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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 10 NOVEMBER 2026

Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 12:07

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 10 NOVEMBER 2026

Archive reference: SLF-2007-114

The Sakhalin Papers CIV: The Half-Million-Tonne Question — Sakhalin’s Forgotten Gas-Chemical Ambition A 1997 agreement envisaged supplying Sakhalin with at least 500,000 tonnes of light hydrocarbon fractions annually, beginning in 2005. Shell’s engineers subsequently designed sophisticated gas-processing facilities, but the documented commercial system directed recovered condensate towards oil exports. Nearly thirty years after the original agreement, Sakhalin’s authorities are still discussing major new gas-chemical and condensate-processing industries. Original contractual material, Shell technical publications, operating-company records and contemporary Russian government reporting reveal what was envisaged, what was actually constructed and what remains unproven.

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, using contemporaneous technical material authored by Shell personnel, published contractual records, original project-contractor documentation, Sakhalin Energy operating-company disclosures, Russian regional government statements and independent reporting.

Publication date: 10 November 2026

Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia

Previous instalment: SLF-2007-113 — The Sakhalin Gas Promise: What the Island Was Supposed to Receive, and Why Moscow Looked Elsewhere

INTRODUCTION: THE OTHER PROMISE BENEATH SAKHALIN

In April 1997, the Russian federal government and the administration of Sakhalin Oblast agreed upon arrangements for distributing benefits from the enormous offshore oil and gas development known as Sakhalin II.

The agreement addressed revenues, taxation, royalties and the Russian state’s share of production.

It also contained provisions concerning supplies of natural gas for the island’s domestic needs.

Yesterday’s Sakhalin Papers investigation examined those gas-supply expectations.

But the document included another provision that deserves independent scrutiny.

Beginning in 2005, Sakhalin was to receive no less than 500,000 tonnes annually of a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons.

The same section explicitly contemplated construction of a gas-chemical complex.

These provisions suggested an industrial ambition extending beyond the production and export of natural gas.

The island was not merely being considered as a location from which hydrocarbons could be extracted and shipped overseas.

Its authorities also envisaged using some of those resources to support local processing and industrial development.

Nearly thirty years later, the distinction between the original ambition and the infrastructure actually constructed has become particularly revealing.

Sakhalin II became an internationally significant liquefied natural gas development.

Shell’s engineering expertise helped establish Russia’s first major LNG export plant.

The project also incorporated substantial facilities for processing gas, separating hydrocarbon liquids and stabilising condensate.

Those facilities were real.

They operated.

They formed part of an enormous industrial system.

But the publicly documented product flows tell a more complicated story.

An important technical paper published in October 2001 by two Shell Global Solutions specialists explained how hydrocarbons separated during LNG production would be treated.

Some light components would be recovered for use in the refrigeration process.

Others would be returned to the LNG stream.

Stabilised condensate would be directed towards the neighbouring oil export terminal.

The operating company’s current documentation confirms that recovered condensate is mixed with oil for export.

This provides an unusually clear distinction between processing hydrocarbons and developing a separate regional gas-chemical industry.

Meanwhile, in September 2025, Sakhalin officials were still discussing the construction of major gas-processing and gas-chemical facilities.

Their plans extended into the 2030s.

In June 2026, Governor Valery Limarenko indicated that another proposed development — a gas-condensate refinery — would not begin construction until after 2030.

That facility would depend upon resources from the separate Sakhalin III development.

These records do not establish that Shell breached the 1997 agreement.

They do not demonstrate that all the original industrial proposals were abandoned.

But they raise an important documentary question.

What happened to the industrial development envisaged when Moscow and Sakhalin agreed to allocate 500,000 tonnes of light hydrocarbon fractions annually to the region?

The surviving evidence allows the question to be examined without confusing proposals, actual infrastructure and contractual obligations.

PART ONE: THE ORIGINAL 1997 DOCUMENT 1. The agreement that recorded the industrial ambition

The starting point is the agreement dated 3 April 1997 between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Administration of Sakhalin Oblast.

Its purpose was to distribute the Russian side’s revenues and resources arising from the development of the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye fields.

The underlying Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement had been signed on 22 June 1994.

The 1997 document was a separate arrangement between two Russian governmental parties.

An archival reproduction survives on the website of Sakhalin Environment Watch.

The original Russian text is particularly important because it identifies the financial and physical benefits the regional authorities expected from the project.

Section 5 addresses the allocation of natural gas for domestic purposes.

It recognises Sakhalin as a preferred area for domestic supplies.

The provision expressly takes account of the anticipated construction of a gas-chemical complex.

It then identifies minimum quantities of natural gas for regional requirements.

The volumes increase from 2.5 billion cubic metres annually in 2005 to 6.25 billion cubic metres annually in 2015.

But a separate sentence concerns liquid hydrocarbons.

It provides for annual supplies of at least 500,000 tonnes of a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons from 2005.

The distinction is significant.

Natural gas and light hydrocarbon fractions are not interchangeable commodities.

The former can be supplied through pipelines for heating, electricity generation and industrial use.

The latter can serve as feedstock for processing and petrochemical industries.

The document therefore envisaged more than one category of regional hydrocarbon supply.

It suggested the possibility of developing a broader downstream industrial economy.

Primary historical source: Agreement Between the Russian Government and Sakhalin Administration, 3 April 1997 — Sakhalin Environment Watch. Sakhalin Environment Watch

2. What are light hydrocarbon fractions?

The Russian expression used in the agreement is commonly abbreviated as ШФЛУ.

It refers to a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons.

Such material generally comprises a mixture of hydrocarbons that can be separated from natural gas during processing.

Depending upon its composition, it may contain ethane, propane, butanes and heavier components.

Further processing can separate these materials into commercially useful products.

Propane and butanes may be marketed as liquefied petroleum gas.

Ethane can serve as feedstock for ethylene production.

Other light hydrocarbons can be used in chemical manufacturing or fuel-related processes.

A broad hydrocarbon fraction therefore represents potential industrial feedstock.

But its commercial value depends upon several factors.

The material must be produced in a suitable form.

Its composition must be known.

Appropriate processing and transportation facilities must exist.

And there must be commercial customers or industrial users.

A region receiving a large annual supply of such material might develop petrochemical or other downstream activities.

But the availability of feedstock does not automatically create a viable manufacturing industry.

A separate investment programme may be required.

That distinction becomes central to interpreting the 1997 agreement.

The agreement identified an anticipated supply of raw material. It did not, in the reproduced passage examined, provide a complete financed construction plan for a particular petrochemical plant.

3. The half-million-tonne figure was substantial

The quantity envisaged was considerable.

Five hundred thousand tonnes annually represents half a million metric tonnes of hydrocarbon material every year.

If the intended supplies had commenced in 2005 and continued at that level, they could have supported a significant industrial operation.

But there is a critical limitation.

The figure in the agreement does not identify the precise composition of the hydrocarbon mixture.

It does not specify the final products that a proposed gas-chemical complex would manufacture.

Nor does it disclose the investment cost, commercial ownership or planned location of such a complex.

Those matters cannot be reconstructed by assumption.

A light-hydrocarbon supply obligation is not equivalent to a requirement to build a polypropylene plant, an ethylene plant or any other specified facility.

Such conclusions would require additional documentation.

The original figure nevertheless demonstrates that the regional authorities were contemplating substantial volumes of material beyond natural gas supplied for ordinary consumption.

The intended benefit was industrial as well as fiscal.

That makes the subsequent development of the project worth examining closely.

4. The qualification that prevents a simple allegation of breach

Section 5 of the reproduced agreement includes an important qualification.

It provides that the dates and quantities may be changed by agreement between the parties, depending upon the commencement of work and the achievement of relevant hydrocarbon production levels.

This provision must be considered alongside the original numerical targets.

It means that the 2005 date cannot automatically be interpreted as an unconditional deadline.

Nor can the annual quantity be treated as legally immutable.

The federal and regional authorities anticipated the possibility of adjustments.

The surviving public reproduction does not establish whether those adjustments were subsequently made.

It also does not reproduce every provision of the original 1994 production-sharing agreement governing the Russian state’s entitlement to particular hydrocarbon products.

Therefore, the evidence does not establish that Shell was personally or directly bound to supply the entire 500,000 tonnes to a specified regional chemical plant by 2005.

The 1997 document governed the relationship between Russian public authorities.

Its obligations must be distinguished from those imposed upon Sakhalin Energy under the original production-sharing agreement.

That distinction is essential.

The document establishes an industrial aspiration incorporated into a governmental agreement. It does not, without the complete contractual record, establish a breach by Shell or Sakhalin Energy.

PART TWO: WHAT SHELL ACTUALLY DESIGNED 5. October 2001: Shell engineers publish the technical design

One of the most useful contemporaneous documents appeared in Oil & Gas Journal on 1 October 2001.

Its title was:

Unusual Design Considerations Drive Selection of Sakhalin LNG Plant Facilities.

The paper was written by Wim Dam and Siew-mung Ho.

Both were associated with Shell Global Solutions International.

Dam was a principal technologist in Shell’s LNG and gas-processing group in The Hague.

Ho had been seconded to Shell Global Solutions in 1999.

The authors described the engineering arrangements being developed for Sakhalin II’s second phase.

Their paper provides unusually detailed evidence of Shell’s original technical intentions.

The proposed LNG plant would comprise two production trains.

Each would have a design capacity of 4.8 million tonnes annually.

The combined capacity would therefore be 9.6 million tonnes per year.

The project would use Shell’s Double Mixed Refrigerant technology.

That technology was selected partly because of Sakhalin’s demanding climate.

The process needed to operate efficiently across substantial seasonal temperature variations.

But the most important part of the paper for this investigation concerns the treatment of natural gas liquids.

The authors described an integrated fractionation system.

It would separate hydrocarbon components from the gas entering the liquefaction process.

Those components would then be handled according to the requirements of the LNG plant.

This is direct technical evidence from Shell personnel concerning the design of facilities intended for the project.

It is more valuable than a retrospective general description because it records the engineering approach while the development was still being planned.

Contemporaneous Shell-authored technical source: Oil & Gas Journal — Unusual Design Considerations Drive Selection of Sakhalin LNG Plant Facilities, 1 October 2001. Oil & Gas Journal

6. The fractionation system was real — but its purpose matters

The technical paper describes a sequence of processing units.

The fractionation system included equipment for separating methane, ethane, propane and butane-related fractions.

Some recovered components were required for refrigeration.

The LNG plant depended upon carefully controlled refrigerant mixtures to cool natural gas to liquefaction temperatures.

Other light hydrocarbon components were returned to the LNG stream.

Heavier material was stabilised.

