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All Electric Homes founder Trent Jones warns that a shortage of skilled tradies, fragmented business models and poorly designed rebates could derail Australia’s push to electrify millions of homes.

The post Why the old tradie business model won’t deliver all-electric homes | SwitchedOn Australia appeared first on Renew Economy.

For asset owners, buyers, managers and O&M teams, the webinar will cover performance metrics, service levels, warranty-compliant operating procedures, independent data measurement, distinguishing data gaps from genuine performance breaches, and Glenn’s “Lessons Learned” checklist for a successful 20-year asset.

The post Webinar: Hard-earned lessons for BESS operators – warranties, diagnostics, and contract design appeared first on Renew Economy.

Less than two years after starting construction, four-hour big battery energy storage system powers up in preparation for full operation on state's grid.

The post Commissioning starts on what will be state’s biggest battery – but not for long appeared first on Renew Economy.

Fascinating chart backs up AEMO chief's observation that people are piling in on the offer of free power in the middle of the day – with EVs, batteries and appliances.

The post “Stunning example of market working:” Households embrace free power offer, causing major spike in demand appeared first on Renew Economy.

An overwhelming majority of US motorists say they feel they have zero choice in how much they get behind the wheel — and most of them explicitly want to transportation system that doesn’t force them to drive almost everywhere they go, a new study finds.

A stunning 73 percent of self-identified drivers in a recent survey by the Climate and Community Institute said they “have no choice but to drive as much as they do,” with another 53 percent reporting that they “would like to have more transportation options” beyond endlessly reaching for the keys.

That second number may be an undercount — both because CCI conducted the poll before the war in Iran sent gas prices soaring, and because many Americans simply cannot imagine a future where their own cities make driving optional and offer attractive alternatives.

For the one in three US residents who can’t drive or lack reliable access to a car, though, those auto-centric cities are just a difficult fact of life — and they need more motorists to join them in the fight for more and better travel options.

“Whether you get around mostly by car or you don’t drive at all, most people in the U.S. are united by feeling unhappy with their daily transportation options,” said Emmett Hopkins, the transportation policy manager at the Institute and co-author of the study. “Broadly speaking, they want the same thing: more good transportation options that don’t [leave] a car as the only choice — or basically, the forced choice.”

Source: Data for Progress, Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

Unfortunately, most US policymakers haven’t exactly gotten the memo about how many of their constituents feel trapped by car dependency — never mind how many of them long to escape it.

Co-author and researcher Kira McDonald points out that the federal government routinely guarantees 80 percent of federal funds to automotive uses alone, while making much of the funding for shared and active transportation all too easy to claw back. As those ratios propagate across state and local transportation policies, highways, parking lots, and other car-centric infrastructure have come to dominate our physical environment.

Worse, car dominance has created the illusion that America is a “nation of drivers,” rather than a nation of people who drive because they have no other choice — and quite often, despite the fact that a lot of people can’t really afford cars.

Two in five adults surveyed said they struggled to weather an unexpected transportation cost like a car repair, and the same share said they sometimes have to make significant adjustments to their budget just to stay on the road.

“A ludicrous percentage of adults use cars to get to work — [but that’s] because we are under-investing in other modes,” McDonald added. “The novel contribution of this report was to supplement those [mode share statistics] with survey data, and ask people what they actually want.“

To get even further beyond the statistics, co-author Ruth Rojas led an effort to gather stories from non-drivers about how car dependency impacts their lives — and help explain why so many US residents are hesitant to join their ranks.

Again and again, she found that non-drivers struggled with unreliable transportation, navigating transit-poor neighborhoods, and lengthy commutes across sprawling regions. She cites the example of immigrant communities, where she says those challenges can fuel a belief that life would be easier on four wheels — until they actually get a car, and find themselves trapped in it for much of the day.

“[I personally grew up in] an immigrant family who didn’t have access to cars in a small town that was very spread out and didn’t have public transit,” added Rojas. “My family really bought into that idea that cars meant freedom, cars meant getting a job, cars meant more economic growth. … The narrative ends up being that cars give us a perceived freedom… What gets left out is everybody who doesn’t — or maybe can’t — [drive them].”

Rojas and her co-authors acknowledged that it’s not enough to simply make policymakers aware of how poorly the transportation system is serving is non-drivers and compulsory motorists alike — or even what a sheer majority of Americans belong to those categories.

Hopkins stressed that much of US transportation policy is the product of “profit-seeking forces” that have successfully influenced lawmakers to privilege automotive interests over the needs of everyday people — and it will take organizing among those people to change the tide.

“This call to offer more people more choices is really a call to stand up for working people against corporate power determining what options they have in their lives,” he adds.

Still, the report argues that change is possible, starting with “an overhaul of Departments of Transportation (DOTs) at the federal and state levels, as well as massive investment in diverse transportation options to help people have choice in how they get around.” The executive branch, meanwhile, must overhaul auto-centric “rules, guidelines, and culture,” while Congress must use its power of the purse to robustly fund that shift.

Needless to say, local governments must work fast to implement those changes on the ground, in ways that actually engage with the majority of residents who are clamoring for other options. And they have an even more critical role to play among residents who would embrace a different transportation landscape, if they just got a taste of how good life with a broader menu of mobility options can be — even if the transition feels temporarily uncomfortable.

“I think there’s a kind of induced demand [among] people who want to live outside of car dependency, but they don’t know it yet, because they haven’t experienced it,” added McDonald. “These policies always see their popularity improve after implementation.”

A version of this article is the first in a short series that was originally appeared on the author’s Substack. It is republished with permission; read part one in the series here.

Let’s look at some states’ transportation performance, starting with climate. Democrats support reducing climate emissions and Republicans don’t — right?

Not necessarily. Former Washington State Gov. Jay Inslee was often called the climate governor. But he didn’t apply his climate leadership to the state’s transportation program. He liked to build new highways too much. See our report, Fueling the Crisis, on how states spent their federal transportation funding under the Biden era Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA).

Why did North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Montana perform so much better at reducing emissions than California, Washington, and Connecticut?

It wasn’t because they promised climate action and delivered. It’s because they are less likely to build highways they can’t afford to maintain. In other words: fiscal responsibility might be better for the climate than a climate champion.

Most people believe that Democrats care about more than just reducing traffic congestion. They want to provide ways to move around outside of a car. But do they?

North Carolina likes to brag about putting some money into rail and bike/ped projects, but that amount is very small compared to their highway building budget. That is no surprise when you look at the five scoring criteria North Carolina uses to prioritize statewide projects for funding:

• 30 percent travel time benefits v cost, which is how much vehicle speeds increase vs cost (safety is not part of their economic case);
• 30 percent congestion, which scores the problem of congestion, not how an investment will affect it;
• 10 percent economic competitiveness, which estimates how speeding up vehicles affects the economy according to the TREDIS model;
• 20 percent multimodal, which is just existing congestion on military and truck routes plus truck volumes; and
• 10 percent safety, which is the existence of a safety problem rather than how a project might improve it.

In other words, it’s 90 percent the existence of congestion and/or how an inaccurate transportation model claims a project will improve it … and 10 percent safety.

Recommended Oregon Highway Expansion Facing Second Lawsuit for ‘Cumulative Impacts’ George Kevin Jordan August 16, 2024

Oregon is often held up as a leader on transit — but it has a constitutional restriction on using the gas tax or vehicle taxes for transit and spends a fraction of what they spend on highways for transit.

The state has lost a lot of goodwill due to its roughly $1 billion budget gap that caught lawmakers and the public by surprise. Oregon’s truck taxation system has generated years of controversy over whether heavy trucks were paying too much, followed by calculations indicating they were paying too little.

And while the state pleads poverty about transportation maintenance and staffing, it commits billions in borrowing and matching funds to megaprojects, like the I-5 Rose Quarter expansion that will induce traffic and likely cost way more than whatever ODOT is saying it will cost now. Further, ODOT struggles to deliver the Columbia River Crossing project after decades of talking about it; I worked on this project when I worked for Rep. Brian Baird in the late 1990s.

The governor is looking for a new ODOT leader now. The fear is that she will pick someone who is an expert in how ODOT has run in the past rather than someone who understands how ODOT needs to modernize to deliver the results it has consistently promised to the Oregon taxpayers.

In fact, this is a challenge that many new governors — at least the 18 of them who will face after the election in November. Stay tuned, because we will have a memo for those newly elected leaders calling for and explaining how to connect their transportation priorities to their transportation spending.

Recommended Did Minnesota Just Release the Best Statewide Transportation Bill Yet? Streetsblog July 18, 2023

Some states have made progress but it isn’t always clear whether a new governor will maintain it.

The State of Minnesota will have a new governor, likely Sen. Amy Klobuchar, who has a voting record in the Senate of supporting a status quo transportation policy. But many of the exciting updates in Minnesota’s transportation policies were legislated, and the legislative champions, such as Sen. Scott Dibble, are likely to still be in office to protect them.

