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When Min left the hot, dusty plains of central Myanmar for its mountainous eastern border with China earlier this year, he had few options. A 2021 military coup had devastated the formal economy of the Southeast Asian country, and jobs were scarce. Min’s native Sagaing Region was at the epicenter of an armed uprising, making it a target of airstrikes and other retaliatory attacks. And the military introduced mandatory conscription in 2024, accelerating the exodus of young people from areas under its control. 

As many of his peers fled Myanmar, Min paid a broker 2,000 Chinese yuan ($290) to arrange jobs for him and his younger brother at a rare earth mining site in an autonomous region controlled by a powerful ethnic army. 

Assigned to build roads, Min and his brother each earned around 3,000 yuan ($430) a month. It was far more than they could earn in most industries, but the work came with risks. They were digging on steep slopes and Min’s brother had little experience operating heavy machinery.

Weeks after arriving, Min’s brother died in a landslide. Min’s account of the incident could not be independently verified, but local media have documented at least five fatal landslides at rare earth mining sites in Myanmar in recent years, in one case burying more than a dozen workers.

His family held religious rites without his brother’s body, which could not be transported. Min did not go home either. “Despite the risks, I continue working,” he said. “There are not many other job options.” (Editor’s note: Like other workers interviewed, Min has been given a pseudonym.)

A rare earth mining site, seen here in January 2026, near the town of Hpare in territory controlled by the Kachin Independence Organization near the border with China. Machya

Min is part of an expanding workforce enduring hazardous conditions and handling toxic chemicals to extract some of the world’s most coveted raw materials. Used in the manufacture of wind turbines and electric vehicles, the 17 elements known as rare earths are often framed as essential to fighting climate change. But they are also used in advanced weapons, elevating their geostrategic value.

Many countries consider rare earths to be ‘critical minerals’ — vital to economic and security interests but vulnerable to supply chain disruption. As competition for control over supply chains intensifies, rare earth extraction has left a wake of destruction in source countries. Myanmar, the world’s largest supplier of a particularly sought-after subset known as heavy rare earths, is now enduring a disproportionate burden.

Myanmar’s rare earth mining industry operates in secret, with no public records of active permits or companies involved. Worksites are heavily guarded, and only a handful of journalists have reported on the ground over the past decade. 

Still, news has trickled out — of poisoned rivers, forests devoid of wildlife, and farmland so toxic that growers cannot sell their crops. In May, a local human rights group reported that a Chinese rare earth mining company in Myanmar’s eastern Shan State was using prisoners and human trafficking victims for “slave labor.” It found that both the Myanmar military and United Wa State Army, an ethnic army that maintains a ceasefire with the military, were complicit.

A rare earth mining site, seen here in September 2025, in the Mong Pawk area of Shan State, Myanmar, in territory controlled by the United Wa State Army.
Gawng Loe Mu

The businesses carrying out this extraction face few consequences in Myanmar — in part because the industry operates in a legal grey area. Chinese companies extract rare earths in autonomous, militarized regions controlled by local ethnic armies, which protect mining operations while taking a cut of the profits. The mined material is then trucked across the border into China, where it is mixed and essentially laundered with rare earths from other sources and processed for use in global products.

The conflict monitoring organization Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, or ACLED, has ranked Myanmar’s war as the second-most extreme on the planet, and also the world’s most fragmented, with more than 1,200 distinct armed groups. Corruption and weak rule of law have further contributed to an explosion of criminal activity of all kinds. According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Myanmar has the highest levels of organized crime of any country in the world.

“External influence, such as global demand and China, play a major role in Myanmar’s rare earth extraction,” said Thaw Htoo, a pseudonym for a political ecologist from Myanmar who conducts her research anonymously for safety reasons. “Armed groups and lawlessness allow this to happen while the international community turns a blind eye. … These actors are all involved in these harmful and irresponsible practices, and ideas like responsible sourcing or a just energy transition do not reflect the reality on the ground.”

As the world’s superpowers seek control over rare earth supply chains as a means to advance their national interests, from weapons to renewable energy, their demand is indirectly funding conflict actors in Myanmar during a time of war, incentivizing rapid extraction with minimal safeguards.

Debris surrounds a damaged statue of Buddha in February 2024 following fighting between Myanmar’s military and the Kachin Independence Army in Nam Hpat Kar, Kutkai township in Myanmar’s northern Shan State. STR / AFP via Getty Images

Rare earths are common in the Earth’s crust, but their low concentration, combined with the fact that they occur in complex clays and minerals, makes them costly and difficult to mine. Researchers have found that their extraction tends to occur at the margins of state and corporate power, with those profiting from extraction often using narratives of untapped wealth and critical strategic needs to justify their expansion.

Rare earth exploration has reached Indigenous territories in the Amazon, the deep sea, and even the moon. As the United States seeks ways to reduce its dependence on China, it has made deals involving rare earths in geopolitical hotspots including Ukraine and contested regions of Pakistan, while working to extend its influence over rare earth-rich countries including Venezuela and Greenland.

Within Myanmar, these patterns are repeated along its eastern border. “The question we need to ask about rare earths is why these same regions keep getting remade as extractive sacrifice zones,” said Jasnea Sarma, an ethnographer and geographer at the University of Zurich. 

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Myanmar’s borderlands have been contested since shortly after the country, formerly known as Burma, gained independence from Britain in 1948. Ethnic groups like the Kachins that had relative autonomy under the British rose up against direct central rule by the Burman majority. The Burmese military has sought to quell these rebellions with a brutal tactic known as “four cuts” — starving opponents of food, funds, intelligence, and recruits by targeting entire communities. Now in its eighth decade, Myanmar’s civil war is considered the world’s longest.

The central military and ethnic armies holding territory along the country’s borders take taxes from resources including jade, timber, and gold. Their affiliated companies profit directly from these industries. Armed groups that agreed not to fight against the military have been rewarded with a higher degree of autonomy to do business, giving them an added layer of impunity. Their territories have become hubs for more overtly criminal industries including drug production and online scams.

Because rare earth mining in Myanmar is so secretive, data on the industry is scarce. But China’s customs reports show that from 2017 to 2024, it imported more than 320,000 tons (290,000 metric tons) of rare earths from Myanmar, or roughly two-thirds of its total imports. According to the environmental nonprofit Global Witness, Myanmar surpassed China as the world’s largest source of heavy rare earths in 2021. It is a particularly vital source of dysprosium and terbium, components of heat-resistant permanent magnets — known as neodymium-iron-boron, or NdFeB magnets — used in a range of technologies with military and civilian applications.

There is limited publicly available data on the uses of dysprosium and terbium by volume, but research by the U.S. Department of Energy found that consumer electronics and industrial motors accounted for nearly 60 percent of global NdFeB magnet demand as of 2020, while offshore wind turbines and electric vehicles accounted for an additional 20 percent. If the world speeds up its shift away from fossil fuels as predicted in a high-growth scenario, offshore wind turbines and electric vehicles would account for nearly two-thirds of global demand for NdFeB magnets by 2030, according to the Energy Department.

China, which holds more than 90 percent of the world’s rare earth processing capacity, began restricting its exports of heavy rare earths last year in response to U.S. tariffs. The shutoff left global economies scrambling to find new ways to procure them, and prompted new deals and partnerships. 

Samples of rare-earth minerals from the Bayan Obo mining district are on display at the Institute of Geology and Geophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences in May 2025 in Beijing, China.
VCG / VCG via Getty Images

The highly sanctioned Myanmar military has meanwhile stepped up efforts to ingratiate itself with the Trump administration. In April, its Ministry of Information hired Roger Stone, one of America’s most notorious lobbyists, to help build ties with the U.S.

Some Americans have already lobbied for the U.S. to pursue access to Myanmar’s rare earths. Such a pursuit would most likely involve collaboration with India, Myanmar’s western neighbor and China’s rival in the region; analysts warn it would face immense logistical and geopolitical hurdles. 

Whether these hurdles will stop the U.S. from trying remains unclear. In May 2026, the Trump administration signed a deal with India to cooperate in securing supplies. Days later, Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing visited India and met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, discussing “ways to deepen cooperation” in rare earths among other topics, even though extraction areas are outside the military’s control.

A recent report by Forest Trends, a conservation-focused nonprofit, found that nature crimes — the illegal extraction and trade of natural resources — are “deeply embedded within broader illicit economies” across Southeast Asia’s Mekong Region, and that global demand for rare earths may intensify not only extraction in Myanmar, but associated conflict and crime. 

Although legality in Myanmar is complicated by the military’s illegitimate claim to power and its involvement in criminal enterprises, Myanmar’s role as a hub for environmental exploitation is undisputed. According to Forest Trends, this activity provides military and criminal groups with revenue outside formal banking systems that can fund other illicit operations.

These extractive industries are highly lucrative, in some cases generating billions of dollars annually. The military claims the profits benefit the public, though many of the military’s conglomerates are sanctioned by the U.S. and other Western countries for funding human rights abuses. Groups fighting against the military, meanwhile, use narratives of revolutionary struggles and ethno-territorial rights to justify claims to land and resources, without taking responsibility for the harmful impacts. 

“Everyone’s talking about rare earths now, and understandably so. But the story didn’t start there, and it won’t end there either,” said Sarma of the University of Zurich. “People are finally paying attention to the slow, perpetual violence that’s been unfolding here for decades beneath layers of extraction.”

An unexploded projectile sits on the roof of a house in February 2024 following fighting between Myanmar’s military and the Kachin Independence Army in Nam Hpat Kar, Kutkai township in Myanmar’s northern Shan State.
STR / AFP via Getty Images

China once mined most of the world’s supply of rare earths domestically. In the Bayan Obo district of Inner Mongolia, an autonomous region of northern China, open-pit mining in the 1990s and early 2000s scarred the landscape with massive tailings ponds and poisoned the air and water. 

Bayan Obo is mainly a source of light and medium rare earths. Heavy rare earths are scarcer and more difficult to extract, and are typically mined in Myanmar through a process called in-situ leaching. It involves dispersing acid and chemical solvents through mountains, leaching out the rare earths in chemical pools, and burning them in furnaces.

The method carries substantial environmental and public health risks, according to Regan Kwan, a research analyst at the Stimson Center who studies the impacts of rare earth mining in Southeast Asia — particularly when pollution makes its way into water. “Chemical leaks and wastewater discharge can turn rivers toxic, reduce biodiversity, and expose communities to elevated levels of rare earth elements and heavy metals in crops,” he said. “On a human level, chronic exposure can affect the brain, liver, bones, and immune systems, and can be extremely detrimental during childhood development.”

China initially endured the consequences of in-situ leaching in its southeastern provinces, but eventually, the harms reached a tipping point. In 2012, the government found that rare earth mining had caused “great damage” to public safety, health, and the environment, and vowed to overhaul the industry. It has since drastically tightened regulations, driving the shift into Myanmar. 

“Regulations were looser,” said Ryan Castilloux, the founder and managing director of the critical minerals strategy firm Adamas Intelligence. “Chinese companies or interests could take their expertise and get production going quickly.”

Thai activists gathered outside the embassy of The People’s Republic of China in Bangkok in July 2026 to demand China address pollution affecting the Kok, Sai, Ruak, and Mekong rivers due to cross-border pollution linked to mining in Myanmar.
Peerapon Boonyakiat / SOPA Images / LightRocket via Getty Images

The origin story of rare earth mining in Myanmar is difficult to pinpoint, but satellite images and Chinese import data show that it reached an industrial scale around 2017. 

By 2022, satellite images showed hundreds of rare earth mining sites in Myanmar’s northernmost Kachin State. Most of these sites spread out from the border town of Pangwa, which served as the headquarters for a warlord named Zahkung Ting Ying. 

A former member of the Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, one of Myanmar’s oldest and strongest ethnic armed forces, he established his own rival army in 1989. He signed a ceasefire with the military the same year; in return, it designated his territory as a Special Region, an administrative status conferring a high degree of autonomy.

Ting Ying’s army is one of several to benefit from this arrangement. According to Kevin Woods, a political ecologist and research associate at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, the military and ethnic armies on Myanmar’s border with China have used ceasefires as a deliberate means of generating wealth from natural resources while asserting control over land and people — part of a strategy he calls ceasefire capitalism.

In Ting Ying’s territory, the strategy was a success. Over three decades, he cultivated relationships with the military and Chinese investors while opening his territory for business. It became a hub for logging, poppy cultivation, banana plantations, and various types of mining. When China began looking for new places to source rare earths, his territory was a natural fit. 

Zahkung Ting Ying, center, leader of the New Democratic Army-Kachin, attends the Kachin State Special Region 1 People’s Conference on March 20, 2006 in Panwa, Kachin State Special Region 1 of Kachin State, Myanmar. China Photos / Getty Images

Kachin’s rare earth mining boom coincided with a political transition in Myanmar. In 2011, the military began handing over power to a civilian government following a half-century of direct rule. Five years later, it took a back seat to the elected democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi.

Although her party initiated reforms seeking to strengthen natural resource governance and curb corruption during its five-year term, it ultimately faced criticism for its limited achievements. While activists accused it of suppressing independent voices and walking back protections for customary land ownership, the civilian government also lacked independent access to Myanmar’s Special Regions like the one set up for Ting Ying, hindering its ability to monitor some of the worst environmental offenses.

Still, Aung San Suu Kyi’s party was easily reelected in November of 2020. The military refused to accept the results, however, and on February 1, 2021, it arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of her party and took power in a coup. Widespread nonviolent protests followed; when the military cracked down with lethal force, many protesters turned to armed resistance.

Hundreds of new armies emerged with a shared aim of overthrowing the military and establishing a democracy, but their goals went further. They also sought a federal political system that granted autonomy to ethnic states — a goal that brought them in step with some of the country’s most powerful ethnic armies. The Kachin Independence Army is one of several that sided with the resistance, hedging its bets that victory would bring it closer to the self-determination it had been seeking since the 1960s.

Armed and trained by the KIA and other established forces, Myanmar’s anti-junta resistance has made significant gains. The military, backed by Russia and China, has retaliated with a heavy hand, killing thousands of civilians and displacing millions. United Nations investigators have accused it of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. In 2025, the U.N. found that Myanmar was facing a polycrisis that had pushed millions into poverty and “reshaped every aspect of life.”

An anti-coup protester holds a banner during a peaceful protest in Yangon, Myanmar in March 2021.
Hkun Lat / Getty Images

A scramble for resources followed the coup, offering armed actors and their business partners new opportunities to make money. “There has been less rule of law since the coup, and a much stronger demand for revenue generation among a proliferation of armed groups,” said Woods, the political ecologist. “That has created a context, especially along the China border, that has little remaining accountability.”

In Kachin, Ting Ying initially experienced a windfall. As war raged across the country, his territory remained peaceful, and rare earth mining expanded. Chinese customs data shows that China imported $3.6 billion worth of rare earths from Myanmar from 2021 to 2024, out of a total of around $4.3 billion since 2017. The vast majority of rare earth mining sites in Myanmar were in Ting Ying’s territory at the time.

Then in late 2024, the KIA defeated Ting Ying’s army. Ting Ying was initially rumored to have fled to China, but has since been cozying up to Myanmar military officials and Chinese diplomats. In his former territory, now controlled by the KIA, rare earth mining has been slow to resume. Some reports indicate the KIA has faced pressure from China, which typically prioritizes its own business interests in the country. Since the coup, China has repeatedly pushed ethnic armies supporting the pro-democracy movement to cease fighting the military or withdraw from territory they control.

