You are here
News Feeds
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 31 OCTOBER 2026
By John Donovan — 31 October 2026
On 8 March 2022, Shell apologised for purchasing discounted Russian crude oil and announced its intention to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons. Yet its trading arrangements continued to permit purchases of certain refined petroleum products containing almost 50% Russian-origin material. Bloomberg exposed the practice in April. Ukraine’s government accused Shell of exploiting an accounting trick. Shell disputed the allegation that it was deliberately purchasing Russian products for blending and resale. On 27 April, Reuters reported that the company had tightened its trading terms to exclude refined products containing any Russian-origin material. The surviving corporate statements, contemporaneous trading reports and official sanctions records reveal what happened — and the important distinction between a contractual loophole, an actual purchase and an unlawful transaction.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-104
Publication date: 31 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-103 — The Discounted Cargo, 30 October 2026
Principal documentary evidence: Shell’s announcement of 8 March 2022; Bloomberg’s examination of Shell’s trading terms, 8 April 2022; the letter dated 13 April from Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleg Ustenko, as reported by Bloomberg; Shell’s response reported on 22 April; Reuters’ examination of revised Shell trading terms, 27 April; UK government statements and subsequent sanctions legislation; European Union sanctions records.
Evidence classification: Authenticated corporate statements, contemporaneous reporting based on observed trading bids, attributed government correspondence, official regulatory records and separately identified editorial commentary.
Important evidential limitation: The relevant trading conditions are documented through contemporary Bloomberg and Reuters reporting. The complete original Shell trading contracts, cargo-level transaction records and the original Ukrainian letter have not been independently obtained for this instalment. Their reported contents are distinguished from documents examined directly.
Introduction: When does Russian oil stop being Russian?The question sounds almost absurd.
If a petroleum product contains Russian oil, surely it remains at least partly Russian.
But international commodity trading does not operate according to such simple definitions.
Petroleum products may be blended with equivalent products originating in other countries.
Crude oil may be refined outside the country where it was extracted.
Cargoes may be transferred between vessels.
Products may pass through several storage terminals, traders and intermediaries before reaching their ultimate purchasers.
The resulting questions concerning origin, ownership and contractual restrictions can become extraordinarily complicated.
In April 2022, those complications became a public-relations crisis for Shell.
The company had already apologised for purchasing Russian crude after the invasion of Ukraine.
It had promised to cease spot purchases of Russian crude and withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons more broadly.
But an examination of its trading terms revealed that certain refined products containing less than 50% Russian-origin material could still qualify for purchase.
The practice became associated with a term used by commodity traders:
The Latvian blend.
Ukraine’s government protested.
Shell defended its conduct.
Then, on 27 April 2022, Shell confirmed that it had changed its purchasing requirements.
The revised conditions excluded refined products containing Russian-origin material, even when blended with products from other countries.
This instalment reconstructs the sequence using contemporary documents and reporting.
The central question is not whether blending petroleum products is inherently unlawful.
It is whether Shell’s purchasing rules adequately reflected its publicly declared commitment to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons.
The answer requires careful distinctions between established facts, contested allegations and matters that remain unverified.
1. The March apology: What Shell actually promisedOn 8 March 2022, Shell issued the statement examined in the previous instalment.
Chief executive Ben van Beurden apologised for purchasing a cargo of Russian Urals crude oil after the invasion.
The company’s announcement went substantially beyond the narrower withdrawal from Russian equity partnerships announced on 28 February.
Shell declared that it intended to withdraw from involvement in Russian hydrocarbons, including crude oil, petroleum products, pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas.
But the announcement contained an important qualification.
The withdrawal would proceed “in a phased manner.”
Shell committed to immediately stopping spot purchases of Russian crude oil.
It also undertook not to renew term contracts.
The company acknowledged that removing Russian crude from its supply chain could take weeks.
Withdrawing from Russian petroleum products, pipeline gas and LNG was expected to take considerably longer.
These distinctions were explicit in Shell’s original statement.
The company was not promising that every existing contractual obligation or physical delivery involving Russian energy would disappear immediately.
Its commitment concerning crude-oil spot purchases was immediate.
Its withdrawal from other Russian hydrocarbons was progressive.
That difference subsequently became central to Shell’s defence of its trading arrangements.
However, the broader public message was clear.
Shell intended to cease its involvement in Russian hydrocarbons.
For a company already facing criticism over its discounted crude-oil purchase, the scope and implementation of that commitment were matters of substantial public interest.
Primary source: Shell’s original announcement, 8 March 2022. Shell
2. A trading condition that changed the meaning of originThe controversy developed around contractual definitions used in Shell’s trading operations.
In April 2022, Bloomberg columnist Javier Blas examined provisions governing the company’s purchases of petroleum products.
The relevant arrangements distinguished between products classified as Russian-origin and those classified as non-Russian.
The critical issue was the proportion of Russian material in a blended product.
According to Bloomberg’s examination, products containing less than 50% Russian-origin material could fall outside Shell’s contractual definition of Russian-origin products.
A cargo containing 49.99% Russian material and 50.01% material from elsewhere could therefore satisfy the non-Russian-origin condition described in the report.
This was not a claim that Russian oil had physically ceased to exist.
The Russian material remained present.
The issue was how the product was classified for the purposes of Shell’s purchasing conditions.
This distinction requires emphasis.
A private contractual definition of origin is not automatically a rule established by international sanctions law.
There was no universal legal principle under which mixing 49.99% Russian petroleum with 50.01% non-Russian petroleum automatically made every resulting transaction lawful.
The applicable legal position depended on jurisdiction, the particular sanctions in force, the nature of the product, its actual origin and the relevant customs and sanctions rules.
The arrangement reported by Bloomberg concerned Shell’s own trading conditions.
It was therefore primarily a question about corporate purchasing policy and the implementation of Shell’s public commitments.
Bloomberg published its investigation on 8 April 2022.
It became the principal source for the controversy that followed. Bloomberg.com
3. The Latvian blend: A term from the commodity marketsThe expression Latvian blend was not the name of a separate geological oil field.
It was a term associated with blending Russian petroleum products with material originating elsewhere.
Bloomberg described commercial arrangements involving Russian diesel transported through Baltic export routes.
The port of Ventspils in Latvia was identified as one location associated with the practice.
Other blending locations mentioned in contemporary reporting included storage facilities in the Netherlands and transfers between vessels.
The commercial principle was relatively straightforward.
A petroleum trader could combine material from different sources to produce a cargo satisfying particular commercial specifications.
Blending is a normal feature of international petroleum trading.
Diesel, jet fuel and other refined products are frequently blended to meet quality specifications, seasonal requirements or contractual conditions.
That practice is not inherently suspicious.
The controversy arises when blending is used, or appears capable of being used, to change how a product’s origin is represented.
In April 2022, origin had become especially important because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had generated pressure on energy companies to stop purchasing Russian hydrocarbons.
A product containing substantial quantities of Russian diesel could create a commercial and reputational dilemma if it was described as non-Russian solely because the Russian component was below a specified threshold.
The term Latvian blend became shorthand for that dilemma.
But an important qualification is necessary.
The label did not establish that every blended cargo was physically mixed in Latvia.
Nor did it establish that Shell itself operated a blending facility producing such cargoes.
The distinction between a trading-market expression and a verified physical transaction is fundamental. Bloomberg.com
4. Latvia’s response: The geography was also disputedThe Latvian aspect of the controversy received attention from the country’s own media and authorities.
On 12 April 2022, Latvian public broadcaster LSM reported that the relevant authorities intended to examine the circumstances described in Bloomberg’s investigation.
The report referred to possible blending involving Ventspils.
But it also recorded denials from operators associated with the port’s petroleum terminals.
Those operators disputed their involvement in the activities described.
This is an important piece of the documentary record.
The existence of blending arrangements within international petroleum markets does not establish that a specific Latvian company participated in them.
Nor does the use of the expression Latvian blend establish the geographical origin of every product described by that term.
The available reporting therefore supports a limited conclusion.
The controversy prompted scrutiny in Latvia.
Questions were raised about whether blending was taking place through particular facilities.
But the material examined here does not establish a regulatory finding that the named terminal operators had engaged in unlawful conduct.
The geographical allegations should not be treated as proved simply because the market terminology became widely used.
Contemporary source: Latvian Public Media, 12 April 2022 — Authorities Examine Reports of the Latvian Blend.
5. A March 30 trading bid provides a more precise documentary referenceOne of the most useful details in the subsequent Bloomberg reporting concerns a specific trading bid.
According to data examined by Bloomberg, Shell sought to purchase ultra-low-sulphur diesel through the S&P Global Platts pricing process on 30 March 2022.
The conditions of the bid excluded Russian-origin cargoes.
However, the accompanying definition permitted blends containing less than 50% Russian-origin material.
This matters because it establishes more than a general allegation about industry practice.
It identifies a particular date, commodity and trading process.
The bid was placed more than three weeks after Shell’s 8 March apology.
But the evidential distinction remains important.
A bid demonstrates the terms on which a company was prepared to purchase.
It does not necessarily establish that the bid resulted in a completed transaction.
Nor does it establish that the resulting cargo, if purchased, contained the maximum amount of Russian material permitted by the conditions.
The figure of 49.99% became prominent because it illustrated the contractual threshold.
It should not automatically be presented as the verified composition of a cargo actually delivered to Shell.
The surviving public reporting identifies the purchasing condition.
It does not provide a complete cargo-by-cargo accounting of deliveries made under that condition.
That limitation prevents an allegation about contractual eligibility from being transformed into an unsupported assertion concerning specific shipments. gCaptain
6. Ukraine’s government challenges Shell againThe controversy attracted a direct response from Ukraine.
In a letter dated 13 April 2022, Oleg Ustenko, chief economic adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, challenged Shell’s position.
The letter was addressed to Shell chief executive Ben van Beurden.
Contemporary Bloomberg reporting also identified Shell’s legal director, Donny Ching, as a recipient of questions concerning the company’s trading rules.
The letter expressed concern that Shell’s purchasing conditions appeared to permit continued dealings in products containing Russian petroleum.
Ustenko characterised the arrangement as an accounting device through which companies could continue supporting Russian energy revenues while publicly claiming to have withdrawn.
He described the alleged practice as deplorable.
The letter raised questions concerning the treatment of cargoes containing less than 50% Russian material.
It also sought clarification about whether such cargoes would comply with restrictions in other jurisdictions, including the United States and the United Kingdom.
Another question concerned the quantities of blended oil Shell might still be lifting from Russian ports under longer-term arrangements.
These were important questions.
They went beyond the immediate issue of a purchasing condition.
They sought to establish whether Shell’s contractual definitions were consistent with the practical consequences of its public withdrawal commitment.
The criticism also followed an earlier confrontation.
In March, Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, had condemned Shell’s purchase of discounted Russian crude.
The April letter therefore represented a second major Ukrainian challenge to Shell’s Russian petroleum trading activities.
However, the letter was an expression of the Ukrainian government’s concerns and allegations.
It was not a judicial finding.
Its contents were reported by Bloomberg and other contemporary media organisations.
The original signed letter has not been independently examined for this instalment.
That distinction is retained. gCaptain
7. Shell’s response: The company disputed the central accusationShell did not accept the suggestion that it was deliberately purchasing Russian products for blending and resale under a non-Russian label.
In a response reported by Bloomberg on 22 April, a Shell spokesperson denied that the company had purchased products exported from Russia for that purpose after its 8 March withdrawal announcement.
The company also said it had stopped spot purchases of Russian crude and LNG.
Shell stated that it had eliminated the vast majority of spot purchases of refined products that might contain Russian material blended earlier in the supply chain.
This response deserves careful treatment.
Shell was making a specific denial concerning deliberate purchases of products exported from Russia for blending and subsequent resale as non-Russian.
That is not identical to denying that its contractual terms had contained the 50% definition.
Nor is it identical to claiming that every petroleum product purchased anywhere in its supply chain was completely free of Russian material.
The company acknowledged that refined products could contain Russian-origin components introduced earlier in the supply chain.
It also maintained that it was working to reduce and eliminate those exposures.
The distinction is significant.
The company’s response supports the conclusion that Shell regarded the withdrawal as an ongoing process.
It also illustrates why the contractual wording attracted criticism.
A company could intend to eliminate Russian petroleum while retaining purchasing conditions that permitted some Russian-origin material in blended products.
Whether particular transactions were consistent with the company’s commitments depended upon their actual circumstances.
Shell’s statement cannot independently establish that every transaction complied with its policy.
Equally, the existence of permissive contractual language does not establish that Shell deliberately purchased Russian oil to disguise its origin.
Both propositions would require additional transaction-level evidence.
Contemporary source: Bloomberg — Ukraine Criticizes Shell’s Rules on Russian Fuel Purchases, 22 April 2022.
8. The Donovan–Shell archive preserved the controversy as it unfoldedAn important feature of this investigation is that RoyalDutchShellPlc.com was recording the developments in April 2022.
The archive contains contemporary articles examining the Latvian blend controversy, Ukraine’s objections and Shell’s response.
On 22 April, the website published a report from City A.M. describing the Ukrainian government’s accusations and Shell’s denial.
Other contemporary coverage preserved by the archive included reporting from The Telegraph and the Daily Mail.
The archive subsequently published Reuters’ account of Shell tightening its trading terms on 27 April.
These records are valuable because they establish what was being publicly reported at the time.
They also help preserve the sequence of events.
This is particularly important when investigating corporate controversies retrospectively.
A later account can sometimes compress several distinct events into a single narrative.
The original reports show a more complicated progression.
Shell’s withdrawal announcement came first.
The contractual definition attracted scrutiny.
Bloomberg’s investigation brought the issue into wider public discussion.
Ukraine’s government challenged Shell.
Shell responded.
The company then tightened its trading requirements.
The archival record also demonstrates why contemporaneous reporting should be preserved with its original date and attribution.
The City A.M. report and the Bloomberg account do not constitute separate independent confirmation of every allegation.
Both drew upon the same underlying controversy and statements.
Their value lies in documenting the developing public record.
Contemporary archive: Ukraine’s Government Writes to Shell, Accusing It of an Accounting Trick — 22 April 2022.
9. Wednesday, 27 April: Reuters documents the changeThe most decisive development came on 27 April 2022.
Reuters journalists Ron Bousso and Rowena Edwards reported that Shell had tightened its purchasing restrictions.
The company would no longer accept refined petroleum products containing Russian-origin material, including blended fuels.
Reuters had examined a bid placed by Shell for a cargo of jet fuel through the Platts trading process.
The new conditions prohibited Russian-origin products.
They also prohibited products blended with material produced in Russia.
The conditions extended to the transportation route, excluding arrangements involving Russian transit.
This was materially different from the earlier threshold.
Under the previous conditions described by Bloomberg, a cargo containing less than 50% Russian material could satisfy the origin requirement.
Under the new conditions reported by Reuters, Russian-origin material was excluded regardless of its proportion in the blend.
A Shell spokesperson confirmed that the trading terms had changed.
The company described the amendment as another stage in removing Russian oil and gas from its supply chain.
Reuters also noted an important limitation.
The revised refined-product conditions did not themselves alter the separate arrangements concerning Russian crude oil, which Shell was continuing to phase out.
This distinction is essential.
Shell had tightened its purchasing rules for blended refined products. That did not mean every remaining Russian crude-oil contract had been extinguished.
The article was published by Reuters on 27 April and appeared in several international publications.
RoyalDutchShellPlc.com preserved the report that evening. Investing.com UK
10. What the new trading conditions actually establishedThe revised language was more demanding than the earlier contractual definition.
It did not merely require a non-Russian origin designation.
It addressed the possibility that a product had been blended with material originating in Russia.
It also covered aspects of the transportation route.
These conditions were significant because they moved beyond a simple percentage threshold.
But the wording should still be interpreted carefully.
The Reuters report establishes that the new conditions appeared in a particular trading bid.
It establishes that a Shell spokesperson confirmed the tightening of the company’s purchasing terms.
It does not establish the contents of every subsequent Shell trading contract.
Nor does it prove that every supplier could independently verify the complete origin of every component in every product.
Contractual restrictions and physical traceability are different questions.
A contract may require a seller to certify that a product contains no Russian-origin material.
Whether that certification is reliable depends upon the seller’s records and the wider supply chain.
For blended petroleum products, the relevant evidence could include certificates of origin, bills of lading, refinery records, storage-terminal records and contractual declarations.
Some of those documents may be difficult to reconcile where material has passed through several intermediaries.
Shell’s revised terms therefore represented a more restrictive purchasing policy.
They did not, by themselves, establish that the global petroleum supply chain had become fully traceable.
This distinction would become particularly important in the company’s subsequent public comments.
11. Was the Latvian blend a sanctions loophole?The expression sanctions loophole appeared frequently in reporting about Russian petroleum.
But it requires legal precision.
On 27 April 2022, the European Union had not yet adopted the comprehensive Russian oil-import restrictions included in its sixth sanctions package.
Those measures were announced on 3 June 2022.
The EU subsequently introduced phased prohibitions concerning seaborne Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products.
The restrictions included specified transitional periods and exceptions.
The United Kingdom had announced on 8 March that it would phase out Russian oil imports by the end of 2022.
The principal UK prohibition on importing Russian oil and oil products subsequently took effect on 5 December 2022.
The legal environment in April was therefore different from that which developed later.
Companies were already subject to sanctions affecting particular Russian individuals, institutions and activities.
But Russian petroleum products were not universally prohibited across all relevant European markets.
A company could face substantial public criticism for purchasing Russian-origin petroleum even when a particular purchase was not prohibited by the sanctions then applicable.
That is the distinction at the centre of this controversy.
Shell’s 50% definition was a contractual purchasing condition.
It should not be represented as a statutory exemption permitting violations of sanctions.
Nor should later sanctions restrictions be applied retrospectively to a transaction from March or April 2022.
There is another relevant distinction.
Customs rules concerning the origin of products can involve questions about processing and substantial transformation.
Simply mixing products and refining crude oil are not necessarily equivalent for origin purposes.
The applicable rules depend upon the legislation and the circumstances of the particular product.
The 49.99% threshold should therefore not be confused with a universal legal test of whether Russian petroleum had ceased to be Russian.
