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Ireland’s public sector workers go on national strike
More than 300,000 public sector workers across Ireland took strike action for 24 hours on Wednesday, 14 October, in a dispute over pay and living...
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Incinerators Out of COP31: The Climate Crisis Cannot Be Solved by Burning Waste
GAIA Statement | Global Week of Action to Stop Incineration | October 2026 · Leer en español
As communities across the world mobilize against waste incineration, the Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA) is raising the alarm about the waste-burning industry’s presence at COP31, the UN Climate Change Conference taking place in Antalya, Türkiye, this November.
At a time when the COP31 Presidency has made zero waste a priority, representatives of the incineration industry are expected to participate in discussions on circular cities, waste management, and climate finance.
These include CEWEP, the European waste-to-energy industry’s lobbying association, which actively promotes incineration as a climate and energy solution, and Kanadevia Inova, a major waste-to-energy technology provider, both listed in the COP31 official side events agenda. CEWEP has previously promoted incineration at UN climate conferences, including COP30. Meanwhile, Kanadevia Inova’s involvement in the proposed Smokey Mountain incineration project in Manila, alongside its local partner Philippine Ecology Systems Corp. (PhilEco), has raised serious concerns among human rights advocates, environmental organizations, and local residents, as documented in GAIA’s report, The Smokey Mountain Waste-to-Energy Project: Arrested Development and Environmental Justice in Urban Manila.
There is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of this participation: an industry whose business depends on burning waste is seeking to influence discussions about waste prevention, climate action, and the transition towards sustainable waste systems.
The global zero waste agenda must not become an opportunity to greenwash incineration, legitimize polluting infrastructure, or redirect climate finance away from real solutions that protect communities, support a just transition for waste workers, and deliver meaningful climate benefits.
Key findings- Waste-to-energy incineration emits about 1.7 times more greenhouse gas per unit of electricity than coal-fired power.
- Europe’s existing incinerators could burn almost 65 million more tonnes of waste a year than they currently process.
- GAIA’s Clearing the Air research recorded fine particulate levels 5 to 8 times above WHO guidelines near sites in Indonesia, Nigeria and the Philippines.
- The proposed Smokey Mountain project in Manila: ₱26 billion, 100 MW, built to burn around 3,000 tonnes of waste a day.
- More than 550 municipalities worldwide are taking steps towards zero waste.
Waste-to-energy is often marketed as clean or renewable energy. But burning waste does not make its carbon emissions disappear.
Waste-to-energy incineration produces approximately 1.7 times as much greenhouse gas pollution per unit of electricity as coal-fired power plants. Plastics, which are made primarily from fossil fuels, contribute significantly to these emissions.
Incineration also destroys materials that could otherwise be reused, recycled, or composted, creating additional emissions through the extraction and manufacture of replacement products.
Far from advancing a circular economy, incineration perpetuates a linear model of extraction, consumption and destruction.
An expensive industry that locks cities into burning wasteIncinerators are among the most capital-intensive waste management facilities. Their financial models frequently depend on long-term contracts, public subsidies, and guaranteed volumes of waste.
These arrangements can lock municipalities into decades of waste burning, even as they seek to reduce waste generation, expand recycling and introduce separate collection of organic waste.
The financial consequences are particularly serious for cities in the Global South, where scarce public resources are urgently needed for basic waste services, community infrastructure, and climate adaptation.
Meanwhile, Europe is already struggling with overcapacity. According to Zero Waste Europe’s latest update of its Enough is Enough report, existing incineration infrastructure has the capacity to burn almost 65 million tonnes more waste annually than it currently processes.
Yet incineration companies continue promoting and exporting the same infrastructure model internationally.
Why should countries facing urgent development and climate challenges invest in infrastructure that other regions have already built in excess?
Communities pay the priceBehind the industry’s promises of clean energy and modern infrastructure are communities facing pollution, financial burdens, and threats to their livelihoods.
GAIA’s Burn Book: Incinerators that Threaten the Climate, Public Health, and our Finances highlights how these concerns recur across countries and regions.
In Delhi, India, communities around the Timarpur-Okhla waste-to-energy plant have raised concerns about air pollution and the facility’s proximity to residential neighbourhoods.
In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Reppie waste-to-energy facility illustrates the risks of prioritizing large, centralized waste-burning infrastructure in cities where recycling, organic waste recovery, and inclusive waste services require investment.
In Surabaya, Indonesia, community-led air quality monitoring near waste-burning operations has documented serious pollution concerns. GAIA’s Clearing the Air research, covering sites in Indonesia, Nigeria, and the Philippines, recorded fine particulate matter levels five to eight times higher than World Health Organization guidelines.
And in Manila, Philippines, the proposed Smokey Mountain waste-to-energy project offers a stark warning about the environmental justice implications of incineration expansion.
The proposed ₱26 billion, 100 MW project, designed to process approximately 3,000 tonnes of waste per day, threatens to transform an area with a long history of environmental injustice into a new site of industrial waste burning.
GAIA’s investigation into the Smokey Mountain project documents concerns over displacement, inadequate community consultation, environmental risks, and threats to waste-picker livelihoods. Kanadevia Inova has been identified as a technology partner in the project.
These examples expose a wider pattern: communities already bearing the burden of waste pollution are being asked to accept new infrastructure that may deepen existing inequalities, while the companies promoting these projects present themselves as providers of climate solutions.
Incineration also threatens the livelihoods of waste pickers, who play a vital role in recovering materials and sustaining local recycling economies. By burning valuable recyclables, incinerators can displace workers and undermine existing recovery systems. A just transition must recognize their contributions, protect their rights and livelihoods, and strengthen their role in building inclusive zero waste systems.
Climate finance must not subsidize false solutionsAt COP31, the participation of CEWEP in an event addressing the Global Zero Waste and Methane Fund raises particularly serious concerns.
Methane reduction in the waste sector is urgently needed. But replacing methane emissions from organic waste with fossil carbon emissions from burning plastics is not a credible pathway to a zero waste future.
Climate finance should support prevention, separate collection, composting, anaerobic digestion where appropriate, recycling, and the inclusion of waste pickers.
It should not be used to finance infrastructure that burns recoverable materials, creates long-term financial liabilities, and competes with the very systems needed to achieve zero waste.
The presence of industry representatives in climate policy discussions also raises important questions about conflicts of interest, transparency, and whose expertise is prioritized.
The companies and associations that stand to profit from expanding incineration should not be given privileged influence over the policies and financing mechanisms intended to accelerate the transition away from polluting waste management.
Real solutions are already hereAround the world, GAIA members are working with municipalities, waste pickers, and communities to demonstrate practical alternatives to incineration.
More than 550 municipalities worldwide are taking steps towards zero waste, demonstrating that preventing waste, recovering materials, managing organics, and protecting livelihoods can form the foundation of effective local climate action.
These approaches reduce methane emissions, prevent pollution, conserve resources, and support a just transition by recognizing waste pickers, improving working conditions, and creating opportunities for decent livelihoods.
They are the solutions that deserve international recognition, technical support, and climate finance.
GAIA calls on the COP31 Presidency and climate finance institutions to:- Keep the incineration industry out of climate policymaking. Establish safeguards against conflicts of interest and prevent companies with vested interests in waste burning from shaping the zero waste agenda.
- Reject incineration as a zero waste or climate solution. Ensure that COP31 commitments prioritize waste prevention, reuse, separate collection, recycling, and organic waste management.
- Exclude incineration from climate finance. Establish explicit safeguards preventing the Global Zero Waste and Methane Fund and other climate finance mechanisms from supporting waste burning, including refuse-derived fuels and co-incineration.
- Put communities, waste pickers and a just transition at the center. Guarantee meaningful participation, protect workers’ rights and livelihoods, and invest in inclusive zero waste systems that improve working conditions, provide social protection, and strengthen local economies.
- Invest in proven, community-led solutions. Direct international climate finance towards zero waste systems that reduce emissions, improve public health, create dignified livelihoods, and support local governments, waste picker organizations, and communities.
As the Global Week of Action to Stop Incineration brings together communities resisting waste burning across the world, their message to COP31 is clear:
The climate crisis cannot be solved by burning more waste.
Climate finance must not fuel incineration. Climate policy must not be shaped by the industries that profit from it. And a just transition must not leave behind the workers and communities who are already building the solutions we need.
Incinerators Out of COP31. Zero Waste In.
Frequently asked questions Why does GAIA want incinerators kept out of COP31?Waste-burning industry groups, including CEWEP and Kanadevia Inova, are listed in COP31’s official side events on circular cities, waste and climate finance. GAIA argues that an industry that profits from burning waste shouldn’t shape the zero waste agenda.
Is waste-to-energy a clean or renewable energy source?No. Burning waste releases its carbon, and waste-to-energy produces about 1.7 times more greenhouse gas per unit of electricity than coal. It also destroys materials that could be reused, recycled or composted.
Why shouldn’t climate finance pay for incinerators?Incinerators rely on long contracts and guaranteed waste volumes that lock cities in for decades and compete with recycling and composting. Swapping methane from organic waste for fossil carbon from burning plastic isn’t a credible path to zero waste.
What is GAIA asking the COP31 Presidency to do?Keep the incineration industry out of climate policymaking, reject incineration as a climate or zero waste solution, exclude it from climate finance, put communities and waste pickers at the center, and invest in proven, community-led zero waste solutions.
What are the alternatives to incineration?Waste prevention, reuse, separate collection, composting, recycling and the inclusion of waste pickers. More than 550 municipalities worldwide are already moving towards zero waste.