To keep business flowing amid the volatility in Kachin, Chinese companies expanded rare earth mining southward into Myanmar’s Shan State — particularly areas bordering China, controlled by ethnic armies that signed ceasefires with the military. 

“China’s rising demand, coupled with uncertainty in Kachin, has shifted investment,” said Xu Peng, a political scientist at the University of Manchester. “With high margins and reliable tax take, rare earths have become a key, competing extractive resource for ethnic armed organizations, reinforcing today’s rapid growth.”

A drone shot taken in September 2025 of a rare earth mining site near the town of Hpare in territory controlled by the Kachin Independence Organization near the China border.
Machya

Five rare earth mining workers based in areas controlled by the KIA and United Wa State Army in Shan State described exploitative and risky conditions. All of them have been given pseudonyms.

Kaung worked his way up from a laborer to a supervisory role over five years, but quit his job earlier this year due to feelings of discrimination by his Chinese employers. He said they underpaid him, and walked back their offer of a commission based on mining output. “Because there were no written contracts, they claimed they had no obligation to pay,” he said.

He and other workers from Myanmar said that Chinese nationals held almost all senior positions, and that even when workers from Myanmar were promoted, they were still under Chinese bosses. “There were many structural challenges,” said Kaung. “Working under Chinese management meant that all work depended on their decisions and authority.”

Without written contracts, workers had little recourse from dismissal. Women faced particular risks. “Some Chinese supervisors sought second wives, and if female workers refused their advances, they were dismissed from their jobs,” said Kaung.

He added that even the value set for a worker’s life differed by nationality. “If a Myanmar worker dies, compensation is limited to between 80,000 and 100,000 yuan,” he said. “If a Chinese national dies, compensation can exceed 1 or even 2 million yuan.”

Pann Ei fled her village in Shan State as fighting escalated in 2023. Now a cook at a rare earth mining site, she typically works 10 hours a day, with only two rest days a month. “Most workers don’t stay long because of problems like not receiving salaries regularly or having deductions,” she said. “Even though the jobs are dangerous, salaries are still uncertain.”

Si Thu, a laborer at another site, works similar hours for daily wages. “When I arrived here, I found that the work is not done under a formal contract,” he said. “There are no fixed rest days. We can take leave if we request it, but the missed days are deducted from our pay.”

His job is to dig boreholes and install pipes for dispersing chemicals through the mountains. “It’s like injecting medicine into a patient’s vein,” he said. “We drill holes into the mountain and inject liquid acid through the pipes so that it seeps into the ground.”

Mi Mi, who works as a cook, said her company provided protective gear for laborers, but that people would sometimes take off their gloves and boots due to the heat. She witnessed the consequences for a Chinese worker who handled acid without wearing gloves. “It caused burns on his hands, leaving red, blister-like marks,” she said.

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Research by Tanapon Phenrat of Thailand's Naresuan University found that water samples taken from areas of extraction in Kachin State were severely contaminated with radioactive elements, toxic heavy metals and other harmful substances, representing levels that would “substantially exceed” regulatory thresholds in China.

Kaung, the site supervisor, said he had little choice about the water he used in daily life. “Drinking water is taken from mountain sources through pipelines connected to areas where there are no rare earth mines. We boil the water before drinking it, and the same water is used for bathing,” he said. “Even though the water is sourced from non-mining areas, I believe it may still be contaminated.” 

While he has not identified any discernible consequences on workers’ health, he said that supervisors of rare earth-burning furnaces had heard of infertility problems among both male and female workers — an impact of rare earth exposure that has been identified in some laboratory research and studies of other contexts. 

Workers in Myanmar also described severe environmental destruction. “The water is lifeless, and the mountains have been badly damaged,” said Kaung. “Plants and trees can no longer grow. … Wild animals have lost their habitats due to extensive drilling and the digging of boreholes.”

According to Mi Mi, companies abandon mining sites after depleting their resources. “No one takes responsibility for what happens to the land,” she said. “Despite this, we have no choice but to rely on this work for our livelihoods.”

Nyi Tun, a man in his 50s who has also been given a pseudonym, described major impacts in his village. His family has survived generationally through hill cultivation and raising livestock, but this way of life is now under threat. “In the past, this area was very pleasant to live in,” he said. “It is not good to live in anymore. There is a lot of mining across the mountains, including rare earth mining.”

People stand next to debris in the aftermath of a landslide in a mining area in Pangwa in Myanmar’s northern Kachin State in June 2024.
STR / AFP via Getty Images

The problems started around six years ago, when Chinese businessmen and local officials informed village leaders that they would soon begin mining rare earths just a few miles away. “No one asked for the villagers’ opinions,” said Nyi Tun.

Destruction followed. “The soil color has changed; it used to be rich and reddish, but now the environment is dry, like the soil from the desert, and it looks pale and yellowish,” he said. “Dirty water, polluted water, and waste from rare earth mining in the mountains flow into our streams and creeks.”

In the dry season, trucks transporting rare earths to China blow up dust and damage the roads. The hot season feels hotter than in the past, while the rainy season brings deadly landslides and floods. “Crop yields are lower now,” said Nyi Tun. “We can only farm enough for our own consumption; the yield isn’t good enough to produce a surplus to sell.”

As the conditions worsen, young people are migrating to cities and towns in search of work. “I am not educated, but I know and understand how this village began and the current situation,” said Nyi Tun. “Some people call this development, but I don’t see it that way. I feel sad seeing our ancestral lands and farms damaged.”

These impacts point to a double standard. While China now mandates that companies mining rare earths within its borders adhere to strict environmental regulations, it doesn’t require the same compliance abroad, according to Xu Peng of the University of Manchester. “The regulatory framework governing overseas extraction, including in Myanmar, remains comparatively vague,” she said. “There does not appear to be a clear, directly enforceable Chinese legal restriction specifically prohibiting environmental harm from rare earth mining overseas, including in Myanmar.”

Once these rare earths cross into China, processing is highly centralized. Castilloux of Adamas Intelligence compared China’s rare earth processing industry to a coffee grinder, so thoroughly blending together material from different sources that the individual components are nearly impossible to trace to their origin countries. “Unless you’re on the floor and you can kind of track the molecules down the separation line and then follow it to a metals plant, it becomes really, really tricky,” he said.

Still, he asserted that based on proportionality, companies using heavy rare earths in their products could be sure that their supply chain, at least a portion of it, is tied to Myanmar. “If you’re buying magnets from China, or let’s say Japan with inputs from China, there is some portion of that material in those magnets … that has certainly come from Myanmar, in every case,” he said.

According to Ben Hardman, Mekong legal director at the environmental nonprofit EarthRights International, companies are aware of the problem but are skirting responsibility. “I think companies are consistently using Myanmar as a sacrifice zone,” he said.

He called on companies that rely on heavy rare earths in their supply chains to both reduce this dependence and engage with local civil society groups and ethnic armed organizations controlling rare earth mines in Myanmar, in order to mitigate and remedy the harms. “It’s not acceptable for companies to say, ‘We are going to keep sourcing magnets that include these heavy rare earths but we can’t do anything about it because it’s complex,’” he said.

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Julie Michelle Klinger, a geographer and associate professor at the University of Wisconsin, Madison warned that rare earths’ other applications — including their use in petrochemical refining, nuclear, and hydropower, as well as weapons — are often overlooked. “There are currently no measures in place to track, much less ensure, that mines opened ostensibly to meet the growing demand for renewable energy technologies actually serve that purpose,” she said. “In the context of global rearmament, it is reasonable to guess that an even smaller share of global rare earth output is actually going toward technologies that might be used in an energy transition.”

While accountability remains near-absent in Myanmar, the problems continue, and are spreading to other countries. In neighboring Thailand, water testing over the past year has revealed toxic contamination of rivers from rare earth extraction and other forms of mining in Myanmar. Local advocates in Thailand are calling on the Thai government to take action, even though it does not formally engage with the ethnic armies controlling areas of Shan State where the rivers originate, and where civic space is minimal.

In Kachin, a sliver of hope has emerged since the KIA took over rare earth mining areas in 2024. The Kachin Independence Organization, or KIO, which oversees the KIA, has a history of engagement with civil society, but has long struggled to balance its dependence on resources with its accountability to the public. Since the coup, it has come under renewed pressure to reform its approach to resource governance, but its response has been mixed.

In a landmark case in 2023, it canceled plans to mine rare earths at one site following widespread protests, only to later allow mining in the same area. In another case, it dispersed protests at a planned site and detained more than 20 people, effectively silencing local activism. With independent media unable to visit the area, it is unclear whether the mining proceeded. 

A civilian living in Kachin, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that locals were being paid to allow rare earth mining on their land, but lacked the conditions enabling them to make free and informed decisions. “There is no formal consultation, information sharing, or public announcement process with communities,” he said. At the same time, he remained fearful of expressing this or other concerns directly to the KIO. “Raising the topic of rare earth mining is still very sensitive,” he said.

Lahkyen Roi, a Kachin scholar-activist, is speaking out using a pseudonym. “Even if these mines are providing vital revenue for the war against the military, the KIO should place a moratorium on these extractive activities for now, considering short- and long-term implications on the local communities, local economy, and environment,” she said. “With rare earth exploration expanding across many ethnic territories to exploit the current sociopolitical instability, the industry is headed toward a ‘race to the bottom.’”

Whether in Kachin or Shan, workers face pressure to keep their heads down. “If information related to rare earth mining is posted online, monitoring becomes stricter and more vigilant,” said Min. 

After his brother’s death, his employers urged him to refrain from posting about the incident on social media, while offering him compensation amounting to around a year’s worth of wages. Ultimately, he accepted the offer, sent the money home to his family, and continued his work. “There is no freedom to speak openly about rare earth mining,” he said. “Workers simply work, rest when their shifts end, and receive their salaries when the time comes.”

Additional reporting by Gawng Loe Mu

toolTips('.classtoolTips2','A group of 17 soft gray metals including lanthanides, scandium, and yttrium, so-called rare earths form key parts of the magnets in wind turbines and are used in high-tech products ranging from consumer electronics to defense satellites.'); toolTips('.classtoolTips8','A lightweight, silvery-white alkali metal with properties that allow it to store large amounts of energy. Lithium is a key component of many batteries, including those that store renewable energy and power electric vehicles.'); toolTips('.classtoolTips10','A conductive and heat-resistant metal that forms a key part of many battery cathodes, which allow electric charges to flow. It is used in the lithium-ion batteries that power many EVs as well as solar energy systems and wind turbine components.'); toolTips('.classtoolTips11','A scarce blue metal that helps battery cathodes store large amounts of energy without overheating or collapsing. It is a key component of lithium-ion batteries. ');

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline How war in Myanmar is driving a deadly rare earth mining boom on Jul 23, 2026.

After more than a decade of nurturing, it had come time to infect this 28-acre grove of American elms with a disease that would almost certainly kill them. Dressed in hunter-green muck boots, grey pants, and a brown Nature Conservancy T-shirt, Gus Goodwin knelt down to give the first tree its shot. Using a bamboo stake marked at 12 inches as a gauge, he measured that far off the ground, held his drill at a slight downward angle, and pulled the trigger. 

“We need to create a wound,” Goodwin, the conservancy’s director of science and technology advancement in Vermont, said as the tool began to whir. He bore an inch-deep hole into the tree, the bit sending shavings spiraling out behind it. Putting the drill aside, he took a blue pipette from his tool box and injected 2 teaspoons of a clear solution containing roughly 100,000 spores of the fungus that causes Dutch elm disease. 

“That’s it,” he said. “Pretty simple.”

One by one, row by row, the plan was to stick nearly all of the 5,300 or so elms at the sprawling site in southern Vermont, save the few that received a squirt of water as a control. In the coming weeks, most of the trees would doubtlessly succumb to the pathogen that has already killed tens of millions of their ancestors and made Ulmus americana an endangered species. The ones that live, however, could help save the species.

A research specialist with the University of Vermont records information young elm trees that have been inoculated with Dutch elm disease on May 19, 2026. Jessica Rinaldi / The Boston Globe via Getty Images

This project is the most promising attempt yet in the decades-long effort to restore a crumbling pillar of American forests. If successful, it could spawn the largest, healthiest, most genetically diverse population of disease-tolerant elms North America has seen in more than a century. Those trees would provide shade and elegance wherever they cast shadows and support the creatures, like double-toothed prominent moths, specifically adapted to them. “Their life is so tightly tied to the species that they evolve to look like the edge of the leaf,” Goodwin said, explaining how the caterpillar camouflages neatly with the stegosaurus-like ridges along the edge of an elm leaf. “If you substitute another species in, you kind of pull the rug out from under that.”

American elms also help mitigate flooding, which climate change is making more frequent, intense, and devastating. It’s a threat that Vermont knows well, having experienced two 100-year deluges since 2023. According to one study, bolstering the state’s floodplains could avoid as much as $1 billion in property damage over the next century. Similar logic applies across New England and beyond. “There’s no other floodplain tree that’s shade tolerant, flood tolerant, and long-lived,” said Goodwin. The hope is to bring that buffer against climate disasters back. 

If, of course, any of the trees here survive.

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After Goodwin injected his first sapling, he marked it with a dab of orange paint to show that it had been jabbed. He then opened an app detailing this research plot, and looked up the tree. Elm number 439 is the offspring of Valley Forge, a nursery strain bred to be disease-tolerant, and an individual called Damon from the Pioneer Valley of western Massachusetts. Survivor tree 31, as the latter is known, measures more than 7 feet around and is one of about 50 potentially hearty parents represented in this research plot. Those with the most resistant and genetically diverse progeny will be cloned and moved to the new seed orchard of “super trees.”  

Goodwin also recorded where sprouts, called epicormic shoots, had popped out of number 439. Knowing this was important because, if more of them appeared later, it could be an indicator of stress. With that done, he moved to the next elm, then the next, a trail of orange paint in his wake. In the coming days, as many as six crews would descend on the grove to finish the task. After each tree-tap was registered in the app, the icon went from red to green.

“I get the satisfaction of watching that dot turn color,” said Goodwin, who was eager to see which trees would start to die. In a few weeks, trees without resistance would begin to develop symptoms — wilting, discolored leaves, or an outburst of epicormic shoots. Only then would the researchers know if their plan for a reinvigorated army of elms might work. “We’re at a really exciting milestone in the project.”

Researchers inject experimental elms with Dutch elm disease at a test site in Benson Vermont. The Nature Conservancy

The American elm is remarkable. Its branches arch upward and outward, forming a cathedral-like canopy of green that can stretch more than 100 feet above the forest floor. Each autumn, the leaves turn a vibrant golden-yellow. “The elm is a tree which can be distinguished farther off perhaps than any other,” 19th-century naturalist Henry David Thoreau wrote in his journal. “It is beautiful alike by sunlight and moonlight.” 

These fecund specimens achieve their mature height and vase-like shape in as little as 15 years and, unencumbered, can live as long as 300. With their expansive native range and a love of moist, fertile soil, the trees used to dominate river valleys and floodplains from the Canadian maritimes to East Texas. For Indigenous populations, they were meeting places, signposts and council trees around which important gatherings revolved. As the New World became America, settlers began clearcutting across New England, with forests giving way to sheep pastures. Elms, however, have a tendency to warp that makes them nearly worthless as lumber. This spared the trees from the worst of the denuding.

