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Hungary has never had such a good climate bill as the one it could have now if, improbably, its parliament were to adopt the draft written by civil society and put out for public consultation. The fate of this draft legislation – which, with minimal changes, could be of outstanding quality even by international standards – depends on the stance of the Tisza government. But how will Péter Magyar and his party proceed?

Last summer, the Hungarian constitutional court ruled that the climate law passed by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government – which liked to call itself a “champion of the climate” – was inadequate and unconstitutional. The court annulled part of the law, calling on the National Assembly to “remedy the breach of the Fundamental Law resulting from this failure” by June 2026.

Subsequently, the Fidesz government showed no interest whatsoever in the matter. But a regulatory proposal has been drawn up that is virtually ready for implementation and could even have ensured compliance with the deadline. This document was not drafted by any parliamentary group: it is the joint effort of more than 180 civil society and professional organisations, and the proposal currently under public debate is of a particularly high standard.

Built on solid principles…

One of the draft bill’s greatest strengths is that it treats mitigation (alleviating environmental harm), adaptation (adjusting to climate change), and resilience (increasing resistance) as objectives of equal importance. Unusually, the system of guiding principles is also sufficiently detailed: alongside traditional environmental law principles (precaution, the polluter pays, prevention), it also includes distinctly modern, progressive principles such as the “principle of sufficiency” (which focuses on well-being rather than maximum consumption, thereby limiting waste and the over-use of resources), a systems approach, data-driven decision-making, and proportionate individual responsibility. The fact that the prohibition on regression and intergenerational justice are linked to existing constitutional court case law indicates that the drafters of the text drew upon the few effective practices that Hungarian environmental protection has painstakingly developed over recent decades.

Particularly positive is the detailed and forward-looking approach to water management. The proposal entails the requirement to review bilateral water-sharing agreements, ensuring the public availability of groundwater monitoring data, and encourages the use of greywater. These are all elements that were previously absent from domestic legislation and would be indispensable to managing the water crisis Hungary now faces – the most tangible consequence of climate change in the Carpathian Basin.

The section on forest management is also very thorough: avoiding clearcutting, accounting for shifts in climate zones, and calling for support for species migration all point to a distinctly modern approach. Another positive aspect is the inclusion of the concepts and requirements relating to mental health and energy poverty in the cooling sector, which are absent from many otherwise modern European climate laws

The detailed description of the carbon budget mechanism (a legally binding, period-based planning and accounting framework that determines how much greenhouse gas we may emit in each period if we are serious about achieving net-zero emissions) is useful: together, the five-year rolling planning cycle, the carry-over option, the institution of infringement proceedings, and the obligation to submit final accounts form an enforceable system similar to the UK model. The requirement to introduce consumption-based emissions tracking is also welcome, as it can counterbalance the limitations of the territorial approach. The sectoral measures (building renovation, transport, industry, food consumption) are sufficiently wide-ranging and specific, whilst the establishment of an ecological hierarchy for biomass utilisation (modelled on the waste hierarchy) is particularly forward-looking.

One of the draft bill’s greatest strengths is that it treats mitigation, adaptation, and resilience as objectives of equal importance.

… and strong scientific foundations

The scientific and innovation elements of the concept are particularly strong: the Climate Innovation Centre, the National Climate Data Centre, and the introduction of funding mechanisms similar to Carbon Contracts for Difference initiatives to support emissions-reduction investments create promising institutional and financial instruments. Support for grassroots initiatives and recognition of traditional and community knowledge are also forward-looking and in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Moreover, the obligation to promote climate awareness at all levels of the education system, the development of teacher training, and measures to combat disinformation together form a coherent strategy for shaping public attitudes.

It seems useful to introduce ex-ante climate risk assessment as a separate legal institution to ensure that no government decision may be adopted without such an evaluation. Extending scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions (i.e. those related to purchased energy, on-site emissions, and arising from suppliers, respectively) to cover the entire value chain in environmental impact assessments is also a modern, ESG-compatible, and forward-looking rule.

Involving the Ombudsman for Future Generations in the ombudsman procedure in the event of a carbon budget overrun could also serve as a strong enforcement mechanism. A similar institution once existed, but the 2011 amendments to the Fundamental Law rendered it ineffective.

The enshrinement of the status of the Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Policy is clearly positive: it operates solely in accordance with the Hungarian constitution and the law and has its own budget and secretariat, and proposals relating to climate targets cannot be adopted without its opinion. The joint nomination mechanism of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) and the Hungarian Research Network (HUN-REN) also provides a safeguard against political influence. The operation of the government Committee on Climate Protection under the prime minister’s leadership provides an appropriate framework for inter-ministerial coordination, whilst the mixed (partly non-political) composition of the National Climate Protection Council can strengthen its social legitimacy.

The introduction of the concept of “climate endangerment” into Hungarian law is particularly noteworthy: the public prosecutor could also bring proceedings against major emitters, seeking compensation and a ban on their activities, which represents a significant step forward in climate litigation. The privileged legal status of civil society organisations as claimants, their right to bring legal proceedings, and an exemption from litigation fees also provide a significant safeguard. The Advocate for Future Generations’ powers to intervene and to submit motions to the constitutional court are also commendable.

