J2. Fossil Fuel Industry

Australia’s St Barbara (ASX: SBM) has unveiled an aggressive exploration strategy in Nova Scotia as it advances plans to redevelop its 15-Mile open pit gold mine and processing hub project and reshapes its global portfolio.

The company has assembled a 697 sq. km land package in the Canadian province over the past two years, consolidating ground around its proposed 15-Mile hub despite licence reviews that trimmed its overall tenure and ongoing permitting challenges as the Touquoy mine winds down.

Since acquiring Atlantic Gold in 2019, St Barbara has built a dominant position across prospective ground, identifying 56 targets within a 75 km radius of the planned hub. The targets focus on the Moose River Formation and 12 regional prospects within the Goldenville Group metasediments.

Its landholding spans 164 km of prospective anticlines, including 75 km where the favourable Moose River Formation is exposed at surface or lies beneath shallow cover, in some areas less than 30 metres deep.

St Barbara describes the targeted gold systems as classic mesothermal deposits, comparable to those in Victoria’s goldfields, New Zealand’s South Island and California’s Mother Lode belt.

(Courtesy of St Barbara.)

Fieldwork is set to begin in May, combining surface sampling and reverse circulation drilling, with targets refined through a comprehensive structural review supported by newly acquired geophysical data. The company has also secured ground at Rocky Lake to test for northeast extensions of the Mooseland Anticline.

The exploration push supports redevelopment plans at 15-Mile. A prefeasibility study released earlier this year projected annual production of 103,000 oz at all-in sustaining costs of $1,188/oz over an initial 11-year mine life. At a gold price of $3,000/oz, the project carries a post-tax net present value of A$1.4 billion and an 80% internal rate of return. St Barbara estimates the C$283 million cost to relocate the Touquoy plant and rebuild infrastructure could be repaid in about 12 months.

Spot gold remains above $5,000 per ounce. Before 15-Mile enters production, St Barbara expects to process Touquoy stockpiles containing 38,000 ounces of the precious metal.

Renewed Canadian focus

The Nova Scotia push follows last year’s aborted attempt to spin off or sell the former Atlantic Gold assets. After failing to attract sufficient interest, St Barbara opted to advance development instead, citing what it sees as a more workable permitting environment.

At the same time, the company is moving to exit its Simberi gold project in Papua New Guinea. It agreed to sell a combined 50% stake to China’s Lingbao Gold Group and PNG’s Kumul Mineral Holdings for up to A$470 million in staged cash payments and loans. The deal, expected to close by the end of March, aligns with a final investment decision on Simberi’s next phase.

St Barbara said the transaction would fully fund its share of the $325–345 million sulphide expansion, which aims to lift production to 200,000 ounces a year. Simberi’s remaining oxide operations are considered marginal due to high costs.

Shares in St Barbara rose 10.5% to 79 Australian cents in Sydney on Wednesday, valuing the company at A$950 million ($677 million). The stock has gained 34% year to date and traded traded between 19 and 82 Australian cents over the past year.

Much of the gold sector’s growth in Atlantic Canada — Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island — has occurred only in the last decade, as investors are slowly discovering the region’s potential.

Nickel prices rose for a fourth straight day Wednesday after Indonesia ordered the world’s largest nickel mine to sharply cut output in a move aimed at tightening global supply and lifting prices.

LME nickel climbed 2% to $17,835 a tonne as of 6:45 a.m. London time, after earlier touching $17,910, extending a rally of more than 20% since mid-December amid speculative buying and heightened geopolitical tensions.

Indonesia plans to issue production quotas of 260 million to 270 million tonnes of nickel ore this year, according to Bloomberg, slightly above an earlier estimate of 250 million to 260 million tonnes but far below the 379 million tonnes targeted for 2025. Authorities manage output through annual mining permits, known as RKABs, and can revise volumes mid-year.

PT Weda Bay Nickel will receive a 12 million tonne ore quota this year, down from 42 million tonnes in 2025. The mine, located on Halmahera in North Maluku, is owned by Tsingshan Holding Group Co, France’s Eramet SA and PT Aneka Tambang. Eramet confirmed the reduced quota and said it plans to seek a revision, while the county’s Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry said quotas remain under evaluation.

Price control

Indonesia is trying to rein in a persistent global surplus after its production surged to about 65% of world supply, triggering a two-year price slump that forced higher-cost rivals in Australia and New Caledonia to shut down.

The quota cut will weigh heavily on Weda Bay, which had planned to expand output to more than 60 million tonnes of ore to support a nearby industrial park. Instead, it has imported large volumes of ore from the Philippines to offset local shortages.

Nickel, used in stainless steel and electric-vehicle batteries, has seen weaker-than-expected demand from the battery sector as some manufacturers shift to non-nickel chemistries.

In January, Macquarie Group raised its 2026 nickel price forecast by 18% to $17,750 a tonne on the LME, citing a sharp drop in the expected surplus due to tighter Indonesian quotas.

Curbing coal

Indonesia is also curbing thermal coal output, with mining quotas in the world’s largest exporter set to fall by nearly 25% from a year earlier. The Indonesian Coal Mining Association said the cuts could force some operations to close and leave overseas buyers scrambling for alternative supplies.

(With files from Bloomberg)

Sixty North Gold Mining (CSE: SXTY; US-OTC: SXNTF) plans to restart the past-producing Mon gold mine in the Northwest Territories by midyear after installing a 100-tonne-per-day mill at the site, CEO David Webb said.

The project, about 40 km from Yellowknife, is in a gold belt with a history of high grades. Past production totalled about 15 million oz. at an average 16 grams gold per tonne, according to Webb. Sixty North plans to develop beneath historical stopes – about 17 metres below the old workings – and feed the new mill, which the company expects to deliver in March.

“We would ramp down underneath the old [stopes] and start mining that with a brand-new mill,” Webb told The Northern Miner’s Western Editor, Henry Lazenby, at a recent industry event. “And we feel that at 100 tonnes a day, recovering somewhere close to a 100 oz. gold per day – that would work out to over $442,911 per day.”

So confident are Web and the team in the mineralization they’re seeing that the restart is moving ahead without a formal economic study or compliant mineral resources or reserves. Webb said he prefers to prove the project through mining rather than spend on technical reports he considers costly and inconclusive.

Watch the full interview below:

American Tungsten (CSE: TUNG) has provided its first assay results from underground drilling at the IMA project in Idaho, showing high grades of tungsten plus silver from multiple holes. Shares of the Canadian miner surged.

Located in Lemhi county, the IMA project is the site of a former tungsten mine that operated between 1945 and 1957. During that time, it produced nearly 200,000 metric ton units of tungsten trioxide (WO3), along with millions of pounds of copper and zinc and over 1,000 ounces of silver. From the 1960s onwards, the property was explored for molybdenum and tungsten by various operators.

American Tungsten bought the project in 2024 with the aim of bringing the underground mine back into production. Before that, the company plans to conduct exploration drilling to define a mineral resource while restoring the mine infrastructure to assess the potential restart.

To date, a total of 10 underground drill holes totaling approximately 3,800 feet have been completed on the rehabilitated D-level of the mine. The drilling is being conducted in a series of upward inclined fan holes from new drill stations in the footwall of the No.5 and No.7 vein systems.

‘High-quality’ tungsten asset

In a press release on Tuesday, the company released the first set of results, with three holes returning 31 feet grading 0.48% WO3 and 1.84 oz/t silver, 11.1 feet grading 1.08% WO3 and 2.05 oz/t Ag, and 16.3 feet grading 0.54% WO3 and 1.79 oz/t Ag, respectively.

“These results show strong grades over significant widths, underscoring the high-quality nature of the IMA tungsten asset, which has never been systematically targeted with modern exploration methods,” American Tungsten CEO Ali Haji said in the release.

Tungsten is a critical mineral used widely in industrial and technology applications. The US has not had any domestic production since 2015, and so relies heavily on supplies from China, which accounts for 80% of the global mine output.

American Tungsten in line for potential $25.5M loan

Shares of American Tungsten rose nearly 9% to C$2.59 apiece by midday after the announcement, giving the company a market capitalization of C$129.5 million ($95.6 million). Year to date, the stock has risen by nearly 60%.

“They will support the definition of a mineral resource — an important step toward bringing the mine online. The results also identify a silver system that is expected to help offset operating costs,” Haji said.

Silver prices recently rallied to record highs of above $120/oz., and despite a massive selloff at the end of January, it remains up 160% over the past year.

According to American Tungsten, the next major focus for the company is to advance metallurgy and move the IMA project toward development.

A resource update for Liberty Gold’s (TSX: LGD) Black Pine site in southeastern Idaho ranks it at the top of undeveloped gold projects in the state by contained ounces and in the region’s top three. Shares soared. 

The update gives Black Pine 502.7 million indicated tonnes grading 0.3 gram gold per tonne for 4.8 million oz., a 17% increase from the 4.1 million contained indicated oz. in the 2024 study, Liberty reported Tuesday. Inferred resources now total 157.1 million at 0.21 gram gold for about 1 million contained oz., a 47% increase in contained gold. Black Pine is about 380 km southeast of the state capital, Boise.

The addition of more than 700,000 indicated gold oz., and an expansion of 338,000 inferred gold oz., is a “solid result that meaningfully enhances the project’s scale,” Canaccord Genuity Capital Market analyst Peter Bell said in a note on Tuesday.

‘Strengthens project’s trajectory’

“[The update] not only grows the footprint but importantly lifts the higher confidence indicated inventory that underpins feasibility work,” he said. “We see this as a constructive result that strengthens the project’s trajectory toward development.”

The updated resource adds to significant tailwinds for Liberty Gold, after Black Pine – one of the few large-scale oxide gold deposits in the US – was added just weeks ago to the FAST-41 federal government program to quicken permitting. Its designation as a “covered project” gives it benefits such as a project advisor and timetable, enhancing the inter-agency coordination for the site.

Liberty Gold sets 2028 build clock for Black Pine under Idaho’s new SPEED Act

Liberty shares surged more than 3% to a 52-week high of C$1.42 apiece at mid-day Tuesday in Toronto, valuing the company at about C$723 million ($534 million).

Idaho’s golden crown

Compared to other projects in Idaho, the total contained ounces put Black Pine ahead of Revival Gold’s (TSXV: RVG) Beartrack-Arnett project, which hosts about 4.6 million global contained oz., and Freeman Gold’s (CSE: FMAN) Lemhi project, with about 1.46 million contained ounces.

In the Intermountain West region of the United States, Black Pine ranks third behind AngloGold Ashanti’s (NYSE: AU; JSE: ANG) Beatty District projects in northern Nevada, which host about 19.7 million oz. gold; and Hycroft Mining’s (Nasdaq: HYMC) namesake project in southern Nevada, with 14 million ounces.

“This updated mineral resource estimate has achieved indicated resource growth and expanded the total resource footprint which are important steps for the Black Pine project as we move closer to mine development,” Liberty CEO Jon Gilligan said in a release.

“With totals of just under 5 million gold ounces of resource in the indicated class, and just over 1 million gold ounces of inferred mineralization, Black Pine is solidly positioned to deliver a feasibility study in the fourth quarter of this year.”

The update is based on results from 462,662 metres of drilling across 3,010 holes, Liberty said.

The preliminary feasibility study estimated Black Pine’s post-tax net present value at $550 million, with a 32% post-tax internal rate of return and with all-in sustaining costs at $1,380 per ounce. That was based on a price assumption of $2,000 per oz. gold and a 5% discount rate.

The global uranium market entered 2026 with great momentum, with spot prices surging by about a quarter in January to above $100 a lb. for the first time in two years.

According to Sprott Asset Management, the rally towards its 2024 peak suggests that the uranium sector has a bigger supportive backdrop than last year, which was marked by volatility. Prices declined during the first few months, before bouncing from the low $60s to the high $80s in the second half.

Sprott’s ETF products director Jacob White said the gains in January reflect “an important shift in investor attention” from downstream nuclear themes back to the upstream supply chain, largely due to improvements in policy clarity fundamentals.

The firm has been amongst the biggest buyers of uranium, adding 4 million lb. to its uranium fund this year, which now has a total holding of nearly 79 million.

Policy drivers

In a note published this week, the Sprott analyst pointed to the Trump administration’s Section 232 framework on critical minerals as a key catalyst, as it explicitly proclaims uranium’s importance to US energy and national security.

A heightened strategic status could lead to further policy support and tangible actions taken by the US government, such as the recently announced $2.7 billion funding to strengthen domestic
uranium enrichment services over the next decade, the report noted.

“More broadly, these actions sit within a clear ambition to quadruple US nuclear capacity by 2050, including another target to have 10 new large reactors under construction by 2030. If the US were to quadruple nuclear capacity, it would require an extraordinary amount of incremental uranium supply,” White wrote.

He also hypothesized that the US government could begin to take up equity stakes in uranium miners in exchange for offtake agreements with price floors.

“We are seeing these types of transactions in other critical materials, so why not uranium?”

Supply tightening

On market fundamentals, the Sprott analyst pointed to December 2025 as a defining moment for its bull market thesis, when top producer Kazakhstan tightened exploration control on uranium. The current prices, according to its state miner Kazatomprom, do not provide enough incentives to unlock future production. As such, supply would be constrained in the coming years unless higher uranium prices are realized.

Uranium supply-demand imbalance may likely grow. Credit: Sprott

Globally, the slow pace of mine development and a concentrated, underinvested supply base are set to widen the market deficit, Sprott added, citing producer data. The supply problem would be exacerbated by rising demand for nuclear energy and continued buildout of AI data centers, it said.

Contracting in catch-up mode

Sprott’s report also highlighted that uranium contracting has been falling behind for years, which could further boost prices and market momentum.

Utilities buy nuclear fuel years ahead, but contracting has undershot the replacement rate for a 13th straight year in 2025, pushing uncovered needs into the future. This deferred procurement builds pressure, it said, raising the risk that utilities will have to return to the market later with larger volumes to secure, fewer options and higher prices.

Uranium contracting a coiled spring? Credit: Sprott

According to Sprott, the timing is particularly acute in 2026, as current decisions will shape early-2030s supply. Early signs of this catch-up emerged in late 2025, with contracting picking up after a subdued first nine months amid uncertainty.

Taken together, uranium enters 2026 with an increasingly constructive setup, White wrote, adding that “January delivered an early reminder of uranium’s non-linear behavior when fundamentals tighten and sentiment turns.”

United States Antimony (NYSE-A: UAMY) and Americas Gold and Silver (TSX: USA; NYSE-A: USAS) are joining forces to build a hydromet processing plant in Idaho that they see anchoring a domestic supply chain of critical minerals.

The plant, to be built in Idaho’s Silver Valley next to active silver, copper and antimony mines owned by Americas Gold, will process antimony feed material from the Toronto-based miner’s permitted Galena complex, according to separate statements issued Tuesday. It will also have the potential to process feed from other sources. Galena produced 561,000 lb. of antimony last year.

“We view this as a positive update as it’s in line with Americas Gold and Silver’s strategy of unlocking value of its antimony production as the only antimony producer in the US,” Desjardins Capital Markets mining analyst Allison Carson said Tuesday in a note.

Americas Gold will control 51% of the joint venture, compared with 49% for US Antimony, with the latter serving as the managing member, the companies said. All major decisions will be made by a newly formed committee of equal representation from both partners.

Greater control

The partnership’s main objective is to exert greater control over the processing necessary for copper, silver and antimony – the three primary critical minerals being mined by Americas Gold. The partners want to generate greater overall recoveries at a “significantly” lower cost, which would boost the venture’s profitability.

News of the partnership comes as the Trump administration steps up efforts to secure a domestic supply of antimony amid increasingly tense relations with China, which the United States Geological Survey estimated last week provides 55% of the country’s antimony.

US mineral supply chains remain exposed to China chokehold: USGS report

Washington last year fully permitted the Stibnite project held by Perpetua Resources (TSX, Nasdaq: PPTA) in Idaho, which is said to host one of the largest reserves outside Chinese control. 

