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We can’t decarbonize if we can’t build
This is a re-post from The Climate Brink
Today more than 2,000 gigawatts of new power plants and batteries are waiting in line to connect to America’s electric grid. That is more than the capacity of every power plant now operating in the country, and about 85% of it is solar, wind and storage. Projects that came online in 2025 typically spent around 61 months in line waiting to be approved, up from 36 months in 2015.
For most of my career as a climate scientist, the main obstacle to cutting our emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases was the cost. But over the past decade clean energy has become dramatically cheaper. The problem has shifted to building it, and sending the electricity where it is needed. The United States built only 411 miles of new high-capacity transmission lines in 2025, less than we managed a decade ago and a fraction of the roughly 5,000 miles a year that analysts estimate we need in deep decarbonization scenarios. A bipartisan permitting bill now moving through the Senate would start to fix these problems. Senators voted 73 to 25 last week to take it up, and a final vote is expected in the coming days.
Addressing climate change takes more than using less dirty energy; it requires building an enormous amount of clean energy at an unprecedented pace. We will need to replace most of the fossil fuels we burn in our homes, cars and factories with electricity. That means producing far more electricity, and most scenarios have the US roughly tripling its current generation. We cannot dramatically expand the grid with the five-year wait times and anemic transmission growth we see today.
The Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA) attempts to address these bottlenecks. If a state does not take action on a transmission application for more than a year, federal regulators can step in and permit the line. Grid regions must plan lines with their neighbors, and grid operators must study connection requests faster, helping unclog the queue. Agencies can no longer revoke a permit once issued without clearing a high bar of evidence. These rules, along with requirements to speed up decision-making, would make it much harder for any future administration to hold up the approval of new clean energy projects the way the Trump administration has.
The bill is far from perfectThe BAAJA permitting reform bill was introduced by two of the Senate’s most outspoken climate champions – Sheldon Whitehouse and Martin Heinrich – as well as two of their Republican colleagues Shelley Capito and Mike Lee. As such it represents a bipartisan compromise, and includes parts that will make neither side happy.
While the bill makes it easier to build clean energy, it also makes it easier to build fossil fuels, particularly natural gas infrastructure. The bill exempts the expansion of existing gas pipelines from environmental review and narrows states’ ability to block pipelines under the Clean Water Act. It limits lawsuits in ways that will make it harder for communities to challenge projects of every kind – clean and dirty. And if court that finds that an environmental review was flawed could only send it back to the agency while the permit stays in effect, so a mine or drilling project approved on a bad review could keep going while the agency redoes its review.
The revised text the was released last week made some notable improvements to the bill. It clarifies that the permit protections do not limit the power of courts to issue injunctions, and it narrows the national security exception that the Trump administration used on to justify blocking offshore wind. It also adds an exception for agency actions “taken pursuant to any applicable law or regulation,” which supporters of the bill read as covering any new pollution rules (but some critics call too vague to rely on).
Even accounting for these issues in the bill, faster and more durable permits will matter far more for clean energy than for fossil fuels. About three-quarters of US oil and nearly nine-tenths of its natural gas come from private and state land and waters where federal permits only play a small role. Clean energy is the opposite: nearly every offshore wind farm sits in federal waters, and the federal government owns 46% of the land in the 11 Western states that are home to the country’s best solar resources. Wind and solar farms also cover vastly more ground than a gas plant, and new transmission lines cross hundreds of miles and multiple states and in turn need more approvals from regulators.
It will modestly reduce emissions – but also pave the way for more ambitious policyTwo independent modeling groups have now taken a look at the bill, and both find that it will reduce US emissions. Rhodium Group, which modeled the pipeline provisions as well as the grid reforms, found that the bill would lower US emissions in every scenario it examined, by between 5 and 148 million tons in 2040 (or up to 4% of US emissions). Resources for the Future, which looked only at the power sector impacts, found that the bill would lower emissions by about 6% by 2041.
The main provisions of the Senate permitting bill, who they mostly help today and their likely effect on US emissions. A more detailed version of this graphic with sources for each row is available here.
The bill also has important impacts on the wave of new data centers being built today. Many data center developers currently plan to skip the grid and build their own gas plants on site, in part to avoid long waits for a grid connection. As I found in an earlier analysis, the engines and turbines most of them plan to use emit 60 to 80% more per unit of electricity than the grid does. By speeding up grid connections and new transmission, the bill should make it easier for data centers to connect to the grid and avoid reliance on dirtier and more expensive off-grid generation. The bill also requires data centers to pay the full cost of the grid service and upgrades built for them, so that other ratepayers do not end up covering those costs.
The BAAJA permitting reform bill is best thought of not as a climate bill per se, in that it will not drive substantial emissions reductions by itself. But it will set the stage for climate policy enacted by the next US administration to be much more impactful. The bill removes many of the obstacles that could stop a future administration from undertaking more ambitious climate action. A president who wants to build clean energy fast would inherit federal backstop siting for transmission, interregional planning, enforceable review deadlines and lawsuit limits that cover clean energy projects, along with approvals a successor could not easily revoke. As a recent Columbia University analysis put it, removing these barriers “can make stronger climate policies less costly and more effective in the future.”
But the bill may do less to restrain the current administration. A Clean Air Task Force analysis of the revised text concluded that the permit protections “may have little deterrent effect” on its efforts to block wind projects. Most of the climate benefits will come under whoever follows President Trump.
Why not just wait for the next Congress?This month’s elections represented a sea change in US politics. Democrats will control both chambers of Congress in January, with over 255 House seats and (very likely) 56 seats in the Senate. A number of Democrats including Rep. Jared Huffman and Sen. Jeff Merkley have argued that the party should wait and try to write a better bill next year.
But a new Congress does not change who ultimately needs to sign bills into law. President Trump will be in office until January 2029, and before the election he was explicit about what he would do with legislation from a Democratic Congress: “veto everything”. A permitting bill written mostly by Democrats, with the pipeline provisions stripped out and stronger protections for wind and solar seems about as likely a candidate for a veto as any that I can think of. Overriding a veto takes two-thirds of both chambers, which would mean finding around 35 House Republicans and 11 Republican senators willing to defy Trump to pass a Democratic-led permitting bill.
Even setting the veto aside, the Senate math does not change all that much. Permitting legislation will still need 60 votes in the Senate next year, and therefore the support of at least four Republicans. A bill that can clear that bar and earn a presidential signature would likely end up looking a lot like this one.
And we have unfortunately seen this process play out before, with the result being additional stasis and gridlock on permitting. In December 2024 a bipartisan permitting bill from Senators Joe Manchin and John Barrasso died in the lame duck session. Republicans had just won the White House and both chambers of Congress, and planned to pass something more to their liking along party lines the following year. Manchin warned at the time that permitting reform “will continue to be subject to the Senate’s 60-vote threshold next year.” Meanwhile the country has gone two more years without fixing the problems holding back clean energy development and transmission expansion.
Realistically, the choice is between this bill now and a hypothetically better one in 2029 at the earliest. And that will only happen if Democrats win the presidency, hold both chambers and can still find 60 votes in the Senate. When it comes to climate change, delays matter. The bill gives federal regulators 18 months to write new rules for connecting projects to the grid, and gives grid regions two more years to comply. Big transmission lines take around a decade on average to plan, permit and build. If the BAAJA bill passes now, the new rules will be in force by around 2030. If we cannot pass permitting reform until 2029, we won’t be able to build the infrastructure we need until closer to 2033. Passing this bill now is a much better bet than waiting for a better one that may never come.
This is ultimately not the bill that I or many climate advocates would have written. But politics is often the art of compromise, and making the perfect the enemy of the good is a recipe for preserving the status quo. Every year a solar farm spends waiting in line to connect to the grid is a year a gas or coal plant runs in its place. We’ve already succeeded in making clean energy cheap. Now we need to ensure that we can actually get it built.
Breaking Green Podcast – Data Centers – A New Rust Belt with Michel Legendre
Jason Clay Leaves a Lasting Legacy in Food and Agriculture
Jason Clay, a fellow Missourian and a force in the world of food and agriculture, died on November 16. He was 75.
I don’t think Jason liked me much when we first met. But after a conference several years ago, in Italy if I’m remembering right, I ended up sharing a ride to the airport with Jason and his good friend, the agricultural scientist Howard-Yana Shapiro, someone else, like Jason, I deeply admire. By the time we got to the airport, I think Jason had learned to like me—a little bit.
Jason grew up on a small farm near King City, Missouri, and went on to spend more than three decades at the World Wildlife Fund. He was able to bring companies that competed with one another to sit down together and figure out how to do less damage to the land and water we all depend on. His legacy is one of collaboration, tough conversations, and the ability to understand that these issues aren’t black and white, but very gray. All of us who try to do just a small part of the work he did are standing on the shoulders of a giant.
He spoke at one of our first Food Tank Summits, and I’m grateful he said yes. Jason helped so many of us understand that working with the private sector isn’t just important. It’s necessary. And working with companies means asking more of them, not less.
I’ll miss Jason and his leadership and am grateful for his work. And I’m glad I got in that car.
You can read his full obituary here.
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The post Jason Clay Leaves a Lasting Legacy in Food and Agriculture appeared first on Food Tank.
What’s next for Europe’s autumn of protests?
This article What’s next for Europe’s autumn of protests? was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
It was a Wednesday afternoon in late October, and several marches were converging on Syntagma Square in Athens, the epicenter of Greek protest. There were teachers on strike, university students who’d camped in the square overnight, and high schoolers holding painted banners that read “From Greece to France, we’re fighting for modern schools.” Parents pushed strollers through the growing crowd, their toddlers looking on in wonder.
But not everyone was there for the same reason. Groups of black-clad young men ducking in and out of the march, faces covered, were play-fighting each other in a way that looked like a rehearsal. Riot police were lining the side streets, watching over it all with the bored expression of men waiting for their shift to end. And photojournalists were circling, hoping for the youths and the police to meet in a burst of violence that would pay for their day.
The violence didn’t happen this time. According to the police count, 10,000 people marched peacefully through central Athens. Afterwards, people hung around, arguing about politics and passing water bottles in the autumn sun.
I keep thinking about those bored riot police, though, because they seemed to understand what organizers sometimes don’t: A government that has seen a lot of marches knows how to wait one out. The question for the teachers and students in Athens — and in Paris, Milan, Brussels, Lisbon, Madrid, Berlin, Vienna, Tirana and every other city caught up in Europe’s autumn of protest — is how to make saying no cost their governments more than saying yes.
An autumn of angerThe energy in Europe’s streets is bigger than many realize. Young people have been protesting in at least nine European countries this autumn, most of them since mid-September.
In France, a walkout over the lack of teachers at one high school in Créteil in September spread to hundreds of schools within weeks. By mid-October, about 550,000 people (by the government’s own count) were marching in cities and towns across the country. In Spain and Portugal, the anger is about housing. Protesters set up camps in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol and Lisbon’s Rossio, and on Nov. 11, Spain’s tenants’ unions, backed by the big trade unions, held the country’s first general strike in 14 years. It came after Maricarmen Abascal, an 87-year-old widow in fragile health, was forcibly removed from the Madrid apartment she had lived in for most of her life. She died in hospital two weeks later.
Demonstrators march for the right to housing after the eviction of an 87-year-old woman from the home where she had lived for around seventy years in Madrid, Spain. (Wikimedia Commons)The grievances overlap without being the same. It’s about schools in France and Greece, university tuition in Belgium and Albania, university budgets in Austria, military conscription in Germany, and rent in Portugal and Spain, where the average rent is now 98.7 percent of what a young person earns in a month. But running beneath most of them is a familiar story: governments that say there’s no money for schools, or for people who are struggling, always, somehow, manage to find it for something else, often weapons.
In France, Germany and Italy, protesters have made that link. France’s 2027 budget adds $7 billion for defense and just $1.2 billion for schools, while cutting 1,588 teaching posts. In Germany, young people marched in more than 30 cities on Oct. 31, angry, as Al Jazeera reported, that military spending is rising while education funding is cut.
The protests have achieved some modest wins. On Oct. 26, France’s government promised to replace Parcoursup, the hated university admissions system, cap first-year high school classes at 28, and add 500 teaching posts. And in Serbia, a student movement that began after a railway station canopy collapsed in Novi Sad two years ago turned itself into an electoral list and, on Oct. 25, beat Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia’s strongman of 14 years.
#newsletter-block_6551ac5f2d6c48e9218c7b92369656bf { background: #ECECEC; color: #000000; } #newsletter-block_6551ac5f2d6c48e9218c7b92369656bf #mc_embed_signup_front input#mce-EMAIL { border-color:#000000 !important; color: #000000 !important; } Sign Up for our NewsletterFacts like these are why, in my organizing circles, there’s a lot of talk of a “European wave.” I think we should be careful with that phrase, though, because it suggests a level of coordination and a plan that doesn’t — yet — exist. The reporting I trust describes these protests as “largely unconnected”: common causes, solidarity marches and viral calls, but no shared target, no joint demands, and nobody deciding anything together across borders.
The closest thing to coordination is an international student strike on Nov. 20, which I’ll come back to. Because I think it shows both what this moment could become, and what it’s missing.
Why “no” is cheapSo why, with so much energy on the streets sustained over two months, has so little been won? Serbia is the exception, because its movement is two years old and has organized itself, faculty by faculty, from the start. Elsewhere, I think it comes down to two things—one that is out of protesters’ hands, and one that isn’t entirely.
A government can wait out a crowd that hasn’t said what it wants, from whom and by when, or what it will take away if it doesn’t get it.