Official sources: UK Government — Phase-out Announcement, 8 March 2022; Council of the European Union — Sixth Sanctions Package, 3 June 2022; and UK Government — Russian Oil Import Ban and Implementation Guidance.
12. The wider industry: Shell was not operating in isolationThe problem of Russian-origin petroleum was not confined to Shell.
International fuel markets relied upon extensive networks of producers, refiners, traders, terminals and transport companies.
Europe had been a major importer of Russian crude and refined products before the invasion.
According to Eurostat data cited by Reuters, Russia supplied slightly more than a quarter of the European Union’s oil imports in 2020.
Diesel and jet fuel were particularly important.
As companies began restricting Russian purchases, alternative supplies had to be obtained from other producers and refineries.
That involved shipping capacity, refinery compatibility, storage and financing.
In these circumstances, the origin of blended petroleum products became increasingly important.
Reuters reported on 27 April that TotalEnergies, Repsol and BP had adopted restrictions excluding refined products containing Russian material.
Shell’s revised conditions therefore brought its publicly reported purchasing requirements closer to those of several major competitors.
But it would be misleading to assume that every international energy company adopted identical policies at the same time.
Companies had different contractual obligations and geographical operations.
Their exposure to Russian crude, refined products, LNG and pipeline gas also differed.
Some retained long-term contracts while discontinuing new purchases.
Others were primarily affected by investments in producing assets.
The wider industry context helps explain why removing Russian-origin petroleum from international markets proved difficult.
It does not determine whether Shell’s earlier contractual definition was commercially or ethically appropriate.
That is a separate question. euronews
13. The UK import figures reveal another difficultyOfficial UK trade statistics provide useful retrospective context.
On 24 August 2022, the Office for National Statistics reported that the United Kingdom had imported no fuels from Russia during June.
It was the first month without such recorded imports since the relevant statistical series began in January 1997.
The figures showed a dramatic reduction following Russia’s invasion.
Before the war, Russia had supplied approximately 24.1% of the UK’s refined-oil imports in 2021.
The ONS attributed the subsequent decline to sanctions and companies voluntarily seeking alternative suppliers.
This was an important development.
It demonstrated that direct recorded fuel imports from Russia had fallen dramatically.
However, the figures should not be interpreted as proof that every petroleum product consumed in Britain was entirely free of Russian-origin material.
Trade statistics depend upon the classifications and origin information used in recording international transactions.
A product refined in another country may be recorded differently from the Russian crude oil used as an input.
The issue becomes particularly complicated when the original feedstock has passed through a foreign refinery.
The ONS statistics therefore establish the reduction in recorded imports from Russia.
They do not provide complete molecular traceability of the entire British petroleum supply chain.
That limitation is important when assessing the longer-term effectiveness of policies intended to exclude Russian-origin hydrocarbons. Office for National Statistics
14. The unresolved question: What was actually purchased?This investigation has identified a clear sequence of documentary evidence.
Shell publicly committed itself to withdrawing from Russian hydrocarbons.
Its purchasing conditions subsequently attracted criticism because they permitted certain blended refined products containing less than 50% Russian material.
Ukraine’s government challenged those conditions.
Shell disputed allegations that it was deliberately purchasing Russian products for blending and resale under a non-Russian designation.
Reuters then documented a change to more restrictive trading terms.
But several potentially important records remain unavailable.
The complete earlier contractual conditions would help establish precisely how Shell defined Russian-origin material across different products and transactions.
The relevant trading bids would help clarify the circumstances in which those terms were used.
Cargo-level records would establish whether purchases were completed, what products were delivered and what their actual compositions were.
Shipping and storage-terminal records could identify the origin and movements of specific quantities of material.
Internal Shell correspondence could explain why the earlier threshold was adopted and what prompted its subsequent removal.
Without those records, it would be premature to claim that Shell deliberately engineered particular shipments to evade sanctions.
It would also be premature to assert that no products containing Russian-origin material were acquired under the earlier conditions.
The available evidence supports a narrower and more reliable conclusion.
Shell’s publicly reported trading conditions permitted certain Russian-containing blends after its March withdrawal announcement. The company subsequently tightened those conditions following public scrutiny and criticism.
That is an important finding.
It does not require speculation about transactions that have not been independently established.
DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS Established factsShell announced its intention to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons on 8 March 2022.
The company immediately committed to ending spot purchases of Russian crude while acknowledging that withdrawal from other products and contracts would take longer.
Bloomberg reported on 8 April that Shell’s trading conditions could classify blended petroleum products containing less than 50% Russian-origin material as non-Russian.
A Shell bid for ultra-low-sulphur diesel dated 30 March was subsequently identified in Bloomberg reporting as using the relevant origin definition.
The expression Latvian blend became associated with the practice of mixing Russian petroleum products with material from other countries.
Latvian authorities and media examined questions arising from the reporting.
Operators associated with Ventspils disputed their involvement in the alleged activities.
Oleg Ustenko, an adviser to Ukraine’s president, challenged Shell’s purchasing conditions in a letter dated 13 April.
Shell disputed the allegation that it was purchasing Russian products for deliberate blending and resale as non-Russian.
On 27 April, Reuters reported that Shell had tightened its trading conditions to exclude refined products containing Russian-origin material.
Reuters examined a jet-fuel trading bid containing the revised conditions.
A Shell spokesperson confirmed the change.
The revised terms did not automatically terminate every remaining Russian crude-oil contract.
The relevant comprehensive EU oil restrictions were introduced after the April controversy.
Matters requiring qualificationThe 49.99% figure illustrates the contractual threshold. It is not independently established as the composition of every cargo purchased by Shell.
A trading bid is evidence of an offer or purchasing condition, not necessarily a completed transaction.
The available documents do not establish that Shell itself physically blended Russian petroleum with other products.
They do not establish that all cargoes described as Latvian blends originated in Latvia.
The original Ukrainian letter has been reported by reputable contemporary sources, but the complete signed document has not been independently examined for this instalment.
The complete original Shell contracts and associated cargo documentation have not been obtained.
Legal positionNo court judgment specifically determining Shell’s liability in relation to the April 2022 blending arrangements has been identified in the materials examined.
The documentary evidence does not establish that Shell violated sanctions through the reported contractual definition.
The commercial and ethical controversy must be distinguished from the legal status of particular transactions.
A private 50% origin threshold was not a universal exemption under sanctions law.
Not establishedThe available evidence does not prove that Shell deliberately designed the blending arrangements to circumvent sanctions.
It does not establish that particular Shell executives ordered traders to conceal Russian petroleum.
It does not establish the quantity or value of Russian-origin products actually acquired under the disputed conditions.
It does not establish that Shell knowingly submitted false declarations of origin.
Nor does it establish that the change announced on 27 April immediately eliminated every indirect Russian-origin component from the company’s global supply chain.
EDITORIAL COMMENTARY The difference between leaving Russia and removing Russia from the supply chainThis episode exposes an important distinction between a company’s public commitments and the operational systems through which those commitments must be implemented.
Shell’s March announcement was an expression of corporate intention.
Its trading conditions governed the circumstances in which commercial transactions could proceed.
The two were related, but they were not identical.
The company intended to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons.
Its earlier purchasing terms nevertheless permitted some refined products containing Russian-origin material.
That was sufficient to generate substantial criticism, even without proof that Shell had intentionally purchased specific cargoes to conceal their origin.
The Ukrainian government’s objection was understandable within the circumstances of the war.
Ukraine was seeking to reduce Russian energy revenues.
From that perspective, purchasing a product containing substantial quantities of Russian petroleum could still indirectly support Russian exports, regardless of how the finished product was classified.
Shell’s response reflected another concern.
The company was attempting to disentangle itself from complex supply chains while maintaining fuel availability for customers.
That concern also had a legitimate commercial basis.
European dependence upon Russian petroleum could not be eliminated merely by issuing a corporate announcement.
Refineries required feedstocks.
Traders were subject to existing contracts.
Customers continued to need fuel.
The difficulty was real.
But so was the reputational risk.
A company that publicly declares an intention to stop dealing in Russian hydrocarbons creates expectations about its subsequent conduct.
Those expectations extend beyond the narrow wording of individual announcements.
If commercial purchasing conditions permit substantial Russian content, the company must be prepared to explain why those arrangements remain consistent with its commitment.
In Shell’s case, that explanation was challenged.
The company subsequently tightened its trading requirements.
The documentary record does not establish whether criticism was the sole reason for that decision.
But the change is clear.
The importance of the original documentsThe episode also demonstrates why contemporaneous records matter.
The public statements explain Shell’s declared policy.
Bloomberg’s reporting identifies the earlier contractual threshold.
The Ukrainian letter records the government’s objections, as reported by contemporary journalists.
Shell’s response explains what the company disputed.
Reuters’ investigation establishes the subsequent tightening of the purchasing conditions.
Official government records clarify the legal environment.
Each source answers a different question.
None should be made to answer questions beyond its evidential scope.
Most importantly, the Reuters report of 27 April should not be treated as proof that Shell had previously committed a sanctions offence.
It is evidence that Shell changed its trading terms.
Equally, the company’s statement that it was acting lawfully does not resolve every question about whether the earlier arrangements were consistent with the spirit of its withdrawal commitment.
Legal compliance and corporate accountability are related but distinct considerations.
A conclusion supported by the evidenceThe March apology did not instantly remove Russian-origin petroleum from every part of Shell’s international trading arrangements.
By April, the company’s purchasing terms still permitted certain blended refined products containing less than 50% Russian material.
Those terms attracted criticism.
Shell disputed the suggestion that it was deliberately purchasing Russian products for disguised resale.
The company then changed its purchasing requirements.
This is the central documentary finding: Shell’s withdrawal from Russian energy involved successive revisions to its commercial practices, rather than a single immediate break.
That conclusion is supported by Shell’s statements and contemporaneous reporting.
It requires no allegation of secret criminal conduct.
But the controversy also points towards a more difficult problem.
Even when a company excludes products blended directly with Russian petroleum, what happens when Russian crude is refined in another country before the resulting diesel or jet fuel enters international markets?
That question cannot be answered simply by examining the percentage of Russian material in a blended cargo.
It concerns the fundamental ability of international commodity markets to trace petroleum back to its original source.
And Shell’s own chief executive would soon acknowledge just how difficult that could be.
PRINCIPAL SOURCES1. Shell plc — Shell Announces Intent to Withdraw From Russian Oil and Gas, 8 March 2022
The authenticated corporate announcement establishing the distinction between the immediate halt to Russian crude spot purchases and the phased withdrawal from other Russian hydrocarbons.
Read Shell’s original announcement
2. Bloomberg Opinion — Javier Blas, The Backdoor That Keeps Russian Oil Flowing Into Europe, 8 April 2022
The contemporary investigation describing the 49.99% contractual threshold and the trading-market expression Latvian blend. This is an attributed Bloomberg analysis, not an independent judicial finding.
Read the Bloomberg investigation
3. Latvian Public Media — Investigation of Reports Concerning the Latvian Blend, 12 April 2022
Reports Latvian authorities’ interest in the allegations and records denials from operators associated with the Ventspils petroleum terminals.
Read the original Latvian report
4. Bloomberg — Laura Hurst, Ukraine Criticizes Shell’s Rules on Russian Fuel Purchases, 22 April 2022
Documents the letter dated 13 April from Oleg Ustenko, the March 30 trading-bid conditions and Shell’s response to the Ukrainian government’s allegations.
Read the Bloomberg report reproduced by gCaptain
5. RoyalDutchShellPlc.com — Ukraine’s Government Writes to Shell, Accusing It of an Accounting Trick, 22 April 2022
The contemporary Donovan–Shell archive preserves the City A.M. account of the dispute and Shell’s denial.
Read the original archive entry
6. Reuters — Ron Bousso and Rowena Edwards, Shell Tightens Restrictions on Russian Oil Buying, 27 April 2022
The central contemporary report establishing the revised trading conditions, the Platts jet-fuel bid and Shell’s confirmation of the change.
7. RoyalDutchShellPlc.com — Shell Tightens Restrictions on Russian Oil Buying, 27 April 2022
The contemporary Donovan–Shell archive’s complete reproduction of the Reuters account.
Read the original archive publication
8. UK Government — UK to Phase Out Russian Oil Imports, 8 March 2022
The official announcement establishing the initial British policy of ending Russian oil imports by the end of 2022.
Read the UK government statement
9. Council of the European Union — Sixth Sanctions Package, 3 June 2022
The official record of the EU’s subsequent Russian oil-import restrictions and their phased implementation.
10. Office for National Statistics — The Impact of Sanctions on UK Trade With Russia, 24 August 2022
Official statistics documenting the reduction in recorded Russian fuel imports and providing context concerning Britain’s former dependence on Russian refined petroleum.
Documentary disclaimerThis instalment relies upon authenticated Shell corporate statements, contemporary Bloomberg and Reuters reporting, official UK and European Union records, Latvian public-media reporting and contemporary material preserved by RoyalDutchShellPlc.com.
The earlier Shell trading conditions are documented through published reporting concerning observed trading bids. The complete original contracts and cargo-level transaction records have not been independently examined.
The correspondence from Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleg Ustenko is identified through contemporaneous reporting. The original signed letter has not been independently obtained.
The Ukrainian government’s allegations concerning an accounting trick are reported as allegations.
Shell’s contemporaneous denials and explanations are included.
The existence of contractual terms permitting some Russian-origin material is distinguished from proof that particular cargoes were delivered under those terms.
No allegation is made that Shell deliberately falsified certificates of origin, knowingly breached sanctions or committed a criminal offence through the reported arrangements.
The term Latvian blend is identified as contemporary commodity-market terminology. It does not constitute proof of misconduct by any specific Latvian company or terminal operator.
The article distinguishes the contractual purchasing restrictions adopted voluntarily by Shell from sanctions imposed by governments.
Later sanctions legislation is not applied retrospectively.
The revised trading conditions announced on 27 April 2022 are not presented as evidence that every existing contractual relationship involving Russian energy was immediately terminated.
Editorial commentary concerning the consistency of Shell’s public commitments and commercial practices is separately identified.
Factual corrections, additional primary documents and responses from Shell or other interested parties are welcome.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-105 — The Sakhalin Papers XCV: The Molecule Problem — Russian Crude Refined Abroad and the Limits of Shell’s Clean BreakOn 27 April 2022, Shell tightened its trading conditions to exclude refined petroleum products containing Russian-origin material.
It appeared to close the most controversial aspect of the Latvian blend arrangements.
But eight days later, on 5 May, Shell chief executive Ben van Beurden publicly explained a far more difficult problem.
There was no comprehensive international system capable of tracing every petroleum product back to the country in which its original crude oil had been extracted.
The distinction mattered.
Russian crude could be exported to a country outside Europe.
A refinery in that country could process it into diesel, petrol or jet fuel.
The resulting petroleum products could then enter international markets under the origin rules applicable to the refined goods.
Van Beurden used the example of diesel produced at an Indian refinery from Russian crude.
The product could be treated as Indian diesel for the purposes he was discussing.
His comments were reported by Reuters and S&P Global Commodity Insights.
They raised an uncomfortable question.
How could Shell promise to eliminate Russian-origin petroleum from its supply chain when its own chief executive acknowledged that the global system could not reliably trace every refined product back to its original crude-oil source?
The answer requires examining the difference between physical origin, customs origin, contractual representations and the practical limits of commodity-market traceability.
It also requires distinguishing an unavoidable limitation of international refining from deliberate sanctions evasion.
The next instalment will examine Shell’s 5 May 2022 statements, the contemporaneous industry reporting and the regulatory framework governing petroleum refined outside Russia.
The question is not whether Shell changed its purchasing rules.
That is established.
The question is whether those rules could ever guarantee what the company’s public commitments appeared to promise.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
Documentary starting point for the next investigation: S&P Global Commodity Insights — Shell Flags Industry Hurdles to Blocking All Russian Imports Into the EU, 5 May 2022.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 31 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 31, 2026 at 8:55 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Shell’s $6.4 Billion Pension Bombshell: “This whole deal is murky and stinks to high heaven”
Hello John
I had not looked at your site for a while when someone sent me your piece on the SSPF.
I distributed that to several old colleagues. Great appreciation. This whole deal is murky and stinks to high heaven. We should have closed the fund and not chosen for ‘invaren’.
But the politicians and evil HR staff forced/bamboozled the staffcouncil to agree. This whole deal is sold as transparant but it is as intransparant as can be.
Delta Lloyd and IBM have chosen to close and not go for invaren.
Unilever and Dow (and others) also chose not to go for invaren.
It all started when a caretaker government (had fallen and elections were planned) signed a few days before going home the new pension law against advice of many genuine experts. In the law it is fixed that individuals have no rights anymore. So we are neutralised. As a thank you the PM became secretary of the NATO and the minister who signed the law became mayor of Rotterdam. You scratch my back, I scratch your back…
Blackrock and other xxxxxxxxx will now run many pensionfunds.
And this choice for Blackrock by Shell after our own organisation (Shell Asset Management) had done a great job for many years. It just stank.
So your piece was (as usual) very timely. But I fear we can do nothing anymore. The rich dutch pensionfunds will be robbed empty and given to the ‘poor’ countries like France, Italy, Greece and others.
Shell’s $6.4 Billion Pension Bombshell: “This whole deal is murky and stinks to high heaven” was first posted on October 31, 2026 at 8:00 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
COP17: Key outcomes agreed at the UN biodiversity conference in Yerevan
- Formal negotiations
- Finance
- Global review
- Global report
- Digital sequence information
- Harmful subsidies
- Marine biodiversity
- Planning, monitoring, reporting and review
- Article 8(j) implementation
- Biodiversity and climate change
- Links with other bodies
- Around the COP
- Armenian presidency
- Protests
- Lobbying and influence
- Carbon and biodiversity markets
Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.
The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.
It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.
Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.
Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.
This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.
It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.
The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.
During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.
Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later.
Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.
Formal negotiations FinanceFinance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks.
At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes.
The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.
As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.
The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.
Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.
Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya.
Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after.
Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030.
However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.
Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF.
The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature.
Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature.
The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. Source: UN CBDThe text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”.
The list was last amended in 2006.
(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)
Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan.
The first “non-paper” had four different options for expanding the contributor base. These ranged from using the World Bank’s country income groups “as a proxy” to identify high-income countries, to commissioning a study on the impacts of being included on the list.
