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Call for EOI | Consultancy on the AfCFTA Annex on Plant Variety Protection

AFSA - 4 hours 43 min ago

Consultancy to Conduct a Research Study on the Implications of the AfCFTA Annex on Plant Variety Protection for African Countries

The Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA), in collaboration with APBREBES, invites qualified and experienced consultants to submit expressions of interest to undertake a research study examining the legal and policy implications of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Annex on Plant Variety Protection (PVP) for African countries.

The AfCFTA Protocol on Intellectual Property Rights and its Annex on Plant Variety Protection seek to establish a harmonised framework for protecting new plant varieties across Africa. However, their implementation raises important questions concerning national and regional legal obligations, farmers’ rights, farmer-managed seed systems, traditional knowledge and agricultural biodiversity.

The proposed study will provide a rigorous, accessible and policy-oriented analysis of these implications and offer evidence-based recommendations to inform African governments, policymakers and civil society organisations.

Scope of the Assignment

The selected consultant will examine the AfCFTA legal and institutional framework, including the Intellectual Property Rights Protocol and PVP Annex, and assess their implications for national legislation, farmers’ rights, breeders’ rights, seed governance and agricultural biodiversity. The assignment will involve a comparative analysis of relevant regional and international legal frameworks, including UPOV 1991, the ARIPO Arusha Protocol, the OAPI Bangui Agreement and the African Union Model Law. The study will also assess implications for smallholder farmers and farmer-managed seed systems and develop practical policy recommendations for African governments.

Expected Deliverables and Duration

The assignment is expected to be completed within six to eight (6–8) weeks from the date of contract signature. The consultant will produce an inception report, a draft research study of approximately 20–30 pages, a presentation of preliminary findings to AFSA and APBREBES, and a final publication-ready report. The study will also serve as the basis for developing a concise two-page policy fact sheet.

Required Qualifications

Applicants should hold an advanced degree in law, intellectual property, agricultural policy, international trade or a related discipline, with demonstrated expertise in plant variety protection, intellectual property law, seed governance or farmers’ rights. Strong knowledge of African and international legal frameworks, experience in comparative legal research and excellent analytical and policy-writing skills are essential. Familiarity with agroecology, farmer-managed seed systems and African agricultural contexts will be an added advantage.

Application and Submission

Interested consultants should submit a technical proposal outlining their understanding of the assignment, proposed methodology, work plan and relevant experience, together with an updated CV, samples of comparable research and a separate financial proposal. Applications will be evaluated based on relevant qualifications and experience, methodological quality, understanding of the assignment, feasibility of the proposed work plan and value for money.

Applications must be submitted by 30 November 2026 to afsa@afsafrica.org, with the subject line “Proposal for implications of AfCFTA annex on PVP for African countries”.

For complete details on the assignment, qualifications, deliverables and submission requirements, please refer to the attached Terms of Reference (ToR).

EN: Recruitment of a consultant to conduct a study on the implications of the AfCFTA Annex on Plant Variety Protection for African countries

TOR: Recrutement d’un consultant chargé de mener une étude sur les implications de l’annexe de la ZLECAF relative à la protection des obtentions végétales pour les pays africains

 AFSA and APBREBES welcome applications from suitably qualified consultants who can contribute to informed, evidence-based policymaking on plant variety protection and farmers’ rights in Africa.

 

Categories: A3. Agroecology

Tribes push back as Congress moves to fast-track energy projects

Grist - 10 hours 18 min ago

After years of negotiation, Congress is on the cusp of passing a bipartisan “permitting reform” bill that would make it far easier to build power plants and electric transmission lines in the United States. The bill was negotiated by a bipartisan group of senators including Democrat Sheldon Whitehouse, a noted climate hawk, and Republican Mike Lee, an opponent of environmental regulation. It has picked up support from clean energy advocates because it would promote more transmission lines to carry renewable power to cities, speed up review for solar and wind projects, and stop presidents from cancelling offshore wind farms. It has also been endorsed by many conservative, business, and fossil fuel groups, who say it would cut down on environmental red tape and speed up natural gas pipelines.

The bill has divided the climate movement, separating groups focused on decarbonization from those focused on endangered species protection and environmental justice, but the most influential opposition has come from tribal nations. The bill would weaken a historic preservation law that tribes often use to protect cultural and religious sites from development, and numerous prominent Indigenous nations and organizations have said it harms tribal sovereignty.

While the bill cleared a procedural hurdle in the Senate last week, it remains unclear whether it will pass there or in the House. The negotiators who framed the bill say they believe they have the votes, but a number of Democrats in both chambers have opposed the bill. Hakeem Jeffries, the likely next Speaker of the House, has criticized what he called the bill’s “failure to adequately protect tribal sovereignty.” Nevada senator Catherine Cortez Masto, who voted to advance the bill, has said she won’t ultimately vote to pass it, saying she “cannot ignore the concerns” of tribes in her state.

“Projects affecting tribal governments before were already fast-tracked, but now this allows for a super fast track,” said John Bathke, a member of the Navajo Nation, a former historic preservation officer for the Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation, and now a professor of Indigenous studies at San Diego City College.

The 1966 National Historic Preservation Act, passed in the wake of nationwide urban renewal efforts that demolished many old buildings, requires the federal government to consider the effect of construction projects on historic and cultural properties. (Most intact objects or properties that are more than 50 years old and have some kind of historical, cultural, or religious significance qualify under the law.) When you’re building a solar farm or a transmission line, that is a big undertaking: The area of review can extend for as much as 5 miles away from the project itself, and major transmission lines can be hundreds of miles long. Even if a project is visible a few miles away when you’re standing in a historic area, that still counts as a potential effect.

While tribal nations have control over infrastructure projects on their reservations, many tribes have cultural, religious, and political claims over areas that are outside their reservation boundaries. The historic preservation law is one of the only tools they have to stop or alter construction projects that might desecrate sacred territories or religious sites. 

“Even though a lot of these projects aren’t on reservation land, it’s part of their traditional homeland, it’s part of their spiritual landscape,” said Bathke. “That land still belongs to them and they belong to that land.”

Tribal nations have used this law to limit energy projects that they say would harm their sacred territories. In perhaps the best-known example, the Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation sued the federal government in 2010 over its approval of a 6,000-acre solar farm on federal land in California, one of the first such projects in the United States. The tribe argued that the project would destroy religious sites and buried remains and that the government had rubber-stamped it after just a few meetings. A court sided with the tribe and the solar developer nixed the project, moving to build on private farmland instead. (Bathke was the tribe’s historic preservation officer — the tribal official who helps with historic reviews — during the solar dispute.)

Supporters of clean energy development have long sought to reform the law. They argue that historic preservation review has become a far more sweeping and burdensome process than the authors of the law intended, and that clean energy projects are affected more than any other type of construction. The onus is heaviest for transmission lines — in some cases, the area under review can extend to hundreds of square miles, and entire rivers or valleys can be considered historic sites. Since transmission wires can be seen from miles away, it’s hard to eliminate all visual impacts associated with building them. 

“As written, [the historic preservation law] is a modest procedural check on hasty decisionmaking. … In practice, it has grown into a substantive burden on building infrastructure of all kinds,” write Ben Schifman and Aiden Mackenzie, two research analysts at the Institute for Progress, in a report on how the law affects energy development. The Institute for Progress has been a leading advocate for reforming the law and for the bipartisan permitting bill. 

To illustrate their argument, Schifman and Mackenzie cite the example of SunZia, an $11 billion transmission line that carries wind energy west from New Mexico to California. The project took two decades to complete. The line had to secure permits from multiple state power regulators, but it also had to undergo a historic review process that covered an area twice the size of Delaware. Among many other things, the government had to consider whether being able to see the transmission line in the distance would harm the historic characteristics of thousands of different sites across multiple states. 

While the government undertook this review, a coalition of tribes in the area protested the process. One of their main arguments centered on the San Pedro River Valley, a landform in Arizona that is sacred to the Apache, O’odham, Hopi, and Zuni peoples. The tribes wanted the government to declare the entire valley a historic zone, which could have required SunZia to reroute its wires. The government declined to give the valley that designation, arguing that the tribes had not identified the issue early enough in the review process. The Tohono O’odham and the San Carlos Apache tribes along with a group of environmental nonprofits then sued to stop the line. They failed to halt construction before the wires joined the grid, but the case is still ongoing, and a court could still force the developer to alter the project if the tribes win. 

Senators Martin Heinrich of New Mexico and Mike Lee of Utah listen during a hearing on reforming the National Historic Preservation Act. The two senators are part of a bipartisan group behind the permitting reform bill moving through Congress. Photo by Alex Wong / Getty Images

The initial version of the permitting bill limited the scope of the historic review process in several ways in an apparent attempt to avoid future SunZias. It made consultation with tribes effectively optional, allowing the federal government to move ahead with projects in cases where a tribe’s designated historic preservation official took too long to identify important sites. It outlined a definition for “traditional religious or cultural importance,” which had previously been open-ended under federal law. It narrowed the definition of a “visual” impact, requiring that such impacts “direct[ly]” and “significantly diminish” the historic value of a place; this standard is subjective, but it would likely exclude things like being able to see a wind turbine on the horizon. It also prohibited judges from halting construction work on projects if they find a flaw in a historic preservation analysis, as happened in the Quechan Tribe wind farm case; instead, judges could only order the federal government to redo its analysis as construction continued. 

These provisions provoked an immediate outcry from several tribal nations and Indigenous groups, who said it would threaten tribal sovereignty. A coalition of several major tribal groups, including the National Congress of American Indians, said that the bill was in “deep conflict with federal trust and treaty obligations” and that Senate negotiators were “proposing to facilitate the demolition of our heritage.”

Some lawmakers who support the bill expressed regret about their failure to incorporate Native interests.

 “We didn’t bring the tribes along on this … we could have done better on it in retrospect,” said Republican senator Alan Armstrong, who represents Oklahoma, in an interview with Punchbowl News.

Negotiators amended the bill earlier this month to address these concerns. The bill now makes tribal consultation mandatory throughout the historic review process, which isn’t the case under current law. It also prevents the government from taking over the historic review process when tribal officials are slow to respond. These changes are significant given that the Trump administration is already trying to weaken the historic review process through executive action. The administration’s rulemaking could limit the historic review process even if the permitting bill doesn’t pass. 

The tribes and tribal organizations that opposed the first version of the bill say these changes are nowhere near enough. Their primary areas of concern, including the limited definition of visual effects and the ban on injunctions, are still in the new version.

“While this amendment addresses select concerns, the authors ask Indian Country to be grateful Washington chose to take away fewer of our rights in the name of ‘progress,’” said Ira Matt, the head of the the National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers and a member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes. He also said the bill erodes “protections we have spent decades fighting to secure” and that those supporting it had demonstrated a “fundamental failure to understand and respect Tribal sovereignty.” 

The Kayenta Solar Plant in the Navajo Nation is the first tribally-built and owned solar facility in the United States. Tribes that support the permitting bill say it would help attract investment for energy projects on tribal lands. Jim West / UCG / Universal Images Group via Getty Images

It’s unlikely that lawmakers will strip the historic preservation section altogether. Many of the most suitable areas for clean energy development are on federal land in the west. In order to build enough clean energy to replace fossil fuels, developers will likely have to build projects that pass near tribal cultural sites. In that light, the bill’s historic preservation reform represents the biggest win for clean energy companies since the passage of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which subsidized wind and solar construction and has since been largely repealed. 

Some tribal nations believe they themselves will benefit from the bill’s effort to speed up energy permitting. A few tribes have endorsed the bill, most of them tribes that have significant coal and oil resources. The Apsáalooke (Crow) tribe, whose reservation covers 2 million acres in Montana, told Senate negotiators last month that the bill could deliver “a predictable regulatory environment” and greater investment certainty” for “energy-producing tribes.” The tribe has significant coal reserves and has historically been a large coal producer, but its production has declined in recent years. The National Tribal Energy Association, which represents a number of fossil-fuel producing tribes, has also endorsed the bill. 

The bill will also strengthen the investment case for solar and wind on tribal lands, said Anthony Walters, a member of the Cherokee Nation and the vice president for government relations at the Alliance for Tribal Clean Energy, which helps tribes develop renewable energy. Walters says the main constraint that many tribes face is getting access to capital, and speedy environmental reviews and more transmission lines would make it easier for tribes to attract the money they need. 

Even so, he said the economic benefits of that development could never outweigh the potential destruction of sites that tribes hold sacred.

“The bill would help clean energy development projects across the board, so tribes would see the benefit of that,” he said. “But on the whole, right, we can’t do that at the expense of all the processes that tribes use to protect their interests. It’s a big trade-off.”

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This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Tribes push back as Congress moves to fast-track energy projects on Nov 17, 2026.

Categories: H. Green News

Nitrates in drinking water are a ‘public health crisis,’ environmentalists warn

Grist - 10 hours 48 min ago

When the federal government set its limit on how much nitrate drinking water can safely contain, the primary concern was blue baby syndrome, a condition that deprives infants of oxygen. In the 51 years since then, research has associated exposure to the contaminant with cancer and other health problems, fueling calls for a stricter standard.

On Monday, a coalition of national and local advocacy organizations including the Natural Resources Defense Council, Union of Concerned Scientists, Prairie Rivers Network, and 11 others filed a petition calling on the U.S Environmental Protection Agency to lower that threshold from 10 milligrams per liter to 1 mg/liter. In its petition, the coalition argued that “nitrates in drinking water are causing a public health crisis across the country.” 

“One in three Americans — nearly 120 million people in this country — are currently being served water with dangerous levels of nitrate in it,” said Tyler Lobdell, a senior staff attorney at Food & Water Watch. That figure includes people served water with nitrate concentrations above 1 mg/L — one-tenth of the current federal standard.

Nitrate pollution, much of it linked to fertilizer and manure runoff and leaching from agriculture, is a particular concern in farming regions, where contaminated groundwater can disproportionately impact rural, low-income, Latino, and farmworker communities. Studies have linked exposure with colorectal cancer, thyroid disease, and fetal abnormalities. A 2019 study estimated that up to 12,594 new cancer cases each year are attributable to nitrate in drinking water.

“This change would reflect the best available, peer- reviewed science and would bring substantial health benefits to communities across the country,” according to the petition. 

Climate change can exacerbate nitrate contamination as increasingly intense rainfall and flooding washes fertilizer and manure into waterways and groundwater. Drought can concentrate pollutants.

In a statement to Grist, the EPA wrote that it would review the petition but noted that it completed its review of drinking water regulations, including the nitrate standard, in July, 2024. 

“EPA conducted a robust evaluation of available studies and applicable data for nitrate to determine if any new information provided a basis to support a regulatory revision that would improve or strengthen public health protection,” the statement read. “Based on the agency’s review, EPA determined that the nitrate rule was not a candidate for revision at the time.”

As part of the petition, the organizations commissioned the consulting firm One Water Econ to analyze the costs and benefits of adopting the proposed standard, especially in states most affected by nitrate contamination. 

The 43-page report found that slashing the threshold isn’t cheap. The report estimates that adopting the 1mg/L benchmark would cost $94.5 billion over 50 years, which would cover everything from upgrading water treatment plants, maintenance, and replacing equipment. Despite the steep price tag, the analysis found that returns would significantly outweigh the investment, the benefits totaling $364 billion.  

“People are paying with their health right now,” Lobdell said. “Costs are accruing right now in the real world, in the form of people losing their loved ones and  children being born with abnormalities.”

The states with the largest impacted populations tend to cluster in the West and Midwest and account for 62 percent of the affected population, according to the analysis. Agricultural powerhouses like California, Texas, and Arizona topped that list, with traditional farming states like Iowa not far behind. 

In Iowa, approximately 42 percent of residents are exposed to nitrate levels above 1 mg/L, according to the analysis. This summer, Des Moines-area residents faced water restrictions for the second year in a row amid high nitrate levels. Illinois faces a similar problem. Between 2021 and 2023, more than 2 million people were served drinking water that tested above 1 mg/l, said Robert Hirschfeld, the director of water policy at Prairie Rivers Network. 

The current 10 mg/L threshold dates to 1975 and was formally adopted in 1991, based largely on the risk of blue baby syndrome. Advocates argue that the standard does not account for subsequent research associating nitrate exposure with other health problems.

The EPA has twice tried to reassess the nitrate benchmark as part of its required periodic review of national drinking water standards. The Obama administration began that process in 2016, but the Trump administration paused it in 2019. The Biden administration restarted it in 2023, before the second Trump administration cut the effort short by eliminating the office responsible for the reviews.

“We’ve done the EPA’s work for it,” Lobdell said.

The petition asks the EPA to take two immediate steps: Adopt an interim benchmark for nitrate while it considers the new limit, and enforce other federal protections like the Clean Water Act and rein in industrial agriculture, which Lobdell said has been given “free pass to pollute.”

For communities confronting nitrate contamination, the debate is ultimately about where regulators draw the line between what is legal and what is safe.

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Nitrates in drinking water are a ‘public health crisis,’ environmentalists warn on Nov 17, 2026.

Categories: H. Green News

Thomas Frank on How the Elites Used Creativity and Innovation to Con America

Green and Red Podcast - Mon, 11/16/2026 - 15:27
Politics and culture are used by the Ruling Class to subvert working class movements and secure consent from the masses along with state violence and economic dominance. These Gramscian methods…
Categories: B4. Radical Ecology

November Newsletter: Stopping BAAJA, ending immunity, breaking climate silence.

Stop the Money Pipeline - Mon, 11/16/2026 - 12:49

Following last week’s election results a new era of political possibility is upon us. But with climate tipping points fast approaching, Big Tech’s hard lurch to the right ongoing, and MAGA already regrouping, what happens from here could not be more critical. 

As the newly-empowered Democrats prepare for power, here are 3 things Stop the Money Pipeline will be focused on in this new political era.

1. Stopping the Dirty Data Center Deal: Before the new Congress is even seated, we need to stop the energy permitting legislation, known as the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, that is being fast-tracked through this lame duck Congress.  The precise causes of the election results are still being debated, but one thing is clear: this election was an absolute repudiation of Big Tech’s dystopian vision for our future.. 

In Georgia, Ohio, Michigan, Texas (where Governor-elect Hinojosa appeared in a campaign ad shooting Flock cameras), and elsewhere opposition to data centers, AI, and Big Tech, helped propel Democrats to power. Out of 40 data center ballot initiatives across the country, opponents of data centers won 39. 

