moral and ethical question to just stand up for people next to you.

KG: If people are moved in that way: I have to show up because it’s the right thing to do, I think that’s brilliant. But also, I think there is this insight that, if they lose their rights, they’re coming for me next. I think that is very real, and we have seen that play out in the last 15 or 20 years.

I think another piece of solidarity for me is letting people mess up. I was just listening to Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor giving a talk. And she was like, “What if during the Black Lives Matter movement, we didn’t expect people to already be abolitionists when they came into our meetings?”

What if we invited people to a meeting and a white working-class person comes who is not convinced that cops are bad, and says, “Sometimes my neighbors and I do call the cops because things happen”? And then sometimes what we saw in that moment was maybe cancel politics. Maybe, “Oh we’re not going to invite that person to the next meeting” instead of a holding organizing spaces that can actually be somewhere where you get your questions answered in a loving, comradely way to then move people to understand—like what I just explained for a cis man caring about trans people. That just can’t happen in your own home. That has to be in collectivity with someone else who’s also thinking about it.

Say you’re a teacher and it’s your first time hearing about a gender-neutral restroom in your school. The spaces that organizers create have to be where people can connect those struggles. Then solidarity can be material. But if we are expecting people to say a certain thing, or to be educated on this certain thing, I don’t know where adults are going to get educated on this thing. They’re coming to us, I hope. So when they come into our spaces that should be easily accessible.

They should say something wrong. And then we should meet them with love and care, and get them to abolitionist politics, not expecting someone to show up and completely understand Zionism, and completely understand a one-state solution, and completely understand Palestinian liberation.

How can we be the landing pad for people to recognize the material connections from themselves and a Palestinian in Gaza? We have to be doing that work.

I just heard David McNally say that the spaces that we’re in, they might not be revolutionary spaces, but if they are spaces where people are at, we must be there. And we don’t change our politics, but we create spaces to talk about things with other people and bring our revolutionary politics into that.

I know both you and I are at universities where people have many different ideas. But universities are also made up of poor people, of working-class people, of Black and Brown people, so we must be there. Then we have to offer a different vision of what the university could be like. We have to talk to people who maybe have not thought about a free education. Or about an LGBTQ center that will always be in existence, or no police on campus. We have to be in these spaces where people are to offer these different types of visions, to work with people, and to move each other. We have to be open to being shifted by other people that we’re meeting. I think that’s how the relationship has to work to be a true, honest, comradely relationship.

PJ: There are not thousands of people on the street. Because of all the repression, the movements themselves don’t look as big in that kind of climate. There are a lot of people who are on the fence, who aren’t exactly sure what their next step should be. What kind of thoughts or advice do you have for people on the fence right now who see a lot of atrocities but aren’t sure what they should do?

We have to be in these spaces where people are to offer these different types of visions, to work with people, and to move each other. We have to be open to being shifted by other people that we’re meeting. I think that’s how the relationship has to work to be a true, honest, comradely relationship.

KG: Really, I think all I can say is you can’t do it alone. And you have to do something. You have to act, but that action only means something, and you’re only provided with safety to act ifs you do it with other people. So that means understanding the community you’re in.

Who’s meeting where? What is the landscape of the city you’re in? Do you have a friend who is just as pissed off as you and you want to read this book about McCarthyism together? I’m sure all of us have a pissed off coworker or a pissed off sibling who’s also thinking about this stuff. It doesn’t have to be a meeting with 50 people. It can be getting with a couple of people and thinking about how things work and why they work the way they work and providing each other that space to ask those questions. If you hear of a protest, if you hear of a march, if you hear of a teach-in, go. And you will hopefully be met with kindness.

The role of an organizer is to ask, “You got a ride?” Or to send you an email with five resources because you had this one question that they remembered from two weeks ago. That’s the role of an organizer, to make it easier for people to think about their place in organizing, their place in this revolution.

There’s a place for everybody. But we have to do something, and we have to do it with other people.

Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the Tempest Collective. For more information, see “About Tempest Collective.”
Featured Image credit: Becker1999 and Pranav Jani; modified by Tempest.

The post We have to do something appeared first on Tempest.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 4 OCTOBER 2026 SLF-2007-077 The Sakhalin Papers LXVII: From Protocol Toward a Joint Venture — Shell and Gazprom Neft Plan Expansion Across Western Siberia and Beyond Seven months after Shell and Gazprom signed their “Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation”, Shell chief executive Peter Voser and Gazprom Neft chief Alexander Dyukov signed basic terms for something more concrete: a possible new joint venture covering Western Siberia, other Russian regions and even “third countries”. The distinction matters. No new venture was actually created by the June 2011 document. Shell and Gazprom Neft agreed to study one. By September Alexey Miller and Voser were still discussing how it might be established. But the direction was unmistakable. Four years after Shell lost control of Sakhalin II, the company was attempting to turn its relationship with Gazprom into a platform for expansion far beyond Sakhalin.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-077
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2011; US Securities and Exchange Commission filing record; Gazprom corporate records concerning the 2010 Strategic Global Cooperation Protocol and the June 2011 Gazprom Neft–Shell agreement
Contemporaneous reporting: Gazprom Neft press-service material; Dow Jones; Russian business press; contemporaneous Donovan archive
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The June 2011 agreement is described according to what it actually did: it established basic terms for examining the creation of a joint venture. It is not represented as proof that the contemplated venture had already been incorporated or that every proposed project proceeded. Corporate statements about technology, international assets and future cooperation are attributed to the companies making them. Commentary concerning strategic motives is identified as commentary.

Introduction

Yesterday’s file ended with a remarkable document.

On 30 November 2010 Shell and Gazprom signed a:

Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation.

Its reach was deliberately broad.

Western Siberia.

The Russian Far East.

European downstream markets.

And possible Gazprom participation in Shell projects outside Russia.