Under Gov. Jared Polis, Colorado has funded some pretty massive highway expansions that will do little-to-nothing to address congestion or spur the economy. But his administration also established a rule that requires the Colorado Department of Transportation and the state’s five metropolitan planning organizations to show that their transportation plans cut greenhouse gas emissions. If they can’t, they must offset those emissions or remove the projects that cause emissions increases.

The progressive Democrat that is likely to be the next governor of Colorado, state Attorney General Phil Weiser, was rumored earlier in the campaign to be squishy on this important policy. But recently, supporters sound more hopeful.

Recommended State DOTs Aren’t Stacking Up On Sustainability and Equity Kea Wilson April 2, 2025

This is not a comprehensive write-up of where progressive state DOTs land on transportation policy. There are blue states doing very interesting things, like Virginia and Smart Scale and Minnesota on transit funding and climate. There are red states that are being ridiculous, like Florida which has made some safety projects illegal even though it is the most deadly state for cyclists and third most deadly for pedestrians. I can’t cover everything here.

But which states are willing to try new things and innovate does not always track with their partisan leaning. For example, my organization has had success working on quick build safety demonstration projects on state roads in Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee — while being told by Pennsylvania and North Carolina that they simply couldn’t do the same. We have also worked with California, Connecticut, and Maryland on some awesome quick-build safety projects. Just don’t assume.

Recommended It’s Time For State DOTs to Step Up and Do a Better Job Kea Wilson March 24, 2025

The point is this: just because leaders claim to share your priorities does not mean they will do anything meaningful to move those priorities forward. And sometimes those who claim to oppose one of your goals (like reducing emissions) support other goals (like fiscal responsibility) that will get to the same outcomes.

Conservatives might sometimes produce better progressive outcomes than progressives, even if it is unintentional.If you support transit or more walkable communities or climate or reconnecting communities or fix-it-first or whatever, do not assume that a Democrat will be your champion or that a Republican will block your priorities.

No matter who is in charge, figure out what they care about and where your priorities might overlap or lead to similar outcomes. Demand leadership that is fresh and expert in where you want to go, not where you have been. And then demand that the transportation agency be held accountable for the results it achieves — whether that means criticizing your supposed allies or praising your supposed opposition.

• The rate of pedestrian deaths in the U.S. is more than twice that of most developed nations, and experts believe it will likely rise under Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy’s “car-obsessed MAGA ideology.” Under his leadership, the Trump administration scrubbed references to and proven safety measures like road diets and bike lanes. (The Guardian)
• More transit agencies are using tap-and-go fare payment systems. (Eno Center for Transportation)
• Boston is building a protected bike lane at the intersection where a driver killed transportation planner and cyclist Louisa Gag. (WBUR)
• Automated speed cameras in Denver and expanded hours when parking fees are in effect are expected to generate $6 million in revenue. (Denverite)
• Uber is spending $2.5 million to help re-elect New York Gov. Kathy Hochul at a time when state lawmakers are considering regulations on its competitors, like Waymo. (Politico)
• WalletHub ranked Philadelphia as the worst city in the U.S. to drive in. (Billy Penn)
• A walkable New Urban development in Utah is facing backlash from opponents of density. (Salt Lake Tribune)
• Tacoma is studying potential improvements to crash-prone Portland Avenue. (The Urbanist)
• Richmond is making more than 3,000 repairs to broken sidewalks near schools. (Standard)
• Relaxed zoning laws around Edmonton light rail have led to a 50 percent increase in new housing units. (CBC)
• Even some transit advocates like Reece Martin are starting to think high-speed rail is too expensive for Canada, and that frequent service might be more important. (The Transit Brief)
• Cyclists are challenging Ontario’s policy of tearing up bike lanes at Canada’s Supreme Court. (CP24)
• European cities are not electrifying their bus fleets fast enough to meet climate goals. (DW)

EWG, Consumer Reports: People demand stronger protections from pesticides rcoleman October 14, 2026

WASHINGTON – Consumers deserve to be protected from pesticides, and Congress should reject any pesticide legislation that fails to do so. 

Today the Environmental Working Group and Consumer Reports unveiled their Consumer Pesticide Safety Bill of Rights to ensure that any federal pesticide legislation protects the public, including children. 

Consumers too often lack basic information about pesticides used in their homes, communities and in food, and lack meaningful protections when those chemicals put their health at risk. 

The Consumer Pesticide Safety Bill of Rights declares Americans’ right to: 

• Warnings on the products people bring into their homes, including the right to know whether a pesticide is linked to cancer and other health harms.. 
• Know if a toxic pesticide that can make people sick is being sprayed nearby.
• Know that the food people feed their children is subject to the toughest pesticide safety standards. 
• Expect that children are protected from toxic pesticides when they are at school or playing in local parks. 
• Expect that U.S. pesticide regulators will act quickly to review toxic pesticides when other nations ban them. 
• Be informed about where pesticides have been used, when they’ve been mishandled, and how much is being detected in Americans’ food and water.
• Seek justice when pesticides have caused harm. 

“Consumers deserve to know if the pesticides we bring into our homes or that have been sprayed nearby might make us sick,” said EWG Legislative Director Geoff Horsfield.

“We should be confident our children are safe when they’re at school and confident their food is subject to the toughest safety standards,” he added.

“Our current pesticide laws fall short of giving consumers the information and protections they need to protect their families,” said Brian Ronholm, director of food policy for Consumer Reports. “This Bill of Rights is a road map for making the food we eat and the communities we live in safer.”

The Consumer Pesticide Safety Bill of Rights addresses long-running gaps in pesticide protection.

Few states require farmers or commercial pesticide companies to publicly notify when they’re spraying these chemicals. Warnings on household pesticide products are often inadequate. And many pesticides found on food children commonly eat aren’t subject to the strictest safety standards. 

Only a handful of states require buffers to protect kids at school from exposure to toxic pesticides, and standards vary regarding pesticides that can be used in school buildings or on school grounds. 

Many pesticides used in the U.S. have been banned by other nations. But the EPA can take decades to restrict pesticides. Consumers also lack basic information about pesticide use, spills and detections on food and water.

Exacerbating an already problematic situation, the Supreme Court recently acted to limit access to the courts for people harmed by pesticides. 

The Consumer Pesticide Safety Bill of Rights tackles many of these issues head-on – and lawmakers may soon have a chance to incorporate it into legislation.

Congress could consider renewing the Pesticide Registration Improvement Act as early as December. The current law, through which the chemical industry negotiates fees that fund EPA’s pesticide reviews, is set to expire next September.

“Congress should reject any new pesticide law that fails to protect consumers,” said Horsfield. “We should expect our kids to be safe from toxic pesticides. We deserve to know when pesticides could make us sick. And we should be able to seek justice in court when pesticides do make us sick.”

“The renewal of the Pesticide Registration Improvement Act is a critical opportunity to deliver meaningful protections for Americans, including clearer warnings and greater transparency about where these chemicals are used and when they’re detected in our food and water,” said Ronholm. 

###

The Environmental Working Group is a nonprofit, non-partisan organization that empowers people to live healthier lives in a healthier environment. Through research, advocacy and unique education tools, EWG drives consumer choice and civic action. Visit www.ewg.org for more information.

Founded in 1936, Consumer Reports (CR) has a mission to help build a fair and just marketplace for all. The nonprofit CR is widely known for its rigorous research, testing, and reviews of thousands of products and services. CR advocates for consumer rights and protections, reports extensively on consumer issues, and surveys millions of people every year. CR is nonpartisan and independent, and it accepts no advertising. Learn more at www.consumerreports.org

Areas of Focus Family Health Children’s Health Pesticides ‘Bill of Rights’ seeks to protect consumers as Congress weighs federal pesticide policy law Press Contact Alex Formuzis alex@ewg.org (202) 667-6982 October 14, 2026

As more and more Victorian households quit gas, there remain real and unresolved questions about who bears the cost of abandoned pipelines. Slamming the brakes on electrification isn’t the solution.

The post Gas networks want Victoria to stall electrification. Households and industry should hope it doesn’t oblige appeared first on Renew Economy.

Study compares electric and gas commercial kitchens in the US, find gas exposes chefs to dangerous levels of nitrogen dioxide and heat.

The post Sick kitchens: Gas exposes commercial chefs to dangerous levels of air pollution, study finds appeared first on Renew Economy.

Origin boss says the country's largest coal plant remains on course for an exit in two and a half years - for now.

The post Origin sticks by 2029 Eraring closure date, as plant runs at lower capacity factors and battles tube leaks appeared first on Renew Economy.

Sandra Guzmán is director at the Climate Finance Group for Latin America and the Caribbean (GFLAC), and Raju Pandit Chhetri is lead climate finance negotiator for the least-developed countries at the UNFCCC. 

Recent catastrophic floods in Nepal starkly remind us that the climate crisis demands urgent action. The initial estimate that the country will need to spend $5 billion on recovery will likely remain a major concern. However, that is only one part of the story. No financial metric can capture the value of lives lost in crises like this. 

And this is not a standalone event; from the mountains of Nepal to the coastlines of Latin America and the Caribbean, developing countries are increasingly facing severe climate impacts. The average annual loss from climate disasters in the Latin American and Caribbean region is estimated at $58 billion. Human suffering remains immeasurable in all these instances.

