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Are “fast, free buses” a pie-in-the-sky New York City campaign promise, or an urgent policy prerogative for cities across America?

Results are still pending on now-mayor Zohran Mamdani’s pledge to free NYC transit riders from gridlock and the farebox. Advocates at the Climate and Community Institute argued last spring, though, that other cities can and should aspire to the same goal — even in an era of sharp federal transit cuts that have only escalated since their report was initially released.

“When we zoomed out from New York — which to many people seems like an outlier in the United States — we started finding so many examples of smaller cities that were implementing these kinds of changes, both to speed buses up and to reduce or eliminate fares,” said John Stehlin, a professor at University of North Carolina, Greensboro and co-author of the report. “Sometimes, [they’re even doing both] at the same time. It seemed like way more of a national story, despite the fact that New York was getting the biggest headlines.”

Why fast and free?

Stehlin notes that transit agencies across the country are already working to speed up routes or zero out the price of a ride — even if most do neither, and few have done both.

On the “fast” side of the equation, Pittsburgh has been building dedicated bus corridors since the 1970s; meanwhile, true bus rapid transit has been operational in places like Los Angeles, Cleveland, and Eugene, Oregon, since the late 2000s. Countless others have explored lower-lift strategies, too, like giving buses first priority at traffic signals.

When it comes to free transit, dozens of cities have gone zero-fare on at least a few of their routes for decades, especially in downtown business districts or tourist areas. Many small communities like ski towns have even stopped collecting cash system-wide — and more could probably afford to, since US transit agencies recovered just 13 percent of their operating expenses on average from ticket sales in 2024.

In some communities like Olympia, Washington, agencies found that enforcing fare collection actually cost them more than the amount their riders were paying.

“A lot of places looked at the cost of collecting fares and found that the juice wasn’t worth the squeeze,” added Stehlin.

And the societal payoff for giving folks a free ride could be huge. One study cited by the researchers found that ridership shoots up an average of 56 percent after fares are eliminated.

When policies that make buses fast and free are implemented together, though, Stehlin says both priorities are often easier to achieve.

Eliminating fares, for instance, can get buses out of the stop and back on the road faster, since drivers don’t have to wait extra time for passengers to fumble with fare cards and loose change.

Speeding up routes, meanwhile, can attract new riders, which helps make whole systems more efficient – and helps make the case for what Stehlin calls “collecting fares on the societal level.” He encourages skeptics to think of it like the taxes and bonds communities currently collect to fund public libraries, where we’d never think of charging for books per check-out.

Still, he acknowledges that some “free” transit programs haven’t translated into steep ridership increases, while cannibalizing scarce revenues that agencies sorely need to speed buses up. But he says that’s all the more reason to think of the two policies as two sides of the same positive feedback loop — and fund both robustly.

“This is evidence that we should really look at implementing fast and free together, because if you have a bus system that’s not working well enough for people and meeting their needs, then making it free is not going to attract a lot of people,” added Emmett Hopkins, Stehlin’s co-author and the Transportation Policy Manager for the Institute. “But if we can do both together, then it can.”

Perhaps the best reason to do fast and free together, the authors argue, is simply how many lives it would make better.

“We found stories of specific people [whose] buses had been made faster or free, and those people were just better able to stay connected to the things that they needed in their lives — whether it be housing, health care, school, work, groceries, recreation, or their loved ones,” said Hopkins.

Recommended Why Arguments Against ‘Free Transit’ Are Missing the Point Streetsblog August 23, 2022

As Washington aims for steep federal transit cuts and transit agencies across the country follow suit, both Hopkins and Stehlin acknowledge that achieving the dream of fast and free buses nationwide won’t be easy. Still, they say it is possible — with a few ambitious policies.

First, both co-authors emphasize that forward-thinking state DOTs already have the ability to “flex” capital dollars away from highways and towards transit agencies, freeing up funds to plan and build faster infrastructure like bus rapid transit.

Advocates, meanwhile, can fight for funding explicitly to support fare-free operations, like Virginia already did to eliminate fares in its capital city of Richmond — at the cost of just $5 million, or 0.4 percent of the DOT’s annual budget.

State legislatures can clear the way by abolishing outdated “minimum farebox recovery” mandates that effectively require agencies to charge for a ride, and let localities pass local bond measures, raise taxes, and pursue other revenue streams to amp up transit investment of all kinds.

And if full-scale bus rapid transit redesigns and system-wide fare abolition aren’t in the cards, agencies can always start small with interventions like changing signal priority to benefit buses, or making key downtown routes free.

“States and cities have the opportunity to give people those better options on a pretty short time scale,” added Hopkins. “That could happen in a matter of months or within a year — or, in some cases, almost immediately.”

Stehlin adds that there’s hope for faster, free buses even in communities not known for being progressive on transit — because many of them are already doing it, at least at small scale. Perhaps the best example is Birmingham, Alabama, which saw ridership rise sharply after its free, 10-mile rapid transit project, Birmingham Xpress, opened in 2022.

“One of the things that we noticed when we did the research for this report was that we’re already seeing a lot of success in these kinds of initiatives in relatively conservative states,” Stehlin said. “There are aspects of this that are more popular than a car-only agenda.”

An earlier version of this story misstated how much it cost for Virginia to fund free buses in Arlington. It was 0.4 percent, not 0.07 percent.

Let’s imagine a city that wants more visitors to explore its downtown on foot. The photographs on the city’s website show a pedestrian paradise: broad sidewalks, outdoor tables, even a trail along the water. A family arrives by bus, follows the map the city provided … and discovers that to reach the trail entrance, they have to cross a busy road. Those last few hundred feet might ruin the whole afternoon. 

Let’s take another example: a public plaza has been open for years, but its restrooms close before evening programming begins. Or imagine a visitor’s district which promises a car-free day out, yet the last return bus leaves before the advertised evening activities finish. 

In each example, an attractive public promise meets a practical challenge that the whole trip depends on — and it fails the test. 

These are different problems with different owners. But they all share the same planning question: has anyone tested the whole journey that people are being invited to make, from beginning to end? 

Whether we’re talking about streetscapes, trails, transit connections, or public spaces, the usefulness of our local investments often depends on what happens beyond a construction boundary or departmental responsibility. A bike path can be finished while the connection to the larger bike network remains unresolved; an event can be staffed while the route home is overlooked. A map can describe a continuous experience for which no single organization is responsible, so it doesn’t deliver on its promise. 

The framework I call “Visitor Readiness” offers a way to examine those dependencies, through five questions: What is being promised? Who has the capacity to deliver it? What conditions must exist? How will delivery work? What will actual use teach us?

Visitor readiness in practice  

Despite the name, Visitor Readiness applies to residents as well as tourists. Someone crossing town for a shift, accompanying a child, or visiting an unfamiliar neighborhood should not need insider knowledge to make a public space work. Residents also have knowledge that a promotional itinerary can miss; their experience should help define readiness from the beginning.

Start with a specific promise. The vague desire for a “A connected waterfront” is difficult to meet. But a community canguarantee that “a person arriving at this bus stop can reach the waterfront on a continuous, usable route and return after the event.” Specificity gives a team something to examine. It also makes clear where transportation, parks, event operations, and communications have to coordinate.

Then, follow that journey with the people who depend on it. Include disabled residents, transit riders, nearby workers, and caregivers. Compensate participation where possible. A lunchtime walkthrough by project staff cannot establish what happens after dark, during a busy event, or when a usual route is closed. Ask who is missing from the test and what their absence leaves unknown.

For planners and advocates, the practical questions are straightforward: Can someone find and complete the trip without a car, a smartphone, or prior local knowledge? Do opening hours and transportation schedules actually support the activity being promoted? Where can someone rest, find a restroom, or get help? Who corrects conflicting information? When a connection fails, who has the authority and budget to fix it?

Record the answers in ordinary language. Separate what has been observed from what is assumed. Assign each unresolved question to someone who can answer it, and pick a date to check on their progress. “Coordinate with partners” is insufficient when everyone believes another organization owns the problem.

How quickly you respond to those questions should correspond to how urgent the problem is. Correcting an outdated map could happen immediately. Extending restroom hours requires staffing and an operating budget, and that needs to be sorted out soon. A dangerous crossing needs a substantive safety response; better directions cannot compensate for unsafe access. When not all problems can be immediately solved, communicate the limitation clearly and specify the work needed to finish the job. 

An evolving process 

Visitor Readiness must also remain open to revision. An established trail or plaza can become unusable when service hours change, a nearby connection closes, or maintenance falls behind. Teams should revisit the journey after significant changes and use complaints, staff observations, and conversations with people who stopped coming to identify what might have been missed. 

In addition to capital funding, advocates can and should ask for the operational resources they need to do this work: an operating owner, maintenance and access, a test of the full journey, and a public review after use begins. That makes readiness part of delivering an improvement, rather than another indefinite hurdle to be surmounted in the quest to build safer streets.

Promoting a public place creates expectations about how it will work. The useful test is whether someone can actually do what that space invites them to do, under the conditions they will actually encounter. Public investment earns its value in those ordinary trips — including the last few hundred feet.