Instead, elms were often celebrated as shade givers, with particularly stately examples known by name: the Washington Elm in Cambridge, Massachusetts, for instance, under which George Washington is said to have assumed control of the Continental Army in 1775. The Deerfield, Pittsfield, Wethersfield, and Concord elms were after the New England towns where they once stood.

An 1853 colored engraving of the Washington Elm in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Bettmann / Getty Images

It wasn’t until the mid-19th century, though, that the elm grew into a cultural icon. Spurred by a twin push to uplift native tree species and beautify neighborhoods, the fast-growing and vast trees become a go-to for arborists. “They’re kind of like junkyard dogs. They can grow in really tough locations and be perfectly fine,” said Stephanie Adams, a tree pathologist at Texas A&M University. “That’s why you see pictures of Main Street, USA back in those times and all the streets are just lined with American elms.” Thousands of roadways still bear the tree’s name, and what else would Wes Craven call his 80’s slasher classic but A Nightmare on Elm Street. 

“The American elm is a symbol for American history,” said Doug Still, an arborist and host of the podcast “This Old Tree.” “Until, of course, Dutch elm disease wiped them out.”

The aptly abbreviated DED kills with incredible efficiency. While it likely originated in Asia, Ophiostoma ulmi was first observed in northern Europe around 1910 and Dutch scientists officially described it in 1922. The fungus that causes it soon arrived in North America, reportedly on logs imported to make veneer, and native elm bark beetles carried it on their backs as they burrowed into their hosts. The afflicted tree mounts an aggressive immune response, trying to stop the invader by deploying balloon-like plugs called tyloses that prevent transmission through the xylem, which shuttles water and nutrients from its roots to its leaves. These arteries eventually clog, and the tree essentially starves. Death can come in as little as a year.

Rings are pictured in the trunk of an elm tree in Boston in 2017. Planted in the 1880s, the tree was taken down after succumbing to Dutch elm disease.
David L. Ryan / The Boston Globe via Getty Images

The impact on the American landscape was immediate. Trees suspected of having the disease were quickly felled to curb the plague, and, by 1935, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had allotted $2.5 million to the effort. Culling intensified, but instead of stemming DED it may have hastened its expansion. “The only tool we had in our toolbox at the time was a chainsaw, and when that’s the case, everything looks like a removal,” said Adams, explaining that, once introduced, the disease can move from one elm to another through their interconnected roots. “We didn’t know that removing before severing the root grafts actually exacerbated and sped up the spread.” 

The 1940s brought more setbacks. America’s entry into World War II diverted attention and resources away from the elm war. Then a far more aggressive strain — Ophiostoma novo-ulmi — arrived, turning the epidemic into what one researcher, in 2017, deemed “arguably the most significant event in the history of urban forestry.” This potent variant raced through the country, killing as many as 100 million trees.

Though the percentage of elms lost is murky, the impact is unmistakable. Trees came down by the thousands in cities and towns nationwide. New Haven, Connecticut, once known as “Elm City,” was almost entirely stripped of its namesake. The population on the University of Illinois campus tumbled from 1,850 to 92 in a little over a decade. By the 1970s, Minneapolis was taking down more than 20,000 of its roughly 400,000 elms each year, estimated Ryan Murphy, who leads the elm selection program at the University of Minnesota. A mere 35,000 remain in the city, and statewide the devastation is even worse, with the plague claiming 95 percent of the elm population. “In some communities in Minnesota there are just a few American elm left in the entire city,” he said. “And the disease is still killing trees.”

The easiest way to find the plot of dying elms in Benson, Vermont is to put “Preserving God’s Creation Taxidermy” into a GPS, and cross the street when you get there. The business is in some ways emblematic of what scientists are doing in the field below — ensuring that people can continue enjoying a species. And like taxidermy, it requires that individuals die. “I feel like we should warn them and apologize to them because we’re torturing them,” said Leila Wilson, a research ecologist with the U.S. Forest Service, as she set out to start injecting another young elm. She cringes each time, knowing the consequences. “I don’t like that part. But they’re serving the greater good.” 

In an era of high-tech fixes, Wilson, Goodwin, and their colleagues are doing little more with their elms than Gregor Mendel did with his peas: crossbreeding them. The idea isn’t new; such efforts began almost as soon as scientists learned of the disease, but no one has had much success. Between 1937 and 1965, scientists at Cornell University and the Boyce Thompson Institute grew, infected, and tested 21,000 seedlings. Only 16 survived, and many of those couldn’t pass along their genetic resistance. None made it to nurseries for distribution. That failure, among others, dampened the appetite to fund such costly, long-term research. “So many false hopes have been raised that there is apathy in some quarters about the outcome of our battle against this disease,” the author of a 1975 scientific paper on the subject wrote. But, he added, “surely it is worth the trouble.”

“Trouble” implies inconvenience and feels insufficient for the toils of restoring elms. By one estimate, only about 1 in 100,000 elms are truly tolerant to DED rather than simply lucky. But just what makes those survivor trees special remains a bit of a puzzle. Unlike the American chestnut, which was similarly ravaged by a blight, there isn’t a clear genetic marker that points to exactly what allows some elms to stave off DED more effectively than others. That makes gene editing moot and breeding the only option.  

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After earning his doctorate in forest genetics and plant breeding in 1969, Alden “Denny” Townsend found a job at the U.S. National Arboretum’s Agricultural Research Service in Ohio. The young scientist’s work spanned a range of species and projects, including an American elm program that had lain mostly dormant for years. The assignment came as DED rampaged, and pessimism about the species was nearly as pervasive. “American elms were dying everywhere,” said Townsend. “I thought there was hope.” 

Townsend, though, inherited something of a mess. His predecessors had, fortunately, planted around 70,000 American elms at the Ohio research station that had grown to 40 or 50 feet and were available for testing. But with no proper accounting of where the trees came from, Townsend started infecting them en masse to see what would happen. Slowly, he identified tolerant elms, then cloned or bred them to generate versions with even greater resistance. After more than two decades, he eventually ended up with one variant — dubbed “Valley Forge,” after George Washington’s Revolutionary War encampment — that was fit enough to send to nurseries. He identified another survivor along a road in Ohio that also proved exceptional and the arboretum eventually released it too, as New Harmony.

A conservation information manager for The Nature Conservancy injects a young elm with Dutch elm disease on May 19, 2026.
Jessica Rinaldi/The Boston Globe via Getty Images

Since those breeds went on sale in the late 1990s, others have joined the fray. The Jefferson elm, for instance, is essentially a copy of a tree that grows on the National Mall in Washington, D.C., which boasts one of the largest remaining stands of mature American elms in the country. But there are still only a handful of cultivars available, and they have quirks. Some, for instance, have weaker crotches and snap more easily during storms. “They are probably better suited in parks or country clubs or where there’s lots of land,” said Townsend. “If these trees do get Dutch elm disease, they’re gonna be a real hazard.” 

They have another drawback too: limited genetics. There simply aren’t enough reliably tolerant strains to provide the genetic diversity needed for the widespread floodplain repopulation that Goodwin envisions. “It’d be like starting a population over again with six individuals,” he said. But Townsend said previous efforts like his should be considered building blocks rather than failures. “Mistakes were made,” he acknowledged with a chuckle. But he’s optimistic that the funding and scientific rigor being applied to the problem this time around will drastically improve the odds. “I’m glad to hear the Forest Service is continuing to work on it,” he said. “Diversity is the key.”

Christian Marks started working at The Nature Conservancy in 2007 as an ecologist studying floodplains along the Connecticut River. He knew the dwindling ecosystems act as vital sponges when the water runs high, absorbing the torrent and preventing inundation downstream. The more he learned, the more he realized the peril these New England bulwarks were in. Because they rely on just a handful of species to function, the loss of even one could be devastating — and most of them are faltering.

Like Townsend, Marks thought elms stood the best chance of recovery, as long as their tolerance could be boosted. While he said the roughly 90 percent survival rate often seen among cultivars might look impressive, floodplain elms should ideally live for well over a century, during which they will probably be exposed to the DED pathogen repeatedly. “You have to be able to survive many times,” said Marks. That requires trees that survive closer to 97 out of 100 times, a standard that could mean the difference between a tree living 50 years or 150 years. “It’s a much more rigorous test,” Marks said.

An old-growth elm trees that survived Dutch Elm Disease grows in Castine, Maine, as seen in February 2022.
Tristan Spinski for The Washington Post via Getty Images

Ironically, earlier failures to stop DED were one reason Marks was confident he could do better. In the decades since Townsend’s work, millions more elms had died, making it far more likely that those left standing were actually DED-tolerant rather than lucky. “You need to have enough trees die for the ones with resistance to become apparent,” said Marks.  

But, although well-versed in floodplain elms, he had no experience breeding them and reached out to Jim Slavicek, a research biologist at the U.S. Forest Service’s Northern Research Station in Ohio. The latest federal elm project had started in 2003 and Slavicek had helped set up a handful of test sites across the Midwest. The two scientists went about trying to establish one in New England too.

The first thing they needed was more survivor trees, and Marks knew where to find them. Starting around 2010, he went around New England, clipping samples and sending them to Slavicek. One of the first he collected was the Rainbow Beach elm in Northampton, Massachusetts, which is over 3 feet in diameter and, he recalled, “magnificent.” Eventually they amassed enough cuttings to raise 53 elms, and the Forest Service began crossbreeding them. By 2018, their offspring were rising from soil at test sites in Ohio and Vermont. Within a decade the trees stood about 8 feet tall, then 12, and soon they were ready for testing. Although Marks recently left The Nature Conservancy, he remains invested in the results. “This is the playoffs,” he said. “What you’ve been preparing for.”

The Benson test site is surrounded by a 10-foot wire fence intended to keep the deer from making a buffet of the elms inside. Chris Hansen and John Butnor had parked their white Dodge Ram with U.S. Forest Service logos on the doors and government plates on the bumpers right outside the gate. It was early July, and the first time they’d come since helping with the inoculation in May. “This guy right here is completely gone. It’s not got a living branch,” Hansen, a researcher at the University of Vermont, said, standing beside a tree with shriveled brown leaves. Then he pointed to a perky green specimen. “This tree right next to it seemingly has nothing going on, which is pretty cool.”

Butnor, a plant physiologist with the Forest Service, checked the tag at the bottom. “Thirty-eight,” he announced, reading the survivor elm’s parent aloud. Goodwin joined him, and the trio walked among the saplings. Each time Butnor saw a healthy-looking tree, he excitedly called out the identity of its parent. Thirty-six. Twenty-five. Three. Another 38 — suggesting it may be a particularly strong donor. “You hear us throw around the words resistance and tolerance, and I think most of the time we should actually be saying tolerance,” said Hansen. “There’s plenty, as you’re seeing.” 

An initial accounting of the plot revealed a range of responses to injection, including about 800 trees that aren’t yet showing signs of DED. “It’s too early to make predictions about individual trees,” stressed Goodwin, who, along with his colleagues, will monitor the elms for another two years before deciding which of their parents are most suitable for planting in the new superseed orchard. From there it’ll take another 10 to 15 years before the new trees bear seed. So far, though, the results are promising.

A land management fellow with Thee Nature Conservancy walks down a row of young elms as she works to inoculate each one with Dutch elm disease on May 19, 2026.
Jessica Rinaldi / The Boston Globe via Getty Images

Any campaign to make elms great again will, and should, run into limits. No one particularly wants to completely revive the species, which in some cities dominated the urban canopy. “One lesson we learned from Dutch elm disease devastating the urban tree canopy was not to plant a monoculture of trees,” said Doug Still, the arborist, citing the more recent plight of emerald ash as another example of why overreliance can be a problem. Today, urban planners tend to be much more restrained, said Ryan Murphy, the elm expert in Minneapolis. “Diversifying your tree population is a sort of a safeguard or hedging your bets against future pests or disease coming through,” he said. “We’ve learned the hard way.”

Some people ask whether the quest to save the American elm is worth decades of effort and millions of dollars in funding, especially when Asian elms are naturally much more tolerant to DED. But Hansen emphasized that such inquiries are rare, and come primarily from journalists and scientists, not the public, which is generally excited about the prospect. “Even people who aren’t necessarily interested in trees know that elm shape,” he said. Goodwin sees a philosophical element to the work too. “There’s kind of like a moral injury of extinction,” he said. “This is a way to try to repair that.” 

The price of not doing this work is evident on the hills surrounding the grove, which are spotted with dead and dying elms. Many look like they’re choking on epicormic shoots. “They’re probably not healthy,” said Hansen. Although no one has tested them, Dutch elm disease is likely the culprit. As he walked back toward the truck, he stopped in a patch of shade and looked up at least 50 feet into the canopy of a middle-aged elm. 

“It’s called the Benson tree,” he said. It’s imperfect — the limbs are haphazard and, as Butnor described them, “a little unruly.” But the vase-like shape is unmistakably an elm and, at somewhere between 50 and 100 years old, one that has long outlived its peers. Hansen isn’t sure if it’s a survivor or simply lucky. There’s a chance Dutch elm hasn’t reached it, though now that the field it abuts is infected, that probably won’t last.

Like the younger elms, the Benson tree awaits its fate. In the meantime, it stands watch over the scientists trying so hard to save its kind.

Correction: This story originally misstated the century in which Henry David Thoreau lived.

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline The deadly experiment that could save the American elm on Jul 23, 2026.

Tadej Pogačar is expected to ride to victory on the Champs-Élysées in Paris when the Tour de France ends Sunday. While his commanding performance has left little doubt about the outcome, the journey to the finale has been remarkable for another reason: climate change. 

The grueling 23-day trek through France has seen a barrage of emissions-driven extremes, from wildfires to blistering heat. It was so dry at one point that organizers banned TV crews from a French pastime, smoking. Pogačar even suggested that the race, which has almost always spanned late June and early July, no longer occur during the summer. 

“If I had the power,” he said, “I would change all the calendar and not race in July and August in hot places.” 

The trouble started earlier this month when wildfires threatened the Pyrénées-Orientales region during the third stage, as each day’s race is called. Organizers considered cancelling it, but decided it would continue. Still, they limited the caravan that typically follows it to essential vehicles. They also asked fans, a fixture along every route, to stay away from the last 27 miles of the day’s 121-mile race.

“We invite the public not to come to the edge of the race or to the finish site,” race director Christian Prudhomme told France TV. “With exceptional fires, exceptional measures on the Tour, the first thing is the protection of the people.”

The more persistent problem has been a record-breaking European heatwave. According to ProCyclingStats.com, the first two weeks of the Tour brought the highest average temperature of the past two decades: 87 degrees Fahrenheit, compared to 79 degrees in 2022. 

Paul Seixas and his teammates wear vests dotted with ice packs to cool down at the start of the ninth stage of the race. Ann-Christine Poujoulat / AFP via Getty Images

“I’ve never seen weather conditions this hot every single day,” said XDS-Astana Team sports director Yvon Ledanois. “It isn’t a case of having one extremely hot day and then returning to normal conditions the next.”

Enduring such heat for one race would be rough, but each of the 21 stages is effectively a race of its own. Competitors ride an average of about 100 miles daily for the better part of three weeks, and it isn’t unusual to see them maintain speeds around 30 mph for hours at a time. Much of the Tour crosses the Alps and Pyrenees, with treacherous climbs. Through it all, riders get just two days of rest.