The introduction of the National Climate Protection Fund is a useful initiative, as it creates a dedicated and predictable funding framework (in contrast to current practice, namely ad hoc budgetary allocations and the routine deductions affecting them). The requirement for green corporate governance obligations and transition plans – particularly in light of the fact that these obligations have been substantially relaxed following the narrowing of the scope of the EU’s CSDDD Directive – is a forward-looking and courageous step. Meanwhile, excluding activities relating to fossil fuels from development bank financing is a clear and correct direction. Furthermore, enshrining participation principles in international climate finance would be fair (although, unfortunately, it seems unrealistic in this form).

Areas for improvement

As noted, Hungarian policymakers have never faced such a well-thought-out and complex climate regulation. That said, there are some minor shortcomings and contradictions, which the current public debate could identify and iron out.

Perhaps the most striking omission is the absence of any explicit reference to the institutional framework of climate justice, including climate litigation and state liability. This would be particularly important, as the “no backsliding” and “polluter pays” principles can only be effectively implemented if backed by a strong enforcement mechanism. It would also be worth incorporating a principle of climate equity, which specifies enhanced protection for socially vulnerable groups (the poor, the elderly, and those with a higher health risk), as they bear a disproportionately greater burden from the impacts of climate change.

It is difficult to understand the complete absence of any mention of the transport sector’s resilience in the proposal. For instance, the text could at least allude to infrastructure risks from heatwaves and extreme rainfall (roads, railways, bridges) and to preparing the vehicle fleet. In the transport section, there is also no discussion of aviation and inland waterway transport, even though their emissions are by no means negligible (although, for the time being, European climate legislation also often treats these as separate categories).

The objective of “phasing out harmful state subsidies by 2030” is correct in itself, but its feasibility is doubtful unless it is accompanied by a mandatory review schedule and a public list of the subsidies concerned. Regarding the management of the National Climate Protection Fund, it would be advisable to ensure its independence from political influence and to give civil society organisations a meaningful role in decision-making (rather than merely representing beneficiaries).

The current wording of the green public procurement requirement – “preference must be given” – is far too weak. To ensure effectiveness, a specific quota requirement or a time-bound obligation should be introduced. What is more, the text includes no provision regarding the responsibility of media actors and social media platforms in combating climate disinformation. In the case of the National Climate Protection Council, limiting membership to nine and granting a minister the role of co-chair pose a risk: despite the principles of proportional representation, government influence could become dominant, particularly if the minister’s department also covers the council’s operating costs. It would be advisable to limit the minister’s role to that of an observer or a non-voting chairperson, and to place the funding under the supervision of the National Assembly.

In the case of local authorities, the phrase “The state shall provide adequate budgetary support” is too general and leaves room for abuse. At the very least, the law should set a minimum funding guarantee or a clear allocation method; otherwise, authorities in smaller parts of the country will be unable to fulfil their statutory obligations due to a lack of resources. Rules on conflicts of interest and disclosure obligations for members are lacking as well, which could allow industry lobbyists to influence the decision-making process.

In addition, it would be advisable to establish a mandatory cooperation mechanism between the Scientific Council and the Ombudsman for Future Generations. Both bodies assess compliance with the carbon budget in parallel, and without coordination, overlapping or contradictory recommendations may arise.

The scope of the climate-threatening offence also appears to be narrow, as it applies only to major emitters subject to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), whilst medium-sized emitters – whose emissions are significant in aggregate – are excluded. To remedy this, the text should introduce a mechanism for gradual extension.

The possibility of bringing an action for failure to act in the event of a carbon budget shortfall is appropriate, but the provision includes no specific sanction if the government fails to comply even after losing the case, which substantially weakens its enforceability. Furthermore, legality oversight is a useful tool for local authority decisions, but the possibility of withholding funding could disproportionately affect smaller local authorities, which are already under-resourced. So,  it would be advisable to establish a graduated system of sanctions and an appeal mechanism.

That said, these are minor details, and there is still time to refine the bill. The more important question is whether, after its historic win, Péter Magyar’s government will have the will to do so – not just to perfect the legislation, but to put an end to the current unconstitutional situation in the first place.

The civil society document is ‘extremely thorough and wide-ranging, comparable to the most comprehensive legislation at European level’.

How will Tisza proceed?

“Experts are analysing the text of the civil society draft bill to assess what elements can be incorporated into the draft bill to be tabled by the government,” the press office of the Ministry of the Living Environment announced at the end of July.  According to the ministry, the civil society document is “extremely thorough and wide-ranging, comparable to the most comprehensive legislation at European level”. Meanwhile, legislators are also examining which elements should be regulated at statutory level, and which issues are better addressed in strategies or lower-level legislation.

According to the ministry’s position, bolder emission-reduction targets alone are not enough. “A framework must also be established setting out how these targets will be achieved, and what the roles of economic and social actors are in the transition towards sustainability.” The legislation must also address how the country can replace fossil fuels with renewables as well as how it can reduce energy consumption.

Notably, the ministry’s response suggests that Hungary’s new climate law will place much greater emphasis on adaptation than the current legislation. “Hungary is one of Europe’s most vulnerable countries to climate change,” the ministry pointed out. According to a previous ruling by the constitutional court, a legal framework must be established to ensure the preservation of the unique landscapes, wildlife, and natural assets of the Carpathian Basin. Accordingly, “The law must address in great detail adaptation to the inevitable effects of climate change and the development of flexible resilience to climate change.”

