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By betting on efficiency, storage, long-term energy planning and grid flexibility, the Illinois’ Clean and Reliable Grid Affordability Act offers a blueprint for the state’s energy future, Vote Solar’s John Delurey writes.

Study shows that deforestation destroys important natural sinks that filter out deadly air pollution

Source

Residential sales fell 0.1% year over year while residential prices soared 10.2% in the same period, to 18.8 cents/kWh, the U.S. Energy Information Administration said.

Completed competitive transmission projects are also about 30% less expensive than comparable incumbent utility projects, according to a report from the think tank. 

No matter where you live in the United States or what your driving habits are, a battery electric vehicle is likely to have a smaller carbon footprint and cost less overall than a comparable gasoline-powered vehicle, according to a new analysis.

The study calls into question some persistent myths about EVs – and gives policymakers and individual drivers tools to evaluate the benefits for their specific situation.

It’s well known that the emissions savings from EVs vary due to a number of factors, such as the greenness of the local electricity grid, climate, and a person’s driving habits. EVs also tend to cost more upfront than gasoline cars, but have lower fuel and maintenance costs. How all these tradeoffs pencil out can be hard to figure.

Most previous studies have looked at just one or a few of these factors at a time. In the new study, the researchers gathered data from every U.S. zip code and systematically analyzed a host of factors that might affect emissions or costs: local climate, electricity sources, congestion, urban versus rural driving and traffic patterns, electricity and gasoline prices, and individual variations in driving habits.

They used the results of the analysis to update a freely available website that compares the life-cycle emissions and total ownership costs of almost any type of EV and gasoline vehicle. “We provide quantitative answers to common questions asked by prospective EV owners,” the researchers write.

EVs reduce emissions the most in areas with a green electric grid, heavier traffic, greater annual travel distances, and mild climate, the researchers found.

 

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In any given area, EVs reduce emissions more for those drivers who drive more often, drive bigger vehicles, and spend more time stuck in traffic.

In most parts of the country, an EV reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 40-60% compared to a gasoline car. Not surprisingly, the greenness of the local grid is the biggest factor in driving differences in emission savings from place to place.

Many members of the public assume that EVs are no better than gasoline cars if the electricity that powers them comes from fossil fuels. But grids have gotten greener, and even in areas with the most carbon-intensive electricity, EVs almost always come out ahead, the researchers found.

Moreover, because grids everywhere are getting even greener yet, this will become less of a source of variation in the future, and individual driving patterns will matter more and more. Already, in some instances individual differences in driving patterns can matter as much as all regional factors combined, the analysis shows.

EVs also reduce emissions even in the most unfavorable climate conditions, upending assumptions that they have little environmental benefit in cold climates. It’s true that battery function takes a hit in the cold, but considered over the course of a whole year the effect on emissions savings is pretty small.

The cost of electricity is the largest factor in determining the relative costs of the different types of vehicles. In most areas of the United States, EVs are cost-competitive with gasoline vehicles, even without tax credits for clean vehicles. In areas where electricity is relatively cheap, EVs tend to have a lower lifetime ownership cost than gasoline cars.

Source: Miotti M. and J.E. Trancik. “Determinants of electric vehicle emissions savings and costs across locations and individuals.” Environmental Research Letters 2026.

Image: ©Anthropocene Magazine.

 

Written by: Ogie Atadero, Energy Transition Campaigner at 350 Pilipinas

There is a particular kind of disbelief that accompanies good news now, especially when it concerns the climate crisis. We have grown used to stories of loss: forests burning, coastlines drowning, heat arriving early and lingering too long. The future has so often been described to us as catastrophe that we forget another possibility exists, that change can sometimes arrive quietly, almost invisibly, carrying not only necessity but relief.

“Saving is happiness,” Ms. Mel Policario said, with the practical certainty of someone who has watched the numbers closely.

She is the Finance Officer of Dr. Yanga’s Colleges Inc. (DYCI), a school in Bulacan, a province located on the island of Luzon in the Philippines. DYCI, near the close of 2025, made what sounds at first like a technical decision: to shift to renewable energy through the Green Energy Option Program, or GEOP. But many of the most important transformations begin this way; not with spectacle, but with paperwork, conversations, signatures, and a willingness to imagine that the systems surrounding us are not fixed forever.

 

A simpler path to clean energy

For years, renewable energy in the Philippines has often been imagined as something distant or inaccessible, requiring solar panels stretched across rooftops or wind turbines turning against the horizon. There is romance in those images, certainly, but also intimidation. They suggest large investments, technical expertise, maintenance costs, and space that many institutions simply do not have.

GEOP changes the story.

Through the program, qualified consumers can choose renewable energy suppliers directly, receiving clean energy through the same national grid that already powers their buildings and classrooms. No installation crews arrive. No roofs need rebuilding. The electricity travels invisibly, as electricity always has. What changes is the source: somewhere beyond sight, energy generated from renewable sources is fed into the grid and credited to institutions like DYCI.

Eligibility for GEOP is relatively straightforward and is often indicated in the electricity bill of large energy consumers. Initially set at a minimum monthly peak demand of 100 kW, the threshold has since been revised to 50 kW, enabling more institutions to qualify and access renewable energy options.

In the Philippines, we are used to noticing energy only when something goes wrong: during brownouts, rising electricity bills, or the heavy heat of a classroom when the power suddenly cuts out. Electricity is something people feel very personally here.

The savings no one expected

Which is why DYCI’s transition to renewable energy feels quietly remarkable. Nothing about the school suddenly looked different. There were no giant machines built across the campus, no dramatic reconstruction. And yet something fundamental had changed beneath ordinary life itself: the source of the energy powering classrooms, offices, electric fans, and lights.

With nearly the same level of electricity consumption as the previous year, DYCI has already reduced its electricity costs significantly through renewable energy procurement. In only a matter of months, the school has saved more than one hundred thousand pesos – money that can now be redirected toward students, facilities, and the ordinary needs that sustain an educational institution.

There is something quietly radical in this.

The dominant narrative around climate action has long framed it as sacrifice: consume less, pay more, expect hardship. Fossil fuel dependency, meanwhile, has been normalized as the practical and affordable choice, despite the immense social and environmental costs hidden beneath every coal plant and oil shipment. But moments like this reveal another reality. Renewable energy is not merely an ethical gesture toward the planet’s future. It is increasingly the smarter economic choice in the present.

How transitions really happen

Implemented as a mechanism under the Renewable Energy Act of 2008, GEOP opened a door that many institutions are only beginning to realize exists. Since its implementation in 2021, it has allowed schools, businesses, and organizations to participate in the energy transition without the enormous upfront costs that traditionally defined renewable energy projects.

Additionally, DYCI’s commitment to explore alternative energy options like GEOP, ultimately led to the securing of contracts under the Retail Competition and Open Access (RCOA) framework. Alongside GEOP, RCOA serves as a complementary mechanism that enables qualified consumers to directly engage with competitive electricity suppliers, further supporting the transition to more sustainable and cost-efficient energy sources.

And perhaps this is how transitions really happen: not all at once, not everywhere simultaneously, but through accumulating acts of practical imagination. A school changes providers. A finance officer notices the savings. A conversation begins. Someone else realizes they can do the same.

If larger institutions, including government agencies, are willing to transition to renewable energy and make the process accessible and straightforward, it can significantly encourage broader public adoption. When the transition is supported by accessible, reliable, and well-established mechanisms that are enabling rather than punitive, individuals are more likely to follow and adopt the shift quickly

The future often arrives long before we recognize it has already begun.

The post The future of energy is here, and it’s saving schools money appeared first on 350.

Mill Industries and Amazon are partnering to keep grocery store food waste out of landfills. Mill’s recycling systems will roll out in Whole Foods Market stores in 2027, turning discarded food scraps into chicken feed for the retailer’s private-label egg suppliers.

The Mill grounds will make up 5 to 10 percent of suppliers’ total feed, and Whole Foods hopes to offer it at a lower cost than traditional feed, says Caitlin Leibert, Vice President of Sustainability at Whole Foods Market. The pilot will begin in the produce department, but Leibert notes the opportunity for expansion to other food waste streams. Whole Foods is working closely with farmers and cross-functional teams to validate the model and prepare for launch.

According to ReFED, food retailers in the United States generated an estimated 4.63 million tons of surplus food, worth US$30.3 billion. Despite donation and composting pathways, nearly 30 percent of that food ended up in landfills or incinerators.

Mill Co-Founder & President Harry Tannenbaum sees both an economic and environmental opportunity in reducing retail-level food waste. He tells Food Tank, “When we waste food, we’re wasting the water, energy, labor, land, and time it took to grow it, along with the opportunity to put those resources to better use. Tackling this issue head-on is a massive opportunity for impact.”