The Dirty Data Center Deal needs to be stopped not only because it would lock in more gas-powered data centers, but because it would just be a terrible political move.

After this week’s election, Democrats should be siding with the supermajority of people opposed to data centers, not voting for a bill championed by Big Tech that will superfire data center construction even more.

2. Ending Immunity: Perhaps my favorite video released on election night was one from the Democratic Oversight Committee, celebrating Ranking Member Representative Robert Garcia’s two-word warning to the Trump Administration: Lawyer Up.

From Elon Musk eviscerating government agencies charged with regulating his companies to the Trump family making billions through tungsten mines in Kazakhstan and shadowy crypto schemes, the scale of corruption over the last two years has been truly unprecedented.  

And now that they have the gavel, Democrats need to not only ensure accountability for such corruption, but use the power of Congress to educate the American public about how Trump and Musk enriched themselves to the tune of billions over the last two years, as everyday Americans struggled to pay for groceries and gas. 

 3. Making Climate a Top Priority Again: Over the last two years, as Trump has spent billions fighting clean energy, the media, the corporate world, and even deep blue states, such as California and New York, have also rolled back climate commitments. In this, they have been significantly aided by centrists who’ve championed deprioritizing climate as a political issue.

Yet in 2026 alone, climate-driven heatwaves killed at least 50,000 Europeans and a single climate disaster in Nepal probably killed more than 6,000. As we approach climate tipping points, we absolutely need to make the climate crisis a top-tier priority political issue once again.

This shouldn’t be hard. Global heating is making everything from groceries to owning a home more expensive, and nearly two-thirds of voters support a transition to 100% renewables by 2050.

And at a time when Americans are sick and tired of corporate influence over politicians, Big Oil just donated $182 million in the midterms to elect their favored politicians.

Our job as we head into this new political era is clear: we must build a movement powerful enough to end immunity for billionaires and win transformational climate policy that also makes life more affordable for everyday people. But first, we need to stop the Dirty Data Center Deal. 

For ways to get plugged in right away, check out the news and updates from across the Stop the Money Pipeline Network below. 

In Solidarity
– Alec Connon, Stop the Money Pipeline, coalition director

 

News & Updates from the Coalition

– Stopping the Dirty Data Center Deal

If you haven’t yet urged Members of Congress to oppose BAAJA, (aka: the Dirty Data Center Deal), join nearly 6,000 STMP supporters and email your Member of Congress.

And once you have sent your email, use this tool to call them, too. Calls are more impactful than emails and this tool makes it so it should take you less than five minutes. (You can also check out whether your Senator has taken a position on BAAJA here. If they haven’t, or voted yes to advance it in yesterday’s initial vote, it’s critical that they hear from you.)

– Stop the Money Pipeline 2.0

After finishing up a coalition recommitment process, we’re excited to announce that there are 108 organizations that are now formally a part of the Stop the Money Pipeline Network. Our partners range from frontline environmental justice groups to global NGOs, but we all have one thing in common: a commitment to end the fossil fuel industry and defeat far-right authoritarianism.

We’ll get our website updated in the coming weeks, but for now you can view the full list of our Stop the Money Pipeline Network Partners here. 

To get involved with one of our local partners, check out our STMP Local Partner Map.  

 – Investigate Musk, Investigate DOGE

This month, we had a huge breakthrough in the Investigate DOGE campaign – and not only because of the election results. 

On October 23rd, The Washington Post published a bombshell piece announcing that Senator Blumenthal, the Ranking Member on the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, “intends to investigate Musk and DOGE.”

Not only that, but the Post credited our campaign with pushing the Democrats towards real accountability on Elon: “Activist group Investigate DOGE has channeled the spirit of the Tesla Takedown movement, which staged anti-Musk demonstrations outside Tesla showrooms, calling for Musk and DOGE alumni to face congressional scrutiny.”

Check out the piece here, and our video explainer here. 

 – Protecting our right to protest oil & gas pipelines

Sigh. In addition to BAAJA, there’s another piece of bad legislation in Congress that needs to be stopped: pipeline “safety” legislation currently being considered would expose people to 20 years in federal prison for participating in protests that slow down or temporarily halt the construction of an oil or gas pipeline.

The Water Protectors protecting their homelands at Standing Rock from the Dakota Access pipeline? If this bill passes, nonviolent activists engaging in these types of protests in the future would be subjected to serious felony charges.

Email Senator Cantwell―the Democrats lead negotiator on the final text of the bill―and urge her to protect our right to nonviolent protests. To learn more, check out our video explainer here. 

– Insurers are blowing the whistles

Last month, insurance insiders blew the whistle on how the insurance industry is responding to the climate crisis.

In a bombshell memo and a Guardian op-ed, senior leaders at major insurance companies revealed how the insurance industry is responding to the climate crisis: First, they’re raising prices, making insurance unaffordable for many, especially low-income and marginalized people. Second, they’re reducing what policies cover–we’ve already seen this in states like California, Louisiana, and Florida. And finally, they’re “simply withdrawing” from entire communities, leaving people without protection and forced to foot the entire bill after a disaster. 

Contact your State Insurance Commissioner to demand they regulate Big Insurance’s ability to pass the costs of the climate crisis onto the rest of us.

 – State-level solutions to the climate & insurance crisis

Last month, Big Oil tried to move its “legal immunity bill” through the House of Representatives. Thankfully, after thousands of you contacted your Members of Congress to demand they stop the bill, the legislation stalled before the House went out on recess.

But we need to be vigilant. We expect Big Oil’s puppets in Congress to try and move the legislation forward again in the lame duck session after the midterms. So if your Members of Congress haven’t heard from you on this yet, make sure they do. 

And on that note, it seems appropriate to close with the words of the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres when he addressed world leaders in New York last month: polluters must pay.

The next learning session is on Monday, Sept 14th at 1PT/4ET. RSVP here.

 – State-level solutions to the climate & insurance crisis

Unlike other financial institutions, major insurance companies are regulated at the state level. That means, if we can pass legislation in key states we can 1) stop insurance companies from passing the costs of climate change onto the rest of us; and 2) end the insurance industry’s bankrolling of new fossil fuel projects.

In 2027, we’ll be focused on passing legislation in three states to achieve this.

In Connecticut, we’re supporting the Insuring Connecticut’s Future campaign, campaigning to pass legislation that would force major insurance companies and Big Oil to pay their fair share for the state’s climate resiliency. If you’re in Connecticut, join the campaign welcome call on Thursday, December 3rd. 

In Oregon, we’re doing the same thing. If you’re in Oregon, you can plug in by joining the Insuring Oregon’s Future Launch Call on December 3rd.  

In New York, we’ll be doing everything we can to pass the Insure our Communities Act, the strongest anti-oil and gas insurance bill in the country. If you’re in New York, complete our community survey – we’d love to talk.

 – Aligning your money with your values #1: Insurance

Our partners at Green America have launched an updated version of their Climate-Smart Insurance Directory 

State Farm, Liberty Mutual, Allstate, Travelers, Chubb, and Geico/Berkshire Hathaway: these companies are investing in and insuring new fossil fuel projects even as they pass the costs of the climate crisis onto the rest of us.

Fortunately, there are better options. Find one of 180 climate-friendly insure companies here. If you have questions or have already made the switch, you can contact Cathy Becker at Green American: cbecker@greenamerica.org 

  – Aligning your money with your values #2: Investments

Our partner Third Act is hosting a training series on how you can align your money with your values. In recent months, they’ve covered banking and insurance.

Next up, they are sharing how you can ensure that your investment is supporting, and not undermining, the climate transition. Join the session on December 14th at 1PT/4ET. 

And to close out our newsletter this month, here, again, is the new Democratic Oversight Committee’s two-word warning to Trump and his corrupt cronies like Elon Musk.

The post November Newsletter: Stopping BAAJA, ending immunity, breaking climate silence. appeared first on Stop the Money Pipeline.

Categories: G1. Progressive Green

Legendary Skolt Sámi Teacher, Knowledge Holder Satu Moshnikoff Has Gone Home

Snowchange Cooperative - Mon, 11/16/2026 - 10:57
Satu in 2011

Satu Moshnikoff, Snowchange affiliate and a person of knowledge from the Skolt Sámi community of Sevettijärvi, has passed on.

Satu Moshnikoff (b. 1940) has passed on. Snowchange joins family and community in mourning. Counselor of Education, teacher, Elder, person of knowledge Satu was instrumental in the community life of Sevettijärvi from early on. Saturday worked from 1970s as teacher at the Sevetti school. Together with her husband, Elder Jouni Moshnikoff, they developed the Skolt Sámi linguistic basis of grammar, dictionaries, teaching materials and many other educational assets that led the Skolt Sámi language to be rescued and revitalized.

Satu participated in the salmon fishing and reindeer herding life as a member of the community. The Moshnikoffs spent substantial amount of their summers at Njauddam river, significant Atlantic Salmon river in Finland. Between 2009 and 2013 Satu worked with us to co-develop the river collaborative management plan, ensuring the participation and view of women as knowledge holders.

Snowchange and Satu as well as Jouni until his death in 2012 worked on an all-encompassing biocultural push for revitalization of Sámi ways of knowing, governance, nature protection, restoration and cultural re-awakenings. Monumental achievements of the past twenty years have included for example the Eastern Sámi Atlas, documentation of climate and extreme events in the community, salmon and other fish data, gendered ways of knowing, Skolt Sámi plant lore and use of traditional materials, sacred sites, food and reindeer culture and many other aspects of Skolt traditions.

For these and many more efforts Satu took a lead on led to international and domestic recognitions. Satu was chosen Skolt Sámi of the Year, Counselor of Education and other awards and recognitions reflected the numerous books, educational materials, linguistic and grammatical works that Satu and her family produced over the years. Central to all of the work was a guiding principle – through hard work the language, culture and therefore unique and priceless Skolt Sámi way of life will come back and revitalize.

We join in mourning and remember Satus and familys work and vision for decades to come.

Categories: E1. Indigenous

Media Advisory: SUWA to Announce Next Step in the Fight to Restore Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante – 11.16.26

Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance - Mon, 11/16/2026 - 08:11

November 16, 2026 – FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Media Advisory: SUWA to Announce Next Step in the Fight to Restore Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante – 11.16.26

Contacts:
Grant Stevens, Communications Director, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA); (319) 427-0260; grant@suwa.org

WHAT: The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) will publicly announce its next steps to restore Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments, which were cut by 90% in July. 

WHEN: Tuesday, November 17, 2026, 11:00 a.m. MT

WHERE: Utah State Capitol Rotunda, 350 N. State St., Salt Lake City

EVENING EVENT: Media are also welcome at SUWA’s public launch celebration that evening from 6 to 8 p.m. at Red Butte Garden’s Orangerie, 300 Wakara Way. Remarks are around 7 p.m., with interview opportunities with SUWA staff and supporters. 

Please RSVP to Grant Stevens (grant@suwa.org or 319-427-0260). 

###

The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) is a nonprofit organization with members and supporters from around the country dedicated to protecting America’s redrock wilderness. From offices in Moab, Salt Lake City, and Washington, DC, our team of professionals defends the redrock, organizes support for America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act, and stewards a world-renowned landscape. Learn more at www.suwa.org.

The post Media Advisory: SUWA to Announce Next Step in the Fight to Restore Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante – 11.16.26 appeared first on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.

Categories: G2. Local Greens

Draft cover decision silent on key climate finance issues

Demand Climate Justice - Mon, 11/16/2026 - 08:02

For Immediate Release

16 November, 2026

Reacting to today’s draft cover text, Rachitaa Gupta, Global Coordinator, Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice, said:

“The draft cover decision skirts around the issue of climate finance without holding developed countries accountable for their obligations. The devastating floods in Nepal have shown us that Global South countries urgently need climate finance for adaptation and loss and damage. Yet Global North countries are still using every means and process possible inside COP31 to block progress on climate finance provision to the Global South. 

On the Climate Finance Work Programme, developed countries said today they need a “no text option” and want a procedural closure, which is totally unacceptable. The cover text only “recalls” the CFWP but stays shamefully silent on its operationalisation. 

At the same time, the draft cover text focuses mostly on adaptation finance for the Small Island Developing States and Least Developed Countries, without acknowledging the needs of the rest of the developing countries and the Global South, condemning millions if not billions of peoples in the Global South to more devastating impacts of the climate crisis induced disasters.”

For Media Enquiries and Interview Requests:

DCJ Comms Team at COP31

Juliah Kibochi & Sidharth Pandey

sidharth.dcj@gmail.com
juliah.dcj@gmail.com
dcj.comms@demandclimatejustice.org

Website: https://demandclimatejustice.org

The post Draft cover decision silent on key climate finance issues appeared first on Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice.

Categories: G1. Progressive Green

New Rules, Old Questions: What the UN’s Latest Carbon Market Decisions Mean for Forests and Communities

Global Forest Coalition - Mon, 11/16/2026 - 03:46
New standards for cookstove carbon credits promise greater environmental integrity. But can better accounting rules address the deeper problems of carbon markets?

By: Sophia Arias, Rahi Kumbar, Bob Yang, undergraduate students at the University of Southern California with the Gibson Climate Justice Lab

Can carbon credits for improved cookstoves in Myanmar really protect forests and combat global climate change? 

The United Nations’ new carbon market is betting that it can. But a growing number of civil society organizations are questioning whether the promises behind these credits can be trusted. 

On October 9, the UN’s Article 6.4 Supervisory Body concluded its twenty-third meeting (SBM023) by approving two new methodologies for generating carbon credits from cleaner, more efficient household cookstoves. These credits are marketed, in part, on the claim that cleaner stoves reduce the wood harvested for cooking fuel. 

That same week, over 130 civil society groups were still waiting for an answer to their call to suspend credits under the new mechanism, which faces serious concerns over human rights and carbon accounting.   

Against this backdrop, student researchers with the Gibson Climate Justice Lab (GCJLab) at the University of Southern California ask how SBM023 addressed, or failed to address, the problems civil society organizations have repeatedly identified.  

Can improved cookstoves really protect forests?

The promise behind cookstove projects sounds straightforward: households use less firewood, fewer trees are harvested, and fewer greenhouse gases enter the atmosphere.

But the relationship between cooking fuel and forest protection is considerably more complicated. 

Fuelwood may come from multiple sources, including deadwood, agricultural residues, managed woodlots, or natural forests. Reducing household wood consumption does not automatically translate into an equivalent reduction in deforestation, yet carbon-crediting methodologies depend on assumptions about how much fuelwood would otherwise have been harvested and whether that biomass would have regenerated. 

There are also questions about how emissions reductions are measured. Distributing an improved cookstove does not guarantee that households will use it consistently or abandon traditional cooking practices. Overestimating these changes can generate credits for emissions reductions that were never realized. 

Beyond the accounting concerns, these projects risk overlooking the traditional knowledge, livelihoods and customary forest management practices of Indigenous and local communities, and despite the UNFCCC’s claims that cleaner cookstoves “empower women,” they rely almost entirely on the unpaid labor of women who have very little say in project design and implementation, and receive no share of the financial benefits.

The issue is not whether households should have access to cleaner cooking technologies. They should. The question is whether changes in their cooking practices can then be used to justify continued emissions elsewhere. 

New rules, old problems: What changed at SBM023?

Clean cooking methodologies were at the heart of SBM023’s agenda. With numerous projects being grandfathered into the new systems, transitioning them to comply with new standards was the main priority. 

At SBM023, the Body approved two new methodologies for generating carbon credits from household cooking activities, which will replace existing CDM methodologies. The first, Cooking Energy Transitions, covers shifts toward lower-emission household cooking technologies and fuels. The second, Energy Efficiency Measures in Household Cooking, addresses improvements in cooking efficiency, including technologies that reduce the amount of biomass needed to prepare food. While the UNFCCC has yet to officially implement either methodology, they found that focusing on improvements in cooking efficiency would result in greater reversal buffer deductions from credits compared to historical baselines.

Compared with the Myanmar project’s AMS-II.G calculations (which used a 10% baseline improvement in efficiency and existing monitoring rules for continued traditional stove use), A6.4-AMM-005 overhauls several core variables. It introduces a performance-based baseline benchmark, requires household fuel measurements covering all cooking devices in use, and mandates reversal-buffer contributions that are immediately cancelled. At the same time, it raises the fuelwood CO2 emission factor from 63.7 to 112tCO2/TJ and incorporates non-CO2 emissions into the calculation. Because these methodological changes pull in opposite directions, determining how the Myanmar project’s credit volume would change under A6.4-AMM-005 is not possible without a full recalculation using household-level measurement data and a project-specific reversal-risk assessment.

Neither is entirely new, as they both build on earlier carbon-crediting approaches under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, the carbon trading predecessor to the Paris Agreement.

The Body also adopted new sampling and survey requirements intended to improve the reliability of emissions calculations. These changes matter, because carbon markets have often faced criticism for issuing credits that exaggerate emissions reductions. 

However, several decisions illustrate the limits of these technical reforms. 

For example, the Supervisory Body granted the household efficiency methodology an exemption from a downward adjustment to credited emissions reductions in the second and subsequent calendar years. It also requested further work on how uncertainty should be treated when project developers use alternative or measured data. 

Taken together the range of uncertainties coming from these decisions pose a risk of overcrediting and detrimental harm to the climate.

A woman using an improved cookstove in Myanmar. Soneva Foundation/Flickr

What happens when promised benefits do not last?

SBM023 also addressed another important issue: reversal risk.

In carbon markets, a reversal usually occurs when a previously credited climate benefit is subsequently lost. For example, carbon sequestered in a forest can be released when trees die, burn, or are cut down.

But cookstove projects raise a different question.

Unlike forest-based offsets which draw down and store carbon from the atmosphere, improved cookstoves generally claim to avoid emissions altogether by reducing fuel consumption. If households stop using the improved cookstoves, future emissions savings (which have already been modeled out) may disappear.  

Rules designed to protect stored carbon, such as those for forest carbon removal projects, may not then be appropriate for every type of emissions-reduction or avoidance project. 

At SBM023, the Supervisory Body adopted a new risk-reversal tool and requested that its expert panel continue monitoring evidence that could justify revising the risk factors applied to activities reducing non-renewable biomass consumption.