Related resources- Global Week of Action to Stop Incineration
- Waste-Burning 101: What Is Waste-to-Energy?
- The High Cost of Waste Incineration
- Lee esta declaración en español
The post Incinerators Out of COP31: The Climate Crisis Cannot Be Solved by Burning Waste first appeared on GAIA.
Fuera las incineradoras de la COP 31: la crisis climática no se resuelve quemando residuos
Declaración de GAIA | Semana Mundial de Acción contra la Incineración | Octubre de 2026 · Read in English
Mientras comunidades de todo el mundo se movilizan contra la incineración de residuos, la Alianza Global para Alternativas a la Incineración (GAIA) alerta sobre la presencia de la industria de la incineración en la COP31, la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático que tendrá lugar este noviembre en Antalya, Turquía.
En un momento en que la Presidencia de la COP31 ha situado la basura cero entre sus prioridades, se espera que representantes de la industria de la incineración participen en debates sobre ciudades circulares, gestión de residuos y financiación climática.
Entre ellos se encuentran CEWEP, la asociación europea que representa los intereses de la industria de la valorización energética de residuos y que promueve activamente la incineración como solución climática y energética, y Kanadevia Inova, uno de los principales proveedores de tecnología de incineración con recuperación de energía. Ambas organizaciones figuran en el programa oficial de eventos paralelos de la COP31. CEWEP ya ha promovido anteriormente la incineración en conferencias climáticas de la ONU, incluida la COP30. Por su parte, la participación de Kanadevia Inova en el proyecto de incineración propuesto para Smokey Mountain, en Manila, junto con su socio local Philippine Ecology Systems Corp. (PhilEco), ha suscitado graves preocupaciones entre organizaciones de derechos humanos, organizaciones ambientales y residentes de la zona, como documenta el informe de GAIA The Smokey Mountain Waste-to-Energy Project: Arrested Development and Environmental Justice in Urban Manila.
Existe una contradicción fundamental en esta participación: una industria cuyo modelo de negocio depende de quemar residuos pretende influir en los debates sobre prevención de residuos, acción climática y transición hacia sistemas sostenibles de gestión de residuos.
La agenda mundial de basura cero no puede convertirse en una oportunidad para maquillar de verde la incineración, legitimar infraestructuras contaminantes o desviar la financiación climática de las verdaderas soluciones que protegen a las comunidades, apoyan una transición justa para las personas trabajadoras del sector de residuos y generan beneficios climáticos reales.
Datos clave- La incineración con recuperación de energía emite unas 1,7 veces más gases de efecto invernadero por unidad de electricidad que las centrales de carbón.
- Las incineradoras de Europa podrían quemar casi 65 millones de toneladas más de residuos al año de las que procesan actualmente.
- La investigación Clearing the Air de GAIA registró partículas finas entre 5 y 8 veces por encima de las guías de la OMS cerca de instalaciones en Indonesia, Nigeria y Filipinas.
- El proyecto propuesto en Smokey Mountain (Manila): 26.000 millones de pesos filipinos y 100 MW, para quemar unas 3.000 toneladas de residuos al día.
- Más de 550 municipios de todo el mundo avanzan hacia la basura cero.
La incineración con recuperación de energía suele presentarse como una fuente de energía limpia o renovable. Sin embargo, quemar residuos no hace desaparecer las emisiones de carbono.
La incineración de residuos con recuperación de energía genera aproximadamente 1,7 veces más emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero por unidad de electricidad producida que las centrales eléctricas de carbón. Los plásticos, fabricados principalmente a partir de combustibles fósiles, contribuyen significativamente a estas emisiones.
La incineración también destruye materiales que podrían reutilizarse, reciclarse o compostarse, lo que genera emisiones adicionales asociadas a la extracción de materias primas y la fabricación de nuevos productos para sustituirlos.
Lejos de impulsar una economía circular, la incineración perpetúa un modelo lineal de extracción, consumo y destrucción.
Una industria costosa que condena a las ciudades a seguir quemando residuosLas incineradoras se encuentran entre las instalaciones de gestión de residuos que requieren mayores inversiones de capital. Sus modelos financieros suelen depender de contratos a largo plazo, subvenciones públicas y volúmenes garantizados de residuos.
Estos acuerdos pueden comprometer a los municipios a seguir quemando residuos durante décadas, incluso cuando intentan reducir su generación, ampliar el reciclaje e introducir la recogida separada de residuos orgánicos.
Las consecuencias financieras son especialmente graves para las ciudades del Sur Global, donde los escasos recursos públicos se necesitan urgentemente para servicios básicos de gestión de residuos, infraestructuras comunitarias y adaptación al cambio climático.
Mientras tanto, Europa ya se enfrenta a un problema de sobrecapacidad. Según la última actualización del informe Enough is Enough de Zero Waste Europe, la infraestructura de incineración existente tiene capacidad para quemar casi 65 millones de toneladas adicionales de residuos al año respecto a los volúmenes que procesa actualmente.
A pesar de ello, las empresas incineradoras siguen promoviendo y exportando este mismo modelo de infraestructura a otros países.
¿Por qué deberían los países que afrontan desafíos urgentes de desarrollo y acción climática invertir en infraestructuras que otras regiones ya han construido en exceso?
Las comunidades pagan las consecuenciasDetrás de las promesas de energía limpia e infraestructuras modernas de la industria de la incineración hay comunidades que sufren contaminación, cargas financieras y amenazas a sus medios de vida.
La publicación de GAIA Burn Book: Incinerators that Threaten the Climate, Public Health, and our Finances muestra cómo estas preocupaciones se repiten en distintos países y regiones.
En Delhi, India, las comunidades que viven alrededor de la planta de incineración con recuperación de energía de Timarpur-Okhla han expresado su preocupación por la contaminación atmosférica y la proximidad de la instalación a zonas residenciales.
En Adís Abeba, Etiopía, la planta de incineración con recuperación de energía de Reppie ilustra los riesgos de priorizar grandes infraestructuras centralizadas de quema de residuos en ciudades donde el reciclaje, la recuperación de residuos orgánicos y los servicios inclusivos de gestión de residuos necesitan inversión.
En Surabaya, Indonesia, el monitoreo comunitario de la calidad del aire cerca de instalaciones de quema de residuos ha documentado graves problemas de contaminación. La investigación de GAIA Clearing the Air, que abarca instalaciones en Indonesia, Nigeria y Filipinas, registró niveles de partículas finas entre cinco y ocho veces superiores a los valores recomendados por la Organización Mundial de la Salud.
Y en Manila, Filipinas, el proyecto de incineración con recuperación de energía propuesto para Smokey Mountain constituye una clara advertencia sobre las implicaciones de la expansión de la incineración para la justicia ambiental.
El proyecto propuesto, valorado en 26.000 millones de pesos filipinos, con una capacidad de 100 MW y diseñado para procesar aproximadamente 3.000 toneladas de residuos al día, amenaza con transformar una zona marcada por una larga historia de injusticia ambiental en un nuevo emplazamiento de quema industrial de residuos.
La investigación de GAIA sobre el proyecto de Smokey Mountain documenta preocupaciones relacionadas con posibles desplazamientos de población, consultas comunitarias insuficientes, riesgos ambientales y amenazas a los medios de vida de las personas recicladoras de base. Kanadevia Inova ha sido identificada como socio tecnológico del proyecto.
Estos ejemplos ponen de manifiesto un patrón más amplio: se pide a comunidades que ya soportan las consecuencias de la contaminación por residuos que acepten nuevas infraestructuras que pueden profundizar las desigualdades existentes, mientras las empresas que promueven estos proyectos se presentan como proveedoras de soluciones climáticas.
La incineración también amenaza los medios de vida de las personas recicladoras de base, que desempeñan un papel fundamental en la recuperación de materiales y el sostenimiento de las economías locales del reciclaje. Al quemar materiales reciclables valiosos, las incineradoras pueden desplazar a estas personas trabajadoras y debilitar los sistemas de recuperación existentes. Una transición justa debe reconocer sus contribuciones, proteger sus derechos y medios de vida, y fortalecer su papel en la construcción de sistemas inclusivos de basura cero.
La financiación climática no debe subvencionar falsas solucionesEn la COP31, la participación de CEWEP en un evento dedicado al Fondo Mundial de Basura Cero y Metano (Global Zero Waste and Methane Fund) plantea preocupaciones especialmente graves.
Reducir las emisiones de metano del sector de residuos es una necesidad urgente. Pero sustituir las emisiones de metano procedentes de los residuos orgánicos por emisiones de carbono fósil derivadas de la quema de plásticos no constituye una vía creíble hacia un futuro de basura cero.
La financiación climática debe apoyar la prevención de residuos, la recogida separada, el compostaje, la digestión anaerobia cuando resulte apropiada, el reciclaje y la inclusión de las personas recicladoras de base.
No debe utilizarse para financiar infraestructuras que queman materiales recuperables, generan obligaciones financieras a largo plazo y compiten con los mismos sistemas necesarios para alcanzar la basura cero.
La presencia de representantes de la industria en los debates sobre políticas climáticas también plantea cuestiones importantes sobre los conflictos de intereses, la transparencia y qué conocimientos y experiencias reciben prioridad.
Las empresas y asociaciones que se benefician económicamente de la expansión de la incineración no deben gozar de una influencia privilegiada sobre las políticas y los mecanismos de financiación destinados a acelerar la transición hacia sistemas de gestión de residuos no contaminantes.