In 2024, the Biden administration enacted wide-ranging regulations to protect communities near petrochemical plants from air toxics. The Trump administration has since granted exemptions to scores of polluting facilities and is working to rewrite the long-awaited rule.

Read more on E360 →

A new report co-published by the Centre for Future Work and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives reviews six new ‘Workforce Alliances’ being established by the federal government as part of its economic strategy responding to Donald Trump’s trade war. The report concludes that the Alliances have potential to improve training, labour supply, and labour standards – but Canadian unions must be ambitious and assertive to ensure that they fulfil this potential.

The report, Hinge Moment for Canada’s Workforce and Industrial Policy, is based on research presented at the recent Canadian Industrial Relations Association conference at Université Laval in Québec.

The federal government is advancing these new Alliances to strengthen the labour side of major new investment and industrial policies. Somewhat reminiscent of the previous tripartite era of sector councils from the 1990s, unions are once again being invited to participate. 

Ottawa has announced six Workforce Alliances, which largely mirror the government’s industry, energy and transportation infrastructure initiatives. On a parallel track, a historic $6 billion funding stream to support Red Seal skilled trades training has also been launched. 

Unions have ample experience with supply-side training programs. Too many have focused solely on meeting the labour supply needs of employers, with limited benefits for workers and no opportunity to build union power. Could this iteration of workforce policy be an opportunity for the labour movement to do better? Does it create an opening to influence industrial policy, labour standards and worker rights? 

At a special panel during the 2026 conference of the Canadian Industrial Relations Association (CIRA) at Université Laval in June, union experts and labour studies academics came together to review the Workforce Alliances and their associated training initiatives, and examine the opportunities for genuine trade union engagement.

The presentations to the CIRA conference are collected in this compendium. The goal is to start a bigger discussion among trade unionists and progressive researchers about a labour strategy that links workforce policy with labour standards and conditionalities across the industries and sectors receiving federal funding, including a larger role for unions in shaping industrial policy. 

Several common themes emerge from the contributions collected here. First, workforce policy cannot be reduced to labour supply measures aimed solely at meeting employers’ skills needs. Second, sectoral institutions and public investments must be linked to stronger labour standards, worker retention and equitable employment outcomes. Finally, the Workforce Alliances raise broader questions about industrial governance and whether unions can use these new institutions to exercise meaningful influence over economic strategy and democratic decision-making. 

Fred Wilson’s introduction traces the evolution of workforce policies from the old sector councils, to industry-led labour market information programs and now back to partial joint governance in the Workforce Alliances. In each case, the primary purpose has been to provide “labour market information,” or LMI, and training programs to meet employer needs. Yet, in this latest version of workforce policy, to meet the government’s promise of “not just jobs, but careers” will require going well beyond the LMI model. Labour’s goals in the new workforce policies must address sector and industry-based standards and industrial policies that create and sustain high-quality, value-added jobs. 

Ken Delaney, the managing director of the Canadian Skilled Trades Employment Coalition (CSTEC), Canada’s longest-standing “sector council” model, speaks to the limits of the former sector councils that were confined by government agendas. CSTEC’s work highlights the promise of workforce programs to address worker transition, equity and inclusion, especially if workers are allowed to maintain EI benefits in training. The organization’s programs also demonstrate how the career-building potential of Red Seal training can be adapted to meet the needs of skilled workers in manufacturing and other sectors. Delaney encourages unions to seize the opportunity in the Workforce Alliances to integrate industrial policy with labour market policy. 

Professor Evelyn Dionne’s study of the construction sector in Quebec warns that sector programs to increase labour force supply and speed up construction can lead to “a downward spiral marked by declining skill levels, lower-quality housing, inefficient green buildings and high turnover.” Dionne calls for project labour agreements (PLAs) to be incorporated into housing and construction projects in order to establish common and high-quality terms and conditions governing all workers and contractors. “By embedding training, equity and labour standards into procurement processes,” she writes, “PLAs can help ensure that accelerated construction does not come at the expense of quality or working conditions.” 

After pressure from within the Liberal caucus, reinforced by advocacy from social policy and feminist advocates, the federal government agreed to establish a Workforce Alliance for the care economy. Laurell Ritchie, a member of the Care Economy Initiative, emphasizes that in the care economy, worker retention is as important as recruitment. Like industrial sectors, meeting workforce goals in the care economy will require sector-based programs and standards, and strong government leadership. The inclusion of the care economy among the Workforce Alliances is itself recognition that industry and workforce policy can be influenced by advocacy from unions and women’s organizations. 

Unifor Research Director Angelo DiCaro’s contribution on the interrelationship between industrial policy and workforce policy underscores the need for the state to act as a “conductor” of a complex orchestra involving multiple public and private players. A weak state role leaves the government as a passive enabler of the private sector, resulting in “industrial improvisation” rather than industrial strategy. For the Workforce Alliances to make a real difference, they must go beyond workforce development—filling vacancies, and sponsoring training—to become well-rounded tables for “peak-level social dialogue” with “a whole-of-supply-chain approach” to labour standards and industrial growth. 

