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Carbon removal combined with emissions reduction is the only remaining pathway to avert catastrophic levels of warming, a new report warns.

Published Sept. 2, 2026

The world has failed in its goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial times, the United Nations said on Wednesday, in a sober assessment that laid out a new goal for fighting climate change that would set the world on an uncertain path.

A decade ago, most of the world’s countries agreed in Paris to try to limit global temperature rise to “well below” two degrees Celsius while aiming for the more ambitious target of 1.5 degrees Celsius, or 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit.

But Wednesday’s 141-page U.N. report warned that the world is certain to breach that mark and should focus on finding ways to limit “overshoot” and eventually bring global temperatures back down.

Despite advancements in wind and solar power, countries have continued to burn oil, gas and coal, releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere where it traps heat and has raised average global temperatures by about 1.4 degrees Celsius. The damage from global warming is now felt across the planet, with intensifying heat, drought, floods, fire and other threats to humans, animals and plants.

The idea laid out in the U.N. report would be extremely difficult because it would require pulling carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere on a colossal scale. Achieving that would potentially mean blanketing enormous parts of the world with forests or relying on novel technologies for sucking carbon out of the air that haven’t yet worked on any significant scale.

Under such a scenario, the planet would still continue to heat up for the foreseeable future, and wouldn’t return to temperatures like today’s for decades or even centuries. And some changes, like glacial melting or rising seas, would be essentially irreversible.

“This is by no means an acceptable or preferred pathway,” the U.N. said in its report Wednesday. “It is simply the best remaining option.”

But even this fallback plan would require the kind of climate ambition and major cuts in greenhouse gas emissions that have long been out of reach. To add to the challenges, the Trump administration has withdrawn the United States, the largest historical emitter of greenhouse gases, from the global fight against climate change and weakened domestic environmental policies.

Based on current climate policies among nations and trends, the planet is expected to warm 2.6 degrees Celsius, or 4.7 degrees Fahrenheit, by the end of the century.

“So long as we fail to find political will, we will be marching past every target we put out there. That is the danger,” said Michael Mann, a professor of earth and environmental science at the University of Pennsylvania who was not involved with the report.

Dr. Mann noted that even at current levels of warming, “dangerous and catastrophic climate change is here,” referencing last week’s deadly glacial collapse and flood in Nepal.

António Guterres, the U.N.’s secretary general, had previously acknowledged that the 1.5 Celsius mark — the most ambitious aspect of the Paris Agreement among nations to limit global warming — would inevitably be breached. The new report makes clear just how little margin there is for the overshoot plan to be feasible.

Specifically, in order for temperatures to be brought back to the 1.5-degree mark this century, global warming at its peak would have to be limited to 1.8 Celsius (3.2 Fahrenheit), compared with preindustrial times. Most scientists describe that as unlikely.

Then, countries would have to ramp up an enormous program for removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Even under the most optimistic scenarios, a single decade of warming could take about 50 years to reverse.

Glen Peters, a senior researcher at the CICERO Center for International Climate Research in Norway, said the idea of bringing down temperatures might sound as easy as “planting a billion trees” to absorb carbon dioxide. But tracts of land larger than entire American states would need to be reforested. Conflicts with agriculture could arise. Higher temperatures could hinder forest growth. And of course, wildfires could stymie progress.

“Anything at scale, you’re going to run into some sort of problem,” said Dr. Peters, who was not involved in the report.

The report says that while tech-based solutions would be needed, it noted that the current industrial capacity to pull carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is extremely limited. The technology has long been controversial in part because the fossil fuel industry has pitched it as a way for their products to continue to be used. Over the course of the industrial age, the burning of fossil fuels has released immense amounts of planet-warming carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.

Climate Analytics, a Berlin-based climate science and policy institute, said in a statement that the U.N. report risked “being a call to apathy,” and criticized the report for not more explicitly mentioning the need to phase out fossil fuels. Countries committed to pivot away from oil, gas and coal at an international climate summit in 2023 but carbon emissions continue to climb.

The U.N. report predicted the rise in average global temperatures would eclipse 1.5 degrees Celsius in “the next few years.” At that level of warming, “there are no good outcomes,” said Inger Andersen, the executive director of the U.N. Environment Program.

Already common extreme weather events, like heat waves and floods, will intensify, as will the melting of glaciers, the rising of sea levels and the bleaching of coral reefs, the report said. There is also a risk of changes in crucial global systems, like the weakening or collapse of ocean currents that carry heat northward from the tropics, the report said, with the potential to “reshape the world forever.”

Ruling finds Biden administration’s approval violated Endangered Species Act

by Hannah Meisel -September 1, 2026

A federal judge this week ordered the U.S. Forest Service to suspend a commercial logging project in southern Illinois’ Shawnee National Forest, finding the 2024 approval of the project under President Joe Biden violated the Endangered Species Act.

The agency improperly approved the project in October 2024 without waiting for a final “biological opinion” from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, an East St. Louis judge ruled Monday. That opinion, which was completed six weeks after the Forest Service approved the logging project, identified the roughly 70-acre project area as home to the federally protected Indiana bat.

Environmental groups sued the Forest Service last summer, alleging the agency’s own August 2024 assessment of the area disclosed Indiana bats had been detected in the project area. The assessment, an internal, nonpublic document, concluded that even if the Forest Service implemented all legally required mitigation measures, the logging project would be “likely to adversely affect” the endangered bats.

The groups alleged the agency’s “decision memo” approving the project that fall was “written to falsely suggest that the Forest Service’s surveys detected no endangered bats in the project area” and did not mention or even cite its August 2024 assessment in the memo.

But the Forest Service argued that it hadn’t violated the Endangered Species Act because it didn’t commit any resources to the project until early 2025 — well after the Fish and Wildlife Service issued its final opinion approving the project so long as the Forest Service agreed to certain mitigation measures.

Additionally, the Forest Service maintains the other agency’s opinion contained “no new information” that wasn’t included in its own assessment and points to mitigation measures included in both agencies’ project directives. Therefore, the Forest Service argued that nothing about the project’s approval would have changed had the agency waited for the final opinion in 2024.

The Forest Service further argued that the project approval wouldn’t change in 2026 even if a court vacated the decision memo and ordered officials to take the final opinion into account before reapproving it. But U.S. District Judge Nancy Rosenstengel didn’t buy that argument.

“An agency cannot evade the jurisdiction of the federal courts merely by promising that it will not change its mind even if a court orders it to reconsider; otherwise, an agency could act as arbitrarily and capriciously as it wished and simply moot every challenge that came its way,” she wrote in her 27-page opinion. “Fortunately, this is not the law.”

Half-complete project

Indiana bats, found primarily in Midwestern states, were first identified as endangered in the mid-1960s. According to the Fish and Wildlife Service, by 2019 the population had declined by half in the five decades since, and has been particularly affected by white-nose syndrome since its 2007 arrival in North America.

While the bats spend winter hibernating in caves and mines, colonies of Indiana bats typically spend the warmer months roosting in the peeling bark of large, often dead trees. The Fish and Wildlife Service’s final opinion advised against the Forest Service doing the logging project between April and October.

But the Forest Service’s project approval contained no directives on timing, and the logging company the agency contracted for the job began its work in mid-August 2025. By the time Rosenstengel issued a temporary restraining order halting the logging project eight days later, the contractor had already thinned out 40 of the 67 acres constituting the project area in rural Pope County along the Ohio River.

Though the judge dissolved her order less than two weeks later, the contractor still hasn’t returned to finish the job in the year since it left. Rosenstengel pointed out the lack of urgency to complete the project undercut the Forest Service’s arguments that vacating its project approval would result in delays that “could reduce wildlife habitat, increase soil erosion” and cause economic harm as the already cut lumber has been laying on the forest floor for a year, possibly decaying.

“In other words, all of the harms contemplated by the Forest Service when discussing vacatur are already accruing through its contractor’s inaction,” she wrote. “The Court has not prevented the Forest Service from requiring its contractor to re-initiate work, from hiring a different contractor, or from finishing the work itself.”

Meanwhile, the Trump administration this summer has moved to change two federal rules that would make it easier to approve logging projects on federal land and national forests like Shawnee, in addition to oil and gas drilling and other development.

In July, the administration finalized a rule weakening the Endangered Species Act, narrowing the definition of “harm,” which has for decades been interpreted broadly to block encroachment on areas where threatened and endangered animals live. Under the new rule, wildlife habitats would be fair game for industry so long as the animals themselves aren’t injured or killed in the process.

In another rule proposed last month, the Forest Service is rolling back a 25-year-old policy blocking road construction in federally owned land, which would open the door to logging and mining activity on tens of millions of acres controlled by the government. The administration maintains the rule has prevented proper maintenance of forest land, increasing wildfire risk. But many environmental groups claim clearing more trees and building more roads would have the opposite effect.