The language suggested ambition.

But a protocol is not a project.

It does not drill a well.

It does not transfer an asset.

It does not create a producing company.

The next question was therefore obvious:

Would Shell and Gazprom turn the rhetoric into corporate machinery?

By June 2011, the answer was beginning to emerge.

Not through Sakhalin Energy itself.

Through Gazprom’s oil subsidiary:

Gazprom Neft. 1. First came an April meeting

On 12 April 2011, Alexey Miller and Peter Voser met in Moscow.

The companies discussed implementation of the global strategic-cooperation protocol.

The agenda included possible joint projects in Western Siberia and eastern Russia, downstream cooperation in Russia and Europe, and Gazprom participation in Shell projects in third countries.

There was also an immediate Sakhalin issue.

Japan had suffered the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011, followed by the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

Contemporary reporting recorded that Gazprom and Shell discussed increasing LNG deliveries to Japan from Sakhalin II. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

The Sakhalin partnership therefore had two dimensions by spring 2011.

It was an operating LNG business.

And it was becoming the institutional foundation for something much larger.

2. 16 June 2011: Shell and Gazprom Neft sign the basic terms

Gazprom’s subsequent official corporate record dates the next major step to:

16 June 2011.

Gazprom Neft and Shell signed what Gazprom described as the:

Basic Terms and Conditions of the Agreement.

The parties would examine the possibility of creating a joint venture for projects in:

Western Siberia;

other Russian regions;

and:

“third countries.”

Gazprom repeated that description in later official releases, including its June 2012 account of continuing Shell cooperation. Gazprom

A contemporaneous Gazprom Neft press-service account carried by Russian business media described the same agreement and its intended geographical scope. BFM.ru – деловой портал

This was the bridge between the grand 2010 protocol and possible operating ventures.

3. A small but important correction: no new joint venture yet

The wording needs care.

Shell and Gazprom Neft did not announce on 16 June that a new joint venture had already been created.

They agreed to:

assess the potential of creating one.

The surviving English-language version of the announcement states that the companies would examine a joint venture to pursue projects inside and outside Russia.

Peter Voser described the agreement as a:

“launch pad for new joint projects”

in Russia and elsewhere.

Alexander Dyukov said working with Shell could give Gazprom Neft access to advanced technology and opportunities involving assets outside Russia. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com

That distinction is central to this instalment.

The ambition was established.

The corporate vehicle was still being designed.

4. Western Siberia was not new territory for Shell

Shell was not entering Western Siberia for the first time.

It already had a substantial producing business there.

Shell and Gazprom Neft each held 50 per cent of the Salym development.

Shell’s 2011 Annual Report and Form 20-F records that Salym production averaged approximately:

165,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day

during 2011.

The same filing records Shell’s continuing 27.5 per cent interest in Sakhalin II. FinancialFilings

So the contemplated new joint venture was not an experiment between companies unfamiliar with one another.

There was already a working precedent.

Sakhalin II linked Shell with Gazprom.

Salym linked Shell with Gazprom Neft.

5. Salym provided a different model from Sakhalin

The contrast is worth making explicit.

At Sakhalin II, Shell had begun as the controlling shareholder and later became a minority partner after Gazprom acquired 50 per cent plus one share.

At Salym, Shell and Gazprom Neft were equal partners.

That meant Shell already possessed an example of Russian cooperation based on:

50–50 ownership.

The June proposal therefore did not simply extend the ownership structure imposed at Sakhalin II.

It pointed towards a different model:

equal partnership with the oil arm of Gazprom.

That was potentially much easier for Shell to present internally and externally as conventional commercial cooperation.

6. And Salym was producing at substantial scale

Shell’s SEC-filed 2011 annual report provides useful perspective.

Sakhalin II had reached planned plateau production of about:

360,000 boe per day

in 2010.

Its two LNG trains had been designed around approximately 9.6 million tonnes per annum, and Shell said optimisation increased production to:

10 million tonnes per annum

in 2011.

Salym, meanwhile, was producing approximately:

165,000 boe per day.

These were not marginal experimental assets.

Together they demonstrated that Shell’s Russian partnerships were already capable of producing hydrocarbons at material scale. FinancialFilings

The strategic-cooperation programme therefore rested on substantial operating experience.

7. Gazprom Neft said openly what it wanted from Shell

Alexander Dyukov’s statement accompanying the June agreement is unusually revealing.

Gazprom Neft wanted:

experience;

advanced technology;

and:

access to assets outside Russia.

That last element directly echoed the reciprocity principle discussed in yesterday’s file.

Gazprom’s senior management had already said that foreign companies obtaining access to Russian upstream projects should be prepared to offer access to attractive international opportunities in return.

The Gazprom Neft statement now expressed the same idea at operating-company level. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com

Russia had the resource base.

Shell had international assets and technology.

The contemplated venture was intended to combine them.

8. Shell’s description was equally revealing

Voser did not describe the June agreement as damage limitation following Sakhalin.

He said it built upon the companies’:

“successful partnership”.

And he called it a potential:

“launch pad”

for projects in Russia and elsewhere. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com

The choice of language matters.

Four and a half years earlier Shell had been fighting to retain control of its largest Russian investment.

Now its chief executive was treating the relationship that emerged from that confrontation as a base from which to expand.

That statement is corporate fact.

Why Shell regarded this as strategically sensible belongs partly to commentary.

But what Shell said publicly is unambiguous.

9. The proposed reach was deliberately wider than oil production

The agreement was not confined to drilling.

The contemporary Gazprom Neft press-service account said the companies wanted to develop cooperation across:

geological exploration;

production;

processing;

and:

marketing of hydrocarbons.

That meant the proposed partnership could span a substantial part of the oil and gas value chain. BFM.ru – деловой портал

Again, this closely reflected the November 2010 Global Strategic Cooperation Protocol.