As DiCaro aptly puts it, the Workforce Alliances could be “a vital cog in the wheel of industrial growth and rising workplace standards.” Alternatively, they could become an “unambitious and burdensome exercise, simply facilitating training fund transfers, and entirely delinked from future-facing industrial strategy.” 

Prime Minister Carney has described this as a “hinge moment” for Canada, as Canadians collectively face up to the unprecedented threat posed by Donald Trump and aggression from Washington. It is also a hinge moment for labour. The potential reorientation of Canada’s economy away from deep dependence on U.S. export markets, with a greater role for active industrial policy and public investment, carries both opportunities and risks for unions and the workers they represent. 

The Workforce Alliances are an opportunity for unions to shape this historic economic moment, leveraging workers’ position at the point of production to demand both material progress and democratic power as this pivot unfolds. Canada’s unions must demonstrate that they have the organizational capacity and political leverage to bring a working-class agenda to the Workforce Alliances, and help to shape this new era of industrial policy in favour of workers. 

Please see the full paper here.

The post Workforce Alliances an Opportunity for Canadian Unions to Shape Future Industrial Strategies appeared first on Centre for Future Work.

• Angie Schmitt wrote about how the big-box retail model is killing smaller stores and thus walkable neighborhoods, forcing everyone who lives downtown to drive miles to the suburbs just to pick up a tube of lipstick. Sure, Costco is cheaper, but in the long run how much are you saving if you need to buy an SUV to get there? (Love of Place)
• Meanwhile, shopping malls are becoming more like downtowns in that they’re starting to charge for parking — which, as Donald Shoup taught us, is never actually free. (USA Today)
• Sprawl has been the key to the Sun Belt’s success because cities can keep building more cheap housing without any opposition from existing neighborhoods. Now that temperatures are rising, they have to figure out how to cool down all those asphalt ovens. (We Can Have Nice Things)
• This just might be a conflict of interest: More than 300 local governments seeking federal funding to recover from damage caused by climate change hired lobbyists who also work for the fossil fuel industry. (The Guardian)
• The Trump administration’s justification for building roads on remote federal lands is to fight forest fires, but bringing more people into those areas is likely to cause more fires. (Heatmap; registration required)
• Two programs in California and Denver show that people really like e-bike rebates. (Government Technology)
• South Carolina and the Federal Highway Administration are spending $2.7 billion to fix one freeway interchange. (The State)
• Seattle’s Sound Transit could use a value capture tool called tax increment financing to pay for the Ballard Link. (The Urbanist)
• Bus rapid transit on Maryland Parkway in Las Vegas has cut commuting times by 20 percent. (Sun)
• Columbus is still tweaking its bikeshare and e-scooter policies. (Axios)
• Wichita is testing a Douglas Avenue road diet for six months. (KAKE)
• The Transit Brief takes a look at what Montreal could have built if construction costs in Canada were as low as Europe’s.
• Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers are the big winners of Trump’s war on Iran, which has lifted EV sales everywhere but the U.S. (Yale Climate Connection)

Mayor Mamdani will not tear down the deteriorating triple-cantilevered stretch of the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, and instead pursue his own version of long-stalled plans to rebuild the segment over 10 years using a bypass structure that city officials say will be temporary.

Mamdani’s plan, which he will unveil on Monday, differs from previous plans for a temporary highway structure by not expanding the highway’s footprint through the Brooklyn waterfront. Construction will start in 2030, wrap up in 2040 and extend the structure’s lifespan to 2080, city officials told reporters at a closed briefing last week.

Past attempts to rebuild the city-owned “BQE Central” segment of the highway fizzled out under mayors Bill de Blasio and Eric Adams, who attempted to get federal funding for the effort.

The city spends $160 million a year maintaining the structure in lieu of a long-term solution, the administration said. DOT bean counters insist that any shutdown would risk diverting a “significant portion” of the 130,000 daily car and truck trips onto local streets.

“For decades, prior administrations have failed to deliver urgent long-term repairs to BQE Central — but we can no longer afford to wait for the perfect solution,” Mamdani said in a statement. “This plan allows us to safely fix the BQE without slowing our city down or wasting decades more on magical thinking. The cost of inaction is too high, and the risks to New Yorkers are too important to delay any longer.”

We're done kicking the can down the road. Here's how we're fixing the city-owned section of the BQE. pic.twitter.com/ln0it98s1w

— Mayor Zohran Kwame Mamdani (@NYCMayor) August 24, 2026

The Department of Transportation plans involve building a temporary two-tiered bypass highway next to the 0.4-mile cantilever along Furman Street, between Atlantic Avenue and Columbia Heights. The detour road will continue over the Brooklyn Bridge approach at Vine Street to connect back into the rest of the BQE, though its exact route near the bridge is still under consideration.

Mamdani and his team vowed not to increase the BQE’s footprint, and to keep it at two lanes in each direction, after his predecessor Eric Adams proposed rebuilding the highway as a three-lane road. But officials who briefed the media last week reiterated the city’s longstanding position that tearing the road down entirely would unleash its traffic onto local streets — despite growing calls for the city to seize the chance and phase out the BQE.

“While the city and the state must right the wrongs of Robert Moses with the BQE and other infrastructure plowed through urban communities, decades of political paralysis have left us out of options,” DOT Commissioner Mike Flynn said in a statement. “Confronting the reality of cracked concrete, exposed steel and extensive rust damage simply cannot wait for another blue-ribbon commission.”

