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Andhra Pradesh Community Managed Natural Farming (APCNF) recently received the 2026 Food Planet Prize for their role in leading one of the world’s largest agroecology projects. The award will help the organization scale sustainable practices to the 6 million farmers in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh and beyond.

The Food Planet Prize, the world’s largest environmental award of US$1.5 million, recognizes successful projects working at the intersection of food and agriculture systems and climate. This year, the committee recognized APCNF for demonstrating a scalable pathway for farmers to improve their livelihoods, resilience, and environmental outcomes. 

APCNF—led by the nonprofit Rythu Sadhikara Samstha (RySS), which translates to the Farmer Empowerment Organisation—began with 40,000 smallholders practicing natural farming in 2016. Over the last decade, it has grown to reach 1.8 million producers.

Under the program, farmers learn how to use locally available biological resources, diversify crops, and introduce natural soil-enrichment techniques. Those who become experts in these practices, known as master farmers, take on the role of teachers in their communities. Each master farmer offers training and guidance to 100–150 neighboring producers.

At the center of this program are women, who make up over 60 percent of the master farmers in APCNF’s network. “They are the heroes of our work,” Vijay Kumar Thallam, Executive Vice Chair of RySS, tells Food Tank. “Women have played such a critical role as people who are experimenting because it’s not a top-down approach.”

Thallam sees every farmer as a scientist, adding to the knowledge pool, helping to refine innovations, determining what strategies work, and where. “That’s the beauty of this,” he says.

But the transition isn’t without uncertainty, and Thallam feels immense gratitude to everyone who puts their trust in natural farming. Without deep resources to fall back on, farmers are putting their livelihoods on the line. “It’s a very big risk when they shift.”

Fortunately, their work is paying off. “The poorest farmers believed in us,” Thallam tells Food Tank. “They experimented in this, they found success, they expanded the area, and inspired others.”

In Andhra Pradesh, natural farming plots have grown more resilient to extreme weather patterns—something that will become particularly important this year during El Niño. Heavy rains may destroy plants on chemically-treated fields, but when farmers use natural farming techniques, their crops better withstand the conditions. As the approach scales to other countries, including Zambia and Sri Lanka, producers are seeing similar results. 

“What we are doing is very simple but very profound,” Thallam tells Food Tank. “It’s something anybody can do anywhere in the world.”

Watch the full conversation with Vijay Kumar Thallam on “Food Talk with Dani Nierenberg” to hear more about the journey farmers take with APCNF, why chemical-based agriculture is built on the wrong science, and plans to bring natural farming to more producers around the world.

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Andhra Pradesh Community Managed Natural Farming

The post ‘Simple But Profound’: Natural Farming Is Changing the Lives of Millions in India appeared first on Food Tank.

When you walk into Magnolia Cafe in Dunn, North Carolina, you are greeted by a friendly kitchen and the smell of comfort food. A mural of colorful magnolias covers one wall while another showcases the phrase, “Where Dignity Meets Delicious.” Despite being a new cafe, it feels like a place where the locals are regulars. Behind the locally sourced ingredients and the display case of banana pudding, there’s something that makes this cafe extra special.

The post Magnolia Cafe in Dunn, NC | Where Dignity Meets Delicious appeared first on RAFI.

A Los Angeles Times article published this week highlights the escalating climate risks facing California and the world. With experts forecasting a strengthening El Niño, continued record-breaking temperatures, and mounting concern over rapidly warming oceans, these threats are no longer theoretical, but unfolding now. 

The article cites officials who confirmed that global sea surface temperature reached a record high this month. Warmer oceans increase the likelihood of extreme precipitation, flooding, and stronger storms, while also contributing to sea level rise and placing significant stress on marine ecosystems and wildlife. 

Scientists also warn that El Niño is expected to prolong an ongoing marine heat wave, creating an extended period of abnormally warm ocean temperatures that can have devastating impacts on marine life.

These climate-driven changes also threaten water supplies across the West, contributing to more severe droughts and heat waves. The article exemplifies the urgent need for California to adapt its water management strategies by investing in sustainable, local water solutions rather than relying on large-scale water diversion schemes that will become increasingly unreliable as climate change reduces available supplies.

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments Rain, typhoons and heat

GUANGXI FLOODS: Severe floods hit south-western China’s Guangxi province after heavy rains, killing 39 people and leaving another nine missing, reported the state-run newspaper China Daily. “Torrential rain” caused by Typhoon Maysak overwhelmed rivers and reservoirs in the province, said the New York Times. The Southern Weekly reported that several villages in Guangxi’s Hengzhou city were submerged. An unnamed researcher told the outlet that “small and medium-sized reservoirs”, not just in Guangxi but nationwide, are “severely aged, making it difficult for them to effectively withstand floods caused by extreme weather events against the backdrop of global [climate] change”.

TORNADOES AND 50C HEAT: At least 11 people were killed by two “extremely rare” tornadoes in central China’s Hubei province also linked to Maysak, according to Reuters. Typhoon Bavi is “on course to hit China’s eastern coast” in the coming days, said BBC News. Meanwhile, Xinjiang province in the north-west and Hainan province in the south both experienced “prolonged and intense heatwaves” in June, reported finance outlet National Business Daily. It added that temperatures in Xinjiang reached 50C.

‘MORE FREQUENT AND SEVERE’: China is “warming faster than the global average”, reported state-run newspaper China Daily. It said the China Meteorological Administration’s 2026 “blue book” on climate change in China found that from 1961 to 2025, China’s “annual average temperature increased by 0.31C per decade”. The blue book also found that “extreme weather and climate events in China have become more frequent and severe”, said China National Radio. The outlet said this included extreme heat, precipitation events and typhoons.

New five-year plans and action plans

‘BEAUTIFUL CHINA’ PLAN: The full text of the 15th five-year plan for building a “Beautiful China” outlines “seven key tasks”, including “actively addressing climate change”, reported Xinhua. The plan, re-published by BJX News, set quantitative targets for 2030. These included a 3% cut in carbon emissions per unit of production at industries included in China’s national carbon market. It added that the plan also called for “controlling and reducing coal use” and “reasonably controlling” the scale of coal-power capacity. Meanwhile, the outlet says, the government will “accelerate efforts” to ensure new electricity demand is met by clean energy. It also reported that the plan notes the need to “improve the capacity to respond to climate change” and to “actively participate and lead in” global climate governance. An op-ed attributed to a “commentator from this newspaper” in the environment ministry-run China Environment News said that the next five years are “pivotal” for the “Beautiful China” initiative. 

OTHER FIVE-YEAR PLANS: The government also published a 15th five-year plan on “meteorological development”, calling for “enhanced” support for addressing climate change, said BJX News. It added that the plan emphasises the need to “participate deeply” in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and “actively participate” in the World Meteorological Organization’s work on greenhouse gas monitoring. A third 15th five-year plan on developing a circular economy pledges to “address the shortcomings” in the recycling of clean-tech, reported finance outlet EastMoney. In a Q&A, a government official noted that used batteries, solar and wind power equipment “currently present particularly prominent challenges”, according to BJX News. The five-year plan for tourism encourages the use of carbon offsets and promotes “low-carbon travel”, said industry outlet China Travel News.  

PEAKING ‘ACTION PLAN’: China released an “action plan” for peaking its carbon emissions “by 2030”, reported state news agency Xinhua. It added that the action plan reiterated China’s existing targets for carbon intensity and share of non-fossil energy in energy consumption. The plan calls on officials to “vigorously promote” non-fossil energy development and to accelerate efforts to improve “absorption” of new energy into the grid, according to International Energy Net. The plan “doesn’t seek to rein in the country’s fast-growing coal-to-chemicals industry”, said Bloomberg. It noted that the focus instead is on “low-carbon retrofits, reductions in coal consumption per unit of output and a gradual substitution of some fossil-based feedstocks and energy inputs”.

Dialogue deadline 

EU-CHINA TALKS: The EU and China have set an October deadline to “reset trade ties” as tensions over cleantech exports and other economic matters “rise”, reported Bloomberg. In a joint statement, the two sides established a “trade and investment consultation mechanism” with four workstreams, including trade and investment balancing and export controls, reported state news agency Xinhua. A joint statement, released by the European Commission, said the two sides agreed to “strengthen” dialogue and to “maintain…the stability of global industrial supply chains”.

AVENUES OF COOPERATION: A Chinese state-affiliated consulting firm and several European certification bodies have established a consortium to coordinate on “green electricity certificates”, aiming to “establish a network for mutual recognition of green power”, reported financial outlet Yicai. Meanwhile, China’s foreign ministry described increasing air-conditioner and fan exports to Europe during a record heatwave as a sign of the “complementary advantages” of EU-China trade, said Xinhua. This message was echoed in several articles by Chinese state-backed outlets. The People’s Daily noted that “as climate change drives more frequent and intense heatwaves…China’s industrial and energy capabilities are…helping address rising demand in Europe”.

PRESSURE ON COMPETITION: Meanwhile, China issued strict mandatory energy consumption and efficiency standards for the solar power industry in efforts to “curb overcapacity”, said financial news outlet Caixin. The country is “rolling back” tax exemptions for plug-in hybrids and electric commercial trucks, Caixin also reported, adding that fully electric passenger cars will not be affected. 

More China news

• US FRICTION: The US is “drafting a ban on imports of foreign inverters…over concerns China ​could use them to disrupt power supplies”, reported Reuters. 
• ‘ZERO-CARBON CORRIDORS’: China called for developing “zero-carbon transport corridors” and vehicle hubs, including the promotion of low-carbon vehicles and vessels, says power news outlet BJX News.
• ‘SCALE UP SUPPORT’: At a climate meeting in Bangkok, climate envoy Liu Zhenmin advocated “scaling up support to developing countries” and creating an “inclusive, just transition mechanism”, said Earth Negotiations Bulletin.
• BRICS MEETING: The BRICS grouping will “emphasise the continued role of fossil fuels” in providing energy security, according to a joint communiqué. China will act as chair of BRICS in 2027, noted industry outlet International Energy Net.
• VENTURING NORTH: China has launched its 16th Arctic Ocean expedition, said state broadcaster CGTN. It added that “climate change and its impacts” is a key focus of the mission.

Captured

China received $4.3bn in climate finance from the World Bank in 2020-2025, according to Carbon Brief analysis. The World Bank has dropped a pledge on climate-related lending, reported the Financial Times. The newspaper also reported that the bank will also “phase out its lending to China by 2031”. (China is estimated to have provided $3-4.5bn of climate finance annually to other countries, according to estimates by different thinktanks.)

Spotlight  Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’

A new database has mapped every climate initiative launched or run by China.

In this issue, Carbon Brief interviewed Dr Sun Yixian, professor of sustainability governance at the University of Bath, on what this data shows about China’s approach to climate “leadership”.

Below are highlights from the conversation. The full interview is published on the Carbon Brief website.

Carbon Brief: Your team has compiled a database of China’s “environmental leadership”. What do you mean by leadership?

Sun Yixian: In this project, what we are trying to look at is China’s role in global environmental governance – China’s shifting role, especially from a more passive participant in global governance processes to play a more proactive role in developing or managing its own initiatives on transnational or cross-border environmental governance. 

So, [this includes] different environmental issues, but, of course, we found that climate change is a very important issue area. We have come up with a typology of different governance functions, trying to look at what specific activities Chinese actors are doing, or what kind of public goods Chinese actors are delivering, to the audiences of different initiatives.

CB: Could you explain what some of these climate initiatives look like in practice?

SY: In practical terms, there are all different kinds of initiatives. [The majority focus on] sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. 

Or also by providing funding, for example, China has created this south-south climate fund. It can also include research collaboration. 

It can be traditional leadership activities, in the sense of developing certain international regulatory frameworks or rules or standards. It can also be pilot projects. China sometimes can start to work directly with some international partners to trial new ideas and new practices.

CB: The database stops at 2024 – just before the current administration withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement. Have you noticed any changes in China’s global climate engagements following this? 

SY: I would say the trend is a continuous one, even [before] the withdrawal of the US…Over the past 10 years, we have seen an upward trend, with more and more new initiatives created by Chinese actors.

But I think the shift will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners – or countries or actors that haven’t been engaged very closely with China – to work more closely with China.

Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question. 

CB: The theme of the data set is environmental leadership, but…Chinese officials have eschewed being called a climate leader. Would you say that China wants to be seen as a climate leader?

SY: We are entering into the implementation phase for the Paris Agreement. That means it is very difficult to create new agendas at this stage. [Instead the focus is] trying to see if countries can deliver.

If we want to see whether China is becoming a leader, we have to look at how fast, for example, China is accelerating its energy transition and how fast China can reduce its emissions. 

Then, in terms of international engagement, what our data is trying to show is that China has become more proactive in that space. 

When I was in China a few months ago, [leading experts] said the government…[is] not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time, I think…in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. 

So, I think the question is whether this…will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of policymakers or decision-makers. 

This interview was conducted by Anika Patel via Zoom on 1 July 2026.

Watch, read, listen

ENVOY INTERVIEW: Climate envoy Liu Zhenmin spoke to state broadcasting station CGTN about climate finance, expectations for China to “lead climate action” and trade tensions.

VIEW FROM THE US: The Atlas Live podcast hosted a debate on “what it will take” for the US to match China’s strength in manufacturing clean-energy technologies.

‘ELECTROSTATE’ EXPLORED: The state media-affiliated WeChat blog Yuyuan Tantian discussed how becoming an “electrostate” would boost China’s “resilience against external risks”.

HYDROGEN TARGETS: The Switched On podcast explored what China’s new targets for “green hydrogen” mean for the development of the industry. 

New science 

• Offshore wind could provide 3-18% of China’s electricity by 2050 | Communications Earth and Environment
• A new “environmental and nutritional database” of the eight major cuisines of China, including Sichuan, Cantonese and Hunan, reveals “significant variability” in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and nutrient content | Scientific Data

Recently published on WeChat

• 媒体反应：气候变化如何加剧欧洲六月破纪录高温
• 图表：中国太阳能热潮为何放缓

China Briefing is written by Anika Patel, with contributions from Lekai Liu. It is edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

China Briefing 25 June 2026: Five-year plans passed | Critical-mineral tensions | Industrial decarbonisation plan

China Briefing

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25.06.26

China Briefing 11 June 2026: Tech clampdown | Extreme weather | Provinces’ energy plans

China Briefing

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11.06.26

China Briefing 28 May 2026: Deadly rains | China pushes back | Examining China’s carbon intensity metric 

China Briefing

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28.05.26

China Briefing 30 April 2026: Fossil fuel ‘strict controls’ | El Niño approaches | Why cleantech exports have surged

China Briefing

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30.04.26

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The post China Briefing 9 July 2026: Guangxi floods | ‘Beautiful China’ plan | New EU-China mechanism appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Statement on FDA’s delay of GRAS amendment proposal Iris Myers July 9, 2026

WASHINGTON – The Food and Drug Administration’s plan to amend the “generally recognized as safe,” or GRAS, regulatory loophole for food chemicals is slipping to December.

The agency originally planned to propose the amendment in October 2025. In December, it sent a draft rule to the White House Office of Management and Budget for pre-publication review, where it’s still pending. The administration then last week released its updated regulatory plan with timelines for upcoming agency rules, including the GRAS delay.

GRAS is a loophole that for years has allowed companies to add new, potentially harmful chemicals and other substances to snacks, drinks and more without undergoing the FDA’s safety review. 