Climate finance has been a key demand from our regions and from all developing countries to meet the needs of their citizens. At the recently concluded pre-COP31 in the Pacific, several developing-country governments strongly warned leaders about the dangers of failing to act on both climate and climate finance. 

Pacific leaders rail at climate finance failures after pre-COP trip to Tuvalu

Yet, two years after the Baku climate summit, where all governments agreed on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for climate finance – with multilateral development banks (MDBs) playing a key role in delivery – that discussion risks being sidelined at this week’s annual meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Bangkok, Thailand.

World Bank drops climate finance target

The MDBs have a critical role in mobilising a share of the $300-billion-per-year goal for public climate finance adopted at COP29 and are key to scaling broader financing to $1.3 trillion per year by 2035. They entered the NCQG dialogues promising capacity to mobilise these resources and agreeing to be part of the solution. 

This June, even as the World Bank announced the renewal of its Climate Change Action Plan, it dropped its 45% climate finance target under pressure from the US administration. That commitment was key to ensuring the bank continues to deliver on its promise to mobilise enough climate finance to meet the NCQG target. 

This announcement was a setback at a moment when developing countries are looking to MDBs to step up and fill gaps left by cuts in official development assistance (ODA) by donor governments. 

World Bank’s climate work can endure without finance target, experts say

MDBs have long said they can convert $1 provided by donors into $2-$4 for client countries and have promised to deliver impact. Official data does paint an encouraging picture overall. The MDBs have delivered an increase in climate finance almost every year so far. 

While financing needs far exceed what has been provided, MDBs mobilised an average of around $75bn per year in climate finance for low- and middle-income countries over the last five years, showing they are still on track to deliver the $120 billion per year they committed to. 

Adding to the debt burden

However, climate finance cannot be measured by quantity alone. As MDBs increase their focus on private-sector mobilisation to diversify their funding, tracking the quality of the financing they mobilise becomes even more critical.  Beyond scale, this is where the system currently lags most. 

Between 70-90% of the financing provided by MDBs is in the form of loans, exacerbating the debt burdens that the World Bank and IMF have long warned about. This strains countries’ economies at a time when developing countries face severe climate impacts, inflationary pressures, and global economic uncertainty. Adding further debt that climate-vulnerable countries must repay with interest does not necessarily translate into effective climate finance flows. 

It is also essential to address barriers to accessing finance in low- and middle-income countries, particularly by prioritising transparency around how much climate finance goes to the most climate-vulnerable countries and communities. 

Additionally, there needs to be clarity on how much climate finance is being mobilised to build resilience and address increasingly frequent climate disasters, as well as for renewable energy projects that would help developing countries achieve a just transition. 

A woman looks at an alley filled with debris after the passage of Hurricane Beryl, in St. George’s, Grenada, July 1, 2024. (Photo: REUTERS/Arthur Daniel) A woman looks at an alley filled with debris after the passage of Hurricane Beryl, in St. George’s, Grenada, July 1, 2024. (Photo: REUTERS/Arthur Daniel) Climate stresses undermine development 

As climate-induced disasters become more frequent, countries are compelled to shift resources away from vital sectors such as health, education, food security and infrastructure that underpins development. For nations already grappling with limited fiscal budgets and mounting debt, climate change is becoming an even heavier burden, pushing them to borrow more.

These are also development issues at their very core – countering debt challenges, investing in resilient infrastructure, protecting schools and hospitals from climate disasters, and increasing crop yields to reduce the cost of food. So, when the World Bank talks about a smart development framework, it warrants a check on how much climate finance is provided and its quality.

Editor’s Desk: Nepal’s disaster has laid bare the world’s adaptation accountability gap

MDBs must now lead the charge by publishing a clear plan to deliver on the scaled-up climate finance goal as a first step, and make financing accessible and affordable, including grant-based instruments. The plan must also define clear accountability metrics to track delivery, access, affordability and reach and commit to at least triple adaptation finance.

MDB shareholder countries also have a role in backing the institutions to deliver on these promises. When World Bank and IMF management meets with finance ministers this week in a region battered by the worst climate impacts, they must not leave climate finance off the agenda. 

They must give the World Bank and IMF the mandate, the capital and the political backing to make real scale-up possible. The true test of this financial system will not be found in conference rooms in Bangkok, but in the lives saved in Nepal. 

The post World Bank and IMF should lead the financial system in responding to the climate crisis appeared first on Climate Home News.

The powers of the resources minister to change how much a gas exporter must quarantine for Australian users will be curtailed.

The post Gas lobby gets its wish as Labor dials back domestic reservation scheme appeared first on Renew Economy.

Top Reasons to Oppose CO2 Injection Wells in Nebraska:

• Property Rights
• CO2 Leaks and Safety
• Drinking Water Endangerment
• Aquifer Contamination Risks
• Increased Energy Costs
• 45Q Tax Credit $$$ Giveaway

The “Carbon Capture” Scheme

• Can seek to use eminent domain to acquire “pore space” underneath landowners’ property to inject CO2 under their homes
• CO2 is a toxic asphyxiant. A pipeline rupture can spread a lethal plume of CO2 over two miles, displacing oxygen.
• CO2 can escape along injection or monitoring wells, abandoned wells, or through cracks in the caprock. There is no guarantee that CO2 can be permanently sequestered for hundreds of years without it leaking. If it leaks, it can contaminate drinking water with heavy metals.
• CCS increases water use by up to 55% for each capture site. Much of this is used for cooling
• Carbon capture requires 13-44% more energy, increasing electricity costs by 25-50%
• CCS requires tax credits (“45Q”) in order to be economically viable, equating to hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars given away

Bold Alliance was an original signatory to a 2024 letter, “EPA Must Immediately Stop CO2 Injection Wells to Protect Public Safety and Drinking Water,” that calls on EPA to suspend permits for injecting carbon dioxide (CO2) underground, permitting of new CO2 injection wells, approval of primacy applications for CO2 injection wells, and to direct states with primacy over injection wells to halt injections and permitting of wells.

Our demands in the letter stemmed from:

1) multiple leaks of CO2 and equipment failures at the Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) facility in Decatur, Illinois;

2) new information about an increase in non-compliance violations in Texas Class II wells starting in 2011;

3) a higher percentage of Class II Texas CO2 injection wells that have failed one or more mechanical integrity tests when these wells are compared to other Class II wells; and

4) findings at EPA that steel used for well construction at the ADM site, and others around the country, is prone to corrosion in CO2 injection wells.

The events at the ADM facility have brought to light systemic problems with CCS technology and its regulation, raising serious concerns that CCS is neither safe nor viable. Reported failures at monitoring and detection systems due to corrosion and the migration of CO2 outside the intended storage zone expose multiple levels of failure. What is perhaps more concerning is that EPA has identified that injection wells around the country have the same design and material flaws that led to corrosion at at least one of ADM’s leaking wells, raising concerns that CO2 injection wells could very well be leaking significant quantities of CO2 into groundwater and the atmosphere.

Aquifer & Drinking Water Contamination

The threat to drinking water and public health posed by CO2 injection wells cannot be overstated given that leaks from the injection of CO2 into underground saline formations can migrate into overlying freshwater aquifers and be released into the atmosphere.

Once CO2 dissolves in water, it forms carbonic acid, which lowers the pH of the water, eroding and corroding rock and well equipment, and mobilizing toxic metals such as lead, arsenic, and mercury. These metals are particularly concerning for drinking water sources near injection sites.

CO2 Pipeline & Equipment Ruptures

The release of CO2 into the atmosphere adversely impacts our climate. Even at relatively low concentrations, it can impair cognitive, cardiovascular, neurologic, hearing, and vision function through asphyxiation and toxicity as was, in part, demonstrated by a CO2 pipeline rupture in Satartia, Mississippi that sent dozens of people to the hospital and highlighted the challenges to first responders needing to respond to CO2 releases into the atmosphere.

Earthquakes

Another serious concern associated with CO2 sequestration is induced seismicity from injecting CO2 underground, which can cause fractures and re-activate faults, either of which can result in additional pathways for CO2 migration.

Scientists have expressed concern that injecting larger volumes of CO2, at higher pressures and for longer duration associated with CCS has an even higher probability of inducing earthquakes. But, U.S. EPA Class VI permitting does not address induced earthquakes.

Lack of Proper Regulation & Oversight

In combination with malfunctioning equipment, the injections can create unpredictable and widespread impacts from leaks on the water we drink and the air we breathe. EPA’s oversight of carbon dioxide injection wells is lacking in general, and is highlighted by the lack of transparency and oversight relating to these well failures.

These concerns are not limited to Class VI wells like the one operated by ADM, but extend to Class II wells, a much larger universe of thousands of potential injection sites across the country used to extract oil. The practice of injecting CO2 into these wells carries many of the same risks associated with Class VI wells used for CCS; however, the regulations governing Class II wells are less stringent, posing an even greater risk of leaks.