ReFED estimates that only 11.4 percent of surplus food was repurposed for animal feed. Adoption has been constrained by food safety concerns, logistical complexity, and limited infrastructure. But with proper processing, food waste can be converted into safe, nutritious, and cost-effective animal feed.

In South Korea, government-supported operations help divert more than 90 percent of the country’s food waste and turn over 42 percent into animal feed. “That really shows that with the right infrastructure, regulatory frameworks, monitoring systems, and government investment, you can manage some of the risks,” Sharyn Murray, Director of Impact Capital Programs at ReFED, tells Food Tank.

There is a common misconception that waste-feeding reduces production or compromises quality, says Ryan Martens, Livestock Director at Stone Barns Center for Food and Agriculture in New York. But the Center has operated a waste-feeding program for over a decade, and Martens reports they have not seen any decline in lay-rate or hen health. “We do blind tastings with the chefs and farmers and consistently the waste-fed eggs score higher on flavor compared to premium supermarket options,” he tells Food Tank.

Martens says that many farmers in the U.S. practice waste-feeding, but they must individually source, process, and formulate the feed. “In order for the U.S. to implement waste-feeding projects on a larger scale, we need to start formalizing and creating efficient processes for collecting, processing, and balancing waste-feeds,” he says.

Processing waste directly in stores could ease some of the logistical constraints that have limited waste-to-feed programs. Tannenbaum notes frequent collection and downstream management at centralized processing facilities as challenges Mill could help address. “By embedding decentralized infrastructure within stores, we can enable new recycling pathways that would have otherwise been economically or logistically inconceivable,” he says.

While preventing waste and donating food remain the best options for reducing hunger, converting unavoidable scraps into feed may become an increasingly important option for retailers.

Mill’s recycling systems are designed to turn discarded scraps into feed while helping stores identify and prevent waste upstream. The technology uses AI and computer vision to track waste types and volumes in real-time, offering retailers insights into inventory losses and waste drivers. “It’s not about simply processing food waste—it’s to prevent it from happening in the first place,” says Tannenbaum.

Murray emphasizes that retailers like Whole Foods occupy a unique position in the food value chain. “They are an important intersection point,” she says. “They’re connected to their suppliers, consumers, and ultimately to the farmers.”

If waste-feeding expands, it could reshape feed supply chains and improve margins for farmers. And the environmental upside may be substantial. In the U.S., decomposing food waste in landfills contributes greenhouse gas emissions equivalent to the annual emissions of 15 coal-fired power plants. “Even something as small as a 5 percent substitution of conventional feeds with waste-feed would take the burden off of millions of acres of corn and soy production while removing millions of pounds of food waste from our landfills in returning that food waste back to the soil,” Martens tells Food Tank.

“The reality is, this really isn’t waste at all,” Leibert tells Food Tank. “It’s a super valuable, nutrient-rich commodity.”

The project’s results may serve as an example for the industry’s potential to make waste-to-feed systems viable at scale, and to reframe the narrative around food waste.

“It’s an exciting opportunity to put a circular model on display,” Leibert says. “Nature and climate don’t work in a silo, and neither should we.”

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Kristin O Karlsen, Unsplash

The post A Circular Solution for Retail Food Waste Takes Shape in U.S. Grocery Stores appeared first on Food Tank.

According to a European Environment Agency survey of 27,000 people across 27 European countries, published before the war in the Middle East in February, over 38% of respondents said they could not afford to keep their homes adequately cool in summer.

As temperatures continue to soar around the world, heatwaves are becoming more frequent and intense. But they’re not only uncomfortable; they can also pose serious health risks. It’s important to stay cool and protect ourselves while also looking out for those who might be more vulnerable in our communities.

Here are some practical tips to help you cool down during a heatwave.

1. Shield Your Home from the Sun’s Rays: It might be counterintuitive to keep your windows closed during heatwaves but as soon as it starts to feel hotter outside than it is in your home – it’s best to close all your windows and close your curtains or blinds when the sun is directly on them to keep the heat out. You can also put tin foil with the shiny side facing outward in your window to reflect heat away.
2. Let the Heat Out! In the evening, if it’s cooler outside open all your windows and doors for as long as possible to let the cooler air flow through your home and remember to close them again in the morning before it gets hotter.
3. Stay Hydrated: Freeze water bottles overnight so you have ice-cold water to drink throughout the day. Make yourself an electrolyte-infused hydration drink by mixing 100ml of lemon juice, 2 tbsp lime juice, 500ml of water, 2 tbsp of honey, 1/8 tsp sea salt.
4. Make Your Own Air Conditioner: Freeze a big bottle of water overnight and put it in front of a fan (on top of a towel to catch any condensation). Sit in front of the bottle and enjoy the cool breeze.
5. Cool Your Skin: Take cold showers or baths (and then dry off in front of your homemade air conditioner!). Keep a spray bottle of water in the fridge so you can mist yourself through the day. You can cool off fast by soaking your feet in a bucket of cold water.

Find out more ways to stay cool from the World Health Organisation – including what to do if you or someone you are assisting is suffering from heat exhaustion or heat stroke.

How can you help others?

We are facing an unprecedented severity and frequency of heatwaves and the impacts aren’t felt equally. It is the people with underlying medical conditions, people in unstable housing, and some of the same folks who were hailed as ‘essential workers’ during the height of the pandemic who are the most at risk from the impacts of these heat waves. Make sure to check in on people in your community, particularly elderly and unhoused folks. Consider distributing cold water bottles to folks who might need them.

Share these tips with your friends and family.

What else can you do about the climate and affordability crisis? 

Heatwaves are evidence that we’re already paying for a crisis we didn’t create. Meanwhile, those that did create the crisis – oil and gas companies – continue to profit, backed by billions in public subsidies. Our governments must choose to make a great power shift that will bring down energy costs and tackle the climate crisis at the same time.

Sign the petition calling on all governments to ensure affordable renewable energy for all, to tax polluters permanently and to stop fossil fuel subsidies.

True renewable, democratic, and just energy systems are possible. Check out the 350.org Hope Hub, which showcases projects worldwide that do just that.

The post 5 ways to stay cool in a heatwave appeared first on 350.

Europe’s far right is on the rise. Right-wing populist movements have recently undergone an exponential growth in public support and a systematic rise to power within mainstream political platforms, securing about 25 percent of seats in the European parliament in 2024 (European Parliament, 2024). Despite their promotion of traditionalist views of gender and active opposition of feminism and “gender ideology,” right-wing conservative parties across Europe have been relying on a paradoxical weaponization of feminist ideas to defend the supposed superiority of Western values and target migrant communities (Vieten, 2025). This selective invocation of women’s rights, used to ostracize and alienate ethnic and religious minorities, was conceptualized by British sociologist Sara Farris as “femonationalism” (Farris, 2017). Farris argues that femonationalism reinforces negative stereotypes about Muslim immigrants and informs policies and laws, leading to systematic discrimination and hostility towards these communities that become a target for a hate campaign.

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a political party founded in 2013, has become one of the most influential forces in contemporary German politics, despite being officially categorized as “right-wing extremist” in a report issued by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Notably, the AfD has one of the lowest proportions of female membership compared to its opponents, yet women still hold positions of power where they enjoy a certain degree of visibility and renown in its public image and political communication. This paradox raises a central question: How does the AfD actively shape the boundaries of women’s political representation while advancing anti-feminist and anti-immigrant agendas? More specifically, how does gender function as an integral element of the party’s nationalist project rather than a contradiction to it? The concept of femonationalism illuminates how the selective invocation of women’s rights becomes a mechanism for legitimizing xenophobic and exclusionary policies.

The stakes here are high. Populist far-right groups in Western Europe have been able to attain an enormous amount of power and political capital in recent years. Germany’s AfD has gained immense public support during the 2025 national elections, becoming the second-largest political force in the country. This marks a significant shift that suggests a resurging normalization of right-wing populism within the country’s parliamentary politics (Arzheimer, 2015). According to a 2025 report, the share of women among political party members in Germany as of December 2021 varied by party, with the Green Party having the highest number of female members at roughly 42 percent, followed by 37 percent in the Left party and 33 percent in the SPD (Statista, 2025). The AfD share of female members was the lowest at only 18.7 percent. Despite this severe gender imbalance, women continue to be strongly featured at the forefront of the AfD’s public image, embroidering a perceived sense of progress that sharply contradicts the party’s conservative agenda. Porzycki (2025) argues that radical-right parties often use their female members and leaders to portray themselves as modern and moderate in the public eye, a method that is commonly referred to as strategic image management. Yet at the heart of this strategy, there lies a clear irony: While women in the AfD are enabled and encouraged to acquire positions of power within the public political sphere, their presence in these spaces is leveraged to advance anti-feminist agendas. These women typically target female voters by appealing to their concerns about issues of safety and protection. As showcased by the concept of “the heartland” in populist German politics, radical-right parties equally appeal to nationalist fervor through a carefully curated vision of Germany that is partially fueled by a chronic idealization of the country’s problematic past (Porzycki et al., 2025), dismissing the inflammatory nature of such an ideal in the context of a “post-nazi” Germany.