The June agreement was beginning to give that framework an operating shape.

10. “Third countries” may be the most important phrase

Western Siberia was unsurprising.

Shell already operated there.

Other Russian regions were logical.

But the phrase:

“third countries”

deserves attention.

It meant the contemplated venture was not necessarily to be confined to Russia.

Gazprom Neft wanted the possibility of accompanying Shell into international assets.

That was a major conceptual shift from the early Sakhalin relationship.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, Shell had brought international capital and expertise into a Russian project.

By 2011, Russia’s state-controlled energy companies were seeking routes outward.

Shell could potentially provide them.

11. Shell was not relying exclusively on Gazprom

Another fact prevents the story from becoming too neat.

Shell was also talking to:

Rosneft.

In July 2011, after the collapse of BP’s attempted strategic alliance with Rosneft, Peter Voser confirmed that Shell had held early-stage discussions with the Russian state and Rosneft about opportunities both inside and outside Russia.

He specifically acknowledged Shell’s interest in Arctic acreage, including the Russian Arctic.

Dow Jones contemporaneously reported Voser saying the discussions were still at an early stage and that any outcome would be speculative. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com

That matters.

Shell’s strategy was not simply:

attach ourselves permanently to Gazprom.

A more defensible reading is:

secure access to Russian resources through relationships with the state-controlled companies capable of providing it.

Gazprom was central.

It was not necessarily exclusive.

12. September: the proposed joint venture returns to the agenda

On 15 September 2011, Alexey Miller and Peter Voser met again at Gazprom headquarters.

The official account, reproduced contemporaneously, states that the parties discussed implementation of the June agreement.

Specifically, they considered issues connected with:

creating a joint venture

for projects in:

Western Siberia;

other Russian regions;

and third countries. Oreanda News

Three months after the June signing, therefore, the venture was still prospective.

The companies were discussing its creation.

That reinforces the evidential distinction made earlier.

13. The September meeting broadened the discussion again

The Miller–Voser meeting also addressed wider cooperation in:

geological exploration;

hydrocarbon production;

processing;

and distribution;

in Russian and international oil and gas markets. Oreanda News

The progression can now be traced document by document.

November 2010

A protocol for global strategic cooperation.

April 2011

Detailed discussion of Russian and international opportunities.

June 2011

Basic terms for examining a new Shell–Gazprom Neft joint venture.

September 2011

Management discussions about actually creating that venture.

The relationship was moving incrementally from political language towards operating structures.

14. Shell’s own year-end filing shows how important Russia remained

Royal Dutch Shell filed its 2011 Annual Report and Form 20-F with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on:

15 March 2012. SEC

Its Russia section did not describe a company retreating from the country.

It recorded:

a 27.5 per cent interest in Sakhalin II;

a 50 per cent interest in Salym;

additional exploration interests in Russia;

and new exploration rights acquired during the year.

Shell also reported that total LNG sales rose to:

18.83 million tonnes in 2011,

with higher Sakhalin II production among the factors contributing to the increase. FinancialFilings

Russia remained embedded in Shell’s growth portfolio.

15. Sakhalin II was now performing better than its original nameplate figure

There is another small but telling detail in the annual report.

The original two-train Sakhalin LNG plant was designed around approximately:

9.6 mtpa.

After optimisation, Shell reported that production from the two trains reached:

10 mtpa

in 2011. FinancialFilings

The project over which Shell had fought so bitterly was not merely operational.

It was performing strongly.

That made the commercial logic of staying in Russia easier to understand.

Shell had lost control.

It had not lost the profitability or strategic value of its remaining share.

16. The proposed new partnership therefore rested on success, not failure alone

It is easy to frame every subsequent Shell-Gazprom agreement as an aftershock of the 2006 crisis.

That misses half the story.

By 2011 Shell had practical evidence that joint Russian ventures could work commercially.

Sakhalin II was exporting LNG.

Salym was producing approximately 165,000 boe per day.

Gazprom and Shell had established long-term LNG and pipeline-gas arrangements.

Both sides had experience working together.

The new venture discussions were therefore not occurring in the shadow of Sakhalin alone.

They were also being driven by the operating results that followed it.

17. But the political asymmetry had not vanished

This is where fact and commentary must be separated.

Nothing in the June agreement says:

Shell accepted a weaker political position in exchange for resource access.

Nothing in the September account says:

Gazprom was rewarding Shell for its behaviour at Sakhalin II.

No such proposition should be presented as documented fact.

But the institutional structure remained asymmetric.

Shell could provide technology, capital and international assets.

It could not grant itself licences to strategic Russian resources.

Russian state-controlled companies occupied the stronger position in determining access.

That structural fact helps explain why partnership became central to Shell’s Russian strategy.

It does not prove a secret bargain.

18. The High Court record remains relevant — but only as history

The surviving judicial record concerning Sakhalin II remains:

Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin).

Mr Justice Mitting delivered judgment on 17 March 2008.

The case concerned access to environmental information relating to possible UK financial support for Sakhalin II.

It recorded the project’s environmental significance and the ownership transition involving the Russian participant.

It did not consider the 2010 strategic protocol.

It did not consider the 2011 Gazprom Neft agreement.

It did not rule on Shell’s decision to expand its Russian partnerships.

And it made no finding that later commercial cooperation constituted compensation for Shell’s earlier loss of control. vLex

The court record supplies historical context.

It does not supply motive.

19. What was actually created in June 2011?

The documentary answer is narrower than the headline ambition.

The parties created:

an agreed framework for studying a joint venture.

They did not yet create the joint venture itself.

That distinction is supported twice:

first by the June wording;

and again by the September meeting, when Miller and Voser were still discussing the issues involved in creating the vehicle. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com

This is an important example of why corporate announcements must be read literally.

“Agreement.”

“Joint venture.”