It also acknowledged unresolved accounting problems associated with the carbon market’s buffer pool. Buffer pools function by reserving a set amount of carbon credits from each project that are not sold. These credits serve as a ‘buffer’ if other credits in the project face reversal risks or fail to meet efficiency standards. Rather than resolving these problems though, the Body requested further analysis of alternative approaches and their implications for national climate accounting.

For cookstove credits, the practical test is whether credible emissions estimates are backed by arrangements capable of addressing reversals. The effectiveness of these rules will depend on how both requirements are met in practice. These questions about technical credibility also raise the issue of whose evidence informs the rules.

Myanmar exposes the limits of technical reform

The controversy surrounding Myanmar’s cookstove project makes these concerns especially urgent. 

In October, more than 130 civil society groups called for the suspension of all carbon credits from the project, citing concerns about the credits’ integrity and their connections to institutions operating under Myanmar’s military junta. 

Since the military seized power in February 2021, Myanmar has experienced widespread violence, repression, and serious human rights violations.

This context prompts serious questions about the involvement of state institutions controlled by the junta in the cookstove project, alongside questions about whether meaningful oversight, verification, and community participation – all required under Art. 6.4 mechanisms – are even possible under these conditions. 

In addition to being under junta control, carbon credit generation in Myanmar is being administered by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) rather than a non-nationally affiliated body.  With clean cookstoves serving as aid for underprivileged communities in Myanmar, many civil society groups question whether their MONREC can be trusted to evenly distribute cookstoves through the Dry Zone Greening Department (DZGD) and other regional departments while MONREC is under the illegal control of the junta. 

These are not issues that can be solved simply by improving emissions calculations. A carbon crediting project can satisfy technical requirements while still violating environmental, social and cultural norms and rules. 

Although the Supervisory Body formally addressed some stakeholder inputs at SBM023, they did not address this appeal directly and ultimately chose not to revoke any credits from the cookstove project. Rather, they revised risk reversal assessments to account for “human-induced reversal risk.”

As a result of this controversy, there was some reluctance among the Supervisory Body to even account for so much reversal risk at all, since it can decrease the worth of clean cooking credits by as much as 60%.

Furthermore, an interesting trend throughout SBM023 was the brevity of stakeholder consideration. As a whole, stakeholder input was initially presented but not followed up on later in negotiations. Outside input on cookstoves and forest protection was incorporated during Monday’s discussion but day-by-day, stakeholder input was hardly discussed past the Secretariat’s opening. 

Final Thoughts

SBM023 repeated a familiar failure of international negotiations: stakeholder input was treated as an afterthought. Time pressure, claims of irrelevance and members’ personal opinions crowded out serious engagement with what stakeholders had submitted. Forest-dependent and cookstove-using communities are among those most exposed to climate impacts, yet their views were not at the center of the decisions that affect them. The perspectives that carried the room were mostly those of credit-purchasing countries, not of the communities that generate the credits.

The way input was handled made this worse. The secretariat presented stakeholder statements without verifying them, attributing them or providing supporting evidence, so the Body had little basis to weigh them fairly. For example, Olga Gassan-Zade, the Chair of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body, noted that in response to the Methodological Expert Panel’s (MEP) request for views on credit non-permanence, eleven statements were presented, six in support and five opposed , yet each represented anywhere from ten to 100 people. Presenting them as equal in weight further obscures forest-dwelling communities and civil society in global debate.

The substantive outcomes follow the same pattern. The Body tightened sampling rules and added reversal-risk safeguards, but then weakened those safeguards with exemptions and postponed hard questions on uncertainty and buffer pools. Its refusal to suspend the junta-linked Myanmar cookstove project shows that technical compliance cannot substitute for human rights and political legitimacy. No amount of methodological fine-tuning can fix a market still designed around the priorities of credit buyers rather than the realities of forest-dependent communities.

Categories: G1. Progressive Green

Carbon dioxide is a climate problem. It might also be a laundry solution.

Grist - Mon, 11/16/2026 - 01:45

Doing the laundry has grown easier and more efficient over the years, yet two things have always remained the same: A washing machine needs water, and a dryer needs heat. Technology designed to clean aerospace parts reimagines the process by ditching both of those in favor of an unlikely substitute: carbon dioxide, the very gas we’re trying so hard to contain.

Under pressure, CO2 becomes a low-viscosity liquid capable of penetrating fabrics and carrying away oils and grime. When depressurized, it reverts to a gas, leaving clothes clean and dry. No wastewater. No dryer.

Beyond its novelty, the idea could clean up a resource-intensive chore. The average family runs roughly 300 loads a year, consuming thousands of gallons of water. And more than 80 percent of U.S. households own a dryer, with one study putting the annual CO2 emissions from machine drying alone at 27 million metric tons.

Long confined to industrial operations, liquid-CO2 cleaning is getting a second look from appliance giants LG and Samsung — this time for the home. Still, shrinking a technology built around bulky, high-pressure machinery to fit both a laundry room and household budget is a tall order. No less challenging is doing so without washing away the environmental gains that make waterless, dryerless laundry so enticing in the first place.

Just getting this far has taken decades. Hughes Aircraft developed the process in 1990 to remove grease and other contaminants from electronic components. Electrolux later pursued it as a safer alternative to solvent-based dry cleaning, though cost, complexity, and bulky equipment kept it from catching on.

In 2009, Colorado-based Tersus Solutions began refining the technology and has since carved out a niche cleaning outdoor apparel and equipment, as well as firefighter gear contaminated with hazardous residues. Its machines offer a glimpse of what CO2 cleaning can do and why squeezing it into a household appliance is no simple feat.

Tersus CEO Peter Whitcomb describes the machines as “futuristic front-loading washers,” though the company’s two models dwarf those found in a typical laundromat. Each occupies a roughly 10-foot cube, with the larger unit handling up to 85 pounds of laundry, or a dozen sleeping bags. Behind a thick, submarine-like hatch, a rotating drum sits inside a pressurized chamber amid a maze of pipes, pumps, and compressors.

Despite the complexity, what happens inside is relatively simple. Carbon dioxide turns from gas to liquid at 900 pounds per square inch of pressure — roughly one-third of what’s inside a full scuba tank. As it circulates, filters trap the grime, which accumulates as a thick purplish sludge for disposal. When the 45-minute cycle ends, the pressure drops and liquid returns to gas, instantly drying the load. More than 90 percent of the CO2 is recaptured for the next run; the rest escapes in a smoky wisp.

The process is particularly effective on firefighter gear, with tests showing an average of more than 95 percent removal of contaminants such as PAHs, potentially harmful compounds found in smoke and soot. Water-soluble stains from sweat and food can be trickier, said Chris Robbins, Tersus’ chief technology officer, occasionally requiring pretreatment — “think Tide pen, but for CO2” — or conventional washing.

For most loads, however, the process eliminates water and additives alike. “We’re not using detergent, we don’t use heat,” Whitcomb said. Tersus estimates its larger machines save roughly 300 gallons of water per load compared with conventional washing. There is another potential upside, as well: By eliminating wastewater and trapping shed fibers for disposal, the process could further reduce microplastic contamination from laundry.

The energy equation, however, is more complicated. A California Energy Commission demonstration with the U.S. Navy found the method used about 15 percent less energy than smaller commercial washers and dryers, yet about as much as larger industrial combinations. Tersus has found comparable performance, said Robbins. While CO2 cleaning avoids thermal drying — typically the most energy-intensive part of conventional laundry — removing impurities from the carbon dioxide for reuse requires significant power. The company is exploring more efficient ways of heating and cooling the gas, Robbins said.

As for the CO2, Tersus gets it from a nearby ethanol plant, where it’s a byproduct of fermentation. That minimizes transportation needs, although purifying and liquefying it require additional energy — further complicating the calculation of the technology’s overall carbon footprint.

Tersus Solutions’ industrial CO2 washers use high pressure to turn carbon dioxide into a liquid that can clean fabrics without water. The machines’ bulky pressure chambers, pumps, pipes, and compressors illustrate the challenge appliance makers face in trying to shrink the technology for household use.
Courtesy Teresus Solutions

Then there’s the question of scale: Could all that machinery — enough to fill a small bedroom — be shrunk into a household appliance?

LG and Samsung are working on that. Recent patents from the companies, both of which declined to comment, tackle distinct challenges: removing stains resistant to CO2 cleaning and reducing the pressure required to make the tech work.

LG’s design uses detergents and other additives to help remove water-soluble stains. Although the patent doesn’t specify a formula, a recent study found that adding isopropyl alcohol and water improved liquid carbon dioxide’s ability to remove sugars, salts, and other compounds. Samsung, meanwhile, proposes combining CO2 with other solvents to bring operating pressures down to a fraction of those used in industrial machines. That could make home models more compact, though some of the mixtures include PFAS, raising questions about environmental trade-offs.

Smaller, however, doesn’t necessarily mean simpler. Separating and recovering those added solvents could require still more equipment, said Eckhard Groll, head of mechanical engineering at Purdue University and an expert in CO2 refrigeration. “There’s no question” that a home version is technically feasible, he said, “but it may be very costly, the technology.”

Even if the machines become affordable, the environmental benefits may not carry over, said Rainer Stamminger, a household appliance efficiency researcher at the University of Bonn. With households running just a few loads a week, pressurizing and recovering carbon dioxide could be “very inefficient just for one wash” compared to industrial machines that run continuously.

The economics may be especially challenging in the U.S., where electricity is relatively cheap. Groll pointed to heat pump dryers, which use about half the energy of conventional electric models. Popular in Europe, they made up 75 percent of new dryer sales in 2020, helped by higher electricity prices that helped ease the sticker shock; meanwhile, American sales still lag. CO2 washers could as well if their efficiency comes with a hefty upfront premium. 

Whitcomb sees greater opportunities in commercial dry cleaning, apartment buildings, and institutions, where higher volumes could justify the equipment costs — and keep the machines running often enough to take advantage of their scale. With a new facility in Calgary expanding its Colorado operations, Tersus now works with more than 40 brands and retailers, offering repairs, restoration, and resale services that “complement the cleaning” to extend garment life and keep products in circulation, Whitcomb said.

Even if engineers can make a home CO2 washer affordable and efficient, they would still have to convince people to buy one. The early market for water-efficient front-load washers offers a precedent: Energy and water savings attracted some consumers, while upfront costs deterred others. Performance and convenience mattered, too, said Gwendolyn Hustvedt, a textiles and consumer sciences professor at Texas State University who studied the trend.

The technology may have one big selling point, however: The clothes come out dry. Beyond saving time and hassle, skipping what Hustvedt called “cooking your clothes in a box” could help garments last longer by reducing shrinkage and wear from heat and tumbling. Whether consumers would pay a premium for those benefits is another question. 

Home CO2 washers still have a long way to go before they break up the familiar washer-dryer combo. But if engineers can make the physics work economically — and environmentally — at household scale, the next big thing in laundry might be one less appliance.

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This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Carbon dioxide is a climate problem. It might also be a laundry solution. on Nov 16, 2026.

Categories: H. Green News

Henri Deterding, Hitler and the Historical Press Record

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 15:10

A documented English-language source audit | 15 November 2026 AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION — RESEARCH DOSSIER By the Donovan–Shell Archive | Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT

EDITORIAL STATUS: Interim source audit, not a complete translation of the ZBW clipping collection. The original ZBW image viewer could not be inspected in this research session. The statements below are based on the independently accessible texts and reproductions specifically identified. Historical allegations are not converted into established facts.

Introduction

Sir Henri Deterding, the former head of Royal Dutch, has a well-documented history of intense anti-communism and increasing sympathy towards Nazi Germany. The critical historical question is not simply whether newspapers linked him to Adolf Hitler, but which alleged meetings, transactions and donations are supported by independent contemporary documentation. Press reports of private negotiations are evidence that claims circulated; they are not themselves proof that a negotiation occurred exactly as described.

The German National Library of Economics (ZBW) retains a dossier of press cuttings relating to Deterding. The Donovan–Shell Archive reproduced many scans in 2018, labelled DOC 1–72 with gaps, and published several preliminary English translations. Not all scans have readable text available in the web-accessible rendition. This audit avoids pretending that a complete translation has been completed.

Main finding: meetings between Deterding and Hitler

March 1933 — an audience request refused

The Shell-commissioned corporate history by historians Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden says that Deterding sought an audience with Hitler in March 1933 and was rebuffed. This is a specific claim about March; it does not settle whether Deterding met Hitler subsequently.

Source: A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1 (2007), pp. 477, 483, as reproduced at https://royaldutchshellgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ShellHistory36P.V1.May2015Comp.pdf

November 1933 — Deterding reportedly claimed a meeting

The same corporate history reports that Deterding said in November 1933 he had recently met Hitler. The historians characterize this as a claim rather than independent confirmation. The statement should therefore be attributed to Deterding until a corroborating meeting diary or official record is located.

Source: A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1, p. 477; source above

October 1934 — a newspaper alleges a four-day visit

The Daily Gleaner, 29 October 1934, reproduces a London-datelined account saying Deterding had recently visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden for four days to discuss a petroleum-distribution monopoly. It alleges disagreement over first-year oil credit, protected roadside distribution stations and reinvestment of frozen German funds. The report describes negotiations breaking down; it is attributed, not a verified transcript or proof of an agreement. The Donovan–Shell Archive also identifies reporting in the New York Times and Montreal Gazette. These could reflect a syndicated source rather than independent eyewitness corroboration.

Source: The Daily Gleaner report reproduced at https://royaldutchshellplc.com/1934/10/29/sir-henri-deterding-of-royal-dutch-shell-4-day-meeting-with-hitler/

Interpretation

The rejected March 1933 request and alleged October 1934 visit concern different dates, so neither automatically disproves the other. But a published 1934 story cannot, on its own, establish that Deterding met Hitler on the specified occasion or that any monopoly agreement existed. Access to the original diplomatic files, Hitler appointment records and the earliest version of the press dispatch would strengthen the finding.

Source: Comparison of sources above

The most significant newly verified German document

4 January 1937 — Nazi press instruction concerning Deterding

An edited collection of Nazi-era press directives reproduces an instruction dated 4 January 1937, archival identifier ZSg. 101/9/5/Nr. 4. It attributes to Hermann Göring a description of Deterding’s support as a generous foundation. The order states that Deterding had settled in Germany, married a German woman, and made ten million available for importing food because of his admiration for Hitler. It also reports gifts of a large Mecklenburg estate to the Reich Food Estate and a large workers’ settlement in Hamburg. Deterding allegedly did not want public thanks; newspapers were told not to publish further material on him unless the German News Bureau supplied it. These are the claims recorded in the regime’s internal press instruction; the instruction is strong evidence of how Nazi officials represented the assistance, but it is not independent proof of every asserted earlier gift. The currency of the “ten million” is not stated in this particular directive; contemporary reporting described ten million Dutch guilders.

Source: NS-Presseanweisungen der Vorkriegszeit, vol. 5/I (1998), edited by Karen Peter, document 8, printed p. 3. https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9783110964158_A31053539/preview-9783110964158_A31053539.pdf

English-language findings from accessible ZBW-related scans

DOC 5 — Frankfurter Zeitung, 27 January 1931

The archive’s existing English rendering describes rumours that Deterding was negotiating a gasoline monopoly in exchange for a $150 million loan. A German report called the claim implausible, while Deterding described his visit as almost entirely private and denied financial negotiations. This clipping is evidence of early rumours and explicit denials, not evidence that such a loan was agreed.

Source: 2018 annotated ZBW scan collection: https://royaldutchshellplc.com/2018/08/01/1930s-german-newspaper-clippings-about-sir-henri-deterding/

DOC 9 — Berliner Tageblatt, 19 September 1934

The archive identifies the headline and subject as Deterding’s claims concerning Soviet-expropriated oilfields. A full English translation of the scanned body is not available in the accessible page text and has not been created here. Its significance lies in the documented continuing prominence of the Soviet oil-property dispute.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

DOC 10 — report of Deterding travelling to Berlin

An existing short translation cites an Agence Économique et Financière report about Deterding travelling to Berlin. A Dutch newspaper reportedly sought confirmation at The Hague and was told that the alleged trip was not known. No meeting with Hitler is established by the available extract. The underlying article date and precise newspaper citation remain to be checked on the scan.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

DOC 15 — Berliner Tageblatt, 30 June 1936

The existing translation reports rumours that Deterding would retire and settle in the Netherlands and that Shell representatives disputed the retirement account. It does not report a Hitler meeting. The wording in the 2018 rendering is imperfect and should be checked against the original before being reissued as a verbatim translation.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

DOC 16 — Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 16 July 1936

The previously translated article marks the fortieth anniversary of Deterding’s association with Royal Dutch and recounts his commercial strategy, early Asian oil markets, the Asiatic Petroleum Company and competition with Standard Oil. It is biographical and does not independently establish political meetings.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

DOC 72 — French-language retrospective on Deterding

The 2018 archive publishes an English extract characterising Hitler as a defence against Bolshevism from Deterding’s perspective and mentioning visits to Mussolini and Pope Pius XI. This is a retrospective characterisation, not a verified account of meetings with Hitler. The source publication and date should be checked on the original scan.

Source: Same 2018 annotated ZBW collection

Other important sources outside the ZBW dossier

British diplomatic intelligence and the limits of the evidence

The Shell-commissioned corporate history reports that British ambassador Sir Eric Phipps heard in June 1934 that Deterding had promised a year’s supply of products on credit to Germany in an emergency. British Foreign Office specialists doubted the rumour, and the authors found no corroborating records in company archives. They cite Alfred Rosenberg’s diary for a separate May 1934 proposed oil-storage arrangement that ultimately failed. These differentiated claims matter: contemporary diplomatic hearsay, a Nazi official’s diary and proof of a completed contract are different kinds of evidence.

Source: A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1, pp. 484–485; PDF above

December 1936 — the Dutch food-purchase scheme

Contemporary British and international newspapers reported that Deterding made funds available to buy surplus Dutch agricultural produce for shipment to Germany. A key question is the commercial flow of food and the destination of sale proceeds, not merely whether the scheme was described as charitable. The corporate history states the proceeds went to the Nazi Winterhilfswerk. That constitutes a clearer documented link to Nazi-organised activity than uncorroborated rumours of earlier secret financing.

Source: https://royaldutchshellgroup.com/1936/12/12/news-reports-of-sir-henri-deterding-food-donations-to-nazi-germany/ ; corporate history PDF above

Corporate history offers an important counterpoint

The official company history does not deny Deterding’s pro-Nazi sympathies. It does, however, state that large pre-1933 donations and alleged monopoly-for-cash deals remained unsubstantiated in the archives its authors examined. That position should be represented accurately while comparing it with the independently sourced contemporary press and government directives.