The paper explains that the resulting condensate would be routed towards the adjacent oil export terminal.

This is the central technical distinction.

The fractionation system was not merely an imaginary proposal.

It formed part of the engineering design for the LNG plant.

But the published design did not describe a separate regional petrochemical complex receiving 500,000 tonnes annually of the broad hydrocarbon fraction envisaged in the 1997 agreement.

The process described by Shell was integrated with LNG production and oil exports.

Its immediate objectives included gas conditioning, refrigerant recovery and condensate stabilisation.

Those are essential activities in a major LNG development.

They are not necessarily equivalent to manufacturing petrochemicals for regional industries.

The distinction is not semantic.

It concerns the physical destination and commercial use of the recovered material.

A project can include a sophisticated fractionation facility while directing the resulting products towards export rather than a separate local manufacturing industry.

The 2001 engineering paper demonstrates that such an export-oriented arrangement was contemplated.

It does not establish that every possible alternative industrial arrangement was permanently excluded.

7. Why the design was commercially understandable

The Sakhalin II project required substantial capital expenditure.

The development involved offshore platforms, pipelines, an onshore processing facility, liquefaction trains and marine export infrastructure.

The project was intended to produce LNG for international customers.

The associated oil and condensate streams would also be marketed.

An integrated design offered practical advantages.

Hydrocarbon components recovered during gas treatment could be used within the liquefaction process.

Stabilised condensate could be transported through the project’s existing export infrastructure.

That could avoid the need for a separate downstream processing and distribution system.

These considerations are commercially understandable.

They do not establish that the design was the only economically viable option.

Nor do they prove that a regional gas-chemical complex would necessarily have been uneconomic.

Such a comparison would require a feasibility study covering feedstock composition, capital costs, markets, infrastructure and competing investment alternatives.

No complete feasibility study for the originally envisaged regional gas-chemical complex has been authenticated for this instalment.

The available evidence therefore explains the system Shell designed.

It does not establish why every alternative proposal was accepted or rejected.

PART THREE: WHAT WAS ACTUALLY CONSTRUCTED 8. The onshore processing facility became operational

The project moved from engineering design to construction.

One of the principal contractors was ENKA, working in a joint venture with Bechtel.

ENKA’s own project record identifies the contract for Sakhalin II’s onshore processing facility.

It states that the joint venture received the relevant contract in May 2003.

The facility was designed to process gas, condensate and oil arriving from the offshore fields.

ENKA describes a processing capacity of approximately 51 million cubic metres of gas per day.

It also identifies substantial condensate and oil-processing capacity.

According to the contractor, the first phase was completed in 2006.

The second phase, involving additional work and modifications, was commissioned in 2008.

These are not merely prospective construction plans.

They are statements by a principal contractor concerning facilities it helped construct.

They establish that substantial gas-processing infrastructure was delivered.

But the contractor’s description also identifies the principal purpose of the installation.

The processed gas and liquids were transported towards the LNG plant and oil export facilities in southern Sakhalin.

The onshore processing facility was therefore an essential component of the integrated export development.

The record does not identify it as the separate gas-chemical complex contemplated in the regional industrial-development ambitions of 1997.

Source: ENKA — Sakhalin Projects, Original Contractor Project Record. ENKA İnşaat ve Sanayi A.Ş.

9. The operator confirms condensate processing

The current Sakhalin Energy website provides further evidence.

The company describes the onshore processing facility near the landfall of the pipeline from the Lunskoye platform.

The installation includes equipment for gas processing and compression.

It also includes condensate stabilisation units.

The operator identifies a daily design capacity exceeding 7,200 tonnes of condensate.

That figure demonstrates the scale of the processing infrastructure.

But it is a design-capacity figure.

It does not establish how much material was actually processed during a particular year.

Nor does it establish that an equivalent quantity was supplied to regional chemical manufacturers.

The same operating-company page describes the role of Booster Station 1.

The station combines stabilised condensate with processed oil from the offshore platforms.

Its purpose includes transporting the resulting hydrocarbon mixture towards the Prigorodnoye production complex.

The material is therefore integrated into the project’s oil and condensate export system.

This is important evidence because it describes operating infrastructure rather than only the original engineering design.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — Onshore Processing Facility, Official Technical Description. Sakhalin Energy

10. The decisive evidence: Where the condensate goes

The strongest operational evidence appears on Sakhalin Energy’s official page describing the Prigorodnoye production complex.

The complex includes the LNG plant and oil export terminal.

Its oil-handling system receives production from the offshore fields through the Trans-Sakhalin pipelines.

The operator explains that the oil is mixed with condensate recovered through gas fractionation.

The resulting mixture is then transferred to storage and loaded onto tankers.

This establishes an important physical destination.

Condensate recovered through the project’s gas fractionation system forms part of the oil and condensate export stream.

That is not speculation about Shell’s commercial intentions.

It is the operating company’s own description of the production system.

The finding is also consistent with the engineering arrangement described by Shell’s technical specialists in 2001.

The original design contemplated stabilised condensate being routed towards the oil export terminal.

The operating company’s current description confirms that condensate from gas fractionation is incorporated into the exported hydrocarbon mixture.

The two records are unusually consistent.

One describes the engineering plan.

The other describes the operating system.

But an important qualification remains.

The condensate incorporated into the export stream is not automatically identical in composition, quantity or contractual classification to the broad fraction of light hydrocarbons identified in the 1997 agreement.

The 1997 provision referred to a specific category of regional hydrocarbon supply.

The operating company’s description concerns material handled by the export system.

Establishing whether they were legally or chemically interchangeable would require more detailed product specifications and contractual documentation.

Nevertheless, the operating record does not demonstrate that the originally envisaged 500,000 tonnes were being delivered to a separate regional gas-chemical complex.

That remains an unanswered question.

Primary operating-company evidence: Sakhalin Energy — Prigorodnoye Production Complex, Official Asset Description. Sakhalin Energy

PART FOUR: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPORT BUSINESS 11. February 2009: The LNG plant begins operation

Sakhalin II became Russia’s first major LNG export development.

The plant at Prigorodnoye was inaugurated in February 2009.

Its original design capacity was 9.6 million tonnes of LNG annually.

The project subsequently increased production through operational improvements.

Its commercial orientation was towards international energy markets.

Long-term LNG contracts supported the development.

The project’s customers were principally located in the Asia-Pacific region.

This was a major achievement for Shell and its partners.

The development required substantial engineering expertise and investment.

It also generated employment, procurement opportunities and public revenues.

Those achievements should be recognised.

But they do not resolve the separate question concerning the original regional industrial ambitions.

An LNG export facility produces a different commercial result from a gas-chemical complex manufacturing downstream products.

Both involve processing natural gas.

Both may use sophisticated equipment.

Both may generate substantial economic benefits.

But the products, customers and industrial relationships differ.

The fact that Sakhalin II successfully produced LNG does not establish that a proposed separate gas-chemical industry was also created.

That distinction is central to assessing what was envisaged in 1997.

12. The export system remains important in 2026

The operating company’s current records demonstrate that Sakhalin II remains an important LNG and oil producer.

Its description of the project identifies the offshore platforms, pipeline system, processing facilities, LNG plant and export terminal.

For 2025, the company reported that Sakhalin LNG accounted for approximately 2.4% of global LNG demand.

It also reported substantial continuing sales into Asia-Pacific markets.

The project’s oil export product, Sakhalin Blend, incorporates oil and gas condensate.

These statements confirm the continuing economic significance of the integrated development.

But they also illustrate what the operator publicly identifies as the principal products.

LNG is marketed internationally.

Oil and condensate are blended and exported.

Natural gas is also delivered through arrangements supporting domestic consumption.

The official infrastructure description does not identify a completed separate regional gas-chemical complex fulfilling the particular 1997 half-million-tonne provision.

That absence is significant but must be interpreted carefully.

A corporate infrastructure summary is not necessarily a comprehensive inventory of every downstream facility operated by another company.

Nor is it an audit of every historical obligation.

It cannot conclusively establish that no relevant processing operation existed elsewhere on Sakhalin.

The defensible conclusion is that the documented Sakhalin II operating infrastructure does not itself demonstrate fulfilment of the original regional gas-chemical ambition.

Source: Sakhalin Energy — General Information and Current Project Infrastructure. Sakhalin Energy

PART FIVE: THE INDUSTRIAL AMBITION RETURNS 13. September 2025: Sakhalin again discusses major gas-processing industries

The contemporary record becomes particularly interesting in September 2025.

During the international Far Eastern Energy Forum, officials from Sakhalin Oblast discussed plans for new industrial facilities.

On 25 September 2025, regional publication Sakh.online reported statements by Timur Rizvanov, a deputy minister responsible for investment, industry and external relations.

The proposed developments included major gas-processing and gas-chemical facilities.

Other projects under consideration included production of hydrogen, ammonia and additional industrial products.

The regional authorities linked these ambitions to future development of the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye gas-condensate field.

That field forms part of Sakhalin III.

The development was not presented as an immediate completed project.

Regional officials discussed the possibility of major processing facilities becoming operational in the 2030s.

The report also explained the importance of identifying viable markets and processing capacities.

This is valuable contemporary evidence.

Nearly three decades after the 1997 agreement, regional officials were still discussing substantial new downstream hydrocarbon industries.

The original and later projects cannot automatically be described as identical.

The available documentation does not establish a continuous development programme extending directly from the 1997 gas-chemical proposal to the projects discussed in 2025.

The resource bases also differ.

But the broad economic ambition is recognisable.

Sakhalin continues seeking ways to convert offshore hydrocarbon resources into local industrial activity beyond the established export business.

Contemporaneous source: Sakh.online — Major Gas-Processing Plants Not Expected Before 2033, 25 September 2025. Sakh

14. The proposed facilities are not evidence that the original plant was built

The 2025 announcements require careful interpretation.

A proposal to construct a new gas-chemical complex does not establish that an earlier project failed.

A region can develop several gas-processing facilities over time.

Different plants can serve different customers.

New projects may use technologies unavailable when earlier facilities were planned.

But the continued discussion of major processing facilities demonstrates that significant downstream industrial development remains an active policy objective.

The original 1997 agreement already contemplated the possibility of using hydrocarbon resources for regional industrial purposes.

The 2025 proposals show that similar ambitions remain relevant.

The documentary gap lies between those dates.

The available records do not establish a complete chronology of the original proposed gas-chemical complex.

They do not identify a verified final investment decision for that specific 1997 proposal.

They do not establish that the contemplated plant began commercial production.

And they do not provide authenticated annual delivery records demonstrating that the particular 500,000-tonne commitment was fulfilled.

That does not justify a definitive claim that the original project never progressed beyond an idea.

It justifies identifying the absence of the necessary proof.