Las verdaderas soluciones ya existenEn todo el mundo, las organizaciones miembro de GAIA trabajan con municipios, personas recicladoras de base y comunidades para demostrar que existen alternativas prácticas a la incineración.
Más de 550 municipios de todo el mundo están avanzando hacia la basura cero, demostrando que la prevención de residuos, la recuperación de materiales, la gestión de residuos orgánicos y la protección de los medios de vida pueden constituir la base de una acción climática local eficaz.
Estos enfoques reducen las emisiones de metano, previenen la contaminación, conservan los recursos y apoyan una transición justa mediante el reconocimiento de las personas recicladoras de base, la mejora de las condiciones laborales y la creación de oportunidades de trabajo digno.
Estas son las soluciones que merecen reconocimiento internacional, apoyo técnico y financiación climática.
GAIA hace un llamamiento a la Presidencia de la COP31 y a las instituciones de financiación climática para que:1. Mantengan a la industria de la incineración fuera de la formulación de políticas climáticas. Establezcan salvaguardas frente a los conflictos de intereses e impidan que las empresas con intereses económicos en la quema de residuos influyan en la agenda de basura cero.
2. Rechacen la incineración como solución climática o de basura cero. Garanticen que los compromisos de la COP31 den prioridad a la prevención de residuos, la reutilización, la recogida separada, el reciclaje y la gestión de residuos orgánicos.
3. Excluyan la incineración de la financiación climática. Establezcan salvaguardas explícitas para impedir que el Fondo Mundial de Basura Cero y Metano y otros mecanismos de financiación climática apoyen la quema de residuos, incluidos los combustibles derivados de residuos y la coincineración.
4. Sitúen a las comunidades, las personas recicladoras de base y la transición justa en el centro de las decisiones. Garanticen una participación efectiva, protejan los derechos y los medios de vida de las personas trabajadoras e inviertan en sistemas inclusivos de basura cero que mejoren las condiciones laborales, proporcionen protección social y fortalezcan las economías locales.
5. Inviertan en soluciones probadas y lideradas por las comunidades. Orienten la financiación climática internacional hacia sistemas de basura cero que reduzcan las emisiones, mejoren la salud pública, generen medios de vida dignos y apoyen a los gobiernos locales, las organizaciones de personas recicladoras de base y las comunidades.
Mientras la Semana Mundial de Acción contra la Incineración reúne a comunidades de todo el mundo que se oponen a la quema de residuos, su mensaje a la COP31 es claro:
La crisis climática no se resuelve quemando más residuos.
La financiación climática no debe alimentar la incineración. Las políticas climáticas no deben estar determinadas por las industrias que se benefician de ella. Y una transición justa no puede dejar atrás a las personas trabajadoras y las comunidades que ya están construyendo las soluciones que necesitamos.
¡Fuera las incineradoras de la COP31! ¡Sí a la basura cero!
Preguntas frecuentes ¿Por qué GAIA pide sacar a las incineradoras de la COP31?Representantes de la industria, como CEWEP y Kanadevia Inova, figuran en el programa oficial de eventos paralelos de la COP31 sobre ciudades circulares, residuos y financiación climática. Una industria que se beneficia de quemar residuos no debería definir la agenda de basura cero.
¿La incineración con recuperación de energía es limpia o renovable?No. Quemar residuos libera su carbono y genera unas 1,7 veces más emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero por unidad de electricidad que el carbón. Además, destruye materiales que podrían reutilizarse, reciclarse o compostarse.
¿Por qué la financiación climática no debe apoyar la incineración?Las incineradoras dependen de contratos largos y volúmenes garantizados de residuos que atan a las ciudades durante décadas y compiten con el reciclaje y el compostaje. Sustituir el metano de los residuos orgánicos por carbono fósil de la quema de plásticos no es un camino creíble hacia la basura cero.
¿Qué le pide GAIA a la Presidencia de la COP31?Mantener a la industria de la incineración fuera de las políticas climáticas, rechazarla como solución climática o de basura cero, excluirla de la financiación climática, poner a las comunidades y a las personas recicladoras de base en el centro, e invertir en soluciones de basura cero lideradas por las comunidades.
¿Qué alternativas hay a la incineración?La prevención de residuos, la reutilización, la recogida separada, el compostaje, el reciclaje y la inclusión de las personas recicladoras de base. Más de 550 municipios de todo el mundo ya avanzan hacia la basura cero.
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The world is crumbling in ‘The History of Concrete’
It’s the second-most used material on Earth, it’s an environmental disaster, and it’s falling apart all around us. Meet concrete, the subject of a new feature-length documentary by John Wilson, a filmmaker with a knack for finding laugh-out-loud absurdity in the mundane.
The History of Concrete stitches together quick cuts of handheld footage and deadpan narration in the same style as How To with John Wilson, the HBO show that made the filmmaker’s career. As in his episodes on “how to make small talk” and “how to put up scaffolding,” the titular subject of the film isn’t really the point. Instead, Wilson uses the theme of concrete as a kind of connective tissue, taking the viewer on a sprawling exploration of the overlooked corners of our world. Concrete’s pervasiveness allows this film to venture anywhere — a family-run mortuary that specializes in tattoo preservation, a patriotic brick-laying competition in Las Vegas, and a 3,100-mile spiritual race in which runners circle a single block in Queens for weeks on end.
It would be a stretch to call the documentary a climate film. (In fact, it’s explicitly styled like a Hallmark movie.) But with each turn of the lens, Wilson sheds light on an unfolding environmental disaster. After all, he points out, concrete is the third biggest contributor to global warming. And although concrete is an indispensable part of modern life, its short, crumbling lifespan makes it a hazard on an increasingly disaster-prone planet. (Reader beware, there are more grim facts about concrete — and spoilers — ahead.)
Wilson’s fascination with concrete started when the basement of his apartment building in Queens began intermittently flooding. He tried to patch the repair himself with a store-bought concrete mix, but the leak kept coming back. His frustration is widely shared: As climate change intensifies storms and raises sea levels, New Yorkers are dealing with more extreme rainfall and coastal flooding than ever before. The abundance of concrete worsens flooding by preventing stormwater from seeping into the soil and, when it cracks, fails to block the water from filling subway stations and buildings for dozens of days a year.
More on concrete A new solution for flood-prone cities? Concrete made from shellfish waste. Ayurella Horn-MullerWilson goes on to discover our concrete-smothered world is full of hazards, owing to the material’s surprisingly short lifespan. Structures like the Brooklyn Promenade, which makes up the upper most deck of a four-layered expressway, aren’t supposed to last more than 40 years according to Sam Schwartz, a former New York City traffic commissioner who Wilson interviews. Today, the 1,800-foot-long artery is covered in patch jobs. Schwartz tells Wilson that a mass catastrophe could be just a few years away.
With these facts in mind, any city starts to look like a morass of potential disasters. It’s no wonder that Wilson spent at least a year filming the cracks around New York. Some places, such as a public swimming pool sanitation facility that is inundated with leaks, are given a few minutes of screentime. Others, including the architecturally famous Spring Street Salt Shed, which is patched with packing tape, and a 10-year-old skyscraper in midtown Manhattan that may already need to be demolished, are presented in a quick, jaw-dropping montage. As Wilson says, it feels as though “we’re all in danger somehow.”
Perversely, climate change is making this problem even worse. Studies show that extreme weather hastens the deterioration of concrete structures around the world. And while Wilson doesn’t say this, it’s worth noting that even structurally sound concrete is a hazard as the planet warms. The material creates an “urban heat island” effect that can cause local air temperatures to rise as much as 7 degrees Fahrenheit, turning the pavement into a scalding 140 degrees F griddle and killing hundreds of people in places like Arizona every year.
But, as a contractor tells Wilson, “We’d be up a creek without concrete. It is used for everything.” Places like New York require vast amounts of the material to build new housing and maintain urban areas. Unfortunately, sand — the key ingredient in concrete — is vanishing as coastlines erode and humans use up some 50 billion tons of the stuff per year. While most people remain blissfully unaware, Wilson says, experts have been trying to warn us of an impending global sand shortage.
Near the end of the film, Wilson takes a peak at a concrete recycling plant, one of the few existing solutions to these problems. These facilities exist to stop debris from demolitions going to landfills, and, ideally, to make newly usable material with fewer emissions. But the one that Wilson found near Brooklyn’s marine terminal was also filling nearby neighborhoods with dangerous amounts of airborne dust, prompting protests and the plant’s eventual closure in 2025.
For now, our dependency on concrete seems as intractable as its pitfalls. “Once you’re used to something, it becomes hard to change your lifestyle without external pressure,” Wilson says.
I was already aware of the environmental costs of concrete when I first moved to New York City as an early-career climate reporter, but I wasn’t prepared for what it would feel like to be surrounded by so much of it. I found myself questioning the commonly cited statistic that urban lifestyles have a smaller carbon footprint than suburban ones. After all, these studies generally account for the energy and materials residents consume directly, while leaving out the emissions embodied in the buildings, sewers, and other parts of the built-up environment that make city life possible.
Although my own back-of-the-envelope calculations support the idea that living here is probably the greener choice, I still rush through my commutes to spend less time amid the chaos. But walking out of the Manhattan theater where I saw The History of Concrete, my gray surroundings came into sharper focus — almost like the film had never stopped. There’s a kind of poetry in Wilson’s work: the banal becomes beautiful, the bizarre becomes delightful, and the heartbreaks become unguardedly funny. His curiosity, bordering at times on voyeurism, is an invitation to join him in the simple act of paying attention.