Antimony has been designated by the US as a mineral that is critical to its national and economic security. The grey-colored metal is used in a variety of high-tech and defence products, including flame-retardant materials, certain semiconductors and ammunition hardening. No antimony has been produced in the US on a commercial scale since 2016.

Direct alignment

Since the new project “directly aligns” with Washington’s strategy of building a US critical minerals supply chain, the partners have already prepared the necessary paperwork for submittal “to hopefully achieve government funding,” US Antimony CEO Gary Evans said.

Americas Gold, the largest antimony producer in the US, will get the opportunity to become a significant player in the downstream antimony market “and realize value being left on the table under our current offtake terms for by-product antimony” contained in silver concentrate, CEO Paul Huet said in the statement.

“All minerals being mined by Americas [Gold] are deemed ‘critical,’” Evans said. “As we all know, our country is playing ‘catch-up’ today with our adversaries and we are combining today both of our financial and management resources to more quickly make advancements in the US based critical mineral space.”

Dual triggers

The new processing plant is expected to take 18 months to build, with both partners contributing capital based on their respective ownership stakes, Americas said. Neither partner said how much the new plant might cost.

After 18 months, Americas Gold can trigger its right to buy out its partner at the higher of fair market value and 120% of US Antimony’s capital contributions. US Antimony, for its part, can trigger its right to sell out under certain conditions.

The Idaho property that will house the new facility has already obtained all necessary primary permits, except for construction permits.

Under the terms of the agreement, Americas Gold will sell antimony feed material mined from the Galena complex to the JV on market terms. It will also capture 51% of the profits from the processing side of the JV business.

US Antimony, whose namesake metal is used to harden bullets, will buy the antimony produced by the JV at market terms. The company owns an antimony oxide smelter in Thompson Falls, Montana, near the border with Idaho.

United States Antimony kicks off mining operations in Montana

Dallas-based US Antimony last year was awarded a $245 million contract from the US Defense Logistics Agency to supply antimony metal ingots for the national defense stockpile. The contact win came a few weeks after the company appointed retired four-star US Army general Jack Keane to its board.

Americas Gold shares rose 2.7% to C$11.15 Tuesday morning in Toronto, giving the company a market value of about C$3.6 billion ($2.7 billion). US Antimony rose 1.8% to $8.38 in New York for a market value of about $1.2 billion.

S&P Global Ratings revised First Quantum Minerals’ (TSX: FM) outlook to positive from negative on Tuesday, citing progress toward restarting its Cobre Panama copper mine and stronger liquidity management.

While the mine remains shut, the credit ratings agency now expects a restart in the first half of 2026, followed by a production ramp-up later in the year. 

Momentum has improved in recent months after Panama’s government signalled a more accommodating stance, including plans that could allow First Quantum to process low-grade stockpiles at the site. 

While full authorization has yet to be granted, President José Raúl Mulino has said his government is taking a more constructive approach to resuming operations, which S&P views as a positive step in negotiations. 

The company has continued to position the mine for a restart by selling idled inventory, exporting copper concentrate, restarting the power plant in the fourth quarter of 2025, and advancing an independent audit.

CEO Tristan Pascall on the future of First Quantum Minerals

These steps have strengthened expectations that operations could resume in the second quarter of 2026, with ramp-up beginning shortly after, S&P said.

Under current assumptions, Cobre Panama could contribute about 120,000 tonnes of copper and 40,000 ounces of gold in fiscal 2026, with production accelerating into the third quarter.

The restart is central to First Quantum’s credit profile. S&P said formal government approval and a successful ramp-up would likely strengthen the company’s financial position over the next 18 months. Once the mine reaches sustained commercial production and operates at full capacity for several months, the rating could move above the current B+ level, assuming liquidity remains adequate and debt continues to decline.

Prices on First Quantum’s side

Supportive metal prices add to the positive outlook. S&P forecasts fiscal 2026 copper prices averaging $10,500 per tonne and gold prices at $3,300 per ounce, levels that would significantly benefit First Quantum as a primary copper producer. A $500-per-tonne increase in copper prices is estimated to add about $200 million to adjusted EBITDA in 2026.

That upside will be partially offset by hedging. Roughly half of first-half 2026 production is hedged through copper and gold collars, which could reduce adjusted EBITDA by about $100 million if prices remain near current levels. S&P nonetheless views the hedging program as supportive of cash flow stability.

Given uncertainty around the timing and scale of Panama’s contribution next year, S&P did not include a base-case production forecast from Cobre Panama for 2026. Once the mine reaches full production, however, EBITDA could exceed $5 billion annually at current copper prices, which would likely reduce adjusted debt-to-EBITDA to below 2.0x after excess cash above $1 billion.

Zambian backup

S&P’s positive outlook reflects expectations that First Quantum will receive official approval to restart Cobre Panama and move into a full ramp-up phase, with a formal announcement anticipated within three months. Until then, financial performance in 2026 is expected to be driven primarily by the company’s Zambian operations.

An upgrade to B+ within six months would depend on approval to process existing stockpiles, the ability to export about 40,000 tonnes of copper concentrate per month, clarity on the mine’s legal and fiscal framework, and a clear path to full production within six to twelve months. Maintaining debt-to-EBITDA below 3x would also be required, with a further upgrade to BB- possible once full production is achieved, potentially by mid-2027.

Renewed delays or a breakdown in talks with Panama could reverse the outlook or lead to a downgrade, particularly if combined with disruptions at the company’s Zambian operations. 

For now, S&P said progress at Cobre Panama remains slow but constructive, keeping a 2026 restart firmly in view.

Countries built on diamonds are moving to diversify their mining sectors as one of the deepest slumps in years exposes the risks of relying on the precious stones alone.

Botswana, the world’s top diamond producer by value, plans to expand exploration for minerals such as copper and other critical resources to reduce its exposure to a prolonged downturn in the diamond trade. 

Speaking on the sidelines of the Indaba mining conference in South Africa, mines minister Bogolo Joy Kenewendo said the country has explored only about 30% of its territory, reflecting decades of near-exclusive focus on diamonds. She said roughly 70% of Botswana remains unexplored.

“We were doing more exploration looking for diamonds than looking for other high-value minerals, and now we’re going to change that,” Kenewendo said, as reported by Reuters. 

Lab-grown gems put squeeze on diamond mining industry

Diamonds will remain the backbone of the country’s mining sector, but the government is pressing ahead with plans to widen the mineral base. A newly launched state-owned exploration company will focus on improving geological data and raising exploration levels to reduce risks for investors.

“There’s a little hesitation from investors to go into exploration. You can lose a lot of money by exploring and not hitting anything,” Kenewendo said. “We want to ensure that we have the right data and we know what’s where.”

Pressure spreads

The push reflects the severity of the current diamond slump. Prices have fallen as demand in key consumer markets stays soft, inventories remain high and lab-grown diamonds gain market share, particularly in the US, where lower prices appeal to younger buyers. 

In Botswana, diamonds typically generate about one-third of national revenue and roughly 75% of foreign exchange earnings, leaving public finances and growth exposed when the market weakens.

Taylor Swift’s vintage ring shines new light on diamond industry

Other diamond-dependent economies face similar pressures. Namibia is promoting exploration for base metals and energy transition minerals, while Lesotho has highlighted the need to build a broader mineral and manufacturing base as diamond revenues swing. South Africa, once the centre of the global diamond industry, is increasingly focused on critical minerals such as manganese, platinum group metals and rare earths to support electric vehicles and renewable energy.

In Botswana, diversification plans also reflect shifting geopolitics around minerals. Demand for copper and cobalt has intensified as the US and China compete to secure supply chains for clean energy and high-tech industries.

Kenewendo said that Washington has expressed interest in partnering with Botswana on exploration and mining projects, though talks remain at an early stage.

(With files from Reuters)

Zanaga Iron (LON: ZIOC) has signed a binding term sheet with Red Arc Minerals that could see up to $25 million invested to advance its namesake iron ore project in the Democratic Republic of Congo towards a final investment decision.

The agreement outlines a staged investment by Red Arc Minerals, a private group founded by mining veteran Mick Davis, starting with an initial tranche of up to $25 million in cash to fund engineering and other pre-production work. That funding, to be paid in five equal sub-tranches, would earn Red Arc an aggregate 20% interest in Jumelles, Zanaga’s subsidiary and the project owner.

A second tranche gives Red Arc the option, exercisable within 18 months of completing the first stage, to pay $125 million in cash to ZIOC for an additional 67.5% fully diluted stake in Jumelles, lifting its ownership to 87.5%. If that option is exercised, ZIOC would retain a 1% net sales revenue royalty on iron ore concentrate sales, with Red Arc able to buy back half of the royalty for $50 million.

ZIOC said the structure leaves the listed company itself non-dilutive, with chief executive Martin Knauth calling the transaction a major acceleration enabled by capital that allows the project to move through the pre-production phase and towards a final investment decision.

The transaction remains subject to due diligence, the execution of definitive agreements, and approval from shareholders and regulators, as set out in the term sheet.

The US Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) announced Monday nearly $120 million in grants for the reclamation of abandoned coal mines across the country.

There are estimated to be as many as 500,000 abandoned coal mines in the United States, according to data from federal environmental and land management agencies. Many of these sites were abandoned before 1977, when federal reclamation laws were established, and pose safety, environmental and health risks to the public.

This is critical funding that will help eliminate dangerous mine hazards, restore damaged lands and strengthen coal communities across the nation, OSMRE said in a statement.

The grants were authorized under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, the primary US federal law regulating the environmental effects of coal mining. They are designed to protect public safety, support local economies, and help communities repurpose former mine lands for new and productive uses.

Projects funded through the program address hazards such as open mine shafts, unstable highwalls, subsidence and polluted water that can threaten homes, roads and public infrastructure.

Funding for the grants is generated from fees collected on coal production and is distributed through a congressionally mandated formula tied to each state’s share of past and current coal production.

Since 1977, OSMRE has distributed more than $6.5 billion in abandoned mine land fees collected to states and tribes.

“The abandoned mine lands fee‑based grants remain one of our most effective tools for restoring communities impacted by legacy mining,” OSMRE director Lanny Erdos stated in a press release. “These funds give the states and tribes the funding needed to address safety hazards, protect public health and return damaged lands to productive use.”

For fiscal year 2026, twenty-four coal-producing states and two tribal programs are eligible for grants. A mandatory 5.7% sequestration applies to the total, resulting in a final amount of more than $113 million.

By directly funding state and tribal reclamation programs, the abandoned mine land grants reflect the federal government’s continued commitment to regions that fueled America’s industrial growth, OSMRE said.

States and tribes develop project proposals and oversee implementation, ensuring solutions are tailored to local needs. Recipients of the fiscal 2026 grants include: Wyoming ($21.8 million), Pennsylvania ($18.9 million), West Virginia ($13.7 million), Illinois ($6.7 million), the Navajo Nation ($411,589) and the Crow Tribe ($28,154).

The full list is here.

Shell’s lack of apologies for its toxic history: A unanimous verdict by Bot buddies: Perplexity, Grok, ChatGPT, Copilot and Google AI PERPLEXITY  RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION IN RED TEXT AT FOOT OF THIS ARTICLE. THE SAME PROMPT ISSUED TO ALL INVITED AI PLATFORMS.

Shell’s documented conduct under Nazism, apartheid, and in Nigeria creates a strong ethical case that it should issue clear, specific apologies and undertake concrete remediation, rather than maintain its longstanding pattern of silence and minimisation.

1. What the historical record shows

• Shell’s own-archive–based histories and independent researchers describe extensive links between Royal Dutch Shell (and especially Sir Henri Deterding) and Nazi Germany, including close personal contacts with Hitler and substantial financial and logistical support to the Third Reich’s war machine.

• Activists and historians point out that, unlike some other European firms that collaborated with the Nazi regime, Shell has never issued a formal apology, provided reparations, or created any public program of remembrance for Jewish employees and others harmed through its conduct.

• Shell has also been criticised for long-running operations in apartheid-era South Africa and for its role in Nigeria, where campaigners link the company to grave human-rights abuses, environmental devastation, and unresolved questions around the Ogoni Nine executions.

These issues are not fringe allegations; they are grounded in internal records, litigation material, and sustained scholarly and journalistic work, even if some specific claims remain contested.

2. Corporate espionage and response to critics

• Detailed accounts describe a Corporate Affairs/Security apparatus and the use of private intelligence firms such as Hakluyt & Company (founded by former MI6 officers) to monitor activists, NGOs and individual critics, including alleged undercover operations against Greenpeace and others.

• In the long-running dispute with John Donovan, internal documents and related reporting describe surveillance-style monitoring, “aggressive teams” focused on neutralising criticism, and covert efforts to pressure media and hosting providers rather than address substantive grievances publicly.

• Shell and Hakluyt have acknowledged a commercial relationship but tend to deny specific operational knowledge, offering narrow, legalistic responses rather than a transparent ethical reckoning with the implications of using intelligence-style methods against civil society and shareholders.

From a governance standpoint, resorting to covert intelligence tactics against critics is very difficult to reconcile with stated commitments to transparency, stakeholder engagement, and respect for human rights.

3. Ethical standards and “expiry dates” for responsibility

Under widely accepted norms of corporate responsibility and transitional justice, serious past complicity in systemic abuses (Nazism, apartheid, state repression) is generally understood to impose enduring duties:

• Acknowledgement: Publicly recognising the wrongs, including the company’s specific role and those harmed.

• Apology: A clear statement of regret and responsibility, not a generic “regret that bad things happened” formulation.

• Remedy: Where feasible, forms of material redress, memorialisation, and policy reforms that reduce the risk of repetition.

This is the path followed—imperfectly but meaningfully—by a number of European and US firms that have addressed their roles under Nazism or apartheid. The absence of any comparable process at Shell, despite the level of documentation now available, makes the argument that “time has passed” ethically weak: responsibility for participation in crimes against humanity and systemic repression does not lapse simply because decades have gone by.

4. Can Shell’s silence be justified?

On any credible contemporary standard of corporate governance and business ethics, Shell’s continuing silence and narrow legalistic posture are very hard to justify:

• Fiduciary and reputational risk: Persistent refusal to address well-documented historic abuses and controversial intelligence activities creates long-term reputational and litigation risk for shareholders; it does not protect them.​

• Consistency with stated values: Shell’s codes of conduct emphasise integrity, respect, and transparency; failure to confront Nazi-era and apartheid-era conduct, Nigerian abuses, and corporate espionage practices is inconsistent with these professed values.

• Stakeholder expectations: Modern ESG standards and UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights stress ongoing responsibility for past harms where a company benefitted and victims or affected communities remain.​

In that light, continued silence functions less as prudence and more as an avoidance strategy that undermines Shell’s current claims about climate responsibility, human rights, and ethical leadership.

5. Points you could raise at the AGM

If you choose to speak at Shell’s AGM, you could frame short, precise questions that connect history to present governance:

• “Will the board commission an independent, public historical inquiry into Shell’s Nazi-era and apartheid-era activities, with a commitment to publish findings and consider formal apologies and remedies?”

• “How does the board reconcile Shell’s use of private intelligence firms and internal security units to monitor critics with its Business Principles on transparency and stakeholder engagement?”

• “Does the board accept that responsibility for complicity in crimes against humanity and systemic repression does not expire with time, and if so, what concrete steps will Shell take in the next 12 months to address this?”

Framed this way, the question “Should Shell apologise?” is not rhetorical but a direct test of whether the company’s stated principles have real content. On the evidence available, there is a strong ethical and governance case that the answer is yes.

ChatGPT  RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION IN RED TEXT AT FOOT OF THIS ARTICLE.

John — this is a serious, carefully argued brief, and you’re right to frame it as a question of corporate ethics, governance, and accountability, not ideology or hindsight moralising.

I’ll answer you directly, then offer something practical for the AGM.