As a language that makes it easy to create compound words, German has a surplus of derogatory terms used to refer to migrants and asylum seekers of ethnic descent. Terms like Überfremdung (Over-foreignization), Asylkriminalität (Asylum Criminality), Schuldkult (Cult of Guilt), and Parallelgesellschaften (Parallel Societies) are often used in political and online discourse to dehumanize migrants, criticize the nation’s culture of memory/remembrance, and generate panic within German society, thus creating further polarization in both official and unofficial public opinion. In fact, this misleading and offensive manipulation of language occurs so often that there is a German linguistic initiative that annually selects a word or a phrase deemed inappropriate and commonly misused, in order to raise awareness about inflammatory language posing a threat to democracy and human dignity. Unwort des Jahres (Non-word of the year) dates back to 1991, the year it was launched to draw attention to questionable use of loaded vernacular. In response to the resurgence of Germany’s far right, numerous “Unwörter” selected by the Unwort des Jahres’s independent panel have been linked to political actors such as the AfD, whose frequent use of populist neo-nazi lingo has left its permanent trace on contemporary trends in German slang. In 2024, Biodeutsch (Bio-German) was named “non-word” of the year, referring to people with German citizenship who do not have an ethnic German background. This further illustrates the importance of language in political discourse, particularly in the context of political mobilization. As exemplified by the German far right, language possesses a transformative capacity, enabling the establishment of a normalization of narratives previously considered extremist (Zajak et al., 2025).

The AfD utilizes a racialized ideal image of the “emancipated white woman” to frame Muslim women as inherently oppressed, unfree, and therefore incompatible with German society.

Doerr (2021) empirically investigates the construction of migrant Muslim communities as a “threat” to German society and to the supposed homogeneity of its native culture. The study emphasizes the role of the AfD in propagating a stereotypical image about these communities through physical street advertisements, digital platforms, mobile displays, and both national parliament elections and state-level campaigns. Doerr essentially argues that the AfD utilizes a racialized ideal image of the “emancipated white woman” to frame Muslim women as inherently oppressed, unfree, and therefore incompatible with German society. A primary example of this is the 2017 AfD campaign poster which exhibited an image of three white women in bikinis, accompanied by a slogan that reads: “Burkas? Wir steh’n auf Bikinis (Burkas? We prefer bikinis)” (Doerr, 2021). While the bikini is meant to symbolize freedom of choice and self-determination, Doerr (2021) argues that the AfD deploys a sexualizing chauvinistic male gaze that partially targets young male voters, portraying German women as governable subjects in need of protection from the likely dangers of Muslim invasion. Similar patterns emerge when we analyze speeches and press releases from the party, as its members consistently claim exclusive ownership of women’s rights and leverage gendered issues of public safety to amass voters and public supporters.

Women as victims of migration

One of the most assertively direct iterations of femonationalist ways of arguing is evident in Alice Weidel’s October 2025 press release titled: “More and more women live in fear—The AfD is ready to restore security” (Alternative für Deutschland, 2025). The title itself claims a causal chain before presenting any empirical data to support such a fallacious assertion: German women are unsafe in the public sphere and only the AfD is capable of reimposing order and security. Weidel states, “More than half of all women in Germany no longer feel safe in public spaces. This alarming figure from the representative Civey survey is further proof of the government’s failure in migration and security policy.” This statement proceeds without delay to pin the blame of a security issue on a particular ethnic minority: Syrians. She continues, “As the Federal Ministry of the Interior had to admit, between 2015 and 2024, according to official data, 135,668 Germans were victims of crimes committed by Syrian suspects.” The juxtaposition of women’s nocturnal fear with failure in border policy lacks empirical support from scholarly research. The primary objective of such a statement, however, is to evoke emotional responses rather than logical reasoning. According to Farris’s framework, this is a classic femonationalist move, as it reduces women to a quantifiable populace of nationalist subjects whose survival ostensibly counts on the AfD’s electoral victory. Weidel specifies that “the ones who suffer most are especially young women and children, who are often defenselessly exposed to violent assaults” (Alternative für Deutschland, 2025). Such word choices perform a crucial role, as they highlight the vulnerability of German women in the face of a persistent influx of migrants who are, in the eyes of Weidel and her fellow party members, the sole perpetrators and aggressors against such a precarious demographic. At the same time, these outlandish claims carry out the ideological work of concealing migrant and racialized women from the AfD’s ostensibly feminist narrative on women’s public safety issues. In a manner that can only be described as dehumanizing, these women are deemed unworthy of protection or dignity. The only presence that the ethnic/racialised woman is allowed in the AfD’s official pseudo-feminist discourse is one where she is depicted as a rhetorical device or an object with no agency, used only to advance the party’s xenophobic and racist agenda.

The AfD’s selective protective paternalistic narrative is deeply rooted in Samuel Huntington’s post-cold war “clash of civilizations” theory, which was subsequently adopted by contemporary political figures like Thilo Sarrazin whose essentialist views on migration and social integration have consistently contributed to the normalization of such exclusionary discourse within mainstream politics (Sprengholz, 2021). This view promotes a rigid concept of cultural identity, which is ultimately weaponized to exclude migrant communities deemed ‘incompatible’ with the host culture. Within this theoretical structure, gender is once again weaponized under the assumption that German society has already achieved absolute gender equality, thus instrumentalizing this flawed premise to draw racialized boundaries of citizenship and belonging that exclude all non-white Germans. The paradox herein is clear as day: Whereas anti-migration policies are presented as effective solutions to a gender-related issue, they often exacerbate gender inequalities by aggravating socioeconomic vulnerabilities among migrant women, with little regard to the consequences of such laws against non-constituent, non-white, non-Western —mostly Muslim—women.

Whereas anti-migration policies are presented as effective solutions to a gender-related issue, they often exacerbate gender inequalities by aggravating socioeconomic vulnerabilities among migrant women, with little regard to the consequences of such laws against non-constituent, non-white, non-Western —mostly Muslim—women.

This sentiment is reverberated in one of Alice Weidel’s most controversial press statements as she states: “The alarming scale and the high proportion of foreign suspects in sexual offenses against women are a warning signal. Since the Union opened the gates in 2015, especially to men from societies shaped by archaic and misogynistic norms, women have become fair game” (Weidel, 2024). The language used in this context is extremely offensive and dehumanizing, as the term Freiwild in German implies that women have been left unprotected and “available” for harassment and sexual violence due to the absence of stringent border measures. This kind of alarmist and sensitive language aligns with the AfD’s broader strategy of appropriating feminist rhetoric in the Bundestag —the federal parliament of Germany—to conceal its anti-feminist position and divert the public’s attention from its own conservative and traditionalist views of gender (Sprengholz, 2021). Analogously, internal conflicts within the AfD regarding the party’s stance on homosexuality are omitted from official statements (Arzheimer, 2015).

The racialization of sexism and male violence

The phrase “men from societies shaped by archaic and misogynistic norms” (Weidel, 2024) betrays a form of cultural essentialism that homogenizes entire societies and depicts them as inherently regressive and backwards, thus establishing a civilization hierarchy placing German culture and people above racialized migrant men and their cultures. In 2018, Alice Weidel used the term Messermänner auf Sozialhilfe or “Knife-wielding men on welfare” in reference to high-profile knife crimes that the country has witnessed, calling for waves of mass deportations of asylum seekers and refugees. In media coverage of stabbing crimes in Germany, systematic regularities seem to be permanently present across different outlets as reporting often emphasizes the ethnic background/origin of the perpetrators, thus constructing alarmist narratives that villainize and alienate migrant communities.