And so I noticed the toddler lying on her belly outside of the gum-plastered entrance to the subway station. A dumpling food truck, seemingly stuck in a pothole. Groups of women in ballgowns rushing past, their long skirts dragging into puddles — all of it part of a concrete world worth noticing.
This story was originally published by Grist with the headline The world is crumbling in ‘The History of Concrete’ on Oct 19, 2026.
How Audubon Science Informs a New Global Effort to Protect Migratory Birds
Protecting nature is a public duty, not a Wall Street profit opportunity
An Lambrechts is a biodiversity politics expert at Greenpeace International with extensive experience in biodiversity-related multilateral negotiations. She is the head of the Greenpeace delegation at the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) COP17 happening in Yerevan, Armenia.
In 2022, COP15 delivered the landmark Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. With COP17 starting in Yerevan, we are now halfway to the deadline, and according to the first Global Review of progress, countries are not on track to meet the biodiversity targets, and implementation must accelerate fast.
One of the main findings of the Global Review is that funding falls far short of the scale needed to halt and reverse nature loss. But the crisis facing the world’s biodiversity is not an absolute scarcity of capital – it is a profound public policy distortion.
The global economy currently spends roughly $30 destroying nature for every single dollar invested in its protection. According to a report from the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, a staggering $2.4 trillion is spent in public subsidies for fossil fuels, agriculture and water use, while global investment in biodiversity conservation and restoration stands at a mere $220 billion.
Countries urged to ramp up “insufficient” nature policies at COP17
Yet, discussions about how to close the biodiversity finance gap continue to claim that salvation lies in mobilising private capital, scaling offsets and “derisking” investments in nature. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of both the nature of ecological stewardship and of the global financial architecture.
Biodiversity conservation is not a speculative investment portfolio – it is the foundation of human survival. The health of our planet is a non-monetisable, non-excludable public good. Expecting profit-seeking private capital to protect nature perpetuates the structural drivers of ecosystem destruction in the first place.
But if private market mechanisms cannot save biodiversity, where will the necessary public resources come from?
Money going to the wrong placesThe answer lies in recovering the vast public wealth currently drained by cross-border tax abuse, financial secrecy and corporate impunity. Finance and environment ministers meeting in Yerevan must give a strong political signal that, to avert ecological breakdown, countries need to take swift action to reform global tax rules, eliminate harmful public subsidies and cancel unsustainable sovereign debts for the public revenues to end up where they belong.
Extractive sectors such as industrial agriculture, fishing, timber and mining continue business-as-usual, often heavily subsidised by public treasuries, while voluntary carbon and biodiversity offset markets pose a serious risk to nature conservation. Offset schemes have delivered only a negligible fraction of the funding needed to preserve ecosystems, allowing industries to continue with their destructive business-as-usual practices.
In advanced economies, public funding often actively undermines biodiversity. In Europe, over €5.3 billion in public subsidies is funnelled annually into intensive forest biomass harvesting under renewable energy directives, degrading primary forest ecosystems and undermining long-term climate resilience. Pleading with private investors to fill a “finance gap” while pouring billions into ecological destruction is an exercise in futility.
Developing countries struggle with debt burdenFor developing countries, reliance on private finance is further compounded by a crushing sovereign debt crisis. In 2024, public debt in developing economies reached record levels, with net interest payments alone absorbing $921 billion. A record 61 developing countries now spend more than 10% of government revenue on foreign debt service, with many climate-vulnerable nations spending twice as much servicing external debt as they receive in climate and biodiversity finance combined.
This burden acts as a structural driver of ecosystem destruction. Under pressure from external creditors and international financial institutions to avoid default and secure foreign exchange, governments are routinely forced into austerity measures and pushed to expand raw commodity exports into pristine biomes.
Comment: World Bank and IMF should lead the financial system in responding to the climate crisis
The current negotiations for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UNFCITC) also offer a way forward. An estimated $492 billion in tax revenue is lost every year to offshore tax havens. Multinational corporations account for around $348 billion of this total by shifting profits away from the countries where real economic extraction and environmental degradation occur.
In the mining sector alone, developing nations lose tens of billions annually to corporate tax dodging. Furthermore, international financial secrecy shields environmental criminals, with illicit financial flows from illegal logging draining between $51 billion and $152 billion annually.
At COP17, leaders must seize the opportunity to build a bridge between the two conventions and enhance cooperation. Governments must put the world on a firm path to securing predictable, sufficient, sovereign public finance for biodiversity conservation. It’s the only path to a restorative, rights-based future for people and the planet.
The post Protecting nature is a public duty, not a Wall Street profit opportunity appeared first on Climate Home News.
Whoosh And They're Gone
Well that was fun. In last week's welcome bit of comic relief, we got the vapid rise and rapid fall - despite requisite blonde hair, faux smile and passing resemblance to Ivanka - of "manifestly unqualified" Barbie News Reader and fake Chinese lawyer Katie Zacharia after a brutal debut. So much for MAGA meritocracy. SAD! Zacharia set a new speed record - half a Mooch - in a job akin to Spinal Tap drummer. But the question remains: When will the incompetent male dolts get fired?
While by far not the most substantive Trump blunder, it was one of the most cringeworthy, exposing (again) the profound ineptitude of his shambolic rule just before voters go to the polls to render judgment on it. In less than a week, Zacharia managed to get plucked from right-wing obscurity, be "shoehorned" into a job far beyond her skillset, humiliate herself before millions, go on Fox and stammeringly fail to redeem herself, and get fired by a capricious, perennial loser who got famous fake-firing people on TV and now daily exposes his own clownish unfitness for his job. One astute observer: "I'm starting to think this Donald guy might not have any idea what he's doing."
Born Kate Sharon Black in 1984, Zacharia grew up in California in the "liberal cesspool” of Cambria; she was the conservative “black sheep” of her family "thanks to the great, late Rush Limbaugh, who raised me as a kid on the radio." Describing a clash with woke patrons of her "cardio kickboxing gym," she said the owner once asked her not to wear her "Trump 2024" hat but "I would never take my Trump hat off to appease the left." A Pizzagate, Qanon and Stop the Steal buff, she was a "huge fan of ICE and Border Patrol" who briefly worked for Kristi Noem and a commentator for right-wing TV before being spotted by Trump, maybe because she scheduled her gigs when she thought he'd be watching. Totally normal.
Officials looking to replace Karoline Leavitt had reportedly narrowed down the list of candidates "only to find that (they'd) said something negative about (Trump)," which of course wouldn't do for the fragile toddler. Thus did uber-obsequious, ringlet-bottle-blonde "lizard person" Zacharia take to the podium, blare "Good morning!!" in a sing-songy screech, and stumble through a smiley, halting, inflection-challenged briefing about Trump's "historic one-day war," "attendance at record highs as enthusiastic hardworking Americans are lining up and packing arenas," a "booming economy....and a, um, he, great relationship...with Venezuela...um, and...my president, excuse me, my husband, that's a good one..." Not.
After the one question on Ukraine, and the famous, “I’ll have to get back to you on that,” it was over. 14 minutes, or forever in bimbo time. It got worse. The oft-repeated claims of being a lawyer when she’d failed the bar - weirdly, thanks Hannity - and of working in China on “international transaction law” when she was basically a paid intern. The verdict: "A train wreck," "a joke hire," "talk about a public execution," "between the 3rd-grade level reading and the fake attorney in China thing, brutal." Anti-DEI,.scandal-plagued Rick Santorum's glowing review: She was "not even close to the worst." Trump's lazy excuse: "I told her, 'If I were you, I'd reconsider.'" Fox: She's "transitioning" out of the job she held for 14 minutes.
It was a made-for-the-Internet spectacle. The White House declared, "She’ll be remembered as one of the all-time greats." America proclaimed, "She's gonna be a punchline for a very long time." Democratic strategist Mike Nellis clarified, "She wasn't fired because she lied,” a Trump requisite, but because "she was a bad liar." Another requisite: Michael Steele mused no more "blonde white female pronouncing his noise in a way that makes him feel good.” Some selfishly mourned the loss: "Please let her last long enough to hold a second briefing - I need the joy." Some empathized with SNL writers stuck with Friday night rewrites. Some were shocked: "I can't believe her husband, I mean president, fired her."
Though no press secretary really matters because Trump daily lies, veers, makes things up, some speculated on the next one: Scott Jennings, Katie Miller, Melissa McCarthy doing Sean Spicer. The Borowitz Report announced it's George Santos, who was "thrilled...I will bring to this job my experience not only as a lawyer but as a doctor and astronaut.” Also, he was cutting short his reunion tour "with his fellow Beatles." Some noted Zacharia "was press secretary longer than she was a lawyer." Others asserted they'd had blueberries, bananas, takeout and lettuce in their fridge longer than she had her job. Also that the U.K's Liz Truss lasted longer, as did the head of lettuce that often competed with her.
Some mulled Zacharia's future: "Next: memoir and book tour," "Now she can go back to studying for the bar, or at least its cocktail menu," "She is leaving 'to spend more time with my children, who will teach me how to read.'" A guy met her years ago on a cruise ship: She was telling a friend she'd partied the night before and slept in. They told her she'd missed them crossing the equator that morning. She said, "Oh, what did it look like?" Some waxed lyrical: "Like sands through the hourglass, so are the Days of Our Lives." Some lamented inflation: "I remember when you could get a few months of work out of a press secretary. Now they're like those new batteries - they look like they'll last but whoosh and they're gone."