Some areas of Shawnee, including an area near the Pope County logging project, is currently subject to the so-called “Roadless Rule.”

Capitol News Illinois is a nonprofit, nonpartisan news service that distributes state government coverage to hundreds of news outlets statewide. It is funded primarily by the Illinois Press Foundation and the Robert R. McCormick Foundation.

Thousands of Americans die every year from a chronically underreported cause: heat.
August 31, 2026
by Alejandra Borunda
Read article here

As summer heat intensifies because of human-driven climate change, the United States’ official tally of heat-related deaths does not come close to capturing the full human toll. The data feeding into nationwide death counts is collected inconsistently and rarely thoroughly.

The result is a vast undercount of the number of people who die because of heat. And experts say failing to recognize and address this may cost more people their lives.

So NPR set out to create a more comprehensive national count.

The Undercount: The invisible death toll from climate change

Here’s why an Arizona medical examiner is working to track heat-related deaths

We partnered with Boston University to find the total number of deaths influenced by heat every year in the United States. The investigation took two years and involved building a statistical model that assessed nearly every county in the country. The full analysis will soon be published in a scientific journal.

An accurate assessment of the true scope — as well as understanding who is affected, where and why — is critical for developing lifesaving solutions, says Quinn Adams, a research scientist at Boston University’s Center for Climate and Health and the lead partner in the joint NPR-BU investigation.

COMIC: How excessive heat kills and how to stay safe

Beyond the statistical assessment, NPR set out to find people whose deaths slipped through the cracks — those who might not have died if heat hadn’t pushed them beyond their breaking point — to understand exactly how heat could be missed as a factor. We will be bringing you their stories in the coming days.

But first, here are three key takeaways from our research — and why it matters.

How big is the undercount?

The scale of the undercount is significant.

The primary keeper of cause-of-death records in the U.S. is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It keeps an annual tally of heat-related deaths in the U.S., which is compiled from state reports based on whether heat is noted on individual death records.

From 2004 to 2018, the national number of heat-related deaths compiled by the CDC was low: on average, around 700 a year. The number has crept up in recent years, averaging around 1,700 but sometimes topping 2,000, as heat risks grow and counting strategies evolve.

But even that number is an underestimate, according to NPR and BU’s analysis. On average between 2018 and 2025, we estimate that some 9,000 deaths each year in the country are impacted by heat — a factor of five higher than the official average over that same period.

Some years, heat-related deaths can top 10,000.

The true figure could be even higher, says Adams, because of some limitations in the data and the conservative nature of our analysis.


The dangers from heat are growing every year because of human-caused climate change. The heat wave season has extended by a month and a half since the 1960s. In 50 of the country’s biggest cities, the number of heat waves has doubled since the 1980s. Heat domes that settle over the country regularly expose tens of millions of Americans — sometimes well over 100 million at a time — to dangerous heat.

“The frequency and the duration of these heat events has been expanding very rapidly,” says Adams. “That’s what we can expect moving forward into the next few decades: having more heat waves, and having them last longer, and having them be more intense such that people don’t get the escape from the heat that they need to physiologically reset.”

The reasons for the undercount are complex. But a crucial issue, says doctor and researcher Sameed Khatana of the University of Pennsylvania’s Perelman School of Medicine, is that heat’s role in a death is often masked by other more obvious causes of death, like a heart attack.

“Heat is what people often call the silent killer, compared to things like hurricanes and typhoons,” says Khatana.

Climate Why certain medications can increase your risk in the heat

Heat, he says, can often be the trigger that pushes someone’s health condition — like cardiovascular disease — from manageable to fatal. “The heart starts beating faster and harder,” he explains, to shunt blood to the skin to cool the body. And eventually, if someone’s heart is already weak, it may not be able “to keep up with the demand that was required of it,” he says. That can lead to something like a heart attack.

But often, Khatana says, because heat leaves no obvious mark behind for doctors or coroners to examine, the cause of death gets marked down only as a heart attack. Heat isn’t noted on the death certificate, and therefore it is not included in the tallies reported to the municipality, the state and eventually the federal recordkeepers.

Such omissions are understandable, Khatana says. But repeated thousands of times, in all parts of the country, they create a blind spot that obscures the scale of heat’s danger.

National risks — even in unexpected places

The NPR and BU investigation found that heat is killing people in nearly every corner of the country.

Our analysis finds that Florida and Texas have the most heat-related deaths overall. That is in part due to their large populations. But those states remain among the most impacted even when adjusted for their size.

But the losses are not limited to states historically considered hot.

Source: CDC’s WONDER database; ERA5-Land weather database

Our model finds that more than 100 people die from heat-related causes in Michigan every year, 10 times the official reported numbers. In Massachusetts, official records say only about 5 people die from heat each year, but our estimate suggests that number could be more than 60.

And in Florida, the difference is even more dramatic: We estimate more than 1,900 deaths each year, about 40 times as many as reported.

Heat can be particularly dangerous for people who are not already used to it. And in many parts of the country that were not historically hot, infrastructure to keep cool is less common. Nearly all homes in Alabama have some form of air conditioning, for example. But in Washington state, only 53% of homes do. In Maine, 70% do. Yet the risks of heat exist, and are growing, in those states as well as those where it is a more entrenched problem.

Counts are getting more accurate — but not everywhere

The official national counts from the CDC have trended upward in recent years, rising from an average of roughly 700 between 2004 and 2018 to about 1,700 between 2018 and 2025.

That increase is due in large part to two things: Heat is simply getting worse, according to the most recent National Climate Assessment, and also there is better counting of heat-related deaths in some parts of the country.

Arizona’s Maricopa County — home to Phoenix — has developed sophisticated protocols for sussing out the subtle influences of heat on people’s deaths. Maricopa County trains “death investigators” to look for signs of heat stress, such as asking about the state of the deceased’s air conditioning system, their ability to pay electric bills to run ACs, their use of medications that increase heat sensitivity, and more.

But Maricopa County is something of an outlier. In contrast, the counties home to Los Angeles and Houston report very few heat-related deaths. Yet our model finds hundreds of people likely die in each of those counties because of heat each year.

Los Angeles recognizes the problem, says Nichole Quick, the chief science officer at the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health. The county’s official numbers “are vast undercounts,” Quick says. “The true impact of this is higher than I think a lot of the numbers show.”

Short Wave Summers are getting hotter. Here’s how experts say to cope with it

But solving the counting problem isn’t simple. It took Maricopa County years to fine-tune its strategies for more accurately assessing heat’s impact on deaths. And many doctors who certify deaths in emergency rooms and hospitals, or for patients who die at home, don’t have protocols for confidently identifying heat impacts, says Khatana.

Until such issues are addressed, says Adams, the undercount will remain, and heat’s true toll will remain obscured — making it harder for policymakers, planners and families to understand the urgency to protect themselves.

“Most people do not see themselves as vulnerable to heat. They’re like, ‘Oh, that’s someone else. It’s not me,'” says Adams. But the data is clear: Heat can take anyone, anywhere in the country. “But then, you know, push comes to shove and it actually is you.”

NPR will be continuing this coverage in the coming days, exploring why deaths slip through the cracks and how lives can be saved.

Credits

Nick McMillan contributed to this report.

This reporting was supported by a Nova Institute for Health Media Fellowship. It was also supported by the Dennis A. Hunt Fund for Health Journalism.

Maine State Nurses Association/National Nurses Organizing Committee, an affiliate for National Nurses United (NNU), released the following statement today in response to illegal discipline against nurses by Prime Healthcare.

New York State Nurses Association and National Nurses United announced a co-endorsement of Claire Valdez for New York’s 7th, Brad Lander for New York’s 10th, and Darializa Avila Chevalier for New York’s 13th congressional districts. Together, these three candidates represent nurses’ values of caring and compassion.

To celebrate the 20th anniversary of Rights of Nature in Tamaqua, CELDF is sharing an interview with Cathy Miorelli and CELDF’s Education Director Ben Price as the two recall some of the events and impacts that led to the historic ordinance adoption in 2006.

The post Press Release: 20th Anniversary of Rights of Nature  appeared first on CELDF - Community Rights Pioneers - Protecting Nature and Communities.

Fifteen miles from downtown Detroit, goldenrods, asters, and blazing stars shine in a sea of grass. Bats, butterflies and birds skim the air; foxes rustle in bluestem and Indian grass. This is Sibley...

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026 SLF-2007-061 The Sakhalin Papers LI: The Billion-Rouble Exit Price — Novatek, Gazprom and the US$1 Billion Shell Still Could Not Simply Collect In April 2023, the Russian government put a precise price on the 27.5% Sakhalin II interest Shell had declined to take in the replacement Russian operator: 94.8 billion roubles. Novatek was approved as purchaser. Shell’s response was immediate — no money had been received and its legal rights remained intact. Eleven months later, Moscow cancelled the Novatek arrangement and substituted a Gazprom-owned company at exactly the same price. The stake changed hands. The cash did not simply pass to Shell. By 2024, the 94 billion-rouble pot had become entangled with restricted-account rules and a much larger Russian claim against Shell. The corporate exit announced in February 2022 had become a battle over who was entitled to the exit proceeds. 1. A price finally appeared

The previous instalment followed Shell out of the operating Sakhalin II project.