By 21 October, the number of options swelled to eight, including two from Saudi Arabia and one from Peru.
Some countries “expressed concern” that certain options were based on a CBD secretariat study on “what constitutes a developed country”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported.
By the end of the first week, it was clear that the finance deadlock would have to go into informal ministerial consultations for any consensus to emerge.
At a press conference on 28 October, Christopher O’Sullivan, Ireland’s nature minister and representing the EU delegation, told Carbon Brief:
“Our position isn’t that we want to pull back in terms of contributing…but it’s been 20 years since that list was added to, times have changed and there are new realities. We just simply want those new realities reflected. I don’t fully understand why there’s so much opposition to that.”
The EU chose not to comment on which countries it would like to see on that list.
Lim Li Ching from the Third World Network, meanwhile, called the push for others to “assume the obligations” of developed countries “sheer hypocrisy”, adding that any country could make a voluntary contribution. She told Carbon Brief:
“At a forum like the CBD, this linking of income status with finance does not take into account where historical and current responsibilities lie. If you want to generate more funding for biodiversity, let’s look at sovereign debt burdens and rules, which are inequitable for developing countries. But if you can fund wars, and provide resources for your defence industry, then you know where the priorities are.”
On 29 October – at a plenary meant to adopt final texts for the most contentious subjects – Norway’s Gaute Hanssen announced that resource-mobilisation discussions would go into a smaller “friends of the chair” meeting.
Facilitated by Carolina Caceres from Canada and Imèn Meliane from Tunisia, the meeting would discuss the most contentious elements of a draft decision that had swelled to 112 brackets, denoting areas of disagreement on specific details in the text.
While the meeting was open to all, countries that were called to be present included Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Fiji, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the UK.
At the same time, a “non-paper” text by finance and environment ministers laid out countries’ red lines and compromises.
A key paragraphs from a minister’s non-paper on nature finance published on 29 October. Source: UN CBDAt the end of COP17, countries welcomed a final compromise text, with Kenya thanking the “strong women” co-chairs who strove to strike a “delicate” balance.
China, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Fiji cautioned against any further interventions, with Brazil warning: “If we open this text, we will never close it again.”
While the final decision “recognises” that “contributions from more parties would improve the mobilisation” of biodiversity finance, it steered away from issuing criteria to expand the list of donor countries.
The text makes it clear that no additions to the list would be made without inviting and confidentially consulting with interested countries, to secure their explicit consent.
Instead, the CBD secretariat “invites” countries keen to be on the list and “assume the obligations” of developed countries to “signal interest” before COP18 and at every alternate COP thereafter.
At the same time, developing countries can contribute to meeting the GBF and biodiversity convention’s goals on a “voluntary basis”, with contributions not implying inclusion on the list.
A negotiator for China told Carbon Brief at the closing plenary:
“We welcome this balanced document. It was a very long discussion that has gone [on] since [2022 nature talks in] Nairobi. But actually this time, there were a lot of sensitive issues, [there were] a lot of critical things we didn’t open in the contact groups; it mainly went to the high-level discussion.”
The decision also establishes a financial mechanism for nature funding after 2030 under the governance of the COP, a key ask from developing countries.
However, it defers decisions on what form this mechanism would take – whether this would be a new fund or based on existing arrangements – until COP18.
Oscar Soria at the Common Initiative told Carbon Brief that the decision on the financial mechanism leaves things “very open”, with “no movement” towards a new fund or money and no upgrades to existing funding arrangements.
The text acknowledges the links between debt and biodiversity eight times, mentioning how debt-related instruments can be included in biodiversity plans, but does not go further.
“It is almost as if the debt studies they called for at COP16 didn’t happen,” said Soria, who had earlier flagged serious methodological issues with the first-ever COP-commissioned report on debt and biodiversity.
Global reviewIn Yerevan, countries agreed on the first stocktake of progress towards the 2030 nature targets – known as the “global review”.
The review was one of the keenly anticipated outcomes from COP17 and was seen as less controversial than some of the other major negotiation strands.
It was swiftly signed off by countries at the start of the final COP17 plenary, with just one last-minute addition.
The concept of carrying out a global review on “collective progress” was set out in the GBF and its underlying documents.
The details of how this review would be carried out were supposed to be agreed at COP16, but it was not discussed before the plenary in Cali was suspended for loss of “quorum”. It was instead adopted at the resumed COP16 negotiations in Rome in February 2025.
The global review was based largely on the findings of the global report and other information provided by countries.
The final text “welcomes” and also “notes with deep concern” the findings of the global report. It then homes in on various ways countries can increase their biodiversity action to get on track to meet the targets.
As of 19 October, when COP17 officially began, the non-paper contained 152 brackets, which indicate areas of disagreement in UN texts.
Smaller “contact group” discussions took place to try and reduce the number of brackets throughout the first week. This group was co-chaired by Sanne Kruid from the Netherlands and Sivendra Michael from Fiji.
A few days into the talks, Kruid told Carbon Brief that the progress on the global review was “relatively positive”, with countries “engaging quite well”.
One contentious section of the 11-page text was paragraph 15, which “urges” countries to accelerate implementation of nature targets, “including by increased ambition” in addressing key challenges.
Some developing countries were wary of including the word “ambition” in this section, arguing that higher ambition requires more nature finance, which is already falling “far short”.
Kirsty Leong, a policy expert at WWF, told Carbon Brief:
“You have one side wanting to have very strong language and high ambition in what countries should do…and the other side of the room saying the main problem in implementation is that they don’t have the means to do it.”
But the word made it into the final text, which “urges” parties to accelerate implementation of the GBF, “including by increased ambition”, while recognising that developing countries need more support to “allow for higher ambition in their actions”.
Another hotly debated section was paragraph 26, which “encourages” countries to accelerate reform of nature-harming subsidies, “in accordance with national circumstances”.
Earlier in the talks, it was also unclear whether this would feature in the final version due to pushback from countries including Saudi Arabia and Russia. (See: Harmful subsidies)
Earlier drafts of paragraph 16 – another key section – focused on supporting increased action to address biodiversity loss, and also mentioned transforming global financial systems and economic sectors.
This was heavily stripped back in the final version, which “emphasises that accelerating implementation would need to be supported through increased action to address the underlying drivers of biodiversity loss.”
The review also “notes with deep concern” that the 2050 nature goals “may be at risk” if 2030 targets are not achieved.
The COP17 presidency and others frequently discussed a “Yerevan pathway” during the negotiations.
It was unclear whether this would feature in a separate cover decision text, similar to those agreed at climate COP summits, or in another way.
In the end, the “pathway” referred to the sections of the global review outlining calls for countries to scale up action to meet the 2030 nature targets.
A CBD statement said it “sets out a shared response to those findings [of the global report], identifying priorities for action through 2030 and areas where progress will need to be accelerated”.
Elsewhere in the global review talks, Earth Negotiations Bulletin said a small group was also set up to address references to “actors other than national governments”.
These “actors” include Indigenous peoples and local communities. Joji Carino from the not-for-profit Forest Peoples Programme called for this wording to be “discontinued”.
She told a 20 October press briefing that the phrase is a “major regression”, believing it makes it sound like “governments were always the central actor” and Indigenous peoples were “just there on the side”.
This phrase featured a number of times in the final global review document, with Indigenous peoples and local communities also highlighted several times.
On 28 October, rumours circulated that the COP17 president, Hambardzum Matevosyan, wanted to bring the global review text for agreement at a plenary session that evening, two days before talks were due to end.
When Carbon Brief ran into Matevosyan in a lift that afternoon, he said this would only occur if countries reached a consensus on the text. They did not manage this and he confirmed in the evening plenary that consultations would continue.
Carbon Brief understands that Brazil was the main blocker on movement of the text at this stage. The issues were not necessarily with the text itself, but with progress on other texts – namely, resource mobilisation.
(Similarly, at COP16, the Democratic Republic of the Congo called for the full monitoring framework text to be put in brackets due to dissatisfaction over resource mobilisation.)
In the final plenary on 30 October, countries supported the presidency’s proposals to clear the remaining 28 brackets in the text.
Brazil made a last-minute request to mention people of African descent in paragraph 35, which “emphasises” the contributions of actions from various groups of people to the GBF.
Colombia supported the proposal, and no country objected, so the COP17 president approved the addition before gavelling through the document, saying “we have started very good”.
Daudi Sumba, the chief conservation officer at WWF International, said in a statement:
“Negotiators returning home must now turn the global review into clear dedicated action, scaling nature’s recovery by transforming the most damaging sectors and activities across our food and finance systems.”
Global reportJust ahead of COP17, the UN released a global report finding that the world is falling behind on 22 out of 23 of its nature targets for 2030.
It said that the GBF has led to “unprecedented” interest in tackling biodiversity loss, but added:
“However, unless collective implementation accelerates rapidly, the 2030 targets and mission will not be achieved.”
The global report provided a basis for the global review of progress towards meeting the targets of the GBF, which was undertaken by countries in Yerevan.
The scheduling of both the global report and the global review were agreed as part of the GBF and its underlying documents in 2022.
The global report draws on countries’ national reports, which were due to be submitted to the UN in February of this year. It also draws on countries’ national nature plans, known as “national biodiversity strategies and action plans” (NBSAPs) and national targets, which were both due in 2024.
Not all countries have met the call to publish these documents and targets. According to the UN, 45% of countries published NBSAPs in time to be considered for the report, 83% had submitted at least one national target and 66% had produced their new national report.
The first draft of the global report was published on 29 June 2026. This draft was subject to a “peer-review process”, which invited countries and observers, such as NGOs and businesses, to submit comments on all aspects of the report.
The second draft, which has been revised based on the peer review, was published on Sunday 26 July, just ahead of COP17 preparatory talks being held in Nairobi.
The final version – titled “The state of biodiversity action: The global report on collective progress” – was published on 24 September.
The second draft of the global report included a scorecard showing numerical data on progress towards each of the GBF’s 23 targets, based on different metrics. (See Carbon Brief’s article.)
Some of these figures featured in the finalised report, but a “decision was made” to leave them out of the final scorecard, the CBD confirmed to Carbon Brief.
Instead, the final scorecard solely uses a colour-coding system to rank progress on these metrics. But the colours are not that straightforward to interpret.
The rankings from worst (red) to best (green) are based on where progress on each metric ranks relative to the highest and lowest scores achieved in each instance.
This means that, for example, a poor-performing target can have certain figures coloured green on scores as low as 43%, while this same score appears as yellow in other instances.
Digital sequence informationDigital sequence information (DSI) – the genetic data derived from nature – was one of the most keenly watched “fights” by countries, companies, academia and Indigenous peoples alike.
This data is used in a wide range of industries, including pharmaceuticals and agribusiness companies, to develop products such as medicines, cosmetics, supplements and crop varieties.
At COP16, countries agreed to the first-ever global fund – the Cali Fund – to which companies using DSI “should contribute”, along with a unique multilateral mechanism to support it.
They established a steering committee to conduct studies and provide advice to the COP on the small print still left unresolved on the Cali Fund and mechanism.
In Yerevan, countries were supposed to consider and finalise these details, such as who “should” pay into the fund and how this money would reach countries and Indigenous communities protecting the world’s genetic diversity.
However, following two weeks of deep divisions, delays and then fears of rushing crucial details in the plenary, most of this work has been pushed to intersessional negotiations leading up to COP18 in 2028.
Countries did, however, finalise a review methodology to assess how the mechanism and thinly lined fund are working by COP18.
Money in vs money outCountries had a lot to achieve on DSI at COP17. This task list had been broadly grouped by the steering committee into two categories: “money in” and “money out”. The Cali decision gave the steering committee two years to prepare studies and documents to support COP17 deliberations on both tracks.
“Money in” refers to which – and by how much – companies pay into the fund, defined by “thresholds” and contribution rates. Thresholds mean deciding which companies – small, medium or large – “should” contribute to the Cali Fund and whether that is decided on the basis of size, revenue or their “proportional” use of DSI.
Contribution rates refer to how much companies pay. Days before COP17, the CBD secretariat submitted a 209-page study, conducted by an external consultant, on thresholds and contribution rates.
Contributions to the fund, however, are voluntary, with indicative rates already set out in the COP16 decision – 0.1% of revenue, or 1% of profits. According to a DeSmog investigation, pharmaceutical trade lobbies “challenged” these rates and called for a radical rethink of the fund itself. (See: Lobbying and influence.)
“Money out”, meanwhile, refers to how the Cali Fund’s resources are allocated, disbursed and spent.
As Carbon Brief reporting has shown, there has been barely any “money in” to the Cali Fund over the past two years. At the start of COP17, the fund had only $6,000 in it. By the end of it, pledges went up, but not by much: totalling $10,565 and less than $9,000 in actual deposits.
To date, not a single large company among the sectors identified as reliant on DSI has contributed to the fund.
Observers and government delegates across blocs told Carbon Brief that the bulk of the steering committee’s work leading up to COP17 was focused on the “money out”.
This included an emphasis on certificates and other “incentives” for companies to pay. Obtaining such a certificate for a full contribution, for instance, could indemnify companies from paying any more for DSI use that year. Right now, every voluntary contribution, no matter how small, gets a receipt from the Cali Fund.
“Money out” also comprises how funds would be allocated and disbursed to countries and Indigenous communities, as well as transparency on how it would be spent.
At the talks, Brazil – supported by other developing countries – called for Cali Fund contributions to reach at least $200m in its pilot phase before discussing allocation.
Dr Siva Thambisetty, associate professor of law at the London School of Economics, told Carbon Brief:
“We seemed to collapse the entire question to certificates. I question whether we should have spent so much time on allocation strategies when the ‘money in’ has been so insignificant.”
Through most of the talks, industry – supported by the EU and UK – sought “legal clarity” on “certificates” for potential contributions.
At an informal dialogue on DSI on 23 October attended by Carbon Brief, industry representatives echoed calls for more “legal certainty” before they would pledge more. They also warned of “obligation stacking” from having to share benefits from using genetic resources under other treaties.
While the first non-paper on DSI on 20 October had 154 brackets, countries worked over the weekend to remove contentious elements.
However, disagreements on these details underpinning the text were still substantive. At 6am on 28 October, the COP president sent out a letter calling for informal ministerial consultations, steered by Norway and Zimbabwe. The letter also set out “overarching questions” to resolve.
Extract from a letter issued by the COP17 president on 28 October listing key issues for ministers to resolve on DSI. Credit: COP17 Presidency.The penultimate DSI text only emerged late on the final day of COP17, with parties such as Fiji saying that many countries had very little time to read it.
After multiple interventions from countries including Fiji, India, the EU, Brazil, China and Argentina, parties could find no way forward.
The chair of a working group tasked with resolving some of the most contentious negotiations before the final plenary called for a “friends of the chair” group to determine intersessional work on DSI, led by Fiji. He urged these consultations to continue in parallel with the COP17 plenary, or risk having no COP decision at all.
At 5am on 31 October, the COP president proposed a draft decision on DSI, as the final plenary entered its seventh hour.
The text “reaffirms” the indicative contribution rates agreed at COP16. It sets out an allocation methodology on how funds from the Cali Fund will be disbursed after COP18, while “allow[ing]” the steering committee to make payments “on an exceptional basis” if contributions to the Cali Fund reach $150m.
The allocations from the Cali Fund for Indigenous peoples in the COP17 decision. Credit: UN CBDOnly contributions by companies amounting to “1% of their profit or 0.1% of their revenue” will be entitled to a Cali Fund certificate for the year, it clarifies.
The president’s text was adopted without objections at 5:25am, with the emptying plenary hall bursting into applause.
Speaking to Carbon Brief minutes after the DSI decision was adopted, Fiji’s Sivendra Michael said he was “so glad I was given the opportunity to chair and bring this decision to a close”. He added:
“It matters a lot, especially for Indigenous people back home, because any work that is done in the methodology and how benefits get distributed should respect the rights of Indigenous peoples.
“I knew I would land it before I left here. It also shows Pacific leadership in this space, because Pacific islands may be small, but our leadership has really been demonstrated across the room, when we can come in and offer bridging proposals and push countries to show what flexibility looks like.”
Despite Michael welcoming the decision, others were more critical.
Dr June Rubis, Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLC) representative from Asia on the Cali Fund’s steering committee, said:
“Many wealthy nations asked for a voluntary fund, got one, and business has spent the last two years stalling contributions, throwing doubt on the multilateral mechanism.
“The commitment made in Cali still stands and Indigenous peoples and local communities cannot keep waiting while companies free-ride off nature’s genetic information. While setting the rules for new funds like this does take time to get right, governments need to start treating this as a matter of economic resilience and human survival.”
Thambisetty told Carbon Brief after the talks concluded:
“The Cali Fund is on life support. We leave Yerevan with an open-ended working group. It became clear that work in the run-up to COP17 was distorted by industry echo chambers, a receptive steering committee and lack of close engagement and oversight.
There is much work ahead, but we need transparency, a robust and imaginative public narrative and, inevitably, a hardening of the regulatory ecosystem by states where large DSI users are based.”
Industry-led initiativesIn addition to the work on DSI by parties, there was an industry-led initiative announced at COP17.
The proposal – seen by Carbon Brief – aims to start a separate philanthropic fund, called the Biodiversity Foundation Initiative.
This initiative argues that the Cali Fund and national benefit-sharing measures “create complex payment obligations, compliance requirements and unpredictable financial exposure”.
Rubis expressed concern that industry was “picking up on our language of ‘different pathways’” to start its own fund with the expectation it would then receive particular certificates from key governments.
While the initiative says it “intends to complement – not replace” – the Cali Fund, it also notes that it hopes to “engage key governments” and “build political support”, with little clarity on whether communities would receive benefits.
Other Indigenous leaders and academics told Carbon Brief they were being “actively lobbied” at COP17 to support this initiative, although its architects described their outreach as a “co-design” phase for the fund.
Harmful subsidiesNature-harming subsidies were a central point of discussion throughout COP17 – both inside negotiation rooms and at side events in Yerevan.
Governments spend as much as $1.8tn each year on subsidies and incentives that could be “harmful” to biodiversity across a range of sectors, particularly fossil fuels and agriculture.
