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Don’t underestimate heat. While less visible than other extreme weather events like hurricanes or floods, heat consistently accounts for more U.S. fatalities than any other type of weather disaster. Around the world, extreme heat now kills one person every minute, according to a recent report, a rate that has risen 23 percent since the 1990s.

Heat deaths are also chronically undercounted, both in the U.S. and around the world. Outdoor workers are among the most vulnerable, along with older people, children, and those with chronic health conditions. But heat can affect anyone, and our own biases about what constitutes good weather (sunny summer days are glorious) often downplay its risks.

Grist has been reporting on the steadily increasing threat of extreme heat for years. So as we contend with continued record-breaking years of temperature highs, we’re rounding up some of that reporting to help you understand why it’s vital to take heat seriously, and how to stay safe. 

The rising threat of heat A sign posted in Phoenix, Arizona during the city’s 2023 heat wave. Mario Tama / Getty Images

To put it simply, hot places are getting hotter, and places that have traditionally not experienced extreme heat and are less prepared to weather it are increasingly subject to dangerous temperatures.

The risk of heat is increasing. Any given heat event can’t be solely attributed to climate change, but there is no doubt that heat waves are happening more often and reaching higher highs as a result of climate change. In fact, scientific consensus is now that climate change has played a role in making almost all heat waves more likely or more severe.

And yes, even in years that experience extreme cold weather, the average overall temperature is rising.

Other factors can amplify the warming effects of climate change, like the naturally occurring El Niño weather pattern. In an El Niño year, global heat is typically exacerbated by high ocean temperatures in the Pacific. The hottest years on record tend to happen during El Niño.

The term heat wave generally describes any period of unusually hot weather. But some of the most dangerous heat waves are caused by what’s known as a heat dome. In a heat dome, a high-pressure system traps hot air in one region, feeding off itself to increase heat and humidity the longer it stagnates in one place.

Humidity makes heat even more dangerous. Any type of heat can be dangerous when your body can’t pump out sweat fast enough to stay cool. But heat and humidity play together to affect your ability to cool off. Higher humidity makes it harder for sweat to evaporate, reducing your body’s ability to cool itself naturally.

That’s why you may hear not just about temperature, but about something called “wet bulb temperature,” a measure that includes both heat and humidity — essentially the temperature we experience after sweat cools us off.

When the wet bulb temperature crosses 95 degrees Fahrenheit, our bodies lose the ability to cool down entirely — a threshold that has already been breached more than a dozen times, mostly in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. But stress on the body can start much lower than that. Even healthy young adults can experience health effects at a wet bulb temperature as low as 86 degrees F.

Heat affects your whole body A poster on a Los Angeles street warns about heat-related illness in 2026. Justin Sullivan / Getty Images

Exposure to high heat has immediate health effects. Extreme heat forces the heart to pump two to four times as much blood per minute to cool the body. That can lead to dehydration, which makes blood thicker and harder to circulate, and worsen into heat exhaustion or heatstroke, or lead to heart failure. On particularly hot days, burns from scorching hot surfaces, including pavement, are an added risk.

Each year, hundreds of thousands of people in the U.S. end up in the emergency department due to heat illness and related cardiovascular, respiratory, and kidney issues. 

What to watch for: The first symptom of severe dehydration is typically cramps, which might feel like normal workout cramps.

Signs of heat exhaustion include muscle aches or cramps; headache; excessive sweating and thirst; feeling lightheaded or dizzy; nausea or vomiting; and pale, cool, clammy skin, especially on the extremities.

To combat heat exhaustion, bring down a person’s body temperature by removing heavy clothes, drinking water, and moving to shade or AC. Laying them down with elevated legs and applying damp cloths or misting with water can also help actively cool the body.

Save this quick tip sheet from Grist’s Instagram. Adapted from Extreme Heat 101.​

Heatstroke occurs when the body loses its ability to cool itself and reaches dangerous internal temperatures. It can result in permanent brain injury or loss of life. Look out for symptoms like confusion, irritability, or unresponsiveness; severe fatigue; a fast pulse; nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea; lack of sweat (though sweating is possible too); and hot and dry skin.

Call 911 if you think someone is experiencing heat stroke, then dunk them in cold or iced water, or apply ice on areas near large blood vessels, like the groin, armpits, neck, and core.

Save this quick tip sheet from Grist’s Instagram. Adapted from Extreme Heat 101.​

Heat’s health effects also reach much deeper. Exposure to extreme heat affects us in all sorts of other ways that doctors and scientists are just beginning to understand. For example, heat has been shown to increase rates of violent crime, and has been linked to worsening mental health including suicide.

Long-term exposure to heat can result in chronic health issues, like cardiovascular disease. Outdoor workers in some of the hottest parts of the world are developing an unusual form of chronic kidney disease linked to extended dehydration and heat stress. 

Heat affects all of your body systems. These are a few key ones. Find even more here: How climate change gets under the skin​

Nighttime heat is a particular driver. Nighttime temperatures are increasing faster than daytime temperatures in much of the world, eliminating a crucial window for cooling down.

We also sleep worse when it’s hot, already losing 45 hours of sleep per year due to the heat.

Ways to prepare Improvised window coverings in a Paris apartment during the June 2026 heat wave. Sophia Berger / Hans Lucas via AFP / Getty Images

Your house makes a big difference. If a heat wave is headed your way, dehumidify your house to get the indoor humidity down. Seal off openings around windows and doors to prevent hot air from entering. Cover windows to prevent the sun from heating up the indoors — blackout shades, blinds, or even DIY solutions work.

In a low humidity environment, you can even DIY your own air conditioning.

Keep water, electrolytes, and ice on hand, at home and at work, and identify cool places to go, like a public library. This isn’t just useful to ease boredom — heat can place additional strain on the electricity grid as everyone runs their air conditioners, sometimes resulting in power outages.

In the long term: Retrofits like reflective roofs, window overhangs to block the sun, and better insulation can provide more relief.

And as you’re preparing, don’t forget to check on vulnerable neighbors and community members. 

Grist has even more advice for safety and preparedness. Go deeper on community readiness and workplace safety here: Extreme heat 101

And more tips on emergency preparedness, including for heat and power outages, can be found here: How to prepare for a disaster

Stay safe out there (or, better yet, inside where it’s cool).

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Why heat is so deadly and how to stay safe on Jul 9, 2026.

EWG testimony to the California Senate Committee on Agriculture on AB1603 to increase the transparency and reporting of PFAS pesticides usage rcoleman July 9, 2026

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is David Andrews and I am the Chief Science Officer for the Environmental Working Group.

I hold a Ph.D. in Chemistry from Northwestern University and have been a co-author on ten peer-reviewed publications on PFAS, including a paper on PFAS pesticides.

PFAS—or "forever chemicals"—pose serious health risks, including cancer, reproductive problems, harm to the thyroid and immune system, liver and kidney disease and more. 

2.5 million pounds of PFAS pesticides are used each year in California.

40% of non-organic produce grown in California had at least one PFAS pesticide, some with many. 

PFAS pesticides are widespread in water and soil in California.

PFAS should be regulated as a class - we do not want one problematic chemical substituted for another. 

California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control has stated that all PFAS share the core hazard trait of extreme environmental persistence. 

PFAS pesticides fall into a regulatory blind spot.

The US EPA’s and the California Department of Pesticide Regulations’ current have been inadequate with respect to immune system harm, or the cumulative impacts of the very small PFAS.

TFA, or trifluoroacetic acid, is one of the small PFAS contaminants that result from PFAS pesticide usage and levels are increasing in our water, food and environment.

North Carolina ground water testing found TFA in nearly all of their samples, and it is estimated that PFAS pesticide use in California creates up to 600,000 pounds of TFA.

Earlier this month, ECHA's scientific committee concluded TFA should be classified as toxic to reproduction, and also very persistent and very mobile.

With the increasing evidence of harm from PFAS we are disappointed that the legislature is not acting more decisively on PFAS pesticides but we support this step to catalogue usage.

Thank you.

Areas of Focus Toxic Chemicals Pesticides PFAS Chemicals Authors David Andrews, Ph.D. June 30, 2026

EWG testimony to the California Senate Committee on Environmental Quality on AB1603 to restrict and ban the use of PFAS pesticides rcoleman July 9, 2026

Good morning,

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Varun Subramaniam and I am a Science Analyst at the Environmental Working Group.

I hold a graduate degree in health data science as well as a degree in environmental health.

I coauthored recent reports which found that, each year, millions of pounds of PFAS pesticides are being applied to, and detected in high frequencies on, fruits and vegetables grown in California. 

PFAS pesticides are also often found in surface water and soil near agricultural areas.

PFAS in any form pose serious, well-documented health and environmental risks that warrant strict limitations of their use and regulation as a class. 

Exposure to PFAS is linked to liver and kidney disease, reproductive problems, child development delays, cancer, weakened thyroid function, and reduced vaccine effectiveness in children. 

Additionally, all PFAS share the core characteristic of a carbon-fluorine bond that results in extreme environmental persistence; they do not fully break down in the environment.3

This drastically increases the timeframe of exposure, with today’s contamination potentially harming health for decades.

These PFAS pesticides fall into a regulatory blind spot.

Current regulatory evaluations of PFAS pesticides do NOT adequately account for potential immune system harm or the impacts of very small forms of PFAS that form from many PFAS pesticides, including trifluoroacetic acid or TFA.

Immunotoxicity is one of the most critical health effects for PFAS risk assessments, so we are overlooking key, not fringe, information by not considering studies of immune effects.4,5

In addition, TFA, which is linked to reproductive harm, has been detected in nearly all water and human serum samples, where tested.

Fortunately, farmers have options that are not PFAS. 

Of the roughly 1,000 active pesticide ingredients currently approved for use in California, 95% are not PFAS. And other states, like Maine and Minnesota, have already announced planned phase-outs for these chemicals.

The health and environmental risks of PFAS exposure are significant. 

Scientists across the world agree that we must act swiftly to halt this multigenerational cycle of contamination.

Thank you.

Areas of Focus Toxic Chemicals Pesticides PFAS Chemicals Authors Varun Subramaniam, M.S. June 24, 2026

EWG testimony to California Assembly Committee on Environmental Safety and Toxic Materials on AB1603 to restrict and ban the use of PFAS pesticides rcoleman July 9, 2026

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

My name is David Andrews, and I am the Acting Chief Science Officer at the Environmental Working Group. I hold a Ph.D. in Chemistry from Northwestern University and have been a co-author on ten peer-reviewed publications on PFAS, including a 2024 paper that identified EPA-approved PFAS pesticides.

PFAS—often called "forever chemicals"—pose serious, well-documented health risks. 

Exposure to this class of chemicals is linked to altered immune and thyroid function, liver and kidney disease, reproductive problems, child development delays, cancer and more. 

The Department of Toxic Substances Control has stated that all PFAS share the core hazard trait of extreme environmental persistence.

And what may surprise you is that our food is a primary, under regulated route of exposure.

PFAS pesticides fall into a regulatory blind spot.

The EPA’s and the California Department of Pesticide Regulations’ current regulatory evaluation of PFAS pesticides have NOT adequately evaluated the pesticides’ potential for immune system harm, or fully assessed the impacts of the very small PFAS, including trifluoroacetic acid or TFA, that form from PFAS pesticides. 

Levels of these small PFAS are increasing in our water, food and environment and exposure to them is linked to reproductive and immune toxicity.

North Carolina ground water testing found TFA in 95% of their samples, and it is estimated that PFAS pesticide use in California creates up to 600,000 pounds of TFA each year. These findings should alarm California, which will likely find similar contamination when official tests are done.

In regard to food, EWG recently found that nearly 40% of all non-organic produce grown right here in California contains traces of at least one PFAS pesticide. For some agricultural staples such as peaches, plums and nectarines, the numbers are even higher.

Fortunately, farmers have options that are not PFAS. Of the roughly 1,000 active pesticide ingredients currently approved for use in California, only 53 are PFAS. 

Thank you.

Areas of Focus Toxic Chemicals Pesticides PFAS Chemicals Authors David Andrews, Ph.D. April 14, 2026

EWG testimony to Vermont House Committee on Agriculture, Food Resiliency, and Forestry on H.911 to prohibit PFAS in pesticides and packaging rcoleman July 9, 2026

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. 

My name is Varun Subramaniam, and I am a Science Analyst at the Environmental Working Group. 

I hold a master's degree in health data science from the George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health and a degree in environmental health science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Gillings School of Global Public Health.

My professional work involves applying data science techniques to issues of environmental health, with attention to chemical exposures. 

EWG is a national environmental organization that has, for several decades, investigated the impacts of PFAS on public health and tracked PFAS detections in tap water. 