First, European governments have learned how to absorb a crowd. There’s no evidence they’re coordinating, but they have landed on remarkably similar responses. Italy sent 500 troops to Milan after riots in October and passed an emergency decree that makes it easier to hold youth 14 and older criminally responsible. France deployed soldiers to guard public buildings, banned protests in several cities and imposed a curfew in parts of Paris. By Oct. 8, French police had taken 6,877 people into custody, about 80 percent of them children. Portuguese police cleared the housing camps in Lisbon and Porto before dawn.
And most governments have found a way to say no to protesters’ demands: France opened a “consultation” and made partial offers, Portugal said it “will not give in to shouts from the street,” and Greece pointed to money it says it’s already spending.
Behind all this is the fact that time is on the government’s side in most of these countries. As Arundhati Roy put it in a recent essay about India’s Cockroach movement, states have the power to wait, but people don’t. Erica Chenoweth’s research found that even as nonviolent campaigns became more popular through the 2010s, their success rate fell, partly because states got smarter, and partly because movements leaned on mobilizing people rather than organizing them.
The second thing is that a government can wait out a crowd that hasn’t said what it wants, from whom and by when, or what it will take away if it doesn’t get it. And from observing what most of these protests do in public, that’s where they are. Their demands keep getting lost, and few of their actions seem aimed at the person who can say yes, or timed to a moment when that person needs something. (Spain and Belgium are the exceptions, and I’ll come back to both.)
And when a movement doesn’t define itself, everybody else gets to define it for them. The mainstream press focused mostly on the violence, and even sympathetic commentators turned the protests into a test of the EU’s survival. Donald Trump announced that “the migrants have taken over France.” An AI-generated photo of an elderly couple supposedly stripped by rioters got a million views and was shared by a French police union. Albania’s prime minister, Edi Rama, blamed “foreign hands” and said the protests were “not a student phenomenon.” And parts of the left, my own corner included, did the same thing from the other direction, arguing that a crowd that had come out over missing teachers was actually protesting about Gaza, or arms dealers, or capitalism.
That fight decides who turns up at the next protest and, critically, who gets to position themselves as the answer. In France, Marine Le Pen gave a solemn address in front of a French flag after the Oct. 17 riots, and the first poll afterwards put her at 36 percent, up from 32 in September. If the students don’t define their movement, the candidate of “order” will.
Four old questionsWhen faced with an organizing problem, I go back to the oldest questions in campaigning: Who can give you what you want — in other words, who decides? What exactly are you asking them to do? By when? And what leverage can’t they ignore?
1. Who decides?The default answer to “who decides” is almost always “the government.” That isn’t wrong, but it’s too vague to be useful, because a government is hundreds of people with different jobs. And the decision-maker who can say yes to a particular demand may not be the one people are marching against. Take two of the French students’ demands: smaller classes and more teachers. Class sizes, it turns out, the government could change itself, and it offered a cap within weeks. But teaching posts are in the budget, which is up to parliament, and the next vote is in the Senate on Dec. 9. Two demands, two different targets.
Students in Belgium worked this out early. The tuition increase at French-speaking universities wasn’t set by the federal government, but by the parliament of the French-speaking community. So that’s where they took the fight: they protested before the decree passed in June, and now they’re taking it to the Constitutional Court, which can overturn unconstitutional laws. They haven’t won yet — but they are fighting in the right venue.
Working out exactly who decides takes more work than it sounds. But the point is: It’s usually done by a few people around a laptop on a Monday night, rather than in the streets on a Saturday.
2. What are you asking?When I went hunting for what the French students were actually asking for, I had to find their national coordination’s communiqué on an activist website because almost no English-language outlet had reported it. It mixed things a minister could grant tomorrow, like scrapping Parcoursup, with things no one could grant at all, like an end to inequality between rich and poor neighborhoods. When I posted about this, several people messaged me to say these weren’t even the demands most of the movement backed.
Movements with clear demands mostly arrive at them the same way: They put them to a vote among the people doing the marching, or at least consult them. Serbia’s students decided theirs in open assemblies at every faculty, by show of hands. In Spain, the Tenants’ Union didn’t pick the date for its general strike on its own; it talked to the protesters first, then brought it to the big unions. A list people have voted for is much harder for anyone else to rewrite.
Previous CoverageAnd a list that is short, fixed and public is much harder for governments to dodge. Serbia’s protesters held to four demands for months — so when the government claimed it had met them all, they could rebut it point by point. But France’s “yellow vest” movement in 2018 had 42 demands, which let Emmanuel Macron pick the ones he liked — and launch a national debate that split the movement.
Last, the demands that stick are usually the most concrete ones. “Maximum class sizes of 25” is something you can measure and chase; an end to inequality is a vision nobody can grant, so a government can wait it out forever. I’ve made this argument before: Keep the end goal, but give people a fight they can win on the way. Or, as Mark and Paul Engler put it, make demands that are “both practical and visionary.”
3. By when?Then there’s the date. On Oct. 18, the first weekend of the school holidays, France’s student coordination set its next national day of protest for Nov. 3, just after the holidays end. This was a smart move, because people who go away need to know when to come back. The harder part, though, is pointing that protest date at a decision: a vote, a deadline, a meeting where someone has to say yes or no. Belgium’s students did that with the June vote; Spain’s tenants, below, did it with an election.
4. What can’t they ignore?This is the pressure point. I don’t mean public pressure, which is a tactic; I mean something your target needs, from someone specific, at a particular moment. Whose vote do they depend on? Who are they asking for something? The date tells you when they decide; the pressure point is what would make them decide your way.
Spain offers the clearest example of getting this right. The Tenants’ Union, which has spent nearly a decade building rent strikes, picked Nov. 11 for the general strike, 18 days before Spain’s snap election. Pedro Sánchez’s Socialists are trailing in the polls, and what they need is for voters who care about rent to turn out for them. By putting housing at the center of the campaign, the strike makes every party compete for those votes.
The union has also refused to let any party identify with the strike or frame it as an attack on rival parties. It isn’t against “the other side,” said its spokesperson, but against “the rentier system.” That makes it much harder for anyone to relabel.
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DonateAnd a strike asks just a day’s pay of the people taking part while costing the economy dearly — by one bank’s estimate, up to 0.2 percent of annual GDP. “We, the workers — who are also renters or who also pay mortgages — are the ones with the power to halt production and bring the economy to a standstill,” Sandra Mora of the Madrid Tenants’ Union told Spanish radio. Organizers say about four million people took part.
Of course, none of this guarantees a good result on Nov. 29, and the right may still win. But the point is: Spain is what a protest looks like when it’s attached to something a government can’t wait out.
And when there’s no pressure point to find, some movements build one. Serbia’s students spent two years marching for demands that were never fully met. In the end they stopped asking Vučić for anything and simply built the thing that could take power from him: a list of candidates with no party, no leader and one material grievance — corruption. That took two years, not two months.
From a date to a targetWhich brings me back to Nov. 20. For the first time, if it all goes to plan, students in a dozen or so countries will walk out on the same day. The walkout was called by a small network of student and left-wing groups, months before the French protests began. But this autumn’s movements have since picked it up: Italy’s national student organizations have adopted it, Italy’s biggest union has called a general strike for the same day, and in Berlin, high school students will be marching with teachers’ unions.
The youth strike’s first demand is the one that runs through almost every protest this autumn: “Investments in welfare, public education, healthcare and youth instead of weapons and militaries.” That’s an answer to the “what.” But it doesn’t yet have a “who” or a “when.”. Money for weapons and schools is decided in budgets, by parliaments, on dates set well in advance. And a budget vote is a moment when a government needs something it may not have: the votes in parliament. Whose votes are in doubt, and what would make them think twice, is the last question. And it’s what turns a date into a target.
Those riot police in Syntagma could afford to look bored, because they knew the march would be over by evening. A crowd on its own can be waited out. A crowd that keeps coming back — to the right decision-makers, at the right moment, and able to take away something they need — is much harder to ignore.
The march shows how many people care. But the campaign is what you do with them.
This article What’s next for Europe’s autumn of protests? was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
Op-Ed | Late Means Never: The Hormuz Shock Exposed How Little Africa Grows for Itself
In Southern Africa, the planting season does not wait for shipping lanes. When the first good rains fall in November, a maize farmer has a few weeks to get seed and fertilizer into the ground. Miss that window, and no price cut later in the year can buy it back.
This year, that window collided with a war. When shipping through the Strait of Hormuz seized up, urea, the nitrogen fertilizer most African maize farmers depend on, jumped from around US$400 per metric ton to more than US$850 in April 2026, according to the World Trade Organization. Nearly a third of the world’s seaborne fertilizer trade passes through the strait, and the World Bank’s fertilizer price index reached its highest level since October 2022. By June, prices had fallen back. The headlines moved on. The harvest will not.
Markets call this a supply shock. For a smallholder farmer, it is more personal: a bag that costs twice as much, a delivery that comes late, a field planted with less than it needs. Fuel adds a second blow, raising the cost of moving seed to rural shops and grain to market. The farmer pays on the way in and again on the way out. And because most farming in Southern and East Africa is rain-fed, there is no second chance. Late means never.
I made that case at COP31 this week, at a side event on security and climate convened by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Ban Ki-moon Foundation. But the more uncomfortable point is this: the shock did not create Africa’s vulnerability. It revealed it.
Consider seed, the input that comes before fertilizer. The chair of Eswatini’s national seed committee told a national meeting this year that the country imports more than 95 percent of its seed and has three seed inspectors for the entire country. A country in that position does not have a price problem. It has an institutional problem. When imports stall, there is little domestic supply to fall back on and almost no one to check that what is sold as seed will grow.
The answer is not to wall off global markets. It is to build enough capacity at home that a distant crisis becomes an inconvenience rather than a lost season. Local seed systems, from community seed banks to small domestic seed companies, shorten the chain between breeder and field. Blending organic and mineral fertilizers reduces how much a farmer must buy in a market she cannot influence. And new varieties have to be bred with farmers, not just for them. On the same panel, Nizar Haddad of the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas described a barley variety that delivered far higher yields, yet farmers turned it down because the straw was too coarse for their animals. A breakthrough that farmers will not plant is not a breakthrough.
Building that capacity means paying for people, which is exactly what climate finance struggles to do. Seed inspectors, extension officers, and community animal health workers earn no revenue to repay a loan, and they outlast any three-year project. In Zimbabwe, the program I manage is supporting the formal recognition of community animal health workers, because a trained person in the village, backed by law, keeps herds alive through a drought. That is infrastructure, even if no infrastructure budget counts it.
The money is thin. Small-scale agrifood systems received just 0.8 percent of tracked climate finance in 2019 and 2020, according to the Climate Policy Initiative. And finance is usually counted when it is pledged, not when it reaches a field.
The delivery channels already exist. Zambia’s farm input program now reaches more than 1 million farmers through an electronic voucher, according to the World Bank, letting them buy inputs from local agro-dealers. A channel like that could carry drought-tolerant and legume seed, storage bags, and vaccines, and build demand for local suppliers in the process.
COP32 will be held in Addis Ababa next year, in a country where most people still make their living from farming. It should be judged by one test: what arrives on farms before the rains, not what is announced in the plenary.
The next shock is already somewhere on a shipping chart. Whether it becomes another lost season depends on choices governments and funders make now about seed, about people, and about where the money stops.
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The post Op-Ed | Late Means Never: The Hormuz Shock Exposed How Little Africa Grows for Itself appeared first on Food Tank.
Biodevastation 2000
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 18 NOVEMBER 2026
Archive reference: SLF-2007-122
The Sakhalin Papers CXII: The Missing Cost-Recovery Ledger — The $370 Million Audit Challenge Behind Shell’s $24.5 Billion Recovery MilestoneIn April 2007, Russian government-appointed auditors proposed excluding $370 million from Sakhalin II’s recoverable expenditure for 2004. Six months earlier, a separate review had reportedly challenged approximately $2.5 billion in projected costs. Yet, on 18 April 2007, the project’s amended development budget received official approval alongside Gazprom’s acquisition of majority control. Five years later, Sakhalin Energy announced that it had recovered $24.5 billion in capital and operating expenditure. Original Shell SEC filings, Mitsui’s authenticated corporate accounts, contemporaneous Russian reporting and a British High Court judgment establish the chronology — but leave unresolved how individual disputed costs were finally treated.
AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION
By the Donovan–Shell Archive
Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT. Based on original Royal Dutch Shell filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Mitsui’s SEC disclosures, contemporaneous Reuters, Vedomosti and Kommersant reporting, Sakhalin Energy’s published explanation of the production-sharing agreement, and relevant British High Court proceedings.
Publication date: 18 November 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-121 — The R-Share Dividend Trail
INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION BEHIND $24.5 BILLIONOn 30 March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced a major financial milestone.
The operator of Sakhalin II stated that it had recovered approximately $24.5 billion in project expenditure.
According to its announcement, that amount comprised capital and operating expenditure associated with the development’s first and second phases.
The milestone triggered the commencement of profit-production sharing with the Russian side.
It marked a decisive transition in the project’s financial history.
But the announcement did not provide a detailed ledger identifying every category of expenditure recovered.
Nor did it disclose how earlier disputed costs had been treated.
That omission is important because the recovery of expenditure had been one of the most controversial aspects of the Sakhalin II project.
In July 2005, Shell publicly acknowledged that the estimated investment required for the second phase had increased to approximately $20 billion.
The original estimate had been approximately $10 billion.
Russian officials challenged the revised figures.
Government-appointed specialists questioned particular categories of expenditure.
And the dispute became part of the wider confrontation preceding Gazprom’s acquisition of majority ownership.
The subsequent political and commercial agreement was widely interpreted as resolving the immediate crisis.
But an important distinction remained.
Agreement upon an amended development budget was not necessarily equivalent to independent certification of every individual cost ultimately recovered under the production-sharing agreement.
This investigation examines that distinction.