• Rural communities that only have bare-bones transit service as it is will feel the brunt of congressional Republicans’ cuts to federal transit funding. The proposed BUILD America 250 Act provides only $103 billion for transit over five years, compared to $120 billion from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act signed by President Biden in 2021. (Grist)
• Meanwhile, the stopgap transportation funding law signed by President Trump three weeks ago cuts funding for three rail grant programs from $9 billion to just $200 million. (Railway Supply)
• Several rail and transit funding referendums are scheduled for November, and with federal support flagging, losses at the ballot box could be catastrophic. (Governing)
• Probably the largest of those is a Bay Area vote to help the region’s four struggling transit agencies (San Jose Mercury News). Oakland residents gathered at city hall recently to push for passing the $14 billion measure (Oaklandside).
• A set of key votes on Austin light rail are scheduled for today (KXAN).
• In addition, the Atlanta city council will vote on a resolution in support of light rail along the Beltline (CBS News).
• The California High-Speed Rail Authority reimbursed $600,000 in unallowable expenses like Uber rides and bar tabs, according to an investigator general’s report. (CalMatters)
• The Federal Transit Administration has closed a years-long review of safety on Boston transit. (WGBH)
• The Miami-Dade government shifted $5 million to its already flush tourism bureau at a time when transit is struggling. (WLRN)
• Both U.S. Senate candidates in Michigan favor suspending state and federal gas taxes (Michigan Public), even though that doesn’t save drivers much money and hampers transportation projects.
• North Carolina started an initiative making it easier for Raleigh-to-Charlotte intercity rail passengers to connect to local transit. (ABC 11)
• San Antonio is starting a pilot program to help late-shift service industry workers get home. (KSAT)
• A bus rapid transit project in Bloomington is on hold as the city awaits federal grant approval. (Bloomingtonian)
• Quartz ranked Cambridge, UK as the most bike-friendly city in the world, with Marrakech, Warsaw and some other surprises landing in the top 10 along with the usual Northern European suspects.

Victoria's coal country is rapidly morphing into battery country, as one huge project starts commissioning, while another marks a construction milestone with major expansion plans.

The post Renewables retailer doubles down on coal country battery plans as huge new BESS prepares to power up appeared first on Renew Economy.

British Columbia should make long-term care part of its big-project building agenda and commit to a construction timetable for seven deferred public care projects, says a new report from the Centre for Future Work.

The report examines the economic benefits of building public long-term care facilities, and the dangers and costs of relying on for-profit operators. It argues that full accounting of the costs and benefits of long-term care construction needs to include financing charges (which are much lower for public builds), broader economic spin-offs from new construction, and a range of savings resulting from superior health outcomes demonstrated in public facilities.

Projections indicate the province needs 16,000 additional subsidized long-term care beds over the next decade—about 1,600 a year. But over the last six years, B.C. added an average of only about 240 net new beds annually.

Despite that gap, seven public long-term care construction and redevelopment projects were deferred in the province’s 2026 budget. The provincial government continues to list the projects in its long-term capital plan, but without firm timelines for construction.

The report challenges exaggerated stereotypes about the cost of building public long-term care facilities, and called for more transparent and systematic comparisons of cost estimates. Many public projects include services such as child care, hospice spaces and other services, often accessible to the broader community – making simple per-bed comparisons misleading.

Financing is an important cost advantage for public builds. In an illustrative comparison, the higher cost of private borrowing increases cumulative interest costs by 41 per cent, adding $49 million to a $200 million project over 25 years.

Most long-term care in B.C. receives provincial government funding, regardless of whether a facility is publicly owned, non-profit, or for-profit. Those payments help cover building and financing expenses as well as operating costs. Data published by the B.C. Senior’s Advocate indicates that building costs in private facilities (ultimately charged to the public purse) are much higher than non-profit facilities.

Outsourcing new builds to private operators does not make the public cost disappear. Government still pays for those facilities through decades of care funding.

The report calls for a transparent comparison of construction costs across public, non-profit and for-profit facilities. It identifies ways to improve value in future projects, including using public land, sharing sites with other health services, standardizing designs and coordinating procurement.

It recommends that the provincial government quickly complete its review of the deferred projects, and publish a reliable construction timetable by the next provincial budget. It also calls for capital funding and development support for non-profit providers, alongside a longer-term plan to meet projected demand.

Please see the full report, Economic Benefits from Construction of Public Long Term Care Capacity in British Columbia, authored by Jim Stanford, Economist and Director of the Centre for Future Work.

The post The Build-Big Agenda in B.C. Should Include Long-Term Care Homes appeared first on Centre for Future Work.

VicGrid has released its preferred route for the 60 km new transmission line needed to bring offshore wind power to the main grid in the Latrobe Valley.

The post Route for first offshore wind transmission link mapped out amid scramble to meet 2032 target appeared first on Renew Economy.

In this special episode recorded live from Everything Electric Sydney, we explore how close Australia is to making V2G an everyday reality.

The post The Driven Podcast: Is Australia finally ready for V2G? | Live from Everything Electric Sydney appeared first on Renew Economy.

State Electricity Commission says it will slash the power bill of major sports and aquatic centre by as much as $80,000 a year through a rooftop solar system it has installed and will operate.

The post State utility partners on massive rooftop solar array to slash sports centre’s annual power bill by $80,000 appeared first on Renew Economy.

NSW takes lead on mandatory recycling for solar panels that could set a national benchmark, and bypass a roadblock created by stalled federal scheme.

The post NSW takes lead on mandatory solar panel recycling as ministers call for urgent action on rising tide of waste appeared first on Renew Economy.

EPBC waves through 2 GW wind, solar and battery project proposed for Australia's biggest isolated grid, with list of conditions to protect endangered black cockatoos and native flora.

The post Huge hybrid wind project gets final green tick, but must use tall turbines to avoid black cockatoos appeared first on Renew Economy.

The Amazon does not need new masters Channel News brendan 21st September 2026 Teaser Media

On Thursday evening, Sept. 24, Food Tank, New York University, and Rodale Institute will host Marion Nestle’s 90th Birthday Party at Climate Week NYC 2026. The evening will honor and celebrate Nestle’s legacy of advancing evidence-based nutrition, championing transparency in the food system, and empowering people to ask critical questions about the food we eat.

“Marion Nestle has spent her career teaching us that food is never just food. The choices we make about how we grow, sell, market, and eat shape our health, our communities, and the future of our planet,” said Jeff Tkach, CEO of the Rodale Institute.

Nestle is Professor Emerita of Nutrition, Food Studies, and Public Health at New York University and one of the world’s most influential voices on food, nutrition, and public health. She has spent decades shaping the national conversation on food policy, corporate influence, nutrition science, and the importance of healthy, equitable food systems. Nestle is also a bestselling author of numerous acclaimed books, including Food Politics, What to Eat, Slow Cooked, and, most recently, Sugar Coated, which will be on sale in the lobby by Books On Call NYC.

With live musical performances, toasts, cake, and a fireside chat with Nestle herself, the evening will celebrate how she has inspired generations of researchers, policymakers, journalists, and advocates.

To conclude the evening, Rodale Institute will present Nestle with the Organic Stewardship Award for Lifetime Achievement in Education. Since 2011, the award has recognized individuals whose work has profoundly influenced efforts to improve the health of our agriculture and food systems. Nestle will receive the inaugural award for education, recognizing her visionary work to inspire lasting change by deepening public understanding of the vital relationship between agriculture, nutrition, environmental stewardship, and human health.

“For decades, Marion has had the courage to ask the questions others won’t, challenge conventional thinking, and bring clarity to complex issues. In doing so, she has shaped how generations understand our food system and empowered them to think more critically about their role within it,” says Tkach. “It is a privilege to honor her extraordinary body of work with Rodale Institute’s first Organic Stewardship Lifetime Achievement Award for Education.”

The evening will feature toasts to Marion Nestle by food system visionaries including Jennifer Berg, Clinical Professor and Department Chair, Nutrition and Food Studies, NYU Steinhardt; Mark Bittman, Editor-in-Chief, The Bittman Project; Nancy Easton, Executive Director and Co-Founder, Wellness in the Schools; Kathleen Finlay, President, Glynwood Center for Regional Food and Farming; Cathy Kaufman, Culinary Historian and Food Studies Scholar; Corby Kummer, Executive Director of Food & Society, the Aspen Institute, Senior Editor, The Atlantic, and Senior Lecturer, Tufts Friedman School of Nutrition Science; Frances Moore Lappé, Author and Co-Founder, Small Planet Institute; Kristie Patten, Gale and Ira Drukier Dean, NYU Steinhardt; Ruth Reichl, Author and Former Editor in Chief, Gourmet; Kim Severson, The New York Times; Max Sinsheimer, Literary Agent, Sinsheimer Literary, LLC; and Lisa Sutherland, Co-Author with Marion Nestle, Sugar Coated: Unboxing the Hidden Forces Shaping America’s Favorite Breakfast Food, and Interim President, Jacksonville University.

The event will kick off at WNYC-NPR Studios’ The Greene Space in New York City at 6:35pm with light food and live musical performances, followed by a reception until 9:30pm.

The birthday party will also feature special musical performances by Singer-Songwriter Amber Rubarth; Jake Pedersen, a Broadway and TV actor currently in Ragtime on Broadway, who recently starred as Boq in Wicked on Broadway and on tour, as well as Frankie Epps in Parade on Broadway; and Maria Caputo, a New York-based composer, pianist, vocalist, music director, and Broadway music copyist whose work spans musical theatre, jazz, classical, and contemporary music.

The event will be streamed live on FoodTank.com and Food Tank’s YouTube channel, here. Join the Food Tank newsletter list for reminders, and click here for Food Tank’s full lineup of events at Climate Week NYC 2026.

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

The post Celebrating Marion Nestle appeared first on Food Tank.

On Monday afternoon, Sept. 21, Food Tank will host the “Mission-Driven Brands Sustainability Summit” at Climate Week NYC 2026, in partnership with Bel US, Northstar Recycling, the Global Traceability Framework for Beef and Leather, and Bonterra Organic Estates.

The event is Food Tank’s annual gathering of Chief Sustainability Officers, mission-driven brand leaders, impact directors, and founders at Climate Week NYC. The afternoon will feature food system industry leaders discussing challenges and opportunities for brands to make an impact across retail, food service, and hospitality.

“We’re honored to join this conversation during Climate Week NYC and to celebrate the organizations demonstrating that purpose and commercial leadership can go hand in hand,” says Mark Kaplan, Chief Marketing and Sustainability Officer at blockchain-based traceability system Wholechain.