When Congress created the GRAS loophole, in 1958, the exemption was intended to apply largely to ingredients widely recognized as safe, such as salt, water, yeast and vinegar.

But in the intervening years, GRAS has expanded to apply to much more. Since 2000, nearly 99% of food chemicals were introduced into the market as a result of  the GRAS loophole, according to a 2025 analysis from the Environmental Working Group. This allows scores of food chemicals to be approved for use with little government oversight.

The threat of preemption

A draft House bill would, if enacted, further hobble the already broken food safety review process. 

The bill is known as the FDA Review and Evaluation for Safe, Healthy and Affordable Foods, or FRESH and Affordable Foods Act. It would gut rules on the information companies must provide the FDA when submitting a notice that a food chemical is GRAS.

The following is a statement from Melanie Benesh, EWG vice president for government affairs: 

The federal government’s decision to push back its timeline for proposing changes to the broken GRAS system is yet another reminder that consumers cannot afford to wait for Washington to act.

For years, the FDA has failed to adequately oversee food chemicals, leaving states to fill the void by passing commonsense protections against harmful food chemicals linked to serious health risks. 

A delay in this long-promised rulemaking only reinforces why states must continue leading the way.

Congress should not respond by tying states’ hands. 

Lawmakers should reject misguided preemption proposals like the FRESH Act, which would strip states of their ability to protect families while weakening, not strengthening, federal oversight of food chemicals.

The federal government is taking longer to close the GRAS loophole. But the last thing Congress should do is block the states that are already taking action. Americans deserve stronger protections from harmful food chemicals, not more delays and fewer safeguards.

###

The Environmental Working Group (EWG) is a nonprofit, non-partisan organization that empowers people to live healthier lives in a healthier environment. Through research, advocacy and unique education tools, EWG drives consumer choice and civic action.

Areas of Focus Food & Water Food Ultra-Processed Foods Toxic Chemicals Food Chemicals Press Contact Iris Myers iris@ewg.org (202) 939-9126 July 9, 2026

The Toxic Legacy of Eighty Years of U.S. Military Occupation

Part 2 of a 3-part series.  Part 1 examined PFAS at Pituffik Space Base; while Part 3 will survey the appeals U.S. veterans have filed with the U.S. Veterans Administration, claiming cancers and disease as a result of their exposure to toxins in Greenland.

By Pat Elder
July 9, 2026

“Greenland doesn’t really help Denmark. Denmark doesn’t spend money to really help Greenland, but it’s important for the United States... It should be controlled by the United States, not by Denmark.” — U.S. President Donald Trump, speaking in Ankara, Türkiye, July 7, 2026, Photo CNBC

Introduction

President Donald Trump's July 2026 remarks criticizing Denmark's relationship with Greenland provide an unexpected backdrop for this report. Although the President did not specify what he meant by Denmark "not spending money to really help Greenland," his comments invite a broader examination of the responsibilities that accompany the American military presence and strategic interest on the world's largest island.

The geopolitical tensions have been extraordinary. Following President Trump's repeated suggestions earlier this year that he might use military force to acquire Greenland, Danish military planners reportedly developed highly classified contingency plans that included destroying key Greenlandic airfields if the United States attempted an invasion, according to the BBC.

On April 1, 2026, The New York Times reported that the Trump administration was negotiating with Denmark for access to three additional military installations in Greenland. According to the newspaper, two of the proposed sites were former American bases abandoned following the Cold War. The report underscored Greenland's renewed strategic importance at a moment when many of the environmental consequences of earlier U.S. military operations remain unresolved.

For more than eighty years, the United States has maintained an extensive network of military installations across Greenland. Those bases left behind nuclear radiation, fuel spills, abandoned infrastructure, military waste, contaminated landfills, PCB-containing materials, asbestos, unexploded ordnance, and, at several locations, documented PFAS contamination associated with firefighting activities.

Successive Danish and Greenlandic governments have invested substantial public resources investigating former American installations, documenting contamination, and, in some rare cases, undertaking cleanup projects. The United States has strongly maintained that it bears no legal obligation to restore former facilities to their original condition, relying on provisions contained in Article XI of the 1951 Defense Agreement: “It is understood that any areas or facilities made available to the  Government of the United States of America under this Agreement need not be left in the condition in which they were at the time they were thus made available.”

As a result, almost all of the financial burden for assessing and addressing contamination has fallen on Denmark and Greenland rather than on the guilty party that established and operated the installations.

When the U.S. upgraded its radar systems in 2004, Greenland attempted to compel  the United States to clean up former U.S. bases on the island.  U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the legal responsibility for cleaning up older, abandoned bases had already transferred to local/Danish authorities and would remain there.  Because the U.S. maintained this legal stance, the Danish government ultimately agreed to pay for the cleanup.

In 2018 the Danish government relented by investing around 24 million Euro to “clean-up” the abandoned bases. It is a paltry sum. By 2024, progress on the clean-up had been slow. Only around 5.3 million Euro has been spent. That figure is almost irrelevant when measured against the scale of cleaning up the horror at Camp Century alone.

No public authority has produced a comprehensive cleanup estimate for Camp Century. Given the scale of the buried infrastructure, the Arctic environment, and the costs associated with excavating, transporting, and disposing of radioactive and hazardous materials, the eventual cost could reasonably reach into the billions of euros.

This report provides a consolidated overview of former United States military installations in Greenland and their documented environmental legacy. It is based primarily on the groundbreaking investigative reporting and field research published by the Danish newspaper Politiken supplemented by publicly available reports from the Government of Greenland, the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), NIRAS, U.S. government agencies, scientific literature, and historical records.

Military Poisons is indebted to the journalists, editors, photographers, and researchers at Politiken for their exceptional work documenting the environmental legacy of former U.S. military activities in Greenland. Their reporting has significantly advanced public understanding of these historically important sites and provided an invaluable foundation for further research.

The individual descriptions of each installation have been substantially condensed from the original source material to provide readers with a concise reference to the history, environmental conditions, and current status of each site. While every effort has been made to accurately reflect the available public record, this report is intended as a summary and research aid rather than a substitute for the original investigations and technical reports.

Taken together, these installations reveal a remarkably consistent pattern spanning more than eight decades of American military operations in Greenland. Facilities ranging from major air bases to isolated weather stations and LORAN navigation sites were frequently abandoned with fuel drums, vehicles, construction materials, electrical equipment, batteries, hazardous building materials, and waste disposal areas left in place. Environmental investigations have repeatedly documented petroleum contamination, Polychlorinated biphenyls PCBs, asbestos, mercury, lead, cadmium, and other heavy metals, while many sites remain only partially characterized because comprehensive environmental assessments have never been completed.  Camp Century occupies a category of its own. Unlike the conventional military installations scattered across Greenland, the underground nuclear-powered base left behind highly toxic radioactive waste, diesel fuel, sewage, and thousands of tons of construction materials beneath the Greenland Ice Sheet.

One of the more striking findings is how unevenly these sites have been investigated. A few former bases have undergone detailed engineering studies involving soil, water, sediment, and waste characterization. Others have received only scant historical inventories documenting visible structures and debris. Several installations—including Camp Tuto, Camp Fistclench, the Ice Cap Sites, and a number of protected-area weather stations—have never undergone comprehensive environmental assessments.

Cleanup efforts have likewise been inconsistent. Denmark initiated a political agreement in 2018 to begin addressing contamination at selected former American installations, but remediation has progressed slowly. Several major sites remain only partially cleaned despite years of planning. Other installations, including Pituffik Space Base and several research camps within the active military reservation, are excluded from testing and remediation because they remain operational. Somehow, sharing environmental secrets involving levels of PCB’s, PFAS, Radiation, and Mercury are matters of national security. The same holds true from Weisbaden, Germany to Yokosuka, Japan to Honolulu, Hawaii. Victims in these locations cry out for data and justice.

As Greenland assumes greater strategic importance and climate change accelerates the exposure of long-buried Cold War infrastructure, the environmental legacy of former U.S. military installations is likely to receive increasing international attention. This report seeks to provide a concise, evidence-based reference to what is presently known about these sites, where significant uncertainties remain, and where additional investigation is long overdue.

What’s in a drum?

Throughout Greenland, former American military installations are littered with hundreds of thousands of abandoned steel fuel drums. Many reportedly contained residual gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel, lubricating oil, or other petroleum products when they were discarded. As these drums corrode over time, residual fuels and additives leach into surrounding soils and surface waters. Among the contaminants of greatest concern are petroleum hydrocarbons and volatile organic compounds, particularly the BTEX chemicals—benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes—along with polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and other fuel constituents, like PCB’s. See our rundown on the 36 contaminated sites below. First, please consider helping us financially.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Before reading on, Please support our testing in Fort Ord, California.

The distance from Fort Ord, California, to Nuuk, Greenland is only about 3,300 miles. Most people are surprised to learn that.

This fall, I will travel to Fort Ord to meet with a dozen local environmental advocates, scientists, and Army veterans who are deeply concerned about the rapid redevelopment of the former Army base. New apartments, homes, schools, parks, and retail centers continue to be built over land that contains some of the military's deadliest legacy contamination.

‍Over the years, almost 2,000 local residents, former service members, and civilian workers have told us about cancers and other illnesses they believe are connected to their exposure at Fort Ord.

‍We are especially concerned about large groundwater plumes containing trichloroethylene (TCE), tetrachloroethylene (PCE), and carbon tetrachloride (CT). These chemicals can migrate into buildings as vapor, potentially affecting the air people breathe inside their homes and workplaces. We are also concerned about the possible presence and movement of PFAS ("forever chemicals") and other toxic contaminants in groundwater, soil, surface water, and indoor dust.

‍Our goal is to collect independent environmental samples, work with qualified experts, and make the results available to the public. We believe communities deserve reliable information about the environment where they live, work, and raise their families. We need your help. We need to pay for airfare for three of us (from Maryland, Ohio, and Michigan). We must pay for lodging for four nights. (two stars..) And then, we have to pay for the testing. We already have the Cyclopure test kits for PFAS. We still need to pay for testing of soil, air, and water at different locations. $10,000 is our goal.
See who “we” are.

If you have supported Military Poisons in the past, we hope you will consider helping us again. If you didn’t receive a personal thank you, I apologize. Every donation helps us bring greater transparency to this community living with the environmental legacy of military contamination.

‍ Thank you for standing with us.   Go here, to the bottom of the page to contribute. https://www.fortordcontamination.org/ Now, back to Greenland.

‍ _______________________________________________________________________________________________ ‍

Part I — The Bluie West Installations

Bluie West 1 (Narsarsuaq) U.S. Operation:1942–1958

The largest American air base in Greenland during World War II, Bluie West 1 served as a major refueling stop for thousands of aircraft enroute to Europe. When the United States departed in 1958, it left behind extensive debris, including aircraft wreckage, oil drums, batteries, cables, machinery, buried scrap metal, and asbestos from the former military hospital. Local officials report that waste was buried in multiple layers beneath the site. Although asbestos hazards have been documented for years, the installation is not included in Denmark's current cleanup program.

Note: Bluie West Two  was a planned World War II United States military site in southwest Greenland that proved unusable and was ultimately rejected.

Bluie West 3 (Simiutaq) U.S. Operation:1942–1958

Established as a weather and radio station supporting aircraft operations at Narsarsuaq, Bluie West 3 now contains approximately 4,400 metric tons of abandoned military waste. The site includes rusting oil drums, construction materials, battery components, shipwreck debris, pipelines, and large abandoned fuel tanks. Environmental investigations have documented severe petroleum contamination, including mobile free-phase oil capable of migrating through soil. Elevated PCB concentrations, lead contamination, and petroleum impacts to nearby marine sediments and mussels make Simiutaq one of Greenland's most extensively documented contaminated military sites.

Bluie West 4 (Marraq / Teague Airfield) U.S. Operation: 1942–1948

Built as an emergency landing field and weather station south of Nuuk, Marraq was abandoned with thousands of oil drums, diesel generators, vehicles, radio equipment, barges, and buried scrap metal. Investigators estimated that at least 120,000 liters of diesel fuel contaminated the site, with petroleum odors still evident decades after abandonment. Surveys also identified asbestos, PCBs, and mercury contamination. Officials concluded that pollutants posed potential risks to freshwater ecosystems, marine organisms, and shellfish inhabiting the adjacent fjord. Cleanup operations began in 2019 but remain unfinished.

Bluie West 5 (Aasiaat) U.S. Operation:1942–1958

Bluie West 5 functioned as a weather station near present-day Aasiaat during World War II. Although the site has been used for other purposes over the years, environmental investigations have clearly identified American military debris, including deteriorating buildings and stockpiles of rusted oil drums. More than five metric tons of hazardous or contaminated waste remain. Soil testing has documented elevated concentrations of lead and cadmium associated with the former U.S. installation. Questions regarding present ownership have complicated decisions concerning remediation.

Bluie West 6 (Pituffik / Thule Air Base / Pituffik Space Base) U.S. Operation:1942–Present

Originally established as the Bluie West 6 weather station during World War II, the installation expanded dramatically under the secret Project Blue Jay and became Thule Air Base in 1952, now known as Pituffik Space Base. The installation remains the only active U.S. military base in Greenland. Historic investigations have identified at least fifty waste disposal areas surrounding the base, including former missile silos converted into landfills. Long-term PCB contamination has been documented in nearby marine environments, but because the base remains operational, it has largely been excluded from Denmark's national cleanup program.

Bluie West 7 / Navy 26 / Grønnedal

U.S. Operation:1943–1951 (later operated by Denmark until 2012)

Established near Ivigtut during World War II, Bluie West 7 was accompanied by the adjacent U.S. Navy 26 installation, later transferred to Denmark and renamed Grønnedal. Investigations have documented extensive petroleum and groundwater contamination migrating toward Arsuk Fjord. Large American dump sites contain vehicles, hazardous wastes, and an estimated 20,000 cubic meters of discarded material. Underwater surveys have identified additional debris in the fjord, including a tanker truck, crane, tracked vehicle, and other equipment. Cleanup costs are now estimated at between DKK 100 and 200 million.

Bluie West 8 (Kangerlussuaq / Søndre Strømfjord) U.S. Operation:1941–1992‍ ‍

Built before the United States entered World War II, Kangerlussuaq became one of Greenland's most important military airfields and later served Cold War radar operations before transitioning into Greenland's principal civilian airport. The United States left behind oil drum dumps, unexploded ammunition, scrap metal, and abandoned military structures. Local residents have criticized the burning of open landfills containing American military waste. Greenlandic officials have also alleged that diesel fuel was intentionally dumped into nearby lakes for mosquito control, with reports that some waters still exhibit petroleum odors decades later.

Bluie West 9 (Cruncher Island) U.S. Operation:1942–1986

Constructed to support weather observations and aviation operations associated with Kangerlussuaq, Bluie West 9 remained active for more than four decades. The abandoned installation contains building ruins, generators, vehicles, cables, pipes, waste dumps, and approximately 1.5 metric tons of discarded batteries. Environmental investigations documented elevated concentrations of petroleum, lead, cadmium, copper, zinc, and mercury in soils. Approximately eleven metric tons of hazardous or contaminated waste remain. Danish and Greenlandic authorities have identified the site as a priority for future cleanup.