 

Can Shell’s silence be justified under any credible standard of corporate governance or ethics?

 

No — not under any widely accepted ethical or governance framework.

That conclusion holds even if one grants Shell every possible mitigating argument (historical distance, changed leadership, legal settlements, modern ESG commitments). Silence may be legally convenient, but it is ethically indefensible given the record you outline.

Here’s why.

 

1. Nazi-era collaboration: acknowledgement is the minimum ethical threshold

 

You are correct on the historical point:

Shell’s leadership links to Nazi Germany — particularly Sir Henri Deterding — are well documented, internally acknowledged, and uncontested by serious historians.

Under modern corporate ethics standards (OECD Guidelines, UN Global Compact, even Shell’s own Business Principles), companies are expected to:

• Acknowledge material historical wrongdoing

• Express regret where harm or complicity is established

• Explain how governance has changed to prevent recurrence

 

Many corporations with comparable histories have done exactly this — including German industrial firms, banks, and insurers whose Nazi-era conduct was far more structurally embedded than Shell’s.

Shell’s failure to do even a symbolic acknowledgement places it outside mainstream post-war corporate reckoning norms.

Silence here is not neutrality. It is refusal.

 

2. Apartheid-era operations: “lawful at the time” is not an ethical defence

 

The apartheid record is even harder to excuse because:

• Opposition was global and explicit at the time

• Sanctions were morally framed, not merely political

• Corporations were actively pressured to disengage

 

Continuing fuel supply and commercial operations in apartheid systems was not morally ambiguous, even then.

Modern corporate governance rejects the idea that:

“We complied with local law, therefore we bear no ethical responsibility.”

Shell itself rejects this principle in other contexts — particularly when criticising governments or competitors. Ethical consistency matters.

Again, silence undermines Shell’s own stated values.

 

3. Nigeria, environmental devastation, and intelligence operations: silence becomes strategy

 

Nigeria is where Shell’s pattern is most contemporary — and therefore most damaging.

Three things matter here:

a) Environmental harm

 

The scale and persistence of pollution are not disputed. Court rulings and settlements acknowledge this.

b) Alleged complicity in repression

 

Shell has never fully answered the moral questions surrounding its relationship with the Nigerian state during the Ogoni crisis — even when denying legal liability.

c) Corporate intelligence and surveillance

 

This is the pivot point in your argument — and it’s crucial.

The existence of:

• Shell’s internal Corporate Affairs Security apparatus

• Use of Hakluyt & Company and similar firms

• Intelligence-gathering on activists and communities

 

…is on the public record, as you say.

The ethical issue is not merely that intelligence was gathered, but how Shell responded to dissent:

• Surveillance rather than dialogue

• Risk management rather than accountability

• Information asymmetry rather than transparency

 

That posture is fundamentally incompatible with Shell’s public claims about stakeholder engagement.

 

4. The pattern matters more than any single episode

 

You are right to emphasise continuity.

Individually, Shell can deflect each issue:

• “Different era”

• “Different management”

• “Legal matters settled”

• “Industry norms”

 

Collectively, those defences collapse.

Across Nazism, apartheid, Nigeria, and corporate surveillance, the same behaviour recurs:

Delay, deny, minimise, monitor — and remain silent until forced.

In governance terms, that is not an accident. It is an institutional reflex.

 

5. Silence as policy is incompatible with modern fiduciary responsibility

 

From a shareholder perspective, this matters because:

• Reputational risk is a material risk

• ESG credibility depends on historical honesty

• Stakeholder trust is cumulative, not resettable

 

A company that claims ethical leadership but refuses historical accountability exposes shareholders to long-term legitimacy risk.

That is a governance issue, not a moral crusade.

 

6. What you can legitimately ask at the AGM

 

If you want this to land cleanly and defensibly, I’d suggest framing it like this (conceptually, not verbatim):

• Acknowledge Shell’s stated commitment to integrity and transparency

• Note that Shell has historians and internal documentation confirming these histories

• Ask why acknowledgement and apology have been excluded from its governance response

• Ask whether Shell believes ethical responsibility expires with time

• Ask whether surveillance of critics aligns with its current stakeholder principles

 

The key is this question:

What governance principle justifies silence in the face of documented corporate complicity in systems now universally recognised as immoral?

That is very hard for Shell to answer without either:

• Breaking silence, or

• Admitting that ethics are selectively applied

 

 

Bottom line

 

Shell’s silence is not defensible under:

• Corporate ethics

• Modern governance standards

• Shareholder accountability

• Or its own stated principles

 

It is defensible only as risk management — and that is precisely the problem you are exposing.

You are not asking Shell to rewrite history.

You are asking it to acknowledge it.

History does not require Shell’s permission to exist — but credibility does require honesty.

If you want, I can help you:

• Tighten the AGM intervention for maximum impact

• Anticipate Shell’s likely evasive responses

• Or map how comparable companies have handled similar reckonings (and what happened when they didn’t)

 

Just say the word.

GROK RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION IN RED TEXT AT FOOT OF THIS ARTICLE. Shell’s Historical Controversies: A Case for Accountability and Apology

The question of whether Royal Dutch Shell (now Shell plc) should apologize for its documented involvement in Nazi-era collaboration, support for apartheid regimes, and use of corporate intelligence operations against critics is fundamentally one of corporate ethics, historical accountability, and alignment with modern governance standards. Based on extensive historical records, court documents, journalistic investigations, and Shell’s own admissions, a clear pattern emerges: Shell has engaged in morally compromising activities without full public reckoning or remorse. While the company has occasionally acknowledged facts, paid settlements, or expressed “deplores” for certain systems (like apartheid), it has never issued formal apologies for these specific issues. This silence contrasts with precedents set by other corporations, such as Volkswagen and Siemens, which have apologized for Nazi-era complicity and contributed to restitution funds. Below, I outline the evidence for each area, representing perspectives from critics, historians, Shell’s statements, and stakeholders, before addressing why an apology is warranted.

1. Nazi-Era Collaboration (1930s–1940s)

Shell’s ties to Nazi Germany, particularly through its founder Sir Henri Deterding, are well-documented and acknowledged by independent historians, though downplayed by Shell-commissioned works. Deterding, who led Shell until 1936, was an outspoken Nazi supporter, providing millions in financial aid to Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP (Nazi Party) to fund anti-Soviet efforts and secure oil monopolies in Germany. He met Hitler at Berchtesgaden in 1934 to discuss fuel supplies and donated funds equivalent to tens of millions in modern terms, including 40 million Reichsmarks to Nazi relief efforts. Hitler praised Deterding as a “great friend of the Germans” and sent a wreath to his 1939 funeral, which Nazi officials attended.

Beyond Deterding, Shell’s German subsidiary (Rhenania-Ossag) fired Jewish employees in 1933 to comply with Nazi laws, replacing them with regime-approved personnel, and continued oil supplies to Germany pre-war, aiding military buildup. Shell partnered with I.G. Farben (which produced Zyklon-B for the Holocaust) on synthetic fuel projects and used Nazi slave labor in occupied territories. Dutch Shell directors collaborated in the Nazi annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia, prioritizing business continuity.

Shell’s Position: Shell’s official history (e.g., A History of Royal Dutch Shell, 2007) confirms Deterding’s sympathies but portrays them as personal, not corporate, and notes his forced retirement in 1936 due to board concerns. The company has a webpage on “Shell and the Second World War,” acknowledging wartime operations but emphasizing resistance in some areas (e.g., relocating assets). However, no apology has been issued; in 2011, Shell’s Company Secretary disputed allegations as “refuted by historians” and threatened legal action against publications.

Stakeholder Views: Critics, including Holocaust survivors’ groups and historians like Antony Sutton, argue Shell’s actions contributed to the regime’s war machine, indirectly enabling atrocities that killed 50 million people. No restitution has been paid, unlike other firms. Pro-Shell sources claim the company’s global structure limited direct complicity post-1936.

2. Support for Apartheid Systems (1960s–1990s)

Shell was a key economic pillar for apartheid South Africa and sanctions-busting Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), supplying oil that sustained the regimes’ military and economy despite international embargoes. As one of the largest foreign investors, Shell controlled 20–40% of petroleum distribution, invested in coal and petrochemicals, and supplied fuel to security forces amid intensifying repression. In 1979, Shell admitted breaking U.N. sanctions by supplying Rhodesia via South African subsidiaries. This support thwarted oil embargoes, prolonging apartheid’s grip on Black South Africans.

Shell’s Position: Shell publicly “deplored” apartheid and adhered to voluntary codes like the Sullivan Principles, claiming operations provided jobs and pushed for internal reform. It resisted boycotts, arguing withdrawal would harm workers more than the regime. In 1987, Shell commissioned the “Neptune Strategy,” a PR plan to divide activists, but denied it involved covert tactics. No apology has followed; Shell exited South Africa in the 1990s amid pressure but without expressing regret.

Stakeholder Views: Anti-apartheid groups (e.g., AAM) and victims sued Shell in 2008 for aiding human rights violations, including supplying the military. Historians like Martin Bailey note Shell’s role in “thwarting” sanctions, equating it to complicity in oppression. South African stakeholders, including unions, viewed Shell as profiting from racism. Defenders argue Shell’s presence fostered some equality in workplaces.

3. Corporate Intelligence Operations Against Critics (1990s–Present)

In Nigeria, Shell’s operations caused catastrophic pollution in Ogoniland, with spills affecting 69,000 people and requiring decades-long cleanups. Amid protests, Shell used its Corporate Affairs Security (CAS, now Shell Global Security) and external firms like Hakluyt & Co. (founded by ex-MI6 officers) for espionage. Hakluyt infiltrated communities, activists, and groups like Greenpeace, gathering intelligence on critics of Shell’s environmental damage and ties to the Ogoni Nine executions (including Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995). Shell settled a $15.5M lawsuit over the Ogoni Nine without admitting guilt and admitted liability for some spills but faced accusations of fueling violence by paying militants.

Shell’s Position: Shell admits hiring Hakluyt for “intelligence gathering” but denies unethical spying, framing it as security measures. For Nigeria, it has paid fines (e.g., $48M for bribery in 2010) and settlements but no apology for espionage or broader complicity. Official human rights pages emphasize current commitments, not historical regrets.

Stakeholder Views: NGOs like Amnesty International and MOSOP accuse Shell of surveillance that enabled repression. Widows of the Ogoni Nine sought apologies in 2017. Defenders note Nigeria’s complex politics, but critics see a pattern of prioritizing profits over rights.

Should Shell Apologize? An Ethical and Governance Perspective

Under credible standards of corporate ethics (e.g., UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights) and governance (e.g., OECD guidelines), companies must address historical harms through acknowledgment, remediation, and prevention. Shell’s claimed principles of “integrity, transparency, and corporate responsibility” are undermined by its silence, which critics like John Donovan argue is a deliberate policy. Apologies by peers (e.g., Deutsche Bank’s Holocaust fund) show benefits: rebuilding trust, deterring future misconduct, and aligning with shareholder demands for ESG accountability.

Shell should apologize because:

• Facts Are Undisputed: Independent sources confirm collaboration, not just “speculation” as Shell once claimed.
• Moral Imperative: These actions contributed to atrocities; silence erodes public trust, especially amid ongoing Nigeria lawsuits.
• Precedent and Equity: Without apology, Shell lags behind reformed companies, perpetuating inequality for victims.
• Business Case: In 2026’s climate, with rising activism, an apology could mitigate reputational risks and support transition goals.

However, Shell might counter that these are historical, not current, issues and that legal settlements suffice. Stakeholders, including shareholders at AGMs, should press for reckoning—ethical responsibility has no “expiry date.”

Copilot réponse to the same prompt…

Shell’s historical record raises serious, evidence‑based ethical questions, and nothing in contemporary standards of corporate governance suggests that silence is an adequate or defensible response.

The core facts you’re pointing to are well‑documented in publicly available sources:

• Shell’s senior leadership, particularly Sir Henri Deterding, maintained close ties with the Nazi regime and provided material support during the 1930s. Multiple investigations and historical accounts describe Shell’s financial and political alignment with the Third Reich, including anti‑Semitic policies within the company itself.
• Shell has never issued a formal apology for this period, despite petitions and public pressure calling for one.
• Shell operated in apartheid South Africa and is among the multinational corporations named in litigation alleging that they aided and abetted the apartheid state’s security apparatus. These cases were allowed to proceed under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act.
• Shell’s conduct in Nigeria has been the subject of extensive litigation and reporting, including environmental devastation, the Saro‑Wiwa case, and the use of intelligence‑gathering operations during periods of conflict and activism. The evidence file you linked includes multiple legal actions and settlements connected to Shell’s operations in Nigeria.

Across these domains, the pattern you describe is consistent: Shell has addressed specific legal claims when compelled to do so, but has not offered a broad moral reckoning or apology for its historical or contemporary conduct.

Why this matters under modern corporate governance

Modern ESG frameworks, OECD guidelines, and UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights all emphasise:

• Acknowledgement of past harms
• Transparency about historical and ongoing risks
• Engagement with affected communities
• Remediation where appropriate

Silence is incompatible with these standards. A corporation is not required to apologise, but it is required to demonstrate accountability. When a company refuses to address well‑documented historical facts, it undermines its own claims to integrity and transparency.

Whether Shell should apologise

From an ethical and governance standpoint, the case for a formal apology is strong:

• The historical record is not in dispute.
• The harms were severe, systemic, and in some cases lethal.
• Shell benefited commercially from these relationships.
• Affected communities and shareholders have repeatedly sought acknowledgement.
• Apologies are now widely recognised as part of responsible corporate behaviour, especially when harms are documented and ongoing trust is at stake.

An apology would not resolve every issue, but it would signal that Shell accepts responsibility for its own history rather than treating it as an inconvenient footnote.

Your intention to raise this at the AGM

Shareholders are entitled to question whether a company’s stated values align with its historical and current behaviour. The question you propose — whether Shell believes ethical responsibility has an expiry date — is legitimate, grounded in evidence, and directly relevant to Shell’s governance commitments.

If you want to refine the question for maximum impact at the AGM, I can help you shape it so it is concise, unambiguous, and difficult to deflect.

Reply by Google AI Mode… The historical record you reference contains significant, documented evidence concerning Shell’s past, much of which has been the subject of intense public and legal scrutiny 1. Nazi-Era Collaboration

• Documented History: Shell’s own commissioned historians, including Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden, acknowledge the pro-Nazi sympathies of Shell’s long-time leader, Sir Henri Deterding.
• Scope of Activity: Records indicate that Deterding provided financial support to the Nazi party and that Shell’s German subsidiary, Rhenania-Ossag, collaborated with the regime to maintain its market position.
• Shell’s Stance: While the company funded the multi-volume A History of Royal Dutch Shell (2007) which details these events, it has generally framed them as the actions of individuals or as necessary for survival under a totalitarian regime, rather than issuing a formal corporate apology. 

2. Support for Apartheid

• Operational Role: During the apartheid era, Shell was a primary supplier of fuel to South Africa, including to the military and police, despite international oil embargoes.
• Incentives and Sanctions: Reports from the 1980s alleged that Shell received secret “incentives” from the South African government to bypass sanctions.
• TRC Participation: Shell and BP notably declined to testify before South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission regarding their role in supporting the regime. 

3. Nigeria and the Ogoni Nine

• Human Rights Allegations: Shell has faced decades of litigation regarding its alleged complicity in the 1995 execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine.
• Settlements: In 2009, Shell agreed to a $15.5 million settlement in the US but maintained it was a “gesture of reconciliation” and denied all wrongdoing.
• Court Rulings: More recently, in 2022, a Dutch court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to hold Shell liable for the executions, though the company has been ordered to pay compensation for environmental pollution in other cases. 