In another statement, Deputy Mayor for Operations Julia Kerson warned the highway’s collapse would force “cars and heavy trucks…onto local streets” and disrupt “key freight transportation networks.”

“We must and will act now,” Kerson said.

If realized, the decade-long project will cost $4 billion and effectively lock the highway in place for the next half-century, but Mamdani will likely encounter local resistance.

In 2018, the de Blasio administration faced stiffed resistance to its plan to build a six-lane replacement highway atop the popular Brooklyn Heights Promenade. De Blasio ultimately kicked the can down the road, making patchwork fixes and converting the highway segment from three lanes to two to lighten the load on the aging structure. His successor Eric Adams unsuccessfully pitched the federal government to rebuild the BQE to last for another century and flirted with rewidening the highway to six lanes at the behest of car-first Brooklyn Democratic Party bigwigs, but never got sign-off from Uncle Sam.

The Mamdani administration’s plan seems designed to reduce the backlash this time by building the interim structure lower than the promenade — about at the height of the northbound upper roadway of the cantilever.

DOT will close portions of the scenic walkway for the repairs, however, but officials promised to keep it partially open at all times. DOT also plans to reconstruct the adjacent Columbia Heights overpass during the work as well.

The project will impact a long list of park space, including Squibb Park, Hillside Dog Park, Anchorage Plaza, Clumber Corner, Bar and Grill Park, Adam Yauch Park, and part of Harry Chapin Playground, according to City Hall.

The temporary bypass along Brooklyn Bridge Park will be within Furman Street’s right-of-way, but officials insisted that access to Brooklyn Bridge Park from that road will remain throughout construction.

DOT plans to ask the state to alienate parkland as part of the project, but officials vowed to tear down the temporary roadway and restore the green spaces after the work wraps.

Brooklyn Heights residents and other civic and environmental groups formed a coalition in 2024 calling on the city and state to reimagine the entire BQE corridor, from the Verrazzano Bridge and the Kosciuszko Bridge, and move away from a highway.

There are plenty of successful examples of highway removal projects, like the Cheonggyecheon in Seoul, which officials in the Korean capital turned into a river walk. Closer to home, there’s the removal of Alaska Way Viaduct in Seattle where traffic “just disappeared,” the Embarcadero Freeway in San Francisco, and, of course, the collapse of the West Side Highway in Manhattan.

Gov. Hochul also recently called off an expansion of the Cross-Bronx Expressway following pushback by residents and extensive coverage by Streetsblog.

DOT leaders said such an effort would need buy-in from the state, which controls most of the BQE, to scale back its portion of the expressway as well, along with support from the federal government, since the thoroughfare is also part of the interstate highway system.

DOT took over the cantilever project from the state during the de Blasio era; planning for the project goes all that way back to 2006. The city only owns the 1.5-mile portion of the roadway between Atlantic Avenue and Sands Streets, while the state owns and operates the remaining stretches. Albany has shown no interest in taking down the highway.

Despite DOT’s stated fears of spilling highway traffic to local streets, that already happens with motorists getting off the highway and taking shortcuts around the trenched section in Carroll Gardens and Cobble Hill, before getting back on at Atlantic Avenue.

Experts have for years recommended the city close off the Atlantic Avenue interchange to discourage the cut-through traffic and calm the chaotic on-ramps near Brooklyn Bridge Park. DOT has been studying closing the on-ramps as part of a redevelopment of the nearby Brooklyn Marine Terminal, but any work on interchanges would trigger a federal review, officials said.

The city will launch an environmental review by mid-2028, and start construction in 2029, before moving traffic onto the bypass the following year, officials said.

Tejido Global de Alternativas: Declaración Popular de Bandung [ English ] [ Español ] [ Français ] [ Português] [ Kurdish] Emitida en la segunda Asamblea presencial celebrada en Bandung, Indonesia, del 11 al 17 de abril de 2026. A los pueblos del mundo y a quienes luchan contra todas y cada una de las formas de opresión e injusticia. A toda la vida, incluidas todas las especies no humanas. A los gobiernos de los Estados-nación del mundo y a las instituciones internacionales.

Global Tapestry of Alternatives: People’s Bandung Declaration [ English ] [ Español ] [ Français ] [ Português] [ Kurdish] Issued after the second in-person Assembly of the Global of held in Bandung, Indonesia, 11-17 April 2026 To the peoples of the world and to those struggling against any and all forms of oppression and injustices. To all of life, including all non-human species. To the nation-state governments of the world, and to international institutions.TapestryAlternativesalternativ…

For Immediate Release:

August 26, 2026

Contact:
Ashley Castaneda, ashley@restorethedelta.org

SOLANO, CA — California Forever, a proposed development project in Solano County that would have devastating impacts on the Delta, is once again seeking to circumvent legislative processes to gain preferential treatment. Despite the Solano County Board of Supervisors voting in opposition to California Forever, legislation advancing through the state Legislature and supported by Governor Newsom would create sweeping exemptions from environmental review to move portions of the project forward. 

Today at a press conference, when asked by a reporter about the controversial legislative proposal concerning California Forever, Governor Newsom stated that he would have “voted for it in a nanosecond”.