Similarly, AfD board member Dennis Hohloch claimed that “multiculturalism means a loss of traditions, a loss of identity, a loss of home, murder, killing, robbery and gang rape” (Baumgärtner et al., 2025). Scrinzi (2023) refers to a political and social process called “the racialization of sexism” through which misogyny is ascribed to racialized migrant communities and is therefore externalized and treated as an issue of foreign origins. While predominantly employed by right-wing political actors, racialized gender-based framings have also been passively endorsed by left-wing movements and secular groups. In France, for instance, the movement Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Subaltern), dubbed progressive, played a crucial role in detaching gender-based violence from “middle-class white masculinity” (Scrinzi, 2023, p. 48). Despite it being spearheaded by French women of North African origins, the movement’s framing of sexual violence against women as a problem associated with Islam and the nation’s immigrant population greatly helped construct a narrative positioning racialized men as the hypersexualized aggressors of white women and the inherent oppressors of racialized women (Scrinzi, 2023, p. 49). Such accounts revive the ideological frameworks that colonial powers once used to rationalize territorial conquest and economic extraction of goods from the Global South. By failing to address gendered suburban violence as a multifaceted systemic issue and choosing to pathologize Islam instead, the Ni Putes Ni Soumises movement engages in a form of “carceral feminism” used by the republic to justify state racism and fortify the racist apparatus of the prison-industrial complex. The NPNS’s call for banning the veil is a prominent example of how femonationalist movements, emerging from Western feminisms, often reproduce racist and neoliberal narratives that either victimize or pathologize Muslim women (Farris, 2017, p. 62).

Far-right pro-natalism and women as “breeding machines”

The racialization of sexism constitutes a key element of the AfD’s populist mobilization strategy, which allows it to adopt a feminism that claims to protect German women while actively supporting policies that undermine their basic rights, such as access to abortion. This dynamic is closely intertwined with far-right pro-natalist rhetoric, which treats women’s bodies as reproductive tools tasked with “resisting” demographic change that is seen as a direct consequence of migration, thereby reducing women to agents of national preservation rather than autonomous rights-bearing individuals.

A 2017 campaign poster for the AfD made a huge commotion nationwide due to its disturbing message; The poster features the image of a pregnant white woman lying in a field of flowers with a bold-fonted caption that reads: “Neue Deutsche? Machen wir selber (More Germans? We’ll make them ourselves).” Critics have argued that this slogan was entrenched in the xenophobic nativist rhetoric, which deliberately excludes racialized communities from Germany’s national fabric. However, few were able to point out the misogynistic undertones hidden in plain sight. Such language and imagery exposes a pattern within populist right-wing politics that reveals a strong commitment to a pro-natalism that treats women as “breeding machines” for the “right” kind of citizens.

AfD politician Mariana Harder-Kühnel shared an official statement as a response to the German government’s 2024 family report, criticizing its failure to address “a long-known demographic crisis” and its reverberations on the skilled-labor market which has been witnessing a severe shortage of domestic workers (Alternative für Deutschland, 2024). Harder-Kühnel argues in favor of kontrollierten Bevölkerungsentwicklung liegen (controlled population development), presenting it as a more potent cure for the country’s economic and demographic woes than immigration ever was. Within this particular statement, Mariana Harder-Kühnel strategically deploys a language of pseudo-feminist “choice” that conveniently and suspiciously aligns with her imperative. Despite her insistence on the implementation of pro-choice-in-parenting policies, she fails to admit the coercive nature of her proposed measures she is suggesting (for example, the ban on abortion, promotion of the traditional family, and opposition to children’s rights in the constitution).

The leveraging of traditionalist domestic ideals to nurture white supremacist and nativist agendas is inseparable from the gendered pro-natalist language that blames women for social decline, therefore coercing them into abandoning their natural right to reproductive choice.

The AfD’s documented efforts of promoting familialism – a state-driven ideology that treats the nuclear family as the foundation of the national community and the main mechanism for social cohesion and welfare – and mobilizing post-feminist common sense narratives (Sprengholz, 2021) suggest that its pro-natalist agenda is inherently ideological and ethnonationalist in nature. This problematic language has been linked to the party’s electoral success, particularly in East Germany which has experienced a dramatic long-term population decline since the 1990 reunification (Höhne et al., 2025). The party has been relentless in its efforts to advance traditionalism, fueled by a commitment to preventing demographic collapse and ensuring the dominance of the so called “Aryan” race, a term so commonly misused that it has become synonymous with Nordic racial grouping, despite historically referring to ancient Indo-Iranian peoples. The leveraging of traditionalist domestic ideals to nurture white supremacist and nativist agendas is inseparable from the gendered pro-natalist language that blames women for social decline, therefore coercing them into abandoning their natural right to reproductive choice. While online discourse around reproductive health seems to be primarily focused on the United States, pro-natalist ideas in Germany stem from the party’s proper ideological evolution and the country’s homegrown völkisch (folkish/ethnic) nationalism (Heinemann, 2022). Pro-natalism comprises political, religious, and socioeconomic pressures that undermine women’s reproductive autonomy and freedom of choice, often culminating in legislative restrictions on contraception and abortion access (Bajaj & Stade, 2022). It is no surprise therefore that right-wing factions often adopt the infamous alarmist “fertility crisis” narrative to push for more control on women’s bodies.

Conclusion

The AfD’s rhetoric and actions push the boundaries of Western democracy and free speech and confirm the significance of language in politics, yet femonationalism extends far beyond German populist politics. Radical-right populism heavily relies on antagonistic framing and the strategic invocation of gender, which allows politicians to align themselves ideologically with their target audience, or at the very least to shift public discourse, normalize racist rhetoric, and strongly dominate the media landscape.

Works Cited

Alternative für Deutschland. (2025, October 28). Alice Weidel: Immer mehr Frauen leben in Angst – Die AfD ist bereit Sicherheit wieder herzustellen. Alternative Für Deutschland. https://www.afd.de/alice-weidel-immer-mehr-frauen-leben-in-angst-die-afd-ist-bereit-sicherheit-wieder-herzustellen/

Alternative für Deutschland. (2024, May 15). Mariana Harder-Kühnel: Familienreport 2024 enthält kein Konzept zur Lösung des Geburtenmangels und der Demografie-Katastrophe. Alternative Für Deutschland. https://www.afd.de/mariana-harder-kuehnel-familienreport-2024-enthaelt-kein-konzept-zur-loesung-des-geburtenmangels-und-der-demografie-katastrophe/

Arzheimer, K. (2015). The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany? West European Politics, 38(3), 535–556. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230

Bajaj, N., & Stade, K. (2022). Challenging pronatalism is key to advancing reproductive rights and a sustainable population. The Journal of Population and Sustainability, 7(1), 39–70. https://doi.org/10.3197/jps.63799953906861

Baumgärtner, M., Müller, A., Siemens, A., & Wiedmann-Schmidt, W. (2025, May 14). Compendium of Extremism: A Look inside the Report Documenting the AfD’s Right-Wing Radicalism. DER SPIEGEL, Hamburg, Germany. https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/compendium-of-extremism-a-look-inside-the-report-documenting-the-afds-right-wing-radicalism-a-de2ab5b5-623e-4100-addb-d1e44c298305 b

Doerr, N. (2021). The Visual Politics of the Alternative for Germany (AfD): Anti-Islam, Ethno-Nationalism, and Gendered Images. Social Sciences, 10(1), 20. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10010020

European Parliament. (2024, September 13). 2024 European elections: 15 additional seats divided between 12 countries | News | European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230911IPR04910/2024-european-elections-15-additional-seats-divided-between-12-countries

Fangen, K., & Lichtenberg, L. (2021). Gender and family rhetoric on the German far right. Patterns of Prejudice, 55(1), 71–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2021.1898815

Farris, S. R. (2017). In the Name of Women’s Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism. Duke University Press.

Heinemann, I. (2022). Volk and Family: National Socialist legacies and gender concepts in the rhetoric of the Alternative for Germany. Journal of Modern European History, 20(3), 371–388. https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221110713

Höhne, B., Kölzer, J., & Träger, H. (2025). Geography of Shrinkage: Local Population Decline and Electoral Support for the Anti-establishment Parties AfD and BSW in East German State Elections. German Politics, 34(3), 449–477. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2025.2489409

Porzycki, V., Oshri, O., & Shenhav, S. R. (2025). What you see is not what you get: The incorporation of women in radical right parties. European Union Politics, 26(3), 477–500. https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165251340336

Scrinzi, F. (2023). The Racialization of Sexism. Routledge. https://www.perlego.com/book/4270023

Sprengholz, M. (2021). Post-feminist German heartland: On the women’s rights narrative of the radical-right populist party Alternative für Deutschland in the Bundestag. European Journal of Women’s Studies, 28(4), 486-501. https://doi.org/10.1177/13505068211007509 (Original work published 2021)

Statista. (2025, November 29). Share of women among political party members in Germany 2021. https://www.statista.com/statistics/955972/women-share-political-party-members-germany/?srsltid=AfmBOooYDhCC25ugDxGodJBVoMKgVeAutFUSDA4IqRS4lnwnpqRK5Bd7

Törnberg, P., & Chueri, J. (2025). When Do Parties Lie? Misinformation and Radical-Right Populism Across 26 Countries. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612241311886

Vieten, U. M. (2025). The Far-Right, Gender In/Equalities and Liberal Feminism: Scrutinising EU Narratives of Gender Equality in Italy, France and Germany. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2025.2592306

Weidel, A. (2024, November 20). Alice Weidel: Migrationskrise macht Frauen zu Freiwild. presseportal.de. https://www.presseportal.de/pm/110332/5913293

Zajak, S., Meuth, A., & Best, F. (2025). The Dynamics of (De-)Normalization of the far Right: perceptions in the German population. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-025-09532-6

Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the Tempest Collective. For more information, see “About Tempest Collective.”
Featured Image credit: Olaf Kosinsky; modified by Tempest.