By April 2023, Moscow had reached the next stage.

Russian Government Order No. 890-r, dated 11 April 2023, approved the sale of the unclaimed 27.49999998621683%interest in the new Sakhalin Energy LLC for:

94.8 billion roubles

and designated Novatek Moscow Region LLC as purchaser. Interfax reported that the order had been published through Russia’s official legal-information system. (Interfax)

At the exchange rate quoted in contemporaneous Reuters reporting, that amounted to approximately US$1.16 billion. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)

The precision of the Russian order is striking.

Not simply “about 27.5%.”

Not simply “approximately 95 billion roubles.”

The legal instrument identified the interest to fourteen decimal places and fixed the price at 94.8 billion roubles.

But fixing a price was not the same thing as paying Shell.

2. This was not a conventional Shell sale

The legal structure needs to remain clear.

Shell had not negotiated with Novatek and signed an ordinary share-purchase agreement transferring its original Bermuda-incorporated Sakhalin Energy shares.

Following President Vladimir Putin’s June 2022 decree, the operating rights and obligations of the old Sakhalin Energy Investment Company had been moved, under Russian law, into a newly created Russian company.

Mitsui and Mitsubishi elected to participate in that company.

Shell did not. (Interfax)

The 27.5% interest being allocated by Moscow in 2023 was therefore an unclaimed interest in the replacement Russian operator.

That distinction matters because Shell has continued to state that it retains legal rights connected with its 27.5% minus one share interest in the original Bermuda company. (BOE Report)

The Russian state was arranging disposition of the new Russian-company interest.

Shell was preserving its legal position concerning the old one.

Those were related, but not identical, propositions.

3. Novatek appeared to have won

Novatek had publicly expressed interest in acquiring the interest.

The Russian government then approved it as buyer at the 94.8 billion-rouble valuation. (Interfax)

Contemporaneous Reuters reporting described the transaction straightforwardly as Moscow approving the sale of Shell’s former 27.5% stake in Sakhalin II to Novatek. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)

From outside, the sequence appeared simple:

Shell had left.

Russia had valued the interest.

Novatek would buy it.

Shell would receive compensation.

But almost immediately, Shell inserted an important qualification.

4. Shell: “No payments have been made”

On 4 May 2023, Shell Chief Financial Officer Sinead Gorman was asked about reports that the Sakhalin interest had been sold to Novatek.

Her answer was concise:

“No payments have been made and we retain our legal rights.”

Interfax recorded Gorman emphasising that Shell was aware of Russian press reports but had not received the proceeds. (Interfax)

That sentence is one of the key documentary markers in Shell’s Russian withdrawal.

Moscow had selected a purchaser.

Moscow had fixed a price.

Russian media were discussing the foreign-exchange consequences of transferring nearly 95 billion roubles.

Yet Shell said it had received nothing.

The difference between a government-approved disposition and a completed payment was already becoming apparent.

5. Russian rules contained another obstacle

The Russian mechanism did not simply say:

buyer pays 94.8 billion roubles;

Shell receives 94.8 billion roubles.

Interfax reported that foreign partners could receive proceeds only after determining and offsetting compensation for alleged damage connected with implementation of the project. (Interfax)

That qualification descended directly from the special legal machinery imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent rupture with Western companies.

In other words, the 94.8 billion roubles represented a valuation and sale price.

It did not necessarily represent an unconditional debt immediately payable to Shell.

That difference would later become crucial.

6. The money briefly became a foreign-exchange story

During April 2023, Russian reporting even linked the proposed Shell payment with movements in the rouble.

The suggestion was that conversion and repatriation of nearly 95 billion roubles could create significant demand for foreign currency.

Russian officials pushed back against exaggerated interpretations.

Interfax reported Deputy Finance Minister Alexei Moiseyev pointing out that large foreign-exchange transactions connected with corporate exits were subject to restrictions imposed by the Central Bank. (Interfax)

This episode illustrates how real the expected payment appeared at the time.

Markets were discussing how Shell might convert the money.

Shell was saying it had not received it.

7. The Novatek deal then stalled

The expected transaction did not proceed to the straightforward conclusion implied by the April 2023 order.

Almost a year passed.

Then Moscow changed the buyer.

On 23 March 2024, the Russian government issued Order No. 701-r.

The Novatek order was declared invalid.

In its place, the government approved Sakhalin Project LLC as purchaser. (Interfax)

Sakhalin Project was part of the Gazprom group.

And the price?

Exactly the same:

94.8 billion roubles

There was no newly negotiated valuation.

The state changed the buyer.

The figure survived unchanged.

8. Moscow gave no public explanation for replacing Novatek

Reuters reported that the Russian government nullified the year-old decision to sell the interest to Novatek without explaining why. (Business Standard)

Interfax likewise recorded that Gazprom had replaced Novatek as purchaser and that the April 2023 order was no longer valid. (Interfax)

The archive therefore should not invent an explanation.

It is possible to speculate about commercial, political or legal reasons.

There is no need.

The documentary fact is sufficient:

Novatek was approved in April 2023.

The Novatek transaction did not move forward.

Gazprom’s vehicle replaced it in March 2024.

The 94.8 billion-rouble price remained unchanged.

Anything beyond that requires evidence.

9. Gazprom ended up controlling nearly 78%

Before the restructuring, Gazprom had held just over 50% of Sakhalin Energy.

Mitsui retained 12.5%.

Mitsubishi retained 10%.

The acquisition of the former Shell allocation took Gazprom’s effective interest in the replacement operator to approximately 77.5%. (Interfax)

The ownership transformation was therefore substantial.

Shell, which had once led development of Sakhalin II, was outside the Russian operating company.

Gazprom now exercised overwhelming control.

The Japanese partners remained.

The project itself continued producing LNG.

But Shell’s financial rights connected with the exit were still unresolved.

10. Shell again reserved its rights

When Reuters reported the Gazprom transaction in March 2024, Shell did not describe the matter as a normal completed sale from which it had received the purchase price.

Its statement was carefully worded.

Shell said it could not comment on matters relating to the Russian government decree process and added that it reserved all legal rights relating to its 27.5% minus one share interest in Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. (BOE Report)

This language is significant.

Shell was not accepting the proposition that Moscow’s disposal of the replacement-company interest had extinguished every right Shell associated with its original investment.

Nor did Shell publicly acknowledge receipt of the 94.8 billion roubles.

The legal position had become layered:

Russia had transferred the project into a Russian entity.

Shell had refused to join it.

Russia had valued the unclaimed interest.

Russia had designated Novatek.

Russia had cancelled Novatek.

Russia had designated a Gazprom company.

Gazprom had acquired the interest.

Shell continued reserving its rights.

That is not a conventional divestment.

11. The dollar value changed even though the rouble figure did not

There is an instructive detail in the contemporaneous reporting.

When Novatek was approved in April 2023, Reuters valued 94.8 billion roubles at approximately US$1.16 billion. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)

When the Gazprom-controlled buyer was approved in March 2024, Reuters valued the same 94.8 billion roubles at approximately US$1.02 billion. (Business Standard)

Nothing had changed in the Russian government’s nominal valuation.

The exchange rate had.

That is another reminder that even if Shell ultimately became entitled to the full rouble amount, the value of the compensation in Shell’s reporting currency was not fixed.

Time itself was changing the economics.

12. Gazprom’s accounting tells another part of the story

The Russian buyer did not subsequently account for the Sakhalin interest as though 94.8 billion roubles represented the full economic value of what it obtained.

Gazprom’s financial reporting later recognised a very large gain associated with increasing its Sakhalin II interest.

Bloomberg reported that Gazprom provisionally recognised a gain of approximately 167.4 billion roubles in the first half of 2024 after purchasing Shell’s former 27.5% allocation. (The Star)

Later reporting said that figure was revised upward.

The accounting point is important but should not be overstated.

A bargain-purchase gain does not prove that Russia deliberately cheated Shell or establish what Shell would have obtained in an unrestricted arm’s-length sale.

Accounting fair-value measurements and politically constrained exit prices are not the same thing.

What it does establish is that Gazprom itself recognised an economic value from the acquisition materially greater than the cash price it paid.

13. The 94.8 billion roubles did not disappear

By October 2024, the compensation figure reappeared in an entirely different context.

Russia’s Prosecutor General brought proceedings against eight Shell-group entities.

Interfax reported that the Russian claim was approximately comparable in scale to the 94.8 billion roubles paid for the Sakhalin interest. (Interfax)

Shell’s own SEC filing later explained the position much more precisely.