EWG has published multiple peer-reviewed studies on PFAS exposure sources, including a 2024 peer-reviewed paper on PFAS pesticides. 

Last month, we published a new analysis on the presence of PFAS on fruits and vegetables in the United States.

The growing threat of PFAS

PFAS pose serious health risks to the public.

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, PFAS exposure may lead to increased cholesterol, decreased fertility, developmental harm including low birth-weight, interference with the body’s natural hormones and harm to the immune system.

The agency also reports that PFAS have been linked to an increased risk of some cancers, including prostate, kidney, and testicular cancers. 

PFAS exposure for children is particularly concerning due to increased sensitivity to the harmful effects of chemicals such as PFAS.

PFAS overexposure

We know from recent research that everyone is overexposed to PFAS. 

In 2022, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine assessed PFAS concentrations in human blood samples.

They found that 98% of samples had PFAS levels that warranted exposure reduction and screenings for various health disorders, including hypertension during pregnancy and breast cancer.

PFAS are frequently found in our tap water. 

Food as a Primary Route of Exposure

What may surprise you is that our food, not our water, might be an even bigger source of PFAS exposure. 

The general scientific consensus is that our food is a significant, if not primary, route of exposure.

A 2020 study in Environment International concluded that dietary exposure from the ingestion of food and drinks was the “predominant exposure pathway” to PFAS.

How PFAS enters our diets

PFAS contaminates our food in many, overlapping ways. 

First, PFAS that is used in food packaging can migrate into our food. 

Second, sewage sludge that is contaminated with PFAS and used as a fertilizer can contaminate our food and the farm animals who are fed contaminated feed. 

Third, irrigation water that is contaminated with PFAS can also be absorbed by crops and contaminate our food. 

Fourth, and perhaps most directly, pesticides either made with PFAS as an ingredient or stored in containers that are lined with PFAS can contaminate our food. 

PFAS pesticides on produce

The presence of PFAS pesticides on our food is widespread.

Last month, EWG released a new study of PFAS residues on produce. 

We analyzed testing data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and found 31 different PFAS pesticides were detected on 30% of non-organic U.S. fruit and vegetables.

The most commonly detected pesticide on U.S. produce was fludioxonil–a PFAS fungicide.

Fludioxonil was found on 14% of all produce samples and on nearly 90% of peach and plum samples.

Peer-reviewed literature has linked fludioxonil exposure to hormonal disruption and has found evidence of reproductive toxicity.

Why are PFAS used in pesticides?

You might ask: why is PFAS used in pesticides?

PFAS can modify the attributes of pesticides, mainly conferring increased molecular stability on the chemical. This means that the pesticides can’t be broken down easily and are highly heat-resistant.

PFAS are also known to increase membrane permeability, meaning that pests absorb the chemical faster and can be immobilized more efficiently11.

Alternatives to PFAS pesticides

Farmers have alternatives to pesticides made with PFAS. 

There are effective options available to manage insects and weeds without relying on PFAS pesticides.

Biological controls, such as biopesticides or those derived from entirely biological sources, are popular alternatives to PFAS pesticides.

The menu of pesticides available to farmers is large and ever-growing, with new pesticide active ingredients and products coming to the market each year. 

There are more than 90,000 pesticide products registered with the EPA, comprising over 800 active ingredients. Of these, about 350 active ingredients are approved for use on food crops.

Just 66 of these active ingredients are PFAS. 

According to U.S. Geological Survey, less than 1% of all the pesticides, by volume, used in the state of Vermont are pesticides that include PFAS as an ingredient.

The Hidden PFAS around us

Another concerning characteristic of these chemicals is that most PFAS pesticides ultimately break down into other PFAS like trifluoroacetic acid, or TFA. 

TFA can persist in the environment for hundreds of years and levels are increasing in soil, water, plants, plant based foods, and human bodies.

It’s not just the PFAS pesticides that can last for years and harm health – they are also precursors to other chemicals that will outlast us by centuries.

Conclusion

In summary, we are all exposed to PFAS. Many of us have levels of PFAS in our blood that pose serious health risks. 

Our food is a significant source of our exposure to PFAS. 

The food we eat is contaminated through: PFAS used in food packaging, PFAS in sewage sludge used as fertilizer, contaminated irrigation water, and pesticides either made with PFAS or stored in containers lined with PFAS. 

Most pesticides are made without PFAS, and new, better-studied pesticides are routinely approved for use by the EPA.

Less than 1% of the pesticides, by volume, used in Vermont are pesticides made with PFAS. 

Thank you for allowing me to testify today about PFAS pesticides.

I am happy to answer any questions.

Areas of Focus Toxic Chemicals Pesticides PFAS Chemicals Authors Varun Subramaniam, M.S. April 9, 2026

Job Opening Announcement: Wildlands and Wildlife Program Staff Attorney
Reports to: Wildlands and Wildlife Program Director
Location: Portland, Oregon strongly preferred. Other WELC office locations may be considered for an exceptional candidate in the right situation.
Timeline: Job opening posted July 9, 2026; we will review applications and interview candidates on a rolling basis and encourage early applications. The position is open until filled.
Salary: $76,000 – $106,000 annually
To Apply: ApplicantPro portal

About the Western Environmental Law Center:
The Western Environmental Law Center is a leading nonprofit, public-interest environmental law firm rooted in the landscapes and communities of the western U.S. Founded in 1993, WELC has been celebrated as an Outside Magazine Best Place to Work for the final six years of the contest (it ended in 2024), Oregon Business Magazine Best Nonprofit, Law360 Environmental Group of the Year, and Better Business Bureau Torch Award winner for ethics.

We envision a thriving western U.S., abundant with protected and interconnected ecosystems, powered by renewable energy, and cared for by communities brought together in an ecology of kinship. We embrace a collaborative, team-based approach to foster the trust, belonging, and dignity essential to a healthy organization and to relationship-based advocacy that builds power for transformative change.

We seek to retain a Staff Attorney (2+ years of experience) to join our team. We strongly encourage people of color, persons with disabilities, women, LGBTQ+ applicants, and people of diverse lived experience to apply.

Position Summary:
The Wildlands & Wildlife Program Staff Attorney is an exempt, full-time position. The central focus of this position is strategic legal advocacy centered on public lands, waters, wildlife, and communities in the western U.S. The position’s responsibilities will be allocated among the following core areas:

• Litigation and administrative engagement protecting federal public lands, wildlife habitat, species, and water.
• Engagement in federal and potentially state-level legislation, rulemaking, and policymaking to protect public lands, water, and species. This may include defense of existing laws and regulations as well as efforts to improve the same.

Given the dynamic moment in which we find ourselves, this litigation position’s focus and time allocations will necessarily evolve in response to changing political, scientific, social, and economic circumstances and opportunities consistent with specific organizational strategies. Further, the position may be somewhat flexible to accommodate a successful candidate’s distinctive skills, experiences, and interests to further and complement WELC’s strategic Wildlands and Wildlife focus. WELC’s organizational and strategic direction is not “top down,” but is informed precisely by the individual qualities of its staff. Moreover, the location of the successful candidate will play a role in their precise docket of work.

Accordingly, over time, the Staff Attorney will be encouraged and supported to identify and advance opportunities to shape WELC’s organizational and strategic direction, to share perspectives, and to become a trusted and respected leader in their field and within their scope of work. The Staff Attorney will support and coordinate with WELC leadership, development, communications, and finance staff, as well as represent WELC in public and private settings. The Staff Attorney will also participate in retreats, trainings, and other organizational events.

To fulfill this position’s responsibilities, the Staff Attorney may provide a full range of legal services on behalf of WELC, including primarily litigation, but also policy advocacy, and administrative action. To excel in these efforts, the Staff Attorney will stay apprised of relevant law, policy, social, and other developments. The Staff Attorney will work collaboratively with staff across the organization, as well as with partner organizations and clients.

The Staff Attorney is a normal 40-hour week position based out of WELC’S Portland office or, potentially for an exceptional candidate, another of WELC’s office, primarily working during Monday to Friday business hours, though some night and weekend hours may be required at times, depending on organizational and advocacy needs. Limited travel is required, averaging a total of 2-3 weeks per year, including some overnight and weekend travel. The position also involves standard office physical demands. WELC will provide all reasonable accommodations to the extent possible or required pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Qualifications:
We are keenly interested in considering a range of applicants with diverse lived experiences who approach the world with kindness, empathy, imagination, and vision. We will happily consider applicants who offer an equivalent or alternative set of qualifications to fulfill this position’s responsibilities, apart from the first two qualifications set forth below, which are mandatory.

• Law degree from an accredited law school.
• Admission to and good standing with the state bar in Oregon, and/or one of the states where we practice and willingness and ability to obtain membership to the Oregon state bar at the earliest opportunity.
• Lived experience within or past work experience in partnership with people and communities of diverse backgrounds and experience, particularly in the western U.S.
• Two or more years relevant attorney experience.
• Excellent research, writing, and oral advocacy skills.
• Experience with and knowledge of public lands, waters, species, and community challenges and opportunities in the western U.S.
• Experience with and knowledge of the relevant agencies, laws, and regulations employed in litigation to protect public lands, waters, and species.
• Ability and willingness to use a complete set of legal advocacy tools including litigation, policy, and administrative advocacy.
• A commitment to conceptualizing and implementing legal strategies that further equity, inclusion, and justice, including through the just treatment and meaningful involvement of clients, partners, and frontline community groups and individuals.
• Dynamic and empathetic skills to foster relationships with partners, clients, agency staff, and community members. Demonstrated ability to work in complex, potentially high-conflict, multi- dimensional arenas involving a broad array of organizations and interests.
• Eagerness to mentor, support, and help develop newer attorneys and a self-awareness, motivation, and desire to seek opportunities for your own growth and development.
• An interest in and understanding of science and other technical fields and their interplay with public interest environmental law.
• Ability to work independently and proactively, including a willingness to be flexible and adaptive when needed.
• Desire to work on and contribute to a team. This includes learning from others, giving and receiving support and feedback, and active, constructive engagement in organizational discussions to advance the organization’s mission and contribute to its cohesion.
• Highly organized and intellectually curious.
• Demonstrated commitment to WELC’s mission and strategies and the public interest, as well as a love for the land, waters, species, and communities of the western U.S.

Benefits and Compensation:
Western Environmental Law Center is an equal opportunity employer. We offer a flexible, friendly, team-based environment with immediate opportunities to shape organizational strategies, and competitive, transparent, and equity-based salaries as follows:

• Staff Attorney, range based on years of legal experience: $76,000 (2 years) – $106,000 (10 years) with commensurate increases for an attorney with greater experience.
• WELC offers an excellent benefits package, including health, vision, dental, life, and disability coverage (with 100% employer paid premiums), a 401(k) retirement plan with a 4% employer match, 22 days combined of paid annual vacation and personal leave, 13 days of paid holiday leave, paid sick leave, and a paid long-term leave policy (3 months sabbatical leave for every 5 years of employment).

To Apply:
Please submit the following as PDF attachments through our ApplicantPro portal.

• 1-2 page cover letter addressed to Sarah McMillan, Wildlands & Wildlife Program Director
• Resume;
• 3 professional references; and
• 1-2 concise writing samples, with at least 1 writing sample involving a legal memorandum, brief, or filing. An additional, non-legal writing sample is also welcomed to illustrate the candidate’s background, views, or

Cover letters should communicate applicants’ commitment to WELC’s mission and advocacy and their motivation to work in this position and in public interest environmental law generally. In your cover letter, please do not repeat information apparent from a review of your resume. Instead, applicants are very strongly encouraged to tell us who they are as human beings, why they care about this work, and why they want to work for WELC specifically.

The post Career Opportunity: Wildlands and Wildlife Program Staff Attorney (Portland, others considered) appeared first on Western Environmental Law Center.

As the United States marked its 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, Native leaders, scholars, and advocates say the country’s milestone cannot be understood without acknowledging the Indigenous nations that predate the U.S and the promises that remain unfulfilled.

During a Native News Online live stream, America 250: A Republic Built on Native Land, hosted by Editor Levi Rickert, five conversations explored what America’s semiquincentennial means from Native perspectives. Guests included Cherokee Nation Principal Chief Chuck Hoskin Jr.; Navajo author and activist Mark Charles; Native Organizers Alliance Executive Director Judith LeBlanc; and professors Anton Treuer and Dina Gilio-Whitaker.

Although their perspectives differed, each agreed on one point: the nation’s history and its future must include Native voices.

 

The post American 250: A Republic Built on Native Land appeared first on Native Organizers Alliance.