That kind of prolonged exertion during extreme heat can be dangerous, even for athletes with the specialized training required to complete the Tour. Pogačar reported having a “full headache” at the start of Stage 4 as temperatures topped 100 degrees. Officials relaxed their rules around food and hydration, and one team said each of its riders was drinking around 28 bottles of water every day, which is several times the norm. Many also wore “ice vests” before the start of each day’s ride, and “ice socks” during it. Things got so bad that race organizers shortened one leg for the first time in Tour history when they cut 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) from Stage 9. The government told regional officials they could cancel them entirely in the event of a red heatwave alert. 

Even when the sun went down, the respite was minimal. Temperatures didn’t ease much, and many European hotels do not have air conditioning. “When we have these high nighttime temperatures, the body isn’t able to recover sufficiently,” Kurt Shickman, who works on heat issues at the World Resources Institute, told Grist when asked about early July’s heatwave. “They’re going into the next hot day with a couple strikes against you from a health perspective.”  

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Recent research has shown these hazards are growing more frequent and intense. “My co-authors and I have been following the heat during this Tour with horror,” Ivana Cvijanovic, a climate scientist at the French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development and the paper’s lead author, told TIME. “This summer is clearly extreme — there was simply no opportunity to be lucky as France and Spain have been under heat wave warnings for weeks.”

The brutal conditions have sparked a discussion about the Tour’s support from fossil fuel companies. French oil giant TotalEnergies sponsors a team and has signed a three-year deal to underwrite the race. Australian energy company Santos has long backed the Tour Down Under. While their funding helps finance riders and events, these companies are driving climate change, which threatens the viability of cycling and other sports, including the World Cup — where Saudi oil giant Aramco was a major advertiser. 

“It’s almost impossible to avoid becoming a billboard for them,” one anonymous rider told Cycling Weekly. “I’d go further and say that, concerning the climate crisis, and professional cycling’s addiction to sponsorship from oil companies, airlines, and car manufacturers, there is a rule of silence, as deeply rooted in cycling culture as the old omertà about doping.”

Whether and how the Tour adjusts to climate change remains to be seen. Pogačar’s suggestion that the race be held at a different time of year would upset the traditional order of the sport’s three grand tours. A number of other solutions have been proposed, including altering start times. But even small changes can be a big problem given the complex logistics and broadcast schedules involved. 

In the meantime, the Tour is racing toward its inevitably sweaty conclusion.

Correction: The average temperature for the first two weeks of the Tour de France has been changed. It was 87 degrees Fahrenheit, not 90 degrees F.

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline The year climate change came for the Tour de France on Jul 23, 2026.

A recent report from Brazil’s national space agency showed that deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is the lowest it’s been in a decade. The news made headlines and was lauded as an example of the progress President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had made toward his promise of eliminating illegal deforestation there by 2030. Since taking office in 2023, Lula’s administration has ramped up environmental policies aimed at making the country’s beef industry more transparent, such as increasing policing and remote monitoring of forest lands.     

But some of that progress is at risk of being undone, say environmental experts. 

In January, a number of agrifood groups left a voluntary trade agreement known as the Amazon Soy Moratorium, which had been highly effective at curbing deforestation for the sake of cultivating soybeans. The pact prohibited members from buying soy grown on lands deforested after July 2008. When the moratorium fell apart earlier this year, researchers and advocates expected it to usher in a rise in deforestation for soy cultivation. Now, thanks to a group of scientists working in both the U.S. and Brazil, we have an initial expectation of how much deforestation is likely to occur in the coming years. 

In a new paper published last week in Science, researchers say that the Amazon forest is at risk of losing 1.4 million hectares — or the equivalent of about 2 million soccer fields — to deforestation over the next 10 years. 

Before the moratorium was in place, soy cultivation was one of the main drivers of deforestation in the Amazon; for example, in Mato Grosso, Brazil’s leading soy producing state, a quarter of soy production from 2001 to 2005 came from clearing forested lands. After a widespread public campaign led by Greenpeace, public and private sector actors working in the Amazon forest came together to create the soy moratorium. “People generally followed it,” said Lisa Rausch, one of the authors of the Science paper. “There weren’t many violations of it, especially in the early days and years. This created a situation where land deforested after 2008 was no longer valuable to soy traders.”

Ane Alencar, a director of science at the Amazon Environmental Research Institute, or IPAM, agreed that the soy moratorium was a “very important private policy mechanism” for curbing deforestation. She also argued that without it, lands deforested after 2008 that are currently used for things like raising cattle will now be converted to soybean production — and that the cattle ranching will move to “new frontiers,” likely leading to deforestation elsewhere in the Amazon. 

Area that has been cleared for soy cultivation in the Amazon rainforest near the Brazilian city of Belém. Larissa Schwedes / picture alliance via Getty Images

The new research on soy-driven deforestation in the Amazon also comes at a time when private commitments from major food groups to clean up their supply chains have been flagging. This month, JBS, the world’s largest meat producer, publicly walked back its so-called promise to reach net-zero deforestation by 2040. The news shouldn’t necessarily come as a surprise, as last year, the company’s chief sustainability officer admitted in an interview with Reuters that the pledge was always purely aspirational.  

Alencar believes that the private sector still has a role to play in disincentivizing deforestation, and that companies like JBS are still susceptible to consumer pressure to do the right thing. “They are very reactive to the public opinion,” she said, “so maybe there is a need for more campaigns asking for these companies to be more responsible in the Amazon.”

Other forest countries in Latin America are working on curbing deforestation. Colombia recently passed a first-of-its-kind law aimed at increasing traceability within its beef industry. Over the next two years, government agencies must work with cattle ranchers to ensure they are not raising herds on illegally deforested lands — as well as bring in slaughterhouses, meat processors, cattle auctioneers, and exporters to make sure they are not moving or selling products from these areas. Rausch called this development a strong signal, but said much remains to be seen about how Colombian authorities will accomplish these goals. 

And there are still other agreements in place that aim to restrict deforestation in Brazil — such as the nation’s Forest Code, which limits how much land can be cleared for any type of agricultural production. When lands are deforested outside of these limits, the owners receive a fine and then the land in question is placed under embargo, meaning it cannot be used for any commercial agricultural use. 

But Rausch argued the Forest Code does not go far enough to protect forested land. Her paper found that 20 percent of soy farms in the Amazon have embargoes against them for illegal deforestation. “The economic incentives for deforestation are still there,” she said, while adding that the latest deforestation update from Brazil’s space agency is welcome news. “But unless there are new things brought to the table, this will be a temporary drop, and it will creep back up for sure.”

Alencar also finds the future outlook of deforestation in the Amazon “worrisome.” With Lula up for reelection — and facing off against Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro — Alencar fears that progress could be undone. 

“I’m afraid that all of these results that we have achieved,” she said, “they’ll really be in danger if the government becomes more anti-environmental.”

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Without stronger government action, Brazil’s low deforestation in the Amazon is unlikely to last on Jul 23, 2026.

Take a walk on the wild side Channel News brendan 23rd July 2026 Teaser Media

The Lock the Gate Alliance is calling for scrutiny over Origin Energy's plan to drill gas wells and spread chemical-laden waste directly onto the land as part of a giant gas project under development in Tara. 

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

Over the past week smoke from Canadian wildfires has once again poured into cities across Canada and the northern US. Toronto briefly had the worst air quality of any major city on Earth, Thunder Bay’s readings went off the top of Canada’s air quality health index scale, and unhealthy air alerts stretched from Minneapolis to New York City.

This smoke-pocalypse has renewed a long-standing debate online that these fires aren’t really about climate change at all, but about forest mismanagement. Decades of aggressive fire suppression, the argument goes, have let fuel pile up. We don’t log enough, thin enough, or do enough prescribed burning The forests are overgrown tinderboxes and we have only ourselves to blame. Climate is a distraction from a problem we created by listening to Smokey Bear’s insidious propaganda.

I want to take this argument seriously, because it has a real kernel of truth. The fire-deficit story is a genuine phenomenon in the dry conifer forests of the western United States. But most of what’s burning in Canada is boreal forest, and the boreal is a fundamentally different beast. So in this piece I’ll try to explain why the management argument, largely valid in a California pine stand, mostly falls apart when you move it a couple of thousand kilometers north, and explore what the fire data actually shows.

Here’s the short version. Canada’s area burned has surged, and it has surged in step with warming: hot, dry fire seasons burn far more forest, with area burned rises roughly 80% for each 1C increase in fire-season temperature (with a correlation coefficient of 0.61). This relationship is robust to a variety of statistical tests and controlling for confounding variables. The boreal burns in rare, high-intensity crown fires on a natural cycle measured in a century or more, across enormous remote areas that have never been logged, thinned, or effectively suppressed. Only about a fifth of Canada’s burned area over the past four decades was even inside forest regions that have ever been actively managed. You cannot have a fuel-buildup from forest mismanagement in a forest you were never managing.

Forest mis-management?

The forest-mismanagement argument was, in fairness, based on real evidence from some regions. In the frequent-fire dry forests of the western US that are dominated by ponderosa pine and mixed conifers the natural fire regime is low-to-moderate intensity surface fire returning every 5 to 30 years, historically stoked in part by Indigenous burning. A century of fire exclusion in those forests really did remove that frequent fire, let stands grow denser and more continuous, and build up a “fire deficit” that raises the odds of severe fire (Hagmann et al. 2021). And in that setting, fuel treatments work: Prichard et al. (2021) find wide agreement that mechanical thinning combined with prescribed burning measurably reduces subsequent fire severity. If you’re arguing about the Sierra Nevada, the management story is as important if not more important than the climate one.

The problem is that the Canadian boreal is not the Sierra Nevada. It burns in infrequent, high-intensity, stand-replacing crown fires that kill the whole stand on natural fire cycles measured in many decades to centuries (commonly a century or more, and two centuries or longer in the east), not 5 to 30 years. It is, ecologically speaking, supposed to burn this way; black spruce is practically built for it. Fire in this system was never the gentle recurring ground-clearing that suppression interrupted in California. And the burning is astonishingly concentrated: across the boreal, something like 3% of fires account for about 97% of the area burned. This is not a landscape full of many small fires that “used to clean out the fuel.” Rather, its a landscape that waits, and then burns catastrophically under extreme weather.

Why do we know that Canadian boreal forest fires are not being driven by mismanagement?

First, and most importantly, most of the boreal was never being managed in the first place. As University of Alberta fire scientist Jen Beverly has pointed out, only about one-fifth of Canada’s total burned area from 1986 to 2023 occurred within long-term forest tenure (the land that’s actually logged and managed). The vast majority burns in remote forest with no timber operations. In Canada’s so-called “extensive” fire-management zones there has been no serious suppression efforts historically. Fires there are monitored and largely left to burn unless they threaten people or infrastructure. You can’t blame overgrown, over-suppressed forests for fires in places nobody was suppressing.

Second, the fuel-buildup mechanism doesn’t fit the recent fires. If decades of suppression had loaded the forest with excess old fuel, you’d expect the big fire years to preferentially consume the oldest, most fuel-laden stands. But in Alberta’s brutal 2023 season, fires burned stands of essentially all ages in proportion to how much of each was on the landscape. That’s the signature of fire driven by weather, which doesn’t care how old the trees are, not by fuel accumulation.

Third, the proposed fixes don’t scale to the boreal even if you wanted them. This is the conclusion of the very scientists who documented Canada’s fire deficit. Coogan, Parisien and colleagues (2020) state it flatly: mechanical fuel treatments “require continued maintenance over time, are too expensive to apply across large boreal landscapes, and are usually not designed to halt extreme wildfires.” The boreal is on the order of three million square kilometers. You are not going to thin or prescribe-burn your way across it, and the crown fires that produce the smoke wouldn’t stop at a fuel break anyway.

So if it’s not mismanagement, what is it? Let’s look at the data.

The Canadian fire record

To start with, here is the long-term record of area burned, combing the satellite-mapped NBAC composite from 1972 on with the less-complete point-based records before that shown in grey (note that this is primarily for illustration; I don’t compute any statistics across the 1972 splice to avoid potential bias from changing measurement approaches).

Annual forest area burned in Canada, 1959–2026. Grey bars show the point-based record (1959–1971); red bars the NBAC satellite composite (1972–2025); the hatched bar is 2026 through mid-July (CIFFC, preliminary). Data: NRCan CNFDB/NBAC; CIFFC.

2023 stands out like a sore thumb with 14.8 million hectares in the satellite-mapped data (Canadian agency tallies actually run higher at 17–18 Mha as different products count differently),1 roughly 2.5 times the previous record. 2025 came in second at ~7.3 Mha in the satellite data. And 2026 so far is about 2.8 Mha by mid-July, a bit above the typical pace for this date, but far below the last few extreme years.

One caveat around how unprecedented this actually is. A recent tree-ring reconstruction back to 1800 (Danneyrolles et al. 2025) found that while 2023 itself was off the charts in most regions they studied, the decadal burn rate for 2014–2023 still sits within the range of the past two centuries in several zones, especially in the eastern boreal. We are not necessarily seeing more fire than ever everywhere, but rather a rapid rate of increase with the increasing prevalence of fire weather driving it. In addition, parts of the northwestern boreal are now burning at rates that do appear to exceed anything in thousands of years.

One important driver: higher temperatures Change in fire-season (May–September) mean temperature, 1959 to 2025, computed as a per-gridcell LOWESS trend. Canada-wide mean change is +2.2C, exceeding +3C in parts of the high Arctic. Data: ERA5-Land (ECMWF/Copernicus) via Google Earth Engine.

Canadian fire seasons (May through September) have warmed about 2.2C on average since 1959. Canada warms at roughly twice the global rate, and its north at roughly three times. That warming matters for fire through a well-understood mechanism: warmer air is exponentially “thirstier” (saturation vapor pressure rises ~7% per degree), so it pulls moisture out of live vegetation and dead fuels alike, priming the landscape to burn. It’s the same fuel-drying pathway that Abatzoglou and Williams (2016) found had roughly doubled cumulative forest area burned in the western US.

Hanes et al. (2019), examining the Canadian record from 1959 to 2015, found fire seasons starting earlier and ending later, more days with conditions suitable for fire spread, and increases in both annual area burned and the frequency of large fires. They found that these trends were consistent with human-caused warming, not with changes in forest management (which have been broadly stable since the 1980s even as the fire seasons have gotten dramatically worse).

Hot and dry years burn

A few years ago my Berkeley Earth colleague Robert Rohde made a lovely figure plotting each California fire season by its temperature and precipitation. Here is my Canadian version: every year from 1959 to 2025 placed in climate space, with dot size proportional to national area burned and the ten largest fire years outlined in black.

Each dot is one year (1959–2025), positioned by its fire-season (May–Sep) mean temperature and total precipitation averaged over burnable land, sized by national area burned (NBAC). Adapted from Robert Rohde’s California fire season weather chart. Data: ERA5-Land; NRCan CNFDB/NBAC.

The pattern is hard to miss. The biggest fire years pile up in the hot-and-dry corner with 2023 really standing out, and the recent era (red dots, 2011–2025) has shifted visibly toward that corner relative to the black dots of the 1960s. Canada’s fire seasons are migrating into the part of weather-space where the big burns happen.

We can also try and more directly quantify the relationship between area burned and temperature. Nationally, fire-season temperature correlates with log area burned at r = 0.61 (1972–2025), which means that a fire season 1C warmer sees ~80% more area burned. I want to be careful about what this does and doesn’t show, so I stress-tested it: the correlation survives detrending (r = 0.57), first-differencing (r = 0.46), and partialling out precipitation (r = 0.58). It isn’t just two things drifting upward together, and it isn’t a rebranded precipitation effect.2

Correlation of fire-season mean temperature with log annual area burned by province/territory, 1972–2025, with 95% moving-block bootstrap intervals. Red dots are significant after false-discovery-rate correction. Data: NRCan CNFDB/NBAC; ERA5-Land.