For a documentary investigation, that distinction is important.

PART SIX: THE NEW SAKHALIN REFINERY PROPOSAL 15. February 2026: A proposed 100-billion-rouble development

Another significant announcement followed in February 2026.

Regional reporting described plans for a major gas-condensate processing facility on Sakhalin.

On 12 February, EastRussia reported information attributed to the Sakhalin regional government’s press service.

The proposed investment was approximately 100 billion roubles.

The facility was expected to process substantial quantities of gas condensate.

Its products would include aviation kerosene, diesel fuel, marine fuel and naphtha.

The aim was to support regional fuel requirements and potentially establish feedstock supplies for further industrial activities.

This was a different project from the 1997 gas-chemical ambition.

It involved a proposed refinery using gas condensate associated with Sakhalin III.

The original 1997 provision concerned supplies of light hydrocarbon fractions associated with the Sakhalin II arrangements.

Those distinctions should not be blurred.

Nevertheless, the proposed refinery illustrates the continuing regional interest in processing hydrocarbons locally.

Rather than relying entirely upon external supplies of refined petroleum products, Sakhalin’s authorities were considering a substantial new manufacturing facility.

The original February reporting contemplated construction beginning in 2028 if an investment decision was reached.

That was a conditional timetable.

It was subsequently revised.

Source: EastRussia — Sakhalin Condensate Refinery Estimated at Approximately 100 Billion Roubles, 12 February 2026. Eastrussia

16. June 2026: The timetable moves beyond 2030

On 27 June 2026, RBC reported further comments by Governor Valery Limarenko.

The governor stated that the proposed hydrocarbon-processing plant would be constructed after 2030.

He explained that the development depended upon the commissioning of production facilities at the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field.

The anticipated initial production period was 2028–2029.

According to his explanation, the composition of the produced hydrocarbons would need to be established through further analysis.

Only then could detailed engineering design proceed.

The governor indicated that design work would begin around 2029.

Construction was expected during the 2030s.

This was a significant qualification to the earlier anticipated timetable.

The reporting shows that the project remained prospective.

It also identifies a practical reason for the delay.

The processing facility’s design depended upon the quantity and composition of the feedstock expected from the associated field.

This is a conventional but important consideration in downstream petroleum investment.

Industrial facilities cannot be designed reliably without adequate knowledge of the raw materials they will process.

The June 2026 statement therefore provides useful evidence of the project’s actual status.

It was not an operating refinery.

It remained a proposed development requiring further production data, engineering and investment decisions.

Source: RBC — Governor Limarenko Says Sakhalin Refinery Construction Is Planned After 2030, 27 June 2026. РБК

PART SEVEN: THREE DIFFERENT INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS 17. The original proposal, the operating export system and the new plans

The evidence now permits three distinct categories to be identified.

The first is the 1997 regional industrial ambition.

The federal-regional agreement contemplated substantial supplies of natural gas and a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons for Sakhalin.

It referred expressly to the anticipated construction of a gas-chemical complex.

The surviving document records the planned quantities and dates, subject to amendment.

It does not provide a complete construction and financing history.

The second is the Sakhalin II system actually constructed.

Shell’s engineers described an integrated LNG plant incorporating gas treatment, liquefaction and fractionation facilities.

The contractor record confirms construction of the onshore processing facility.

Sakhalin Energy’s current documentation confirms that condensate is processed, stabilised and incorporated into the oil export stream.

These are established operating facilities.

They should not be dismissed merely because they do not demonstrate the existence of the originally envisaged separate gas-chemical complex.

The third is the later regional industrial-development programme.

Sakhalin’s authorities have discussed additional gas-processing, gas-chemical and condensate-refining facilities.

Some of these plans depend upon Sakhalin III.

Their proposed completion dates extend into the 2030s.

They remain distinct from the original Sakhalin II arrangements.

The three categories overlap in their broader economic purpose.

But they are not interchangeable.

That distinction prevents an industrial-development aspiration from being treated as proof of a completed facility.

It also prevents the existence of major operating gas infrastructure from being wrongly dismissed as evidence of no regional economic development.

18. What became of the original feedstock?

This is the central unanswered question.

The 1997 document identified at least 500,000 tonnes annually of a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons.

The technical and operating records establish that Sakhalin II processes substantial quantities of gas and condensate.

But the records examined do not provide a direct reconciliation between the original contractual category and the actual annual disposition of the relevant hydrocarbon fractions.

Several questions remain open.

What precise chemical composition was intended in 1997?

Was the specified material to be supplied directly from Sakhalin II facilities or through subsequent processing arrangements?

Which Russian governmental party was responsible for arranging onward delivery?

Did the parties amend the quantity or commencement date?

Was any portion of the material delivered to regional industrial consumers?

If so, to which facilities?

What annual volumes were supplied?

And did any part of the original programme become incorporated into a different industrial or commercial arrangement?

These questions cannot be answered by examining LNG production figures alone.

Nor can they be resolved merely by examining the total quantity of exported Sakhalin Blend.

The physical and contractual categories differ.

A reliable answer requires source-specific records.

Those would include the executed production-sharing agreement, the federal-regional agreement and amendments, product specifications, production-accounting statements and records of deliveries to the Russian side.

Until those records are obtained, the fate of the particular half-million-tonne provision remains unverified.

EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 19. The difference between extracting resources and developing an industry

The broader economic issue is familiar in resource-producing regions.

Major oil and gas developments can generate substantial export revenues.

They can also create employment, support contractors and provide public income through taxation and royalties.

Those benefits are important.

But resource extraction does not automatically establish a diversified local manufacturing economy.

A region may export raw or partly processed hydrocarbons while importing manufactured products derived from similar materials.

Creating local processing industries requires additional investment.

It requires infrastructure, technical expertise and markets.

It also requires reliable access to feedstock under commercially workable arrangements.

The 1997 Sakhalin agreement appears to have recognised that opportunity.

Its reference to a gas-chemical complex suggests that regional authorities were looking beyond the immediate revenue generated by offshore production.

The specified supply of light hydrocarbon fractions potentially provided part of the required industrial foundation.

But the later technical documentation establishes that the principal Sakhalin II development was designed around an integrated LNG and oil export system.

That difference is not automatically evidence of wrongdoing.

The original industrial ambition may have encountered commercial, technological or financial difficulties.

The regional authorities may have revised their plans.

The relevant parties may have agreed alternative arrangements.

The documents examined do not establish which explanation is correct.

The important point is that the industrial ambition and the completed export system should be evaluated separately.

20. Shell’s responsibility must be assessed against the actual contracts

Shell played a central role in Sakhalin II’s development.

By the early 2000s, it held a controlling interest in Sakhalin Energy.

Its engineers helped design the LNG facilities.

The company’s expertise was important to the project’s eventual commercial success.

But that participation does not mean Shell was personally responsible for implementing every industrial objective discussed between Russian federal and regional authorities.

The 1997 document was an agreement between two Russian governmental parties.

The original production-sharing agreement established the obligations of Sakhalin Energy and the Russian side.

Those contractual arrangements must be distinguished.

Without examining the relevant provisions together, it would be inappropriate to conclude that Shell was required to finance or construct the particular gas-chemical complex mentioned in the 1997 text.

It would also be inappropriate to conclude that Shell was entitled to ignore any applicable obligations.

The correct position is that the specific contractual responsibilities remain to be established.

The current evidence supports scrutiny of the original industrial promises and their subsequent implementation.

It does not support an allegation of contractual breach by Shell.

21. The engineering record is more informative than speculation

The 2001 technical paper is particularly valuable because it explains how Shell intended the LNG plant to operate.

It describes actual processing arrangements.

It identifies the function of the fractionation system.

It explains the use of recovered hydrocarbon components within the liquefaction process.

And it describes the route by which stabilised condensate would reach the oil export terminal.

The current operating-company documentation provides a corresponding account of the completed infrastructure.

This combination of records is stronger than a retrospective allegation unsupported by technical evidence.

It demonstrates that recovered hydrocarbons were integrated into the export production system.

The records do not establish that the particular 1997 regional feedstock allocation was satisfied through that arrangement.

But they provide an important basis for asking where the relevant material ultimately went.

That is the appropriate documentary question.

It is more precise than alleging that Shell simply took everything abroad.

And it is more informative than assuming that any fractionation facility automatically fulfilled the original regional gas-chemical ambition.

22. Nearly thirty years later, the ambition remains recognisable

The 2025 and 2026 announcements introduce an important historical comparison.

Sakhalin’s current authorities continue to consider downstream industrial developments based upon the region’s hydrocarbon resources.

The proposed facilities include gas-processing and refining operations.

They are expected to support regional economic development and provide products for local consumption or further manufacturing.

These objectives resemble the broad industrial ambitions contemplated in 1997.

But the similarities should not obscure important differences.

The proposed resource base is often Sakhalin III rather than Sakhalin II.

The intended products are not necessarily the same.

The commercial circumstances have changed.

The technologies and markets are different.

The proposed projects are therefore not automatically continuations of an uncompleted 1997 programme.

Nevertheless, the repetition of the underlying economic objective is striking.

The island has spent decades participating in major offshore hydrocarbon developments.

It has become internationally important as an LNG producer.

Yet the development of additional local processing industries remains a subject of future planning.

That is a legitimate matter for documentary scrutiny.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

The available evidence supports the following conclusions.

First, the published reproduction of the agreement dated 3 April 1997 contemplated supplying Sakhalin Oblast with substantial quantities of natural gas and light hydrocarbon fractions.

Second, the document identified a minimum annual quantity of 500,000 tonnes of a broad fraction of light hydrocarbons beginning in 2005.

Third, the same section expressly referred to anticipated construction of a gas-chemical complex.

Fourth, the agreement permitted changes to specified dates and quantities by agreement between the Russian governmental parties, depending upon project progress and production levels.

Fifth, an authenticated technical paper published in October 2001 by Shell Global Solutions personnel described the planned Sakhalin LNG plant and its hydrocarbon fractionation system.

Sixth, the technical design contemplated recovering components for use in refrigeration, returning some hydrocarbons to the LNG stream and routing stabilised condensate towards the oil export terminal.

Seventh, contractor ENKA records the construction and commissioning of substantial onshore gas-processing infrastructure during the development of Sakhalin II.

Eighth, the current Sakhalin Energy operating-company records confirm the presence of gas-processing, condensate-stabilisation and fractionation facilities.

Ninth, the operator expressly describes condensate from gas fractionation being mixed with oil for export through the Prigorodnoye complex.

Tenth, the documented export-processing arrangements do not, by themselves, establish that the original 500,000-tonne regional feedstock provision was fulfilled.