According to Shell, the Russian prosecutor seeks a declaration allowing Gazprom Export to take approximately 94 billion roubles purportedly set aside for Shell for Sakhalin equity compensation from a Type-C account, and to offset that money against part of an alleged debt owed by Shell Energy Europe to Gazprom Export. (SEC)

The money had therefore travelled conceptually through several stages:

a valuation;

a proposed Novatek acquisition;

a Gazprom acquisition;

a restricted compensation pot;

and finally a potential litigation set-off.

Shell still had not simply collected the exit price.

14. The separate Russian claim is much larger

The 94 billion-rouble fund is only one component of the current dispute.

Shell’s latest annual reporting states that the Russian prosecutor also seeks approximately:

€1.5 billion

from Shell Energy Europe Limited for alleged unpaid gas deliveries during 2022. (Shell)

The prosecutor also seeks declarations concerning what it characterises as Shell’s unlawful abandonment of support for Sakhalin Energy Investment Company.

These are allegations.

They are not findings of liability.

That distinction is particularly important because the Russian proceedings remain unresolved in Shell’s latest authenticated annual report. (Shell)

15. The Sakhalin compensation became collateral in another dispute

This is perhaps the most revealing development in the entire exit-price saga.

The 94.8 billion roubles originally looked like compensation for an asset Shell could no longer operate.

By late 2024, Russia was seeking to use approximately that same pool of money to satisfy part of an entirely different alleged obligation.

A compensation mechanism had become a litigation asset.

That is why describing the March 2024 transaction simply as:

“Gazprom bought Shell’s Sakhalin stake for US$1 billion”

is incomplete.

Gazprom did acquire the replacement-company interest for that price.

But the documentary record does not show Shell simply receiving an unrestricted US$1 billion equivalent.

Shell’s own latest disclosures say the compensation is caught inside the dispute.

16. Shell still owns shares — but not the operating project

There is another apparent paradox.

Shell’s latest reporting continues to identify its 27.5% minus one share interest in Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd, the Bermuda-incorporated predecessor entity.

At the same time, Shell notes that this company purportedly no longer holds the licences, rights and obligations associated with Sakhalin II. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)

This is why phrases such as “Shell sold its Sakhalin stake to Gazprom” require qualification.

Economically, Gazprom acquired the 27.5% allocation in the new Russian operating company corresponding to Shell’s former position.

Legally, Shell continues to preserve rights connected with shares in the predecessor company.

The operating interest and the original corporate interest are no longer the same thing.

17. The project itself continued

None of this stopped Sakhalin II from producing LNG.

Interfax reported production of approximately 11.5 million tonnes of LNG in 2022. (Interfax)

Reuters later reported that production exceeded 10 million tonnes in 2023, with cargoes continuing to move principally to Asian destinations including Japan, South Korea and China. (BOE Report)

This is another important part of the story.

Shell withdrew.

The corporate vehicle changed.

Ownership changed.

The dispute over compensation persisted.

But the physical asset kept producing.

The project Shell had spent decades building did not disappear with Shell’s exit.

Its economic life continued under a different ownership structure.

18. The Japanese shareholders demonstrate the alternative path

Mitsui and Mitsubishi chose a different course.

They accepted interests in the replacement Russian company.

That decision preserved their direct participation in the operating project.

Shell chose not to.

There were obvious political, sanctions, governance and corporate-policy reasons for Shell’s withdrawal after Russia invaded Ukraine.

This archive does not suggest that remaining would necessarily have been preferable.

The comparison matters for another reason.

It shows that the subsequent compensation dispute was not an unavoidable consequence for every foreign shareholder.

It followed from Shell’s decision not to enter the replacement corporate structure and Russia’s imposed mechanism for disposing of the resulting unclaimed interest. (Interfax)

19. Was 94.8 billion roubles a fair price?

The documentary record does not permit a definitive answer.

Russia determined the valuation under a state-created mechanism after fundamentally restructuring the project.

The sale was not an unrestricted international auction.

Shell did not negotiate the transaction as seller in an ordinary commercial process.

Gazprom later recorded a substantial accounting gain from acquiring the additional interest. (The Star)

Those facts provide context.

They do not establish what an arm’s-length market price would have been.

Accordingly:

Established: Russia fixed the interest’s sale price at 94.8 billion roubles.

Established: Novatek was initially selected.

Established: Gazprom’s vehicle eventually acquired the interest at the same price.

Established: Gazprom subsequently recognised a substantial accounting gain associated with increasing its Sakhalin interest.

Not established: that 94.8 billion roubles represented fair market value.

Not established: that Shell was legally entitled to receive that full amount free of offsets or restrictions.

Not established: that Gazprom’s accounting gain measures any loss legally recoverable by Shell.

20. Shell’s latest position: uncertainty

The most recent authenticated Shell position is contained in its 2025 Annual Report and Accounts, published in March 2026.

Shell states that the Russian proceedings remain ongoing.

It says that the magnitude and timing of any possible obligations or payments cannot presently be estimated reliably.

It also describes a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the ultimate outcome and potential effects on future operations, earnings, cash flow and financial condition. (Shell)

Four and a half years after Shell announced its intention to leave Sakhalin II, that is where the documentary record stands.

Not with a clean closing statement.

Not with a confirmed payment.

But with:

an old Bermuda shareholding;

a Russian operating company Shell did not join;

a 94.8 billion-rouble acquisition price paid by a Gazprom entity;

a restricted compensation account;

and unresolved Moscow litigation.

Documentary Findings

Established: Russian Government Order No. 890-r of 11 April 2023 fixed the sale price of the unclaimed 27.5% Sakhalin Energy LLC interest at 94.8 billion roubles and selected Novatek Moscow Region LLC as purchaser. (Interfax)

Established: In May 2023, Shell CFO Sinead Gorman said Shell had received no payment and retained its legal rights. (Interfax)

Established: The Novatek transaction did not proceed as originally contemplated.

Established: Russian Government Order No. 701-r of 23 March 2024 replaced Novatek with Gazprom-controlled Sakhalin Project LLC while retaining the 94.8 billion-rouble price. (Interfax)

Established: Reuters reported the Gazprom entity’s acquisition of the 27.5% interest for approximately US$1 billion in March 2024. (Business Standard)

Established: Shell responded that it reserved all legal rights associated with its interest in Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. (BOE Report)

Established: Shell’s latest annual reporting says approximately 94 billion roubles purportedly set aside for Shell’s Sakhalin equity compensation is held in a Type-C account and is now the subject of a Russian request for set-off against an alleged debt. (Shell)

Established: The same Russian proceedings seek approximately €1.5 billion from Shell Energy Europe for alleged unpaid 2022 gas deliveries. (Shell)

Alleged: The Russian prosecutor’s assertions concerning Shell’s conduct and unpaid gas obligations remain allegations in pending litigation.

Not established: that Shell has received the 94.8 billion roubles.

Not established: that Russia’s valuation represented unrestricted fair-market value.

Not established: that Shell will ultimately recover the compensation or be liable for the claims now asserted against it.

Commentary

Shell’s Sakhalin exit is a useful demonstration of the difference between leaving an asset operationally and leaving it legally.

Operationally, Shell was gone quickly.

Its directors resigned.

Its personnel were withdrawn.

Its influence disappeared.

The Russian state transferred the project into a replacement company.

But ownership rights, compensation rights, LNG-contract disputes and alleged gas-payment liabilities survived.

The 94.8 billion-rouble figure became the thread connecting all of them.

First it was an exit valuation.

Then it was Novatek’s purchase price.

Then Gazprom’s.

Then a compensation pool.

Now Russia wants to use that same pool against Shell in litigation.

A neat corporate exit never occurred.

What occurred was a transfer of control followed by years of legal aftershocks.

Source Record

The principal Russian-government action in 2023 is Order No. 890-r of 11 April 2023, approving Novatek Moscow Region LLC as purchaser of the 27.49999998621683% interest for 94.8 billion roubles. Interfax reproduced the operative terms and recorded publication through Russia’s official legal-information portal. (Interfax)

Interfax — Russian government approves Novatek purchase, 12 April 2023

Shell CFO Sinead Gorman’s May 2023 statement provides the clearest contemporaneous Shell response: no payment had been received and Shell retained its legal rights. (Interfax)

Interfax — Shell says no Sakhalin payment received, 4 May 2023

The principal 2024 Russian action is Order No. 701-r of 23 March 2024, replacing Novatek with Gazprom-controlled Sakhalin Project LLC at the same 94.8 billion-rouble price. (Interfax)

Interfax — Gazprom replaces Novatek as buyer, 25 March 2024

Reuters contemporaneously reported the Gazprom transaction and Shell’s continued reservation of legal rights. (BOE Report)

Reuters report — Gazprom acquisition of former Shell allocation

Shell’s latest authenticated position is contained in its 2025 Annual Report and Accounts and SEC reporting, which describe the continuing Moscow litigation, the approximately €1.5 billion alleged gas debt and the attempt to access approximately 94 billion roubles held for Sakhalin compensation. (Shell)

Shell Annual Report and Accounts 2025

SEC — Shell Russia contingency disclosure

Archive disclaimer: This instalment distinguishes between Shell’s original interest in the Bermuda-incorporated Sakhalin Energy Investment Company, the unclaimed interest in the replacement Russian operator, and the Russian-government mechanism used to dispose of that interest. Russian prosecutorial claims are identified as allegations and are not presented as findings of liability. No inference of unlawful expropriation, unfair valuation or legal entitlement to compensation is made beyond what the cited documents establish.