Target 18 of the GBF sets out the aim to identify – by 2025 – and then “eliminate, phase out or reform” these harmful incentives. It also outlines that subsidies should be reduced by at least $500bn each year by 2030.
Carbon Brief analysis published in July found that 84% of countries missed the 2025 identification deadline. Countries have also shown “insufficient” progress so far on target 18, according to the global report.
At an event on 26 October, UN biodiversity chief Astrid Schomaker described subsidy reform as “politically charged and socially sensitive”. This was evident throughout the negotiations, despite countries already agreeing to the terms of target 18 four years ago.
Harmful subsidies featured in several negotiated outcomes from Yerevan – most notably in the global review. (See: Global review)
Earlier versions of a subsidy-related paragraph in the review “urge[d]” stronger action on target 18.
In a non-paper released on 25 October, this was softened to “encourage” countries to scale up identification, elimination, phase-out or reform of harmful incentives, “in accordance with national circumstances”.
Bracketed text on subsidies from a 25 October non-paper on the global review. Source: UN CBDCarbon Brief understands that Colombia, the UK, Norway, EU nations and many others were in favour of including a paragraph on harmful subsidy reform in the global review. Countries opposed to this included Saudi Arabia and Russia. Near the end of the negotiations, India also proposed removing this paragraph from the text.
The final global review text agreed at COP17 “encourages” countries to “accelerate the implementation of target 18”, but in “accordance with national circumstances”.
Eva Zabey, the chief executive of Business for Nature, said in a statement:
“This COP is a turning point on incentive reform. Through the adoption of this decision, parties have made it a key priority. Incentive reform has moved from the margins to the mainstream of the biodiversity agenda.”
Ahead of COP17, more than 130 businesses and financial organisations signed an open letter calling for governments to reform nature-harming incentives.
On 19 October, a Conservation International report estimated that harmful subsidies result in $11-24.7tn of “hidden environmental and social damage costs” every year.
COP17 also saw the launch of several initiatives focused on subsidy reform, with a number of related announcements on 26 October.
On this day, the COP17 presidency launched the “Yerevan call” on positive biodiversity incentives – a political declaration to increase action and reaffirm commitments to target 18.
It formed one of four “flagship” priorities for the COP17 presidency, with the others focused on conservation measures, mountain and freshwater ecosystems and biodiversity monitoring.
A new group called the “friends of target 18” was also announced. The initiative, put together by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), will be co-chaired by Colombia and Finland.
Armenia is the only other country currently officially involved in the group, while France, Malawi and Guinea have indicated they will join.
The “friends” group has already held several informal meetings since March 2025, said Farooq Ullah, a senior policy advisor at the IISD. He told Carbon Brief that the group intends to help countries share information and solutions on subsidy reform, and to strengthen “political will” on tackling subsidies.
Ullah said more information and the full list of countries involved will be published in May 2027, during the first planned in-person meeting of the “friends”.
The IISD also published a report on national-level progress on target 18, finding that countries are “not on track” to meet their commitments on subsidy reform.
Throughout COP17, the narrative around harmful subsidies focused primarily on economic – rather than environmental – benefits of reform. Ullah told Carbon Brief:
“Something is different now. Governments are taking this seriously for the first time and, honestly, it may not be for environmental reasons. It is because they are out of money.”
Dozens of countries around the world increased their fossil-fuel subsidies this year to ward off energy price rises after the US-Israel war on Iran disrupted supplies flowing through the Strait of Hormuz.
Marine biodiversityThere were three main points of contention around the text on marine and coastal biodiversity in Yerevan.
The main sticking point concerned references to the agreement on marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, known as BBNJ, or the “High Seas Treaty”. The BBNJ agreement entered into force in January of this year and it has been ratified by more than 100 countries.
The initial non-paper presented for discussion contained six direct references to the treaty – all in brackets. While most parties were in agreement about the importance of recognising the treaty in this text, Russia remained adamantly opposed to most of these references.
Similarly, while many parties wanted to include text in the decision that “welcomes with appreciation” the treaty’s entry into force, Russia said it “could not accept” anything other than “takes note of”.
Ultimately, references to the BBNJ agreement were removed from the preambular paragraphs and several other places in the text, with the decision saying it “takes note of” the treaty’s entry into force.
Parties did agree to establish an informal advisory group on work conducted under the CBD in relation to marine areas beyond national jurisdiction.
The establishment of this group was a “very important” part of the text, said Lolita Couchene, advocacy officer at Nausicaá. Couchene pointed out that the Yerevan summit is the first CBD COP since the entry into force of the BBNJ treaty. She told Carbon Brief:
“There are really high stakes around how it will be addressed…It’s really important, because the entry into force of the BBNJ agreement is a major milestone for ocean governance, and its implementation will also depend on how it connects effectively with the other international frameworks – especially the Convention on Biological Diversity.”
The second sticking point was around one of the annexes to the decision, which concerned ecologically or biologically significant marine areas, known as “EBSAs”.
At COP16 in Cali, negotiators finally came to a decision on the process for scientifically describing EBSAs, after eight years of negotiations. Alongside this, parties requested “voluntary guidelines on peer-review processes” for describing EBSAs.
That language proved contentious in Yerevan, even though it had already been agreed two years earlier. Some parties felt that the word “guidelines” – even directly following “voluntary” – could be seen as too binding. However, many other parties were dissatisfied with the proposed alternative of “voluntary reference elements for good practice”.
As of the second week of the COP, both of these options remained bracketed in the text, along with a compromise option of “voluntary guidance”.
Annex I from the marine and coastal biodiversity text released on 25 October. Source: UN CBDUltimately, it was this third option that made it into the text adopted during the closing plenary.
The final sticking point with the text was around explicit mentions of Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs), as well as women and youth. These mentions were also contested by Russia.
All of the bracketed mentions of these groups were removed before the text went to the plenary for approval, although the final decision does retain one reference that had not been bracketed.
Xiomara Acevedo, founder and director of the civil society organisation Barranquilla+20, told Carbon Brief that the “regression” on language around IPLCs, women and youth is “concerning because this is already agreed language”. She added:
“We cannot achieve global biodiversity targets by weakening the recognition of the peoples, communities and knowledge systems that have contributed to protecting biodiversity for generations.”
When the marine biodiversity text was discussed in the final plenary session, several parties noted their unhappiness with Russia’s resistance to certain elements of this text. A Chilean delegate said she had “deep concern in the steps we are taking back”. She added:
“We are erasing with our elbow what we have just written.”
Her statement was met with lasting applause in the plenary room.
Planning, monitoring, reporting and reviewAlongside the global review, delegates negotiated a separate text on “further enhancing” planning, monitoring, reporting and review (PMRR).
This included additional work on the monitoring framework, which was one of the last issues to get resolved at COP16 – ultimately, it was agreed at the resumed session in Rome in February 2025.
Coming into Yerevan, there “wasn’t really a mandate to continue working on the monitoring framework”, Victoria Romero, senior policy officer for biodiversity at the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), told Carbon Brief. Rather, she said, the discussions were very “process-oriented”.
The PMRR decision “welcomes with appreciation” parties’ efforts to provide information in a timely manner, but also “notes with concern” the “institutional, technical, capacity and resource challenges” that made it difficult for parties to do so.
Much of the discussion in Yerevan centred on those challenges. Romero told Carbon Brief:
“There’s an acknowledgement that the monitoring framework wasn’t used as much as it should have. But then one of the gaps identified – that is addressed at this COP – is this expression of needs of capacity to be able to use the monitoring framework.”
The decision “requests” that the Global Environment Facility ensure that “timely, adequate and accessible resources” are available for parties as they prepare their eighth national reports.
In a non-paper released on the first day of the talks, disagreement was clear on several issues, including the level of detail of reporting; the post-2030 work of the convention; development and addition of indicators; and specific references to Indigenous peoples and local communities, women and youth.
An annex to the decision laid out more than a dozen additional, optional indicators that parties could use to report on their progress towards the global targets. Parties were split on how to refer to these indicators, with some supporting text that “agrees” to their inclusion and some wanting weaker text that “takes note” of the additional indicators.
The entire annex was also placed in brackets at one point, but parties later agreed to remove those, with the provision that a footnote be added to clarify that the indicators themselves had not been negotiated by the COP or its subsidiary bodies, according to Earth Negotiations Bulletin.
The final text “takes note” of the additional proposed indicators, while adding that their use is “optional and subject to national circumstances”.
Parties also diverged on how to refer to the convention’s work after 2030: as a post-2030 strategic plan; a possible follow-up to the Framework; or continued implementation of the GBF towards its 2050 goals. Some parties felt it was important not to prejudge the outcome of COP19 by specifying what the post-2030 work would look like.
Text on post-2030 work submitted by the working group chair for plenary consideration. Source: UN CBDUltimately, parties agreed to a compromise, brought forward by the EU at the final plenary, to ask the subsidiary bodies for “recommendations on an inclusive, transparent and party-driven way forward for the period post-2030 without prejudging the outcome” in reference to future work.
The decision also agreed to establish an ad hoc technical expert group on the “further operationalisation” of the monitoring framework. This group, which will support parties in preparing their eighth national reports, was a “positive outcome” from the PMRR decision, Romero said.
Article 8(j) implementationOne of the major outcomes from COP16 was the agreement to create a new permanent body for Indigenous peoples.
This would provide a space to advise and offer the views of Indigenous peoples directly at biodiversity COPs for the first time.
Discussions on the role of Indigenous peoples take place at UN biodiversity COPs under Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
This mandates that countries “respect, preserve and maintain” the knowledge of Indigenous peoples and local communities related to biodiversity conservation, and to “encourage the equitable sharing of benefits”.
At COP17, countries negotiated several documents related to figuring out how this mechanism would be implemented within the CBD, its budget and other organisational matters.
At the end of the final plenary session on 30 October, countries agreed on the “modus operandi” of the permanent body. This was widely celebrated after two weeks of tense and divided negotiations.
The divisions centred on a number of things, including the composition between Indigenous peoples and local communities in a “friends of the bureau” group, plus the geographical rotation of nominations for co-chairs of the subsidiary body.
Several “contact group” negotiations took place on 8(j) at COP17, co-chaired by Jennifer Corpuz from the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity and Sikeade Oluwakemi Egbuwalo from Nigeria.
On 27 October, Corpuz told Carbon Brief that countries showed “constructive spirit”, but a lot of “red lines” remained. She added:
“We’re trying our best to get past them, but we know that there are very, very strong views on either side of the table.”
It would be a “failure of COP17” to not agree on the modus operandi, said the DRC on behalf of the African group in the final plenary session on 30 October.
The DRC claimed the plenary would lose “quorum” in “30 minutes” as the talks ran well into overtime, calling on countries to “show courage” on the issue.
In the end, countries signed off on the terms of how the permanent body would be implemented.
More detailed coverage of 8(j) negotiations and outcomes will be added to this article shortly.
Biodiversity and climate changeCountries in Yerevan agreed to a new text on biodiversity and climate change, which included new voluntary guidance for scaling up nature-based solutions, but left out references to a landmark legal climate opinion and new biodiversity science.
Though recognising the links between climate change and biodiversity was a key objective of the Colombian presidency in Cali at COP16, the mood at COP17 was distinctly different, observers told Carbon Brief.
In Cali, countries agreed to a text that “recognises” that biodiversity loss and climate change are “interdependent” issues that “need to be addressed urgently and in a coherent and balanced manner”.
Despite finding agreement two years ago, negotiators decided to revisit this passage again in Yerevan, explained An Lambrechts, head of the Greenpeace delegation at COP17. She told Carbon Brief:
“They actually went to having this exact same debate about some words in the text that they had at COP16. For example, if they refer to interconnected ‘crises’ or ‘challenges’ – and that kept going in circles for a long time.
“[There is] a feeling that there is some backtracking because the world has changed, compared to Cali.”
One key area of contention this year was a movement to cite the International Court of Justice’s landmark advisory “opinion” on climate change within the biodiversity and climate change text. (See Carbon Brief’s in-depth summary of the ICJ opinion.)
Several draft versions of the text contained a reference to the ICJ’s opinion in brackets (illustrated below).
A draft version of the biodiversity and climate change text from 30 October. Source: UN CBDDebates on whether or not to include the reference continued into COP17’s last scheduled day.
The Pacific small island states, Panama, the EU and Brazil supported citing the advisory opinion in the text, Carbon Brief understands, with small islands indicating it was a “red line”.
Meanwhile, Russia, Saudi Arabia and India were “in favour of deletion”, an observer said.
During the final plenary, Russia restated that it would not be willing to agree to the text unless the reference to the ICJ opinion was removed, telling the presidency:
“We are just not willing to move on that, particularly at this time of night.”
Russia also asked the presidency to delete other passages of text referencing IPBES assessments on how to achieve “transformative change” for nature and on the “nexus” between biodiversity, water, food and health.
This was opposed by the UK, which noted that past COPs had “previously welcomed” new scientific assessments and reports.
In a further intervention, the UK suggested a “compromise” of deleting a reference to the transformative change assessment, but keeping a reference to the nexus assessment – arguing this was the more “relevant” report for the biodiversity and climate text.
Russia accepted this compromise.
The text was adopted without references to the ICJ opinion on climate change and the IPBES transformative change assessment.
Another key passage in the climate text refers to the development of new “voluntary guidelines” for helping countries scale up nature-based solutions to climate change.
The text “invites” countries to “consider using the voluntary guidelines” to “integrate” nature-based solutions and “social and environmental safeguards in mitigation and adaptation measures”.
It also “requests” that CBD executive secretary Astrid Schomaker “invites” countries and civil society to submit their “views and reflections” on the voluntary guidelines.
Links with other bodiesFollowing a strong outcome for “links with other bodies” at COP16, negotiations stalled on a number of agenda items in Armenia.
These links were discussed explicitly within agenda item 13, which covers “cooperation with other conventions and international organisations”.
However, references to other “bodies and synergies” across the three Rio conventions were also contentious across several other agenda items, including biodiversity and climate change, as well as the text on marine and coastal biodiversity.
Work mandated by the final COP16 decision led to two documents on cooperation with other bodies being produced during intersessional meetings, which formed the basis of negotiation in Yerevan.
However, not all parties supported these documents and disagreements quickly arose.
View of the room during an event on cooperation among the Rio Conventions. Credit: IISD/ENB | Mike MuzurakisNegotiations at COP16 had led to some “really ambitious text” on synergies within the biodiversity and climate change item, according to Bethan Laughlin, senior policy specialist at the Zoological Society of London.
Laughlin told Carbon Brief:
“What we saw was real pushback against the ambition that these annexes brought to the table, with significant resistance from a small number of parties to strengthening synergies, in general. There was also resistance from some to anything that might not be in line with some governments’ national priorities…[This] manifested in the [final] decision, really whittling it down and weakening it.”
Across the first week, in discussion on links with other bodies, contentious elements included the development of a multilevel road map to enhance synergies across the Rio conventions and a “supplement to the voluntary guidelines on ecosystem-based adaptation and disaster risk reduction”.
A heavily bracketed “non-paper” published during the second week of COP17 highlighted the lack of consensus.
Observers told Carbon Brief that some parties pushed back against any references to mitigation within the voluntary guidelines text, alongside references to the recent “nexus” and “transformative” change IPBES assessments.
This mirrors a wider trend of objecting to science and implementation language, both at COP17 and within the wider multilateral space.
There was also significant pushback in the marine and coastal biodiversity negotiations on references to the agreement on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (the “High Seas Treaty”), which entered into force in January. (See: Marine biodiversity)
A reference to the High Seas Treaty was bracketed in early versions of the cooperation text, but remained in the final version.
Ultimately, parties decided to pass the multilevel roadmap to peer review, providing parties and stakeholders with more time to provide additional views on the roadmap.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Camila Jardim, an international political expert at Greenpeace Brazil, said negotiators “struggled to uphold the commitments made in Cali”, adding:
“There was pushback against the synergies agenda – even regarding the use of the term ‘synergies’ itself.”
A draft text was gavelled through during the final plenary for cooperation; however, it pushed work on a number of elements into future meetings.
In the closing days of COP17, the CBD presidency alongside the presidencies of other Rio conventions – the UNFCCC’s COP31, UNCCD’s COP17 and UNCCD’s COP18 – released a joint statement declaring their intention to accelerate work on biodiversity through the use of synergies. It added:
“We call for elevating Rio convention synergies higher on the political agenda, providing opportunities for parties, other governments and relevant stakeholders to engage and contribute in an open, inclusive, transparent, balanced and participatory manner.”
Around the COP Armenian presidencyArmenia was chosen over Azerbaijan as the host of COP17 in a vote held at the previous UN nature summit in 2024.
(At UN biodiversity talks, countries vote in a secret ballot for the next host nation, at the end of each COP.)
This year’s summit took place in the mountainous nation’s capital of Yerevan – one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world.
Several delegates told Carbon Brief that the COP17 president, Hambardzum Matevosyan, was engaged and well-organised throughout the talks.
During the summit, Matevosyan, Armenia’s environment minister, kept a relatively low public profile outside the walls of the official negotiation rooms.
He spoke at high-level events and a small number of press conferences – alongside frequent Facebook updates – but remained tight-lipped to the media about how the talks were progressing.
He told journalists on 22 October that he had discussed key negotiation issues with countries in the months leading up to the summit, to expedite progress at the talks.
At a mid-point press briefing on 26 October, Matevosyan described “encouraging momentum” and cooperation in the negotiations. He added that he believed COP17 would be judged by its “lasting results”, beyond the final gavel falling.
Speaking at a press conference after the all-night, 12-hour final plenary session, Matevosyan said: “We have achieved more than we could have expected”.
CBD executive secretary Schomaker said the COP achieved “remarkable things at a moment when multilateralism is supposedly not functioning”.
Attendees also widely praised the logistics in Yerevan, with free buses to the conference venue and efforts to ease city congestion, including traffic restrictions and closing local schools.
However, Armenia’s hosting of the COP also drew attention to its own environmental record.
Civil-society groups criticised the launch of operations at a gold mine in the south-east of the country just over one week before COP17 began. (See: Protests)
Prime minister Nikol Pashinyan’s framing of the mine as a “success” also drew criticism, according to Armenian investigative outlet Hetq.