The risks associated with carbon capture and storage, particularly the injection of CO2 into Class II and Class VI wells, are too great to ignore. The recent events at the ADM facility in Decatur are a warning sign that current regulatory practices are inadequate.

45Q Tax Credit for Carbon Capture is an $800 Billion Giveaway

A blank check that increases the federal deficit: The 45Q program that is the financial lynchpin for these Carbon Capture and Storage projects has no financial cap making it an unlimited tax dollar giveaway. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis studied announced CCS projects and found that, if all these projects are constructed, 45Q tax credit claims between now and 2042 would total approximately $835 billion. If Congress extends the 45Q tax credit to allow continued use of these facilities beyond their first 12 years of operation, the total call on federal dollars could be in the trillions.

 

 

Nebraska Seeking “Primacy” From U.S. EPA to Regulate CO2 Injection Wells

Nebraska has applied to the U.S. EPA to take over the regulation, including granting of permits and monitoring of CO2 injection wells in the state. If the EPA grants Nebraska’s application, that would mean the Nebraska Department of Water, Energy & Environment (DWEE NE) would instead be tasked with oversight of the entire process.

CO2 Threats to Nebraska: Aquifer Contamination

There are currently applications pending for carbon injection wells in some far western Nebraska panhandle counties, a location that also includes the High Plains Aquifer and secondary aquifers:

High Plains Aquifer Secondary Aquifers in Nebraska

CO2 Threats to Nebraska: Earthquakes

University of Nebraska: Seismicity in Nebraska and adjacent states: The historical perspective and current trends

“A sudden spike in earthquake events has been observed in central Nebraska. Since April 2018, 26 earthquakes with equivalent moment magnitudes from 2.7 to 4.1 occurred, clustered tightly in Custer County. A similar cluster of 24 earthquakes with equivalent moment magnitudes from 2.6 to 3.7 occurred in Jewell County in northern Kansas in 2017. We have compiled an earthquake database for Nebraska and parts of adjacent states from different sources to determine whether these recent earthquake spikes are consistent with historic seismicity. We identified two historic earthquake clusters occurring in our study area. The first contained 32 events and was active in Red Willow County in southwestern Nebraska from 1977 to 1982. As it coincides spatially with the Sleepy Hollow oil field, it may be related to enhanced oil recovery from that field, although it is also located at the edge of the Chadron-Cambridge Arch. The second historical earthquake cluster is located in Pawnee and Richardson counties in southwestern Nebraska and includes eight earthquakes with equivalent moment magnitudes of 2.3 to 2.8 that occurred in a period from 1982 to 1989 over the Nemaha uplift and appear to be related to the Humboldt fault. We note an increase in both maximum magnitude, as well as in the cumulative seismic moment per cluster with time.”

Induced Earthquakes
Injection of CO2 also can induce earthquakes large enough to damage the wellbore or break the caprock. We know injecting produced water from oil and gas production far below groundwater or aquifers causes earthquakes:

• 5.2 M earthquake in TX in November 2023, the 4th largest in the state.
• At least 10 earthquakes occurred in OK on the same day in January 2024, the largest of which was 4.3.

Scientists have expressed concern that injecting larger volumes of CO2, at higher pressures and for longer duration associated with CCS has an even higher probability of inducing earthquakes. But, U.S. EPA Class VI permitting does not address induced earthquakes.

“Orphaned” oil & gas extraction wells

Abandoned wells – another path for leakage
There are thousands of oil and gas wells across central and southern Illinois. This map shows only “orphaned wells” – unplugged wells – which total over 4,000.  The Illinois Department of Natural Resources says they believe there are more than 32,000 oil & gas wells in Illinois, but acknowledges they don’t know where all of them are:

• Old wells can provide a pathway for CO2 to escape containment and rise to the surface.
• Even “plugged wells” are at risk – carbonic acid can erode cement.

An old well released CO2 near a Wyoming school in 2017, requiring evacuation & school shutdown for months.

Out of Sight, Out of Mind?
Supercritical CO2 is highly pressurized. Once injected underground, it moves both laterally and vertically, putting pressure on weak spots of the containment area.

We don’t have a lot of history to show success:

• It took 27 years before a CCS project in Norway began to leak and cause concern 

• ADM has been sequestering CO2 for 12 years, but it is a small project storing an average of just 420,000 tons each year since 2016 (less than 1/2 of what was promised).

Projects in Illinois now being reviewed by the U.S. EPA are nearly 100 times the size of ADM’s Decatur project. One Earth Sequestration LLC’s application shows it’s project would be 23 times the size.

How can we be sure CO2 won’t leak? We can’t.

The post Don’t Let Nebraska Become a CO2 Waste Dump appeared first on Bold Nebraska.

Streetsblog supports California high-speed rail because for all of the headaches caused by missteps in the early years, when all is said and done the state deserves, and one day will get, a high-speed rail line.

But these last few weeks have been rough. 

A state investigation found nearly $600,000 in questionable consultant travel expenses. The governor vetoed legislation intended to strengthen oversight earning jeers from the media. Republican politicians are demanding resignations, and the familiar chorus declaring the entire project a failure has gotten louder.

But the headlines about the latest scandal shouldn’t obscure another important story: work to prepare California’s first high-speed rail line continues. Construction is advancing in the Central Valley, and the authority is still working to connect that segment to the Bay Area.

The authority has completed 66 structures along the first 119 miles of the future rail line, including four projects in Tulare County earlier this month. Bridges, viaducts and underpasses must be finished before crews can install tracks through those locations, while the railbed and guideway must be prepared to support them. Once the civil works are complete, crews can install tracks, electrical power, signaling and communications systems.

The scandal is real, and the board is taking action

The latest controversy centers on a September investigation by the High-Speed Rail Authority’s inspector general. Auditors reviewed travel expenses submitted by four consulting firms over two years and found that authority staff had approved nearly $600,000 in questionable expenses.

Some consultants flew first class, took expensive rides and visited nightclubs, cigar lounges, bars and other destinations on the public’s dime. Many, but not all, trips lacked adequate justification or prior authorization. 

Ian Choudri.

On October 9, the authority’s board voted 7-2 to restrict authority CEO Ian Choudri’s contracting powers. He can no longer independently sign or manage contracts under $25 million, and the authority’s in-house attorneys must approve changes to new and existing contracts. The board already had authority over contracts exceeding $25 million.

The authority also paused travel payments to the four consulting firms, began reviewing their expenses and promised to seek reimbursement for questionable charges. Choudri told the board that disciplinary action had been taken against some consultants, although he did not provide details.

Meanwhile, Gov. Gavin Newsom vetoed Assembly Bill 1608, a bill that would have given the inspector general more flexibility to hire specialized auditors and investigators and sign certain contracts. The governor argued that the office should work through existing state procedures, despite the inspector general’s concerns that those procedures have hampered timely investigations.

Vetoing AB 1608 seems to be an unforced error on the governor’s part as concerns that the construction authority is not well-run have spread well beyond just opponents of high-speed rail or Republicans looking to score political points. The legislation was authored by the Chair of the Assembly Transportation Committee Lori Wilson (D-Suisun City) and was passed overwhelmingly in the Assembly (64-8 with 7 abstentions) and Senate (39-0 with 1 abstention.)

Next Steps

The authority is also continuing the environmental review and planning needed to connect the Central Valley to the Bay Area.

In October, the agency issued a notice of preparation for a supplemental environmental impact report covering the San José-to-Merced project section through the Diablo Range, southeast of Gilroy to northeast of Los Banos. The previously approved alignment includes 15.1 miles of tunnels through the mountains. With construction costs rising and federal funding becoming less reliable, the authority is considering alternative ways to deliver the connection.

Residents can weigh in on the proposed alternatives for the San José-to-Merced high-speed rail route by attending public scoping meetings on November 4 at Casa de Fruta in Hollister or November 5 at the Los Banos Community Center, both from 5:30 to 7 p.m., or joining a virtual meeting on November 9. Written comments on the scope of the environmental review are due November 13 and can be emailed to the California High-Speed Rail Authority with the subject line “G-Y Project Segment HSR Scoping Comment.” For more details, click here.

Useful Tips on the Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples’ Mechanism (CSIPM) for Relations with the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) – (2026 edition)

The kit is an accessible tool for CSIPM participants and Coordination Committee members to find their way through the CFS and the CSIPM. We want to unpack these spaces for everyone carrying out the struggle at the local level!

Download the kit  and share it widely across your constituencies and sub-regions.