The relationship is strongest in the western and northern boreal – Yukon, BC, the Northwest Territories, the Prairie provinces, Ontario – and weak to non-significant in Nunavet, Quebec, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick, matching the literature’s finding that eastern boreal fire is generally less temperature-limited.

Lightning in the middle of nowhere Cumulative area burned by ignition cause, 1990–2023. Data: National Forestry Database (agency-reported).

About 71% of Canada’s area burned over 1990–2023 came from lightning-ignited fires, and in the record 2023 season it was ~93%. These are remote boreal megafires, ignited by lightning far from any road, timber lease, or fuel-treatment crew. This is worth considering in the context of the management debate: the fires driving the smoke are not escaped campfires or mismanaged plantations. They are lightning strikes into a drying landscape, often burning in exactly the places no one was managing. And because warming is expected to increase high-latitude lightning, climate change can contribute to both the fuel dryness and the ignition side of the equation.

What attribution science actually says

This week the National Academies released a major report on the attribution of extreme weather events and their impacts, updating their influential 2016 assessment. Its wildfire findings are careful, and they land almost exactly on the distinction I’ve been trying to make in this piece.

On the general question, the report concludes it is very likely that climate change has increased the likelihood and severity of extreme fire weather: the hot, dry, windy conditions that let fires ignite and spread. At the same time it assigns low confidence to attributing any specific individual wildfire, because fires are irreducibly multivariate: ignition, fuels, land management, and suppression all mediate the on-the-ground relationship between fire weather and hectares burned. Notably, the report also flags that no attribution study has yet isolated the role of fuel or ignition changes, precisely because those human factors are so entangled. The science is much stronger on “climate change made conditions like these more likely” than on “climate change, specifically, caused this fire.”

For Canada’s exceptional 2023 fire year the evidence is unusually strong, and the report devotes a whole box to it. Kirchmeier-Young et al. (2024) found the record burned area was 2–5 times more likely thanks to human influence in Canada’s eastern and western ecozones, and the extraordinarily long fire season more than 5 times more likely. World Weather Attribution found the cumulative fire-weather severity at least 7 times more likely and ~50% more intense. Jones et al. (2024) put the fire-weather likelihood increase at ~2.9–3.6x and burned area ~10% higher (95% CI: 3-40%) than without warming. And Barnes et al. (2025) found the James Bay severity rating at least 32% more intense, while noting the season was amplified by an extreme run of atmospheric blocking (~50 blocking days versus an average of 15), a reminder that in any single year the weather still matter enormously.

Where management does matter

The prior sections are about the physical science of what’s driving the fire trend. What we should do about it is a policy question, and here the management crowd is not wrong so much as aiming at the wrong target.

There genuinely is a fire deficit in parts of boreal Canada — but it’s local, and it’s about people, not country or regional fire totals. Parisien, Coogan and colleagues (2020) found that of 160 boreal communities they studied, 54% were surrounded by less recently-burned forest than their fire regime would predict reflecting a suppression legacy that leaves older, more flammable forest ringing towns. This is a place where thinning, fuel breaks, and prescribed burning could genuinely help.

Fuel management is valuable around communities, but is essentially useless across the remote boreal. But in Canada it does not explain and cannot reverse the rise in area burned that’s filling the sky with smoke. Treating the wildland-urban interface and cutting the emissions that are drying the forest should be seen as complementary rather than as competitors.

Why the smokey skies

One last point on the thing thats actually dominating the news a the moment. Even a year like 2026 that appears not to be headed for a top-5 record for area burned in Canada can still have catastrophic air pollution impacts.

Large-fire footprints (≥200 ha) across Canada, 2015–2024 (grey, ~39 Mha total), with the 878 fires still active as of 17 July 2026 (red, sized by area). Data: NRCan CNFDB large-fire polygons; CIFFC year-to-date feed.

Whether a given city chokes on smoke depends on where fires burn, how high their plumes loft, which way the wind blows, and how many people live downwind, not on total hectares burned nationwide. This July, fires across northwestern Ontario, the Prairies, and Quebec have sat upwind of the Great Lakes population corridor under a persistent transporting flow. A modest fire season in the wrong place can choke tens of millions, while a record season in the remote north can have much smaller impacts on populated regions. While overall area burned is the climate-linked trend, who breathes the smoke on a given week in July is mostly driven by the weather.

A few takeaways

So what are the takeaways here?

First, the forest-mismanagement explanation is borrowed from the wrong forest. Its a real problem in the frequent-fire dry forests of the western US, but the Canadian boreal is a rare-crown-fire system, mostly unmanaged and unsuppressed, where only about a fifth of the burned area is even on managed land and where the fire scientists themselves say landscape-scale fuel treatments can’t scale or stop the megafires.

Second, the surge in Canadian burning tracks temperature with striking consistency, and hotter, drier fire seasons burn far more forest (+80% per 1C), the biggest fire years are almost universally hotter and drier, over 90% of the record 2023 burn was remote lightning fire, and the attribution studies tie these extremes to a warmer atmosphere without needing to invoke forest management at all.

And third, where management does matter like for the forests ringing communities it’s a genuine and worthy fix. But here it just protects towns; it doesn’t solve the underlying factors driving area burned or wildfire smoke pollution.

So next time someone tells you Canada’s fires can be solved by raking the forests, you can point out that the thing filling their sky with smoke is a lightning-struck, drought-primed boreal forest doing what a warming climate is making it do more and more often.

In case its helpful, I’ve put the code and data to reproduce this analysis on my GitHub here.

1 Burned-area products genuinely differ: the National Burned Area Composite (NBAC) maps fire perimeters from satellite imagery and is more conservative, while agency/CIFFC tallies are reported figures with different cutoff dates (2023 is 14.8 Mha in NBAC vs ~17–18 Mha in agency totals). I use NBAC as the primary series and avoid computing statistics across the 1972 data-source splice; the 2026 number is a preliminary CIFFC year-to-date figure.

2 The gory methodological details: correlations use the homogeneous NBAC record (1972–2025), with effective sample sizes adjusted for autocorrelation (Bretherton et al. 1999), 95% moving-block bootstrap confidence intervals, and Benjamini–Hochberg false-discovery-rate control across jurisdictions. The national relationship also holds when refit excluding 2023 and 2025 (r = 0.52), so it is not an artifact of the two recent extreme years. Temperature and precipitation are area-weighted over each jurisdiction’s forested/woody land (MODIS IGBP classes 1–9) from ERA5-Land. Fire-season precipitation correlates with area burned at r = −0.49.

Trump Slashes Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears by 3 Million Acres

 

We’ve known since Trump returned to office that he would likely attempt another illegal reduction to Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears National Monuments, but that didn’t make July 13 any less heartbreaking. On that day, flanked by the Utah congressional delegation, he signed two executive orders slashing the monuments by a combined 3 million acres, or nearly 90% (yes, you read that right). We’ve created maps showing the staggering scale of the reductions.

We were ready for this moment, and we will fight for the monuments in every way we can, using every tool in our toolbox for as long as necessary. Here are some examples of how we’re already responding:

• A week after Trump’s unlawful action, SUWA and our partners rallied to host a Monumental Day of Action, with over a thousand people attending events in Salt Lake City, Ogden, Provo, Moab, St. George, Bluff, and Boulder on a 100-degree day! The Salt Lake Tribune headline captured it well: “‘Motivated by love’: Utahns find strength in numbers during protest of Trump’s monument slashing.“
  
  
• We plan to litigate over these illegal reductions, as we did in 2017 (that case was not resolved by the time President Biden restored the monuments in 2021). We’re currently coordinating with conservation partners, Tribal nations, and the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante Inter-Tribal Coalitions to determine a litigation strategy based on the new proclamations.
  
  
• We’re ramping up our efforts to promote America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act, which would protect much of the land included in the monuments as wilderness.

We’ll be sharing much more in the weeks and months to come. In the meantime, you can learn more from some of the recent news coverage in the New York Times, Washington Post, Utah News Dispatch, KUER, Outdoor Life, and Rocky Mountain Community Radio.

AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson

Last Day to Submit Comments on Trail Canyon and Dinosaur North Travel Management Plans

 

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is accepting public comments on travel management plans for two very different but spectacular areas: Trail Canyon, east of Zion National Park, and Dinosaur North, near Dinosaur National Monument. The plans will determine where off-road vehicles (ORVs) are allowed to travel in these areas for decades to come.

Trail Canyon includes places like Moquith Mountain, Orderville Canyon, and the east and north forks of the Virgin River. Dinosaur North encompasses the John Wesley Powell National Conservation Area, Browns Park, and the B and C sections of the Green River (well known to river runners). Both areas are home to irreplaceable cultural sites and historic resources, spectacular recreation opportunities, and important habitat for elk, mule deer, bighorn sheep, and other species.

For both travel plans, only Alternative B—modified by additional route closures—would comply with the BLM’s duties to protect natural and cultural resources and balance conflicts between motorized and non-motorized recreationists. In both cases Alternative B would remove redundant and particularly damaging routes while helping preserve wilderness study areas and other wilderness-quality lands.

The agency’s public comment period closes today (July 22), so please submit your comments now if you haven’t already done so.

>> Click here to submit comments on Trail Canyon

>> Click her to submit comments on Dinosaur North

Photo © Ray Bloxham/SUWA

Airstrip Designations Threaten Wildlife Habitat, Backcountry Solitude

 

SUWA has spent a great deal of time lately pushing back on new and troubling Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposals that would expand or legitimize aircraft use in some of southern Utah’s quietest and wildest landscapes.

This spring, the agency’s Price field office issued a disappointing decision permitting aircraft takeoffs and landings at the unauthorized Keg Knoll airstrip in the Labyrinth Canyon Wilderness. A week later, the BLM’s Canyon Country District issued a decision designating ten backcountry airstrips in the Moab and Monticello areas, including sites in or near wilderness-quality lands, bighorn sheep habitat, the Green River corridor, and the backcountry adjacent to Bears Ears National Monument.

Though the BLM held no formal public comment process, SUWA members submitted over 2,500 comments urging the agency to remove six of the most damaging airstrips from their decision—Spring Canyon, Big Flat, Castle Creek, Nokai Dome, Piute, and Red Canyon. Reopening or formalizing these airstrips could bring chronic aircraft noise, habitat fragmentation, vegetation clearing, and mechanized intrusion into places the agency should be protecting.

We’re evaluating our options to push back on the BLM’s disappointing decisions and will keep you posted.

Photo © James Kay

July Brings New Cosponsors for America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act 

 

Since the beginning of the month, America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act (HR 2467/S 1193) has gained seven new cosponsors in the House of Representatives! This brings us up to 76 cosponsors in the House and 18 in the Senate. The latest members of Congress to endorse the bill include Rep. Lloyd Doggett (D-TX-37), Rep. Danny Davis (D-IL-7), Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI-6), Rep. Lori Trahan (D-MA-3), Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ-6), Rep. Teresa Leger Fernandez (D-NM-3), and Rep. André Carson (D-IN-7). If any of these legislators represent you, please thank them for their support.

America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act aims to permanently protect over 8 million acres of Bureau of Land Management land in Utah as federally designated wilderness. Preserving the wild character of this spectacular and world-renowned landscape would help protect Native cultural sites, keep climate-disrupting fossil fuels in the ground, and maintain a vital migration corridor for western wildlife species.

Gains in cosponsorship are the result of persistent outreach to members of Congress from constituents like you! If your representative and/or senators have not signed onto the bill, please ask them to cosponsor the Red Rock bill today!

>> Click here to contact your members of Congress now

Photo © James Kay

Raise Your Voice for Wilderness

 

SUWA is a proud founding member of the National Wilderness Coalition, which began just a few years ago as a small group discussing the future of the wilderness movement and is now a nationwide coalition of over 50 organizations from coast to coast. What brings us together is a shared goal of reinvigorating a diverse, powerful wilderness movement.

Earlier this year, the Coalition launched Voices for Wilderness, a project that collects stories, experiences, and perspectives about why wilderness and wild places matter. We’re hoping you’ll participate in this effort by sharing your story in the format that feels most comfortable to you: video, voice recording, or written response. Examples from other wilderness enthusiasts and details about how to participate can be found here.

In the months ahead, these stories will be shared on the Voices for Wilderness website, across social media, and with decision-makers in Washington, DC. At a time when wild places face growing threats, it’s more important than ever to share why they matter.

>> Click here to share your story

The post July 2026 Redrock Report appeared first on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.

 In June, Come to the Table partnered with Dr. Sarah Bowen and Dr. Annie Hardison-Moody of N.C. State University to host a workshop on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), its history, and how communities can respond in light of recent cuts of the program.
The RAFI team led participants through a timeline of the last year as it relates to SNAP. Since October 2025, the food assistance space has taken blow after blow from significant changes and cuts to federal policy.

The post A Reflection on Food & SNAP appeared first on RAFI.

Britain’s new prime minister announced in his first week that he will cut the cost of public transport and electricity, making lower-emission technologies like bus travel, electric vehicles and heat pumps more affordable for voters. But some of the funding for those policies will come from the budget for international climate finance, the government has said, raising concerns about fairness.

Former Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham took over from Keir Starmer as Labour Party leader and prime minister on Monday, appointing climate advocates Ed Miliband as foreign and development minister and Miatta Fahnbulleh as climate and energy minister.

On Tuesday, Burnham said his government would cut the value added tax (VAT) households and some small businesses pay on their electricity bills from 5% to zero from October 1, saving households £45 ($60) a year.

On Wednesday, he said the maximum fare bus companies in England can charge for a single journey will be reduced from £3 ($4) to £2 from January 1, 2027. The government said the subsidies to achieve this would be mostly funded by switching money set aside for overseas climate finance projects from grants to loans. It did not give further information in its announcement, while the UK’s transport minister told Sky News the plan was still being worked out.

Climate Home News has since learned that the money will come from a change in the form of a contribution to a new international fund to protect rainforests. The British government is expected soon to announce £400 million (about $533m) for the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) that was launched by Brazil late last year.

The UK’s finance ministry had originally planned to provide this sum as a grant, but will now offer it as a loan instead. The TFFF plans to invest its seed capital in financial markets and then reimburse wealthy donor governments while paying forest countries to keep their trees standing.

• Jul 3, 2026 News Tropical forest protection fund at risk after UK stalls on pledge The Brazil-led TFFF was launched at COP30 as an innovative financial model to keep rainforests standing, but is still short on startup cash Read more
• May 14, 2026 Finance UK halves Green Climate Fund contribution, as it spends more on security After promising £1.6 billion to the UN’s flagship climate fund in 2023, the UK government has now said it will only hand over half as much Read more
• Jun 24, 2026 News EU, UK lead push for electrification as “powerful weapon” against fossil fuels A group of dozens of countries seeks to build momentum for a COP31 pledge to electrify 35% of global energy use by 2035 as an alternative to fossil fuels Read more

The floated changes to the climate finance budget were immediately criticised by groups working on climate justice for developing countries, including Bond, the UK network for NGOs, which described the decision as “disappointing”.

