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 Companies bid on about 2% of the tracts offered for sale in the Gulf of Mexico.

The company will plead no contest to all six charges.

ExxonMobil will be bringing 40 to 60 new permanent jobs to the area.

The multi-year, $5 million software project should help operators better manage, treat and beneficially reuse produced water

Tabbs Bay is east of Houston near Baytown and La Porte. 

State regulators came under intense scrutiny in 2021 when it was discovered that one-third of its leadership lived out of state.

More than half of the U.S. population lives within 50 miles of a coast, so offshore wind sites are close to electricity demand centers.

We are able to track who actually builds and owns a large portion of the nation’s renewable energy.

Colorless and odorless, methane is a potent greenhouse gas that traps 83 times more heat in the atmosphere over a 20-year period than an equivalent amount of carbon dioxide.

Two proposed wind farms off the Texas and Louisiana coasts would join offshore oil drilling rigs in the gulf as the Biden administration tries to boost the country’s clean energy supply.

A Morgan Stanley report updated Monday states that retail energy generation company Vistra could see huge windfalls from ERCOT's new 'reliability-based' business model.  

Researchers are increasingly linking oilfield activity and seismic activity, with a new report from the University of Texas at Austin connecting the two in the Delaware Basin.

The cost of electricity in Texas is tightly tied to the price of natural gas.

Lydia Larce has what she calls “storm PTSD.”

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, October 25, 2026 thru Sat, October 31, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Policy and Politics (7 items)

• Canada And EU Are Slip Sliding Away On Vehicle Emissions Driven by current events Canada and the EU back away from existing commitments to reduce motor vehicle emissions, threatening urgent long-term goals. CleanTechnica, Steve Hanley, Oct 24, 2026.
• Global climate body fights for survival: why the IPCC must be saved The UN organization faces perhaps the most serious crisis in its nearly 40-year history — but it is too precious to lose. Nature, Editorial, Oct 26, 2026.
• Ministers accused of `catastrophic` decision to approve new gas power station Environmental campaigners reacted angrily to the Scottish Government’s decision to approve a power station at Peterhead. The Independent News, Katrine Bussey, Oct 27, 2026.
• Is Brazil`s vote a turning point for climate politics? Brazil's newly reelected president faces a tricky economic balancing act in the face of urgent need to arrest degradation of th Amazon while not igniting backlash. Atmos, Miranda Green, Oct 29, 2026.
• A Democratic Wave In the Midterms Could Change How Companies Talk About Climate TIME, Justin Worland, Oct 30, 2026.
• The Key Climate Issues to Watch In The Midterm Elections TIME, Simmone Shah, Oct 30, 2026.
• How Trump Is Dismantling America`s Scientific Research Machine The system that has driven life-altering discoveries and helped make the United States a superpower is now under intense strain. NYT, Christopher Flavelle, Irena Hwang, Adam Sella, Alan Blinder, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Benjamin Mueller and Michael C. Bender, Oct 31, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (5 items)

• Bangladesh`s climate migrants are arriving in cities unprepared to protect them As environmental pressures drive people from their homes, researchers are examining the risks migrants face in the secondary cities where they relocate and whether these cities are equipped to accommodate growing numbers of climate-displaced people. Mongabay, Usraat Fahmidah, Oct 25, 2026.
• As extreme heat worsens, renters are gaining a `right to cooling` New laws are treating cooling as a necessity rather than a luxury, though what landlords must provide varies widely. Grist, Joseph Winters, Oct 27, 2026.
• Major greenhouse gases rise again to record levels Levels of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide in the atmosphere continued to rise in 2025, along with a lesser-known gas with a more powerful warming effect. New Scientist, Shosha Adie, Oct 27, 2026.
• The climate crisis will destroy our economies - we learned this 20 years ago. When will we act? | Fiona Harvey The radical Stern report showed that a low-carbon future is also good economics. But it seems that capitalism needs a reminder The Guardian, Fiona Harvey, Oct 28, 2026.
• Net Zero vs. Carbon Neutral "Net zero" and "carbon neutral" are not the same thing, but how? Climate Trunk, John Lang, Oct 30, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (4 items)

• How not to detect warming acceleration A new paper finding significant acceleration uses an inappropriate test with high false-positive rates Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Oct 26, 2026.
• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #44 2026 Skeptical Science's latest weekly scan of climate-related research published in academic journals and by governments and NGOs. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Oct 29, 2026.
• Our climate models have a big, dangerous blind spot A powerful feedback loop could drive more warming than predicted. MIT Technology Review, James Temple, Oct 29, 2026.
• How a U.N. report legitimized carbon capture and skewed decades of climate policy Scientists buffaloed into putting cosmetic gloss on dubious carbon capture methods at the behest of the fossil fuel industry. ProPublica, Katie Worth, Amy Westervelt, Maddie Stone, Oct 30, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (3 items)

• Cranky Uncle Greek Thanks to the work of volunteer translators, we'll shortly be releasing the Greek translation of our critical thinking skills-builidng game Cranky Uncle. Skeptical Science, Skeptical Science Team, Oct 25, 2026.
• This Climate Data Scientist Explains What the Numbers Really Mean The 'climate debate' is no longer about whether the planet is warming but increasingly includes more difficult questions: which solutions can work, how quickly they can scale, and what they cost financially, culturally, and environmentally, These thorny topics are tackled in a new book by data scientist Hannah Ritchie. Atmos, Daphne C. Milner, Oct 26, 2026.
• Why aren`t Democrats talking about climate? Long story short: Billionaire-backed centrist groups told them not to. But with the midterms days away, is that really a good idea? HEATED, Emily Atkin, Oct 29, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (3 items)

• Summer 2026 heat toll exceeded 50,000 deaths in European cities, analysis estimates Phys.org, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, Oct 23, 2026.
• Protecting Health in the Age of Climate Disinformation The 2026 collective position paper of the WHO Civil Society Working Group on Climate and Health explains why information integrity is a public-health priority and sets out actions for WHO, governments, health institutions, professional associations, civil society and funders. Global Climate And Health Alliance, Collaborative, Oct 26, 2026.
• Why the WHO must declare climate change a public health emergency The Conversation, Nicholas Brink, Fortunate Machingura, Matthew Chersich and Robb Butler, Oct 28, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (2 items)

• `Snipped And Posted`: How Pro-Oil Groups Generate Viral Content Online Internal slidedecks from Canada Action explain strategy to get millions of views for industry talking points. DeSmog, Taylor Noakes, Oct 22, 2026.
• The BoM`s temperature record keeping is under attack - again. What`s going on? | Temperature Check An ‘audit’ of the Bureau of Meteorology main dataset for measuring climate change claims it contains ‘widespread errors’. It doesn’t stack up The Guardian, Graham Readfearn, Oct 24, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 item)

• Fact brief - Do nearby wind turbines decrease home values by an average of 75%? Skeptical Science's latest fact brief on common climate solutions denial myths tackles the impact of wind generation turbines on local property prices. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, Oct 27, 2026.

Climate Change Impacts (1 item)

• Attributing Storm Austen Storm Austen dropped 30-40% more rain because of climate change Climate Lab Book, Ed Hawkins & Rhidian Thomas, Oct 27, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (1 item)

• Climate change rarely goes on trial. This one could be a landmark Fifteen young Canadians say their government’s failure to curb emissions violates their constitutional right to life, liberty, and security. Grist, Tik Root, Oct 26, 2026.

Miscellaneous (1 item)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #43 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, October 18, 2026 thru Sat, October 24, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Oct 25, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

When the sun goes down, the wind picks up in central New Mexico, whipping through arid canyons with a ghostly howl that for centuries, locals have likened to the wails of the folkloric ghost La Llorona.

A few hours east of Albuquerque, this June, those gusts began powering the largest wind farm this continent has ever seen, twirling over 900 colossal steel turbines. Each is as tall as the Statue of Liberty, scattered across a patch of desert roughly the size of Chicago. They plug into a 550-mile transmission line stitched across the Southwest and are now powering over 1 million homes — as far away as California.

The SunZia Wind and Transmission project is a rare 21st-century triumph of American infrastructure, an engineering marvel that generates more electricity than the Hoover Dam. When the turbines came online this spring, they immediately broke records for wind-generated power in California’s energy supply, where solar power may rule the day, but the winds of New Mexico increasingly fuel the night.

After years of stagnant power growth, the U.S. is absolutely starving for more electricity, with demand projected to rise by 25 percent by the end of this decade, and a staggering 78 percent by 2050. Enormous as this challenge might seem, it may ultimately be the catalyst the country needs to dramatically dial up its renewable energy infrastructure, so that the years to come are powered not by gas or coal, but by clean energy sources like the sun and the wind. By next summer, the project will have prevented about 9 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere, according to Pattern Energy, the project’s developer.

For decades, however, it seemed the project would remain little more than a spectral dream.

“It works!” This was the call Hunter Armistead, Pattern’s CEO, remembers getting from his head engineer when the turbines came online for the very first time. “We were creating power, and it was showing up 550 miles away in Phoenix, almost as if it was magic.” During the ribbon-cutting for the wind farm, some construction workers showed off massive new turbine tattoos. “It’s their pride that for the rest of their lives, they can drive by and tell their kid, ‘I did this,’” Armistead said.

Read Next A gigantic green energy transmission project will cut through Indigenous lands in the Southwest Taylar Dawn Stagner

But SunZia almost didn’t get built at all. It is not just the project’s scale that makes it remarkable, but the utter morass its developers slogged through to bring it online. The project spanned five presidential administrations, an ownership change, a major reroute, and a standoff with a U.S. military base.

It also involved a series of lawsuits from local tribal communities and environmental advocates, some of which remain pending even as the turbines now finally whirl. Building any renewable megaproject requires vast amounts of space, and hyper-specific natural conditions, like a wind that blows at night or a reliably sun-soaked desert plain. Then getting that energy to major cities means traversing some of the most pristine, spectacular natural corridors this nation has left, and particularly in the Southwest, rubbing up against the sacred lands of local tribal communities.

The decades-long saga to settle some of these tensions has turned SunZia into a helpful lesson, and for many, deserved or not, it became the ultimate poster child for permitting reform. And for many years, the country’s need for power didn’t seem to call for such a wildly ambitious project anyway. But in the interim, as the world changed, SunZia changed too, becoming — at least in some places — a better and more collaborative project than it was when it began. And now, with a nation finally focused on building more clean energy megaprojects, it can offer a glimpse of what’s to come, even a blueprint of what could be.

The real reason(s) it took so long for SunZia to get built

When SunZia was first proposed in 2006, the same year Twitter went online, coal was still the most important electricity source in America, and the nation’s appetite for electricity had remained nearly flat year after year.

And for the next 17 years, SunZia flailed, never even breaking ground. It ping-ponged between financial and regulatory purgatories that most commentators have attributed to endless permitting delays. There were, for example, a few state-level permitting debacles, with New Mexico rejecting SunZia’s initial transmission route in 2018. Even after such interstate power lines get federal approval, they often need to wait years longer for approvals from every state in which their project passes.

Senator Martin Heinrich of New Mexico, for one, has cited SunZia as a key impetus for his co-sponsoring the Senate’s new plan for permitting reform. This would make it easier for the federal government to coordinate approval processes for interstate transmission lines, ensuring that they happen concurrently and preventing one state from dragging its heels.

The project had faced one particularly large and sticky permitting challenge: getting the power through the White Sands Missile Range. But this, and other challenges, were eventually resolved relatively quickly. And to David Hayes, who served as deputy secretary of the Department of the Interior during the Obama administration, this suggests that financing hamstrung the project even more than red tape.

Read Next The bipartisan energy bill tearing the climate movement apart Jake Bittle & Austin Corona

“The facts are the facts, and they got their permit,” said Hayes — all the way back in 2015, not long after the Obama administration put SunZia on a “fast track” to approval. “So we finally got the permit done. Hooray, right? And then nothing happens. Nothing happens.”

Part of that was the fact that the two states where SunZia wanted to build its transmission lines were not entirely on board. But it was also the sheer expense involved in building the project, especially given that the federal approval required burying parts of the transmission line near the missile range. Moreover, even if everything went perfectly with the project’s permitting process, it might have been impossible to build SunZia back then, said Armistead, because “we really didn’t have the market need for it.”

The U.S. simply wasn’t as ravenous for new electricity as it is right now, and the importance of building out the future of energy was not enticing enough for investors on its own.

But, refusing to die a slow death of a thousand permitting blockades or financial setbacks, SunZia instead evolved. Pattern Energy, initially only in charge of developing the wind farm portion of the project, took over the transmission line project in 2022. Around that time, SunZia applied for a revised federal permit, one that would circumvent the missile range, and within less than two years — a relative sprint for federal bureaucracy — they had a new approval in hand. Then came $11 billion in financing from several global financial institutions, pension funds, and clean energy investors. Then, a few years of construction time later, the Americas’ biggest wind farm was finally switched on.