In 2023, the United State Supreme Court ruled on the Sackett decision, which drastically narrowed the scope of the federal Clean Water Act and left many waters that were previously covered by the...

Checks & Balances Project (C&BP) filed a Freedom of Information Act with Sussex County, Virginia, seeking all communications and records related to the April firing of County Administrator Richard Douglas.

In a motion by Supervisor Alfred Futrell, Douglas was fired April 16 in a surprise vote by county supervisors.

His removal followed months of dissatisfaction over county finances and disputes over the county emergency medical services (EMS) contracts.

Douglas was replaced by Board Chair Steve White, who assumed the job of acting county administrator. C&BP has filed a complaint with Virginia Attorney General Jay Jones seeking an investigation into whether White is violating state law by service as a county official and an elected supervisor. C&BP has asked White if he is drawing a salary for acting as county administrator.

White is a also a Virginia state employee, working for the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services.

Potential conflicts of interest

C&BP has also filed FOIA requests seeking the county’s recusal policy for elected officials, the number of times officials have recused themselves in the last 25 years and for all records related to the county’s EMS services and the Stony Creek Volunteer Rescue Squad (SCVRS), which White chairs.

As of July 9, the county has not provided any of the records.

C&BP reported on June 30 that the IRS suspected SCVRS’ nonprofit status in 2023 because it had failed to file tax returns for three years. The nonprofit status was restored in 2025, but the latest publicly available SCVRS tax return is from 2019.

SCVRS reported a $304,000 surplus in the five years of tax returns from 2015 to 2019 that are on the IRS website.

Questions about finances

The murkiness around SCVRS’s finances was noted in the record of an April 17, 2025, board meeting. According to publicly available minutes from the board meetings:

Then-Sussex County Fire Chief Nick Sheffield told supervisors that Stony Creek and the nearby Waverly rescue squad each bills for its services.

Sheffield said, “Each of the rescue squads operate off of that money.”

Sheffield also said, “There’s a net profit to that and nobody knows what the net profit is,” though it is unclear if Sheffield was referring to Stony Creek’s profits of those of other County rescue squad.

There is no record from that time showing anyone at the supervisors’ meeting knew that Stony Creek had lost its tax status two years earlier because it had not filed its taxes for several years.

Six months later, Sheffield left his job after supervisors voted in a Sept. 18, 2025, meeting to eliminate funding for his job. He now works in North Carolina.

Ray Locker is the executive director for Checks & Balances Project, an investigative watchdog blog holding government officials, lobbyists, and corporate management accountable to the public. Funding for C&BP is provided by Renew American Prosperity and individual donors.

You may also want to read:

Checks & Balances Project files FOIA request seeking Sussex County EMS records

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The post C&BP seeks Sussex County records on firing of county administrator appeared first on Checks and Balances Project.

Andhra Pradesh Community Managed Natural Farming (APCNF) recently received the 2026 Food Planet Prize for their role in leading one of the world’s largest agroecology projects. The award will help the organization scale sustainable practices to the 6 million farmers in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh and beyond.

The Food Planet Prize, the world’s largest environmental award of US$1.5 million, recognizes successful projects working at the intersection of food and agriculture systems and climate. This year, the committee recognized APCNF for demonstrating a scalable pathway for farmers to improve their livelihoods, resilience, and environmental outcomes. 

APCNF—led by the nonprofit Rythu Sadhikara Samstha (RySS), which translates to the Farmer Empowerment Organisation—began with 40,000 smallholders practicing natural farming in 2016. Over the last decade, it has grown to reach 1.8 million producers.

Under the program, farmers learn how to use locally available biological resources, diversify crops, and introduce natural soil-enrichment techniques. Those who become experts in these practices, known as master farmers, take on the role of teachers in their communities. Each master farmer offers training and guidance to 100–150 neighboring producers.

At the center of this program are women, who make up over 60 percent of the master farmers in APCNF’s network. “They are the heroes of our work,” Vijay Kumar Thallam, Executive Vice Chair of RySS, tells Food Tank. “Women have played such a critical role as people who are experimenting because it’s not a top-down approach.”

Thallam sees every farmer as a scientist, adding to the knowledge pool, helping to refine innovations, determining what strategies work, and where. “That’s the beauty of this,” he says.

But the transition isn’t without uncertainty, and Thallam feels immense gratitude to everyone who puts their trust in natural farming. Without deep resources to fall back on, farmers are putting their livelihoods on the line. “It’s a very big risk when they shift.”

Fortunately, their work is paying off. “The poorest farmers believed in us,” Thallam tells Food Tank. “They experimented in this, they found success, they expanded the area, and inspired others.”

In Andhra Pradesh, natural farming plots have grown more resilient to extreme weather patterns—something that will become particularly important this year during El Niño. Heavy rains may destroy plants on chemically-treated fields, but when farmers use natural farming techniques, their crops better withstand the conditions. As the approach scales to other countries, including Zambia and Sri Lanka, producers are seeing similar results. 

“What we are doing is very simple but very profound,” Thallam tells Food Tank. “It’s something anybody can do anywhere in the world.”

Watch the full conversation with Vijay Kumar Thallam on “Food Talk with Dani Nierenberg” to hear more about the journey farmers take with APCNF, why chemical-based agriculture is built on the wrong science, and plans to bring natural farming to more producers around the world.

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Andhra Pradesh Community Managed Natural Farming

The post ‘Simple But Profound’: Natural Farming Is Changing the Lives of Millions in India appeared first on Food Tank.

When you walk into Magnolia Cafe in Dunn, North Carolina, you are greeted by a friendly kitchen and the smell of comfort food. A mural of colorful magnolias covers one wall while another showcases the phrase, “Where Dignity Meets Delicious.” Despite being a new cafe, it feels like a place where the locals are regulars. Behind the locally sourced ingredients and the display case of banana pudding, there’s something that makes this cafe extra special.

The post Magnolia Cafe in Dunn, NC | Where Dignity Meets Delicious appeared first on RAFI.

A Los Angeles Times article published this week highlights the escalating climate risks facing California and the world. With experts forecasting a strengthening El Niño, continued record-breaking temperatures, and mounting concern over rapidly warming oceans, these threats are no longer theoretical, but unfolding now. 

The article cites officials who confirmed that global sea surface temperature reached a record high this month. Warmer oceans increase the likelihood of extreme precipitation, flooding, and stronger storms, while also contributing to sea level rise and placing significant stress on marine ecosystems and wildlife. 

Scientists also warn that El Niño is expected to prolong an ongoing marine heat wave, creating an extended period of abnormally warm ocean temperatures that can have devastating impacts on marine life.

These climate-driven changes also threaten water supplies across the West, contributing to more severe droughts and heat waves. The article exemplifies the urgent need for California to adapt its water management strategies by investing in sustainable, local water solutions rather than relying on large-scale water diversion schemes that will become increasingly unreliable as climate change reduces available supplies.

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments Rain, typhoons and heat

GUANGXI FLOODS: Severe floods hit south-western China’s Guangxi province after heavy rains, killing 39 people and leaving another nine missing, reported the state-run newspaper China Daily. “Torrential rain” caused by Typhoon Maysak overwhelmed rivers and reservoirs in the province, said the New York Times. The Southern Weekly reported that several villages in Guangxi’s Hengzhou city were submerged. An unnamed researcher told the outlet that “small and medium-sized reservoirs”, not just in Guangxi but nationwide, are “severely aged, making it difficult for them to effectively withstand floods caused by extreme weather events against the backdrop of global [climate] change”.

TORNADOES AND 50C HEAT: At least 11 people were killed by two “extremely rare” tornadoes in central China’s Hubei province also linked to Maysak, according to Reuters. Typhoon Bavi is “on course to hit China’s eastern coast” in the coming days, said BBC News. Meanwhile, Xinjiang province in the north-west and Hainan province in the south both experienced “prolonged and intense heatwaves” in June, reported finance outlet National Business Daily. It added that temperatures in Xinjiang reached 50C.

‘MORE FREQUENT AND SEVERE’: China is “warming faster than the global average”, reported state-run newspaper China Daily. It said the China Meteorological Administration’s 2026 “blue book” on climate change in China found that from 1961 to 2025, China’s “annual average temperature increased by 0.31C per decade”. The blue book also found that “extreme weather and climate events in China have become more frequent and severe”, said China National Radio. The outlet said this included extreme heat, precipitation events and typhoons.

New five-year plans and action plans

‘BEAUTIFUL CHINA’ PLAN: The full text of the 15th five-year plan for building a “Beautiful China” outlines “seven key tasks”, including “actively addressing climate change”, reported Xinhua. The plan, re-published by BJX News, set quantitative targets for 2030. These included a 3% cut in carbon emissions per unit of production at industries included in China’s national carbon market. It added that the plan also called for “controlling and reducing coal use” and “reasonably controlling” the scale of coal-power capacity. Meanwhile, the outlet says, the government will “accelerate efforts” to ensure new electricity demand is met by clean energy. It also reported that the plan notes the need to “improve the capacity to respond to climate change” and to “actively participate and lead in” global climate governance. An op-ed attributed to a “commentator from this newspaper” in the environment ministry-run China Environment News said that the next five years are “pivotal” for the “Beautiful China” initiative. 

OTHER FIVE-YEAR PLANS: The government also published a 15th five-year plan on “meteorological development”, calling for “enhanced” support for addressing climate change, said BJX News. It added that the plan emphasises the need to “participate deeply” in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and “actively participate” in the World Meteorological Organization’s work on greenhouse gas monitoring. A third 15th five-year plan on developing a circular economy pledges to “address the shortcomings” in the recycling of clean-tech, reported finance outlet EastMoney. In a Q&A, a government official noted that used batteries, solar and wind power equipment “currently present particularly prominent challenges”, according to BJX News. The five-year plan for tourism encourages the use of carbon offsets and promotes “low-carbon travel”, said industry outlet China Travel News.  

PEAKING ‘ACTION PLAN’: China released an “action plan” for peaking its carbon emissions “by 2030”, reported state news agency Xinhua. It added that the action plan reiterated China’s existing targets for carbon intensity and share of non-fossil energy in energy consumption. The plan calls on officials to “vigorously promote” non-fossil energy development and to accelerate efforts to improve “absorption” of new energy into the grid, according to International Energy Net. The plan “doesn’t seek to rein in the country’s fast-growing coal-to-chemicals industry”, said Bloomberg. It noted that the focus instead is on “low-carbon retrofits, reductions in coal consumption per unit of output and a gradual substitution of some fossil-based feedstocks and energy inputs”.

Dialogue deadline 

EU-CHINA TALKS: The EU and China have set an October deadline to “reset trade ties” as tensions over cleantech exports and other economic matters “rise”, reported Bloomberg. In a joint statement, the two sides established a “trade and investment consultation mechanism” with four workstreams, including trade and investment balancing and export controls, reported state news agency Xinhua. A joint statement, released by the European Commission, said the two sides agreed to “strengthen” dialogue and to “maintain…the stability of global industrial supply chains”.

AVENUES OF COOPERATION: A Chinese state-affiliated consulting firm and several European certification bodies have established a consortium to coordinate on “green electricity certificates”, aiming to “establish a network for mutual recognition of green power”, reported financial outlet Yicai. Meanwhile, China’s foreign ministry described increasing air-conditioner and fan exports to Europe during a record heatwave as a sign of the “complementary advantages” of EU-China trade, said Xinhua. This message was echoed in several articles by Chinese state-backed outlets. The People’s Daily noted that “as climate change drives more frequent and intense heatwaves…China’s industrial and energy capabilities are…helping address rising demand in Europe”.

PRESSURE ON COMPETITION: Meanwhile, China issued strict mandatory energy consumption and efficiency standards for the solar power industry in efforts to “curb overcapacity”, said financial news outlet Caixin. The country is “rolling back” tax exemptions for plug-in hybrids and electric commercial trucks, Caixin also reported, adding that fully electric passenger cars will not be affected. 

More China news

• US FRICTION: The US is “drafting a ban on imports of foreign inverters…over concerns China ​could use them to disrupt power supplies”, reported Reuters. 
• ‘ZERO-CARBON CORRIDORS’: China called for developing “zero-carbon transport corridors” and vehicle hubs, including the promotion of low-carbon vehicles and vessels, says power news outlet BJX News.
• ‘SCALE UP SUPPORT’: At a climate meeting in Bangkok, climate envoy Liu Zhenmin advocated “scaling up support to developing countries” and creating an “inclusive, just transition mechanism”, said Earth Negotiations Bulletin.
• BRICS MEETING: The BRICS grouping will “emphasise the continued role of fossil fuels” in providing energy security, according to a joint communiqué. China will act as chair of BRICS in 2027, noted industry outlet International Energy Net.
• VENTURING NORTH: China has launched its 16th Arctic Ocean expedition, said state broadcaster CGTN. It added that “climate change and its impacts” is a key focus of the mission.