It also identifies a potentially important documentary trail that has received relatively little attention in the international reporting of the Sakhalin controversy.
In April 2007, Kommersant reported that government-appointed auditors had proposed excluding $370 million from the costs claimed for 2004.
The operator disagreed.
The auditors’ recommendations were due to be considered further.
Within days, the amended development budget was formally approved.
The surviving public record establishes each of those developments.
But it does not establish whether the particular $370 million recommendation was ultimately accepted, rejected, modified or incorporated into a broader settlement.
Nor does it explain how that dispute related to the $24.5 billion recovery milestone announced in 2012.
These are legitimate questions about financial transparency and historical accountability.
They do not constitute proof of fraudulent expenditure.
They require examination of the original documents.
PART ONE: WHAT THE PRODUCTION-SHARING AGREEMENT ALLOWED 1. Russia retained oversight rightsSakhalin II was developed under a production-sharing agreement signed in 1994.
The Russian Federation and Sakhalin Oblast constituted the Russian side.
Sakhalin Energy undertook to finance and develop the project.
The underlying oil and gas resources remained under Russian sovereignty.
The arrangement was designed to accommodate a development requiring substantial international investment, technology and financial risk.
But the agreement also gave the Russian state important rights concerning expenditure.
Sakhalin Energy’s published explanation states that the state approves work budgets and possesses the right to audit the investor’s expenses.
The operator describes the contractual system as providing for financial transparency.
That is a significant feature.
The investor was not simply free to determine recoverable expenditure without any governmental oversight.
Budget approval and audit rights formed part of the original financial structure.
Those provisions mattered because recoverable expenditure influenced when the Russian side would begin receiving profit production.
The operator’s subsequent account confirms that profit-production sharing began in 2012.
However, the existence of audit rights does not establish how every disputed expense was ultimately resolved.
To reconstruct that process would require the relevant supervisory-board decisions, audit reports, responses and final cost-recovery schedules.
Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Production-Sharing Agreement.
Production Sharing Agreement
PART TWO: SHELL’S OWN COST ADMISSION 2. July 2005: The original $20 billion warning
On 14 July 2005, Shell issued a formal stock-exchange announcement concerning Sakhalin II.
The announcement is preserved in an original filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
Shell stated that the second phase of Sakhalin II faced serious additional cost and scheduling difficulties.
Sakhalin Energy provisionally estimated that the phase would require approximately $20 billion.
The figure covered planned development activity, including drilling through 2014.
The operator was also anticipating that LNG deliveries would begin in summer 2008.
The revised estimate had not yet been finally confirmed.
Shell explicitly stated that the figures remained under review.
The announcement also recorded that Sakhalin Energy would consult Russian authorities and state experts about the revised plans and budgets.
That is important contemporaneous evidence.
The company recognised that the revised expenditure required further review.
It did not present the new estimate as already agreed with the Russian side.
Malcolm Brinded, then Shell’s Executive Director responsible for Exploration and Production, publicly acknowledged the difficulties and stated that action was being taken to address them.
Shell maintained its commitment to completing the project.
The document therefore establishes three facts.
The cost forecast had increased substantially.
The new estimate remained provisional.
And the company anticipated further scrutiny by Russian authorities.
It does not establish that the whole $20 billion was spent, approved or subsequently recovered.
Those were separate questions.
Authenticated primary source: Shell — Sakhalin II Project Schedule and Cost Update, SEC Form 6-K, 14 July 2005.
SEC
3. Shell’s annual report confirmed the seriousness of the overrun
Royal Dutch Shell’s 2005 Annual Report, filed with the SEC, confirmed that Sakhalin Energy had estimated second-phase project investment costs at approximately $20 billion.
The company described the increase as a substantial cost overrun.
By the end of 2005, Shell reported that construction of the second phase was approximately 60% complete.
The development was therefore already significantly advanced.
The increase was not a speculative possibility concerning an undeveloped field.
It concerned a major construction programme already under way.
The company was building offshore facilities, pipelines, an LNG plant and associated infrastructure.
The documented cost escalation became one of the principal commercial issues surrounding Sakhalin II.
Authenticated source: Royal Dutch Shell plc — 2005 Annual Report, SEC Form 20-F.
SEC
PART THREE: THE RUSSIAN COST CHALLENGE 4. October 2006: The reported Zarubezhneft review
By October 2006, the Russian authorities were challenging the project’s revised expenditure estimates.
On 23 October, Reuters reported that the state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft had examined costs associated with the second phase.
The report was based upon information published by the Russian business newspaper Vedomosti.
According to that reporting, Zarubezhneft specialists considered that some of the projected expenditure had been overstated.
One assessment placed costs through 2014 at approximately $17.6 billion.
The report also identified particular items that specialists reportedly recommended excluding from reimbursement.
Those included approximately $1 billion associated with delays to LNG deliveries, $560 million relating to airport infrastructure and another $74 million in capital expenditure.
These were reported recommendations.
The underlying review has not been independently authenticated in full for this instalment.
It would therefore be incorrect to treat every figure as a final governmental determination.
Sakhalin Energy’s Vice President for Corporate Affairs, Igor Ignatyev, was quoted as explaining that the relevant state technical appraisal process had not yet been completed.
The contemporaneous evidence establishes that the proposed costs were actively disputed.
It does not establish that each proposed exclusion was ultimately upheld.
Contemporaneous source: Reuters — Russia Finds Sakhalin II Costs Too High, 23 October 2006, preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.
Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
5. November 2006: The reported $2.5 billion objection
The following month brought a further development.
On 13 November 2006, Reuters reported that Zarubezhneft’s review had identified approximately $2.5 billion in allegedly excessive costs.
The information was again attributed to Vedomosti and sources familiar with the government-commissioned examination.
The report identified approximately $800 million in contractor-related expenditure as one of the largest questioned categories.
The distinction between an audit objection and a final decision is essential.
A contractor-cost challenge may concern whether expenditure was necessary, efficiently incurred, properly allocated or eligible for recovery.
But an objection does not automatically establish fraud.
Nor does an estimate of excessive expenditure establish that the final approved figure was reduced by an identical amount.
The documentation examined does not establish how the alleged $2.5 billion discrepancy was finally reconciled.
The November report therefore represents evidence of a substantial contemporary dispute.
It is not evidence that a court or competent authority ultimately disallowed precisely $2.5 billion.
Contemporaneous source: Reuters — Russian Audit Disputes $2.5 Billion of Shell Cost Estimate, 13 November 2006, preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.
Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
PART FOUR: DECEMBER 2006 — THE ECONOMIC COMPROMISE 6. Shell reaches agreement with the Russian ministry
The next decisive development occurred on 21 December 2006.
On that date, Shell announced that the shareholders of Sakhalin Energy had reached agreement with Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Energy concerning the amended budget and cost recovery.
The announcement was filed with the SEC.
It is therefore an authenticated original Shell document.
Shell stated that the production-sharing agreement would continue.
It also said that approval of the amended second-phase budget was expected from the supervisory board.
That wording is important.
Agreement with the ministry had been reached.
But the supervisory-board approval remained a further formal step.
The announcement also referred to the parties’ intention to resolve outstanding issues.
It did not disclose the full terms of the underlying cost-recovery settlement.
Nor did it provide an itemised reconciliation of the disputed expenditure.
The document therefore confirms that the parties had reached an important agreement.
It does not establish exactly how each audit objection was treated.
Authenticated primary source: Royal Dutch Shell plc — Sakhalin II Shareholders Reach Agreement with Russian Ministry, SEC Form 6-K, 21 December 2006.
SEC
7. The reported $3.6 billion adjustment
On 28 December 2006, Vedomosti published further details concerning the negotiations.
The newspaper reported that the foreign shareholders had agreed to assume responsibility for approximately $3.6 billion in additional costs.
The reported arrangement concerned expenditure that the Russian authorities did not consider appropriate to treat in the same way as other recoverable project costs.
Vedomosti attributed comments to Deputy Minister Andrei Dementiev.
He distinguished cost increases associated with market conditions from those involving engineering or technical decisions that the authorities considered avoidable.
The newspaper described a proposed revised budget of approximately $19.4 billion.
It also reported that the foreign shareholders would bear the additional $3.6 billion burden.
The report suggested that this could reduce the effective amount of recoverable expenditure to approximately $15.8 billion.
But the distinction between the total development budget, expenditure financed by particular shareholders and expenditure eligible for recovery was not fully resolved by the newspaper account alone.
The eventual approved terms need to be examined separately.
The Vedomosti report is valuable evidence concerning what was being negotiated.
It should not be treated as a substitute for the final signed agreement.
Contemporaneous source: Vedomosti — $3.6 Billion Saved, 28 December 2006.
Ведомости
PART FIVE: THE $370 MILLION AUDIT OBJECTION 8. April 2007: A more precise challenge emerges
One of the most revealing documents in the available reporting appeared on 13 April 2007.
Kommersant published an article examining an interdepartmental Russian government commission’s review of production-sharing projects.
The newspaper reported that it had obtained the relevant commission document.
The review concerned expenditure under Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II.
For Sakhalin II, government-appointed auditors had examined expenditure incurred in 2004.
The report identified the auditing firm Top-Audit.
According to Kommersant, the auditor recommended excluding approximately $370 million from the expenditure submitted for recovery.
The auditor proposed accepting approximately $3.012 billion of the relevant costs.
This was not a general political criticism of the project.
It concerned a specific financial year, a specific audit process and a defined proposed adjustment.
The underlying audit report has not been independently obtained.
But Kommersant’s contemporaneous account identifies the reviewing body, the disputed amount and the operator’s response.
That makes the report particularly useful for reconstructing the documentary chronology.
Contemporaneous source: Kommersant — Non-Recoverable Costs, 13 April 2007.
Коммерсантъ
9. The operator disputed the finding
Kommersant also reported that Sakhalin Energy disagreed with the auditor’s conclusions.
The operator intended to submit objections.
The matter was expected to be considered through a further process involving the relevant parties.
This is an essential qualification.
The auditor’s proposed $370 million exclusion was not presented as a final court judgment.
Nor did the report establish that Sakhalin Energy had accepted the recommendation.
The fact that the company disputed it means that the contemporaneous record contains competing positions.
The auditor considered particular expenditure unsuitable for recovery.
The operator disagreed.
The outcome of that disagreement cannot be assumed.
To establish the final treatment would require the subsequent audit-resolution documents, governmental determinations or relevant supervisory-board minutes.
Without those materials, the proper finding is that a documented audit challenge existed and remained disputed when Kommersant reported it in April 2007.
PART SIX: THE $11.29 BILLION STILL OUTSTANDING 10. A financial snapshot from 1 January 2007The same Kommersant report contained another significant figure.
According to the government-commission material it described, approximately $11.29 billion in Sakhalin II expenditure remained unrecovered as of 1 January 2007.
That figure provides a useful historical checkpoint.
It also illustrates why the cost-recovery process remained economically significant.
The operator had incurred substantial expenditure.
The project was still progressing towards completion.
And a considerable amount remained to be recovered under the applicable arrangements.
But the $11.29 billion figure must be understood correctly.
It was a reported outstanding balance at a particular date.
It was not the total cost of the project.
Nor was it a statement that $11.29 billion had been rejected by government auditors.
Most importantly, it was not identical to the $370 million adjustment proposed in the audit of 2004 expenditure.
The larger figure represented expenditure awaiting recovery.
The smaller figure represented costs that auditors reportedly considered ineligible.
The categories were different.
That distinction is central to understanding the Sakhalin II financial record.
PART SEVEN: THE AUDITOR ITSELF BECAME AN ISSUE 11. Questions about the auditing processKommersant’s April 2007 report contained an additional detail.
It stated that PricewaterhouseCoopers had previously been involved in auditing the relevant project expenditure.
According to the government-commission material described by the newspaper, objections had been raised concerning aspects of that work.
The report identified a change in the audit arrangements.
The Russian firm FinExpertiza was named as the replacement auditor.
This was an important development in the oversight process.
It indicated that questions concerned not merely the size of expenditure but also how the relevant audits were conducted and documented.
However, the report does not establish professional misconduct by PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Nor does it independently demonstrate that the firm’s previous audit conclusions were false.
Those would require separate evidence and, where appropriate, findings by competent authorities.
The contemporaneous reporting establishes that the auditing arrangements were criticised and changed.
It does not establish the eventual treatment of every disputed accounting entry.
This is another reason why the final cost-recovery ledger matters.
A complete documentary reconstruction would need to identify which audits were relied upon and how outstanding disagreements were resolved.
PART EIGHT: APRIL 2007 — THE AMENDED BUDGET IS APPROVED 12. Shell’s SEC filing confirms the formal decisionOn 18 April 2007, Gazprom completed its acquisition of majority control of Sakhalin Energy.
Shell’s interest fell from 55% to approximately 27.5%.
The transaction was worth $7.45 billion to the selling shareholders collectively.
Shell received approximately $4.1 billion.
The same period saw the approval of the amended development budget.
Shell’s SEC-filed first-quarter 2007 financial report confirms that the supervisory board approved the amended Sakhalin II budget.
It also records the Russian government’s approval of the revised Environmental Action Plan.
Shell disclosed that additional agreements had been signed with the Russian government addressing the project’s economic balance.
These facts establish the formal sequence.
The ownership restructuring was completed.
The amended budget received approval.
And further economic arrangements accompanied the transaction.
But the SEC filing does not reproduce the complete supervisory-board decision.
Nor does it provide the schedules showing which disputed expenses were accepted or excluded.
It therefore establishes approval of the budget without independently resolving the detailed accounting questions raised by earlier auditors.
Authenticated primary source: Royal Dutch Shell plc — First-Quarter 2007 Financial Report, SEC Exhibit 99.2.