Speakers will explore how to build a common language for supply chains, including through solutions like The Global Traceability Framework for Beef and Leather. The pre-competitive platform for collaborative action provides a shared foundation for how traceability data is captured and exchanged, so systems can work together across companies and geographies.

“Leather has traditionally been treated as a byproduct and afterthought of the beef industry,” says Jason Weller, Chief Sustainability Officer at JBS, the world’s largest meat processor. “At JBS, we have spent years building the expertise and techniques to elevate leather as a valuable resource: tracing hides to the source farm groups, re-engineering tanning chemistry to cut water and chemical use, and performing in-depth analyses so that we understand opportunities to improve the greenhouse gas emissions performance of our products.”

“We are thrilled JBS is joining us and showing their leadership by example to advance standardized, interoperable traceability,” says Kaplan. “Their leadership shows how mission-driven brands can accelerate meaningful progress by building the common language for data sharing that benefits their entire industries.”

The conversation will also turn to regenerative agriculture and how brands can support more resilient farming systems. Panel topics and fireside chats include “Mission Driven from Brand to Shelf,” “Regenerative Agriculture Grain to Glass at Star Hill,” and “How Regenerative Vineyards Are Shaping the Future of Wine.”

Immersive tasting experiences throughout the afternoon will feature traceable beef, lobster, and honey, Bel US cheese, Maker’s Mark whiskey, and wines from Bonterra Organic Estates.

“As climate change continues to challenge our food system, we must transition from extractive to regenerative models of production,” says Beatrix Scolari, Sustainability Manager at Bonterra Organic Estates. “Food Tank provides a forum for sharing the ideas, partnerships, and practical solutions needed to make that transition possible. Bonterra is honored to join this year’s summit, and we hope participants leave inspired by the growing evidence that regenerative agriculture can both strengthen farm resilience and help restore the health of our planet.”

With lightning talks on topics like the future of circular food systems, speakers will also emphasize the importance of collaboration across the food system to turn sustainability goals into action.

“Meaningful progress in sustainability happens when leaders across the food system come together to share what’s working, challenge conventional thinking, and learn from one another. That’s what makes gatherings like this so valuable,” says Shawna Laczko, Chief Revenue Officer at Northstar Recycling. “I hope attendees leave with new perspectives, practical ideas they can take back to their organizations, and a stronger sense of how collaboration across the value chain can turn ambitious sustainability goals into real, scalable progress.”

The event will kick off at WNYC-NPR Studios’ The Greene Space in New York City at 1:30pm with food and live musical performances, followed by a reception until 5pm.

Speakers include Jordan Catalana, Senior Manager, Social Impact, Tapestry Foundation; Dana Cowin, Founder, Progressive Hedonist and Former Editor-in-Chief, Food & Wine Magazine; Stephen Cronk, Co-Founder and Trustee, The Regenerative Viticulture Foundation; Co-Founder and CEO, Maison Mirabeau; Diana Hanus, Senior Executive Vice President, Commercial & Business Development, Sovereign Seas; Ann Marie Hourigan, Head of Quality Standards, Whole Foods Market; Mark Kaplan, Chief Marketing and Sustainability Officer, Wholechain; Shawna Laczko, Chief Revenue Officer, Northstar Recycling; Elaina Leibee, Wine Director, Erewhon; Peter McGuinness, CEO, Bel North America; Sarah McMullin, Senior Vice President, Owned Brands Product Operations and Manufacturing, Target; Danielle Nierenberg, President, Food Tank; Rob Samuels, Eighth-Generation Whisky Maker and Managing Director, Maker’s Mark; Beatrix Scolari, Sustainability Manager, Bonterra Organic Estates; and Jason Weller, Global Chief Sustainability Officer, JBS.

“Mission Driven Brands Sustainability Summit” will feature a special musical performance by Daniel Quadrino, Broadway actor currently starring as Boq in Wicked, with additional Broadway credits including The Who’s Tommy, Newsies, and Bye Bye Birdie. He will be joined by Ryan Fielding Garrett, a New York City-based composer, music director, orchestrator, and musician whose Broadway credits include Kinky Boots, Wicked, Back to the Future, The Notebook, and Mean Girls.

This summit will be streamed live on FoodTank.com and Food Tank’s YouTube channel, here. Join the Food Tank newsletter list for reminders, and click here for Food Tank’s full lineup of events at Climate Week NYC 2026.

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

The post Food and Agriculture Businesses Tackle Food Sustainability at Climate Week NYC appeared first on Food Tank.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 20 SEPTEMBER 2026 SLF-2007-063 The Sakhalin Papers LIII: The Missing LNG Cargoes — Shell’s Contract Was Supposed to Run Until 2028. Then It “Stood Terminated” Shell entered the Sakhalin LNG business as both shareholder and buyer. Public agreements envisaged long-term deliveries through 2028. After Russia transferred Sakhalin II to a new domestic operator in 2022, Shell stopped receiving the cargoes. In February 2023 it said it was considering its legal options. Its subsequent annual report went further: Shell said the old Sakhalin Energy company had failed to perform, had thereby renounced the LNG purchase contract, and that the contract “stood terminated.” No public record located for this file establishes that Shell has since received compensation for the lost deliveries.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-063
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Shell Annual Report and Accounts 2022; Shell Form 20-F 2023; Shell Form 20-F 2025
Contemporaneous reporting: Interfax, Reuters, Energy Intelligence and S&P Global
Related legal record: Russian restructuring of Sakhalin II and the continuing Moscow proceedings examined in the previous instalment
Evidence standard: Shell’s characterisation of contractual renunciation is attributed to Shell. It is not presented as a judicial finding. No inference is made that the absence of a publicly identified damages award proves that no confidential arbitration, negotiation or settlement process ever existed.

Introduction

The previous Shell Leaks File dealt with a contract that did not concern Sakhalin LNG.

Russia is currently seeking approximately €1.5 billion from Shell Energy Europe over disputed pipeline-gas payments from 2022.

This file turns to the other contract.

This one really did concern Sakhalin.

And unlike the pipeline-gas dispute, the public record contains a remarkably clear statement from Shell about what happened to it.

The Sakhalin LNG contract was supposed to continue until 2028.

The cargoes stopped during the third quarter of 2022.

By the following year, Shell’s own annual report said the contract had been renounced through non-performance and:

“stood terminated.” (SEC)

That is a much more consequential statement than merely saying Shell had withdrawn from the Sakhalin II shareholding.

It means the 2022 Russian restructuring severed another commercial relationship that had been expected to survive for years.

1. Shell was not merely a shareholder in Sakhalin II

For much of Sakhalin II’s history, Shell occupied several different positions simultaneously.

It was an investor.

It supplied technology and expertise.

It participated in project governance.

And it was also an LNG buyer.

That purchasing relationship dated back well before commercial LNG production began.

In 2004, Sakhalin Energy and Shell Eastern Trading announced a long-term agreement under which Shell would purchase 37 million tonnes of LNG over twenty years, initially intended principally for the North American market through the Energia Costa Azul terminal in Baja California. Contemporary industry reporting described plateau supply of approximately 1.6 million tonnes per year. (Energy Intelligence)

The commercial structure subsequently evolved.

On 8 April 2009, Gazprom and Royal Dutch Shell announced another package of LNG and gas agreements.

Under those arrangements, Shell Eastern Trading and Gazprom Global LNG were each to purchase approximately:

1 million tonnes of LNG per year

from Sakhalin Energy.

Deliveries were scheduled from 2009 until:

2028

The arrangements also included an equivalent pipeline-gas component for Shell’s European portfolio. (Energy Intelligence)

The precise contractual evolution between the earlier 2004 agreement and the 2009 arrangements is not fully reconstructed from the public documents examined here.

But one point is beyond serious dispute:

Shell possessed a long-term Sakhalin LNG purchasing relationship scheduled to run until 2028.

2. The contract became part of Shell’s global LNG machine

That mattered because Shell does not treat individual LNG cargoes merely as isolated shiploads.

Its LNG business operates as a portfolio.

Shell’s annual reports describe a trading system in which equity production and third-party purchases can be combined, redirected and optimised through a global shipping and terminal network.

A cargo originally associated with one supply source can therefore contribute to obligations or trading opportunities somewhere else.

Shell explains that if a customer does not require a scheduled cargo, the company may redirect it; similarly, if Shell needs another cargo, it can procure one from third parties. (SEC)

The Sakhalin purchase contract therefore represented more than gas physically leaving Prigorodnoye.

It represented a recurring block of LNG within a much larger international trading portfolio.

At the publicly reported plateau rate of approximately one million tonnes per year, several million tonnes of future contracted supply remained when deliveries stopped in 2022.

The precise financial value of those future cargoes cannot responsibly be calculated from the public evidence.

The contract price formula is not before us.

Nor are Shell’s hedging arrangements, destination flexibility, replacement-purchase costs, mitigation measures or any confidential contractual provisions governing termination.

3. Then came the June 2022 presidential decree

On 30 June 2022, President Vladimir Putin issued the decree that fundamentally altered Sakhalin II’s corporate structure.

The existing operator was the Bermuda-incorporated:

Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd.

Russia created a replacement domestic company:

Sakhalin Energy LLC.

Under the Russian restructuring, the project’s assets, licences, rights, obligations and personnel were transferred into the new company.

Gazprom remained.

Mitsui and Mitsubishi ultimately elected to participate in the replacement structure.

Shell did not. (euronews)

Shell had already announced after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that it intended to exit its Russian ventures and withdraw in a phased manner from Russian hydrocarbons.

But leaving the shareholding and terminating every outstanding commercial contract were not necessarily the same legal act.

That distinction now became critical.

4. Other Sakhalin customers were offered new contracts

The Russian restructuring did not cause Sakhalin II LNG exports generally to cease.

Instead, customers had to deal with the new operator.