Captured

China received $4.3bn in climate finance from the World Bank in 2020-2025, according to Carbon Brief analysis. The World Bank has dropped a pledge on climate-related lending, reported the Financial Times. The newspaper also reported that the bank will also “phase out its lending to China by 2031”. (China is estimated to have provided $3-4.5bn of climate finance annually to other countries, according to estimates by different thinktanks.)

Spotlight  Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’

A new database has mapped every climate initiative launched or run by China.

In this issue, Carbon Brief interviewed Dr Sun Yixian, professor of sustainability governance at the University of Bath, on what this data shows about China’s approach to climate “leadership”.

Below are highlights from the conversation. The full interview is published on the Carbon Brief website.

Carbon Brief: Your team has compiled a database of China’s “environmental leadership”. What do you mean by leadership?

Sun Yixian: In this project, what we are trying to look at is China’s role in global environmental governance – China’s shifting role, especially from a more passive participant in global governance processes to play a more proactive role in developing or managing its own initiatives on transnational or cross-border environmental governance. 

So, [this includes] different environmental issues, but, of course, we found that climate change is a very important issue area. We have come up with a typology of different governance functions, trying to look at what specific activities Chinese actors are doing, or what kind of public goods Chinese actors are delivering, to the audiences of different initiatives.

CB: Could you explain what some of these climate initiatives look like in practice?

SY: In practical terms, there are all different kinds of initiatives. [The majority focus on] sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. 

Or also by providing funding, for example, China has created this south-south climate fund. It can also include research collaboration. 

It can be traditional leadership activities, in the sense of developing certain international regulatory frameworks or rules or standards. It can also be pilot projects. China sometimes can start to work directly with some international partners to trial new ideas and new practices.

CB: The database stops at 2024 – just before the current administration withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement. Have you noticed any changes in China’s global climate engagements following this? 

SY: I would say the trend is a continuous one, even [before] the withdrawal of the US…Over the past 10 years, we have seen an upward trend, with more and more new initiatives created by Chinese actors.

But I think the shift will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners – or countries or actors that haven’t been engaged very closely with China – to work more closely with China.

Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question. 

CB: The theme of the data set is environmental leadership, but…Chinese officials have eschewed being called a climate leader. Would you say that China wants to be seen as a climate leader?

SY: We are entering into the implementation phase for the Paris Agreement. That means it is very difficult to create new agendas at this stage. [Instead the focus is] trying to see if countries can deliver.

If we want to see whether China is becoming a leader, we have to look at how fast, for example, China is accelerating its energy transition and how fast China can reduce its emissions. 

Then, in terms of international engagement, what our data is trying to show is that China has become more proactive in that space. 

When I was in China a few months ago, [leading experts] said the government…[is] not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time, I think…in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. 

So, I think the question is whether this…will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of policymakers or decision-makers. 

This interview was conducted by Anika Patel via Zoom on 1 July 2026.

Watch, read, listen

ENVOY INTERVIEW: Climate envoy Liu Zhenmin spoke to state broadcasting station CGTN about climate finance, expectations for China to “lead climate action” and trade tensions.

VIEW FROM THE US: The Atlas Live podcast hosted a debate on “what it will take” for the US to match China’s strength in manufacturing clean-energy technologies.

‘ELECTROSTATE’ EXPLORED: The state media-affiliated WeChat blog Yuyuan Tantian discussed how becoming an “electrostate” would boost China’s “resilience against external risks”.

HYDROGEN TARGETS: The Switched On podcast explored what China’s new targets for “green hydrogen” mean for the development of the industry. 

New science 

• Offshore wind could provide 3-18% of China’s electricity by 2050 | Communications Earth and Environment
• A new “environmental and nutritional database” of the eight major cuisines of China, including Sichuan, Cantonese and Hunan, reveals “significant variability” in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and nutrient content | Scientific Data

Recently published on WeChat

• 媒体反应：气候变化如何加剧欧洲六月破纪录高温
• 图表：中国太阳能热潮为何放缓

China Briefing is written by Anika Patel, with contributions from Lekai Liu. It is edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

China Briefing 25 June 2026: Five-year plans passed | Critical-mineral tensions | Industrial decarbonisation plan

China Briefing

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25.06.26

China Briefing 11 June 2026: Tech clampdown | Extreme weather | Provinces’ energy plans

China Briefing

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11.06.26

China Briefing 28 May 2026: Deadly rains | China pushes back | Examining China’s carbon intensity metric 

China Briefing

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28.05.26

China Briefing 30 April 2026: Fossil fuel ‘strict controls’ | El Niño approaches | Why cleantech exports have surged

China Briefing

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30.04.26

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The post China Briefing 9 July 2026: Guangxi floods | ‘Beautiful China’ plan | New EU-China mechanism appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Statement on FDA’s delay of GRAS amendment proposal Iris Myers July 9, 2026

WASHINGTON – The Food and Drug Administration’s plan to amend the “generally recognized as safe,” or GRAS, regulatory loophole for food chemicals is slipping to December.

The agency originally planned to propose the amendment in October 2025. In December, it sent a draft rule to the White House Office of Management and Budget for pre-publication review, where it’s still pending. The administration then last week released its updated regulatory plan with timelines for upcoming agency rules, including the GRAS delay.

GRAS is a loophole that for years has allowed companies to add new, potentially harmful chemicals and other substances to snacks, drinks and more without undergoing the FDA’s safety review. 

When Congress created the GRAS loophole, in 1958, the exemption was intended to apply largely to ingredients widely recognized as safe, such as salt, water, yeast and vinegar.

But in the intervening years, GRAS has expanded to apply to much more. Since 2000, nearly 99% of food chemicals were introduced into the market as a result of  the GRAS loophole, according to a 2025 analysis from the Environmental Working Group. This allows scores of food chemicals to be approved for use with little government oversight.

The threat of preemption

A draft House bill would, if enacted, further hobble the already broken food safety review process. 

The bill is known as the FDA Review and Evaluation for Safe, Healthy and Affordable Foods, or FRESH and Affordable Foods Act. It would gut rules on the information companies must provide the FDA when submitting a notice that a food chemical is GRAS.

The following is a statement from Melanie Benesh, EWG vice president for government affairs: 

The federal government’s decision to push back its timeline for proposing changes to the broken GRAS system is yet another reminder that consumers cannot afford to wait for Washington to act.

For years, the FDA has failed to adequately oversee food chemicals, leaving states to fill the void by passing commonsense protections against harmful food chemicals linked to serious health risks. 

A delay in this long-promised rulemaking only reinforces why states must continue leading the way.

Congress should not respond by tying states’ hands. 

Lawmakers should reject misguided preemption proposals like the FRESH Act, which would strip states of their ability to protect families while weakening, not strengthening, federal oversight of food chemicals.

The federal government is taking longer to close the GRAS loophole. But the last thing Congress should do is block the states that are already taking action. Americans deserve stronger protections from harmful food chemicals, not more delays and fewer safeguards.

###

The Environmental Working Group (EWG) is a nonprofit, non-partisan organization that empowers people to live healthier lives in a healthier environment. Through research, advocacy and unique education tools, EWG drives consumer choice and civic action.

Areas of Focus Food & Water Food Ultra-Processed Foods Toxic Chemicals Food Chemicals Press Contact Iris Myers iris@ewg.org (202) 939-9126 July 9, 2026

The Toxic Legacy of Eighty Years of U.S. Military Occupation

Part 2 of a 3-part series.  Part 1 examined PFAS at Pituffik Space Base; while Part 3 will survey the appeals U.S. veterans have filed with the U.S. Veterans Administration, claiming cancers and disease as a result of their exposure to toxins in Greenland.

By Pat Elder
July 9, 2026

“Greenland doesn’t really help Denmark. Denmark doesn’t spend money to really help Greenland, but it’s important for the United States... It should be controlled by the United States, not by Denmark.” — U.S. President Donald Trump, speaking in Ankara, Türkiye, July 7, 2026, Photo CNBC

Introduction

President Donald Trump's July 2026 remarks criticizing Denmark's relationship with Greenland provide an unexpected backdrop for this report. Although the President did not specify what he meant by Denmark "not spending money to really help Greenland," his comments invite a broader examination of the responsibilities that accompany the American military presence and strategic interest on the world's largest island.

The geopolitical tensions have been extraordinary. Following President Trump's repeated suggestions earlier this year that he might use military force to acquire Greenland, Danish military planners reportedly developed highly classified contingency plans that included destroying key Greenlandic airfields if the United States attempted an invasion, according to the BBC.

On April 1, 2026, The New York Times reported that the Trump administration was negotiating with Denmark for access to three additional military installations in Greenland. According to the newspaper, two of the proposed sites were former American bases abandoned following the Cold War. The report underscored Greenland's renewed strategic importance at a moment when many of the environmental consequences of earlier U.S. military operations remain unresolved.

For more than eighty years, the United States has maintained an extensive network of military installations across Greenland. Those bases left behind nuclear radiation, fuel spills, abandoned infrastructure, military waste, contaminated landfills, PCB-containing materials, asbestos, unexploded ordnance, and, at several locations, documented PFAS contamination associated with firefighting activities.

Successive Danish and Greenlandic governments have invested substantial public resources investigating former American installations, documenting contamination, and, in some rare cases, undertaking cleanup projects. The United States has strongly maintained that it bears no legal obligation to restore former facilities to their original condition, relying on provisions contained in Article XI of the 1951 Defense Agreement: “It is understood that any areas or facilities made available to the  Government of the United States of America under this Agreement need not be left in the condition in which they were at the time they were thus made available.”

As a result, almost all of the financial burden for assessing and addressing contamination has fallen on Denmark and Greenland rather than on the guilty party that established and operated the installations.

When the U.S. upgraded its radar systems in 2004, Greenland attempted to compel  the United States to clean up former U.S. bases on the island.  U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the legal responsibility for cleaning up older, abandoned bases had already transferred to local/Danish authorities and would remain there.  Because the U.S. maintained this legal stance, the Danish government ultimately agreed to pay for the cleanup.

In 2018 the Danish government relented by investing around 24 million Euro to “clean-up” the abandoned bases. It is a paltry sum. By 2024, progress on the clean-up had been slow. Only around 5.3 million Euro has been spent. That figure is almost irrelevant when measured against the scale of cleaning up the horror at Camp Century alone.

No public authority has produced a comprehensive cleanup estimate for Camp Century. Given the scale of the buried infrastructure, the Arctic environment, and the costs associated with excavating, transporting, and disposing of radioactive and hazardous materials, the eventual cost could reasonably reach into the billions of euros.

This report provides a consolidated overview of former United States military installations in Greenland and their documented environmental legacy. It is based primarily on the groundbreaking investigative reporting and field research published by the Danish newspaper Politiken supplemented by publicly available reports from the Government of Greenland, the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), NIRAS, U.S. government agencies, scientific literature, and historical records.

Military Poisons is indebted to the journalists, editors, photographers, and researchers at Politiken for their exceptional work documenting the environmental legacy of former U.S. military activities in Greenland. Their reporting has significantly advanced public understanding of these historically important sites and provided an invaluable foundation for further research.

The individual descriptions of each installation have been substantially condensed from the original source material to provide readers with a concise reference to the history, environmental conditions, and current status of each site. While every effort has been made to accurately reflect the available public record, this report is intended as a summary and research aid rather than a substitute for the original investigations and technical reports.

Taken together, these installations reveal a remarkably consistent pattern spanning more than eight decades of American military operations in Greenland. Facilities ranging from major air bases to isolated weather stations and LORAN navigation sites were frequently abandoned with fuel drums, vehicles, construction materials, electrical equipment, batteries, hazardous building materials, and waste disposal areas left in place. Environmental investigations have repeatedly documented petroleum contamination, Polychlorinated biphenyls PCBs, asbestos, mercury, lead, cadmium, and other heavy metals, while many sites remain only partially characterized because comprehensive environmental assessments have never been completed.  Camp Century occupies a category of its own. Unlike the conventional military installations scattered across Greenland, the underground nuclear-powered base left behind highly toxic radioactive waste, diesel fuel, sewage, and thousands of tons of construction materials beneath the Greenland Ice Sheet.

One of the more striking findings is how unevenly these sites have been investigated. A few former bases have undergone detailed engineering studies involving soil, water, sediment, and waste characterization. Others have received only scant historical inventories documenting visible structures and debris. Several installations—including Camp Tuto, Camp Fistclench, the Ice Cap Sites, and a number of protected-area weather stations—have never undergone comprehensive environmental assessments.