Part II — The Bluie East Installations

Bluie East 1 (Ikerasassuaq / Prince Christian Sound) U.S. Operation:1942–1945 (later operated by the Danish Meteorological Institute) No Photo

Established as a weather and radio station near Cape Farewell, Bluie East 1 played an important role in Allied North Atlantic weather forecasting during World War II. The installation consisted of a harbor, power plant, radio facilities, living quarters, and support buildings connected by a long wooden staircase. Unlike many other American installations in Greenland, little is known about what environmental contamination remains. Danish authorities report that no formal environmental assessment has been conducted, leaving uncertainty about whether hazardous materials from the wartime occupation persist beneath or around the site. 

Bluie East 2 (Ikkatteq) U.S. Operation:1942–1947

Ikkatteq was one of the largest American airfields on Greenland's east coast, serving as both a refueling stop and radio surveillance station with a wartime population approaching 600 personnel. When abandoned, the base contained more than 100,000 oil drums scattered across the landscape, dozens of military vehicles, batteries, collapsed buildings, and structures containing asbestos. Environmental investigations documented extensive petroleum contamination together with PCBs, lead, and cadmium. Authorities concluded that contamination posed direct risks to both wildlife and people. Although cleanup began years ago, significant remediation remains unfinished.

Bluie East 3 (Walrus Bay) U.S. Operation: 1942–1945

This small weather and radio station on Greenland's east coast supported Allied operations with a complement of approximately fourteen personnel. Although relatively modest in size, environmental investigators classified the site's overall environmental impact as significant. Abandoned structures, fuel drum storage areas, and military debris remained after the American withdrawal. Scrap metal was removed in 2022, but no comprehensive environmental investigation has been completed, leaving unanswered questions regarding remaining soil and groundwater contamination. 

Bluie East 4 (Ella Island) U.S. Operation: 1942–1945 No Photo

Located within what is now Northeast Greenland National Park, Bluie East 4 served as a wartime weather and radio station. Limited information survives regarding the installation, although investigators have identified abandoned building foundations likely containing petroleum residues and mercury. Engineering studies characterize the site's environmental impact as moderate, but its protected status has limited investigation and cleanup activities. Consequently, the full extent of contamination remains unknown.

Bluie East 5 (Eskimonæs) U.S. Operation: 1942–1943 No photo

Bluie East 5 was the northernmost American installation on Greenland's east coast. The original station was destroyed during a German raid in 1943, after which operations were relocated elsewhere. Environmental investigations suggest that mercury contamination and petroleum residues remain at the original location. Because the site lies within a protected national park, it has been excluded from Denmark's post-2018 cleanup initiative. No comprehensive environmental assessment has yet been completed, leaving the extent of contamination uncertain.

Cape Cort Adelaer U.S. Operation: Approximately 1943–1945

Cape Cort Adelaer served as a small weather and radio station supporting Allied operations along Greenland's eastern coast. Investigators have identified abandoned fuel storage tanks and numerous building foundations remaining from the American occupation. Engineering assessments conclude that the site likely contains mercury, petroleum contamination, asbestos, and heavy metals, resulting in an overall environmental impact classified as significant. Although historical research has begun, no comprehensive environmental investigation has yet been completed.

Skjoldungen (Louis Boplads) U.S. Operation: 1943–Approximately 1948

Constructed as a weather station during World War II, Skjoldungen appears to have been abandoned largely intact. Engineering investigations describe large quantities of scattered waste, including chemicals, broken glass, discarded clothing, medication residues, and other debris left where they were originally discarded. Environmental assessments conclude that mercury, petroleum contamination, heavy metals, and asbestos are likely present, resulting in a significant environmental impact. Historical investigations are underway, although no comprehensive field assessment has yet been completed.

Atterbery Dome (Comanche Bay) U.S. Operation: Approximately 1943–1945

Atterbery Dome was a small radio and rescue station established during World War II along Greenland's east coast. Although modest in size, engineering investigations classify its environmental impact as significant. Remaining contamination is believed to include petroleum residues, mercury, asbestos, and heavy metals associated with deteriorating military infrastructure. Authorities have commissioned historical research to better document the installation before determining whether a full environmental investigation or cleanup should proceed.

Part III — Camp Century, the Pituffik Research Camps, Ice Cap Sites, and DYE Stations

Camp Century U.S. Operation:1959–1966(dangerous nuclear reactor operated 1960–1964)

Constructed beneath the Greenland Ice Sheet approximately 150 miles east of Thule Air Base, Camp Century was the most ambitious American military installation ever built in the Arctic. Although presented publicly as a scientific research station, it also served as a testbed for Project Iceworm, a classified proposal to deploy nuclear missiles beneath the ice.

Politiken reports: "When the camp was abandoned, the nuclear reactor had been removed, but an estimated 24 million liters of radioactive cooling wastewater, 200,000 liters of diesel fuel, sewage, and roughly 9,000 metric tons of construction debris were left entombed beneath the ice. As climate warming accelerates ice loss, researchers warn these materials could eventually re-enter the environment."

Military Poisons note: NASA’s summary of the underlying scientific research describes the waste inventory somewhat differently. According to NASA, Camp Century contains approximately 200,000 liters of diesel fuel, 24 million liters of wastewater, including sewage, an unknown quantity of low-level radioactive waste, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). NASA's description does not characterize the entire 24 million liters of wastewater as "radioactive cooling wastewater."

Camp Nuto (Nunatarssuaq Take Off / Camp Red Rock) U.S. Operation:Approximately 1953–1960s   No Photo

‍Camp Nuto was one of several research facilities established near Thule Air Base to study the engineering properties of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Researchers conducted experiments on ice ramps and vehicle operations under Arctic conditions that supported later military construction projects. Environmental investigations indicate petroleum contamination remains at the site, although the overall environmental impact has been classified as moderate. Because Camp Nuto lies within the active Pituffik military complex, it has not been included in Denmark's national cleanup program and has received only limited environmental evaluation.

Camp Tuto (Thule Take Off) U.S. Operation:1954–Early 1960s‍ ‍

Located roughly 25 kilometers southeast of Thule Air Base, Camp Tuto became one of the Army's principal Arctic engineering laboratories. Approximately 450 personnel were stationed there to study tunnel construction beneath glaciers and excavation through frozen permafrost. Engineers built a 400-meter tunnel within the ice to evaluate the feasibility of large underground military facilities. Little public information exists concerning waste left behind, and no comprehensive environmental investigation has been reported. Because the camp remains within the broader Pituffik military area, it has not been scheduled for cleanup.

Camp Fistclench U.S. Operation:Mid-1950s–1959 No Photo

Camp Fistclench served as the direct predecessor to Camp Century. Constructed beneath the ice using covered trenches, the installation allowed Army engineers to test construction techniques later employed for the much larger Camp Century project. Scientific work focused on snow mechanics, ice behavior, and the effects of explosives on glacial ice. Following completion of Camp Century, Camp Fistclench was abandoned. Little documentation exists concerning remaining debris or contamination, and no comprehensive environmental assessment has been reported.

Ice Cap Site I U.S. Operation:1953–1954 to late 1950s No Photo

Ice Cap Site I formed part of an experimental network of radar stations constructed on the Greenland Ice Sheet to provide early warning of potential Soviet air attacks against Thule Air Base. Harsh environmental conditions and the logistical difficulty of maintaining the station limited its operational life. Publicly available information does not identify what equipment or waste remains beneath the ice, and no formal environmental assessment has been conducted.

Ice Cap Site II  U.S. Operation:1953–1954 to late 1950s No Photo

Constructed alongside Ice Cap Site I, this radar installation supported the defense of Thule Air Base during the early years of the Cold War. The station was abandoned after only a few years because maintaining remote facilities on the moving ice sheet proved impractical. Little information is available regarding remaining infrastructure or environmental contamination, and no comprehensive environmental investigation has been completed.

DYE-1 (Red River)   U.S. Operation:1950s–1988

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DYE-1 was one of four massive radar stations comprising Greenland's portion of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, established to detect Soviet bombers approaching North America across the Arctic. The mountaintop installation featured a large radar dome and extensive support facilities. Following closure in 1988, the Greenland Self-Government reportedly undertook cleanup activities, burying waste dumps and storage areas. Unlike many former U.S. installations, DYE-1 is generally considered to have undergone substantial remediation, although little environmental data has been published.

 

DYE-2 (Sea Bass) U.S. Operation: Late 1950s–1980s

Built directly on the Greenland Ice Sheet, DYE-2 monitored Arctic airspace around the clock as part of the DEW Line. Fuel tanks and heavy infrastructure were embedded within the ice. The station was abandoned rapidly at the end of its operational life, leaving large quantities of equipment behind with the expectation that the ice sheet would permanently entomb the facility.

DYE-3 (Sob Story) U.S. Operation: Late 1950s–1980s

Like DYE-2, DYE-3 operated as an elevated radar station supported by ski-equipped aircraft that delivered personnel and supplies onto the Greenland Ice Sheet. In 1972, a U.S. Air Force C-130 transport crash-landed near the station. After useful equipment was removed, much of the aircraft was buried within the ice. The station itself was abandoned with substantial infrastructure remaining.  

Politiken reports that the United States contributed funds for cleanup at DYE-2 and DYE-3, but publicly available records I reviewed do not substantiate that claim.

The documented cleanup agreement appears to have been financed by Denmark and Greenland, not the United States.

DYE-4 (Big Gun) U.S. Operation:1950s–1991

Perched atop a mountain near Kulusuk, DYE-4 was the easternmost radar station in Greenland's DEW Line. The installation contained massive rotating radar antennas housed within a large radome that monitored northern airspace throughout the Cold War. After closure in 1991, the station was dismantled by Greenland authorities in 1994, and much of the material was buried in local landfills. Only foundations remain visible today. No formal environmental assessment has been reported following the demolition.

This section highlights a striking contrast. Many of the World War II installations were abandoned with visible debris—oil drums, vehicles, buildings, and dumps. The Cold War facilities often left a different legacy: buried infrastructure, petroleum products, and, in the case of Camp Century, radioactive wastewater and diesel fuel sealed beneath the ice. As the Greenland Ice Sheet continues to thin, these hidden legacies may become increasingly important to environmental monitoring and international policy.

Part IV — LORAN Stations, Radio Stations, Artillery Sites, and Other Installations

Gamatron U.S. Operation:1942–1958

Established near present-day Qaqortoq, Gamatron served as a weather station, radio station, and submarine observation post supporting Allied operations in the North Atlantic. After the Americans departed, they left 34 buildings, six storage areas containing hundreds of oil drums, multiple waste dumps, and an estimated 175–185 metric tons of abandoned military waste. Environmental investigations found contamination severe enough that water from a nearby lake was declared unsuitable for drinking because of pollution originating from an abandoned dump.

 

Qutdleq U.S. Operation: 1960–1978

Qutdleq was constructed as a LORAN (Long Range Navigation) station on a small island in southeastern Greenland. Following its closure, numerous deteriorating buildings, communications masts, and large fuel storage tanks remained on the site. While the abandoned infrastructure is well documented, no comprehensive environmental investigation has yet been completed, leaving uncertainty regarding possible petroleum contamination or hazardous materials associated with the former installation.

Orssuiagssuaq U.S. Operation:1960–1977

Built as another LORAN navigation station, Orssuiagssuaq was abandoned with communications towers, storage tanks, ruined buildings, and deteriorating barracks still standing decades after closure. Although the physical remains have been documented photographically, authorities have not yet completed an environmental assessment. Historical investigations are expected before decisions are made regarding cleanup or remediation of the site.

Sabine Island U.S. Operation:1959–Early 1960s

Sabine Island housed a small unmanned radio beacon located within a protected bird sanctuary. Although the station itself was modest, approximately thirty-five discarded industrial batteries remain near the antenna building, many with exposed lead cores. Authorities have concluded that the battery dump presents a potential source of heavy metal contamination. Because the installation lies within a protected wildlife area, no formal environmental assessment or cleanup has been scheduled.

 

Nipisat U.S. Operation: 1954–1975

Nipisat served as a LORAN navigation station on Greenland's west coast. Environmental investigations documented multiple oil and gasoline storage tanks together with at least three confirmed petroleum spills. Engineers concluded that the site also contains PCBs, pesticides, mercury, heavy metals, and asbestos. One municipal official described the abandoned station as "something of a disaster," noting that extensive vandalism had left the once-important military installation in a severely deteriorated condition despite its location in an area of exceptional natural value.

 Angissoq U.S. Operation: 1963–1994 No Photo

One of Greenland's last LORAN navigation stations, Angissoq remained in operation until satellite navigation rendered the system obsolete. The abandoned installation includes remnants of twenty-three buildings, a power plant, fuel storage facilities, and coastal waste dumps. Environmental investigators documented petroleum contamination near former fuel tanks and observed that coastal erosion is gradually exposing buried waste to the sea. A comprehensive environmental investigation has not yet been completed.

Cape Atholl U.S. Operation: 1954–1972

Located near Thule Air Base, Cape Atholl operated as a U.S. Coast Guard LORAN navigation station. Environmental investigations documented severe petroleum contamination, including free-phase oil, PCB-contaminated building materials, batteries, cable scrap, burned refuse, and mixed waste buried in coastal bluffs. Investigators observed erosion exposing buried debris directly onto the shoreline, creating potential pathways into the marine environment. The site also presents possible risks to wildlife, including walruses using nearby beaches. Danish and Greenlandic authorities are planning cleanup operations.

Artillery Point U.S. Operation: 1941–1946

Artillery Point defended the strategically important Narsarsuaq airfield with two 155-mm coastal guns during World War II. Following the war, approximately seventeen metric tons of military waste remained, including abandoned buildings, construction materials, and a small landfill. Environmental investigations identified petroleum contamination together with low concentrations of lead and cadmium. Because the contamination is relatively limited and the site possesses historical significance, the National Museum of Greenland has recommended that the area remain largely undisturbed.

 

Camp Corbett U.S. Operation: 1942–1958

Camp Corbett functioned as a communications station supporting the nearby Narsarsuaq air base. The installation contained emergency generators, fuel tanks, hundreds of utility poles, multiple dumps, and buried waste disposal areas. Investigators estimate that at least 377 metric tons of military waste remain, including approximately 314 metric tons classified as hazardous or contaminated. Contaminants include PCBs, asbestos, heavy metals, and tar residues. Cleanup has begun, but officials report that massive reinforced concrete foundations will require extensive excavation and blasting before remediation can be completed.

Conclusion

While the Trump administration is “negotiating” with Denmark for access to three additional military installations in Greenland, and President Trump is making threatening remarks about U.S. intentions, the talks between Washington, Copenhagen, and Nuuk remain fixated on sovereignty and strategic positioning. Consequently, a critical geopolitical blind spot persists: the massive environmental liabilities scattered across dozens of legacy American military installations. These sites contain a hazardous catalog of contaminated soils, abandoned landfills, deteriorating fuel infrastructure, PCBs, petroleum, unexploded ordnance, and PFAS. Most critically, Camp Century holds radioactive and toxic waste entombed beneath the rapidly melting Greenland Ice Sheet.

Although President Trump’s critique of Danish spending in Greenland was likely unmoored from these specific ecological realities, it inadvertently highlighted a profound structural failure. The paltry sums Copenhagen has allocated to investigate and remediate this contamination pale in comparison to the actual scale of the crisis. Remediation at Camp Century alone could soar into billions of euros.

How, then, in the face of this catastrophic reality, can the Danish government continue to hide behind passive diplomatic platitudes?

While the Danish Foreign Minister publicly insists that Denmark will protect Greenland’s independence from political takeover, why are they not screaming from the rooftops about eighty years of toxic American negligence?