Reuters reported in August 2022 that Japanese utilities holding long-term Sakhalin contracts were being offered replacement arrangements by the newly established Russian company. (The Japan Times)

JERA subsequently signed an agreement with the new operator.

Its spokesperson told Reuters that key commercial terms including volume, price and payment currency remained essentially the same as before. (Journal Chrétien – Actualité chrétienne)

Tokyo Gas also entered a long-term contract with Sakhalin Energy LLC.

Mitsui and Mitsubishi remained as shareholders in the new structure. (euronews)

This creates an important comparison.

The project continued.

Japanese buyers continued.

Japanese shareholders continued.

Shell did not.

5. Shell’s cargoes stopped in the third quarter of 2022

The first authenticated Shell record is strikingly terse.

Shell’s 2022 Annual Report and Accounts states that the company still held two long-term LNG offtake contracts with Russian entities.

Then it records:

the counterparty under one contract stopped delivering cargoes during the third quarter of 2022. (Shell)

The report did not identify the counterparty in that sentence.

But the identity soon became clear.

It was Sakhalin.

Interfax reported Shell’s clarification on 2 February 2023.

One Russian LNG contract involved Novatek and Yamal LNG.

The other was the Sakhalin contract running until 2028.

Shell confirmed that it was no longer receiving the cargoes due under the Sakhalin arrangement. (Interfax)

6. Shell initially said it was evaluating its legal options

Shell’s February 2023 statement is important because it captures the company’s position before the later annual-report wording became more definitive.

Shell said that, as it understood the Russian decree, the licences, assets, liabilities and personnel of the old Sakhalin Energy company had been transferred into the new Russian entity.

Shell was no longer receiving the LNG cargoes.

And the company said it was continuing to monitor developments and evaluate what options were available within the legal framework. (Interfax)

That was not yet an announcement of a settlement.

Nor was it an announcement of a damages claim.

It was a reservation of position.

The contractual consequences were still being assessed.

7. Shell’s 2023 annual report went considerably further

Shell’s 2023 Form 20-F later supplied the clearest legal formulation identified for this file.

It said that in February 2023 Shell had concluded that the old Sakhalin Energy Investment Company had:

renounced the long-term LNG purchase contract through failure to perform.

Shell then stated the consequence:

the contract:

“stood terminated.”

(SEC)

That wording deserves care.

It represents Shell’s legal position.

No court judgment located for this instalment independently determines that Sakhalin Energy breached the contract or that Shell’s interpretation of renunciation was legally correct.

But the wording nevertheless establishes something important.

Shell did not regard the Sakhalin LNG agreement as merely suspended.

By its own 2023 reporting, Shell regarded it as terminated.

8. A contract scheduled to survive until 2028 had disappeared five years early

The distinction is substantial.

Industry contract records continued to identify the historical Sakhalin arrangement as approximately 1 million tonnes per year with a 2028 expiry date. S&P Global’s later contract table continued to record Shell on that basis when describing the original Sakhalin II contract portfolio. (S&P Global)

That table should not be interpreted as evidence that Shell was still receiving LNG.

Shell’s own filings say the opposite.

It is useful because it preserves the nominal contractual horizon.

The original commercial arrangement extended to 2028.

Shell says performance ended in 2022 and that the contract was terminated in 2023.

In practical terms, the 2022 restructuring cut across a supply relationship with years still left to run.

9. The physical LNG did not disappear

This is another critical distinction.

The project continued producing LNG.

Gazprom describes Sakhalin II’s Prigorodnoye plant as having two LNG trains with design capacity of approximately 9.6 million tonnes per year. (Gazprom)

Sakhalin Energy had previously produced substantially above that nominal design capacity: more than 11.6 million tonnes in 2020, according to the company’s own reporting. (Gazprom)

And after Shell’s departure, production continued under the Russian operator.

Gazprom was still describing the Sakhalin II LNG plant as successfully operating in October 2024. (Gazprom)

Thus Shell did not lose its contracted cargoes because the LNG facility stopped producing.

The commercial relationship changed while the physical asset continued to operate.

10. The Japanese buyers illustrate what might otherwise be misunderstood

Because Japanese purchasers entered replacement arrangements with the new operator, it would be wrong to describe the 2022 events as a general cancellation of all Sakhalin II sales contracts.

Different counterparties made different choices and faced different circumstances.

Japan regarded Sakhalin II as significant to its energy security.

JERA, Tokyo Gas and other Japanese buyers pursued continuity.

Shell had already committed publicly to withdrawing from Russian hydrocarbons and declined participation in the replacement Russian project company. (S&P Global)

The resulting contractual paths diverged.

That is established.

Why every legal and commercial choice was made behind closed doors is not.

11. Shell’s withdrawal policy did not automatically erase existing contracts

There is an apparent paradox here.

On one hand, Shell announced that it would withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons.

On the other, it complained that Sakhalin LNG cargoes were no longer being delivered.

Those positions are not necessarily inconsistent.

Shell repeatedly distinguished between new or spot Russian purchases and pre-existing long-term contractual obligations.

Its 2022 reporting states that it stopped spot purchases of Russian crude, LNG and refined products while existing contractual relationships were being wound down in accordance with legal obligations and contractual provisions.

The Sakhalin contract therefore had to be legally dealt with.

A corporate policy announcement could not simply rewrite the contract.

Neither could a change in Russian corporate structure necessarily determine its treatment under whatever governing law and dispute-resolution provisions the LNG agreement contained.

Those provisions have not been located publicly for this file.

12. What did Shell actually lose?

At minimum, Shell lost continued performance under a long-term LNG purchase agreement that had been expected to continue until 2028.

Public sources place the later contractual volume at approximately one million tonnes annually. (Energy Intelligence)

But translating that into a damages figure would require information not publicly available.

Among the missing variables are:

the contract pricing formula;

the exact quantity schedule;

destination and diversion rights;

take-or-pay provisions;

force majeure clauses;

sanctions provisions;

termination rights;

replacement cargo costs;

Shell’s hedging position;

and any obligation to mitigate losses.

Accordingly, this archive does not attach a speculative dollar or euro amount to the missing cargoes.

The documentary finding is narrower:

Shell lost contractual LNG supply that was scheduled to continue for years.

13. Did Shell ever obtain compensation?

No publicly identified judgment, arbitral award, settlement announcement or Shell disclosure located for this instalment establishes that Shell subsequently received compensation specifically for the terminated Sakhalin LNG purchase contract.

That absence requires qualification.

International LNG agreements commonly contain confidential dispute-resolution provisions.

Any arbitration could itself be private.

Negotiations could also remain confidential.

The absence of a public record therefore does not prove that Shell never pursued a claim.

What can be said is that Shell’s later published reports do not identify the Sakhalin LNG purchase agreement as an active Russian supply contract.

14. By 2023 only the Novatek contract remained

The contrast in Shell’s own reporting is unusually clear.

At the end of 2022 Shell said it had two long-term Russian LNG purchase contracts.

One was Sakhalin.

The other was a Novatek-linked agreement associated with Yamal LNG. (Shell)

Shell’s 2023 annual report then said the Sakhalin contract had been renounced and terminated.

It added that Shell still held one long-term LNG purchase contract with a Novatek entity. (SEC)

Shell’s 2024 report repeated the same position.

So did its 2025 Form 20-F, published in March 2026. (SEC)

The accounting trail therefore tells the story almost mechanically:

Two Russian LNG contracts.

Then:

Sakhalin stops performing.

Then:

Sakhalin contract terminated.

Then:

one Russian LNG contract remains.

15. The surviving contract is not Sakhalin

This is important because it prevents another possible confusion.

Shell’s latest reporting still acknowledges a long-term Russian LNG purchase contract.

That does not mean the Sakhalin agreement revived.

The remaining contract is with a Novatek entity.

The original Novatek deal was signed in 2015 and contemplated approximately 900,000 tonnes of LNG annually for more than twenty years from the Yamal LNG project. (LNG Industry)

The Sakhalin purchase contract, by contrast, is no longer identified by Shell as active.

That distinction will matter in the next instalment.

16. The current Moscow lawsuit is about something else

Another distinction is essential.

The continuing Moscow lawsuit examined yesterday seeks approximately €1.5 billion from Shell Energy Europe for alleged unpaid pipeline gas supplied by Gazprom Export in 2022.

That litigation should not be confused with the missing Sakhalin LNG cargoes.

The Sakhalin LNG purchase agreement concerned liquefied gas supplied from the Russian Far East under a separate commercial relationship.

The Gazprom Export dispute concerned pipeline gas destined for Germany and the post-invasion rouble-payment mechanism.

Russia has subsequently linked the pipeline-gas dispute to money associated with Shell’s former Sakhalin equity interest.

But the public record examined for these files does not show the €1.5 billion claim as damages arising from the missing Sakhalin LNG cargoes. (Interfax.ru)

Keeping those transactions separate is crucial.

Documentary Findings Established

Shell had a long-term commercial relationship under which it purchased LNG produced by Sakhalin II. (Energy Intelligence)

Publicly announced 2009 arrangements contemplated approximately one million tonnes per year being purchased by Shell from Sakhalin Energy through 2028. (Energy Intelligence)

Russia transferred the Sakhalin II operating structure from the Bermuda-incorporated Sakhalin Energy Investment Company to a new Russian entity in 2022. (S&P Global)

Japanese shareholders Mitsui and Mitsubishi entered the replacement company, and several Japanese LNG purchasers entered replacement supply arrangements with the new operator. (euronews)

Shell did not enter the replacement operating company.