Cleanup efforts have likewise been inconsistent. Denmark initiated a political agreement in 2018 to begin addressing contamination at selected former American installations, but remediation has progressed slowly. Several major sites remain only partially cleaned despite years of planning. Other installations, including Pituffik Space Base and several research camps within the active military reservation, are excluded from testing and remediation because they remain operational. Somehow, sharing environmental secrets involving levels of PCB’s, PFAS, Radiation, and Mercury are matters of national security. The same holds true from Weisbaden, Germany to Yokosuka, Japan to Honolulu, Hawaii. Victims in these locations cry out for data and justice.

As Greenland assumes greater strategic importance and climate change accelerates the exposure of long-buried Cold War infrastructure, the environmental legacy of former U.S. military installations is likely to receive increasing international attention. This report seeks to provide a concise, evidence-based reference to what is presently known about these sites, where significant uncertainties remain, and where additional investigation is long overdue.

What’s in a drum?

Throughout Greenland, former American military installations are littered with hundreds of thousands of abandoned steel fuel drums. Many reportedly contained residual gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel, lubricating oil, or other petroleum products when they were discarded. As these drums corrode over time, residual fuels and additives leach into surrounding soils and surface waters. Among the contaminants of greatest concern are petroleum hydrocarbons and volatile organic compounds, particularly the BTEX chemicals—benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes—along with polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and other fuel constituents, like PCB’s. See our rundown on the 36 contaminated sites below. First, please consider helping us financially.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Before reading on, Please support our testing in Fort Ord, California.

The distance from Fort Ord, California, to Nuuk, Greenland is only about 3,300 miles. Most people are surprised to learn that.

This fall, I will travel to Fort Ord to meet with a dozen local environmental advocates, scientists, and Army veterans who are deeply concerned about the rapid redevelopment of the former Army base. New apartments, homes, schools, parks, and retail centers continue to be built over land that contains some of the military's deadliest legacy contamination.

‍Over the years, almost 2,000 local residents, former service members, and civilian workers have told us about cancers and other illnesses they believe are connected to their exposure at Fort Ord.

‍We are especially concerned about large groundwater plumes containing trichloroethylene (TCE), tetrachloroethylene (PCE), and carbon tetrachloride (CT). These chemicals can migrate into buildings as vapor, potentially affecting the air people breathe inside their homes and workplaces. We are also concerned about the possible presence and movement of PFAS ("forever chemicals") and other toxic contaminants in groundwater, soil, surface water, and indoor dust.

‍Our goal is to collect independent environmental samples, work with qualified experts, and make the results available to the public. We believe communities deserve reliable information about the environment where they live, work, and raise their families. We need your help. We need to pay for airfare for three of us (from Maryland, Ohio, and Michigan). We must pay for lodging for four nights. (two stars..) And then, we have to pay for the testing. We already have the Cyclopure test kits for PFAS. We still need to pay for testing of soil, air, and water at different locations. $10,000 is our goal.
See who “we” are.

If you have supported Military Poisons in the past, we hope you will consider helping us again. If you didn’t receive a personal thank you, I apologize. Every donation helps us bring greater transparency to this community living with the environmental legacy of military contamination.

‍ Thank you for standing with us.   Go here, to the bottom of the page to contribute. https://www.fortordcontamination.org/ Now, back to Greenland.

‍ _______________________________________________________________________________________________ ‍

Part I — The Bluie West Installations

Bluie West 1 (Narsarsuaq) U.S. Operation:1942–1958

The largest American air base in Greenland during World War II, Bluie West 1 served as a major refueling stop for thousands of aircraft enroute to Europe. When the United States departed in 1958, it left behind extensive debris, including aircraft wreckage, oil drums, batteries, cables, machinery, buried scrap metal, and asbestos from the former military hospital. Local officials report that waste was buried in multiple layers beneath the site. Although asbestos hazards have been documented for years, the installation is not included in Denmark's current cleanup program.

Note: Bluie West Two  was a planned World War II United States military site in southwest Greenland that proved unusable and was ultimately rejected.

Bluie West 3 (Simiutaq) U.S. Operation:1942–1958

Established as a weather and radio station supporting aircraft operations at Narsarsuaq, Bluie West 3 now contains approximately 4,400 metric tons of abandoned military waste. The site includes rusting oil drums, construction materials, battery components, shipwreck debris, pipelines, and large abandoned fuel tanks. Environmental investigations have documented severe petroleum contamination, including mobile free-phase oil capable of migrating through soil. Elevated PCB concentrations, lead contamination, and petroleum impacts to nearby marine sediments and mussels make Simiutaq one of Greenland's most extensively documented contaminated military sites.

Bluie West 4 (Marraq / Teague Airfield) U.S. Operation: 1942–1948

Built as an emergency landing field and weather station south of Nuuk, Marraq was abandoned with thousands of oil drums, diesel generators, vehicles, radio equipment, barges, and buried scrap metal. Investigators estimated that at least 120,000 liters of diesel fuel contaminated the site, with petroleum odors still evident decades after abandonment. Surveys also identified asbestos, PCBs, and mercury contamination. Officials concluded that pollutants posed potential risks to freshwater ecosystems, marine organisms, and shellfish inhabiting the adjacent fjord. Cleanup operations began in 2019 but remain unfinished.

Bluie West 5 (Aasiaat) U.S. Operation:1942–1958

Bluie West 5 functioned as a weather station near present-day Aasiaat during World War II. Although the site has been used for other purposes over the years, environmental investigations have clearly identified American military debris, including deteriorating buildings and stockpiles of rusted oil drums. More than five metric tons of hazardous or contaminated waste remain. Soil testing has documented elevated concentrations of lead and cadmium associated with the former U.S. installation. Questions regarding present ownership have complicated decisions concerning remediation.

Bluie West 6 (Pituffik / Thule Air Base / Pituffik Space Base) U.S. Operation:1942–Present

Originally established as the Bluie West 6 weather station during World War II, the installation expanded dramatically under the secret Project Blue Jay and became Thule Air Base in 1952, now known as Pituffik Space Base. The installation remains the only active U.S. military base in Greenland. Historic investigations have identified at least fifty waste disposal areas surrounding the base, including former missile silos converted into landfills. Long-term PCB contamination has been documented in nearby marine environments, but because the base remains operational, it has largely been excluded from Denmark's national cleanup program.

Bluie West 7 / Navy 26 / Grønnedal

U.S. Operation:1943–1951 (later operated by Denmark until 2012)

Established near Ivigtut during World War II, Bluie West 7 was accompanied by the adjacent U.S. Navy 26 installation, later transferred to Denmark and renamed Grønnedal. Investigations have documented extensive petroleum and groundwater contamination migrating toward Arsuk Fjord. Large American dump sites contain vehicles, hazardous wastes, and an estimated 20,000 cubic meters of discarded material. Underwater surveys have identified additional debris in the fjord, including a tanker truck, crane, tracked vehicle, and other equipment. Cleanup costs are now estimated at between DKK 100 and 200 million.

Bluie West 8 (Kangerlussuaq / Søndre Strømfjord) U.S. Operation:1941–1992‍ ‍

Built before the United States entered World War II, Kangerlussuaq became one of Greenland's most important military airfields and later served Cold War radar operations before transitioning into Greenland's principal civilian airport. The United States left behind oil drum dumps, unexploded ammunition, scrap metal, and abandoned military structures. Local residents have criticized the burning of open landfills containing American military waste. Greenlandic officials have also alleged that diesel fuel was intentionally dumped into nearby lakes for mosquito control, with reports that some waters still exhibit petroleum odors decades later.

Bluie West 9 (Cruncher Island) U.S. Operation:1942–1986

Constructed to support weather observations and aviation operations associated with Kangerlussuaq, Bluie West 9 remained active for more than four decades. The abandoned installation contains building ruins, generators, vehicles, cables, pipes, waste dumps, and approximately 1.5 metric tons of discarded batteries. Environmental investigations documented elevated concentrations of petroleum, lead, cadmium, copper, zinc, and mercury in soils. Approximately eleven metric tons of hazardous or contaminated waste remain. Danish and Greenlandic authorities have identified the site as a priority for future cleanup.

Part II — The Bluie East Installations

Bluie East 1 (Ikerasassuaq / Prince Christian Sound) U.S. Operation:1942–1945 (later operated by the Danish Meteorological Institute) No Photo

Established as a weather and radio station near Cape Farewell, Bluie East 1 played an important role in Allied North Atlantic weather forecasting during World War II. The installation consisted of a harbor, power plant, radio facilities, living quarters, and support buildings connected by a long wooden staircase. Unlike many other American installations in Greenland, little is known about what environmental contamination remains. Danish authorities report that no formal environmental assessment has been conducted, leaving uncertainty about whether hazardous materials from the wartime occupation persist beneath or around the site. 

Bluie East 2 (Ikkatteq) U.S. Operation:1942–1947

Ikkatteq was one of the largest American airfields on Greenland's east coast, serving as both a refueling stop and radio surveillance station with a wartime population approaching 600 personnel. When abandoned, the base contained more than 100,000 oil drums scattered across the landscape, dozens of military vehicles, batteries, collapsed buildings, and structures containing asbestos. Environmental investigations documented extensive petroleum contamination together with PCBs, lead, and cadmium. Authorities concluded that contamination posed direct risks to both wildlife and people. Although cleanup began years ago, significant remediation remains unfinished.

Bluie East 3 (Walrus Bay) U.S. Operation: 1942–1945

This small weather and radio station on Greenland's east coast supported Allied operations with a complement of approximately fourteen personnel. Although relatively modest in size, environmental investigators classified the site's overall environmental impact as significant. Abandoned structures, fuel drum storage areas, and military debris remained after the American withdrawal. Scrap metal was removed in 2022, but no comprehensive environmental investigation has been completed, leaving unanswered questions regarding remaining soil and groundwater contamination. 

Bluie East 4 (Ella Island) U.S. Operation: 1942–1945 No Photo

Located within what is now Northeast Greenland National Park, Bluie East 4 served as a wartime weather and radio station. Limited information survives regarding the installation, although investigators have identified abandoned building foundations likely containing petroleum residues and mercury. Engineering studies characterize the site's environmental impact as moderate, but its protected status has limited investigation and cleanup activities. Consequently, the full extent of contamination remains unknown.

Bluie East 5 (Eskimonæs) U.S. Operation: 1942–1943 No photo

Bluie East 5 was the northernmost American installation on Greenland's east coast. The original station was destroyed during a German raid in 1943, after which operations were relocated elsewhere. Environmental investigations suggest that mercury contamination and petroleum residues remain at the original location. Because the site lies within a protected national park, it has been excluded from Denmark's post-2018 cleanup initiative. No comprehensive environmental assessment has yet been completed, leaving the extent of contamination uncertain.

Cape Cort Adelaer U.S. Operation: Approximately 1943–1945

Cape Cort Adelaer served as a small weather and radio station supporting Allied operations along Greenland's eastern coast. Investigators have identified abandoned fuel storage tanks and numerous building foundations remaining from the American occupation. Engineering assessments conclude that the site likely contains mercury, petroleum contamination, asbestos, and heavy metals, resulting in an overall environmental impact classified as significant. Although historical research has begun, no comprehensive environmental investigation has yet been completed.

Skjoldungen (Louis Boplads) U.S. Operation: 1943–Approximately 1948

Constructed as a weather station during World War II, Skjoldungen appears to have been abandoned largely intact. Engineering investigations describe large quantities of scattered waste, including chemicals, broken glass, discarded clothing, medication residues, and other debris left where they were originally discarded. Environmental assessments conclude that mercury, petroleum contamination, heavy metals, and asbestos are likely present, resulting in a significant environmental impact. Historical investigations are underway, although no comprehensive field assessment has yet been completed.

Atterbery Dome (Comanche Bay) U.S. Operation: Approximately 1943–1945

Atterbery Dome was a small radio and rescue station established during World War II along Greenland's east coast. Although modest in size, engineering investigations classify its environmental impact as significant. Remaining contamination is believed to include petroleum residues, mercury, asbestos, and heavy metals associated with deteriorating military infrastructure. Authorities have commissioned historical research to better document the installation before determining whether a full environmental investigation or cleanup should proceed.

Part III — Camp Century, the Pituffik Research Camps, Ice Cap Sites, and DYE Stations

Camp Century U.S. Operation:1959–1966(dangerous nuclear reactor operated 1960–1964)

Constructed beneath the Greenland Ice Sheet approximately 150 miles east of Thule Air Base, Camp Century was the most ambitious American military installation ever built in the Arctic. Although presented publicly as a scientific research station, it also served as a testbed for Project Iceworm, a classified proposal to deploy nuclear missiles beneath the ice.

