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This article The Yippies and the power of counterculture was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

Since President Donald Trump’s second inauguration, an authoritarian presidency has been accompanied by a brutal crackdown on social movements. While there are strikingly new features of Trump’s reign, many of the assaults on freedom and the persecution of activists have parallels in the histories of U.S. imperialism, the anti-Vietnam war movement and the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s, and the rise of the right in the 1980s.

And many of the questions organizers are asking today were in debate then. How do you balance militant activism with the need to build a mass movement? What role do creativity, theatrics and joy take in resistance? What does it mean to support those who are facing the brunt of the state’s criminalization of protest?

This is why “Levitating the Pentagon and Other Uplifting Stories: A Life of Activism,” a recent memoir by New Left organizer Nancy Kurshan, comes at a critical moment. Kurshan takes a magnifying glass to her decades of organizing experience in an attempt to pull out the lessons that are most informative for today. I talked with Nancy about her history in revolutionary organizations like the Weather Underground and the Yippies — known for their theatrical antiwar activism — and how she sees their choices years later.

Your book is named after the Oct. 21, 1967 demonstration organized by the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (the precursor to the Youth International Party, or the Yippies), in which they claimed they would attempt to psychically raise the Pentagon building into the air. I don’t think you would be surprised that when I first heard that story, it was explained as a type of disconnect: These people really believed they were about to levitate the Pentagon. Can you put the levitation in context? 

We always claimed we did, in fact, levitate the Pentagon, but just not high enough — although I doubt a single one of us thought we would literally succeed. But we did hope to help end the war and, in order to do that, we did need to have those evil spirits expelled by enough people to help change policy. 

For instance, there was a young Daniel Ellsberg watching from an upstairs window of the Pentagon who later became a famous whistleblower by releasing the Pentagon Papers. So maybe we did succeed at driving out the evil spirits or at least hastening that process. Who knows?

As you discuss, this was a much more strategically conceived demonstration than it first appeared, even if it had some elements that weren’t that strategic.

That demonstration in particular was very strategic. We were not yet Yippies when a small group of us arrived in New York to help build a national antiwar protest in Washington. Our strategic goal was to build a larger, more militant movement and one that tapped into the energy of the emerging counterculture. Our little band of youthful agitators argued for the demonstration to be the at Pentagon, as opposed to the usual humdrum protest outside the White House. We wanted a target that made it clear this was not just about an argument of words but about a conflict in which millions of lives were being taken by weapons of destruction — over 2 million Vietnamese lives and 60,000 American GIs. And we wanted our slogan to be: “Shut it down!” 

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And we wanted to do this by organizing mass civil disobedience. And the reason I stress mass is because there had already been very orchestrated, “stepping over the line” civil disobedience carried out by a few very wonderful, committed people. But it was time to massify it. And we did it. Hundreds were arrested. It was the largest civil disobedience of the anti-Vietnam war movement to that date. 

The other strategic aspect was we wanted to appeal to the youth of America. The hippie phenomenon was taking hold in many places throughout the nation, and the Pentagon protest was able to project a union of antiwar and countercultural streams. Later the colorful, satirical approach of the Yippies was very resonant with young Americans. 

What would you say is the value of these theatrical and performative protest actions?

Theatrical and performative protest are incredibly valuable. The whole Pentagon protest was a theatrical event, but one particular photo of Super-Joel placing a flower in the musket of a National Guardsman has traveled around the world. 

Subpoenaed by the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1968, Jerry Rubin dresses as an “international guerrilla,” accompanied by Nancy Kurshan in witch garb.

After Black Panther Fred Hampton and others were assassinated, and the guilty verdict in the Chicago Conspiracy trial came down, Anita Hoffman, Tasha Dellinger and I held a press conference and we burned judges’ robes in front of a banner referencing the Jefferson Airplane’s “We Are All Outlaws In The Eyes of Amerika,” [from the song “We Can Be Together.”] The photo went around the globe. 

During the wars in the 1980s in Central America, we went out in canoes and dyed the Chicago River red and left “bloodied” hands on the walls of the federal building. 

The 1,000 Grandmothers for Future Generations, a climate justice organization that I am a part of, has fantastical, huge puppets — the Water Protector, Flo the Hummingbird, the Fierce Protector and Winds of Change. The names alone are great, but the creatures are fabulous. And people, including children, love them. The incredibly original, creative banners and signs are proof that we are not “paid agitators.” Sometimes the movement’s fabulous art is reflected in the mass media, more often on social media. But always in our hearts and minds. 

Your book includes a deep dive into the Chicago Eight trial, in which eight antiwar activists were prosecuted for allegedly inciting a riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention, including Yippies Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, and Black Panther Bobby Seale (although Seale wasn’t present and had no connection). You were involved in court and jail support for the defendants, the kind of organizing that became increasingly important as repression against organizers grew. Can you talk about why this kind of prison solidarity and court support activism are so key, and what other campaigns you’ve been involved in?

I believe that prison support should play a central role in any vibrant movement challenging the status quo. I don’t think a movement can persist and grow if political prisoners are locked away without support. I was privileged to be part of a campaign to free 11 Puerto Rican independentistas, a campaign that was conducted in Puerto Rico, in Chicago and around the globe. After decades of imprisonment, their sentences were ultimately commuted by President [Bill] Clinton. That never would have happened if it weren’t for a persistent and intense campaign to free them across decades. I saw in that campaign what real loyalty looked like when day after day and year after year, decade after decade, there was a ceaseless attempt to hold the political prisoners in community, to tell their stories, to organize protests, to visit them, to raise funds and to incorporate them into the daily life of the community, primarily in Puerto Rican neighborhoods, but also among other allies.

I was part of the Committee to End the Marion Lockdown, a campaign in the 1980s and ’90s to end the ongoing lockdown at the United States Penitentiary Marion [now named Federal Corrections Institution Marion], a federal prison where inmates were confined to their cells for 23 hours a day and without normal contact and recreation. I wrote a book about it, “Out of Control: A 15 Year Battle Against Control Unit Prisons,” published by Freedom Archives. For 15 years we organized and protested to end mass incarceration and particularly long-term solitary confinement. That was our primary effort. However, we worked along with our Puerto Rican friends and others, incorporating demands to free political prisoners into our work, as they joined in fighting long-term solitary [confinement], which disproportionately fell on political prisoners like the 11. We also together assembled, published, collated and distributed four editions of “Can’t Jail the Spirit,” collections of biographies and photos of all the political prisoners we knew of at the time. 

I applaud the work of groups like The Sentencing Project and the California Coalition for Women Prisoners. And when significant charges come down, whether on activists from the movement against Palestinian genocide or the immigration or climate movements, let’s show solidarity and have their backs. 

How did the struggle against white supremacy and for civil rights develop your consciousness as an organizer?

Anti-racism had always been, since high school, at the center of my political thinking. I was a Northern supporter of the Southern civil rights movement and then later, I was part of Students for a Democratic Society. I was committed to building an interracial movement of the poor. I was a middle-class white girl knocking on apartment doors of Black folks who were more hospitable than you can imagine. 

Then along came Malcolm X and the evolution of the civil rights movement into a movement for Black liberation. I heard both Stokely Carmichael and Malcolm X speak and I got it: Black people are not the problem, and white people need to organize our own communities to oppose racism. 

My militancy grew in response to the way the Black movement had been treated and the response that ill-treatment generated in younger Black activists of my generation. We noted everything that was going on. The refusal of the Democratic Party to seat the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the brutal murders of [James Earl] Chaney, [Andrew] Goodman and [Michael] Schwerner, and the assassinations of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. had a deep impact on me and many other activists.  

Over your years in organizing, how did you balance militancy and radicalism with the need to build a mass movement? 

Sometimes well, sometimes not that well. It was and is a conundrum wrapped in an enigma. This is a huge topic and I could look at each decade of my life and try to see how I – and we – dealt with that balance. But that would be a whole long piece. So I’ll just touch on it.

Previous Coverage

The day they levitated the Pentagon

I advocated for militancy in the form of nonviolent direct action, as exemplified by the October 1967 Pentagon demonstration. Our advocacy included satire and theater, thus the levitation. But our slogan of “Shut it down!” represented our militant intent, as did our refusal to leave. [The] Chicago ‘68 [Democratic National Convention protests] continued our militant trajectory and we were still able to grow the mass movement. 

Many of the Black youth in the movement were becoming more militant. The Black Panthers were sick and tired of being the victims of white hatred and violence, whether by the police or by racist white folks. So they marched into the Sacramento capitol of California with rifles and declared themselves the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. 

This was a time of J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI COINTELPRO [counter-intelligence program], whose core objective was to “prevent the rise of a ‘messiah’ who could unify, and electrify, the militant Black nationalist movement.” It involved overt and often illegal operations aimed at surveilling, infiltrating, discrediting and neutralizing domestic political organizations. Neutralizing? Scores of dead Black people give meaning to the definition. I was in Chicago when Black Panther leader Fred Hampton was assassinated. I walked through the bloody scene where they killed him in his sleep. He was old enough to be my baby brother. 

As Black, Puerto Rican, Mexican and Native (Indigenous, to use today’s language) contemporaries became more militant, we asked ourselves how we should respond. We supported what they were doing. So why wasn’t it appropriate for us to join in? Should we be onlookers or should we be like Old John Brown and his family — white folks who actively opposed slavery with their lives. 

For some of us becoming more militant meant joining the Weather Underground. By doing so, I never expected to become divorced from the mass movement. My passion was deep and I didn’t realize the mass movement would recede so quickly. 

What did that receding of the mass movement look like?

There were collectives around the country, particularly in college towns and other youth communities that persisted. I encountered many of them when a group of us traveled around the country in 1974. But in hindsight we could see that after the ending of the Vietnam War, and the repression of the Black movement, and also of Puerto Rican, Mexican and Native American [movements], the mass movement significantly receded.

By 1976 we in the Weather Underground Organization planned a Hard Times Conference in Chicago, a conference to address the economic recession taking place nationally, in large part to help reinvigorate a mass movement that would link a militant fight to combat racism and sexism together with the concerns of all working-class people. That didn’t work. I wasn’t there because I was delivering a baby at that moment. Large numbers of people showed up from around the country, but there was too much internal division for the convening to be successful. 

We made mistakes but perhaps objective conditions were not ripe. Our youthful passion often overlooked a clear view of objective conditions. We thought if we just worked harder, we could change anything and everything. 

You talked about your move away from the “straight left,” which was the term for the less theatrical and subcultural organizing left, in part because the cultural values of young people were coming up against the entrenched social conservatism you were fighting against, and this made many of the more buttoned-down leftist tactics seem antiquated. What was the value of this countercultural movement in terms of resisting the war and structural injustice? 

I lived in several different situations, but the most extraordinary was the Bachenheimer houses on Parker Street in Berkeley. The complex was a cluster of houses that went on rent strike for a couple of years. Bachenheimer was the name of the landlord/slumlord in charge of overcharging and under-repairing everything.

The rent strike meant much more than simply not paying rent. We, like so many others, had rejected the traditional materialistic values of U.S. society and were looking for more meaningful, cooperative and creative ways of living. We treated the houses as if they were our own, tearing down walls and rehabbing as desired. The backyards of the buildings ran together and there was a large outdoor common area.

The rent strike was a collective decision and action taken by all the Bachenheimer houses. We weren’t out to con the landlord. On the contrary, we believed that people had the right to decent and affordable living conditions, and we put our rent checks into an escrow account every month — payable when and if Bachenheimer brought the houses up to code. 

The nature of that community was not lost on the FBI. My FBI file [obtained through the Freedom of Information Act], indicates that: “This department had not had any success in developing any sources or informants … in the 2200 block of East Parker, Berkeley, California. … Because the residents of this block are ‘hippie type individuals,’ their attitude towards any type of authority or law enforcement official is somewhat negative, therefore, communication with them is also somewhat limited.”

I wonder if any left organization was better guarded against snooping FBI agents or undercover informants than the Bachenheimer houses. Although the rent strike may have been exceptional, there were communities of similar character all around the country.

Do you continue to see value for radical movements in the development of a counterculture as important?

I suspect that the melding of the antiwar movement and countercultural hippies probably led to the most successful influence on disaffected working-class youth [of any recent movement]. I can’t prove it, but I doubt anyone can disprove it. My family was solidly middle class by the 1960s, but I encountered countercultural working-class youth in Kent, Ohio as well as in Berkeley, California, the Lower East Side of New York, the Twin Cities, Minnesota, and in Manchester, New Hampshire, all of whom were antiwar. They were not that different from people I knew as a young child in Brooklyn. 

I also met with deserters from the U.S. Army in Sweden and worked with Vietnam Veterans Against the War. In fact, resistance to the war inside the military, and organizing on the outside at coffee houses set up near military bases, was essential to ending the war and most of the participants were working class, albeit not only white folks. Tremendously aided by the music of Phil Ochs and Bob Dylan but also the Rolling Stones; Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young; Bob Marley and Jimmy Cliff and so many others. 

That assessment of the past hasn’t changed. Yes, many people both from the political movement and the counterculture returned to the mainstream, but in doing so, many maintained, in varying degrees, the values and thinking of the political/cultural movements. The civil rights movement was probably the grandmother/grandfather of them all, but it can be argued that the counterculture advanced notions of sexual liberation that, although shot full of male supremacy, or perhaps partly in reaction to that, then led to the birth of the women’s and gay liberation movements. You could argue similarly about the current climate movement. The seeds were there in the counterculture.

And the antiwar movement, unique in that it led to the eventual, massive alienation from the war machine, is still having reverberations today. The war in Vietnam remained popular much longer than the current war on Iran. That is echoes of the so-called Vietnam Syndrome.  