The post CSIPM Welcome Kit appeared first on CSIPM.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 OCTOBER 2026 SLF-2007-086 The Sakhalin Papers LXXVI: Poland’s Red Light — How Shell’s Nord Stream 2 Shareholding Became a €950 Million Financing Commitment

In September 2015, Royal Dutch Shell signed an agreement intended to give it a 10 per cent shareholding in Nord Stream 2, the controversial pipeline designed to transport Russian natural gas directly to Germany. Eleven months later, Poland’s competition authority effectively derailed the proposed ownership arrangement. Shell and its partners withdrew their application. But the project survived. On 24 April 2017, Shell signed a different agreement, committing financing and guarantees worth up to €950 million while Gazprom retained sole ownership of the pipeline company. The authenticated corporate announcements, Polish regulatory records, contemporaneous Reuters reporting and subsequent court proceedings reveal how an apparent regulatory defeat became a fundamentally different commercial arrangement.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-086
Publication date: 13 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Principal authenticated records: Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), 22 July and 12 August 2016; joint corporate announcement by Gazprom and its European partners, 12 August 2016; Royal Dutch Shell corporate announcement, 24 April 2017; Shell Annual Report and Form 20-F 2022.
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, 12 August 2016 and 24 April 2017; Forbes, 12 August 2016; Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Warsaw, 26 April 2017.
Judicial context: Court of Justice of the European Union, Nord Stream 2 AG v European Parliament and Council, Case C-348/20 P, judgment of 12 July 2022; Polish competition-court proceedings arising from UOKiK’s subsequent 2020 enforcement decision.
Evidence standard: Corporate announcements establish contractual commitments and stated intentions. Regulatory objections are distinguished from findings of illegality. Financing commitments are distinguished from completed payments and equity ownership. Later judicial outcomes are reported separately from the events of 2016–2017.

Introduction: The agreement that did not survive

The previous instalment, The Shell Leaks Files — 12 October 2026, examined the September 2015 shareholders’ agreement that brought Royal Dutch Shell into Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2 project.

The proposal was commercially ambitious and politically divisive.

Two additional pipelines would run beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, adding approximately 55 billion cubic metres of annual gas-transport capacity.

The route would bypass Ukraine, historically one of the most important transit countries for Russian gas entering Europe.

Shell’s chief executive, Ben van Beurden, had presented the project as an important contribution to Europe’s future energy requirements.

But several European governments saw something different.

For Poland, Ukraine and other critics, Nord Stream 2 threatened to strengthen Gazprom’s position while weakening countries that depended upon existing transit routes.

The disagreement was not simply over whether Europe needed additional natural gas.

It concerned where that gas would originate, how it would reach European customers and who would control the infrastructure.

In 2016, Poland moved beyond political criticism.

Its competition authority examined the proposed corporate structure and raised formal objections.

The companies withdrew their application.

For a brief moment, it appeared that Poland had stopped one of Gazprom’s most important European expansion plans.

What happened next is the subject of this file.

1. December 2015: Six companies seek approval

The documentary trail begins with an application submitted to Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, known as UOKiK, in December 2015.

The proposed transaction involved six companies:

Gazprom, the Russian state-controlled gas producer; Germany’s E.ON-related business, subsequently represented by Uniper; France’s ENGIE; Austria’s OMV; Royal Dutch Shell; and Wintershall.

The proposed joint venture would be responsible for designing, financing, constructing and operating Nord Stream 2.

The application was not a minor administrative formality.

It concerned a major infrastructure investment with potentially significant consequences for the European gas market.

Under the proposed structure, Gazprom would retain controlling influence while Western European energy companies acquired minority interests.

For Shell, the arrangement represented a direct equity participation in a major Russian gas-export project.

Unlike lending money to an enterprise, becoming a shareholder would give Shell an ownership interest, subject to the rights attached to those shares.

It would also expose the company to the opportunities and risks associated with ownership.

The Polish regulator therefore had to consider whether the transaction could significantly restrict competition.

The official record confirms the application, the participating companies and the proposed joint venture’s responsibilities. Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów

2. Poland investigates Gazprom’s market power

In February 2016, UOKiK referred the application for more detailed examination.

The regulator conducted a market investigation involving companies operating within Poland’s natural gas sector.

Those consulted included the Polish gas transmission operator, the company responsible for the Świnoujście LNG terminal, the operator of the Yamal–Europe pipeline and numerous gas importers.

Poland’s Energy Regulatory Office was also asked for its assessment.

The investigation concerned the potential consequences of strengthening Gazprom’s position.

Gazprom already had an important role in supplying natural gas to Poland.

UOKiK considered whether giving Gazprom and its European partners control of additional infrastructure could increase the Russian company’s negotiating power.

The concern extended beyond the physical construction of a pipeline.

A pipeline can change the commercial options available to buyers and suppliers.

If alternative transport routes make certain existing routes less important, their operators and customers may lose bargaining power.

Conversely, additional infrastructure can increase transport capacity and potentially lower costs.

The competition implications depend upon market structure, ownership, access arrangements and commercial behaviour.

Poland’s investigation focused upon those implications.

For a country attempting to diversify its energy supplies, Nord Stream 2 presented a potentially serious strategic problem.

Poland was developing LNG import infrastructure partly to reduce dependence upon traditional Russian pipeline supplies.

A new Baltic pipeline strengthening Gazprom’s access to major European markets could complicate that objective.

These were competition concerns raised by the Polish regulator, not judicial findings that the proposed transaction was unlawful.

3. 22 July 2016: The formal objections

On 22 July 2016, UOKiK publicly announced its objections.

The regulator stated that the proposed concentration might restrict competition.

It concluded that Gazprom held a dominant position in gas supplies to Poland and that the transaction could strengthen its negotiating position.

This was a significant development.

The Polish authority was no longer merely examining a proposed agreement.

It had formally identified competition concerns requiring a response from the companies.

However, the procedural distinction matters.

The objections were not a final prohibition decision.

The companies were entitled to respond and present arguments concerning the proposed transaction.

They could also seek additional time to do so.

The regulator’s announcement explicitly distinguished its preliminary objections from the eventual outcome of the proceedings.

That qualification is important because subsequent descriptions of the episode sometimes suggest that Poland issued a definitive ruling prohibiting construction of Nord Stream 2.

The actual position was narrower.

Poland challenged the proposed concentration.

It had not issued a general prohibition on constructing the pipeline.

Primary source: UOKiK — Objections to a concentration, 22 July 2016.

4. 12 August 2016: Shell and its partners withdraw

Three weeks later, the situation changed dramatically.

On 12 August 2016, Gazprom and its five European partners announced that they had withdrawn their merger-control application.

The announcement followed their joint response to the Polish authority’s objections.

Shell was among the companies withdrawing the application.

UOKiK welcomed the development.

Its president, Marek Niechciał, explained that the withdrawal meant the proposed six-company joint venture could not be established as envisaged.

The regulator subsequently discontinued the merger-control proceedings.

For the original ownership structure, the result was decisive.

The planned multinational joint venture would not proceed in that form.

Shell would not obtain its proposed shareholding through the transaction submitted to the Polish regulator.

But the corporate announcement contained another important statement.

The companies maintained that the pipeline remained important to Europe’s energy system.

They indicated that each would consider alternative ways of supporting the project.

And they made clear that withdrawing the merger notification did not mean Nord Stream 2 AG would abandon its construction plans.

The distinction was fundamental.

The companies had withdrawn an application to create a particular ownership arrangement. They had not agreed to abandon Nord Stream 2.

The contemporary joint corporate statement is preserved by Uniper.

Primary sources: UOKiK — Nord Stream 2 application withdrawn, 12 August 2016 and Joint statement by Gazprom, Shell and the European partners.

5. What Poland actually achieved

Poland’s intervention demonstrated that national competition authorities could influence the structure of major international energy investments.

Although Nord Stream 2 would not pass through Polish territory, the project could affect competition in Poland’s gas market.

The regulator had examined the potential commercial consequences of the proposed joint venture rather than limiting its attention to the pipeline’s geographical route.

That was significant.

The companies responded by abandoning the proposed ownership transaction.

But the regulator’s intervention did not establish that the physical pipeline could never be built.

Gazprom remained determined to proceed.

And the Western European companies retained substantial commercial interest in the development.

Contemporary reporting reflected this distinction.

On 12 August 2016, Forbes examined Poland’s intervention and the obstacles it presented to Gazprom’s original financing and ownership plans.

The possibility that Gazprom might proceed without Western equity partners was already being discussed.

The question was no longer simply whether Nord Stream 2 would be built.

It was how.

6. The commercial problem: Financing without ownership

Nord Stream 2 was an exceptionally expensive undertaking.

Its estimated construction cost eventually reached approximately €9.5 billion.

Gazprom wanted substantial Western European participation.

Such participation could provide finance, commercial support and relationships with established European energy companies.

The original shareholding arrangement would have enabled Western partners to participate directly in the project company’s ownership.

Poland’s intervention disrupted that structure.

The challenge was to find an arrangement that would provide financial support without requiring the same acquisition of equity interests.

Lending presented one possible alternative.

A shareholder owns part of a company.

A lender provides finance under a contract, normally expecting repayment under agreed terms.

A lending agreement does not necessarily confer ownership or voting rights.

However, lending may still create substantial economic exposure.

The lender’s ability to recover its money depends upon contractual protections, the borrower’s financial position and the wider risks affecting the project.

A large financing commitment can therefore be commercially important even when it carries no direct ownership interest.

For Shell and the other European participants, this distinction would become central.

For Gazprom, it offered a route towards retaining complete formal ownership while obtaining Western financial assistance.

The commercial implications were clear.