Politiken reports: "When the camp was abandoned, the nuclear reactor had been removed, but an estimated 24 million liters of radioactive cooling wastewater, 200,000 liters of diesel fuel, sewage, and roughly 9,000 metric tons of construction debris were left entombed beneath the ice. As climate warming accelerates ice loss, researchers warn these materials could eventually re-enter the environment."

Military Poisons note: NASA’s summary of the underlying scientific research describes the waste inventory somewhat differently. According to NASA, Camp Century contains approximately 200,000 liters of diesel fuel, 24 million liters of wastewater, including sewage, an unknown quantity of low-level radioactive waste, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). NASA's description does not characterize the entire 24 million liters of wastewater as "radioactive cooling wastewater."

Camp Nuto (Nunatarssuaq Take Off / Camp Red Rock) U.S. Operation:Approximately 1953–1960s   No Photo

‍Camp Nuto was one of several research facilities established near Thule Air Base to study the engineering properties of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Researchers conducted experiments on ice ramps and vehicle operations under Arctic conditions that supported later military construction projects. Environmental investigations indicate petroleum contamination remains at the site, although the overall environmental impact has been classified as moderate. Because Camp Nuto lies within the active Pituffik military complex, it has not been included in Denmark's national cleanup program and has received only limited environmental evaluation.

Camp Tuto (Thule Take Off) U.S. Operation:1954–Early 1960s‍ ‍

Located roughly 25 kilometers southeast of Thule Air Base, Camp Tuto became one of the Army's principal Arctic engineering laboratories. Approximately 450 personnel were stationed there to study tunnel construction beneath glaciers and excavation through frozen permafrost. Engineers built a 400-meter tunnel within the ice to evaluate the feasibility of large underground military facilities. Little public information exists concerning waste left behind, and no comprehensive environmental investigation has been reported. Because the camp remains within the broader Pituffik military area, it has not been scheduled for cleanup.

Camp Fistclench U.S. Operation:Mid-1950s–1959 No Photo

Camp Fistclench served as the direct predecessor to Camp Century. Constructed beneath the ice using covered trenches, the installation allowed Army engineers to test construction techniques later employed for the much larger Camp Century project. Scientific work focused on snow mechanics, ice behavior, and the effects of explosives on glacial ice. Following completion of Camp Century, Camp Fistclench was abandoned. Little documentation exists concerning remaining debris or contamination, and no comprehensive environmental assessment has been reported.

Ice Cap Site I U.S. Operation:1953–1954 to late 1950s No Photo

Ice Cap Site I formed part of an experimental network of radar stations constructed on the Greenland Ice Sheet to provide early warning of potential Soviet air attacks against Thule Air Base. Harsh environmental conditions and the logistical difficulty of maintaining the station limited its operational life. Publicly available information does not identify what equipment or waste remains beneath the ice, and no formal environmental assessment has been conducted.

Ice Cap Site II  U.S. Operation:1953–1954 to late 1950s No Photo

Constructed alongside Ice Cap Site I, this radar installation supported the defense of Thule Air Base during the early years of the Cold War. The station was abandoned after only a few years because maintaining remote facilities on the moving ice sheet proved impractical. Little information is available regarding remaining infrastructure or environmental contamination, and no comprehensive environmental investigation has been completed.

DYE-1 (Red River)   U.S. Operation:1950s–1988

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DYE-1 was one of four massive radar stations comprising Greenland's portion of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, established to detect Soviet bombers approaching North America across the Arctic. The mountaintop installation featured a large radar dome and extensive support facilities. Following closure in 1988, the Greenland Self-Government reportedly undertook cleanup activities, burying waste dumps and storage areas. Unlike many former U.S. installations, DYE-1 is generally considered to have undergone substantial remediation, although little environmental data has been published.

 

DYE-2 (Sea Bass) U.S. Operation: Late 1950s–1980s

Built directly on the Greenland Ice Sheet, DYE-2 monitored Arctic airspace around the clock as part of the DEW Line. Fuel tanks and heavy infrastructure were embedded within the ice. The station was abandoned rapidly at the end of its operational life, leaving large quantities of equipment behind with the expectation that the ice sheet would permanently entomb the facility.

DYE-3 (Sob Story) U.S. Operation: Late 1950s–1980s

Like DYE-2, DYE-3 operated as an elevated radar station supported by ski-equipped aircraft that delivered personnel and supplies onto the Greenland Ice Sheet. In 1972, a U.S. Air Force C-130 transport crash-landed near the station. After useful equipment was removed, much of the aircraft was buried within the ice. The station itself was abandoned with substantial infrastructure remaining.  

Politiken reports that the United States contributed funds for cleanup at DYE-2 and DYE-3, but publicly available records I reviewed do not substantiate that claim.

The documented cleanup agreement appears to have been financed by Denmark and Greenland, not the United States.

DYE-4 (Big Gun) U.S. Operation:1950s–1991

Perched atop a mountain near Kulusuk, DYE-4 was the easternmost radar station in Greenland's DEW Line. The installation contained massive rotating radar antennas housed within a large radome that monitored northern airspace throughout the Cold War. After closure in 1991, the station was dismantled by Greenland authorities in 1994, and much of the material was buried in local landfills. Only foundations remain visible today. No formal environmental assessment has been reported following the demolition.

This section highlights a striking contrast. Many of the World War II installations were abandoned with visible debris—oil drums, vehicles, buildings, and dumps. The Cold War facilities often left a different legacy: buried infrastructure, petroleum products, and, in the case of Camp Century, radioactive wastewater and diesel fuel sealed beneath the ice. As the Greenland Ice Sheet continues to thin, these hidden legacies may become increasingly important to environmental monitoring and international policy.

Part IV — LORAN Stations, Radio Stations, Artillery Sites, and Other Installations

Gamatron U.S. Operation:1942–1958

Established near present-day Qaqortoq, Gamatron served as a weather station, radio station, and submarine observation post supporting Allied operations in the North Atlantic. After the Americans departed, they left 34 buildings, six storage areas containing hundreds of oil drums, multiple waste dumps, and an estimated 175–185 metric tons of abandoned military waste. Environmental investigations found contamination severe enough that water from a nearby lake was declared unsuitable for drinking because of pollution originating from an abandoned dump.

 

Qutdleq U.S. Operation: 1960–1978

Qutdleq was constructed as a LORAN (Long Range Navigation) station on a small island in southeastern Greenland. Following its closure, numerous deteriorating buildings, communications masts, and large fuel storage tanks remained on the site. While the abandoned infrastructure is well documented, no comprehensive environmental investigation has yet been completed, leaving uncertainty regarding possible petroleum contamination or hazardous materials associated with the former installation.

Orssuiagssuaq U.S. Operation:1960–1977

Built as another LORAN navigation station, Orssuiagssuaq was abandoned with communications towers, storage tanks, ruined buildings, and deteriorating barracks still standing decades after closure. Although the physical remains have been documented photographically, authorities have not yet completed an environmental assessment. Historical investigations are expected before decisions are made regarding cleanup or remediation of the site.

Sabine Island U.S. Operation:1959–Early 1960s

Sabine Island housed a small unmanned radio beacon located within a protected bird sanctuary. Although the station itself was modest, approximately thirty-five discarded industrial batteries remain near the antenna building, many with exposed lead cores. Authorities have concluded that the battery dump presents a potential source of heavy metal contamination. Because the installation lies within a protected wildlife area, no formal environmental assessment or cleanup has been scheduled.

 

Nipisat U.S. Operation: 1954–1975

Nipisat served as a LORAN navigation station on Greenland's west coast. Environmental investigations documented multiple oil and gasoline storage tanks together with at least three confirmed petroleum spills. Engineers concluded that the site also contains PCBs, pesticides, mercury, heavy metals, and asbestos. One municipal official described the abandoned station as "something of a disaster," noting that extensive vandalism had left the once-important military installation in a severely deteriorated condition despite its location in an area of exceptional natural value.

 Angissoq U.S. Operation: 1963–1994 No Photo

One of Greenland's last LORAN navigation stations, Angissoq remained in operation until satellite navigation rendered the system obsolete. The abandoned installation includes remnants of twenty-three buildings, a power plant, fuel storage facilities, and coastal waste dumps. Environmental investigators documented petroleum contamination near former fuel tanks and observed that coastal erosion is gradually exposing buried waste to the sea. A comprehensive environmental investigation has not yet been completed.

Cape Atholl U.S. Operation: 1954–1972

Located near Thule Air Base, Cape Atholl operated as a U.S. Coast Guard LORAN navigation station. Environmental investigations documented severe petroleum contamination, including free-phase oil, PCB-contaminated building materials, batteries, cable scrap, burned refuse, and mixed waste buried in coastal bluffs. Investigators observed erosion exposing buried debris directly onto the shoreline, creating potential pathways into the marine environment. The site also presents possible risks to wildlife, including walruses using nearby beaches. Danish and Greenlandic authorities are planning cleanup operations.

Artillery Point U.S. Operation: 1941–1946

Artillery Point defended the strategically important Narsarsuaq airfield with two 155-mm coastal guns during World War II. Following the war, approximately seventeen metric tons of military waste remained, including abandoned buildings, construction materials, and a small landfill. Environmental investigations identified petroleum contamination together with low concentrations of lead and cadmium. Because the contamination is relatively limited and the site possesses historical significance, the National Museum of Greenland has recommended that the area remain largely undisturbed.

 

Camp Corbett U.S. Operation: 1942–1958

Camp Corbett functioned as a communications station supporting the nearby Narsarsuaq air base. The installation contained emergency generators, fuel tanks, hundreds of utility poles, multiple dumps, and buried waste disposal areas. Investigators estimate that at least 377 metric tons of military waste remain, including approximately 314 metric tons classified as hazardous or contaminated. Contaminants include PCBs, asbestos, heavy metals, and tar residues. Cleanup has begun, but officials report that massive reinforced concrete foundations will require extensive excavation and blasting before remediation can be completed.

Conclusion

While the Trump administration is “negotiating” with Denmark for access to three additional military installations in Greenland, and President Trump is making threatening remarks about U.S. intentions, the talks between Washington, Copenhagen, and Nuuk remain fixated on sovereignty and strategic positioning. Consequently, a critical geopolitical blind spot persists: the massive environmental liabilities scattered across dozens of legacy American military installations. These sites contain a hazardous catalog of contaminated soils, abandoned landfills, deteriorating fuel infrastructure, PCBs, petroleum, unexploded ordnance, and PFAS. Most critically, Camp Century holds radioactive and toxic waste entombed beneath the rapidly melting Greenland Ice Sheet.

Although President Trump’s critique of Danish spending in Greenland was likely unmoored from these specific ecological realities, it inadvertently highlighted a profound structural failure. The paltry sums Copenhagen has allocated to investigate and remediate this contamination pale in comparison to the actual scale of the crisis. Remediation at Camp Century alone could soar into billions of euros.

How, then, in the face of this catastrophic reality, can the Danish government continue to hide behind passive diplomatic platitudes?

While the Danish Foreign Minister publicly insists that Denmark will protect Greenland’s independence from political takeover, why are they not screaming from the rooftops about eighty years of toxic American negligence?

The environmental criminality cannot be overstated while Copenhagen treats this assault as a footnote. As Danish officials sit at the negotiating table to grant the U.S. military even more access to Greenlandic soil, why are they not aggressively demanding full, immediate remediation as a non-negotiable prerequisite? How can Copenhagen claim to stand for Greenlandic sovereignty while letting the United States get away with a multi-billion-dollar ecological crime?

Please see the Greenland Appendix containing a spreadsheet that displays the kinds of information shown here on all 36 abandoned sites in Greenland.

Radical Democracy and Autonomy: What do we mean? - A Conversation ...

The number of global climate initiatives launched or run by China has been growing since 2009, a new study shows.

But whether this will translate into China taking up the mantle of climate leadership remains an “open question”, says Dr Sun Yixian, study co-author and professor of sustainability governance at the University of Bath.

Sun’s team has compiled a database tracking all global environmental initiatives established from the 1980s onwards that were launched or run by China.

These initiatives are either created by China or co-created with other governments, or have operations that are mainly managed by Chinese institutions.

They range from research cooperation and south-south climate funding to high-level policy signalling, such as joint statements on climate change. 

In an interview with Carbon Brief, Sun discusses the key findings of the new “China’s Global Environmental Leadership” (CGEL) database.

He adds that it is not yet clear if the US withdrawal from the UN climate regime will change China’s role in global climate governance. 

The conversation covers how the number of China-led initiatives has changed over time, what these projects look like and how China’s approach to climate “leadership” is changing.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity. 