SEC
13. Mitsui independently confirms the approval
A second original corporate document provides important corroboration.
Mitsui & Co., one of Sakhalin Energy’s Japanese shareholders, subsequently filed its Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 2008 with the SEC.
The filing confirmed that the second-phase development budget had been revised to approximately $20 billion.
Mitsui attributed the increase to design changes, construction delays and rising labour and material costs.
Crucially, Mitsui also confirmed that the amended development budget was approved by the supervisory board in April 2007.
The company identified the board as including representatives of the Russian Federation, Sakhalin Oblast and Sakhalin Energy.
This independent shareholder filing reinforces Shell’s disclosure.
The amended budget was approved.
That is an established corporate fact.
But Mitsui’s filing does not disclose a complete reconciliation of the earlier $370 million audit objection.
Nor does it identify the final treatment of every expense questioned in the Zarubezhneft review.
Authenticated shareholder source: Mitsui & Co. — Annual Report, SEC Form 20-F, Financial Year Ended 31 March 2008.
SEC
PART NINE: THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE $19.4 BILLION AND $24.5 BILLION FIGURES 14. What the government approved in 2007
Reuters reported on 18 April 2007 that the Russian Energy Ministry had confirmed supervisory-board approval of approximately $19.4 billion in costs associated with the project’s second phase through 2014.
The report described those costs as reimbursable.
It also identified approximately $2 billion associated with the first phase.
Taken together, the reported amounts produced a figure of approximately $21.4 billion.
But this reporting must be considered alongside the earlier Vedomosti account.
In December 2006, Vedomosti had described a proposed $19.4 billion budget involving approximately $3.6 billion to be borne by the foreign shareholders.
The two reports do not provide a complete, mutually reconciled explanation of the final cost-recovery terms.
The difference may reflect the treatment of separate expenditure categories or the final arrangements negotiated between December and April.
The documents examined do not establish which explanation is correct.
Contemporaneous source: Reuters — Gazprom Takes Sakhalin II Lead Ceded by Shell, 18 April 2007, preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.
Royal Dutch Shell Group .com
15. What Sakhalin Energy reported recovering in 2012
Five years later, the operator announced that the project had recovered approximately $24.5 billion.
That was not described as a second-phase construction budget.
It was a cumulative cost-recovery figure.
The announcement stated that it included capital and operating expenditure associated with both phases.
Consequently, the $24.5 billion figure cannot responsibly be compared with the $19.4 billion approved budget as though the difference automatically represented unauthorised expenditure.
The two amounts have different scopes.
One concerned a development budget associated with the second phase.
The other concerned cumulative recovery of capital and operating costs associated with the first and second phases.
There may also have been expenditure and recoveries occurring across different reporting periods.
A reliable reconciliation would therefore require more than subtracting one headline number from another.
It would require an account of the applicable recoverable costs, approved amendments and actual recovery through production.
Contemporaneous source: Interfax — Recovered Sakhalin II Costs Reached $24.5 Billion, 30 March 2012.
Interfax.ru
PART TEN: THE COURT RECORD — WHAT IT ESTABLISHES AND WHAT IT DOES NOT 16. The British High Court considered a different Sakhalin controversy
The Sakhalin II development also generated legal proceedings in Britain.
One important judicial record is Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin).
The case was heard by Mr Justice Mitting.
It concerned the disclosure of information held by British government departments about proposed support for Sakhalin II.
The judgment recorded that approximately $650 million in project-finance support had been sought.
It also addressed the project’s environmental sensitivity and the government’s handling of requests for information.
On 17 March 2008, the High Court dismissed the Export Credits Guarantee Department’s appeal against an information-disclosure ruling.
The judgment is relevant to the broader history of governmental scrutiny and transparency surrounding Sakhalin II.
But its limits are equally important.
The court did not determine the correct Sakhalin II development budget.
It did not adjudicate the $370 million audit objection.
It did not determine whether Zarubezhneft’s reported cost criticisms were justified.
Nor did it certify the costs subsequently recovered by Sakhalin Energy.
No judicial determination resolving those specific financial questions has been authenticated for the present investigation.
Judicial source: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), judgment of 17 March 2008.
vLex United Kingdom
EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 17. The 2007 approval resolved a major commercial obstacle
The documentary record demonstrates that the amended budget’s approval was a decisive development.
Before April 2007, the project was experiencing an extended dispute over its costs.
Russian officials challenged the revised estimates.
The shareholders were negotiating the project’s future ownership.
Regulators were also pursuing environmental concerns.
Shell and its Japanese partners eventually agreed to Gazprom’s acquisition of majority control.
The amended development budget was approved alongside that restructuring.
It is reasonable to conclude that the approval removed an important commercial obstacle.
But the documents do not establish that every outstanding disagreement disappeared.
Indeed, Kommersant’s account of the $370 million audit objection appeared only five days before the formal announcement of the completed ownership transaction.
That timing is significant.
It demonstrates that specific historical cost questions were still being reported as contested immediately before the amended budget received approval.
The later public filings do not disclose precisely how that particular objection was resolved.
There is therefore a difference between establishing the approval of the amended budget and establishing the final fate of each disputed cost.
18. The evidence does not support a simple allegation of inflated expenditureThe Russian criticisms were substantial.
The reported Zarubezhneft review questioned billions of dollars in projected costs.
Government-appointed auditors proposed excluding $370 million from expenditure for 2004.
The operator disputed those audit findings.
Those are documentary facts and attributed contemporaneous allegations.
But they should not be converted into a definitive accusation that Shell fraudulently inflated the project budget.
Cost escalation in a complex engineering project can arise from numerous causes.
Changes in material prices, labour costs, design requirements, construction schedules and environmental measures can all influence expenditure.
Shell’s own filings identified a number of those factors.
Other disagreements may concern whether particular expenditure is recoverable under a contract, rather than whether it was genuinely incurred.
That distinction matters.
An expense might be real but contractually ineligible for recovery.
Conversely, an initially disputed expense might be supported by further documentation and ultimately accepted.
The documents examined do not establish which conclusion applies to every questioned Sakhalin II cost.
Nor do they establish that the Russian authorities’ objections were wholly justified.
The proper approach is to preserve the competing positions and identify the evidence necessary to resolve them.
19. The missing record is a reconciliation, not proof of a hidden scandalThe central limitation concerns the lack of a complete independently available reconciliation.
The public documents establish several important stages.
Shell announced the revised estimate.
Russian state-appointed specialists challenged aspects of it.
A broader agreement was reached in December 2006.
The amended budget received approval in April 2007.
The operator later reported recovering $24.5 billion.
What remains unavailable in the records examined is a continuous ledger connecting those stages.
Such a ledger would identify the original categories of expenditure, the costs submitted for recovery, the amounts questioned by auditors and the final disposition of those objections.
It would also identify later authorised expenditure and the cumulative recovery calculations leading to March 2012.
The absence of that ledger from the publicly examined material does not establish that no such records exist.
The Russian authorities possessed contractual oversight rights.
The operator maintained financial records.
And successive audits were undertaken.
The relevant documents may exist within corporate or governmental archives.
But the fact that they have not been independently examined means that the historical reconciliation remains incomplete.
A missing public reconciliation is a transparency limitation. It is not, by itself, evidence of wrongdoing.
20. The documentary trail nevertheless establishes genuine accountability questionsThe $370 million audit objection was sufficiently specific to merit further examination.
It concerned a defined financial year.
It arose from a government-commissioned review.
The operator disputed the recommendation.
And the subsequent outcome has not been independently established.
The larger Zarubezhneft review raises related questions.
The reported $2.5 billion challenge concerned substantial forecast expenditure.
The December 2006 negotiations reportedly involved a $3.6 billion adjustment to the burden borne by foreign investors.
The April 2007 approval then established a revised budget.
But the available reports do not reconcile those figures into a single set of contractual accounts.
The issue is not that the numbers are necessarily inconsistent.
They may concern different categories, dates and contractual arrangements.
The problem is that the complete documentary explanation has not yet been established.
For a historical archive, that is a legitimate subject of investigation.
It is particularly important because the amount of expenditure eligible for recovery affected the timing of profit-production sharing.
The public consequences extended beyond the investors.
They concerned the Russian state and Sakhalin Oblast.
DOCUMENTARY FINDINGSThe investigation establishes that Sakhalin II was developed under a production-sharing agreement providing Russian governmental rights to approve work budgets and audit expenditure.
Shell’s authenticated SEC filing of 14 July 2005 confirms a provisional second-phase investment estimate of approximately $20 billion, including planned development and drilling through 2014.
Royal Dutch Shell’s 2005 Annual Report subsequently described the increase as a substantial cost overrun.
Reuters reported Russian cost challenges in October and November 2006.
The November report attributed a $2.5 billion cost objection to Zarubezhneft’s review, drawing upon Vedomosti’s reporting.
Those were reported audit criticisms, not authenticated final judicial findings.
Shell’s SEC filing of 21 December 2006 confirms that the company and its partners reached agreement with Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Energy concerning the amended budget and cost recovery.
Vedomosti subsequently reported a proposed arrangement under which foreign shareholders would bear approximately $3.6 billion in additional expenditure.
The final signed terms have not been independently reconciled against that reporting.
Kommersant reported on 13 April 2007 that a government-appointed auditor had recommended excluding $370 million from Sakhalin II’s recoverable expenditure for 2004.
The operator disputed the recommendation.
The same report identified approximately $11.29 billion in unrecovered expenditure as of 1 January 2007.
Shell’s SEC filings establish that the amended development budget received supervisory-board approval in April 2007.
Mitsui’s independently filed SEC annual report confirms that approval.
Contemporaneous Reuters reporting identified an approved second-phase budget of approximately $19.4 billion through 2014.
Sakhalin Energy subsequently announced on 30 March 2012 that it had recovered approximately $24.5 billion in capital and operating expenditure associated with both phases.
That recovery milestone triggered profit-production sharing with the Russian side.
The $19.4 billion development budget and the $24.5 billion cumulative recovery figure are not directly interchangeable.
The available documentation does not establish the final treatment of the $370 million audit objection or every other disputed cost.
The British High Court proceedings concerning Sakhalin II dealt with environmental-information disclosure and did not adjudicate these cost-recovery disputes.
No evidence examined establishes that Shell deliberately falsified the relevant expenditure or fraudulently obtained recovery.
CONCLUSION: THE APPROVAL WAS REAL — BUT THE FULL RECONCILIATION REMAINS UNFINISHEDThe Sakhalin II cost controversy was one of the defining episodes of Shell’s involvement in Russia.
In July 2005, Shell publicly acknowledged that its estimated second-phase investment had risen to approximately $20 billion.
The figure was substantial.
It was also provisional.
The company expected further discussions with Russian authorities concerning the revised development plans.
Those discussions became increasingly contentious.
By late 2006, Russian officials were publicly challenging significant categories of expenditure.
Government-appointed specialists questioned the estimates.
The ownership negotiations intensified.
And the confrontation culminated in an agreement that brought Gazprom into the project as majority shareholder.
The original corporate filings establish the final outcome.
The amended development budget received approval in April 2007.
Shell retained a minority interest and continued participating in the project.
That was a major commercial achievement for the restructuring.
But it did not bring every historical accounting question into the public record.
Kommersant’s April 2007 investigation demonstrates that a specific $370 million audit objection existed concerning expenditure for 2004.
The operator disputed the recommendation.
The documents examined do not establish the final decision concerning that amount.
Nor do they reconcile the broader Russian cost objections, the reported $3.6 billion investor adjustment, the approved 2007 development budget and the subsequent recovery of $24.5 billion.
The latter figure was announced by Sakhalin Energy in March 2012.
It was a major milestone.
Profit-production sharing began.
The Russian state subsequently received substantial revenues.
But those later receipts do not independently validate every earlier expenditure claim.
Nor does the existence of the earlier audit objections demonstrate that the operator’s final recovery calculation was improper.
Both conclusions would go beyond the evidence.
The most defensible historical finding is therefore a limited but important one.
Shell and its partners reached agreement with Russia concerning the amended Sakhalin II budget. The supervisory board approved that budget. The operator subsequently reported recovering $24.5 billion. But the complete public reconciliation of disputed expenditure, approved recoverable costs and the final recovery calculation remains incomplete in the documents examined.
That is not a finding of fraud.
It is a finding about the limits of the available documentary record.
For an archive concerned with corporate accountability, that distinction is essential.
The historical importance of Sakhalin II lies not merely in the enormous sums involved.
It lies in the interaction between contractual financial rights, corporate management, governmental oversight and the subsequent distribution of public revenues.
The production-sharing agreement gave Russia rights to examine expenditure.
The Russian authorities exercised oversight through multiple reviews.
The investors challenged certain findings.
The parties eventually reached agreement.
And the project proceeded to generate substantial revenue.
The unresolved question is not whether those events occurred.
They are documented.
It is whether the surviving public records permit an independent reconstruction of how the original disputed costs were ultimately treated.
The current evidence does not.
The amended budget was approved. The reported cost-recovery milestone was reached. But a complete independent account of the expenditure underlying that milestone has yet to be established.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCESRoyal Dutch Shell / Shell Transport and Trading — 14 July 2005. Original SEC Form 6-K recording Sakhalin II’s provisional $20 billion second-phase investment estimate and the ongoing review of revised plans and budgets. Read the original SEC filing.
Royal Dutch Shell plc — 2005 Annual Report. Authenticated SEC filing confirming that the project experienced substantial cost overruns. Read the original annual report.
Reuters — 23 October 2006. Contemporaneous report concerning the Zarubezhneft cost review, including particular proposed exclusions. Read the preserved report.
Reuters — 13 November 2006. Contemporaneous reporting concerning the alleged $2.5 billion cost discrepancy and questioned contractor expenditure. Read the preserved report.