So I suggest that the mainstream has actually been moving towards us. Perhaps a slow evolution but a change in direction. And of course subsequent movements were critical — Occupy and Black Lives Matter. All these movements encourage changes in consciousness. And what we are seeing in this era, is the counter-revolution, if you will. In other words, the collective “we” has had a great influence which is why there is such a fierce response. It’s hard to tease out the different elements but it’s clear that all the mass struggles of our people have planted seeds that have blossomed in subsequent generations.

I returned to Vietnam in 2013 as a guest of the Vietnamese government, in thanks for helping end the war. It was the first time that I completely internalized that yes, we had made a positive difference. 

What kind of advice do you have for organizers today who are asking questions about the role of cultural struggle?

Don’t give in to cynicism. The current powers that be would love nothing better. When asked if I’m hopeful, I like to quote the Italian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci, “I’m a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of will.” I take it to mean we have to see the reality for what it is, not through rose-colored [glasses]. But we have to continue to act. 

My wish is to see some massive nonviolent actions — I like the ideas people are putting forth of a general strike.

But there are many other tools in the tool box as well. Find your own voice and use it in whatever way you see fit. Ask yourself what you think needs to be done, and consider what your own talents and inclinations are.

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Let’s continue to deepen our connections in the communities where we live, at the same time as we keep an eye on and respond to world events because the people in Gaza, in Lebanon, in Iran, in Cuba are our sisters and brothers. We are all connected and they have been paying a heavy price.

Let’s build a big tent. Don’t get hung up on small differences. And let’s not throw anyone under the bus. Let’s continue to embrace the most vulnerable, and that includes the undocumented folks and trans people. We can build a big tent and do all that. 

The time is now. The place is here. We are the ones we’ve been waiting for.

This article The Yippies and the power of counterculture was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

EWG testimony to the California Senate Committee on Agriculture on AB1603 to increase the transparency and reporting of PFAS pesticides usage rcoleman July 9, 2026

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is David Andrews and I am the Chief Science Officer for the Environmental Working Group.

I hold a Ph.D. in Chemistry from Northwestern University and have been a co-author on ten peer-reviewed publications on PFAS, including a paper on PFAS pesticides.

PFAS—or "forever chemicals"—pose serious health risks, including cancer, reproductive problems, harm to the thyroid and immune system, liver and kidney disease and more. 

2.5 million pounds of PFAS pesticides are used each year in California.

40% of non-organic produce grown in California had at least one PFAS pesticide, some with many. 

PFAS pesticides are widespread in water and soil in California.

PFAS should be regulated as a class - we do not want one problematic chemical substituted for another. 

California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control has stated that all PFAS share the core hazard trait of extreme environmental persistence. 

PFAS pesticides fall into a regulatory blind spot.

The US EPA’s and the California Department of Pesticide Regulations’ current have been inadequate with respect to immune system harm, or the cumulative impacts of the very small PFAS.

TFA, or trifluoroacetic acid, is one of the small PFAS contaminants that result from PFAS pesticide usage and levels are increasing in our water, food and environment.

North Carolina ground water testing found TFA in nearly all of their samples, and it is estimated that PFAS pesticide use in California creates up to 600,000 pounds of TFA.

Earlier this month, ECHA's scientific committee concluded TFA should be classified as toxic to reproduction, and also very persistent and very mobile.

With the increasing evidence of harm from PFAS we are disappointed that the legislature is not acting more decisively on PFAS pesticides but we support this step to catalogue usage.

Thank you.

Areas of Focus Toxic Chemicals Pesticides PFAS Chemicals Authors David Andrews, Ph.D. June 30, 2026

EWG testimony to the California Senate Committee on Environmental Quality on AB1603 to restrict and ban the use of PFAS pesticides rcoleman July 9, 2026

Good morning,

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Varun Subramaniam and I am a Science Analyst at the Environmental Working Group.

I hold a graduate degree in health data science as well as a degree in environmental health.

I coauthored recent reports which found that, each year, millions of pounds of PFAS pesticides are being applied to, and detected in high frequencies on, fruits and vegetables grown in California. 

PFAS pesticides are also often found in surface water and soil near agricultural areas.

PFAS in any form pose serious, well-documented health and environmental risks that warrant strict limitations of their use and regulation as a class. 

Exposure to PFAS is linked to liver and kidney disease, reproductive problems, child development delays, cancer, weakened thyroid function, and reduced vaccine effectiveness in children. 

Additionally, all PFAS share the core characteristic of a carbon-fluorine bond that results in extreme environmental persistence; they do not fully break down in the environment.3

This drastically increases the timeframe of exposure, with today’s contamination potentially harming health for decades.

These PFAS pesticides fall into a regulatory blind spot.

Current regulatory evaluations of PFAS pesticides do NOT adequately account for potential immune system harm or the impacts of very small forms of PFAS that form from many PFAS pesticides, including trifluoroacetic acid or TFA.

Immunotoxicity is one of the most critical health effects for PFAS risk assessments, so we are overlooking key, not fringe, information by not considering studies of immune effects.4,5

In addition, TFA, which is linked to reproductive harm, has been detected in nearly all water and human serum samples, where tested.

Fortunately, farmers have options that are not PFAS. 

Of the roughly 1,000 active pesticide ingredients currently approved for use in California, 95% are not PFAS. And other states, like Maine and Minnesota, have already announced planned phase-outs for these chemicals.

The health and environmental risks of PFAS exposure are significant. 

Scientists across the world agree that we must act swiftly to halt this multigenerational cycle of contamination.

Thank you.

Areas of Focus Toxic Chemicals Pesticides PFAS Chemicals Authors Varun Subramaniam, M.S. June 24, 2026

EWG testimony to California Assembly Committee on Environmental Safety and Toxic Materials on AB1603 to restrict and ban the use of PFAS pesticides rcoleman July 9, 2026

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

My name is David Andrews, and I am the Acting Chief Science Officer at the Environmental Working Group. I hold a Ph.D. in Chemistry from Northwestern University and have been a co-author on ten peer-reviewed publications on PFAS, including a 2024 paper that identified EPA-approved PFAS pesticides.

PFAS—often called "forever chemicals"—pose serious, well-documented health risks. 

Exposure to this class of chemicals is linked to altered immune and thyroid function, liver and kidney disease, reproductive problems, child development delays, cancer and more. 

The Department of Toxic Substances Control has stated that all PFAS share the core hazard trait of extreme environmental persistence.

And what may surprise you is that our food is a primary, under regulated route of exposure.

PFAS pesticides fall into a regulatory blind spot.

The EPA’s and the California Department of Pesticide Regulations’ current regulatory evaluation of PFAS pesticides have NOT adequately evaluated the pesticides’ potential for immune system harm, or fully assessed the impacts of the very small PFAS, including trifluoroacetic acid or TFA, that form from PFAS pesticides. 

Levels of these small PFAS are increasing in our water, food and environment and exposure to them is linked to reproductive and immune toxicity.

North Carolina ground water testing found TFA in 95% of their samples, and it is estimated that PFAS pesticide use in California creates up to 600,000 pounds of TFA each year. These findings should alarm California, which will likely find similar contamination when official tests are done.

In regard to food, EWG recently found that nearly 40% of all non-organic produce grown right here in California contains traces of at least one PFAS pesticide. For some agricultural staples such as peaches, plums and nectarines, the numbers are even higher.

Fortunately, farmers have options that are not PFAS. Of the roughly 1,000 active pesticide ingredients currently approved for use in California, only 53 are PFAS. 

Thank you.

Areas of Focus Toxic Chemicals Pesticides PFAS Chemicals Authors David Andrews, Ph.D. April 14, 2026

EWG testimony to Vermont House Committee on Agriculture, Food Resiliency, and Forestry on H.911 to prohibit PFAS in pesticides and packaging rcoleman July 9, 2026

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. 

My name is Varun Subramaniam, and I am a Science Analyst at the Environmental Working Group. 

I hold a master's degree in health data science from the George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health and a degree in environmental health science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Gillings School of Global Public Health.

My professional work involves applying data science techniques to issues of environmental health, with attention to chemical exposures. 

EWG is a national environmental organization that has, for several decades, investigated the impacts of PFAS on public health and tracked PFAS detections in tap water. 

EWG has published multiple peer-reviewed studies on PFAS exposure sources, including a 2024 peer-reviewed paper on PFAS pesticides. 

Last month, we published a new analysis on the presence of PFAS on fruits and vegetables in the United States.

The growing threat of PFAS

PFAS pose serious health risks to the public.

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, PFAS exposure may lead to increased cholesterol, decreased fertility, developmental harm including low birth-weight, interference with the body’s natural hormones and harm to the immune system.

The agency also reports that PFAS have been linked to an increased risk of some cancers, including prostate, kidney, and testicular cancers. 

PFAS exposure for children is particularly concerning due to increased sensitivity to the harmful effects of chemicals such as PFAS.

PFAS overexposure

We know from recent research that everyone is overexposed to PFAS. 

In 2022, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine assessed PFAS concentrations in human blood samples.

They found that 98% of samples had PFAS levels that warranted exposure reduction and screenings for various health disorders, including hypertension during pregnancy and breast cancer.

PFAS are frequently found in our tap water. 

Food as a Primary Route of Exposure

What may surprise you is that our food, not our water, might be an even bigger source of PFAS exposure. 

The general scientific consensus is that our food is a significant, if not primary, route of exposure.

A 2020 study in Environment International concluded that dietary exposure from the ingestion of food and drinks was the “predominant exposure pathway” to PFAS.

How PFAS enters our diets

PFAS contaminates our food in many, overlapping ways. 

First, PFAS that is used in food packaging can migrate into our food. 

Second, sewage sludge that is contaminated with PFAS and used as a fertilizer can contaminate our food and the farm animals who are fed contaminated feed. 

Third, irrigation water that is contaminated with PFAS can also be absorbed by crops and contaminate our food. 

Fourth, and perhaps most directly, pesticides either made with PFAS as an ingredient or stored in containers that are lined with PFAS can contaminate our food. 

PFAS pesticides on produce

The presence of PFAS pesticides on our food is widespread.

Last month, EWG released a new study of PFAS residues on produce. 

We analyzed testing data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and found 31 different PFAS pesticides were detected on 30% of non-organic U.S. fruit and vegetables.

The most commonly detected pesticide on U.S. produce was fludioxonil–a PFAS fungicide.

Fludioxonil was found on 14% of all produce samples and on nearly 90% of peach and plum samples.

Peer-reviewed literature has linked fludioxonil exposure to hormonal disruption and has found evidence of reproductive toxicity.

Why are PFAS used in pesticides?

You might ask: why is PFAS used in pesticides?

PFAS can modify the attributes of pesticides, mainly conferring increased molecular stability on the chemical. This means that the pesticides can’t be broken down easily and are highly heat-resistant.

PFAS are also known to increase membrane permeability, meaning that pests absorb the chemical faster and can be immobilized more efficiently11.

Alternatives to PFAS pesticides

Farmers have alternatives to pesticides made with PFAS. 

There are effective options available to manage insects and weeds without relying on PFAS pesticides.

Biological controls, such as biopesticides or those derived from entirely biological sources, are popular alternatives to PFAS pesticides.

The menu of pesticides available to farmers is large and ever-growing, with new pesticide active ingredients and products coming to the market each year. 

There are more than 90,000 pesticide products registered with the EPA, comprising over 800 active ingredients. Of these, about 350 active ingredients are approved for use on food crops.

Just 66 of these active ingredients are PFAS. 

According to U.S. Geological Survey, less than 1% of all the pesticides, by volume, used in the state of Vermont are pesticides that include PFAS as an ingredient.

The Hidden PFAS around us

Another concerning characteristic of these chemicals is that most PFAS pesticides ultimately break down into other PFAS like trifluoroacetic acid, or TFA. 

TFA can persist in the environment for hundreds of years and levels are increasing in soil, water, plants, plant based foods, and human bodies.

It’s not just the PFAS pesticides that can last for years and harm health – they are also precursors to other chemicals that will outlast us by centuries.

Conclusion

In summary, we are all exposed to PFAS. Many of us have levels of PFAS in our blood that pose serious health risks. 

Our food is a significant source of our exposure to PFAS. 

The food we eat is contaminated through: PFAS used in food packaging, PFAS in sewage sludge used as fertilizer, contaminated irrigation water, and pesticides either made with PFAS or stored in containers lined with PFAS. 

Most pesticides are made without PFAS, and new, better-studied pesticides are routinely approved for use by the EPA.

Less than 1% of the pesticides, by volume, used in Vermont are pesticides made with PFAS. 

Thank you for allowing me to testify today about PFAS pesticides.

I am happy to answer any questions.

Areas of Focus Toxic Chemicals Pesticides PFAS Chemicals Authors Varun Subramaniam, M.S. April 9, 2026

Job Opening Announcement: Wildlands and Wildlife Program Staff Attorney
Reports to: Wildlands and Wildlife Program Director
Location: Portland, Oregon strongly preferred. Other WELC office locations may be considered for an exceptional candidate in the right situation.
Timeline: Job opening posted July 9, 2026; we will review applications and interview candidates on a rolling basis and encourage early applications. The position is open until filled.
Salary: $76,000 – $106,000 annually
To Apply: ApplicantPro portal

About the Western Environmental Law Center:
The Western Environmental Law Center is a leading nonprofit, public-interest environmental law firm rooted in the landscapes and communities of the western U.S. Founded in 1993, WELC has been celebrated as an Outside Magazine Best Place to Work for the final six years of the contest (it ended in 2024), Oregon Business Magazine Best Nonprofit, Law360 Environmental Group of the Year, and Better Business Bureau Torch Award winner for ethics.

We envision a thriving western U.S., abundant with protected and interconnected ecosystems, powered by renewable energy, and cared for by communities brought together in an ecology of kinship. We embrace a collaborative, team-based approach to foster the trust, belonging, and dignity essential to a healthy organization and to relationship-based advocacy that builds power for transformative change.