• Sun on the types of climate initiatives: “There are all different kinds of initiatives – we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. Or also by providing funding, for example.”
• On the rise in new climate initiatives: “From after 2009 and 2010, we’ve seen many initiatives – of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and even the last five years, from 2021…have been created.”
• On the impact of the Trump administration: “The shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners…Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question.” 
• On a growing focus on multilateral programmes: “What we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents. So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale.” 
• On a climate leadership ‘mindset’: “[Leading Chinese experts] said the government, and also people in China, are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time…in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. So, I think the question is whether this…will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country.” 
• On the future of China’s climate engagement: “My read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements…But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies.”
• On the future of multilateral climate negotiations: Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes. Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment. 

Carbon Brief: Thank you for joining us, Yixian. Your team has compiled a database of China’s “environmental leadership”. What do you mean by leadership and what did you find in relation to climate change?

Sun Yixian: Thanks Anika, it’s great to speak to Carbon Brief. Leadership is a very contested concept in social science, or especially in international relations. This is why we were very cautious when we thought about the name of this dataset, but we thought it was a good way to capture what we’re trying to do.

In this project, what we are trying to look at is China’s role in global environmental governance – China’s shifting role, especially from a more passive participant in global governance processes to play a more proactive role in developing or managing its own initiatives on transnational or cross-border environmental governance. 

So, [this includes] different environmental issues, but, of course, we found that climate change is a very important issue area. By leading, we are using the concept of governance – in a sense that we are looking at the initiatives where Chinese actors claim some authority over other audiences towards certain public goods. So, it’s trying to provide public goods, in different ways. We have come up with a typology of different governance functions, trying to look at what specific activities Chinese actors are doing, or what kind of public goods Chinese actors are delivering, to the audiences of different initiatives.

And by audience we mean…international actors. So, that means we are not interested in what China is doing domestically, but beyond its borders. 

CB: Could you explain what some of these climate initiatives look like in practice?

SY: This is very important, because it sounds very abstract if we just talk about leadership. In practical terms, there are all different kinds of initiatives – we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. 

Or also by providing funding, for example, China has created this south-south climate fund. It can also include research collaboration or producing knowledge – mainly between research institutes. 

It can be traditional leadership activities, in the sense of developing certain international regulatory frameworks or rules or standards – we call this rulemaking and standard-setting. It can also be pilot projects. China sometimes can start to work directly with some international partners to trial new ideas and new practices – what we call direct actions.

These are the different types of leadership activities that we look at and we actually code each initiative that meets the criteria of our database according to this topology, to try to look at what [the Chinese government] are looking at.

Some initiatives can do multiple things at the same time…One example is the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization [GEIDCO]. [This was] initially created by the State Grid of China to try to promote clean energy and energy interconnections. 

This initiative will deliver different types of activities, including building the capacity of some developing countries on energy and electricity grids, and also, for example, developing an international platform – they have annual international meeting and a lot of information-sharing activities, and engagement at UN meetings, including at COP side-events, and also directly engaging with some international organisations. 

So, this is an example of the type of leadership initiative that has been included in our database.

CB: And would you say that there’s one particular type of activity that dominates, in terms of China’s climate leadership? Or is it very evenly split against all of the different types? 

SY: This is also one of the main findings in our work. In the first paper we published to highlight the key patterns from the dataset, we highlighted that there’s a very uneven distribution in terms of what China tries to deliver or to promote, itself, internationally on environmental governance.

There have been a lot of initiatives focusing on sharing information and building platforms and this is the most dominant category – across all environmental issues, but the same pattern applies to climate change. 

In the first article we published in the Earth Systems Governance journal, we looked at the whole dataset, but we are also developing a few studies, currently under review. One paper particularly looks at climate initiatives and it’s the same pattern: information-sharing and networking.

At the same time, the least frequent or popular type is the provision of funding – creating some financing programmes to directly give funding to international partners. I think this reflects China’s position on environmental or climate finance, especially internationally. 

The number of different types of China-led climate initiatives established from 1991-2004. Source: CGEL database.

[China’s] not trying just to provide money, but really think about how to support other countries on more practical, more pragmatic terms. This is why I think that after information-sharing, what we have seen is capacity-building activities, which have also been quite frequently used by Chinese initiatives when collaborating with their international partners. This also explains China’s logic to teach [others] how to develop things, but not just giving money.

The other important category is research collaboration and knowledge production. This has been mainly led by research institutes in China, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, especially with a strong focus on scientific co-production. 

But, lately, we have also seen more and more initiatives focused on sharing knowledge not just about science itself, but sometimes also on the social sciences side – the experiences of China as a whole. China’s experiences can also be learned from by other countries, especially in the global south. 

These are just some examples, but the overall pattern is [a focus on] information-sharing, capacity building and knowledge production and not too much on provision of funding.

CB: You mentioned the GEIDCO example earlier. How much of a tangible impact would you say a lot of these initiatives have? Are they very high-level, strategic and quite abstract? Or do they kind of result in programmes on the ground? 

SY: That’s a very interesting question – the answer is that it really varies. GEIDCO, as you  mentioned, is a very high-level initiative. I think, initially, the idea of energy interconnection was proposed by President Xi himself. Now, of course, GEIDCO, with the backing of the State Grid, does a lot of high-level [national planning] and trans-national [grid network] planning work with developing countries.

But, at the same time, there are also a lot of grounded, locally focused initiatives. A lot, for example, are co-developed between China – especially supported by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment [MEE] – and UNEP [United Nations Environment Programme] in, for example, Africa and Southeast Asia. [This includes] some projects looking at climate adaptation and resilience. But these are more small-scale projects. 

So, in our database – and I welcome your readers to explore the database itself that you can see – there are a big variety of initiatives and their scope, their mission and their intended outcomes or impacts vary significantly. 

But we are just providing this public resource. Hopefully, people can use it to further explore, for example, the question of the impact or outcome. At this stage, we’re not going to assess what has been delivered, but I think if we can take, for example, a case-study approach – trying to trace what has been done, what has been delivered – this could also be a very interesting research agenda. 

CB: Is there a particular time from when China’s interest in engaging on climate change started, or has this been a very long-term process?

SY: In our database, we really wanted to capture the historical trend. That’s why we looked back from early on – [we focused on] from the beginning of this century, but also traced initiatives that had been created even earlier but became active in the 21st century. 

So we can [see that,] already in the late 1980s or 90s, there were some initiatives in the area of climate change. But, most importantly, the majority of the initiatives were started after 2008, mainly in the 2010s. We can see a very clear upward trend. It was not shown directly in our recently published article, but it’s in the database and we have looked at the data and produced a graph for other studies we are currently developing. 

Really, from after 2009 and 2010, we’ve seen many initiatives – of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and, even the last five years, from 2021, we still see more and more initiatives have been created.

The number of new China-led international environmental initiatives focused on climate change established between 1991-2024. Source: CGEL database.

This timeframe corresponds to China’s shifting international role, to move from [being] a more regional power, a large developing country, to a global superpower, and trying to project its influence globally. 

That also correlates with, for example, the belt and road initiative and lately the global development initiative – China is trying to also use climate change in this broader policy framework and trying to promote and support climate action in different parts of the world.

CB: The database stops at 2024 – just before the current administration withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement. Have you noticed any changes in China’s global climate engagements following this? 

SY: I would say the trend is a continuous one, even with the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and lately from the UNFCCC. Because, as I mentioned earlier, over the past 10 years, we have seen this upward trend, with more and more new initiatives created by Chinese actors. 

But I think the shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners – or countries or actors that haven’t been engaged very closely with China – to work more closely with China.

Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question. 

We really want to explore [this] further. Something I didn’t mention earlier is we are publishing this data set as version one, we want to keep updating on a regular basis. We hope we’ll have versions two or three out, maybe every two years. We’ll see how things go, but I think this is a very important question. 

CB: Looking at how China is engaging with all of these different countries – as you mentioned, more and more potentially wanting to work with it following the US’s withdrawal – do you get the sense that the Chinese government prefers to engage with countries bilaterally, on a one-to-one basis, or are they also engaging at the regional and multilateral levels?

SY: This is a great question. This is also an important finding from our work, because the conventional understanding is that China prefers to engage with countries bilaterally. 

But, if we look at our database, what we can see is that, actually, China has developed more and more transnational initiatives – meaning that it also involves non-state actors or [works] beyond the traditional multilateral processes and [develops initiatives] with a global scope. 

If we look at the historical trends, initially – especially up to 2010 – there were a lot of bilateral initiatives. Most cases in our database are bilateral initiatives. 

But, lately, I think this trend is shifting. Still, I think there are many more bilateral initiatives than multilateral and transnational initiatives. 

How we differentiate leadership activities of Chinese [state] actors across different levels [affects the trend], but, lately, what we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents.

So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale. 

I think this is also quite interesting, to understand how not only the government, but also lots of Chinese actors – including, for example, businesses and civil society actors – are trying to project and their footprint globally. 

And also I think this reflects a shifting global role of China, in general. We can further explore what the implications of this phenomenon are. This is some ongoing research I’m doing – trying to understand how actors in different parts of the world react or perceive this changing rule of China and how such engagement between China and different countries shape, or reshape, the sustainability transition.

CB: You mentioned just then that there’s not just the Chinese government, but also civil society, businesses and other non-state actors. What role do you think these non-state organisations play in the country’s overall climate strategy and climate engagement?

SY: Let me start with the caveat that, first of all, as shown in our database, the government, or state actors, still play a very important role – especially central government agencies, for example, the MEE [Ministry of Ecology and Environment] or NDRC [National Development and Reform Commission]. 

But, at the same time, especially over the last 10 years, what we have seen is that non-state actors have become more active and engaged more, in various ways, in leading climate initiatives beyond China’s borders. 

This means, sometimes, they collaborate with state actors to co-develop certain initiatives. Sometimes, they develop their own initiatives with, of course, some support from the state. One thing we need to bear in mind is, in China, it’s almost impossible to [avoid involving] the state. At least, you have to closely align with the strategy of the government. 

But, at the same time, what we can see is the agency of these actors. They have developed or showed the ambition to develop certain initiatives, including, for example, standards in the critical mineral space, to provide guidelines to companies for their overseas activities.

Similarly, some civil society actors, [such as] research institutes, also want to claim their leadership in a global sphere, trying to showcase how they can lead certain activities and show how their expertise or their knowledge can support countries or actors in other parts of the world.

CB: On the standards-setting point, is that something where it might be led by one Chinese company with multiple partners – whether it be from one country or from various different countries in a region? Or is it a broad spectrum of Chinese companies coming together saying that we want to work with Chile, Zimbabwe etc, on mining standards? Is it very representative of the industry, or does it tend to be quite piecemeal? 

SY: This is an inclusion criteria for the databases. We [only] look at the initiatives that are, to a large extent, institutionalised. It’s not that company’s claim that “we are doing this”. If we can’t track down any information or find any records then we cannot include things like that in our database.

That means we only tend to look at initiatives that are well-developed. These are often, for example, developed by national industry associations. They try to convene different companies together and try to collaborate with, or coordinate, different actors along supply chains and also across sectors or industries.

When they work with different international partners, this is also a question I think we need to further explore, using our data set to try to look at – sometimes I think it’s not easy for us to do everything! – but try to look at what kind of partners they select and how they get involved with partners in different countries or different regions.

But I think this probably requires some other methodologies to look at, or maybe zoom out to specific cases. 

This is similar – I always want to use this as a comparison – when we started [seeing] this phenomenon in Europe or in North America, for example, where companies start to take climate actions, we didn’t really pay a lot of attention to how and who they work with, as long as they say: “We are trying to support global climate action.”

But, nowadays, when it comes to the question of China, people start to be interested in who they work with. But if we look at the narrative and discourse of these initiatives, they say as well: “We want to support actions around the world.” 

They don’t always specify [the geographic scope of their standard-setting work], but if we further zoom into where they are working and why they work in specific areas or regions, this is also an interesting question – I think there is also a question of politics or political economy there. I would encourage researchers to use our dataset to further explore that kind of question.

CB: Zooming back out – the theme of the data set is environmental leadership, but – at least in global climate negotiations – Chinese officials have eschewed being called a climate leader. Your database seems to show an uptick in activity that could be defined as leadership. Would you say that China wants to be seen as a climate leader?

SY: This is a very strong claim, so I probably would not say [so] – also, it’s very subjective, depending on who you ask this question to and how people perceive it.

Let me frame me this way – let’s separate multilateral negotiation processes from what the country or different actors are doing. Of course, for leadership, another way to measure this is to see the performance itself. 