Source: A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1, pp. 477–485; PDF above

What can safely be deduced

1. Deterding was demonstrably sympathetic to Nazi Germany, particularly from an anti-Bolshevik perspective; the corporate historians also document encounters with senior Nazi officials including Rosenberg and Göring.

2. The 1936 food-purchase arrangement and the January 1937 Nazi press directive provide firmer documentary evidence of material support to Nazi-era German institutions than allegations of earlier clandestine funding.

3. At least one published newspaper account alleges a four-day meeting between Deterding and Hitler in 1934. The evidence examined here is insufficient to confirm that account independently or determine exactly what occurred.

4. A rejected meeting request in March 1933 does not negate a possible meeting later in 1933 or 1934, but reports should not be combined into a categorical claim that multiple meetings have been definitively established.

5. Deterding’s personal financial support must not automatically be described as an authorised corporate donation by Royal Dutch Shell. The persons, legal entities, funds and date of each transaction require individual attribution.

Outstanding work needed for a comprehensive translation edition

The original ZBW folder and its image manifest were not retrievable through the research connection. Therefore the full texts and dates of the remaining labelled entries cannot be established, and this dossier must not be advertised as a translation of all 69 accessible scans. A complete edition would need the original page images supplied in an accessible package or export, then item-by-item transcription, translation, source identification, duplicate checking and copyright clearance where necessary.

Only limited extracts and original commentary are reproduced here. Some historical newspaper articles may remain protected by copyright; hosting the scans publicly does not by itself grant redistribution or full-translation rights. The recommended publication method is to link to originals and provide sourced English summaries unless reproduction rights or public-domain status are confirmed.

Source and corrections policy

Article dates are dates of original source publication wherever established; dates of archive web posts and book editions are separately identified. Contemporary newspaper allegations, official directives, corporate historiography and editorial deductions are labelled separately. Corrections and authenticated alternative records are welcome. The archive is independent of Shell plc and the findings do not constitute a judicial determination of corporate liability.

Principal live sources

ZBW Deterding dossier: https://purl.org/pressemappe20/folder/pe/003922

2018 Donovan–Shell scan index: https://royaldutchshellplc.com/2018/08/01/1930s-german-newspaper-clippings-about-sir-henri-deterding/

1934 Daily Gleaner report: https://royaldutchshellplc.com/1934/10/29/sir-henri-deterding-of-royal-dutch-shell-4-day-meeting-with-hitler/

1937 German press-directives edition: https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9783110964158_A31053539/preview-9783110964158_A31053539.pdf

Shell historical volume 1: https://royaldutchshellgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ShellHistory36P.V1.May2015Comp.pdf

International 1936 food-aid news references: https://royaldutchshellgroup.com/1936/12/12/news-reports-of-sir-henri-deterding-food-donations-to-nazi-germany/

Henri Deterding, Hitler and the Historical Press Record was first posted on November 16, 2026 at 12:10 am.
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Nigeria’s Plan to Restart Oil in Ogoniland Hits a Consent Test — A Documentary Investigation into Shell’s Unfinished Legacy

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 14:00

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

15 November 2026

Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT.

Thirty-one years after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight fellow Ogoni campaigners, Nigeria is again attempting to restore petroleum production in Ogoniland. But a committee involved in negotiations with the federal government has refused to sign a proposed agreement without further community consultation. A separate Ogoni organisation has rejected the arrangements more fundamentally. Government statements, recent reporting, Shell’s corporate disclosures and the United Nations’ original environmental assessment reveal why the dispute is about much more than restarting oil wells — and why Shell’s withdrawal from Nigerian onshore production has not erased its historical connection with the controversy.

An agreement that has not yet been agreed

On 9 November 2026, the Ogoni Dialogue Committee held a meeting in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, to consider proposals for the resumption of petroleum operations in Ogoniland.

Thirty-five committee members reportedly attended.

The meeting produced a significant decision.

The committee would not sign the proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the Nigerian federal government until credible community congresses had been held across the four Ogoni local government areas: Eleme, Gokana, Khana and Tai.

The committee’s position was reported by Nigerian newspapers including The Punch and subsequently Premium Times, and by Channels Television.

The King of Eleme, Philip Obele, explained that the committee would not sign until the proposed congresses had taken place under arrangements approved by the committee and organised by elected local government chairmen.

This was more than a routine request for consultation.

It established a condition that the committee itself considered necessary before entering into an agreement over the proposed restoration of petroleum activities.

The government may wish to restart production.

Some committee members support that objective.

But the latest meeting demonstrates that support for the general objective is not equivalent to approval of the particular agreement.

Contemporary reporting: The Punch, 10 November 2026 — Oil resumption: Ogoni leaders demand consent, FG action.

See also Premium Times, 11 November 2026 — Ogoni leaders withhold consent for oil resumption.

Punch Newspapers+1

 

The government’s earlier declaration of progress

The November decision deserves particular attention when compared with the government’s own earlier statements.

On 26 September 2025, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited published an official statement concerning the proposed re-entry into Ogoniland.

The announcement followed the presentation of a report by the Presidential Committee on Ogoni Consultations.

President Bola Tinubu acknowledged the suffering experienced by the Ogoni people.

NNPC Group Chief Executive Officer Bashir Bayo Ojulari described the development as a historic opportunity for reconciliation and national progress.

The statement presented the proposed return as a means of combining petroleum development with environmental protection, infrastructure improvements and community benefits.

NNPC also credited the National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, and the presidential consultation committee chaired by Professor Don Baridam with helping establish the framework for dialogue.

The company emphasised that restarting operations would require collaboration with affected communities.

Those were important public commitments.

They were not, however, proof that every Ogoni community had approved a final agreement.

Nor did the September statement establish that commercial oil production had actually resumed.

The distinction matters.

A government announcement celebrating progress towards reconciliation is not the same thing as an executed agreement accepted by the affected communities.

The November committee decision now provides evidence that significant questions concerning consent and implementation remain unresolved.

Primary source: NNPC Ltd, 26 September 2025 — Ogoni Re-entry is a Beacon of Reconciliation through Collaboration.

NNPC

 

The Ogoni Dialogue Committee is not simply rejecting oil production

It would be inaccurate to interpret the committee’s November decision as unanimous opposition to petroleum development.

The publicly reported statements indicate a more complicated position.

Rev. Monsignor Pius Kii, a senior committee participant and Judicial Vicar of the Catholic Diocese of Port Harcourt, explained that the committee supported the government’s efforts to resume petroleum activities for the benefit of Nigeria and the Ogoni people.

The committee also intended to continue harmonising the proposed Memorandum of Understanding.

Local government chairmen had been instructed to engage communities before the proposed congresses.

According to the reporting, progress had already been made on those consultations.

The committee therefore appears to be attempting to establish a process through which an agreement could acquire sufficient legitimacy to proceed.

That is materially different from announcing that petroleum production must never resume.

The position can be summarised accurately:

The committee supports continued negotiations and, according to its representatives, supports the objective of restarting petroleum operations.

It does not consider the proposed agreement ready for signature.

It wants further community approval before proceeding.

Whether that approval can be obtained remains unknown.

Nor have the publicly examined reports established precisely how the congresses will be organised, who will participate, how decisions will be recorded or whether each area must approve the same terms.

Those details will matter if the process is to provide a credible foundation for any eventual agreement.

A separate Ogoni organisation rejects the proposed compromise

The Dialogue Committee is not the only organisation claiming to represent Ogoni interests.

On 8 November 2026, the Green Ogoni Initiative, describing itself as a grassroots movement involving Ogoni people in the diaspora, issued a public statement rejecting the proposed resumption arrangements.

The statement was published by Newspot Nigeria under the title:

Ogoni Rejects Dialogue Committee’s Compromise — Green Ogoni Initiative.

The organisation questioned the legitimacy of the consultation process and argued that the proposed arrangements failed to respect the Ogoni people’s right to determine their future.

It also raised concerns about the absence of an adequate environmental impact assessment.

The Green Ogoni Initiative’s position is materially more critical than that expressed by members of the Dialogue Committee following the 9 November meeting.

While the committee supports continued negotiations and proposes community congresses, the Green Ogoni Initiative challenges the underlying terms and credibility of the proposed compromise.

These differences should not be concealed.

The Ogoni people are not represented by a single organisation holding one uncontested position.

Their communities include individuals and organisations with different views about petroleum development, environmental restoration, compensation, economic opportunity and political representation.

An investigation that treats one committee’s statements as the settled view of every Ogoni resident would risk reproducing precisely the problem that the consultation process is supposed to address.

There is also a necessary evidentiary qualification.

The Green Ogoni Initiative’s published statement contains additional accusations concerning financial inducements and the conduct of committee members.

Those accusations have not been independently substantiated by the documents examined for this investigation.

They are therefore not adopted as findings of fact.

Similarly, the organisation’s concern about environmental impact assessment deserves examination, but the material reviewed does not establish whether every assessment required for a particular future petroleum development has or has not been completed.

The proper investigative questions concern the existence, scope, publication and adequacy of the relevant environmental documentation.

They cannot responsibly be answered by treating an allegation as a regulatory finding.

Why the Shell connection remains fundamental

At first sight, a dispute involving the Nigerian government and present-day Ogoni representatives might appear to be principally a Nigerian political and economic issue.

That is partly correct.

But Ogoniland’s modern petroleum history cannot be understood without reference to Shell.

Shell’s operations helped establish Nigeria’s petroleum industry, and the company’s former Nigerian subsidiary, the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, became central to controversies concerning pollution, operating practices, community relations and responsibility for environmental damage.

Petroleum production in Ogoniland was halted in 1993 amid protests over the environmental and social consequences of oil extraction.

The subsequent execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni campaigners by Nigeria’s military government on 10 November 1995 became an internationally recognised symbol of the struggle over oil, human rights and corporate accountability.

Shell has consistently denied responsibility for the executions.

In 2009, the company settled litigation brought in the United States concerning alleged involvement in human-rights abuses without admitting liability.

These historical events must be distinguished from the current negotiations.

The Nigerian government conducted the executions.

The existence of serious historical allegations against Shell does not mean that every allegation was judicially established.

But the controversy surrounding Shell’s former operations remains central to understanding why renewed petroleum production is such a sensitive issue.

The present dispute cannot be reduced to a disagreement over how quickly an oilfield should reopen.

It concerns whether the legacy of earlier petroleum operations has been adequately addressed and whether affected communities trust the arrangements now being proposed.

Shell has sold SPDC — but OML 11 requires a more precise explanation

An important development in Shell’s Nigerian operations occurred on 13 March 2025.

Shell completed the sale of its former onshore subsidiary, SPDC, to the Renaissance consortium.

The company was subsequently renamed Renaissance Africa Energy Company.

Shell’s official announcement confirmed that the transaction transferred its former subsidiary and the associated interest in the SPDC joint venture.

The new owner assumed the operating role previously carried out through SPDC.

Shell emphasised that it was redirecting its Nigerian investment towards deepwater petroleum production and integrated gas activities.

Those corporate facts are established.

Primary source: Shell, 13 March 2025 — Completion of sale of SPDC to Renaissance.

But a potentially important distinction has emerged from more detailed research into the Nigerian petroleum leases.

A lease-by-lease investigation published on 2 November 2026 by Africa Energies Report, an initiative of the African Petroleum Producers’ Organization, identifies Oil Mining Lease 11 as having a distinct operating history.

The report states that OML 11, which covers Ogoniland, did not pass to Renaissance as part of the wider former-SPDC portfolio.

It identifies NNPC Exploration and Production as the operator, following the earlier dispute over Shell’s entitlement to renew the lease.

The report also notes that although production in Ogoniland has been suspended since 1993, this should not be confused with the absence of all petroleum production throughout OML 11. It identifies the Otakikpo marginal field elsewhere within the lease area as having produced since 2017.

This is an important geographical and legal distinction.

The history of Shell’s former Nigerian subsidiary, the transfer of its other assets to Renaissance and the operating arrangements governing the particular Ogoni resources are related subjects.

They are not necessarily identical.

The underlying OML 11 licence and latest regulatory register have not been independently examined for this article. Consequently, the lease-specific findings are attributed to the published industry research rather than presented as a new legal determination by this archive.

Supporting source: Africa Energies Report, 2 November 2026 — The Great Handover: Who Now Runs Nigeria’s Major Oil Fields, Lease by Lease.

Africa Energies Report

 

The practical implication is clear.

It would be misleading to suggest that Shell plc is presently negotiating the Ogoni Memorandum of Understanding as the current operator of the proposed restarted production.

The available evidence identifies the Nigerian authorities and Ogoni representatives as the parties conducting the present dialogue.

Shell’s connection is overwhelmingly historical, while separate questions concerning legacy environmental obligations and litigation remain relevant.

That distinction does not make Shell’s earlier activities irrelevant.

It makes accurate attribution of present-day responsibility essential.

The United Nations established the environmental consequences

Any proposal to restore oil production in Ogoniland must be considered against the findings of the United Nations Environment Programme.

In 2011, UNEP published its landmark Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland.

The study was based on extensive fieldwork examining soil, groundwater, surface water, ecosystems, industrial practices and public-health risks.

The scale of the investigation was extraordinary.

UNEP examined more than 200 locations, reviewed over 5,000 medical records, surveyed 122 kilometres of pipeline rights of way and engaged thousands of residents.

More than 4,000 environmental samples were analysed.

The findings documented serious contamination.

At Nisisioken Ogale, investigators discovered benzene contamination in drinking-water wells at levels exceeding 900 times the World Health Organization guideline.

Hydrocarbons were found at substantial depths underground.

The investigation also documented damage to mangroves and other ecosystems, and identified pollution resulting from several sources, including petroleum infrastructure and illegal refining activities.

UNEP concluded that comprehensive environmental restoration could take 25 to 30 years.

It recommended urgent interventions to protect human health and substantial long-term investment in environmental remediation.

This was not simply an allegation advanced by campaigners.

It was the result of an independent scientific assessment undertaken by a United Nations body.

Its findings did not establish the legal responsibility of every individual company for every spill.

Nor did the report determine the exact legal obligations attached to any future petroleum development.

But it established an authoritative environmental baseline against which subsequent restoration claims and development proposals can be assessed.

Primary sources: UNEP — Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, 2011 and UNEP — Executive Summary and Recommendations.

WeDocs+1

 

Ten years of cleanup efforts — and the question of what remains unfinished

Nigeria has not entirely ignored the UNEP recommendations.

The Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project, HYPREP, has undertaken environmental restoration activities across parts of Ogoniland.

In September 2026, during events marking the tenth anniversary of the Ogoni Cleanup Programme, the Nigerian government announced further work on shoreline remediation, mangrove restoration and community infrastructure.

The government also disclosed plans for a new five-year strategic programme covering 2026 to 2031.

Minister of Environment Balarabe Lawal emphasised the importance of completing outstanding work and protecting areas where restoration had already been undertaken.

HYPREP Project Coordinator Professor Nenibarini Zabbey reported that programme activities had supported employment and training opportunities for thousands of Ogoni residents.

He also cited encouraging signs of ecological recovery in some restored areas.

These statements should be acknowledged fairly.

Environmental restoration is a long-term undertaking, and progress in individual locations can be meaningful even where other sites remain contaminated.

But government-reported progress should not be confused with independent verification that the entire Ogoni environment has been restored.

The government itself has identified outstanding and more complex restoration tasks.

That makes the relationship between cleanup and renewed petroleum development particularly important.

If additional extraction is contemplated, communities may reasonably seek evidence concerning the condition of the environment, the management of future spills, monitoring arrangements and the funding of any further remediation.

Source: Voice of Nigeria, 7 September 2026 — HYPREP Begins Five-Year Strategic Plan for Ogoni Cleanup.

Voice of Nigeria

 

The environmental impact assessment question

The Green Ogoni Initiative’s concerns raise a specific documentary issue.

What environmental impact assessment has been prepared for the proposed restoration of petroleum operations?

The answer cannot be established merely by observing that UNEP conducted its assessment in 2011.

The UNEP report is an authoritative investigation of historical contamination and the need for restoration.

It is not automatically equivalent to a project-specific assessment addressing the engineering works, infrastructure, production methods and environmental risks of a proposed new development.

The age and condition of infrastructure would also be relevant to an assessment of operational risk.

So would the potential for future leaks, accidental releases, illegal connections and other forms of contamination.

However, the precise legal requirements depend on the proposed activity and the applicable Nigerian regulatory framework.

A reopened existing well, a newly drilled well, a replacement pipeline and a substantially redesigned production facility may raise different approval questions.

No authenticated, complete project-specific assessment corresponding to the proposed agreement has been located in the public sources examined for this article.

That does not prove no such assessment exists.

It establishes a need for disclosure and clarification.

The Nigerian authorities should be able to identify the specific project being considered, the relevant approvals and the environmental documents supporting them.

Any eventual agreement should be examined against those records.

The road that has become part of the oil negotiations

There is another revealing aspect of the November committee meeting.

Members expressed concern about the suspension of previously agreed confidence-building projects.

Particular attention was directed towards the Eleme section of the East-West Road.

Professor Innocent Barikor, a member of the Dialogue Committee, urged the federal government to resume work.

The concern was not presented simply as a complaint about transport infrastructure.

Committee representatives linked the road project to public confidence in the government’s willingness to honour commitments.

That connection is significant.

An agreement concerning petroleum development may involve promises about roads, employment, water supply, health services and other community benefits.

Such commitments can be important to local residents independently of the value of any oil produced.

But they create questions about implementation and accountability.

Who is responsible for delivering the projects?

Are completion dates specified?

Are budgets secured?

What happens if an agreed project is delayed?

Are community benefits enforceable commitments or expressions of policy intention?

The November committee statements indicate that these matters are already affecting confidence in the negotiations.

The credibility of the proposed petroleum agreement may therefore depend partly on the delivery of infrastructure commitments made before production resumes.

That is an issue of governance and public accountability, not merely petroleum economics.

What is meant by community consent?

The phrase community consent is central to the present controversy.

But it must be used carefully.

The Ogoni Dialogue Committee has demanded community congresses before it signs the proposed agreement.

That is a reported position taken by the committee.