We seek to retain a Staff Attorney (2+ years of experience) to join our team. We strongly encourage people of color, persons with disabilities, women, LGBTQ+ applicants, and people of diverse lived experience to apply.

Position Summary:
The Wildlands & Wildlife Program Staff Attorney is an exempt, full-time position. The central focus of this position is strategic legal advocacy centered on public lands, waters, wildlife, and communities in the western U.S. The position’s responsibilities will be allocated among the following core areas:

• Litigation and administrative engagement protecting federal public lands, wildlife habitat, species, and water.
• Engagement in federal and potentially state-level legislation, rulemaking, and policymaking to protect public lands, water, and species. This may include defense of existing laws and regulations as well as efforts to improve the same.

Given the dynamic moment in which we find ourselves, this litigation position’s focus and time allocations will necessarily evolve in response to changing political, scientific, social, and economic circumstances and opportunities consistent with specific organizational strategies. Further, the position may be somewhat flexible to accommodate a successful candidate’s distinctive skills, experiences, and interests to further and complement WELC’s strategic Wildlands and Wildlife focus. WELC’s organizational and strategic direction is not “top down,” but is informed precisely by the individual qualities of its staff. Moreover, the location of the successful candidate will play a role in their precise docket of work.

Accordingly, over time, the Staff Attorney will be encouraged and supported to identify and advance opportunities to shape WELC’s organizational and strategic direction, to share perspectives, and to become a trusted and respected leader in their field and within their scope of work. The Staff Attorney will support and coordinate with WELC leadership, development, communications, and finance staff, as well as represent WELC in public and private settings. The Staff Attorney will also participate in retreats, trainings, and other organizational events.

To fulfill this position’s responsibilities, the Staff Attorney may provide a full range of legal services on behalf of WELC, including primarily litigation, but also policy advocacy, and administrative action. To excel in these efforts, the Staff Attorney will stay apprised of relevant law, policy, social, and other developments. The Staff Attorney will work collaboratively with staff across the organization, as well as with partner organizations and clients.

The Staff Attorney is a normal 40-hour week position based out of WELC’S Portland office or, potentially for an exceptional candidate, another of WELC’s office, primarily working during Monday to Friday business hours, though some night and weekend hours may be required at times, depending on organizational and advocacy needs. Limited travel is required, averaging a total of 2-3 weeks per year, including some overnight and weekend travel. The position also involves standard office physical demands. WELC will provide all reasonable accommodations to the extent possible or required pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Qualifications:
We are keenly interested in considering a range of applicants with diverse lived experiences who approach the world with kindness, empathy, imagination, and vision. We will happily consider applicants who offer an equivalent or alternative set of qualifications to fulfill this position’s responsibilities, apart from the first two qualifications set forth below, which are mandatory.

• Law degree from an accredited law school.
• Admission to and good standing with the state bar in Oregon, and/or one of the states where we practice and willingness and ability to obtain membership to the Oregon state bar at the earliest opportunity.
• Lived experience within or past work experience in partnership with people and communities of diverse backgrounds and experience, particularly in the western U.S.
• Two or more years relevant attorney experience.
• Excellent research, writing, and oral advocacy skills.
• Experience with and knowledge of public lands, waters, species, and community challenges and opportunities in the western U.S.
• Experience with and knowledge of the relevant agencies, laws, and regulations employed in litigation to protect public lands, waters, and species.
• Ability and willingness to use a complete set of legal advocacy tools including litigation, policy, and administrative advocacy.
• A commitment to conceptualizing and implementing legal strategies that further equity, inclusion, and justice, including through the just treatment and meaningful involvement of clients, partners, and frontline community groups and individuals.
• Dynamic and empathetic skills to foster relationships with partners, clients, agency staff, and community members. Demonstrated ability to work in complex, potentially high-conflict, multi- dimensional arenas involving a broad array of organizations and interests.
• Eagerness to mentor, support, and help develop newer attorneys and a self-awareness, motivation, and desire to seek opportunities for your own growth and development.
• An interest in and understanding of science and other technical fields and their interplay with public interest environmental law.
• Ability to work independently and proactively, including a willingness to be flexible and adaptive when needed.
• Desire to work on and contribute to a team. This includes learning from others, giving and receiving support and feedback, and active, constructive engagement in organizational discussions to advance the organization’s mission and contribute to its cohesion.
• Highly organized and intellectually curious.
• Demonstrated commitment to WELC’s mission and strategies and the public interest, as well as a love for the land, waters, species, and communities of the western U.S.

Benefits and Compensation:
Western Environmental Law Center is an equal opportunity employer. We offer a flexible, friendly, team-based environment with immediate opportunities to shape organizational strategies, and competitive, transparent, and equity-based salaries as follows:

• Staff Attorney, range based on years of legal experience: $76,000 (2 years) – $106,000 (10 years) with commensurate increases for an attorney with greater experience.
• WELC offers an excellent benefits package, including health, vision, dental, life, and disability coverage (with 100% employer paid premiums), a 401(k) retirement plan with a 4% employer match, 22 days combined of paid annual vacation and personal leave, 13 days of paid holiday leave, paid sick leave, and a paid long-term leave policy (3 months sabbatical leave for every 5 years of employment).

To Apply:
Please submit the following as PDF attachments through our ApplicantPro portal.

• 1-2 page cover letter addressed to Sarah McMillan, Wildlands & Wildlife Program Director
• Resume;
• 3 professional references; and
• 1-2 concise writing samples, with at least 1 writing sample involving a legal memorandum, brief, or filing. An additional, non-legal writing sample is also welcomed to illustrate the candidate’s background, views, or

Cover letters should communicate applicants’ commitment to WELC’s mission and advocacy and their motivation to work in this position and in public interest environmental law generally. In your cover letter, please do not repeat information apparent from a review of your resume. Instead, applicants are very strongly encouraged to tell us who they are as human beings, why they care about this work, and why they want to work for WELC specifically.

The post Career Opportunity: Wildlands and Wildlife Program Staff Attorney (Portland, others considered) appeared first on Western Environmental Law Center.

As the United States marked its 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, Native leaders, scholars, and advocates say the country’s milestone cannot be understood without acknowledging the Indigenous nations that predate the U.S and the promises that remain unfulfilled.

During a Native News Online live stream, America 250: A Republic Built on Native Land, hosted by Editor Levi Rickert, five conversations explored what America’s semiquincentennial means from Native perspectives. Guests included Cherokee Nation Principal Chief Chuck Hoskin Jr.; Navajo author and activist Mark Charles; Native Organizers Alliance Executive Director Judith LeBlanc; and professors Anton Treuer and Dina Gilio-Whitaker.

Although their perspectives differed, each agreed on one point: the nation’s history and its future must include Native voices.

 

The post American 250: A Republic Built on Native Land appeared first on Native Organizers Alliance.

In 2023, the United State Supreme Court ruled on the Sackett decision, which drastically narrowed the scope of the federal Clean Water Act and left many waters that were previously covered by the...

Checks & Balances Project (C&BP) filed a Freedom of Information Act with Sussex County, Virginia, seeking all communications and records related to the April firing of County Administrator Richard Douglas.

In a motion by Supervisor Alfred Futrell, Douglas was fired April 16 in a surprise vote by county supervisors.

His removal followed months of dissatisfaction over county finances and disputes over the county emergency medical services (EMS) contracts.

Douglas was replaced by Board Chair Steve White, who assumed the job of acting county administrator. C&BP has filed a complaint with Virginia Attorney General Jay Jones seeking an investigation into whether White is violating state law by service as a county official and an elected supervisor. C&BP has asked White if he is drawing a salary for acting as county administrator.

White is a also a Virginia state employee, working for the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services.

Potential conflicts of interest

C&BP has also filed FOIA requests seeking the county’s recusal policy for elected officials, the number of times officials have recused themselves in the last 25 years and for all records related to the county’s EMS services and the Stony Creek Volunteer Rescue Squad (SCVRS), which White chairs.

As of July 9, the county has not provided any of the records.

C&BP reported on June 30 that the IRS suspected SCVRS’ nonprofit status in 2023 because it had failed to file tax returns for three years. The nonprofit status was restored in 2025, but the latest publicly available SCVRS tax return is from 2019.

SCVRS reported a $304,000 surplus in the five years of tax returns from 2015 to 2019 that are on the IRS website.

Questions about finances

The murkiness around SCVRS’s finances was noted in the record of an April 17, 2025, board meeting. According to publicly available minutes from the board meetings:

Then-Sussex County Fire Chief Nick Sheffield told supervisors that Stony Creek and the nearby Waverly rescue squad each bills for its services.

Sheffield said, “Each of the rescue squads operate off of that money.”

Sheffield also said, “There’s a net profit to that and nobody knows what the net profit is,” though it is unclear if Sheffield was referring to Stony Creek’s profits of those of other County rescue squad.

There is no record from that time showing anyone at the supervisors’ meeting knew that Stony Creek had lost its tax status two years earlier because it had not filed its taxes for several years.

Six months later, Sheffield left his job after supervisors voted in a Sept. 18, 2025, meeting to eliminate funding for his job. He now works in North Carolina.

Ray Locker is the executive director for Checks & Balances Project, an investigative watchdog blog holding government officials, lobbyists, and corporate management accountable to the public. Funding for C&BP is provided by Renew American Prosperity and individual donors.

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Andhra Pradesh Community Managed Natural Farming (APCNF) recently received the 2026 Food Planet Prize for their role in leading one of the world’s largest agroecology projects. The award will help the organization scale sustainable practices to the 6 million farmers in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh and beyond.

The Food Planet Prize, the world’s largest environmental award of US$1.5 million, recognizes successful projects working at the intersection of food and agriculture systems and climate. This year, the committee recognized APCNF for demonstrating a scalable pathway for farmers to improve their livelihoods, resilience, and environmental outcomes. 

APCNF—led by the nonprofit Rythu Sadhikara Samstha (RySS), which translates to the Farmer Empowerment Organisation—began with 40,000 smallholders practicing natural farming in 2016. Over the last decade, it has grown to reach 1.8 million producers.

Under the program, farmers learn how to use locally available biological resources, diversify crops, and introduce natural soil-enrichment techniques. Those who become experts in these practices, known as master farmers, take on the role of teachers in their communities. Each master farmer offers training and guidance to 100–150 neighboring producers.

At the center of this program are women, who make up over 60 percent of the master farmers in APCNF’s network. “They are the heroes of our work,” Vijay Kumar Thallam, Executive Vice Chair of RySS, tells Food Tank. “Women have played such a critical role as people who are experimenting because it’s not a top-down approach.”

Thallam sees every farmer as a scientist, adding to the knowledge pool, helping to refine innovations, determining what strategies work, and where. “That’s the beauty of this,” he says.

But the transition isn’t without uncertainty, and Thallam feels immense gratitude to everyone who puts their trust in natural farming. Without deep resources to fall back on, farmers are putting their livelihoods on the line. “It’s a very big risk when they shift.”

Fortunately, their work is paying off. “The poorest farmers believed in us,” Thallam tells Food Tank. “They experimented in this, they found success, they expanded the area, and inspired others.”

In Andhra Pradesh, natural farming plots have grown more resilient to extreme weather patterns—something that will become particularly important this year during El Niño. Heavy rains may destroy plants on chemically-treated fields, but when farmers use natural farming techniques, their crops better withstand the conditions. As the approach scales to other countries, including Zambia and Sri Lanka, producers are seeing similar results. 

“What we are doing is very simple but very profound,” Thallam tells Food Tank. “It’s something anybody can do anywhere in the world.”

Watch the full conversation with Vijay Kumar Thallam on “Food Talk with Dani Nierenberg” to hear more about the journey farmers take with APCNF, why chemical-based agriculture is built on the wrong science, and plans to bring natural farming to more producers around the world.

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Andhra Pradesh Community Managed Natural Farming

The post ‘Simple But Profound’: Natural Farming Is Changing the Lives of Millions in India appeared first on Food Tank.

When you walk into Magnolia Cafe in Dunn, North Carolina, you are greeted by a friendly kitchen and the smell of comfort food. A mural of colorful magnolias covers one wall while another showcases the phrase, “Where Dignity Meets Delicious.” Despite being a new cafe, it feels like a place where the locals are regulars. Behind the locally sourced ingredients and the display case of banana pudding, there’s something that makes this cafe extra special.

The post Magnolia Cafe in Dunn, NC | Where Dignity Meets Delicious appeared first on RAFI.

A Los Angeles Times article published this week highlights the escalating climate risks facing California and the world. With experts forecasting a strengthening El Niño, continued record-breaking temperatures, and mounting concern over rapidly warming oceans, these threats are no longer theoretical, but unfolding now. 

The article cites officials who confirmed that global sea surface temperature reached a record high this month. Warmer oceans increase the likelihood of extreme precipitation, flooding, and stronger storms, while also contributing to sea level rise and placing significant stress on marine ecosystems and wildlife. 

Scientists also warn that El Niño is expected to prolong an ongoing marine heat wave, creating an extended period of abnormally warm ocean temperatures that can have devastating impacts on marine life.

These climate-driven changes also threaten water supplies across the West, contributing to more severe droughts and heat waves. The article exemplifies the urgent need for California to adapt its water management strategies by investing in sustainable, local water solutions rather than relying on large-scale water diversion schemes that will become increasingly unreliable as climate change reduces available supplies.