But whether such arrangements fell within Polish competition law would later become a separate legal controversy.

7. 24 April 2017: The replacement agreement

The decisive development came on 24 April 2017.

At a signing ceremony in Paris, five European energy companies entered into financing agreements with Nord Stream 2 AG.

They were Shell, ENGIE, OMV, Uniper and Wintershall.

Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of the project company.

The estimated total project cost was €9.5 billion.

The five Western companies each committed to provide financing and guarantees for up to 10 per cent of that amount.

For Shell, the maximum commitment was therefore:

€950 million.

The five companies collectively committed financing and guarantees covering up to half the estimated project cost.

Gazprom would be responsible for the other half.

The arrangement was confirmed in an authenticated corporate announcement issued by Royal Dutch Shell on 24 April 2017.

The document survives in Shell’s consolidated archive of its 2017 corporate press releases, at page 40.

It provides the clearest primary-source explanation of Shell’s new role.

Primary source: Shell — 2017 corporate press releases, page 40. Shell

8. The figures inside Shell’s financing agreement

The financial details deserve careful examination.

Shell’s April 2017 announcement explained that each of the five European companies would provide a long-term funding facility of €285 million.

Those facilities were expected to be drawn down during 2017.

The companies also agreed to provide up to €665 million each in additional short-term and long-term funding or guarantees.

That second component depended upon subsequent decisions concerning the project’s overall financing requirements.

The figures were therefore:

Initial long-term funding facility: €285 million per company.

Additional financing and guarantees: Up to €665 million per company.

Maximum commitment: €950 million per company.

Combined maximum commitment from the five Western companies: €4.75 billion.

These figures described contractual commitments and available facilities.

They should not be interpreted as proof that the entire maximum amount was paid immediately in April 2017.

The distinction matters.

An agreement to provide finance is not identical to a completed transfer of funds.

Nor is the provision of a guarantee necessarily identical to a cash loan.

Shell’s subsequent financial statements would eventually establish that the commitment developed into substantial actual lending.

But in April 2017, the immediate documentary fact was the signing of the financing agreements.

9. Gazprom remains the sole shareholder

One sentence in Shell’s announcement is especially important.

Shell confirmed that Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2 AG.

That fact distinguished the revised arrangement from the original proposal.

In September 2015, Shell had signed an agreement contemplating a minority ownership interest.

In August 2016, the companies withdrew the Polish merger notification.

In April 2017, Shell entered into a financing agreement instead.

The result was a significant change in the legal relationship.

Shell would support the pipeline financially without acquiring the proposed equity stake in the project company.

Gazprom retained formal ownership.

That did not make Shell’s involvement insignificant.

A financial commitment approaching €1 billion was substantial.

But ownership and financing involve different legal rights and responsibilities.

This distinction was subsequently recorded by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

In its judgment of 12 July 2022 in Nord Stream 2 AG v European Parliament and Council, Case C-348/20 P, the Court described Nord Stream 2 AG as a Swiss company whose sole shareholder was Gazprom.

The judgment also recorded that half the project’s €9.5 billion funding was provided by the five Western companies, including Royal Dutch Shell.

This judicial description independently corroborates the ownership and financing structure.

It must not, however, be misrepresented as a judgment approving the arrangement under Polish competition law.

The European Court proceedings concerned the application of European Union gas-market legislation.

They did not determine the separate Polish merger-control dispute.

Judicial source: Court of Justice of the European Union — Case C-348/20 P, judgment of 12 July 2022.

10. Reuters identifies the importance of the change

Reuters reported the financing agreement on 24 April 2017.

Its account described the agreement as removing an important obstacle to the proposed pipeline.

The agency explained that the five European companies had agreed to contribute financing equivalent to approximately half the project’s estimated cost.

Reuters also recorded that the revised structure enabled the Western participants to avoid the original ownership arrangement that had encountered Polish objections.

This was an important contemporary observation.

The change was not merely a technical adjustment to the wording of a contract.

It replaced equity participation with financing agreements.

Gazprom could retain complete ownership of the project company.

The Western companies could remain financially involved.

And construction plans could continue.

The arrangement therefore achieved an important commercial objective for the participants despite the failure of the original joint-venture proposal.

Source: Reuters — Gazprom’s Western partners agree Nord Stream 2 financing, 24 April 2017.

11. The Polish research institute’s assessment

Two days later, on 26 April 2017, analysts at Warsaw’s Centre for Eastern Studies, commonly known by its Polish initials OSW, published a detailed assessment.

The authors were Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Szymon Kardaś and Rafał Bajczuk.

Their analysis examined the revised arrangements from several perspectives.

First, it confirmed that Gazprom remained the sole shareholder while the five Western companies provided financing.

Second, it noted that the agreement demonstrated continuing Western corporate interest in Nord Stream 2 despite growing political objections.

Third, it identified significant unanswered commercial questions.

Those included the precise terms of the financing agreements and what benefits the Western companies expected to obtain.

The analysts also considered the possibility that the revised arrangement could impose a less favourable financing structure upon Gazprom than the original ownership proposal.

Gazprom would retain the responsibilities associated with sole ownership while relying upon external financing commitments.

The OSW analysis suggested that Gazprom’s willingness to accept this arrangement demonstrated its determination to complete the project.

That was the analysts’ interpretation, not a judicial finding concerning Gazprom’s motives.

Their report also identified the continuing dispute over the project’s regulatory treatment within the European Union.

Source: OSW — Agreement on financing Nord Stream 2, 26 April 2017.

12. A pipeline agreement does not establish a secret bargain

The sequence of events invites an obvious question.

Did Gazprom and its Western partners deliberately restructure Nord Stream 2 to overcome Poland’s objections?

The documents establish that the original ownership arrangement was withdrawn following the Polish competition authority’s intervention.

They also establish that alternative financing agreements were subsequently signed.

The joint corporate announcement of August 2016 had expressly contemplated alternative methods of participation.

The April 2017 agreements provided such a method.

That chronology supports the conclusion that the companies developed a replacement commercial structure after the failure of their original proposal.

But it does not automatically establish that they acted unlawfully.

Nor does it establish the existence of concealed contractual terms.

The complete financing agreements have not been reproduced in this instalment.

Their commercial provisions cannot be reconstructed from press releases alone.

It would therefore be inappropriate to assert that the arrangements contained secret control rights, undisclosed guarantees or improper political undertakings.

The surviving public documents establish a substantial financing relationship.

They do not establish every contractual detail.

13. The later Polish legal challenge

There is an important judicial qualification to the story.

Poland’s concerns did not disappear after the financing agreements were signed.

In 2018, UOKiK initiated proceedings concerning the participation of Gazprom and its Western partners in financing Nord Stream 2.

The regulator questioned whether their arrangements amounted to an unapproved concentration under Polish competition law.

In October 2020, UOKiK imposed substantial financial penalties.

Gazprom received a penalty exceeding PLN 29 billion.

The five Western companies, including Shell, were collectively fined more than PLN 234 million.

The authority also ordered the termination of the financing agreements.

These were regulatory decisions that the companies challenged.

The subsequent judicial outcome is essential to an accurate account.

In November 2022, Poland’s Court of Competition and Consumer Protection overturned the regulatory decision.

The Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the annulment in October 2023.

ENGIE’s subsequent published financial disclosures confirm that UOKiK did not pursue a further cassation appeal and that the main proceedings were definitively closed.

The 2020 penalties must therefore not be presented as final, enforceable findings of wrongdoing.

The judicial record also illustrates the distinction between a competition authority’s interpretation of commercial arrangements and the courts’ assessment of whether those arrangements fall within its legal powers.

The details of that later dispute deserve a separate documentary examination.

Sources: Polish Radio — Court of Appeal overturns the Nord Stream 2 fines, 26 October 2023; ENGIE — 2025 financial statements, Polish competition proceedings.

14. The later financial record: Shell’s commitment was real

There is another reason why the April 2017 financing agreement deserves attention.

It eventually produced a substantial financial loss for Shell.

The company’s 2022 annual reporting confirms that its final loan instalments for Nord Stream 2 were made in the second quarter of 2020.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Shell announced its intention to end its involvement in the pipeline project and withdraw from Russian ventures involving Gazprom.

Shell subsequently assessed the recoverability of its Nord Stream 2 loan.

It recorded a full write-down in the first quarter of 2022.

The amount was:

$1.126 billion.

This was not merely an abandoned proposal or an unrealised intention to invest.

The financing arrangement had created an actual financial asset whose carrying value Shell subsequently wrote down.

A write-down is an accounting recognition that the recorded value of an asset is no longer recoverable under the applicable assessment.

It does not necessarily establish that every possible legal right to repayment has been extinguished.

But it demonstrates that Shell regarded the loan’s recoverable accounting value as zero at that time.

Shell’s own filings establish both the timing of the final loan instalments and the subsequent write-down.

Primary source: Shell plc 2022 Form 20-F, filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. SEC

The contrast is striking.

In 2015, Shell proposed to acquire an ownership interest.

In 2016, Poland’s objections disrupted that arrangement.