It is not, by itself, a judicial determination of the precise legal requirements for authorising petroleum operations under Nigerian law.

Nor can it be assumed that the committee’s proposed congresses will necessarily resolve every disagreement among Ogoni organisations.

A credible process would need to address who participates, whether dissenting organisations can present their objections, how the proposed agreement is disclosed and how competing views are recorded.

The distinction between consultation and consent is important.

A consultation may allow residents to express views without requiring approval of the final proposal.

A consent process implies a more consequential role for community agreement.

The legal effect of any particular process depends on the relevant law and the arrangements actually adopted.

The available public reporting does not establish that the proposed congresses will have the force of a legally binding referendum.

Nor does it demonstrate that their procedures have been finalised.

What can be established is that the Dialogue Committee has made these congresses a condition of signing the proposed Memorandum of Understanding.

Whether that condition will be satisfied remains to be seen.

What the original agreement could reveal

The most important missing document is the proposed Memorandum of Understanding itself.

Its precise terms would allow an independent assessment of the arrangements being offered to the Ogoni communities.

Several matters would deserve particular scrutiny.

The document should identify the entities expected to conduct petroleum operations and the legal basis for their involvement.

It should explain how community benefits are to be determined and administered.

It should distinguish government-funded infrastructure commitments from obligations placed on commercial petroleum operators.

It should clarify the arrangements for environmental monitoring, damage prevention, remediation and compensation.

And it should establish how affected communities will participate in decisions once any agreement has been signed.

Without the complete text, it is impossible to determine whether the agreement addresses these issues satisfactorily.

Nor should claims about particular financial percentages or payments be adopted without the relevant documentary evidence.

The absence of a publicly examined final text is especially consequential when different Ogoni organisations disagree about the legitimacy of the negotiating process.

Independent scrutiny requires access to the actual terms, not merely competing accounts of what those terms may contain.

Shell’s response to its Nigerian environmental legacy

Shell has defended its historical conduct in the Niger Delta.

On its current corporate website, the company maintains that oil theft, sabotage and illegal refining have caused extensive pollution.

It argues that criminal interference by third parties has been a major factor in the operational difficulties faced by its former Nigerian subsidiary.

The company also points to its participation in cleanup programmes and its cooperation with Nigerian authorities.

Following the sale of SPDC, Shell states that Renaissance retained the former subsidiary’s operating capabilities and responsibilities within the transferred joint venture.

These positions are relevant to the documentary record.

They should not be omitted simply because environmental organisations dispute Shell’s conclusions.

Source: Shell — What Are Shell’s Activities in Nigeria?.

Shell Global

 

There is also continuing litigation in the English courts involving Shell’s historical Nigerian operations.

The Bille and Ogale claims raise contested questions concerning pollution, the responsibilities of the former Nigerian subsidiary and the potential liability of Shell plc.

Those proceedings are distinct from the current Ogoni petroleum negotiations.

The Donovan–Shell Archive has previously examined the relevant High Court judgments, including the decision delivered in September 2026 concerning amended claims and contested allegations about earlier witness evidence.

The litigation has not established every allegation advanced against Shell.

Nor does Shell’s completion of its Nigerian onshore divestment automatically determine the outcome of those proceedings.

The appropriate distinction is between the company’s former commercial ownership, its present business activities, responsibilities assumed by successor entities and liabilities that may still be disputed in court.

Each requires separate evidence.

Thirty-one years after the Ogoni Nine

The timing of the present dispute is particularly significant.

On 10 November 2026, the thirty-first anniversary of the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni campaigners passed.

The anniversary came one day after the Dialogue Committee’s decision to require community congresses before signing the proposed agreement.

It also followed the Green Ogoni Initiative’s public rejection of the proposed compromise.

That sequence is historically resonant.

The original Ogoni struggle was never exclusively about the immediate financial value of the area’s petroleum.

It concerned environmental protection, political representation, community rights and the consequences of industrial activity.

Those subjects remain relevant to the current negotiations.

But historical remembrance should not be used to assume that all present-day Ogoni residents hold identical views about their economic future.

Some may support renewed production subject to enforceable safeguards and substantial community benefits.

Others may oppose it because of the environmental legacy and lack of confidence in the authorities.

Others may support development in principle while rejecting the negotiating process or the terms currently proposed.

A documentary investigation should allow those differences to emerge from the evidence.

The sacrifice of the Ogoni Nine is an essential part of the history.

It is not a substitute for examining what today’s communities are being asked to approve.

The Donovan–Shell Archive’s historical interest

On 8 November 2026, the Donovan–Shell Archive announced its intention to prepare a dedicated series entitled The Ogoni Files.

That project will examine the historical documentary record concerning Shell, the Ogoni Nine, environmental controversies, litigation, security issues and the long search for accountability.

It will also consider historical correspondence and materials preserved through the archive’s contact with Ogoni campaigners and individuals connected with the litigation.

The present investigation is separate from that archival research.

It is based on publicly accessible contemporary reporting, corporate disclosures, official Nigerian statements and the original UNEP assessment.

Unexamined private correspondence, historical allegations and trial recordings have not been treated as verified evidence for this article.

That separation is important.

The future Ogoni Files series may produce additional historical findings.

The current negotiations require scrutiny in their own right, on the basis of the evidence now available.

Related archive publication: Coming Soon: The Ogoni Files — A New Independent Documentary Investigation into Shell, the Ogoni Nine and the Long Search for Justice, 8 November 2026.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

Established by official corporate and institutional records

Shell completed the sale of its Nigerian onshore subsidiary SPDC to Renaissance in March 2025.

Shell continues to operate other businesses in Nigeria, particularly deepwater petroleum and integrated gas.

NNPC publicly promoted its proposed Ogoni re-entry programme in September 2025 and linked it to reconciliation, infrastructure, community participation and petroleum development.

UNEP’s 2011 assessment established severe historical environmental contamination in parts of Ogoniland and recommended extensive long-term restoration.

The Nigerian government has subsequently undertaken cleanup activities and announced further restoration plans.

Established by attributable contemporary reporting

The Ogoni Dialogue Committee decided on 9 November 2026 not to sign the proposed Memorandum of Understanding before community congresses had been held.

The decision followed a meeting involving 35 committee members.

The committee supports continued negotiations and has expressed support for the objective of renewed petroleum activities, subject to the consultation process.

Committee representatives identified concerns about outstanding infrastructure commitments, particularly work on the Eleme section of the East-West Road.

The Green Ogoni Initiative separately issued a statement on 8 November rejecting the proposed arrangements.

Important ownership distinction

Recent industry research identifies OML 11 as having a different ownership and operating history from the assets transferred to Renaissance in the wider SPDC divestment.

This finding warrants examination against the current official petroleum licence records before any definitive legal conclusion is drawn.

Allegations and positions not independently established

The Green Ogoni Initiative’s criticisms of the proposed agreement are attributed to that organisation.

Its claims about financial inducements are not independently substantiated.

The assertion that an adequate environmental impact assessment is absent remains a matter requiring verification against the relevant regulatory records.

No complete, authenticated version of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding has been examined for this article.

The reporting does not establish that all Ogoni communities have rejected renewed petroleum development.

Nor does it establish that the government has obtained consent through the proposed congresses.

Editorial conclusion

The current negotiations demonstrate that the Nigerian government’s objective of restarting petroleum operations has not yet been translated into an uncontested agreement with the Ogoni communities.

The most consequential unresolved questions concern the legitimacy of consultation, the terms of any eventual agreement, the adequacy of environmental safeguards and the delivery of government commitments.

These questions arise within a historically significant petroleum-producing region whose environmental and human-rights controversies remain closely associated with Shell’s earlier operations.

CONCLUSION: THE OIL MAY REMAIN, BUT AGREEMENT CANNOT BE ASSUMED

Nigeria’s effort to restore petroleum production in Ogoniland has entered another important stage.

The government has identified economic and developmental reasons for proceeding.

NNPC has presented the initiative as an opportunity for reconciliation and renewed investment.

Members of the Ogoni Dialogue Committee have indicated support for continued negotiations.

Yet the committee has now refused to sign the proposed agreement until community congresses have been held.

A separate organisation has rejected the proposed compromise more fundamentally.

The government’s confidence in its earlier consultations has therefore not resolved the dispute over legitimacy and consent.

The historical background explains why this matters.

Shell’s former operations became inseparable from decades of environmental controversy and demands for accountability.

The United Nations subsequently documented severe environmental contamination requiring sustained restoration.

The Nigerian government has made progress on some cleanup initiatives while acknowledging that further work remains.

Shell has sold its former onshore subsidiary.

But the transfer of corporate ownership has not removed the need to address the environmental and social consequences of the industry’s history.

Nor has it resolved every disagreement concerning the future of petroleum operations in Ogoniland.

The decisive question is no longer simply whether Nigeria wants the oil to flow again. It is whether the proposed arrangements can withstand scrutiny by the people expected to live with their consequences.

The November committee decision establishes that the answer has not yet been settled.

An agreement may eventually be reached.

It may provide substantial economic benefits.

It may also include environmental obligations and safeguards that communities consider adequate.

But those possibilities must be demonstrated through the actual terms, approvals and implementation arrangements.

They cannot be assumed from government announcements or expressions of support from selected representatives.

For the Donovan–Shell Archive, the documentary obligation is to follow the evidence.

That means acknowledging Shell’s historical involvement without incorrectly presenting the company as the current negotiating operator.

It means recognising the government’s restoration work without declaring the environmental crisis resolved.

And it means respecting the different positions expressed by Ogoni organisations rather than choosing one to speak for the entire population.

Thirty-one years after the Ogoni Nine were executed, the future of petroleum operations in Ogoniland remains contested.

The latest evidence shows that community legitimacy is now a central condition of the proposed return.

Whether the Nigerian government can secure it remains an open question.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

1. Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited — 26 September 2025

Ogoni Re-entry is a Beacon of Reconciliation through Collaboration

Official government-owned petroleum company statement outlining the rationale for re-entry, the consultation process and proposed community commitments.

2. The Punch — 10 November 2026

Oil resumption: Ogoni leaders demand consent, FG action

Contemporaneous reporting of the 9 November Dialogue Committee meeting, including attributable statements concerning community congresses, the proposed agreement and infrastructure commitments.

3. Premium Times — 11 November 2026

Ogoni leaders withhold consent for oil resumption, demand community congresses

Additional contemporary account, providing background on the federal government’s negotiations and statements from committee representatives.

4. Green Ogoni Initiative — Statement published 8 November 2026

Ogoni Rejects Dialogue Committee’s Compromise

Published advocacy statement providing a contrasting Ogoni position. Its allegations are attributed and not treated as independently established findings.

5. United Nations Environment Programme — 2011

Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland

Original independent environmental assessment establishing the historical contamination, public-health risks and long-term restoration requirements.

6. Shell plc — 13 March 2025

Shell Completes Sale of SPDC to Renaissance

Primary corporate announcement establishing the completion of Shell’s Nigerian onshore subsidiary divestment and its remaining business priorities.

7. Africa Energies Report — 2 November 2026

The Great Handover: Who Now Runs Nigeria’s Major Oil Fields, Lease by Lease

Recent industry research distinguishing OML 11 from the wider Renaissance acquisition and examining the operating arrangements associated with former international-major petroleum assets.

8. Voice of Nigeria — 7 September 2026

HYPREP Begins Five-Year Strategic Plan for Ogoni Cleanup

Reporting of the Nigerian government’s latest restoration programme, including official statements concerning achievements and outstanding work.

9. Shell plc — Current Nigerian operations and environmental position

What Are Shell’s Activities in Nigeria?

Shell’s explanation of its historical operations, sale of SPDC, remaining Nigerian businesses and position concerning environmental responsibility.

10. Donovan–Shell Archive — 8 November 2026

Coming Soon: The Ogoni Files

Earlier archive announcement providing context for the forthcoming historical documentary investigation.

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This article is an independent documentary investigation into current proposals to resume petroleum operations in Ogoniland, Nigeria, and the historical connection of those proposals with Shell’s former Nigerian onshore activities.

The investigation is based on official statements from NNPC and Shell, the United Nations Environment Programme’s published environmental assessment, identifiable Nigerian media reporting, published statements attributed to Ogoni organisations and recent industry research.

The 9 November 2026 Ogoni Dialogue Committee decision is supported by contemporary reporting. The complete committee minutes and signed resolutions have not been independently obtained.

The proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the Nigerian government has not been examined in authenticated final form. Its complete financial, environmental, operational and governance provisions are therefore not established by this investigation.

The views of the Green Ogoni Initiative are attributed to that organisation. Unsubstantiated allegations concerning financial inducements, misconduct or other improper behaviour are not treated as facts.

Statements concerning environmental impact assessment distinguish the organisation’s criticisms from independently verified regulatory findings.

The 2011 UNEP assessment is a historical scientific investigation. It is not presented as a current assessment of every affected location or as a determination of liability for individual historical spills.

Shell’s sale of SPDC to Renaissance in March 2025 is established by the company’s corporate disclosures. The more specific operating status of OML 11 is attributed to identified industry research pending examination of the current official lease record.

No allegation is made that Shell plc is presently conducting the Ogoni negotiations as the operator of the proposed restarted petroleum development.

Historical allegations concerning Shell and the Nigerian military regime, pollution, human-rights abuses and the Ogoni Nine are distinguished from established events and relevant legal outcomes.

The article does not make a finding that Shell, Renaissance, NNPC, the Ogoni Dialogue Committee, any Ogoni organisation or any individual has acted unlawfully in connection with the current negotiations.

The Donovan–Shell Archive welcomes factual corrections, authenticated documents and responses from Shell plc, NNPC, Renaissance, the Ogoni Dialogue Committee, the Green Ogoni Initiative, Nigerian regulatory authorities and other affected representatives.

Substantiated corrections and additional evidence will be considered fairly.

This publication is documentary reporting and analysis, not legal advice or an adjudication of liability.

Nigeria’s Plan to Restart Oil in Ogoniland Hits a Consent Test — A Documentary Investigation into Shell’s Unfinished Legacy was first posted on November 15, 2026 at 11:00 pm.
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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 15 NOVEMBER 2026

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 13:45
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 15 NOVEMBER 2026

Archive reference: SLF-2007-119

The Sakhalin Papers CIX: The Sakhalin Budget Test — How Shell’s $24.5 Billion Cost Recovery Led to a Regional Revenue Windfall

In March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced that it had recovered $24.5 billion in development and operating expenditure, triggering a new stage in the distribution of Sakhalin II’s oil and gas revenues. Four years later, the company reported that payments from the project accounted for more than 60% of Sakhalin Oblast’s public revenues. But its own figures also revealed a remarkable change: payments to regional and local budgets fell from $2.41 billion in 2015 to $1.28 billion in 2016. Original Shell-era corporate reports, an authenticated Shell filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, contemporary reporting and a preserved Russian governmental agreement reveal how the project moved from disputed costs to extraordinary public revenues — and why that success also created fiscal vulnerability.

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, using original Sakhalin Energy financial disclosures, an authenticated Royal Dutch Shell plc SEC filing, contemporaneous industry and Russian news reports, and a historical Russian governmental agreement preserved by Sakhalin Environment Watch.

Publication date: 15 November 2026

Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia

Previous instalment: SLF-2007-118 — The Sakhalin Address Test: 5,933 Local Contracts, but How Much of Shell’s Energy Legacy Stayed on the Island?

INTRODUCTION: THE YEAR THE MONEY STARTED TO CHANGE

On 30 March 2012, Sakhalin Energy made an announcement that marked a decisive moment in the financial history of Sakhalin II.

The company reported that production sharing had begun.

From March 2012, the Russian Federation and Sakhalin Oblast would receive their shares of profit production under the project’s production-sharing arrangements.

The development represented the culmination of an expensive and politically controversial investment programme.

It also carried important implications for Russia’s Far Eastern island.

The company’s announcement revealed that approximately $24.5 billion in project expenditure had been recovered.

That amount covered capital and operating expenditure associated with the project’s first and second development phases.

Only after the applicable cost-recovery conditions had been satisfied did the new stage of profit-production sharing begin.

For more than a decade, the financial implications of that arrangement had been a source of controversy.

Shell originally held a controlling interest in Sakhalin Energy.

During construction, the project’s estimated costs increased dramatically.

Russian officials argued that the escalation would delay the state’s economic returns.

The Accounts Chamber criticised the project’s financial arrangements.

Environmental regulators also challenged aspects of its implementation.

The resulting confrontation helped transform the ownership of Sakhalin II.

Gazprom acquired majority control in April 2007.

Shell retained a substantial minority interest.

But the production-sharing agreement continued to govern the project’s financial arrangements.

Then came the March 2012 announcement.

The project had crossed the threshold separating the earlier cost-recovery period from the stage in which the Russian side would receive profit production.

Sakhalin Energy’s Chief Executive, Andrey Galaev, described the transition as occurring ahead of the company’s previous expectations.

The announcement projected that Russia would receive approximately $500 million in profit production during 2012, assuming an oil price of $100 per barrel.

That was a forecast, not a certified final receipt.

But it identified the start of a different financial phase.

By the end of 2016, Sakhalin Energy would report cumulative payments to the Russian side exceeding $20.8 billion.

Approximately $8 billion was attributed to Sakhalin Oblast.

The company also reported that project-related revenues represented more than 60% of the region’s budget.

These were substantial achievements.

Yet the same corporate disclosures reveal another important feature.

Regional and local budget payments changed sharply from year to year.

The operator’s own figures show payments of $2.411 billion in 2015 and $1.281 billion in 2016.

That difference is central to the present investigation.

Sakhalin II had become an exceptionally important source of public income. But the greater its contribution to the regional budget, the more consequential changes in that income could become.

The original documents demonstrate both sides of this relationship.

They also reveal why it is necessary to distinguish project costs, profit production, royalties, corporate taxation and regional budget receipts.

These are different financial categories.

They cannot responsibly be treated as interchangeable.

PART ONE: THE ORIGINAL FINANCIAL BARGAIN 1. The 1994 production-sharing agreement

The Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement was signed on 22 June 1994.

It concerned the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye offshore oil and gas fields.

The investor was Sakhalin Energy.

The Russian side was represented by the Government of the Russian Federation and the Administration of Sakhalin Oblast.

The agreement was intended to attract the investment and advanced technology needed to develop fields located in a remote and demanding environment.

The offshore project required substantial expenditure.