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments Rain, typhoons and heat

GUANGXI FLOODS: Severe floods hit south-western China’s Guangxi province after heavy rains, killing 39 people and leaving another nine missing, reported the state-run newspaper China Daily. “Torrential rain” caused by Typhoon Maysak overwhelmed rivers and reservoirs in the province, said the New York Times. The Southern Weekly reported that several villages in Guangxi’s Hengzhou city were submerged. An unnamed researcher told the outlet that “small and medium-sized reservoirs”, not just in Guangxi but nationwide, are “severely aged, making it difficult for them to effectively withstand floods caused by extreme weather events against the backdrop of global [climate] change”.

TORNADOES AND 50C HEAT: At least 11 people were killed by two “extremely rare” tornadoes in central China’s Hubei province also linked to Maysak, according to Reuters. Typhoon Bavi is “on course to hit China’s eastern coast” in the coming days, said BBC News. Meanwhile, Xinjiang province in the north-west and Hainan province in the south both experienced “prolonged and intense heatwaves” in June, reported finance outlet National Business Daily. It added that temperatures in Xinjiang reached 50C.

‘MORE FREQUENT AND SEVERE’: China is “warming faster than the global average”, reported state-run newspaper China Daily. It said the China Meteorological Administration’s 2026 “blue book” on climate change in China found that from 1961 to 2025, China’s “annual average temperature increased by 0.31C per decade”. The blue book also found that “extreme weather and climate events in China have become more frequent and severe”, said China National Radio. The outlet said this included extreme heat, precipitation events and typhoons.

New five-year plans and action plans

‘BEAUTIFUL CHINA’ PLAN: The full text of the 15th five-year plan for building a “Beautiful China” outlines “seven key tasks”, including “actively addressing climate change”, reported Xinhua. The plan, re-published by BJX News, set quantitative targets for 2030. These included a 3% cut in carbon emissions per unit of production at industries included in China’s national carbon market. It added that the plan also called for “controlling and reducing coal use” and “reasonably controlling” the scale of coal-power capacity. Meanwhile, the outlet says, the government will “accelerate efforts” to ensure new electricity demand is met by clean energy. It also reported that the plan notes the need to “improve the capacity to respond to climate change” and to “actively participate and lead in” global climate governance. An op-ed attributed to a “commentator from this newspaper” in the environment ministry-run China Environment News said that the next five years are “pivotal” for the “Beautiful China” initiative. 

OTHER FIVE-YEAR PLANS: The government also published a 15th five-year plan on “meteorological development”, calling for “enhanced” support for addressing climate change, said BJX News. It added that the plan emphasises the need to “participate deeply” in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and “actively participate” in the World Meteorological Organization’s work on greenhouse gas monitoring. A third 15th five-year plan on developing a circular economy pledges to “address the shortcomings” in the recycling of clean-tech, reported finance outlet EastMoney. In a Q&A, a government official noted that used batteries, solar and wind power equipment “currently present particularly prominent challenges”, according to BJX News. The five-year plan for tourism encourages the use of carbon offsets and promotes “low-carbon travel”, said industry outlet China Travel News.  

PEAKING ‘ACTION PLAN’: China released an “action plan” for peaking its carbon emissions “by 2030”, reported state news agency Xinhua. It added that the action plan reiterated China’s existing targets for carbon intensity and share of non-fossil energy in energy consumption. The plan calls on officials to “vigorously promote” non-fossil energy development and to accelerate efforts to improve “absorption” of new energy into the grid, according to International Energy Net. The plan “doesn’t seek to rein in the country’s fast-growing coal-to-chemicals industry”, said Bloomberg. It noted that the focus instead is on “low-carbon retrofits, reductions in coal consumption per unit of output and a gradual substitution of some fossil-based feedstocks and energy inputs”.

Dialogue deadline 

EU-CHINA TALKS: The EU and China have set an October deadline to “reset trade ties” as tensions over cleantech exports and other economic matters “rise”, reported Bloomberg. In a joint statement, the two sides established a “trade and investment consultation mechanism” with four workstreams, including trade and investment balancing and export controls, reported state news agency Xinhua. A joint statement, released by the European Commission, said the two sides agreed to “strengthen” dialogue and to “maintain…the stability of global industrial supply chains”.

AVENUES OF COOPERATION: A Chinese state-affiliated consulting firm and several European certification bodies have established a consortium to coordinate on “green electricity certificates”, aiming to “establish a network for mutual recognition of green power”, reported financial outlet Yicai. Meanwhile, China’s foreign ministry described increasing air-conditioner and fan exports to Europe during a record heatwave as a sign of the “complementary advantages” of EU-China trade, said Xinhua. This message was echoed in several articles by Chinese state-backed outlets. The People’s Daily noted that “as climate change drives more frequent and intense heatwaves…China’s industrial and energy capabilities are…helping address rising demand in Europe”.

PRESSURE ON COMPETITION: Meanwhile, China issued strict mandatory energy consumption and efficiency standards for the solar power industry in efforts to “curb overcapacity”, said financial news outlet Caixin. The country is “rolling back” tax exemptions for plug-in hybrids and electric commercial trucks, Caixin also reported, adding that fully electric passenger cars will not be affected. 

More China news

• US FRICTION: The US is “drafting a ban on imports of foreign inverters…over concerns China ​could use them to disrupt power supplies”, reported Reuters. 
• ‘ZERO-CARBON CORRIDORS’: China called for developing “zero-carbon transport corridors” and vehicle hubs, including the promotion of low-carbon vehicles and vessels, says power news outlet BJX News.
• ‘SCALE UP SUPPORT’: At a climate meeting in Bangkok, climate envoy Liu Zhenmin advocated “scaling up support to developing countries” and creating an “inclusive, just transition mechanism”, said Earth Negotiations Bulletin.
• BRICS MEETING: The BRICS grouping will “emphasise the continued role of fossil fuels” in providing energy security, according to a joint communiqué. China will act as chair of BRICS in 2027, noted industry outlet International Energy Net.
• VENTURING NORTH: China has launched its 16th Arctic Ocean expedition, said state broadcaster CGTN. It added that “climate change and its impacts” is a key focus of the mission.

Captured

China received $4.3bn in climate finance from the World Bank in 2020-2025, according to Carbon Brief analysis. The World Bank has dropped a pledge on climate-related lending, reported the Financial Times. The newspaper also reported that the bank will also “phase out its lending to China by 2031”. (China is estimated to have provided $3-4.5bn of climate finance annually to other countries, according to estimates by different thinktanks.)

Spotlight  Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’

A new database has mapped every climate initiative launched or run by China.

In this issue, Carbon Brief interviewed Dr Sun Yixian, professor of sustainability governance at the University of Bath, on what this data shows about China’s approach to climate “leadership”.

Below are highlights from the conversation. The full interview is published on the Carbon Brief website.

Carbon Brief: Your team has compiled a database of China’s “environmental leadership”. What do you mean by leadership?

Sun Yixian: In this project, what we are trying to look at is China’s role in global environmental governance – China’s shifting role, especially from a more passive participant in global governance processes to play a more proactive role in developing or managing its own initiatives on transnational or cross-border environmental governance. 

So, [this includes] different environmental issues, but, of course, we found that climate change is a very important issue area. We have come up with a typology of different governance functions, trying to look at what specific activities Chinese actors are doing, or what kind of public goods Chinese actors are delivering, to the audiences of different initiatives.

CB: Could you explain what some of these climate initiatives look like in practice?

SY: In practical terms, there are all different kinds of initiatives. [The majority focus on] sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. 

Or also by providing funding, for example, China has created this south-south climate fund. It can also include research collaboration. 

It can be traditional leadership activities, in the sense of developing certain international regulatory frameworks or rules or standards. It can also be pilot projects. China sometimes can start to work directly with some international partners to trial new ideas and new practices.

CB: The database stops at 2024 – just before the current administration withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement. Have you noticed any changes in China’s global climate engagements following this? 

SY: I would say the trend is a continuous one, even [before] the withdrawal of the US…Over the past 10 years, we have seen an upward trend, with more and more new initiatives created by Chinese actors.

But I think the shift will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners – or countries or actors that haven’t been engaged very closely with China – to work more closely with China.

Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question. 

CB: The theme of the data set is environmental leadership, but…Chinese officials have eschewed being called a climate leader. Would you say that China wants to be seen as a climate leader?

SY: We are entering into the implementation phase for the Paris Agreement. That means it is very difficult to create new agendas at this stage. [Instead the focus is] trying to see if countries can deliver.

If we want to see whether China is becoming a leader, we have to look at how fast, for example, China is accelerating its energy transition and how fast China can reduce its emissions. 

Then, in terms of international engagement, what our data is trying to show is that China has become more proactive in that space. 

When I was in China a few months ago, [leading experts] said the government…[is] not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time, I think…in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. 

So, I think the question is whether this…will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of policymakers or decision-makers. 

This interview was conducted by Anika Patel via Zoom on 1 July 2026.

Watch, read, listen

ENVOY INTERVIEW: Climate envoy Liu Zhenmin spoke to state broadcasting station CGTN about climate finance, expectations for China to “lead climate action” and trade tensions.

VIEW FROM THE US: The Atlas Live podcast hosted a debate on “what it will take” for the US to match China’s strength in manufacturing clean-energy technologies.

‘ELECTROSTATE’ EXPLORED: The state media-affiliated WeChat blog Yuyuan Tantian discussed how becoming an “electrostate” would boost China’s “resilience against external risks”.

HYDROGEN TARGETS: The Switched On podcast explored what China’s new targets for “green hydrogen” mean for the development of the industry. 

New science 

• Offshore wind could provide 3-18% of China’s electricity by 2050 | Communications Earth and Environment
• A new “environmental and nutritional database” of the eight major cuisines of China, including Sichuan, Cantonese and Hunan, reveals “significant variability” in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and nutrient content | Scientific Data

Recently published on WeChat

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China Briefing is written by Anika Patel, with contributions from Lekai Liu. It is edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

China Briefing 25 June 2026: Five-year plans passed | Critical-mineral tensions | Industrial decarbonisation plan

China Briefing

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25.06.26

China Briefing 11 June 2026: Tech clampdown | Extreme weather | Provinces’ energy plans

China Briefing

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11.06.26

China Briefing 28 May 2026: Deadly rains | China pushes back | Examining China’s carbon intensity metric 

China Briefing

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28.05.26

China Briefing 30 April 2026: Fossil fuel ‘strict controls’ | El Niño approaches | Why cleantech exports have surged

China Briefing

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30.04.26

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The post China Briefing 9 July 2026: Guangxi floods | ‘Beautiful China’ plan | New EU-China mechanism appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Statement on FDA’s delay of GRAS amendment proposal Iris Myers July 9, 2026

WASHINGTON – The Food and Drug Administration’s plan to amend the “generally recognized as safe,” or GRAS, regulatory loophole for food chemicals is slipping to December.

The agency originally planned to propose the amendment in October 2025. In December, it sent a draft rule to the White House Office of Management and Budget for pre-publication review, where it’s still pending. The administration then last week released its updated regulatory plan with timelines for upcoming agency rules, including the GRAS delay.

GRAS is a loophole that for years has allowed companies to add new, potentially harmful chemicals and other substances to snacks, drinks and more without undergoing the FDA’s safety review. 

When Congress created the GRAS loophole, in 1958, the exemption was intended to apply largely to ingredients widely recognized as safe, such as salt, water, yeast and vinegar.

But in the intervening years, GRAS has expanded to apply to much more. Since 2000, nearly 99% of food chemicals were introduced into the market as a result of  the GRAS loophole, according to a 2025 analysis from the Environmental Working Group. This allows scores of food chemicals to be approved for use with little government oversight.

The threat of preemption

A draft House bill would, if enacted, further hobble the already broken food safety review process. 

The bill is known as the FDA Review and Evaluation for Safe, Healthy and Affordable Foods, or FRESH and Affordable Foods Act. It would gut rules on the information companies must provide the FDA when submitting a notice that a food chemical is GRAS.

The following is a statement from Melanie Benesh, EWG vice president for government affairs: 

The federal government’s decision to push back its timeline for proposing changes to the broken GRAS system is yet another reminder that consumers cannot afford to wait for Washington to act.

For years, the FDA has failed to adequately oversee food chemicals, leaving states to fill the void by passing commonsense protections against harmful food chemicals linked to serious health risks. 

A delay in this long-promised rulemaking only reinforces why states must continue leading the way.

Congress should not respond by tying states’ hands. 

Lawmakers should reject misguided preemption proposals like the FRESH Act, which would strip states of their ability to protect families while weakening, not strengthening, federal oversight of food chemicals.

The federal government is taking longer to close the GRAS loophole. But the last thing Congress should do is block the states that are already taking action. Americans deserve stronger protections from harmful food chemicals, not more delays and fewer safeguards.

###

The Environmental Working Group (EWG) is a nonprofit, non-partisan organization that empowers people to live healthier lives in a healthier environment. Through research, advocacy and unique education tools, EWG drives consumer choice and civic action.

Areas of Focus Food & Water Food Ultra-Processed Foods Toxic Chemicals Food Chemicals Press Contact Iris Myers iris@ewg.org (202) 939-9126 July 9, 2026

The Toxic Legacy of Eighty Years of U.S. Military Occupation

Part 2 of a 3-part series.  Part 1 examined PFAS at Pituffik Space Base; while Part 3 will survey the appeals U.S. veterans have filed with the U.S. Veterans Administration, claiming cancers and disease as a result of their exposure to toxins in Greenland.

By Pat Elder
July 9, 2026

“Greenland doesn’t really help Denmark. Denmark doesn’t spend money to really help Greenland, but it’s important for the United States... It should be controlled by the United States, not by Denmark.” — U.S. President Donald Trump, speaking in Ankara, Türkiye, July 7, 2026, Photo CNBC

Introduction

President Donald Trump's July 2026 remarks criticizing Denmark's relationship with Greenland provide an unexpected backdrop for this report. Although the President did not specify what he meant by Denmark "not spending money to really help Greenland," his comments invite a broader examination of the responsibilities that accompany the American military presence and strategic interest on the world's largest island.