Eleventh, Sakhalin officials discussed substantial new gas-processing and gas-chemical developments in September 2025.

Twelfth, those later plans included prospective facilities associated with the separate Sakhalin III resource base.

Thirteenth, regional reporting in February and June 2026 identified a proposed gas-condensate refinery whose construction was expected after 2030 according to the governor’s later timetable.

Fourteenth, the later projects cannot automatically be treated as either fulfilment or continuation of the original 1997 industrial proposal.

Fifteenth, no authenticated delivery records establishing the annual supply of the particular 500,000-tonne quantity to regional industrial consumers have been identified in the documents examined.

Sixteenth, the available evidence does not establish that Shell or Sakhalin Energy breached a contractual obligation concerning the proposed gas-chemical complex.

These conclusions distinguish original contractual provisions, engineering intentions, completed infrastructure, current operating arrangements and future industrial plans.

CONCLUSION: THE INDUSTRIAL AMBITION THAT SURVIVED THE DECADES

The Sakhalin II development transformed Russia’s position in international LNG markets.

Shell helped design and develop an industrial system of exceptional scale.

Offshore platforms produced oil and gas.

Pipelines transported those resources across Sakhalin.

Onshore facilities treated the production streams.

The LNG plant liquefied natural gas for international customers.

Condensate was processed and incorporated into the oil export system.

The resulting development became one of the most significant energy projects in Russia’s Far East.

Those achievements are established.

But the original federal-regional agreement envisaged benefits that extended beyond the export operation.

Its provisions concerning natural gas and light hydrocarbon fractions reflected an ambition to use Sakhalin’s resources for regional economic development.

The half-million-tonne provision is particularly revealing.

It identified a substantial quantity of potential industrial feedstock.

The accompanying reference to a gas-chemical complex placed that quantity within a broader development vision.

The subsequent engineering records show what Shell designed.

The contractor records show what was built.

The operating-company documentation explains where recovered condensate goes.

And the contemporary regional announcements show that major additional processing industries remain under consideration.

The records do not establish a simple narrative of betrayal.

They do not show that Shell was legally required to construct a particular petrochemical plant and deliberately failed to do so.

They do not demonstrate that the original 500,000 tonnes were unlawfully withheld.

Nor do they establish that every industrial objective recorded in 1997 was abandoned.

What they reveal is a more complicated distinction.

Sakhalin II successfully developed an internationally important LNG and hydrocarbon export system. The separate ambition of creating a substantial regional gas-chemical industry remains incompletely documented and cannot be treated as fulfilled merely because the export facilities were constructed.

The outstanding evidence matters.

The original agreements and amendments could clarify the applicable obligations.

Production records could establish the relevant quantities.

Delivery documents could identify the recipients.

And historical investment decisions could explain whether the contemplated industrial complex was revised, postponed, replaced or abandoned.

Until those records are available, the half-million-tonne question remains open.

Nearly thirty years after the original agreement, Sakhalin’s authorities are again discussing major gas-processing facilities.

The proposed developments involve different resources and different commercial circumstances.

But they reflect a familiar aspiration.

The island should not merely produce hydrocarbons.

It should also obtain lasting industrial benefits from processing them.

That was part of the economic vision recorded in 1997.

It remains relevant in 2026.

The offshore resources were developed. The export industry was built. The unresolved documentary question is what became of the separate industrial benefits originally envisaged for Sakhalin itself.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

1. Russian Government and Sakhalin Oblast — 3 April 1997

Archival reproduction of the federal-regional agreement governing the distribution of revenues and resources from Sakhalin II.

Section 5 records the anticipated natural gas supplies, the reference to a gas-chemical complex and the proposed annual supply of 500,000 tonnes of light hydrocarbon fractions.

Read the Original Russian Agreement — Sakhalin Environment Watch

2. Shell Global Solutions Personnel — 1 October 2001

Wim Dam and Siew-mung Ho, Unusual Design Considerations Drive Selection of Sakhalin LNG Plant Facilities.

Published in Oil & Gas Journal.

The paper describes the planned LNG plant, Shell’s liquefaction technology, gas treatment, natural gas liquids fractionation and the destination of stabilised condensate.

Read the Original Technical Paper

3. Vedomosti — 15 June 2001

Interview with Shell Exploration & Production Services executive Rein Tambuzer concerning the development of Sakhalin II.

The interview discusses the project’s investment requirements, gas markets, Russian participation and contractual arrangements.

Vedomosti — Investors Must Choose for Themselves Whom to Work With

4. ENKA — Sakhalin Projects

Original contractor description of the Sakhalin II onshore processing facility.

Records the construction arrangements, processing capacities and commissioning history.

ENKA — Sakhalin Projects, Contractor Record

5. Sakhalin Energy — Onshore Processing Facility

Official technical description of the facility’s gas-treatment, condensate-stabilisation and compression systems.

Sakhalin Energy — Onshore Processing Facility

6. Sakhalin Energy — Prigorodnoye Production Complex

Official operating-company description of the LNG plant and oil export terminal.

The document expressly describes condensate recovered through gas fractionation being incorporated into the oil export system.

Sakhalin Energy — Prigorodnoye Production Complex

7. Sakhalin Energy — General Project Information

Current operating-company overview identifying Sakhalin II’s production facilities, LNG exports, condensate handling and domestic gas deliveries.

Sakhalin Energy — General Information

8. Sakh.online — 25 September 2025

Contemporaneous reporting of statements by Sakhalin regional officials concerning prospective gas-processing, gas-chemical and other industrial facilities.

Major Gas-Processing Plants Not Expected Before 2033

9. EastRussia — 12 February 2026

Reporting based upon information from the Sakhalin regional government concerning the proposed gas-condensate refinery and its estimated investment requirements.

Sakhalin Refinery Project Estimated at Approximately 100 Billion Roubles

10. RBC — 27 June 2026

Reporting of Governor Limarenko’s explanation that refinery construction was now envisaged after 2030, following further development of the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field.

Governor Limarenko Discusses the Revised Sakhalin Refinery Timetable

11. Donovan–Shell Archive — 9 November 2026

The preceding Sakhalin Papers investigation examining the natural gas-supply expectations recorded in the 1997 agreement and the subsequent arrangements for domestic gasification.

The Shell Leaks Files — 9 November 2026

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This investigation examines the industrial-development provisions contained in the published reproduction of the agreement dated 3 April 1997 between the Russian federal government and the Administration of Sakhalin Oblast.

The investigation also examines contemporaneous Shell technical publications, project-contractor records, Sakhalin Energy operating-company information and reporting concerning subsequent regional industrial-development proposals.

The reproduced 1997 agreement has not been independently compared with a certified executed original and all subsequent amendments.

Its terms are therefore attributed to the surviving archival reproduction.

The provision concerning annual supplies of 500,000 tonnes of light hydrocarbon fractions is not represented as an unconditional obligation imposed directly upon Shell.

The qualification permitting changes to quantities and dates by agreement between the Russian governmental parties is expressly acknowledged.

The original 1994 production-sharing agreement and the separate 1997 federal-regional agreement are distinguished.

No conclusion is reached concerning the ultimate legal effect of the half-million-tonne provision without examination of the complete contractual record.

The investigation distinguishes broad fractions of light hydrocarbons, stabilised gas condensate, liquefied natural gas and blended export crude.

These products are not assumed to be chemically or contractually interchangeable.

The existence of a fractionation facility is not treated as proof that a separate regional gas-chemical complex was constructed.

Equally, the absence of an identified regional delivery record is not treated as proof that no relevant deliveries occurred.

The Shell-authored October 2001 technical paper is identified as evidence of the engineering design then contemplated.

Its descriptions are distinguished from the later operating-company records concerning completed facilities.

ENKA’s contractor statements are attributed to the company.

The current operating-company descriptions are treated as evidence of the assets and production arrangements reported by Sakhalin Energy.

They are not treated as an exhaustive inventory of every industrial facility operated by every company on Sakhalin Island.

The regional industrial proposals reported in September 2025 and February–June 2026 are identified as prospective developments.

They are not described as completed facilities.

The distinction between Sakhalin II and Sakhalin III is maintained.

No allegation is made that Shell directed or improperly influenced decisions concerning the proposed Sakhalin III-related refinery.

The investigation does not allege that Shell unlawfully withheld light hydrocarbon fractions from Sakhalin Oblast.

It does not allege that Shell deliberately prevented construction of a regional gas-chemical complex.

Nor does it conclude that Sakhalin Energy breached the original production-sharing agreement.

No court judgment establishing such misconduct has been identified in the records examined.

The fate of the specific 1997 regional feedstock provision remains unverified.

Editorial commentary concerning the distinction between resource extraction, exports and regional industrial development is identified separately from the underlying documentary findings.

Shell plc, former Sakhalin Energy personnel, Gazprom, the present Sakhalin Energy operator, Russian federal and regional authorities and other interested parties are invited to provide factual corrections, authenticated contractual amendments, production records and relevant responses for consideration and publication.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-115 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CV The 70 Percent Question: Shell, Russian Suppliers and the Local-Content Promise Behind Sakhalin II

In June 2001, a senior Shell executive gave an unusually revealing interview to Russian business newspaper Vedomosti.

The interview concerned Sakhalin II’s second development phase.

The executive was Rein Tambuzer, head of Shell Exploration & Production Services in Russia.

He discussed the project’s anticipated expenditure, construction arrangements and the relationship between foreign contractors and Russian suppliers.

The conversation contained a striking statement.

According to Tambuzer, the Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement required Russian suppliers to account for 70% of equipment supplies over the life of the project.

He acknowledged that achieving such a proportion during construction of the technically complex LNG plant would be difficult.

But he anticipated that the project would compensate through other procurement and operating activities.

Those statements raise important questions.

What did the original production-sharing agreement actually require?

Did the reported 70% figure concern the value of equipment, the value of total procurement or a more complicated contractual measure?

How much work was awarded to Russian companies?

How much was performed by international contractors?

And did the project ultimately satisfy the applicable requirements?

The next investigation will examine Tambuzer’s contemporaneous statements alongside original procurement records, contractor disclosures and Sakhalin Energy’s published accounts of Russian participation.

It will distinguish legally binding requirements from corporate targets and political expectations.

It will also distinguish Russian-owned suppliers from work merely performed within Russia by foreign-controlled companies.

Shell helped build an LNG export industry on Sakhalin. The next file will investigate how much of the industrial opportunity was intended to go to Russian suppliers — and what the documentary record establishes about the results.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

Documentary starting point: Vedomosti — Interview with Shell Executive Rein Tambuzer, 15 June 2001

Editorial note: This instalment follows SLF-2007-113 and introduces an important additional category of evidence: a contemporaneous technical paper authored by Shell personnel describing the original fractionation design, corroborated by the present operator’s account of the completed condensate export system.