The bill contains several dangerous provisions, including: 

• The bill contains several dangerous provisions, including: 
• Eliminating environmental review for a large new industrial site in Collinsville for shipbuilding and other undisclosed industrial uses.
• Creating vague exemptions that extend the bill’s stated purpose and could allow the construction of data centers tied to shipbuilding.
• Allowing California Forever to unilaterally end tribal consultation without mitigation measures or agreement from affected Tribes.
• Overriding the vote of the people of Solano County, who have, since 1984, preserved their right to weigh in on land-use changes through the Orderly Growth Initiative.

Restore the Delta has worked successfully with Solano Together and the Solano County Board of Supervisors to reject this harmful proposal in recognition that it is an attempt to bypass due process, public input, and the priorities of local communities and Tribes. Now, Sacramento must stop this trailer bill to ensure that local residents maintain the right to shape economic planning and development, not billionaires.

We successfully convinced the Board of Supervisors to reject this harmful legislation, but we need Sacramento to stop this trailer bill once and for all. 

Take Action Before It’s Too Late!

1. Tell Governor Newsom and California legislators “No backroom deals for California Forever!”

• Governor Newsom – (916) 445-2841
• Speaker Robert Rivas – (916) 319-2029
• Pro Tem Limon – (916) 651-4021
• Assemblymember Wilson – (916) 319-2011
• Senator Cabaldon – (916) 651-4003

Tell them that: 

• You oppose any attempts to streamline the controversial California Forever Project, which would have direct and detrimental impact on Delta communities and ecosystems; and 
• Trailer Bills that circumvent the policy process undermine our democratic process and should not be entertained

2. Sign the NEW petition calling on State Lawmakers to not pursue this legislation.

SEND A LETTER TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES TODAY!

Videos Here we will publish the videos we made in the Assembly

Report Here we will publish the PDF report

[ Tejedores] TGA es una “red de redes”. Cada una de esas redes actúa en diferentes partes del planeta identificando y conectando Alternativas. Son los Tejedores. [ Apoyos] Diversas organizaciones progresitas, post-desarrollo y/o anti-capitalistas apoyan esta iniciativa. Tambien lo hacen académicos, activistas y referentes.

Democracia radical y autonomía: ¿a qué nos referimos? - Una conversación Introducción En todo el mundo, muchas personas sienten que la democracia no está funcionando. La idea de un gobierno basado en la representación mediante sistemas electorales parecía muy prometedora, pero está demostrando fracasar. Quizá el problema sea más profundo que una simple mala implementación: lo que comúnmente se llama democracia conserva, a menudo, los rituales como elecciones, los partidos, la representación y …

About the Photo: Bread & Puppet Theater takes to the streets of Vermont against the Iraq War. This figure is from Peter Schumann’s Grey Lady imagery—figures associated with war, grief, and mourning. Artist Peter Schumann is the founder and director of the Bread & Puppet Theater. Photo: Orin Langelle/GJEP (circa 2003)

When logging companies cut down trees to thin overcrowded forests, they are left with a costly headache: giant mounds of limbs and spindly trunks worth so little that it’s easier to burn them.

But they could turn this biomass trash into carbon-rich treasure, both making money and trapping much of the carbon dioxide that rises into the atmosphere from these blazing slash piles, according to new research.

In many parts of the arid western United States, companies could earn billions of dollars by simply burying the wood debris underground and selling carbon credits, according to research published today in Science Advances.   

The new work shows that “pairing these two pathways together could enable more forest restoration as well as carbon storage,” said Sinéad Crotty, an ecologist and manager at the Carbon Containment Lab, a Connecticut-based nonprofit that studies ways to reduce greenhouse gas pollution.

The strategy is deceptively simple. Plants are the ultimate carbon capture device, sucking carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and storing it in wood and leaves. But the long-term fate of that carbon hinges on what happens when those plants are cut down or die.

Burn them, and much of it goes back into the atmosphere, where it contributes to global warming. Let them decay, and the same thing happens. But if you stick them underground and shield them from the air, much of that carbon should stay put. After all, that’s basically what happened with all that oil and coal we are now burning. It was once ancient vegetation buried under sediment.

 

.IRPP_ruby , .IRPP_ruby .postImageUrl , .IRPP_ruby .centered-text-area {height: auto;position: relative;}.IRPP_ruby , .IRPP_ruby:hover , .IRPP_ruby:visited , .IRPP_ruby:active {border:0!important;}.IRPP_ruby .clearfix:after {content: "";display: table;clear: both;}.IRPP_ruby {display: block;transition: background-color 250ms;webkit-transition: background-color 250ms;width: 100%;opacity: 1;transition: opacity 250ms;webkit-transition: opacity 250ms;background-color: #eaeaea;}.IRPP_ruby:active , .IRPP_ruby:hover {opacity: 1;transition: opacity 250ms;webkit-transition: opacity 250ms;background-color: inherit;}.IRPP_ruby .postImageUrl {background-position: center;background-size: cover;float: left;margin: 0;padding: 0;width: 31.59%;position: absolute;top: 0;bottom: 0;}.IRPP_ruby .centered-text-area {float: right;width: 65.65%;padding:0;margin:0;}.IRPP_ruby .centered-text {display: table;height: 130px;left: 0;top: 0;padding:0;margin:0;padding-top: 20px;padding-bottom: 20px;}.IRPP_ruby .IRPP_ruby-content {display: table-cell;margin: 0;padding: 0 74px 0 0px;position: relative;vertical-align: middle;width: 100%;}.IRPP_ruby .ctaText {border-bottom: 0 solid #fff;color: #0099cc;font-size: 14px;font-weight: bold;letter-spacing: normal;margin: 0;padding: 0;font-family:'Arial';}.IRPP_ruby .postTitle {color: #000000;font-size: 16px;font-weight: 600;letter-spacing: normal;margin: 0;padding: 0;font-family:'Arial';}.IRPP_ruby .ctaButton {background: url(https://www.anthropocenemagazine.org/wp-content/plugins/intelly-related-posts-pro/assets/images/next-arrow.png)no-repeat;background-color: #afb4b6;background-position: center;display: inline-block;height: 100%;width: 54px;margin-left: 10px;position: absolute;bottom:0;right: 0;top: 0;}.IRPP_ruby:after {content: "";display: block;clear: both;}Recommended Reading:The idea of burying wood to store carbon is so simple it almost sounds absurd. But is it?