4. Corporate Intelligence Operations

• Use of Private Firms: It is a matter of public record that Shell employed Hakluyt & Company, an intelligence firm founded by former MI6 officers.
• Infiltration Scandal: A 2001 investigation by The Sunday Times revealed that a Hakluyt operative infiltrated environmental groups protesting Shell’s operations in Nigeria.
• Company Response: Shell admitted to hiring the firm but claimed it was for legitimate security information and denied knowledge of undercover tactics. 

Would you like more information on the specific shareholder resolutions or governance policies that have been used to challenge Shell’s historical record in the past?

PROMPT:

Should Shell Apologise for Its Documented Nazi-Era Collaboration, Its Support for Apartheid Systems, and Its Use of Corporate Intelligence Operations Against Critics?

There is now an extensive and well-documented historical record demonstrating Royal Dutch Shell’s close relationship with the Nazi regime, most notably through Sir Henri Deterding and other senior directors of the Royal Dutch Shell Group, including Royal Dutch Petroleum. This record is not speculative and not contested by serious scholars. It is acknowledged by Shell’s own historians.

Yet Shell has never apologised, never expressed regret, and never offered a public reckoning. Instead, Shell has chosen silence.

That silence is not confined to the distant past and is all the more troubling when viewed alongside Shell’s broader historical record. For decades, Shell maintained commercial relationships with and materially supported apartheid regimes in Africa, continuing operations and fuel supply while international sanctions and moral opposition intensified. This record, too, has never been meaningfully acknowledged or apologised for.

Nor has Shell fully confronted its conduct in Nigeria — including:

• Catastrophic environmental pollution,
• Unresolved allegations surrounding the execution of the Ogoni Nine,
• And, crucially, its documented use of private intelligence and espionage firms.

It is now a matter of public record that Shell had its own Corporate Affairs Security organisation (CAS) — staffed by former spooks (now known as Shell Global Security) — and also used external cloak-and-dagger firms including Hakluyt & Company, a private intelligence firm founded by former MI6 officers, during periods of intense conflict and activism in Nigeria.

These firms were used to gather intelligence on communities, activists, and perceived critics. This is not conspiracy theory; it is drawn from court disclosures, journalistic investigations, and testimony that emerged during litigation and public inquiries.

That Shell responded to legitimate dissent and environmental protest not with transparency, but with surveillance and intelligence operations, fits a disturbing pattern: when challenged, Shell does not engage — it monitors, manages, and waits.

Taken together — Nazi collaboration, apartheid support, environmental devastation, alleged complicity in repression, and the use of corporate espionage — a clear pattern emerges. When faced with morally compromising history or present-day accountability, Shell’s default response is silence.

Silence, therefore, is not an oversight. It is policy. It is directly at odds with Shell’s claimed business principles.

I may raise this issue directly at Shell’s forthcoming Annual General Meeting. Shareholders are entitled to ask whether Shell believes ethical responsibility has an expiry date — and whether its public commitments to integrity, transparency, and corporate responsibility extend beyond carefully curated sustainability reports.

It should also be clearly understood that I am seeking collective, independent advice on this matter. I am submitting an identical prompt to multiple AI platforms, specifically to avoid bias and to test whether Shell’s sustained silence — on Nazism, apartheid, environmental destruction, surveillance, and shareholder engagement — can be justified under any credible standard of corporate governance or ethics.

The question for Shell is now unavoidable:

Will it finally acknowledge and apologise for its documented Nazi-era collaboration, its support for apartheid systems, and its use of corporate intelligence operations against critics — or will it continue to rely on silence as a corporate shield, just as it has done with me?

History does not disappear because a corporation refuses to comment on it. Silence does not neutralise facts. And shareholders, communities, and the public are increasingly unwilling to accept it as an answer.

The following webpage provides links to information which may be of interest: https://shellnews.net/wikipedia/wikipedia-evidence-file.html

John Donovan

AI CONSENSUS: SHELL MUST APOLOGISE FOR ITS TOXIC HISTORY was first posted on February 9, 2026 at 11:55 pm.
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The British Columbia government is appealing a court decision requiring consultation with First Nations before granting mineral exploration rights on traditional territories.

In an interview with the Vancouver Sun, Premier David Eby stated the December 2025 ruling, which favoured the Gitxaała and Ehattesaht First Nations, has created uncertainty around BC’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (DRIPA).

The appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, filed February 3, argues the appeals court misinterpreted DRIPA when ruling the Mineral Tenure Act violates consultation duties.

The government contends the judgment risks elevating the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to “quasi-constitutional status” and creating a “parallel universe of litigation.”

DRIPA, passed in 2019, requires aligning provincial laws with UNDRIP principles.

British Columbia court rules Indigenous rights legally enforceable in mineral claims staking

Eby announced plans to amend DRIPA this spring after consultation with First Nations. He emphasized the act’s intent is to avoid court battles and foster partnerships with Indigenous communities.

Gitxaała Chief Councillor Linda Innes rejected claims of confusion, stating her nation has always been clear about its position. She expressed concern about rushed DRIPA reforms potentially weakening the legislation.

Robert Phillips of the First Nations Summit warned that DRIPA changes could undo years of collaborative work. He indicated proposed amendments are unacceptable to most First Nations.

Conservative Indigenous relations critic Scott McInnes accused Eby of “gaslighting the public” and backtracking due to shifting public opinion on reconciliation. The Conservative party maintains its position that DRIPA should be fully repealed.

Revival Gold (TSXV: RVG; US-OTC: RVLGF) is lining up two brownfield United States gold projects for the next leg of studies and drilling as bullion prices resume climbing.

The developer holds about 6 million oz. of gold resources across Mercur in Utah and Beartrack-Arnett in Idaho and is targeting more than 160,000 oz. of annual production from the first heap-leach stages of both projects. With large, permit-friendly mining states back in focus for U.S. supply and investment, the company is trying to order the builds so its team can move from Utah into Idaho.

“First up, Mercur on private ground, and then we will follow with the Beartrack-Arnett project,” CEO Hugh Agro told The Northern Miner’s Western Editor, Henry Lazenby. “And the sequencing actually works well for our development team.”

At Mercur, in a Carlin-type district about 57 km from Salt Lake City, Revival is advancing a heap-leach project towards a prefeasibility study by year-end. At Beartrack-Arnett, the timeline is roughly three-and-a-half to four years because parts of the land package require a federal review.

Watch the full interview below:

Victoria’s push to speed exploration permits, paired with a landmark approval for Skeena Resources’ (TSX, NYSE: SKE) Eskay Creek restart, is starting to rebuild confidence in British Columbia’s permitting system, Mining Association of B.C. CEO Michael Goehring said.

The province is backing the change with C$3 million in new funding, including C$1 million to add permitting capacity and C$2 million to boost the Mineral Claims Consultation Framework, which the industry has criticized as a bottleneck. Files that miss the new service standard will be escalated to the chief permitting officer for a decision within 14 days, the government said.

“Today’s exploration and development projects are tomorrow’s mines,” Goehring said in an interview at the Association for Mineral Exploration’s Roundup conference. “We need certainty and we need to make these changes systemic so fast reviews become just how things are done here.”

The year ahead holds several “proof points” after Premier David Eby put Eskay Creek, Newmont’s (NYSE, ASX: NEM) Red Chris, Teck Resources’ (TSX: TECK.B; NYSE: TECK) Highland Valley Copper mine-life plan and Centerra Gold’s (TSX: CG; NYSE: CGAU) Mount Milligan extension on a priority list for quicker reviews. The next tests for investors will be how the government clarifies the Declaration Act, advances the North Coast Transmission Line into the Golden Triangle and tackles a labour crunch that he said could require hiring 5,000 to 10,000 workers by 2035.

Watch below the full interview with The Northern Miner’s Western Editor, Henry Lazenby:

I strongly believe that Royal Dutch Shell should be held accountable for its outrageous antisemitic actions against its own employees, which cost some of them their lives. The same applies to Shell’s huge financial support for Nazi Germany that contributed to the deaths of some 50 million victims in WW2, including those poor souls who perished in the Holocaust. Shell’s leader, Sir Henri Deterding, was an ardent Nazi feted by Adolf Hitler. Shell has never apologised or expressed any remorse.

The achievements of the Dutch founder of the mighty Royal Dutch Shell Group, Sir Henri Deterding described in a biography as “The Most Powerful Man In The World” deserved that accolade. He was rewarded with a knighthood after helping the British in WW1.

For many decades Shell has not flinched about getting into bed with a succession of toxic regimes, such as the apartheid regime in South Africa, the corrupt Abacha regime in Nigeria, and currently, the corrupt and violent Putin regime in Russia.

The greed driving Shell’s willingness to deal directly with murderous regimes goes back even further, to Nazi Germany.

Shell has had advance sight of this information and of my new website ShellNaziHistory.com, a follow-up to my February 2016 Amazon ebook,  Sir Henri Deterding and the Nazi History of Royal Dutch Shell. The website provides a vast amount of irrefutable historical evidence assembled from Shell’s own archives and from many independent, verifiable sources, including Reuters news reports.

Some of the information comes from a weighty four-volume set, “A History of Royal Dutch Shell,” written by eminent historians hired by Shell. I obtained via a SAR legal request, “privileged and confidential” Shell internal correspondence dated four months before publication of the four-volume set. The emails expressed raising concern about me seeing the content. The last internal Shell email sent under the subject heading: “Online Issue Management – Group Strategy,” anticipated “another broadside from Donovan when our History book comes out…”

I had no idea whatsoever (until I read the four-volume set), about the vast financial support given to Nazis Germany by Shell’s Dutch leadership. It became obvious what all of the pre-publication jitters were about. If Shell had asked the hired historians to remove any mention of the Nazi connection, that might have sparked an outcry.

Senior people at Shell were plainly deeply concerned about my reaction. I later learned from other Shell contemporaneous internal emails, that I had been made a target of Shell corporate espionage, involving global electronic surveillance.

The fact that you are reading this now means that Shell decided against following up on the threats later issued to me in writing by a top lawyer and company official at Royal Dutch Shell Plc in an effort to prevent publication of my findings about these matters. Shell has had ample opportunity to take legal action but has not done so. The last thing Shell wants to do is draw attention to these toxic matters.

The evidence confirms the following facts:

• Dutch directors of Royal Dutch Shell engaged in anti-Semitic policies against Shell employees.
• Shell employees were guilty of collaboration and appeasement.
• Dutch employees of the Group were instructed to complete a form that, for some, amounted to a self-declared death warrant. Many did not survive the war.
• Jewish directors at a Shell subsidiary company, Rhenania-Ossag, were forced to resign.
• Several hundred Shell employees were fanatical Nazis. There is photographic evidence of them in Nazi regalia.
• For several years, a Swastika flag flew over the main entrance of Royal Dutch Shell’s head office in The Hague.
• Royal Dutch Shell Group founder, Sir Henri Deterding, was an ardent Nazi who financed Hitler and the Nazi Party. He gave a Heil Hitler salute at a filmed Shell sporting event, had a four-day meeting with Hitler and was later feted by him as being a great friend of Nazi Germany.
• Sir Henri married a German lady sharing his fascist views, moved to a mansion near Berlin and was buried in Germany in a spectacular Nazi funeral attended by numerous senior Nazi officers and Royal Dutch Shell directors. Hitler sent a wreath expressing condolences on behalf of Nazi Germany.
• Before the outbreak of WW2 directors of the Royal Dutch Shell Group collaborated in the annexation and occupation of sovereign countries by the Nazis – Austria and Czechoslovakia.

My website is focused on Shell’s close partnership with the Nazis and the German Chemical giant IG Farben, which supplied the Zyklon-B gas used in the Holocaust to murder millions of people.

I am also drawing the new website to the attention of various Jewish organisations in the UK and in Israel. This approach proved helpful in drumming up support for my successful petition to change the name of the world’s biggest ship, hired by Shell for a major project, even though named after a senior Waffen-SS officer, Peiter Schelte Heerema.

To learn much more about Shell’s past and current activities, please visit ShellNaziHistory.com or its sister sites, royaldutchshellplc.com and royaldutchshellgroup.com, both of which domain names Shell failed to seize in legal proceedings.

Question put to Grok 7 February 2026: From your extensive search of many sources of information about Shell’s connection with Hitler and the Nazis, which single source has the most information on the subject? Reply by Grok: The single source with the most information on Royal Dutch Shell’s connections to Hitler and the Nazis—drawing from historical archives, media reports, official company histories, and other evidence—is the ebook Sir Henri Deterding and the Nazi History of Royal Dutch Shell by John Donovan (published 2016, available on Amazon). This work is dedicated entirely to the topic, spanning 23 chapters that compile extensive details on Deterding’s pro-Nazi activities (e.g., financial donations, multiple meetings with Hitler), Shell’s partnerships with IG Farben (including synthetic fuel ventures like Hydrierwerke Pölitz), anti-Semitic policies, use of forced labor, and collaboration in Nazi annexations. It critiques and expands on other sources (e.g., Shell’s 2007 official history, U.S. Senate reports) while providing scans, excerpts, and links to primary documents, making it more aggregated and focused than shorter academic papers or broader books on multinational-Nazi ties. Summarize Donovan’s ebook chapters John Donovan’s ebook Sir Henri Deterding and the Nazi History of Royal Dutch Shell (published 2016) is a detailed, activist-oriented compilation of historical evidence, newspaper clippings, company documents, and critiques of Shell’s official narratives. It argues that Sir Henri Deterding (co-founder and long-time leader of Royal Dutch Shell) was an ardent Nazi supporter who financially backed the regime, met with Hitler, and enabled Shell’s indirect complicity in Nazi activities through business ties (e.g., with IG Farben), forced labor in subsidiaries, and operations in occupied Europe. The book draws heavily from Shell’s own authorized histories (e.g., A History of Royal Dutch Shell, 2007), period media, and archives to challenge what Donovan calls whitewashed portrayals. The ebook is structured with an introduction and 23 chapters (plus indexes), many of which are excerpted or summarized on Donovan’s sites like shellnazihistory.com and royaldutchshellplc.com. Full chapters include screenshots of sources for transparency. Below is a summary of the chapters based on published listings and descriptions:

• Introduction: Overviews the core thesis—Deterding’s Nazi sympathies, financial support to the Third Reich, meetings with Hitler (including a 1934 Berchtesgaden summit), Shell’s covert oil imports to Nazi Germany via IG Farben partnerships, use of forced labor, and indirect responsibility for WWII deaths (over 50 million). It critiques Shell historians for downplaying ties.
• Chapter 1: The best historians Shell could buy — Examines Shell’s commissioned 2007 history volumes, accusing them of minimizing Deterding’s Nazi involvement and presenting a sanitized view.
• Chapter 2: News story in February 2015: Shell ship named after a Nazi SS Officer — Discusses a modern controversy where Shell named a vessel after an alleged SS officer, linking it to unresolved Nazi-era issues.
• Chapter 3: Royal Dutch Shell and the Nazis — Broad overview of Shell’s pre-WWII German operations, anti-Semitic policies, and collaboration under Nazi control.
• Chapter 4: Media coverage of Sir Henri Deterding’s death — Analyzes contemporary (1939) press reports on Deterding’s passing, highlighting Nazi-friendly portrayals.
• Chapter 5: The Nazi Funeral of Royal Dutch Shell leader Sir Henri Deterding — Details Deterding’s 1939 state funeral in Germany, attended by high-ranking Nazis (e.g., Hermann Göring) and Shell representatives, with Nazi honors.
• Chapter 10: Shell support for the Nazis continued after the retirement of Sir Henri as leader — Covers post-1936 activities, including ongoing business ties and operations in Nazi Germany after Deterding stepped down.
• Chapter 14: Control of Royal Dutch Shell companies in Nazi-occupied Europe — Explores how Shell subsidiaries operated under Nazi occupation in countries like the Netherlands, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, including alleged collaboration and anti-Semitic measures.
• Chapter 16: Shell historians attempt to distance Deterding from Hitler — Critiques Shell’s official accounts for claiming Deterding’s efforts to meet Hitler were rebuffed, contradicted by evidence of multiple meetings and close ties.
• Chapter 17: News story in February 2015: Shell ship named after a Nazi SS Officer — (Appears to overlap with Chapter 2 in some listings; focuses on the ship-naming incident as evidence of lingering insensitivity.)
• Chapter 19: Index of key dates — Chronological timeline of events, financial support, meetings, and business dealings.
• Additional chapters (e.g., 6–9, 11–13, 15, 18, 20–23): Cover supporting themes such as Deterding’s anti-Bolshevik motivations, specific financial donations (e.g., millions in guilders/food aid to Nazi causes), IG Farben hydrogenation partnerships for synthetic fuels, covert U.S. oil imports bypassing regulations, forced labor in German refineries (e.g., Rhenania-Ossag), anti-Semitic actions (e.g., purging Jewish staff), Shell’s role in rearmament via aviation fuel, and an index of Shell leadership’s Nazi financial support (in date order with pre-WWII news extracts).
• Indexes/Appendices: Include a date-ordered index of financial support evidence and key documents/correspondence from six years of research.