Shell’s 2022 Annual Report states that a Russian LNG counterparty stopped delivering cargoes during the third quarter of 2022. (Shell)

Shell subsequently confirmed that the affected contract was the Sakhalin LNG agreement. (Interfax)

In February 2023 Shell said it was monitoring the contract and considering its legal options. (Interfax)

Shell’s 2023 Form 20-F subsequently stated that Sakhalin Energy Investment Company had renounced the LNG purchase contract through non-performance and that the contract stood terminated. (SEC)

Shell’s latest annual reporting identifies only one remaining long-term Russian LNG purchase contract, with a Novatek entity. (SEC)

The Sakhalin II LNG plant continued operating after Shell ceased receiving cargoes. (Gazprom)

Shell’s stated legal position

Shell treated Sakhalin Energy Investment Company’s non-performance as contractual renunciation.

Shell treated the long-term Sakhalin LNG purchase contract as terminated.

Those are authenticated statements of Shell’s position.

They are not substituted here for an independent court or arbitral determination.

Not established

It is not established from the public record examined here that a court or arbitral tribunal found Sakhalin Energy liable to Shell for breach of the LNG purchase contract.

It is not established that Shell received damages or compensation for the undelivered Sakhalin cargoes.

It is not established that Shell received no compensation through any confidential arrangement.

It is not established how many individual cargoes Shell would ultimately have taken between the third quarter of 2022 and the original 2028 contractual expiry.

It is not established what financial value should be attached to those lost deliveries.

It is not established which later Sakhalin cargoes, if any, corresponded physically or commercially to volumes that might otherwise have been supplied to Shell.

And the pending €1.5 billion Moscow claim against Shell Energy Europe concerns a different pipeline-gas relationship and should not be described as litigation over the missing Sakhalin LNG cargoes.

Commentary

The missing cargoes reveal another reason the phrase:

“Shell left Sakhalin in 2022”

is inadequate as history.

Shell had spent decades embedding itself in Sakhalin II.

Its relationship with the project consisted of layers.

Ownership.

Management.

Technology.

Project finance.

LNG production.

Trading.

Long-term purchasing.

Those layers did not disappear simultaneously.

Shell announced its withdrawal from Russian investments in February 2022.

Its significant influence over Sakhalin Energy disappeared shortly afterwards.

Russia transferred the project to a new operating entity.

Shell declined to join it.

But an LNG purchase contract still existed.

Then the cargoes stopped.

Then Shell considered its legal options.

Then Shell formally recorded the contract as renounced and terminated.

That is not a single exit event.

It is an unwinding.

And even four years later, other Russian contractual and legal relationships remain unresolved.

Another archival lesson

The story also demonstrates why annual reports deserve to be read alongside headline news.

The headline in 2022 was:

Shell exits Russia.

The accounts revealed something much more complicated.

Shell still had Russian LNG contracts.

One supplier stopped delivering.

The Sakhalin contract disappeared.

The Novatek contract survived.

A separate Gazprom pipeline-gas dispute later became €1.5 billion litigation.

Shell’s former Sakhalin equity compensation became entangled in that lawsuit.

And the old Bermuda company remains on Shell’s books even though Shell says it no longer possesses Sakhalin II’s operating rights.

None of those details fits comfortably into the simple phrase:

“Shell left.”

That is precisely why the documentary chronology matters.

Source Record

Shell’s Annual Report and Accounts 2022 is the principal authenticated record for the cessation of cargo deliveries. It states that Shell still held two long-term LNG offtake contracts with Russian entities and that one counterparty stopped delivering cargoes during the third quarter of 2022. (Shell)

Shell Annual Report and Accounts 2022

The SEC-hosted Shell Form 20-F 2023 contains the clearest later contractual statement: Shell said Sakhalin Energy Investment Company had renounced the long-term LNG purchase contract through non-performance and that the contract stood terminated. It also records that one long-term LNG purchase contract with a Novatek entity remained. (SEC)

SEC — Shell Form 20-F 2023

Interfax reported Shell’s 2 February 2023 clarification that it was no longer receiving cargoes due under the Sakhalin contract and was evaluating its legal options. (Interfax)

Interfax — Shell says Sakhalin LNG deliveries have ceased, 2 February 2023

Contemporaneous Reuters reporting documents the different route taken by Japanese purchasers and shareholders, several of whom continued under contracts with the replacement Russian operator. (euronews)

Reuters — Russia approves Mitsubishi participation in new Sakhalin II operator

Reuters — Japanese utilities receive replacement Sakhalin contracts

Energy Intelligence’s contemporaneous 8 April 2009 report records the Shell-Gazprom arrangements under which each company was to purchase about one million tonnes annually from Sakhalin Energy from 2009 through 2028. (Energy Intelligence)

Energy Intelligence — Gazprom and Shell sign Sakhalin LNG agreements, 8 April 2009

Gazprom’s current Sakhalin II project record confirms the continuing operation and 9.6 million-tonne design capacity of the Prigorodnoye LNG facility. (Gazprom)

Gazprom — Sakhalin II project record

Shell’s latest authenticated annual report, for 2025, continues to state that Shell has one long-term Russian LNG purchase contract with a Novatek entity while retaining its shares in the old Bermuda-incorporated Sakhalin Energy Investment Company. (SEC)

SEC — Shell Form 20-F 2025

Archive disclaimer: Shell’s characterisation of contractual renunciation and termination is attributed to Shell. No publicly identified judgment or arbitral award located for this file independently determines liability under the Sakhalin LNG purchase agreement. The absence of publicly reported compensation is not treated as proof that no confidential claim, negotiation or settlement existed.

Site-wide disclaimer applies.

Next instalment The Sakhalin Papers LIV: The Russian LNG Contract That Survived — Why Shell Still Lists a Novatek Deal More Than Four Years After Announcing Its Russian Withdrawal

The Sakhalin agreement disappeared.

The other Russian LNG contract did not.

In June 2015, Novatek announced a deal under which Shell International Trading Middle East would purchase approximately:

900,000 tonnes of Yamal LNG every year

for:

more than twenty years.

(LNG Industry)

Shell announced in March 2022 that it intended to withdraw in a phased manner from Russian hydrocarbons.

Yet Shell’s 2025 Annual Report, published in March 2026, still says:

Shell holds one long-term LNG purchase contract with a Novatek entity. (SEC)

That raises the next documentary question:

Why did the Sakhalin LNG contract terminate while the Novatek/Yamal contract survived — and what does “phased withdrawal from Russian hydrocarbons” mean when one of Shell’s Russian LNG agreements may still have more than a decade left to run?

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 20 SEPTEMBER 2026 was first posted on September 20, 2026 at 7:49 pm.
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For workers, the climate crisis is here: TUC Congress 2026 report

Photo: Hert Niks on unsplash

By Tahir Latif GJA Secretary

If the heatwaves, wildfires and the coming El Niño-generated floods in the U.K. have achieved anything, it’s to focus the trade union movement less on a ‘future’ threat to our communities and more on the need to take action right now, without equivocation.  Despite the government’s decisions on Rosebank, Jackdaw and Heathrow still hanging in the balance, there was little of the ‘jobs at all cost’ support for these developments on display; instead, we had some powerful words and a deep commitment from many unions, led by NEU, UCU, UNISON and FBU, on the form immediate action should take.

On the Sunday evening, a climate fringe, The Climate Crisis Is Here: Trade Unions’ Time To Act, hosted by Campaign Against Climate Change Trade Union Group, Greener Jobs Alliance and PCS, included a rousing contribution from Asad Rehman, Chief Executive of Friends of the Earth, while Debra Beale, NEU Joint President, spoke eloquently about the impact of the heatwaves in schools for both teachers and pupils, and the urgent need for investment to upgrade school buildings.

The tone for the week was set by FBU General Secretary Steve Wright, who related the difficulties of meeting the wildfire threat with an inadequate number of workers.  He acknowledged the heroic work of members in dealing with the huge number of calls when resources are stretched thin:

As firefighters, we’re getting quite impatient at politicians talking about the role that firefighters take in these incidents and the craziness across the summer, with no real direction about how they’re going to fix it.

This topic was the central theme of Motion C14, Climate Heat Emergency, heard in the Tuesday morning session.  As well as demands arising specifically from the impacts of the heatwaves, notably a call for a legally enforceable maximum working temperature of 26C, an increase in firefighters and a National Wildfire summit, the motion also reinforced key climate demands such as rights for Green reps, funding for solar panels and implementation of the Green New Deal.

The motion was moved by NEU General Secretary Daniel Kebede, who cut to the heart of the issue, I.e. societal breakdown under neoliberalism: it is, he said, ‘not simply a failure of policy…or a failure of imagination.  It’s the failure of an economic system that has made profit god and treated the living world as sacrifice…an economy organised around extraction, exploitation and endless accumulation.’  FBU’s Dwight Williams underlined the urgent need to reverse 15 years of cuts, provision of proper PPE equipment, better land management and a U.K.-wide wildfire strategy.

On an agenda packed with worthy motions, of particular note here were:

Motion 75, moved by UCU, supporting the Wages not Weapons campaign, and promoting ‘a trade union vision of security based on decent work, quality public services, equality, climate action, democracy and peace’, a welcome and widely supported riposte to the idea that unions should passively ‘chase the money’ if it’s going into weapons manufacture and thereby reinforce the drive to militarism.

Motion C8 (BFAWU) called on the TUC to campaign for ‘the right to food to be enshrined in U.K. law’, ending food poverty and implementing a food and nutrition strategy while ensuring secure unionised jobs to replace unpaid labour.

Motion 55 (ASLEF) and 56 (TSSA) both addressed aspects of the much needed transformation of the rail industry.  Motion 55 won support for ASLEF’s Own Our Trains campaign, which calls for public ownership not only of U.K. rail operations but the rolling stock itself.  Motion 56 demanded guaranteed job protection for workers as they transition to Great British Rail, exactly the base demand that should be at the forefront of the energy unions approach, as well as every other sector of the economy.

In all, if Congress is more about checking the temperature of individual union commitments to action on different subjects than in placing actions on TUC itself, then this was a hugely successful year, showing that the Year of Trade Union Climate Action has had an effect, and that the now very real urgency of meeting the climate crisis is building the kind of cross sectoral action and solidarity that is desperately needed.