Mining is a key economic sector in Armenia, with the nation holding reserves of rare minerals, copper and gold. Land-use change – mainly for agriculture, but also partly for mining – is one of the key drivers of biodiversity loss.
Hetq also reported that “construction waste” from the COP17 negotiations venue “spilled” into a gorge that was recently recognised as a specially protected natural area.
Hetq said Armenia’s ministry of environment “noted that it is not a body that exercises supervisory functions over environmental protection norms”.
ProtestsProtests at COP17 were muted, compared to the loud marches seen at most climate COPs, with many “silent” demonstrations inside the blue zone when negotiations were under way.
On the first day of the talks, Armenian activists wearing t-shirts and carrying signs drawing attention to the controversial Amulsar gold mine were prevented from entering the venue.
Two days later, one of the same activists, Anna Shahnazaryan, was again denied entry to the venue – although she was later allowed to speak at an event organised by the CBD women’s caucus.
In a press conference, Shahnazaryan said that the mine – which began operations one week before COP17 – “undermines and obstructs all 23 targets” of the GBF. She added:
“This is similar to the climate COPs, where the whole world gathers to discuss the climate crisis, but oil industry representatives attend and strike deals. The same thing is happening here at our COP. We must not allow the discourse on biodiversity conservation to be cynically turned into mining rhetoric.”
The UN special rapporteur for environmental defenders, Michel Forst, told Carbon Brief:
“Biodiversity [loss], climate [change] and pollution are the main threats to the planet currently. And my concern as special rapporteur is that I see many people could not participate in COP meetings. I’m there also to prevent attacks from occurring, but to ensure people have the full right to participate and express themselves safely in these premises.”
As wildfires raged in Indonesia, activists wearing pollution masks in the foyer of the COP17 venue drew attention to the extinction risk facing Tapanuli orangutans.
According to a new report by conservation NGO Mighty Earth, around 7% of the species’ population was wiped out by Cyclone Senyar, which struck Sumatra last year. The report noted that the storm was “supercharged” by climate change.
Prof Serge Wich, a primatologist who helped identify the Tapanuli orangutans as a distinct species only in 2017, said in the report:
“[Extinction of these orangutans] would be a terrible failure by humanity, the conservation community and governments. With all the knowledge and money we have in the world, if we can’t save charismatic species like this… what is the hope for all the other species that we care about?”
The largest protest by far at COP17 was held by Brazilian Indigenous groups ahead of the country’s presidential run-off election on 25 October. Protesters said the vote was crucial to “defend democracy”, Brazil’s sovereignty and biodiversity.
According to a statement by the Articulation of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (APIB), the “electoral advance of the far right” in Brazil’s Congressional elections earlier this month brought back issues that are “not abstract” to Indigenous peoples, but are tied to their safety, autonomy and survival.
Prior to the election, Carbon Brief analysis showed that Lula’s third term as president prevented the deforestation of an area of Amazon rainforest roughly the size of the US state of New Jersey.
Camila Jardim from Greenpeace Brazil told Carbon Brief at a press briefing that the incoming Brazilian Congress will, nonetheless, have a stronger ability to “dismantle” environmental protections due to the large majority won by far-right parties.
As ministers huddled behind closed doors on 29 October, human-rights organisations held a silent protest in the main hallway to draw attention to frontline environmentalists killed defending biodiversity.
Protest in the COP17 corridors drawing attention to the killings of environmental defenders. Credit: ENB/IISD | Mike Muzurakis Lobbying and influenceThroughout the talks, advocacy groups highlighted the role of lobbying within negotiations on key texts.
Investigative outlet DeSmog said a leading pharmaceutical group had tried to weaken the terms of the Cali Fund, since it was first announced in 2024.
DeSmog said it had seen documents in which the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) called for a “radical rethink” of the fund.
The outlet quoted Guilherme Cintra, director of innovation policy at IFPMA, saying the group had “long supported the goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity and continues to deliver against the targets set out in the Global Biodiversity Framework”.
However, DeSmog also quoted the industry group stating that the “modalities of the decision” to establish the Cali Fund should be “significantly reviewed, revised and clarified”.
Various charities raised concerns about the potential role of lobbying in the run-up to COP17, including Amnesty International, which warned in a briefing document:
“Companies and industry associations have massively stepped up their lobbying to counter and roll back biodiversity protections, which they see as limiting their business opportunities. To do this, they turn up in large numbers at the COPs, and take up space that could be used for the voices of affected communities.”
As the negotiations continued into their second week, charities continued to caution about the potential for lobbying.
For example, Greenpeace called on governments to “get their act together and…prevent corporate lobbyists from capturing the negotiations”.
Carbon and biodiversity marketsDespite controversy surrounding biodiversity offsets and credits, they are officially accepted as one of the official means of achieving the GBF’s target 19.
Amid a shortfall in international public finance for biodiversity, these markets were expected to feature prominently in Yerevan.
“One area the discussion has moved forward quite a lot is the area of biodiversity credits,” said UN biodiversity chief Schomaker at a nature finance press conference ahead of COP17 in September.
She admitted that credits were “rather controversially discussed” at COP16 and “among the messages” from Indigenous communities and civil society was the “need to really learn from carbon credits”. Schomaker added that they “remain an important instrument”, if they can be “high-integrity”.
At a press conference on the first day at COP17, Indigenous leaders opposed the use of “charismatic species” – such as lions or rhinos that are generally popular with people – as credits to “offset” biodiversity loss.
Speaking to reporters, Tom Goldtooth, Dakota environmentalist and executive director of the Indigenous Environmental Network, called biodiversity credits a “violation of the sacred, of Indigenous peoples’ values”.
Criticising “buffalo bonds” for carbon storage, Goldtooth continued:
“It’s Chevron, it’s Shell leasing trees using colonial structures of property rights. I cannot comprehend a world where they use whales as carbon sponges. We come from the buffalo, but markets do not understand this. For us, nature is not an asset class; nature is Mother Earth and Father Sky.”
On 27 October, the EU environment commissioner Jessika Roswall launched an initiative called “Friends of Credits for Nature and Biodiversity” at an event co-hosted with France and Peru.
According to the EU’s statement, the “informal” initiative aims to build “governmental support” and international cooperation on nature credits. It has been “welcomed” by Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, as well as Australia, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Japan and New Zealand.
When asked why the EU was focusing on “broadening the contributor base” through biodiversity markets at COP17, Roswell told Carbon Brief that nature credits were part of the EU’s attempts to close the nature investment gap as part of target 19.
She told Carbon Brief that biodiversity finance is not just a “question of will”, but also the “bigger horizontal risk” of not working on the areas. As such, Rosland said the EU is “working on a broader perspective” and looking at a range of solutions, “not only public money”.
In Yerevan, China also announced that it would be testing nature markets, with a pilot in Sichuan, reported Carbon Pulse.
During the COP17 plenary, however, Peru called for biodiversity offsets to be scrutinised as a financial instrument listed in the GBF’s Target 19.
Peru’s call for a study to examine whether biodiversity credits and offsets “generate additionality in biodiversity conservation” was included in the final resource mobilisation decision.
Peru’s call for an amendment to scrutinise biodiversity offsets in the resource mobilisation decision at COP17. Credit: UN CBD. COP17: Which countries have released new pledges to tackle nature loss? 16.10.2026 COP17 Yerevan COP17: Tracking progress towards the UN’s 2030 nature targets 15.10.2026 COP17 Yerevan COP17: Developed countries ‘fall far short’ of UN targets for nature finance 15.10.2026 COP17 Yerevan Interactive: Tracking negotiating texts at the COP17 biodiversity summit 12.10.2026 COP17 Yerevan .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }The post COP17: Key outcomes agreed at the UN biodiversity conference in Yerevan appeared first on Carbon Brief.
The EPA is quietly killing its web archive
In a little-noticed webpage update, the Environmental Protection Agency has announced a plan to decommission its online web archive at the end of the year, a move that would wipe tens of thousands of publicly available environmental resources from the web. The discreet banner notice comes in stark contrast to EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin’s recent public takedowns of the agency’s power plant pollution standards and federal methane regulatory system.
“The EPA’s online archive makes information about a wide variety of environmental issues and past policies available to the public, dating back at least 20 years,” said Gretchen Gehrke, co-founder of the Environmental Data and Governance Initiative, or EDGI. “This information is irreplaceable, and if the archive is decommissioned, that information will be lost forever.”
For decades, the web archive has been an unparalleled resource for researchers, legislators, policymakers, and the public writ large. It houses everything from fact sheets and environmental reports to agency policy changes and regulatory actions, making it a tool for “democratic oversight,” according to Gehrke, who for 10 years has been tracking changes to vulnerable federal environmental data.
Screenshot of the EPA’s online archive webpage Rachel SantarsieroThis isn’t the first time the environmental agency has tried to shutter the online web archive. In late January 2022, the Biden administration’s EPA announced plans to discontinue the online repository, citing burdensome financial upkeep; through a Freedom of Information Act request, Gehrke was able to determine that the agency spent roughly $2 million a year to maintain it. A coalition of environmentalists, historians, and librarians swiftly condemned the decision, with groups like EDGI and American Society for Environmental History calling the announcement “alarming” and cause for a “tremendous gap” in the historical record.
After five months of public backlash, the EPA acquiesced, in part by announcing it would delay the web archive’s retirement by one year to July 2023. I reported on it at the time for New Security Beat:
“News of this welcome reprieve for the EPA digital archive raises a significant question: Why continue with plans to shut it down at all? Postponement does not resolve the eventual damage to government transparency and historical record keeping that the archive’s demise will create. And the concern of organizations opposed to closure will not be satisfied by an additional year of operation.”
In March 2023, the agency walked back its decision further still by adjusting the banner announcement to say that the online web archive was simply “retiring” — end date not included. Since then, over the last three and a half years, the online resource has soldiered on quietly, no longer being updated but still accessible to the public until a few weeks ago, when the EPA updated the archive’s expiration date to December 31, 2026.
While the usability of the archive has historically been far from perfect — researchers often encountered dead links and frustratingly limited search capabilities — the archive has held a trove of tens of thousands of EPA documents dating back to the 1990s simply not available elsewhere.
Major political environmental inflection points could be tracked through the archive, such as President George W. Bush’s 2003 Clear Skies Initiative, or President Barack Obama’s 2015 Clean Power Plan — two initiatives that sought to dramatically transform power plant pollution standards. And during President Trump’s first term, when the administration deleted the majority of the EPA’s climate change web resources, the online resource crucially maintained and made accessible these defunct pages for the public.
Read Next The EPA’s data on cancer risk from air pollution has gone dark Sachi Kitajima MulkeyThe archival repository has also been a tool for environmental enforcement and oversight. In 1989, after an investigation found that military operations had contaminated the soil, sediment, surface water, and groundwater at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and the Marine Corps Air Station in North Carolina, the EPA listed the base on its National Priorities List. Documents on the EPA’s decades-long investigation were preserved on the archive and helped nearby residents and service members on base overcome doubts about the agency’s effectiveness and better evaluate chemical exposures. Earlier this week, President Trump said he would withhold compensation due to service members and their families exposed at Camp Lejeune if Republicans lose their majority in Congress.
Now, the EPA’s latest move could further undermine public confidence at a time when trust in government is near historic lows.
“The EPA’s insistence on decommissioning its web archive will only continue to erode public trust — at the exact time the public and lawmakers need agency information the most,” Lauren Harper, the first Daniel Ellsberg chair on government secrecy for the Freedom of the Press Foundation, wrote in an email. “Killing easy access to records forces researchers and lawmakers to flood an already underwater FOIA office just to see once-public records.”
The recently updated webpage states that historical information can still be found in the EPA’s “snapshot collections,” but given the second Trump administration’s crusade against public data and evisceration of funds to federal programs and personnel, it’s hard to know for sure if all, or even a fraction, of the archive’s contents will live on.
“EPA should expand and systematize the archive, not throw it away and expect that three discrete snapshots will suffice,” said Gehrke.
The EPA did not respond to a request for comment.
toolTips('.classtoolTips7','A powerful greenhouse gas that accounts for about 11% of global emissions, methane is the primary component of natural gas and is emitted into the atmosphere by landfills, oil and natural gas systems, agricultural activities, coal mining, and wastewater treatment, among other pathways. Over a 20-year period, it is roughly 84 times more potent than carbon dioxide at trapping heat in the atmosphere.');This story was originally published by Grist with the headline The EPA is quietly killing its web archive on Oct 31, 2026.
COP17 delivers fragile deal to boost conservation and funding for nature
Governments at the COP17 nature summit in Armenia agreed on Saturday to scale up their policies to protect the planet’s shrinking biodiversity, and for the first time invited large emerging economies like China and Gulf states to take on donor responsibilities to help fund those efforts.
For the past two weeks, countries held talks in Yerevan under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity to outline a plan to ramp up currently “insufficient” policies to conserve land and marine ecosystems. A recent UN progress report found the world is off track to meet 22 out of 23 global targets aimed at reversing species loss and protecting 30% of land and seas by 2030.
While a response plan, called the “Global Review of Collective Progress”, was expected to be the main outcome of COP17, negotiations struggled to advance amid a deadlock over the controversial subject of how to finance the boost in conservation measures needed.
After an all-night session on Friday, delegates agreed to invite developing countries to voluntarily signal their interest in assuming donor funding obligations alongside developed nations. Negotiators repeatedly warned that any stronger provisions on expanding the donor base would collapse the deal.
COP president: Results beat expectationsAn exhausted COP17 president Hambardzum Matevosyan, Armenia’s environment minister, told journalists in the early hours of Saturday that “we’ve achieved more than we could’ve expected” given the “importance” of the decisions being taken.
“It was 100% possible that those items did not made it through. 100% possible,” he said, adding that the conference had made progress on “all the most important items”.
Speaking at the closing plenary, the group of Pacific Islands said that, while the summit had achieved “great outcomes”, delegates are also departing Yerevan “with realities not reflected in the official text”, such as the low replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), a key funder of nature projects.
Some observers also said the deal did not go far enough. Steven Guilbeault, a former Canadian environment minister who helped broker the Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), said the Yerevan package of action is “an important step forward”, but still “falls short of what is needed to meet our 2030 commitments”.
An Lambrechts, biodiversity politics expert at Greenpeace International, said COP17 had kept things moving forward and set well-intentioned promises, but added that these “won’t remove major roadblocks to implementation” such as insufficient finance and debt constraints in developing countries.
WWF chief conservation officer Daudi Sumba noted that financial issues were not fully resolved. Despite the deal in Yerevan, “I fear finance will remain the key issue that continues to haunt the UN biodiversity summits,” he said in a statement.
‘Yerevan Pathway’ tackles nature plans and subsidiesIn the lead-up to the summit, the UN assessment report showed countries are falling short on virtually all targets in the GBF, the 2022 global deal often referred to as the ‘Paris Agreement for nature’.
They include a landmark target to protect at least 30% of the planet’s land and sea by 2030. If countries all stick to their current national goals, about 26% of land would be protected and only about 12% of marine ecosystems would be under conservation measures by the end of this decade.
The main COP17 decision – named the Yerevan Pathway by the presidency – calls for countries to revise their biodiversity plans, subject to available funding, with a particular focus on addressing the gap in coverage of “marine, coastal and inland water ecosystems”.
It also urges the over 60 countries that have not yet submitted a national plan to finalise one “as soon as possible”, while taking into account the gaps identified by the UN progress report.
Countries also agreed to tackle the drivers of biodiversity loss by “accelerating” the reduction of subsidies for activities that damage nature. Subsidy reform, covered by Target 18 of the GBF, is where countries have made the least progress so far, according to the assessment report.
Jill Hepp, director of nature and marine policy and incentives at green group Conservation International, said singling out subsidies in the Yerevan Pathway “gives a strong signal” that closing the gap for biodiversity action requires “more urgent efforts to reform harmful incentives and scale up positive incentives”.
Delegates huddle for a last-minute negotiation at the COP17 closing plenary in Yerevan, Armenia, on October 31, 2026. (Photo: IISD/ENB – Mike Muzurakis) Delegates huddle for a last-minute negotiation at the COP17 closing plenary in Yerevan, Armenia, on October 31, 2026. (Photo: IISD/ENB – Mike Muzurakis) “Timid” steps to expand base of donorsHaving failed to meet a target to channel $20 billion for biodiversity conservation by 2025 and faced with shrinking aid budgets, the EU pushed a proposal to expand the list of which countries count as donors, so that wealthy emerging economies like China and Saudi Arabia could also voluntarily contribute. The group of Arab nations strongly opposed this.
During the talks, Irish minister of state for nature, Christopher O’Sullivan, whose country holds the EU presidency, said the bloc wanted the world’s “new realities” to be reflected in the donor list.
Negotiations remained gridlocked for most of the two-week talks, until a last-day compromise was struck to invite developing countries that may want donor status “to indicate to the [Convention on Biological Diversity] secretariat their interest in being included in the corresponding list”.
Countries also asked the secretariat to send an invitation to emerging economies wanting donor status at each subsequent COP, and requested a technical report on “the implications of inclusion in the list” for emerging economies.
Swiss lead negotiator Gabriela Blatter said her country had expected greater steps towards expanding the base of contributing countries, but added that “if we’re mutually unhappy, it’s probably the closest we can get on these very delicate political compromises”. Saudi Arabia expressed dissatisfaction, saying it had expected “a lot less”.
The fragile deal was approved in a package of decisions together with the Global Review, after some delegations including Brazil and China appealed to the plenary not to make further changes to the text at the risk of collapsing the whole agreement.
In a statement delivered to the closing plenary, the EU said the finance outcome had delivered “timid” progress towards fully broadening the base of donors.
An EU negotiator speaks at the COP17 closing plenary in Yerevan, Armenia on October 31, 2026. (Photo: UN Biodiversity) An EU negotiator speaks at the COP17 closing plenary in Yerevan, Armenia on October 31, 2026. (Photo: UN Biodiversity) Cali Fund still not operationalAdopted two years ago at COP16, the Cali Fund was seen by some observers as a way to channel private-sector finance into biodiversity conservation, as governments struggle to find public funds. But it is still struggling to get up on its feet.