“Robbing Peter to pay Paul is not the answer and pitches marginalised communities in the UK against marginalised communities in lower-income and climate-vulnerable countries,” BOND CEO Romilly Greenhill said in a statement. “Climate finance must not worsen the debt burden of countries that are already suffering the worst – and most costly – impacts of a climate crisis they did not cause.”

Hunt for money

Burnham promoted both policies as measures to combat the rising cost of living and “give people breathing space”, with climate campaigners and industry groups noting they are also likely to reduce the UK’s climate-heating emissions by encouraging bus travel and the use of electric vehicles and heating.

But the hurried policy announcements sparked thorny questions remain over how they will be paid for. The government said Tuesday’s VAT cut for electricity would be funded by scrapping the previous government’s digital ID programme, but Darren Jones, a former minister involved with that policy, said it had been “unfunded” – a statement that dominated media coverage.

A day later, the government said the new bus fare cap would cost £454 million ($606m). Transport minister Heidi Alexander told Sky News that £54 million would be taken from an under-spend in the budget of the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) and £400 million would come from changing unspecified international climate finance from grants to loans. The details “still need to be worked through”, she said, adding that the government “had wanted to make an announcement today”.

Mohamed Adow, director of Nairobi-based think-tank Power Shift Africa, said “climate finance was never meant to be a pot of money that governments raid when they need to pay for domestic spending”.

Speaking on television, minister Alexander added, “We’re not wanting to fleece anyone here, and we actually want to maximise the development potential of this money that is available.”

Mohamed Adow speaking on the official final day of COP29. (Photo: UNFCCC/Kiara Worth)

Aside from the controversy over their funding, the policies themselves were widely welcomed by climate campaigners. Jess Ralston, energy lead at the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), said the tax cut on electricity bills “could help households to switch to electric heat pumps, protecting UK homes from becoming ever more exposed to the whims of Putin and Trump when turning on their gas boiler”.

The last few months have seen global momentum build behind electrification, spurred by the US-Iran war disrupting oil and gas supplies and driving up prices. The Turkish and Australian COP31 presidencies have announced a global target to boost electrification, backed by the European Union, Canada, Philippines, UK and others.

Campaigners call for lower power prices

While reaction to the VAT cut was supportive, some questioned whether £45 a year of savings per household is enough and called for more measures to cut electricity bills.

Friends of the Earth’s energy lead Imogen Dow said those on the lowest incomes should be given cheaper electricity through a “social tariff” and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) think-tank – which is close to the Labour Party – said levies on energy bills should be shifted to general taxation.

Matthew Paterson, a politics professor at Manchester University, told Climate Home News that the most effective way to reduce electricity bills is to take on the UK’s private electricity companies, while consumer-oriented measures like the VAT cut are “tinkering around the edges”.

Jarrod Birch, head of policy and public affairs for the EV charging industry association Charge UK, said that while the policy would make home-charging cheaper, people who charge their vehicles at public points will still have to pay 20% VAT. The UK’s tax authority is fighting a court ruling that ordered it to reduce the tax motorists pay on public chargers to the current household rate of 5%.

Further measures will be the responsibility of Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero Miatta Fahnbulleh, who is relatively new to politics after a career at left-wing, pro-climate think tanks the IPPR and the New Economics Foundation.

Fahnbulleh and Healey leave 10 Downing Street following Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s first cabinet meeting, on July 21, 2026 in London, England. (Photo: Ben Montgomery/Getty Images)

Michael Jacobs, political economy professor at Sheffield University and former adviser to UK Labour prime minister Gordon Brown, said Fahnbulleh would be a “climate advocate” who would continue the “progressive climate agenda” of her predecessor Ed Miliband.

“She’s a very creative policy wonk so I expect there to be lots of policy innovation under her,” he said, “I think she will be looking at new ways to encourage take-up of heat pumps and domestic batteries.”

Aid budget in Miliband’s hands

Despite reports he could be made finance minister, Miliband has been appointed Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Miliband has attended many climate COP meetings over several decades, most recently representing the UK at COP29 and COP30, and has been targeted by the right-wing media for his support for climate action and opposition to new oil and gas drilling in the UK’s part of the North Sea.

In his new role, Miliband will be responsible for the UK’s overseas aid budget including its international climate finance, which the Starmer government had slashed to fund increases in defence spending.

UK cuts support for climate action abroad to fund military instead

Jacobs said he expected Miliband to prioritise climate and development in the UK’s foreign policy and to push Burnham and new finance minister John Healey to reverse Starmer’s aid cuts.

But there are fears Healey could try to cut the aid budget further to fund the military. Healey was a surprise pick for Chancellor of the Exchequer and grabbed headlines when he resigned as Starmer’s defence minister in June over what he saw as insufficient defence spending.

This article was updated after publication on July 24, clarifying how the UK plans to free up $400 million from its climate finance budget.

The post Will new UK PM’s green measures at home cause climate finance pain overseas? appeared first on Climate Home News.

A majority of Utah’s residents opposed shrinking Bears Ears National Monument before President Donald Trump drastically slashed its size last week, according to multiple polls conducted over the past few years. Those findings contrast with statements from Utah’s political leaders who argued that the cuts reflected what Utahns want.

President Donald Trump signed two executive orders shrinking Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears national monuments by roughly 90 percent each. He announced the change flanked by members of Utah’s congressional delegation and Governor Spencer Cox, all of them Republicans. Trump’s proclamation said the move “will better align the use of these public lands with the public interest,” citing the region’s deposits of critical minerals such as copper, nickel, and uranium, among others. 

On Monday, hundreds gathered outside the Governor’s Mansion in Salt Lake City to protest the cuts, part of efforts organized by the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance across the state to pressure lawmakers. 

The two monuments, which totaled about 3.3 million acres in southern Utah before Trump’s executive orders, were created by Democratic presidents despite protests from Utah’s elected Republican leaders.

During the signing ceremony in the Oval Office, Utah Representative Celeste Maloy, a Republican, said that supporters of shrinking the monuments  included “the locals who are worried about losing multiple uses on these federal lands,” and said that Trump was “listening to the people of Utah” in reducing the size of both monuments.

“It was very unfair to the people of Utah,” Trump said, “and now fairness has been brought back.”

But separate polls conducted before Trump shrank the monuments show that most Utahns and residents of other Mountain West states favored keeping their existing designations.

“It is very contradictive of our findings,” said Michaelann Nelson, a professor of environmental rhetoric at the Utah State University campus in Price. “They’re kind of picking and choosing which Utahns they’re paying attention to and listening to.”

In surveys conducted in 2024 and 2025, researchers with Utah State University found that 61 percent of Utahns either supported or strongly supported preserving Bears Ears as a national monument, with just 19 percent opposed or strongly opposed. Some 53 percent of respondents opposed or strongly opposed reducing Bears Ears, while 26 percent supported the idea. The remaining 21 percent neither supported nor opposed shrinking the monument.

Utah Senate Minority Leader Luz Escamilla, Autumn Gillard of the Piute Indian Tribe of Utah, and others join a rally to protect public lands at the Utah Capitol in January 2025.
Francisco Kjolseth / The Salt Lake Tribune

Nearly half — 46 percent — opposed Utah pursuing legal action to overturn the Bears Ears National Monument designation, which was initially created by President Barack Obama in 2016 under the Antiquities Act. It included 1.35 million acres, but has now been reduced to about 121,000 acres.

Grand Staircase-Escalante wasn’t included in the Utah State University study. President Bill Clinton designated that monument in 1996, and it eventually reached nearly 1.9 million acres after some adjustments by Congress. After Trump’s order to cut the monument last week, it now includes just over 181,500 acres.

Nelson, the lead author of the poll, said she focused her surveys on Bears Ears because it was newer and a bigger focus of Utah politicians’ ire at the time. But she expects Utahns’ sentiments toward Grand Staircase-Escalante are similar.

“In some ways, perhaps [Utahns would be] even more in favor of Grand Staircase,” Nelson said, “just because we’ve existed with it for more than 20 years.”

Jessica Schad, a professor of sociology and the director of the Utah State’s Community and Natural Resources Institute, oversaw the survey efforts. She suspects Utahns’ attitudes toward monuments haven’t shifted much in the months since researchers polled them.

“It seems like this issue has become really politicized,” Schad said, “and our politicians aren’t taking into account what residents are preferring.”

The poll included 468 respondents in Utah, and the university tapped sociologists based in rural parts of the state so the results didn’t overrepresent residents in the more urban Wasatch Front, home to Salt Lake City. “We use high-quality, really rigorous survey methods,” Schad said.

Other surveys conducted across eight Mountain West states showed similar sentiments about national monuments to the Utah State University poll. A total of 91 percent of voters in these states wanted existing national monuments kept in place as of January, compared to 88 percent last year and 80 percent in 2017, according to the annual Conservation in the West Poll conducted by Colorado College.

This year’s study included interviews with voters in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. About 24 percent of respondents lived in rural areas or small towns, 24 percent lived in cities, and the rest lived in suburbs. Politically, 36 percent identified as Republicans, including 35 percent who said they supported MAGA; another 36 percent were independent, and 28 percent were Democrats.

The survey found support for existing national monuments nationwide was strong across party affiliations, backed by 87 percent of Republicans, 92 percent of independents, and 96 percent of Democrats. The share of MAGA supporters who wanted to keep existing national monument designations in place grew from 81 percent in 2025 to 87 percent this year.

“We’ve asked about this many times over the years,” said Lori Weigel, a principal with New Bridge Strategies, a Republican public opinion research group that assists Colorado College with its annual poll. “What we have seen very consistently in the data is that people want additional protections for these public lands.”

The poll also found that voters from both parties wanted to prioritize “conservation, recreation, and renewables over fossil fuel development,” according to a statement accompanying the results. A separate December 2024 survey by New Bridge Strategies found 71 percent of Utah voters supported keeping Bears Ears protected as a national monument, and 74 percent felt the same about Grand Staircase-Escalante. Another 75 percent of Utahns surveyed backed a president’s ability to create more national monuments.

Utah’s politicians, including Cox and Senator Mike Lee, have asserted Democratic presidents went too far in designating the two monuments. The 1906 Antiquities Act allows presidents to protect sites of historic and scientific interest as national monuments, but directs presidents to preserve “the smallest area compatible with the proper care” of those lands.

“These multimillion-acre monuments that are bigger than the state of Delaware certainly do not fit that designation,” Cox said at Monday’s event with Trump.

The designations have brought more visitors to the Bears Ears and Escalante areas, a statement issued by the Utah Senate notes. That puts a strain on land management agencies and law enforcement, causing “degradation” at the sites.

When Trump downsized the two monuments during his first term in 2017, records showed mining companies had lobbied administration officials to reduce the boundaries of Bears Ears. The president’s latest orders both cite a need to mine domestic supplies of critical minerals on public lands as part of the justification for reducing Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante.

During the signing ceremony last week, Trump complained that the previous monument boundaries closed off access to recreation, too. “You can’t do anything. You can’t go hunting. You can’t go fishing. You can’t do anything. You can virtually not even walk on it,” he said.

But the fact is that hunting, fishing, driving off-road vehicles on designated trails, and other recreation are allowed in both Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante — activities that are sometimes prohibited at other national monuments. Bears Ears also had an intertribal commission that federal agencies consulted for management of the monument and protection of its resources. Trump’s order disbanded that body.

Nearly 90 percent of Utahns supported Native American tribes having a strong role in managing ancestral lands, according to the 2024 New Bridge Strategies survey, and 81 percent said that the incoming Trump administration should keep agreements with tribes in place for managing Bears Ears.

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This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Most Utahns want to protect their national monuments. Trump had other plans. on Jul 22, 2026.

Workers at the Hunter Valley Operations (HVO) coal mine and the wider communities of Singleton and Muswellbrook have been left without a mine exit strategy to manage the social and economic consequences of mine closure after mine operator Glencore and the NSW Department of Planning quietly scrapped a condition requiring the company to develop one.

A call for unity and awareness Channel Comment brendan 22nd July 2026 Teaser Media

TORONTO— ADAM THORN, clean growth director at the Pembina Institute, made the following statement in response to the latest U.S. tariffs on Canadian goods: “Recent U.S. trade actions are another reminder that Canada's economy and auto sector are...

This summer, the Government of Canada launched its National Strategy for an Electrified Canadian Economy, highlighting the need to double Canada’s electricity capacity and accelerate electrification over the next two decades. The Government of...

Reports of human rights and environmental abuses linked to Chinese companies’ overseas investments in the mining and refining of minerals needed for the clean energy transition are on the rise, research by a monitoring group has found.

The number of recorded allegations of harm at projects tied to Chinese firms have increased every year since 2021, rising to 148 in 2025, according to the Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRC). On Wednesday it released new data showing that a total of 434 allegations of abuse were made against Chinese-backed projects over the five-year period in projects across the world.

The world’s top cleantech manufacturer, China is also the leading financier of critical minerals projects worldwide. The country has committed more than $120 billion in foreign direct investment into mineral mining and processing since 2023, Australian think-tank Climate Energy Finance recently found.

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“China plays a central role in global transition mineral supply chains, and as such has a unique opportunity to raise the bar on human rights and community engagement at every stage of mining,” said Michael Clements, BHRC’s executive director.  

“While there have been encouraging developments, from stronger regulations to more company engagement, there remains a gap between human rights commitment and action,” he said.

The report comes as communities affected by Chinese-backed mineral projects have filed the first two cases to a Beijing-based mediation mechanism intended to bring willing Chinese companies to the discussion table with affected communities.

Allegations of harms on the rise

BHRC’s latest analysis – including data for the period 2023-2025 – covered mining, smelting and refining projects for 11 minerals considered key to manufacturing clean energy technologies such as batteries, EVs and solar panels needed to move away from climate-heating fossil fuels.

The highest number of abuses was recorded in Indonesia, the world’s largest producer of nickel, which is used to make EV batteries. After the Indonesian government banned exports of raw nickel, Chinese firms invested billions of dollars to develop a large-scale nickel smelting and processing industry in the Southeast Asian country, largely powered by coal.  

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Other countries with a high number of recorded harms include the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Chinese firms dominate cobalt and copper production; Myanmar, where unregulated rare earths mining has caused widespread environmental destruction; Serbia, where Chinese-backed mining of some of Europe’s most significant copper and gold deposits is swallowing land and homes, and Zimbabwe, where Chinese investments have turned the nation into Africa’s top lithium producer.

Growing risks for people and nature

Allegations tracked by BHRC included negative impacts on local livelihoods, health and land rights, workers’ health and safety and work-related deaths, as well as water pollution and environmental contamination. In addition, 18 people were attacked for raising concerns about Chinese transition mineral projects between 2023 and 2025.

The report shows that 10 Chinese companies, including Zijin Mining, Tsingshan Group and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, accounted for nearly two-thirds of all allegations recorded in the last five years. It found that some Chinese companies “still appear to turn a blind eye to these issues” but noted that several others have been more responsive to allegations of abuse. However, even among companies with human rights policies, implementation remains a challenge, BHRC warned.

• Jul 9, 2026 Clean Energy Frontier India looks to untapped graphite riches for slice of critical minerals boom Clean energy demand for battery-grade graphite is surging, but India faces hurdles as it positions itself to compete with China’s grip on the supply chain Read more
• Feb 9, 2024 Clean Energy Frontier Indonesia turns traditional Indigenous land into nickel industrial zone Indonesia supplies the EV industry with critical battery materials but the sector’s rapid expansion is infringing the rights of Indigenous peoples Read more
• May 27, 2026 Clean Energy Frontier Recycling could meet half of Europe’s critical mineral needs by 2050 A new report by an EU-funded research project says the bloc could harness its “urban mines” to reduce its dependence on China for energy transition minerals Read more

Zijin Mining and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt repeatedly responded to the allegations of harm by saying they take environmental and social risks seriously and adhere to international standards. Tsingshan Group never responded to BHRC’s requests for comment.