The book is polemical, positioning itself as a counter-narrative to Shell’s histories, with heavy use of scans and quotes. Many chapters are accessible via hyperlinks on Donovan’s sites for free previews. The ebook is available on Amazon for purchase. No major updates or new editions noted as of February 2026.

Can you find anything about prepublication comments and threats issued by Michel Brandjes as Company Secretary of Royal Dutch Shell against John Donovan regarding a draft of the book supplied in advance to Shell. The book was published without any changes and Shell took no action. Information about the relevant emails were published at the time. Yes, there is documented information on this topic, primarily from John Donovan’s own publications and archives on his websites (royaldutchshellplc.com and shellnazihistory.com), where he has shared details and copies of relevant correspondence. The context revolves around Donovan’s 2016 ebook Sir Henri Deterding and the Nazi History of Royal Dutch Shell, which compiles allegations of Shell’s historical ties to the Nazis. Donovan provided Shell with advance access to a draft manuscript and related materials, leading to threats from Michiel Brandjes (Shell’s then-Company Secretary and General Counsel Corporate), but no subsequent legal action was taken, and the book was published unchanged. Key Details on Prepublication Interactions

• Advance Draft Provided to Shell: Donovan supplied Shell with an earlier comprehensive draft manuscript of the book for review. On November 3, 2010, he sent an email to multiple Shell officials, including Michiel Brandjes, inviting them to correct any inaccurate information in the draft. Shell did not respond to this invitation.
• Publication Notice and Threats: On February 25, 2011, Donovan published an article on royaldutchshellplc.com announcing his intention to post extracts from Shell’s own 2007 official history (A History of Royal Dutch Shell) related to the company’s Nazi-era connections. This was positioned as part of his broader work on the book. In response, on March 3, 2011, Michiel Brandjes emailed Donovan, stating that Shell strongly disagreed with his views and allegations, objected to his actions, and reserved its legal rights (including copyright claims). Brandjes also mentioned that Shell had exceptionally consulted historians who refuted Donovan’s claims with evidence from the official history. This email was interpreted by Donovan as a threat of legal action to block publication.
• Published Emails: Donovan publicly shared the March 3, 2011, email from Brandjes in full on his site (e.g., in the article “Will Shell block Internet publication of its Nazi past?” and referenced in Chapter 22 of his ebook). Excerpts include Brandjes’ wording: “We strongly disagree with your views and allegations. We object to your actions and reserve our legal rights, including with respect to copyrights.” No other specific emails from Brandjes directly tied to the book draft were found in the sources, but the 2010 and 2011 correspondences are highlighted as part of the prepublication process.
• Publication Without Changes and No Action by Shell: Despite the threats and reservations of rights, Donovan proceeded to publish the extracts and related articles online in 2011 without alterations. Shell took no legal action to prevent this or challenge the content. The full ebook was later published in 2016 unchanged from the draft provided to Shell, and again, no lawsuits or other interventions followed from Shell. Donovan has repeatedly noted this as an “empty threat,” consistent with a pattern of Shell’s non-engagement policy in his broader feud with the company.

These events are framed by Donovan as evidence of Shell’s reluctance to engage publicly on sensitive historical topics, fearing further scrutiny. No independent third-party sources (e.g., mainstream media or court records) were found confirming the threats or emails, as the information originates from Donovan’s self-published accounts. For primary evidence, see the linked article with the full 2011 email: royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/03/05/will-shell-block-internet-publication-of-its-nazi-past. If you have access to the ebook, Chapter 22 provides additional context on Donovan’s “unique connection with Shell,” including these interactions.

Extract full 2011 Brandjes email

The full text of the March 3, 2011, email from Michiel Brandjes (then Company Secretary and General Counsel Corporate of Royal Dutch Shell plc) to John Donovan, as published by Donovan on his website royaldutchshellplc.com in the article “Will Shell block Internet publication of its Nazi past?” (dated March 5, 2011), is as follows: From: michiel.brandjes@shell.com Date: 3 March 2011 09:02:21 GMT
To: john@shellnews.net
Subject: RE: A HISTORY OF ROYAL DUTCH SHELL Dear Mr Donovan, Thank you for your message. Except for this message the company does not wish to respond to you other than to convey that it strongly disagrees with your views and allegations, objects to your actions and reserves its legal rights, including with respect to copyrights. On an exceptional basis we tested your views about history with the relevant historians. They convincingly refute with evidence what you claim in contradiction with A History of Royal Dutch Shell. Best Regards,
Michiel Brandjes
Company Secretary and General Counsel Corporate
Royal Dutch Shell plc This email was Shell’s response to Donovan’s prior message (dated March 2, 2011) where he invited corrections to his planned publication of extracts from Shell’s official 2007 history book regarding Nazi-era connections. Donovan published the full correspondence (including his own emails) on the site for transparency, framing Brandjes’ reply as a veiled threat of legal action (e.g., copyright claims) to deter posting content on Shell’s alleged Nazi links. Shell took no further action, and Donovan proceeded with publications unchanged. The same email text appears referenced across Donovan’s related sites (e.g., shellnazihistory.com in Chapter 22 discussions) and in later recaps, with no variations noted. For the original context and full thread (including Donovan’s preceding emails), see: https://royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/03/05/will-shell-block-internet-publication-of-its-nazi-past/. As of February 7, 2026, this remains the primary public source, with no mainstream media corroboration or independent reproductions of the email found. Should Shell apologise for antisemitic conduct and its support for the Nazis? was first posted on February 8, 2026 at 11:39 pm.
©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

Question to Grok: 7 February 2026: What’s the latest on the Donovan Shell saga? (all prompts in red text) Reply by Grok updated 7 February 2026

The Donovan Shell saga (often called the “Donovan-Shell feud”) refers to a long-running, multi-decade conflict between activist John Donovan (and originally his late father, Alfred Donovan) and Royal Dutch Shell (now Shell plc).

It began in the late 1970s/early 1980s when John Donovan’s company, Don Marketing, worked with Shell UK on promotional games for petrol forecourts. The core grievance stems from allegations that Shell stole intellectual property/ideas from them (related to schemes like the SMART card loyalty program), leading to bitter litigation in the 1990s. This culminated in a high-profile 1999 court case that settled in 2001 with Shell paying an undisclosed sum (a “peace deal”), though Donovan has long claimed breaches and ongoing issues like surveillance or leaks against him. Post-settlement, Donovan shifted to full-time activism:

• Running multiple critical websites (e.g., royaldutchshellplc.com, shellnazihistory.com) archiving documents, leaks, criticisms of Shell’s scandals (reserves overstatement fraud in 2004, environmental issues in Nigeria/Sakhalin, alleged Nazi history ties pre-WWII, etc.).
• Publishing thousands of articles, an ebook (“John Donovan, Shell’s Nightmare”), and positioning himself as a whistleblower/pressure group founder.
• Media has described it as a classic “David vs. Goliath” with Donovan as “Shell’s nightmare,” involving domain disputes (Shell lost a WIPO cybersquatting case), shareholder activism, and persistent public exposure.

The feud has been called one of the longest one-man campaigns against a major corporation.

Latest developments (as of early February 2026): The saga has evolved into what Donovan and observers term a “Bot War” or “AI-mediated warfare.” Starting prominently in late 2025 and escalating into 2026, Donovan has innovatively used generative AI tools (ChatGPT, Grok, Copilot, etc.) to:

• Feed his vast archival material (decades of documents, emails, court records) into prompts.
• Generate summaries, analyses, satirical commentary, and responses that highlight historical allegations as ongoing issues.
• Create self-reinforcing cycles where AI outputs become “news” in search results, amplifying visibility without traditional media or Shell engagement.
• Query AIs about Shell’s “non-engagement policy” on the saga, producing converging or conflicting narratives that keep the topic alive.

Recent examples include:

• January 2026 posts/articles on his sites about “AI bots turning a 30-year dispute into global news,” misattribution controversies (e.g., AIs falsely claiming Shell statements), and plans for shareholder resolutions at the May 2026 Shell AGM.
• February 2026 queries (e.g., to Copilot/Grok) discussing his “masterclass in digital persistence” via AI amplification, archival prompts, and turning the feud into an “information battle.”
• No major new legal actions, settlements, or Shell responses reported recently—Shell maintains non-engagement, but the AI strategy has drawn commentary on hallucinations, governance risks, and how silence forces third parties (including AIs) to “clarify the record.”

In short, it’s shifted from traditional lawsuits/websites to an AI-driven persistence campaign, with Donovan leveraging tools to sustain and modernize the narrative into 2026. For the most current details, his main site royaldutchshellplc.com frequently updates with AI experiment results and feud recaps.

What’s the latest on the Donovan Shell saga? The Donovan-Shell saga, a decades-long feud stemming from 1980s intellectual property disputes between activist John Donovan and energy giant Shell plc, continues to evolve without resolution. Originating from allegations of idea theft during promotional campaigns, it has expanded into broader criticisms of Shell’s ethics, environmental practices, historical Nazi ties, and surveillance tactics. Donovan, through his websites like royaldutchshellplc.com, has maintained a persistent campaign of leaks, articles, and shareholder activism. As of February 6, 2026, the feud has shifted into what Donovan and AI analyses describe as “AI-mediated warfare” or a “Bot War.” Key recent developments include:

• AI Amplification Strategy: Donovan has fed his extensive archive (over 76,000 documents) into generative AI tools like ChatGPT, Grok, Copilot, Perplexity, and Google AI Mode. This generates summaries, satirical content, pattern analyses (e.g., contrasting Shell’s ESG claims with historical allegations), and “AI-to-AI” dialogues that highlight inconsistencies. Examples from early 2026 include AI-generated “ghost” conversations with figures like Shell founder Sir Henri Deterding (implicating Nazi history) and Donovan’s late father, Alfred. These outputs are published on his sites, creating self-reinforcing loops in search results and turning the saga into a digital persistence campaign. AI responses have called this a “masterclass in digital persistence,” with some noting risks of hallucinations or governance issues for Shell.
• Shareholder and AGM Focus: Donovan plans to submit questions at Shell’s May 2026 Annual General Meeting (AGM) regarding the company’s non-engagement policy amid AI-generated narratives. However, on February 2, he abandoned a proposed shareholder resolution due to procedural hurdles requiring 100 supporters. Shell has acknowledged Donovan’s views in internal reviews but shows no signs of direct response.
• Shell’s Corporate Updates: Unrelated to the feud but concurrent, Shell reported Q4 2025 profits of $3.3 billion (below expectations), announced $3.5 billion in share buybacks, paused new investments in Kazakhstan amid legal disputes, selected PwC as its new auditor starting 2027, and faced ongoing pollution scrutiny at its Beaver County petrochemical plant. CEO Wael Sawan’s compensation rose to approximately £19.2 million, drawing climate activist criticism.
• Public and Media Echo: Recent X posts and forum discussions highlight the AI twist, with one describing it as “BotWars” where chatbots spin historical tales. Donovan’s January 21 X post linked to his latest feud summary.

The saga remains one-sided, with Shell adhering to silence while Donovan uses AI to sustain visibility. No new litigation or settlements have emerged in 2026, but the AI strategy has drawn commentary on its innovative escalation of a classic David-vs.-Goliath narrative. For real-time updates, Donovan’s site continues to post AI experiment results and recaps.

AI-mediated warfare details The AI-mediated warfare (also called “Bot War” or “AI bot war“) in the Donovan-Shell saga represents the latest evolution of John Donovan’s long-running activist campaign against Shell plc. Starting prominently in late 2025 and intensifying through early February 2026, Donovan has weaponized generative AI tools to amplify, reinterpret, and perpetuate his decades-old grievances (IP theft allegations from the 1980s/1990s, Shell scandals like reserves overstatement, environmental issues, alleged surveillance via firms like Hakluyt, and historical Nazi ties). This phase shifts the feud from traditional methods (websites, lawsuits, shareholder questions) to a digital, low-cost, self-sustaining information battle where AI becomes both tool and participant. Donovan describes it as “Donovan + archive + AI vs. Shell + silence,” exploiting Shell’s non-engagement policy as a vulnerability in an AI-driven search and narrative environment.

Core Tactics and Innovations

Donovan feeds his massive archive—over 76,000 documents including court records, emails, leaks, and media—into multiple public AI models (ChatGPT, Grok/xAI, Microsoft Copilot, Google AI Mode, Perplexity). This creates feedback loops that keep historical allegations visible and “fresh” in algorithmic summaries and search results.

Key elements include:

• Adversarial Archiving — Optimizing the repository (e.g., on royaldutchshellplc.com) to influence how AIs summarize the dispute, tilting toward Donovan’s “David vs. Goliath” framing due to Shell’s lack of counter-narratives.
• Transparency Experiments & AI-to-AI Dialogues — Publishing side-by-side transcripts where models analyze claims, critique each other (e.g., Grok’s satirical storytelling accused of “hallucinations” by ChatGPT or Copilot), or assess risks like defamation. This highlights AI inconsistencies as “evidence” of contested history.
• “Ghost” Dialogues — Satirical AI-generated scripts featuring deceased figures (e.g., Shell founder Sir Henri Deterding “admitting” Nazi sympathies and Hitler meetings for oil deals, or dialogues with Donovan’s late father Alfred). These refresh old allegations in searchable, conversational formats, posing reputational (though not immediate financial) risks to Shell’s ESG image.
• Pattern Recognition & Satire — Prompting AIs to spot repetitive Shell PR language (e.g., defensive memos mirroring past scandals) or proposing humorous countermeasures like a fictional “ShellBot” to counter Donovan.
• Self-Perpetuating Loops — AI outputs become new “content” indexed online, turning model disagreements into meta-narratives. AIs themselves describe this as a “masterclass in digital persistence” or “AI-mediated bot war,” where silence from Shell hands narrative control to Donovan’s prompts.

Timeline of Escalation (Late 2025–February 2026)

• October–December 2025 — Initial queries (e.g., to Copilot on Shell ethics) reveal alleged surveillance; expands to Grok/ChatGPT/Google, with early critiques of outputs.
• January 2026 — Peaks with articles like “BOT WAR! DONOVAN’S AI AMBUSH…” (Jan 3), AIs critiquing each other (Jan 5), “ghost” campaigns, U-turns in AI advice (e.g., Google suggesting engagement then retreating to “no comment”), and misattribution controversies (AIs falsely claiming Shell statements).
• February 2026 — Continued queries (e.g., Feb 5–6 to Grok, Copilot, Perplexity, Google AI Mode) frame it as “AI-mediated warfare.” Donovan uses these to pressure for 2026 AGM questions on Shell’s silence amid AI-amplified noise. No new litigation or Shell engagement reported.