In honor of her historic reign, Wikipedia’s “List Of Humorous Units Of Measurement” was updated to include the “Zacharia,” a “fractional unit of a Scaramucci,” the previous record for Anthony Scaramucci's 11 days as press secretary in Trump's first term. The change prompted heated debate, pained mathematical equations, admiration: "Nobody thought anything could go faster than the speed of Mooch, but here we are." There were questions - Are Mooches a metric system? Would that be 45 centi-Mooches? - and answers: "They convert at a 5/11 ratio." Talk turned existential: "A Scaramucci was a measure of time. A Zacharia is more ethereal, a measure of being, a disconnect between one’s story and one's purpose...Beautiful really."
And there was anger Zacharia got fired but Trump's still here, that the media and GOP have let him "get away with LYING ABOUT EVERY GODDAMNED THING...from 2015 SPOUTING THAT OBAMA BIRTH CERTIFICATE SHIT AND EVERY OTHER FUCKING LIE HE’S TOLD SINCE." And, in the last few months, that half of eight female officials have resigned or been fired, all replaced by men. That consistently inept, unhinged, corrupt, sick idiots like Hegseth, Patel, Lutnick, Goebbels, Vance etc lie, cheat, rave, royally screw up yet keep their jobs. What the fuck. Meanwhile Zacharia, still sketchy, posts altered photos from the Oval Office and declares the guy who threw her under the bus "kind, wonderful, gracious, thoughtful, enthusiastic and hard-working...No one will ever make America great the way he has and continues to." Damn, we hope not.
Helpful Press Secretary conversion table.Image from Bluesky
The extractivists of the Foreign Office
Expansion of first coal country big battery reaches financial close as key licence awarded
Plan to expand the big battery built at the site of what was once the country's most polluting coal plant go ahead after gaining key licence and reaching financial close.
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For a more affordable Canada, optimize electricity demand while building new supply
PART 3 TRAINING NOV 10 AT 6PM ET: People’s Assemblies and The Revolutionary Potential of Grassroots Power
Back by request! CELDF is hosting Part 3 of People's Assemblies & The Revolutionary Potential of Grassroots Power on Nov 10 at 6:00 PM ET. Registration required.
The post PART 3 TRAINING NOV 10 AT 6PM ET: People’s Assemblies and The Revolutionary Potential of Grassroots Power appeared first on CELDF - Community Rights Pioneers - Protecting Nature and Communities.
Fortescue claims technology breakthrough to unlock potential of copper key to green energy transition
Andrew Forrest's iron ore miner says a demo plant in Brisbane that strips arsenic from copper is doing so at a fraction of the energy used in other processes.
The post Fortescue claims technology breakthrough to unlock potential of copper key to green energy transition appeared first on Renew Economy.
Queensland LNP gets excited as it shortlists companies competing in its first energy tender – for fossil gas
Queensland LNP's first major energy tender in a long time - for fossil gas generators - attracts 10 bidders with four short-listed.
The post Queensland LNP gets excited as it shortlists companies competing in its first energy tender – for fossil gas appeared first on Renew Economy.
South Korea unveils trillion-dollar green energy transition plan, and the opportunities are huge for Australia
South Korea unveils a $A1.1 trillion energy transition strategy, aimed at expanding renewables and transforming the country’s heavy industry, and the opportunities for Australia are huge.
The post South Korea unveils trillion-dollar green energy transition plan, and the opportunities are huge for Australia appeared first on Renew Economy.
Minns government manufactures jobs crisis to justify coal pollution expansion
The Premier has announced that the NSW Government intends to introduce laws to allow the Mount Pleasant mine to increase its annual production by nearly a third.
Coal lobby applauds, Greens horrified as premier promises to protect mine from High Court ruling
State to introduce bill allowing mine at centre of High Court ruling to continue with its planned expansion, increasing its annual production limit to 16.5 million tonnes.
The post Coal lobby applauds, Greens horrified as premier promises to protect mine from High Court ruling appeared first on Renew Economy.
Webinar: How integrated wind, storage and grid technologies are shaping Australia’s energy future
Join Envision Energy and Renew Economy for a webinar exploring the technologies shaping Australia’s next-generation energy system.
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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 18 OCTOBER 2026
Nine years after Shell helped finance Nord Stream 2, and four years after explosions crippled the Baltic pipelines, an extraordinary new chapter is unfolding. On 8 October 2026, Reuters reported discussions involving senior American and Russian figures about bringing US investors into the Nord Stream infrastructure. The reported participants included Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, and Kirill Dmitriev, a close adviser to Vladimir Putin. Germany immediately reiterated its opposition. Then, on 17 October, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak declared that restoring gas supplies through Nord Stream remained technically possible. Behind these developments lies a remarkable documentary trail: Shell’s original 2017 financing agreement, former East German intelligence officer Matthias Warnig’s leadership of Nord Stream 2, American sanctions, a $1.126 billion Shell write-down, Swiss restructuring proceedings and an increasingly complicated battle with European regulators.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-091
Publication date: 18 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: The Shell Leaks Files — 17 October 2026
Principal evidence: Shell’s authenticated 2017 corporate announcement; Gazprom’s contemporaneous financing announcement; Shell’s 2022 financial disclosures; US Treasury sanctions records; Financial Times and Reuters investigations; German government statements; European Commission sanctions records; and proceedings before the European Union courts.
Evidence classification: Authenticated corporate records and government decisions; attributable statements from identified officials; independently reported but unconfirmed commercial proposals; separately identified editorial commentary.
Introduction: A supposedly dead pipeline returns to the negotiating tableThe previous instalment examined the financial aftermath of Nord Stream 2.
Shell had committed substantial financing to the Russian-controlled project.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the company recognised a $1.126 billion impairment.
Nord Stream 2 never entered commercial service.
One of its two pipeline strings was damaged in the September 2022 explosions.
The operating company entered financial restructuring proceedings in Switzerland.
European sanctions created additional obstacles.
The conventional conclusion might have been that the project was finished.
Yet the evidence reveals something rather different.
Despite extraordinary financial losses, physical damage and political opposition, influential individuals continued exploring ways to revive the infrastructure.
In March 2025, the Financial Times reported a proposal involving former Nord Stream 2 chief executive Matthias Warnig and prospective American investors.
Warnig denied participating in the alleged discussions.
In October 2026, Reuters reported further discussions about potential American investment, this time involving figures associated with the highest levels of the US and Russian administrations.
The reports do not establish that an acquisition has been agreed or that the pipelines will reopen.
But they demonstrate that the possibility of commercial revival has not disappeared from international discussions.
The significance for Shell’s historical archive is that the company participated directly in the financing arrangements that made Nord Stream 2 possible.
And the original documents identify a particularly interesting individual at the centre of those arrangements.
His name was Matthias Warnig.
1. The authenticated document: Shell and Gazprom sign the financing agreementOn 24 April 2017, Shell and four other European energy companies signed financing agreements with Nord Stream 2 AG.
The other companies were Engie, OMV, Uniper and Wintershall.
The project was controlled by Gazprom.
Its estimated construction cost was €9.5 billion.
The five Western companies collectively agreed to provide financing and guarantees covering up to half that amount.
Each company’s commitment was limited to approximately €950 million.
Shell’s announcement explained that the arrangement included a €285 million long-term funding facility, with up to another €665 million available through additional financing and guarantees.
Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2 AG.
This was not a speculative press report.
It was an authenticated corporate transaction announced publicly by Shell, Gazprom and the participating European companies.
The agreement was presented as strengthening European energy security.
Its supporters believed the infrastructure would provide an important additional source of natural gas as European production declined.
Opponents argued that it would increase Europe’s dependence upon Russia and reduce Ukraine’s importance as a transit country.
Those competing positions were already well established in 2017.
Documentary sources: Shell — 2017 Corporate Press Releases, including 24 April Nord Stream 2 Agreement; Gazprom — Nord Stream 2 Financing Agreements, 24 April 2017. Uniper
The original photograph identifies the principal participantsGazprom’s archived announcement contains photographs of the signing ceremony.
Its official captions identify senior executives from the participating companies.
Among them were Maarten Wetselaar, then a member of Shell’s Executive Committee; Alexey Miller, chairman of Gazprom’s Management Committee; and Matthias Warnig, chief executive of Nord Stream 2 AG.
The photographs provide contemporaneous confirmation that these individuals participated in the same corporate event.
They do not, by themselves, establish anything about private conversations or subsequent conduct.
But they offer a useful historical reference point.
Here was Shell, represented at a senior level, formally participating in a major Russian-controlled infrastructure project.
And Warnig was already occupying a central executive position.
Archival photograph: Nord Stream 2 financing agreement ceremony, Paris, 24 April 2017. Source: OMV’s contemporaneous corporate announcement. omv.com
2. Matthias Warnig: From East German intelligence to Russian energyMatthias Warnig’s career is unusual even by the standards of international energy politics.
A German businessman and former officer of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security, commonly known as the Stasi, Warnig subsequently developed a substantial career in banking and Russian business.
He worked for Dresdner Bank in Russia following German reunification.
He became associated with major Russian financial and energy interests.
His relationship with Vladimir Putin has been documented extensively in international reporting.
Warnig has described meeting Putin in St Petersburg during the 1990s.
Other accounts have examined their possible connections during the final years of East Germany, when Putin served as a Soviet intelligence officer.
Those competing historical accounts should not be treated as interchangeable.
The relevant established fact is that Warnig developed a longstanding professional and personal association with Putin.
Warnig eventually became one of the most prominent executives involved in the Nord Stream projects.