Platform for dialogue between communities and Chinese firms

At the same time, Chinese authorities have made “significant progress” on introducing a more specific framework for managing environmental and social risks in overseas investment, BHRC said.

This includes global consultation on a draft Sustainable Mining Code, adherence to UN guiding principles on business and human rights, and greater emphasis on oversight of companies operating overseas.  

The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) set up a mediation and consultation mechanism intended to provide a platform for dialogue between affected communities or civil society groups that have raised concerns and Chinese companies.

More than three years since its launch, the mechanism has now received its first two complaints from local communities and many more are considering filing a case, Margaux Day, executive director at the nonprofit Accountability Counsel, told an event hosted by Climate Home News last month.

“This is incredibly exciting in that it fills a governance and accountability gap where often communities who are seeking to protect their rights and the environment can’t reach someone who will respond to them,” she told the panel discussion at London Climate Action Week.

Climate Home News understands that the complaints were filed by communities in Latin America and Southeast Asia over labour rights and resettlement issues. No information about the cases has yet been made public. The mechanism’s secretariat did not respond to Climate Home News’ questions.

The mechanism was set up after the Chinese regulator for banks and insurers called on investor-level institutions to establish complaints bodies to hear from communities outside of China. But whether the new initiative will prove effective in tackling grievances remains an open question.  

“Real potential” for better mining practices

Participation in the mechanism is voluntary for Chinese firms and it doesn’t have a fact-finding function, nor can it impose provisions for compensation or compliance with human rights standards.

But Day told Climate Home News that, if successful, it could bring companies to negotiate an outcome that is better for people and the planet and leads to more sustainable mining practice.

Chen Yu, an independent China advisor for campaign group Global Witness, agreed that the mechanism holds “real potential”.

“There exists nothing else at a similar level to promote dialogue between communities and Chinese mining companies in particular,” she said.

For companies, the mechanism opens “a channel for problem-solving and dialogue with communities”, she added, as “Chinese companies often remain cautious of approaching affected communities directly, afraid of making the problem bigger”.

However, Chen said the mechanism remains at an early stage of development, faces resourcing challenges and is not yet sufficiently understood by communities in mining areas or Chinese firms.

To help it address some of these challenges, the secretariat is currently seeking technical support from a range of organisations, including civil society groups. But, Chen said, “it will take time for the mechanism to show its value”.

The post Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise appeared first on Climate Home News.

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters

As climate change bakes forests across North America, dense smoke from dozens of out-of-control wildfires burning in northern Minnesota and adjacent portions of Ontario is blanketing tens of millions of people with hazardous pollution.

The fires are bringing the worst air quality on record to much of the Great Lakes, mid-Atlantic, and Northeast United States. Pollution from small particles called PM2.5 — the fine particles less than 2.5 microns in diameter are the primary air pollution killers — has been far into the “Hazardous” range across five states since Wednesday morning.

The award for worst air in the nation on July 16 went to the city that has in the past billed itself as a climate haven: Duluth, Minnesota. The city’s 24-hour air quality index, or AQI, for PM2.5 particle pollution hit 934, over three times the threshold for “Hazardous” pollution. This shattered Duluth’s previous all-time AQI record of 159 set July 20, 2021. EPA pollution records go back to 1999.

The award for worst air in the nation on July 16 went to the city that has in the past billed itself as a climate haven: Duluth, Minnesota. The city’s 24-hour air quality index, or AQI, for PM2.5 particle pollution hit 934, over three times the threshold for “Hazardous” pollution. This shattered Duluth’s previous all-time AQI record of 159 set July 20, 2021. EPA PM 2.5 pollution records go back to 1999.

Record 24-hr PM 2.5 air quality on July 16, 2026

Duluth, MN: 934 AQI for PM2.5 (Old record: 159, July 20, 2021)
Toledo, OH (5 monitors): 624 (Old record: 190, June 28, 2023)
Chicago. IL (42 monitors): 511 (Old record: 246, June 28, 2023)
Detroit, MI: 490 (Old record: 226, June 28, 2023)
Cleveland, OH: 297 (Old record: 285, June 28, 2023)
Milwaukee, WI: 414 (Old record: 270, June 27, 2023)
Flint, MI: 343 (Old record: 178, June 27, 2023)
Minneapolis, MN (39 monitors): 251 (Old record: 193, July 29, 2021)
Green Bay, WI (5 monitors): 372 (Old record: 179, June 29, 2023)
Grand Rapids, MI (4 monitors): 482 (Old record: 227, June 27, 2023)
Lansing, MI (2 monitors): 408 (Old record: 194, June 29, 2023)
Buffalo, NY (11 monitors): 206 (Old Record: 176, June 7, 2023)

Record 24-hr PM 2.5 air quality on July 17, 2026

Washington D.C. (21 monitors): 246 AQI at Ashburn, VA, and 234 at Springfield, VA (Old record: 222, June 8, 2023, at Franconia Park, VA)
Pittsburg, PA (25 monitors): 261 (Old record: 237, June 29, 2023)
Dover, DE (2 monitors): 223 (Old record: 207, June 8, 2023)
Columbus, OH (8 monitors): 272 (Old record: 210, June 28, 2023)

Because of the huge number of people affected, and since this is occurring at the same time as a severe humid heat wave, this extreme and widespread pollution event — which will be followed by many months of repeated wildfire smoke incursion into the U.S. — will undoubtedly cause hundreds and perhaps thousands of premature deaths. The only comparable wildfire smoke event affecting this portion of North America occurred in 2023; a 2025 study blamed that event for 33,000 premature deaths in the United States, 8,300 in Canada, and 23,000 in Europe. According to the EPA, a premature air pollution death is one that occurs on average 14 years before a person would have otherwise died.

The climate change connection to the wildfires

As the climate warms, fire danger increases, mostly because the atmosphere gets “thirstier” – more water vapor can evaporate into warmer air. This results in more water vapor evaporating from plants, which dries them out and creates an increased risk of large and intense fires that can generate huge smoke plumes. Most of the fires grew out of control under extreme heat conditions made up to five times more likely by climate change (Fig. 1). According to Climate Central, the heat that helped fuel these fires would have been “highly unlikely” to have occurred in a world without climate change.

Figure 1. Climate Shift Index for Monday, July 13, 2026, showing the factor increase in high temperatures because of human-caused climate change. (Image credit: Climate Central)

Five states recorded “Hazardous” air quality on Thursday

On Thursday, July 16, portions of Ontario and five states — Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio — experienced 24-hour levels of PM2.5 with an air quality index in the “Hazardous” (brown) range. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, these conditions necessitate health warnings of emergency conditions, with the entire population more likely to be affected. Purple “Very Unhealthy” air was observed in three other states — New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana. This level of pollution triggers a health alert, and everyone – not just people with vulnerabilities – may experience more serious health effects.

Figure 2. Observed 24-hour air quality index (AQI) for PM2.5 pollution for Jul. 16, 2026. Fifty monitors in five states had “Hazardous” air, plus an additional nine monitors in Ontario. (Image credit: EPA)

According to air pollution scientist Ryan Stauffer, yesterday’s air pollution event blows away the previous most extreme wildfire smoke event in this region — in June 2023 — for extremity. During the 2023 event, only about three EPA monitors, all in Pennsylvania, recorded a 24-hour AQI in the hazardous range. But on Thursday, 50 official EPA monitors recorded a 24-hour AQI in the “Hazardous” range (Fig. 2), plus an additional nine monitors in Ontario. According to rankings at iqair.com, Detroit was the most polluted major city worldwide for most of Thursday, with Chicago bumping Detroit out on Thursday night. On Friday morning, the top five most polluted cities in the world were all in North America: Detroit, Chicago, Washington D.C., Toronto, and New York City.

On an hourly scale, some truly extreme AQI readings above 1,000 were recorded Thursday in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. The “Hazardous” (brown) range is for an AQI in above 300, so these readings were more than three times beyond the “Hazardous” threshold. The most extreme readings occurred in northern Minnesota downwind of the fires burning in the Boundary Waters park, where an AQI of 3,567 was measured by a purpleair.com sensor.

How the trouble started: record heat and a record-strong high-pressure system

The wildfire event began on Monday, when the strongest upper-level ridge of high pressure ever observed in the north-central U.S. baked the region. All-time record heat exceeding 100 degrees Fahrenheit (37.8°C) was observed, worsening existing moderate to severe drought conditions. Thunder Bay, Ontario, on the north shore of frigid Lake Superior, hit 39.5 degrees Celsius (103.1°F), smashing its all-time heat record by over 2°C. To the north, Armstrong hit 40.7°C (105.3°F), the hottest temperature observed in all of Ontario since the great Dust Bowl heat wave of July 1936.

Strong winds moved in with the heat, fanning multiple wildfires that feasted on the dry fuels, which featured plenty of dead trees from a spruce budworm infestation and a 1999 derecho event that felled thousands of trees. Extreme fires with a rapid rate of spread resulted and created at least two massive pyrocumulus clouds — giant thunderstorms spawned by the heat of intense fires that reached the stratosphere. Tomer Burg has an excellent thread explaining the meteorology that led up to the wildfire event:

How to interpret PM 2.5 readings at airnow.gov and purpleair.com

You can access EPA’s real-time PM2.5 NowCast AQI numbers at https://www.airnow.gov (note that you can’t just type in “airnow.gov” to get to the website, since they haven’t configured it to allow that). The AQI numbers are updated once per hour (shortly after the top of the hour). Because the EPA standard is based on a 24-hour average, the raw hourly data is not reported. Instead, EPA’s NowCast AQI numbers are computed using a 12-hour weighted average from the past 12 hours of data.

When air quality is highly variable (e.g., during a wildfire or a sudden wind shift), the algorithm heavily weights the past 1-3 hours. Otherwise, the past 12 hours are weighted nearly equally, and the AQI number is a 12-hour average. At the end of a day, the official daily AQI is calculated using a true arithmetic 24-hour average.

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In contrast, the AQI numbers at purpleair.com update every few seconds, so you get a much better idea of rapid changes in air quality. Clicking on a dot will bring up a graph of the past few days of data; the default averaging time for this graph is 10 minutes, but you can change this to a longer time span. Important: you need to choose “US EPA” in the “Apply Conversion” setting, or else the PM 2.5 readings will be too high.

The current situation: over 20 large fires out of control

As of Friday, there were 193 active fires covering 1.7 million acres (673,000 ha) in Ontario, with the vast majority of these considered to be “out of control,” according to the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre. Of the 22 large fires in over 2,000 acres burning nearest the U.S. border, 18 were receiving a full fire-fighting response, and four were not being fought. In the U.S., the National Interagency Fire Center reported six large fires in northern Minnesota, all 0% contained, covering 60,000 acres.

Figure 3. Monthly fire assessment for North America for July 2026 (left) and August 2026 (right). Red shading indicates areas where conditions would favor increased fire activity. Green shading indicates areas where conditions would favor decreased fire activity. (image credit: National Interagency Fire Center).

The forecast: relief coming by Saturday for the worst-affected states

Thunderstorms moved over the Minnesota/Ontario fire area Friday morning, bringing up to two inches of rain. This water will help firefighting efforts, but the fire danger index in Ontario is still high to very high, and the thunderstorms may have sparked additional fires.

The cold front accompanying this storm will bring westerly winds that should flush the worst of the smoke out of Chicago and Wisconsin by Friday afternoon, and out of Michigan by early Saturday morning. However, a renewed invasion of smoke is predicted for Michigan and Wisconsin Saturday night into Sunday, bringing more “Hazardous” AQI conditions. Another pulse of smoke is predicted to move deep into the central U.S. on Wednesday, perhaps reaching Arkansas and Missouri.

We can anticipate that some of the major smoke-emitting fires in Minnesota/Ontario will continue to burn for an extended period, with some lasting until the first snows come in October. The long-range fire assessment (Fig. 3) calls for above-average fire risk over much of the forested areas of northern Canada and the western U.S. this summer, and we should anticipate frequent bouts of poor air quality from wildfire smoke across much of North America. July and August are usually the peak months of fire season, which typically extends well into September. A potent North American Monsoon is now bringing heavy rains to parts of the southwest U.S., so the overall fire risk in that region may decrease to average levels by August.

Many lightning-caused fires occurred in the Pacific Northwest yesterday. With hot, windy weather expected to move in during the coming week, some of these fires may well become significant smoke producers.

Climate change predicted to further worsen wildfires

The number of people in the U.S. who experienced at least one day each year with smoke-related fine particle pollution levels at three times over the EPA standard has increased 27-fold over the last decade, and we can expect climate change to significantly worsen wildfire smoke problems in North America in the coming years.

For example, the frequency and magnitude of extreme wildfires around the globe have doubled in the past 21 years because of climate change, according to a study published last year in the journal Nature Ecology & Evolution. Rising temperatures have ushered in an era of hotter and drier weather, lending the right conditions for wildfires to erupt, the researchers found.

Here are some additional resources on climate change and wildfires:

• Explore how climate change has worsened wildfire smoke.
• Explore how fire weather has changed in your area on Climate Central’s interactive map.
• Visit their More U.S. Fire Weather analysis for science background and methodology.
• Explore our guide to staying safe from wildfires and smoke.

Andreas Sieber is head of political strategy at 350.org. Cat Abreu is director of the International Climate Politics Hub.

From the US abduction of Venezuela’s president at the start of this year to the Iran war which rumbles on, disruption is the new normal for global geopolitics, more often than not linked to conflict over supplies of oil and gas. 

Events so far in 2026 – driven largely by the desire of the Trump administration to grab control of fossil fuels around the world – show that the climate community’s approach to energy diplomacy will have to evolve if we are to operate effectively and push for climate action in such a volatile landscape. 

Today’s climate and energy governance must be able to cope with trade wars, genocide, fascism, spiralling inequality and challenges to multilateralism. The increasingly dominant paradigms of economic competitiveness, energy security and green industrialisation can help drive the transition but they also challenge our collective mission to deliver an equitable green shift. 

US-China rivalry dominates

Longer-term geopolitical trends that are seeing power move from West to East and North to South have fuelled a US–China “superpower rivalry”, which is pulling the global economy apart and reining in trade. 

A key question will be how the fracture “lines” are drawn: by the US and China, or also by other countries or blocs? Many governments will try to remain “in the middle” between the two giants to capture economic gains from both sides. Yet despite the language of “strategic autonomy”, Washington and Beijing may be in a position to force choices via market access, export controls and sanctions.

• Jun 24, 2026 News EU, UK lead push for electrification as “powerful weapon” against fossil fuels A group of dozens of countries seeks to build momentum for a COP31 pledge to electrify 35% of global energy use by 2035 as an alternative to fossil fuels Read more
• Jul 20, 2026 News Top maritime court rejects bid to halt UN deep-sea mining inquiry Two subsidiaries of The Metals Company sought to block the probe into potential contract breaches launched after the firm’s application for US-sponsored permits Read more

At first glance, this may not seem particularly relevant for climate and energy politics. But Huawei’s exclusion from 5G operations across the political West and India following the so-called Clean Network Campaign by the US government serves as a warning of what could happen to climate green tech. 