The geopolitical tensions have been extraordinary. Following President Trump's repeated suggestions earlier this year that he might use military force to acquire Greenland, Danish military planners reportedly developed highly classified contingency plans that included destroying key Greenlandic airfields if the United States attempted an invasion, according to the BBC.

On April 1, 2026, The New York Times reported that the Trump administration was negotiating with Denmark for access to three additional military installations in Greenland. According to the newspaper, two of the proposed sites were former American bases abandoned following the Cold War. The report underscored Greenland's renewed strategic importance at a moment when many of the environmental consequences of earlier U.S. military operations remain unresolved.

For more than eighty years, the United States has maintained an extensive network of military installations across Greenland. Those bases left behind nuclear radiation, fuel spills, abandoned infrastructure, military waste, contaminated landfills, PCB-containing materials, asbestos, unexploded ordnance, and, at several locations, documented PFAS contamination associated with firefighting activities.

Successive Danish and Greenlandic governments have invested substantial public resources investigating former American installations, documenting contamination, and, in some rare cases, undertaking cleanup projects. The United States has strongly maintained that it bears no legal obligation to restore former facilities to their original condition, relying on provisions contained in Article XI of the 1951 Defense Agreement: “It is understood that any areas or facilities made available to the  Government of the United States of America under this Agreement need not be left in the condition in which they were at the time they were thus made available.”

As a result, almost all of the financial burden for assessing and addressing contamination has fallen on Denmark and Greenland rather than on the guilty party that established and operated the installations.

When the U.S. upgraded its radar systems in 2004, Greenland attempted to compel  the United States to clean up former U.S. bases on the island.  U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the legal responsibility for cleaning up older, abandoned bases had already transferred to local/Danish authorities and would remain there.  Because the U.S. maintained this legal stance, the Danish government ultimately agreed to pay for the cleanup.

In 2018 the Danish government relented by investing around 24 million Euro to “clean-up” the abandoned bases. It is a paltry sum. By 2024, progress on the clean-up had been slow. Only around 5.3 million Euro has been spent. That figure is almost irrelevant when measured against the scale of cleaning up the horror at Camp Century alone.

No public authority has produced a comprehensive cleanup estimate for Camp Century. Given the scale of the buried infrastructure, the Arctic environment, and the costs associated with excavating, transporting, and disposing of radioactive and hazardous materials, the eventual cost could reasonably reach into the billions of euros.

This report provides a consolidated overview of former United States military installations in Greenland and their documented environmental legacy. It is based primarily on the groundbreaking investigative reporting and field research published by the Danish newspaper Politiken supplemented by publicly available reports from the Government of Greenland, the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), NIRAS, U.S. government agencies, scientific literature, and historical records.

Military Poisons is indebted to the journalists, editors, photographers, and researchers at Politiken for their exceptional work documenting the environmental legacy of former U.S. military activities in Greenland. Their reporting has significantly advanced public understanding of these historically important sites and provided an invaluable foundation for further research.

The individual descriptions of each installation have been substantially condensed from the original source material to provide readers with a concise reference to the history, environmental conditions, and current status of each site. While every effort has been made to accurately reflect the available public record, this report is intended as a summary and research aid rather than a substitute for the original investigations and technical reports.

Taken together, these installations reveal a remarkably consistent pattern spanning more than eight decades of American military operations in Greenland. Facilities ranging from major air bases to isolated weather stations and LORAN navigation sites were frequently abandoned with fuel drums, vehicles, construction materials, electrical equipment, batteries, hazardous building materials, and waste disposal areas left in place. Environmental investigations have repeatedly documented petroleum contamination, Polychlorinated biphenyls PCBs, asbestos, mercury, lead, cadmium, and other heavy metals, while many sites remain only partially characterized because comprehensive environmental assessments have never been completed.  Camp Century occupies a category of its own. Unlike the conventional military installations scattered across Greenland, the underground nuclear-powered base left behind highly toxic radioactive waste, diesel fuel, sewage, and thousands of tons of construction materials beneath the Greenland Ice Sheet.

One of the more striking findings is how unevenly these sites have been investigated. A few former bases have undergone detailed engineering studies involving soil, water, sediment, and waste characterization. Others have received only scant historical inventories documenting visible structures and debris. Several installations—including Camp Tuto, Camp Fistclench, the Ice Cap Sites, and a number of protected-area weather stations—have never undergone comprehensive environmental assessments.

Cleanup efforts have likewise been inconsistent. Denmark initiated a political agreement in 2018 to begin addressing contamination at selected former American installations, but remediation has progressed slowly. Several major sites remain only partially cleaned despite years of planning. Other installations, including Pituffik Space Base and several research camps within the active military reservation, are excluded from testing and remediation because they remain operational. Somehow, sharing environmental secrets involving levels of PCB’s, PFAS, Radiation, and Mercury are matters of national security. The same holds true from Weisbaden, Germany to Yokosuka, Japan to Honolulu, Hawaii. Victims in these locations cry out for data and justice.

As Greenland assumes greater strategic importance and climate change accelerates the exposure of long-buried Cold War infrastructure, the environmental legacy of former U.S. military installations is likely to receive increasing international attention. This report seeks to provide a concise, evidence-based reference to what is presently known about these sites, where significant uncertainties remain, and where additional investigation is long overdue.

What’s in a drum?

Throughout Greenland, former American military installations are littered with hundreds of thousands of abandoned steel fuel drums. Many reportedly contained residual gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel, lubricating oil, or other petroleum products when they were discarded. As these drums corrode over time, residual fuels and additives leach into surrounding soils and surface waters. Among the contaminants of greatest concern are petroleum hydrocarbons and volatile organic compounds, particularly the BTEX chemicals—benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes—along with polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and other fuel constituents, like PCB’s. See our rundown on the 36 contaminated sites below. First, please consider helping us financially.

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Before reading on, Please support our testing in Fort Ord, California.

The distance from Fort Ord, California, to Nuuk, Greenland is only about 3,300 miles. Most people are surprised to learn that.

This fall, I will travel to Fort Ord to meet with a dozen local environmental advocates, scientists, and Army veterans who are deeply concerned about the rapid redevelopment of the former Army base. New apartments, homes, schools, parks, and retail centers continue to be built over land that contains some of the military's deadliest legacy contamination.

‍Over the years, almost 2,000 local residents, former service members, and civilian workers have told us about cancers and other illnesses they believe are connected to their exposure at Fort Ord.

‍We are especially concerned about large groundwater plumes containing trichloroethylene (TCE), tetrachloroethylene (PCE), and carbon tetrachloride (CT). These chemicals can migrate into buildings as vapor, potentially affecting the air people breathe inside their homes and workplaces. We are also concerned about the possible presence and movement of PFAS ("forever chemicals") and other toxic contaminants in groundwater, soil, surface water, and indoor dust.

‍Our goal is to collect independent environmental samples, work with qualified experts, and make the results available to the public. We believe communities deserve reliable information about the environment where they live, work, and raise their families. We need your help. We need to pay for airfare for three of us (from Maryland, Ohio, and Michigan). We must pay for lodging for four nights. (two stars..) And then, we have to pay for the testing. We already have the Cyclopure test kits for PFAS. We still need to pay for testing of soil, air, and water at different locations. $10,000 is our goal.
See who “we” are.

If you have supported Military Poisons in the past, we hope you will consider helping us again. If you didn’t receive a personal thank you, I apologize. Every donation helps us bring greater transparency to this community living with the environmental legacy of military contamination.

‍ Thank you for standing with us.   Go here, to the bottom of the page to contribute. https://www.fortordcontamination.org/ Now, back to Greenland.

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Part I — The Bluie West Installations

Bluie West 1 (Narsarsuaq) U.S. Operation:1942–1958

The largest American air base in Greenland during World War II, Bluie West 1 served as a major refueling stop for thousands of aircraft enroute to Europe. When the United States departed in 1958, it left behind extensive debris, including aircraft wreckage, oil drums, batteries, cables, machinery, buried scrap metal, and asbestos from the former military hospital. Local officials report that waste was buried in multiple layers beneath the site. Although asbestos hazards have been documented for years, the installation is not included in Denmark's current cleanup program.

Note: Bluie West Two  was a planned World War II United States military site in southwest Greenland that proved unusable and was ultimately rejected.

Bluie West 3 (Simiutaq) U.S. Operation:1942–1958

Established as a weather and radio station supporting aircraft operations at Narsarsuaq, Bluie West 3 now contains approximately 4,400 metric tons of abandoned military waste. The site includes rusting oil drums, construction materials, battery components, shipwreck debris, pipelines, and large abandoned fuel tanks. Environmental investigations have documented severe petroleum contamination, including mobile free-phase oil capable of migrating through soil. Elevated PCB concentrations, lead contamination, and petroleum impacts to nearby marine sediments and mussels make Simiutaq one of Greenland's most extensively documented contaminated military sites.

Bluie West 4 (Marraq / Teague Airfield) U.S. Operation: 1942–1948

Built as an emergency landing field and weather station south of Nuuk, Marraq was abandoned with thousands of oil drums, diesel generators, vehicles, radio equipment, barges, and buried scrap metal. Investigators estimated that at least 120,000 liters of diesel fuel contaminated the site, with petroleum odors still evident decades after abandonment. Surveys also identified asbestos, PCBs, and mercury contamination. Officials concluded that pollutants posed potential risks to freshwater ecosystems, marine organisms, and shellfish inhabiting the adjacent fjord. Cleanup operations began in 2019 but remain unfinished.

Bluie West 5 (Aasiaat) U.S. Operation:1942–1958

Bluie West 5 functioned as a weather station near present-day Aasiaat during World War II. Although the site has been used for other purposes over the years, environmental investigations have clearly identified American military debris, including deteriorating buildings and stockpiles of rusted oil drums. More than five metric tons of hazardous or contaminated waste remain. Soil testing has documented elevated concentrations of lead and cadmium associated with the former U.S. installation. Questions regarding present ownership have complicated decisions concerning remediation.

Bluie West 6 (Pituffik / Thule Air Base / Pituffik Space Base) U.S. Operation:1942–Present

Originally established as the Bluie West 6 weather station during World War II, the installation expanded dramatically under the secret Project Blue Jay and became Thule Air Base in 1952, now known as Pituffik Space Base. The installation remains the only active U.S. military base in Greenland. Historic investigations have identified at least fifty waste disposal areas surrounding the base, including former missile silos converted into landfills. Long-term PCB contamination has been documented in nearby marine environments, but because the base remains operational, it has largely been excluded from Denmark's national cleanup program.

Bluie West 7 / Navy 26 / Grønnedal

U.S. Operation:1943–1951 (later operated by Denmark until 2012)

Established near Ivigtut during World War II, Bluie West 7 was accompanied by the adjacent U.S. Navy 26 installation, later transferred to Denmark and renamed Grønnedal. Investigations have documented extensive petroleum and groundwater contamination migrating toward Arsuk Fjord. Large American dump sites contain vehicles, hazardous wastes, and an estimated 20,000 cubic meters of discarded material. Underwater surveys have identified additional debris in the fjord, including a tanker truck, crane, tracked vehicle, and other equipment. Cleanup costs are now estimated at between DKK 100 and 200 million.

Bluie West 8 (Kangerlussuaq / Søndre Strømfjord) U.S. Operation:1941–1992‍ ‍

Built before the United States entered World War II, Kangerlussuaq became one of Greenland's most important military airfields and later served Cold War radar operations before transitioning into Greenland's principal civilian airport. The United States left behind oil drum dumps, unexploded ammunition, scrap metal, and abandoned military structures. Local residents have criticized the burning of open landfills containing American military waste. Greenlandic officials have also alleged that diesel fuel was intentionally dumped into nearby lakes for mosquito control, with reports that some waters still exhibit petroleum odors decades later.

Bluie West 9 (Cruncher Island) U.S. Operation:1942–1986

Constructed to support weather observations and aviation operations associated with Kangerlussuaq, Bluie West 9 remained active for more than four decades. The abandoned installation contains building ruins, generators, vehicles, cables, pipes, waste dumps, and approximately 1.5 metric tons of discarded batteries. Environmental investigations documented elevated concentrations of petroleum, lead, cadmium, copper, zinc, and mercury in soils. Approximately eleven metric tons of hazardous or contaminated waste remain. Danish and Greenlandic authorities have identified the site as a priority for future cleanup.

Part II — The Bluie East Installations

Bluie East 1 (Ikerasassuaq / Prince Christian Sound) U.S. Operation:1942–1945 (later operated by the Danish Meteorological Institute) No Photo

Established as a weather and radio station near Cape Farewell, Bluie East 1 played an important role in Allied North Atlantic weather forecasting during World War II. The installation consisted of a harbor, power plant, radio facilities, living quarters, and support buildings connected by a long wooden staircase. Unlike many other American installations in Greenland, little is known about what environmental contamination remains. Danish authorities report that no formal environmental assessment has been conducted, leaving uncertainty about whether hazardous materials from the wartime occupation persist beneath or around the site. 

Bluie East 2 (Ikkatteq) U.S. Operation:1942–1947

Ikkatteq was one of the largest American airfields on Greenland's east coast, serving as both a refueling stop and radio surveillance station with a wartime population approaching 600 personnel. When abandoned, the base contained more than 100,000 oil drums scattered across the landscape, dozens of military vehicles, batteries, collapsed buildings, and structures containing asbestos. Environmental investigations documented extensive petroleum contamination together with PCBs, lead, and cadmium. Authorities concluded that contamination posed direct risks to both wildlife and people. Although cleanup began years ago, significant remediation remains unfinished.