He headed Nord Stream 2 AG until 2023.
His earlier Stasi service is relevant biographical history.
It does not establish that his later commercial activities involved intelligence operations or misconduct.
That distinction is important.
Nevertheless, his career illustrates the intersection of former Cold War intelligence networks, post-Soviet business relationships and European energy development.
Contemporaneous reporting: Deutsche Welle — Matthias Warnig and the Proposed Nord Stream 2 Revival, 2 March 2025. n-tv.de
3. Washington’s complicated relationship with Nord Stream 2American opposition to Nord Stream 2 long preceded the September 2022 explosions.
Successive US administrations criticised the project.
Their concerns included European dependence on Russian gas, the strategic position of Ukraine and the geopolitical consequences of additional Russian-controlled energy infrastructure.
The issue also became connected with American legislation providing for sanctions against companies involved in the pipeline’s construction.
On 19 May 2021, the Biden administration announced sanctions-related measures concerning Nord Stream 2.
However, it also granted a waiver covering Nord Stream 2 AG, Matthias Warnig and certain company officers.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained that the waiver was considered consistent with American national interests at that time.
The administration continued to oppose Nord Stream 2 politically.
The waiver did not represent American endorsement of the project.
It was a decision concerning the application of sanctions.
Primary US government source: US Department of State — Nord Stream 2 and European Energy Security, 19 May 2021.
February 2022: The waiver endsThe situation changed dramatically following Russia’s escalation against Ukraine.
On 22 February 2022, Germany suspended the certification process for Nord Stream 2.
The following day, the United States imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG and Matthias Warnig.
The US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control added both to its Specially Designated Nationals list.
The restrictions affected dealings involving American persons and US jurisdiction.
The Treasury also issued a narrowly defined authorisation for winding down certain transactions.
That was not permission to operate or revive the pipeline.
The documentary record therefore establishes a significant reversal.
In May 2021, Washington waived specified sanctions against the company and its chief executive.
By February 2022, both were sanctioned.
Any future American investment proposal would have to confront that legal history.
Primary sanctions record: US Treasury — Nord Stream 2 AG and Matthias Warnig Designations, 23 February 2022.
4. Shell’s financial exposure becomes a documented lossShell’s position changed in the first quarter of 2022.
Following the invasion of Ukraine, the company announced its intention to withdraw from Russian ventures involving Gazprom and related businesses.
That included ending its involvement in Nord Stream 2.
Shell’s third-quarter 2022 financial announcement subsequently confirmed that the company had fully written down its Nord Stream 2 loan.
The carrying amount was $1.126 billion.
The write-down occurred in the first quarter.
That timing matters.
When explosions damaged the Nord Stream infrastructure on 26 September 2022, Shell had already recognised the impairment.
The company subsequently reported that the rupture of one Nord Stream 2 string caused no additional third-quarter financial impact on that loan.
The original accounting loss was therefore connected to Shell’s reassessment of its Russian investment, not the later physical destruction.
Shell’s authenticated financial disclosure provides the controlling evidence.
Primary Shell document: Shell plc — Third Quarter 2022 Unaudited Results, Note 8: Withdrawal from Russian Oil and Gas Activities.
An essential distinctionShell’s financial involvement in Nord Stream 2 was through financing.
Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2 AG.
Consequently, it would be inaccurate to describe Shell as having owned 10 per cent of the operating company.
It would also be inaccurate to suggest that Shell retained an ownership stake that it could subsequently sell to American investors.
The company’s possible contractual rights as a creditor are a separate question.
As established in the previous instalment, Nord Stream 2 AG subsequently reached a restructuring agreement with creditors in Switzerland.
The precise amount, if any, eventually recovered by Shell has not been established from the documents examined.
Nor is there evidence in the material reviewed that Shell participated in the later American investment proposals.
That limitation must remain explicit.
5. November 2024: An American investor explores buying Nord Stream 2The first important indication of American commercial interest appeared in November 2024.
The Wall Street Journal reported that American investor Stephen P. Lynch was seeking permission from the US government to bid for Nord Stream 2.
Lynch was described as an investor with extensive experience acquiring Russian-related assets.
According to the report, he had sought authorisation from the US Treasury to negotiate with sanctioned entities.
His interest arose partly from the financial difficulties facing Nord Stream 2 AG.
If the Swiss restructuring failed, the company’s assets might become available through insolvency proceedings.
Lynch reportedly believed that an acquisition could provide American investors with influence over future European gas supplies.
The proposal was therefore presented as having both commercial and strategic potential.
But there were significant uncertainties.
An auction had not necessarily been scheduled.
The required American permissions had not been established as granted.
Gazprom’s position remained central.
And Germany had not authorised operation of the pipeline.
The report established that an identifiable American investor was pursuing an opportunity.
It did not establish that an acquisition had occurred.
Contemporaneous reporting: Wall Street Journal — A Miami Financier Is Quietly Trying to Buy Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline, November 2024; Meduza — Summary of Stephen Lynch’s Proposed Bid, 22 November 2024.
6. March 2025: The Financial Times reports a Warnig initiativeOn 2 March 2025, the Financial Times published a report that introduced another possibility.
The newspaper stated that Matthias Warnig was associated with efforts to restart Nord Stream 2 with backing from American investors.
The report relied upon individuals described as familiar with the discussions.
According to those sources, American businessmen could provide a channel to members of Donald Trump’s administration.
The proposed arrangement was reportedly being considered in the context of possible negotiations concerning the war in Ukraine and future US-Russian economic relations.
The report suggested that an American-led consortium had explored the outline of an arrangement involving Gazprom.
Such a transaction might have allowed American investors to acquire a financial interest in infrastructure originally built to transport Russian gas to Germany.
The implications were substantial.
A pipeline previously opposed by Washington might become an investment opportunity for American interests.
But the published account did not establish a completed agreement.
And there was a significant contradiction.
Warnig denied participating in the alleged discussions.
He told the Financial Times that he was not involved in discussions with American political or business representatives.
He also referred to his obligation to comply with American sanctions.
His denial was reported by German and international news organisations.
It must be included alongside the allegations.
The documentary position is therefore clear: the Financial Times reported a proposed initiative based upon confidential sources; Warnig denied the involvement attributed to him.
Neither account should be misrepresented as an uncontested finding.
Principal reporting: Financial Times — Putin Ally Pushes Deal to Restart Nord Stream 2 with US Backing, 2 March 2025; N-TV — Warnig Denies Involvement in Reported Pipeline Revival Discussions, 2 March 2025. ANSA.it
7. June 2025: Moscow says no purchase approach has been madeThe Russian government’s public response introduced another complication.
On 19 June 2025, Reuters reported comments by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.
Novak stated that no one had approached the Russian government about purchasing Nord Stream 2.
His remarks followed the earlier reporting about Stephen Lynch’s proposed acquisition.
They did not establish that no informal discussions existed anywhere.
But they contradicted any suggestion that the Russian government had already acknowledged a formal purchase approach.
Again, the distinction matters.
Expressions of commercial interest are not binding agreements.
Exploratory discussions are not completed negotiations.
And reporting about an investor’s intentions is not proof that Gazprom has agreed to transfer assets.
Contemporaneous source: Reuters — Russia’s Novak Says No One Has Approached Government About Buying Nord Stream 2, 19 June 2025.
8. July 2025: The European Union creates another formidable barrierWhile the commercial proposals attracted attention, European regulators were moving in the opposite direction.
On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted its eighteenth package of sanctions against Russia.
The package included a specific transaction prohibition concerning Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2.
The European Commission explained that the measure was intended to prevent transactions connected with the pipelines.
The restrictions covered their completion, operation, maintenance and use.
They also addressed associated financing.
The legal framework included narrowly defined exceptions and possibilities for authorisation, including certain restructuring, compensation, legal and safety-related matters.
Those provisions should not be mistaken for permission to restart commercial gas deliveries.
The effect was significant.
Even if American investors could reach an arrangement with Gazprom, European sanctions would remain an independent obstacle.
American ownership would not automatically remove the restrictions applicable within the European Union.
Primary regulatory documents: Council of the European Union — Eighteenth Sanctions Package, 18 July 2025; European Commission — Nord Stream Transaction Ban Explained.
9. January 2026: Europe legislates to end Russian gas importsThe regulatory barriers became more substantial in January 2026.
On 26 January, the European Union formally adopted Regulation (EU) 2026/261.
The legislation established a phased prohibition on imports of Russian natural gas.
It applied to both liquefied natural gas and pipeline supplies.
The rules included transitional arrangements for qualifying existing contracts.
The general prohibition began applying on 18 March 2026, subject to those arrangements.
The final phase-out of long-term Russian pipeline gas imports was scheduled for autumn 2027.
This legislation did not concern Nord Stream alone.
It formed part of a wider European policy intended to reduce dependence upon Russian energy.
Nevertheless, its implications for Nord Stream were obvious.
The surviving Nord Stream 2 string might remain physically capable of transporting gas.
But physical capability would not overcome the applicable import restrictions.
Nor would it resolve the absence of German operational certification.
Official sources: Council of the European Union — Final Approval of Phased Russian Gas Import Ban, 26 January 2026; Regulation (EU) 2026/261 — Official Legal Record.
10. April 2026: Nord Stream 2 challenges European legislationThe operator did not accept the new legal environment without challenge.
On 27 April 2026, Nord Stream 2 AG brought proceedings before the General Court of the European Union.
The case was registered as T-264/26 — Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council.
The company seeks annulment of Regulation (EU) 2026/261 or, alternatively, specific provisions.