And more massive projects like this will be needed, because nowadays “there is no longer the excuse” of a market unready for high volumes of clean energy, Armistead told me. “It is game time, and we’re supposed to get this done.”

What America’s biggest clean energy project got right

One of the secrets to SunZia’s ultimate success in New Mexico was the project’s ability to strike compromises, even with some of its earliest critics. In some cases, a bunch of birds.

Right about now, the earliest migratory birds, like the crimson-capped sandhill crane, have begun arriving at their Southwestern wintering grounds, not far from some of SunZia’s newly operational high-voltage transmission lines.

This crane had nearly gone extinct before, driven in part by an explosion of new hydroelectric dams in the early 20th century, whose construction dried out local wetlands. SunZia’s initial route, which was planned across one of the most congested flyways in the country, threatened them again, birders feared, alongside other migratory species who might accidentally fly into the new power lines, a threat believed to kill millions of birds nationwide each year.

Read Next Congress has a plan to stop Trump’s attack on offshore wind. It may not be enough. Jake Bittle

While SunZia’s original developer, the Southwestern Power Group, was largely unmoved by those concerns, said Sarah Rose, vice president of climate at the National Audubon Society, the nonprofit found an unusually receptive partner to compromise when Pattern Energy took over.

“They took their role as a project developer really seriously,” she said, “and I think they engaged with us with a lot of integrity and a lot of good faith.” Under a rerouting plan, original power lines were moved north, erected next to existing infrastructure, or affixed with visual warning systems or bird diverters. Not only did the changes make the bird advocates happy, but they were enough to help convince the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission, which had rejected SunZia’s permit application a few years earlier in part due to these concerns, to unanimously approve the project in 2022.

To be clear, not everybody believed Pattern always made the appropriate compromises, especially in Arizona, where SunZia’s route remained unchanged under the new management. Peter Else, a local environmentalist, has spent years fighting SunZia in court over its intrusion into the scenic San Pedro Valley, a region that is sacred to Indigenous communities such as the Tohono O’odham Nation and San Carlos Apache Tribe. To see it marred by more power lines through the landscape has been like “mourning a death,” Else said, “like an ecological homicide.”

He would have liked to see SunZia try to run the valley’s new power lines alongside existing ones, as it managed to do in parts of New Mexico, a process that Armistead told me would not have been possible because the Arizona portion of the line “was already put to bed,” and the original federal permit had found the valley to be “the least impactful and best route.” A lawsuit from the Tohono O’odham Nation and San Carlos Apache Tribe accusing SunZia and the Department of the Interior of failing to protect the valley remains pending.

Of course, climate change threatens many of these regions more than a single power line. In the two decades it took SunZia to begin pumping clean energy across state lines, waves of extreme heat have taken tens of thousands of American lives, and the entire Southwest has continued in a mega drought unseen in the past 1,200 years.

These are some of the very concerns that SunZia seeks, in part, to combat. And if we want to avoid even more heat deaths, extreme droughts, more flash floods, and more habitat destruction, then we probably will need a lot more facilities like it, some of which will require hard tradeoffs.

But they aren’t doomed always to. It may have taken SunZia over a decade to learn that lesson, but for future megaprojects, the blueprint may already be there. The nearby 280-mile high-voltage Southline Transmission Project spanning parts of Arizona and New Mexico is set to begin construction next year, and it’s been so intentional about minimizing its ecological and cultural impact that even Else praised it as a good idea. And this approach could pave the way for even more essential large-scale projects like it. “If more folks could come to the table looking for solutions as opposed to expecting conflict,” Rose said, “I think we would be able to move a lot more quickly.” Ideally, it won’t take another 20 years.

This story was supported by a grant from Arnold Ventures. Vox had full discretion over the content of this reporting.

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline How the biggest renewable energy project in US history finally got built on Nov 1, 2026.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 31 OCTOBER 2026 SLF-2007-104 The Sakhalin Papers XCIV: The Blending Loophole — Russian Oil in Shell’s Supply Chain After the Apology

By John Donovan — 31 October 2026

On 8 March 2022, Shell apologised for purchasing discounted Russian crude oil and announced its intention to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons. Yet its trading arrangements continued to permit purchases of certain refined petroleum products containing almost 50% Russian-origin material. Bloomberg exposed the practice in April. Ukraine’s government accused Shell of exploiting an accounting trick. Shell disputed the allegation that it was deliberately purchasing Russian products for blending and resale. On 27 April, Reuters reported that the company had tightened its trading terms to exclude refined products containing any Russian-origin material. The surviving corporate statements, contemporaneous trading reports and official sanctions records reveal what happened — and the important distinction between a contractual loophole, an actual purchase and an unlawful transaction.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-104
Publication date: 31 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-103 — The Discounted Cargo, 30 October 2026

Principal documentary evidence: Shell’s announcement of 8 March 2022; Bloomberg’s examination of Shell’s trading terms, 8 April 2022; the letter dated 13 April from Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleg Ustenko, as reported by Bloomberg; Shell’s response reported on 22 April; Reuters’ examination of revised Shell trading terms, 27 April; UK government statements and subsequent sanctions legislation; European Union sanctions records.

Evidence classification: Authenticated corporate statements, contemporaneous reporting based on observed trading bids, attributed government correspondence, official regulatory records and separately identified editorial commentary.

Important evidential limitation: The relevant trading conditions are documented through contemporary Bloomberg and Reuters reporting. The complete original Shell trading contracts, cargo-level transaction records and the original Ukrainian letter have not been independently obtained for this instalment. Their reported contents are distinguished from documents examined directly.

Introduction: When does Russian oil stop being Russian?

The question sounds almost absurd.

If a petroleum product contains Russian oil, surely it remains at least partly Russian.

But international commodity trading does not operate according to such simple definitions.

Petroleum products may be blended with equivalent products originating in other countries.

Crude oil may be refined outside the country where it was extracted.

Cargoes may be transferred between vessels.

Products may pass through several storage terminals, traders and intermediaries before reaching their ultimate purchasers.

The resulting questions concerning origin, ownership and contractual restrictions can become extraordinarily complicated.

In April 2022, those complications became a public-relations crisis for Shell.

The company had already apologised for purchasing Russian crude after the invasion of Ukraine.

It had promised to cease spot purchases of Russian crude and withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons more broadly.

But an examination of its trading terms revealed that certain refined products containing less than 50% Russian-origin material could still qualify for purchase.

The practice became associated with a term used by commodity traders:

The Latvian blend.

Ukraine’s government protested.

Shell defended its conduct.

Then, on 27 April 2022, Shell confirmed that it had changed its purchasing requirements.

The revised conditions excluded refined products containing Russian-origin material, even when blended with products from other countries.

This instalment reconstructs the sequence using contemporary documents and reporting.

The central question is not whether blending petroleum products is inherently unlawful.

It is whether Shell’s purchasing rules adequately reflected its publicly declared commitment to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons.

The answer requires careful distinctions between established facts, contested allegations and matters that remain unverified.

1. The March apology: What Shell actually promised

On 8 March 2022, Shell issued the statement examined in the previous instalment.

Chief executive Ben van Beurden apologised for purchasing a cargo of Russian Urals crude oil after the invasion.

The company’s announcement went substantially beyond the narrower withdrawal from Russian equity partnerships announced on 28 February.

Shell declared that it intended to withdraw from involvement in Russian hydrocarbons, including crude oil, petroleum products, pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas.

But the announcement contained an important qualification.

The withdrawal would proceed “in a phased manner.”

Shell committed to immediately stopping spot purchases of Russian crude oil.

It also undertook not to renew term contracts.

The company acknowledged that removing Russian crude from its supply chain could take weeks.

Withdrawing from Russian petroleum products, pipeline gas and LNG was expected to take considerably longer.

These distinctions were explicit in Shell’s original statement.

The company was not promising that every existing contractual obligation or physical delivery involving Russian energy would disappear immediately.

Its commitment concerning crude-oil spot purchases was immediate.

Its withdrawal from other Russian hydrocarbons was progressive.

That difference subsequently became central to Shell’s defence of its trading arrangements.

However, the broader public message was clear.

Shell intended to cease its involvement in Russian hydrocarbons.

For a company already facing criticism over its discounted crude-oil purchase, the scope and implementation of that commitment were matters of substantial public interest.

Primary source: Shell’s original announcement, 8 March 2022. Shell

2. A trading condition that changed the meaning of origin

The controversy developed around contractual definitions used in Shell’s trading operations.

In April 2022, Bloomberg columnist Javier Blas examined provisions governing the company’s purchases of petroleum products.

The relevant arrangements distinguished between products classified as Russian-origin and those classified as non-Russian.

The critical issue was the proportion of Russian material in a blended product.

According to Bloomberg’s examination, products containing less than 50% Russian-origin material could fall outside Shell’s contractual definition of Russian-origin products.

A cargo containing 49.99% Russian material and 50.01% material from elsewhere could therefore satisfy the non-Russian-origin condition described in the report.

This was not a claim that Russian oil had physically ceased to exist.

The Russian material remained present.

The issue was how the product was classified for the purposes of Shell’s purchasing conditions.

This distinction requires emphasis.

A private contractual definition of origin is not automatically a rule established by international sanctions law.

There was no universal legal principle under which mixing 49.99% Russian petroleum with 50.01% non-Russian petroleum automatically made every resulting transaction lawful.

The applicable legal position depended on jurisdiction, the particular sanctions in force, the nature of the product, its actual origin and the relevant customs and sanctions rules.

The arrangement reported by Bloomberg concerned Shell’s own trading conditions.

It was therefore primarily a question about corporate purchasing policy and the implementation of Shell’s public commitments.

Bloomberg published its investigation on 8 April 2022.

It became the principal source for the controversy that followed. Bloomberg.com

3. The Latvian blend: A term from the commodity markets

The expression Latvian blend was not the name of a separate geological oil field.

It was a term associated with blending Russian petroleum products with material originating elsewhere.

Bloomberg described commercial arrangements involving Russian diesel transported through Baltic export routes.

The port of Ventspils in Latvia was identified as one location associated with the practice.

Other blending locations mentioned in contemporary reporting included storage facilities in the Netherlands and transfers between vessels.

The commercial principle was relatively straightforward.

A petroleum trader could combine material from different sources to produce a cargo satisfying particular commercial specifications.

Blending is a normal feature of international petroleum trading.

Diesel, jet fuel and other refined products are frequently blended to meet quality specifications, seasonal requirements or contractual conditions.

That practice is not inherently suspicious.

The controversy arises when blending is used, or appears capable of being used, to change how a product’s origin is represented.

In April 2022, origin had become especially important because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had generated pressure on energy companies to stop purchasing Russian hydrocarbons.

A product containing substantial quantities of Russian diesel could create a commercial and reputational dilemma if it was described as non-Russian solely because the Russian component was below a specified threshold.

The term Latvian blend became shorthand for that dilemma.

But an important qualification is necessary.

The label did not establish that every blended cargo was physically mixed in Latvia.

Nor did it establish that Shell itself operated a blending facility producing such cargoes.

The distinction between a trading-market expression and a verified physical transaction is fundamental. Bloomberg.com

4. Latvia’s response: The geography was also disputed

The Latvian aspect of the controversy received attention from the country’s own media and authorities.

On 12 April 2022, Latvian public broadcaster LSM reported that the relevant authorities intended to examine the circumstances described in Bloomberg’s investigation.

The report referred to possible blending involving Ventspils.

But it also recorded denials from operators associated with the port’s petroleum terminals.

Those operators disputed their involvement in the activities described.

This is an important piece of the documentary record.

The existence of blending arrangements within international petroleum markets does not establish that a specific Latvian company participated in them.

Nor does the use of the expression Latvian blend establish the geographical origin of every product described by that term.

The available reporting therefore supports a limited conclusion.

The controversy prompted scrutiny in Latvia.

Questions were raised about whether blending was taking place through particular facilities.

But the material examined here does not establish a regulatory finding that the named terminal operators had engaged in unlawful conduct.

The geographical allegations should not be treated as proved simply because the market terminology became widely used.

Contemporary source: Latvian Public Media, 12 April 2022 — Authorities Examine Reports of the Latvian Blend.

5. A March 30 trading bid provides a more precise documentary reference

One of the most useful details in the subsequent Bloomberg reporting concerns a specific trading bid.

According to data examined by Bloomberg, Shell sought to purchase ultra-low-sulphur diesel through the S&P Global Platts pricing process on 30 March 2022.

The conditions of the bid excluded Russian-origin cargoes.

However, the accompanying definition permitted blends containing less than 50% Russian-origin material.

This matters because it establishes more than a general allegation about industry practice.

It identifies a particular date, commodity and trading process.

The bid was placed more than three weeks after Shell’s 8 March apology.

But the evidential distinction remains important.

A bid demonstrates the terms on which a company was prepared to purchase.