Bluie East 3 (Walrus Bay) U.S. Operation: 1942–1945

This small weather and radio station on Greenland's east coast supported Allied operations with a complement of approximately fourteen personnel. Although relatively modest in size, environmental investigators classified the site's overall environmental impact as significant. Abandoned structures, fuel drum storage areas, and military debris remained after the American withdrawal. Scrap metal was removed in 2022, but no comprehensive environmental investigation has been completed, leaving unanswered questions regarding remaining soil and groundwater contamination. 

Bluie East 4 (Ella Island) U.S. Operation: 1942–1945 No Photo

Located within what is now Northeast Greenland National Park, Bluie East 4 served as a wartime weather and radio station. Limited information survives regarding the installation, although investigators have identified abandoned building foundations likely containing petroleum residues and mercury. Engineering studies characterize the site's environmental impact as moderate, but its protected status has limited investigation and cleanup activities. Consequently, the full extent of contamination remains unknown.

Bluie East 5 (Eskimonæs) U.S. Operation: 1942–1943 No photo

Bluie East 5 was the northernmost American installation on Greenland's east coast. The original station was destroyed during a German raid in 1943, after which operations were relocated elsewhere. Environmental investigations suggest that mercury contamination and petroleum residues remain at the original location. Because the site lies within a protected national park, it has been excluded from Denmark's post-2018 cleanup initiative. No comprehensive environmental assessment has yet been completed, leaving the extent of contamination uncertain.

Cape Cort Adelaer U.S. Operation: Approximately 1943–1945

Cape Cort Adelaer served as a small weather and radio station supporting Allied operations along Greenland's eastern coast. Investigators have identified abandoned fuel storage tanks and numerous building foundations remaining from the American occupation. Engineering assessments conclude that the site likely contains mercury, petroleum contamination, asbestos, and heavy metals, resulting in an overall environmental impact classified as significant. Although historical research has begun, no comprehensive environmental investigation has yet been completed.

Skjoldungen (Louis Boplads) U.S. Operation: 1943–Approximately 1948

Constructed as a weather station during World War II, Skjoldungen appears to have been abandoned largely intact. Engineering investigations describe large quantities of scattered waste, including chemicals, broken glass, discarded clothing, medication residues, and other debris left where they were originally discarded. Environmental assessments conclude that mercury, petroleum contamination, heavy metals, and asbestos are likely present, resulting in a significant environmental impact. Historical investigations are underway, although no comprehensive field assessment has yet been completed.

Atterbery Dome (Comanche Bay) U.S. Operation: Approximately 1943–1945

Atterbery Dome was a small radio and rescue station established during World War II along Greenland's east coast. Although modest in size, engineering investigations classify its environmental impact as significant. Remaining contamination is believed to include petroleum residues, mercury, asbestos, and heavy metals associated with deteriorating military infrastructure. Authorities have commissioned historical research to better document the installation before determining whether a full environmental investigation or cleanup should proceed.

Part III — Camp Century, the Pituffik Research Camps, Ice Cap Sites, and DYE Stations

Camp Century U.S. Operation:1959–1966(dangerous nuclear reactor operated 1960–1964)

Constructed beneath the Greenland Ice Sheet approximately 150 miles east of Thule Air Base, Camp Century was the most ambitious American military installation ever built in the Arctic. Although presented publicly as a scientific research station, it also served as a testbed for Project Iceworm, a classified proposal to deploy nuclear missiles beneath the ice.

Politiken reports: "When the camp was abandoned, the nuclear reactor had been removed, but an estimated 24 million liters of radioactive cooling wastewater, 200,000 liters of diesel fuel, sewage, and roughly 9,000 metric tons of construction debris were left entombed beneath the ice. As climate warming accelerates ice loss, researchers warn these materials could eventually re-enter the environment."

Military Poisons note: NASA’s summary of the underlying scientific research describes the waste inventory somewhat differently. According to NASA, Camp Century contains approximately 200,000 liters of diesel fuel, 24 million liters of wastewater, including sewage, an unknown quantity of low-level radioactive waste, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). NASA's description does not characterize the entire 24 million liters of wastewater as "radioactive cooling wastewater."

Camp Nuto (Nunatarssuaq Take Off / Camp Red Rock) U.S. Operation:Approximately 1953–1960s   No Photo

‍Camp Nuto was one of several research facilities established near Thule Air Base to study the engineering properties of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Researchers conducted experiments on ice ramps and vehicle operations under Arctic conditions that supported later military construction projects. Environmental investigations indicate petroleum contamination remains at the site, although the overall environmental impact has been classified as moderate. Because Camp Nuto lies within the active Pituffik military complex, it has not been included in Denmark's national cleanup program and has received only limited environmental evaluation.

Camp Tuto (Thule Take Off) U.S. Operation:1954–Early 1960s‍ ‍

Located roughly 25 kilometers southeast of Thule Air Base, Camp Tuto became one of the Army's principal Arctic engineering laboratories. Approximately 450 personnel were stationed there to study tunnel construction beneath glaciers and excavation through frozen permafrost. Engineers built a 400-meter tunnel within the ice to evaluate the feasibility of large underground military facilities. Little public information exists concerning waste left behind, and no comprehensive environmental investigation has been reported. Because the camp remains within the broader Pituffik military area, it has not been scheduled for cleanup.

Camp Fistclench U.S. Operation:Mid-1950s–1959 No Photo

Camp Fistclench served as the direct predecessor to Camp Century. Constructed beneath the ice using covered trenches, the installation allowed Army engineers to test construction techniques later employed for the much larger Camp Century project. Scientific work focused on snow mechanics, ice behavior, and the effects of explosives on glacial ice. Following completion of Camp Century, Camp Fistclench was abandoned. Little documentation exists concerning remaining debris or contamination, and no comprehensive environmental assessment has been reported.

Ice Cap Site I U.S. Operation:1953–1954 to late 1950s No Photo

Ice Cap Site I formed part of an experimental network of radar stations constructed on the Greenland Ice Sheet to provide early warning of potential Soviet air attacks against Thule Air Base. Harsh environmental conditions and the logistical difficulty of maintaining the station limited its operational life. Publicly available information does not identify what equipment or waste remains beneath the ice, and no formal environmental assessment has been conducted.

Ice Cap Site II  U.S. Operation:1953–1954 to late 1950s No Photo

Constructed alongside Ice Cap Site I, this radar installation supported the defense of Thule Air Base during the early years of the Cold War. The station was abandoned after only a few years because maintaining remote facilities on the moving ice sheet proved impractical. Little information is available regarding remaining infrastructure or environmental contamination, and no comprehensive environmental investigation has been completed.

DYE-1 (Red River)   U.S. Operation:1950s–1988

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DYE-1 was one of four massive radar stations comprising Greenland's portion of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, established to detect Soviet bombers approaching North America across the Arctic. The mountaintop installation featured a large radar dome and extensive support facilities. Following closure in 1988, the Greenland Self-Government reportedly undertook cleanup activities, burying waste dumps and storage areas. Unlike many former U.S. installations, DYE-1 is generally considered to have undergone substantial remediation, although little environmental data has been published.

 

DYE-2 (Sea Bass) U.S. Operation: Late 1950s–1980s

Built directly on the Greenland Ice Sheet, DYE-2 monitored Arctic airspace around the clock as part of the DEW Line. Fuel tanks and heavy infrastructure were embedded within the ice. The station was abandoned rapidly at the end of its operational life, leaving large quantities of equipment behind with the expectation that the ice sheet would permanently entomb the facility.

DYE-3 (Sob Story) U.S. Operation: Late 1950s–1980s

Like DYE-2, DYE-3 operated as an elevated radar station supported by ski-equipped aircraft that delivered personnel and supplies onto the Greenland Ice Sheet. In 1972, a U.S. Air Force C-130 transport crash-landed near the station. After useful equipment was removed, much of the aircraft was buried within the ice. The station itself was abandoned with substantial infrastructure remaining.  

Politiken reports that the United States contributed funds for cleanup at DYE-2 and DYE-3, but publicly available records I reviewed do not substantiate that claim.

The documented cleanup agreement appears to have been financed by Denmark and Greenland, not the United States.

DYE-4 (Big Gun) U.S. Operation:1950s–1991

Perched atop a mountain near Kulusuk, DYE-4 was the easternmost radar station in Greenland's DEW Line. The installation contained massive rotating radar antennas housed within a large radome that monitored northern airspace throughout the Cold War. After closure in 1991, the station was dismantled by Greenland authorities in 1994, and much of the material was buried in local landfills. Only foundations remain visible today. No formal environmental assessment has been reported following the demolition.

This section highlights a striking contrast. Many of the World War II installations were abandoned with visible debris—oil drums, vehicles, buildings, and dumps. The Cold War facilities often left a different legacy: buried infrastructure, petroleum products, and, in the case of Camp Century, radioactive wastewater and diesel fuel sealed beneath the ice. As the Greenland Ice Sheet continues to thin, these hidden legacies may become increasingly important to environmental monitoring and international policy.

Part IV — LORAN Stations, Radio Stations, Artillery Sites, and Other Installations

Gamatron U.S. Operation:1942–1958

Established near present-day Qaqortoq, Gamatron served as a weather station, radio station, and submarine observation post supporting Allied operations in the North Atlantic. After the Americans departed, they left 34 buildings, six storage areas containing hundreds of oil drums, multiple waste dumps, and an estimated 175–185 metric tons of abandoned military waste. Environmental investigations found contamination severe enough that water from a nearby lake was declared unsuitable for drinking because of pollution originating from an abandoned dump.

 

Qutdleq U.S. Operation: 1960–1978

Qutdleq was constructed as a LORAN (Long Range Navigation) station on a small island in southeastern Greenland. Following its closure, numerous deteriorating buildings, communications masts, and large fuel storage tanks remained on the site. While the abandoned infrastructure is well documented, no comprehensive environmental investigation has yet been completed, leaving uncertainty regarding possible petroleum contamination or hazardous materials associated with the former installation.

Orssuiagssuaq U.S. Operation:1960–1977

Built as another LORAN navigation station, Orssuiagssuaq was abandoned with communications towers, storage tanks, ruined buildings, and deteriorating barracks still standing decades after closure. Although the physical remains have been documented photographically, authorities have not yet completed an environmental assessment. Historical investigations are expected before decisions are made regarding cleanup or remediation of the site.

Sabine Island U.S. Operation:1959–Early 1960s

Sabine Island housed a small unmanned radio beacon located within a protected bird sanctuary. Although the station itself was modest, approximately thirty-five discarded industrial batteries remain near the antenna building, many with exposed lead cores. Authorities have concluded that the battery dump presents a potential source of heavy metal contamination. Because the installation lies within a protected wildlife area, no formal environmental assessment or cleanup has been scheduled.

 

Nipisat U.S. Operation: 1954–1975

Nipisat served as a LORAN navigation station on Greenland's west coast. Environmental investigations documented multiple oil and gasoline storage tanks together with at least three confirmed petroleum spills. Engineers concluded that the site also contains PCBs, pesticides, mercury, heavy metals, and asbestos. One municipal official described the abandoned station as "something of a disaster," noting that extensive vandalism had left the once-important military installation in a severely deteriorated condition despite its location in an area of exceptional natural value.

 Angissoq U.S. Operation: 1963–1994 No Photo

One of Greenland's last LORAN navigation stations, Angissoq remained in operation until satellite navigation rendered the system obsolete. The abandoned installation includes remnants of twenty-three buildings, a power plant, fuel storage facilities, and coastal waste dumps. Environmental investigators documented petroleum contamination near former fuel tanks and observed that coastal erosion is gradually exposing buried waste to the sea. A comprehensive environmental investigation has not yet been completed.

Cape Atholl U.S. Operation: 1954–1972

Located near Thule Air Base, Cape Atholl operated as a U.S. Coast Guard LORAN navigation station. Environmental investigations documented severe petroleum contamination, including free-phase oil, PCB-contaminated building materials, batteries, cable scrap, burned refuse, and mixed waste buried in coastal bluffs. Investigators observed erosion exposing buried debris directly onto the shoreline, creating potential pathways into the marine environment. The site also presents possible risks to wildlife, including walruses using nearby beaches. Danish and Greenlandic authorities are planning cleanup operations.

Artillery Point U.S. Operation: 1941–1946

Artillery Point defended the strategically important Narsarsuaq airfield with two 155-mm coastal guns during World War II. Following the war, approximately seventeen metric tons of military waste remained, including abandoned buildings, construction materials, and a small landfill. Environmental investigations identified petroleum contamination together with low concentrations of lead and cadmium. Because the contamination is relatively limited and the site possesses historical significance, the National Museum of Greenland has recommended that the area remain largely undisturbed.

 

Camp Corbett U.S. Operation: 1942–1958

Camp Corbett functioned as a communications station supporting the nearby Narsarsuaq air base. The installation contained emergency generators, fuel tanks, hundreds of utility poles, multiple dumps, and buried waste disposal areas. Investigators estimate that at least 377 metric tons of military waste remain, including approximately 314 metric tons classified as hazardous or contaminated. Contaminants include PCBs, asbestos, heavy metals, and tar residues. Cleanup has begun, but officials report that massive reinforced concrete foundations will require extensive excavation and blasting before remediation can be completed.

Conclusion

While the Trump administration is “negotiating” with Denmark for access to three additional military installations in Greenland, and President Trump is making threatening remarks about U.S. intentions, the talks between Washington, Copenhagen, and Nuuk remain fixated on sovereignty and strategic positioning. Consequently, a critical geopolitical blind spot persists: the massive environmental liabilities scattered across dozens of legacy American military installations. These sites contain a hazardous catalog of contaminated soils, abandoned landfills, deteriorating fuel infrastructure, PCBs, petroleum, unexploded ordnance, and PFAS. Most critically, Camp Century holds radioactive and toxic waste entombed beneath the rapidly melting Greenland Ice Sheet.