Site-wide disclaimer applies.

Next instalment The Sakhalin Papers LII: The Type-C Account — €1.5 Billion in Gas Claims, 94 Billion Roubles in Compensation and the Moscow Lawsuit Shell Cannot Yet Close

The 94.8 billion-rouble exit price did not end the Sakhalin story.

It became part of another dispute.

In October 2024, the Russian Prosecutor General sued eight Shell-group entities.

The claim reaches beyond Sakhalin ownership itself.

Russia alleges that Shell Energy Europe failed to pay approximately €1.5 billion for gas delivered in 2022.

It also seeks access to the 94 billion roubles purportedly reserved as Sakhalin equity compensation so that those funds can be applied against the alleged debt. (Shell)

Shell says the outcome remains highly uncertain.

The next file follows the litigation itself:

What is Russia alleging, how did an LNG supply dispute become tied to Shell’s Sakhalin compensation, what has happened inside the Moscow court, and why does Shell still say it cannot reliably estimate what — if anything — it may ultimately have to pay?

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026 was first posted on September 18, 2026 at 7:24 pm.
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On Friday, a coalition of 15 civil-society and press-freedom organizations demanded that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) release renowned Miami-based journalist Luis Galeano. The letter’s signers include Free Press, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the Freedom of the Press Foundation, the National Association of Hispanic Journalists, PEN America, Reporters Without Borders and the Society of Professional Journalists, among others.

Read the letter.

ICE detained Galeano on Sept. 14, 2026, while he was working as a rideshare driver to support his primary role as director of the news outlet Café con Voz. Galeano came to the United States in 2018 from Nicaragua. His reporting in Nicaragua had exposed the government’s significant human-rights abuses. Later, the Ortega-Murillo regime stripped nearly 100 journalists of their Nicaraguan citizenship as a penalty for covering the government’s totalitarian tactics.

Since arriving in the United States, Galeano has conducted Spanish-language reporting for communities throughout Florida. He has a Social Security number and a work permit, with a pending asylum case filed nearly seven years ago.

“The U.S. government’s targeting and detention of Galeano are a troubling escalation of attacks on journalists and media workers, particularly immigrant journalists, who consistently provide much-needed journalism and civic information for their communities,” the letter reads. “In the case of Galeano, there are severe dangers should the U.S. government seek to ignore his asylum case and move to deport him. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) withdrew temporary protected status (TPS) for Nicaraguan immigrants starting in July 2025. That would mean any unfounded punitive actions taken against Galeano that might lead to his deportation could very well place him in dire circumstances upon return to Nicaragua, where he was a vocal leader in the press community advocating for human rights.”

Free Press Senior Counsel Nora Benavidez said:

“When the government arrests and detains a journalist and prevents them from doing their work, it sends a chilling message to other reporters and civilians considering speaking truth to power. It’s horrifying that Luis Galeano is now the latest in a long line of journalists who came to the United States to report on issues of the day and instead face deportation.

“To be clear: These cases aren’t just about cracking down on immigration. They are about cutting off community access to vital coverage and scaring reporters from holding those in power accountable. If our government can close off channels of exchange and the free flow of ideas, it is no more than a dictatorship. This coalition has joined together to urge for Luis Galeano’s release — and we will continue to advocate for press freedom as essential to our democracy and collective dignity.”

To celebrate the 20th anniversary of Rights of Nature in Tamaqua, CELDF is sharing an interview with Cathy Miorelli and CELDF’s Education Director Ben Price as the two recall some of the events and impacts that led to the historic ordinance adoption in 2006.

The post 20th Anniversary of Rights of Nature appeared first on CELDF - Community Rights Pioneers - Protecting Nature and Communities.

Ukraine may be heading toward one of its strongest harvests since the start of the full-scale war. But in 2026, the central question is no longer how much grain the country can produce. It is how much of that harvest can actually reach buyers.

According to the Ukrainian Grain Association, Ukraine’s combined grain and oilseed harvest could reach 84.6 million metric tons in 2026, up from roughly 80 million metric tons in 2025. As of September 15, 2026, the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine reported over 24.9 million metric tons of wheat and 6.4 million metric tons of barley being harvested. The country is expected to harvest 32.1 million metric tons of corn. If logistics operate without major disruptions, Ukraine’s export potential could approach 52 million metric tons in the 2026/27 marketing year, compared with 41.1 million metric tons in the previous season.

These figures highlight the extraordinary adaptability of Ukrainian agriculture. Farmers continue to work through air raid alerts, cultivate land near the front lines and in mined lands, and cope with labor shortages, damaged machinery, unstable electricity supplies, and rising production costs.

These numbers are impressive, although they should not be read in isolation. For many producers, the situation on the ground remains considerably more difficult than aggregate harvest data would suggest.

Yet a strong harvest alone does not guarantee food system resilience. Ukraine’s challenge is increasingly shifting from production to access. Farmers may be able to grow the grain, but whether they can move it efficiently, safely, and affordably to international markets will determine the real value of the 2026 harvest.

For Ukraine, that difference matters not only for export revenues. It will also shape farmers’ ability to finance the next planting season, maintain stable production, and remain economically viable under prolonged wartime conditions. And for the rest of the world, the stakes extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The country remains a key supplier to global grain markets, meaning that disruptions to its exports can reverberate through food prices, trade routes, and economies dependent on food imports. Ukraine may have the harvest. The harder question is whether the world will be able to receive it.

The harvest is there. Logistics are the bottleneck. In August and September, the scale of Ukraine’s logistics challenge became especially clear. According to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, between August 1 and 26 the country exported 1.423 million metric tons of grains, oilseeds, and processed agricultural products—only about one-third of its potential export volume. Grain exports alone totaled 822 thousand metric tons, or roughly 21 percent of the potential volume needed. Logistics issues worsen grain storage shortages, with slow exports threatening an 8–11 million ton domestic deficit by November.

The problem, then, is not a lack of grain or a lack of buyers. It is the physical ability to deliver agricultural products from Ukrainian farms to global markets. Black Sea ports remain essential to Ukraine’s agricultural trade. According to the Ukrainian Grain Association, seaports handle around 90 percent of the country’s grain and oilseed exports, while overland and other alternative routes cannot fully replace maritime shipping. Due to continuing logistics constraints caused by the war, Ukraine could lose nearly US$10 billion in potential agricultural exports.

There is another problem—the cost of alternatives. According to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, shifting agricultural exports to alternative routes in August increased logistics costs by at least US$50 per metric ton. In particular Atria Brokers reports an increase in freight rates for shipping corn on 6-thousand-ton coasters from Danube River ports to the Mediterranean reaching US$105 per ton as of September 10, 2026, compared to US$28 in June-July 2026. For a relatively low-value bulk commodity such as grain, that additional cost can absorb a significant share of a farmer’s margin. The result is a striking paradox. Global grain prices can rise as Black Sea supplies become tighter, while prices received by Ukrainian farmers can fall because grain accumulates inside the country. In other words, the same disruption that makes Ukrainian grain more valuable on the world market can make it less profitable for the farmers who produce it.

Global markets are already responding to lower Ukrainian supplies.This is no longer only a Ukrainian problem. In August, the FAO Food Price Index rose to 133.3 points, up 1.9 percent from the previous month and 2.5 percent from a year earlier. The FAO Cereal Price Index increased by 2.2 percent, while international wheat prices rose 2.6 percent over the month and were already 15 percent higher than a year earlier. FAO identified disruptions to Black Sea logistics as one of the factors contributing to higher prices. The wheat market has reacted even more sharply. According to Reuters, by August 20 Chicago wheat futures had risen by more than 17 percent since the beginning of July.
Black Sea wheat was trading at roughly US$260-280 per metric ton for August-September arrivals, while replacing those supplies with Australian wheat could cost Asian buyers around US$315–320 per metric ton. For wealthier countries, this mostly means paying more for grain. For import-dependent economies, the consequences can be far more serious. According to Reuters, Egypt sourced more than 82 percent of its imported wheat from Russia and Ukraine combined during the first half of 2026. Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and other major importers also remain highly dependent on supplies from the Black Sea region.