The central documentary finding is that the 1997 regional feedstock ambition cannot be equated with the LNG and condensate infrastructure that was ultimately built. The precise disposition of the originally envisaged 500,000 tonnes annually remains unverified.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 10 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 10, 2026 at 9:07 pm.
©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

Statewide Ads Press NC Governor to Freeze Data Center Development — NC WARN News Release

NC WARN - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 12:00

NC WARN criticizes Josh Stein for aiding the recruitment of power-guzzling A.I. data centers to the state

Though he has retreated on publicly praising A.I. data centers as backlash has accelerated across NC and the nation, Governor Josh Stein is among those who have celebrated the influx of the polluting developments into the state. 

Stein was “damn excited” about Amazon’s plans to construct a data center in Richmond County in 2025. 

That line is featured in a new 30-second video ad by NC WARN. The watchdog says it’s time for the governor to make amends and enact a 2-year freeze on the development of data centers. These massive projects are now notorious for air, water and noise pollution and repeatedly driving up power bills, among a host of other noxious impacts.

NC WARN started calling on the Governor in June for a data center moratorium and to halt Duke Energy’s recruitment of those energy-guzzling facilities to the state. The power giant has used the hype around data centers to plan a nation-leading expansion of fossil fuels.

Duke Energy gained deceptive headlines and gushing praise last month after claiming falsely that its recent deal with tech oligarchs would protect other customers from the costs of providing power to data centers. 

NC WARN filed a demand on October 1 for all records from the Governor’s Office and Commerce Department pertaining to their assistance to Duke Energy in the recruiting activities. And last month, NC WARN launched a statewide petition drive calling on Stein to use his authority and political power to implement a 2-year moratorium.

The Governor helped fuel the data center frenzy. Now, it’s on him to freeze current data center development and protect North Carolinians from further toxic projects borne from deceptive and backroom scheming.

###

Now in its 38th year, NC WARN is building people power in the climate and energy justice movement to persuade or require Charlotte-based Duke Energy – one of the world’s largest climate polluters – to make a quick transition to renewable, affordable power generation and energy efficiency in order to avert climate tipping points and ongoing rate hikes. 

The post Statewide Ads Press NC Governor to Freeze Data Center Development — NC WARN News Release appeared first on NC WARN.

Categories: G2. Local Greens

The Newsroom In a Tent – Flamingo Park

Global Justice Ecology Project - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:49
While Nixon’s RNC played to prime time, the underground press filed a different story. A simple banner, made from an old bedsheet, lashed to the front of a sagging canvas tent. Its message was defiant: THE ALTERNATIVE MEDIA IS THE ONLY MEDIA YOU CAN TRUST.
Categories: B4. Radical Ecology

Trump Administration Continues Systematic Dismantling of Public Lands – 11.10.26

Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:25

November 10, 2026 – FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Trump Administration Continues Systematic Dismantling of Public Lands – 11.10.26 Proposed Rule Would Shut the Public Out and Allow the Administration to Make Sweeping Decisions About 250 Million Acres of Western Public Lands Behind Closed Doors

Contacts:
Grant Stevens, Communications Director, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA); (319) 427-0260; grant@suwa.org

Washington, DC – Yesterday, the Trump Administration announced a proposed Bureau of Land Management (BLM) rulemaking that would drastically weaken the public’s involvement in land use planning and gut protections for Areas of Critical Environmental Concern (ACECs), one of BLM’s primary conservation designations, across 245 million acres of Western public lands. The rule proposes to stifle the voices of local communities by significantly shortening public comment periods and cutting out robust environmental analysis. These changes would make it easier for the BLM to fast-track the sale, transfer, or use of public lands for oil and gas drilling, mining, data centers, and other industrial or commercial development, all while shutting out the American people. The announcement kicks off a 60 day comment period (January 9th deadline). 

The public lands overseen by the BLM contain crucial wildlife corridors, critical habitat, cultural resources and landscapes, watersheds, historic sites, and access to nature and scenery.  The rule threatens to strip vital safeguards for ACECs and environmental review that protect these values, leaving the West’s most sensitive lands vulnerable to irreparable harm.

The new rule will (Brief Analysis):

  • Attempt to eliminate mandatory Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) for land use plans;
  • Eliminate the 90-day public comment period;
  • Allow BLM to eliminate written comment opportunities in favor of public meetings;
  • Eliminate key planning and analysis requirements;
  • Bypass normal planning procedures by creating new emergency authority and making broad programmatic amendments potentially easier;
  • Weaken area of critical environmental concern (ACEC) designation and protection procedures
  • Reduce state, local, and Tribal government participation.

This aggressive regulatory rollback is the latest chapter in a coordinated, systematic dismantling of America’s public lands. It directly connects to a broader pattern of hostility toward balanced stewardship, which includes the recent rescission of the landmark Public Lands Rule, stated intention to roll back the Roadless Rule and Wilderness policies, the evisceration of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) standards, and repeated attempts to give away public lands to corporations and developers. This rulemaking contributes to this administration’s singular focus: fast-tracking industrial exploitation and drilling at the expense of our shared heritage, tribal sovereignty and the outdoor recreation economies that sustain rural Western communities.

The proposal comes as Congress debates permitting legislation that would also weaken public participation in decisions affecting shared lands and give more power to development interests. Planning serves as the foundational blueprints governing public lands for decades; eroding these processes is a profound threat to the long-term health of the West. Making robust environmental review optional and weakening ACEC standards intentionally ties the agency’s hands, preventing it from effectively responding to the compounding threats of climate change, drought, and habitat fragmentation. This action rejects the unmistakable demand from the American public, including local leaders, Tribal representatives, and local elected officials, who have consistently called for public lands to be managed transparently and protected for future generations.

Quotes

“The Trump administration is attempting to undermine conservation, remove the public from public lands, and make it easier to turn these lands over to extractive industries,” said Neal Clark, Wildlands Director at the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA). “Minimizing public engagement and comprehensive environmental analysis does nothing to streamline public land management and is only intended to prioritize private profit at the expense of ecosystem health and public land users.”   

“Gutting transparency, review, and public engagement requirements within the West’s most ecologically sensitive wildlife corridors, watersheds, and cultural resources are the actions of cowards trying to fast-track industrial development at any and all social costs,” said Kara Matsumoto, senior policy director at the Conservation Lands Foundation. “Resource management plans are the blueprints for keeping public lands and waters healthy, and weakening them will weaken local economies and fragile ecosystems. We’ll continue to fight this corporate greed because the overwhelming majority of Americans want more nature protected, not less.”

“The opportunity to review and comment on land management actions keeps the public in public lands.” said Hilary Eisen, federal policy director at Wild Montana. “Resource management plans provide the long-term framework for how vast swaths of public land across the West are managed and it is essential that these plans be crafted with robust public engagement. This proposed rule sidelines the public, as well as local, state, and tribal governments, in BLM land use planning.”

“Resource management planning is meant to provide the public a real say in how BLM manages our shared public lands, and Areas of Critical Environmental Concern are how the agency turns that input into on-the-ground protections for special places and important wildlife habitat,” said Maddy Munson, senior policy and planning specialist at Defenders of Wildlife. “Cutting back public participation and narrowing the agency’s analysis isn’t streamlining, but rather stacking the deck against the places and species that need protection the most.”  

“For Nevadans public land is our way of life. Whether we have jobs dependent on mining, grazing, the outdoor industry or just love taking our families camping, these public lands in Nevada are a huge part of who we are. We want to have an active role in determining how these lands are managed and efforts to take the public out of this planning process and weaken protections are just wrong,” said Shaaron Netherton, Executive Director at Friends of Nevada WIlderness. “We need to stand up and keep the public in our public lands.” 

“The Trump Administration is once again plotting to undermine our world-renowned system of shared lands and the public processes that guide their management,” said Jackie Feinberg, Sierra Club’s National Lands Conservation Manager. “Weakening protections and public participation would fast-track the industrialization and privatization of places essential for wildlife, clean water, cultural and historic preservation, and access to nature. We stand firmly against these attempts to cut out the “public” from public lands for the benefit of corporate polluters and profiteers.” 

“The Trump administration continues to eliminate tools that the Bureau of Land Management has relied on for decades for conserving wildlife habitat, protecting clean water, and working with local communities. The objective is clear: replace the multiple uses and values of our public lands with the singular use of fossil fuel development. That agenda has no footing in Colorado, where 96% percent of Coloradans support conserving public lands and open space and 81% believe oil and gas development is not an acceptable use of public lands,” said Juli Slivka, Senior Director of Policy and Programs at Wilderness Workshop.

“These are the plans that decide whether a valley gets drilled or a trout stream gets protected, and this proposal is built to make those decisions faster and with fewer people in the room,” said Bobby McEnaney, Senior Lands Analyst at NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council). “Cutting the public’s time to weigh in by two thirds, scrapping the full environmental review, and letting a political appointee invoke an emergency to skip the rest is not modernization. It is a way to lock in drilling and mining decisions before anyone can object. Governors get 30 days and no appeal, Tribal plans drop out of the review entirely, and the agency gives itself the power to shrink or erase existing protected areas. Interior should withdraw this proposal and keep the public’s seat at the table.”

“These lands are called “public lands” for a reason: They are owned by the people of the United States. The Bureau of Land Management’s job is to manage them in the public’s interest, for the common good. By so severely restricting opportunities for the public—including, importantly, Tribal Nations—to be involved in planning for their management, the BLM is depriving all of us of our rights as the owners,” said Michael Painter, Coordinator, Californians for Western Wilderness.

“The Trump administration continues its relentless agenda of handing over public lands to corporations,” said Thomas Delehanty, senior attorney with Earthjustice’s Rocky Mountain Office. “Cutting the public out of land management benefits no one except the extractive industries hellbent on controlling these shared resources for their own private gain. Anyone who values public lands must be loud and clear: these attacks end now.”

“Public lands belong to all Americans, and decisions about their future should be made through transparent processes informed by science, meaningful public participation and consultation with Tribes and others in the community. This proposed rule would give us less of a say in the management of 245 million acres of our shared lands and weaken areas of critical environmental concern, the BLM’s primary tool for protecting important natural and cultural sites. It is another clear attempt to give drilling, mining and other development interests more influence over our public lands, in the same spirit as rescission of the BLM Public Lands Rule—and only days after voters delivered a stinging rebuke to this administration’s agenda of doing favors for oil and gas companies and other powerful corporations. Our public lands deserve better, and so do future generations that will inherit them.” said Michael Carroll, BLM Campaign Director, The Wilderness Society.