The environmental criminality cannot be overstated while Copenhagen treats this assault as a footnote. As Danish officials sit at the negotiating table to grant the U.S. military even more access to Greenlandic soil, why are they not aggressively demanding full, immediate remediation as a non-negotiable prerequisite? How can Copenhagen claim to stand for Greenlandic sovereignty while letting the United States get away with a multi-billion-dollar ecological crime?

Please see the Greenland Appendix containing a spreadsheet that displays the kinds of information shown here on all 36 abandoned sites in Greenland.

Ebola is once again making headlines and has been declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern — the World Health Organization’s highest level of alert — after cases crossed the border from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into Uganda.

For many people this feels too distant to be of concern, but scientists and public health experts have been warning us that the conditions that allow Ebola and other diseases to spread from animals to humans have been building for decades.

Around 60% of known infectious diseases in humans are zoonotic (diseases that are transmitted between animals and people), and up to 75% of new and emerging infectious diseases have animal origins, mostly from wildlife. Nearly all WHO Public Health Emergencies of International Concern have been caused by diseases of animal origin: H1N1 (2009), Ebola (2014), Zika (2016), Ebola (2019), COVID-19 (2020), Mpox (2022 and 2024), and now this 2026 Ebola outbreak, which is spreading across the region at an alarming pace and scale.

To understand the potential threat, consider that the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was the largest since the virus was reported in 1976. There were more cases and deaths in that outbreak than all others combined; more than 28,600 people became infected and 11,325 died.

This current outbreak is particularly concerning because this strain of Ebola (Bundibugyo) has no approved vaccine or therapeutics, and available diagnostic tests often fail to detect it. This means case numbers are very likely underestimated, and the true scale of transmission is uncertain. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region, high population mobility, including urban spread, and confirmed cross-border transmission create the perfect conditions for quick escalation. Ebola has devastating consequences once it infects people, with previous outbreaks recording case fatality rates ranging from approximately 30% to 66%, underscoring the importance of preventing spillover before it occurs.

How Spillover Happens

Fruit bats are one of the natural reservoir hosts, meaning they can carry the virus long term without becoming sick themselves. But it’s not just bats: Great apes, monkeys, duikers, chevrotains, pangolins, and other species are intermediate hosts, meaning they can carry and pass the virus on to humans.

It’s no coincidence that many of these species are also commonly hunted, traded, and sold in bushmeat and wildlife markets across Central and West Africa. Recent research by my organization, World Animal Protection, documented the pangolin trade on TikTok in West Africa and highlights how wildlife trade networks are increasingly operating both in physical markets and online, expanding opportunities for zoonotic disease spread. People who handle or eat the bushmeat can become infected through direct contact with the blood, bodily fluids, or tissues of infected animals, with the virus spreading through communities, person-to-person.

The risks are man-made and wholly preventable. When wild animals are captured, transported, confined, and slaughtered under stressful and inhumane conditions, we create the perfect storm for disease. At every stage of the trade chain, from capture and transport to sale and slaughter, wild animals are exposed to stress, injury, deprivation, and close confinement with other species they would rarely encounter in the wild. This weakens animals’ immune systems and increases opportunities for pathogens to spread between species, including to humans.

Why Habitat Loss and Wildlife Exploitation Matter

One major driver of Ebola risk is habitat destruction. When people clearcut or fragment forests for logging, mining, road building, and agricultural expansion, the chance of disease spillover increases. Studies of previous Ebola outbreaks (2004–2014) confirm that infection hotspots tend to occur in areas with greater forest fragmentation. As people gain access to previously undisturbed habitats, human activities such as hunting and bushmeat consumption increase the risk exponentially.

Commercial wildlife trade is another key driver of the high-risk conditions that produce spillover events. Wild animals transported across regions and borders, contained and slaughtered in markets with inadequate biosecurity and poor health conditions, and handled by people with little or no protective gear, pose an ongoing threat. Each time an animal is handled is an accident waiting to happen.

Species linked to Ebola spillover, including pangolins and primates, continue to be hunted and traded for meat and other purposes throughout the region despite the well-documented public health risks.

Although surveillance is a critical part of managing diseases, it only works when a disease is already present and people are showing symptoms. But with a disease like Ebola, this is already too late; by the time symptoms arrive, we’re playing catchup to limit further spread. Taking upstream action to prevent diseases from spilling over to people is the most meaningful way to prevent outbreaks and pandemics in the first place.

So here we are again talking about pandemic prevention. It’s significantly less costly than response in both economic and societal terms — a recent study estimates that a decade of pandemic prevention measures would cost around 2% of the economic damage caused by COVID-19 alone. Taking preventive action — including protecting habitats, ending commercial wildlife trade activities, and reducing human–animal interactions — is a smart, cost-effective investment.

From Evidence to Policy Action

The scientific community has been warning us of this growing risk for years. In 2020 the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) convened a panel of experts who concluded that land-use change, wildlife exploitation, and biodiversity loss are the primary drivers of pandemic emergence — and called explicitly for reducing the commercial exploitation of wild animals.

The report also reinforced growing scientific understanding that animal, human, and ecosystem health are inseparable. Poor treatment of wild animals is not only an ethical issue. It is also a public health issue.

Research by World Animal Protection has gone further, demonstrating that the commercial wildlife trade does not create isolated risks. Instead it generates feedback loops between poor animal welfare, pathogen transmission, ecosystem degradation, and governance failures.

Ending commercial wildlife trade — not simply regulating it or monitoring it — is what will break the cycle. If wild animals continue to be exploited, commodified, and transported through commercial supply chains, the conditions for future spillover events will remain.

At the international level, momentum has been building. The WHO Pandemic Agreement, adopted in 2025 after years of negotiation, recognizes the critical role of prevention and addressing drivers at the human–animal–environment interface. It also enshrines the One Health approach, recognizing that human, animal, and ecosystem health are interconnected — a landmark achievement.

For wildlife the impact is significant. Protecting forests and ending the commercial exploitation of wild creatures helps keep them within their natural habitats and can help keep them safer from disease and exploitation. For people, prevention not only saves lives but is far less costly than responding after an outbreak has begun.

Ultimately, if we want to save lives — of both people and animals — we need to look at doing things differently. Prevention is the only cure.

References

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Dobson, A. P., Pimm, S. L., Hannah, L., Kaufman, L., Ahumada, J. A., Ando, A. W., Bernstein, A., Busch, J., Daszak, P., Engelmann, J., Kinnaird, M. F., Li, B. V., Loch-Temzelides, T., Lovejoy, T., Nowak, K., Roehrdanz, P. R., & Vale, M. M. (2020). Ecology and economics for pandemic prevention. Science, 369(6502), 379–381. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abc3189

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Radical Democracy and Autonomy: What do we mean? - A Conversation ...

The Stay Grounded network has launched a new project called ‘Red Lines for Airports’. It seeks to unite and support groups campaigning against airport expansion projects and build power for a reduction of air traffic. As part of it, we’re running a European Tour, visiting members, and supporting with workshops and skill-shares. Here, Michaela Leitner shares the story of Vienna’s decades-long…

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The number of global climate initiatives launched or run by China has been growing since 2009, a new study shows.

But whether this will translate into China taking up the mantle of climate leadership remains an “open question”, says Dr Sun Yixian, study co-author and professor of sustainability governance at the University of Bath.

Sun’s team has compiled a database tracking all global environmental initiatives established from the 1980s onwards that were launched or run by China.

These initiatives are either created by China or co-created with other governments, or have operations that are mainly managed by Chinese institutions.

They range from research cooperation and south-south climate funding to high-level policy signalling, such as joint statements on climate change. 

In an interview with Carbon Brief, Sun discusses the key findings of the new “China’s Global Environmental Leadership” (CGEL) database.

He adds that it is not yet clear if the US withdrawal from the UN climate regime will change China’s role in global climate governance. 

The conversation covers how the number of China-led initiatives has changed over time, what these projects look like and how China’s approach to climate “leadership” is changing.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity. 

• Sun on the types of climate initiatives: “There are all different kinds of initiatives – we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. Or also by providing funding, for example.”
• On the rise in new climate initiatives: “From after 2009 and 2010, we’ve seen many initiatives – of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and even the last five years, from 2021…have been created.”
• On the impact of the Trump administration: “The shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners…Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question.” 
• On a growing focus on multilateral programmes: “What we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents. So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale.” 
• On a climate leadership ‘mindset’: “[Leading Chinese experts] said the government, and also people in China, are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time…in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. So, I think the question is whether this…will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country.” 
• On the future of China’s climate engagement: “My read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements…But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies.”
• On the future of multilateral climate negotiations: Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes. Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment. 

Carbon Brief: Thank you for joining us, Yixian. Your team has compiled a database of China’s “environmental leadership”. What do you mean by leadership and what did you find in relation to climate change?

Sun Yixian: Thanks Anika, it’s great to speak to Carbon Brief. Leadership is a very contested concept in social science, or especially in international relations. This is why we were very cautious when we thought about the name of this dataset, but we thought it was a good way to capture what we’re trying to do.

In this project, what we are trying to look at is China’s role in global environmental governance – China’s shifting role, especially from a more passive participant in global governance processes to play a more proactive role in developing or managing its own initiatives on transnational or cross-border environmental governance. 

So, [this includes] different environmental issues, but, of course, we found that climate change is a very important issue area. By leading, we are using the concept of governance – in a sense that we are looking at the initiatives where Chinese actors claim some authority over other audiences towards certain public goods. So, it’s trying to provide public goods, in different ways. We have come up with a typology of different governance functions, trying to look at what specific activities Chinese actors are doing, or what kind of public goods Chinese actors are delivering, to the audiences of different initiatives.

And by audience we mean…international actors. So, that means we are not interested in what China is doing domestically, but beyond its borders. 

CB: Could you explain what some of these climate initiatives look like in practice?

SY: This is very important, because it sounds very abstract if we just talk about leadership. In practical terms, there are all different kinds of initiatives – we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. 

Or also by providing funding, for example, China has created this south-south climate fund. It can also include research collaboration or producing knowledge – mainly between research institutes. 

It can be traditional leadership activities, in the sense of developing certain international regulatory frameworks or rules or standards – we call this rulemaking and standard-setting. It can also be pilot projects. China sometimes can start to work directly with some international partners to trial new ideas and new practices – what we call direct actions.

These are the different types of leadership activities that we look at and we actually code each initiative that meets the criteria of our database according to this topology, to try to look at what [the Chinese government] are looking at.

Some initiatives can do multiple things at the same time…One example is the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization [GEIDCO]. [This was] initially created by the State Grid of China to try to promote clean energy and energy interconnections. 

This initiative will deliver different types of activities, including building the capacity of some developing countries on energy and electricity grids, and also, for example, developing an international platform – they have annual international meeting and a lot of information-sharing activities, and engagement at UN meetings, including at COP side-events, and also directly engaging with some international organisations. 

So, this is an example of the type of leadership initiative that has been included in our database.

CB: And would you say that there’s one particular type of activity that dominates, in terms of China’s climate leadership? Or is it very evenly split against all of the different types? 

SY: This is also one of the main findings in our work. In the first paper we published to highlight the key patterns from the dataset, we highlighted that there’s a very uneven distribution in terms of what China tries to deliver or to promote, itself, internationally on environmental governance.

There have been a lot of initiatives focusing on sharing information and building platforms and this is the most dominant category – across all environmental issues, but the same pattern applies to climate change. 

In the first article we published in the Earth Systems Governance journal, we looked at the whole dataset, but we are also developing a few studies, currently under review. One paper particularly looks at climate initiatives and it’s the same pattern: information-sharing and networking.

At the same time, the least frequent or popular type is the provision of funding – creating some financing programmes to directly give funding to international partners. I think this reflects China’s position on environmental or climate finance, especially internationally. 

The number of different types of China-led climate initiatives established from 1991-2004. Source: CGEL database.

[China’s] not trying just to provide money, but really think about how to support other countries on more practical, more pragmatic terms. This is why I think that after information-sharing, what we have seen is capacity-building activities, which have also been quite frequently used by Chinese initiatives when collaborating with their international partners. This also explains China’s logic to teach [others] how to develop things, but not just giving money.

The other important category is research collaboration and knowledge production. This has been mainly led by research institutes in China, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, especially with a strong focus on scientific co-production. 

But, lately, we have also seen more and more initiatives focused on sharing knowledge not just about science itself, but sometimes also on the social sciences side – the experiences of China as a whole. China’s experiences can also be learned from by other countries, especially in the global south. 

These are just some examples, but the overall pattern is [a focus on] information-sharing, capacity building and knowledge production and not too much on provision of funding.

CB: You mentioned the GEIDCO example earlier. How much of a tangible impact would you say a lot of these initiatives have? Are they very high-level, strategic and quite abstract? Or do they kind of result in programmes on the ground? 

SY: That’s a very interesting question – the answer is that it really varies. GEIDCO, as you  mentioned, is a very high-level initiative. I think, initially, the idea of energy interconnection was proposed by President Xi himself. Now, of course, GEIDCO, with the backing of the State Grid, does a lot of high-level [national planning] and trans-national [grid network] planning work with developing countries.

But, at the same time, there are also a lot of grounded, locally focused initiatives. A lot, for example, are co-developed between China – especially supported by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment [MEE] – and UNEP [United Nations Environment Programme] in, for example, Africa and Southeast Asia. [This includes] some projects looking at climate adaptation and resilience. But these are more small-scale projects. 

So, in our database – and I welcome your readers to explore the database itself that you can see – there are a big variety of initiatives and their scope, their mission and their intended outcomes or impacts vary significantly. 

But we are just providing this public resource. Hopefully, people can use it to further explore, for example, the question of the impact or outcome. At this stage, we’re not going to assess what has been delivered, but I think if we can take, for example, a case-study approach – trying to trace what has been done, what has been delivered – this could also be a very interesting research agenda. 

CB: Is there a particular time from when China’s interest in engaging on climate change started, or has this been a very long-term process?

SY: In our database, we really wanted to capture the historical trend. That’s why we looked back from early on – [we focused on] from the beginning of this century, but also traced initiatives that had been created even earlier but became active in the 21st century. 

So we can [see that,] already in the late 1980s or 90s, there were some initiatives in the area of climate change. But, most importantly, the majority of the initiatives were started after 2008, mainly in the 2010s. We can see a very clear upward trend. It was not shown directly in our recently published article, but it’s in the database and we have looked at the data and produced a graph for other studies we are currently developing. 

Really, from after 2009 and 2010, we’ve seen many initiatives – of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and, even the last five years, from 2021, we still see more and more initiatives have been created.

The number of new China-led international environmental initiatives focused on climate change established between 1991-2024. Source: CGEL database.

This timeframe corresponds to China’s shifting international role, to move from [being] a more regional power, a large developing country, to a global superpower, and trying to project its influence globally. 

That also correlates with, for example, the belt and road initiative and lately the global development initiative – China is trying to also use climate change in this broader policy framework and trying to promote and support climate action in different parts of the world.

CB: The database stops at 2024 – just before the current administration withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement. Have you noticed any changes in China’s global climate engagements following this? 

SY: I would say the trend is a continuous one, even with the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and lately from the UNFCCC. Because, as I mentioned earlier, over the past 10 years, we have seen this upward trend, with more and more new initiatives created by Chinese actors. 

But I think the shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners – or countries or actors that haven’t been engaged very closely with China – to work more closely with China.

Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question. 

We really want to explore [this] further. Something I didn’t mention earlier is we are publishing this data set as version one, we want to keep updating on a regular basis. We hope we’ll have versions two or three out, maybe every two years. We’ll see how things go, but I think this is a very important question. 

CB: Looking at how China is engaging with all of these different countries – as you mentioned, more and more potentially wanting to work with it following the US’s withdrawal – do you get the sense that the Chinese government prefers to engage with countries bilaterally, on a one-to-one basis, or are they also engaging at the regional and multilateral levels?

SY: This is a great question. This is also an important finding from our work, because the conventional understanding is that China prefers to engage with countries bilaterally. 

But, if we look at our database, what we can see is that, actually, China has developed more and more transnational initiatives – meaning that it also involves non-state actors or [works] beyond the traditional multilateral processes and [develops initiatives] with a global scope. 

If we look at the historical trends, initially – especially up to 2010 – there were a lot of bilateral initiatives. Most cases in our database are bilateral initiatives. 

But, lately, I think this trend is shifting. Still, I think there are many more bilateral initiatives than multilateral and transnational initiatives. 

How we differentiate leadership activities of Chinese [state] actors across different levels [affects the trend], but, lately, what we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents.

So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale. 

I think this is also quite interesting, to understand how not only the government, but also lots of Chinese actors – including, for example, businesses and civil society actors – are trying to project and their footprint globally. 

And also I think this reflects a shifting global role of China, in general. We can further explore what the implications of this phenomenon are. This is some ongoing research I’m doing – trying to understand how actors in different parts of the world react or perceive this changing rule of China and how such engagement between China and different countries shape, or reshape, the sustainability transition.

CB: You mentioned just then that there’s not just the Chinese government, but also civil society, businesses and other non-state actors. What role do you think these non-state organisations play in the country’s overall climate strategy and climate engagement?

SY: Let me start with the caveat that, first of all, as shown in our database, the government, or state actors, still play a very important role – especially central government agencies, for example, the MEE [Ministry of Ecology and Environment] or NDRC [National Development and Reform Commission]. 

But, at the same time, especially over the last 10 years, what we have seen is that non-state actors have become more active and engaged more, in various ways, in leading climate initiatives beyond China’s borders. 

This means, sometimes, they collaborate with state actors to co-develop certain initiatives. Sometimes, they develop their own initiatives with, of course, some support from the state. One thing we need to bear in mind is, in China, it’s almost impossible to [avoid involving] the state. At least, you have to closely align with the strategy of the government. 

But, at the same time, what we can see is the agency of these actors. They have developed or showed the ambition to develop certain initiatives, including, for example, standards in the critical mineral space, to provide guidelines to companies for their overseas activities.

Similarly, some civil society actors, [such as] research institutes, also want to claim their leadership in a global sphere, trying to showcase how they can lead certain activities and show how their expertise or their knowledge can support countries or actors in other parts of the world.

CB: On the standards-setting point, is that something where it might be led by one Chinese company with multiple partners – whether it be from one country or from various different countries in a region? Or is it a broad spectrum of Chinese companies coming together saying that we want to work with Chile, Zimbabwe etc, on mining standards? Is it very representative of the industry, or does it tend to be quite piecemeal? 

SY: This is an inclusion criteria for the databases. We [only] look at the initiatives that are, to a large extent, institutionalised. It’s not that company’s claim that “we are doing this”. If we can’t track down any information or find any records then we cannot include things like that in our database.

That means we only tend to look at initiatives that are well-developed. These are often, for example, developed by national industry associations. They try to convene different companies together and try to collaborate with, or coordinate, different actors along supply chains and also across sectors or industries.

When they work with different international partners, this is also a question I think we need to further explore, using our data set to try to look at – sometimes I think it’s not easy for us to do everything! – but try to look at what kind of partners they select and how they get involved with partners in different countries or different regions.

But I think this probably requires some other methodologies to look at, or maybe zoom out to specific cases. 

This is similar – I always want to use this as a comparison – when we started [seeing] this phenomenon in Europe or in North America, for example, where companies start to take climate actions, we didn’t really pay a lot of attention to how and who they work with, as long as they say: “We are trying to support global climate action.”

But, nowadays, when it comes to the question of China, people start to be interested in who they work with. But if we look at the narrative and discourse of these initiatives, they say as well: “We want to support actions around the world.” 

They don’t always specify [the geographic scope of their standard-setting work], but if we further zoom into where they are working and why they work in specific areas or regions, this is also an interesting question – I think there is also a question of politics or political economy there. I would encourage researchers to use our dataset to further explore that kind of question.

CB: Zooming back out – the theme of the data set is environmental leadership, but – at least in global climate negotiations – Chinese officials have eschewed being called a climate leader. Your database seems to show an uptick in activity that could be defined as leadership. Would you say that China wants to be seen as a climate leader?

SY: This is a very strong claim, so I probably would not say [so] – also, it’s very subjective, depending on who you ask this question to and how people perceive it.

Let me frame me this way – let’s separate multilateral negotiation processes from what the country or different actors are doing. Of course, for leadership, another way to measure this is to see the performance itself. 

But, in the end, I think we also tried to be very reflective when we developed this work to acknowledge the subjectivity of leadership and the relational nature of leadership. That means that, if you want to be a leader, others need to acknowledge your leadership or recognise this status.

But this is why I think it comes to an interesting question about what’s the role of China and how different actors perceive China’s role in today’s global climate governance.

In multilateral negotiation processes, we are entering into the implementation phase for the Paris Agreement. That means it is very difficult to create new agendas at this stage. [Instead the focus is] trying to see if countries can deliver what they have done.

Of course, I think there is a question of ambition in terms of updating your nationally determined contributions. So, there is an ambition question – there is a performance question.

If we want to see whether China is becoming a leader, we have to look at how fast, for example, China is accelerating its energy transition, trying to reduce – of course, some data shows China has already peaked its emissions – but maybe, how fast China can reduce its emissions. 

Then, in terms of international engagement, what our data is trying to show is that China has become more proactive in that space. The question is also if this engagement translates into some progress in different parts of the world – if China is actually helping. We need more data to do this kind of impact assessment.

But, at the same time, I think the question of whether the Chinese government wants itself to be seen as a leader – this is also an interesting question. Depending on who they want to engage with, in different fora or on different platforms, the answer may be different. 

I just want to quote, when I was in China a few months ago, we had some dialogues with leading Chinese experts. They said the government – and also people in China – are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time, I think, what China is doing or the role of the country – in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. 

So, I think the question is whether this physical change that has already happened will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country. 

I think this is a question that China needs to figure out, itself. Then, of course, there will be implications for China’s strategy for engaging with the rest of the world, especially on climate change.

CB: And what do you think China’s climate engagements will look like in 5-10 years from now? 

SY: I think, from an energy-transition perspective – let me start from there – China is going to be, at the least, more proactive in promoting energy transition, because it aligns with China’s economic interests and, to a certain extent, its political interest as well, to support energy transitions around the world.

The key question is what role China can play in doing that. Of course, there is the question of trade, of tariffs. There is also the question of investment, intellectual property and technology transfer. 

My read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements, to support other countries. But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose some viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies. 

What we have seen is a lot of countries, especially in the global south, have benefited already, or are in the process of benefiting from, affordable technologies produced by China. 

But, at the same time, this is not sustainable – at least from an economic point of view – not a sustainable situation in the sense that these countries also need to find a way to move themselves upward in supply chains and try to absorb some technologies. How they can work with China [to achieve this] – that’s a very important question to me and also my team. We want to do more research in that area.

This is from the energy-transition perspective. But then, if we look at multilateral processes, I would say China is very committed to multilateralism. If we look at all the discourse, including the cases in our database – we have done some text analysis looking at the narrative discourse of the vision of these initiatives. Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes. 

Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment. 

So, I think this pattern will probably last. At the same time, because – depending on the other important countries’ climate policies, for example, the US – back to your question about the leadership in multilateral processes, how proactive and how ambitious China wants to be in taking on this leadership position in multilateral processes is still an open question. 

This also depends on the concept of leadership in different cultures.

Whether China wants to take over the US to become the only superpower of a global system – I think this is probably very unlikely. China may want to figure out a slightly different model. Even if, physically, it’s one of the most, or the most, important or powerful countries in the world, how using how the country can use this position to support or guide the governance of global challenges, this is probably slightly different from the views or understanding of, for example, European and other global north countries.

The question is how China can propose a slightly different model – still in the current multilateral system – for governing global challenges, including climate change. This is really important. I don’t have an answer, so that’s why we will continue to look at this question and try to use our research to help people understand what role China can play in global climate governance. 

CB: Thank you.

This interview was conducted by Anika Patel via Zoom on 1 July 2026.

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As the techno-authoritarian race to develop advanced Artificial Intelligence technologies continues at full steam, Silicon Valley’s sway over regulatory agendas has come to rival – even surpass – that of many states. Yet, between the ambitions of global superpowers and AI giants, Europe has the opportunity to seek something better. An interview with award-winning journalist and author Karen Hao.

Alessio Giussani: Several metaphors have been evoked to describe the current model of AI development – a parrot or a mirror, for example. Why did you choose that of empire?

Karen Hao: I think those metaphors are all extremely useful. I focus on empire because I’m not just looking at the technical artefact itself and what happens when it’s deployed in society, but also at the production of this technology and the actors who consolidate an extraordinary amount of economic and political power to produce it.

There are four main reasons why I call this system an empire. First, these companies lay claim to resources that are not theirs: individuals’ data, as well as the work of writers and creators. Second, they exploit an extraordinary amount of labour, and that goes for the workers they exploit within the production process and the supply chain of these technologies, as well as the workers whose labour rights are eroded when the technology is deployed.

The third aspect is information control. A major facet of empires’ expansion is the ability to filter all knowledge production and information through the lens of their imperial agenda, and this is precisely what AI companies are doing. They control and censor the science that gets produced by bankrolling most AI researchers, and they are building an information technology that they seek to make the central portal through which everyone else engages with the world, including in education.

Lastly, they wrap all this in a civilising mission. They say that they’re engaging in this work because ultimately they are trying to bring humanity a technology that will elevate us to a utopian state, and if the bad guys – which usually means China – develop it before us, then we will instead descend into a dystopian state. This is a kind of religious narrative that was also common among empires of old.

The AI empire, as you are describing it, is not limited to a company; it’s a system, a logic. What lies behind your focus on OpenAI and on the figure of its CEO, Sam Altman?

One answer is that people need stories to help make concrete what would otherwise be an abstract idea. But OpenAI is also particularly interesting because it made all of the major decisions that changed the norms within the industry, pushing it towards empire-building. It was OpenAI that decided to scale at all costs, to work with large language models, and produce a chatbot-like interface for them. Pretty much everything that the public understands to be associated with AI today was first decided within OpenAI’s walls.

By telling that history, it becomes much more obvious that AI is not inevitable, because you start to realise there were real people making those decisions based on their values, their worldviews, their personal vendettas – whatever it is that actually shaped the trajectory of AI development. Sam Altman’s ideologies are imbued in the model, not just in an abstract sense. You often hear the truism that models reflect their creators, but I wanted to show how this actually happens. It’s about the companies, the people, and the economic and ideological environment they are part of.

As these technologies grow more powerful, asserting control over their deployment is becoming an existential question. We saw Big Tech bowing to Trump at his second inauguration, but we are also seeing AI CEOs increasingly at odds with the government. Who will end up having the final say – the state or private companies?

There is an ongoing battle for who’s going to call the shots. I see the relationship between Washington and Silicon Valley as an alliance of convenience, but a very fraught one. They represent two different models of empire, each with its own imperial agenda. Both are trying to expand and quite literally take over more land from other countries, but the Trump administration sees AI companies as tools in the hands of the state’s imperial ambitions. Meanwhile, Silicon Valley sees the Trump administration as a tool of their imperial ambitions, but they’re not actually on the same page, because each of them wants to be the supreme entity that comes out on top.

There have been moments when the US government has demonstrated that it’s still on top – when Trump and Musk collided, Musk got booted out. However, when the Department of War clashed with Anthropic, the company showed that it was the stronger power in that instance: Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth evoked the nuclear option, threatening to declare the company a supply chain risk as the ultimate stick that he could whack to get Anthropic in line, and the company still didn’t get in line. Quite embarrassingly, the Department of War has become deeply dependent on a private actor that is unwilling to cooperate on the government’s terms, and the government can do nothing about it.

There needs to be accountability for both of these imperial actors, and that accountability will not come from either of them; it has to come from the people. From bottom-up, grassroots organising, which we are beginning to see blossoming all around the world, including in the US. As impervious as the alliance of convenience may appear, it is actually extremely fragile, and there are opportunities to accelerate its demise by applying more pressure at its pain points.

Instead of looking at AI as a global race between the good and the bad guys, we should be thinking about what vision we have for society.

The state of AI development looks like a competitive race to the bottom between rival companies and global superpowers. What role has geopolitical competition with China played in bringing AI to its current predicament?

China is a card that Silicon Valley has played for a decade, pretty much ever since it got kicked out of China. But when you look at the track record of this argument, you see that what has happened is consistently the opposite of what Silicon Valley said would happen.

They said that by not regulating Silicon Valley companies – and by regulating China through export controls – American technology would dominate worldwide. Yet TikTok is now the most popular social media platform, and Chinese open-source AI models are becoming more and more popular around the world, including in the US. They also promised that Silicon Valley dominance would have a liberalising effect on the world, but that hasn’t come to pass either; their effect has been deeply illiberalising. There has been an extraordinary erosion of democratic institutions and a rapid acceleration of democratic backsliding, aided by Silicon Valley platforms and AI technologies.

Instead of looking at AI as a global race between the good and the bad guys, we should be thinking about what vision we have for society, what kind of AI technologies would support that vision, and what resources we need to bring it about. We should be competing not in a race Silicon Valley defined, but on the ideas and values we want to uphold. And I believe Europe has an opportunity here to show the world a third way, different from those of the US and China, that resets the rules of the game.

The European Commission has recently adopted a tech sovereignty package as part of Europe’s effort to chart its own technological path. How should we articulate this vision to avoid ending up with a European version of a surveillance-based, oligarchic business model?

The North Star that Europe should be following is not sovereignty for sovereignty’s sake, but the purpose of achieving that sovereignty. Europe, or at least most of it, is one of the last bastions of democracy in the world. It upholds human rights and freedoms, and it needs tech sovereignty to help advance these values. As long as it remains extremely dependent on systems being developed in a very authoritarian way and seeking to undermine European societies, it cannot uphold its values. Sovereignty as a concept tends to become vague if you just start thinking about it as a goal in and of itself. It should be a means towards a purpose.

What kind of coalitions, constituencies, or sites of conflict should we be starting from in order to build that alternative vision?

First of all, we should understand AI governance in an expansive way. Strengthening labour rights and protecting civil society, for example, counts as AI governance. Students, teachers, and health care workers should also be at the table to help shape and contest how AI is developed and deployed in society. Education is key, both as a sector and a coalition that we need to bring in, and in terms of public education around AI.

Another important aspect is funding AI researchers and entrepreneurs to figure out the more technical aspects of what you are trying to build and how you want to apply it. But you can’t just give them money without allowing the rest of society a say; otherwise, you are just replicating the problems we have in the US, where it’s essentially technocrats or techno-authoritarians calling the shots.