Royal Dutch Shell plc — 21 December 2006. Original SEC Form 6-K confirming agreement with the Russian Ministry of Industry and Energy concerning the amended budget and cost recovery. Read the original Shell filing.
Vedomosti — 28 December 2006. Contemporary reporting concerning the proposed $19.4 billion revised budget and the reported $3.6 billion burden borne by foreign shareholders. Read the Vedomosti article.
Kommersant — 13 April 2007. Contemporary reporting of a government-commissioned audit identifying a proposed $370 million exclusion from 2004 expenditure and approximately $11.29 billion in unrecovered costs as of 1 January 2007. Read the original article.
Royal Dutch Shell plc — First-Quarter 2007 Financial Report. SEC-filed corporate disclosure confirming the approval of Sakhalin II’s amended development budget and the related ownership restructuring. Read the authenticated filing.
Mitsui & Co. — Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 2008. Authenticated SEC filing independently confirming the approval of the amended second-phase budget in April 2007. Read Mitsui’s SEC filing.
Reuters — 18 April 2007. Contemporaneous reporting of Gazprom’s completed acquisition and the reported $19.4 billion budget approval. Read the preserved report.
High Court of England and Wales — 17 March 2008. Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth[2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), concerning environmental-information disclosure rather than adjudication of Sakhalin II expenditure. Read the judgment.
Interfax — 30 March 2012. Contemporaneous report of Sakhalin Energy’s announcement that approximately $24.5 billion in project expenditure had been recovered and profit-production sharing had begun. Read the Interfax report.
Sakhalin Energy — Production-Sharing Agreement. Official explanation of budget approval, governmental audit rights and the cost-recovery arrangements. Read the company’s explanation.
Donovan–Shell Archive — 29 September 2026. Earlier investigation examining Gazprom’s acquisition, the amended budget and the additional economic-balance agreements. Read SLF-2007-072.
DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMERThis investigation examines historical cost estimates, audit objections, development-budget approvals and recovered expenditure associated with the Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement.
The Shell and Mitsui SEC filings are treated as authenticated corporate records of the statements and disclosures made by those companies.
The contemporaneous Reuters, Vedomosti and Kommersant reports are identified as journalism.
Where those reports describe governmental audits or confidential negotiations, the relevant findings are attributed to the reporting rather than represented as independently authenticated copies of the underlying documents.
The original Zarubezhneft cost review and the complete Top-Audit report concerning 2004 expenditure have not been independently examined.
The $2.5 billion and $370 million figures therefore remain attributed historical audit objections.
Neither figure is presented as an established final disallowance.
The original supervisory-board approval of April 2007 and the complete supporting cost-recovery schedules have not been independently obtained.
The authenticated SEC filings establish the approval of the amended budget, but not the detailed disposition of every individual audit objection.
The reported $3.6 billion adjustment involving the foreign shareholders is attributed to contemporaneous reporting.
The investigation does not independently certify the final contractual treatment of that amount.
The $19.4 billion development-budget figure and the $24.5 billion cumulative recovered-expenditure figure concern different reported financial categories and periods.
They are not compared as though they represent identical accounting measures.
The March 2012 recovery figure is attributed to Sakhalin Energy’s announcement.
It has not been independently reconciled against a complete cost-recovery ledger.
The British High Court judgment cited concerned environmental-information disclosure and did not decide the historical cost-recovery disputes.
No final judicial determination establishing fraud, deliberate expenditure inflation or improper recovery of the specific sums examined has been authenticated.
The investigation does not allege that Shell falsified the project accounts or that Russian officials acted improperly in accepting or rejecting expenditure.
Editorial observations about financial transparency are distinguished from established documentary findings.
Shell plc, former Sakhalin Energy personnel, Gazprom, the Russian authorities and other interested parties are invited to provide relevant original documents, factual corrections and responses for fair consideration.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-123 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CXIII The $2.5 Billion Decommissioning Question — Who Was Expected to Pay When Sakhalin II’s Oil and Gas Facilities Reached the End of Their Lives?A separate financial issue arose during the years following the confrontation over Sakhalin II’s development budget.
The question concerned the eventual dismantling and restoration of the project’s industrial facilities.
Offshore platforms, pipelines, processing plants and associated infrastructure cannot simply be abandoned when production ceases.
They generate substantial future obligations.
In September 2008, RBC Daily reported details of a Russian Accounts Chamber review concerning the management of production-sharing projects.
According to that report, the auditors had identified unresolved questions about the creation of a fund for the eventual decommissioning of Sakhalin II’s facilities.
The article referred to an estimated $2.5 billion in potential decommissioning expenditure.
It also described disagreements concerning how those costs should be financed and allocated between the investors and the Russian side.
That reported amount has not yet been authenticated against the complete original audit and underlying project estimates.
The next investigation will examine the surviving historical evidence, the production-sharing arrangements and the subsequent treatment of decommissioning obligations.
It will distinguish reported future-cost estimates from actual liabilities and expenditure.
It will also examine whether the original arrangements adequately identified who would bear the financial responsibility for eventual dismantling and restoration.
The question is particularly important because some project infrastructure may ultimately become the responsibility of the host state.
The documentary objective will be to establish what was proposed, what was agreed and what the available records show about later provisions.
No assumption will be made that Shell or its partners failed to meet a legal obligation without supporting evidence.
The central question: if Sakhalin II’s development costs were recovered from production revenues, who was expected to finance the eventual dismantling of the facilities — and were those future liabilities properly accounted for?
The next file will examine the reported $2.5 billion estimate, the original governmental concerns and the financial arrangements designed to address the project’s eventual closure.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 18 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 18, 2026 at 8:46 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Shell’s Raízen Reckoning — A Documentary Investigation into Brazil’s R$61.4 Billion Debt Restructuring and the Planned Split of a Biofuels Giant
AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION
By the Donovan–Shell Archive
18 November 2026
Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT.
Fifteen years after Shell and Brazil’s Cosan established Raízen as a major international biofuels venture, the partnership faces a fundamental restructuring. Court-approved arrangements concerning approximately R$61.4 billion of financial debt are being implemented through a combination of fresh capital, creditor participation, changes in corporate governance and a proposed division of the company into two separately listed businesses. Newly examined regulatory disclosures reveal the scale of the financial difficulties, the conditions attached to Shell’s proposed R$3.5 billion contribution and the possibility that the existing ownership structure will be substantially transformed.
Introduction: A company that helped define Shell’s biofuels ambitions faces a new futureOn 6 November 2026, the board of Brazilian energy company Raízen S.A. unanimously approved the principal terms of a private capital increase that could reach almost R$39.8 billion.
The figure is striking.
But it requires immediate explanation.
The proposed transaction is not an announcement that Shell will inject R$39.8 billion in cash.
It combines a proposed R$3.5 billion contribution by Shell, possible participation by another shareholder, conversion of existing financial claims into equity and subscription rights available to other shareholders.
The operation forms part of a much larger restructuring of Raízen’s financial obligations.
A plan approved by a São Paulo court in July 2026 provides the framework for reorganising approximately R$61.4 billion of unsecured financial debt.
On 12 November, Raízen published its latest quarterly financial results, confirming that implementation of the restructuring remained central to its operations.
The company also provided further details of a planned corporate separation.
Under that arrangement, the sugar, ethanol and bioenergy businesses would be concentrated in Raízen Energia S.A., while Raízen S.A. would retain fuel distribution and lubricants operations under the Shell brand.
These are not minor adjustments to an ordinary investment portfolio.
They represent a potential transformation of one of Shell’s most important longstanding ventures in lower-carbon fuels.
Principal documentary sources: Raízen’s 6 November 2026 regulatory announcement filed with Brazil’s CVM and Raízen’s quarterly results published on 12 November 2026.
CVM+1
1. The original ambition: Shell and Cosan create a Brazilian biofuels giant
The historical significance of the restructuring becomes clearer when the partnership’s origins are examined.
On 2 June 2011, Royal Dutch Shell and Cosan publicly launched Raízen.
The venture combined Shell’s international energy business, fuel-distribution operations and biofuels expertise with Cosan’s substantial Brazilian sugar-cane and ethanol interests.
Shell and Cosan initially established the venture on a broadly equal ownership basis.
At the time, the companies presented Raízen as an important development in the commercial production of lower-carbon transport fuels.
Sugar-cane ethanol was central to the strategy.
The partners intended to combine large-scale production in Brazil with an international distribution network capable of serving customers in multiple markets.
Raízen also incorporated conventional fuel distribution.
The company therefore brought together two activities that were sometimes presented separately in public discussion: the production of biofuels and the marketing of petroleum-based fuels.
Shell’s own announcement emphasised the opportunity to expand sugar-cane ethanol production and sales.
Original Shell and Cosan joint announcement — 2 June 2011.
PR Newswire
The Donovan–Shell Archive reported the development at the time.
Shell launches ethanol project with Brazilian firm — 17 February 2011.
Raízen subsequently became a significant producer and marketer of sugar, ethanol and bioenergy, while also operating a substantial network of fuel-distribution activities associated with the Shell brand.
The present restructuring must be understood against that history.
Shell did not acquire a small, incidental financial holding.
It helped establish a business that became an important part of its public account of how biofuels could contribute to the future energy system.
2. March to July 2026: The debt crisis becomes a court-supervised restructuringRaízen’s recent difficulties did not arise overnight.
Its financial position deteriorated against a background of heavy indebtedness, demanding capital requirements and difficult operating conditions.
On 11 March 2026, the company sought recuperação extrajudicial under Brazilian law.
This expression is generally translated as extrajudicial or out-of-court restructuring.
It describes a process in which a company negotiates arrangements with affected creditors and seeks judicial recognition of the resulting plan.
It should not be confused with a completed liquidation or the automatic closure of the operating business.
On 5 June, Raízen submitted a restructuring plan.
On 30 July 2026, the relevant São Paulo court approved it.
The proceedings are identified in Raízen’s own regulatory announcement as case 4037759-13.2026.8.26.0100, before the Third Bankruptcy and Judicial Restructuring Court in São Paulo.
The scale is considerable.
According to Cosan’s subsequent SEC disclosure, creditors representing approximately 81.6% of the affected financial claims supported the plan.
The resulting arrangements concern approximately R$61.4 billion in unsecured financial debt.
Not every liability owed by Raízen is necessarily included within that perimeter.
Nor should the R$61.4 billion figure be confused with the company’s total gross indebtedness or its reported net debt, which are calculated differently.
Primary source: Cosan S.A. — November 2026 Form 6-K filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
SEC
The judicial approval was a major milestone.
But it did not mean that every financial and corporate measure contemplated by the plan had already been completed.
That distinction remains essential.
The November disclosures concern the continued implementation of the restructuring, not merely a retrospective description of a concluded process.
3. The R$39.8 billion headline: What Shell is actually proposing to contributeRaízen’s 6 November filing authorised a private capital increase ranging from R$3.5 billion to approximately R$39.796 billion.
The issue price was fixed at R$0.25 for each new share.
The maximum transaction would involve issuing more than 159 billion new shares across different classes.
Those enormous figures may create the impression that billions in additional cash are about to enter Raízen.
That interpretation would be misleading.
The official document identifies several mechanisms contributing to the total value of the proposed capital increase.
Shell’s contribution
Shell Brazil Holding B.V., or an affiliated Shell company, is to contribute up to R$3.5 billion in cash under the proposed structure.
This would be exchanged for newly issued ordinary shares and a newly created class of preferred shares.
Possible additional shareholder contribution
Aguassanta Participações S.A., associated with Brazilian businessman Rubens Ometto and the Cosan controlling group, may participate with up to R$500 million.
Its participation is conditional.
Conversion of creditor claims
An important part of the recapitalisation involves creditors exchanging existing claims against Raízen for newly issued securities.
This can reduce obligations appearing on the company’s balance sheet.
But exchanging a debt claim for shares is not the same as depositing fresh cash into the company.
Raízen’s own filing makes that distinction explicit.
Participation by other shareholders
Existing shareholders have statutory subscription rights under the announced arrangements.
The permitted exercise period began on 9 November and runs until 8 December 2026.
The amount eventually subscribed depends upon the operation of these different mechanisms.
Consequently, R$39.8 billion represents the maximum approved capital increase, not a R$39.8 billion cash rescue by Shell.
That distinction is essential to understanding both the transaction and the extent of Shell’s commitment.
Source: CVM filing — Capital Increase, Units and Securities Arrangements, 6 November 2026.
CVM+1
4. A new ownership structure: The significance of Shell’s special share class
The proposed transaction contains an important governance provision.
For the capital increase to become effective under the stated conditions, at least 14 billion new shares must be subscribed.
In addition, Shell must hold, on its own, a majority of the newly issued Class B preferred shares.
That condition gives Shell a particular position within the planned recapitalisation.
But it must not be misrepresented.
A majority of Class B preferred shares is not the same thing as a majority of every share in Raízen.
The company has several share classes, and its proposed restructuring involves new securities and potentially substantial creditor ownership.
The precise outcome will depend upon completion of the various steps.
Raízen’s official ownership information provides a useful starting point.
In its shareholding disclosure dated 29 October 2026, the company reported that Shell Brazil Holding B.V. held approximately 44% of the total shares, while Cosan held a similar aggregate percentage.
The remaining shares were primarily held by public investors.
The voting and preferred-share percentages were not identical.
Shell was reported as holding approximately 42% of ordinary shares, compared with Cosan’s 58%.
Those figures describe the ownership position before implementation of the new capital increase.
They should not be presented as the expected final ownership percentages.
Raízen Investor Relations — Shareholding Composition, reference date 29 October 2026.
ri.raizen.com.br
The most important question is not whether Shell retains a majority of one class of securities.
It is what the complete restructured ownership and governance arrangements will mean for the company.