Although President Trump’s critique of Danish spending in Greenland was likely unmoored from these specific ecological realities, it inadvertently highlighted a profound structural failure. The paltry sums Copenhagen has allocated to investigate and remediate this contamination pale in comparison to the actual scale of the crisis. Remediation at Camp Century alone could soar into billions of euros.

How, then, in the face of this catastrophic reality, can the Danish government continue to hide behind passive diplomatic platitudes?

While the Danish Foreign Minister publicly insists that Denmark will protect Greenland’s independence from political takeover, why are they not screaming from the rooftops about eighty years of toxic American negligence?

The environmental criminality cannot be overstated while Copenhagen treats this assault as a footnote. As Danish officials sit at the negotiating table to grant the U.S. military even more access to Greenlandic soil, why are they not aggressively demanding full, immediate remediation as a non-negotiable prerequisite? How can Copenhagen claim to stand for Greenlandic sovereignty while letting the United States get away with a multi-billion-dollar ecological crime?

Please see the Greenland Appendix containing a spreadsheet that displays the kinds of information shown here on all 36 abandoned sites in Greenland.

Ebola is once again making headlines and has been declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern — the World Health Organization’s highest level of alert — after cases crossed the border from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into Uganda.

For many people this feels too distant to be of concern, but scientists and public health experts have been warning us that the conditions that allow Ebola and other diseases to spread from animals to humans have been building for decades.

Around 60% of known infectious diseases in humans are zoonotic (diseases that are transmitted between animals and people), and up to 75% of new and emerging infectious diseases have animal origins, mostly from wildlife. Nearly all WHO Public Health Emergencies of International Concern have been caused by diseases of animal origin: H1N1 (2009), Ebola (2014), Zika (2016), Ebola (2019), COVID-19 (2020), Mpox (2022 and 2024), and now this 2026 Ebola outbreak, which is spreading across the region at an alarming pace and scale.

To understand the potential threat, consider that the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was the largest since the virus was reported in 1976. There were more cases and deaths in that outbreak than all others combined; more than 28,600 people became infected and 11,325 died.

This current outbreak is particularly concerning because this strain of Ebola (Bundibugyo) has no approved vaccine or therapeutics, and available diagnostic tests often fail to detect it. This means case numbers are very likely underestimated, and the true scale of transmission is uncertain. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region, high population mobility, including urban spread, and confirmed cross-border transmission create the perfect conditions for quick escalation. Ebola has devastating consequences once it infects people, with previous outbreaks recording case fatality rates ranging from approximately 30% to 66%, underscoring the importance of preventing spillover before it occurs.

How Spillover Happens

Fruit bats are one of the natural reservoir hosts, meaning they can carry the virus long term without becoming sick themselves. But it’s not just bats: Great apes, monkeys, duikers, chevrotains, pangolins, and other species are intermediate hosts, meaning they can carry and pass the virus on to humans.

It’s no coincidence that many of these species are also commonly hunted, traded, and sold in bushmeat and wildlife markets across Central and West Africa. Recent research by my organization, World Animal Protection, documented the pangolin trade on TikTok in West Africa and highlights how wildlife trade networks are increasingly operating both in physical markets and online, expanding opportunities for zoonotic disease spread. People who handle or eat the bushmeat can become infected through direct contact with the blood, bodily fluids, or tissues of infected animals, with the virus spreading through communities, person-to-person.

The risks are man-made and wholly preventable. When wild animals are captured, transported, confined, and slaughtered under stressful and inhumane conditions, we create the perfect storm for disease. At every stage of the trade chain, from capture and transport to sale and slaughter, wild animals are exposed to stress, injury, deprivation, and close confinement with other species they would rarely encounter in the wild. This weakens animals’ immune systems and increases opportunities for pathogens to spread between species, including to humans.

Why Habitat Loss and Wildlife Exploitation Matter

One major driver of Ebola risk is habitat destruction. When people clearcut or fragment forests for logging, mining, road building, and agricultural expansion, the chance of disease spillover increases. Studies of previous Ebola outbreaks (2004–2014) confirm that infection hotspots tend to occur in areas with greater forest fragmentation. As people gain access to previously undisturbed habitats, human activities such as hunting and bushmeat consumption increase the risk exponentially.

Commercial wildlife trade is another key driver of the high-risk conditions that produce spillover events. Wild animals transported across regions and borders, contained and slaughtered in markets with inadequate biosecurity and poor health conditions, and handled by people with little or no protective gear, pose an ongoing threat. Each time an animal is handled is an accident waiting to happen.

Species linked to Ebola spillover, including pangolins and primates, continue to be hunted and traded for meat and other purposes throughout the region despite the well-documented public health risks.

Although surveillance is a critical part of managing diseases, it only works when a disease is already present and people are showing symptoms. But with a disease like Ebola, this is already too late; by the time symptoms arrive, we’re playing catchup to limit further spread. Taking upstream action to prevent diseases from spilling over to people is the most meaningful way to prevent outbreaks and pandemics in the first place.

So here we are again talking about pandemic prevention. It’s significantly less costly than response in both economic and societal terms — a recent study estimates that a decade of pandemic prevention measures would cost around 2% of the economic damage caused by COVID-19 alone. Taking preventive action — including protecting habitats, ending commercial wildlife trade activities, and reducing human–animal interactions — is a smart, cost-effective investment.

From Evidence to Policy Action

The scientific community has been warning us of this growing risk for years. In 2020 the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) convened a panel of experts who concluded that land-use change, wildlife exploitation, and biodiversity loss are the primary drivers of pandemic emergence — and called explicitly for reducing the commercial exploitation of wild animals.

The report also reinforced growing scientific understanding that animal, human, and ecosystem health are inseparable. Poor treatment of wild animals is not only an ethical issue. It is also a public health issue.

Research by World Animal Protection has gone further, demonstrating that the commercial wildlife trade does not create isolated risks. Instead it generates feedback loops between poor animal welfare, pathogen transmission, ecosystem degradation, and governance failures.

Ending commercial wildlife trade — not simply regulating it or monitoring it — is what will break the cycle. If wild animals continue to be exploited, commodified, and transported through commercial supply chains, the conditions for future spillover events will remain.

At the international level, momentum has been building. The WHO Pandemic Agreement, adopted in 2025 after years of negotiation, recognizes the critical role of prevention and addressing drivers at the human–animal–environment interface. It also enshrines the One Health approach, recognizing that human, animal, and ecosystem health are interconnected — a landmark achievement.

For wildlife the impact is significant. Protecting forests and ending the commercial exploitation of wild creatures helps keep them within their natural habitats and can help keep them safer from disease and exploitation. For people, prevention not only saves lives but is far less costly than responding after an outbreak has begun.

Ultimately, if we want to save lives — of both people and animals — we need to look at doing things differently. Prevention is the only cure.

References

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Bernstein, A. S., Ando, A. W., Loch-Temzelides, T., Vale, M. M., Li, B. V., Li, H., Busch, J., Chapman, C. A., Kinnaird, M., Nowak, K., Castro, M. C., Zambrana-Torrelio, C., Ahumada, J. A., Xiao, L., Roehrdanz, P., Kaufman, L., Hannah, L., Daszak, P., Pimm, S. L., & Dobson, A. P. (2022). The costs and benefits of primary prevention of zoonotic pandemics. Science Advances, 8(5), Article eabl4183. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abl4183

Dobson, A. P., Pimm, S. L., Hannah, L., Kaufman, L., Ahumada, J. A., Ando, A. W., Bernstein, A., Busch, J., Daszak, P., Engelmann, J., Kinnaird, M. F., Li, B. V., Loch-Temzelides, T., Lovejoy, T., Nowak, K., Roehrdanz, P. R., & Vale, M. M. (2020). Ecology and economics for pandemic prevention. Science, 369(6502), 379–381. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abc3189

D’Cruze, N., Green, J., Elwin, A., & Schmidt-Burbach, J. (2020). Trading tactics: Time to rethink the global trade in wildlife. Animals,10(12), 2456.

Finch, A., Gostin, L. O., Vora, N. M., Baylis, C., Dordelly Rosales, N., Hassan, L., Jamal, N., Niño, Y., Parravani, E., Pegger-Baur, T., Plowright, R. K., & Walzer, C. (2026). Elevating spillover prevention at the 2026 UN High-Level Meeting on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. The Lancet. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(26)00557-X

Gruetzmacher, K., Karesh, W. B., Amuasi, J. H., Arshad, A., Farlow, A., Gabrysch, S., Jetzkowitz, J., Lieberman, S., Palmer, C., Winkler, A. S., & Walzer, C. (2021). The Berlin principles on one health – bridging global health and conservation. Science of the Total Environment, 764, Article 142919. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.142919

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Leendertz, S. A. J., Wich, S. A., Ancrenaz, M., Bergl, R. A., Gonder, M. K., Humle, T., & Leendertz, F. H. (2017). Ebola in great apes – current knowledge, possibilities for vaccination, and implications for conservation and human health. Mammal Review, 47(2), 98–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/mam.12082

Le Guenno, B., Formenty, P., Wyers, M., Gounon, P., Walker, F., & Boesch, C. (1995). Isolation and partial characterisation of a new strain of Ebola virus. The lancet, 345(8960), 1271-1274.

Lindenmayer, J. M., & Kaufman, G. E. (2021). One health and one welfare. In T. Stephens (Ed.), One welfare in practice: The role of the veterinarian (Chapter 1). CRC Press.

Olivero, J., Fa, J. E., Real, R., Márquez, A. L., Farfán, M. A., Vargas, J. M., Gaveau, D., Salim, M. A., Park, D., Suter, J., King, S., Sheil, D., Leendertz, S. A., & Nasi, R. (2017). Recent loss of closed forests is associated with Ebola virus disease outbreaks. Scientific Reports, 7, Article 14291. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-14727-9

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Radical Democracy and Autonomy: What do we mean? - A Conversation ...

The Stay Grounded network has launched a new project called ‘Red Lines for Airports’. It seeks to unite and support groups campaigning against airport expansion projects and build power for a reduction of air traffic. As part of it, we’re running a European Tour, visiting members, and supporting with workshops and skill-shares. Here, Michaela Leitner shares the story of Vienna’s decades-long…

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The number of global climate initiatives launched or run by China has been growing since 2009, a new study shows.

But whether this will translate into China taking up the mantle of climate leadership remains an “open question”, says Dr Sun Yixian, study co-author and professor of sustainability governance at the University of Bath.

Sun’s team has compiled a database tracking all global environmental initiatives established from the 1980s onwards that were launched or run by China.

These initiatives are either created by China or co-created with other governments, or have operations that are mainly managed by Chinese institutions.

They range from research cooperation and south-south climate funding to high-level policy signalling, such as joint statements on climate change. 

In an interview with Carbon Brief, Sun discusses the key findings of the new “China’s Global Environmental Leadership” (CGEL) database.

He adds that it is not yet clear if the US withdrawal from the UN climate regime will change China’s role in global climate governance. 

The conversation covers how the number of China-led initiatives has changed over time, what these projects look like and how China’s approach to climate “leadership” is changing.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity. 

• Sun on the types of climate initiatives: “There are all different kinds of initiatives – we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. Or also by providing funding, for example.”
• On the rise in new climate initiatives: “From after 2009 and 2010, we’ve seen many initiatives – of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and even the last five years, from 2021…have been created.”
• On the impact of the Trump administration: “The shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners…Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question.” 
• On a growing focus on multilateral programmes: “What we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents. So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale.” 
• On a climate leadership ‘mindset’: “[Leading Chinese experts] said the government, and also people in China, are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time…in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. So, I think the question is whether this…will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country.” 
• On the future of China’s climate engagement: “My read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements…But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies.”
• On the future of multilateral climate negotiations: Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes. Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment. 

Carbon Brief: Thank you for joining us, Yixian. Your team has compiled a database of China’s “environmental leadership”. What do you mean by leadership and what did you find in relation to climate change?

Sun Yixian: Thanks Anika, it’s great to speak to Carbon Brief. Leadership is a very contested concept in social science, or especially in international relations. This is why we were very cautious when we thought about the name of this dataset, but we thought it was a good way to capture what we’re trying to do.

In this project, what we are trying to look at is China’s role in global environmental governance – China’s shifting role, especially from a more passive participant in global governance processes to play a more proactive role in developing or managing its own initiatives on transnational or cross-border environmental governance. 

So, [this includes] different environmental issues, but, of course, we found that climate change is a very important issue area. By leading, we are using the concept of governance – in a sense that we are looking at the initiatives where Chinese actors claim some authority over other audiences towards certain public goods. So, it’s trying to provide public goods, in different ways. We have come up with a typology of different governance functions, trying to look at what specific activities Chinese actors are doing, or what kind of public goods Chinese actors are delivering, to the audiences of different initiatives.

And by audience we mean…international actors. So, that means we are not interested in what China is doing domestically, but beyond its borders. 

CB: Could you explain what some of these climate initiatives look like in practice?

SY: This is very important, because it sounds very abstract if we just talk about leadership. In practical terms, there are all different kinds of initiatives – we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. 

Or also by providing funding, for example, China has created this south-south climate fund. It can also include research collaboration or producing knowledge – mainly between research institutes. 

It can be traditional leadership activities, in the sense of developing certain international regulatory frameworks or rules or standards – we call this rulemaking and standard-setting. It can also be pilot projects. China sometimes can start to work directly with some international partners to trial new ideas and new practices – what we call direct actions.

These are the different types of leadership activities that we look at and we actually code each initiative that meets the criteria of our database according to this topology, to try to look at what [the Chinese government] are looking at.

Some initiatives can do multiple things at the same time…One example is the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization [GEIDCO]. [This was] initially created by the State Grid of China to try to promote clean energy and energy interconnections. 