You are not starting from scratch. A lot of work has already been done to establish the common goals society should strive towards. I’m talking about the Sustainable Development Goals, for example. That could be a starting point for figuring out how to fund AI innovation.

The narratives around current AI technologies are extremely polarised. On one side, you have those who say there’s nothing particularly new about these technologies, and that the bubble is about to burst. On the other, you have those who believe AI will transform our lives, revolutionise supply chains, and make us all redundant. What do you make of these different stances?

It’s true, many people tend to exaggerate the benefits without considering the costs of these technologies, or overemphasise the costs without seeing the benefits. But I think there’s quite a large percentage of people who agree that we want the benefits of AI, but not at the cost of our own ability to live a dignified life, with access to good health care, economic opportunity, a healthy environment, and a flourishing planet. That’s the most balanced approach to take.

AI is a name for many different types of technologies, and so we should be thinking carefully about which ones we invest in, which new ones we want to build, because they each come with a different set of trade-offs; some of those align with the future that we want to build, and some others don’t. We should choose wisely.

AI is a name for many different types of technologies, and so we should be thinking carefully about which ones we invest in, which new ones we want to build.

What’s your own relationship with existing AI tools?

I don’t use them for three main reasons. One, the ethical stance. Two, the privacy stance: I’m investigating these companies, and they are ultimately the most effective surveillance technologies ever invented. Three, these tools are not very useful for the particular skill set that I need to perform my job.

I’m not saying that everyone should do the same. I’ve talked with many people who clearly get something out of these tools, or are required to use them as part of their professional role. Rather, the way to get out of the current problem is to do the same that we’ve done with other industries in the past, like the fashion industry. When we discovered that many of our clothes were being produced in a really horrific way, we didn’t just get rid of clothes. There was a lot of consumer and worker organising, government regulation, and general public backlash that reined in the industry. Of course, the fashion industry is still far from perfect, but at least there are alternatives now, and consumers can vote with their wallets over what kind of supply chain and corporate practices they endorse.

We need to do the same with AI. There are not enough alternatives for users right now, and for that to change, there needs to be more labour organising and more public backlash. Those who can abstain from these technologies should absolutely boycott them, and governments should step in to help create new markets for alternatives. Consumers have an important lever to pull, but it’s not the only one. As people, as individuals, we also wear the hats of the worker, the educator, and the citizen, and we should think about how to use all those roles in relation to AI development to make it better.

Counter-revolution in Egypt: Sisi’s New Republic by Hossam el-Hamalawy (Verso, 2026). “Engels elucidates the concept of the ‘power’ which is called the state…What does this...

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Wamuyu Manyara is country director for Trócaire Malawi and Tarcizio Kalaundi is its climate resilience officer.

This week, the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) faces a significant decision that will determine its ability to address the harms being done by climate change.

Discussions on the Fund’s Resource Mobilisation Strategy must get the scale and accessibility of the Fund right. Failure to do so would risk undermining its role to channel finance to countries ex­periencing loss and damage, and undermine obligations to climate justice and human rights.

This discussion could not come at a more pressing time. As loss and damage (L&D) continues to escalate globally, and as the world teeters perilously close to the Paris Agreement’s critical 1.5C warming limit, the FRLD also faces the very real danger of running out of funding in 2027.

As Nigeria rails at loss and damage “mirage”, fund boss assures money is coming

Experts calculate that in 2025, L&D finance needs for climate-vulnerable countries may have reached USD$937 billion. Last year’s major impacts included a series of extremely destructive cyclones that hit the Philippines, estimated to have caused over $5 billion in losses, while in Jamaica, the losses and damage caused by Hurricane Melissa were estimated at $12.2 billion.

The bill for just one of these disasters would exhaust the Fund’s existing resources many times over. While the costs and human rights violations rack up, almost four years after being agreed at COP27, the FRLD remains critically underfunded.

Pledges to the Fund ($822 million) are just a fraction of 1% of annual loss and damage needs, and only around half of those pledges ($448 million) have been paid into the Fund so far.

Meanwhile, those who have done nothing to cause the climate crisis are facing its worst – and intensifying – impacts and are being left to foot the bill for the damages already incurred, not to mention the severe non-economic costs to communities. It is therefore crucial that the FRLD’s Resource Mobilisation Strategy urgently brings in far more L&D finance.

Contributor conundrum

Many developed states will claim that additional countries should provide L&D finance. This, however, is a distraction – particularly considering the deep abyss between the contributions of developed states that are obligated to pay and their fair share as calculated according to their wealth and historical emissions. Furthermore, some states and regions that are currently not obligated to contribute are already doing so. 

Analysis reveals that, even in the highly inequitable scenario where all states including those who have contributed nothing to causing the climate crisis were to pay towards L&D finance, wealthy countries would still be responsible for the vast majority of L&D finance.

New loss and damage fund could run out of money next year

The Fund’s Resource Mobilisation Strategy must focus political discussions on the ability of rich and highly polluting states to raise public, grant-based L&D finance that is new and additional to existing climate finance obligations and overseas development assistance.

Developed states have the means to pay and the FRLD should introduce mandatory and progressive mechanisms to make the biggest polluters, including the ultra-rich and fossil fuel corporations, pay for their climate harms. 

African impacts

Increasingly unpredictable seasons and more frequent and extreme events are driving food insecurity, malnutrition, displacement and other human rights risks in climate-vulnerable countries, and communities facing these escalating and compounding impacts must be centred in FRLD policies.

In Ethiopia, 2023 saw 24 million people affected by five back-to-back failed rains leading to severe food and water shortages, including a 90% crop loss in drought-affected areas. Eleven million people required food assistance, and over 500,000 people were displaced. Meanwhile, the 2023–24 floods and the 2024 Gofa landslide disrupted or destroyed health facilities, displaced thousands, and led to outbreaks of cholera, malaria, and measles.

Comment: Let’s tax luxury air travel to fund climate adaptation and loss and damage

Today, Somalia is facing one of its most severe drought emergencies in recent history driven by climate extremes. Malnutrition rates continue to exceed projections and previous devastating records, with 1.9 million children in Somalia acutely malnourished.

In Malawi, child stunting had significantly reduced, but climate impacts are now affecting children’s growth and development. Tropical Cyclone Freddy in 2023 was one of the worst on record, causing over 1,200 deaths, displacing half a million people, and causing damages exceeding $500 million. Recovery needs for four major disasters between 2015 and 2023 are estimated at $1.7 billion, equivalent to more than a quarter of Malawi’s 2026-2027 budget. 

Funding for communities

Access to community grants in the southern African country, however, has catalysed local responses to L&D that coordinate around immediate and long-term needs and restoring livelihoods.

Direct access to the FRLD for climate-vulnerable countries and communities, with community-centric planning, is essential to ensure that the Fund can respond to the needs of people experiencing the worst impacts of climate change, through prompt and flexible mechanisms that do not hinder recovery options.

Stepping up to fill the FRLD through an ambitious and needs-based Resource Mobilisation Strategy is the bare minimum that wealthy states can and must do. It is, after all, an obligation that flows from the international duties of cooperation and prevention of harm, and from the obligation to provide reparation when harm occurs. Failure to do so would further erode climate justice and human rights for communities on the frontline of loss and damage.

The post The loss and damage fund needs far more finance to deliver climate justice appeared first on Climate Home News.

Last week the United States decided not to renew the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

United States trade representative Jamieson Greer announced the decision in a statement, but did not explicitly state the reason. He referenced “shortcomings” and “trade deficits” that the U.S. will continue to address with Mexico and Canada.

The USMCA Agriculture Coalition, representing farm and agricultural groups, and 20 House Agricultural Committee Democrats sent letters to the Trump-Vance administration encouraging the renewal and expressing concern about the future of North American trade. Set to expire in 2036, USMCA will now be reviewed annually and subject to negotiations.

House Democrats wrote in their letter, that “by not renewing USMCA, the president and his administration are threatening one of his legacy achievements, and the last source of trade certainty our farmers have.”

USMCA, which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 2020 under the first Trump administration, serves as an agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada and is intended to strengthen North American trade and support economic stability. In 2024, “agricultural and seafood exports to Canada and Mexico generated US$149 billion in total economic contribution to the U.S. economy and supported nearly half a million jobs,” according to a study by the Agricultural Coalition for USMCA.

The current Agreement maintains NAFTA’s elimination of tariffs on almost all U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada. According to the International Trade Administration, major differences between the two Agreements include the modernization of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, which ensure food safety for agricultural products, and the creation of standards for handling evolving biotechnologies, such as gene editing. It also expands market access for U.S. products, including dairy.

A study by Purdue University finds that trade agreements, including USMCA, have significantly lowered food prices for Americans and created access to seasonal produce year-round.

Prior to the renewal period, the Agriculture Coalition for USMCA sent a letter to the U.S., Canada, and Mexico trade representatives urging them to renew the Agreement. In light of the U.S.’ failure to renew, Bryan Goodman, a spokesperson for the Coalition, tells Food Tank that  “U.S. farmers continue to seek the renewal and strengthening of USMCA… President Trump is a strong negotiator, and we look forward to working with the administration to renew the agreement.”

While the U.S. declined renewal, Canada and Mexico expressed their support of the Agreement in the meeting. “We agreed on the importance of continuing our discussions and identifying ways to ensure trade and investment frameworks… to support North American prosperity and competitiveness,” says the Honorable Dominic LeBlanc, Minister of Canada-U.S. Trade, Intergovernmental Affairs, Internal Trade and One Canadian Economy.

The U.S. will meet with Mexico in two weeks to continue negotiations.

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Howard Walsh, Unsplash

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Between the view, the marshes, and the birds, Liat Meitzenheimer concedes the drive along California State Route 37 is scenic. Still, she avoids it for two reasons: congestion and flooding.

The highway, about half of which is two-lane, is often backed up with people commuting between affordable communities in Solano County to the east and jobs in pricier Sonoma and Marin counties to the west. It also is a regional link to Napa Valley and other destinations, much of it built on embankments, bridges, and causeways that span marshes precariously close to San Pablo Bay. That makes it prone to flooding, which has led to occasional closures. 

“I don’t go that route whenever we have the potential of flooding, because I know how crazy it can get,” said Meitzenheimer, a retiree who lives in Vallejo, not far from the highway’s eastern terminus at Interstate 80. 

These problems will worsen as the population grows and climate change brings more frequent and intense storms. Without adaptation measures, portions of the road are at risk of permanent inundation by 2050.

The state Department of Transportation and the regional Metropolitan Transportation Commission are pursuing a $500 million project that would, over five years, remake portions of the 21-mile highway. It would replace one of five bridges with one 5 feet taller, raise two one-mile sections by up to 8 inches, add a carpool and bus lane in each direction, and restore a tidal marsh and other ecosystems. 

Not everyone thinks that goes far enough. Some want the highway moved several miles inland. Others favor a far more ambitious $10 billion project that would take at least 20 years. It would raise almost the entire roadway, add a lane for cyclists and pedestrians, and perhaps include railway tracks. To do anything less, advocates of this approach say, overlooks two pressing issues.

“Highway expansion does not solve congestion and will worsen climate change,” said Zack Deutsch-Gross, who leads TransForm CA, a sustainable transportation advocacy organization. “This project is pretty egregious,” because the highway, if left where it is, “in the long term will be underwater.”

The challenges facing SR-37 are not unique. California’s iconic Highway 1, has been repeatedly closed due to floods, fires, and rockslides. Coastal cities like Miami Beach and Atlantic City are scrambling to harden infrastructure against rising seas and frequent inundation. Hurricanes routinely leave island and low-lying communities isolated by deluged causeways. Addressing these problems requires tremendous investment — bolstering bridges alone could cost $170 billion by 2050. Failing to do so could bring grave consequences. Without further adaptation, annual damage from coastal flooding worldwide could account for 2.9 percent of global gross domestic product by 2100. That’s up from 0.3 percent just 11 years ago.

California is among the states most aggressively planning for a warmer world. How it proceeds with SR-37 will show just how serious it is about adapting roadways to climate change.

California Highway 37 regularly floods during severe rain, as it did during an atmospheric river that dumped enough rain in January 2023 to require closing the two westbound lanes. Alan Dep / Marin Independent Journal via Getty Images

Highway 37 began as Sears Point Tollway, which opened in 1928 to connect Marin and Solano counties north of San Francisco. California bought it 10 years later, and in the decades since has widened it as the road became an increasingly important commuter and freight route. The road is essentially a causeway and crosses an intricate system of wetlands, sloughs, rivers, and creeks at the northern end of San Pablo Bay. It also traverses a federally protected wildlife refuge, a state managed wildlife area, and an immense tidal marsh.

Transportation planners have considered widening, raising, or relocating portions of the road since the 1950s, but rarely proceeded due to the cost and environmental impact. That’s become less of a concern as repeated flooding and sea level rise — California could see an average increase of 10 inches by 2050 and 1.6 to 3.1 feet by 2100 — become more urgent problems.

Fraser Shilling, who leads the Road Ecology Center at the University of California, Davis, started researching SR-37 in 2010, which is about when Caltrans started considering sea level rise. His work presented a variety of ways to bolster it against that inevitability. “The least resilient was what they’re currently building, which is the highway on a berm,” he said. “The most resilient was to move the highway inland.”

A raised highway would still rest precariously on mud, Shilling said. He favors the strategic retreat of moving it as much as 5 miles inland. “There’s always been a problem that it goes through the marshes,” Shilling said. “You would never ever get permission to build that today.”

Barring that, he said, the state and region face irreconcilable choices. Without sufficient hardening, the highway could wash away. But too much could make the shoreline erode more quickly. 

The Metropolitan Transportation Commission considered relocating the highway, but chose to focus on more feasible projects given the cost and time constraints, said agency spokesperson John Goodwin. “We would love to see the long-term projects completed sooner rather than later, but recognizing that [it] would take many billions of dollars, and probably 20 years, we’ve got needs that need to be satisfied,” he said.

The agency has secured $270 million to replace the Novato Creek Bridge in what Goodwin called the first part of the long-term project –– that would accommodate sea-level rise and storm surges on SR-37 until 2130. He said starting with quicker, relatively cheaper projects will also give the agency enough time to find the $10 billion needed for the long-term project.

The Sanibel Causeway is the only road connecting Sanibel Island with mainland Florida. The state reopened it in 15 days. Ricardo Arduengo / AFP via Getty Images

In 2022, Hurricane Ian flooded the 3-mile Sanibel Causeway, which connects that Florida island to the mainland. While the state managed to reopen it in 15 days, the experience has become a cautionary tale for other islands. 

Jill Gambill, a researcher at Georgia Tech’s Institute for People and Technology, began developing an adaptation plan for Tybee Island in 2012 –– the first of its kind by a local government in the state. An 11-mile causeway connects it to the mainland near Savannah. Flooding closed it four times in 2024, leaving residents stranded for as long as five hours.

A hurricane has not made landfall in Georgia since 1979, but hurricanes Irma and Matthew brought the highest water levels since measurement began in 1935. “If we were to get hit by, even a category two or a category three storm here, where it’s a direct hit, that would be catastrophic,” Gambill said. 

The state, which maintains Highway 80, repaved and raised it 8 inches in 2019. Elevating it more substantially could help reduce flooding but require widening the base, threatening important marsh habitat. It would also be expensive, and the state Department of Transportation, which did not respond to a request for comment, has yet to commit the funding. 