“Strategic cooperation.”

“Basic terms.”

These phrases can sound interchangeable in headlines.

Legally and commercially, they are not.

20. What the agreement nevertheless demonstrates

Even with that caution, the significance is substantial.

Shell and Gazprom had moved from:

a contested ownership restructuring;

to operating cooperation;

to LNG sales;

to global strategic cooperation;

to studying a new international joint venture.

That sequence was completed in less than five years.

The 2006 confrontation therefore did not produce a long-term commercial rupture.

It produced a different architecture for Shell’s Russian business.

One in which state-controlled Russian companies would be embedded much more deeply in Shell’s future plans.

Documentary Findings Established

On 30 November 2010, Shell and Gazprom signed a Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation covering Russian and international opportunities.

On 16 June 2011, Gazprom Neft and Shell signed basic terms governing study of a possible joint venture for projects in Western Siberia, other Russian regions and third countries. Gazprom later repeated that chronology in its official corporate records. Gazprom

The contemporary Gazprom Neft press-service account said the proposed cooperation covered exploration, production, processing and marketing of hydrocarbons. BFM.ru – деловой портал

Peter Voser described the agreement as a potential “launch pad” for joint projects in Russia and elsewhere. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com

Alexander Dyukov said cooperation with Shell could provide Gazprom Neft with advanced technology, additional experience and access to assets outside Russia. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com

On 15 September 2011, Alexey Miller and Peter Voser were still discussing the creation of the contemplated joint venture. Oreanda News

Shell’s 2011 Form 20-F recorded a 50 per cent interest in Salym, where production averaged about 165,000 boe/d, and a 27.5 per cent interest in Sakhalin II. FinancialFilings

Shell reported that Sakhalin II LNG production reached approximately 10 mtpa after optimisation of the two existing trains. FinancialFilings

Established broader context

Shell was simultaneously holding early-stage discussions with Rosneft concerning further Russian and international opportunities, including possible Arctic involvement. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com

This shows that Shell’s Russian strategy was not confined exclusively to Gazprom.

Judicial boundary

The relevant High Court litigation concerned environmental-information disclosure and pre-dated the 2010–11 strategic agreements.

It did not adjudicate Shell’s later partnership strategy or the motives behind it. vLex

Not established

The June 2011 document did not itself establish the contemplated new joint venture.

No evidence examined here establishes that Shell was guaranteed any particular Russian field.

No evidence examined here establishes that Gazprom Neft obtained a specific overseas Shell asset under the June agreement.

No court finding establishes that later cooperation was compensation for Shell’s loss of control of Sakhalin II.

No public document examined here establishes a secret quid pro quo connecting the 2006 ownership transfer with the 2011 joint-venture negotiations.

Commentary

The language of the June agreement is revealing precisely because it was so practical.

The 2010 protocol had spoken of “strategic global cooperation.”

Seven months later the companies were asking the more difficult question:

What corporate structure would actually deliver it?

The answer under consideration was a joint venture.

Western Siberia provided an obvious starting point.

Shell and Gazprom Neft were already producing oil together at Salym.

The commercial relationship had operating history.

The technical relationship had substance.

The companies knew one another.

But “third countries” shows that the ambition went further.

Gazprom Neft did not merely want Shell’s help producing Russian oil.

It wanted the experience of working internationally.

Shell, meanwhile, wanted continuing access to a resource-rich country in which access to strategic acreage depended heavily upon relationships with state companies.

That is the bargain visible in the public record.

Not a secret bargain.

A structural one.

Resources and access on one side.

Technology, international reach and project experience on the other.

Sakhalin II had demonstrated how unequal the political relationship could become when circumstances changed.

Salym demonstrated that equal commercial partnership could nevertheless work.

By 2011 Shell was trying to build upon both lessons.

The irony remains unavoidable.

Five years earlier Shell had been struggling against the dilution of its largest Russian investment.

Now its chief executive was publicly calling cooperation with the same state-controlled corporate system a:

“launch pad”.

That does not mean Shell had forgotten Sakhalin.

It may mean Shell had learned from it.

Source Record

Royal Dutch Shell plc’s Annual Report and Form 20-F 2011, filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on 15 March 2012, records Shell’s Russian production interests, including Sakhalin II and Salym. SEC

US SEC — Royal Dutch Shell plc 2011 Form 20-F filing index

Gazprom’s official 21 June 2012 review of Shell cooperation confirms that Gazprom Neft and Shell signed the Basic Terms and Conditions on 16 June 2011, contemplating a joint venture for Western Siberia, other Russian regions and third countries. Gazprom

Gazprom — Gazprom and Shell develop cooperation in Russian and international oil and gas markets

The contemporaneous Gazprom Neft press-service account describes the purpose of the June agreement and records the statements of Alexander Dyukov and Peter Voser. BFM.ru – деловой портал

Royal Dutch Shell archive — Shell and Gazprom Neft to Implement Joint Projects

The 15 September 2011 Miller–Voser meeting record confirms that creation of the proposed venture was still under discussion three months later. Oreanda News

Contemporaneous Dow Jones reporting recorded Shell’s simultaneous early-stage discussions with Rosneft and Peter Voser’s expressed interest in Russian Arctic opportunities. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com

The relevant judicial background remains Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), judgment of Mr Justice Mitting dated 17 March 2008. vLex

Archive disclaimer: Agreements to investigate, study or establish future ventures are not treated as completed investments unless the documentary record establishes completion. Corporate statements are distinguished from independent reporting and from judicial findings. Strategic interpretation is identified as commentary rather than fact.

Site-wide disclaimer applies.

Next instalment SLF-2007-078 — The Sakhalin Papers LXVIII: From Siberia to the Arctic — Shell Takes the Gazprom Partnership Into Russia’s New Frontier

The joint-venture discussions did not disappear.