But, in the end, I think we also tried to be very reflective when we developed this work to acknowledge the subjectivity of leadership and the relational nature of leadership. That means that, if you want to be a leader, others need to acknowledge your leadership or recognise this status.

But this is why I think it comes to an interesting question about what’s the role of China and how different actors perceive China’s role in today’s global climate governance.

In multilateral negotiation processes, we are entering into the implementation phase for the Paris Agreement. That means it is very difficult to create new agendas at this stage. [Instead the focus is] trying to see if countries can deliver what they have done.

Of course, I think there is a question of ambition in terms of updating your nationally determined contributions. So, there is an ambition question – there is a performance question.

If we want to see whether China is becoming a leader, we have to look at how fast, for example, China is accelerating its energy transition, trying to reduce – of course, some data shows China has already peaked its emissions – but maybe, how fast China can reduce its emissions. 

Then, in terms of international engagement, what our data is trying to show is that China has become more proactive in that space. The question is also if this engagement translates into some progress in different parts of the world – if China is actually helping. We need more data to do this kind of impact assessment.

But, at the same time, I think the question of whether the Chinese government wants itself to be seen as a leader – this is also an interesting question. Depending on who they want to engage with, in different fora or on different platforms, the answer may be different. 

I just want to quote, when I was in China a few months ago, we had some dialogues with leading Chinese experts. They said the government – and also people in China – are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time, I think, what China is doing or the role of the country – in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. 

So, I think the question is whether this physical change that has already happened will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country. 

I think this is a question that China needs to figure out, itself. Then, of course, there will be implications for China’s strategy for engaging with the rest of the world, especially on climate change.

CB: And what do you think China’s climate engagements will look like in 5-10 years from now? 

SY: I think, from an energy-transition perspective – let me start from there – China is going to be, at the least, more proactive in promoting energy transition, because it aligns with China’s economic interests and, to a certain extent, its political interest as well, to support energy transitions around the world.

The key question is what role China can play in doing that. Of course, there is the question of trade, of tariffs. There is also the question of investment, intellectual property and technology transfer. 

My read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements, to support other countries. But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose some viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies. 

What we have seen is a lot of countries, especially in the global south, have benefited already, or are in the process of benefiting from, affordable technologies produced by China. 

But, at the same time, this is not sustainable – at least from an economic point of view – not a sustainable situation in the sense that these countries also need to find a way to move themselves upward in supply chains and try to absorb some technologies. How they can work with China [to achieve this] – that’s a very important question to me and also my team. We want to do more research in that area.

This is from the energy-transition perspective. But then, if we look at multilateral processes, I would say China is very committed to multilateralism. If we look at all the discourse, including the cases in our database – we have done some text analysis looking at the narrative discourse of the vision of these initiatives. Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes. 

Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment. 

So, I think this pattern will probably last. At the same time, because – depending on the other important countries’ climate policies, for example, the US – back to your question about the leadership in multilateral processes, how proactive and how ambitious China wants to be in taking on this leadership position in multilateral processes is still an open question. 

This also depends on the concept of leadership in different cultures.

Whether China wants to take over the US to become the only superpower of a global system – I think this is probably very unlikely. China may want to figure out a slightly different model. Even if, physically, it’s one of the most, or the most, important or powerful countries in the world, how using how the country can use this position to support or guide the governance of global challenges, this is probably slightly different from the views or understanding of, for example, European and other global north countries.

The question is how China can propose a slightly different model – still in the current multilateral system – for governing global challenges, including climate change. This is really important. I don’t have an answer, so that’s why we will continue to look at this question and try to use our research to help people understand what role China can play in global climate governance. 

CB: Thank you.

This interview was conducted by Anika Patel via Zoom on 1 July 2026.

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As the techno-authoritarian race to develop advanced Artificial Intelligence technologies continues at full steam, Silicon Valley’s sway over regulatory agendas has come to rival – even surpass – that of many states. Yet, between the ambitions of global superpowers and AI giants, Europe has the opportunity to seek something better. An interview with award-winning journalist and author Karen Hao.

Alessio Giussani: Several metaphors have been evoked to describe the current model of AI development – a parrot or a mirror, for example. Why did you choose that of empire?

Karen Hao: I think those metaphors are all extremely useful. I focus on empire because I’m not just looking at the technical artefact itself and what happens when it’s deployed in society, but also at the production of this technology and the actors who consolidate an extraordinary amount of economic and political power to produce it.

There are four main reasons why I call this system an empire. First, these companies lay claim to resources that are not theirs: individuals’ data, as well as the work of writers and creators. Second, they exploit an extraordinary amount of labour, and that goes for the workers they exploit within the production process and the supply chain of these technologies, as well as the workers whose labour rights are eroded when the technology is deployed.

The third aspect is information control. A major facet of empires’ expansion is the ability to filter all knowledge production and information through the lens of their imperial agenda, and this is precisely what AI companies are doing. They control and censor the science that gets produced by bankrolling most AI researchers, and they are building an information technology that they seek to make the central portal through which everyone else engages with the world, including in education.

Lastly, they wrap all this in a civilising mission. They say that they’re engaging in this work because ultimately they are trying to bring humanity a technology that will elevate us to a utopian state, and if the bad guys – which usually means China – develop it before us, then we will instead descend into a dystopian state. This is a kind of religious narrative that was also common among empires of old.

The AI empire, as you are describing it, is not limited to a company; it’s a system, a logic. What lies behind your focus on OpenAI and on the figure of its CEO, Sam Altman?

One answer is that people need stories to help make concrete what would otherwise be an abstract idea. But OpenAI is also particularly interesting because it made all of the major decisions that changed the norms within the industry, pushing it towards empire-building. It was OpenAI that decided to scale at all costs, to work with large language models, and produce a chatbot-like interface for them. Pretty much everything that the public understands to be associated with AI today was first decided within OpenAI’s walls.

By telling that history, it becomes much more obvious that AI is not inevitable, because you start to realise there were real people making those decisions based on their values, their worldviews, their personal vendettas – whatever it is that actually shaped the trajectory of AI development. Sam Altman’s ideologies are imbued in the model, not just in an abstract sense. You often hear the truism that models reflect their creators, but I wanted to show how this actually happens. It’s about the companies, the people, and the economic and ideological environment they are part of.

As these technologies grow more powerful, asserting control over their deployment is becoming an existential question. We saw Big Tech bowing to Trump at his second inauguration, but we are also seeing AI CEOs increasingly at odds with the government. Who will end up having the final say – the state or private companies?

There is an ongoing battle for who’s going to call the shots. I see the relationship between Washington and Silicon Valley as an alliance of convenience, but a very fraught one. They represent two different models of empire, each with its own imperial agenda. Both are trying to expand and quite literally take over more land from other countries, but the Trump administration sees AI companies as tools in the hands of the state’s imperial ambitions. Meanwhile, Silicon Valley sees the Trump administration as a tool of their imperial ambitions, but they’re not actually on the same page, because each of them wants to be the supreme entity that comes out on top.

There have been moments when the US government has demonstrated that it’s still on top – when Trump and Musk collided, Musk got booted out. However, when the Department of War clashed with Anthropic, the company showed that it was the stronger power in that instance: Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth evoked the nuclear option, threatening to declare the company a supply chain risk as the ultimate stick that he could whack to get Anthropic in line, and the company still didn’t get in line. Quite embarrassingly, the Department of War has become deeply dependent on a private actor that is unwilling to cooperate on the government’s terms, and the government can do nothing about it.

There needs to be accountability for both of these imperial actors, and that accountability will not come from either of them; it has to come from the people. From bottom-up, grassroots organising, which we are beginning to see blossoming all around the world, including in the US. As impervious as the alliance of convenience may appear, it is actually extremely fragile, and there are opportunities to accelerate its demise by applying more pressure at its pain points.

Instead of looking at AI as a global race between the good and the bad guys, we should be thinking about what vision we have for society.

The state of AI development looks like a competitive race to the bottom between rival companies and global superpowers. What role has geopolitical competition with China played in bringing AI to its current predicament?

China is a card that Silicon Valley has played for a decade, pretty much ever since it got kicked out of China. But when you look at the track record of this argument, you see that what has happened is consistently the opposite of what Silicon Valley said would happen.

They said that by not regulating Silicon Valley companies – and by regulating China through export controls – American technology would dominate worldwide. Yet TikTok is now the most popular social media platform, and Chinese open-source AI models are becoming more and more popular around the world, including in the US. They also promised that Silicon Valley dominance would have a liberalising effect on the world, but that hasn’t come to pass either; their effect has been deeply illiberalising. There has been an extraordinary erosion of democratic institutions and a rapid acceleration of democratic backsliding, aided by Silicon Valley platforms and AI technologies.

Instead of looking at AI as a global race between the good and the bad guys, we should be thinking about what vision we have for society, what kind of AI technologies would support that vision, and what resources we need to bring it about. We should be competing not in a race Silicon Valley defined, but on the ideas and values we want to uphold. And I believe Europe has an opportunity here to show the world a third way, different from those of the US and China, that resets the rules of the game.

The European Commission has recently adopted a tech sovereignty package as part of Europe’s effort to chart its own technological path. How should we articulate this vision to avoid ending up with a European version of a surveillance-based, oligarchic business model?

The North Star that Europe should be following is not sovereignty for sovereignty’s sake, but the purpose of achieving that sovereignty. Europe, or at least most of it, is one of the last bastions of democracy in the world. It upholds human rights and freedoms, and it needs tech sovereignty to help advance these values. As long as it remains extremely dependent on systems being developed in a very authoritarian way and seeking to undermine European societies, it cannot uphold its values. Sovereignty as a concept tends to become vague if you just start thinking about it as a goal in and of itself. It should be a means towards a purpose.

What kind of coalitions, constituencies, or sites of conflict should we be starting from in order to build that alternative vision?

First of all, we should understand AI governance in an expansive way. Strengthening labour rights and protecting civil society, for example, counts as AI governance. Students, teachers, and health care workers should also be at the table to help shape and contest how AI is developed and deployed in society. Education is key, both as a sector and a coalition that we need to bring in, and in terms of public education around AI.

Another important aspect is funding AI researchers and entrepreneurs to figure out the more technical aspects of what you are trying to build and how you want to apply it. But you can’t just give them money without allowing the rest of society a say; otherwise, you are just replicating the problems we have in the US, where it’s essentially technocrats or techno-authoritarians calling the shots.

You are not starting from scratch. A lot of work has already been done to establish the common goals society should strive towards. I’m talking about the Sustainable Development Goals, for example. That could be a starting point for figuring out how to fund AI innovation.

The narratives around current AI technologies are extremely polarised. On one side, you have those who say there’s nothing particularly new about these technologies, and that the bubble is about to burst. On the other, you have those who believe AI will transform our lives, revolutionise supply chains, and make us all redundant. What do you make of these different stances?

It’s true, many people tend to exaggerate the benefits without considering the costs of these technologies, or overemphasise the costs without seeing the benefits. But I think there’s quite a large percentage of people who agree that we want the benefits of AI, but not at the cost of our own ability to live a dignified life, with access to good health care, economic opportunity, a healthy environment, and a flourishing planet. That’s the most balanced approach to take.

AI is a name for many different types of technologies, and so we should be thinking carefully about which ones we invest in, which new ones we want to build, because they each come with a different set of trade-offs; some of those align with the future that we want to build, and some others don’t. We should choose wisely.

AI is a name for many different types of technologies, and so we should be thinking carefully about which ones we invest in, which new ones we want to build.

What’s your own relationship with existing AI tools?

I don’t use them for three main reasons. One, the ethical stance. Two, the privacy stance: I’m investigating these companies, and they are ultimately the most effective surveillance technologies ever invented. Three, these tools are not very useful for the particular skill set that I need to perform my job.

I’m not saying that everyone should do the same. I’ve talked with many people who clearly get something out of these tools, or are required to use them as part of their professional role. Rather, the way to get out of the current problem is to do the same that we’ve done with other industries in the past, like the fashion industry. When we discovered that many of our clothes were being produced in a really horrific way, we didn’t just get rid of clothes. There was a lot of consumer and worker organising, government regulation, and general public backlash that reined in the industry. Of course, the fashion industry is still far from perfect, but at least there are alternatives now, and consumers can vote with their wallets over what kind of supply chain and corporate practices they endorse.

We need to do the same with AI. There are not enough alternatives for users right now, and for that to change, there needs to be more labour organising and more public backlash. Those who can abstain from these technologies should absolutely boycott them, and governments should step in to help create new markets for alternatives. Consumers have an important lever to pull, but it’s not the only one. As people, as individuals, we also wear the hats of the worker, the educator, and the citizen, and we should think about how to use all those roles in relation to AI development to make it better.

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