Link to TUC Congress 2026 home page, where you’ll find the agenda, motions and all other information:

And a direct link to the YouTube videos of proceedings.  The debate on Motion C14 can be found 1hr 25 mins into the Tuesday morning session. 

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The post For workers, the climate crisis is here: TUC Congress 2026 report first appeared on Greener Jobs Alliance.

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 13, 2026 thru Sat, September 19, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (8 articles)

• A Super El Niño Is Building. Florida`s Most Vulnerable Homes Aren`t Ready. A strong El Niño is raising the odds of an active winter storm season—and the Floridians most likely to die in a tornado live in aging manufactured homes the state can’t even count. Inside Climate News, Kate Waxman, Sep 13, 2026.
• The Atmosphere Just Set a Water Vapor Record More water vapor means more rocket fuel for extreme rain — so this record is not good news The Climate Brink, Andrew Dessler, Sep 14, 2026.
• Climate crisis likely behind devastating Nepal-Tibet floods that killed more than 1,300, first study finds Scientists say global heating was a destabilising factor in collapse of 200,000 sq metre glacier in August. The Guardian, Damien Gayle, Sep 16, 2026.
• The open houses at the edge of disaster This story is part of Betting the House, a pop-up climate newsroom bringing together independent journalists to cover climate and housing. HEATED, Emily Atkin, Sep 17, 2026.
• Climate change is making it easier for invasive species to succeed The Conversation, Nicola S. Smith & William W. L. Cheung , Sep 17, 2026.
• MIT researchers are mapping extreme weather risks - and building tools to act on them The Climate Grand Challenges “New World of Weather” project shows how modeling, planning tools, and infrastructure analysis are translating research into real-world resilience. MIT News, David Chandler, Sep 18, 2026.
• What Happens When Earth Passes 1.5 Degrees of Warming? Climate scientist Michael Mann digs into the story behind the latest numbers. Inside Climate News, Steve Curwood, Sep 19, 2026.
• Burning forests, emptying rivers, €180bn in damage: Europe`s politicians face reckoning after `summer of truth` Amid record-shattering heatwaves and popular demand for climate action, why are politicians often timid or in denial? The Guardian, Fiona Harvey, Sep 19, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (7 articles)

• This climate problem isn`t on the UN agenda - data centers The slow moving climate talks are struggling to address one of the world’s biggest drivers of rising energy demand. Politico, Sara Schonhardt, Sep 11, 2026.
• EPA Will Remove Carbon Dioxide Limits on Power Plants The U.S. power sector—which accounts for roughly a quarter of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions—will no longer need to abide by Biden-era federal climate pollution regulations. Eos, Grace van Deelen, Sep 14, 2026.
• Trump Administration Will Roll Back Climate Rules According to published reports, the Trump Administration will finalize rules to rollback carbon pollution standards for power plants, as soon as today. Common Dreams, Newswire Editor, Sep 14, 2026.
• Trump Doubles Down on Climate Denial With Plan to Repeal Power Plant Rules The EPA revoked limits on greenhouse gas emissions from power plants, rejecting decades of settled science to argue that they do not contribute to dangerous air pollution. Inside Climate News, Liza Gross, Sep 15, 2026.
• How does unthinkable policy become inevitable? The `Overton window` is one possible answer The Overton window seems convenient for explaining big shifts in public policy. But just how good is it? The Conversation, Joshua Black, Lecturer in Australian Political Studies, University of Canberra, Sep 15, 2026.
• What the science really says about the health and climate risks of carbon pollution The repeal of this rule is the latest in the Trump Administration’s attempts to roll back federal climate regulation. TIME, Simmone Shah, Sep 15, 2026.
• Why Germany is building an ark for U.S. climate data As researchers around the world begin work on the next U.N. climate assessment, fears are growing that the Trump administration could meddle with critical U.S. climate data. In response, scientists are preparing to transfer vast troves of that data to repositories in Germany. YaleEnvironment360, Christian Schwägerl, Sep 17, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (4 articles)

• Why is Venus hotter than Mercury, when Mercury is closer to the sun? Despite being farther from the sun, Venus is the hottest planet in the solar system, and the reason has little to do with proximity to a star. Live Science, Olivia Maule, Sep 12, 2026.
• Africa`s climate services need local detail and knowledge, say people who use the information The Conversation, Petra HoldenCherié Janine Forbes and Gerald Ngoma, Sep 13, 2026.
• Australia must double down to meet our climate targets. Our new study shows how A new report from Climate Analytics and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research asks and attempts to answer a seemingly simple question: what can Australia do to limit GHG emissions overshoot? The Conversation, Bill Hare, Murdoch University, Sep 13, 2026.
• Scrap the term `net zero` - it`s too toxic, net zero committee urges Calling for a major rebranding of the effort to tackle climate change, the cross-party committee said the term had become a ‘lightning rod for opposition to climate action’ The Independent News, Millie Cooke, Sep 17, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (3 articles)

• Wildfires, permafrost melt in Canada causing even more climate change, new study shows New research says current climate models don’t account for warming-induced emissions CBC, Inyat Singh, Sep 11, 2026.
• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #38 2026 Skeptical Science's weekly survey of peer-reviewed climate research plus climate-related reports from think tanks and governments. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Sep 17, 2026.
• How narwhal 'scientists' track Arctic warming Phys.org, Issam AHMED, Sep 19, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (2 articles)

• In Florida, textbook publishers are minimizing or removing climate change coverage The words "climate change" are slowly being removed from textbooks in Florida and from the state's education standards. NPR, Jessica Meszaros, Sep 15, 2026.
• 12 climate books for back-to-school season These titles showcase how disciplines across the curriculum can inform our response to climate change. Yale Climate Connections, Michael Svoboda, Sep 15, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #37 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 6, 2026 thru Sat, September 12, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Sep 13, 2026.
• Kim Stanley Robinson won`t read aloud his climate disaster scene from `The Ministry for the Future` Kim Stanley Robinson, author of one of the most famous novels on climate change, says he has done more than 600 speaking events since “The Ministry for the Future” was published in 2020 — but he won’t read the first chapter out loud. AP News, Peter Prengaman, Sep 17, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

• Many Trump `enemies` are being spoon-fed to him by one conservative think tank Climate denial successfully fed to the White House as policy framework. The Independent News, Andrew Feinberg, Sep 18, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

• Congressional Republicans Aim to Shield Fossil Fuel Companies From Climate Lawsuits The House Judiciary Committee will consider the Stop Climate Shakedowns Act as the Trump administration moves to roll back federal limits on greenhouse gas emissions. Inside Climate News, Georgina Gustin, Sep 15, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

While tech oligarchs grandstand about the existential danger AI superintelligence poses to humanity, former Environmental Protection Agency officials say we should be worried about a more immediate threat to our health: the data centers that power those AI models. 

The former EPA researchers, now working with the nonprofit Environmental Protection Network, are warning in a new report that since January 2025, Donald Trump’s EPA has embarked on a systematic weakening of pollution safeguards, permitting processes, inspection norms, and other guardrails — at least 30 different actions — that could increase the health risks associated with the data center boom. 

There are currently about 3,000 data centers in the United States, and more than 1,500 new centers are in the planning stages. But as developers build out this vast, energy-hungry infrastructure, the country is losing the government regulatory safeguards that are needed to ensure that expansion is done safely, the ex–EPA officials say. 

Read Next AI could help fossil fuel companies create more emissions Molly Taft, WIRED

Dan Costa, who spent 35 years at the EPA studying air pollution, noted that for decades the environmental agency, which was established in 1970, had a large and committed cadre of researchers who investigated emerging sources of pollution and new environmental threats.

“Over the decades, toxicologists, chemists, atmospheric scientists, modelers, and engineers worked in concert with academic colleagues on behalf of the American people — not on behalf of industry,” Costa said in a press briefing last week. “We wanted to carry out EPA’s mission of protecting people’s health from industrial air pollution.”

Now, though, that workforce has been gutted. The Trump administration has dismantled EPA’s main research office, and the agency’s priorities have shifted away from strict enforcement of pollution standards. “Transforming the nation’s energy system, while diminishing its scientific capacity to understand what the impacts are going to be, makes no sense,” Costa said. 

But that appears to be the direction the country is heading in. President Donald Trump is “positioning America as the global leader in AI,” EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin wrote in a memo last year. The agency is “committed to bolstering” those efforts, Zeldin said, by “cutting heavy-handed regulations to ensure America can build and power the data centers essential to Making America the AI Capital of the World.” 

Read Next It’s official: Data centers are slowing America’s shift away from coal Jake Bittle

Since Trump returned to the White House, data center developers have seized the opportunity to expand at a rapid pace, helped by the administration’s moves. In some cases, that deregulation has involved keeping old coal-fired plants online past their planned decommissioning times in order to power data centers; other times, it has meant easing regulations on the use of onsite fossil fuel-powered turbines to power hyperscale data centers like xAI’s Colossus. 

The agency has proposed a rule change that would let developers begin constructing data centers and their associated power plants before they get air pollution permits. And it has directed the agency’s enforcement staff to avoid any action that could “unduly burden or significantly disrupt” energy production or power generation.

According to one study the former EPA researchers cited in their new report, pollution associated with the AI boom may lead to 1,300 additional deaths per year. 

Physician and former EPA administrative official Lynn Goldman said some health impacts of increased data center pollution might be felt quickly — for example, heart attacks or premature births associated with particulate exposure. Others, such as cancer, might take years to emerge. “The AI industry’s race for advantage should not be a matter of life or death,” Goldman said at the press conference. “Families shouldn’t have to pay for the AI boom with their health.” 

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Former EPA officials: Trump is letting data centers make people sick on Sep 20, 2026.