Its legal arguments include challenges concerning the regulation’s legal basis and allegations involving proportionality and property rights.
Those are the company’s arguments.
They are not established findings by the court.
The official record confirms that proceedings were commenced.
It does not establish that Nord Stream 2 has succeeded.
This is another important example of the continuing legal life of the project.
The operating company is challenging the rules governing the very activity for which the pipeline was constructed.
Official judicial record: European Union General Court — Case T-264/26, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council.
11. 8 October 2026: Reuters reports a new American-Russian initiativeThe most significant recent development came on 8 October 2026.
Reuters published an investigation by John O’Donnell, Gram Slattery and David Gauthier-Villars.
The agency reported that senior American and Russian figures had discussed bringing an American investor into the Nord Stream pipelines.
Its account cited five individuals familiar with the situation.
The reported participants included Jared Kushner and Kirill Dmitriev.
Kushner is President Trump’s son-in-law and has been involved in American diplomatic efforts relating to Russia and Ukraine.
Dmitriev is a senior Russian investment official and adviser associated with President Putin.
The sources told Reuters that the possibility of American participation in Nord Stream remained under consideration.
The report described discussions involving the possible restoration of US-Russian economic relationships.
A commercial arrangement might allow American investors to benefit financially from future Russian gas exports to Europe.
But the report also contained qualifications.
It was unclear how extensively Nord Stream had been discussed during particular meetings between Kushner and Dmitriev.
The proposed commercial structure was not publicly established.
And a White House official disputed the suggestion of recent pipeline discussions.
According to Reuters, the official said there had been “no Nord Stream discussions recently.”
The same official indicated that any relevant agreements would have to involve appropriate American government authorities and benefit US interests.
That was not confirmation of an agreed transaction.
The White House response must be considered alongside the anonymous-source reporting.
Principal contemporary investigation: Reuters — US and Russia Explore Gas Sale to Europe Amid Ukraine War, 8 October 2026; English-language republication by The Moscow Times. onvista
An important distinction between the pipeline companiesThe Reuters report discussed potential American involvement in the Nord Stream infrastructure more broadly.
That wording is significant.
Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 are separate corporate projects.
Nord Stream AG, the operator of Nord Stream 1, has a Gazprom majority shareholder and minority European shareholders.
Nord Stream 2 AG is wholly owned by Gazprom.
Consequently, a proposed American investment in one company would not necessarily involve acquiring an interest in the other.
Nor would it automatically resolve existing creditor claims.
The precise commercial structure contemplated in the reported discussions remains unresolved.
It would be premature to describe the proposals as an agreed American purchase of Nord Stream 2.
12. Germany’s response: The government is not seeking a restartThe German government’s reaction to the October report was unequivocal.
Reuters obtained comments from a spokeswoman for Germany’s Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.
She emphasised that the Nord Stream pipelines were subject to European sanctions.
Germany supported those restrictions.
The government also reiterated that reducing dependence upon Russian gas remained an important objective.
The spokeswoman explained that any operational restart would require certification from Germany’s Federal Network Agency.
Additional governmental and European regulatory processes would also be necessary.
She stated that no such process was being pursued.
That position is especially important because Nord Stream’s intended European destination is Germany.
An agreement between investors in Washington and commercial interests in Moscow would not, by itself, authorise operation of the infrastructure.
Germany’s legal and regulatory responsibilities cannot simply be bypassed through a change in ownership.
Reuters also reported opposition from other European countries, including Poland.
German political opinion was divided.
Some advocates of renewed Russian energy imports argued that commercial relations might eventually be restored.
Others warned that reopening Nord Stream could recreate the strategic vulnerabilities exposed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
These competing positions remain politically important.
But the government’s official stance is a separate matter.
As of 8 October 2026, Berlin was not pursuing Nord Stream’s operational certification or revival. onvista
13. 17 October 2026: Russia says restoration remains technically possibleA further development occurred yesterday.
On 17 October 2026, the Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported remarks by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.
Speaking in an interview broadcast by Solovyov Live, Novak said that restoring gas supplies through Nord Stream remained technically possible.
He acknowledged that three of the four pipeline strings were not operational following the September 2022 explosions.
One string survived.
According to Novak, that remaining pipeline could potentially carry gas if the necessary decisions were taken.
He also expressed the view that damaged sections could be repaired.
His comments placed responsibility for future decisions partly upon European customers and governments.
These are attributed statements by a Russian government official.
They should not be treated as an independent engineering certification.
Novak did not establish that repairs had been authorised.
He did not announce a completed American investment agreement.
Nor did his remarks remove the sanctions or regulatory obstacles identified by Germany and the European Union.
Nevertheless, the timing is notable.
Reuters had reported the American-Russian discussions on 8 October.
Nine days later, a senior Russian government official publicly reiterated the possibility of restoring deliveries through the pipeline system.
The statements are consistent with Moscow maintaining an interest in the infrastructure’s commercial future.
They do not prove that a coordinated agreement exists.
Contemporaneous Russian reporting: Vedomosti — Alexander Novak Says Nord Stream Gas Deliveries Remain Technically Possible, 17 October 2026.
14. The surviving pipeline: What would actually be required?Nord Stream consists of four pipeline strings across the two projects.
Three were damaged in September 2022.
One Nord Stream 2 string was not ruptured.
Its original designed annual capacity was approximately 27.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas.
This creates an unusual situation.
A substantial piece of infrastructure remains beneath the Baltic Sea.
But that does not mean it is commercially available.
A revival would face several distinct obstacles.
Physical and engineering requirements: The condition of the surviving pipeline would need to be assessed and verified before operations could be authorised.
Corporate arrangements: Gazprom’s ownership position, relevant financing arrangements and any proposed investment transaction would need to be addressed.
American sanctions: Transactions involving sanctioned persons or entities could require authorisation or changes to the applicable restrictions.
European sanctions: The specific restrictions concerning Nord Stream would remain applicable unless changed or relevant authorisations were lawfully granted.
European import legislation: Regulation (EU) 2026/261 establishes restrictions on the importation of Russian natural gas.
German certification: The infrastructure would require the relevant German regulatory approvals.
Commercial arrangements: Buyers, suppliers, transportation agreements, pricing arrangements and other contractual conditions would be required.
None of these obstacles can be eliminated merely by announcing that the pipeline is physically repairable.
That is why the distinction between technical feasibility and legal commercial viability is so important.
15. Where does Shell fit into the latest developments?Shell’s involvement belongs primarily to the earlier financing history.
The company’s role in 2017 is documented.
Its relationship with Nord Stream 2 AG was established through formal financing agreements.
Its 2022 loan impairment is documented.
Its announcement of withdrawal from Russian ventures is documented.
However, the reporting examined for this instalment does not identify Shell as a participant in the October 2026 American-Russian discussions.
Nor does it establish that Shell has agreed to finance a revival.
The presence of former Shell executives at the 2017 signing ceremony should not be confused with evidence of current involvement.
The potential rights of creditors under Nord Stream 2 AG’s restructuring arrangements must also be distinguished from ownership of the project.
In particular, the financial consequences of a possible future change in ownership cannot be determined without examining the underlying contracts.
It remains unclear whether such a transaction could produce any financial recovery relevant to Shell.
That is a legitimate question for further documentary research.
It is not an established outcome.
The archive should therefore describe Shell as an original financier of Nord Stream 2 whose disclosed loan was fully written down in 2022, rather than as a participant in the later revival proposals.
COMMENTARY: Who Would Control Europe’s Russian Gas Supply?The reported American interest raises a question extending beyond the financial position of Nord Stream 2 AG.
What would a revived pipeline represent strategically?
The original project was developed under Gazprom’s control.
Its commercial purpose was to transport substantial quantities of Russian gas to Germany.
Western European energy companies supported its construction through financing.
The arrangement promised additional supply capacity.
But it also raised longstanding concerns concerning strategic dependence upon Russia.
Those concerns became acute following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The American investment proposals introduce a different possibility.
Could an ownership or financial arrangement involving US investors provide Washington with influence over Russian gas exports to Europe?
That possibility has been raised in contemporary reporting.
Its potential advantages and disadvantages depend upon the structure of any agreement.
Supporters might argue that American participation could introduce additional oversight or commercial leverage.
Opponents might contend that changing the nationality of investors would not alter the Russian origin of the gas or remove the underlying dependency.
Other concerns could involve the distribution of revenues, European energy security and the position of Ukraine.
But all such assessments remain conditional upon a transaction that has not been established as completed.
It would be misleading to treat a speculative commercial structure as an existing geopolitical arrangement.
The danger of confusing investors with governmentsThere is another distinction worth preserving.
American investors are not automatically acting on behalf of the US government.
A private proposal does not necessarily represent official American policy.
Conversely, discussions involving government officials do not establish that a commercial acquisition has received final approval.
The 2024 report concerning Stephen Lynch related to an identifiable private investor.
The March 2025 Financial Times report described a possible initiative associated with Warnig, who denied the discussions attributed to him.
The October 2026 Reuters report concerned discussions reportedly involving senior American and Russian figures.
These are related developments.
They are not proof of a single continuous, coordinated operation.
Nor has the available evidence established that all the named individuals participated in one agreed plan.
A documentary history must resist the temptation to connect every reported contact into a single narrative of secret coordination.
The evidence must support the connections.
16. The remarkable 2017 photograph and the Sakhalin connectionFor the Shell archive, the most revealing historical contrast may be between the photograph from April 2017 and the circumstances of October 2026.