Who will appoint directors?
Which decisions will require special approval?
How will creditor shareholders participate in governance?
And which entity will ultimately control strategic decisions concerning ethanol production, fuel distribution and future capital expenditure?
The filings identify the proposed mechanisms.
They do not yet provide an established final result.
5. Existing shareholders face substantial potential dilutionThe 6 November filing also contains an unusually clear warning concerning dilution.
Raízen estimates that shareholders who do not exercise their subscription rights could experience a reduction in their percentage ownership of approximately 57% if only the minimum number of shares is issued.
If the maximum number is issued, the company calculates potential dilution of up to approximately 94%.
These figures concern percentage ownership, not an established monetary loss of the same size.
They also do not mean that every existing shareholder will necessarily experience those outcomes.
Participation in the capital increase, the number of securities ultimately issued and the operation of the creditor arrangements will affect the result.
Nevertheless, the disclosure demonstrates the potential scale of the change.
This is not an ordinary financing exercise involving a modest increase in issued capital.
It is a restructuring capable of radically altering the relationship between existing shareholders and creditors.
Cosan’s own SEC filing acknowledges that implementation may significantly dilute its existing interest and change the nature of its involvement in Raízen.
It also recognises the possibility that Cosan could cease to exercise joint control over the company.
That is a particularly significant statement from one of the two organisations that originally established Raízen.
The historical 50–50 partnership may therefore be moving towards a substantially different governance arrangement.
No final outcome should be assumed before the recapitalisation takes effect.
Sources: Raízen’s CVM disclosure and Cosan’s SEC filing.
CVM+1
6. The planned corporate split: Bioenergy on one side, Shell-branded fuels on the other
The second major component of the restructuring concerns the future organisation of the business.
Under arrangements approved by shareholders on 30 October, Raízen is preparing to separate its activities into two independently listed corporate structures.
Raízen Energia S.A. is intended to concentrate the production and commercialisation of ethanol, sugar and bioenergy.
Raízen S.A. is intended to retain fuel distribution and lubricants operations associated with the Shell brand.
The plan also envisages a reduction in share capital of up to R$35 billion through the distribution to shareholders of securities issued by Raízen Energia.
That does not mean shareholders are necessarily to receive R$35 billion in cash.
The proposed transaction involves the delivery of securities as part of a corporate reorganisation.
Raízen has already described the intended appointment of new governing bodies for the businesses.
However, the effectiveness of the changes remains linked to implementation of the restructuring plan.
The company’s 12 November results expressly state that completion of the separation is subject to the relevant conditions.
Primary sources: Raízen — New Boards and Corporate Restructuring, 30 October 2026 and Raízen — Results for the Second Quarter of the 2026/27 Crop Year.
Raízen+1
For Shell, the distinction between the two future businesses is particularly important.
The original Raízen partnership was built around the combination of petroleum distribution and large-scale biofuels production.
The restructuring proposes to separate those activities into different listed entities.
That does not necessarily mean Shell will withdraw from bioenergy.
Nor does it establish that the Shell-branded distribution business will be sold.
The future ownership arrangements remain conditional.
But the proposed separation marks a significant departure from the integrated corporate structure around which the original venture developed.
7. The financial evidence: An improving quarter does not erase the debt problemThe November financial results complicate any simplistic account of Raízen as a business experiencing uniform operational collapse.
For the July–September 2026 quarter, Raízen reported net revenue of approximately R$53.5 billion.
Adjusted EBITDA reached approximately R$4.38 billion, an increase of 41.3% over the corresponding period of the previous year.
The company’s consolidated net loss narrowed to approximately R$843.7 million, compared with a loss of R$2.31 billion a year earlier.
Those figures indicate an improvement in reported quarterly performance.
But Raízen remained loss-making.
Its reported net debt at 30 September stood at approximately R$55.68 billion.
The ratio of net debt to adjusted EBITDA over the preceding twelve months was approximately 4.3 times.
The company also reported that its gross debt, including derivatives, exceeded R$71 billion.
These amounts refer to different financial measures and should not be treated as interchangeable.
The distinction between the company’s principal business segments is equally important.
Fuel distribution and lubricants performed strongly.
Adjusted EBITDA in that segment reached approximately R$3.62 billion, compared with R$1.36 billion in the equivalent quarter a year earlier.
The sugar, ethanol and bioenergy business faced more difficult conditions.
Raízen identified excessive rainfall in Brazil’s Centre-South region, reduced effective harvesting days, lower production and sales volumes, and pressure on realised prices.
The company also pointed to measures intended to improve efficiency and reduce costs.
These explanations are those provided by management.
The published results support the conclusion that the distribution business contributed substantially to the quarter’s improved operating performance.
They do not establish that every operational and financial difficulty affecting the bioenergy business has been resolved.
Primary source: Raízen’s 12 November 2026 Results Release — consolidated financial and segment figures.
FinancialFilings+1
The wider restructuring must therefore be assessed against two simultaneous realities.
Raízen remains a substantial operating business generating significant revenue.
It also faces a financial position serious enough to require court-approved debt reorganisation, creditor concessions and a fundamental review of its corporate structure.
Both facts matter.
8. An especially revealing disclosure from CosanAmong the most consequential documents examined for this investigation is Cosan’s November 2026 filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
Cosan is not an outside commentator.
It is Shell’s founding partner in Raízen.
Its financial statements therefore provide a direct account of how the restructuring is affecting one of the existing owners.
The filing records that Raízen’s annual financial statements released in June 2026 identified significant uncertainty concerning its ability to continue as a going concern.
The factors cited included high indebtedness, substantial cash consumption, credit-rating downgrades and breaches of certain financial covenants.
Cosan also reported that its investment in Raízen remained at zero on Cosan’s own balance sheet.
It explained that its management had concluded, after reviewing the relevant arrangements, that Cosan did not have additional legal or constructive obligations to support the joint venture financially.
This is a statement about Cosan’s accounting treatment and assessment of its obligations.
It does not mean that Raízen’s factories, distribution networks and other assets are worthless.
Nor does it establish Shell’s accounting valuation of its own interest.
Nevertheless, it is an unusually stark disclosure concerning the financial consequences experienced by a founding shareholder.
Cosan further states that the planned restructuring may alter the basis on which it accounts for its continuing interest.
If it loses joint control, the investment may have to be classified and measured differently.
That possibility illustrates how the restructuring extends beyond changes to repayment dates and borrowing arrangements.
It may change the legal, financial and governance relationships between Raízen and the organisations that established it.
Primary source: Cosan S.A. — November 2026 SEC Form 6-K, note concerning Raízen’s going-concern uncertainty and restructuring.
SEC
9. The federal tax settlement: Another important condition
The restructuring also involves a substantial agreement with Brazilian federal tax authorities.
On 28 October 2026, Raízen announced a settlement involving the Office of the Attorney General of the National Treasury and Brazil’s Federal Revenue Service.
According to the company, the agreement covered specified federal tax liabilities totalling approximately R$22.4 billion.
The disclosed allocation was important.
Of that amount, approximately R$16.7 billion represented obligations for which Raízen bore economic responsibility.
A further R$5.7 billion was attributed to the ultimate economic responsibility of its controlling shareholders under the relevant arrangements.
For Raízen’s own portion, the agreement provided approximately R$8.5 billion in reductions relating to penalties and interest.
The remaining R$8.2 billion was to be settled through the use of tax-loss credits worth approximately R$5.7 billion and a cash payment of approximately R$2.5 billion.
These figures must not be confused.
The R$22.4 billion total does not represent a cash payment of that amount.
Nor does it mean that the entire amount was forgiven.
Equally, the R$8.5 billion reduction in penalties and interest should not be described as a direct cash benefit paid to Shell plc.
The settlement represents one component of Raízen’s financial restructuring.
It is also identified as a condition relevant to implementing the wider plan.
Primary source: Raízen — Federal Tax Settlement, 28 October 2026, filed with the CVM.
CVM
The agreement demonstrates the range of counterparties involved in Raízen’s financial recovery.
Private financial creditors, existing shareholders, public investors and federal tax authorities all have roles in different parts of the process.
That complexity is another reason why the restructuring cannot accurately be reduced to the description of a straightforward Shell bailout.
10. What does this mean for Shell’s wider biofuels strategy?The Raízen restructuring presents an interesting contrast with some of Shell’s other recent decisions.
On 3 September 2025, Shell announced that it would not restart construction of its planned biofuels facility in Rotterdam.
The company explained that its commercial and technical reassessment had concluded the project would not be sufficiently competitive.
However, Shell simultaneously reaffirmed its belief in the continuing importance of lower-carbon fuels.
Its announcement specifically identified Raízen as an important producer of bioethanol and reported Shell’s 44% interest in the Brazilian venture.
Shell — Decision Not to Restart Rotterdam Biofuels Plant, 3 September 2025.
Shell Global
The present developments provide a more complicated picture than a simple withdrawal from renewable or lower-carbon energy.
Shell is proposing to commit substantial additional cash to Raízen.
At the same time, the joint venture is planning to separate biofuels production from the fuel-distribution business.
These developments should be considered alongside Shell’s stated preference for commercial discipline and selective capital allocation.
But they should not be interpreted as proving that Shell intends to abandon ethanol production.
The available documents do not support that conclusion.
The proposed cash contribution could be consistent with several commercial objectives, including preserving the value of an existing investment, maintaining a role in the restructured business or supporting the continuity of important supply and marketing arrangements.
Determining which objectives carry the greatest weight would require further evidence.
What is firmly established is that Shell is participating in a financial restructuring of exceptional scale.
That participation deserves scrutiny against the company’s long-standing public descriptions of Raízen’s importance to its biofuels business.
11. The questions Shell, Cosan and Raízen have not yet fully answeredThe documentary record establishes the principal structure of the planned transaction.
But several important matters remain unresolved.
The first concerns the final ownership arrangements.
Shell is to hold a majority of the newly issued Class B preferred shares under the stated conditions. That does not settle the overall distribution of economic interests, voting rights or governance powers once the various new securities have been issued.
The second concerns creditor participation.
The final allocation of shares will depend upon implementation of the plan, including the conversion of eligible claims and completion of the subscription process.
The third concerns the future of the bioenergy business.
Raízen Energia is intended to become a separately listed company. Its eventual shareholder composition, financing arrangements and investment priorities will matter greatly to anyone assessing the future of Shell’s participation in Brazilian ethanol production.
The fourth concerns the relationship between the two businesses.
Fuel distribution and biofuels production have historically been linked within the Raízen structure.
The commercial agreements governing future supply, distribution, branding and financing will therefore be important.
The fifth concerns the ultimate financial consequences for Shell itself.
The Brazilian subsidiary’s proposed R$3.5 billion contribution is publicly documented.
But the effect upon Shell plc’s consolidated reporting, the valuation of its continuing interests and any eventual changes in control will need to be assessed against subsequent Shell disclosures.
Finally, there is the question of timing.
Raízen’s November results stated that management expected the extrajudicial restructuring process to conclude in December 2026, earlier than the previously anticipated March 2027.
A board meeting concerning ratification of the capital increase was scheduled for 16 December 2026.
These are announced expectations and planned dates, not established future outcomes.
The restructuring and separation should not be described as completed before the relevant conditions have been satisfied.
12. What the evidence establishes — and what it does notThe principal regulatory and corporate records establish that Raízen entered an extrajudicial restructuring process in March 2026, submitted a plan in June and obtained court approval in July.
They establish that approximately R$61.4 billion of unsecured financial debt is covered by the relevant restructuring arrangements.
They establish that the company has approved the terms of a capital increase potentially approaching R$39.8 billion.
They establish Shell’s proposed R$3.5 billion cash participation, the possible contribution from Aguassanta and the role of converting creditor claims into shares.
They establish that significant dilution of existing shareholders is possible.
And they establish the approved framework for separating the bioenergy and Shell-branded fuel-distribution businesses, subject to implementation conditions.
The documents also show continuing operational activity, improved quarterly results in fuel distribution and significant remaining indebtedness.
What they do not establish is equally important.
They do not establish that Shell has already completed its proposed cash contribution.
They do not establish that Shell will own a majority of Raízen’s total equity after the restructuring.
They do not establish that every financial claim will be converted into shares.
They do not establish that the proposed corporate separation has been completed.
They do not establish that Raízen has ceased operating or entered liquidation.
And they do not establish wrongdoing by Shell, Cosan, Raízen or their directors.
The present investigation concerns the substance and implications of publicly disclosed corporate restructuring arrangements.
Any allegation of unlawful conduct would require separate evidence and a distinct legal assessment.
Conclusion: The original Shell–Cosan partnership is approaching a turning pointRaízen began in 2011 as an ambitious partnership between an international oil company and a major Brazilian sugar and ethanol producer.
Shell contributed its fuel-distribution expertise, global commercial reach and biofuels interests.
Cosan contributed extensive experience and assets in sugar-cane production, ethanol and the Brazilian market.
The venture was presented as a major opportunity to combine conventional energy distribution with large-scale lower-carbon fuel production.
Fifteen years later, the company faces an exceptionally substantial financial restructuring.
Its creditors are being offered a route into equity ownership.
Its existing shareholders face potential dilution.
Its governance arrangements are being revised.
And its two principal business divisions are intended to become separate listed companies.
Shell’s proposed R$3.5 billion contribution places it at the centre of the recapitalisation process.
But the extent of its eventual ownership and governance rights cannot be determined merely from the headline value of the proposed capital increase.
The documents reveal a business undergoing a fundamental change in its financial and corporate architecture.
They also reveal the importance of separating commercial ambition from demonstrated outcomes.
Raízen remains a substantial operating enterprise.
Its fuel-distribution business has recently delivered stronger results.
Its ethanol and bioenergy operations continue to have economic significance.