The investors were expected to provide financing and undertake the development risks.

In return, they obtained contractual rights governing the recovery of expenditure and participation in the production generated by the fields.

The state retained ownership of the natural resources.

Sakhalin Energy’s official explanation of the production-sharing agreement describes the arrangement as replacing significant parts of the ordinary tax and licensing regime with a contractual system intended to remain effective over the project’s life.

It also identifies an important oversight provision.

The Russian state was entitled to approve work budgets and audit the investor’s expenditure.

This mattered because expenditure influenced the timing of the financial returns.

Under the operator’s description, the production-sharing stage began after the investor recovered its applicable costs.

The shares payable subsequently depended upon the project’s profitability.

Consequently, the classification and amount of recoverable expenditure were central to the economics of the agreement.

The longer the recovery process continued, the longer the Russian side could have to wait for certain profit-production entitlements.

That did not mean Russia received no payments before the recovery threshold.

Royalties, taxes and other contractual payments were separate categories.

But the timing of profit-production sharing was particularly important.

Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Production-Sharing Agreement.

Production Sharing Agreement

 

2. Sakhalin’s regional government wanted a defined share

Three years after the original agreement, Moscow and Sakhalin concluded a further arrangement governing the distribution of specified revenues payable to the Russian side.

The agreement was dated 3 April 1997.

A substantial reproduction survives in the historical document collection maintained by Sakhalin Environment Watch.

The agreement recognised Sakhalin Oblast’s economic difficulties.

It also established arrangements for distributing different categories of project receipts.

One provision allocated the state’s share of profit production equally between the federal government and Sakhalin Oblast.

Another provided that Sakhalin would receive 60% of specified development bonuses, with the federal government receiving 40%.

The agreement also addressed historical exploration expenditure, taxation, resource payments and supplies of natural gas for regional use.

Those distinctions were significant.

The share of profit production was not identical to the allocation of corporate profits tax.

Nor was either arrangement identical to the distribution of royalties.

The financial relationship involved multiple revenue streams.

It also depended upon the timing of production, expenditure and the applicable legal arrangements.

The full executed agreement and subsequent amendments have not been independently authenticated together for this investigation.

The reproduced text is therefore treated as a valuable historical source, not as a certified statement of every provision continuing unchanged throughout the project’s lifetime.

The federal-regional allocation was examined in greater detail in SLF-2007-112 — The Other Sakhalin Dispute.

The present investigation addresses a different question.

When did the financial mechanism begin generating substantial profit-production receipts, and what did the later corporate records reveal about Sakhalin’s dependence upon the resulting revenues?

Historical source: Sakhalin Environment Watch — Agreement Between the Russian Government and Sakhalin Oblast, 3 April 1997.

Экологическая вахта Сахалина

 

PART TWO: THE COST OVERRUN THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING 3. July 2005: Shell acknowledges a doubling of projected costs

On 14 July 2005, Shell publicly acknowledged a dramatic increase in the projected cost of Sakhalin II.

The project was expected to cost approximately $20 billion.

That was roughly twice the previous estimate.

Contemporaneous reporting identified several explanations.

They included rising construction and material costs, currency movements, difficulties associated with pipeline construction and environmental requirements.

Malcolm Brinded, then Shell’s Executive Director responsible for Exploration and Production, acknowledged that the original budget and timetable had been substantially underestimated.

The announcement was important for Shell’s shareholders.

But it also mattered to the Russian government.

Under the production-sharing arrangements, recoverable expenditure affected when the state would begin receiving its full profit-production entitlements.

An increase in project costs could therefore have consequences beyond the investor’s own financial accounts.

It could affect the timing of state revenues.

The July 2005 announcement did not establish that the increased expenditure was fraudulent or improperly recoverable.

Large engineering projects can experience genuine cost escalation.

But the scale of the revision inevitably raised questions about budgeting, oversight and the economic implications for the Russian side.

Contemporaneous source: The Guardian — Shell Costs Double at Sakhalin, 15 July 2005.

The Guardian

 

4. October 2006: The Accounts Chamber challenges the economics

By October 2006, Russia’s Accounts Chamber was publicly criticising the financial implementation of Sakhalin II.

A report distributed by RIA Novosti on 6 October stated that the watchdog considered the production-sharing arrangements disadvantageous to Russia.

The report attributed to the Accounts Chamber an assessment that Russia’s share of hydrocarbon output could remain very limited under the project conditions then being examined.

The Chamber also questioned assumptions used in forecasting future oil revenues.

It referred to project-cost estimates that had increased substantially.

These were official criticisms reported contemporaneously.

They were not judicial findings.

Nor were the Accounts Chamber’s projections definitive statements of what Russia eventually received.

But they provide evidence of the financial concerns that existed during the period of confrontation with Shell and its partners.

The criticism involved more than the absolute cost of construction.

It concerned the relationship between expenditure, future revenues and the state’s contractual entitlements.

The issue was therefore central to Sakhalin II’s financial structure.

The project could succeed industrially while remaining the subject of disagreement over whether its financial arrangements adequately protected the Russian side.

Historical source: RIA Novosti — Sakhalin PSA Gives Russia Limited Share, Accounts Chamber Says, 6 October 2006, preserved by the Donovan–Shell Archive.

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com

 

PART THREE: SHELL’S AUTHENTICATED SEC FILING 5. April 2007: Gazprom takes majority control

The political and commercial confrontation culminated in a fundamental change to Sakhalin Energy’s ownership.

On 18 April 2007, Shell and its partners signed an agreement allowing Gazprom to acquire a controlling interest.

The transaction was documented in an original Royal Dutch Shell plc filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

The filing provides an authenticated corporate record of the transaction.

Gazprom acquired 50% plus one share of Sakhalin Energy for $7.45 billion.

The existing shareholders reduced their interests.

Shell’s holding fell from 55% to 27.5%.

Mitsui’s holding became 12.5%.

Mitsubishi retained 10%.

The transaction was implemented under the terms of an agreement reached in December 2006.

Shell’s original announcement welcomed Gazprom’s participation and linked it with improved prospects for completing the project and expanding future LNG capacity.

The filing is significant because it establishes the ownership change through an original company disclosure rather than retrospective commentary.

But it also establishes the limits of the event’s direct financial meaning.

The $7.45 billion was the consideration for Gazprom’s acquisition of shares.

It was not a payment into Sakhalin Oblast’s public budget.

Nor was it a calculation of the project’s recoverable expenditure.

It concerned the transfer of ownership between the relevant companies.

That distinction matters because the Sakhalin II financial history contains several exceptionally large dollar figures.

They do not all represent money received by the Russian state or Sakhalin’s population.

Authenticated primary source: Royal Dutch Shell plc — SEC Form 6-K, April 2007: Gazprom Enters Sakhalin II Project.

SEC

 

PART FOUR: MARCH 2012 — THE FINANCIAL TURNING POINT 6. The announcement that changed the revenue timetable

On 30 March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced that production sharing had begun.

The company’s statement was reproduced contemporaneously by LNG World News, now part of Offshore Energy.

The announcement said that the Russian Federation and Sakhalin Oblast had begun receiving their shares of profit production from March.

The Chief Executive, Andrey Galaev, stated that the transition had occurred ahead of expectations.

The company attributed the achievement to favourable market conditions and operational improvements.

The announcement included the most important figure for the present investigation.

Sakhalin Energy reported that approximately $24.5 billion in project costs had been recovered.

The company specified that the amount covered capital and operating expenditure associated with both development phases.

This is a crucial qualification.

The $24.5 billion figure should not be treated as identical to the $20 billion project-cost forecast announced by Shell in 2005.

The earlier figure was a forward-looking construction and development estimate.

The later figure was the operator’s reported cumulative recovery of applicable capital and operating expenditure.

They differ in scope, period and accounting purpose.

They cannot responsibly be used as interchangeable measures of a single cost overrun.

Nevertheless, the 2012 announcement establishes that the financial threshold for profit-production sharing had been reached.

The project had entered a new stage.

Contemporaneous company-sourced record: Offshore Energy — Russia: Production Sharing Under Sakhalin-2 Project Starts, 30 March 2012.

Offshore Energy

 

7. The Russian side had already received money before March 2012

The announcement contained another important distinction.

Sakhalin Energy reported that more than $1.14 billion in taxes and other mandatory payments had been transferred to government budgets during 2011.

It also stated that the Russian side had received approximately $3 billion from the project over the period from 1995 through 2011.

These figures demonstrate that Russia was receiving financial benefits before the beginning of the profit-production-sharing stage.

Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that Russia received nothing until March 2012.

The correct distinction is between the earlier forms of payment and the additional profit-production entitlements triggered when the cost-recovery conditions were satisfied.

That distinction also matters for Sakhalin Oblast.

The regional authorities could receive certain payments before the new production-sharing stage.

But the commencement of profit-production sharing created an additional source of economic entitlement.

The precise allocation of those benefits depended upon the contractual and federal-regional arrangements.

A single headline stating that Russia began receiving its share in 2012 would therefore be incomplete.

The state had already received several categories of payments. What changed in March 2012 was the commencement of profit-production sharing under the applicable cost-recovery arrangements.

PART FIVE: THE $100 BILLION FORECAST 8. An ambitious projection — not an established outcome

The March 2012 announcement included an exceptionally large forward-looking figure.

Sakhalin Energy stated that the Russian side’s total revenues over the entire life of the project were expected to exceed $100 billion.

That was a projection.

It was not money already received.

Nor was it a guaranteed payment.

The figure depended upon future production, prices, costs and other assumptions.

The same announcement estimated that Russia would receive approximately $500 million in profit production during 2012, based on an assumed oil price of $100 per barrel.

This qualification is important.

Commodity-price assumptions can materially influence projected receipts.

The future economics of an LNG and oil development also depend upon production performance, contract terms, operating costs, capital expenditure and the relevant allocation formulas.

Consequently, the $100 billion figure should be understood as a company forecast made in March 2012.

It cannot be presented as an independently verified valuation of the state’s eventual receipts.

Nor can the forecast be used to establish what Sakhalin Oblast alone would receive.

The projection concerned the Russian side as a whole.

Its regional allocation was a separate matter.

The announcement is nevertheless historically significant.

It demonstrates the scale of the future economic benefits anticipated by Sakhalin Energy after the project had crossed the cost-recovery threshold.

The forecast also provides a useful benchmark for examining subsequent company disclosures.

PART SIX: WHAT THE 2016 REPORT ACTUALLY SHOWS 9. The original Shell-era figures

The most useful authenticated corporate source for assessing the financial position four years later is Sakhalin Energy’s Sustainable Development Report 2016.

The report was published in March 2017.

Shell remained a substantial minority shareholder at that time.

The report’s section on economic impact management contains detailed information concerning payments to the Russian side and to Sakhalin’s regional and local budgets.

It states that cumulative receipts by the Russian side from the beginning of the project through the end of 2016 exceeded $20.8 billion.

Of that total, approximately $8 billion was attributed to Sakhalin Oblast.

These were considerable sums.

They establish that the project had become a major contributor to Russian public finances.

They also demonstrate the substantial financial benefits reported for the host region.

But the cumulative figures must not be confused with annual payments.

Nor should the regional amount be added to the Russian-side total, because the regional amount was included within it.

The report also contains year-by-year data.

Those annual figures reveal another important aspect of the project’s economic history.

Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016, pages 60–61 (PDF).

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

10. The regional payment record: 2012–2016

Sakhalin Energy’s report contains a chart showing taxes and other mandatory payments made to Sakhalin Oblast’s budget and local budgets.

The figures are expressed in millions of US dollars.

They provide a valuable historical sequence.

2012 — $391 million. The project had entered the profit-production-sharing stage in March of that year.

2013 — $947 million. The company’s reported payments to regional and local budgets increased substantially.

2014 — $2.234 billion. The annual amount rose again.

2015 — $2.411 billion. The reported regional and local budget payments reached the highest annual amount in this five-year series.

2016 — $1.281 billion. The figure declined markedly from the preceding year.

The sequence reveals two developments.

First, the period following the commencement of profit-production sharing was associated with a substantial increase in the reported amounts flowing into Sakhalin’s regional and local budgets.

Second, the payments were not stable.

After reaching approximately $2.41 billion in 2015, they fell to approximately $1.28 billion in 2016.

The reduction was approximately $1.13 billion.

That is a substantial change in a single reporting year.

The figures come from Sakhalin Energy’s own original corporate report.

They are not a reconstruction based upon later estimates.

But the chart does not independently establish the precise causes of the annual variation.

Changes in commodity prices, profitability, timing of tax payments, contractual allocations and other factors may affect receipts.

The complete underlying government accounting records would be required to explain every component of the change.

The defensible conclusion is that the operator reported a substantial decline in regional and local budget payments between 2015 and 2016, notwithstanding the project’s continuing importance to Sakhalin’s economy.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — 2016 Sustainability Report, page 61, annual regional and local budget payments.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

PART SEVEN: MORE THAN 60% OF THE REGIONAL BUDGET 11. September 2016: The company makes a remarkable statement

On 28 September 2016, Interfax reported comments made by Sakhalin Energy representative Ole Myklestad at the Oil and Gas of Sakhalin 2016 conference.

According to the report, Sakhalin II had paid approximately $2.4 billion in taxes to Sakhalin’s regional budget during 2015.

The company representative stated that this represented more than 60% of the region’s budget revenues.

He also reported cumulative payments of approximately $20.5 billion to Russian budgets at different levels.

Of that amount, approximately $7.9 billion had reached Sakhalin Oblast.

The figures correspond closely with the subsequently published 2016 Sustainability Report.

The later report recorded more than $20.8 billion in cumulative Russian-side receipts and approximately $8 billion for Sakhalin Oblast.

The difference is consistent with the later reporting date and additional project payments.

But the underlying figures remain attributed to Sakhalin Energy.

The Interfax article provides contemporary reporting of the company’s statements.

It is not an independent audit of the regional government’s accounts.

The significance of the statement is nevertheless considerable.

It shows that Sakhalin Energy was publicly acknowledging that its payments constituted the majority of Sakhalin’s reported public revenues.

Contemporaneous source: Interfax — Sakhalin II Paid $2.4 Billion into the Regional Budget in 2015, 28 September 2016.

Дальний Восток || Интерфакс Россия

 

12. The 2016 report repeats the dependence figure

The following year, Sakhalin Energy’s Sustainability Report made a similar statement concerning 2016.

The company reported approximately $1.3 billion in taxes and other mandatory payments to Sakhalin’s regional and local budgets.

It also stated that revenues associated with the project represented more than 60% of the regional budget.

The figures are striking when considered together.

In 2015, project-related receipts were reported as accounting for more than 60% of regional revenues.

In 2016, the operator again described the project as contributing more than 60%.

Yet the nominal dollar amount reported for regional and local budget payments had fallen substantially.

This does not demonstrate that the regional economy suffered an equivalent decline in overall public spending.

The budget’s other revenues, exchange rates and accounting arrangements also matter.

Nor does it establish that the operator reduced payments improperly.

But it illustrates the significance of fiscal concentration.

A regional government can remain heavily dependent upon a major revenue source even when the amount received from that source changes sharply.

The Sakhalin II disclosures therefore establish more than the existence of substantial public revenues.

They demonstrate that those revenues had become central to the financial position of the host region.

PART EIGHT: THE ACCOUNTING DETAIL THAT MATTERS 13. The 2016 payments were not all the same kind of revenue

The 2016 Sustainability Report provides another unusually informative breakdown.

The company stated that approximately $2.02 billion had been paid to the Russian Federation in cash and in kind during the reporting year.

Within the reported amounts, royalties paid in kind were valued at approximately $289 million.

The Russian side’s profit-production share was reported at approximately $330 million.

The company also identified approximately $1.36 billion in profits tax paid during 2016 in respect of the 2015 fiscal year.

It anticipated that approximately $900 million in profits tax relating to 2016 performance would be paid in 2017.

These figures demonstrate several important distinctions.

A royalty may be delivered in hydrocarbons rather than cash.

Profit production is a contractual entitlement arising under the production-sharing arrangements.

Corporate profits tax is a separate fiscal obligation.

And tax paid during one calendar year may relate to the company’s financial performance in a preceding fiscal year.

Consequently, the public accounting record cannot be understood merely by adding every headline amount together.

Different figures may have different scopes, reporting periods or accounting treatments.

They may also overlap when presented in broader totals.

Most importantly, the amount received by the Russian side as a whole is not necessarily the amount received by Sakhalin Oblast.

The regional share must be identified through the applicable contractual and governmental allocation arrangements.

The financial flows were significant, but their classification is essential to an accurate assessment.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016, Financial Benefits to the Russian Federation and Sakhalin Oblast, page 60.

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 14. Cost recovery was the critical dividing line

The most important historical finding concerns the relationship between the original project costs and the timing of the state’s profit-production receipts.

The production-sharing agreement allowed the investor to recover applicable expenditure before the new profit-production-sharing stage began.

That structure was a central feature of the original commercial bargain.

It provided the investment framework for an expensive development in a remote region.

But it also meant that disagreement about costs could have significant fiscal consequences.

This helps explain why the dramatic cost escalation announced in 2005 became a matter of political controversy.

It was not simply a question of Shell spending more money.

It concerned the effect that expenditure might have upon Russia’s future financial entitlements.

The Accounts Chamber challenged the economics.

Shell and its partners faced growing governmental pressure.

Gazprom subsequently acquired majority control.

But the financial milestone was not reached until March 2012.

The project had then recovered the amount required under the operator’s reported interpretation of the applicable arrangements.

That was a significant event.

It demonstrates that the original contractual mechanism ultimately entered the stage in which profit production was shared with the Russian side.

It does not, by itself, establish that every earlier cost dispute had been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.

Nor does it demonstrate that every cost submitted for recovery was independently audited and approved without qualification.

A complete assessment would require the relevant budget approvals, recoverable-cost schedules, audit findings and contractual decisions.

15. The fiscal windfall created a different vulnerability

The later economic consequences were substantial.

Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 disclosures identify billions of dollars in cumulative public receipts.

They demonstrate that Sakhalin II had become a major source of financing for the Russian side and particularly the regional government.

But the annual figures also show significant variation.

Sakhalin’s regional and local budget receipts from the project rose sharply after 2012.

By 2015, the reported annual figure exceeded $2.4 billion.

In 2016, it was approximately $1.3 billion.