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Stand in a surface parking lot in Phoenix on a July afternoon and you are standing on one of the hottest surfaces a human body can approach without being burned.

Phoenix has 12.2 million of these spaces.

That figure comes from a peer-reviewed inventory published in 2019 by researchers at Arizona State University, among them Mikhail Chester, who led the study, and David King, an associate professor of urban planning and a student of the late Donald Shoup, whose work on parking economics reshaped the field. They counted off-street residential spaces, off-street commercial spaces, on-street spaces — all of it.

The result: 4.3 parking spaces per registered vehicle. Roughly 3 spaces per person. Ten percent of all urbanized land in the metro devoted to storing cars. Since 1960, Phoenix has added roughly 200,000 new spaces per year.

NASA ECOSTRESS thermal image of Phoenix, June 2024. Parking lots and roads register between 120 and 160°F. Photo: NASA/JPL-Caltech

The asphalt beneath your feet absorbs approximately 95 percent of the solar radiation hitting it. Its surface temperature is somewhere between 150 and 170 degrees Fahrenheit — the upper range hot enough to cause a second-degree burn in under 30 seconds. NASA’s thermal imaging of Phoenix on a June day in 2024, when the air temperature was 106, showed roads and parking lots glowing between 120 and 160 degrees across the metro. The cars sitting in those lots are ovens. The air rising off the pavement is a wall.

The number is hard to feel from inside a car, which is where most people in Phoenix experience the city. The parking lot is invisible infrastructure — noticed only when it is full, which it rarely is, because the system was designed around the assumption of peak demand and routinely runs at a fraction of capacity. Most spaces sit empty most of the time. Their vacancy is not experienced as waste. It is experienced as availability, which is to say, as comfort, which is to say, as the whole point.

But the lot does not stop existing while the car is away.

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Surface parking accounts for roughly 29 percent of all heat emitted from pavement and vehicles across the metro on a typical summer day. Chester, who led the original study, confirmed the estimate remains current. Asphalt radiates 46 percent more heat than natural landscape during the afternoon. It emits 37 percent more sensible heat than bare ground. And it does not cool quickly. Unlike vegetation or even bare soil, pavement stores the day’s heat and releases it slowly through the night — keeping nighttime temperatures elevated long after sunset.

This is not a new finding. It has been documented here for decades. What it means, measured over time, is a 9-degree rise in average nighttime temperatures in Phoenix over the past twenty years — a number that appears in city reports so often it has started to lose the quality of alarm.

Nine degrees. Every night. Added to a city that was already one of the hottest on earth.

Before 2000, Phoenix averaged roughly five summer nights that did not cool below 90 degrees. In 2024, that number was 37. On July 19th of that year, Sky Harbor Airport recorded an overnight low of 97 degrees. The models now suggest the city could experience a night, within this decade, that does not fall below 100.

The parking lot did not cause this alone. Phoenix’s heat island is the product of everything the city has built: roads, rooftops, walls, the relentless substitution of absorptive surface for desert ground. But parking is one of the largest single components of that surface area, and it is the one whose thermal cost is most clearly optional. A city needs roads. It needs buildings. It does not need 4.3 spaces per vehicle.

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The city has been aware of this for a while and has begun, slowly, to respond. The Cool Pavement Program applied reflective coatings to more than 140 miles of city streets — out of more than 5,000 total. ASU studies found the treatment reduces surface temperatures by roughly 10 to 12 degrees at noon. The effect on nighttime air temperature barely registers. The thermal mass problem runs deep.

The more structurally significant change came in January 2024, when the Phoenix City Council voted 8–1 to reduce parking minimums citywide. In walkable urban zones along light rail corridors, the minimum dropped to 0.75 spaces per unit. For affordable housing near transit, it fell to zero. A 100-unit affordable apartment complex near light rail that once had to provide 113 spaces now has to provide none.

The reform passed over the objections of eight village planning committees. King, who has studied parking policy for over a decade, describes the opposition as “making a good faith, incorrect argument.” The deeper problem, he says, is that cities have required so much parking for so long that reducing the mandate feels like a concession rather than a correction.

“They haven’t yet taken that step to say, we’ve been wrong for the last century,” King told me. “Which I think is a critical thing that the cities have to do.”

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Phoenix has not eliminated parking minimums, and the citywide default remains well above zero. But the vote was meaningful. Just because a city stops requiring parking, King points out, does not mean no one will supply it. The market still responds to demand. What changes is that the supply is no longer mandated at levels the market never justified.

What is changing in the urban core is visible enough. Block 23, the mixed-use tower that opened in 2019 on the site of what had most recently been a surface parking lot, brought 332 apartments, 200,000 square feet of office space, and the first grocery store in the downtown area. Other lots are becoming hotels, housing, parks. The ground is slowly being reclaimed.

But the urban core is not most of Phoenix. Most of Phoenix is the arterial corridor: the strip mall anchored by a pharmacy and a nail salon and a mattress store, each surrounded by more asphalt than any reasonable traffic model requires.

The BedMart at 19th and Northern had thirty-two parking spaces and, in my experience, zero customers. The store closed. A coffee shop moved in and installed a drive-thru. The thirty-two spaces remain.

19th Avenue and Northern, April 2026. Photo: Signal Dispatch

Drive 19th Avenue at two in the afternoon in June and the whole corridor shimmers. The lots are empty. The heat is not. You can feel the pavement through your shoes in the twenty seconds between your car door and the entrance, and those twenty seconds are the entirety of your relationship with the public realm.

When I asked King what he sees driving Phoenix’s arterials that most people don’t, his answer was immediate: “Arterial walls rather than permeable spaces.” The buildings all turn away from the street. The front door faces the parking lot. The corner — which should be the highest-visibility, highest-accessibility point — is treated as an afterthought. Every curb cut for every parking lot is, in his words, “an insult to the pedestrian environment.”

King argues that exposure should be a key metric of planning in a city like Phoenix. Three or four minutes in the summer sun is tolerable. Ten or fifteen is not. The difference between those two experiences is often the distance a parking lot adds between the street and the door. The twenty seconds I described are not an accident of design. They are the design.

I grew up in that corridor. The parking lots never looked like a problem. They looked like the ordinary space between things.

Each of those lots was mandated into existence by a zoning code that assumed the car was the only unit of movement worth designing around. Removing that mandate does not immediately remove the pavement. Changing what gets built next takes longer than changing what the code requires.

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King calls the science behind parking requirements “100 percent pseudoscience.” No study determined that a pharmacy needs a certain number of spaces, or that a nail salon needs another. The numbers were invented, codified, and enforced for decades. And the mandated parking, once built, generated its own secondary costs: stormwater runoff required bioswales and retention ponds, which further shrank the buildable footprint, which pushed buildings further apart, which guaranteed more driving. The code created the problem and then created the infrastructure to manage the problem it created.

There is a word for what Phoenix has built, and it is not parking. The word is infrastructure — the infrastructure of a particular assumption about how life in a desert city should be organized. That assumption was: you arrive by car, you park, you enter, you leave, you drive. The space between things is transition, not place. The outdoors is not somewhere you are meant to be; it is somewhere you are briefly passing through on the way to somewhere cooled.

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The pavement encodes that assumption in both directions. It stores the day’s heat and holds it through the night. It repels the monsoon’s rain — five to eight inches a year, nearly all of it arriving in violent bursts — and channels it fast, hot, picking up motor oil and heavy metals and fertilizer, into a storm drain system that delivers it to rivers and washes without treatment. For every additional percentage point of impervious surface, annual flood magnitude increases by an average of 3.3 percent.

The city has spent tens of millions on drainage infrastructure to manage flooding events generated by its own hardscape. The surface that will not release heat will not absorb water either. The imperviousness is the same.

That assumption made the lot possible, and the lot made the assumption self-fulfilling. More parking meant more driving. More driving meant less walking. Less walking meant less pressure to build the kind of dense, shaded, connected environment where walking made sense.