Nevertheless, the financial pressures have become sufficiently serious to require extraordinary measures.
The central historical question is how a venture launched as a defining example of Shell’s international biofuels ambitions came to require restructuring on this scale — and what role Shell will ultimately retain in the businesses that emerge.
The recently published regulatory filings provide a firmer basis for examining that question than speculation about share prices or corporate intentions.
They document the financial mechanisms, governance changes and conditions still to be fulfilled.
The decisive outcomes remain ahead.
For the Donovan–Shell Archive, this investigation establishes an important documentary checkpoint in the history of Shell’s Brazilian operations.
The original partnership was built around integration.
The proposed future is built around financial restructuring and separation.
Whether that produces a stronger, more sustainable business is not yet established.
What is established is that Raízen’s next chapter may look fundamentally different from the company Shell and Cosan created in 2011.
Principal documentary sources1. Raízen S.A. — Material Fact, 6 November 2026: Capital Increase, Units and Securities Arrangements. Official Brazilian CVM filing describing the recapitalisation, proposed cash contributions, securities and conditions.
2. Raízen S.A. — Second-Quarter 2026/27 Financial Results, published 12 November 2026. Original company results release covering financial performance, debt, tax arrangements and restructuring developments.
3. Cosan S.A. — November 2026 Form 6-K, US Securities and Exchange Commission. Primary disclosure concerning creditor approval, court proceedings, going-concern uncertainty, Cosan’s accounting treatment and prospective changes in control.
4. Raízen S.A. — Federal Tax Settlement, 28 October 2026. Official CVM filing identifying the settlement amounts, discounts and payment mechanisms.
5. Raízen — Shareholding Composition, 29 October 2026. Company-published ownership snapshot before the proposed capital increase.
6. Raízen — Approval of New Board Structures and Restructuring Measures, 30 October 2026. Company announcement describing the planned separation and conditional governance arrangements.
7. Shell and Cosan — Original Raízen Joint-Venture Announcement, 2 June 2011. Contemporary statement explaining the original purpose and biofuels ambitions.
8. Shell plc — Rotterdam Biofuels Decision, 3 September 2025. Shell’s explanation of its continuing biofuels strategy and its interest in Raízen.
9. Reuters — Raízen Narrows Quarterly Loss, 12 November 2026. Independent reporting corroborating key quarterly financial figures.
10. Donovan–Shell Archive — Shell Doubles Down on Brazil’s Sugar-Fuel Empire, 6 March 2026. Earlier archive coverage providing historical context for the subsequent restructuring.
Documentary disclaimerThis article is an independent documentary investigation prepared from publicly available corporate announcements, regulatory filings, financial statements, historical publications and contemporaneous news reporting.
The principal documents include Raízen’s filings with the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, Cosan’s November 2026 filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, and Raízen’s published quarterly financial results.
The investigation has examined the court proceedings through the companies’ official disclosures. It has not independently inspected the complete Brazilian court docket or every underlying restructuring agreement.
References to approval of the restructuring plan concern the judicial recognition of that plan in July 2026. They should not be interpreted as confirmation that every subsequent recapitalisation, corporate separation or governance change has been implemented.
Shell’s proposed cash contribution, creditor conversions, future ownership percentages, board changes and business separation remain subject to the terms and conditions identified in the relevant documents.
The accounting treatment disclosed by Cosan concerns Cosan’s own financial statements and should not be attributed to Shell plc without separate verification.
Statements about Raízen’s operational performance, planned financial recovery and future business arrangements are attributed to company management where appropriate. Forecasts and planned completion dates are not guaranteed outcomes.
No allegation is made that Shell plc, Cosan S.A., Raízen S.A. or any named individual has acted unlawfully, breached a legal duty or deliberately misrepresented financial information.
Editorial conclusions concerning the historical significance of the restructuring are analytical interpretations of the documented evidence, not judicial findings or investment recommendations.
The Donovan–Shell Archive welcomes relevant documentary evidence, factual corrections and responses from Shell plc, Cosan, Raízen, affected creditors, regulatory authorities and other interested parties.
Substantiated corrections and material additional evidence will be considered fairly and incorporated where appropriate.
Shell’s Raízen Reckoning — A Documentary Investigation into Brazil’s R$61.4 Billion Debt Restructuring and the Planned Split of a Biofuels Giant was first posted on November 18, 2026 at 8:39 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Act 59: Vermont Conservation Plan Release Provides Pathways Toward Resilience
Campaigners lose challenge to government methane action plan
The campaign network, which won a landmark climate ruling at the Supreme Court in 2024, failed today in its legal challenge to the government’s plan to reduce methane emissions.
Royal Courts of Justice, London. Photo: DrillOrDropThe Weald Action Group (WG), which campaigns against onshore oil and gas in southern England, lost on all three grounds of its case.
Mr Justice Kolinksy, sitting at the High Court in London, awarded costs, limited to £10,000, against the group.
WAG had sought to revise the government’s Methane Action Plan (MAP), published in October 2025.
It claimed the plan failed to address properly the risks of delivering the UK’s carbon budgets under the Climate Change Act 2008.
It said the plan omitted meaningful policies for methane emissions from onshore oil and gas sites. It also argued that the MAP was government policy and must comply with environmental principles designed to prevent harm and protect the environment.
Power of methanePart of the case centred on two calculations to assess the ability of methane to trap heat in the atmosphere (its global warming potential).
Over a 20-year timespan, methane is about 80 times more powerful than carbon dioxide (CO2). But over 100 years, methane’s comparative potency falls to about 28 times that of CO2.
WAG said the government should have used the 20-year period in the Methane Action Plan, not 100 years. It argued that the next 23 years, to 2050, were key to the UK meeting its target of net zero emissions.
Taking action to reduce methane emissions would be a “quick win”, WAG’s barrister, Marc Willers KC, told the court.
But the judge backed arguments by the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) that the 100-year horizon was an international standard. The secretary of state did not lawfully need to use a different measure, he said.
Targets and risksThe judge also rejected WAG’s argument that the secretary of state had breached the Climate Change Act by failing to set targets for methane reduction or assess the risks in policies set out in the MAP.
Mr Willers said the secretary of state needed sufficient evidence to understand the risks if policies in the MAP, such as ending routine flaring and venting, would help to meet net zero.
WAG said the MAP should also have applied to onshore oil and gas sites in the UK – not just operations in the North Sea.
The court heard that the Horndean oil field in Hampshire was allowed to burn 10 tonnes of gas in a flare every day. Multiply this by other onshore sites and it adds up to a “significant amount”, Mr Willers said.
DESNZ said the MAP did not set new policy and was part of a package of wider measures.
Preventing harmThe judge also said in his ruling that WAG had selectively applied the obligations of the Environment Act 2021 on the secretary of state.
The group had argued that the act placed a duty on ministers to “have due regard” to the environmental principles policy statement (EPPS). This sets out how policymakers should apply environmental principles to support environmental protection and enhancement.
WAG said methane emissions were causing “considerable harm to the climate and air quality”. Policymakers should understand what damage was being caused, where it originated and what were the costs and benefits of a policy, the group said.
Lawyers for DESNZ had said the MAP was a communications tool to explain to the public what was being done and what would be done in future.
Assessments of risks and impacts of policies referred to in the MAP had been done in the Carbon Budget and Growth Delivery Plan, published on the same day, the department said. There was no need to do them again in the MAP.
The judge supported DESNZ’s argument that the secretary of state had been correctly advised on how policies in the MAP aimed to meet methane reductions and there was no need to consider other policies. He said he considered WAG had relied on a “selective and unfair” reading of the EPPS.
The grid will fall short of AI’s power needs. These 6 resources can close the gap.
No single option is fast, firm and large enough on its own, writes Simon Irish, CEO of Terrestrial Energy. Some investments — flexibility, uprates and transmission — remain valuable across demand scenarios, he says.
EWG launches Smart Picks: Cookware to help shoppers find pots and pans without PFAS
WASHINGTON – Shoppers who want to keep the toxic “forever chemicals” known as PFAS off their stovetops can now more easily find pots and pans made without them. Today the Environmental Working Group launched Smart Picks: Cookware, a free online guide to cookware lines made without intentionally added PFAS, chemicals linked to cancer and other serious health harms.
Smart Picks is EWG’s first guide listing products whose makers back their health and safety claims with independent tests. It includes five product lines from three brands across ceramic, ceramic-coated and stainless steel, and a range of price points.
“When companies claim their products are free of toxic chemicals, shoppers should be able to trust that someone has checked those results,” said David Andrews, Ph.D., EWG’s chief science officer. “Smart Picks shows shoppers which brands are willing to put their test results on the table for EWG to review.
“Nonstick coatings are one of the most widely known uses of PFAS. But a pan that’s free of PFAS – while leaching toxic heavy metals into food anyway – isn’t a safer choice.
“Safer cookware shouldn’t be a luxury item. And it shouldn’t take a chemistry degree to identify,” said Andrews.
How does cookware qualify for Smart Picks?Traditional nonstick pans won’t make the list. Cookware with fluoropolymer coatings such as PTFE, a member of the PFAS family, used on most conventional nonstick pans, isn’t eligible.
For each nonstick coated cookware product line, brands must submit:
- No intentionally added PFAS: a public statement, plus the chemical disclosure page required under California law.
- PFAS testing: for coated cookware, a total organic fluorine test of the cooking surface showing a PFAS result of less than 50 parts per million.
- A PFAS-free manufacturing line: written confirmation that the line doesn’t also produce products containing PFAS.
Every product, including metal pans such as stainless steel and carbon steel, must also submit:
- Metals leaching tests: results showing that lead, cadmium, arsenic, aluminum, nickel and chromium do not exceed strict limits under simulated cooking conditions.
- A lead content test: total lead of 90 parts per million or less.
“Smart Picks is open to any brand willing to back up its claims with independent tests,” said Carrie Pezzuti, EWG’s senior director of partnerships and events.
“There’s no fee to apply and no licensing agreement. Brands earn a place by meeting our science-based criteria and showing the evidence. We’re adding qualifying companies on a rolling basis, with the goal of including every brand that meets our criteria,” she added.
Brands pay for their own lab tests, and listings are reviewed every year.
If credible independent findings raise questions about a product, its listing is marked “Under review” and the brand has 30 days to respond with data.
Which cookware brands made the first Smart Picks list?Five product lines from three brands qualified at launch:
- Caraway:
- Caraway Ceramic Non-Stick, Coated Ceramic. Built on an aluminum body with a nonstick ceramic interior made without PTFE, PFOA, PFAS, lead or cadmium.
- Misen:
- Misen Carbon Nonstick, Carbon Steel. Made with nitrided steel, which is naturally nonstick and without PFAS.
- Misen Stainless Steel, Stainless Steel. Made with warp-proof 5-ply stainless (3 steel + 2 aluminum layers)
- Our Place:
- Our Place Ceramic Signature, Coated Ceramic – ceramic nonstick cookware made without PFAS (and will work on induction stoves)
- Our Place Titanium, Stainless Steel – stainless steel and titanium cookware, featuring a patent-pending nonstick coating, called NoCo, for high performance.
More brands are under review, and the list will grow as companies qualify.
“For more than 30 years, EWG has empowered families to cut through the noise and make safer, healthier choices,” said Jocelyn Lyle, EWG’s executive vice president of mission and partnerships.
“Smart Picks brings that mission to the products people use every day, starting in the kitchen. We’re putting a spotlight on companies willing to be transparent about what’s in their products – and what’s not,” added Lyle.
Does your cookware contain PFAS?Nearly four in 10 cookware companies disclosed that their products contain PFAS, according to a public directory of 210 brands released in July 2026 by Defend Our Health. Only 44 brands clearly disclosed that they don’t, as a 2021 California law requires.
Smart Picks goes a step further. Listed brands must back their claims with test results.
What are the health risks of PFAS?Women with the highest blood levels of PFOA and PFOS had higher rates of an aggressive form of breast cancer, according to a new National Institutes of Health study published Nov. 5 in the Journal of Clinical Oncology.
PFAS build up in the body and have been found in the blood of 98% of Americans, including newborn babies. The International Agency for Research on Cancer classifies PFOA as carcinogenic to humans and PFOS as possibly carcinogenic. Even at very low levels, PFAS exposure is linked to immune suppression, reproductive harm and thyroid disease.
Which states have banned PFAS in cookware?Minnesota, Maine and Colorado now ban the sale of cookware made with intentionally added PFAS, starting with Minnesota’s Amara’s Law in 2025. Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington have enacted laws phasing out PFAS in cookware.
Other states are also taking action to regulate PFAS in consumer products.
There is no federal ban.
“Your ZIP code shouldn’t determine whether your frying pan is coated in forever chemicals,” said Scott Faber, EWG’s senior vice president for government affairs.
“Cookware is still poorly regulated, especially the PFAS used in nonstick coatings. Until federal regulators step up, Smart Picks gives families in every state a way to choose cookware made without intentionally added PFAS.”
How is Smart Picks different from EWG Verified?Smart Picks is separate from EWG Verified®, EWG’s mark for personal care, cleaning and other products, which requires a full ingredient review and a licensing agreement. No product on a Smart Picks list is eligible for EWG Verified.
Smart Picks includes affiliate links to retailers. All affiliate fees EWG collects support its research and nonprofit mission.
Find Smart Picks or apply:
- Shoppers: Browse Smart Picks: Cookware and get answers to common questions in the FAQs. Don’t see a favorite brand? A brand’s absence doesn’t mean its products are unsafe. Ask the company to apply.
- Brands: Review the criteria and apply here.
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The Environmental Working Group is a nonprofit, non-partisan organization that empowers people to live healthier lives in a healthier environment. Through research, advocacy and unique education tools, EWG drives consumer choice and civic action. Visit www.ewg.org for more information.