Jo E. Sias, a civil engineer and professor who studies pavement design at the University of New Hampshire, said rising seas also bring hidden problems. As groundwater tables rise, they intersect with pavement below the surface, weakening the road and leading to faster deterioration, she said. The increased moisture in the soil caused by precipitation and sea level can weaken the road and potentially halve its lifetime.

There is growing interest in nature-based solutions. When the Sanibel Island Causeway disappeared, for example, segments near small, self-contained “pocket beaches” remained largely intact when others washed away. “Pocket beaches, beach nourishment projects, dune systems,” Sias said, listing possible solutions. “Anything that you can do to minimize the energy of the water as it’s coming across the roads is going to reduce the propensity for washout.”

Tybee Island recently added three rain gardens to bolster roads around Highway 80 through funding from the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation and the city. A future phase of the project would build living shorelines, which use bags of oyster shells, smooth cordgrass, and other vegetation to absorb energy from waves.

Jason Evans, the executive director at Stetson University’s Institute for Water and Environmental Resilience, sees an opportunity to strengthen both habitats and highways. Oyster reefs, for instance, benefit the ecosystem and grow vertically as seas rise, unlike seawalls. 

Evans said flooding in low-lying southeastern communities is increasing as seas rise. That makes it essential to consider where roads lead and how they are used when developing mitigation plans. It makes little sense to raise a road by six feet if what’s at the other end hasn’t been prepared as well. “You might have an elevated road going out to a flooded island,” he said. 

There are also questions of equity. Residents of coastal communities tend to be wealthier than those living inland. Using tax revenue to elevate a causeway or bridge “so the millionaires and billionaires can get to their beach house” denies funding to projects that could serve a wider swath of the community, Evans said.

Ethan Elkind, who leads the climate program at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, said the Golden State’s approach to transportation conflicts with its climate goals, though he concedes fixing SR-37 is complicated. Many of those who use it commute to rural jobs in wine country or in low-density suburbs. Greater job density would allow public transit to drop workers at fewer, more central locations, “as opposed to needing small-scale transit to help workers reach dispersed locations,” Elkind said. 

Dense, affordable housing in Marin and Sonoma counties would help too by reducing the number of commuters. “Instead, those communities, for decades now, have really put up the gates to any new development,” Elkind said. He added that there’s still time to greenlight more housing development, shore up the roadway, and build a high-capacity bus lane.

As for plans to expand the highway, Hana Cregar, associate director of climate equity at the Greenlining Institute, said people are starting to see the downsides of adding lanes. A Transportation for America survey found that only 10 percent of respondents consider that the best solution to reducing traffic. It may help explain how the project is being pitched.

“The way that this highway expansion project is aiming to rebrand under a climate resilience lens is unique,” Cregar said, “because I think it’s aiming to hide the flaws in this project by painting it as solving a very real issue.”

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline How to build a highway in the age of climate change on Jul 9, 2026.

For decades, Jon Zehr was haunted by an organism he knew was there — but couldn’t see.

It all started in the ‘90s on a research boat in the middle of the ocean. Zehr was an oceanographer studying nitrogen-fixing bacteria — simple, microbial life forms that could pull the element straight from the air, making it bioavailable to plants and animals. Scientists at the time had only seriously studied one species of nitrogen-fixing bacteria in the entire ocean, but Zehr wanted to change that. His plan was to gather and test samples of seawater with the hope that he might find something that other scientists had missed.

Left: Jon Zehr (bottom center) sits aboard a research vessel. Right: Zehr studies nitrogen-fixing bacteria in the lab. Courtesy of Jon Zehr.

Zehr’s plans involved something pretty cutting-edge for the time: DNA. He gathered seawater samples and ran tests for the presence of the gene for nitrogenase, the enzyme that gives bacteria the ability to pull nitrogen out of the air. If he got a hit, it would hopefully mean the seawater contained some new kind of nitrogen-fixing bacteria.

And it worked. Almost immediately, he found traces of a species of nitrogen-fixing bacteria previously unknown to science. Looking at the genes themselves, he could get a pretty good idea of what this new bacteria should look like. It was likely a unicellular cyanobacteria, around 3 micrometers in size, that should fluoresce orange under the microscope. Full of anticipation, he popped the seawater samples under the microscope, expecting to see that bacteria everywhere.

Instead, he found nothing. There weren’t any organisms in the sample that matched the right description.

Surprised, Zehr repeated the process over and over. He tested samples of seawater from the tropical waters of Hawaii and the southern Caribbean, all the way to the cold waters in the Arctic. Again and again, the genetic signature surfaced but not the visible bacteria. It was as if he had discovered a footprint without an animal.

But he didn’t want to stop looking. He knew that any new discovery could represent a vital link in the Earth’s fragile nitrogen cycle. “This one I kept chasing, because it’s globally important,” Zehr said. 

To understand Jon’s obsession, it helps to start with a peculiar biological constraint — a cruel joke, as one scientist put it — at the heart of all life on Earth. It goes like this: All living organisms need the element nitrogen to survive. It’s a key part of proteins, DNA, and RNA. But while our atmosphere is absolutely packed with nitrogen, the one enzyme that can pull nitrogen from the air so that living organisms can actually use it basically falls apart in the presence of oxygen. So even though plants, animals, and fungi are constantly surrounded by nitrogen in the air, they can’t get a hold of it on their own. 

The only organisms that can actually pull this off are ones that can survive without oxygen: super simple bacteria and archaea. That means the entire natural world relies on a relatively small number of microscopic species to make nitrogen usable by more complex forms of life.

Animals, plants, and fungi rely on simple microbes like bacteria and archaea for nitrogen. Jesse Nichols / Grist

This biological bottleneck has had major impacts on human civilization. Nitrogen is a major component of fertilizer, since plants need it to grow. Enriching soil with nitrogen drastically increases crop yields — important for feeding a growing population. Centuries ago, fertilizer was in such short supply that countries fought wars over islands covered in nitrogen-rich bird guano. In the early 20th century, German scientists created an industrial method to create synthetic, or lab-made, fertilizer. While this invention saved billions of lives from starvation, it also wreaked havoc on the environment. Producing synthetic fertilizer uses a massive amount of energy, and the overuse of fertilizer has polluted the water enough to lead to massive “dead zones” in the ocean. 

These dueling problems — the consequences of too much and too little nitrogen — have led scientists to muse about innovations like self-fertilizing plants. But despite these dreams, researchers hadn’t been able to develop a form of complex life capable of fixing its own nitrogen. It seemed to be an ironclad rule of biology that no organism from the complex side of the tree of life could pull nitrogen out of the air.

Which made it all the more puzzling that Jon Zehr’s particular type of nitrogen-fixing bacteria didn’t seem to be playing by the usual rules. His research team had plenty of the organism’s DNA, but no actual organism. Not only that, but the more they studied it, the less the bacteria’s DNA seemed to make sense. They could tell from its genetic markers that it was photosynthetic bacteria, but it didn’t actually seem to have the genes to photosynthesize. In fact, it seemed to have lost about 80 percent of its entire genome, including several genes it should technically need to survive. The organism seemed less like a complete bacterium than a collection of absences. How was it even alive?

After years of studying this puzzle, Zehr started to notice a pattern: Every sample of seawater that contained the mystery bacteria DNA also contained DNA for one specific type of algae. What if the reason that he had never seen the bacteria under the microscope was because it was hiding in plain sight, inside another organism? That might also explain how the bacteria could survive, even with all those missing genes. 

Zehr began to suspect the algae was the missing piece he had been chasing for decades. What he didn’t know was that someone else had spent years trying to solve the other half of the same puzzle from the other side of the world.

Despite being told her research would be of no use to others, Japanese scientist Kyoko Hagino spent decades of her career studying a type of algae called Braarudosphaera bigelowii.
Naotomo Umewaka / Grist

Kyoko Hagino is an algae scientist from Kochi, Japan. Just like Jon Zehr, her story also started in the late ‘90s, with a microorganism that changed the course of her career. She was part of a paleontology research team, studying tiny algae fossils on the ocean floor, to piece together information about Earth’s past climate.

Among the countless microscopic fossils she examined, there was one that absolutely captivated her. It was a type of algae called Braarudosphaera bigelowii. Hagino fondly just calls it Bigelowii.

At certain points in Bigelowii’s life, it surrounds itself with this beautiful geometric shell, and Hagino would find these pentagonal skeletons throughout her samples. “When I first spotted Bigelowii, I thought it was in such a beautiful shape,” she said. “It has a very beautiful shape like a jewel.”

But no one really knew anything about the algae living inside. This was what Hagino wanted to study. But no one else seemed to share her fascination.

Braarudosphaera bigelowii in its jewel-like calcified (left) and non-calcified (right) forms.
Courtesy of Kyoko Hagino

“When I first started the research, my boss at the time objected to it,” she said. “[I was told] even if you do such research that nobody reads, it won’t land you a job.”

At the time, Hagino was having trouble finding a position at a university. At the same time, she was taking care of her young kids. And she was moving to a new city where her husband had found work. Everything in her life seemed to be sending the clear message that she should just drop it and find something else to study. But Hagino just couldn’t do that. For whatever reason, there was something about this algae that just absolutely fascinated her, and she wanted to learn everything about it. Even if that meant studying it on her own.

So Hagino and her daughter started taking trips to the beach, collecting samples of seawater in the hopes of finding this elusive algae. Over the years, they ended up taking hundreds of these trips. They did this so often that her daughter genuinely didn’t know that people went to the beach for other reasons, like to go swimming.

“‘The ocean — isn’t that the place to collect seawater?’” Hagino recounted her daughter saying.
  

Kyoko Hagino and her daughter collect samples of seawater. Courtesy of Kyoko Hagino

Hagino would then spend hours at home with the microscope, searching for Bigelowii cells and individually picking them out when she’d find them. This was incredibly time-consuming, but it was kind of the only way to study them. No matter what she did, the cells didn’t seem to want to grow in a test tube. 

For years, Hagino worked on growing a culture without any kind of university salary. To make ends meet, she ended up picking up a part-time job washing test tubes in a lab. One day, she was talking to one of the scientists there, and he suggested adding an unusual ingredient to her culture. It wasn’t a chemical or anything else you’d normally find in the lab. It was tokoroten, a type of traditional Japanese jelly noodle made from seaweed.

To Hagino’s amazement, the noodles were just what Bigelowii needed.

“I saw Bigelowii swimming and increasing in number,” she said. “I was extremely happy.”

Left: Kyoko Hagino holds a bowl of tokoroten, the secret ingredient she used in her Bigelowii culture. Naotomo Umewaka / Grist. Right: A microscope image of Hagino’s culture. Courtesy of Zehr Lab.

Now that she had a culture, she could finally grow enough cells to answer some of the big questions about this organism. And there was one big question at the top of Hagino’s mind. Over the course of her many years studying Bigelowii, she noticed something odd. It had all the normal components of an algae cell. But then it also had something she couldn’t explain — something she had never seen in any textbook. It was a black dot in the center of the algae.

A transmission electron microscope image of a Bigelowii revealed a strange object. Courtesy of Kyoko Hagino

Hagino was preparing to publish a paper on this mysterious dot, when she stumbled upon an article that had just come out in the American journal Science. It described the search for a seemingly invisible nitrogen-fixing bacteria that the author theorized was likely living inside a species of algae. The author of the article was Jon Zehr, and he was talking about Braarudosphaera bigelowii.

Hagino thought about the strange object she had discovered inside Bigelowii. The pieces fit. She ran a genetic test on Bigelowii, and it came out positive: She had found the nitrogen-fixing bacteria that Zehr had spent so many years searching for. 

“I never imagined that someone was doing research on Bigelowii,” she said. “I was shocked to think that I had been surpassed.”

Zehr was also surprised when Hagino reached out to share her discovery with him — the same puzzle, worked on from an ocean away. “Neither one of us knew that the two things went together!” he said.

Hagino and Zehr had both spent their careers trying to solve a scientific puzzle, with no idea that they each held the other’s missing piece. Now that they had a culture, they had the chance to unravel a mystery that would end up going deeper than they’d ever imagined.

Together, they would reveal a level of cooperation that would rewrite a fundamental rule of biology.

Zehr and Hagino look out at the Pacific Ocean. Left: Naotomo Umewaka​ / Grist Right: Jesse Nichols / Grist

Nature is full of symbiotic relationships: two organisms, each helping the other out. The clownfish from Finding Nemo is a good example of this — it looks after its sea anemone partner, in exchange for a safe place to live. But these helpful relationships can get closer and closer. There are organisms that live inside other organisms, like corals, which get food from zooxanthellae algae living in them. And you even have cells that live inside other cells. At a certain point, the relationship becomes so close that we’re not sure where one organism starts and the other begins. 
  
Now, two organisms converging — going from being considered separate entities to part of the same being — is pretty mind-bending, and it’s a line that’s only been crossed a few times in the history of life on Earth. The two famous examples of this are mitochondria, the powerhouse of the cell found in every complex life form on Earth, and chloroplasts, the parts of plant cells that use photosynthesis to turn sunlight and carbon dioxide into food. Both of these examples started as independent cells that over time got so close to their partners that they became organelles: little organs inside other cells.
  
But what about Bigelowii and its internal bacteria? There was no doubt the relationship between the two was close. Zehr and Hagino were eager to find out just how the two worked together. So they teamed up. She sent a culture to John’s lab with hopes to visit California as the experiment went on.
  
When the culture arrived at Zehr’s office, he was so excited he took a photo to capture the moment. His team debated over which experiments they were going to run first.  

Jon Zehr smiles as he receives the first Bigelowii culture shipment from Hagino in 2020. Courtesy of Zehr Lab

“We sat around as a lab, and we decided the ten things we were going to do first, because we didn’t know how long the culture would stay alive,” he said.  “And within three days, Covid lockdown started.”

The pandemic threw a wrench in all of their plans. Japan put up very strict travel restrictions that ended up staying in place for years. After all her hard work, Hagino couldn’t join Zehr in person. But the two were still hungry for answers, and they decided that Zehr’s lab should proceed with the tests. Hagino, who had funding from a grant she shared with Zehr, would help as much as she could from afar.
  
And pretty quickly, they started to find clues that the algae and the bacteria’s relationship was not a standard case of symbiosis. Bigelowii and the bacteria always divided at the same time. They also grew at the same rate, and in ways that looked really similar to mitochondria or chloroplasts. 

But the most compelling piece of evidence came from Tyler Coale, a postdoc in Zehr’s lab. He was studying the proteins inside of the two organisms, when he noticed something strange: the bacteria were full of proteins that they didn’t have the genes to make. Instead, these proteins were being produced from extra genes found in Bigelowii. And on the very ends of each of these extra genes, there was the same short DNA sequence that kept showing up over and over.

Tyler Coale looks at Braarudosphaera bigelowii cells under a microscope at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Jesse Nichols / Grist

This pattern reminded Coale of an earlier mystery: The nitrogen-fixing bacteria that had somehow lost many of the genes for proteins it needed to survive. Could Bigelowii be supplying them instead? To find out, he ran an experiment, lining up the missing genes from one organism with the extra genes from the other. The match was striking. For nearly every gene that the bacteria had lost, Bigelowii had evolved an extra copy. And each of those extra genes were tagged with that same sequence of DNA on the end — molecular delivery instructions to send the protein over to the bacteria.

This discovery was huge because this kind of system had only been seen a small handful of times in mitochondria and in chloroplasts and now, in the tiny dot Zehr and Hagino had found inside of Bigelowii. The nitrogen-fixing bacteria were no longer bacteria anymore. It had become a part of Bigelowii, an independent microorganism-turned-organelle.