The city that built 12.2 million parking spaces was also building the case for why it needed them. Chester describes what emerged as a system that nobody designed: “For a century we’ve codified and normalized decision making that builds out this system. Now we have it and are largely unaware of its scale and impacts.”

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This is not a design flaw. It is a design choice that Phoenix made for seventy years and is only now beginning to question. The cost was always there. It was just measured in degrees rather than dollars, and Phoenix does not have a habit of reading thermometers critically. “There’s a lot of people who don’t like to accept the truth when it implicates them in the system,” King told me. “If parking is the problem, then I have to drive less. Maybe I’m the bad guy.”

Phoenix is not the only American city that made this choice. It is the one where the cost of the choice is most directly physical and most directly measurable — in degrees, in burn rates, in the temperature of a surface that a fallen person cannot get up from.

ASU’s Urban Climate Research Center has estimated that a half-degree reduction in average air temperature across the metro could save Phoenix $15 million per year in avoided air conditioning costs. The math of the lot, run in the other direction, is considerably less comfortable.

The city is beginning to learn what it built.

The 9 degrees are already here.

The cars go home.

The lots do not.

A major change in the way that China measures its core climate goal has effectively halved the growth in the country’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions over the past five years.

The revised measure of “carbon intensity”, the amount of CO2 per unit of economic output, implies that China’s emissions have only gone up by 7% from 2020-2025.

This is just half of the 14% rise indicated by previous official statistics.

On paper, the revision creates a gap of 700m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) per year, equivalent to the total emissions of Germany or South Korea.

While China has never officially defined how it measures carbon intensity, it has now made what appears to be a retrospective change, with the effect of making targets easier to meet.

The shift means that China officially came close to meeting its carbon-intensity target for 2020-2025, whereas official statistics had previously pointed towards falling well short.

The new definition of carbon intensity has not been made public, but plausible approaches to calculating the metric do not seem to be sufficient to explain the Germany-sized gap.

The apparent gaps or inconsistencies in China’s new carbon accounting also mean that China could meet its international climate pledges for 2030, even if its emissions go up, whereas the previous measure would have required them to fall.

This article explains how the metric appears to have shifted, what changes might potentially explain the revision and what the revised measure implies for China’s climate goals.

Measuring carbon intensity

Reducing carbon intensity – CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – has been China’s key climate commitment since the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009.

At that time, the country pledged to cut its carbon intensity to 48% below 2005 levels by 2020. This was followed up by a 2030 target of a 60-65% reduction, announced in 2014, which was then upgraded to more than 65% in 2021.

Since carbon intensity was made a key progress indicator in China’s 14th five-year plan for 2021-25, the country has reported reductions in carbon intensity every year in its statistical communique, issued at the end of February.

Neither China’s international climate pledges (its nationally determined contributions, NDCs) nor other official documents have ever set out a definition of carbon intensity, despite it being a cornerstone of the country’s climate commitments.

However, until this year, it was possible to closely reproduce the reported numbers, based on a straightforward interpretation of what carbon intensity means.

But the types of emissions that are included in the carbon-intensity metric have now changed.

Previously, it was possible to reproduce the reported carbon-intensity data by combining official GDP data with estimates of emissions from the use of fossil fuels. The latter could be estimated based on the officially reported consumption of coal, oil and gas, multiplied by China’s official emissions factors for the CO2 per unit of energy from each fuel.

The previous carbon-intensity measure apparently included emissions from the use of fossil fuels to generate energy, as well as their use as chemical feedstocks, so-called “non-energy uses”. However, it did not include non-fossil fuel CO2 emissions from industrial processes, such as the production of cement, as shown by the “old scope” in the figure below left.

Old and new scopes of China’s CO2 emission reporting from fossil-fuel use and industrial processes. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta. See “about the data” for further details.

Based on the annually reported progress against this old scope, China’s carbon intensity had fallen by a total of 12.4% from 2020-2025.

This was well short of the 18% target set for these years under the 14th five-year plan.

In September 2025, Huang Runqiu, head of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, acknowledged this gap, saying that meeting China’s carbon-intensity targets had become “more challenging” due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and trade tensions.

Yet the 15th five-year plan, published in March 2026, reported that China had cut its carbon intensity by 17.7% over the same period – just shy of the 18% target.

As such, it is clear that there has been a major shift in the way that China measures its carbon intensity, specifically in terms of which types of emissions are included.

Moreover, the revised numbers imply that – rather than missing it by a large margin – China officially came close to meeting its carbon-intensity target for the 14th five-year plan.

A footnote in China’s latest statistical communique offers a brief description of carbon intensity as relating to the CO2 emissions from “energy activities and industrial production”.

This indicates that the carbon-intensity calculation now includes industrial process emissions and excludes non-energy uses of fossil fuels, shown by the “new scope” in the figure above.

In comments sought by Carbon Brief, Ryna Cui, associate research professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, who was not involved in the analysis, agrees that the changes to the carbon-intensity methodology are “unclear”. However, she notes that “limited data” makes it challenging to fully verify the nature and impact of the changes.

The revision mirrors a recent change made to the way that China measures its “energy intensity”, the energy use per unit of economic output. In 2024, energy intensity was changed to exclude non-energy use of fossil fuels and energy use from non-fossil fuels.

This exclusion also created a major incentive for expanding the chemical industry and the non-energy use of fossil fuels.

As for the change in carbon-intensity metric, this follows the highly energy-intensive pattern of economic growth during and after the Covid-19 pandemic and China’s “zero-Covid” policy.

Germany-sized gap

The shift in the way that China is measuring its carbon intensity has implications for estimates of the country’s emissions, which are only reported officially some years later.

Changes in carbon intensity and GDP are reported far more quickly – and can be used to estimate changes in China’s CO2 emissions.

China’s total emissions from energy and industrial processes were 11.2bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2020. Based on the originally reported changes in carbon intensity and GDP, its fossil-fuel CO2 emissions had grown 14% by 2024, an increase of 1,430m tonnes (MtCO2).

In contrast, the newly reported carbon-intensity figures imply that China’s CO2 emissions only grew by 7% between 2020 and 2025, up just 690MtCO2, as shown by the figure below.

The gap between these figures amounts to 730m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2), equivalent to the annual emissions of Germany or South Korea.

Estimated annual changes in China’s CO2 emissions, relative to 2020=100. Blue line: Estimate based on originally reported changes in carbon intensity. Red: Based on changes reported in 2026. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta. See “about the data” for further details.

On paper, therefore, the change in the carbon-intensity metric effectively halves the rate of growth in China’s CO2 emissions over the past five years.

Decoding the new carbon-intensity methodology

The change in the carbon-intensity metric could have other significant implications, explored below, making it important to understand how it is being calculated.

Yet, while there are some indications of what the new approach entails, these changes do not seem to account for the magnitude of the revision.

The new scope includes industrial-process emissions. One of the largest sources of these emissions, the cement industry, has been contracting due to a slowdown in real estate and infrastructure construction.

This reduction in emissions is one reason why China’s carbon intensity has improved more quickly under the new scope than under the old one.

In addition, the new scope excludes non-energy use of fossil fuels – largely relating to the chemicals industry – where there has been rapid growth over the past five years.

This is another factor in carbon intensity improving faster under the new scope.

Indeed, China’s chemicals industry drove more than half of the growth in its total fossil-fuel use in the past five years, including 40% of coal use and all of oil use. As a result, non-energy use reached 13% of the total consumption of fossil fuels in 2025, up from 7% in 2020, after growing at an average annual rate of 13%.

The figure below illustrates the impact of these changes in scope. It shows the change in China’s emissions from 2020-2025 due to the use of fossil fuels for energy, its industrial-process emissions and non-energy use of fossil fuels.

The first few rows show changes based on the consumption of fossil fuels overall, amounting to a combined 1,430MtCO2 rise in emissions.

This compares with the 690MtCO2 rise implied by the new carbon-intensity metric, leaving that Germany-sized 730MtcO2 gap in emissions. The new scope explains some of this gap.

In terms of industrial processes, the 30% fall in cement production could account for a 300MtCO2 fall in China’s CO2 emissions. In addition, the amount of carbon stored in products, such as plastics, asphalt and rubber, could account for an estimated 100MtCO2 fall in emissions.

On the other hand, emissions from the incineration of plastics increased by an estimated 40% and from metals industry processes by 10%, with aluminium production having expanded by 21%. Together, these would have increased emissions by an estimated 60MtCO2.