It does not necessarily establish that the bid resulted in a completed transaction.

Nor does it establish that the resulting cargo, if purchased, contained the maximum amount of Russian material permitted by the conditions.

The figure of 49.99% became prominent because it illustrated the contractual threshold.

It should not automatically be presented as the verified composition of a cargo actually delivered to Shell.

The surviving public reporting identifies the purchasing condition.

It does not provide a complete cargo-by-cargo accounting of deliveries made under that condition.

That limitation prevents an allegation about contractual eligibility from being transformed into an unsupported assertion concerning specific shipments. gCaptain

6. Ukraine’s government challenges Shell again

The controversy attracted a direct response from Ukraine.

In a letter dated 13 April 2022, Oleg Ustenko, chief economic adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, challenged Shell’s position.

The letter was addressed to Shell chief executive Ben van Beurden.

Contemporary Bloomberg reporting also identified Shell’s legal director, Donny Ching, as a recipient of questions concerning the company’s trading rules.

The letter expressed concern that Shell’s purchasing conditions appeared to permit continued dealings in products containing Russian petroleum.

Ustenko characterised the arrangement as an accounting device through which companies could continue supporting Russian energy revenues while publicly claiming to have withdrawn.

He described the alleged practice as deplorable.

The letter raised questions concerning the treatment of cargoes containing less than 50% Russian material.

It also sought clarification about whether such cargoes would comply with restrictions in other jurisdictions, including the United States and the United Kingdom.

Another question concerned the quantities of blended oil Shell might still be lifting from Russian ports under longer-term arrangements.

These were important questions.

They went beyond the immediate issue of a purchasing condition.

They sought to establish whether Shell’s contractual definitions were consistent with the practical consequences of its public withdrawal commitment.

The criticism also followed an earlier confrontation.

In March, Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, had condemned Shell’s purchase of discounted Russian crude.

The April letter therefore represented a second major Ukrainian challenge to Shell’s Russian petroleum trading activities.

However, the letter was an expression of the Ukrainian government’s concerns and allegations.

It was not a judicial finding.

Its contents were reported by Bloomberg and other contemporary media organisations.

The original signed letter has not been independently examined for this instalment.

That distinction is retained. gCaptain

7. Shell’s response: The company disputed the central accusation

Shell did not accept the suggestion that it was deliberately purchasing Russian products for blending and resale under a non-Russian label.

In a response reported by Bloomberg on 22 April, a Shell spokesperson denied that the company had purchased products exported from Russia for that purpose after its 8 March withdrawal announcement.

The company also said it had stopped spot purchases of Russian crude and LNG.

Shell stated that it had eliminated the vast majority of spot purchases of refined products that might contain Russian material blended earlier in the supply chain.

This response deserves careful treatment.

Shell was making a specific denial concerning deliberate purchases of products exported from Russia for blending and subsequent resale as non-Russian.

That is not identical to denying that its contractual terms had contained the 50% definition.

Nor is it identical to claiming that every petroleum product purchased anywhere in its supply chain was completely free of Russian material.

The company acknowledged that refined products could contain Russian-origin components introduced earlier in the supply chain.

It also maintained that it was working to reduce and eliminate those exposures.

The distinction is significant.

The company’s response supports the conclusion that Shell regarded the withdrawal as an ongoing process.

It also illustrates why the contractual wording attracted criticism.

A company could intend to eliminate Russian petroleum while retaining purchasing conditions that permitted some Russian-origin material in blended products.

Whether particular transactions were consistent with the company’s commitments depended upon their actual circumstances.

Shell’s statement cannot independently establish that every transaction complied with its policy.

Equally, the existence of permissive contractual language does not establish that Shell deliberately purchased Russian oil to disguise its origin.

Both propositions would require additional transaction-level evidence.

Contemporary source: Bloomberg — Ukraine Criticizes Shell’s Rules on Russian Fuel Purchases, 22 April 2022.

8. The Donovan–Shell archive preserved the controversy as it unfolded

An important feature of this investigation is that RoyalDutchShellPlc.com was recording the developments in April 2022.

The archive contains contemporary articles examining the Latvian blend controversy, Ukraine’s objections and Shell’s response.

On 22 April, the website published a report from City A.M. describing the Ukrainian government’s accusations and Shell’s denial.

Other contemporary coverage preserved by the archive included reporting from The Telegraph and the Daily Mail.

The archive subsequently published Reuters’ account of Shell tightening its trading terms on 27 April.

These records are valuable because they establish what was being publicly reported at the time.

They also help preserve the sequence of events.

This is particularly important when investigating corporate controversies retrospectively.

A later account can sometimes compress several distinct events into a single narrative.

The original reports show a more complicated progression.

Shell’s withdrawal announcement came first.

The contractual definition attracted scrutiny.

Bloomberg’s investigation brought the issue into wider public discussion.

Ukraine’s government challenged Shell.

Shell responded.

The company then tightened its trading requirements.

The archival record also demonstrates why contemporaneous reporting should be preserved with its original date and attribution.

The City A.M. report and the Bloomberg account do not constitute separate independent confirmation of every allegation.

Both drew upon the same underlying controversy and statements.

Their value lies in documenting the developing public record.

Contemporary archive: Ukraine’s Government Writes to Shell, Accusing It of an Accounting Trick — 22 April 2022.

9. Wednesday, 27 April: Reuters documents the change

The most decisive development came on 27 April 2022.

Reuters journalists Ron Bousso and Rowena Edwards reported that Shell had tightened its purchasing restrictions.

The company would no longer accept refined petroleum products containing Russian-origin material, including blended fuels.

Reuters had examined a bid placed by Shell for a cargo of jet fuel through the Platts trading process.

The new conditions prohibited Russian-origin products.

They also prohibited products blended with material produced in Russia.

The conditions extended to the transportation route, excluding arrangements involving Russian transit.

This was materially different from the earlier threshold.

Under the previous conditions described by Bloomberg, a cargo containing less than 50% Russian material could satisfy the origin requirement.

Under the new conditions reported by Reuters, Russian-origin material was excluded regardless of its proportion in the blend.

A Shell spokesperson confirmed that the trading terms had changed.

The company described the amendment as another stage in removing Russian oil and gas from its supply chain.

Reuters also noted an important limitation.

The revised refined-product conditions did not themselves alter the separate arrangements concerning Russian crude oil, which Shell was continuing to phase out.

This distinction is essential.

Shell had tightened its purchasing rules for blended refined products. That did not mean every remaining Russian crude-oil contract had been extinguished.

The article was published by Reuters on 27 April and appeared in several international publications.

RoyalDutchShellPlc.com preserved the report that evening. Investing.com UK

10. What the new trading conditions actually established

The revised language was more demanding than the earlier contractual definition.

It did not merely require a non-Russian origin designation.

It addressed the possibility that a product had been blended with material originating in Russia.

It also covered aspects of the transportation route.

These conditions were significant because they moved beyond a simple percentage threshold.

But the wording should still be interpreted carefully.

The Reuters report establishes that the new conditions appeared in a particular trading bid.

It establishes that a Shell spokesperson confirmed the tightening of the company’s purchasing terms.

It does not establish the contents of every subsequent Shell trading contract.

Nor does it prove that every supplier could independently verify the complete origin of every component in every product.

Contractual restrictions and physical traceability are different questions.

A contract may require a seller to certify that a product contains no Russian-origin material.

Whether that certification is reliable depends upon the seller’s records and the wider supply chain.

For blended petroleum products, the relevant evidence could include certificates of origin, bills of lading, refinery records, storage-terminal records and contractual declarations.

Some of those documents may be difficult to reconcile where material has passed through several intermediaries.

Shell’s revised terms therefore represented a more restrictive purchasing policy.

They did not, by themselves, establish that the global petroleum supply chain had become fully traceable.

This distinction would become particularly important in the company’s subsequent public comments.

11. Was the Latvian blend a sanctions loophole?

The expression sanctions loophole appeared frequently in reporting about Russian petroleum.

But it requires legal precision.

On 27 April 2022, the European Union had not yet adopted the comprehensive Russian oil-import restrictions included in its sixth sanctions package.

Those measures were announced on 3 June 2022.

The EU subsequently introduced phased prohibitions concerning seaborne Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products.

The restrictions included specified transitional periods and exceptions.

The United Kingdom had announced on 8 March that it would phase out Russian oil imports by the end of 2022.

The principal UK prohibition on importing Russian oil and oil products subsequently took effect on 5 December 2022.

The legal environment in April was therefore different from that which developed later.

Companies were already subject to sanctions affecting particular Russian individuals, institutions and activities.

But Russian petroleum products were not universally prohibited across all relevant European markets.

A company could face substantial public criticism for purchasing Russian-origin petroleum even when a particular purchase was not prohibited by the sanctions then applicable.

That is the distinction at the centre of this controversy.

Shell’s 50% definition was a contractual purchasing condition.

It should not be represented as a statutory exemption permitting violations of sanctions.

Nor should later sanctions restrictions be applied retrospectively to a transaction from March or April 2022.

There is another relevant distinction.

Customs rules concerning the origin of products can involve questions about processing and substantial transformation.

Simply mixing products and refining crude oil are not necessarily equivalent for origin purposes.

The applicable rules depend upon the legislation and the circumstances of the particular product.

The 49.99% threshold should therefore not be confused with a universal legal test of whether Russian petroleum had ceased to be Russian.

Official sources: UK Government — Phase-out Announcement, 8 March 2022; Council of the European Union — Sixth Sanctions Package, 3 June 2022; and UK Government — Russian Oil Import Ban and Implementation Guidance.

12. The wider industry: Shell was not operating in isolation

The problem of Russian-origin petroleum was not confined to Shell.

International fuel markets relied upon extensive networks of producers, refiners, traders, terminals and transport companies.

Europe had been a major importer of Russian crude and refined products before the invasion.

According to Eurostat data cited by Reuters, Russia supplied slightly more than a quarter of the European Union’s oil imports in 2020.

Diesel and jet fuel were particularly important.

As companies began restricting Russian purchases, alternative supplies had to be obtained from other producers and refineries.

That involved shipping capacity, refinery compatibility, storage and financing.

In these circumstances, the origin of blended petroleum products became increasingly important.

Reuters reported on 27 April that TotalEnergies, Repsol and BP had adopted restrictions excluding refined products containing Russian material.

Shell’s revised conditions therefore brought its publicly reported purchasing requirements closer to those of several major competitors.

But it would be misleading to assume that every international energy company adopted identical policies at the same time.

Companies had different contractual obligations and geographical operations.

Their exposure to Russian crude, refined products, LNG and pipeline gas also differed.

Some retained long-term contracts while discontinuing new purchases.

Others were primarily affected by investments in producing assets.

The wider industry context helps explain why removing Russian-origin petroleum from international markets proved difficult.

It does not determine whether Shell’s earlier contractual definition was commercially or ethically appropriate.

That is a separate question. euronews

13. The UK import figures reveal another difficulty

Official UK trade statistics provide useful retrospective context.

On 24 August 2022, the Office for National Statistics reported that the United Kingdom had imported no fuels from Russia during June.

It was the first month without such recorded imports since the relevant statistical series began in January 1997.

The figures showed a dramatic reduction following Russia’s invasion.

Before the war, Russia had supplied approximately 24.1% of the UK’s refined-oil imports in 2021.

The ONS attributed the subsequent decline to sanctions and companies voluntarily seeking alternative suppliers.

This was an important development.

It demonstrated that direct recorded fuel imports from Russia had fallen dramatically.

However, the figures should not be interpreted as proof that every petroleum product consumed in Britain was entirely free of Russian-origin material.

Trade statistics depend upon the classifications and origin information used in recording international transactions.

A product refined in another country may be recorded differently from the Russian crude oil used as an input.

The issue becomes particularly complicated when the original feedstock has passed through a foreign refinery.

The ONS statistics therefore establish the reduction in recorded imports from Russia.

They do not provide complete molecular traceability of the entire British petroleum supply chain.

That limitation is important when assessing the longer-term effectiveness of policies intended to exclude Russian-origin hydrocarbons. Office for National Statistics

14. The unresolved question: What was actually purchased?

This investigation has identified a clear sequence of documentary evidence.

Shell publicly committed itself to withdrawing from Russian hydrocarbons.

Its purchasing conditions subsequently attracted criticism because they permitted certain blended refined products containing less than 50% Russian material.

Ukraine’s government challenged those conditions.

Shell disputed allegations that it was deliberately purchasing Russian products for blending and resale under a non-Russian designation.

Reuters then documented a change to more restrictive trading terms.

But several potentially important records remain unavailable.

The complete earlier contractual conditions would help establish precisely how Shell defined Russian-origin material across different products and transactions.

The relevant trading bids would help clarify the circumstances in which those terms were used.

Cargo-level records would establish whether purchases were completed, what products were delivered and what their actual compositions were.