The fund allows big corporations to access certificates for the use of genetic material found in biodiversity in return for a financial contribution, which experts estimate has the potential to raise up to $6.9bn for biodiversity. While voluntary, companies are encouraged to pay 1% of their profits or 0.1% of revenue into the fund.
But since its creation, the fund has received little more than $10,000, which Guilbeault argued is because the rules for disbursements to local communities and the operation of the fund had yet to be fleshed out. This was due to happen at COP17.
Yet, while the final decision on the fund laid out some of the rules – including how companies can earn “Cali Fund certificates” – some key technical details were left to the next COP in 2028 in Ecuador. This includes the issue of whether companies can pay a lower rate if they use genetic data for only a small portion of their products.
“By punting essential decisions to two years from now, parties have all but ensured the fund remains empty until then,” said Pakhi Das, a public policy advisor at NGO Plant-for-the-Planet.
The post COP17 delivers fragile deal to boost conservation and funding for nature appeared first on Climate Home News.
Shell’s Iran War Windfall Has Another Side: SEC Filing Reveals $5.4 Billion Shipping-Lease Shock
Shell’s latest financial statements reveal a remarkable accounting consequence of the Middle East conflict. While the oil giant reports extraordinary profits, soaring tanker freight rates have triggered billions of dollars in additional shipping-lease liabilities. The figures are non-cash adjustments, not realised losses, but they expose another dimension of Shell’s vulnerability to geopolitical disruption.
By John Donovan — 31 October 2026
Shell plc’s spectacular third-quarter profits have attracted considerable attention.
The company reported adjusted earnings of $10.814 billion on 29 October 2026, almost double the amount recorded in the corresponding quarter last year.
The financial results have already generated controversy over the extent to which major oil producers are benefiting from the Iran war and the resulting disruption to international energy markets.
But another significant disclosure, buried in the accompanying financial statements, deserves closer examination.
Shell reports that changes in shipping-market conditions resulted in $5.4 billion of non-cash increases in the variable component of its shipping leases during the third quarter.
And the figure becomes even more striking when the reporting period is extended.
During the first nine months of 2026, Shell recorded $7.684 billion in upward adjustments to shipping-lease liabilitiesas a consequence of rising freight-rate indices associated with the Middle East conflict.
These are extraordinary figures.
They are not, however, equivalent to billions of dollars in immediate cash losses.
Understanding that distinction is essential to interpreting what Shell has disclosed.
What Shell actually revealedThe relevant information appears in Shell’s third-quarter financial report, published on 29 October 2026 and included in its US regulatory reporting.
A footnote on page 2 explains that the company’s quarterly lease additions include $5.4 billion in non-cash increases associated with the variable component of shipping leases.
A more detailed explanation appears in Note 7, under the heading Debt, on page 33.
Shell states that certain vessel leases involve payments linked to market indices.
Under International Financial Reporting Standard IFRS 16, the company is required to remeasure the associated lease liabilities using applicable spot rates.
During the first nine months of 2026, the Middle East conflict caused substantial increases in the underlying freight-rate indices.
The result was a $7.684 billion increase in the relevant lease liabilities compared with their measurement at 31 December 2025.
Shell also recognised corresponding adjustments to the associated right-of-use assets in its property, plant and equipment.
The company cautions that the spot rates used in these calculations may not reflect the payments ultimately made under its long-term shipping arrangements.
That warning is particularly important.
A sharp rise in a freight-rate index can produce a large accounting adjustment without necessarily producing an equivalent increase in the future cash payments actually required.
Nevertheless, the figures reveal the scale of Shell’s exposure to exceptionally volatile shipping markets.
Why the Iran conflict mattersOil and liquefied natural gas are transported through international shipping networks that can be severely affected by military conflict, sanctions, port restrictions and changing security conditions.
The Middle East occupies an especially important position in those networks.
The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, is one of the world’s most strategically significant energy transport routes.
Disruption affecting shipping in the region can increase insurance costs, alter vessel availability, lengthen voyages and raise freight rates.
For a company with Shell’s international trading and LNG operations, such changes can have substantial consequences.
Shell does not merely produce and sell hydrocarbons.
It also operates within a vast international system of commodity trading, maritime transport, storage and supply contracts.
Consequently, the commercial impact of geopolitical instability can extend far beyond changes in the market prices of oil and gas.
The latest financial statements demonstrate that shipping costs and related accounting obligations can also become major sources of volatility.
Importantly, Shell expressly links the increased freight-rate indices underlying its lease adjustments to the Middle East conflict.
That connection is not an allegation from an environmental organisation or an outside commentator.
It is the company’s own explanation in its published financial statements.
How can a lease liability increase by billions without a cash loss?This is the central accounting question.
Under IFRS 16, companies generally recognise liabilities representing the present value of qualifying future lease payments.
They also recognise corresponding right-of-use assets reflecting their contractual rights to use the leased equipment or property.
In Shell’s case, some of these arrangements concern vessels whose lease payments are linked to shipping-market indices.
When the relevant indices change, accounting rules may require the recognised lease liabilities to be recalculated.
If the applicable market index rises dramatically, the present value of future payments used in the accounting calculation can increase substantially.
A corresponding adjustment is generally made to the right-of-use asset.
The result is that both the liability and the recognised asset can increase even though no immediate cash transaction has occurred.
Shell’s own figures illustrate the effect.
At 30 September 2026, the company’s total lease liabilities stood at $34.147 billion, compared with $28.933 billion at 31 December 2025.
This net balance-sheet increase is smaller than the $7.684 billion index-related adjustment because other movements, including lease payments and changes elsewhere in the lease portfolio, also affect the overall balance.
The $7.684 billion figure is therefore not the total increase in Shell’s lease liabilities.
Nor should it be added to the $5.4 billion quarterly adjustment as though they represent separate losses.
The quarterly figure forms part of the broader nine-month development.
That distinction is essential to accurate reporting.
The accounting consequences do not end thereShell explains that the remeasurement of its vessel leases creates a corresponding increase in right-of-use assets.
Those assets are then depreciated prospectively over the remaining lease terms.
This means the adjustment can influence future reported depreciation expenses.
However, the ultimate economic impact will depend partly on how the relevant shipping indices evolve and what payments become due under the contracts.
If market conditions normalise, subsequent accounting measurements may change.
It would therefore be misleading to describe the entire $7.684 billion as a permanent realised financial loss.
Equally, it would be wrong to dismiss the disclosure as meaningless simply because it is non-cash.
The adjustment reflects real contractual exposure to volatile market conditions, measured according to the applicable accounting framework.
Shareholders are entitled to understand that exposure and the assumptions used to calculate it.
Profits on one side, shipping volatility on the otherThe shipping disclosure presents a striking contrast with Shell’s headline financial performance.
For the third quarter of 2026, Shell reported:
Financial measure Q3 2026 Adjusted earnings $10.814 billion Income attributable to shareholders $12.057 billion Cash flow from operations $21.043 billion Free cash flow $16.322 billion Net debt at quarter-end $39.733 billion New share-buyback programme $5 billionShell’s performance was supported by strong refining margins and substantial cash generation.
But the Middle East conflict has not simply created favourable conditions.
It has also disrupted energy production, affected shipping markets and increased financial volatility.
Shell’s figures show how the same geopolitical environment can produce very different effects across the business.
Higher hydrocarbon prices and refining margins may support earnings, while increased shipping costs and contractual exposures create additional pressures.
The net consequences cannot be determined from any single accounting adjustment.
That is why the shipping disclosure matters.
It provides a fuller picture of the risks accompanying Shell’s extraordinary profitability.
The link with our investigation into executive rewardsOn 30 October, this website published an investigation examining Greenpeace’s estimate that Shell chief executive Wael Sawan had experienced a £4.7 million increase in the value of his shareholding during the Iran conflict.
That article also documented Sawan’s earlier disposal of 40,000 Shell shares for approximately €1.49 million, using Shell’s own regulatory notification.
The shipping disclosure adds another important dimension to the financial story.
It demonstrates why the consequences of geopolitical conflict cannot simply be categorised as a windfall for every part of an oil company’s operations.
Shareholder valuations, realised executive transactions, operating earnings, future shipping obligations and non-cash accounting adjustments are different financial measures.
Each must be assessed on its own terms.
The company’s profitability is real.
So is the volatility reflected in its shipping-lease calculations.
The challenge is to understand how those developments interact without overstating the evidence.
What about Shell’s exposure to LNG shipping?Shipping is particularly important to Shell’s Integrated Gas business.
Liquefied natural gas must be transported using specialised vessels and supporting infrastructure.
Shell’s global LNG activities involve production, trading, transport and customer supply commitments across multiple regions.
The company has also been expanding its exposure to natural gas through major investments.
In September 2026, Shell completed its acquisition of ARC Resources, strengthening its Canadian gas portfolio.
During the same month, the company announced a final investment decision on LNG Canada Phase 2.
That project is intended to double LNG Canada’s production capacity from 14 million tonnes annually to 28 million tonnes.
These developments underscore the strategic importance of natural gas and LNG within Shell’s future portfolio.
However, Shell’s quarterly disclosure does not provide a sufficiently detailed breakdown to attribute the $7.684 billion shipping-lease adjustment exclusively to LNG carriers rather than other qualifying vessel leases.
Such a conclusion would require additional information.
What is clear is that international shipping arrangements represent an important element of Shell’s commercial and accounting exposure.
The historical perspective: energy transport and geopolitical riskFor readers of the Independent Shell Archive and The Shell Leaks Files, the latest disclosure belongs to a much longer history.
Shell’s development into a major international energy company has always depended on access to resources and the ability to transport those resources across borders.
Shipping routes, political instability, government intervention and international disputes have repeatedly influenced the company’s operations.
The historical archive documents numerous examples of Shell confronting political and commercial risk.
The Sakhalin-2 project provides one particularly significant example of the relationship between major energy investments and geopolitical power.
That history should not be confused with the present circumstances.
The 2026 shipping-lease adjustments are accounting consequences arising from freight-market conditions, not evidence of wrongdoing or a repetition of the Sakhalin controversy.
Nevertheless, both illustrate a broader reality.
International energy companies are profoundly exposed to political developments beyond their direct control.
Their financial performance cannot be understood solely through production volumes, commodity prices or headline profits.
Transport infrastructure and access to international markets are equally important.
Questions shareholders should askShell’s disclosure raises several legitimate questions.
1. Which shipping arrangements are principally responsible?
What proportion of the remeasurement relates to LNG carriers, oil tankers and other vessels?
2. How long do the affected leases run?
Long-term contracts indexed to unusually high spot rates could produce accounting measurements that differ materially from eventual cash payments.
3. What is the actual cash exposure?
How does Shell expect the increase in freight-rate indices to affect payments over the remaining contractual periods?
4. How sensitive are the reported liabilities to lower shipping rates?
Would a return towards earlier freight-market conditions produce substantial downward remeasurement?
5. What are the implications for reported depreciation?
How will the adjusted right-of-use assets influence future accounting expenses?
6. How does Shell manage geopolitical shipping risk?
What contractual, operational and financial arrangements are used to limit exposure to sudden disruption?
These questions do not imply that Shell has breached accounting rules or mismanaged its shipping contracts.
They arise from the magnitude of the adjustment and the importance of the underlying exposures.
A revealing footnote in a remarkable quarterShell’s third-quarter financial statements contain several substantial disclosures.
They include a $2.116 billion impairment relating to a European biogas asset, an impairment reversal of $1.787 billion associated with an Integrated Gas asset, and a projected $6.4 billion non-cash charge relating to the restructuring of the company’s Dutch pension arrangements.
All three have already been examined in our recent investigations.
The shipping-lease disclosure provides another example of how significant financial developments can appear within the detailed notes rather than the headline announcements.
The $5.4 billion quarterly figure is substantial.
The $7.684 billion nine-month adjustment is even more striking.
But neither should be presented as an immediate cash loss.
The company’s own explanation establishes that the figures result from the remeasurement of index-linked vessel leases under IFRS 16, with corresponding asset adjustments.
It also acknowledges that prevailing spot rates may not accurately represent eventual payments.
That qualification is vital.
Nevertheless, the disclosure illuminates a significant source of financial volatility at a time when the global energy industry is experiencing exceptional geopolitical disruption.
Conclusion: the other side of Shell’s Iran war resultsShell’s latest financial performance demonstrates the extraordinary earning power of a global energy company operating during a period of sharply changing commodity markets.
Its shipping disclosures demonstrate something equally important.
The same international conflict associated with high refining margins and substantial profits can also produce multibillion-dollar changes in contractual liabilities.
Those changes may be accounting adjustments rather than immediate cash losses, but they are not irrelevant.
They reveal financial exposures that shareholders should understand.
The important story is not that Shell has suddenly lost $7.684 billion in cash. It has not reported such a loss.
The story is that the Iran conflict has driven shipping-market conditions severe enough to produce an enormous remeasurement of the company’s vessel-lease obligations.
For an international energy business whose operations depend on maritime transport, that is a significant disclosure.
And it is precisely the kind of information that deserves careful preservation in the historical record.
Principal sources1. Shell plc — Third Quarter 2026 and Nine Months Unaudited Results, 29 October 2026
Official Shell quarterly financial statements
The primary source for the financial figures discussed in this article.
Of particular relevance are page 2, footnote 4, concerning the $5.4 billion non-cash shipping-lease increase, and page 33, Note 7, concerning the $7.684 billion remeasurement of index-linked vessel leases.
2. US Securities and Exchange Commission
SEC EDGAR — Shell plc company filings
Regulatory reporting archive. The third-quarter report was supplied as part of Shell’s 29 October 2026 Form 6-K filing.
3. IFRS Foundation — IFRS 16 Leases
Official IFRS 16 accounting standard overview
Background on the accounting rules governing lease liabilities and right-of-use assets.
4. Previous Independent Shell Archive reporting
Shell’s $6.4 Billion Pension Bombshell — 30 October 2026
Shell CEO’s Shares Gain £4.7 Million During Iran War — 30 October 2026
Editorial note: This article is based primarily on Shell plc’s third-quarter financial disclosures released on 29 October 2026. The $5.4 billion quarterly adjustment and $7.684 billion nine-month adjustment concern overlapping periods and must not be added together. Both relate to non-cash lease accounting adjustments rather than realised losses of equivalent amounts. No accounting irregularity, regulatory breach or misconduct is alleged. Shell plc is invited to provide additional explanations or factual corrections, which will be considered for publication.
Shell’s Iran War Windfall Has Another Side: SEC Filing Reveals $5.4 Billion Shipping-Lease Shock was first posted on October 31, 2026 at 11:24 am.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Shell Caught Between Two London Councils: Lambeth Wants Climate Funding, Westminster Offers a Welcome — and a Return to Shell-Mex House
One London council wants Shell to help pay for climate protection. Another is inviting the oil giant to move its headquarters across the Thames. The extraordinary exchange has revived memories of historic Shell-Mex House on the Strand — a building with its own place in the history of the Donovan family’s dealings with Shell.
By John Donovan — 31 October 2026
Shell plc has found itself at the centre of an unusual disagreement between two London local authorities.
In Lambeth, where Shell maintains its London headquarters on the South Bank, the Green Party-led council has publicly challenged the oil giant to contribute towards the costs of protecting local residents from climate change.
Across the River Thames, Westminster City Council’s deputy leader has responded with a rather different proposition.
If Shell feels unwelcome in Lambeth, Westminster would be delighted to have it back.
The invitation comes from Councillor Timothy Barnes, Deputy Leader of Westminster City Council and Cabinet Member for Growth and Planning, in an open letter addressed to Shell chief executive Wael Sawan.
Published by The Critic on 30 October 2026, the letter offers to assist Shell with relocating to Westminster and argues that successful businesses should be welcomed for the employment, investment and economic activity they generate.
The exchange highlights contrasting approaches to corporate responsibility, local government finance and the treatment of major international businesses.
It also revives a fascinating chapter of Shell’s London history.
Lambeth challenges Shell over climate fundingAs we reported on 24 October, Lambeth Council has been asking Shell to help finance measures to protect local communities against the effects of climate change.
Deputy council leader Ciara Alleyne featured in a public appeal outside Shell Centre, the company’s London headquarters near Waterloo.
The campaign included an attempted visit to Shell’s offices, although there was no evidence that a meeting had been arranged or that Shell’s senior management had refused a formal invitation to discuss the issue.
Lambeth’s argument is that companies associated with substantial greenhouse gas emissions should contribute to the costs of protecting communities from climate impacts.
Possible initiatives include measures addressing extreme heat and improving local climate resilience.
The council has highlighted Shell’s substantial profitability and its contribution to global emissions.
However, as our earlier investigation explained, the precise amount being requested, the proposed method of calculation and the legal or voluntary basis of any contribution remain important unanswered questions.
Lambeth’s appeal is a political and environmental initiative, not an established tax liability or binding financial obligation.
That distinction is central to the disagreement now emerging.
Westminster enters the argumentCouncillor Barnes has taken issue with Lambeth’s approach.
In his open letter to Sawan, he suggests that Westminster would offer Shell a more welcoming business environment.
He argues that companies already contribute to their surrounding communities through employment, supply chains, local expenditure and existing taxation.
In his view, a council should not treat the worldwide commercial activities of a company as creating an additional financial obligation merely because its headquarters happen to be located within the borough.
Barnes acknowledges that businesses should meet their tax obligations and be held accountable for wrongdoing.
He also accepts that environmental costs should be addressed through appropriate legislation and regulation.
His objection concerns what he regards as public pressure for an additional voluntary payment tied to Shell’s geographical presence.
The letter presents Westminster as an attractive alternative location for an international company of Shell’s scale.
Barnes points to the borough’s concentration of major businesses, financial institutions and commercial headquarters.
He also refers to Westminster’s economic output and the substantial business-rate revenues collected within the borough.
His message is unmistakable.
Rather than encouraging Shell to contribute more money to local climate initiatives, Westminster is offering to discuss how the company might bring additional employment and investment into its jurisdiction.
The invitation appears to have been made publicly through The Critic. We have identified no evidence that Shell requested relocation assistance or that formal negotiations have begun.
The remarkable reference to Shell-Mex HousePerhaps the most interesting passage in Barnes’s letter concerns Shell’s historical association with Westminster.
He reminds Sawan of Shell-Mex House on the Strand, overlooking the Thames.