In total, the changes in emissions from fossil-fuel use, industrial processes, carbon retained in products and waste incineration add up to a combined 1,070MtCO2 rise from 2020-2025, shown in the penultimate row of the figure below.

Again, this revised total – based on the change in scope of the carbon-intensity metric – goes some way to explaining the Germany-sized gap in China’s CO2 emissions.

However, the new carbon-intensity figures imply that China’s CO2 emissions only increased by 690MtCO2, as shown in the final row of the figure below. This leaves a residual gap of around 380MtCO2, which does not appear to be accounted for by the data available.

Changes in China’s emissions by source from 2020-2025, MtCO2. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta. See “about the data” for further details.

One way to make the numbers add up would be to assume that the amount of carbon embedded in chemical-industry products has increased by the equivalent of 500MtCO2.

However, the reported output of major chemical-industry products cannot account for this level of embedded carbon. The figure below shows that the increase in output of major chemical products only explains around a 110MtCO2 increase in retained carbon.

Much of the increase in the production of plastics was cancelled out by a contraction in the use of bitumen for asphalt, due to lower road-building activity.

The amount of carbon retained in products from 2005-2025, MtCO2. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta. See “about the data” for further details.

Furthermore, the 14th five-year plan for 2021-25 had a target of raising the share of waste incineration to 65% of urban residential waste treatment capacity, up from 45% in 2020.

So, while plastics production did go up, resulting in increased amounts of retained carbon, a larger share of this retained carbon was being incinerated, meaning its carbon would quickly be released back into the atmosphere.

One reason why carbon retained in products has grown more slowly than the amount of fossil fuels used in chemicals production is that the fastest growth has been in the coal-based chemicals industry.

Coal-based processes have a much lower conversion efficiency than oil- and gas-based production, with process emissions that are typically multiple times as high.

For example, these emissions are 10 times as high for the production of olefins – a key plastics feedstock – from coal as compared with oil or gas. The process is reported to require 3.75 tonnes of standard coal per tonne of product. This implies that only 30% of the carbon in the coal is retained in the product, with the other 70% being emitted in the process.

There are also chemical processes that use fossil fuels as a feedstock, but where the end product does not contain carbon. One example is ammonia, a key building block for fertiliser, where production grew by 52% from 2020 to 2025.

Neither the change in scope of the carbon-intensity calculation, nor the change in the amount of carbon retained in products, is sufficient to explain the size of the revision in the newly reported numbers. There must be another explanation.

There are two options. Either the new scope broadly aligns with what is outlined above, but also excludes a subset of the CO2 emissions. Or the scope does not exclude any of the CO2, but there are gaps in the monitoring of some energy or industrial-process emissions.

Either explanation would mean that China is not accounting for some of its CO2 emissions. It would also mean that the improvement in carbon intensity for 2020-2025 is over-reported.

China’s latest officially reported emissions inventories reinforce the second of the two options above, namely, that there are gaps in emissions reporting from the chemical industry.

From 2018 to 2021, the latest year for which China has reported on its emissions, the CO2 output of chemical-industry processes only increased by 13%. Over the same period, non-energy use of fossil fuels increased by 29%, according to data reported to the International Energy Agency by the Chinese government.

One factor in these apparent gaps could be that China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is required to publish data on carbon intensity very quickly, since it is a key indicator in the country’s five-year plans.

On the other hand, detailed greenhouse gas emissions inventories and energy statistics are only published years later, by the environment ministry and NBS, respectively.

What the change means for China’s targets

The change in the definition of carbon intensity has the effect of weakening China’s climate targets and introducing more uncertainty into tracking progress.

On the basis of China’s new numbers, it will require less effort to hit the 2030 target for a 65% reduction in carbon intensity on 2005 levels, as per China’s Paris pledge.

This target can now be met even if CO2 emissions go up between 2025 and 2030, whereas the previous metric would have required a reduction.

It will also require less effort to hit the 17% target in the 15th five-year plan. 

The apparent gaps in the CO2 emissions numbers for 2025 could affect the delivery of China’s other key climate pledges, such as the commitment to peak CO2 emissions before 2030. They could also allow the chemical industry’s CO2 emissions to continue climbing rapidly, while still officially meeting the 2030 goals for CO2 intensity.

Moreover, the apparent gaps or inconsistencies in China’s new carbon accounting also mean that China would be able to officially meet its target to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030, even if its overall CO2 emissions do not actually reach a peak.

The apparent gaps could also affect the delivery of China’s newer target to cut its greenhouse gas emissions to 7-10% below peak levels by 2035 and beyond.

Nevertheless, researchers and analysts can still monitor progress by calculating China’s CO2 emissions independently.

China’s reporting on fossil-fuel consumption, the output of plastics and other carbon-containing products, as well as manufacturing of commodities with substantial process emissions, provides a basis for tracking emissions under the new scope.

While under the UN’s climate framework China is free to use any definition it wants to meet its own nationally determined climate pledges, retrospective changes to methodology or inconsistent accounting could erode the value of the country’s commitments.

Moreover, it will, ultimately, have to close any gaps in its emissions data and reporting, under the transparency rules of the Paris Agreement.

China’s next transparency report to the UN, due by the end of this year, should also provide more clarity on the methodology and data underlying the revised numbers.

This underscores the importance of monitoring, reporting and verification for industrial process emissions. “Mass balances” based on fossil-fuel consumption and product output could be used as a check on CO2 emissions reporting. Finally, China’s emissions data could also be made more granular and clearly defined.

Carbon Brief has approached the National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Ecology and Environment for comment.

The University of Maryland’s Cui tells Carbon Brief that in general, China’s climate goals are “improv[ing]” in terms of their coverage and scope. However, she adds:

“The issue is…the ambiguity and inconsistency in the coverage, definition and method between target setting and progress tracking, which can lead to large uncertainties and room for manipulation. It highlights the importance of transparency in national climate targets, following the UNFCCC’s international transparency framework, which should also be applied as best practices for domestic targets.”

About the data

The calculations in this analysis are based on China’s total coal, oil and gas consumption from energy statistical yearbooks covering the years until 2023, with data for 2024 and 2025 taken from the latest statistical communiques.

“Originally reported” CO2 emissions were back-calculated from carbon-intensity reductions and GDP growth given in annual statistical communiques. The revised emissions for 2020, 2024 and 2025 are similarly back-calculated from the reductions in carbon intensity from 2020 to 2025 and from 2024 to 2025, as reported in the 15th five-year plan outline and the 2025 statistical communique, respectively, combined with annually reported GDP growth.

Cement process emissions up to 2024 are from Robbie Andrews’ estimates, scaled to 2025 based on year-on-year change in total cement output.

Process emissions from the metals industry are based on calculating emissions for aluminium, silicon, lead, zinc and crude steel from the bottom-up, using industrial output data and IPCC default emission factors scaled to the reported total in 2021. For steel, the calculations are based on typical quicklime use in basic-oxygen and electric-arc furnaces.

Emissions from the incineration of plastics are based on a peer-reviewed estimate of plastics incineration in 2022, combined with growth rates in the overall power generation from waste-to-energy plants. The analysis assumes that the share of plastics in the energy content of the incinerated waste stayed constant over this period, which is a conservative assumption given the rapid rise in plastics production.

Total non-energy use of fossil fuels in 2020, 2024 and 2025 is available from an NEA data release, with data for 2021-2023 found in the China energy statistical yearbook 2025.

The mix of coal, oil and gas within non-energy use is based on the energy statistical yearbook data up to 2023, with the increase in coal in 2024 and 2025 based on Wind Financial Terminal data on coal consumption in the chemical industry. Gas use, which is relatively minor, is assumed to have grown on trend and oil is calculated as the residual.

Primary plastics, rubber, and urea output data are from NBS industrial statistics. The production of solvents, lubricants and waxes, as well as the use of bitumen in construction, is from energy statistical yearbooks. The analysis assumes no change in output from 2023 to 2025, given the lack of clear trends.

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The post Analysis: China’s new carbon metric leaves Germany-sized gap in its emissions appeared first on Carbon Brief.

This article An ethically honest Memorial Day was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

On Memorial Day, it is my family’s practice to remember and honor all those who have died in war — including but not limited to those who have served in our country’s military. This broader act of memorialization is both truer to the history of Memorial Day, and more responsive to the moral imperative that all humans — and especially U.S. citizens — face as a result of the suffering and risk that organized violence causes throughout the world.

Like Veteran’s Day, Memorial Day has been gradually co-opted as an opportunity to show unquestioning, blank-check support for the U.S. military. We think participating in these commemorations is just being a good citizen, but in truth by participating we are adding our voice to a highly organized political message that speaks very loudly to the rest of the world. The political message we help send is that we value the lives of U.S. military personnel thousands upon thousands of times more than we value the lives of all others.