 

While people are wrestling with the climate crisis, there is a simultaneous forest health emergency. Many western U.S. forests are overgrown and filled with flammable vegetation, thanks to a combination of dense forests that regrew after logging and decades of suppression of wildfire and Indigenous burning. Pair that with the current mega drought gripping much of the region and you have a recipe for the massive wildfires that blanket states in smoke this time of year.

Crotty and her collaborators wanted to see how viable it would be to tackle both the climate and forest problems by finding a revenue stream to help pay for forest thinning while simultaneously capturing some of the carbon inside the vegetation.

They compared the costs and carbon emissions from different scenarios: the conventional approach of burning the wood waste; burying it in a specially made landfill; burning it for energy and capturing the carbon rising from the smokestacks; letting it rot; or cooking it into a charcoal-like substance called biochar.

To make the calculations more realistic, the scientists considered factors that could affect the cost and effectiveness. They estimated the distance from forest thinning to sites where the wood could be buried or burned. They mapped variables such as rainfall that would influence how deep the wood needed to be buried to avoid rotting and emitting greenhouse gases.

The modeling revealed that in many cases, burying the vegetation made the most sense. Over a century, burning keeps just 4.5% of the carbon stored. Letting it rot is nearly as bad. Biochar stored 44% of the carbon. By contrast, burial in a special landfill captured 78% of the carbon, on par with the 81% from burning and carbon capture. With such carbon capture projects extremely rare, burial appears more realistic in the short term.

The financial math backed up these findings. Burning is the costliest, losing $49 for every ton of carbon dioxide due to expenses such as manpower and planning. If companies can sell carbon credits for $100 per metric ton—a common benchmark in the carbon credit world—burial would earn around $21 per ton, bioenergy would earn $12 and biochar would break even if the leftover char is sold.

With the federal government proposing to treat 3.5 million acres of forest this year, those cost differences add up. Rather than costing $3.1 billion to burn the leftovers, burial could store some 60 million tons of carbon dioxide and earn around $2 billion, the scientists found.

Some companies already see the possibility of spinning this wood waste into buried gold. One company, Graphyte, is turning wood into solid blocks, encasing them in plastic and burying them. It plans to open a plant in Arizona using wood from forest thinning. Colorado-based Woodcache is burying slash on a small scale, while Mast Reforestation is entombing dead trees left after wildfires.

Still, the researchers caution that burial won’t always be the right answer. Factors like soil conditions and rainfall can affect whether the carbon, once buried, will stay in the ground.

“In the wrong soil, digging a burial chamber can release more carbon than the wood could ever store,” cautioned Leah Clayton, the paper’s lead author and incoming Ph.D. student at Stanford University who previously worked at the carbon lab.

That puts a premium on detailed planning for individual sites.

“No single pathway is a silver bullet,” said Clayton. “But there are promising opportunities everywhere.”

Clayton, et. al. “Near-term, geospatial opportunity for biomass carbon storage to address the wildfire and climate crises.” Science Advances. Aug. 26, 2026.

Image: ©Anthropocene Magazine

The new rules shut more migrants out of basic financial and health supports. Here is who is affected, why it matters and why we need to speak up.

What are Ontario Works and ODSP?

In Ontario, financial support is available to some people who need help paying for basic needs.

Ontario Works (OW) supports people with little or no income. The Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) supports low-income people who meet the program’s disability requirements.

These programs are already small and exclusionary. A single person on Ontario Works receives only $733 per month – nowhere near enough to pay rent, buy groceries and meet basic needs.

That amount has been frozen for eight years.

What did Ford change on August 13?

On August 13, 2026 the Ford government changed Ontario’s OW and ODSP regulations to explicitly exclude people based on their immigration status.

The new rules say that people are not eligible if they:

• do not have authorization to remain in Canada; or
• are only authorized to remain temporarily, including people on work and study permits,

unless they fall within specific exceptions, including having made a refugee claim or certain applications for permanent residence.

The same new exclusion was added to ODSP.

The government also removed an existing protection for some people with enforceable removal orders who cannot leave Canada for reasons completely beyond their control.