Zehr and his team decided to call it the Nitroplast.

And that also meant Bigelowii had broken the fundamental rule that only simple organisms like bacteria could pull nitrogen out of the air. The algae are the first known organisms on the complex side of the tree of life that can pull nitrogen out of the air. 

While it’s early days, Coale says the discovery could have big implications for industries like agriculture. “This organism has done what decades of biotech couldn’t do, right? It has engineered this capability into this cell. It’s natural to think that there might be lessons here that we could learn.” he said. 

Zehr, while cautiously optimistic, thinks that self-fertilizing plants are still a long way from becoming a reality. “The downer is it’s really difficult to go from what we know about the nitroplast to engineering a plant,” he said. “But if you don’t take one step, you’re not going to make 100 steps.”

Zehr and Hagino are excited to see where the research takes them next. But for them, it’s never really been about changing the world. They spent their careers studying their tiny pieces of the puzzle, not knowing what they’d find, but with the hope that whatever they discovered could teach them a little more about how the natural world works.

And on that front, there’s so much more to learn.

“This experience has shown that we don’t know which research will be useful and when,” Hagino said.

“Some of the biggest, biggest advances might come from things that you didn’t expect,” Zehr said. “And this might be a case like that.”

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline The tiny cell that broke a big rule of biology on Jul 9, 2026.

Back in April, we launched the Great Power Shift, our flagship global campaign to end fossil fuel dependence and ensure affordable clean energy for all. We are calling on governments to shift public money away from fossil fuels and into renewables, make polluters pay their fair share through a permanent windfall tax, and invest in energy systems that work for everyone, not just the highest bidder.

Months on, our campaign is gaining real momentum across the world, shifting power away from polluters and back to people.

Learn more about how fossil fuels and the cost of living crises are interconnected. Credit: Kathleen Lei Limayo/350.org

From local actions to national campaigns, people across the world are demanding a better future where clean, affordable energy is within reach for everyone.

Together, here’s what we’ve achieved so far:

More than 30,000 people called on G7 leaders to make polluters pay

Ahead of the G7 Summit in France, we made our demand to the world’s richest countries loud and clear: stop letting fossil fuel companies rake in obscene profits while ordinary people pay the price through higher bills and climate disasters.

More than 30,000 people signed our petition, while campaigners in France took the message directly to decision-makers through creative public actions and a wave of online pressure ahead of the summit.

Although G7 leaders stopped short of taxing the windfall profits of oil and gas companies, they couldn’t ignore the growing public demand for a fairer energy system.

The pressure doesn’t stop here.

Thousands helped deliver the ‘Out of Pocket’ Report to decision-makers

Supporters from around the world sent our Out of Pocket report directly to political leaders, highlighting how dependence on imported fossil fuels drives up household energy costs.

The report highlights how fossil fuels are taking money from ordinary people and governments.

And it got noticed. We received a response from the European Commission – proof that people speaking up together can reach the halls of power. We also hand delivered copies to the European Parliament last week.

Communities are already building the alternatives

Across our network, people aren’t waiting for politicians to act.

In the Pacific, community leaders gathered for a Solar Scholars training programme, learning how to bring renewable energy projects to their communities.

Pacific solar scholars program.

In Türkiye, our organisers are building a virtual solar cooperative. In South Africa, our campaigners continue pushing for free basic electricity. In Canada, we’ve joined more than 60 organisations calling for governments to tax fossil fuel companies’ excess profits.

More and more communities are building energy systems that put people first.

A global week of action to #StopEACOP

Communities around the world also stood in solidarity with people resisting the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), a project threatening livelihoods, ecosystems and communities across Uganda and Tanzania.

Residents of Kijumba District, Uganda, stage a peaceful road blockade during the #KickPollutersOut Global Week of Action

Together with partners, campaigners organized more than 60 actions across 19 countries as part of #KickPollutersOut Global Week of Action, from marches and community meetings to creative protests and digital actions, sending a clear message that fossil fuel expansion has no place in our future.

The week showed something powerful: communities separated by thousands of kilometres are standing together against the same system that puts corporate profits before people and the planet.

Taking our demands to global leaders

Momentum continued well beyond the G7.

In Santa Marta, Colombia, representatives from 57 countries came together for the first-ever global conference focused on transitioning away from fossil fuels. For the first time, Indigenous Peoples, frontline communities, trade unions, youth activists and civil society weren’t just watching from the sidelines – they had a seat at the table, shaping the conversation alongside governments.

During the Santa Marta conference, activists and local communities blocked the entrance of one of the main coal ports in Latin America.

Outside the official meetings, communities showed that the transition is already happening. From community energy projects to a peaceful action at one of Latin America’s largest coal ports, people demonstrated that renewable alternatives aren’t ideas for the future – they’re already being built today.

Just weeks later at the UN Climate Talks in Bonn, governments signalled growing momentum behind the global commitment to transition away from fossil fuels. But once again, wealthy countries failed to deliver the finance that climate-vulnerable communities urgently need to adapt to worsening floods, droughts and extreme heat.

The message from both meetings was clear: progress is possible, but governments still need much more public pressure to match their promises with action.

That’s why our movement continues to grow. Around the world, people are facing a cost of living crisis, rising energy bills and worsening climate impacts. Meanwhile, oil and gas companies continue making enormous profits while ordinary households bear the costs.

350.org campaigners in France and Africa call for a permanent windfall tax on fossil fuel profit. Photo: Remy El Sibaïe

Enough is enough. It’s time governments made polluters pay and invested that money in affordable renewable energy and climate solutions that put people first.

When we come together to speak out, organize and build solutions in our own communities, change becomes possible.

Ready to be part of the movement?

Join the Great Power Shift and help push for a fair, fossil-free future.

Join the Great Power Shift

The post The Great Power Shift is underway! appeared first on 350.

Huge wind project with one of the country's biggest batteries to become the first to test Queensland's tough new planning framework.

The post Massive wind farm to be first to test Queensland’s tough new planning laws appeared first on Renew Economy.

Picture a sunflower growing in a median strip along a busy highway in Los Angeles. It looks cheerful enough – bright petals, sturdy stem. But slice open its tissues in a lab, and you might find cadmium concentrations five times higher than sunflowers grown in a rural field 60 miles away. That flower isn’t just decorating the roadside. It’s recording the invisible chemistry of urban air and soil, one metal atom at a time.

Most people associate environmental monitoring with expensive sensors, government agencies, and complicated lab work. But researchers across the U.S. and Europe are increasingly turning to something far simpler – flowering plants – as living detectors of toxic metal contamination. The concept is called bioindication, and flowers, it turns out, are remarkably good at it.

Existing research has focused heavily on mosses, lichens, and tree leaves as bioindicators. Some studies have explored common weeds. But the specific role of flowering species – their petals, reproductive tissues, and ornamental varieties found in every American city – remains an underexplored territory. That’s exactly what makes this topic worth digging into.

What makes a plant a good bioindicator – and why flowers stand out

A bioindicator is any organism that reflects the environmental conditions around it through measurable changes – chemical accumulation, physiological stress, or morphological shifts. For plants, this typically means absorbing metals like lead (Pb), cadmium (Cd), zinc (Zn), copper (Cu), and nickel (Ni) from contaminated soil and air, then storing those metals in their tissues.

Not every plant does this equally well. A good bioindicator species needs a few key traits:

• Wide geographic distribution – so you can compare results across different sites
• High tolerance to pollutants – it needs to survive long enough to accumulate detectable levels
• Measurable uptake – the plant should reliably concentrate metals above background levels
• Easy identification – no confusion about which species you’re sampling

Most published studies have focused on leaves of trees or common weeds. A 2023 study in Scientific Reports tested species like red clover, ribwort plantain, and pigweed – all solid choices. But one finding stood out: the ornamental species Alcea rosea (hollyhock) showed the highest bioconcentration factor for both cadmium (BCF = 8.51) and zinc (BCF = 6.62) among all species tested. This is a garden flower, not a weed. And it outperformed everything else in the experiment.

Why would a flowering ornamental accumulate more metals than a roadside weed? The answer likely involves root architecture, growth rate, and the metabolic demands of producing large, showy blooms. Flower production requires substantial nutrient uptake, and the biochemical pathways that pull in essential micronutrients like zinc can’t always distinguish between zinc and chemically similar toxic metals like cadmium. In a sense, the flower’s own ambition works against it – and in our favor as monitors.

Which flowers tell us the most – and what they’re detecting

A pattern emerges across the phytoremediation and biomonitoring literature: certain flowering species keep showing up as strong accumulators across different studies and geographies. Here’s a practical breakdown.

Hollyhock (Alcea rosea)

This tall, old-fashioned garden flower is a cadmium and zinc accumulator of surprising efficiency. It’s widely planted in American cities for its low-maintenance appeal and drought tolerance. Its large leaf surface area also captures airborne particulate matter containing metals from vehicle exhaust and industrial emissions. For community-level monitoring, hollyhock is almost ideal – it’s recognizable, common, and thrives in disturbed urban soils.

Sunflower (Helianthus annuus)

Already well-known in phytoremediation circles, sunflowers accumulate lead, cadmium, and zinc in both roots and aerial tissues. After the Chernobyl disaster, sunflowers were planted to extract radioactive strontium and cesium from contaminated ponds. In urban settings, their rapid growth cycle (about 70–100 days to maturity) makes them useful for seasonal pollution snapshots. Plant them in spring near a suspected contamination source, harvest the flower heads in late summer, and analyze the tissue. You get a discrete time-stamped pollution record.

Marigold (Tagetes spp.)

Marigolds are planted by the millions across U.S. cities – in parks, school gardens, and commercial landscapes. Research has shown they accumulate lead and cadmium in their roots and, to a lesser extent, in their flowers. They’re annual plants, which means each season gives you a clean baseline. Their ubiquity is the real advantage: you can collect samples from dozens of sites within a single metro area without needing to plant anything yourself.

Clover (Trifolium pratense)

Red clover technically flowers, and its blooms are part of the tissue often analyzed. Studies show it’s particularly good at translocating copper and zinc from roots to shoots (translocation factors above 2.5), making the above-ground parts – flowers included – representative of what’s in the soil below.

How flowers respond to metal stress – visible and invisible clues

Here’s where things get interesting for anyone without access to a chemistry lab. Flowers don’t just accumulate metals silently. They often show physiological signs of stress that you can observe with the naked eye – or with simple measurements.

Chlorosis and necrosis. Excess heavy metals interfere with chlorophyll production. You’ll see yellowing leaves (chlorosis) or brown, dead patches (necrosis), especially in species exposed to high cadmium or lead levels. If marigolds in one city park look healthy and marigolds three blocks from a highway show persistent yellowing despite adequate watering, that’s a data point.

Stunted growth and reduced flowering. Metal toxicity diverts energy from reproduction to stress response. Plants in contaminated sites often produce fewer, smaller blooms. A 2024 study tracking physiological responses in bioindicator plants found elevated hydrogen peroxide levels in roots and leaves – a marker of oxidative stress – along with reduced chlorophyll content and lower relative water content across all tested species.

Petal color changes. This is more anecdotal and species-dependent, but some researchers have noted subtle shifts in flower pigmentation when metal stress alters anthocyanin and carotenoid pathways. It’s not yet reliable enough for quantitative monitoring, but it’s a frontier worth watching.

The key point: even before you send tissue samples to a lab, flowers give visual feedback about environmental quality. That makes them accessible indicators for citizen science programs, school projects, and community advocacy efforts.

Putting it into practice – a citizen science approach

You don’t need a PhD to use flowers as pollution scouts. Here’s a straightforward approach that community groups across the U.S. have adapted for local monitoring:

1. Select 3–5 sites with different expected pollution levels – near a highway, beside an industrial zone, in a residential neighborhood, and in a park or rural reference area
2. Plant the same species at each site (sunflowers or marigolds work well) using identical soil mix in raised beds or containers to isolate airborne deposition from soil contamination
3. Grow for a full season, documenting visual health – leaf color, growth height, flower count, any abnormalities
4. Harvest and dry tissue samples (leaves and flower heads), then send them to a university extension lab or commercial soil-testing facility that offers plant tissue analysis for metals
5. Compare concentrations across sites – the differences tell the story

The cost of plant tissue analysis typically runs $25–$50 per sample at university labs, making this approach dramatically cheaper than deploying electronic air quality monitors. And the data, while less precise than continuous sensor readings, captures cumulative exposure over weeks or months – something point-in-time air samples miss entirely.

What competitors miss – flowers vs. mosses and the seasonal advantage

Much of the existing literature argues that mosses are superior bioindicators because they lack root systems and cuticles, making them efficient at absorbing metals directly from the atmosphere. A study comparing mosses with vascular plant leaves in urban China confirmed that mosses generally showed higher contamination factors for metals like chromium, copper, and zinc.

That’s a valid finding – for atmospheric deposition monitoring. But it misses a crucial distinction. Flowering plants sample both soil and air pathways simultaneously. Their roots pull metals from contaminated ground while their leaves and petals capture airborne particulates. This dual-pathway sampling gives you a more complete picture of total environmental contamination, which is arguably more relevant for human health risk assessment – because people are exposed to both soil dust and air particles.

Flowers also offer a seasonal resolution that mosses can’t match. An annual flower planted in April and harvested in September gives you a five-month integrated pollution sample with a clear time window. Mosses accumulate metals continuously over years, making it harder to pinpoint when contamination events occurred.

And let’s be honest about a practical reality: mosses are harder to find, identify, and collect in many American cities – especially in arid Western states. Flowers are everywhere. They’re already growing in your garden, your neighbor’s yard, and every municipal park from Portland to Miami.

Where this matters most – U.S. urban pollution hotspots

Heavy metal contamination isn’t evenly distributed across American cities. Some areas carry legacy pollution from decades of industrial activity, leaded gasoline use, or mining operations. Consider these contexts:

• Former Superfund sites in cities like Newark, NJ, or East Chicago, IN, where lead and cadmium persist in soils long after cleanup
• Highway corridors – soil within 50 meters of major interstates often contains elevated lead from decades of leaded fuel exhaust, plus ongoing platinum group metals from catalytic converters
• Older residential neighborhoods where lead paint dust has settled into garden soils over generations
• Urban areas near ports and rail yards with diesel particulate matter and associated metal contamination

In all these settings, flowers already growing on-site serve as unintentional monitors. And intentionally planted sentinel flowers can fill monitoring gaps where no government sensors exist – which, frankly, describes most residential neighborhoods in America.

What your garden flowers might be telling you

This isn’t about inducing panic over your backyard sunflowers. Background levels of heavy metals exist everywhere, and most urban flower gardens won’t show dangerous concentrations. But the science is clear that flowering plants accumulate and reflect the metal burdens of their environment with surprising fidelity.

If you’re curious about the pollution profile of your neighborhood – or if you’re involved in community health, urban planning, or environmental education – flowers offer an accessible, affordable, and scientifically grounded starting point. They’re not a replacement for professional environmental assessment, but they’re a powerful complement to it.

For a deeper look at how environmental science intersects with community advocacy and public health policy, Counterview covers critical perspectives that mainstream outlets often overlook. It’s worth exploring if these topics resonate with you.

In the meantime, the next time you pass a flower bed in a city park, consider what those petals might know about the air you’re breathing and the soil beneath your feet. The data is already there – growing quietly in plain sight.