Shipping and storage-terminal records could identify the origin and movements of specific quantities of material.

Internal Shell correspondence could explain why the earlier threshold was adopted and what prompted its subsequent removal.

Without those records, it would be premature to claim that Shell deliberately engineered particular shipments to evade sanctions.

It would also be premature to assert that no products containing Russian-origin material were acquired under the earlier conditions.

The available evidence supports a narrower and more reliable conclusion.

Shell’s publicly reported trading conditions permitted certain Russian-containing blends after its March withdrawal announcement. The company subsequently tightened those conditions following public scrutiny and criticism.

That is an important finding.

It does not require speculation about transactions that have not been independently established.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS Established facts

Shell announced its intention to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons on 8 March 2022.

The company immediately committed to ending spot purchases of Russian crude while acknowledging that withdrawal from other products and contracts would take longer.

Bloomberg reported on 8 April that Shell’s trading conditions could classify blended petroleum products containing less than 50% Russian-origin material as non-Russian.

A Shell bid for ultra-low-sulphur diesel dated 30 March was subsequently identified in Bloomberg reporting as using the relevant origin definition.

The expression Latvian blend became associated with the practice of mixing Russian petroleum products with material from other countries.

Latvian authorities and media examined questions arising from the reporting.

Operators associated with Ventspils disputed their involvement in the alleged activities.

Oleg Ustenko, an adviser to Ukraine’s president, challenged Shell’s purchasing conditions in a letter dated 13 April.

Shell disputed the allegation that it was purchasing Russian products for deliberate blending and resale as non-Russian.

On 27 April, Reuters reported that Shell had tightened its trading conditions to exclude refined products containing Russian-origin material.

Reuters examined a jet-fuel trading bid containing the revised conditions.

A Shell spokesperson confirmed the change.

The revised terms did not automatically terminate every remaining Russian crude-oil contract.

The relevant comprehensive EU oil restrictions were introduced after the April controversy.

Matters requiring qualification

The 49.99% figure illustrates the contractual threshold. It is not independently established as the composition of every cargo purchased by Shell.

A trading bid is evidence of an offer or purchasing condition, not necessarily a completed transaction.

The available documents do not establish that Shell itself physically blended Russian petroleum with other products.

They do not establish that all cargoes described as Latvian blends originated in Latvia.

The original Ukrainian letter has been reported by reputable contemporary sources, but the complete signed document has not been independently examined for this instalment.

The complete original Shell contracts and associated cargo documentation have not been obtained.

Legal position

No court judgment specifically determining Shell’s liability in relation to the April 2022 blending arrangements has been identified in the materials examined.

The documentary evidence does not establish that Shell violated sanctions through the reported contractual definition.

The commercial and ethical controversy must be distinguished from the legal status of particular transactions.

A private 50% origin threshold was not a universal exemption under sanctions law.

Not established

The available evidence does not prove that Shell deliberately designed the blending arrangements to circumvent sanctions.

It does not establish that particular Shell executives ordered traders to conceal Russian petroleum.

It does not establish the quantity or value of Russian-origin products actually acquired under the disputed conditions.

It does not establish that Shell knowingly submitted false declarations of origin.

Nor does it establish that the change announced on 27 April immediately eliminated every indirect Russian-origin component from the company’s global supply chain.

EDITORIAL COMMENTARY The difference between leaving Russia and removing Russia from the supply chain

This episode exposes an important distinction between a company’s public commitments and the operational systems through which those commitments must be implemented.

Shell’s March announcement was an expression of corporate intention.

Its trading conditions governed the circumstances in which commercial transactions could proceed.

The two were related, but they were not identical.

The company intended to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons.

Its earlier purchasing terms nevertheless permitted some refined products containing Russian-origin material.

That was sufficient to generate substantial criticism, even without proof that Shell had intentionally purchased specific cargoes to conceal their origin.

The Ukrainian government’s objection was understandable within the circumstances of the war.

Ukraine was seeking to reduce Russian energy revenues.

From that perspective, purchasing a product containing substantial quantities of Russian petroleum could still indirectly support Russian exports, regardless of how the finished product was classified.

Shell’s response reflected another concern.

The company was attempting to disentangle itself from complex supply chains while maintaining fuel availability for customers.

That concern also had a legitimate commercial basis.

European dependence upon Russian petroleum could not be eliminated merely by issuing a corporate announcement.

Refineries required feedstocks.

Traders were subject to existing contracts.

Customers continued to need fuel.

The difficulty was real.

But so was the reputational risk.

A company that publicly declares an intention to stop dealing in Russian hydrocarbons creates expectations about its subsequent conduct.

Those expectations extend beyond the narrow wording of individual announcements.

If commercial purchasing conditions permit substantial Russian content, the company must be prepared to explain why those arrangements remain consistent with its commitment.

In Shell’s case, that explanation was challenged.

The company subsequently tightened its trading requirements.

The documentary record does not establish whether criticism was the sole reason for that decision.

But the change is clear.

The importance of the original documents

The episode also demonstrates why contemporaneous records matter.

The public statements explain Shell’s declared policy.

Bloomberg’s reporting identifies the earlier contractual threshold.

The Ukrainian letter records the government’s objections, as reported by contemporary journalists.

Shell’s response explains what the company disputed.

Reuters’ investigation establishes the subsequent tightening of the purchasing conditions.

Official government records clarify the legal environment.

Each source answers a different question.

None should be made to answer questions beyond its evidential scope.

Most importantly, the Reuters report of 27 April should not be treated as proof that Shell had previously committed a sanctions offence.

It is evidence that Shell changed its trading terms.

Equally, the company’s statement that it was acting lawfully does not resolve every question about whether the earlier arrangements were consistent with the spirit of its withdrawal commitment.

Legal compliance and corporate accountability are related but distinct considerations.

A conclusion supported by the evidence

The March apology did not instantly remove Russian-origin petroleum from every part of Shell’s international trading arrangements.

By April, the company’s purchasing terms still permitted certain blended refined products containing less than 50% Russian material.

Those terms attracted criticism.

Shell disputed the suggestion that it was deliberately purchasing Russian products for disguised resale.

The company then changed its purchasing requirements.

This is the central documentary finding: Shell’s withdrawal from Russian energy involved successive revisions to its commercial practices, rather than a single immediate break.

That conclusion is supported by Shell’s statements and contemporaneous reporting.

It requires no allegation of secret criminal conduct.

But the controversy also points towards a more difficult problem.

Even when a company excludes products blended directly with Russian petroleum, what happens when Russian crude is refined in another country before the resulting diesel or jet fuel enters international markets?

That question cannot be answered simply by examining the percentage of Russian material in a blended cargo.

It concerns the fundamental ability of international commodity markets to trace petroleum back to its original source.

And Shell’s own chief executive would soon acknowledge just how difficult that could be.

PRINCIPAL SOURCES

1. Shell plc — Shell Announces Intent to Withdraw From Russian Oil and Gas, 8 March 2022

The authenticated corporate announcement establishing the distinction between the immediate halt to Russian crude spot purchases and the phased withdrawal from other Russian hydrocarbons.

Read Shell’s original announcement

2. Bloomberg Opinion — Javier Blas, The Backdoor That Keeps Russian Oil Flowing Into Europe, 8 April 2022

The contemporary investigation describing the 49.99% contractual threshold and the trading-market expression Latvian blend. This is an attributed Bloomberg analysis, not an independent judicial finding.

Read the Bloomberg investigation

3. Latvian Public Media — Investigation of Reports Concerning the Latvian Blend, 12 April 2022

Reports Latvian authorities’ interest in the allegations and records denials from operators associated with the Ventspils petroleum terminals.

Read the original Latvian report

4. Bloomberg — Laura Hurst, Ukraine Criticizes Shell’s Rules on Russian Fuel Purchases, 22 April 2022

Documents the letter dated 13 April from Oleg Ustenko, the March 30 trading-bid conditions and Shell’s response to the Ukrainian government’s allegations.

Read the Bloomberg report reproduced by gCaptain

5. RoyalDutchShellPlc.com — Ukraine’s Government Writes to Shell, Accusing It of an Accounting Trick, 22 April 2022

The contemporary Donovan–Shell archive preserves the City A.M. account of the dispute and Shell’s denial.

Read the original archive entry

6. Reuters — Ron Bousso and Rowena Edwards, Shell Tightens Restrictions on Russian Oil Buying, 27 April 2022

The central contemporary report establishing the revised trading conditions, the Platts jet-fuel bid and Shell’s confirmation of the change.

Read the Reuters report

7. RoyalDutchShellPlc.com — Shell Tightens Restrictions on Russian Oil Buying, 27 April 2022

The contemporary Donovan–Shell archive’s complete reproduction of the Reuters account.

Read the original archive publication

8. UK Government — UK to Phase Out Russian Oil Imports, 8 March 2022

The official announcement establishing the initial British policy of ending Russian oil imports by the end of 2022.

Read the UK government statement

9. Council of the European Union — Sixth Sanctions Package, 3 June 2022

The official record of the EU’s subsequent Russian oil-import restrictions and their phased implementation.

Read the Council announcement

10. Office for National Statistics — The Impact of Sanctions on UK Trade With Russia, 24 August 2022

Official statistics documenting the reduction in recorded Russian fuel imports and providing context concerning Britain’s former dependence on Russian refined petroleum.

Read the ONS analysis

Documentary disclaimer

This instalment relies upon authenticated Shell corporate statements, contemporary Bloomberg and Reuters reporting, official UK and European Union records, Latvian public-media reporting and contemporary material preserved by RoyalDutchShellPlc.com.

The earlier Shell trading conditions are documented through published reporting concerning observed trading bids. The complete original contracts and cargo-level transaction records have not been independently examined.

The correspondence from Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleg Ustenko is identified through contemporaneous reporting. The original signed letter has not been independently obtained.

The Ukrainian government’s allegations concerning an accounting trick are reported as allegations.

Shell’s contemporaneous denials and explanations are included.

The existence of contractual terms permitting some Russian-origin material is distinguished from proof that particular cargoes were delivered under those terms.

No allegation is made that Shell deliberately falsified certificates of origin, knowingly breached sanctions or committed a criminal offence through the reported arrangements.

The term Latvian blend is identified as contemporary commodity-market terminology. It does not constitute proof of misconduct by any specific Latvian company or terminal operator.

The article distinguishes the contractual purchasing restrictions adopted voluntarily by Shell from sanctions imposed by governments.

Later sanctions legislation is not applied retrospectively.

The revised trading conditions announced on 27 April 2022 are not presented as evidence that every existing contractual relationship involving Russian energy was immediately terminated.

Editorial commentary concerning the consistency of Shell’s public commitments and commercial practices is separately identified.

Factual corrections, additional primary documents and responses from Shell or other interested parties are welcome.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-105 — The Sakhalin Papers XCV: The Molecule Problem — Russian Crude Refined Abroad and the Limits of Shell’s Clean Break

On 27 April 2022, Shell tightened its trading conditions to exclude refined petroleum products containing Russian-origin material.

It appeared to close the most controversial aspect of the Latvian blend arrangements.

But eight days later, on 5 May, Shell chief executive Ben van Beurden publicly explained a far more difficult problem.

There was no comprehensive international system capable of tracing every petroleum product back to the country in which its original crude oil had been extracted.

The distinction mattered.

Russian crude could be exported to a country outside Europe.

A refinery in that country could process it into diesel, petrol or jet fuel.

The resulting petroleum products could then enter international markets under the origin rules applicable to the refined goods.

Van Beurden used the example of diesel produced at an Indian refinery from Russian crude.

The product could be treated as Indian diesel for the purposes he was discussing.

His comments were reported by Reuters and S&P Global Commodity Insights.

They raised an uncomfortable question.

How could Shell promise to eliminate Russian-origin petroleum from its supply chain when its own chief executive acknowledged that the global system could not reliably trace every refined product back to its original crude-oil source?

The answer requires examining the difference between physical origin, customs origin, contractual representations and the practical limits of commodity-market traceability.

It also requires distinguishing an unavoidable limitation of international refining from deliberate sanctions evasion.

The next instalment will examine Shell’s 5 May 2022 statements, the contemporaneous industry reporting and the regulatory framework governing petroleum refined outside Russia.

The question is not whether Shell changed its purchasing rules.

That is established.

The question is whether those rules could ever guarantee what the company’s public commitments appeared to promise.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

Documentary starting point for the next investigation: S&P Global Commodity Insights — Shell Flags Industry Hurdles to Blocking All Russian Imports Into the EU, 5 May 2022.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 31 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 31, 2026 at 8:55 pm.
©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

Comment from “An Old EP Hand” on the article: Shell’s $6.4 Billion Pension Bombshell: SEC Disclosure Reveals Major Accounting Loss Expected as Dutch Retirement Scheme Changes

Hello John

I had not looked at your site for a while when someone sent me your piece on the SSPF.