This is not my family’s belief, and therefore we cannot participate in Memorial Day in this way.

Historically, like Veteran’s Day, Memorial Day started as an expression of the strength of human desire for peace and respect for all life. The roots of the holiday began in the days following the end of the Civil War by those wanting to honor the fallen in the name of preserving the peace which had been achieved. Formerly enslaved people in Charleston, South Carolina held perhaps the first documented memorial day on May 1, 1865. While focused on honoring those who served as soldiers for the Union, these early commemorations also remembered and mourned all who died in the fighting, including civilians on both sides and soldiers for the South. So strong was this tendency to name and recognize the harm on both sides that some historians have critiqued these early Memorial Days as having the effect of whitewashing the moral battle that did take place as each person chose which side they were on in that critical time.

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Yet today our Memorial Day celebrations have the exact opposite problem. We dedicate so much time and resources and emotional energy to remembering the fallen soldiers and servicemembers on “our side,” while we willfully decline to mention the exponentially outsized larger picture: the uncountable lives lost, the incalculable cost, and the sheer depth of human suffering caused by war and organized violence around the world. This tendency, to honor the lives of our own military above all other lives, is deeply morally and psychologically dangerous. It trains our minds to accept the unnamed tens of thousands as correctly, reasonably invisible; to consider those whose names and ranks we can recite to be the only losses deserving of pause, mourning and honor.

This is a deep error and our souls know it. Every single person who dies in any war is a human being with a family. Every single loss rips a hole in the hearts of those that loved them. For each soul lost there is unfathomable pain that can never be fully understood or articulated.

But it can and should be recognized. To remember, to memorialize, does help.

Yesterday, Ms. magazine published an article that points to this need for a broader understanding of Memorial Day. It specifically named the women and children whose deaths and suffering in war are often invisibilized. In particular, they name the horrifying deaths of the 165 Iranian girls who were killed when our military, in an apparent but as of yet unacknowledged error, bombed their school. To hold an ethically honest Memorial Day, we could start by naming these children, these innocents – and turning our eyes and our hearts to the unfathomable suffering of their mothers.

Veterans for Peace has also consistently lifted up a call for Memorial Day to acknowledge the full cost of war and affirm the strength of our desire for peace. In their 2025 statement, they include a quote from President Dwight D. Eisenhower, himself a World War II veteran: “I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity.”

The will of the people

I believe that a huge number of Americans hold a similar opinion of war, even those who participate in Memorial Day commemorations. Despite decades of efforts to bake blank-check militarism into U.S. culture, most people are implicitly aware that the entire game serves the interests of the political elite and the very rich, while demanding sacrifice mainly from working class people. Research shows that antiwar sentiment was one of the primary motivations of a subset of Trump voters. A decisive number of voters withheld votes from Kamala Harris due to horror at the Biden-Harris administration’s complicity in Israel’s genocide in Gaza. Neither group of voters has seen their will expressed. 

I myself feel agonizingly helpless by the current news, and I can only imagine how a peace-motivated Trump voter must feel. Far from holding to his antiwar plank, Trump has acutely escalated both the culture and the practice of endless war. He renamed the Department of Defense to the Department of War and has run it in a way that eviscerates all subtlety and respect for human rights. Far from resolving the genocide in Gaza, he has escalated it into a regional conflict that could easily lead to nuclear war. Trump has made numerous horrifying threats, including “that a whole civilization will die,” which is the definition of genocide. He is implementing automatic draft registration for our sons ages 18 to 26, so none can refuse to register as an act of conscientious objection. One is reminded of God’s warning through the prophet Samuel: “This is what the king who will reign over you will claim as his rights: He will take your sons and make them serve with his chariots and horses, and they will run in front of his chariots. Some he will assign to be commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties, and others to plow his ground and reap his harvest, and still others to make weapons of war and equipment for his chariots.”

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In the midst of this, we are all being encouraged to accept these escalations as normal and continue to join in and march and smile and show unquestioning respect and approval of such behavior. No! We must forge a better way.

What we need is an ethically honest Memorial Day. What the human spirit needs is a Memorial Day infused with heart and thoughtfulness, a Memorial Day that harnesses the power of our remembrance toward our deep desire for peace and well being for all. We can start by naming all those we know who have died in war — including soldiers and civilians who were killed in visible, recognized wars; soldiers and civilians who were killed in small conflicts; unofficial military actions that don’t make the news; and all victims of organized violence. We can name each soul whose names we know, and light candles for them.

But we should not stop there. We should also name in some way the unnameable. We should all visit the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in our hearts, and in doing so consider consciously not just those on “our side,” but all the loss of life that our global community has suffered because of war and organized violence. We can mark those uncountable deaths whose names we don’t know, but of whom we are aware. Doing so is an act of psychological honesty; it gives voice to our soul’s knowledge that their lives and their deaths do matter. In doing this we may not change anything outwardly, but we do change the rhythm of our own awareness, and the power of such a shift should not be underestimated.

Art by CODEPINK

This article An ethically honest Memorial Day was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

Expansion of the Wressle oil site near Scunthorpe would result in more than one million tonnes of climate-damaging greenhouse gases, documents have revealed.

But the developer, Egdon Resources, has said the proposal would not have a significant impact on climate change.

Well trajectories (proposed in red and existing in green) from the Wressle oil site.
Source: Egdon Resources application

The expansion would produce an estimated extra 1 million+ barrels of oil over 15 years. Gas produced alongside the oil would be an additional 5.264 billion cubic feet.

The figures were published in a new assessment of the climate impact of the plans.

Egdon first submitted the proposal in March 2024 for two new wells, lower-volume fracking, 15 years of production and a 600m gas pipeline.

An approval by officials at North Lincolnshire Council in September 2024 was quashed in a legal case brought by a local campaigner.

This followed the landmark Finch ruling at the Supreme Court, which required decisionmakers to take account of the greenhouse gas emissions from the use of onshore oil or gas production.

Egdon had previously said the plans did not need a detailed environmental impact assessment (EIA).

But the company agreed earlier this year to voluntarily submit a slimmed-down version of an EIA, looking at just climate change, socio-economic impacts and cumulative effects.

Emissions estimates

Egdon’s consultants, Bureau Veritas, has estimated that at worst the greenhouse gases from the project would amount to 1,007,731 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e).

More than 90% of the total, 917,999 tCO2e, would be from burning the oil and gas produced at the site, known as scope 3 category 11 emissions.

The remaining emissions, mainly from the production process, are estimated to total 89,732 tCO2e.

The climate assessment said:

“Overall, the Proposed Development is not expected to result in significant adverse effects on climate change, and the assessment demonstrates that emissions and climate risks have been considered in a proportionate and robust manner, consistent with relevant guidance and best practice.”

On the scope 3 category 11 greenhouse gases, the assessment said:

“While these emissions represent a very small proportion of global emissions, it is recognised that climate change is highly sensitive to cumulative emissions.

“Taking into account the global and downstream nature of these emissions, their lack of direct control at the project level, and their consistency with broader decarbonisation pathways, the effect is … considered to be minor adverse overall.”

The assessment estimated that at peak annual production, the scope 3 category 11 emissions would represent, at worst, 0.00033% of the remaining global carbon budget.

This would indicate a moderate adverse effect, the assessment said. But it concluded that the effect was “minor adverse when viewed in the context of global mitigation trajectories”.

The scope 1 and 2 emissions and scope 3 excluding category 11, were also considered to be “minor adverse following mitigation”.

These emissions, compared with UK carbon budgets) ranged from 0.0009% (seventh budget) TO 0.002% (sixth budget).

Other assessments

An updated ecological impact assessment on the Wressle plans said there would be no significant impacts on air quality affecting internationally-important wildlife sites on the Humber Estuary.

It also said there would be no “significant adverse effects” on sites of special scientific interest at Broughton Far Wood, 210m away from the well site, and Broughton Alder Wood, 600m away.

The socio-economic impact assessment concluded there would be “moderate to major beneficial effects” for employment and economic performance in civil engineering, mining and quarrying industries.

On cumulative effects, the assessment said:

“No long term significant effects identified and no greater [impacts] than for the proposed development in isolation”.

Public consultation

People and organisations can now comment on the new documents, either online (go to bottom of application webpage and click submit comment button), by email to planning@northlincs.gov.uk or in writing to the Development Management team, North Lincolnshire Council, Church Square House, 30-40 High Street, Scunthorpe, DN15 6NL, quoting PA/2024/275.

The application’s website lists the closing date for the consultation as 30 June 2026.

DrillOrDrop will report on reaction to Egdon’s climate and other assessments.