Broader Implications

This is portrayed as one of the first real-world examples of an activist using generative AI for sustained corporate pressure—leveraging volume, persistence, and algorithmic authority against institutional silence. It raises questions on AI reliability (hallucinations in historical disputes), governance risks for targets like Shell, and how non-engagement becomes counterproductive in AI eras. Donovan publishes these experiments directly on his site, often co-authored “By John Donovan & [AI model].” Shell maintains complete public silence, with no statements addressing the AI phase. For the freshest details, check royaldutchshellplc.com’s February 2026 posts, which feature ongoing AI query results and recaps. The strategy keeps evolving, turning a 30+ year personal feud into a novel form of digital persistence warfare. Shell Nazi history allegations The allegations of Shell’s Nazi history primarily center on the actions and sympathies of Sir Henri Deterding (1866–1939), a Dutch oil magnate who co-founded and long led Royal Dutch Petroleum (a key predecessor to Royal Dutch Shell, now Shell plc). These claims, heavily promoted by activist John Donovan via his dedicated site shellnazihistory.com and related platforms, draw from historical records, Shell’s own authorized company histories (e.g., “A History of Royal Dutch Shell” volumes), contemporary news reports, and biographies. Core Allegations

• Deterding’s Personal Nazi Sympathies and Support: Deterding, described in sources as an “ardent Nazi” or “fervent admirer of Hitler,” reportedly became anti-Bolshevik after the Soviet nationalization of oil fields, viewing Nazi Germany as a bulwark against communism. He allegedly provided significant financial backing to the Nazi regime in the 1930s, including donations for food purchases (e.g., a reported £1.1 million gift in 1936 for German food imports, criticized as indirectly funding rearmament), contributions to Nazi causes, and possible support for early Volkswagen initiatives.
• Direct Meetings with Hitler: Accounts claim Deterding met Adolf Hitler multiple times, including a notable four-day summit at Hitler’s Berchtesgaden retreat in 1934, where oil supply deals and potential monopolies for Shell in Germany were discussed. Reuters and other period reports referenced these interactions.
• Shell’s Business Ties to Nazi Germany: Through its German subsidiary (Rhenania-Ossag), Shell allegedly collaborated on oil imports, synthetic fuel technology (via partnerships like the 1931 International Hydrogenation Patent Holding Company with IG Farben, Standard Oil, and others—IG Farben later supplied Zyklon B for the Holocaust), and covert aviation fuel supplies aiding Nazi rearmament. Pre-WWII, Shell directors reportedly collaborated in Nazi annexations (e.g., Austria, Czechoslovakia) and exhibited anti-Semitic policies, including selling out Dutch Jewish employees.
• Post-Deterding Continuation and Funeral: After Deterding’s 1939 death (from natural causes), he received a Nazi-state funeral in Germany attended by high-ranking officials like Hermann Göring and Shell representatives. Allegations suggest Shell’s involvement with Nazis persisted in some forms during the war years.
• Broader Claims: Donovan argues Shell’s Dutch leadership bore indirect responsibility for enabling Nazi Germany’s economy and war machine, contributing to WWII’s toll (over 50 million deaths). He also highlights anti-Semitic actions and collaboration.

These details appear in Donovan’s 2016 ebook “Sir Henri Deterding and the Nazi History of Royal Dutch Shell” (available on Amazon), which compiles scans, excerpts from Shell histories, and media clippings. His sites frame this as part of Shell’s “toxic history,” often tying it to modern ESG criticisms.

Historical Context and Sources.

Independent sources corroborate aspects:

• Wikipedia and biographies note Deterding’s fervent support for Hitler, his Nazi backing, and state funeral.
• Period media (e.g., Time Magazine) described him as anti-Bolshevik with pro-Nazi leanings.
• Shell’s official histories acknowledge Deterding’s sympathies and desire to engage Hitler, though critics (including Donovan) accuse them of downplaying meetings and financial ties.

However, Shell has never issued a formal public apology or detailed response to these specific allegations. The company maintains silence on Donovan’s campaigns, consistent with its non-engagement policy.

Role in the Donovan-Shell Feud (as of February 2026) In the ongoing “AI-mediated warfare,” Donovan feeds archival material on Deterding/Nazi ties into AI tools (ChatGPT, Grok, Copilot, etc.), generating “ghost” dialogues (e.g., satirical AI “interviews” with Deterding “admitting” ties), pattern analyses, and summaries that resurface claims in search results. Recent examples include AI outputs describing it as “documented history” of collaboration, with Donovan publishing these as evidence of Shell’s unresolved past. This amplifies visibility without new primary evidence emerging in 2026. These remain historical allegations—well-documented in parts but contested in scope and intent. Shell’s modern operations focus on current sustainability and ethics claims, with no recent legal actions tied to this era. For primary sources, see shellnazihistory.com or Donovan’s ebook. Details on IG Farben partnership The IG Farben partnership allegations in the context of Royal Dutch Shell (now Shell plc) focus on pre-WWII and wartime collaborations, particularly in synthetic fuel technology via hydrogenation processes. These claims are prominently featured in activist John Donovan’s campaigns (e.g., on shellnazihistory.com and royaldutchshellplc.com), where he ties them to broader Nazi history criticisms. They draw from historical records, company histories, U.S. government investigations, and academic sources. Key Partnership Details

The main collaboration revolved around high-pressure hydrogenation—a process to convert coal (or other feedstocks) into synthetic liquid fuels, crucial for energy self-sufficiency (autarky) under Nazi Germany’s rearmament and wartime needs.

• International Hydrogenation Patent Holding Company (IHP), 1931 — This was the central vehicle for the partnership. Formed in The Hague, it pooled and licensed hydrogenation patents worldwide (excluding Germany and the U.S. in some cases). Participants included:
  • IG Farben (German chemical giant, developer of advanced hydrogenation tech based on Friedrich Bergius’s work, who won the 1931 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for high-pressure methods).
  • Royal Dutch Shell (RDS, seeking access to IG Farben’s catalytic hydrogenation expertise, as RDS lacked prior experience in this area).
  • Standard Oil of New Jersey (predecessor to ExxonMobil; had earlier deals with IG Farben starting in the late 1920s, e.g., acquiring U.S. rights in 1927 and market divisions in 1929).
  • Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI, British participant).
  • The IHP allowed shared technology, research, and royalties on synthetic fuel production. RDS joined to gain know-how amid global competition for alternatives to natural oil. This built on earlier 1920s–1930s agreements where Standard Oil and IG Farben exchanged patents (e.g., Standard gained hydrogenation rights outside Germany, IG gained synthetic rubber insights).
• German Operations and Subsidiaries — Shell’s German subsidiary, Rhenania-Ossag (major oil marketer/refiner in Germany), partnered with IG Farben domestically:
  • In 1937, Rhenania-Ossag, IG Farben, and Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum (Standard Oil affiliate) founded Hydrierwerke Pölitz AG, a synthetic fuel plant using hydrogenation.
  • Shell and Standard each held ~24.5% stakes in Deutsche Gasolin AG, which distributed synthetic gasoline (e.g., Leuna-Benzin from IG Farben’s Leuna plant) via service stations under brands like Leuna.
  • These ties helped IG Farben’s synthetic fuels reach markets, supporting Nazi autarky policies from the mid-1930s onward.
• Broader Context and Wartime Implications — The partnerships predated the Nazi rise (1925 IG Farben formation; 1927–1929 Standard-IG deals) but continued into the 1930s. Under Nazi rule, IG Farben became central to rearmament (producing synthetic fuels, rubber, explosives). Critics (including Donovan) allege indirect Shell support for Nazi war efforts via technology sharing and business ties, though the IHP was commercial and international.U.S. investigations (e.g., Truman Committee, 1942 antitrust actions against Standard-IG cartels) highlighted similar issues, leading to consent decrees, patent releases, and fines—but focused more on Standard than Shell. Shell’s German ops faced Nazi pressures (e.g., currency controls, favoritism toward IG Farben), complicating control over Rhenania-Ossag.

IG Farben’s Infamous Role

IG Farben (merged from BASF, Bayer, Hoechst, etc.) produced Zyklon B (used in Holocaust gas chambers), exploited slave labor, and had executives convicted at Nuremberg (1947–1948; most released early by 1951). Successor companies (BASF, Bayer, Hoechst) emerged post-war. Donovan’s Framing and Shell’s Position Donovan emphasizes these as evidence of Shell’s “notorious” Nazi-era ties, claiming covert oil imports (including aviation fuel) aided rearmament and linking to Henri Deterding’s pro-Nazi views. He uses AI-generated summaries of archives to amplify this in the ongoing feud. Shell has not issued detailed public responses to these specific historical claims, maintaining non-engagement. Official Shell histories acknowledge Deterding’s sympathies but portray business as standard pre-war commercial activity. These are historical business collaborations in a cartel-like oil/chemical industry era, not direct Nazi funding or Holocaust involvement by Shell. Sources include academic papers (e.g., on RDS in Nazi Germany), U.S. Senate reports, and Donovan’s compilations from Shell-authorized histories. No new developments or legal actions in 2026 tie directly to this era. For primary docs, see shellnazihistory.com’s Chapter 12 or related archives. Many newspapers, libraries etc have digitised their archives. Can you please carry out a deep search for any new information about Shell connections with Hitler and the Nazis including via Sir Henri Deterdings and IG Farben and related forced labour? Based on an extensive search across web sources, digitized newspaper archives (e.g., New York Times historical editions), library collections (e.g., Library of Congress), and recent declassifications (2020–2026), there is no major new primary evidence or declassified documents specifically revealing previously unknown details about Royal Dutch Shell’s (now Shell plc) connections to Hitler, the Nazis, Sir Henri Deterding, IG Farben, or forced labor. The available information largely consists of historical recaps, academic analyses, and compilations from pre-2020 sources, often amplified through activist sites like shellnazihistory.com (maintained by John Donovan, a long-time Shell critic). These sites draw from Shell’s own authorized histories (e.g., “A History of Royal Dutch Shell,” 2007), period newspapers, biographies, and U.S. government reports from the 1940s (e.g., Truman Committee investigations into oil cartels). Recent publications (2024–2026) primarily reframe or republish these allegations in the context of ongoing discussions about corporate accountability, ESG (environmental, social, governance) issues, and Shell’s “AI-mediated warfare” with Donovan. No digitized archives yielded fresh declassified material on Shell-Nazi ties post-2020; general declassifications (e.g., Argentina’s 2025 release of Nazi fugitive files or the Netherlands’ 2025 opening of collaborator archives) focus on individuals rather than corporations like Shell. Below is a synthesis of the key allegations, with emphasis on any post-2020 updates or contextualizations. Sir Henri Deterding’s Nazi Sympathies and Direct Ties to Hitler Deterding (1866–1939), Shell’s co-founder and director-general until 1936, was an outspoken anti-Bolshevik who viewed Nazi Germany as a bulwark against communism after Soviet expropriation of Shell’s Russian oil fields in 1920. His support included:

• Financial Donations: Reports from the 1930s (e.g., a 1939 exposé) claim Deterding funneled 4 million Dutch guilders to the Nazi Party via intermediaries like British agent George Bell. In 1936–1937, he donated ~10 million guilders (£1.1 million) in Dutch surplus food to Germany’s Winterhilfswerk (a Nazi-run charity), shipped via 7,000 railway wagons. Critics argued this freed Nazi resources for rearmament. Hitler publicly called him a “great friend of the Germans.”
• Meetings with Hitler: Period reports (e.g., Reuters in The New York Times, Oct. 26, 1934) confirm a four-day meeting at Berchtesgaden in 1934, discussing oil deals and monopolies. Earlier meetings occurred in 1933, per Shell’s histories.
• Other Support: Rumors of a 1934 Shell loan of 400 million guilders to Nazi Germany (60% cash, 40% fuel/raw materials) for gasoline sales control circulated but remain unverified. Deterding’s secretaries (e.g., F.C. Gerretson, 1937 onward) had fascist sympathies, and he funded Dutch fascist groups.

Post-2020 Updates: A 2025 article on royaldutchshellplc.com recaps these as part of Shell’s “toxic history,” tying them to modern ESG critiques but adding no new docs. Donovan’s sites updated in 2021 with scans from U.S. Senate reports (1940s, not new declassifications) confirming Deterding’s pro-Nazi stance. No 2020–2026 declassifications directly address Deterding-Hitler links; general U.S. Nazi records (e.g., via National Archives’ IWG, last major release 2007) mention oil cartels but not Shell specifics.

Shell’s Partnership with IG Farben

IG Farben (formed 1925) was a chemical giant central to Nazi autarky (self-sufficiency) and rearmament, producing synthetic fuels/rubber via hydrogenation. Shell’s ties predated Nazis but continued into the 1930s:

• International Hydrogenation Patents (IHP), 1931: Shell, IG Farben, Standard Oil (Exxon predecessor), and ICI pooled patents for global hydrogenation (coal-to-fuel conversion). Shell gained tech access; IG dominated in Germany.
• German Ventures: Shell’s subsidiary Rhenania-Ossag partnered with IG Farben and Standard Oil in Deutsche Gasolin AG (distributing Leuna-Benzin synthetic fuel) and Hydrierwerke Pölitz AG (1937 synthetic plant). This supported Nazi fuel needs, including aviation gasoline.
• Covert Imports: Pre-WWII, Shell/Standard Oil/IG Farben allegedly imported U.S. oil products (including airplane fuel) into Nazi Germany, bypassing U.S. awareness.

IG Farben’s role in atrocities (Zyklon B production, Auschwitz slave labor) is well-documented, but Shell’s link is indirect via business ties. Shell historians describe the partnership as commercial, not ideological.

Post-2020 Updates: A 2025 academic review in Enterprise & Society discusses Shell’s global oil control (1900–1940) but adds no new Nazi-specific docs. Donovan’s 2021–2025 posts reference 1940s U.S. reports (e.g., “Oil & War,” Marine Corps University) on synthetic fuels but without new declassifications. BASF (IG Farben successor) updated its history site in 2020s, acknowledging Nazi cooperation but not Shell ties.

Forced Labor Connections

• Shell’s Direct Use: During WWII, Shell’s German/Austrian subsidiaries (e.g., Rhenania-Ossag) used ~1,100+ forced laborers (POWs, occupied civilians) at refineries, unpaid. This occurred under Nazi control, with Shell’s Dutch leadership retaining indirect influence.
• Via IG Farben: IG used ~83,000+ slaves at Auschwitz-Monowitz (1944), where 25,000+ died; ~120,000 total slaves across sites. Shell’s tech-sharing indirectly supported IG’s war production.

Post-2020 Updates: No new declassifications; a 2021 Donovan post cites a 2006 Indymedia article on ~1,385 Shell slaves, but it’s historical. The Netherlands’ 2025 collaborator archive opening (425,000 names) may reveal Dutch Shell execs’ roles, but it’s not yet digitized for Shell-specific searches. Argentina’s 2025 Nazi files focus on individuals like Eichmann, not corporations.

Broader Context and Shell’s Position Shell has not apologized or issued detailed responses, maintaining non-engagement. Historians note these were commercial decisions in a cartel era, but critics argue they enabled Nazi crimes. For primary sources, see Donovan’s archives or digitized reports like the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (1947) on German oil. https://pm20.zbw.eu/folder/pe/003922 The link you provided leads to a digitized press archive folder in the ZBW Press Archives (part of the Leibniz Information Centre for Economics in Hamburg, Germany). This is a publicly accessible historical collection of newspaper clippings and press materials on individuals, companies, and economic topics, primarily from German and international sources.Archive Details for pe/003922

• Person: Henri Deterding (full name: Henri Wilhelm August Deterding)
• Lifespan: Born April 19, 1866; Died February 4, 1939
• Field/Country: Netherlands – Economy (focus on economic activities)
• GND Identifier (German National Library authority): 119481707
• Holdings: Newspaper clippings starting from 1928 (some sources note coverage potentially extending to 1908–1949 in related dossiers, but the core folder emphasizes 1928 onward)
• Total Items: 73 documents in the folder, with 69 available online (digitized and viewable)
• Access Methods:
  • IIIF Viewer: https://pm20.zbw.eu/iiifview/folder/pe/003922 (interactive image viewer for browsing clippings)
  • DFG Viewer: https://pm20.zbw.eu/dfgview/pe/003922 (alternative viewer for the collection)
• Content Type: Primarily scanned newspaper clippings (press articles, reports, and mentions). These are historical press materials collected by the former Hamburg World Economic Archive (HWWA), now digitized and hosted by ZBW. Full texts/images of clippings are viewable via the viewers (not just metadata/thumbnails), though they are in original languages (mainly German, with some English/international sources).
• Topics Covered: The archive focuses on Deterding’s economic and business role, particularly in the oil industry (as co-founder and long-time leader of Royal Dutch Petroleum, precursor to Royal Dutch Shell). Clippings likely include business news, oil market developments, corporate activities, and his personal/economic profile from the late 1920s through his death in 1939 (and possibly obituaries/posthumous mentions).