I distributed that to several old colleagues. Great appreciation. This whole deal is murky and stinks to high heaven. We should have closed the fund and not chosen for ‘invaren’.

But the politicians and evil HR staff forced/bamboozled the staffcouncil to agree. This whole deal is sold as transparant but it is as intransparant as can be.

Delta Lloyd and IBM have chosen to close and not go for invaren.

Unilever and Dow (and others) also chose not to go for invaren.

It all started when a caretaker government (had fallen and elections were planned) signed a few days before going home the new pension law against advice of many genuine experts. In the law it is fixed that individuals have no rights anymore. So we are neutralised. As a thank you the PM became secretary of the NATO and the minister who signed the law became mayor of Rotterdam. You scratch my back, I scratch your back…

Blackrock  and other xxxxxxxxx will now run many pensionfunds.

And this choice for Blackrock by Shell after our own organisation (Shell Asset Management) had done a great job for many years. It just stank.

So your piece was (as usual) very timely. But I fear we can do nothing anymore. The rich dutch pensionfunds will be robbed empty and given to the ‘poor’ countries like France, Italy, Greece and others.

Shell’s $6.4 Billion Pension Bombshell: “This whole deal is murky and stinks to high heaven” was first posted on October 31, 2026 at 8:00 pm.
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Print article Share Article Contents Expand menu

• Formal negotiations
• Finance
• Global review
• Global report
• Digital sequence information
• Harmful subsidies
• Marine biodiversity
• Planning, monitoring, reporting and review
• Article 8(j) implementation
• Biodiversity and climate change
• Links with other bodies
• Around the COP
• Armenian presidency
• Protests
• Lobbying and influence
• Carbon and biodiversity markets

Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.

The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.

It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.

Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.

Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.

This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.

It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.

The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.

During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.

Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later. 

Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.

• Formal negotiations

  • Finance
  • Global review
  • Global report
  • Digital sequence information

    • Money in vs money out
    • Industry-led initiatives

  • Harmful subsidies
  • Marine biodiversity
  • Planning, monitoring, reporting and review
  • Article 8(j) implementation
  • Biodiversity and climate change
  • Links with other bodies

• Around the COP

  • Armenian presidency
  • Protests
  • Lobbying and influence
  • Carbon and biodiversity markets

Formal negotiations Finance

Finance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks. 

At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes. 

The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.

As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.

The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.

Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.

Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya. 

Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after. 

Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030. 

However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.

Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF. 

The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature. 

Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature. 

The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. Source: UN CBD

The text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”. 

The list was last amended in 2006.

(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)

Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan. 

The first “non-paper” had four different options for expanding the contributor base. These ranged from using the World Bank’s country income groups “as a proxy” to identify high-income countries, to commissioning a study on the impacts of being included on the list.

By 21 October, the number of options swelled to eight, including two from Saudi Arabia and one from Peru. 

Some countries “expressed concern” that certain options were based on a CBD secretariat study on “what constitutes a developed country”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported. 

By the end of the first week, it was clear that the finance deadlock would have to go into informal ministerial consultations for any consensus to emerge. 

At a press conference on 28 October, Christopher O’Sullivan, Ireland’s nature minister and representing the EU delegation, told Carbon Brief:

“Our position isn’t that we want to pull back in terms of contributing…but it’s been 20 years since that list was added to, times have changed and there are new realities. We just simply want those new realities reflected. I don’t fully understand why there’s so much opposition to that.”

The EU chose not to comment on which countries it would like to see on that list.

Lim Li Ching from the Third World Network, meanwhile, called the push for others to “assume the obligations” of developed countries “sheer hypocrisy”, adding that any country could make a voluntary contribution. She told Carbon Brief:

“At a forum like the CBD, this linking of income status with finance does not take into account where historical and current responsibilities lie. If you want to generate more funding for biodiversity, let’s look at sovereign debt burdens and rules, which are inequitable for developing countries. But if you can fund wars, and provide resources for your defence industry, then you know where the priorities are.”

On 29 October – at a plenary meant to adopt final texts for the most contentious subjects – Norway’s Gaute Hanssen announced that resource-mobilisation discussions would go into a smaller “friends of the chair” meeting. 

Facilitated by Carolina Caceres from Canada and Imèn Meliane from Tunisia, the meeting would discuss the most contentious elements of a draft decision that had swelled to 112 brackets, denoting areas of disagreement on specific details in the text.

While the meeting was open to all, countries that were called to be present included Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Fiji, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the UK.

At the same time, a “non-paper” text by finance and environment ministers laid out countries’ red lines and compromises.

A key paragraphs from a minister’s non-paper on nature finance published on 29 October. Source: UN CBD

At the end of COP17, countries welcomed a final compromise text, with Kenya thanking the “strong women” co-chairs who strove to strike a “delicate” balance. 

China, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Fiji cautioned against any further interventions, with Brazil warning: “If we open this text, we will never close it again.”

While the final decision “recognises” that “contributions from more parties would improve the mobilisation” of biodiversity finance, it steered away from issuing criteria to expand the list of donor countries. 

The text makes it clear that no additions to the list would be made without inviting and confidentially consulting with interested countries, to secure their explicit consent. 

Instead, the CBD secretariat “invites” countries keen to be on the list and “assume the obligations” of developed countries to “signal interest” before COP18 and at every alternate COP thereafter. 

At the same time, developing countries can contribute to meeting the GBF and biodiversity convention’s goals on a “voluntary basis”, with contributions not implying inclusion on the list.

A negotiator for China told Carbon Brief at the closing plenary: 

“We welcome this balanced document. It was a very long discussion that has gone [on] since [2022 nature talks in] Nairobi. But actually this time, there were a lot of sensitive issues, [there were] a lot of critical things we didn’t open in the contact groups; it mainly went to the high-level discussion.”

The decision also establishes a financial mechanism for nature funding after 2030 under the governance of the COP, a key ask from developing countries. 

However, it defers decisions on what form this mechanism would take – whether this would be a new fund or based on existing arrangements – until COP18. 

Oscar Soria at the Common Initiative told Carbon Brief that the decision on the financial mechanism leaves things “very open”, with “no movement” towards a new fund or money and no upgrades to existing funding arrangements.

The text acknowledges the links between debt and biodiversity eight times, mentioning how debt-related instruments can be included in biodiversity plans, but does not go further.

“It is almost as if the debt studies they called for at COP16 didn’t happen,” said Soria, who had earlier flagged serious methodological issues with the first-ever COP-commissioned report on debt and biodiversity. 

Global review

In Yerevan, countries agreed on the first stocktake of progress towards the 2030 nature targets – known as the “global review”. 

The review was one of the keenly anticipated outcomes from COP17 and was seen as less controversial than some of the other major negotiation strands. 

It was swiftly signed off by countries at the start of the final COP17 plenary, with just one last-minute addition. 

The concept of carrying out a global review on “collective progress” was set out in the GBF and its underlying documents. 

The details of how this review would be carried out were supposed to be agreed at COP16, but it was not discussed before the plenary in Cali was suspended for loss of “quorum”. It was instead adopted at the resumed COP16 negotiations in Rome in February 2025.

The global review was based largely on the findings of the global report and other information provided by countries. 

The final text “welcomes” and also “notes with deep concern” the findings of the global report. It then homes in on various ways countries can increase their biodiversity action to get on track to meet the targets. 

As of 19 October, when COP17 officially began, the non-paper contained 152 brackets, which indicate areas of disagreement in UN texts.

Smaller “contact group” discussions took place to try and reduce the number of brackets throughout the first week. This group was co-chaired by Sanne Kruid from the Netherlands and Sivendra Michael from Fiji. 

A few days into the talks, Kruid told Carbon Brief that the progress on the global review was “relatively positive”, with countries “engaging quite well”. 

One contentious section of the 11-page text was paragraph 15, which “urges” countries to accelerate implementation of nature targets, “including by increased ambition” in addressing key challenges. 

Some developing countries were wary of including the word “ambition” in this section, arguing that higher ambition requires more nature finance, which is already falling “far short”. 

Kirsty Leong, a policy expert at WWF, told Carbon Brief: 

“You have one side wanting to have very strong language and high ambition in what countries should do…and the other side of the room saying the main problem in implementation is that they don’t have the means to do it.” 

But the word made it into the final text, which “urges” parties to accelerate implementation of the GBF, “including by increased ambition”, while recognising that developing countries need more support to “allow for higher ambition in their actions”. 

Another hotly debated section was paragraph 26, which “encourages” countries to accelerate reform of nature-harming subsidies, “in accordance with national circumstances”.  

Earlier in the talks, it was also unclear whether this would feature in the final version due to pushback from countries including Saudi Arabia and Russia. (See: Harmful subsidies) 

Earlier drafts of paragraph 16 – another key section – focused on supporting increased action to address biodiversity loss, and also mentioned transforming global financial systems and economic sectors. 

This was heavily stripped back in the final version, which “emphasises that accelerating implementation would need to be supported through increased action to address the underlying drivers of biodiversity loss.”  

The review also “notes with deep concern” that the 2050 nature goals “may be at risk” if 2030 targets are not achieved.

The COP17 presidency and others frequently discussed a “Yerevan pathway” during the negotiations.

It was unclear whether this would feature in a separate cover decision text, similar to those agreed at climate COP summits, or in another way. 

In the end, the “pathway” referred to the sections of the global review outlining calls for countries to scale up action to meet the 2030 nature targets. 

A CBD statement said it “sets out a shared response to those findings [of the global report], identifying priorities for action through 2030 and areas where progress will need to be accelerated”.

Elsewhere in the global review talks, Earth Negotiations Bulletin said a small group was also set up to address references to “actors other than national governments”.

These “actors” include Indigenous peoples and local communities. Joji Carino from the not-for-profit Forest Peoples Programme called for this wording to be “discontinued”. 

She told a 20 October press briefing that the phrase is a “major regression”, believing it makes it sound like “governments were always the central actor” and Indigenous peoples were “just there on the side”.

This phrase featured a number of times in the final global review document, with Indigenous peoples and local communities also highlighted several times. 

On 28 October, rumours circulated that the COP17 president, Hambardzum Matevosyan, wanted to bring the global review text for agreement at a plenary session that evening, two days before talks were due to end. 

When Carbon Brief ran into Matevosyan in a lift that afternoon, he said this would only occur if countries reached a consensus on the text. They did not manage this and he confirmed in the evening plenary that consultations would continue. 

Carbon Brief understands that Brazil was the main blocker on movement of the text at this stage. The issues were not necessarily with the text itself, but with progress on other texts – namely, resource mobilisation. 

(Similarly, at COP16, the Democratic Republic of the Congo called for the full monitoring framework text to be put in brackets due to dissatisfaction over resource mobilisation.)

In the final plenary on 30 October, countries supported the presidency’s proposals to clear the remaining 28 brackets in the text. 

Brazil made a last-minute request to mention people of African descent in paragraph 35, which “emphasises” the contributions of actions from various groups of people to the GBF. 

Colombia supported the proposal, and no country objected, so the COP17 president approved the addition before gavelling through the document, saying “we have started very good”.  

Daudi Sumba, the chief conservation officer at WWF International, said in a statement: 

“Negotiators returning home must now turn the global review into clear dedicated action, scaling nature’s recovery by transforming the most damaging sectors and activities across our food and finance systems.”

Global report

Just ahead of COP17, the UN released a global report finding that the world is falling behind on 22 out of 23 of its nature targets for 2030. 

It said that the GBF has led to “unprecedented” interest in tackling biodiversity loss, but added:

“However, unless collective implementation accelerates rapidly, the 2030 targets and mission will not be achieved.”

The global report provided a basis for the global review of progress towards meeting the targets of the GBF, which was undertaken by countries in Yerevan.

The scheduling of both the global report and the global review were agreed as part of the GBF and its underlying documents in 2022.

The global report draws on countries’ national reports, which were due to be submitted to the UN in February of this year. It also draws on countries’ national nature plans, known as “national biodiversity strategies and action plans” (NBSAPs) and national targets, which were both due in 2024.

Not all countries have met the call to publish these documents and targets. According to the UN, 45% of countries published NBSAPs in time to be considered for the report, 83% had submitted at least one national target and 66% had produced their new national report. 

The first draft of the global report was published on 29 June 2026. This draft was subject to a “peer-review process”, which invited countries and observers, such as NGOs and businesses, to submit comments on all aspects of the report.

The second draft, which has been revised based on the peer review, was published on Sunday 26 July, just ahead of COP17 preparatory talks being held in Nairobi.

The final version – titled “The state of biodiversity action: The global report on collective progress” – was published on 24 September.

The second draft of the global report included a scorecard showing numerical data on progress towards each of the GBF’s 23 targets, based on different metrics. (See Carbon Brief’s article.)

Some of these figures featured in the finalised report, but a “decision was made” to leave them out of the final scorecard, the CBD confirmed to Carbon Brief.