The new rules Immigration situationBefore August 13: what the regulations saidSince August 13: what the regulations sayRefugee claimantsCould qualify for ODSP and OW. No change – remain eligible if they meet the other OW/ODSP requirementsPeople who have applied for permanent residenceCould qualify for ODSP and OW. No change – remain eligible if they meet the other OW/ODSP requirements.Migrant workers, international students and other work permit holdersThe regulations did not explicitly say that everyone with temporary status was ineligible. They excluded people categorized as “visitors” and “tourists”.Now explicitly excluded.Undocumented people without an enforceable removal orderCould qualify for ODSP and OW. Now explicitly excluded. People with an enforceable removal order who cannot leave Canada for reasons completely beyond their controlCould qualify for ODSP and OW. Now explicitly excluded.People with an enforceable removal order who have made an H&C application for permanent residenceCould qualify for ODSP and OW. No change – remain eligible if they meet the other OW/ODSP requirements.

Before August 13, the regulations excluded “visitors” and “tourists,” but neither term was defined in the legislation or regulation. 

The Ford government has now removed those words and replaced them with much broader language explicitly covering temporary immigration status and lack of immigration status.

Were migrants receiving OW and ODSP?

Ontario had a longstanding unjust practice of caseworkers treating many people with work and study permits as “visitors.” As a result, many migrants were often denied OW or ODSP. Those who could, challenged those decisions at the Social Benefits Tribunal.

The regulations did not previously say that every person with temporary immigration status, or every person without immigration status, was automatically excluded, so hearings at the Tribunal were often successful. 

The Ministry describes this as a “clarification” of its longstanding policy. But what it has actually done is put a much broader immigration-status exclusion directly into Ontario law.

Who will this hurt?

These rules affect people who may have lived, worked and paid taxes in Ontario for years and then suddenly need help because of illness, unemployment, abuse or another crisis.

Patel: Patel is a 40-year-old man who came to Canada from Bangladesh after fleeing persecution because of his bisexuality. His immigration applications were denied, but he was afraid to return. He was later diagnosed with liver failure and cirrhosis. Because of his serious health condition, Canada cannot remove him. ODSP provides him with essential financial and medical support. Ford has now removed that protection. People in Patel’s situation can now be denied the basic financial and health supports they need to survive.

John: John is a 30-year-old seasonal agricultural worker from Jamaica who has been coming to Canada every year since 2020 to grow and harvest our food. He was diagnosed with cancer in 2024. He could not work while receiving chemotherapy and temporarily relied on Ontario Works.  Today, John is in remission and back at work. Under Ford’s new regulation, most workers in John’s immigration situation are now explicitly excluded from Ontario Works.

Vanessa: Vanessa is a mother from Jamaica who worked as a home support worker caring for elderly people. During the pandemic, she fled abuse from her ex-partner with her children and entered the shelter system. After losing her job, she temporarily relied on Ontario Works while looking for work and child care. Her family later became permanent residents and she returned to care work. Under the new regulations, migrant women on temporary status in similar situations can be explicitly denied basic financial support while trying to escape violence or survive a crisis.

Why is the Ford government doing this?

Meanwhile, Ontario’s Auditor General found that the Ford government spent a record $111.9 million on government advertising in 2024–25. Six of its ten largest advertising campaigns would not have passed Ontario’s former, stricter rules against partisan government advertising.

And while poor people and migrants struggle to pay rent and buy food, Premier Ford used taxpayer money to buy a $28.9 million dollar jet for his own private use. Members of Ford’s government have spent hundreds of thousands of public dollars on hotel rooms and fancy dinners. 

The government announced these changes after media attention around a Social Benefits Tribunal case involving a man who had lived and worked in Canada for decades before losing his home. He challenged the denial of social assistance and won. Ford responded by changing the regulations.

No one should be denied food, housing, medicine or the means to survive because of the immigration documents they have or do not have.

At a time when rent and food prices are soaring and decent jobs are harder to find, blaming migrants will not make anyone’s life more affordable.

Taking $733 a month away from someone with cancer, someone escaping violence or someone who has lost their job will not lower the rent, raise wages or fix health care.

These changes are another attempt to pit migrants and poor people against each other while those responsible for the affordability crisis escape responsibility.

We must reject divide-and-rule and speak up together.

I’m a migrant and I’m worried. Where can I get support?

Migrant Workers Alliance for Change is a group of current and former migrants. We come together to support each other and push back against unfair rules and laws like these.

If you live in the Greater Toronto Area, we offer free, confidential, in-person Migrant Support Clinics every second Thursday from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m.

You can share what is happening and work with other migrants to understand your options and find solutions.

Fill out our form to sign up.

Can’t come in person? Fill out the form anyway and we will get back to you.

The post Ford just changed who can get Ontario Works and ODSP. first appeared on Migrant Workers Alliance for Change.

The post Ford just changed who can get Ontario Works and ODSP. appeared first on Migrant Workers Alliance for Change.

This was an international webinar for the People's Climate Summit held in Antalya, Turkey, parallel to COP31 in November, featuring Max Wilbert (CELDF's Co-coordinator of the Community Resistance & Resilience Program and author of Biocentric) as the main speaker.

The post Greenwashing: The Central Strategy of Next-Generation Industrialism with Max Wilbert appeared first on CELDF - Community Rights Pioneers - Protecting Nature and Communities.

A study from Scotland found that living near an accessible urban woodland significantly lowered the likelihood of being prescribed antidepressants.

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