And the recent debate to cut out Chinese inverters from European markets follows the same pattern – US security forces perceive a risk and start encouraging their allies to drop Chinese technology.

The new drivers: competition and security

Despite this fracturing geopolitical and economic context, energy transition is still happening. To ensure it is effective and equitable, we need to understand what is driving it and how to adapt climate politics so that it better responds to these drivers.

Put simply, China is supplying the world with low-cost renewables (roughly 60% of critical wind and 80% of solar components), batteries, EVs and other key elements. Other countries now also want their piece of the green tech pie and are forming industrial policies to get it.

It is this new competitiveness-driven logic that will shape the quest for decarbonisation, which has shifted from cooperating around the cost of tackling climate change to rivalry for the benefits of climate action. 

Over 90% of new renewables projects are now cheaper than fossil alternatives. Gas-fired power is 3–4 times more expensive than solar and wind. In 2015, most decarbonisation policies were “traditional” emissions-cutting strategies like carbon pricing or net zero dates, whereas green industrial policies now underpin the majority.

Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister

Meanwhile, security has become a central driver of energy politics. We are living through the second major fossil fuel crisis in just four years. Elevated oil and gas prices will impose up to $1 trillion in additional costs on the global economy by the end of the year if disruption continues in the Strait of Hormuz. Fossil fuel supply chains have exposed countries to conflict, coercion and brutal price shocks.

Fossil fuel volatility destabilises whole economies – higher fuel costs drive up food prices, increase political instability, and push millions into poverty and hunger. This incentivises governments to shield themselves from global shocks, especially in countries that are net fossil fuel importers and home to roughly three-quarters of the world’s population. 

Yet security fears can cut both ways. The same instability that makes fossil fuel dependence untenable is also sharpening concern over China’s dominance of critical clean technologies and supply chains.

Equity, cooperation and the opportunity for change

Developing countries benefit from the rapid uptake of renewables enabled by low-cost Chinese technologies. But significant fiscal space and public investment is needed for the electricity grids and infrastructure required to fully unleash the energy transition, as well as for green industrialisation to diversify revenue streams.

Despite this, industrial-scale domestic production and ownership often remain out of reach for too many countries that lack the fiscal space to allow green supply chains to flourish and compete with their traditional industrial base. But more just and diversified green tech supply chains could be achieved with concomitant support.

Can giant batteries unlock Africa’s green industrial future?

For the first time in decades, the international order is being substantially reshaped. If within this context, decarbonisation is increasingly driven by green industrial policy, energy security and competitiveness, the climate policy community must better anticipate where these debates are moving. We must speak the same language, and enter the forums where decisions are made,  including security, trade and bilateral or trilateral spaces. 

We should build on an enlightened self interest recognising that cooperation remains essential and beneficial. This includes using the UN climate process differently: less as an ever-expanding negotiation machine, and more as a space for norm-setting, political alignment and deal-making. In an age of fragmentation, effective cooperation must not only be framed as necessary but thought of as a strategically compelling source of resilience and shared advantage. 

The post Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture appeared first on Climate Home News.

When the Strait of Hormuz first closed at the start of the 2026 Iran war, the world braced for the “largest energy crisis in history.” Before the conflict began, almost 20 percent of the world’s traded oil passed through the narrow waterway between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Iran’s blockade of the strait effectively erased 15 million barrels per day from circulation overnight. 

Many experts and commentators predicted that the supply gap would have catastrophic consequences. Australia expected fuel rationing, the European airline industry warned of mass flight cancellations, and Goldman Sachs predicted widespread oil shortages. The International Monetary Fund warned of a potential global recession, and some traders worried that oil prices could hit $200 a barrel.

But a little over four months into the war, little of that has come to pass. 

TimelineHow the oil market has handled the Iran warFebruary 28The United States and Israel launch a joint military operation against Iran.MarchIran retaliates and announces that it has closed the Strait of Hormuz. Benchmark oil prices rise above $100 a barrel.

The International Energy Agency announces a coordinated strategic reserve release of around 400 million barrels from more than 30 countries, including the United States.

Governments across Asia introduce energy-saving measures such as remote work mandates and restrictions on who can drive.AprilThe United States and other countries increase domestic crude production and exports, filling the gap created by the closure of the strait.MayBrent crude rises toward around $120 a barrel, its highest level on the year, as traders fear a prolonged supply disruption.JuneOn June 17, the United States and Iran sign a ceasefire agreement. Commercial shipping resumes through the Strait of Hormuz, and benchmark oil prices fall back to about $70 per barrel.JulyThe ceasefire breaks down. The U.S. announces a new blockade of Iranian oil and Iran announces new transit requirements for the Strait of Hormuz. Prices rise back to about $85 per barrel.

True, oil prices have gone up around the world, and there have been critical shortages of products such as cooking oil in some places, but rationing and recession have largely not arrived. Instead, a series of emergency measures have helped avoid the predicted crises: Oil exporters including the United States stepped in to fill the gap, either by drawing down strategic petroleum reserves or increasing production. Countries that were most reliant on fossil fuel imports from the Middle East took emergency conservation measures to reduce their demand. 

Here’s how the world has averted the worst of the oil shock so far, and what experts say might happen next if the conflict continues to drag on.

Finding alternative sources of oil

In the months since Hormuz cut off access to Iran’s main oil supply, the world has scraped every corner to find substitute barrels of crude oil. Many countries had stockpiles of oil saved up for an emergency, and in March, the International Energy Agency coordinated a historic release of oil from those reserves. That put on the market more than 400 million barrels, enough to fill about 20 days’ worth of the supply from Hormuz. 

A U.S. flag flies over Marathon Petroleum Corp’s Los Angeles Refinery, one of the largest oil refineries in North America in March 2026 in Carson, California.
David McNew / Getty Images

In addition, oil producers around the world ramped up production to take advantage of elevated prices. The United States, Venezuela, and Norway all pumped out more crude in the first half of the year than they had in previous months, with those additional barrels going to countries that had previously relied on shipments from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. South Korea, for instance, doubled its oil imports from the United States between February and April of this year. Iraq and Saudi also routed more than 6 million barrels of oil per day through land pipelines that were operating below capacity, skirting the strait altogether.

China, the world’s largest oil importer, also helped stabilize the world market. It stopped buying oil for its own strategic reserve after the war began, and it also stopped purchasing crude for its own domestic refineries, shutting them down for months. To generate electricity, it pivoted to coal and solar. These measures together freed up another 5 million barrels per day for the world market.

Using less oil

Even as the world scrambled to replace Middle East oil, the Asian countries that rely on it moved aggressively to slash their usage. Many nations idled their factories and industrial facilities that use petroleum-based liquids, which shaved off a few million more barrels a day. Some increased imports of electric vehicles or accelerated plans to adopt solar and wind technology to reduce their dependence on foreign oil and gas. But the vast majority of imported oil is used for transportation and power generation, so in order to weather the crisis, countries also needed to change consumer behavior.

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More than 100 countries enacted some form of conservation measure, ranging from limits on elevator usage to outright restrictions on when people could drive. The Philippines, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka all moved to a four-day work week, and Myanmar restricted gas vehicles to driving every other day based on the number of one’s license plate. Bangladesh limited air conditioning temperatures to 77 degrees Fahrenheit and closed public university buildings. This helped reduce demand on a power grid that runs on imported oil and liquefied natural gas, much of which also comes through Hormuz.

Some wealthier countries in Europe got even more ambitious: The Netherlands, for instance, allowed citizens to trade in gas cars for electric ones, and Sweden halved the cost of public transportation fares.

Consumers wait to fill gas cylinders at the Nepal Oil Corporation depot in Kathmandu, Nepal, in March. Across much of Asia, cooking gas is in sort supply due to the Iran conflict.
Subaas Shrestha / NurPhoto via Getty Images

These conservation measures likely prevented an out-of-control price spiral, giving importers time to procure more oil from other nations. They also likely saved Asian countries from needing to impose extended periods of rationing the way the United States had to do during the oil crisis of the 1970s, the largest previous disruption to the world’s oil supply.

“There have been multiple measures taken by governments both on the supply and demand side, but mainly on the demand side for large oil importers,” said Kevin Morrison, an analyst at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis who focuses on oil and gas in Australia. “This is a trend that is likely to continue as the uncertainty around future oil supplies remains uncertain.”

How long can these tactics last?

Even though the most dire early predictions haven’t borne out, the closure has not been easy. In the early days of the crisis, before countries procured substitute fuel, price spikes and supply disruptions in Asia altered millions of lives. Taxi drivers in Myanmar lost their livelihoods and funeral homes shut cremation services for lack of fuel. A lack of fertilizer during key rice planting times in Asia will likely hamper harvests later this year, contributing to higher food prices.

Aside from crude oil, the war has caused shortages of other goods like helium and sulfur, shipments of which also pass through the Strait of Hormuz. This has contributed to broader inflation for everything from nickel to semiconductors.

A natural gas delivery worker waits at a red light with tanks of gas strapped to their motorcycle in Bangkok, Thailand, in April The cost of living in Thailand is increasing as petroleum prices skyrocket amid the U.S.-Israel war on Iran.
Matt Hunt / Anadolu via Getty Images

The market shifts of the last few months have had consequences even in places like the United States that could afford a consistent supply of oil. Refiners around the world have produced more jet fuel to keep airlines supplied, but that means they have also produced less gasoline for cars. As the U.S. heads into the peak summer driving season, its gasoline inventories are as low as they have been in a decade. Supplies could drop even lower this fall as companies perform delayed maintenance on their hard-working refineries, said Bob McNally, the founder of the analysis group Rapidan Energy Group, who also advised the administration of President George W. Bush on oil policy.

It may soon get a lot worse. Even though global oil prices have fallen from their peak, there’s still a fundamental mismatch between oil demand and oil supply. As a result, experts say the world could still experience severe economic disruption later this year if the strait remains closed. Some vessel traffic resumed through the Strait of Hormuz last month following a tentative agreement between the United States and Iran, but the ceasefire has collapsed and Iran now says the strait is closed again. 

Read Next The war in Iran could plunge the world into hunger Ayurella Horn-Muller

“The market decided at the end of Round 1 to price for perfection” in an Iran deal, McNally said. “Instead, we’re getting Round 2. We played some tricks and some cards, but all these things … are either wearing off or already known.”

Those “tricks” have run their course. Most countries’ emergency stockpiles are close to depleted, and the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve has fallen so low that its structural integrity is starting to strain. At the same time, China has ended what McNally called its “crash diet” and has started to buy oil for its refineries again. 

This leaves the world without the buffer that it had during the first round of the crisis. 

“Hormuz 1.0 was about supply and inventory,” said McNally. “In Hormuz 2.0, prices will have to do more of the work. And they have to go really high, because the problem is demand is inelastic — you’ve got to eat.”

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This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Why the Iran war hasn’t caused a global oil crisis — yet on Jul 21, 2026.

Low-income Indian workers, many of them migrants from rural areas hit by climate change, are paying for worsening extreme heat through lost working days and health complications, with the cost equivalent to 2% of national GDP per year, new research shows.

The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), a London-based think-tank, worked with local organisations to survey around 540 households of informal workers in three Indian cities: Ajmer, Delhi and Agra. Most had migrated from rural areas to find work in industries such as construction, brick-making, garment manufacturing and food packaging.

The survey found them struggling through long working days with little access to shade, cooling, rest or water, as well as few toilets for women. And even when they go home, many live in makeshift shelters or airless cramped rooms with barely a single fan, bringing almost no respite.

Outdoor workers are losing about 24 days of work a year due to heat, costing them nearly a tenth of their annual earnings, while indoor workers sacrifice roughly 15 days. On top of losing income, they are also bearing the cost of health problems like heat exhaustion, psychological stress and kidney damage brought on by repeated dehydration.

If the survey’s findings are extrapolated to a national level, the IIED researchers estimate that the decline in productivity and effects of kidney disease combined add up to lost wages of $78 billion each year.

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Vishram Meena, 45, from Alwar in Rajasthan, has worked on construction sites in Ajmer for more than a decade, toiling for 10 to 12 hours a day carrying materials and mixing cement in the full sun.

In May 2024, on one of the hottest days, he collapsed after feeling dizzy and suffering a nosebleed. His wife and colleagues managed to get him to hospital where he was diagnosed with heat stroke. He has since returned to the same building work because the family needs the money.

“I went back because what else could I do? We are not machines. We are human beings. The heat is killing us slowly,” he was quoted as saying in a report on the survey’s findings.

“Victorian-era” conditions

Ritu Bharadwaj, IIED’s director of climate resilience, finance and loss and damage, described some of the stories from workers about their experiences of extreme heat as “genuinely horrifying”.

Kusum, a tailor at a garment manufacturing and export unit in Kapashera, Delhi, recounted how the machines for ironing finished garments are in the same tiny room where workers are making the clothes, with steam and hot air building up through her shift.

Fans are too far apart to move the air and nothing has changed in over a decade, she said, adding that “in summer, the unit feels like a furnace”.

“These are Victorian-era working conditions and they’re completely unacceptable in the 21st century,” said Bharadwaj. She called for stepped-up social protection from the government to pay people for days they are unable work due to heat, as well as micro-insurance schemes with payouts triggered by temperature measurements.   

This money would help families buy food and pay medical bills when their income dips if they fall ill or cannot work their usual hours due to soaring temperatures.

Climate change-driven heatwaves hit Delhi’s Red Fort market traders

The aim of the IIED study, Bharadwaj added, is to get policy-makers’ attention by showing the scale of damage extreme heat is doing to India’s GDP in an economy whose growth relies on service-led industries. “If the workers within them start falling sick, you know it’s the economic growth which is going to get impacted,” she told a webinar to present the research.

“Whether [policymakers] care about the workers or not, at least they would care about the GDP, and therefore then invest in the care that is needed for them,” she explained.

Labour code leaves out heat

However, Bharadwaj noted that a 2026 reform to India’s labour law bringing a range of regulations together in one code does not include heat-related protections for workers and only applies to businesses above a certain size. She urged the government to introduce a temperature threshold above which all workers would be able to stop their activities.

IIED and its partners have also carried out a similar study in Bangladesh which will be published later this month, showing that extreme heat is costing its workforce the equivalent of nearly 1.4% of GDP.

Shakirul Islam, chairperson of the Ovibashi Karmi Unnayan Program (OKUP) in Bangladesh, said the government had introduced stricter safety policies for garment-making companies after the Rana Plaza complex collapsed in 2013. But, he said, these rules are rarely followed by manufacturers, especially at the level of smaller subcontractors.

The workers’ welfare centres that do exist are open mainly during work hours so they are difficult to visit. Some companies also make saline water available for heat stress, which is no good for those with high blood pressure, he noted.

For Indian women workers, a just transition means surviving climate impacts with dignity

Archana Shukla Mukherjee, CEO of India’s Change Alliance, which also partnered with IIED on the survey, said it was time to hold both the government and businesses accountable for finding solutions to the intensifying problem of extreme heat’s effects on workers.

She said that employee state insurance schemes should identify heat stroke as an occupational disease while companies along the whole supply chain should start putting in place heat protection measures, including for informal workers and migrants.

If the tools and mechanisms available to help workers do not reach the most vulnerable and marginalised people, “then I think we are not doing something right,” she said.

The post Extreme heat costing India’s poorest workers 2% of GDP, survey finds appeared first on Climate Home News.