It is a particularly appropriate reference.
The immense Art Deco building, completed in 1932, became one of the most recognisable symbols of Shell’s corporate presence in London.
With its imposing façade and enormous clock overlooking the river, Shell-Mex House represented the wealth, commercial influence and prestige of the British petroleum industry.
The building was originally associated with Shell-Mex and BP, reflecting the historical relationship between the two companies’ British marketing operations.
It later remained associated with Shell before the company’s presence there came to an end.
Today, the property is known as Eighty Strand.
The building is Grade II listed, and its architectural significance remains recognised independently of the company’s corporate history.
For Westminster’s deputy leader, it provides an obvious reminder that Shell’s connection with the borough extends back generations.
For the present writer, however, Shell-Mex House has an additional personal significance.
A personal recollection: my visits to Shell-Mex HouseLong before the present dispute between Lambeth and Westminster, I was a regular and welcome visitor to Shell-Mex House.
During the years when my father, Alfred Donovan, and I were involved in providing promotional ideas and services to Shell through our company, Don Marketing, we developed extensive commercial relationships with the oil group.
Our association with Shell began in the early 1980s and continued for many years.
The subsequent disputes and litigation arising from those relationships are extensively documented in the Donovan–Shell historical archive.
But it is worth remembering that the relationship did not begin in conflict.
For many years, we worked with Shell, presented promotional ideas and enjoyed access to people within its organisation.
My recollections of visiting Shell-Mex House belong to that earlier period.
It is therefore rather striking to see the building return to the headlines through an invitation to Shell to re-establish its presence in Westminster.
The corporate world represented by Shell-Mex House was very different from the Shell of today.
Yet the company’s historical identity remains inseparable from its buildings, commercial relationships and institutional memory.
Those connections deserve preservation alongside the later controversies.
From Shell-Mex House to Shell CentreShell’s London corporate history encompasses both sides of the Thames.
Shell-Mex House became a prominent landmark in Westminster, while Shell Centre established the company’s enduring association with the South Bank in Lambeth.
The two buildings reflect different periods in the development of Shell’s British operations.
They also illustrate the company’s substantial physical presence in London over many decades.
Shell Centre, close to the London Eye and Waterloo, became one of the capital’s most recognisable corporate headquarters.
The site has undergone considerable redevelopment, but its association with Shell remains central to its identity.
The present disagreement is therefore not simply about whether one council would welcome a new office tenant.
It concerns a company whose activities have helped shape London’s commercial geography for generations.
That history adds weight to Barnes’s invitation, even if the prospect of a move currently remains hypothetical.
Two councils, two different argumentsThe competing positions deserve to be considered on their merits.
Lambeth’s approach emphasises climate responsibility.
Its argument is that local communities face increasingly expensive adaptation requirements and that major fossil-fuel businesses should help meet the associated costs.
Westminster’s approach emphasises investment, employment and the economic contribution of major companies.
Its argument is that councils should encourage successful businesses to establish and expand operations rather than expose them to additional financial demands based simply on where their offices are located.
Neither position automatically resolves the underlying questions.
A council’s request for a voluntary contribution is not necessarily equivalent to imposing a tax.
Equally, the presence of a profitable multinational business within a borough does not automatically establish a legal obligation to finance particular local programmes.
There is also a distinction between a company’s international responsibility for environmental impacts and its relationship with the local authority hosting its headquarters.
Those questions involve policy, taxation, public finance and corporate responsibility.
They cannot be settled solely through competing political statements.
Could Shell really move?At present, there is no indication that Shell has decided to relocate its London headquarters.
Barnes has made an invitation, not announced an agreement.
A headquarters move by a company of Shell’s size would involve substantial practical and financial considerations.
These might include property arrangements, employee requirements, operational needs and the advantages or disadvantages of remaining at its existing location.
There is no evidence that Shell is undertaking such an assessment in response to Lambeth’s appeal.
Nor should Westminster’s expression of interest be confused with a formal corporate proposal.
For now, the story is principally about the competing messages being directed towards one of Britain’s largest companies.
Nevertheless, an actual response from Shell could turn the exchange into a more substantial development.
What should Shell say?Shell may prefer not to become involved in a public disagreement between two London councils.
But several legitimate questions arise.
Has Lambeth submitted a formal request for a contribution to its climate resilience programme?
Has Shell responded, or does it intend to discuss the proposal?
Has Westminster approached the company through official channels beyond Barnes’s published letter?
Would Shell consider any change to its London property arrangements?
And what, if any, voluntary contributions does Shell already make towards community or environmental initiatives in the areas where it maintains major offices?
Answers would help distinguish political publicity from substantive commercial developments.
The value of the historical recordFor readers of the Independent Shell Archive and The Shell Leaks Files, the story has an importance extending beyond local politics.
The archive documents Shell’s history through corporate records, correspondence, commercial disputes, litigation and contemporary reporting.
But corporate history also includes the people and places associated with a company over time.
Shell-Mex House is one such place.
My own recollection of being a regular visitor provides a small personal connection to that wider history.
The building represents an earlier era when the relationship between Don Marketing and Shell was cooperative, long before the disagreements that would eventually become the subject of extensive legal proceedings and public scrutiny.
Preserving that earlier history is just as important as documenting the disputes that followed.
An accurate historical record should encompass the full development of a relationship, not only its most contentious chapters.
But Could Shell’s Next Destination Be New York?There is a further irony in the disagreement between Lambeth and Westminster.
While two London councils adopt contrasting positions towards Shell’s presence in the capital, the company has previously considered a far more dramatic change: moving its principal stock-market listing from London to New York.
In February 2023, the Financial Times reported that senior Shell executives had discussed the possibility of relocating both the company’s headquarters and its stock-market listing to the United States.
In April 2024, Reuters reported that Shell chief executive Wael Sawan was considering all available options to address the valuation gap between Shell and American competitors such as ExxonMobil and Chevron.
Former Shell chief executive Ben van Beurden also publicly expressed concern that Shell was undervalued by comparison with its American rivals.
In January 2025, Sawan confirmed that Shell continued to review its options, although a relocation was not then under active discussion.
There is an important distinction between moving a company’s principal stock-market listing and relocating its corporate headquarters. One does not necessarily require the other.
Nor is there presently verified evidence that Shell has decided to pursue either course.
Nevertheless, the history adds an intriguing dimension to Westminster’s invitation.
While Westminster offers Shell a welcome return across the Thames, the more consequential question may ultimately be whether Shell wishes to retain London as the principal financial home of the company at all.
For a business that has already transferred its corporate headquarters from the Netherlands to Britain, the possibility of another major change cannot simply be dismissed.
But until Shell announces a decision, New York remains a previously considered option — not an established destination.
Supporting sourcesReuters, 8 April 2024 — Shell considers options including New York listing
Associated Press, 30 January 2025 — Shell continues reviewing listing options
An unexpected invitation across the Thames
The present controversy began with Lambeth asking Shell to contribute towards climate resilience.
It has now produced a public invitation from Westminster to consider moving its headquarters.
The two councils are approaching the same company from markedly different perspectives.
One emphasises environmental costs and corporate responsibility.
The other emphasises economic activity and the benefits of attracting international business.
Whether Shell will respond remains to be seen.
But Barnes’s reference to Shell-Mex House gives the exchange an unexpected historical dimension.
For someone who once visited that building regularly on friendly commercial business, the invitation brings back memories of an earlier Shell.
Half a century of corporate change has not erased Shell’s connection with the Strand.
And it is perhaps fitting that, at a moment when one London council is challenging Shell over its responsibilities, another is reminding the company that it would still be welcome on the opposite side of the river.
Principal sources and further readingThe Critic — 30 October 2026
Shell Would Be Welcome in Westminster — Councillor Timothy Barnes
The original open letter addressed to Shell chief executive Wael Sawan. This is the principal source for Westminster’s invitation and Councillor Barnes’s stated arguments.
Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com — 24 October 2026
Lambeth Puts Shell Under Pressure to Help Pay for Climate Protection
Our earlier report covering Lambeth Council’s climate-funding appeal and the questions surrounding its proposed financial contribution.
Lambeth Council — Official statement, 21 October 2026
Lambeth Council — Official news and announcements
Background on the council’s climate-resilience priorities, including its announced 2027 Climate Emergency Summit.
Historic England
National Heritage List for England — Shell-Mex House, List Entry 1236752
Official heritage record identifying Shell-Mex House as a Grade II listed historic building.
Independent Shell Archive
The Donovan–Shell Historical Archive
Extensive documentary record covering the commercial relationships between Don Marketing and Shell, subsequent disputes, litigation and associated correspondence.
Editorial note: Councillor Timothy Barnes’s invitation is a published political statement, not evidence that Shell intends to relocate. The arguments attributed to Lambeth and Westminster reflect their respective public positions. The personal recollection of visits to Shell-Mex House is the author’s firsthand account and should not be confused with an independently documented corporate record. Shell plc and both councils are invited to provide factual corrections or further comment.
Shell Caught Between Two London Councils: Lambeth Wants Climate Funding, Westminster Offers a Welcome — and a Return to Shell-Mex House was first posted on October 31, 2026 at 11:13 am.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Trump cut funding for farmers — then unlocked billions for them before Election Day
The last two years have been a rough going for farmers and ranchers in the U.S. Rollbacks to several Department of Agriculture programs have cut available funding and left producers in the dark. Last year, farm groups sued the federal agency after it deleted multiple webpages that mentioned climate change, including some with critical information for planning around extreme weather. (Early this year, the ag department agreed to restore the webpages in a settlement.) Just this month, the USDA cut solar from a popular renewable energy grant program and dealt another setback to farmers who wish to lower their utility bills and pad their incomes by installing solar panels on their land.
Meanwhile, cattle ranchers in the U.S. have been frustrated by high beef prices. The average price of ground beef has been steadily climbing since the COVID-19 pandemic, reaching new records in the last two years. Persistent droughts contributing to historically low herd sizes have also added to ranchers’ plight. And President Donald Trump’s various moves to supposedly help lower the price of beef — such as importing more beef from abroad — haven’t helped. Ranchers even say these trade deals undercut their business model.
So heading into the midterm elections, many agricultural producers, once a critical part of Trump’s base, have been clear that they’re aggravated by and disagree with the president. In an apparent attempt to appease these constituents, the USDA has very recently unlocked billions of dollars in support for farmers, as well as additional money for ranchers.
Whether it’s enough to smooth over the tension that farmers and ranchers are feeling remains to be seen. The president of the Iowa Farmers Union, Aaron Lehman, said that U.S. farmers “have needed help for months” and “never should have been put in this position.”
The new funding also underlines the administration’s commitment to supporting fossil fuels, even as the use of these energy sources emit greenhouse gases that further warm the planet. On October 19, the president announced $8 billion would be made available to help farmers make up money they lost due to high diesel prices.
Read Next Hurricane Helene haunts the midterms in North Carolina Katie MyersThe process through which farmers apply for and receive said funding is still unclear. In a press release, the ag department stated it would provide “simple, proportional support to producers” for part of the losses they incurred during the 2026 crop year. Responding to a request for more details from Grist, a USDA representative said, “President Trump has been the most pro-farmer president in our nation’s history, and the Harvest Fuel Relief Program is the latest action to deliver for them. As USDA works to implement the program, we are actively reviewing all available data to determine payments which are expected to be finalized and processed soon.”
Farmers and ranchers are both incredibly reliant on diesel as a fuel source. Much of the equipment that they use — like tractors, combines, and trucks for moving crops or livestock from one place to another — run on diesel. But diesel prices have been increasing due to the Iran war, which has led to significant supply chain disruptions. A Democrat-led congressional report found that U.S. farmers are on track to spend an additional $2.4 billion on diesel specifically due to Trump’s war in Iran.
The timing of Trump’s $8 billion bailout program for farmers who lost money due to high diesel prices is also ironic, given that the ag department just made it harder for farmers to switch to more efficient energy sources like solar and wind.
Mike Lavender, the policy director of the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, called these farmer payments “a failing solution” in a statement. The reality is, he said, that “countless farms nationwide remain in crisis: Farm bankruptcies hit a six-year high this spring, and farmers are carrying heavier debt loads and are more pessimistic about their future.”
On October 26, just over a week before Election Day, the USDA also announced $57 million in funding specifically for ranchers. The funding will help independent producers expand their meat-processing capacity, according to the department’s press release.
Additional measures to help agricultural producers boost their bottom line include an announcement yesterday that the USDA will purchase nearly $500 million in agricultural commodities from U.S. producers.
These bailout programs are also coming at a time when the nation’s foremost agricultural policy remains in limbo. The last farm bill, a legislative package that once upon a time was renewed every five years and controls everything from crop insurance to conservation programs, was passed in 2018. Currently, competing versions of a new farm bill sit in the House of Representatives and the Senate, but advocates say much of the future of the bill hinges on the upcoming midterm elections. For farmers, this period of time represents how the Trump administration is trying to appeal to their needs without a guiding vision for the future.
toolTips('.classtoolTips3','Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other gases that prevent heat from escaping Earth’s atmosphere. Together, they act as a blanket to keep the planet at a liveable temperature in what is known as the “greenhouse effect.” Too many of these gases, however, can cause excessive warming, disrupting fragile climates and ecosystems.');This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Trump cut funding for farmers — then unlocked billions for them before Election Day on Oct 31, 2026.
Salton Sea Leadership Program: A Pathway to Conservation Work
Big battery durations are headed to double figures, and their chemistries are changing – again
The grid is changing rapidly, battery storage durations are getting longer, and chemistries are changing too.
The post Big battery durations are headed to double figures, and their chemistries are changing – again appeared first on Renew Economy.
Election Day is Days Away. Vote YES on Eugene Clean Energy Fund Measure 20-388!
Cheaper power from the balcony: Plug-in solar and batteries could open the energy transition to renters.
Allowing balcony or plug in solar will make it easier to access cheaper, cleaner electricity without owning the roof.
The post Cheaper power from the balcony: Plug-in solar and batteries could open the energy transition to renters. appeared first on Renew Economy.
Making Superglue, Death Metal, Shithouses Great Again
Damn but we're tired of a racist, petty, what-about-me child in the White House. For solace: He's hopefully heading for the losingest fail of his long loser's life - and maybe a jail cell please? - and there are many, many people just as tired, with good shticks to match. This week saw some truly stellar trolling from, in turn, Obama, Norway and a heroic guy in South Carolina who managed to foist the Jonestown Massacre on the latest Nazi rally. Well done, all.
There's nothing like hearing Obama at his recent campaign appearances - in Georgia, Michigan, Ohio - to be starkly reminded there are no grown-ups left in the fake-gold-encrusted room of the current regime. Yes we know: he was seriously flawed, and failed to achieve much of what he promised. Still, it was bracing to see him smoothly obliterate the mad child-king, first with his crack about Saddam's Cheesecake Factory, then by skewering a president (sic) who spends his time "doing arts and crafts" in the Oval Office and who, after his just critiques of war, inflation, apocalyptic decline and "unprecedented corruption" chose to "mobilize a whole government response" not to those issues, but to a cheesecake joke: "This is what I mean. These are not serious people."
Next was Norway's gleeful response to Trump's petulant whining (still) about the Nobel prize won by "a woman nobody ever heard of" - Navanetham Pillay, a renowned South African jurist who's spent decades seeking accountability for war crimes, sexual violence and genocide from Rwanda to Gaza at the ICC and as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights - and not to him, who's "settled 8 (imaginary) wars and I've got 2 more coming." "'What about me?'" he bleated in Michigan of the "disgraceful" choice. "So I’m not in love with Norway. I don't want anybody from Norway. Frankly, Norway sucks. Norway has become a shithouse country, actually.” Thus did a sulky illiterate toddler toss (blond!) Norway in with Haiti, Libya, Somalia, mangling the "shithole" epithet en route.
Norwegian officials, evidently grown-ups, took the picayune insult and ran with it. First, they calmly noted Trump "knows very well" the prize isn't awarded by the government but by an independent Nobel committee. "We have reminded him of that, in case anyone is wondering," said Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide. Then he took pity on the wretched child. "The president is currently in the midst of an election campaign that perhaps isn't going very well for his party," he calmly added. "That leads him to say a lot of things." At home, Bernie Sanders slammed an "insane" babysitting task. "Norway is one of the most democratic and prosperous countries on earth. Free college, strong democracy, free press," he declared. "We have a mentally unbalanced president."
Norway, with just 5.6 million people, likewise boasts one of the world's highest gross national incomes and top ratings for education and life expectancy, its largest sovereign wealth fund, and for the 10th consecutive year first place in the World Press Freedom index. It also has some of the world's most dazzling landscapes - rugged fjords, thunderous waterfalls, sweeping vistas, colossal mountains along 18 designated Scenic Routes - along with, its tourism bureau happily brags, "some of the world's most spectacular toilets," many of them sleek, award-winning "architectural masterpieces" that combine minimalist designs with breathtaking views. "These toilets are worth a visit," they crow, "both when you really have to go - and when you don’t.”
"Yes, Donald, we are a 'shithouse country,'" proudly proclaims the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, taking Michelle Obama's famous "when they go low" approach under the news headline, "Straight Into the Toilet." Norway is, after all, "the home of the outhouse," they note, which many residents connect to the country's hardy traditions and longtime "cabin culture." Visit Norway, its official tourism board, went further, showcasing its striking "lovely lavatories." "We've heard some chatter about a 'shithouse country.' Well, what can we say? Norway makes shit houses great again!," they wrote, urging tourists to "take your time and enjoy. Yes, Norway has some spectacular scenery. It just happens to have some pretty spectacular toilets, too. With love, Visit Norway."
The site highlights the wave-shaped Ureddplassen toilet on the coast of Helgeland in the north, hailed by designers as the most scenic restroom in the world. Also the solar-powered bog at the Utsikten viewpoint, the elegant Tungeneset loo - “Looks pretty good under the Northern Lights” - and, for "the bully in kindergarten,” the triangular “Golden Toilet,” or “Gulldassen,” at Ersfjordstranda on Senja island, recently paired with a glamorous new silver service building: "If you are a mere mortal like us and can’t afford a gold-plated toilet seat, the Golden loo (on) Senja is the next best thing.” Coming soon: a forest-themed wooden loo made from over 60 trees "for the pit stop of your life." Visit Norway on the "immense" response: "The world needs a little laugh."