In 2017, Shell committed substantial financing without acquiring the proposed shares.

By 2020, the loan funding had been advanced.

In 2022, Shell wrote down more than $1.1 billion associated with that financing.

The chronology demonstrates how a commercial commitment survived a change in legal structure but ultimately became exposed to the consequences of a radically altered geopolitical environment.

15. The Sakhalin connection: A recurring strategic relationship

The events reconstructed in this file should not be examined in isolation.

They formed part of a much longer relationship between Shell and Gazprom.

In December 2006, Shell agreed to surrender majority control of Sakhalin Energy to Gazprom under an arrangement that profoundly changed the ownership of Sakhalin II.

In the following years, the companies continued cooperating in Russian natural gas development.

By June 2015, Ben van Beurden and Alexey Miller were discussing an expanded relationship encompassing Sakhalin LNG, upstream gas resources and additional European export infrastructure.

Nord Stream 2 represented the European dimension of that strategy.

The proposed pipeline was different from Sakhalin II.

It involved different assets, markets, contractual arrangements and regulatory authorities.

But Gazprom was central to both.

And Shell was prepared to deepen its commercial relationship with the Russian company despite the increasingly difficult political environment.

That willingness is established by the corporate agreements.

It does not prove that Shell endorsed every policy of the Russian government.

Nor does commercial cooperation establish participation in Russian state decision-making.

The distinction between corporate conduct and political responsibility must be maintained.

Nevertheless, the commercial continuity is significant.

The Sakhalin experience did not bring Shell’s relationship with Gazprom to an end.

The relationship expanded into another major and controversial infrastructure project.

16. Commentary: Who benefited from the revised structure?

The replacement financing arrangement raises an important issue of corporate governance.

Gazprom retained sole ownership of Nord Stream 2 AG.

The Western companies supplied substantial financial support.

That meant the formal ownership and financial exposure were no longer distributed in the way originally envisaged.

For Gazprom, the agreement provided access to Western financing without surrendering equity in the project company.

For Shell and the other European companies, it preserved participation in a strategically important gas development.

But the public documents do not fully explain what commercial advantages justified the commitments.

There may have been legitimate expectations concerning future gas-market opportunities, wider commercial relationships or financial returns.

The record examined here does not provide sufficient contractual detail to assign a definitive motive to Shell.

The question for shareholders is consequently straightforward.

What financial and strategic benefits did Shell expect from providing up to €950 million in financing to a company wholly owned by Gazprom?

And how were the associated political and commercial risks assessed?

The eventual write-down does not prove that the original investment decision was necessarily irrational.

Commercial decisions must be evaluated in the circumstances prevailing when they were made.

But the size of the loss makes the original risk assessment historically important.

Shareholders are entitled to examine how the investment was justified and what assumptions underpinned it.

17. Poland’s warning and the limits of hindsight

It would be tempting to treat the subsequent failure of Nord Stream 2 as proof that every early criticism was correct.

That would be too simplistic.

The Polish regulator’s original objections concerned competition and Gazprom’s market position.

Political critics raised broader questions about European dependence upon Russian gas and the consequences for Ukraine.

The companies defended the project primarily through arguments about gas demand, supply security and infrastructure requirements.

Those arguments were not identical.

A concern about market dominance is different from a prediction about future military conflict.

Likewise, the existence of geopolitical risk does not itself demonstrate that a particular financing agreement violated competition law.

The later history must not be used to manufacture findings that were never made.

What can be said is that Poland identified significant risks associated with strengthening Gazprom’s commercial position.

The companies withdrew the proposed joint-venture application.

They then developed a financing arrangement that allowed the project to proceed.

And Shell ultimately suffered a substantial financial write-down.

Each stage is independently documented.

Their sequence provides a meaningful historical record without requiring speculation about undisclosed intentions.

Conclusion: Poland stopped the shareholding — not the money

The most revealing aspect of the Nord Stream 2 financing story is the distinction between ownership and financial participation.

In 2015, Shell signed an agreement contemplating a minority shareholding in the project.

In July 2016, Poland’s competition authority raised formal objections.

In August, the proposed partners withdrew their merger notification.

The original corporate structure did not proceed.

But in April 2017, Shell and four other European companies signed agreements to provide financing and guarantees worth up to €4.75 billion.

Gazprom retained sole ownership.

The revised arrangement preserved substantial Western participation in a project that remained politically controversial.

Shell’s own financial statements later confirmed that its contribution involved actual loan funding and ultimately resulted in a $1.126 billion write-down.

These are established documentary facts.

They demonstrate how a major energy investment can change its legal form without disappearing as a commercial undertaking.

They also reveal the limits of Poland’s initial intervention.

The proposed equity structure was abandoned.

The project continued.

And Shell remained financially involved.

The central historical lesson is not that Poland’s competition authority was powerless, or that Shell necessarily acted unlawfully.

It is that the withdrawal of a proposed ownership arrangement did not end the underlying commercial relationship.

For Shell, Gazprom and Nord Stream 2, financing replaced shareholding.

The money continued to flow.

And the consequences would be felt years later.

Documentary source record

1. Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection — 22 July 2016

UOKiK issues objections to a concentration — Nord Stream 2

Authenticated regulatory announcement identifying the companies, proposed joint venture, market investigation and competition concerns.

2. Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection — 12 August 2016

Nord Stream 2 — Application withdrawn

Official record confirming withdrawal of the merger-control application and discontinuance of proceedings.

3. Gazprom, Shell, ENGIE, OMV, Uniper, Wintershall and Nord Stream 2 AG — 12 August 2016

Joint corporate press release

Contemporaneous statement confirming withdrawal and the companies’ intention to consider alternative participation arrangements.

4. Royal Dutch Shell plc — 24 April 2017

Shell and four European energy companies sign financing agreements — 2017 corporate press releases, page 40

Primary corporate evidence of the €950 million maximum commitment, financing structure and Gazprom’s sole shareholding.

5. Reuters — 24 April 2017

Gazprom’s Western partners agree Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline financing

Contemporaneous independent reporting explaining the significance of the replacement structure.

6. Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw — 26 April 2017

Agreement on financing Nord Stream 2

Contemporaneous analysis by Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Szymon Kardaś and Rafał Bajczuk of the revised financing arrangements and their commercial implications.

7. Court of Justice of the European Union — 12 July 2022

Nord Stream 2 AG v European Parliament and Council, Case C-348/20 P

Authenticated judicial record identifying Gazprom as sole shareholder and recording Western corporate financing. The case concerned EU gas-market legislation, not the legality of the arrangements under Polish merger-control law.

8. Polish Radio / Polish Press Agency — 26 October 2023

Polish Court of Appeal overturns Nord Stream 2 competition fines

Contemporary reporting of the Polish judicial outcome.

9. Shell plc — Annual Report and Form 20-F 2022

Shell’s filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission

Primary financial record confirming the completed loan instalments and the subsequent $1.126 billion write-down.

Evidence and attribution statement

The contemporaneous corporate announcements, Polish regulatory documents and Shell financial filings are treated as authenticated records of the actions and statements they describe.

UOKiK’s 2016 objections are regulatory assessments, not final findings that the proposed joint venture was unlawful. Its subsequent 2020 penalties were overturned by Polish courts.

The Court of Justice of the European Union’s 2022 judgment is cited for its description of the project’s ownership and financing, not as a determination of the Polish competition dispute.

The authors of the OSW assessment and the journalists cited are responsible for their own interpretations.

The commentary in this instalment addresses the documented commercial relationship and its implications. It does not assert undisclosed wrongdoing, secret political agreements or unlawful conduct by Shell or its partners.

Site-wide disclaimer applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-087 — The Sakhalin Papers LXXVII: Poland Strikes Back — The €7 Billion Nord Stream 2 Penalty and the Courts That Overturned It

Poland’s objections in 2016 did not end the Nord Stream 2 dispute.

After Shell and its European partners agreed to finance the Gazprom-owned pipeline, the Polish competition authority began investigating whether the new arrangements amounted to an unauthorised concentration.

The investigation produced one of the most extraordinary penalties in European energy-sector competition history.

In October 2020, Poland imposed a fine exceeding 29 billion zlotys on Gazprom and additional penalties on Shell and its four European partners. It also ordered the termination of the financing agreements.

But the companies challenged the decision.

In 2022 and 2023, the Polish courts overturned the regulator’s action.

The next instalment will examine the evidence relied upon by UOKiK, the distinction between corporate ownership and contractual financing, the penalties imposed upon Shell and its partners, and the reasons the regulator’s decision failed in court.

The financing arrangement had survived Poland’s first intervention. Could it withstand the second?