Headline News:

• “Wind Power Carbon Footprint: What The Lifecycle Data Actually Shows” • The wind power carbon footprint is often described as “close to zero.” While that may be a bit misleading, the total per kilowatt-hour is so small that the entire lifecycle carbon debt of a modern turbine gets repaid within about a year or two of operation. [Intelligent Living]

Wind farm (Thomas Galler, Unsplash)

• “Trump Says He Will Form New ‘AI Force’ But Continues To Call AI Fears A ‘Hoax'” • As concerns from Silicon Valley and beyond grow about the rapid pace of AI development, President Trump said he will move to create an “AI Force.” He promised to appoint a new AI czar as he continued to defend the technology. He still calls the fears about AI a “hoax.” [ABC News]
• “China’s Electric Aviation Advantage Is A Transport System, Not A Prototype” • China does not need battery aircraft to compete with 350 km/h trains between major cities. It needs them to become the better transport product on routes where another railway has poor economics and conventional regional aviation is too expensive. [CleanTechnica]
• “Canada Haunts Trump With New Offshore Wind Project” • Trump might not like it, but Wind West will add offshore wind to Nova Scotia’s energy resources. According to the Government, the province hosts annual average offshore wind speeds in the range of 9-11 meters per second, making it one of the strongest wind areas in North America. [CleanTechnica]
• “Georgia Power Adds 1.14 GW Of Solar Energy With Seven Projects” • Georgia Power said it received authorization to add 1.14 GW of new solar power capacity through agreements linked to seven projects that will begin commercial operations starting in 2029. The facilities will be distributed across different counties in Georgia. [Inspenet]

For more news, please visit geoharvey – Daily News about Energy and Climate Change.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 19 SEPTEMBER 2026 SLF-2007-062 The Sakhalin Papers LII: The Type-C Account — How a 2022 Rouble-Payment Dispute Became a €1.5 Billion Claim Against Shell Russia’s Prosecutor General is seeking approximately €1.5 billion from Shell Energy Europe over disputed 2022 gas payments — and wants approximately 94 billion roubles set aside for Shell’s Sakhalin compensation used against the claim. The two sums arise from different transactions. Moscow has joined them together in one closed-door lawsuit. Shell says liability remains uncertain. As of July 2026, the next reported hearing was not due until January 2027.

The previous instalment followed the 94.8 billion roubles attached to Shell’s former Sakhalin II interest.

The money did not simply reach Shell.

Instead, approximately 94 billion roubles became trapped inside Russia’s post-2022 financial machinery and subsequently appeared in a lawsuit concerning an entirely different commercial relationship:

pipeline gas supplied by Gazprom Export to Shell Energy Europe for Germany.

That distinction is essential.

The Russian claim now links:

Shell’s withdrawal from Sakhalin II;

a 2022 gas-supply contract;

Russia’s demand that foreign buyers use its new rouble-payment mechanism;

and:

the proceeds associated with Shell’s former Sakhalin interest.

The result is one of the strangest legal afterlives of Shell’s withdrawal from Russia.

1. The dispute began with pipeline gas — not Sakhalin LNG

The €1.5 billion claim now before the Moscow Arbitration Court should not be mistaken for a claim that Shell failed to pay for Sakhalin II LNG.

It concerns a separate contract between Gazprom Export and Shell Energy Europe Limited.

Contemporaneous reporting in 2022 recorded that the contract provided for up to 1.2 billion cubic metres of pipeline gas per year for Germany. (interfax.com)

That contract became caught in the confrontation over Russia’s new gas-payment rules following the invasion of Ukraine.

On 31 March 2022, President Vladimir Putin signed Decree No. 172 establishing a new payment procedure for certain foreign buyers of Russian gas.

Under the Russian mechanism, buyers from designated states were required to use accounts at Gazprombank through which foreign-currency payments would ultimately be converted into roubles. (interfax.com)

Shell did not accept the new requirement.

2. Gazprom cut Shell’s gas supply on 1 June 2022

On 31 May 2022, Gazprom Export said Shell Energy Europe had informed it that the company did not intend to make payment in roubles under the new Russian system.

Gazprom said that, by the payment deadline, it had not received the required rouble payment for gas supplied in April.

It announced that supply would therefore be suspended from 1 June 2022. (interfax.com)

Reuters contemporaneously reported the same event: Gazprom cut Shell Energy’s gas supply into Germany after Shell declined to comply with the rouble-payment demand. (euronews)

This point requires careful wording.

What is established is that:

Gazprom demanded payment under its new rouble mechanism.

Shell declined to adopt that mechanism.

Gazprom said compliant payment had not been received.

Gazprom stopped deliveries.

That does not, by itself, establish that Shell was contractually obliged under the original agreement to adopt Russia’s newly imposed payment system.

That question is part of the dispute.

3. The quarrel then disappeared from public view

For more than two years, the Shell-Gazprom payment dispute attracted comparatively little public attention.

Shell continued its phased withdrawal from Russian hydrocarbons.

Its Sakhalin II interest became subject to the separate restructuring examined in the previous instalments.

Gazprom’s Russian-controlled Sakhalin vehicle ultimately acquired the unclaimed replacement-company interest for 94.8 billion roubles.

Those events appeared to belong to different legal compartments.

One concerned:

gas purchased by Shell Energy Europe for Germany.

The other concerned:

Shell’s former equity position in Sakhalin II.

By 2024, Russia had joined them together.

4. The Prosecutor General filed suit

On 2 October 2024, Russia’s Prosecutor General filed proceedings in the Moscow Arbitration Court against Shell plc and several Shell-group entities.

The public case number is:

A40-241354/2024

The defendants named in public reporting included Shell plc, Shell Energy Europe Limited, several Dutch Shell companies and Shell NefteGaz Development LLC. (ПРАВО.Ru)

Gazprom Export, the Russian Energy Ministry, Sakhalin Energy LLC, the old Sakhalin Energy Investment Company and the Sakhalin regional authorities were among the third parties identified in reporting on the case. (interfax.com)

The Moscow court accepted the proceedings on 11 October 2024. A reproduced court decision identifies the case as Prosecutor-General’s Office of the Russian Federation v Shell plc and others. (Jus Mundi)

At that point, however, the detailed basis of the claim was not publicly available.

The statement of claim itself was not published in the public case card. (ПРАВО.Ru)

5. Russia initially described damages of more than €1 billion

On 15 October 2024, the Moscow court press service told Interfax that the Prosecutor General was seeking damages exceeding €1 billion.

Contemporaneous reporting noted that the amount was broadly comparable with the rouble value associated with Shell’s former Sakhalin interest. (interfax.com)

But at that stage the precise connection had not been publicly explained.

That explanation would eventually come from Shell itself.

6. The courtroom was closed

On 11 December 2024, the Moscow Arbitration Court ordered that the proceedings be heard behind closed doors.

According to Interfax, most participants supported closed hearings because the case materials contained commercially confidential information.

The Prosecutor General also argued that public disclosure of information from the proceedings could increase sanctions pressure on Russia. (Interfax.ru)

That decision has an obvious consequence for this archive.

There is no complete public evidential record from which an outsider can independently reconstruct the parties’ contractual arguments.

The Shell Leaks Files therefore cannot responsibly declare which side is legally correct.

The available record establishes what each side is alleging.

It does not establish liability.

7. Shell eventually disclosed what Russia was seeking

The most important public description came from Shell’s own annual reporting.

Shell’s 2024 Form 20-F stated that the Russian prosecutor sought three principal forms of relief.

First, declarations that Shell had acted unlawfully in withdrawing support from Sakhalin Energy Investment Company.

Second, approximately:

€1.5 billion

from Shell Energy Europe Limited to Gazprom Export for alleged unpaid gas deliveries during 2022.

Third, permission for Gazprom Export to take approximately:

94 billion roubles

purportedly reserved for Shell as Sakhalin equity compensation in a Type-C account, and apply that amount against part of the alleged Shell Energy Europe debt. (SEC)

That disclosure transformed the understanding of the case.

The Sakhalin compensation and the German gas-supply dispute had become legally connected.

8. Two separate commercial relationships were being joined together

This is the central documentary point.

The €1.5 billion claim relates to alleged non-payment for gas under the Gazprom Export–Shell Energy Europe relationship.

The 94 billion roubles relates to compensation associated with Shell’s former Sakhalin position.

They are not the same transaction.

Russia’s case seeks to connect them through set-off.

In simplified terms, the prosecutorial position described by Shell is:

Shell Energy Europe allegedly owes Gazprom Export money.

Money is allegedly being held for Shell arising from Sakhalin.

Russia wants the Sakhalin money applied against the alleged gas debt.

That is the connection.

9. What is a Type-C account?

Type-C accounts became an important part of Russia’s financial response to Western sanctions after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

They are special rouble accounts used in certain circumstances to fulfil obligations to creditors associated with states Russia categorises as “unfriendly”.

The account structure can mean that an obligation is treated as paid within the Russian system even though the foreign creditor cannot freely repatriate or use the funds in the manner normally expected in an international commercial transaction. (lidings.com)

For Shell, however, one qualification is particularly important.

Shell’s annual report does not simply state as an uncontested fact that 94 billion roubles belongs to Shell.

It describes the money as approximately 94 billion roubles “purportedly set aside” for Shell’s Sakhalin equity compensation. (SEC)

That wording preserves Shell’s legal position.

So should this archive.

10. Shell sought postponements

The litigation did not move rapidly towards judgment.

Shell’s 2024 Form 20-F recorded that Shell Energy Europe filed a written postponement motion on 30 January 2025.

Following a hearing on 14 February 2025, the case was postponed until 14 April. (SEC)

Further delays followed.

On 14 April 2025, the court adjourned proceedings until 11 June. (Interfax.ru)

On 11 June, the next hearing was fixed for 25 August. (Interfax.ru)

On 25 August, another postponement took the case to 26 November.