The difference illustrates a familiar challenge for governments dependent upon extractive industries.

Revenue from oil and gas developments can be considerable.

But it may also vary according to prices, profitability, production, tax timing and contractual arrangements.

When a single project accounts for a large proportion of public income, those changes can become particularly significant.

This is not evidence that Sakhalin Energy behaved improperly.

Nor is it proof that Sakhalin’s regional authorities failed to manage their finances responsibly.

It is an economic characteristic of a highly concentrated revenue system.

A large revenue contribution can create public opportunities while also exposing a government to substantial fluctuations in the source of its income.

The company’s disclosures establish that Sakhalin was experiencing both substantial economic benefits and heavy reliance upon one major industrial project.

16. The distinction between corporate success and fiscal security

Sakhalin II’s industrial achievements were considerable.

The development brought major offshore fields into production.

It established Russia’s first large LNG export operation.

It generated substantial business for contractors.

It employed Russian workers and provided significant public revenues.

But industrial success and fiscal security are not necessarily identical.

A company can operate a technically successful development while the resulting public revenues fluctuate.

A government can receive billions of dollars and nevertheless become exposed to changes in a particular revenue stream.

The Sakhalin Energy reports illustrate this distinction.

Their fiscal disclosures demonstrate the scale of the benefits.

Their year-by-year figures demonstrate the variation.

The important analytical question is therefore not whether the project benefited Sakhalin.

It did, according to substantial contemporaneous evidence.

The question is how those benefits were structured and how the regional government could manage dependence upon them.

That subject extends beyond Shell’s operational responsibilities.

It also involves the Russian federal and regional authorities.

Public spending, budget planning and the distribution of government revenues are governmental functions.

Shell’s historical role must be assessed according to its actual contractual and corporate responsibilities, not presumed responsibility for every subsequent budget decision.

17. The 2017 redistribution dispute was a separate development

The fiscal importance of Sakhalin II also helps explain a later political confrontation.

In 2017, Moscow proposed changing the distribution of corporate profits-tax receipts from the project.

Under the arrangements then in place, Sakhalin Oblast received 75% of the relevant profits-tax revenues.

The proposal reversed the proportions, assigning 75% to the federal budget.

The dispute, subsequent legislation and regional objections were examined in detail in the instalment published on 8 November 2026.

That investigation established that the redistribution concerned a particular category of revenue.

It did not mean Moscow acquired 75% of every fiscal and production-sharing entitlement associated with Sakhalin II.

The present investigation supplies additional context.

By the time Moscow proposed the redistribution, the project had already become a major source of income for Sakhalin Oblast.

The 2016 corporate disclosures establish that dependence.

But the 2017 decision was a governmental fiscal measure.

It should not automatically be attributed to Shell, which was then a minority shareholder in Sakhalin Energy.

The distinction between the company’s payments and the government’s subsequent allocation of those payments remains essential.

Historical source: RBC — Sakhalin to Transfer More Than 68 Billion Roubles to the Wider Far East over Three Years, 29 September 2017.

РБК

 

18. What the documents do not establish

The available record provides a substantial documentary foundation.

But it does not answer every question.

The original 1994 production-sharing agreement and all subsequent amendments have not been independently authenticated together for this investigation.

The complete cost-recovery ledger leading to the March 2012 milestone has not been reconstructed.

The full underlying governmental audit findings have not been reconciled with every expenditure approved for recovery.

The $24.5 billion figure is therefore identified as Sakhalin Energy’s reported recovered expenditure.

It is not presented as the result of an independent forensic audit undertaken by this archive.

Similarly, the regional revenue figures originate from the operator’s published reports and contemporaneous reporting of company statements.

They have not been independently reconciled against every entry in Sakhalin Oblast’s government accounts.

The figures nevertheless provide strong evidence of the amounts Sakhalin Energy reported at the time.

The historical conclusion should reflect those limits.

The evidence establishes the commencement of profit-production sharing, substantial public receipts and significant annual variation in regional payments.

It does not establish misconduct by Shell.

Nor does it support an allegation that the financial reports were deliberately falsified.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

The investigation establishes that Sakhalin II’s production-sharing agreement was signed in June 1994 and that the Russian side included both the federal government and Sakhalin Oblast.

The preserved 1997 federal-regional agreement allocated specified categories of project revenue between Moscow and Sakhalin, including an equal division of the Russian side’s profit-production entitlement.

The operator’s published explanation confirms that cost recovery affected the commencement of profit-production sharing.

Shell announced a substantial increase in projected development costs in July 2005, bringing the estimate to approximately $20 billion.

The Russian Accounts Chamber publicly challenged aspects of the project’s financial implementation in October 2006.

The contemporaneous reporting establishes that these concerns were disputed and politically significant. It does not establish a judicial finding of fraud.

An authenticated Royal Dutch Shell plc SEC filing confirms that Gazprom acquired majority control of Sakhalin Energy in April 2007 for $7.45 billion.

Shell retained an interest of approximately 27.5%.

The share-purchase consideration was separate from Sakhalin’s public revenues and the project’s cost-recovery calculations.

In March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced that profit-production sharing had begun.

It reported that approximately $24.5 billion in capital and operating expenditure had been recovered.

The company identified earlier tax and mandatory payments, demonstrating that the Russian side had received financial benefits before the commencement of profit-production sharing.

Its March 2012 announcement projected approximately $500 million in profit production for the Russian side during that year, based upon an assumed oil price.

It also projected that total Russian-side revenues over the project’s lifetime would exceed $100 billion.

These were forecasts rather than established final receipts.

Sakhalin Energy’s 2016 Sustainability Report recorded more than $20.8 billion in cumulative receipts by the Russian side.

Approximately $8 billion was attributed to Sakhalin Oblast.

The report recorded payments to regional and local budgets of $2.411 billion in 2015 and $1.281 billion in 2016.

It also stated that Sakhalin II accounted for more than 60% of the regional budget in 2016.

The company reported separate payments for royalties, profit production and corporate profits tax.

These financial categories are not interchangeable.

The evidence therefore establishes substantial economic benefits alongside marked annual changes in regional receipts.

It does not establish that those changes resulted from improper conduct.

Nor does it provide a complete independent reconciliation of every cost-recovery and governmental revenue calculation.

CONCLUSION: THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCE

The financial history of Sakhalin II cannot be understood simply by comparing the amount invested with the revenues eventually generated.

The project was developed under a complicated production-sharing agreement.

The investors undertook substantial financial and technical risks.

The Russian state retained ownership of the resources.

And the regional government expected meaningful economic benefits.

But the financial timetable mattered.

Recoverable expenditure affected when the Russian side would begin receiving profit production.

That made the escalation of costs particularly controversial.

In 2005, Shell acknowledged that the projected cost of development had doubled.

In 2006, Russia’s Accounts Chamber challenged the economic implications.

In 2007, Gazprom obtained majority ownership.

Then, in March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced that the project had recovered approximately $24.5 billion in expenditure and entered the profit-production-sharing stage.

That was an important turning point.

The following years brought substantial public revenues.

The operator’s original 2016 report records cumulative receipts exceeding $20.8 billion for the Russian side, including approximately $8 billion attributed to Sakhalin Oblast.

Those figures cannot responsibly be dismissed.

They demonstrate the scale of the project’s financial contribution.

But the same report shows why the subject requires more than celebrating a large cumulative total.

Annual payments to regional and local budgets changed markedly.

The 2015 figure exceeded $2.4 billion.

The following year’s figure was approximately $1.3 billion.

Meanwhile, the operator continued to describe Sakhalin II as contributing more than 60% of regional budget revenues.

That combination reveals the central feature of the Sakhalin budget story.

The project had become an extraordinary source of public income.

But the region was also heavily exposed to changes in that income.

The revenue structure created opportunities for infrastructure, public services and development.

It also made the timing, allocation and predictability of payments exceptionally important.

Those matters extended beyond Shell.

They involved the operator, its shareholders, the Russian federal authorities and Sakhalin’s regional government.

The 2017 dispute over the redistribution of profits-tax revenues demonstrated how sensitive the arrangement could become.

But the underlying dependence was already visible in the company’s authenticated financial disclosures.

The documentary evidence therefore supports a balanced conclusion.

Sakhalin II delivered substantial public revenues. Its cost-recovery mechanism delayed the commencement of profit-production sharing until March 2012. The subsequent regional receipts were considerable, but the company’s own records demonstrate that those payments could change sharply from one year to the next.

That is a significant historical finding.

It does not establish that Shell manipulated the agreement.

It does not demonstrate that Sakhalin Energy improperly recovered expenditure.

Nor does it prove that the Russian government failed to manage the resulting revenues.

The available evidence does, however, show why the financial terms of the original contract mattered so greatly.

A development agreement determines more than who owns a project.

It helps determine when the state receives revenue, which payments are available before cost recovery, how subsequent profit production is divided and how the resulting economic benefits are distributed.

For Sakhalin II, those questions shaped more than two decades of corporate and governmental relations.

The original bargain was negotiated in 1994.

The cost controversy erupted in 2005 and 2006.

The ownership structure changed in 2007.

The profit-production-sharing milestone arrived in 2012.

By 2016, Sakhalin II had become central to the region’s finances.

The evidence demonstrates both the success of the project’s revenue-generating capacity and the vulnerability created when a regional government’s public income becomes concentrated in a major oil and gas development.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

1. Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2016. Original corporate report, pages 60–61, containing cumulative payments to the Russian side, the Sakhalin Oblast allocation, annual regional and local budget payments, and the breakdown of royalties, profit production and profits tax. Original PDF.

2. Royal Dutch Shell plc — SEC Form 6-K, April 2007. Authenticated original corporate filing confirming Gazprom’s $7.45 billion acquisition of majority control of Sakhalin Energy and Shell’s resulting minority interest. Read the original SEC filing.

3. Sakhalin Energy — Production-Sharing Agreement. Official corporate explanation of the contractual structure, government expenditure oversight, cost recovery and commencement of production sharing in 2012. Read the official explanation.

4. Sakhalin Environment Watch — Federal-Regional Agreement, 3 April 1997. Historical reproduction of the arrangement between the Russian government and Sakhalin Oblast governing specified shares of project revenue. The text has not been independently checked against a certified executed original and every amendment. Read the historical document.

5. The Guardian — 15 July 2005. Contemporaneous reporting of Shell’s revised Sakhalin II cost estimate and explanations concerning the escalation. Shell Costs Double at Sakhalin.

6. RIA Novosti — 6 October 2006. Contemporaneous reporting of the Russian Accounts Chamber’s criticism of the project’s financial arrangements, preserved by the Donovan–Shell Archive. Read the archived report.

7. Offshore Energy — 30 March 2012. Contemporaneous reproduction of Sakhalin Energy’s announcement that profit-production sharing had begun, reporting $24.5 billion in recovered costs and the company’s future revenue forecasts. Read the announcement.

8. Interfax — 28 September 2016. Contemporaneous reporting of Sakhalin Energy’s statements concerning regional tax payments, cumulative receipts and Sakhalin II’s contribution to the regional budget. Read the Interfax report.

9. RBC — 29 September 2017. Investigation into the proposed redistribution of Sakhalin II corporate profits-tax receipts from the region to the federal government. Read the RBC report.

10. Donovan–Shell Archive — 8 November 2026. SLF-2007-112, examining the 1997 federal-regional agreement and the subsequent fiscal redistribution dispute. Read the earlier investigation.

11. Donovan–Shell Archive — 14 November 2026. SLF-2007-118, examining economic benefits, procurement and employment within Sakhalin Oblast. Read the previous instalment.

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This investigation examines the relationship between Sakhalin II’s cost-recovery arrangements and the subsequent revenues received by the Russian Federation and Sakhalin Oblast.

It relies upon original corporate disclosures, an authenticated Shell filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, historical contractual material and contemporaneous news reporting.

The Sakhalin Energy 2016 Sustainability Report is treated as an original corporate publication.

Its financial figures are attributed to the company.

They have not been independently reconciled against every underlying accounting entry or governmental budget record.

The historical federal-regional agreement dated 3 April 1997 is reproduced in the Sakhalin Environment Watch archive.

Its contents have not been authenticated against a certified executed original and every subsequent amendment.

No definitive legal conclusion is reached concerning the continuing application of every original revenue-allocation provision.

The July 2005 project-cost estimate, the $24.5 billion cost-recovery amount announced in March 2012, and the later regional fiscal receipts represent different financial measures.

They are not treated as interchangeable.

The Accounts Chamber’s criticisms are attributed to the contemporary reporting of those criticisms.

They are not presented as judicial findings.

The investigation does not allege that Shell deliberately inflated project expenditure, falsified recoverable costs or unlawfully delayed Russian state revenues.

The April 2007 transfer of shares is documented through Shell’s original SEC filing.

The purchase consideration is distinguished from project expenditure and payments into public budgets.

The March 2012 announcement is attributed to Sakhalin Energy through contemporaneous industry reporting.

The company’s $100 billion lifetime revenue projection and its forecast for 2012 profit-production receipts are identified as forecasts, not established final results.

The 2016 company report distinguishes payments to the Russian side from those made to Sakhalin regional and local budgets.

Reported royalties, profit-production receipts, profits tax and other payments are not automatically combined because their accounting treatment and reporting periods differ.

The reported fall in regional and local budget payments between 2015 and 2016 is established from the original corporate data.

No definitive causal explanation is advanced without the corresponding underlying financial and budget records.

The fact that Sakhalin II accounted for more than 60% of the region’s reported budget revenues is attributed to Sakhalin Energy’s disclosures.

The investigation does not independently establish the composition of every item of regional public income.

No court ruling establishing misconduct concerning the specific financial matters examined has been authenticated or relied upon.

The interpretation of fiscal dependence, revenue concentration and public accountability is editorial analysis rather than a judicial or regulatory finding.

Shell plc, former Sakhalin Energy personnel, the current operating company, Gazprom, Russian federal authorities, Sakhalin regional officials and other interested parties are invited to provide authenticated documents, independent audit findings, factual corrections or other relevant evidence.

Any substantive response should be considered and reported fairly.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-120 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CX The $100 Billion Projection — What Sakhalin Energy Promised Russia in 2012, and What the Subsequent Records Actually Show

In March 2012, Sakhalin Energy made an extraordinarily ambitious financial forecast.

The company stated that total revenues received by the Russian side over the life of Sakhalin II were expected to exceed $100 billion.

The projection was made when profit-production sharing began.

It followed the reported recovery of approximately $24.5 billion in project expenditure.

And it reflected expectations concerning production, commodity prices and the financial arrangements governing the development.

But a forecast is not a payment.

Nor does an estimate made in 2012 necessarily remain valid under different market or political circumstances.

The next investigation will examine the documentary basis of that $100 billion projection and compare it with subsequent reported receipts.

It will distinguish amounts actually received from forecasts, profit-production entitlements from taxes, and Russian federal receipts from Sakhalin regional revenues.

It will also examine whether the operator’s later financial disclosures permit a reliable assessment of progress against the original forecast.

An important distinction will concern the change in the project’s ownership and operating structure after 2022.

Shell announced its withdrawal from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.

The project subsequently continued under a replacement Russian operator.

Its later financial results cannot simply be attributed to Shell’s management.

Nevertheless, they may provide evidence relevant to the longer history of the project and its economic commitments.

The central documentary question is straightforward: when Sakhalin Energy predicted that Russia would receive more than $100 billion over the project’s lifetime, what assumptions supported that prediction — and how much of the forecast can be measured against subsequently disclosed payments?

The next file will follow the money, distinguish projected benefits from actual receipts and identify the evidence necessary for an independent historical assessment.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

Editorial note: This instalment adds an important documentary finding to the Sakhalin revenue investigation. The original March 2012 announcement establishes the reported $24.5 billion cost-recovery milestone, while the 2016 corporate report provides a year-by-year record of payments to Sakhalin’s regional and local budgets.

The figures demonstrate substantial public revenues alongside significant annual variation. The investigation deliberately avoids treating that variation as evidence of wrongdoing or attributing every subsequent governmental allocation decision to Shell.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 15 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 15, 2026 at 10:45 pm.
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Deadlock continues into week two of COP31 as Global North blocks climate finance, pushes for false solutions

Demand Climate Justice - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 13:29

MEDIA ADVISORY: Press Conference

15 November, 2026

Antalya, Turkey – As COP31 negotiations enter the second week, Global North countries continue to stall progress on climate finance and just transition while pushing for false solutions. Attempts by the COP31 Presidencies to push several contentious issues into the cover decision have also led to more friction in the negotiations rooms.

The devastating flood in Nepal shows us that the Global South urgently needs climate finance, including trillions for adaptation and loss and damage and to fight the climate crisis. However, the Global North has clearly indicated its priorities as the Global military spending hit $2.9 trillion in 2025. At the same time, Big Polluters and their enablers continue to block progress at COP31, as the Kick Big Polluters Out research shows 30 big banks at COP31 accounted for more than $2.2 trillion in fossil fuel financing from 2021-2025.

Join us to hear from Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ) members as they share their assessment of the first week, how the negotiations will proceed in the second week and their expected outcome.

WHEN: 16 November 2026 | 11.00AM Antalya Time (8AM GMT)

WHERE: Press Conference 2, Area D4 (Live webcast link)

WHO:

  • Meena Raman, Third World Network
  • Pema Lhundrup, Earth in Brackets
  • Asad Rehman, FoE England, Wales and Northern Ireland
  • Kaveri Choudhury, ETC
  • Rachitaa Gupta, Moderator, Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice

For interviews and other queries: 

Juliah Kibochi & Sidharth Pandey

juliah.dcj@gmail.com
sidharth.dcj@gmail.com 

The post Deadlock continues into week two of COP31 as Global North blocks climate finance, pushes for false solutions appeared first on Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice.