They evolved.

By 2013, Shell and Gazprom were ready to move into territory considerably more politically and environmentally sensitive than Salym.

In April 2013, during Vladimir Putin’s visit to the Netherlands, Gazprom and Shell signed a memorandum covering possible cooperation on:

Russia’s Arctic shelf.

At the same time Shell and Gazprom Neft moved toward a 50–50 venture for liquids-rich shale development in Western Siberia, with the existing Salym organisation expected to provide initial oilfield services. Gazprom’s own corporate history records the Arctic cooperation memorandum; contemporaneous accounts record the parallel shale arrangement. Gazprom

The timing would be extraordinary.

Only months earlier, Shell’s own attempt to conquer the Alaskan Arctic had ended its 2012 drilling season amid a catalogue of operational setbacks.

Yet rather than retreat from the Arctic idea, Shell was preparing to pursue another Arctic frontier —

this time with Gazprom.

The next file will examine how the partnership born from the Sakhalin crisis moved north into the Russian Arctic, and why Shell remained determined to pursue high-risk frontier oil even after its Alaskan experience had gone badly wrong.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 4 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 4, 2026 at 7:32 pm.
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A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 27, 2026 thru Sat, October 3, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

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• Gavin Newsom condemns Democrats` `climate hushing`, predicts Trump`s downfall and expects AOC to run in 2028 Energy modernization means more affordable energy and politicians should not be afraid to say it. The Guardian, Mark Hertsgaard, Sep 24, 2026.
• Fed up with Brazil’s politicians not listening, a climate scientist runs for office Luciana Gatti, who studies carbon uptake in the Amazon, aims to join Brazil’s lower house in this weekend’s elections Science, Daniel Grossman, Sep 28, 2026.
• Alito`s Recusal From Climate Case: Too Little, Too Late? The justice’s participation in the Boulder case already may have been pivotal, and his continued stock holdings—including in fossil fuels—keep an ethics cloud over the Supreme Court. Inside Climate News, Marianne Lavelle, Sep 29, 2026.
• AI Was Supposed to Cut Emissions. Instead, Fossil Fuel Companies Are Using It to Find More Oil and Gas. A new study found AI-driven fossil fuel productivity could increase emissions. Here are examples of companies already using AI to boost production. Desmog, Sarah Hofmann, Sep 30, 2026.
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• “Godzilla” El Niño = crashing Antarctic sea ice? Part 2 of a 2-part collaboration between Dave Borlace ("Just have a Think") and Ella Gilbert (Dr Gilbz) about possible connections between the Super El Nino and Artic sea ice in the northern and Antarctica in the southern hemisphere. Dr Gilbz on Youtube, Ella Gilbert, Sep 27, 2026.
• The impacts of this year`s record-shattering El Niño El Niño will drive severe drought from Indonesia to the Southern Africa and northern South America, with wetter winters from the US Gulf Coast to Southern South America. The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Sep 28, 2026.
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Miscellaneous (1 item)

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If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

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• “Big Oil Fears The Evidence Of Its Deliberate Climate Lies” • No one knows how the US Supreme Court will rule in Suncor v Boulder, which will likely decide whether the city and county of Boulder, Colorado, will be able to put oil giants ExxonMobil and Suncor Energy on trial for deceiving the public for decades on the climate harms of fossil fuels. [Asia Times]

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 3 OCTOBER 2026 SLF-2007-076 The Sakhalin Papers LXVI: “Strategic Global Cooperation” — Four Years After the Kremlin Crisis, Shell Signs a Worldwide Pact with Gazprom On 30 November 2010, Royal Dutch Shell chief executive Peter Voser and Gazprom chairman Alexey Miller signed a “Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation”. The language was striking. Shell and Gazprom would examine exploration and production opportunities in western Siberia and the Russian Far East, downstream cooperation in Russia and Europe, and even Gazprom participation in Shell projects outside Russia. Shell described the relationship as a “strong partnership”. This was less than four years after Gazprom had taken control of Sakhalin II during one of the most contentious episodes in Shell’s modern history. The protocol did not erase what had happened at Sakhalin. It showed what Shell decided to do afterwards.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-076
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Form 6-K filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, December 2010; Royal Dutch Shell fourth-quarter and full-year 2010 results; Royal Dutch Shell plc Form 6-K of December 2006
Contemporaneous reporting: The Guardian; Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal reporting preserved in the Donovan archive; Bloomberg
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The 2010 protocol, its stated scope and the parties’ public statements are treated as established corporate facts. Contemporary descriptions of the 2006 Sakhalin ownership transfer as forced or Kremlin-driven remain attributed descriptions. No court identified here found that Shell entered the 2010 agreement because of coercion, a secret bargain or an earlier promise of access to Russian resources.

Introduction

Four years earlier, Shell had been fighting to preserve control of Sakhalin II.

By December 2006, it had agreed to halve its interest.

Gazprom would acquire:

50 per cent plus one share.

Shell would fall from:

55 per cent to 27.5 per cent.

The transaction price was:

$7.45 billion.

Shell would remain technical adviser, but Gazprom would become the leading shareholder. Shell’s own SEC filing recorded those terms. SEC

The political and environmental battle surrounding that transaction has occupied much of this archive.

But by late 2010 Shell’s language had changed dramatically.

It was no longer merely accommodating Gazprom inside Sakhalin II.

It was inviting Gazprom into a potentially worldwide relationship.

1. 30 November 2010: the protocol is signed

The most authoritative source is Shell’s own filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.

Royal Dutch Shell furnished a Form 6-K containing the announcement:

“GAZPROM AND SHELL AGREE TO PURSUE BROADER COOPERATION”

The release stated that Alexey Miller and Peter Voser had signed:

a protocol on strategic global cooperation.

Shell said the agreement established “basic guidelines” for broader collaboration. SEC

That phrase matters.