Instead, the final scorecard solely uses a colour-coding system to rank progress on these metrics. But the colours are not that straightforward to interpret.

The rankings from worst (red) to best (green) are based on where progress on each metric ranks relative to the highest and lowest scores achieved in each instance.

This means that, for example, a poor-performing target can have certain figures coloured green on scores as low as 43%, while this same score appears as yellow in other instances.

Digital sequence information

Digital sequence information (DSI) – the genetic data derived from nature – was one of the most keenly watched “fights” by countries, companies, academia and Indigenous peoples alike.

This data is used in a wide range of industries, including pharmaceuticals and agribusiness companies, to develop products such as medicines, cosmetics, supplements and crop varieties.

At COP16, countries agreed to the first-ever global fund – the Cali Fund – to which companies using DSI “should contribute”, along with a unique multilateral mechanism to support it.

They established a steering committee to conduct studies and provide advice to the COP on the small print still left unresolved on the Cali Fund and mechanism.

In Yerevan, countries were supposed to consider and finalise these details, such as who “should” pay into the fund and how this money would reach countries and Indigenous communities protecting the world’s genetic diversity.

However, following two weeks of deep divisions, delays and then fears of rushing crucial details in the plenary, most of this work has been pushed to intersessional negotiations leading up to COP18 in 2028. 

Countries did, however, finalise a review methodology to assess how the mechanism and thinly lined fund are working by COP18. 

Money in vs money out

Countries had a lot to achieve on DSI at COP17. This task list had been broadly grouped by the steering committee into two categories: “money in” and “money out”. The Cali decision gave the steering committee two years to prepare studies and documents to support COP17 deliberations on both tracks. 

“Money in” refers to which – and by how much – companies pay into the fund, defined by “thresholds” and contribution rates. Thresholds mean deciding which companies – small, medium or large – “should” contribute to the Cali Fund and whether that is decided on the basis of size, revenue or their “proportional” use of DSI. 

Contribution rates refer to how much companies pay. Days before COP17, the CBD secretariat submitted a 209-page study, conducted by an external consultant, on thresholds and contribution rates.

Contributions to the fund, however, are voluntary, with indicative rates already set out in the COP16 decision – 0.1% of revenue, or 1% of profits. According to a DeSmog investigation, pharmaceutical trade lobbies “challenged” these rates and called for a radical rethink of the fund itself. (See: Lobbying and influence.)

“Money out”, meanwhile, refers to how the Cali Fund’s resources are allocated, disbursed and spent. 

As Carbon Brief reporting has shown, there has been barely any “money in” to the Cali Fund over the past two years. At the start of COP17, the fund had only $6,000 in it. By the end of it, pledges went up, but not by much: totalling $10,565 and less than $9,000 in actual deposits.

To date, not a single large company among the sectors identified as reliant on DSI has contributed to the fund. 

Observers and government delegates across blocs told Carbon Brief that the bulk of the steering committee’s work leading up to COP17 was focused on the “money out”. 

This included an emphasis on certificates and other “incentives” for companies to pay. Obtaining such a certificate for a full contribution, for instance, could indemnify companies from paying any more for DSI use that year. Right now, every voluntary contribution, no matter how small, gets a receipt from the Cali Fund.

“Money out” also comprises how funds would be allocated and disbursed to countries and Indigenous communities, as well as transparency on how it would be spent. 

At the talks, Brazil – supported by other developing countries – called for Cali Fund contributions to reach at least $200m in its pilot phase before discussing allocation. 

Dr Siva Thambisetty, associate professor of law at the London School of Economics, told Carbon Brief:

“We seemed to collapse the entire question to certificates. I question whether we should have spent so much time on allocation strategies when the ‘money in’ has been so insignificant.” 

Through most of the talks, industry – supported by the EU and UK – sought “legal clarity” on “certificates” for potential contributions. 

At an informal dialogue on DSI on 23 October attended by Carbon Brief, industry representatives echoed calls for more “legal certainty” before they would pledge more. They also warned of “obligation stacking” from having to share benefits from using genetic resources under other treaties.

While the first non-paper on DSI on 20 October had 154 brackets, countries worked over the weekend to remove contentious elements. 

However, disagreements on these details underpinning the text were still substantive. At 6am on 28 October, the COP president sent out a letter calling for informal ministerial consultations, steered by Norway and Zimbabwe. The letter also set out “overarching questions” to resolve.

Extract from a letter issued by the COP17 president on 28 October listing key issues for ministers to resolve on DSI. Credit: COP17 Presidency.

The penultimate DSI text only emerged late on the final day of COP17, with parties such as Fiji saying that many countries had very little time to read it. 

After multiple interventions from countries including Fiji, India, the EU, Brazil, China and Argentina, parties could find no way forward. 

The chair of a working group tasked with resolving some of the most contentious negotiations before the final plenary called for a “friends of the chair” group to determine intersessional work on DSI, led by Fiji. He urged these consultations to continue in parallel with the COP17 plenary, or risk having no COP decision at all.

At 5am on 31 October, the COP president proposed a draft decision on DSI, as the final plenary entered its seventh hour. 

The text “reaffirms” the indicative contribution rates agreed at COP16. It sets out an allocation methodology on how funds from the Cali Fund will be disbursed after COP18, while “allow[ing]” the steering committee to make payments “on an exceptional basis” if contributions to the Cali Fund reach $150m.

The allocations from the Cali Fund for Indigenous peoples in the COP17 decision. Credit: UN CBD

Only contributions by companies amounting to “1% of their profit or 0.1% of their revenue” will be entitled to a Cali Fund certificate for the year, it clarifies.

The president’s text was adopted without objections at 5:25am, with the emptying plenary hall bursting into applause. 

Speaking to Carbon Brief minutes after the DSI decision was adopted, Fiji’s Sivendra Michael said he was “so glad I was given the opportunity to chair and bring this decision to a close”. He added: 

“It matters a lot, especially for Indigenous people back home, because any work that is done in the methodology and how benefits get distributed should respect the rights of Indigenous peoples. 

“I knew I would land it before I left here. It also shows Pacific leadership in this space, because Pacific islands may be small, but our leadership has really been demonstrated across the room, when we can come in and offer bridging proposals and push countries to show what flexibility looks like.” 

Despite Michael welcoming the decision, others were more critical.

Dr June Rubis, Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLC) representative from Asia on the Cali Fund’s steering committee, said:

“Many wealthy nations asked for a voluntary fund, got one, and business has spent the last two years stalling contributions, throwing doubt on the multilateral mechanism. 

“The commitment made in Cali still stands and Indigenous peoples and local communities cannot keep waiting while companies free-ride off nature’s genetic information. While setting the rules for new funds like this does take time to get right, governments need to start treating this as a matter of economic resilience and human survival.”

Thambisetty told Carbon Brief after the talks concluded:

“The Cali Fund is on life support. We leave Yerevan with an open-ended working group. It became clear that work in the run-up to COP17 was distorted by industry echo chambers, a receptive steering committee and lack of close engagement and oversight.

There is much work ahead, but we need transparency, a robust and imaginative public narrative and, inevitably, a hardening of the regulatory ecosystem by states where large DSI users are based.”

Industry-led initiatives

In addition to the work on DSI by parties, there was an industry-led initiative announced at COP17.  

The proposal – seen by Carbon Brief – aims to start a separate philanthropic fund, called the Biodiversity Foundation Initiative. 

This initiative argues that the Cali Fund and national benefit-sharing measures “create complex payment obligations, compliance requirements and unpredictable financial exposure”. 

Rubis expressed concern that industry was “picking up on our language of ‘different pathways’” to start its own fund with the expectation it would then receive particular certificates from key governments. 

While the initiative says it “intends to complement – not replace” – the Cali Fund, it also notes that it hopes to “engage key governments” and “build political support”, with little clarity on whether communities would receive benefits.

Other Indigenous leaders and academics told Carbon Brief they were being “actively lobbied” at COP17 to support this initiative, although its architects described their outreach as a “co-design” phase for the fund.

Harmful subsidies

Nature-harming subsidies were a central point of discussion throughout COP17 – both inside negotiation rooms and at side events in Yerevan. 

Governments spend as much as $1.8tn each year on subsidies and incentives that could be “harmful” to biodiversity across a range of sectors, particularly fossil fuels and agriculture. 

Target 18 of the GBF sets out the aim to identify – by 2025 – and then “eliminate, phase out or reform” these harmful incentives. It also outlines that subsidies should be reduced by at least $500bn each year by 2030. 

Carbon Brief analysis published in July found that 84% of countries missed the 2025 identification deadline. Countries have also shown “insufficient” progress so far on target 18, according to the global report. 

At an event on 26 October, UN biodiversity chief Astrid Schomaker described subsidy reform as “politically charged and socially sensitive”. This was evident throughout the negotiations, despite countries already agreeing to the terms of target 18 four years ago. 

Harmful subsidies featured in several negotiated outcomes from Yerevan – most notably in the global review. (See: Global review) 

Earlier versions of a subsidy-related paragraph in the review “urge[d]” stronger action on target 18. 

In a non-paper released on 25 October, this was softened to “encourage” countries to scale up identification, elimination, phase-out or reform of harmful incentives, “in accordance with national circumstances”. 

Bracketed text on subsidies from a 25 October non-paper on the global review. Source: UN CBD

Carbon Brief understands that Colombia, the UK, Norway, EU nations and many others were in favour of including a paragraph on harmful subsidy reform in the global review. Countries opposed to this included Saudi Arabia and Russia. Near the end of the negotiations, India also proposed removing this paragraph from the text. 

The final global review text agreed at COP17 “encourages” countries to “accelerate the implementation of target 18”, but in “accordance with national circumstances”. 

Eva Zabey, the chief executive of Business for Nature, said in a statement:   

“This COP is a turning point on incentive reform. ⁠Through the adoption of this decision, parties have made it a key priority. Incentive reform has moved from the margins to the mainstream of the biodiversity agenda.” 

Ahead of COP17, more than 130 businesses and financial organisations signed an open letter calling for governments to reform nature-harming incentives.

On 19 October, a Conservation International report estimated that harmful subsidies result in $11-24.7tn of “hidden environmental and social damage costs” every year.    

COP17 also saw the launch of several initiatives focused on subsidy reform, with a number of related announcements on 26 October. 

On this day, the COP17 presidency launched the “Yerevan call” on positive biodiversity incentives – a political declaration to increase action and reaffirm commitments to target 18. 

It formed one of four “flagship” priorities for the COP17 presidency, with the others focused on conservation measures, mountain and freshwater ecosystems and biodiversity monitoring. 

A new group called the “friends of target 18” was also announced. The initiative, put together by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), will be co-chaired by Colombia and Finland. 

Armenia is the only other country currently officially involved in the group, while France, Malawi and Guinea have indicated they will join. 

The “friends” group has already held several informal meetings since March 2025, said Farooq Ullah, a senior policy advisor at the IISD. He told Carbon Brief that the group intends to help countries share information and solutions on subsidy reform, and to strengthen “political will” on tackling subsidies. 

Ullah said more information and the full list of countries involved will be published in May 2027, during the first planned in-person meeting of the “friends”. 

The IISD also published a report on national-level progress on target 18, finding that countries are “not on track” to meet their commitments on subsidy reform. 

Throughout COP17, the narrative around harmful subsidies focused primarily on economic – rather than environmental – benefits of reform. Ullah told Carbon Brief: 

“Something is different now. Governments are taking this seriously for the first time and, honestly, it may not be for environmental reasons. It is because they are out of money.”

Dozens of countries around the world increased their fossil-fuel subsidies this year to ward off energy price rises after the US-Israel war on Iran disrupted supplies flowing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Marine biodiversity

There were three main points of contention around the text on marine and coastal biodiversity in Yerevan.

The main sticking point concerned references to the agreement on marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, known as BBNJ, or the “High Seas Treaty”. The BBNJ agreement entered into force in January of this year and it has been ratified by more than 100 countries.

The initial non-paper presented for discussion contained six direct references to the treaty – all in brackets. While most parties were in agreement about the importance of recognising the treaty in this text, Russia remained adamantly opposed to most of these references.

Similarly, while many parties wanted to include text in the decision that “welcomes with appreciation” the treaty’s entry into force, Russia said it “could not accept” anything other than “takes note of”.

Ultimately, references to the BBNJ agreement were removed from the preambular paragraphs and several other places in the text, with the decision saying it “takes note of” the treaty’s entry into force.

Parties did agree to establish an informal advisory group on work conducted under the CBD in relation to marine areas beyond national jurisdiction.

The establishment of this group was a “very important” part of the text, said Lolita Couchene, advocacy officer at Nausicaá. Couchene pointed out that the Yerevan summit is the first CBD COP since the entry into force of the BBNJ treaty. She told Carbon Brief:

“There are really high stakes around how it will be addressed…It’s really important, because the entry into force of the BBNJ agreement is a major milestone for ocean governance, and its implementation will also depend on how it connects effectively with the other international frameworks – especially the Convention on Biological Diversity.”