Categories: G1. Progressive Green

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #46

Skeptical Science - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 07:29
A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, November 8, 2026 thru Sat, November 14, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

International Climate Conferences and Agreements (6 items)

Climate Policy and Politics (6 items)

Climate Change Impacts (6 items)

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (3 items)

Climate Education and Communication (2 items)

Climate Science and Research (2 items)

  • What if digitalization isn`t the climate fix we imagined? Smart cities and paperless offices promised efficiency. Thirty years of data from the world’s largest economies suggest the energy needed to power them has so far outweighed the savings. The Anthropocene, Sarah DeWeerdt, Nov 10, 2026.
  • Skeptical Science New Research for Week #46 2026 Skeptical Science's weekly roundup of newly published climate research, in peer-reviewed academic journals and from government/NGO sources. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Nov 12, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (1 item)

  • The Scientists Fighting to Help Wildfire Survivors Heal A wildfire exposure study on Maui created a new blueprint for public health research and support after disasters—but funding was drying up. Could the organizers keep it afloat? Inside Climate News, Keerti Gopal, Nov 08, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 item)

Miscellaneous (1 item)

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!
Categories: I. Climate Science

As Texas embraces carbon storage, a Black community questions the risks

Grist - Sun, 11/15/2026 - 06:00

On a rural road outside Beaumont, a Texas energy giant is preparing to pump carbon dioxide underground to permanently store it and keep the gas from contributing to global warming. The project could be the first of its kind to start operating in the state.

It’s a long-awaited milestone for the oil and gas industry, which has touted carbon capture and storage as an important tool for cleaning up industry emissions. Texas lawmakers threw their support behind the technology, while state regulators spent years seeking permitting authority from the federal government to try to clear projects faster.

The Texas Railroad Commission, which oversees the oil and gas industry, won that authority late last year and approved this Exxon Mobil project in September. But the nearby community of Cheek has asked commissioners to reconsider the permit decision.

The area close to the project is predominantly Black, and many residents are working-class or elderly. People there don’t trust the company’s assurances that it will keep residents and their groundwater safe.

Only a small number of carbon storage wells have been permitted so far across the United States, and some CO2-related accidents have already happened. Experts and community advocates have warned of the risk for pipeline accidents and potential underground leaks. Leaders in Cheek are concerned the injected carbon dioxide could contaminate groundwater or get into the air and suffocate them. They worry emergency responders won’t be equipped to rescue them.

“We’re just shocked that they would want to do this so close to homes,” said Douglas Cormier, the 67-year-old president of the Cheek Texas Community Association, who grew up in the rural town and lives there with his wife near his daughters and grandkids.

Residents explained they don’t want to be the test subjects for the technology, and some experts argue it’s more distracting than effective in fighting climate change. Harvard University History of Science Professor Naomi Oreskes, who studies disinformation and climate change, has called carbon capture and storage “mostly a dangerous distraction.”

A recent investigation by Drilled and ProPublica showed it would take more resources than feasible for carbon capture and storage to reduce emissions enough to avoid extreme warming. Companies have canceled or paused nearly a third of 19 proposed carbon storage projects in Texas so far.

But carbon capture supporters argue that storing emissions is an important part of an “all of the above” approach to fighting climate change. Federal tax credits support carbon capture projects. Locally, East Texas remains attractive because of its existing carbon dioxide pipeline network (owned by Exxon Mobil), its geology, and nearby industrial facilities that might pay for their carbon to be stored.

State Representative Drew Darby, a Republican from San Angelo, speaks to panelists at a House Energy Resources Committee meeting regarding carbon storage at the Capitol in Austin on in September.
Jacob Lujan / The Texas Tribune

Exxon Mobil has seven agreements with companies to store the greenhouse gas. The volume of carbon dioxide injected underground through those agreements will equal emissions from 2 million cars.

“The community’s concerns around safety of any sort of an injection project are valid and real and need to be taken seriously,” said Nichole Saunders, senior director and lead counsel for energy transition with the Environmental Defense Fund. “At the same time, the need for more carbon management infrastructure to get to where we want to go on climate is also real.”

So far, the case has raised questions about whether companies and the Railroad Commission are doing enough to address community concerns as a backlog of projects awaits approval.

Agency watchdogs say the commission has a history of failing to keep communities safe from industry risks. It’s also facing pressure from state Representative Drew Darby, leader of the House’s energy resources committee, who told the agency at a September hearing that carbon-capture projects needed to be moving at “utmost pace while protecting the public.”

In a statement to the Tribune, Railroad Commission spokesperson Bryce Dubee said the organization has a record of protecting drinking water while regulating injection wells. Winning the authority to regulate carbon storage “speaks volumes to this expertise,” Dubee said.

Cheek community members sit next to lawyers and oil and gas representatives as the Railroad Commission takes a vote on a proposed Exxon Mobil carbon storage system in East Texas, inside the William B. Travis State Office in Austin on September 15. Jacob Lujan / The Texas Tribune Cheek community members protest outside the William B. Travis State Office Building in Austin before taking a chartered bus back to East Texas after the Railroad Commission of Texas voted in favor of the Exxon Mobil carbon storage system. Jacob Lujan / The Texas Tribune

Exxon Mobil held early meetings with community members in Cheek. The company’s permit requires it to install automatic shut-off systems for the injection wells, monitor the underground carbon dioxide plume, and post a phone number where the operators can be reached around the clock.

The permitting program requires coordination with local emergency officials, according to the commission. Exxon Mobil sponsors emergency training programs through the Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service in College Station.

“We want community members to know they can count on us to operate responsibly, communicate openly, and put safety first every day,” Senior Vice President Dominic Genetti wrote in a blog post.

Christi Craddick, chair of the Texas Railroad Commission, speaks to lawyers and community members before the commission takes a vote on a proposed Exxon Mobil Carbon Storage system in East Texas, inside the William B. Travis State Office in Austin on September 15.
Jacob Lujan / The Texas Tribune

But the day following Darby’s comments, after hearing Exxon Mobil hadn’t talked with the community since the residents hired lawyers, Railroad Commission Chair Christi Craddick scolded Exxon Mobil for not supporting residents enough. Some people from Cheek had taken a bus to be there to voice their concern.

“Give them information,” she said. “Be there for their safety. Give ’em a fire truck if that’s what they want.”

Then Craddick voted for the permit.

Community distrust

Photos and posters about the area’s decades-long history hosting local rodeos hang in 81-year-old Preston Frank’s self-made museum in Cheek. Like many who live here, Frank, an upholsterer, inherited the land from his family. He considers it an important way to build generational wealth.

“That’s the reason why we’ve been fighting Exxon Mobil,” he said. “We don’t want them coming in here and diminishing the value of the land.”

Just west of Beaumont off Interstate 10, the unincorporated community of Cheek is split by the highway and railroad, with many homes sitting on large tracts of land dotted with cattle and horses. People wave to each other. On the north side, there’s a Catholic and a Baptist church. Once a year, residents gather for a community picnic at the park.

Preston Frank poses for a portrait on his property in the unincorporated community of Cheek in October.
Jon Shapley for The Texas Tribune

Exxon Mobil plans to compress carbon dioxide into an “almost liquid state,” pump it thousands of feet deep into the Earth and let it flow into little spaces in the rock, where scientists expect some to dissolve into salty water in those spaces or get stuck like a drink spilled in sand. Residents from the start had concerns.

How does Exxon Mobil know where the molecules will go? What if they don’t behave as expected? What if the project gets abandoned?

Carbon dioxide leaking into water could increase its acidity and cause metals to contaminate it, according to advocacy groups and experts. If it leaks back into the air or a pipeline ruptures and people are caught in a big enough plume, they won’t be able to breathe or run gas-powered cars to escape.

“Contamination of drinking water with CO2, or with metals or chemicals leaching out of rock due to CO2 acidification of the water, could be very costly if the affected aquifer is used by a lot of people,” Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory researchers wrote in a 2007 paper. “[O]nce any aquifer is contaminated, it will remain so.”

Homes are seen near an Exxon Mobil well for injecting carbon dioxide, at upper center, in Jefferson County in October.
Jon Shapley for The Texas Tribune

The Cheek Texas Community Association signed on in July 2025 with attorneys at the nonprofit Earthjustice, which charges no cost. They fought the permit approval all the way to a state administrative hearing in March this year where they argued Exxon Mobil hadn’t done enough to adequately ensure water and public safety would be protected and wasn’t monitoring a large enough area underground.

“It’s the first one in an area so close to a community, and that’s why the water issues and the safety issues are so paramount here,” said Jen Powis, who leads Earthjustice’s Gulf regional office.

The project also raised familiar concerns over environmental justice, a term used by researchers who have shown communities of color suffer a greater proportion of environmental harm than whiter, wealthier areas. Residents feared Exxon Mobil saw in their homes a place where the company could more easily and cheaply push a project through.

The company already built three unassuming injection wells at the edge of the community. Only some residents in Cheek signed so-called pore space agreements with Exxon Mobil for use of the small pockets in underground rock where the carbon dioxide will be stored and that property owners control under current case law.

Doug Cormier drives through Cheek in October. “We’re just shocked that they would want to do this so close to homes,” said Cormier, lifelong resident and president of the Cheek Texas Community Association.
Jon Shapley for The Texas Tribune

“I’m just thinking they found an area where they can do it and not expect a lot of resistance,” said James Strambler, 70, a former IBM technician who moved there around 2017.

After the March hearing, a technical examiner and administrative law judge recommended moving the permit forward to the commission for a vote.

State gains power

Texas’ work to win the authority to permit carbon storage wells dates back more than a decade.

In 2009, Texas lawmakers passed a law authorizing the railroad commission to design a framework for how the state would regulate these projects in a way that upheld federal law. In 2022, the state formally applied to the Environmental Protection Agency for that authority.

At a virtual July 2025 hearing held by the EPA, the Texas Oil and Gas Association, a trade group representing 90 percent of the state’s fossil fuel production, said approving carbon capture and injection would be an economic boom for the state.

Texas Railroad Commissioner Wayne Christian speaks to citizens and experts as the commission takes a vote on a proposed Exxon Mobil carbon storage system in East Texas on September 15 in Austin.
Jacob Lujan / The Texas Tribune

Gaining permitting power for carbon storage wells was “essential for our state’s economic future and energy leadership,” said Todd Staples, the group’s president, following the hearing.

Supporters of the technology are quick to point out that carbon dioxide makes sodas fizzy and creates the tunnels of fog that Texas football teams run through. They cite a study done by Texas A&M researchers that found the danger of leaks presents “a low probability of occurrence” — a risk that can be monitored and managed.

Advocates also point to the state’s decades-long history of injecting carbon dioxide into wells under a different type of permit as a way to draw more oil out of the ground and also store some of the greenhouse gas, a process known as enhanced oil recovery, which Exxon Mobil has pursued for decades.

“This has been put in place now for over 50 years,” said Scott Castleman, a spokesperson for the Gulf Coast Carbon Capture and Storage Alliance, which represents Calpine, Chevron, and Exxon Mobil. “Certainly, there is more discussion and opportunity for this industry to scale, and so that’s where you’re starting to see projects and interest in areas that may not have seen this before.”

Alexis Iwasiw talks about proposed injection wells for carbon dioxide during a meeting at Our Lady of Sorrows Catholic Church in the Jefferson County town of China in October.
Jon Shapley for The Texas Tribune

Establishing community trust will “make or break” projects as the industry grows, said Sophia Cunningham, executive director of the Houston Energy Transition Initiative at the Greater Houston Partnership. Best practices include engaging the community early and providing different, meaningful ways for people to give input and discuss possible benefits.

“It’s a technology that can reduce emissions associated with our industrial activities, and so that is a good pursuit and it’s important to support that,” Cunningham said.“But it’s also reasonable to expect that not everybody in a community is going to want that.”

Residents near projects should be asking whether there would be a helpline to call for any issues, or whether truck drivers would observe weight limits for roads and bridges, said Susan Hovorka, a research professor at the University of Texas at Austin’s Bureau of Economic Geology. In Hovorka’s mind, research and experience have already proven the technology to be safe.

“It’s not utterly without peril, and so people are not foolish to ask,” Hovorka said,“But … their anxiety is sometimes maybe higher than is practical and realistic.”

Nome Mayor Kerry Abney poses for a portrait outside City Hall in Nome. Jon Shapley for The Texas Tribune Mike Doguet visits the site of an injection well being drilled across the street from his home near Nome. The site is part of Exxon Mobil’s Sunflower project, which still needs final regulatory approval. Jon Shapley for The Texas Tribune

But there have been serious incidents in other parts of the U.S.

In Mississippi, a carbon dioxide pipeline ruptured in 2020 after heavy rain caused a landslide, releasing a vapor cloud of CO2. A government investigation found that first responders had not been notified about the safety risks and “had to guess” what they were. Dozens of people went to the hospital.

Injected fluid at another facility in Illinois leaked into “unauthorized zones” underground, which most residents learned about in a news article.

Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry paused the state’s review of new applications to ensure any permit issued would be in compliance with state regulations, citing a need for a review process that considers “the safety of our citizens and environment and that streamlines the process for greater efficiency.” Louisiana has permitted three carbon dioxide wells to be constructed so far but not to begin operating.

Nome Mayor Kerry Abney, front right, measures the concentration of carbon dioxide being vented as Exxon Mobil manager Michael Butler speaks during a safety demonstration at Nome City Hall.
Jon Shapley for The Texas Tribune

In other states with permitting authority as of mid-October, Arizona hasn’t permitted any carbon injection wells. North Dakota has approved eight active injection wells across three projects, and Wyoming has approved five wells in one project.

“The benefit isn’t there,” said Naomi Yoder, an environmental researcher who opposed Texas’ bid to regulate the technology and raised concerns about potential harm to the environment and communities. “So it doesn’t make any risk worth it, and there is risk involved. You can’t possibly sequester enough carbon dioxide to make it worth it.”

Can Texas improve?

In the Texas state hearing in September, the day before Exxon Mobil’s Cheek permit won initial approval, Darby reiterated the importance of supporting the industry. Virginia Palacios, executive director of the agency watchdog group Commission Shift, told him they should also ensure companies pay for equipment and training for emergency responders.

Meanwhile, Railroad Commissioner Wayne Christian has vehemently opposed these projects. Christian has argued carbon dioxide is good for plants, rather than acknowledging the robust science that shows burning fossil fuels has caused carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere to rise, driving up global temperatures.

He voted against Exxon Mobil’s permit, saying he didn’t think it was safe.

An Exxon Mobil well for injecting carbon dioxide is seen near Cheek in October.
Jon Shapley for The Texas Tribune

Newly elected Railroad Commissioner Jon Rosenthal, who will join Craddick and Christian on the three-person commission, told Inside Climate News he supported the state taking over regulation of the wells.

Some projects have meanwhile stalled. Oxy said in its latest earnings call in August that its carbon storage project — the first and only other one approved in the state so far — was coming online “as we look forward.”

Other projects are moving forward, including Exxon Mobil’s second project near a community not far from Cheek, called Nome. The commission is collecting public comment on that project this week at hearings on Monday and Tuesday. Exxon Mobil named this one “Sunflower,” fitting with the Cheek project called “Rose.”

In late October, environmental and community advocates knocked on residents’ doors to invite them to a meeting about how to advocate for themselves. Only one person from the project’s area attended. Several arrived from Cheek, lending advice on what they’d learned while attendees ate pasta and salad.

The meeting hosts characterized the technology as a financial boon to industry and the Railroad Commission while putting drinking water at risk. The colorless, odorless gas can also cause suffocation, presenter Alexis Iwasiw warned the group.

“At high concentrations … it can lead to serious injury or death,” she said.

The next night, Exxon Mobil held an open house in the small Nome City Hall. They served boudin balls and shrimp and offered colorful pamphlets about the company’s safety record, how to respond in an emergency and how drinking water would be protected. They displayed a poster of other pipelines in the area.

As the sun went down, the group of several dozen made its way outside, where the Exxon Mobil presenters enthusiastically launched into explaining how CO2 is safe at certain levels. With a call of “let it rip, tater chip,” they released the gas from a demonstration pipeline, where it puffed out visibly like white smoke.

Mike Doguet, a 72-year-old rice and turf farmer-turned real estate developer, looked on. He believed the company did a much better job communicating with residents in advance here than in Cheek. The company is paying for new firefighting equipment, he said, among other community support. (Cheek community leaders have a list of wants, too, including improved roads, a community center, and an emergency warning system.)

One of the Sunflower project’s injection wells sits across the street from Doguet’s home in Nome, making neighbors wonder if there was oil. Doguet’s daughter lives next door and his son isn’t far. He wasn’t worried about safety.

“In my mind, it’s going to encourage new industry. It’s going to be good for the environment. It’s all positive to me,” Doguet said. “I don’t see the negatives.”

As the presentation went on, a resident from Cheek peppered the Exxon Mobil employees with questions. One of the Exxon Mobil presenters snapped back, telling her they were in the business of keeping substances in pipelines and would always err on the side of safety.

A former Exxon Mobil employee and Nome resident in the crowd, 77-year-old Lawrence Riley, piped up to say that in his decades of experience, he’d never had a pipeline emergency: “They are very, very safe, I am telling you,” he said.

Wearing an Exxon Mobil hat, 71-year-old Mayor Kerry Abney at one point walked through the CO2 cloud. He thought the project was great: Workers were shopping at Big D’s in town, contributing to sales tax, he said. People had a chance to make money in a place where agriculture is tough.

As Abney put it in an interview: “Santa Claus came.”

The Cheek resident watching the plume crossed her arms, looking skeptical.

Carlos Nogueras Ramos and Zach Leggio contributed reporting.

Disclosure: The University of Texas at Austin has been a major financial supporter of The Texas Tribune. Environmental Defense Fund, Greater Houston Partnership, and IBM have been financial supporters within the past five years. The Texas Tribune is a nonprofit, nonpartisan news organization that is funded in part by donations from members, foundations, and corporate sponsors. Financial supporters play no role in our journalism. Find a complete list of them and more information about our financial and disclosure policies here.

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This story was originally published by Grist with the headline As Texas embraces carbon storage, a Black community questions the risks on Nov 15, 2026.

Categories: H. Green News

COP31: Australia and Türkiye urged not to ignore calls for fossil fuel phaseout

Renew Economy - Sat, 11/14/2026 - 21:51

Failure to acknowledge growing calls for a fossil fuel phaseout – particularly by Australia and Türkiye – will damage COP credibility, summit hears.

The post COP31: Australia and Türkiye urged not to ignore calls for fossil fuel phaseout appeared first on Renew Economy.

After the blizzard: In a post-Snowy 2.0 world, what role does Snowy Hydro play?

Renew Economy - Sat, 11/14/2026 - 21:34

Now that we know Snowy 2.0 is going ahead, what role will Snowy Hydro play in the market? A cultural reset is required: Snowy needs to act like a public company.

The post After the blizzard: In a post-Snowy 2.0 world, what role does Snowy Hydro play? appeared first on Renew Economy.

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