This was not a Sakhalin operating note.

It was not an amendment to an LNG sales contract.

It was a framework for a much wider relationship.

2. The proposed cooperation crossed Russia from west to east

Shell’s SEC filing identified one principal area of potential cooperation as:

exploration and production of hydrocarbons in:

western Siberia

and

the Russian Far East.

Those two regions represented very different opportunities.

Western Siberia was Russia’s mature hydrocarbon heartland.

The Far East included Sakhalin and the emerging Asia-Pacific export strategy.

Shell was therefore contemplating cooperation with Gazprom not around a single asset but across two enormous producing regions. SEC

3. Gazprom could also enter Shell projects outside Russia

The second provision was even more revealing.

Shell and Gazprom would examine:

downstream oil-products cooperation in Russia and Europe

and:

Gazprom participation in Shell upstream projects outside Russia.

That represented an important change in the direction of the relationship.

Until then, the public story had largely involved Shell seeking access to Russian resources.

Now Gazprom was being offered the possibility of access to Shell-controlled or Shell-participated opportunities elsewhere in the world. SEC

The partnership was explicitly becoming reciprocal.

4. Gazprom had already explained the principle of reciprocity

The day before the protocol was announced, Gazprom deputy chief executive Alexander Medvedev made the logic unusually clear.

Contemporaneous Dow Jones reporting recorded him saying that Gazprom welcomed foreign partners into Russian upstream projects:

“only if in exchange we get the access to their first class projects somewhere in the world.”

He added that Gazprom knew Shell possessed assets that might interest it. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

This is one of the most revealing statements in the entire post-Sakhalin sequence.

Gazprom was not presenting access to Russian reserves as a one-way commercial opportunity.

It was describing access as something to be exchanged.

Russian resources for international assets.

5. Shell called it a “strong partnership”

Peter Voser’s language was equally notable.

Shell’s SEC-filed announcement quoted him saying:

“This underscores the strong partnership our companies have built in recent years.”

He continued that Russia was an important area for new energy development for Shell and would play a large role in meeting future global oil and gas demand. SEC

The expression “strong partnership” deserves to be read against the chronology.

Those “recent years” included:

the environmental confrontation of 2006;

Gazprom’s acquisition of control;

Shell’s reduction from 55 per cent to 27.5 per cent;

the 2007 completion of that transaction;

the start-up of LNG exports in 2009;

and the rapid commercial deepening described in yesterday’s file.

The company that had lost control was now formally celebrating the partnership that followed.

6. Gazprom saw “new large-scale projects”

Alexey Miller was even more expansive.

Shell’s filing records Miller describing the agreement as a mutually beneficial strategic partnership between major energy companies.

He said the future held:

“new large-scale projects”

and a growing joint presence in new markets. SEC

This was therefore not presented as defensive diplomacy.

Gazprom was talking about expansion.

Shell was talking about partnership.

Both sides were looking beyond Sakhalin II.

7. Joint working groups were to turn the protocol into projects

The protocol was not itself a final investment decision.

No specific new field was awarded to Shell on 30 November.

No overseas Shell asset was transferred to Gazprom.

No new LNG train was formally approved.

The document was a framework.

Shell’s release explicitly stated that:

Shell and Gazprom would create joint working groups

to develop the opportunities further. SEC

That distinction is important.

A protocol establishes intent.

It does not prove that every contemplated project subsequently materialised.

8. Shell already had two substantial Gazprom-linked positions in Russia

The Shell announcement itself identified the existing foundation of the relationship.

First:

Sakhalin II.

Gazprom and Shell had been partners there since 2007.

Second:

Salym.

Shell and Gazprom Neft were jointly developing a group of oil fields in western Siberia. SEC

That gave the new global protocol a practical base.

The parties were not strangers signing a speculative memorandum.

They were already sharing producing assets.

9. By 2010 Sakhalin II was no longer an unfinished megaproject

The timing was commercially significant.

When the Kremlin agreement had been signed in December 2006, Sakhalin II Phase 2 was still under construction.

Shell’s 2006 SEC filing said the project was more than 80 per cent complete and that roughly $12 billion had already been invested by the end of the third quarter. SEC

By 2010, the project was operating.

Russia’s first LNG plant had opened.

LNG exports were flowing.

Sakhalin II had ramped towards full production.

The argument was no longer about whether the giant project could be completed.

It had become a valuable producing asset.

10. Shell told investors the Gazprom protocol was a material portfolio development

The agreement did not disappear into a public-relations archive.

When Shell announced its fourth-quarter and full-year 2010 results, it listed the Gazprom protocol among its major Upstream portfolio developments.

Shell told investors:

“In Russia, Shell signed a protocol on strategic global cooperation with Gazprom”

covering broader collaboration in both Upstream and Downstream businesses. PR Newswire

That inclusion is important.

Shell itself treated the protocol as part of its strategic portfolio story.

11. Sakhalin was already contributing to Shell’s LNG growth

The same full-year results provide the commercial background.

Shell reported LNG sales volumes of:

16.76 million tonnes in 2010,

up from:

13.40 million tonnes in 2009.

An increase of:

25 per cent.

Shell specifically said the increase reflected, among other things, the ramp-up of Sakhalin II LNG sales. PR Newswire

This helps explain why continued cooperation was commercially attractive.

Whatever Shell thought of the events that had cost it control, Sakhalin II was now producing cash-generating LNG within a growing global gas business.

12. Contemporary journalists immediately noticed the irony

The contrast with 2006 was not lost on observers.

The Guardian reported the agreement under the headline:

“Shell and Gazprom sign ‘global co-operation’ pact.”

Its report stressed that the deal had been signed almost four years after Shell surrendered control of Sakhalin II following intense Kremlin pressure.

Analyst Peter Hitchens of Panmure Gordon described the situation as:

“slightly ironic”.