The second sticking point was around one of the annexes to the decision, which concerned ecologically or biologically significant marine areas, known as “EBSAs”.

At COP16 in Cali, negotiators finally came to a decision on the process for scientifically describing EBSAs, after eight years of negotiations. Alongside this, parties requested “voluntary guidelines on peer-review processes” for describing EBSAs. 

That language proved contentious in Yerevan, even though it had already been agreed two years earlier. Some parties felt that the word “guidelines” – even directly following “voluntary” – could be seen as too binding. However, many other parties were dissatisfied with the proposed alternative of “voluntary reference elements for good practice”.

As of the second week of the COP, both of these options remained bracketed in the text, along with a compromise option of “voluntary guidance”.

Annex I from the marine and coastal biodiversity text released on 25 October. Source: UN CBD

Ultimately, it was this third option that made it into the text adopted during the closing plenary. 

The final sticking point with the text was around explicit mentions of Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs), as well as women and youth. These mentions were also contested by Russia. 

All of the bracketed mentions of these groups were removed before the text went to the plenary for approval, although the final decision does retain one reference that had not been bracketed.

Xiomara Acevedo, founder and director of the civil society organisation Barranquilla+20, told Carbon Brief that the “regression” on language around IPLCs, women and youth is “concerning because this is already agreed language”. She added:

“We cannot achieve global biodiversity targets by weakening the recognition of the peoples, communities and knowledge systems that have contributed to protecting biodiversity for generations.”

When the marine biodiversity text was discussed in the final plenary session, several parties noted their unhappiness with Russia’s resistance to certain elements of this text. A Chilean delegate said she had “deep concern in the steps we are taking back”. She added:

“We are erasing with our elbow what we have just written.”

Her statement was met with lasting applause in the plenary room.

Planning, monitoring, reporting and review

Alongside the global review, delegates negotiated a separate text on “further enhancing” planning, monitoring, reporting and review (PMRR).

This included additional work on the monitoring framework, which was one of the last issues to get resolved at COP16 – ultimately, it was agreed at the resumed session in Rome in February 2025. 

Coming into Yerevan, there “wasn’t really a mandate to continue working on the monitoring framework”, Victoria Romero, senior policy officer for biodiversity at the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), told Carbon Brief. Rather, she said, the discussions were very “process-oriented”.

The PMRR decision “welcomes with appreciation” parties’ efforts to provide information in a timely manner, but also “notes with concern” the “institutional, technical, capacity and resource challenges” that made it difficult for parties to do so.

Much of the discussion in Yerevan centred on those challenges. Romero told Carbon Brief:

“There’s an acknowledgement that the monitoring framework wasn’t used as much as it should have. But then one of the gaps identified – that is addressed at this COP – is this expression of needs of capacity to be able to use the monitoring framework.”

The decision “requests” that the Global Environment Facility ensure that “timely, adequate and accessible resources” are available for parties as they prepare their eighth national reports.

In a non-paper released on the first day of the talks, disagreement was clear on several issues, including the level of detail of reporting; the post-2030 work of the convention; development and addition of indicators; and specific references to Indigenous peoples and local communities, women and youth.

An annex to the decision laid out more than a dozen additional, optional indicators that parties could use to report on their progress towards the global targets. Parties were split on how to refer to these indicators, with some supporting text that “agrees” to their inclusion and some wanting weaker text that “takes note” of the additional indicators.

The entire annex was also placed in brackets at one point, but parties later agreed to remove those, with the provision that a footnote be added to clarify that the indicators themselves had not been negotiated by the COP or its subsidiary bodies, according to Earth Negotiations Bulletin.

The final text “takes note” of the additional proposed indicators, while adding that their use is “optional and subject to national circumstances”.

Parties also diverged on how to refer to the convention’s work after 2030: as a post-2030 strategic plan; a possible follow-up to the Framework; or continued implementation of the GBF towards its 2050 goals. Some parties felt it was important not to prejudge the outcome of COP19 by specifying what the post-2030 work would look like.

Text on post-2030 work submitted by the working group chair for plenary consideration. Source: UN CBD

Ultimately, parties agreed to a compromise, brought forward by the EU at the final plenary, to ask the subsidiary bodies for “recommendations on an inclusive, transparent and party-driven way forward for the period post-2030 without prejudging the outcome” in reference to future work.

The decision also agreed to establish an ad hoc technical expert group on the “further operationalisation” of the monitoring framework. This group, which will support parties in preparing their eighth national reports, was a “positive outcome” from the PMRR decision, Romero said.

Article 8(j) implementation

One of the major outcomes from COP16 was the agreement to create a new permanent body for Indigenous peoples. 

This would provide a space to advise and offer the views of Indigenous peoples directly at biodiversity COPs for the first time. 

Discussions on the role of Indigenous peoples take place at UN biodiversity COPs under Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 

This mandates that countries “respect, preserve and maintain” the knowledge of Indigenous peoples and local communities related to biodiversity conservation, and to “encourage the equitable sharing of benefits”.

At COP17, countries negotiated several documents related to figuring out how this mechanism would be implemented within the CBD, its budget and other organisational matters.

At the end of the final plenary session on 30 October, countries agreed on the “modus operandi” of the permanent body. This was widely celebrated after two weeks of tense and divided negotiations. 

The divisions centred on a number of things, including the composition between Indigenous peoples and local communities in a “friends of the bureau” group, plus the geographical rotation of nominations for co-chairs of the subsidiary body.

Several “contact group” negotiations took place on 8(j) at COP17, co-chaired by Jennifer Corpuz from the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity and Sikeade Oluwakemi Egbuwalo from Nigeria. 

On 27 October, Corpuz told Carbon Brief that countries showed “constructive spirit”, but a lot of “red lines” remained. She added: 

“We’re trying our best to get past them, but we know that there are very, very strong views on either side of the table.”

It would be a “failure of COP17” to not agree on the modus operandi, said the DRC on behalf of the African group in the final plenary session on 30 October.  

The DRC claimed the plenary would lose “quorum” in “30 minutes” as the talks ran well into overtime, calling on countries to “show courage” on the issue. 

In the end, countries signed off on the terms of how the permanent body would be implemented. 

More detailed coverage of 8(j) negotiations and outcomes will be added to this article shortly. 

Biodiversity and climate change

Countries in Yerevan agreed to a new text on biodiversity and climate change, which included new voluntary guidance for scaling up nature-based solutions, but left out references to a landmark legal climate opinion and new biodiversity science.

Though recognising the links between climate change and biodiversity was a key objective of the Colombian presidency in Cali at COP16, the mood at COP17 was distinctly different, observers told Carbon Brief.

In Cali, countries agreed to a text that “recognises” that biodiversity loss and climate change are “interdependent” issues that “need to be addressed urgently and in a coherent and balanced manner”.

Despite finding agreement two years ago, negotiators decided to revisit this passage again in Yerevan, explained An Lambrechts, head of the Greenpeace delegation at COP17. She told Carbon Brief:

“They actually went to having this exact same debate about some words in the text that they had at COP16. For example, if they refer to interconnected ‘crises’ or ‘challenges’ – and that kept going in circles for a long time.

“[There is] a feeling that there is some backtracking because the world has changed, compared to Cali.”

One key area of contention this year was a movement to cite the International Court of Justice’s landmark advisory “opinion” on climate change within the biodiversity and climate change text. (See Carbon Brief’s in-depth summary of the ICJ opinion.)

Several draft versions of the text contained a reference to the ICJ’s opinion in brackets (illustrated below).

A draft version of the biodiversity and climate change text from 30 October. Source: UN CBD

Debates on whether or not to include the reference continued into COP17’s last scheduled day.

The Pacific small island states, Panama, the EU and Brazil supported citing the advisory opinion in the text, Carbon Brief understands, with small islands indicating it was a “red line”.

Meanwhile, Russia, Saudi Arabia and India were “in favour of deletion”, an observer said.

During the final plenary, Russia restated that it would not be willing to agree to the text unless the reference to the ICJ opinion was removed, telling the presidency:

“We are just not willing to move on that, particularly at this time of night.”

Russia also asked the presidency to delete other passages of text referencing IPBES assessments on how to achieve “transformative change” for nature and on the “nexus” between biodiversity, water, food and health.

This was opposed by the UK, which noted that past COPs had “previously welcomed” new scientific assessments and reports.

In a further intervention, the UK suggested a “compromise” of deleting a reference to the transformative change assessment, but keeping a reference to the nexus assessment – arguing this was the more “relevant” report for the biodiversity and climate text. 

Russia accepted this compromise.

The text was adopted without references to the ICJ opinion on climate change and the IPBES transformative change assessment.

Another key passage in the climate text refers to the development of new “voluntary guidelines” for helping countries scale up nature-based solutions to climate change.

The text “invites” countries to “consider using the voluntary guidelines” to “integrate” nature-based solutions and “social and environmental safeguards in mitigation and adaptation measures”.

It also “requests” that CBD executive secretary Astrid Schomaker “invites” countries and civil society to submit their “views and reflections” on the voluntary guidelines.

Links with other bodies

Following a strong outcome for “links with other bodies” at COP16, negotiations stalled on a number of agenda items in Armenia. 

These links were discussed explicitly within agenda item 13, which covers “cooperation with other conventions and international organisations”. 

However, references to other “bodies and synergies” across the three Rio conventions were also contentious across several other agenda items, including biodiversity and climate change, as well as the text on marine and coastal biodiversity.

Work mandated by the final COP16 decision led to two documents on cooperation with other bodies being produced during intersessional meetings, which formed the basis of negotiation in Yerevan. 

However, not all parties supported these documents and disagreements quickly arose. 

View of the room during an event on cooperation among the Rio Conventions. Credit: IISD/ENB | Mike Muzurakis

Negotiations at COP16 had led to some “really ambitious text” on synergies within the biodiversity and climate change item, according to Bethan Laughlin, senior policy specialist at the Zoological Society of London. 

Laughlin told Carbon Brief: 

“What we saw was real pushback against the ambition that these annexes brought to the table, with significant resistance from a small number of parties to strengthening synergies, in general. There was also resistance from some to anything that might not be in line with some governments’ national priorities…[This] manifested in the [final] decision, really whittling it down and weakening it.”

Across the first week, in discussion on links with other bodies, contentious elements included the development of a multilevel road map to enhance synergies across the Rio conventions and a “supplement to the voluntary guidelines on ecosystem-based adaptation and disaster risk reduction”. 

A heavily bracketed “non-paper” published during the second week of COP17 highlighted the lack of consensus. 

Observers told Carbon Brief that some parties pushed back against any references to mitigation within the voluntary guidelines text, alongside references to the recent “nexus” and “transformative” change IPBES assessments. 

This mirrors a wider trend of objecting to science and implementation language, both at COP17 and within the wider multilateral space. 

There was also significant pushback in the marine and coastal biodiversity negotiations on references to the agreement on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (the “High Seas Treaty”), which entered into force in January. (See: Marine biodiversity)

A reference to the High Seas Treaty was bracketed in early versions of the cooperation text, but remained in the final version.

Ultimately, parties decided to pass the multilevel roadmap to peer review, providing parties and stakeholders with more time to provide additional views on the roadmap. 

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Camila Jardim, an international political expert at Greenpeace Brazil, said negotiators “struggled to uphold the commitments made in Cali”, adding: 

“There was pushback against the synergies agenda – even regarding the use of the term ‘synergies’ itself.”

A draft text was gavelled through during the final plenary for cooperation; however, it pushed work on a number of elements into future meetings.

In the closing days of COP17, the CBD presidency alongside the presidencies of other Rio conventions – the UNFCCC’s COP31, UNCCD’s COP17 and UNCCD’s COP18 – released a joint statement declaring their intention to accelerate work on biodiversity through the use of synergies. It added: 

“We call for elevating Rio convention synergies higher on the political agenda, providing opportunities for parties, other governments and relevant stakeholders to engage and contribute in an open, inclusive, transparent, balanced and participatory manner.”

Around the COP Armenian presidency

Armenia was chosen over Azerbaijan as the host of COP17 in a vote held at the previous UN nature summit in 2024.

(At UN biodiversity talks, countries vote in a secret ballot for the next host nation, at the end of each COP.)  

This year’s summit took place in the mountainous nation’s capital of Yerevan – one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. 

Several delegates told Carbon Brief that the COP17 president, Hambardzum Matevosyan, was engaged and well-organised throughout the talks. 

During the summit, Matevosyan, Armenia’s environment minister, kept a relatively low public profile outside the walls of the official negotiation rooms.  

He spoke at high-level events and a small number of press conferences – alongside frequent Facebook updates – but remained tight-lipped to the media about how the talks were progressing. 

He told journalists on 22 October that he had discussed key negotiation issues with countries in the months leading up to the summit, to expedite progress at the talks. 