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 13, 2026 at 9:15 pm.
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ON OCT 19TH, 2026 the Government of Alberta will hold a referendum to decide a range of questions surrounding the province’s place in Canadian confederation. All these questions emerge from longstanding grievances about perceived federal interference and overreach into its affairs. Aimed at greater provincial autonomy and a stronger mandate relative to the federal government, the first nine questions concern matters of immigration, provincial residency rules, voter identification, and constitutional powers and jurisdiction. A tenth question asks voters whether they want Alberta to remain a province of Canada, or whether there is adequate support for the Government of Alberta to strike a referendum on provincial separation from Canada. The question was added to the ballot after an Alberta court ruled that citizen-led petitions for provincial separation breached constitutional law. Specifically, the court ruled in favour of First Nations who argued that the separatist petitions violated Treaty relationships, pointing to the duty to consult as an unfulfilled legal requirement.

Treaty First Nations have actively worked to challenge and raise awareness surrounding the referendum through a range of educational and awareness-building initiatives. Their efforts aren’t limited to Alberta separatism, but critique all ten questions by way of contrast with the spirit and intent of the Numbered Treaties. The Confederacy of Treaty 6 First Nations, for instance, writes “These questions do not reflect the spirit of Treaty No. 6, which is about partnership, shared responsibility, and respect for all people within Alberta.” This approach is grounded in the continuity of the Numbered Treaties as foundational governance frameworks in the lands claimed by Alberta, representing an important application of relational treaty frameworks in practice today.

Relational treaty practice represents an extension of Indigenous peoples’ longstanding traditions of entering into political arrangements of mutuality and sharing across difference. It functions as a critique of the ongoing operations of the settler colonial project and the racialized, gendered and capitalist logics that continue to animate it.

As Alberta separatism makes clear, settler colonialism has many shared characteristics, but it also takes shape differently across time and space, adapting to localized geographies and political contexts.

Theorizing Settler Colonialism in “Native” Alberta

The Alberta separatist movement, for instance, relies heavily on notions of cultural and regional difference as the grounds for its claims. Asserting a distinct identity and way of life for Albertans legitimates its drive for greater power and jurisdiction externally by framing separatism as a need to protect Alberta’s culture and interests relative to the Canadian majority. Separatists ground their distinctiveness in Alberta’s location in a uniquely resource-rich geography and its purported experience of exploitation by and for the rest of Canada. The characterization of Albertans as colonized by Ottawa and/or by immigration enabled by Ottawa represents an appropriation and inversion of the language of colonialism. Repurposing the colonizer/colonized binary through a distinctly Albertan nativism not only lets separatists distinguish Alberta as somehow unique but also gives primacy to the interests of the “true Albertan,” a normatively white, hard-working, often rural subject who is alienated from other Canadians and its governing elites. 

If Alberta can assume a nativist identity, it enables the argument that the province is being colonized by immigrants, obfuscating Alberta’s own status as a colonizing government and diverting attention from the subordination and dispossession of actual Indigenous peoples from their homelands. The drive towards Albertan nativism can be understood as a form of “contested colonialism,” a concept that describes the appropriation and inversion of the language of colonialism to sub-national movements seeking more autonomy within a settler colonial state. 

The assumed primacy of the Albertan way of life relative to other ways of life has an established history in the form of settler colonialism and other nation-building projects legitimatized through racist ideas surrounding the superiority of white civilization, development, and notions of progress. Albertan nativism is also a racialized argument; it represents an adaptation of “great replacement theory,” a far-right, white nationalist theory founded on the claim that white or Western power and authority is gradually being diminished by the increased presence of racialized, migrant populations.

Industry and Immigration

The Alberta government’s targeting of recent immigrants is a classic scapegoat strategy designed to keep regular citizens at each other’s throats and divert pressure away from governing and economic elites who are thriving while the rest of us struggle under the weight of rising costs and poor governance. With oil prices sky-high thanks to Donald Trump’s war of choice with Iran, Alberta’s oil and gas industry is making windfall profits.

While recent oil gains are erasing government deficits, they are a reminder of how poorly Alberta’s energy wealth has been managed by successive governments, including Danielle Smith’s UCP. 

Instead of stewarding Alberta’s abundant oil wealth to ensure more easeful lives for Albertans and plant the seeds for needed energy transition – like Norway has been doing with its oil revenues – conservative governments in Alberta have lowered royalties and taxes for companies to prioritize their profits (most of which head south of the border since Alberta’s biggest oil companies are majority owned by US shareholders). Instead of acknowledging years of mismanaged wealth, it is much easier to blame strained and underfunded healthcare and education systems on new immigrants, and the federal government that sets immigration policy. In other words, mismanaged oil wealth becomes part of the rationale behind the argument that Alberta is being colonized.

For separatists, the remedy to perceived powerlessness vis-à-vis Ottawa is to strengthen provincial power and jurisdiction over economic affairs, including resource development, which, again, they view as hindered by federal government interference and, by association, interference from Indigenous peoples, to whom they argue only the federal government is responsible. When they do engage treaties, Alberta separatists tend to focus only on the written text and reproduce a transactional understanding that freezes them in the past. This approach denies Indigenous peoples’ understanding of the numbered treaties as a conditional, reciprocal sharing of land with newcomers and as an active, living relationship intended to protect Indigenous ways of life from the impacts of settlement.

Where are all the Treaty People?

Separatists generally disregard Indigenous peoples’ status as autonomous political actors and as partners in the treaty relationship, positioning treaties as historical events with little contemporary significance aside from representing barriers to the realization of Alberta’s economic potential. Such arguments also heavily rely on racist ideas about the supremacy of Western knowledge in order to actively deny Indigenous knowledge of treaties and to dismiss Indigenous peoples’ capacity to hold and transmit this knowledge intergenerationally. This is how they justify betrayal of the very treaty relationship that allowed them to make their homes in Canada in the first place.

Reinforcing this Albertan cultural difference and positioning Albertan interests at the top of a hierarchical order enables a sense of supremacy over other peoples and over the living earth. This is why many of the referendum questions include measures aimed at the hardening of boundaries and exclusion of new immigrants to justify greater provincial authority over, and entitlement to, local lands, resources, and services. This approach doesn’t aim to transform the structures of colonialism and exploitation that Alberta nativists claim to suffer from; it ultimately doubles down on and re-situates the province as colonizer.  Contrast this approach with that of Treaty First Nations, who, instead of advancing their own status and self-interests are modelling truly relational modes of being grounded in the spirit and intent of treaty. For example, The Confederacy of Treaty Six First Nations has recently noted that “everyone in Treaty No. 6 is a Treaty person regardless of their ethnicity, race, or origin. Treaty is about shared responsibility and making sure people have access to what they need to live well on this land.” 

The numbered treaties, which play a foundational role in Canadian confederation (and without which Alberta would not exist), are relationship frameworks intended for co-existence and mutual flourishing across political and cultural difference.

This follows from a longstanding appreciation of diversity in our relations with other humans and with the living earth. Inter-Indigenous treaties remind us that cultural sameness or uniformity is not a prerequisite for a mutually beneficial political relation. Indigenous peoples have long and established histories of entering into diplomatic relations with other Indigenous peoples across vast cultural, linguistic, and geographic distances, and brought these orientations across to our interrelations with settlers. Here, human difference is seen as a gift, not a danger, much like the unique contributions that varieties of plants, animals, and elements make to the inner workings of Creation. Encounters with cultural difference allow us to diversify our knowledge and skills, as we each bring unique contributions to the interconnected whole that comprises a good life. 

The Future of Alberta

Treaty is grounded in an ethic of relationality. But it’s important to clarify that such an ethic doesn’t translate exclusively to a practice of non-interference. As treaty histories demonstrate, Indigenous peoples have long and established traditions of protecting their homelands from incursion and exploitation, in addition to policy efforts focused on the erasure or assimilation of Indigenous culture. In the face of this all, Indigenous nations in Alberta have been at the forefront of legal and policy responses to federal or provincial plans, with treaty figuring centrally in the Indian Association of Alberta’s Red Paper, activism surrounding repatriation of the Constitution, interventions in the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, interprovincial coalitions with other Treaty First Nations, and the advancement of strategic legal and political efforts surrounding resource exploitation and the denial of gender-affirming health care in the province. 

Considering this, it is safe to say that Treaty First Nations will outlast separatism, as they have outlasted other predatory and divisive forces over time. Treaty emerges from Indigenous relationality with Creation, and forms the foundation of a distinct legal and political status that precedes and transcends provincial boundaries. Indigenous nations will continue to draw on relational treaty frameworks to fulfill their obligations to local lands and waters, and to teach other living beings in treaty regions how to live in a place of care and reciprocity for those we share our lives with, despite and against ongoing interference by settlers, governments, and industry.

As Albertans consider and ultimately vote on these questions of identity, power, and difference in the upcoming referendum, Indigenous people – in their lands – will continue to demonstrate and model effective relationality. Whichever way the referendum goes, settler colonialism will continue to be a feature of life in Alberta. But Indigenous challenges to it will also endure. The future of Alberta is not separatism; it is treaty

Citation:

Starblanket, Gina and James Rowe. “Inseparable: Alberta’s Referendum and the Continuity of Treaty Relationality in the Prairies” Yellowhead Institute. Oct 15 2026. https://yellowheadinstitute.org/2026/inseparable-the-continuity-of-treaty-relationality-in-the-prairies

Artwork: Dene Separation Story by Nathan Meguinis

 

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