“In New Mexico, the BLM planning process gives communities, Pueblos, Tribes, acequias, recreationalists, conservation organizations, ranchers, hunters and anglers a real say in what happens to the 13.5 million acres of public land that the agency manages here,” said Sally Paez, senior staff attorney for New Mexico Wild. “Places like the Greater Chaco landscape, the Permian Basin’s remaining wildlife habitat, and our desert grasslands have protections today because New Mexicans showed up and spoke out during planning. New Mexicans shouldn’t be shut out of decisions about their own public lands.” 

“In Oregon, the BLM manages 2.6 million acres of Oregon and California Lands that are home to imperiled wildlife, endemic botanical resources, wild rivers, and climate change-mitigating ancient forests that provide outstanding recreational opportunities and socioeconomic benefits to Oregonians and all Americans,” said Susan Jane Brown, attorney with Silvix Resources. “The public and other stakeholders must have a central role in the science-informed stewardship of these cherished resources, all of which will be placed at risk of existential loss with BLM’s proposed rulemaking.”

“Oregon’s high desert community has modeled a long, successful history of federal planners, tribal interests, ranchers, hunters and anglers, recreationists, and conservationists working together to craft management strategies that balance land use and promote conservation across 12 million acres of our shared public lands,” said Mark Salvo, Senior Conservation Advisor for Oregon Natural Desert Association. “Now the Trump administration is recklessly dismissing these decades of collaboration and compromise, trampling public processes, and sidelining those who have worked to protect these lands and resources for future generations–all to advance a narrow agenda of exploitation at the expense of the public interest.”

“The public lands are the people’s lands and the American people have spoken loud and clear. The Bureau’s proposal to cut public participation, reduce protections for cultural sites and critically important habitat, and shortcut environmental analysis is just one more indication that the Trump Administration isn’t listening and will do anything to silence the public, Tribes, and scientists and ignore the reality of what’s happening on the ground,” said Josh Osher, public policy director for Western Watersheds Project. “Millions of acres of climate-stressed Bureau-managed lands are already being degraded by extractive industries, and we need planning rules that include thorough and honest science-based assessments and as many voices as possible to help improve ecological conditions and resilience.”  

This is just the latest attempt from the Trump Administration to dismantle our public lands piece by piece,” said Sandra Schubert, Executive Director of Tuleyome. “The proposed Planning Rule undermines protections that ensure that our public lands and wild forests remain accessible and are used sustainably. Resource management plans are built on science and centuries of management experience. They give local land managers and communities the ability to maintain healthy ecosystems while supporting the diverse ways communities depend on public lands. Undermining planning undermines our public lands”

“Once again, Doug Burgum is doing everything in his power to cut the public out of public lands,” said Aaron Weiss, executive director of the Center for Western Priorities. “This new rule gives political appointees in DC more power to shrink protected places and ignore local voices. Public lands belong to all of us, and good land use planning means giving everyone the chance to weigh in.”

“America’s national parks are supported by the public lands that surround them, and this proposal is another blatant attempt to unravel decades of conservation progress that the public overwhelmingly supports,” said Beau Kiklis, associate director of energy and landscape conservation at the National Parks Conservation Association. “Roughly 80 national park sites share a border with BLM lands, and Areas of Critical Environmental Concern have helped protect Dinosaur National Monument from impacts of oil and gas development, support Joshua Tree’s wildlife by protecting the neighboring Pinto Mountains, and protect ancestral sites near Hovenweep among countless others. This is another attempt to sell off and sell out our public lands, and the public deserves a real say before more is lost.”  

### 
The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) is a nonprofit organization with members and supporters from around the country dedicated to protecting America’s redrock wilderness. From offices in Moab, Salt Lake City, and Washington, DC, our team of professionals defends the redrock, organizes support for America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act, and stewards a world-renowned landscape. Learn more at www.suwa.org. 

The post Trump Administration Continues Systematic Dismantling of Public Lands – 11.10.26 appeared first on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.

Categories: G2. Local Greens

Eventos

Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:06
Eventos Próximos eventos El experimento kurdo de democracia radical y autonomía: luchas y riesgos - 13 de noviembre Como parte de la serie de seminarios web para la construcción de una Alianza Global por la Democracia Radical y la Autonomía (GARDA), el Tejido Global de Alternativas (TGA) te invita a una conversación sobre la experiencia kurda de democracia radical y autonomía, con enfoque en sus luchas y riesgos.GTAGTAGTAGTAGTAGTATapestryAlternativesTapestryAlternativesTapestryAlternativesG…

Portada

Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:05
[ Tejedores] TGA es una “red de redes”. Cada una de esas redes actúa en diferentes partes del planeta identificando y conectando Alternativas. Son los Tejedores. [ Apoyos] Diversas organizaciones progresitas, post-desarrollo y/o anti-capitalistas apoyan esta iniciativa. Tambien lo hacen académicos, activistas y referentes.GTAGTAGTA

Events

Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:04
Events Upcoming events Kurdish Experiment in Radical Democracy and Autonomy: Struggles and Risks - November 13th As part of the webinar series for building a Global Alliance for Radical Democracy and Autonomy (GARDA), the Global of () invites you to a conversation on the Kurdish experience of radical democracy and autonomy, focusing on its struggles and risks.GTAGTATapestryAlternativesGTAalternativesTapestryAlternativesAlternativesalternativesTapestryAlternativesGTAGTATapestryAlternatives…

Main page

Global Tapestry of Alternatives - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 11:03
Global of [Weavers] GTA is a “network of networks”. Each of those networks acts in different parts of the planet by identifying and connecting Alternatives. They are the Weavers. [Endorsements] Many progressive, post-developent and anticapitalist organizations around the world endorse this initiative. Also many academics, activists and referents do so.GTAGTAWeaversGTAGTAalternativesAlternatives

Is Big Food influencing the debate over ultra-processed food?

Environmental Working Group - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:58
Is Big Food influencing the debate over ultra-processed food? Anthony Lacey November 10, 2026

Many researchers who criticize a common classification of ultra-processed food have ties to the food industry, a recent study finds. 

Those researchers frequently fail to disclose these relationships, and some go so far as to promote the benefits of ultra-processed foods, the study shows.

How UPF are classified is worthy of scientific debate – but this particular pattern is causing experts to draw comparisons between Big Food and Big Tobacco. Beginning in the 1950s, the tobacco industry funded a steady stream of research designed to manufacture doubt about the links between cigarettes and cancer, often calling for more research as a way to delay action.

Food industry ties in ultra-processed food research

The new study examined 69 academic articles that either questioned the widely used Nova system or highlighted the potential benefits of UPF. 

The Nova system, which categorizes food by how much and why it’s processed, is prevalent in major studies examining links between UPF and health harms. 

The study was published in the American Journal of Public Health.

The papers analyzed were published between 2009 and 2025, years when ultraprocessed food and its associated health harms moved into public awareness. The researchers then examined food industry connections among the 232 paper authors. They found that articles by people with industry ties were more likely to critique the Nova system or even promote potential benefits of UPF.

Most of the articles, or 91%, had at least one author with food industry ties. Of the 232 authors, about two-thirds, or 69%, had connections to the food industry. 

Many of these ties were not reported in the articles reviewed. For 71% of the authors with industry connections, those ties came to light only when the study’s authors searched publicly available information.

Arguments in favor of ultra-processed food appeared in two-fifths of articles with direct industry ties, and three-fifths of articles with organizational or governmental industry ties.

The same defense of UPF was made in just 17% of articles with no apparent industry ties.

Is Big Food using Big Tobacco’s playbook?

A researcher’s ties to industry don’t automatically invalidate their research. But failure to disclose them raises questions about how much they may influence a study’s findings.

The tobacco industry spent decades funding research and “manufacturing academic doubt about its products’ harms.” The authors of the new study warn that food companies are adopting the same tactics to raise concerns about potential UPF health risks. 

What you can do

With an estimated 70% of packaged food sold in the U.S. being ultra-processed, it can be difficult to choose a product that isn’t. 

The federal government has failed to define or regulate ultra-processed food.

But states are taking steps to make healthier food choices easier. 

California in 2025 established the nation’s first legal definition of ultra-processed food. That law, which EWG co-sponsored, requires California public schools to gradually remove the most harmful UPF from their meals.

In September, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law another food bill co-sponsored by EWG. It creates a voluntary certification program that will allow qualifying foods to carry a “non-ultra-processed certified” label, with the goal of making it easier for shoppers to identify healthier alternatives.

Other states have followed suit, introducing or passing scores of bills in the past several years that would protect consumers from harmful food chemicals. 

You can consult our interactive food regulation tracker to get the latest updates. Until these laws take effect – and as long as the federal government leaves us without protection from the harmful food chemicals in UPF – EWG’s Food Scores database can help. It rates thousands of food products based on nutrition, ingredients and processing, making it easier to compare options and find healthier foods for your family. 

Food Scores also flags unhealthy UPF and can help you identify alternatives.

Nicole Pajer is a freelance journalist.

Areas of Focus Food Ultra-Processed Foods Guest Authors Nicola Pajer (for EWG) November 12, 2026
Categories: G1. Progressive Green

Blue wave clears a path for stronger clean energy policy

Climate Solutions - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:57
Blue wave clears a path for stronger clean energy policy Jonathan Lawson Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:57 am
Categories: G2. Local Greens

Grocery Stores as Community Anchors: Investing in Food, Families, and Local Economies

For more than two decades, Mountain Association has prioritized financing grocery stores and local agricultural production because strong food systems support children, families, and the long-term strength of the region. Since 2000, we’ve invested more than $16 million in nearly 150 supermarket, grocery, and food service projects.

Rural communities often struggle to access local, affordable, and high-quality food. More than 20% of the population of Appalachia regularly experiences hunger, and approximately 1 in 3 children are food insecure. Additionally, many residents must drive 20 miles or more to reach a grocery store.

By investing in grocery stores, we improve access to healthy food and strengthen food security—outcomes closely tied to education, health, and overall well-being. At the same time, these stores serve as both community and economic anchors. In many rural towns, they can be one of the few consistent sources of employment, with a single store supporting a dozen or more jobs, contributing to local supply chains, and driving activity for surrounding businesses.

Yet grocery is an extremely low-margin industry, and even small challenges—rising electricity costs, new competition, employee turnover, or fluctuations in government food benefits—can make it difficult to remain open.

Mountain Association helps grocers navigate these pressures by lowering operating costs and improving access to capital. Through hands-on technical assistance with energy efficiency and solar projects, we help businesses reduce expenses while making long-term investments in their operations. We’ve financed 11 energy projects at grocery stores, investing $2.48 million. Additionally, we have helped grocers secure $1.54 million in grant funding to lower project costs. Across a total of 28 stores, our energy work is already generating $629,700 in annual savings—freeing up capital that these businesses can reinvest in equipment, wages, and growth.