For these countries, higher grain prices are not simply a trade issue. They can translate into larger food import bills, greater pressure on public budgets, and higher prices for basic foods. That is why disruptions to Black Sea trade are increasingly shifting from a regional logistics problem into a driver of global food price inflation.

When Ukraine cannot export, other countries fill the gap. One of the clearest signs of how global grain trade is shifting comes from Argentina. According to Reuters, Argentina’s corn exports are expected to reach a record 10 million metric tons in August and September 2026 while the usual export volumes for August-September reach about 3 million tons. Argentina is also getting more active in the global sunflower and soybean oil and meal markets due to tighter supply from the Black Sea region, increasing competition. This is especially relevant for India and the EU, which remain key destinations for both Argentine and Ukrainian products.

Competition is also increasing in oilseed markets. Argentina is expanding its supplies of soybean and sunflower oil to Europe and India, while Brazil continues to strengthen its position as a major soybean supplier to China. Russia is also redirecting grain and vegetable oil exports to alternative markets, further intensifying competition for Ukraine.

One reason is that buyers are looking for alternatives to Ukrainian supplies disrupted by the war and constraints on Black Sea shipping. The shift is especially visible in North Africa, a region that has traditionally been an important market for Ukrainian grain. During the first seven months of 2026, Argentine corn shipments to North Africa increased by 45 percent. Morocco’s imports of Argentine corn jumped 133 percent year over year, while Egypt increased purchases by 48 percent and Algeria by 10 percent. These figures point to an important economic shift. When Ukraine loses export capacity for several months, the consequences extend beyond lost revenue. Buyers find new suppliers, shipping companies reorganize routes, and commercial relationships begin to shift toward competitors.

And once those relationships are established, they may not immediately reverse. Even if Ukraine restores the full capacity of its ports, regaining some export markets could take time. The longer disruptions persist, the greater the risk that what begins as a temporary logistics problem becomes a longer-term loss of market share. In this sense, the cost of disrupted exports is not measured only in the grain that fails to leave Ukraine today. It may also be measured in the markets Ukraine has to win back tomorrow.

The biggest risk is not this year’s harvest, but the next one. Ukraine’s export problem is quickly becoming a liquidity problem for farmers. Grain sales finance the next production cycle. They pay for seeds, fertilizer, fuel, land rent, wages, machinery repairs, and loan repayments. When grain remains in storage, a farmer’s working capital is effectively locked up with it. That is why a large harvest can paradoxically weaken the producer who grew it. As of September 15, 2026, at Ukrainian ports, prices for food and feed wheat stood at $167-177 per ton and $146-155 per ton CPT port, respectively. If farmers are forced to sell at depressed domestic prices while absorbing higher logistics costs, they may respond by cutting fertilizer use, delaying machinery purchases, or reducing the area they plant the following season. Small and medium-sized farms are particularly vulnerable because they typically have less working capital and less capacity to store grain while waiting for better prices.

A U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization assessment of more than 2,800 rural households across nine frontline regions of Ukraine illustrates the scale of this pressure. One in three surveyed households reported declining income over the previous year. Among families that rely primarily on agriculture for their livelihoods, 48 percent reported income losses. More than three-quarters of surveyed households were already drawing down savings, borrowing money, or cutting essential expenses, including spending on health care and education, to cope with financial pressure.

These figures point to a broader lesson about agricultural resilience. Resilience cannot be measured only by how many tons of grain Ukraine harvests this year; it should be assessed in terms of the production sustainability, which depends on whether farmers have enough liquidity to buy inputs, maintain equipment, keep workers employed, and plant again next season. A record harvest today means little if producers cannot afford to produce another one tomorrow.

Storage can buy time, but it cannot solve the problem. If export constraints persist, Ukraine will face another challenge—where to store the new harvest. Logistics issues worsen grain storage shortages, with slow exports threatening an 8–11 million ton domestic deficit by November. According to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, international partners have already confirmed around US$10.5 million in support for temporary storage solutions, including grain bags. Ukraine is also finalizing discussions with the World Bank over an additional US$25 million in assistance.

This support is important, especially for smaller farms and producers in front-line regions. But storage can only buy time. It does not create a buyer. It does not lower transportation costs. And it does not restore the working capital that farmers need for the next production cycle. Temporary storage can help prevent immediate losses and give producers greater flexibility in choosing when to sell. But it cannot substitute for functioning export routes. The real solution is stable and predictable access to international markets. Without such access, additional storage risks becoming nothing more than an enlarged “waiting room” for grain that still has nowhere to be sold.

One question is will Europe and the Danube replace the Black Sea? The European Union has already helped build one of the most important backup logistics systems for Ukrainian trade. According to the European Commission, the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes have enabled the export of nearly 230 million metric tons of Ukrainian goods since May 2022, including around 94 million metric tons of grain, oilseeds, and related products. Without these routes, the consequences of disruptions to maritime trade would have been far more severe. But August 2026 also showed the limits of an overland solution. According to the Ukrainian government, between August 1 and 26, roughly 600,000 metric tons of agricultural products moved by rail and another 600,000 metric tons through the Danube, while road transport accounted for only about 80,000 metric tons.

For grain, this difference matters. Maritime shipping can move enormous volumes of relatively low-value bulk commodities over long distances at lower cost. Moving the same quantities by thousands of railcars and trucks is slower, more expensive, and constrained by border capacity, infrastructure, and transshipment bottlenecks. The Danube, rail links, and road corridors are therefore indispensable as alternative routes. They provide resilience when Black Sea access is disrupted and reduce Ukraine’s dependence on a single export channel.

But due to their limited throughput capacity, they cannot fully replace deep-water seaports. Europe’s overland routes should be treated as a strategic backup and a permanent part of a more diversified export system—not as a substitute for secure Black Sea shipping. For Ukraine’s grain economy, resilience ultimately requires both: strong connections to Europe and reliable access to the sea.

Ukraine needs more than one corridor. It needs a resilient food system. Ukraine’s first priority must remain the security of maritime exports. That means protecting ports, transport networks, and energy infrastructure, while expanding war-risk insurance mechanisms for shipping companies and agricultural businesses.

The second priority is protecting farmers’ financial cycle. Affordable credit, guarantees, grants, warehouse-receipt financing, and access to insurance can help producers avoid being forced to sell grain when domestic prices are at their lowest. Without that financial buffer, even a strong harvest can leave farmers short of the cash they need to plant the next one.

A third priority is expanding the capacity of the Danube, rail, and border infrastructure. The EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes have already demonstrated their strategic value. But the current crisis also shows that these routes need greater capacity, faster border procedures, and continued investment if they are to serve as a reliable long-term component of Ukraine’s export system.

And Ukraine needs to move further up the agricultural value chain. Producing more flour, animal feed, vegetable oils, starch, bioethanol, and other higher-value products would reduce the country’s dependence on a model in which economic performance is determined largely by how many tons of raw grain can physically leave through a port. Processing cannot replace grain exports. But it can diversify revenue, create jobs, reduce the value lost to high transport costs, and make the agricultural economy more resilient to logistics shocks.

Ukraine also needs predictable trade rules with the European Union. Farmers make production decisions months before harvest. Uncertainty over quotas, transit conditions, or national restrictions adds another layer of risk to an already unpredictable wartime environment. The broader lesson is that Ukraine does not need a single replacement for the Black Sea. It needs a diversified food and export system in which secure maritime trade, European land routes, financial support, storage, processing, and predictable market access reinforce one another. Resilience will come not from one corridor, but from having multiple options when any one of them fails. Ukraine will have bread. The question is what the world will pay.

Ukraine does not currently face a physical shortage of grain for domestic consumption. The Ukrainian government has stressed that the country is producing enough to meet its own food needs. But the global market is already feeling the effects of disruptions to Black Sea trade.

Ukrainian grain can theoretically be replaced by supplies from Argentina, Australia, the United States, Canada, and other major exporters. But that substitution comes at a cost. It reshapes trade flows, lengthens shipping routes, increases freight and insurance expenses, and adds pressure to food-importing countries that are often the least able to absorb higher prices. That is why Ukraine’s 2026 harvest is more than a test of the country’s agricultural sector. It exposes one of the central vulnerabilities of the global food system: producing food is not enough. Food must also be moved safely, predictably, and affordably to the people who need it.

There is also a broader point here. Ukraine’s experience since 2022 has shown how closely agricultural production, transport security, trade policy, and global food security are now connected. Treating them as separate policy questions no longer makes much sense. Ukrainian farmers have already proven that they are capable of continuing grain production under the extraordinary conditions of a full-scale war. The question now is whether the international community can help ensure that this grain reaches global markets. Because the success of Ukraine’s harvest should not be measured only by what is grown in its fields. It should also be measured by whether that food can reach the tables that depend on it.