He also argued that foreign companies partnered with Gazprom appeared to fare better in Russia than those attempting to operate independently. The Guardian

That was an analyst’s interpretation.

It was not Shell’s formal explanation.

But it captured the obvious historical tension.

13. The arrangement offered something important to both sides

The commercial exchange was relatively easy to see.

Gazprom controlled enormous Russian hydrocarbon resources.

Shell possessed:

LNG technology;

international project-management experience;

global trading operations;

access to overseas upstream positions;

downstream markets;

and capital.

Gazprom wanted international reach.

Shell wanted Russian resource access.

The 2010 protocol offered a structure through which those interests could meet.

That interpretation is supported by the explicit scope of the agreement, but the precise internal valuation placed on each component by Shell and Gazprom is not public. SEC

14. The protocol also carried a remarkable risk warning

There is an almost surreal documentary detail in Shell’s own SEC filing.

Immediately after announcing its expanded strategic partnership with Gazprom, Shell’s formal cautionary language warned investors about:

political risk;

expropriation;

and:

“renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities.”

It also warned about regulatory developments, project approvals and the risks of operating internationally. SEC

These were standard Shell forward-looking-statement warnings.

They were not written specifically about Russia.

That qualification matters.

But in the context of Sakhalin II, the juxtaposition is extraordinary.

The press release celebrated deeper Russian cooperation.

Its legal boilerplate simultaneously described precisely the class of political and contractual risks that international investors associated with the Sakhalin episode.

15. Compare the two Shell filings: 2006 and 2010

Placed side by side, Shell’s own SEC filings tell the transformation remarkably clearly.

December 2006

Gazprom would acquire 50 per cent plus one share of Sakhalin Energy.

Shell’s holding would fall to 27.5 per cent.

Gazprom would become the leading shareholder.

Shell would remain technical adviser.

The parties would establish an Area of Mutual Interest covering future Sakhalin opportunities. SEC

November 2010

Shell and Gazprom signed a protocol on:

strategic global cooperation.

They would consider Russian upstream development.

They would consider European downstream cooperation.

Gazprom might participate in Shell upstream projects outside Russia.

Joint working groups would develop the opportunities. SEC

The relationship had moved from one project to a potential international alliance.

16. The 2006 Area of Mutual Interest had foreshadowed this direction

The 2006 filing contained a detail whose significance became clearer later.

Shell, Gazprom, Mitsui and Mitsubishi agreed to establish an:

Area of Mutual Interest

covering future oil and gas exploration around Sakhalin and the development of Sakhalin II as a regional oil and LNG hub. SEC

The 2010 strategic protocol did not arise from nowhere.

It enlarged a pattern already embedded in the ownership settlement.

The deal that removed Shell’s control also created mechanisms for future cooperation.

That fact should not be mistaken for proof that future access was secretly promised in return for Shell surrendering control.

The documents do not establish such a bargain.

They do establish continuity.

17. Bloomberg was already reporting possible Sakhalin expansion by the end of December

Within a month of the strategic protocol, the possibility of further Sakhalin expansion was publicly circulating.

Bloomberg reported on 29 December 2010 that Gazprom and Shell might add a third LNG train at Sakhalin II or build another LNG plant.

The Sakhalin regional governor also referred to possible asset swaps involving Gazprom’s Sakhalin III interests.

Gazprom itself said it had no information to confirm the specific LNG expansion proposal at that stage, and Shell declined to comment. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

Again, this distinction matters.

Expansion was being discussed.

It was not yet approved.

18. The High Court record still imposes an evidential boundary

The judicial context remains:

Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin).

Mr Justice Mitting’s judgment independently recorded the controversy surrounding Sakhalin II, the contemplated British export-credit support and the project’s environmental significance.

But the High Court case concerned access to environmental information.

It did not decide why Gazprom obtained control.

It did not adjudicate a secret Kremlin bargain.

It did not determine whether Shell had been unlawfully forced to sell.

And it did not consider the 2010 strategic cooperation agreement, which did not yet exist. vLex

That legal boundary remains essential.

The corporate and journalistic record may support conclusions about strategy and political context.

It cannot be converted into a judicial finding that was never made.

19. What the evidence establishes

By November 2010, several propositions are no longer matters of interpretation.

Shell had accepted minority status at Sakhalin II.

Sakhalin II was producing LNG.

Shell and Gazprom were already commercially linked in western Siberia.

Shell wanted additional Russian opportunities.

Gazprom wanted participation in international projects.

Both sides publicly described deeper cooperation as desirable.

And the relationship had advanced to a formal:

Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation.

That is documentary fact.

20. What the documents do not establish

The public record examined for this instalment does not establish that:

Shell was secretly promised new Russian fields in return for surrendering control of Sakhalin II;

the 2010 protocol was compensation for the 2006 transaction;

Gazprom guaranteed Shell participation in Sakhalin III, Yamal or any particular future field;

Shell privately regarded Gazprom as a trustworthy partner;

the Kremlin admitted using environmental regulation as commercial leverage;

or the 2006 transfer of control was declared unlawful by any court.

Those propositions would require evidence beyond the material presently available.

Documentary Findings Established

On 30 November 2010, Alexey Miller and Peter Voser signed a Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation. SEC

The agreement contemplated further exploration and production cooperation in western Siberia and the Russian Far East.

It contemplated downstream cooperation in Russia and Europe.

It also contemplated Gazprom participation in Shell upstream projects outside Russia. SEC

Shell and Gazprom agreed to establish joint working groups.

Peter Voser publicly described the relationship as a “strong partnership.”