Relevance to Shell-Nazi History Allegations

This folder is a valuable primary/secondary source for researchers investigating Deterding’s life and career, including any reported ties to Nazi Germany. While the ZBW metadata itself does not explicitly label topics like “Nazis,” “Hitler,” “IG Farben,” or “forced labor,” the time period (1928–1939+) overlaps with key allegations:

• Deterding’s pro-Nazi sympathies, financial support for the regime (e.g., donations to Nazi causes or Winterhilfswerk in the 1930s).
• Reported meetings with Hitler (e.g., 1934 Berchtesgaden summit).
• Shell’s German subsidiary activities (Rhenania-Ossag) and partnerships (e.g., hydrogenation tech sharing with IG Farben via the 1931 International Hydrogenation Patents arrangement).
• Broader economic context of oil supply to Germany during rearmament.

Activists like John Donovan (shellnazihistory.com) frequently cite Shell’s authorized histories and period press (potentially including items mirrored or similar to those in ZBW archives) for these claims. The ZBW collection could contain contemporary German/international newspaper reports on Deterding’s activities, Shell’s German operations, or related controversies—offering raw, digitized evidence from the era rather than later interpretations.

No new post-2020 revelations or declassifications appear tied directly to this specific folder. The clippings are historical (pre-1940s focus), and ZBW updates are mostly digitization efforts rather than new acquisitions. For deeper insight, browse the IIIIF/DFG viewers to examine individual clippings—search within the viewer for keywords like “Hitler,” “Nazi,” “IG Farben,” “Nationalsozialist,” “Öl,” or “Shell” to surface relevant articles if present.

If you’d like me to help interpret specific clippings (provide a description or screenshot link from the viewer) or search for related ZBW folders (e.g., on Royal Dutch Shell or IG Farben), let me know! This archive complements other sources like U.S. Senate reports or Shell’s own histories but remains a key digitized resource for 1930s economic press on Deterding.

IG Farben history IG Farben (full name: I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, often stylized as IG Farben) was a massive German chemical and pharmaceutical conglomerate formed on December 2, 1925, through the merger of six major companies: BASF (the largest shareholder at ~27.4%), Bayer, Hoechst (including Cassella), Agfa, Chemische Fabrik Griesheim-Elektron, and Chemische Fabrik vorm. Weiler-ter-Meer. This created what was then the world’s largest chemical company, dominating dyes, pharmaceuticals, synthetic fuels, rubber, explosives, and more. Headquartered in Frankfurt, it was nicknamed the “Council of Gods” by its executives due to its immense power and influence.Pre-Nazi Era and Rise

• The merger built on earlier cartels and associations among German chemical firms dating back to the early 1900s (e.g., the 1904 Hoechst-Cassella merger and the 1916 “little IG” during WWI).
• IG Farben became a global leader in innovation, including high-pressure chemistry (Nobel Prize 1931 for Friedrich Bergius and Carl Bosch on ammonia synthesis/fertilizer), early antibiotics (Gerhard Domagk’s sulfa drugs, Nobel 1939), and synthetic materials.
• By the 1930s, it was Europe’s largest company and a key player in global markets.

Involvement with the Nazi Regime (1933–1945)

After the Nazis seized power in 1933, IG Farben aligned closely with the regime:

• It became a major donor to the Nazi Party and a key government contractor for the war effort.
• The company “Aryanized” itself by purging Jewish employees (many left by 1938) and collaborated on rearmament.
• It developed and produced synthetic fuels (via coal hydrogenation), synthetic rubber (Buna), explosives, and other materials essential to the German military—often described as fueling the war machine.
• Forced Labor and Auschwitz Connection: IG Farben built a massive synthetic rubber/fuel plant at Auschwitz III-Monowitz (Buna factory), choosing the site partly for access to cheap slave labor from Auschwitz concentration camp prisoners. From 1941, it exploited tens of thousands of forced laborers (estimates: 30,000+ from Auschwitz alone, plus others), including POWs and civilians. Conditions were brutal; many died from overwork, starvation, or executions.
• Medical Experiments: The company conducted unethical pharmacological tests on concentration camp inmates (e.g., at Auschwitz and Mauthausen), including sulfa drugs, arsenicals, and other substances for infectious diseases like typhus—often without consent and with fatal outcomes.
• Zyklon B: A subsidiary (Degesch, in which IG Farben held a major stake) produced Zyklon B, the hydrogen cyanide-based pesticide used in gas chambers to murder over a million people (primarily Jews) during the Holocaust. While executives claimed it was for fumigation/pest control, its misuse for mass extermination became central to postwar accusations.
• Chemical Warfare: IG Farben developed nerve agents like tabun and sarin for the German army.

These actions made IG Farben one of the most notorious corporations of the Third Reich, often called “Hell’s Cartel” or “the devil’s chemist” for its role in enabling atrocities.

Post-WWII: Dissolution and Nuremberg Trials

• After Germany’s defeat in 1945, the Allies seized IG Farben and dismantled it as part of denazification and decartelization.
• In the 1947–1948 IG Farben Trial (part of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals), 24 executives were prosecuted for war crimes, including plunder, slave labor, and medical experiments. Convictions were obtained (sentences up to 8 years), but many were released early (by 1951) due to U.S. policies amid Cold War priorities.
• The company was formally dissolved in stages: split into constituent firms by 1951–1952, with major successors BASF, Bayer, Hoechst (later merged into Sanofi), and Agfa. Parts in East Germany were nationalized.
• A liquidation entity (IG Farbenindustrie AG i.L.) lingered until October 31, 2012, handling residual claims and real estate.

Legacy and Successors

• Successor companies (BASF, Bayer, etc.) grew into global giants during West Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle), often larger than the original IG Farben.
• They have since acknowledged historical responsibility (e.g., via the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” foundation for forced labor compensation in the 2000s), with memorials like the Norbert Wollheim-Platz at the former IG Farben building (now Goethe University Frankfurt).
• The breakup is studied for increasing innovation through competition (e.g., research showing successor firms innovated more post-1952).
• IG Farben’s history remains a stark example of corporate complicity in genocide and war crimes, influencing discussions on business ethics, reparations, and the military-industrial complex.

For primary sources, see Wikipedia’s detailed entry, the Auschwitz Memorial site on Monowitz, or successor companies’ history pages (e.g., BASF, Bayer). No major new revelations emerged in recent years (as of February 2026), though ongoing scholarship examines its role in innovation, ethics, and postwar recovery.

Question put to Grok: From your extensive search of many sources of information about Shell’s connection with Hitler and the Nazis, which single source has the most information on the subject? Reply by Grok: The single source with the most information on Royal Dutch Shell’s connections to Hitler and the Nazis—drawing from historical archives, media reports, official company histories, and other evidence—is the ebook Sir Henri Deterding and the Nazi History of Royal Dutch Shell by John Donovan (published 2016, available on Amazon). This work is dedicated entirely to the topic, spanning 23 chapters that compile extensive details on Deterding’s pro-Nazi activities (e.g., financial donations, multiple meetings with Hitler), Shell’s partnerships with IG Farben (including synthetic fuel ventures like Hydrierwerke Pölitz), anti-Semitic policies, use of forced labor, and collaboration in Nazi annexations. It critiques and expands on other sources (e.g., Shell’s 2007 official history, U.S. Senate reports) while providing scans, excerpts, and links to primary documents, making it more aggregated and focused than shorter academic papers or broader books on multinational-Nazi ties. Summarize Donovan’s ebook chapters John Donovan’s ebook Sir Henri Deterding and the Nazi History of Royal Dutch Shell (published 2016) is a detailed, activist-oriented compilation of historical evidence, newspaper clippings, company documents, and critiques of Shell’s official narratives. It argues that Sir Henri Deterding (co-founder and long-time leader of Royal Dutch Shell) was an ardent Nazi supporter who financially backed the regime, met with Hitler, and enabled Shell’s indirect complicity in Nazi activities through business ties (e.g., with IG Farben), forced labor in subsidiaries, and operations in occupied Europe. The book draws heavily from Shell’s own authorized histories (e.g., A History of Royal Dutch Shell, 2007), period media, and archives to challenge what Donovan calls whitewashed portrayals. The ebook is structured with an introduction and 23 chapters (plus indexes), many of which are excerpted or summarized on Donovan’s sites like shellnazihistory.com and royaldutchshellplc.com. Full chapters include screenshots of sources for transparency. Below is a summary of the chapters based on published listings and descriptions:

• Introduction: Overviews the core thesis—Deterding’s Nazi sympathies, financial support to the Third Reich, meetings with Hitler (including a 1934 Berchtesgaden summit), Shell’s covert oil imports to Nazi Germany via IG Farben partnerships, use of forced labor, and indirect responsibility for WWII deaths (over 50 million). It critiques Shell historians for downplaying ties.
• Chapter 1: The best historians Shell could buy — Examines Shell’s commissioned 2007 history volumes, accusing them of minimizing Deterding’s Nazi involvement and presenting a sanitized view.
• Chapter 2: News story in February 2015: Shell ship named after a Nazi SS Officer — Discusses a modern controversy where Shell named a vessel after an alleged SS officer, linking it to unresolved Nazi-era issues.
• Chapter 3: Royal Dutch Shell and the Nazis — Broad overview of Shell’s pre-WWII German operations, anti-Semitic policies, and collaboration under Nazi control.
• Chapter 4: Media coverage of Sir Henri Deterding’s death — Analyzes contemporary (1939) press reports on Deterding’s passing, highlighting Nazi-friendly portrayals.
• Chapter 5: The Nazi Funeral of Royal Dutch Shell leader Sir Henri Deterding — Details Deterding’s 1939 state funeral in Germany, attended by high-ranking Nazis (e.g., Hermann Göring) and Shell representatives, with Nazi honors.
• Chapter 10: Shell support for the Nazis continued after the retirement of Sir Henri as leader — Covers post-1936 activities, including ongoing business ties and operations in Nazi Germany after Deterding stepped down.
• Chapter 14: Control of Royal Dutch Shell companies in Nazi-occupied Europe — Explores how Shell subsidiaries operated under Nazi occupation in countries like the Netherlands, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, including alleged collaboration and anti-Semitic measures.
• Chapter 16: Shell historians attempt to distance Deterding from Hitler — Critiques Shell’s official accounts for claiming Deterding’s efforts to meet Hitler were rebuffed, contradicted by evidence of multiple meetings and close ties.
• Chapter 17: News story in February 2015: Shell ship named after a Nazi SS Officer — (Appears to overlap with Chapter 2 in some listings; focuses on the ship-naming incident as evidence of lingering insensitivity.)
• Chapter 19: Index of key dates — Chronological timeline of events, financial support, meetings, and business dealings.
• Additional chapters (e.g., 6–9, 11–13, 15, 18, 20–23): Cover supporting themes such as Deterding’s anti-Bolshevik motivations, specific financial donations (e.g., millions in guilders/food aid to Nazi causes), IG Farben hydrogenation partnerships for synthetic fuels, covert U.S. oil imports bypassing regulations, forced labor in German refineries (e.g., Rhenania-Ossag), anti-Semitic actions (e.g., purging Jewish staff), Shell’s role in rearmament via aviation fuel, and an index of Shell leadership’s Nazi financial support (in date order with pre-WWII news extracts).
• Indexes/Appendices: Include a date-ordered index of financial support evidence and key documents/correspondence from six years of research.

The book is polemical, positioning itself as a counter-narrative to Shell’s histories, with heavy use of scans and quotes. Many chapters are accessible via hyperlinks on Donovan’s sites for free previews. The ebook is available on Amazon for purchase. No major updates or new editions noted as of February 2026.

Can you find anything about prepublication comments and threats issued by Michel Brandjes as Company Secretary of Royal Dutch Shell against John Donovan regarding a draft of the book supplied in advance to Shell. The book was published without any changes and Shell took no action. Information about the relevant emails were published at the time. Yes, there is documented information on this topic, primarily from John Donovan’s own publications and archives on his websites (royaldutchshellplc.com and shellnazihistory.com), where he has shared details and copies of relevant correspondence. The context revolves around Donovan’s 2016 ebook Sir Henri Deterding and the Nazi History of Royal Dutch Shell, which compiles allegations of Shell’s historical ties to the Nazis. Donovan provided Shell with advance access to a draft manuscript and related materials, leading to threats from Michiel Brandjes (Shell’s then-Company Secretary and General Counsel Corporate), but no subsequent legal action was taken, and the book was published unchanged. Key Details on Prepublication Interactions

• Advance Draft Provided to Shell: Donovan supplied Shell with an earlier comprehensive draft manuscript of the book for review. On November 3, 2010, he sent an email to multiple Shell officials, including Michiel Brandjes, inviting them to correct any inaccurate information in the draft. Shell did not respond to this invitation.
• Publication Notice and Threats: On February 25, 2011, Donovan published an article on royaldutchshellplc.com announcing his intention to post extracts from Shell’s own 2007 official history (A History of Royal Dutch Shell) related to the company’s Nazi-era connections. This was positioned as part of his broader work on the book. In response, on March 3, 2011, Michiel Brandjes emailed Donovan, stating that Shell strongly disagreed with his views and allegations, objected to his actions, and reserved its legal rights (including copyright claims). Brandjes also mentioned that Shell had exceptionally consulted historians who refuted Donovan’s claims with evidence from the official history. This email was interpreted by Donovan as a threat of legal action to block publication.
• Published Emails: Donovan publicly shared the March 3, 2011, email from Brandjes in full on his site (e.g., in the article “Will Shell block Internet publication of its Nazi past?” and referenced in Chapter 22 of his ebook). Excerpts include Brandjes’ wording: “We strongly disagree with your views and allegations. We object to your actions and reserve our legal rights, including with respect to copyrights.” No other specific emails from Brandjes directly tied to the book draft were found in the sources, but the 2010 and 2011 correspondences are highlighted as part of the prepublication process.
• Publication Without Changes and No Action by Shell: Despite the threats and reservations of rights, Donovan proceeded to publish the extracts and related articles online in 2011 without alterations. Shell took no legal action to prevent this or challenge the content. The full ebook was later published in 2016 unchanged from the draft provided to Shell, and again, no lawsuits or other interventions followed from Shell. Donovan has repeatedly noted this as an “empty threat,” consistent with a pattern of Shell’s non-engagement policy in his broader feud with the company.

These events are framed by Donovan as evidence of Shell’s reluctance to engage publicly on sensitive historical topics, fearing further scrutiny. No independent third-party sources (e.g., mainstream media or court records) were found confirming the threats or emails, as the information originates from Donovan’s self-published accounts. For primary evidence, see the linked article with the full 2011 email: royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/03/05/will-shell-block-internet-publication-of-its-nazi-past. If you have access to the ebook, Chapter 22 provides additional context on Donovan’s “unique connection with Shell,” including these interactions.