Finally, bravely facing off against the horrors of a vengeful, demented, badly-accordion-playing rapist implausibly in power comes "absolute legend" and hero without a cape Tom Hoyle, 57, a South Carolina graphics designer in a bushy beard, baseball cap and t-shirt for heavy metal band Death: "I look like you, but I'm not like you," he says of fortuitously blending into a MAGA mob. "I'm the vampire during the day." A longtime Republican until he wasn't, he runs MadPark Designs, which in recent dark days has done screen printing and embroidery for No Kings rallies, George Floyd protests, LGBTQ-led music org We Rock Charlotte etc. Now, MadPark is "being bombarded by 5-star reviews" thanks to Hoyle's unplanned "25 seconds of fame" at his local Nazi rally.
The backstory: Hoyle has hated Trump since his infamous 1980s attack on the Central Park Five, now Exonerated Five - "I decided, 'You're dead to me, and hopefully to everybody else'" - but what "pushed me over the edge" this week was the GOP calling his shop (wait, they do that?) to urge him to attend Friday's rally for clueless Darline Graham. "We despise that," he says, "so we thought we'd turn the tables on them, do something goofy and make some good trouble," maybe some friendly neighborhood heckling. He slipped in through security by "talking in circles" about heavy metal and his shirt: "Death is the most hardcore death metal. You see somebody in a Death shirt and you know they're interested in humanity." He didn't expect what came next: a Fox mike in his face.
His now-viral wisecrack (see below) was entirely off the cuff, though he recalled seeing memes comparing MAGA to 1978's gruesome Jonestown Massacre, a mass murder/suicide in Guyana wherein over 900 glassy-eyed disciples of Jim Jones drank cyanide-laced Kool-Aid to fulfill "a madman’s fever dream." The joke on the difference between Trump and Jones: Trump would charge you for the Kool-Aid before you died. When the Fox guy asked why Hoyle was here, he had his punchline. As he headed to the exit and Secret Service approached, he innocently asked if this was about the concession stand; alarmed, they asked what he'd done there. "Nothing," he said, "but it was closed super early and I was starving." Then he kept walking. He'd like to thank Billy Crystal for his epic timing. We'd like to thank him for his ray of light.
"The devil…the prowde spirite…cannot endure to be mocked.” ― Thomas More
- YouTube www.youtube.com
Climate change: ‘An intensifying global health emergency’
Shell CEO’s Shares Gain £4.7 Million During Iran War — Regulatory Filing Confirms €1.49 Million Share Sale as Oil Giant Reports $10.8 Billion Profits
Greenpeace says four leading oil executives have enjoyed nearly £19 million in increased shareholding value during the Iran conflict. Shell chief executive Wael Sawan accounts for more than £4.7 million of that estimate. But the most revealing evidence comes from Shell’s own regulatory disclosures, which confirm a substantial share disposal in May 2026.
By John Donovan — 30 October 2026
As the Iran conflict continues to disrupt international energy markets, new research by Greenpeace UK has drawn attention to the personal financial benefits experienced by some of the world’s most senior oil executives.
According to the environmental organisation, the shareholdings of four major oil-company chief executives increased in value by nearly £19 million between late February and 28 October 2026.
Among them is Shell plc chief executive Wael Sawan.
Greenpeace estimates that the value of his Shell shareholding increased by more than £4.7 million over the period examined.
Separately, Shell’s own regulatory disclosures confirm that Sawan sold 40,000 ordinary shares on 22 May 2026, generating gross proceeds of €1,486,804.20 — approximately £1.3 million at the exchange rate used in Greenpeace’s reporting.
The timing has attracted attention because the transaction occurred during the Iran conflict and shortly before a reported suggestion by US President Donald Trump that a potential agreement with Iran had largely been negotiated.
There is, however, an important distinction between reporting the timing of a transaction and alleging improper conduct.
Neither Greenpeace’s analysis nor Shell’s regulatory notification establishes that Sawan possessed privileged information, anticipated a diplomatic announcement or breached securities regulations.
What the evidence does establish is a substantial increase in the reported value of executive shareholdings during an extraordinary period for international energy markets.
It also raises legitimate questions about the relationship between geopolitical disruption, shareholder returns and executive remuneration.
Greenpeace identifies nearly £19 million in executive shareholding gainsGreenpeace published its findings on 30 October 2026.
The organisation examined publicly available financial records relating to the chief executives of Shell, TotalEnergies, Harbour Energy and Equinor.
Its calculations cover the period between 27 February and 28 October 2026, using publicly disclosed shareholdings and closing market prices.
The resulting estimates are substantial.
Chief executive Company Estimated increase in shareholding value Patrick Pouyanné TotalEnergies £8.4 million Linda Cook Harbour Energy £4.8 million Wael Sawan Shell £4.7 million Anders Opedal Equinor £1.03 millionThe figures are approximate and come from Greenpeace’s analysis, rather than a common accounting measure published by the four companies.
They represent increases in the estimated market value of shareholdings, not necessarily profits realised through sales.
The research does not include executives’ salaries or other benefits.
Greenpeace also reports that the four companies’ shares outperformed their respective domestic stock-market benchmarks during the period.
According to its calculations, Shell shares rose approximately 27%, while the FTSE 100 fell around 2%.
That contrast is central to the organisation’s argument.
While higher energy prices have created financial pressures for consumers and businesses, they have also contributed to stronger valuations for major energy producers.
Shell’s own records confirm Sawan’s €1.49 million share saleThe most important Shell-specific evidence is not Greenpeace’s interpretation.
It is Shell’s own official regulatory notification.
On 22 May 2026, Shell published a Director/PDMR Shareholding announcement identifying a transaction undertaken by its chief executive.
The details were precise:
- Executive: Wael Sawan
- Transaction date: 22 May 2026
- Transaction: Disposal of ordinary Shell shares
- Number sold: 40,000
- Price per share: €37.170105
- Total proceeds: €1,486,804.20
- Transaction location: Amsterdam
The disclosure was made under the applicable UK and European market-abuse disclosure regimes and was also furnished to the US Securities and Exchange Commission through Form 6-K.
These are independently verifiable facts.
The notification establishes the date, volume and value of the transaction.
It does not explain Sawan’s personal reason for selling.
It would therefore be inappropriate to speculate that the sale was motivated by geopolitical developments or expectations about future oil prices.
Sales by company directors are not inherently suspicious.
Executives may dispose of shares for numerous legitimate reasons, including taxation, diversification, personal financial planning or other circumstances.
The regulatory disclosure is nevertheless important because it enables shareholders and the public to examine significant transactions by individuals responsible for managing major listed companies.
The timing highlighted by GreenpeaceGreenpeace places particular emphasis on the fact that Sawan’s sale took place on 22 May 2026.
The organisation notes that this was the day before President Trump reportedly suggested that a potential US–Iran agreement had largely been negotiated.
That proximity is part of Greenpeace’s narrative.
But timing alone does not demonstrate foreknowledge, unusual trading behaviour or wrongdoing.
There is no evidence in the material reviewed that Sawan traded on inside information or acted improperly.
It is also worth remembering that share transactions by senior executives take place within a regulatory framework that includes disclosure obligations and restrictions on dealing.
The proper conclusion is that the transaction merits transparent reporting, not that its timing proves misconduct.
Another Shell disclosure: 82,987 conditional performance sharesAn additional regulatory announcement provides important context.
On 21 May 2026, Shell announced that Sawan had received a conditional award of 82,987 performance shares under the Shell Share Plan 2023.
The award was made on 20 May and remained subject to performance conditions determined by the company’s Remuneration Committee and the committee’s discretion.
Shell’s chief financial officer, Sinead Gorman, received a conditional award of 10,964 shares under the same arrangement.
A conditional performance-share award should not be confused with an unconditional payment or an immediate cash benefit.
The shares may become deliverable only if the relevant conditions are satisfied.
Nevertheless, the award illustrates how executive remuneration can create substantial exposure to movements in the company’s share price.
It also provides context for the debate about whether executive reward should reflect improvements in shareholder value arising partly from factors beyond management’s control.
Those factors may include commodity-price changes, exchange-rate movements and geopolitical events.
Shell’s extraordinary third-quarter profitsThe Greenpeace investigation arrives immediately after Shell’s announcement of exceptionally strong financial results.
On 29 October 2026, Shell reported:
- Adjusted earnings: $10.814 billion
- Income attributable to shareholders: $12.057 billion
- Operating cash flow: $21.043 billion
- Free cash flow: $16.322 billion
- New share-buyback programme: $5 billion
Adjusted earnings were almost double the $5.432 billion recorded in the corresponding quarter of 2025.
Shell attributed its strong performance to operational delivery in a volatile commodity-price environment, including exceptionally strong refining margins.
The company also acknowledged that the Middle East conflict had disrupted some operations.
Its financial reporting identifies the effects of reduced Qatari production, while LNG Canada contributed additional volumes.
These distinctions matter.
The conflict has not been an unqualified financial benefit to Shell.
It has created both commercial opportunities and operational difficulties.
Nevertheless, the company has demonstrated an ability to generate substantial earnings during a period of major international disruption.
The connection between geopolitical events, commodity prices and corporate profits therefore deserves serious examination.
A £4.7 million increase is not the same as £4.7 million receivedThe distinction between unrealised shareholding appreciation and money received from a sale is essential.
Greenpeace’s estimate that Sawan’s shares gained more than £4.7 million in value does not mean that he received that amount in cash.
The estimated gain reflects changes in the market valuation of his holdings over the research period, using Greenpeace’s methodology.
By contrast, the €1.486 million share disposal recorded by Shell represents a completed transaction.
Even that figure is gross proceeds, not necessarily Sawan’s net personal profit after acquisition costs, taxes or other relevant considerations.
The two figures should not simply be added together and described as a £6 million personal profit.
That would risk counting different financial concepts as though they were equivalent.
The distinction is particularly important when reporting on executive remuneration.
Clear evidence is more persuasive than exaggerated arithmetic.
Greenpeace demands additional fossil-fuel taxationGreenpeace argues that the findings reinforce the case for additional taxation of fossil-fuel companies.
The organisation points to the financial pressures experienced by households and businesses when international oil and gas prices rise.
Its campaign position is that additional revenues from the fossil-fuel sector should help finance clean-energy investment and measures addressing climate-related damage.
Critics of additional windfall taxation, however, argue that poorly designed taxes can discourage investment, reduce future energy production and create uncertainty for projects involving significant long-term capital expenditure.
Those competing arguments are matters of public policy.
The Greenpeace research does not, by itself, establish which tax arrangements would achieve the best economic or environmental outcome.
It does provide evidence relevant to the wider debate about who benefits financially during periods of disruption to energy markets.
What should Shell shareholders ask?The more immediate question for Shell shareholders concerns executive incentives and corporate governance.
Large listed companies commonly use shares and performance-based awards to align management interests with those of shareholders.
The principle is understandable.
If shareholders benefit from stronger performance, senior executives may also receive higher rewards.
But the design of such arrangements can produce complicated outcomes when share prices rise for reasons that management did not directly create.
An oil executive may benefit from higher commodity prices caused by geopolitical disruption even if the underlying improvement in shareholder returns does not result primarily from superior managerial decisions.
Equally, management may deserve recognition for protecting operations, maintaining cash generation and responding effectively to difficult market conditions.
The challenge for remuneration committees is to distinguish these influences.
For Shell, several questions arise.
First, how does the Remuneration Committee assess the contribution of management performance relative to movements in global oil and gas prices?
Second, how are exceptional geopolitical events considered when evaluating long-term incentive outcomes?
Third, what proportion of executive share awards is linked to operational, financial and energy-transition objectives?
Fourth, how does Shell ensure that incentives encourage decisions in the company’s long-term interests rather than simply rewarding short-term increases in market valuation?
Finally, what information is available to shareholders about the circumstances and applicable controls surrounding major executive share disposals?
These are questions of transparency and accountability, not allegations of misconduct.
Our archive reported Sawan’s share sale months agoThere is an important historical dimension to this story.
On 11 September 2026, royaldutchshellplc.com published:
Shell’s Upstream Boss Cashes In as the Oil-and-Gas Strategy Pays Off
That article examined share transactions involving Shell’s senior management and specifically identified Sawan’s 22 May disposal.
It recorded the same 40,000-share transaction and €1,486,804.20 proceeds now highlighted by Greenpeace.
The earlier article also made clear that the disclosure did not suggest improper conduct.
This is a useful example of the value of maintaining a searchable historical archive.
Today’s Greenpeace investigation introduces a broader calculation of executive shareholding gains during the Iran conflict.
But the underlying Shell share sale was already part of the public regulatory record and had already been examined by this website.
The distinction between an established historical fact and a new interpretation of that fact is important.
It helps prevent the public record from being distorted by the excitement surrounding a newly published campaign or news report.
The Shell Leaks Files perspectiveThe Independent Shell Archive and The Shell Leaks Files have repeatedly examined the relationship between corporate decision-making, financial rewards, public representations and shareholder accountability.
Historical internal communications and contemporaneous records demonstrate the importance of preserving original evidence.
That principle applies equally to modern regulatory disclosures.
Executive share transactions, remuneration awards, financial results and shareholder distributions form part of the permanent documentary record of how Shell is governed.
The objective is not to assume wrongdoing whenever a senior executive receives a substantial financial benefit.
It is to establish what happened, examine what the company disclosed and assess whether the available evidence supports the claims made about it.
The present case illustrates why that approach matters.
Greenpeace has published a campaigning interpretation of the financial benefits experienced by oil executives during a period of geopolitical instability.
Shell’s regulatory announcements provide independent evidence of Sawan’s share disposal and conditional performance-share award.
Shell’s quarterly results provide the financial context.
Together, those sources support a substantial story about executive remuneration and corporate accountability.
They do not establish improper trading.
A question of reward, responsibility and disclosureThe latest disclosures present a striking picture.
Shell has reported more than $10.8 billion in quarterly adjusted earnings.
Its chief executive has experienced an estimated £4.7 million increase in the value of his shareholding during the Iran conflict, according to Greenpeace.
The company’s own records establish that he sold shares worth almost €1.5 million in May.
And Shell has authorised another $5 billion in share repurchases.
None of these events is inherently improper.
They do, however, illustrate the scale of the financial interests involved when a major energy company operates in markets profoundly influenced by international conflict.
For shareholders, the central issue is whether executive incentives appropriately reward management performance and sustainable long-term value creation.
For the wider public, it is reasonable to ask how the benefits and costs of energy-market disruption are distributed.
The evidence does not justify accusing Shell’s chief executive of wrongdoing. It does justify asking whether executive reward arrangements sufficiently distinguish management achievement from the financial effects of global crises.
That is the question worth putting to Shell.
And it is one the company’s own regulatory disclosures help bring into focus.
Principal sources1. Greenpeace UK — 30 October 2026
North Sea Oil Bosses Enjoy £19 Million Personal Windfall Since Outbreak of Iran War
Original Greenpeace investigation providing the estimated £19 million combined shareholding appreciation and the £4.7 million estimate relating to Wael Sawan.
Greenpeace — Oil Majors Share Gains Methodology, 28 October 2026
Supporting methodology supplied by Greenpeace. Its calculations and assumptions should be treated as the organisation’s estimates.
2. Shell plc — Official regulatory disclosure, 22 May 2026
Director/PDMR Shareholding — Wael Sawan
Primary corporate evidence confirming the sale of 40,000 ordinary shares for €1,486,804.20.
Shell plc — Form 6-K, 22 May 2026
The shareholding notification furnished to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
3. Shell plc — Official regulatory disclosure, 21 May 2026
Director/PDMR Shareholding — Conditional Performance Share Awards
Primary evidence recording the conditional award of 82,987 performance shares to Wael Sawan.
4. Shell plc — 29 October 2026
Third Quarter 2026 and Nine Months Unaudited Results
Primary source for Shell’s quarterly adjusted earnings, cash flow, shareholder distributions and business performance.
5. Previous Independent Shell Archive reporting
Shell’s Upstream Boss Cashes In as the Oil-and-Gas Strategy Pays Off — 11 September 2026
Previous coverage confirming that Sawan’s May share disposal was already documented by this website.
Our detailed examination of Shell’s latest quarterly financial disclosures.
Editorial note: This article distinguishes Greenpeace’s estimates and campaigning claims from the financial transactions and other information confirmed in Shell’s official disclosures. An increase in the market value of a shareholding is not equivalent to a realised cash gain. A share disposal is not evidence of insider dealing or other misconduct. No such allegation is made against Wael Sawan. Shell plc is invited to provide any factual correction or explanation it wishes to place on the record.
Shell CEO’s Shares Gain £4.7 Million During Iran War — Regulatory Filing Confirms €1.49 Million Share Sale as Oil Giant Reports $10.8 Billion Profits was first posted on October 30, 2026 at 8:22 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Looking Back at Urban Tilth’s Visit to the Richardson Bay Audubon Center & Sanctuary
Rethinking Your Lawn (Without Overthinking It)
Where the dreams of our ancestors meet the memories of our descendants: Reflections on commoning, abolition and reparations - created
WEAVING ALTERNATIVES #21: A periodical of the Global Tapestry of Alternatives
Who Tends the Fire? and The Arithmetic of Fire
Pages
The Fine Print I:
Disclaimer: The views expressed on this site are not the official position of the IWW (or even the IWW’s EUC) unless otherwise indicated and do not necessarily represent the views of anyone but the author’s, nor should it be assumed that any of these authors automatically support the IWW or endorse any of its positions.
Further: the inclusion of a link on our site (other than the link to the main IWW site) does not imply endorsement by or an alliance with the IWW. These sites have been chosen by our members due to their perceived relevance to the IWW EUC and are included here for informational purposes only. If you have any suggestions or comments on any of the links included (or not included) above, please contact us.
The Fine Print II:
Fair Use Notice: The material on this site is provided for educational and informational purposes. It may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. It is being made available in an effort to advance the understanding of scientific, environmental, economic, social justice and human rights issues etc.
It is believed that this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have an interest in using the included information for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. The information on this site does not constitute legal or technical advice.
This site is not the official webpage of the Industrial Workers of the World.