Interfax reported that Shell Energy Europe had again sought an adjournment and that the prosecutor had submitted further written explanations. (Interfax.ru)

The repeated adjournments show that this was not being disposed of summarily.

11. Shell’s latest annual report still records no resolution

Shell’s 2025 Annual Report and Accounts, published on 12 March 2026, provides the most recent authenticated Shell description located for this instalment.

The language is notably cautious.

Shell again states that the prosecutor seeks:

approximately €1.5 billion;

access to approximately 94 billion roubles of alleged Sakhalin compensation;

and declarations concerning Shell’s conduct in relation to Sakhalin Energy Investment Company.

Then comes the critical sentence:

“The proceedings are ongoing.” (SEC)

Shell further says that it cannot reliably estimate either the magnitude or timing of any possible obligation or payment, or even whether payment will ultimately be due.

The company records a high degree of uncertainty over the outcome and its possible effects. (SEC)

That is Shell’s own audited reporting position.

12. The case is now reported to extend into 2027

There is a more recent procedural development.

A report dated 8 July 2026, citing the Moscow Arbitration Court case file, states that the next continuation of the proceedings is scheduled for:

18 January 2027

The reported claim remains €1.5 billion. (https://x-compliance.ru)

That means that, as of the latest public procedural information located for this file, the litigation remains unresolved more than two years after the Prosecutor General first filed suit.

No final Russian judgment has been identified for this instalment.

Accordingly, the archive treats the allegations as pending.

13. The 2022 gas dispute deserves particular care

The Russian claim is often summarised as being for “unpaid gas.”

That shorthand risks obscuring the contractual dispute.

Contemporaneous reporting establishes that Gazprom demanded compliance with a payment mechanism introduced by Russian presidential decree after the original gas relationship was already operating.

Gazprom said Shell refused to pay in roubles.

Shell did not accept the new payment terms.

Gazprom then halted supplies. (interfax.com)

The later Russian prosecutor describes sums as unpaid.

But the public record available here does not contain the full gas contract, the payment clauses, the parties’ contractual notices, or the evidence being considered in the closed Moscow proceedings.

It would therefore be improper to convert the Russian allegation into an established debt.

14. The same caution applies to Russia’s allegation that Shell “abandoned” Sakhalin

Shell announced in 2022 that it intended to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Russia subsequently restructured Sakhalin II under presidential decree.

Shell declined to take an interest in the newly created Russian operator.

Mitsui and Mitsubishi remained.

The Russian prosecutor now seeks declarations concerning what Shell’s annual report describes as alleged unlawful abandonment of support for Sakhalin Energy Investment Company. (SEC)

That allegation forms part of the pending proceedings.

It has not been established by a final judgment located for this instalment.

15. Yet Shell has not entirely disappeared from the old corporate structure

Shell’s 2025 annual report continues to state that the company holds a 27.5% minus one share interest in Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd, the old Bermuda-incorporated company. (SEC)

As previous instalments have documented, Russia transferred the operational rights and obligations into a new Russian company.

Shell did not join that company.

The result is an extraordinary corporate split:

Shell retains shares in the predecessor entity;

the operating project is controlled through the Russian successor;

the economic value associated with Shell’s former operating interest was priced at 94.8 billion roubles;

and Russia now wants approximately that compensation pool applied against a separate gas claim.

16. What the case does not establish

The litigation does not currently establish that Shell owes Gazprom Export €1.5 billion.

It does not establish that the 94 billion roubles is freely available property of Shell.

It does not establish that Russia’s post-2022 rouble-payment mechanism was contractually binding upon Shell Energy Europe under the pre-existing agreement.

It does not establish that Shell’s decision not to participate in the replacement Sakhalin operator was unlawful.

And it does not establish that Gazprom Export is ultimately entitled to set one claim against the other.

Those are precisely the matters that remain contested.

Documentary Findings

Established: Shell Energy Europe had a Gazprom Export contract for up to 1.2 billion cubic metres of gas annually for Germany. (interfax.com)

Established: In May 2022, Shell Energy Europe informed Gazprom Export that it would not adopt the new rouble-payment arrangement demanded under Russian Presidential Decree No. 172. (interfax.com)

Established: Gazprom suspended supplies from 1 June 2022 after stating that the required rouble payment had not been received. (interfax.com)

Established: Russia’s Prosecutor General filed Moscow proceedings against Shell-group entities on 2 October 2024 under Case No. A40-241354/2024. (ПРАВО.Ru)

Established: The proceedings were placed behind closed doors in December 2024. (Interfax.ru)

Established: Shell says the prosecutor seeks approximately €1.5 billion from Shell Energy Europe for alleged unpaid 2022 gas deliveries. (SEC)

Established: Shell says the prosecutor also seeks authority for Gazprom Export to take approximately 94 billion roubles purportedly reserved for Shell’s Sakhalin equity compensation from a Type-C account and apply it against part of the alleged debt. (SEC)

Established: Shell’s 2025 Annual Report, published on 12 March 2026, describes the case as ongoing and says the company cannot reliably estimate any eventual payment obligation. (SEC)

Established: Public procedural reporting dated 8 July 2026 states that the next continuation of the proceedings is scheduled for 18 January 2027. (https://x-compliance.ru)

Alleged: That Shell Energy Europe owes approximately €1.5 billion for unpaid gas.

Alleged: That Shell unlawfully withdrew support from Sakhalin Energy Investment Company.

Not established: That Shell is ultimately liable for either allegation.

Not established: That Gazprom Export is entitled to the 94 billion-rouble compensation pool.

Not established: That the Type-C funds will ever be freely recoverable by Shell.

Commentary

The most revealing feature of this case is not simply its size.

It is the way separate strands of Shell’s Russian exit have become entangled.

A gas-purchase contract for Germany.

A presidential decree changing the currency-payment mechanism.

Shell’s refusal to adopt that mechanism.

Gazprom’s suspension of supply.

Shell’s withdrawal from Sakhalin.

Russia’s transfer of the project to a new operator.

The 94.8 billion-rouble valuation of Shell’s former interest.

A restricted Type-C account.

Then a Prosecutor General’s lawsuit attempting to connect them.

Four years after Shell announced that it would withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons, the company’s Russian relationship is still generating unresolved legal consequences.

That is the point the official record now establishes.

Leaving the country commercially did not mean leaving its legal system behind.

The evidential limitation matters

There is also a larger archival lesson.

The Moscow case is closed to the public.

The full pleadings are not publicly available.

The underlying contracts are not before us.

The court has not issued a publicly identified final judgment.

In those circumstances, certainty would be manufactured.

The proper documentary approach is narrower:

record what Russia alleges;

record what Shell says;

record what the contemporaneous evidence shows;

record the procedural history;

and stop where the evidence stops.

That discipline is especially important when the dispute sits at the intersection of sanctions, war, energy security and state-controlled companies.

Source Record

Shell’s latest authenticated description appears in its 2025 Annual Report and Accounts, published 12 March 2026. It states that the Moscow proceedings remain ongoing, identifies the €1.5 billion claim and the attempted use of approximately 94 billion roubles from a Type-C account, and records Shell’s inability to estimate the eventual financial outcome. (SEC)

Shell Annual Report and Accounts 2025

The SEC-hosted Shell filing provides the same authenticated disclosure.

SEC — Shell Annual Report and Accounts 2025

The original Moscow case is publicly identified as A40-241354/2024. Pravo reported the filing and noted that the statement of claim itself was not available in the public case card. (ПРАВО.Ru)

Pravo — Prosecutor files case against Shell

The Moscow court’s 11 October 2024 decision accepting the case is reproduced by Jus Mundi. (Jus Mundi)

Jus Mundi — Prosecutor-General’s Office v Shell

Interfax recorded the December 2024 decision to close the proceedings to the public and the repeated 2025 adjournments. (Interfax.ru)

Interfax — Court orders closed hearing, 11 December 2024

Interfax — Hearing moved to 11 June 2025

Interfax — Hearing moved to 25 August 2025

Interfax — Hearing moved to 26 November 2025

The 2022 gas-payment dispute was documented contemporaneously by Gazprom statements carried by Interfax and Reuters reporting. (interfax.com)

Interfax — Gazprom halts gas supplies to Shell, 1 June 2022

Reuters report — Gazprom cuts Shell Energy supply, 1 June 2022

The latest procedural report located for this instalment, dated 8 July 2026 and citing the court docket, states that the next hearing is scheduled for 18 January 2027. (https://x-compliance.ru)

X-Compliance — Shell hearing continued to January 2027

Archive disclaimer: Russian prosecutorial allegations are identified as allegations. Shell’s descriptions of the case are attributed to Shell. The absence of public pleadings and the closed nature of the Moscow proceedings prevent an independent assessment of the full contractual evidence. This instalment therefore makes no finding that Shell owes the sums claimed, that Russia’s rouble-payment mechanism governed the original contract, or that Gazprom Export is legally entitled to Shell’s Sakhalin compensation.

Site-wide disclaimer applies.

Next instalment The Sakhalin Papers LIII: The Missing LNG Cargoes — Shell Had a Sakhalin Contract Running to 2028. Then the Deliveries Stopped

There is another contract in the Sakhalin story.

This one did concern LNG.

Shell disclosed that it had a long-term agreement with the old Sakhalin Energy company that was due to run until 2028.

After Russia transferred the project into the replacement Russian operator, Shell said it stopped receiving cargoes due under that contract.

By February 2023, Shell was publicly saying that it was monitoring developments and evaluating its legal options. (interfax.com)

The next file follows those missing cargoes:

What exactly did Shell lose when Sakhalin LNG stopped arriving, what contractual rights survived the Russian restructuring, and did Shell ever obtain compensation for supplies that were supposed to continue for years after its departure?

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 19 SEPTEMBER 2026 was first posted on September 19, 2026 at 9:47 pm.
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