This initiative will deliver different types of activities, including building the capacity of some developing countries on energy and electricity grids, and also, for example, developing an international platform – they have annual international meeting and a lot of information-sharing activities, and engagement at UN meetings, including at COP side-events, and also directly engaging with some international organisations. 

So, this is an example of the type of leadership initiative that has been included in our database.

CB: And would you say that there’s one particular type of activity that dominates, in terms of China’s climate leadership? Or is it very evenly split against all of the different types? 

SY: This is also one of the main findings in our work. In the first paper we published to highlight the key patterns from the dataset, we highlighted that there’s a very uneven distribution in terms of what China tries to deliver or to promote, itself, internationally on environmental governance.

There have been a lot of initiatives focusing on sharing information and building platforms and this is the most dominant category – across all environmental issues, but the same pattern applies to climate change. 

In the first article we published in the Earth Systems Governance journal, we looked at the whole dataset, but we are also developing a few studies, currently under review. One paper particularly looks at climate initiatives and it’s the same pattern: information-sharing and networking.

At the same time, the least frequent or popular type is the provision of funding – creating some financing programmes to directly give funding to international partners. I think this reflects China’s position on environmental or climate finance, especially internationally. 

The number of different types of China-led climate initiatives established from 1991-2004. Source: CGEL database.

[China’s] not trying just to provide money, but really think about how to support other countries on more practical, more pragmatic terms. This is why I think that after information-sharing, what we have seen is capacity-building activities, which have also been quite frequently used by Chinese initiatives when collaborating with their international partners. This also explains China’s logic to teach [others] how to develop things, but not just giving money.

The other important category is research collaboration and knowledge production. This has been mainly led by research institutes in China, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, especially with a strong focus on scientific co-production. 

But, lately, we have also seen more and more initiatives focused on sharing knowledge not just about science itself, but sometimes also on the social sciences side – the experiences of China as a whole. China’s experiences can also be learned from by other countries, especially in the global south. 

These are just some examples, but the overall pattern is [a focus on] information-sharing, capacity building and knowledge production and not too much on provision of funding.

CB: You mentioned the GEIDCO example earlier. How much of a tangible impact would you say a lot of these initiatives have? Are they very high-level, strategic and quite abstract? Or do they kind of result in programmes on the ground? 

SY: That’s a very interesting question – the answer is that it really varies. GEIDCO, as you  mentioned, is a very high-level initiative. I think, initially, the idea of energy interconnection was proposed by President Xi himself. Now, of course, GEIDCO, with the backing of the State Grid, does a lot of high-level [national planning] and trans-national [grid network] planning work with developing countries.

But, at the same time, there are also a lot of grounded, locally focused initiatives. A lot, for example, are co-developed between China – especially supported by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment [MEE] – and UNEP [United Nations Environment Programme] in, for example, Africa and Southeast Asia. [This includes] some projects looking at climate adaptation and resilience. But these are more small-scale projects. 

So, in our database – and I welcome your readers to explore the database itself that you can see – there are a big variety of initiatives and their scope, their mission and their intended outcomes or impacts vary significantly. 

But we are just providing this public resource. Hopefully, people can use it to further explore, for example, the question of the impact or outcome. At this stage, we’re not going to assess what has been delivered, but I think if we can take, for example, a case-study approach – trying to trace what has been done, what has been delivered – this could also be a very interesting research agenda. 

CB: Is there a particular time from when China’s interest in engaging on climate change started, or has this been a very long-term process?

SY: In our database, we really wanted to capture the historical trend. That’s why we looked back from early on – [we focused on] from the beginning of this century, but also traced initiatives that had been created even earlier but became active in the 21st century. 

So we can [see that,] already in the late 1980s or 90s, there were some initiatives in the area of climate change. But, most importantly, the majority of the initiatives were started after 2008, mainly in the 2010s. We can see a very clear upward trend. It was not shown directly in our recently published article, but it’s in the database and we have looked at the data and produced a graph for other studies we are currently developing. 

Really, from after 2009 and 2010, we’ve seen many initiatives – of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and, even the last five years, from 2021, we still see more and more initiatives have been created.

The number of new China-led international environmental initiatives focused on climate change established between 1991-2024. Source: CGEL database.

This timeframe corresponds to China’s shifting international role, to move from [being] a more regional power, a large developing country, to a global superpower, and trying to project its influence globally. 

That also correlates with, for example, the belt and road initiative and lately the global development initiative – China is trying to also use climate change in this broader policy framework and trying to promote and support climate action in different parts of the world.

CB: The database stops at 2024 – just before the current administration withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement. Have you noticed any changes in China’s global climate engagements following this? 

SY: I would say the trend is a continuous one, even with the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and lately from the UNFCCC. Because, as I mentioned earlier, over the past 10 years, we have seen this upward trend, with more and more new initiatives created by Chinese actors. 

But I think the shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners – or countries or actors that haven’t been engaged very closely with China – to work more closely with China.

Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question. 

We really want to explore [this] further. Something I didn’t mention earlier is we are publishing this data set as version one, we want to keep updating on a regular basis. We hope we’ll have versions two or three out, maybe every two years. We’ll see how things go, but I think this is a very important question. 

CB: Looking at how China is engaging with all of these different countries – as you mentioned, more and more potentially wanting to work with it following the US’s withdrawal – do you get the sense that the Chinese government prefers to engage with countries bilaterally, on a one-to-one basis, or are they also engaging at the regional and multilateral levels?

SY: This is a great question. This is also an important finding from our work, because the conventional understanding is that China prefers to engage with countries bilaterally. 

But, if we look at our database, what we can see is that, actually, China has developed more and more transnational initiatives – meaning that it also involves non-state actors or [works] beyond the traditional multilateral processes and [develops initiatives] with a global scope. 

If we look at the historical trends, initially – especially up to 2010 – there were a lot of bilateral initiatives. Most cases in our database are bilateral initiatives. 

But, lately, I think this trend is shifting. Still, I think there are many more bilateral initiatives than multilateral and transnational initiatives. 

How we differentiate leadership activities of Chinese [state] actors across different levels [affects the trend], but, lately, what we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents.

So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale. 

I think this is also quite interesting, to understand how not only the government, but also lots of Chinese actors – including, for example, businesses and civil society actors – are trying to project and their footprint globally. 

And also I think this reflects a shifting global role of China, in general. We can further explore what the implications of this phenomenon are. This is some ongoing research I’m doing – trying to understand how actors in different parts of the world react or perceive this changing rule of China and how such engagement between China and different countries shape, or reshape, the sustainability transition.

CB: You mentioned just then that there’s not just the Chinese government, but also civil society, businesses and other non-state actors. What role do you think these non-state organisations play in the country’s overall climate strategy and climate engagement?

SY: Let me start with the caveat that, first of all, as shown in our database, the government, or state actors, still play a very important role – especially central government agencies, for example, the MEE [Ministry of Ecology and Environment] or NDRC [National Development and Reform Commission]. 

But, at the same time, especially over the last 10 years, what we have seen is that non-state actors have become more active and engaged more, in various ways, in leading climate initiatives beyond China’s borders. 

This means, sometimes, they collaborate with state actors to co-develop certain initiatives. Sometimes, they develop their own initiatives with, of course, some support from the state. One thing we need to bear in mind is, in China, it’s almost impossible to [avoid involving] the state. At least, you have to closely align with the strategy of the government. 

But, at the same time, what we can see is the agency of these actors. They have developed or showed the ambition to develop certain initiatives, including, for example, standards in the critical mineral space, to provide guidelines to companies for their overseas activities.

Similarly, some civil society actors, [such as] research institutes, also want to claim their leadership in a global sphere, trying to showcase how they can lead certain activities and show how their expertise or their knowledge can support countries or actors in other parts of the world.

CB: On the standards-setting point, is that something where it might be led by one Chinese company with multiple partners – whether it be from one country or from various different countries in a region? Or is it a broad spectrum of Chinese companies coming together saying that we want to work with Chile, Zimbabwe etc, on mining standards? Is it very representative of the industry, or does it tend to be quite piecemeal? 

SY: This is an inclusion criteria for the databases. We [only] look at the initiatives that are, to a large extent, institutionalised. It’s not that company’s claim that “we are doing this”. If we can’t track down any information or find any records then we cannot include things like that in our database.

That means we only tend to look at initiatives that are well-developed. These are often, for example, developed by national industry associations. They try to convene different companies together and try to collaborate with, or coordinate, different actors along supply chains and also across sectors or industries.

When they work with different international partners, this is also a question I think we need to further explore, using our data set to try to look at – sometimes I think it’s not easy for us to do everything! – but try to look at what kind of partners they select and how they get involved with partners in different countries or different regions.

But I think this probably requires some other methodologies to look at, or maybe zoom out to specific cases. 

This is similar – I always want to use this as a comparison – when we started [seeing] this phenomenon in Europe or in North America, for example, where companies start to take climate actions, we didn’t really pay a lot of attention to how and who they work with, as long as they say: “We are trying to support global climate action.”

But, nowadays, when it comes to the question of China, people start to be interested in who they work with. But if we look at the narrative and discourse of these initiatives, they say as well: “We want to support actions around the world.” 

They don’t always specify [the geographic scope of their standard-setting work], but if we further zoom into where they are working and why they work in specific areas or regions, this is also an interesting question – I think there is also a question of politics or political economy there. I would encourage researchers to use our dataset to further explore that kind of question.

CB: Zooming back out – the theme of the data set is environmental leadership, but – at least in global climate negotiations – Chinese officials have eschewed being called a climate leader. Your database seems to show an uptick in activity that could be defined as leadership. Would you say that China wants to be seen as a climate leader?

SY: This is a very strong claim, so I probably would not say [so] – also, it’s very subjective, depending on who you ask this question to and how people perceive it.

Let me frame me this way – let’s separate multilateral negotiation processes from what the country or different actors are doing. Of course, for leadership, another way to measure this is to see the performance itself. 

But, in the end, I think we also tried to be very reflective when we developed this work to acknowledge the subjectivity of leadership and the relational nature of leadership. That means that, if you want to be a leader, others need to acknowledge your leadership or recognise this status.

But this is why I think it comes to an interesting question about what’s the role of China and how different actors perceive China’s role in today’s global climate governance.

In multilateral negotiation processes, we are entering into the implementation phase for the Paris Agreement. That means it is very difficult to create new agendas at this stage. [Instead the focus is] trying to see if countries can deliver what they have done.

Of course, I think there is a question of ambition in terms of updating your nationally determined contributions. So, there is an ambition question – there is a performance question.

If we want to see whether China is becoming a leader, we have to look at how fast, for example, China is accelerating its energy transition, trying to reduce – of course, some data shows China has already peaked its emissions – but maybe, how fast China can reduce its emissions. 

Then, in terms of international engagement, what our data is trying to show is that China has become more proactive in that space. The question is also if this engagement translates into some progress in different parts of the world – if China is actually helping. We need more data to do this kind of impact assessment.

But, at the same time, I think the question of whether the Chinese government wants itself to be seen as a leader – this is also an interesting question. Depending on who they want to engage with, in different fora or on different platforms, the answer may be different. 

I just want to quote, when I was in China a few months ago, we had some dialogues with leading Chinese experts. They said the government – and also people in China – are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time, I think, what China is doing or the role of the country – in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. 

So, I think the question is whether this physical change that has already happened will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country. 

I think this is a question that China needs to figure out, itself. Then, of course, there will be implications for China’s strategy for engaging with the rest of the world, especially on climate change.

CB: And what do you think China’s climate engagements will look like in 5-10 years from now? 

SY: I think, from an energy-transition perspective – let me start from there – China is going to be, at the least, more proactive in promoting energy transition, because it aligns with China’s economic interests and, to a certain extent, its political interest as well, to support energy transitions around the world.

The key question is what role China can play in doing that. Of course, there is the question of trade, of tariffs. There is also the question of investment, intellectual property and technology transfer. 

My read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements, to support other countries. But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose some viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies. 

What we have seen is a lot of countries, especially in the global south, have benefited already, or are in the process of benefiting from, affordable technologies produced by China. 

But, at the same time, this is not sustainable – at least from an economic point of view – not a sustainable situation in the sense that these countries also need to find a way to move themselves upward in supply chains and try to absorb some technologies. How they can work with China [to achieve this] – that’s a very important question to me and also my team. We want to do more research in that area.

This is from the energy-transition perspective. But then, if we look at multilateral processes, I would say China is very committed to multilateralism. If we look at all the discourse, including the cases in our database – we have done some text analysis looking at the narrative discourse of the vision of these initiatives. Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes. 

Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment. 

So, I think this pattern will probably last. At the same time, because – depending on the other important countries’ climate policies, for example, the US – back to your question about the leadership in multilateral processes, how proactive and how ambitious China wants to be in taking on this leadership position in multilateral processes is still an open question. 

This also depends on the concept of leadership in different cultures.

Whether China wants to take over the US to become the only superpower of a global system – I think this is probably very unlikely. China may want to figure out a slightly different model. Even if, physically, it’s one of the most, or the most, important or powerful countries in the world, how using how the country can use this position to support or guide the governance of global challenges, this is probably slightly different from the views or understanding of, for example, European and other global north countries.

The question is how China can propose a slightly different model – still in the current multilateral system – for governing global challenges, including climate change. This is really important. I don’t have an answer, so that’s why we will continue to look at this question and try to use our research to help people understand what role China can play in global climate governance. 

CB: Thank you.

This interview was conducted by Anika Patel via Zoom on 1 July 2026.

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The post Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Australia's home battery market is undergoing a "healthy reset," new data shows, with battery sizes and installation numbers both falling.

The post Home battery market undergoes “healthy reset,” as rooftop solar lingers in record territory appeared first on Renew Economy.