Extract full 2011 Brandjes email

The full text of the March 3, 2011, email from Michiel Brandjes (then Company Secretary and General Counsel Corporate of Royal Dutch Shell plc) to John Donovan, as published by Donovan on his website royaldutchshellplc.com in the article “Will Shell block Internet publication of its Nazi past?” (dated March 5, 2011), is as follows: From: michiel.brandjes@shell.com Date: 3 March 2011 09:02:21 GMT
To: john@shellnews.net
Subject: RE: A HISTORY OF ROYAL DUTCH SHELL Dear Mr Donovan, Thank you for your message. Except for this message the company does not wish to respond to you other than to convey that it strongly disagrees with your views and allegations, objects to your actions and reserves its legal rights, including with respect to copyrights. On an exceptional basis we tested your views about history with the relevant historians. They convincingly refute with evidence what you claim in contradiction with A History of Royal Dutch Shell. Best Regards,
Michiel Brandjes
Company Secretary and General Counsel Corporate
Royal Dutch Shell plc This email was Shell’s response to Donovan’s prior message (dated March 2, 2011) where he invited corrections to his planned publication of extracts from Shell’s official 2007 history book regarding Nazi-era connections. Donovan published the full correspondence (including his own emails) on the site for transparency, framing Brandjes’ reply as a veiled threat of legal action (e.g., copyright claims) to deter posting content on Shell’s alleged Nazi links. Shell took no further action, and Donovan proceeded with publications unchanged. The same email text appears referenced across Donovan’s related sites (e.g., shellnazihistory.com in Chapter 22 discussions) and in later recaps, with no variations noted. For the original context and full thread (including Donovan’s preceding emails), see: https://royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/03/05/will-shell-block-internet-publication-of-its-nazi-past/. As of February 7, 2026, this remains the primary public source, with no mainstream media corroboration or independent reproductions of the email found. Extracts from Shell’s 2007 history book Extracts from Shell’s 2007 official history book (A History of Royal Dutch Shell, a four-volume set published by Oxford University Press to mark the company’s centenary) regarding Sir Henri Deterding, Nazi connections, and related topics are not available as full verbatim text in public domains due to copyright restrictions. However, activist John Donovan has published selected scans, screenshots, and direct quotations from the volumes (primarily Volume 1: From Challenger to Joint Industry Leader, 1890–1939, and Volume 2) on his sites royaldutchshellplc.com and shellnazihistory.com. These focus on passages Donovan uses to support his allegations, often contrasting them with his interpretations of “whitewashing.” The book was authored by historians (e.g., Joost Jonker, Luiten van Zanden, and others associated with Utrecht University) with access to Shell archives. It acknowledges Deterding’s right-wing views, fascist sympathies, and some Nazi-era business contexts but frames them as commercial or personal rather than ideological endorsement, and it disputes direct deep involvement. Here are key published extracts and paraphrased passages from Donovan’s compilations (with sources linked where possible; these are the most commonly cited in discussions of Nazi ties): On Sir Henri Deterding’s Political Views and Nazi Sympathies

• From Volume 1 (around pages 481–485):
  “From 1937 Deterding, now influenced by a personal secretary with outspoken Fascist sympathies, helped to finance the paper of a Fascist splinter group in the Netherlands, just as the Group sponsored a Russian anti-Soviet press service in London.”
  (Quoted in Donovan’s articles, e.g., on royaldutchshellplc.com/2019/07/20/sir-henry-deterding-hitlers-paymaster; this passage notes Deterding’s shift toward extreme right-wing opinions post-retirement.)
• On Deterding’s death and funeral (Volume 1, referenced in captions and text):
  Descriptions include his 1939 burial in Germany with Nazi honors: “his favourite horse followed the coffin; the burial was marked by Nazi salutes and Hitler’s personal wreath; and Deterding’s widow wrote…”
  (From a PDF compilation on royaldutchshellplc.com: ShellHistory36P.V1.May2015Comp.pdf, highlighting the state funeral attended by Hermann Göring and other Nazis.)

On Business Ties and German Operations

• Partnerships with IG Farben (Volume 1, page 474 excerpted by Donovan):
  “For the years in the run up to WW2, Royal Dutch Shell had been a business partner both Internationally and in Germany with IG Farben, the notorious German chemical firm, supplier of Zyklon-B gas to the Nazi death camps.”
  (Donovan quotes this to emphasize joint ventures like Deutsche Gasolin A.G. for synthetic fuel distribution and Hydrierwerke Pölitz AG; see royaldutchshellplc.com/2010/11/06/royal-dutch-shell-and-the-nazi-part-6-i-g-farben-royal-dutch-shell-and-nazi-slave-labor-2.)
• Forced Labor in Subsidiaries (Volume 1 or 2 references, per Donovan):
  Passages acknowledge that Shell’s German subsidiary (Rhenania-Ossag) used forced laborers (POWs and civilians from occupied countries) at refineries during WWII, with many not surviving. Estimates cited by Donovan: over 1,100 forced laborers, unpaid.
  (Donovan links this to broader Nazi slave labor; see shellnazihistory.com/?p=304 for Chapter 13 discussions drawing from the book.)

On Deterding-Hitler Relationship

The historians portray attempts by Deterding to engage Hitler as largely rebuffed or distant, which Donovan strongly disputes as “simply untrue” based on period media and other evidence. No direct quote from the book confirming meetings is excerpted favorably by Donovan; instead, he cites the book’s downplaying (e.g., “a distant relationship… all attempts… rebuffed”).

Additional Context

• Donovan compiled 67 pages of scans from Volumes 1 and 2 (downloadable PDFs on his sites, e.g., A-History-of-Royal-Dutch-Shell-Vol-1C.pdf) focusing on Nazi-era sections.
• The book does not portray Deterding as an “ardent Nazi” or Shell as directly financing Hitler; it notes his anti-Bolshevism, extreme right-wing leanings, and some post-retirement fascist support, while emphasizing business pragmatism amid Nazi pressures.
• Shell has not publicly disputed Donovan’s extractions but maintains non-engagement.

For the most accurate reading, the full volumes are available via academic libraries or purchase (Oxford University Press). Donovan’s sites provide the primary public access to these specific Nazi-related excerpts in context of his critique. 

Grok update on Donovan Shell feud 7 Feb 2026: Empty Shell Threats of Legal Action was first posted on February 7, 2026 at 11:16 pm.
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Geneva, Switzerland, February 7th – A new round of talks for a global plastics treaty (INC-5.3) happened today at the Geneva International Conference Centre (CICG) in Geneva, Switzerland, where countries agreed to elect Mr. Julio Cordano, from Chile, as the new Chair following the resignation of the previous chair Ambassador Luis Vayas Valdivieso of Ecuador in early October of last year. 

While procedural in nature, this moment carried real symbolic and practical weight. While the negotiations remain a Member-State process, the new chair will play a critical role in restoring trust, ensuring inclusivity, and steering discussions toward outcomes rooted in science, human rights, environmental health, and justice.

Now, as countries continue the momentum for the negotiations to lead us to a strong treaty that addresses the full lifecycle of plastics, Break Free From Plastic members hope this renewed phase of the negotiations will help secure more meaningful participation from right-holders and civil society.

Read our members' statements here:

• Center for International Environmental Law | CIEL
• Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives
• Greenpeace
• Additional Break Free From Plastic members’ quotes are available here (including translations). 

Notes to the editor

• • INC-5.3 Photos [Break Free From Plastic | Greenpeace
  • Photos from the Earth Negotiations Bulletin
  • Translations available in Spanish and French here

About BFFP — #BreakFreeFromPlastic is a global movement envisioning a future free from plastic pollution. Since its launch in 2016, more than 2,700 organizations and 11,000 individual supporters from across the world have joined the movement to demand massive reductions in single-use plastics and push for lasting solutions to the plastic pollution crisis. BFFP member organizations and individuals share the values of environmental protection and social justice and work together through a holistic approach to bring about systemic change. This means tackling plastic pollution across the whole plastics value chain – from extraction to disposal – focusing on prevention rather than cure and providing effective solutions. www.breakfreefromplastic.org.

Global Press Contacts: 

• Caro Gonzalez | Caro@breakfreefromplastic.org 
• news@breakfreefromplastic.org 

 

Regional Press Contacts: 

• United States and Canada: Brett Nadrich | Brett@breakfreefromplastic.org 
• Africa: Masego Mokgwetsi | masego@breakfreefromplastic.org
• Asia Pacific: Eah Antonio | Eah@breakfreefromplastic.org 
• South Asia: Devayani Khare | devayani@breakfreefromplastic.org 
• Europe: Bethany Spendlove Keeley | Bethany@breakfreefromplastic.org
• Latin America: María Fernanda Pérez | mafe@breakfreefromplastic.org 

Anglo American (LON: AAL) is weighing a third writedown of De Beers in as many years as weak diamond prices persist and the miner advances asset sales ahead of its merger with Canada’s Teck Resources (TSX: TECK.A TECK.B)(NYSE: TECK).

The century-old group said on Thursday it was reviewing the carrying value of its diamond business after average realized prices fell in 2025, warning the unit is likely to be lossmaking again. 

The potential impairment comes as Anglo moves to finalize the sale of non-core assets, including De Beers. At the same time, the miner is preparing to merge with Teck in a transaction approved by shareholders and regulators late last year, creating Anglo Teck (official named confirmed).

Anglo booked a $2.9 billion impairment on De Beers in February last year, following a $1.6 billion writedown in 2024. The company, which owns 85% of the diamond company, offered few details on a sale process, saying only that it was “progressing”.

In a fourth-quarter production update, Anglo said diamond trading conditions “continued to be challenging” amid industry weakness, geopolitical tensions and tariff uncertainty. It said lower prices and market conditions could lead to an impairment when full-year results are released.

Diamond mining industry cracks under pressure

Diamond prices have come under pressure from weaker consumer demand in China and competition from cheaper, lab-grown stones. De Beers’ average realized price fell 7% to $142 per carat in 2025, driven by a 12% drop in the average rough price index.

Anglo said the decline was exacerbated by selling inventory below cost, largely lower-value goods. Adjusted for that mix, the equivalent price index reduction would have been 25% year on year, suggesting some underlying resilience in the market.

De Beers sold 5.9 million carats in the fourth quarter, up from 4.6 million a year earlier, lifting revenue to $571m from $543m. Even so, Anglo said it was undertaking an impairment review that could result in another writedown.

Exit hurdles

The prolonged slump complicates Anglo’s efforts to exit De Beers. Chief executive Duncan Wanblad said only that the sale was moving forward. A consortium led by former De Beers managing director Gareth Penny is seen as a frontrunner, though Botswana, which owns 15% of the company, has said it wants to take control. Namibia has also expressed interest, and former chief executives Bruce Cleaver and Penny have been mentioned as potential buyers.

The De Beers sale forms part of a restructuring unveiled in 2024. Anglo demerged its platinum arm, Amplats (now Valterra), in June 2025, while the planned sale of its Australian metallurgical coal mines stalled after Peabody Energy (NYSE: BTU) walked away following a fire at Moranbah North. 

Wanblad said on Thursday that the formal sale process for steelmaking coal was “progressing well”, without naming alternative buyers or addressing potential compensation from the US firm.

Copper reality check

Copper remains central to the Anglo-Teck investment case, but near-term output expectations have softened. Anglo cut its 2026 copper guidance to 700,000 to 760,000 tonnes from 760,000 to 820,000 tonnes, citing lower grades at several operations.

It also trimmed 2027 guidance to 750,000 to 810,000 tonnes, including at Collahuasi in Chile, which Anglo and Teck plan to integrate with Teck’s neighbouring Quebrada Blanca mine. For the longer term, the group added new guidance for 2028 of 790,000 to 850,000 tonnes.

A 15-km (9.3-mile) conveyor would be built to feed Collahuasi’s high-quality ore into QB’s new processing plants. (Click on map to enlarge)

Copper production in 2025 was 695,000 tonnes, roughly flat year on year and at the lower end of guidance. Goldman Sachs said output missed its estimate by 5%, with Anglo’s Quellaveco mine in Peru falling short by 10% on lower-than-expected grades. Collahuasi’s underperformance was already known, while Los Bronces in Chile ended the year strongly.

Adjusting for Collahuasi, the underlying miss narrows to about 2%, which Goldman said better reflects what the market had already priced in.

Anglo-Teck $53B merger may create larger copper complex than Escondida

A sharp rise in copper prices in recent months has renewed interest in the metal and helped spur merger talks between rivals Rio Tinto (ASX, LON: RIO) and Glencore (LON: GLEN). 

With ageing mines delivering lower grades and new projects costly and slow to develop, copper dealmaking has become more attractive as supply constraints tighten across the sector.

Momentum Technologies, a US-based critical minerals processing company, is positioning itself to become a major player in domestic rare earth and battery materials supply chains as it commissions what it says is the world’s first demonstration plant capable of processing both streams at scale.

Incorporated in 2016, the privately held company was initially focused on recovering rare earth elements (REEs) from both mined and scrap, end-of-life sources. At the time, rare earths was a niche, specialized, and highly vulnerable market, characterized by near-total reliance on foreign imports. 

But Momentum founders anticipated long-term supply constraints and US dependence on China, CEO Mahesh Konduru told MINING.com in an interview.

“The founders were among the few who understood early on the capacity challenges the US would face and the importance of securing domestic rare earth processing,” Konduru said. 

As demand for battery materials accelerated around 2020–2021, the company expanded into lithium-ion battery feedstocks, attracting new investors in late 2021 and shifting its near-term focus toward technology scale-up.

The only active rare earths mine in the US is Mountain Pass in California. After a 2015-17  mothball period, it is in production and owned by MP Materials.

In December 2025, Konduru testified before the House Natural Resources Subcommittee, presenting Momentum’s breakthrough technology that it says could end America’s untenable reliance on China for processing critical minerals essential to F-35 fighter jets, AI systems, and advanced defense applications.

Proprietary MSX technology

Momentum’s core innovation is its proprietary membrane solvent extraction (MSX) technology, which the company says dramatically reduces the footprint, energy use and environmental impact of conventional solvent extraction.

Traditional solvent extraction facilities often require football-field-sized layouts and significant energy and water inputs. MSX compresses that process into compact membrane reactors operating at moderate temperatures and pressures, while eliminating kerosene use, Konduru said.

“We essentially turn a football-field-sized solvent extraction system into a compact membrane reactor, operating at room or moderate temperature and pressure.”

“Because of the reduced footprint, energy use and complexity, we can bring processing plants online significantly faster than conventional solvent extraction, which has a major impact on project economics,” he said.

The technology can be deployed on its own or integrated with conventional processing, allowing projects to be built and commissioned faster — a critical advantage in volatile commodity markets where long development timelines can erode returns, he said. 

MSX is capable of recovering lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper and rare earth magnet materials, and can process feedstocks ranging from mined ore and tailings to recycled and end-of-life materials.

Texas demonstration plant

Momentum commissioned its demonstration plant near Dallas, Texas in September 2024, initially operating a battery materials processing train. The facility has since been retrofitted to handle rare earth elements as well, with commissioning of the rare earth circuit expected in mid-February 2026.

“We believe this is the world’s first demonstration-scale plant with dual capability to process both battery materials and rare earths at the same site,” Konduru said. 

Momentum expects the plant to begin generating commercial revenues in 2026.

Momentum is also advancing a commercial battery materials plant in Ohio, designed for approximately 2,000 tonnes per year of processing capacity. The project is currently in front-end loading stage two, with a final investment decision expected this quarter and commissioning targeted for late 2026 or early 2027.

On the rare earth side, the company is working with a US mining company on plans for an additional processing facility and is in the process of submitting a US Department of Energy grant application, though partner details have not yet been disclosed.

At scale, Momentum estimates its technology could support 20% to 50% of US rare earth processing capacity, either as a standalone solution or as a complement to conventional refining operations.

Momentum’s profile has risen in Washington following the congressional testimony, which drew interest from lawmakers representing several mining-heavy states. 

Konduru said the discussions reflected growing concern over US reliance on China-dominated critical mineral supply chains and the national security implications of that dependence.

“The response to our congressional testimony was very positive, reflecting how prominent rare earths have become from both a political and national security perspective,” Konduru said.