Alexey Miller said the companies expected new large-scale projects and participation in new markets. SEC

Shell’s fourth-quarter and full-year results later identified the Gazprom protocol as an important portfolio development. PR Newswire

Shell’s 2010 LNG sales rose by 25 per cent compared with 2009, with the Sakhalin II ramp-up contributing to that increase. PR Newswire

Established historical context

Shell’s December 2006 SEC filing records Gazprom’s acquisition of 50 per cent plus one share, Shell’s reduction to 27.5 per cent and Shell’s continuing technical-adviser role. SEC

The same filing records an Area of Mutual Interest arrangement covering future Sakhalin development opportunities.

Established contemporaneous interpretation

The Guardian described Shell as having surrendered control after intense Kremlin pressure and noted the irony of the later worldwide cooperation agreement. The Guardian

Dow Jones reporting quoted Gazprom deputy chief executive Alexander Medvedev explicitly linking foreign access to Russian upstream resources with reciprocal access to international assets. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

Judicial boundary

The High Court litigation concerning Sakhalin II dealt with environmental-information disclosure.

It did not adjudicate the motives behind Gazprom’s acquisition or the legality of the ownership transfer. vLex

Not established

No public document examined here establishes a secret quid pro quo between Shell’s loss of control in 2006 and subsequent Russian opportunities.

No court finding identified here establishes that Shell was unlawfully coerced into signing either the 2006 or the 2010 agreements.

The 2010 protocol itself did not guarantee that contemplated projects would proceed.

Commentary

The remarkable feature of the 2010 protocol is not that Shell continued doing business in Russia.

Large energy companies routinely continue operating after disputes with host governments.

What is remarkable is the scale of the reconciliation.

Shell did not merely preserve its reduced Sakhalin stake.

It agreed to explore a relationship extending from Siberian upstream production to European downstream markets and potentially into Shell projects elsewhere in the world.

The company that had lost control of Sakhalin II was contemplating giving Gazprom access to its own international portfolio.

There is a hard commercial logic behind that apparent contradiction.

Shell could not manufacture another Russian resource base.

Gazprom could not instantly manufacture Shell’s international LNG expertise, markets, technology and global project portfolio.

Each possessed something the other wanted.

The imbalance exposed at Sakhalin II had therefore not destroyed the relationship.

It had redefined it.

In 2005, Shell had hoped to trade part of Sakhalin II for Russian gas reserves.

In 2006, Gazprom instead obtained control of Sakhalin II under radically different terms.

By 2010 the concept of reciprocal access had returned — but on a much larger scale.

The language was no longer merely:

Sakhalin.

It was:

strategic global cooperation.

With hindsight, the phrase carries an obvious historical weight.

But the archive should resist hindsight.

In November 2010, Shell publicly regarded deeper cooperation with Gazprom as an opportunity.

Russia was part of Shell’s growth strategy.

Sakhalin II was producing valuable LNG.

Gazprom possessed resources Shell wanted.

And Shell was prepared to build upon the partnership created in the aftermath of one of the bitterest corporate confrontations it had experienced.

The Kremlin crisis had not ended the relationship.

It had changed the terms on which the relationship would continue.

Source Record

Royal Dutch Shell plc’s Form 6-K for December 2010 contains the authenticated Shell announcement of the Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation, its proposed scope, the Miller and Voser statements, and Shell’s accompanying political-risk disclosures. SEC

US SEC — Royal Dutch Shell plc Form 6-K containing the 30 November 2010 Gazprom agreement

Royal Dutch Shell’s fourth-quarter and full-year 2010 results subsequently identified the Gazprom protocol as an Upstream portfolio development and recorded the contribution of Sakhalin II to rising LNG sales. PR Newswire

Royal Dutch Shell plc — Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2010 Results

Royal Dutch Shell’s December 2006 Form 6-K records Gazprom’s acquisition of control, Shell’s reduced shareholding, Shell’s continuing technical role and the Area of Mutual Interest arrangement. SEC

US SEC — Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi Sign Sakhalin II Protocol, December 2006

The Guardian reported contemporaneously on the historical irony of the global cooperation pact and the commercial logic seen by analysts. The Guardian

The Guardian — Shell and Gazprom sign ‘global co-operation’ pact, 30 November 2010

Contemporaneous Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal reporting preserved in the Donovan archive records Gazprom’s explicit exchange principle and Shell’s plans for broader cooperation. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com archive — Shell, Gazprom to Combine Beyond Russia, 30 November 2010

Bloomberg reporting at the end of December 2010 recorded discussion of possible Sakhalin LNG expansion and possible future asset exchanges, while noting that no such project had yet been confirmed. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com archive — Shell, Gazprom May Expand Sakhalin LNG by 2015, Governor Says

The relevant judicial background remains Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), judgment of Mr Justice Mitting dated 17 March 2008. vLex

Archive disclaimer: Statements concerning future cooperation establish what Shell and Gazprom publicly contemplated in November 2010; they do not establish that every proposed opportunity proceeded. Corporate statements, journalistic interpretation and judicial findings are kept separate. No inference of a secret quid pro quo is presented as established fact.

Site-wide disclaimer applies.

Next instalment SLF-2007-077 — The Sakhalin Papers LXVII: From Protocol to Joint Venture — Shell and Gazprom Neft Move Into Western Siberia and Beyond

The November 2010 protocol was only a framework.

Seven months later, the framework began acquiring machinery.

On 16 June 2011, Gazprom Neft and Shell signed basic terms for examining a new joint venture.

Its proposed reach was striking:

western Siberia;

other Russian regions;

and:

third countries.

By September, Alexey Miller and Peter Voser were discussing implementation of the arrangement and the creation of the new venture. Contemporary Gazprom records later described the 2010 protocol as providing cooperation across exploration, production, processing and distribution in Russian and international markets. Oreanda News

The next file will examine how the grand language of “strategic global cooperation” began turning into concrete corporate structures — and whether Sakhalin II had become the template for Shell’s wider Russian strategy.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 3 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 3, 2026 at 8:33 pm.
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