In 2017, senior executives from Shell, Gazprom and other European energy companies publicly celebrated an agreement intended to finance a major gas pipeline.
The project was presented as commercially beneficial.
Its supporters emphasised European energy security.
The executives represented companies with substantial interests in international energy markets.
The relationships appeared sufficiently stable to justify billions of euros in commitments.
Nine years later, the landscape had changed dramatically.
Shell had withdrawn from the project.
Its loan had been fully written down.
The operating company had undergone creditor restructuring.
The pipelines had been sabotaged.
American and European sanctions restricted commercial activity.
And Germany had rejected the prospect of restarting Russian gas deliveries.
Yet individuals and organisations continued examining whether the surviving infrastructure might possess future commercial value.
The contrast is considerable.
It also brings us back to Sakhalin.
Shell’s earlier Sakhalin-2 experience demonstrated how political intervention could alter control over a major Russian energy development.
The Nord Stream experience illustrates a different but related problem.
A project supported by Western capital can become commercially unusable following changes in international political relationships.
Both cases involve Gazprom.
Both involve major Western energy interests.
Both raise questions about the long-term risks associated with international investments dependent upon government decisions.
But they must not be presented as identical.
In Sakhalin-2, Shell held an equity interest in a producing energy project.
In Nord Stream 2, Shell provided financing to a Gazprom-owned company.
The corporate rights, financial consequences and historical circumstances were different.
The common thread is the exposure of major international energy investments to political decisions that can fundamentally alter their economic value.
17. The evidence: What is established and what remains unresolved?The documentary record supports a clear distinction between established events and contested reporting.
Established factsShell signed a financing agreement with Nord Stream 2 AG on 24 April 2017.
Gazprom remained the company’s sole shareholder.
Matthias Warnig was chief executive of Nord Stream 2 AG at the time.
The United States imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG and Warnig in February 2022.
Shell subsequently recognised a $1.126 billion impairment of its Nord Stream 2 loan.
The European Union adopted a specific Nord Stream transaction prohibition in July 2025.
Further EU legislation restricting Russian natural gas imports was adopted in January 2026.
Nord Stream 2 AG commenced proceedings challenging that legislation in April 2026.
Germany stated on 8 October 2026 that it was not pursuing operational certification or revival of Nord Stream.
Attributable statements and reportingThe Wall Street Journal reported Stephen Lynch’s interest in acquiring Nord Stream 2 in November 2024.
The Financial Times reported an initiative associated with Matthias Warnig in March 2025.
Warnig denied participating in the discussions attributed to him.
Reuters reported potential American investment discussions involving senior American and Russian figures on 8 October 2026.
A White House official said there had been no recent Nord Stream discussions.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated on 17 October 2026 that restoring gas deliveries remained technically possible.
Matters not establishedNo completed American acquisition of Nord Stream has been verified.
No binding agreement between Gazprom and a US investor has been established.
No decision by Germany to restart the pipelines has been announced.
No general removal of the relevant European restrictions has been established.
No evidence examined for this instalment shows Shell participating in the reported revival negotiations.
The precise financial consequences for Shell of any future transaction remain unresolved.
These distinctions are not incidental.
They determine what can responsibly be said about the historical record.
Conclusion: The Pipeline That Refuses to DisappearThe Nord Stream story has become an extraordinary example of the persistence of major international energy interests.
The original infrastructure represented billions of euros in investment.
Shell and other European companies helped finance it.
The project was intended to operate for decades.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine destroyed the political assumptions upon which much of that investment depended.
Shell recognised a substantial financial loss.
Sanctions followed.
Then came the explosions.
Yet the commercial interest did not disappear.
American investors reportedly explored acquisition opportunities.
The Financial Times reported a possible initiative involving Matthias Warnig, although he denied participating in the alleged discussions.
Reuters subsequently reported discussions involving senior American and Russian figures about potential US investment.
Germany reiterated its opposition.
And yesterday, Russia’s deputy prime minister publicly argued that the infrastructure could still be used or repaired.
The contrast is striking.
What was once promoted as a major achievement of European-Russian energy cooperation has become a contested asset at the intersection of international finance, sanctions law and diplomacy.
For Shell shareholders, the original financial consequences are documented.
For historians, the 2017 financing agreement and accompanying photographs provide an authenticated starting point.
For regulators, the challenge remains the interaction between private investment proposals and existing legal restrictions.
And for the independent Shell archive, the essential task is to preserve the evidence without overstating what it proves.
A pipeline may survive physically long after its original commercial purpose has collapsed.
But whether it can ever return to operation is a separate question.
For the moment, the evidence establishes interest, reported discussions and substantial obstacles.
It does not establish a completed revival.
Nine years after Shell signed the financing agreement, Nord Stream 2 remains unfinished business — legally, financially and politically.
PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES1. Shell — 24 April 2017
Shell’s Archived Nord Stream 2 Financing Announcement
Authenticated company document establishing the financing arrangement, original commitments and Gazprom’s ownership.
2. Gazprom — 24 April 2017
Nord Stream 2 AG and European Energy Companies Sign Financing Agreements
Contemporaneous corporate record identifying Shell, Matthias Warnig, Alexey Miller and the other participants in the signing ceremony.
3. Shell plc — 27 October 2022
Third Quarter 2022 Unaudited Results
Primary financial evidence establishing Shell’s $1.126 billion loan impairment and its withdrawal from Nord Stream 2.
4. US Department of the Treasury — 23 February 2022
Sanctions Designations Concerning Nord Stream 2 AG and Matthias Warnig
Official government record of the sanctions imposed following the termination of earlier waivers.
5. Wall Street Journal — November 2024
A Miami Financier Is Quietly Trying to Buy Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline
Contemporaneous investigation concerning Stephen Lynch’s proposed acquisition.
6. Financial Times — 2 March 2025
Putin Ally Pushes Deal to Restart Nord Stream 2 with US Backing
Original reporting concerning the alleged Warnig initiative.
7. N-TV — 2 March 2025
Warnig Denies Involvement in Reported Revival Discussions
German reporting recording Warnig’s denial.
8. European Commission — 18 July 2025
Eighteenth Sanctions Package, Including Nord Stream Transaction Restrictions
Official regulatory explanation of the restrictions applicable to Nord Stream.
9. Council of the European Union — 26 January 2026
Final Approval of the Phased Prohibition on Russian Gas Imports
Official record of the European Union’s Russian gas import phase-out legislation.
10. General Court of the European Union — April 2026
Case T-264/26: Nord Stream 2 AG v European Parliament and Council
Authenticated judicial record confirming the operator’s challenge to Regulation (EU) 2026/261.
11. Reuters — 8 October 2026
US and Russia Explore Gas Sale to Europe Amid Ukraine War, Say Sources
The principal contemporary investigation concerning reported American-Russian discussions, together with the relevant White House and German government responses.
12. Vedomosti — 17 October 2026
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak on the Possibility of Restoring Nord Stream Deliveries
Contemporaneous Russian reporting of the latest statements concerning the physical infrastructure.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND LEGAL DISCLAIMERThis instalment draws upon authenticated corporate announcements, official regulatory documents, financial disclosures, judicial records and identified contemporaneous journalism.
The 2017 financing agreement, Shell’s 2022 impairment and the cited sanctions and legislative measures are established documentary facts.
Accounts of prospective American investment are attributed to the publications and sources that reported them.
Matthias Warnig’s denial is expressly acknowledged.
Statements attributed to government officials are distinguished from independently verified conclusions.
No allegation is made that Shell participated in undisclosed negotiations to revive Nord Stream.
No allegation is made that any person mentioned in this article engaged in unlawful conduct in connection with the reported investment proposals.
No completed American acquisition or operational restart has been established.
The discussion of political and commercial implications is editorial analysis, not a finding of misconduct.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-092 — The Sakhalin Papers LXXXII: Gazprom’s Pipeline Takes Europe to Court — The Energy Charter Treaty, Secretive Arbitration and the Battle Over BillionsThe next instalment will examine a legal development that may be even more consequential than the reported American investment proposals.
Nord Stream 2 AG has not confined its efforts to commercial negotiations.
It has also pursued legal proceedings against the European Union.
The disputes reach back to 2019.
They concern European gas-market legislation, international investment protections and the legal consequences of restrictions on Nord Stream.
A particularly revealing authenticated document is Procedural Order No. 18, issued on 22 October 2025 in proceedings administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
The order records a disagreement between Nord Stream 2 AG and the European Union over whether sanctions restrictions created unacceptable risks for the arbitration itself.
Nord Stream 2 argued that the restrictions could affect participants in the proceedings.
The European Commission disputed that interpretation.
The arbitral tribunal ultimately suspended the proceedings pending clarification of the relevant risks.
The document reveals a remarkable situation.
A company controlling infrastructure built to transport Russian gas was challenging European legislation, while arguing that other European sanctions could interfere with its ability to pursue the legal case.
The next instalment will reconstruct that dispute from the actual procedural orders, European court records and the original legislative instruments.
It will also examine the earlier General Court judgment concerning the European gas directive and the later actions challenging sanctions and import restrictions.
Primary documentary starting point: Nord Stream 2 AG v European Union — Procedural Order No. 18, 22 October 2025.
The central question will be whether an international energy investment can generate enforceable compensation rights when subsequent political and regulatory developments undermine its commercial purpose.
For Shell shareholders, the wider historical lesson is significant.
The contracts may have been signed years ago. The financial losses may already have been recognised. But the legal consequences can continue for decades.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 18 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 18, 2026 at 7:05 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
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