At a mid-point press briefing on 26 October, Matevosyan described “encouraging momentum” and cooperation in the negotiations. He added that he believed COP17 would be judged by its “lasting results”, beyond the final gavel falling. 

Speaking at a press conference after the all-night, 12-hour final plenary session, Matevosyan said: “We have achieved more than we could have expected”. 

CBD executive secretary Schomaker said the COP achieved “remarkable things at a moment when multilateralism is supposedly not functioning”.

Attendees also widely praised the logistics in Yerevan, with free buses to the conference venue and efforts to ease city congestion, including traffic restrictions and closing local schools.

However, Armenia’s hosting of the COP also drew attention to its own environmental record. 

Civil-society groups criticised the launch of operations at a gold mine in the south-east of the country just over one week before COP17 began. (See: Protests)

Prime minister Nikol Pashinyan’s framing of the mine as a “success” also drew criticism, according to Armenian investigative outlet Hetq.

Mining is a key economic sector in Armenia, with the nation holding reserves of rare minerals, copper and gold. Land-use change – mainly for agriculture, but also partly for mining – is one of the key drivers of biodiversity loss. 

Hetq also reported that “construction waste” from the COP17 negotiations venue “spilled” into a gorge that was recently recognised as a specially protected natural area. 

Hetq said Armenia’s ministry of environment “noted that it is not a body that exercises supervisory functions over environmental protection norms”. 

Protests

Protests at COP17 were muted, compared to the loud marches seen at most climate COPs, with many “silent” demonstrations inside the blue zone when negotiations were under way. 

On the first day of the talks, Armenian activists wearing t-shirts and carrying signs drawing attention to the controversial Amulsar gold mine were prevented from entering the venue. 

Two days later, one of the same activists, Anna Shahnazaryan, was again denied entry to the venue – although she was later allowed to speak at an event organised by the CBD women’s caucus. 

In a press conference, Shahnazaryan said that the mine – which began operations one week before COP17 – “undermines and obstructs all 23 targets” of the GBF. She added:

“This is similar to the climate COPs, where the whole world gathers to discuss the climate crisis, but oil industry representatives attend and strike deals. The same thing is happening here at our COP. We must not allow the discourse on biodiversity conservation to be cynically turned into mining rhetoric.”

The UN special rapporteur for environmental defenders, Michel Forst, told Carbon Brief:

“Biodiversity [loss], climate [change] and pollution are the main threats to the planet currently. And my concern as special rapporteur is that I see many people could not participate in COP meetings. I’m there also to prevent attacks from occurring, but to ensure people have the full right to participate and express themselves safely in these premises.”

As wildfires raged in Indonesia, activists wearing pollution masks in the foyer of the COP17 venue drew attention to the extinction risk facing Tapanuli orangutans. 

According to a new report by conservation NGO Mighty Earth, around 7% of the species’ population was wiped out by Cyclone Senyar, which struck Sumatra last year. The report noted that the storm was “supercharged” by climate change.

Prof Serge Wich, a primatologist who helped identify the Tapanuli orangutans as a distinct species only in 2017, said in the report: 

“[Extinction of these orangutans] would be a terrible failure by humanity, the conservation community and governments. With all the knowledge and money we have in the world, if we can’t save charismatic species like this… what is the hope for all the other species that we care about?”

The largest protest by far at COP17 was held by Brazilian Indigenous groups ahead of the country’s presidential run-off election on 25 October. Protesters said the vote was crucial to “defend democracy”, Brazil’s sovereignty and biodiversity. 

According to a statement by the Articulation of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (APIB), the “electoral advance of the far right” in Brazil’s Congressional elections earlier this month brought back issues that are “not abstract” to Indigenous peoples, but are tied to their safety, autonomy and survival. 

Prior to the election, Carbon Brief analysis showed that Lula’s third term as president prevented the deforestation of an area of Amazon rainforest roughly the size of the US state of New Jersey. 

Camila Jardim from Greenpeace Brazil told Carbon Brief at a press briefing that the incoming Brazilian Congress will, nonetheless, have a stronger ability to “dismantle” environmental protections due to the large majority won by far-right parties. 

As ministers huddled behind closed doors on 29 October, human-rights organisations held a silent protest in the main hallway to draw attention to frontline environmentalists killed defending biodiversity. 

Protest in the COP17 corridors drawing attention to the killings of environmental defenders. Credit: ENB/IISD | Mike Muzurakis Lobbying and influence

Throughout the talks, advocacy groups highlighted the role of lobbying within negotiations on key texts.

Investigative outlet DeSmog said a leading pharmaceutical group had tried to weaken the terms of the Cali Fund, since it was first announced in 2024. 

DeSmog said it had seen documents in which the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) called for a “radical rethink” of the fund. 

The outlet quoted Guilherme Cintra, director of innovation policy at IFPMA, saying the group had “long supported the goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity and continues to deliver against the targets set out in the Global Biodiversity Framework”.

However, DeSmog also quoted the industry group stating that the “modalities of the decision” to establish the Cali Fund should be “significantly reviewed, revised and clarified”.

Various charities raised concerns about the potential role of lobbying in the run-up to COP17, including Amnesty International, which warned in a briefing document: 

“Companies and industry associations have massively stepped up their lobbying to counter and roll back biodiversity protections, which they see as limiting their business opportunities. To do this, they turn up in large numbers at the COPs, and take up space that could be used for the voices of affected communities.”

As the negotiations continued into their second week, charities continued to caution about the potential for lobbying.

For example, Greenpeace called on governments to “get their act together and…prevent corporate lobbyists from capturing the negotiations”.

Carbon and biodiversity markets

Despite controversy surrounding biodiversity offsets and credits, they are officially accepted as one of the official means of achieving the GBF’s target 19.

Amid a shortfall in international public finance for biodiversity, these markets were expected to feature prominently in Yerevan.

“One area the discussion has moved forward quite a lot is the area of biodiversity credits,” said UN biodiversity chief Schomaker at a nature finance press conference ahead of COP17 in September. 

She admitted that credits were “rather controversially discussed” at COP16 and “among the messages” from Indigenous communities and civil society was the “need to really learn from carbon credits”. Schomaker added that they “remain an important instrument”, if they can be “high-integrity”.

At a press conference on the first day at COP17, Indigenous leaders opposed the use of “charismatic species” – such as lions or rhinos that are generally popular with people – as credits to “offset” biodiversity loss. 

Speaking to reporters, Tom Goldtooth, Dakota environmentalist and executive director of the Indigenous Environmental Network, called biodiversity credits a “violation of the sacred, of Indigenous peoples’ values”.

Criticising “buffalo bonds” for carbon storage, Goldtooth continued:

“It’s Chevron, it’s Shell leasing trees using colonial structures of property rights. I cannot comprehend a world where they use whales as carbon sponges. We come from the buffalo, but markets do not understand this. For us, nature is not an asset class; nature is Mother Earth and Father Sky.”

On 27 October, the EU environment commissioner Jessika Roswall launched an initiative called “Friends of Credits for Nature and Biodiversity” at an event co-hosted with France and Peru. 

According to the EU’s statement, the “informal” initiative aims to build “governmental support” and international cooperation on nature credits. It has been “welcomed” by Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, as well as Australia, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Japan and New Zealand. 

When asked why the EU was focusing on “broadening the contributor base” through biodiversity markets at COP17, Roswell told Carbon Brief that nature credits were part of the EU’s attempts to close the nature investment gap as part of target 19. 

She told Carbon Brief that biodiversity finance is not just a “question of will”, but also the “bigger horizontal risk” of not working on the areas. As such, Rosland said the EU is “working on a broader perspective” and looking at a range of solutions, “not only public money”.

In Yerevan, China also announced that it would be testing nature markets, with a pilot in Sichuan, reported Carbon Pulse. 

During the COP17 plenary, however, Peru called for biodiversity offsets to be scrutinised as a financial instrument listed in the GBF’s Target 19. 

Peru’s call for a study to examine whether biodiversity credits and offsets “generate additionality in biodiversity conservation” was included in the final resource mobilisation decision.

Peru’s call for an amendment to scrutinise biodiversity offsets in the resource mobilisation decision at COP17. Credit: UN CBD. COP17: Which countries have released new pledges to tackle nature loss? 16.10.2026 COP17 Yerevan COP17: Tracking progress towards the UN’s 2030 nature targets 15.10.2026 COP17 Yerevan COP17: Developed countries ‘fall far short’ of UN targets for nature finance  15.10.2026 COP17 Yerevan Interactive: Tracking negotiating texts at the COP17 biodiversity summit 12.10.2026 COP17 Yerevan .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }

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In a little-noticed webpage update, the Environmental Protection Agency has announced a plan to decommission its online web archive at the end of the year, a move that would wipe tens of thousands of publicly available environmental resources from the web. The discreet banner notice comes in stark contrast to EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin’s recent public takedowns of the agency’s power plant pollution standards and federal methane regulatory system.

“The EPA’s online archive makes information about a wide variety of environmental issues and past policies available to the public, dating back at least 20 years,” said Gretchen Gehrke, co-founder of the Environmental Data and Governance Initiative, or EDGI. “This information is irreplaceable, and if the archive is decommissioned, that information will be lost forever.”

For decades, the web archive has been an unparalleled resource for researchers, legislators, policymakers, and the public writ large. It houses everything from fact sheets and environmental reports to agency policy changes and regulatory actions, making it a tool for “democratic oversight,” according to Gehrke, who for 10 years has been tracking changes to vulnerable federal environmental data.

Screenshot of the EPA’s online archive webpage Rachel Santarsiero

This isn’t the first time the environmental agency has tried to shutter the online web archive. In late January 2022, the Biden administration’s EPA announced plans to discontinue the online repository, citing burdensome financial upkeep; through a Freedom of Information Act request, Gehrke was able to determine that the agency spent roughly $2 million a year to maintain it. A coalition of environmentalists, historians, and librarians swiftly condemned the decision, with groups like EDGI and American Society for Environmental History calling the announcement “alarming” and cause for a “tremendous gap” in the historical record. 

After five months of public backlash, the EPA acquiesced, in part by announcing it would delay the web archive’s retirement by one year to July 2023. I reported on it at the time for New Security Beat: 

“News of this welcome reprieve for the EPA digital archive raises a significant question: Why continue with plans to shut it down at all? Postponement does not resolve the eventual damage to government transparency and historical record keeping that the archive’s demise will create. And the concern of organizations opposed to closure will not be satisfied by an additional year of operation.”​

In March 2023, the agency walked back its decision further still by adjusting the banner announcement to say that the online web archive was simply “retiring” — end date not included. Since then, over the last three and a half years, the online resource has soldiered on quietly, no longer being updated but still accessible to the public until a few weeks ago, when the EPA updated the archive’s expiration date to December 31, 2026. 

While the usability of the archive has historically been far from perfect — researchers often encountered dead links and frustratingly limited search capabilities — the archive has held a trove of tens of thousands of EPA documents dating back to the 1990s simply not available elsewhere.

Major political environmental inflection points could be tracked through the archive, such as President George W. Bush’s 2003 Clear Skies Initiative, or President Barack Obama’s 2015 Clean Power Plan — two initiatives that sought to dramatically transform power plant pollution standards. And during President Trump’s first term, when the administration deleted the majority of the EPA’s climate change web resources, the online resource crucially maintained and made accessible these defunct pages for the public. 

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The archival repository has also been a tool for environmental enforcement and oversight. In 1989, after an investigation found that military operations had contaminated the soil, sediment, surface water, and groundwater at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and the Marine Corps Air Station in North Carolina, the EPA listed the base on its National Priorities List. Documents on the EPA’s decades-long investigation were preserved on the archive and helped nearby residents and service members on base overcome doubts about the agency’s effectiveness and better evaluate chemical exposures. Earlier this week, President Trump said he would withhold compensation due to service members and their families exposed at Camp Lejeune if Republicans lose their majority in Congress.

Now, the EPA’s latest move could further undermine public confidence at a time when trust in government is near historic lows. 

“The EPA’s insistence on decommissioning its web archive will only continue to erode public trust — at the exact time the public and lawmakers need agency information the most,” Lauren Harper, the first Daniel Ellsberg chair on government secrecy for the Freedom of the Press Foundation, wrote in an email. “Killing easy access to records forces researchers and lawmakers to flood an already underwater FOIA office just to see once-public records.”

The recently updated webpage states that historical information can still be found in the EPA’s “snapshot collections,” but given the second Trump administration’s crusade against public data and evisceration of funds to federal programs and personnel, it’s hard to know for sure if all, or even a fraction, of the archive’s contents will live on. 

“EPA should expand and systematize the archive, not throw it away and expect that three discrete snapshots will suffice,” said Gehrke. 

The EPA did not respond to a request for comment. 

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This story was originally published by Grist with the headline The EPA is quietly killing its web archive on Oct 31, 2026.