Areas of Focus Food Household & Consumer Products Cookware & Food Containers PFAS Chemicals Guide lists products made without harmful ‘forever chemicals,’ according to makers’ tests Press Contact Monica Amarelo monica@ewg.org (202) 939-9140 November 19, 2026
How National Grid, Eversource are using VPPs to solve local-level constraints
The Northeast’s virtual power plant foundations are far stronger today than a decade ago, but utilities still need more visibility into distribution-system loads and energy resources, executives said.
Ocean advocates warn COP31 agreement should not be read as geoengineering boost
With COP31 set to agree that governments should do more to protect the oceans, climate campaigners and diplomats have warned that this must not be interpreted as encouragement for “unproven” marine-based geoengineering techniques.
Oceans absorb about 30% of the world’s planet-warming carbon dioxide, reducing the impacts of climate change. Initial research suggests that they could absorb more if altered with through techniques like ocean alkalinity enhancement or ocean iron fertilisation, where iron is put in the ocean so that algae grows on it and sucks up carbon.
The initial draft of the COP31 cover text contains a goal to increase carbon dioxide removal in general. Some ocean advocates said the link between this and oceans has not and should not be made. This language is contentious, with the EU opposed, and may not be in the final decision.
A political call to action released yesterday by COP31 co-presidency Türkiye encourages countries to protect marine ecosystems like mangroves and seagrasses, recognising their carbon storage potential, but it avoids any mention of marine geoengineering techniques.
At a COP31 press conference on Tuesday, Palau’s ambassador Ilana Seid said her Pacific country supported strong language on the protection of oceans but is concerned about marine carbon dioxide removal. “A lot of the science there is unproven and we are cautioning against that,” she said.
The main deal being negotiated in Antalya is the first one since the release of a major scientific report by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) saying that overshooting the 1.5C temperature limit is now unavoidable and that, to bring temperatures back down, some technologies that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere will be needed.
Seid added that, while some CDR will be necessary, it should be “at the tail end of the equation” and should not become a substitute for reducing emissions, an argument echoed by UNEP’s chief Inger Andersen at an event in Antalya.
Uncertain impacts on natureMarine Lecerf, head of international policy at Ocean and Climate Platform, told reporters at COP31 on Tuesday that she is wary about marine carbon removal techniques, and that COP31’s strong push for ocean solutions should focus on more proven actions that cut carbon emissions.
“There are many uncertainties surrounding [marine carbon dioxide removal’s] effectiveness, their scalability, their durability – but even more importantly, their potential adverse impact on nature,” she said.
A paper from earlier this year by the University of California and the US-based National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) shows that, while ocean iron fertilisation’s impacts on nature “remain poorly understood”, disturbances may be stronger in some regions – like the equatorial Pacific – and lesser in others, like the Southern Ocean in Antarctica.
Speaking next to Lecerf at a COP31 press briefing, former Canadian environment minister Steven Guilbeault said the focus should instead be on ocean solutions that have already been proven to work. “We can perhaps another day talk about those technologies if we’re going to need them,” he said.
Asked what solutions are available, young Samoan activist Brianna Fruean spoke of a project she saw at the pre-COP in Fiji last month where the villagers of Naidiri have stopped fishing in an area of their waters and are replanting coral that has been bleached.
All the planters are volunteers though, she told Climate Home News, squeezing it in around their day jobs. With funding, they could be paid for their work – which began in 2009 – and restores the reef much faster, she added.
Push for ocean roadmap that informs next global stocktake grows at COP31
More research needed?But some ocean advocates support research into these techniques. Kilaparti Ramakrishna, oceans and climate advisor at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution – which helped organise the COP31 oceans pavilion – told Climate Home News in September that research should be conducted into these techniques.
Ramakrishna said these techniques “have great potential in taking the carbon out of the atmosphere” and that scientific studies show that “it works” on a small scale. But, he said, the impacts on the environment if it is scaled up to draw a billion tonnes of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere are poorly understood. “So, we need to figure that out,” he said.
Woods Hole is conducting ocean iron fertilisation on a 10 square kilometre area and monitoring it for two years. “We’re already doing field studies”, said Ramakrishna, adding “those are the kinds of things that make the ocean a hero in terms of solving the climate problem. But we should always be mindful that in solving one problem we don’t create other problems”.
Back in September, Ramakrishna defended Woods Hole’s work, saying it does not take corporate money for its marine geongineering studies but only philanthropic foundations or governmental grants. It seeks permits from governments which involves long conversations and consultations, he added.
Pushing back against criticism, he said: “Some environmental groups say ‘oh my god, that is really messing with the environment. We are messing with the ocean environment today. You know, we should be mindful of that.”
The post Ocean advocates warn COP31 agreement should not be read as geoengineering boost appeared first on Climate Home News.
U.S. Fossil Fuel Emissions to Drop This Year, Despite Surging Power Demand
U.S. fossil fuel emissions are set to dip this year thanks to declines in coal power and diminished demand for gasoline. The drop comes despite rising demand for power and an aggressive push by the Trump administration to buoy coal.
Wind revival whips up “all-time record” for committed renewables projects, closes gap to 2030 target
Scorecard shows record quarter for committed renewables – mostly from wind and battery projects, and most notably in the Sunshine State.
The post Wind revival whips up “all-time record” for committed renewables projects, closes gap to 2030 target appeared first on Renew Economy.
Ecologists followed an acorn trail. It led to Lyme disease.
When people coined the proverb that “mighty oaks from little acorns grow”, they certainly weren’t thinking of Lyme disease.
But literal acorns—not poetic metaphors—turn out to play a surprisingly big role in the spread of this mighty tick-borne illness, according to a recent paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. A surge in acorns one year can translate into a boom two years later in the population of ticks that transmit the disease to people.
This discovery illustrates the ways in which a web of tiny, interconnected things—acorns, mice, microbes—can have big and unexpected consequences for people. It also shows that it can take decades of scientific research to decipher the head-scratching complexity of ecosystems.
The results are “helping us to inform management of tick-borne disease risk,” said Shannon LaDeau, one of the paper’s authors and an ecologist with the Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies in New York State’s Hudson River Valley.
LaDeau and colleague Richard Ostfeld oversee a Lyme-related research program at the institute that stretches back more than 30 years, just a few decades after the disease was first identified. Over that time, scientists have turned plots of New York forestland into an outdoor Lyme laboratory. They’ve assembled mountains of data tracking the ups and downs of a huge range of elements: temperature, rainfall, oak seedlings, mouse populations, tick numbers, infection rates, you name it.
The results have repeatedly surprised scientists, defying expectations about the disease.
It’s been known since the 1980s that the disease is caused by the bacteria Borrelia burgdorferi. The bite of an infected deer tick transmits the bacterium to people, causing flu-like symptoms that can escalate to chronic fatigue, memory loss, depression and even brain swelling and cardiac problems. More than 450,000 cases are reported in the U.S. each year, plus more than 200,000 in Europe.
Despite the tick’s association with deer, the Cary Institute work didn’t bear out initial suspicions that more white-tailed deer translated into more dangers for people. The researchers found no correlation between deer numbers and the abundance of tick nymphs—the life stage when they most commonly transmit the disease to people. Nor did they find a link to seasonal temperature extremes.
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Instead, the researchers uncovered evidence of a cascade of cause and effect between oak trees, white-footed mice and ticks.
Acorns from red oak trees at the study sites are a primary food source for the mice. The year after a big acorn harvest, the mouse population boomed, the scientists found. The mice, in turn, are a prime feeding target for larval ticks which go on to become nymphs the following year. A big year for mice translated into a roughly 40% increase in abundance of tick nymphs the next year. All this thanks to a bumper crop in acorns two years earlier.
While acorns aren’t abundant everywhere that the disease occurs, fluctuations in other crucial mouse food, such as seeds, could have the same effect, the scientists wrote.
While it took years to tease apart these dynamics, researchers were still puzzled by other patterns. A surge in mice meant more ticks—and therefore a greater risk of people getting infected. But it didn’t translate into a higher percentage of the ticks themselves carrying the disease, the data showed.
“It kept me up at night,” Ostfeld said of the result. “It meant that my understanding of how the system works was incomplete or wrong.”
An apparent answer emerged when the researchers looked not just at the mouse population, but at a variety of small mammals.
The long-term study plots were located in relatively intact forest that supported a range of other warm-blooded critters, such as skunks, squirrels and opossums. Many of these creatures are less prone to getting infected when a tick feeds on them, which also means they are less likely to spread the bacteria to other ticks. As a consequence, the percentage of infected ticks was driven not just by the number of mice but the population of a range of creatures.
By contrast, in nearby places where forests had been broken into pieces by human intrusion, the diversity of small mammals was smaller. In those spots, where ticks had fewer options, higher mouse numbers did translate into more infected ticks.
So in addition to small things like acorns, add two very big things that shape people’s risk of encountering Lyme disease: loss of habitat and of biodiversity.
Ostfeld, et. al. “The ecology of Lyme disease: Long-term data, surprises, and a synthesis.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Aug. 17, 2026.
Image:© Theclarkester| Dreamstime.com
Op-Ed | Who Will Feed the Future? The Earth’s Guardians Have an Answer
For Indigenous Peoples, food is more than sustenance. It connects us to ancestral lands and waters, those who came before us, and generations yet to come. Across Kenya’s Maasai rangelands, the waterways of Aotearoa New Zealand, and Mexico’s ancestral farming landscapes, our traditions differ. Yet we share a conviction: food systems cannot be healthy when the relationships sustaining them are broken.
For Maasai communities, pastoralism is a way of life shaped by generations of knowledge and care for nature. Land, livestock, water, and people are inseparable. Healthy grass and soil sustain cattle and families; water sustains herds and wildlife. Restoring rangelands means sustaining cultural identity and responsibilities passed between generations, not merely increasing production.
In Aotearoa, the Māori word kai carries relationships with land, waterways, and living creatures. Through genealogy, we understand ourselves as kin within the natural world. Customary practices teach us to take only what is needed and honour what is given. Returning the first catch to the ocean, for example, acknowledges both the privilege and responsibility of gathering food.
Among Otomí–Toltec communities in Mexico, seeds are blessed before planting, recognizing spiritual relationships within the milpa, where maize grows alongside other crops. Sacred maize is adorned with flowers as it matures; harvest is an occasion to thank Mother Earth. Cultivation, natural fertilizers, ceremony, and teaching children keep these relationships alive.
These are not traditions frozen in time. They are living approaches to biodiversity, nourishment, and adaptation. Yet climate disruption, ecological degradation, and decisions made far from Indigenous territories threaten their continuity.
In September, we joined the first Global Conscious Food Systems Summit in Bhutan. The gathering challenged participants to consider not only what food systems produce, but how values, relationships, and power shape decisions. Science, technology, and investment matter enormously. But they cannot deliver transformation while decision-makers remain disconnected from communities and the consequences of their choices.
In Kenya, the proposed Oramatiei le Nd’aa initiative in Kajiado County offers one possible path: elders, women, and young people working together to renew food traditions and restore rangelands. It remains a proposal, not a completed success story. Its promise depends on communities directing what happens next.
International recognition of Indigenous knowledge has grown, but recognition without rights or authority is insufficient. We are rights-holders, not simply stakeholders invited to comment after decisions have been made. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples affirms rights to self-determination, lands, resources, and participation in decisions affecting us.
The stakes are tangible. In Mexico, Green Revolution-era agricultural policies promoted synthetic fertilizers and production models that disrupted traditional ecological knowledge and contributed to pollution, soil degradation, and losses of biocultural heritage. Protecting this heritage requires Indigenous Peoples to exercise genuine authority over policies affecting their territories.
Meaningful collaboration begins before a project is designed. It requires respect for rights and consent, resources for community-led priorities, and a willingness by governments, businesses, and institutions to share power. Knowledge cannot be separated from the peoples who hold it or the cultural and spiritual relationships sustaining it.
Bhutan’s call to lead, think, and invest differently offers a practical direction. Lead differently by listening with humility and sharing decisions. Think differently by recognizing Indigenous ways of knowing alongside scientific research. Invest differently by directing resources towards community-defined priorities, territorial stewardship, and cultural continuity, with accountability to rights-holders.
These commitments must be visible beyond conference halls: in policies shaped with Indigenous Peoples, collaborative research, protection of territorial and food sovereignty, and finance that reaches communities without demanding control over their futures.
As the world confronts climate change, biodiversity loss, and food insecurity, success cannot be measured by yields and markets alone. We must also ask whether rivers remain healthy, soils regenerate, livestock and wildlife thrive, cultures flourish, and children inherit the means to feed themselves.
We do not speak for every Indigenous community, nor are our experiences interchangeable. But across our homelands, we know food is a relationship, not merely a commodity. The question is no longer whether Indigenous Peoples can contribute to the future of food. It is whether those shaping that future are prepared to act as genuine partners—and make room for us to lead.
Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.
Photo courtesy of Sammy Wong, Unsplash
The post Op-Ed | Who Will Feed the Future? The Earth’s Guardians Have an Answer appeared first on Food Tank.
Four more countries announce plans to quit fossil fuels while Australia remains silent
Four new countries announce plans to phase out fossil fuels at COP31, with a fifth expected to follow soon. But “political vision” from COP leaders remains lacking.
The post Four more countries announce plans to quit fossil fuels while Australia remains silent appeared first on Renew Economy.
First 100 units in place, as huge battery takes shape next to Australia’s biggest aluminium smelter
AGL marks installation of the first 100 battery units at its Tomago BESS, which is being built next door to the biggest single consumer of energy in NSW.
The post First 100 units in place, as huge battery takes shape next to Australia’s biggest aluminium smelter appeared first on Renew Economy.
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