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Raimond Spekking, Wikimedia Commons

The post Will Ukraine’s Record Wartime Harvest Reach Global Markets? appeared first on Food Tank.

A version of this piece was featured in Food Tank’s newsletter, released weekly on Thursdays. To make sure it lands straight in your inbox and to be among the first to receive it, subscribe now by clicking here.

At major events like Climate Week NYC, we do a lot of talking. Over the course of the week, hundreds of experts and inspiring changemakers cross our stage. I almost always have a water bottle with me when I’m moderating these discussions, because my voice gets tired!

But we can’t just talk about addressing the climate crisis. We have to do something. There’s a reason phrases like “actions speak louder than words” and “leading by example” are repeated so often: They’re 100 percent true.

The discussions we’re having—from Climate Week NYC next week to COP31 later this year and beyond—are most valuable when each of us takes what we’re hearing and learning and translates these into on-the-ground solutions. In this newsletter last week and this week, we’re highlighting 13 (a baker’s dozen!) of the many steps that are already being taken across the global food system.

Find out more about our amazing lineup for Climate Week NYC—featuring more than 225 speakers and performers from September 20 to 25—by CLICKING HERE. And all 13 of our Summits are being livestreamed, so you can tune in from wherever you live!

Here’s this week’s crop of seven solutions:

Telling people-centered food stories

I’ve said before that storytelling can change the world, and that’s no exaggeration! Films and documentaries—and other forms of media, from books to podcasts to articles—can bring viewers to the front lines of food system action, forge powerful personal connections to complex topics, and elevate success stories that can then be shared and replicated for even broader impacts.

“There is a love story in every practice of agriculture, and as we face an increasingly mechanized world, stories coming from the heart are the path towards a more sustainable, prosperous, and empathetic future,” says Haven Worley, the director of “Irish Farmers: A Love Story,” Food Tank’s debut documentary short.

Teaching optimism to future food leaders

Over many decades as one of the country’s top food policy experts, professor and nutritionist Marion Nestle—who celebrated her 90th birthday last week!—has guided generations of eaters, students, and policymakers toward a deeper understanding of the food system. One of the countless lessons I’ve learned from Marion is that true mentorship is not just about navigating the world as it is today; it’s about seeing the world as it could be and developing the tools to make that into reality.

“I deeply believe that setting goals—even those that seem highly unattainable—is a useful public health strategy,” Marion wrote in a 90th birthday reflection blog post. “Unrealistic goals can educate, expand expectations, promote critical thinking, motivate action, attract resources, and encourage accountability.”

Integrating food into the school day beyond the cafeteria

Organizations from Pilot Light to Wellness in the Schools are redefining food education, ensuring that children from a young age are thinking critically about where food comes from, developing tools to fuel their bodies and minds, and reflecting on how they can be agents of change to drive climate action.

“Incredible work is already happening in food education, but the question now is how we build on it so every student has the opportunity to learn about food,” says Alex DeSorbo-Quinn, Executive Director of Pilot Light.

Making better consumer choices feel achievable

Food Tankers know how impactful our food choices are: What we eat matters not just for our individual bodies but for the entire food system, too. But educating consumers—and getting folks to actually change their behavior—is easier said than done, which is why any accessible resource goes a long way. For example, the Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Seafood Watch provides well-researched recommendations that encompass some ¾ of U.S. market seafood and half of global seafood, plus restaurants and major companies committed to sustainable blue food systems.

“I think it really is important to know that the choices we make do matter at the grocery store. They do mean something,” says Wendy Norden, Director of Science and Global Strategies at the Monterey Bay Aquarium. “And they help us do our work and improve, because we want to celebrate seafood.”

Giving chefs a platform as food systems leaders

Here’s an idea: What if our food policy were influenced less by politicians taking donations from major food corporations, and instead shaped by people who know food better than anyone: Chefs! While the Trump-Vance Administration was reshaping the “food pyramid” of dietary guidelines for all Americans, Chef Sean Sherman, a.k.a. The Sioux Chef, had a better idea. He created what he calls the Regional Indigenous Nutritional Guide, or the RING Diet, which helps us eat in ways that match the places we actually live.

“The RING Diet is a living guide, and one you could actually use,” Chef Sherman, the founder of Native American Traditional Indigenous Food Systems (NATIFS) writes. “You can use it to learn about your own region, its seasons, its plants and animals and the precious nutrients they offer and how they work within our bodily systems. A tool to teach your kids, to plan a week of eating, to reconnect with the specific foods of the specific place you stand on.”

Working smarter to nourish the future

It’s easy to list off a couple examples of foods that are healthy and a couple that are not. It’s much more difficult to explain why—what specific biomolecules make up our foods and how each one impacts systems in our bodies. This is why I both admire and am awestruck by the Periodic Table of Food Initiative (PTFI), which is creating data systems to map out these biomolecules and translate that research into action.

As PTFI Global Director Selena Ahmed and other experts write in a joint Op-Ed, “We cannot fix what we do not measure. … Without knowing what’s actually in our food, the tens of thousands of molecules, we cannot design food systems that sustain health.”

Embedding resilience into entire supply chains

We typically think of certifications like organic in the context of individual farms or food producers—but what about entire supply chains? Take a new carbon insetting program in the organic dairy industry, for example: Collaboration across the supply chain is creating a model for private-sector companies like Organic Valley, UNFI, and Whole Foods Market to work together to reduce emissions and build resilience. This is a step toward the kind of big-picture thinking we need to see across the entire food system!

“When we collaborate across the value chain, we unlock new ways to reduce emissions, meet climate goals, and support the people at the heart of it all—our farmers,” says Jessica Luhning, Organic Valley’s Senior Sustainability Manager.

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Polina Kuzovkova , Unsplash

The post These Solutions Are a Roadmap to a Stronger Food System, Part II appeared first on Food Tank.

RUSH, COLO. (September 18, 2026) — Brett Gray Ranch, located in Colorado’s eastern plains, is the latest ranch to achieve the National Audubon Society’s Bird-Friendly Land...

'They hid the facts and continued business as usual, which meant causing sickness and deaths.'

Source

Press Release: CNX’s Expanded Radiation Monitoring and Disclosure Fall Short. FracTracker calls for comprehensive radiation testing and enforceable public reporting requirements across Pennsylvania’s oil and gas industry.

The post CNX’s Expanded Radiation Monitoring and Disclosure Fall Short appeared first on FracTracker Alliance.

The wealth explosion among the ultra-rich has led to soaring demand for luxury private jets and the infrastructure to serve them, including expanded private aircraft hangers and runway capacity at local and regional airports. Meanwhile, transnational corporations wanting to shield their top managers from interactions with the public are also expanding their private jet fleets, even as more shareholders are trying to rein in private jet excess.

A vital new report from the Institute for Policy Studies, High Flyers 2026, reveals just how much this private jet-setting is costing taxpayers and the planet.

Key findings:

• Private jets and charter services account for roughly 16 percent of FAA-handled flight operations. The U.S. Department of Transportation estimates noncommercial private jets account for 7 percent of the airspace activity yet contribute less than 0.6 percent of taxes that flow into the Airport and Airway Trust Fund that helps finance FAA operations.
• An estimated 256,000 people, or roughly 0.003 percent of the population, fly on private jets, including the ultrawealthy who use fractional ownership or private charter jets.
• Private jets are one of the most super-polluting forms of transportation, with direct carbon emissions 10 to 14 times greater per passenger than commercial aviation travel –along with additional contributions to global warming from effective radiative forcing, which can be two to four times greater than those from CO2 emissions.
• The National Business Aviation Association spent approximately $2 million on lobbying in 2025 in favor of legislation that gives massive tax breaks for private jet owners, like the permanent accelerated depreciation tax of 2025.
• Private jet ownership and use has accelerated as the number of ultra-high net worth individuals and billionaires has grown. There are 3,428 global billionaires as of this year. The median wealth of a private jet owner is $190 million, while the median wealth of a fractional owner of a private jet is $140 million.
• A luxury tax of 10 percent on used jets and 5 percent on new jets could have raised more than $3 billion in 2025, funds that could be invested in sustainable ground transportation.
• More than a third of all Airport Infrastructure Grants awarded through 2026 went to airport projects that may primarily benefit private jets, amounting to more than $1.13 billion in grant funds.
• Between 2019 and 2025, fractional jet ownership increased 65 percent.
• Substituting so-called “sustainable aviation fuels” (SAFs) is a greenscreen distraction. While there may be some potential for electrification of small scale short hop aviation, there is no scalable or cost-effective alternative to kerosene-based jet fuels developing at the speed of climate change.

“The rest of us should not have to pay for the luxury excess of the private jet billionaire class. Our hard-earned tax dollars shouldn’t subsidize their reckless air travel habits that further harm our warming planet,” said report co-author Chuck Collins. “At a time when most ordinary people are struggling to afford groceries, rent, and healthcare, our report exposes how the ultra-rich and greedy corporations are private jet-setting at the expense of the rest of us, while trying to dodge accountability for fueling the climate crisis.”