We are proud of the partnerships and innovations we’ve made in supporting our grocery partners over the years, and of the impact these stores have in providing food access, employment, and community.

A few client features from our 50 Years of Impact report: Pikeville Fresh Market

Pikeville, KY

Mountain Association has supported Cox Food Group over the decades with affordable financing and energy savings expertise. Most recently, we worked with Tate Cox on his acquisition and major renovation of a store in Pikeville. This included provided support for their USDA Rural Energy for America Program (REAP) grant for more efficient lighting and upgraded refrigeration for expanded fresh options in the produce, deli and meat departments.

Isom IGA

Isom, KY

After owner Gwen Christon participated in our WINGS business program early in her career, we have continued to partner over the decades. Mountain Association has helped the store navigate rising utility costs by providing technical expertise, financing, and grant support for energy efficiency upgrades and solar. These efforts have reduced the store’s annual electric costs by more than $68,000 — allowing Gwen to reinvest in 10 jobs, overcome a devastating flood, and maintain essential services.

The Markets

Martin, Frenchburg & Salyersville, KY

Jed Weinberg has worked with the Mountain Association to bring upgrades to multiple rural grocery stores he owns or manages. With Mountain Association’s financing, technical support, and help securing significant USDA REAP grants, Weinberg has found energy savings that have been critical to maintain operations, invest in improvements, and continue providing essential food access and employment in three small communities. Flexible and affordable Mountain Association capital allowed for the Market at Salyersville to move into a new building, doubling the size and expanding its fresh options.

Long’s Pic Pac

Pineville, KY

Grocery stores’ power bills often face large power bills in part due to their high energy draws that happen at certain times of day. Mike Long of Long’s Pic Pac has reduced these high electric costs by installing solar and a first-of-its-kind 60 kWh battery storage system, significantly cutting the power bill. Supported with Mountain Association capital and technical support to navigate federal grants, the project is expected to save at least $15,000 annually and pay for itself within four years. These savings help sustain the small, family-run grocery founded by Long’s father in 1964, while allowing continued investment in staffing and improvements.

My IGA

Beattyville, KY

At My IGA, resilience and reinvestment have helped preserve a critical community grocery store. Following a devastating fire and ongoing flooding, the store was rebuilt and relocated to a higher ground site with the Mountain Association providing financing support through the transition. Most recently, we also provided financing as the owner’s grandson took over the family-run business.

For 50 years, the Mountain Association has invested in people and places throughout Eastern Kentucky and Appalachia. To learn more stories of our history, visit mtassociation.org/fifty.  

The post Grocery Stores as Community Anchors: Investing in Food, Families, and Local Economies appeared first on Mountain Association.

Two ‘forever chemicals’ linked to an aggressive type of breast cancer, NIH study finds

Environmental Working Group - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:34
Two ‘forever chemicals’ linked to an aggressive type of breast cancer, NIH study finds Anthony Lacey November 10, 2026

Women with higher levels of two toxic “forever chemicals” in their blood were more likely to develop an aggressive form of breast cancer, according to a new study.

The paper, from the National Institutes of Health, reported that women with the highest blood levels of PFOA had a 67% higher rate of estrogen-receptor-negative breast cancer than women with the lowest levels. For PFOS, the rate was 93% higher, or nearly double. The paper looked at the association between 17 PFAS and three types of cancer, finding that only PFOA and PFOS were associated with the estrogen-receptor-negative breast cancer.

The study was published earlier this month in the Journal of Clinical Oncology.

The authors state it is the largest study yet of PFAS exposure and breast cancer. It was published just as the Environmental Protection Agency moves to delay and weaken national limits on PFAS in drinking water.

Estrogen-receptor-negative tumors are characterized by their ability to grow without estrogen. They tend to advance more aggressively, with more serious outcomes than hormone-driven breast cancers. But scientists know little about what raises the risk.

Study with robust design

The research drew on the Sister Study, led by NIH’s National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. It enrolled 50,884 women ages 35 to 74 in the U.S. and Puerto Rico between 2003 and 2009. None had breast cancer when they joined the study, but each had a sister or half-sister who had been diagnosed with the disease.

The Sister Study is a large prospective cohort study of environmental and genetic risk factors for breast cancer. Since researchers measured 17 PFAS in blood collected years before diagnosis, in a large group of women followed over time, this evidence is stronger than studies that test blood after cancer is found. They looked at 1,609 women who later developed breast cancer with 2,269 women in a comparison group, adjusting for other risk factors, such as hormone therapy, alcohol use and body weight.

The researchers also combined the results of their analysis with six earlier studies, which measured PFAS in blood before diagnosis. Their combined analysis also linked PFOA to estrogen-receptor-negative breast cancer, with weaker but consistent evidence for PFOS.

‘Phased out’ doesn’t mean gone

The study relies on samples from 2003-2009, when PFAS levels were much higher, according to Centers for Disease and Prevention reports. 

The chemical industry often points out that PFOA and PFOS have largely been taken out of use in products like fast food wrappers and nonstick pans. In some cases, PFAS have been removed completely but in other instances, different PFAS chemicals are used in the place of PFOA or PFOS. But these chemicals linger in the environment and in our bodies for years. As recently as 2024, PFAS are still found in the blood of 98% of Americans.

The replacements for PFAS raise their own uncertainties about the link to health harms. That’s why EWG has long urged regulators to address PFAS as a class rather than review their safety one chemical at a time.

Adding to the evidence about PFAS and cancer

The study extends and builds on earlier studies that suggest how harmful PFAS are. 

The International Agency for Research on Cancer classifies PFOA as carcinogenic to humans and PFOS as possibly carcinogenic. A 2020 peer-reviewed study led by EWG scientists found that PFAS share key characteristics with known cancer-causing chemicals. PFAS exposure is also linked to reproductive harm, high blood pressure during pregnancy, and immune system damage, even at low levels.

And last month, EWG reported on a Silent Spring Institute analysis finding that hundreds of chemicals linked to breast cancer in lab and animal studies turn up in everyday products, food, drinking water and air.

A warning as EPA retreats

PFAS are everywhere, precisely because they are designed not to break down. PFAS can be found in drinking water, soil and consumer products like nonstick pans or cosmetics. They are also found in the bodies of virtually everyone. The EPA in 2024 set first-time limits for six PFAS in drinking water.

This May, the agency then proposed revoking the drinking water limits for PFHxS, PFNA and GenX chemicals, along with a limit on PFAS mixtures. 

The EPA plans to retain the two other PFAS drinking water limits, for PFOA and PFOS. But in May, the EPA also proposed letting water utilities request two more years, until 2031, to meet those limits. 

The agency is pursuing those actions even though roughly 197 million people in the U.S. drink tap water contaminated with the toxic “forever chemicals” known as PFAS, according to test data released by the EPA and recent state test results.

The number aligns with findings from another 2020 paper by EWG scientists that estimated PFAS was in the water of 200 million Americans. 

How to lower your exposure Areas of Focus Women's Health PFAS Chemicals Largest study yet on the association comes as the EPA moves to delay, scrap tap water limits Authors Monica Amarelo Alexa Friedman, Ph.D. November 10, 2026
Categories: G1. Progressive Green

Not much COP

Ecologist - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 10:15
Not much COP Channel News brendan 10th November 2026 Teaser Media
Categories: H. Green News

Incineration Is Not Climate Action: Experts Call for Zero Waste Solutions at COP31

Climate advocates warn against false solutions and urge governments to invest in waste prevention, reuse, and locally led zero waste systems.

ANTALYA, TÜRKİYE (November 11, 2026)– As world leaders gather at COP31 to advance climate action, climate advocates, researchers, youth leaders, and local government representatives are calling on governments and climate financiers to reject incineration and invest in real zero waste solutions.

At the press conference “Zero Waste COP – Incinerators Out. Zero Waste In.”, speakers highlighted why addressing the climate impact of waste requires moving upstream through waste prevention, reuse, repair, redesign, and composting—not expanding disposal infrastructure.

“Zero waste is climate action—but only when we address the problem at its source. We cannot solve the waste crisis by building more infrastructure to burn or dispose of what we produce,” said Mariel Vilella, Climate Program Director at GAIA. “Preventing waste, expanding reuse and composting organic materials are practical and proven solutions that can cut emissions while delivering benefits for communities.”

The climate impacts of waste extend beyond disposal. Plastic production is deeply tied to fossil fuels, with emissions occurring across its lifecycle. Mohamed Kamal, Coordinator, Climate Action Network Arab World (CANAW), emphasized: “We cannot tackle climate change while allowing plastic production to keep expanding. Reducing plastic production and scaling reuse must be part of any credible climate strategy.”

The growing promotion of waste-to-energy incineration is another concern. A new report by the GAIA Africa examines 15 incineration projects and proposals across 10 African countries, raising questions about their viability and long-term impacts.

“Incineration can lock municipalities into costly infrastructure, expose communities to harmful pollution, and divert resources from more inclusive zero waste alternatives,” said Weyinmi Okotie, Executive Director of Green Knowledge Foundation.“ Africa needs solutions that respond to its actual waste realities—not expensive technologies that create new problems.”

The financing imbalance is also a major barrier to the zero waste transition. Jacob Johnson Attakpah, Zero Waste Director of the Green Africa Youth Organisation, called for a shift in investment priorities: “Governments and climate financiers must correct this imbalance and make climate finance accessible to the communities and cities already delivering solutions.”

Cities are already demonstrating what practical action can look like. Shahriar Hossain from the Government of Bangladesh, highlighted the role of local governments. Cities are on the frontlines of the waste and climate crises, but they are also where many of the solutions can happen. What cities need is strong political support, consistent public investment and policies that make zero waste systems possible at scale.

Moderated by Yogi Tujuliarto of CNN Indonesia   the press conference will call for climate commitments to translate into implementation, with policies and financing that prioritize prevention over disposal.

The message to COP31 is clear: Incinerators out. Zero waste in.

ABOUT GAIA

GAIA is a global network working toward a just, zero waste world, where resources are conserved and communities are protected from pollution and harmful waste practices. no-burn.org

MEDIA CONTACT:
Sonia Astudillo | Global Climate Communications Lead, GAIA
sonia@no-burn.org | +63 917 596 9286

Carissa Marnce | GAIA Africa
carissa@no-burn.org 

The post Incineration Is Not Climate Action: Experts Call for Zero Waste Solutions at COP31 first appeared on GAIA.