The Institute for Policy Studies worked with the worldwide community of 20,000+ open-source trackers to build a new tool (the Private Jet Emissions Tracker, or PJET) that analyzes the private-jet flights into and out of specific locations and times—like the Super Bowl, the Kentucky Derby, or every game of the World Cup.

One key solution: make private jet-setters pay their fair share.

For starters, Congress should strip a private jet tax avoidance provision from the pending air traffic safety legislation, the ALERT Act. “The private jet lobby is cynically and shamelessly inserting yet another tax break for private jets into legislation to respond to the Potomac river aircraft-heliocopter crash in January 2025,” said Collins.

Champions like Stephen Prince have publicly announced they have given up private jets. Meanwhile, high-profile jet-setters like Taylor Swift who have drawn scrutiny recently have yet to change their travel habits.

“Since we first released our analysis on the costs of private jet travel to taxpayers and the planet in 2023, we’ve seen a shocking and irresponsible rise in the use of private jet travel,” said report co-author Omar Ocampo. “Unfortunately, the private jet lobby has worked hard to lower the tax obligations of the ultrawealthy. Meanwhile, the aviation industry pushes false solutions on the climate crisis. It’s time to stop making taxpayers subsidize luxury private jet travel and use our resources to green other industries.”

Other key policy solutions:

• Stop another pending private jet tax break.
• Repeal one-year accelerated bonus depreciation of private jet purchases and pass the End Subsidies for Private Jets Act.

• Increase tax on private jet fuel.
• Levy a luxury tax on private jet sales.

• Roll back secrecy provisions.
• Stop funding and constructing new private jet infrastructure, just as some institutions have committed to no new fossil fuel infrastructure.

“At a time when billionaires and the ultra-wealthy get to avoid the enshittification of commercial air travel experience, taxpayers and the planet shouldn’t bear the costs of their luxury private jet-setting,” concluded Collins.

Read the full report: https://ips-dc.org/report-high-flyers-2026

The company has until November to formally appeal the Virginia State Corporation Commission’s order to directly assign some costs of transmission. Dominion Energy has an October deadline to propose compliant policy changes.

Iran has experienced multiple crises over the past few years, including economic challenges and war. So far, however, these have not appeared to affect one of the most practical initiatives developed by local conservation leaders in northern Iran: Gavbangi.

In Farsi Gavbangi refers to the call of the maral (also known as Caspian red deer, Cervus elaphus maral), who live in the green mountains in northern Iran from early September to early October. Maral habitat in Iran spans forests from the Azerbaijan-Iran borderland in the northwest to Golestan National Park in the east.

In autumn the forests in the north display beautiful, colorful leaves, and local people commonly hear a sound like a cow that they call Gav (cow) bangi (call). It is both inspiring and reassuring to hear the charismatic calls of deer echoing through the forests, a reminder of a functioning ecosystem. As a former conservation volunteer in Iran and a current Ph.D. student in natural resources at the University of Vermont, I experienced Gavbangi in northern Iran’s protected areas. During that time I witnessed firsthand the vital role of community collaboration in maral’s conservation.

I have also seen the importance of this collaboration: Poachers know this is the ideal time to find deer, specifically males.

A herd of maral in Kiasar National Park, Iran. Photograph by Hamed Tizrooyan. Used with permission.

Maral are a protected species in Iran, but according to the Iranian Department of Environment they face two main threats: habitat loss and poaching. During Gavbangi volunteer conservationists collaborate with rangers and protected area managers to address both threats in protected areas and potential habitats.

Volunteers stay in scheduled locations across the habitat, listening to deer calls and ensuring that poachers do not take advantage of this vulnerable period. Volunteers are divided into small groups assigned to remote areas that are difficult to monitor with a small number of rangers. Their visible presence alone acts as an obstacle, discouraging poachers from entering.

These days economic pressure may be driving an increase in poaching, although there is no reliable data. Human development like expanding road networks also makes these efforts more critical than ever.

A male Maral pictured by Hamed Tizrooyan at Kiasar National Park, Iran, Photo by: Hamed Tizrooyan. Used with permission.

Social media and wildlife photography have played a significant role in promoting awareness of species and habitat protection in Iran. Many young volunteers became interested in conservation activities by seeing the beauty of nature and its residents.

The most interesting social aspect of Gavbangi is how volunteers gather. In my experience social media, activists, and the role of wildlife photographers are crucial, as they showcase the beauty of nature and its diverse forms. These individuals typically work closely with rangers to manage volunteers and identify the best locations. This is an excellent example of collaboration between the public sector and volunteer conservationists, which began around 15 years ago.

A group of volunteers at Gavbbangi, Kiasar National Park, Iran, 2025, Photo by Amirhossein Gohardehi (used with permission)

Many experts say it’s necessary to see interested individuals as an opportunity to preserve biodiversity. The main advantage of these activities is that they involve more people in conservation, which could lead to more effective conservation of the red deer.

There is an ongoing debate among conservationists about whether participation in Gavbangi should remain purely voluntary or be integrated into ecotourism programs, where participants pay to join. Although hosting a tour can bring money to the area and invest it in conservation, it can attract irresponsible individuals and increase the human population, which can negatively affect the project’s goal and compromise the area’s safety.

To me another aspect of Gavbangi is that it provides amateur volunteers with the opportunity to explore the ecosystem in the wild, which could be an excellent driver for enhancing conservation.

As a former volunteer turned professional conservationist, I feel it essential that volunteer initiatives like Gavbangi be closely monitored as they grow to ensure they stay on the right path, especially in engaging younger generations in protecting the Maral during its most vulnerable period. To achieve this, it would be beneficial if local conservation groups collaborate with conservation experts to train the volunteers. And Gavbangi leaders can benefit greatly from engaging local residents on conservation efforts.

Based on my conversations with several experts involved in Gavbangi, Iran’s ongoing challenges have not had a direct impact on the event so far. However, conservationists in the country are under considerable pressure, and we may see the effects of these crises in the next Gavbangi event.

It is our collective responsibility to ensure that future generations can still hear the haunting call of the deer echoing through the northern forests of Iran.

References:

Hadi Pourmosa, S. M. G. (2024). Habitat suitability modeling of the Caspian Red Deer (Cervus elaphus maral) in the central zone of the Hyrcanian region: Identification of priority conservation areas. https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.13823908

Kiabi, B. H., Ali Ghaemi, R., Jahanshahi, M., & Sassani, A. (2004). Population status, biology and ecology of the Maral, Cervus elaphus maral , in Golestan National Park, Iran. Zoology in the Middle East, 33(1), 125–138. https://doi.org/10.1080/09397140.2004.10638071

Kolahi, M., Sakai, T., Moriya, K., Yoshikawa, M., & Esmaili, R. (2014). From paper parks to real conservations: Case study of social capital in Iran’s biodiversity conservation. https://www.sid.ir/en/VEWSSID/J_pdf/108220140111.pdf

Republish this article for free! Read our reprint policy. Previously in The Revelator:

Incredible Journeys: How Hoofing It Helps Deer and Caribou

The post Gavbangi: Iran’s Long-Running Conservation Effort Relies on Volunteers — and Turns Them Into Habitat Protectors appeared first on The Revelator.

“The Hub” is a weekly round-up of transportation related news in the Philadelphia area and beyond. Check back weekly to keep up-to-date on the issues Clean Air Council’s transportation staff finds important.

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WHYY: SEPTA gets $80 million federal grant to make ADA upgrades at trolley stations – Federal grant money has been awarded to SEPTA, through the All Stations Accessibility Program. $80 million has been allocated for the reconstruction of the 22nd Street, 33rd Street, and 36th Street trolley stations, building elevators, and a complete overhaul of facilities. The upgrades should be completed in 2-3 years, coinciding with the implementation of new accessible trolleys, slated for arrival in 2029.

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6ABC: Local athletes develop lifelong passions atop bikes with Independence Youth Cycling – Independence Youth Cycling is a local nonprofit that connects kids with cycling through bike-share programs, coaches and teams, and team rides. The nonprofit supports series across Philadelphia, south Jersey, and Montgomery County. Teams include introducing kids to mountain biking as a sport through race and adventure events, and trail rides in different parks across Philadelphia.

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BillyPenn: The status of the Spring Garden Connector project – The Spring Garden Street corridor has been waiting for improvements and upgrades since 2009. The corridor improvements include protections for cyclists and pedestrians, increased access to green space, and better connectivity to the nationwide East Coast Greenway Project. The project did succeed in 2016 with a public art installation along I-95 underpass outside Spring Garden Station. However, the core concept, protected bike lanes, is still to come. The project is still in the design phase, with hopes to find construction contracts in 2029.

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