Tres Rios Watershed Coalition is Back: Partners in Embudo Valley Restoration

La Jicarita - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 09:55

By KAY MATTHEWS

The Tres Rios Watershed Coalition was founded in 2019 to identify priority areas for forest treatments that would protect communities from the danger of wildfire. Named for the three rivers that make up the greater Embudo Valley watershed—Rio Santa Barbara, Rio del Pueblo, and Rio de Las Trampas—the knowledge of local residents supported by county, state, and federal agencies would be essential in the thinning and restoration projects identified as a priority. The lead organizer was J.R. Logan of Taos County Wildland/Urban Interface, who was also instrumental in organizing the Taos Valley Watershed Coalition.

While The Tres Rios Watershed Coalition held public meetings to keep folks informed and sponsored several field trips to see the damage from the El Valle Fire and the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire, the coalition never formally organized as a non-profit or entity that could apply for funding for identified forest treatments. For the past few years the Coalition has been dormant.

But sometimes things don’t die, they evolve. Now, in 2026, the Tres Rios Watershed Coalition has sprung back to life under the leadership of Santa Barbara Land Grant and Acequia Association members in the Peñasco area. Gabriel Lopez, Antonio Gurule, and Michal Headerle invited community leaders and activists to a working group that would expand the focus of the Coalition to include restoration of all forest resources, especially the waters that feed our acequias. The working group meets monthly at the Peñasco Valley Historical Preservation Society.

To help introduce the Coalition to the wider public, a meeting was held at the Peñasco Community Center on November 6. Notice was sent out to all the names that were on the original Tres Rios Watershed Coalition listserve, and there was a good turnout of community people, forestry groups, forest workers, government agencies, and forest related non-profits.

Daniel Sam told the group that the Rio del Pueblo, its tributaries, and its springs  from Serpent Lake downstream are all sacred to Picuris Pueblo.

Speakers at the meeting provided some history, an overview of current projects in the valley, new projects on the horizon, and possible funding sources to fund these projects.

• Around 2015 a group of activists decided to give the Forest Service “a nudge” with identified projects ready to be treated. The Cerro Negro Forest Council initiated a leñero program for local people to earn money thinning one-acre units in a Wildland/Urban Interface (WUI) thinning project near San Cristobal. Local contractors like Watershed Dynamics and Wood Sharks had crews ready to thin other WUI areas near Taos Valley communities. The Taos Valley Watershed Coalition was formed to help organize and help fund these projects.

• The Tres Rios Watershed Coalition will explore various options on how to formalize: become a 501c3 non-profit; seek a fiscal sponsor; or form a Watershed District. Mark Schuetz of Forest Dynamics volunteered that under Community Wildfire Protection Plans the Coalition could better partner with county, state, and federal agencies. The Tres Rios Watershed Coalition is covered by the Taos County Wildfire Protection Plan, which will be updated in the next six months. The Coalition will also benefit under the Good Neighbor agreements between the Forest Service, Taos County, and Taos County Soil and Water Conservation District to work together on forest projects.

• Camino Real District Ranger Michael Lujan provided an overview of current Forest Service projects. In 2021 the Sangre de Cristos between Taos and Colfax counties were designated an Enchanted Circle Priority Landscape, one of the highest priority landscapes in terms of vulnerability to wildfire. The Carson National Forest, with state and county partners, began to develop plans to identity and prioritize areas within the Enchanted Circle for restoration. In a threatened landscape, if 20 or 40 percent has been thinned, there’s a better chance against wildland fire. By 2025, after funding became available, the Carson had thinned 20,000 acres, focusing on areas where water, access, and WUI are extant. Projects include: 850 acre Las Trampas Watershed Project (where the prescription was written by the partners, not the Forest Service); 10,000 acre Pueblo Ridge; and 30,000 acre McGaffey Ridge. The target for next year is 6,400 acres of mechanical treatment and prescribed burn. 8,000 cords of wood have been delivered to communities from the restoration project on the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire. The proposed Truchas to Costilla Headwaters Active Management Project will expand treatments to over 300,000 acres during a 10-year period. As sawmills close across the country, we need to innovate, and the next presenter is an example of that.

Orange is fires. Gray is completed treatments. Green and yellow are current/proposed treatments on Carson NF lands.

• Arnold Lopez, a member of the Tres Rios Watershed Coalition working group and treasurer of the Las Trampas Land Grant, discussed the land grant’s projects. In a MOU with Carson National Forest the grant will develop a 12-acre forestry woodlot on Forest Service land near Ojito. The land grant, pressed by the Forest Service to help distribute the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire firewood, decided to expand that into a larger project that will include pellet processing, a portable sawmill, and a mulcher. Another agreement, an MOA with the state, will allow the land grant to work on private land near Forest Service and BLM lands that need treatment. The land grant also oversees a leñero project near Vallecitos where over 40 leñeros are paid $1,200 upon satisfactory treatment of their acres.

If you’re interested in more information, you can contact Gabriel Lopez at gplopez@unm.edu; Michael Headerle at haederle@gmail.com, and Antonio Gurule at tgurule56.pena@gmail.com.

Categories: G2. Local Greens

Big fossil-fuel countries back Brazil-led transition roadmap

Climate Change News - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 09:26

Some big fossil fuel-producing countries – among them India, Nigeria and Germany – have swung behind the Brazil-led roadmap to phase out coal, oil and gas, while the UN chief said on Tuesday that all countries should start to make progress on cutting fossil fuels by 2028.

COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago presented the newly published global roadmap on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels (TAFF) to a packed plenary room in Antalya, cheered on by rounds of applause from delegates and civil society.

Nigeria – an OPEC oil producer that participated in the Santa Marta conference on phasing out fossil fuels earlier this year – welcomed the roadmap and said its recognition that countries have different starting points is “fundamental”.

“As a developing country with significant energy resources, energy access challenges and growing industrial ambitions, we must industrialise and decarbonise simultaneously,” the Nigerian delegate told the event.

She welcomed the roadmap’s proposed system for nations to self-identify their fossil fuel demand, supply and exposure of their wider economies, but said the “real test of this roadmap” will be translating transition pathways into “investable opportunities”.

    India – the world’s third-largest oil consumer and its second coal user – also praised Brazil’s efforts to make the roadmap inclusive, saying it “strikes a delicate balance” and that the energy transition “must be co-created”.

    Its representative added that cheap renewables are what makes the transition away from fossil fuels possible, and energy security can support the case as long as countries avoid swapping “one dependency with another”.

    The new TAFF roadmap invites countries to draw up national plans to build clean energy systems by 2028, while envisaging the main push to cut coal, oil and gas supply and demand after 2031. Some European countries, including Germany, France and the Netherlands, have published their own national roadmaps this year, while Brazil is also working on one.

    Germany, Netherlands, UK and Australia are among the countries that have publicly backed the COP30 roadmap. 

    Africa calls for talks on TAFF to focus on justice

    The chair of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), Ghana’s Antwi-Boasiako Amoah, told journalists in Antalya that “we need to transition, bearing in mind that it must be a just one”. That means fossil fuel-dependent African nations would be supported and have flexibility on the phase-out timeline.

    “Big emitters have already developed and we have the right to develop, so we cannot allow those [fossil fuel] assets to be stranded. If you want us to be able to go the way you want us to, then give us the finance and technology for a just transition,” he said.

    Comment: COP31 outcome needs to prioritise transition away from fossil fuels 

    COP30 president Corrêa do Lago told Climate Home News at a press conference that countries “that have some concerns about this debate recognise the effort that we made” so that it’s not “one group against another”.

    “Normally in these discussions, it’s extremes on the two sides and we don’t advance so much. So I believe the structure proposed here allows us to start the debate from another basis in a much more constructive way,” he said.

    Speaking at the plenary event, former US climate envoy John Kerry said the debate on roadmaps away from fossil fuels “is the prime discussion that we need to engage in”, given that current policies are leading the planet to warming of 2.8C.

    Roadmap as key input for global stocktake

    Several countries that spoke, including the Netherlands and Germany, urged Australia and Türkiye as COP31 co-presidents, and Ethiopia as COP32 president, to carry the debate forward into the next Global Stocktake in late 2028.

    UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said countries should use the new roadmap to build their own concrete national plans including clear timelines, responsibilities and financing needs.

    By the 2028 Global Stocktake, “every country should be able to show what it has done to cut fossil fuel use or production, what it will do next, and how it will measure progress,” he said, in a challenge to governments. 

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres meets with climate scientists at COP31 in Antalya on November 10, 2026. (Photo: © UN Climate Change – Kiara Worth) UN Secretary-General António Guterres meets with climate scientists at COP31 in Antalya on November 10, 2026. (Photo: © UN Climate Change – Kiara Worth)

    He added that it is “long past time to stop treating the transition away from fossil fuels as taboo or intractable” and called on COP31 to “move from discussing the transition to organising it, financing it, and delivering it”.

    France’s COP21 president and one of the architects of the Paris Agreement, Laurent Fabius, stressed that 2028 is approaching fast, adding that “agreed commitments are agreed commitments” which have to be fulfilled.

    COP presidencies keep extracting fossil fuels

    Despite Türkiye’s COP31 co-presidency sending a representative to the roadmap event, the country’s leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, praised in a post on X the start of production at two new oilfields in his country last month as “good news” coming from the mountains of Gabar.

    He added that with further development, daily production from 230 wells in the region will increase by 30% to reach more than 100,000 barrels a day in the second half of 2027, contributing billions of dollars a year to the Turkish economy.

    Turkish giant sponsoring COP31 cut climate goals then cashed in on oil boom

    COP31 co-president Australia has also been the target of criticism by environmental groups in Antalya over a recent expansion of coal and gas infrastructure, while former COP host Brazil will continue its oil extraction plans, including in the Amazon region, despite the re-election of left-leaning President Lula da Silva.

    At the international level the TAFF process remains a pick and choose effort. Some fossil fuel-producing nations are adamant it will stay that way and are likely to resist any attempt to anchor the roadmap in the cover decision or other negotiated outcomes at COP31. 

    Fenton Lutunatabua, Pacific and Caribbean program manager at 350.org, said it is up to both COP31 co-presidencies to decide how to carry the process forward, but said they fell short of giving clear signals on how they would do this.

    “The world cannot afford another COP where governments acknowledge the need to move beyond fossil fuels but fail to agree on how to make it happen,” he said.

    This story was edited to add comments by Fenton Lutunatabua.

    The post Big fossil-fuel countries back Brazil-led transition roadmap appeared first on Climate Home News.

    Categories: H. Green News

    The AI boom could shift diesel generators from backup to everyday use

    Utility Dive - Tue, 11/10/2026 - 09:24

    Last week’s election results demand community-friendly data centers. Overlooking the role of diesel backup could create more pollution and noise for residents, write experts from Inlyte Energy.

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