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#25Nov26 | Call to Action – International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women
We demand effective public policies to prevent and eradicate gender-based violence, protect those who defend their territories, and ensure justice and reparation for survivors.
The post #25Nov26 | Call to Action – International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women appeared first on La Via Campesina - EN.
How Trump plans to fast-track mining in Montana
Over the past 20 months, the Trump administration has rolled back regulations and issued executive orders aimed at unilaterally speeding up industrial development projects. In true bureaucratic fashion, even attempts to cut red tape come with a litany of acronyms you may have never heard of. Take, for instance, “FAST-41.”
Title 41 of FAST-41, or the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, was originally passed under former President Barack Obama in 2015. It was created as a mechanism to streamline federal review for approval of large-scale infrastructure projects, and improve the public’s access to any permits and documents produced as part of federal review. Infrastructure projects can only be added to the FAST-41 list if they fall under federal review with the National Environmental Policy Act and meet certain size requirements.
In a July 2025 executive order, Trump expanded the definition of critical infrastructure projects eligible to be covered under the FAST-41 process to include artificial intelligence data centers. “My Administration will utilize federally owned land and resources for the expeditious and orderly development of data centers,” the directive reads. “This usage will be done in a manner consistent with the land’s intended purpose — to be used in service of the prosperity and security of the American people.”
FAST-41 shares similarities with the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, or BAAJA, the permitting bill that passed the Senate this week. That legislation would overhaul environmental regulations like the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act, and change judicial review, with the goal of expediting the permitting process for projects to go from proposals to shovels in the ground more quickly. If the bill passes the House as written, its changes would be applied to all infrastructure permitting projects. FAST-41, unlike BAAJA, does not change existing environmental statutes and only applies to projects listed under the policy.
Reforming the permitting process has increasingly evolved into a bipartisan issue. Lawmakers on both sides have said the lengthy process stalls economic development. New Mexico Democratic Senator Martin Heinrich, one of the BAAJA sponsors, has said the current permitting process particularly hurts transmission expansion and renewable energy projects at a time when those are most needed, and has attributed those setbacks to continued higher energy costs. But depending on the type of project, expanding development can also mean driving up planet-warming emissions. The Natural Resources Defense Council has warned that BAAJA, in its current draft, could “benefit fossil fuel, mining, data center, and other industrial projects more than clean energy.” The environmental nonprofit has also said the bill would limit regulatory oversight of the environmental harms associated with development.
FAST-41 established a dashboard where anyone can view a project’s timelines, required actions by federal agencies, and the status of environmental review and permits. It is overseen by what’s often referred to as the Permitting Council, made up of representatives from 15 federal agencies. There are two categories for projects listed under FAST-41. The first is a “covered” listing, which means a project will receive expedited processes, including a set permitting timeline that federal agencies must comply with and being assigned a project coordinator to carry the project through the review process. The second is a “transparency” listing, which essentially creates a one-stop shop for a project on the FAST-41 dashboard. It’s a centralized location with information on permitting documents.
In late October, Montana became the 11th state to enter into an agreement with the Permitting Council, which oversees FAST-41. This means the federal government will help the state to identify infrastructure projects eligible for a FAST-41 designation — now including those that aid the development of data centers, like the mining of rare earth elements — provide resources to state agencies through the permitting process, and include state-level permitting actions and timelines on the federal transparency dashboard. Montana has a long-standing history of mining and other extractive industries. Some industry groups, like the Montana Mining Association, see this new state-federal collaboration on FAST-41 as an industry win.
Read Next What to expect as world leaders gather for COP31 Joseph WintersAlaska, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Missouri, Tennessee, Louisiana, Georgia, and Iowa had all previously signed agreements as well. This is the first time in FAST-41’s history that these kinds of federal-state agreements have occurred. Given the novelty of this kind of collaboration, it remains to be seen how much say any given state could have in selecting projects for FAST-41 listing, or how expedited the timeline may be when state and federal permitting are happening in tandem.
When Montana Governor Greg Gianforte signed the official memorandum of understanding with the Permitting Council, he said, “This MOU will ensure that critical infrastructure projects avoid unnecessary roadblocks after completion of federal and state environmental review processes. This is especially important for energy infrastructure.”
According to Adrian Van Rythoven, an associate professor with Montana Tech’s Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology, FAST-41 establishes clarity and certainty in the process, which is beneficial for businesses like publicly traded mineral-exploration companies. “Capital markets like having timelines,” he said, adding that timelines build investor confidence and ensure more money flows toward mineral development.
The effort to make it easier to begin a mining project in Montana comes alongside sweeping changes to bedrock environmental policies and how mining projects are permitted on federal lands. There are currently three mining or mining exploration projects in the state with a “transparency” designation: the Sheep Creek Project, Blue Copper, and the Stillwater Mine.
But ultimately, Van Rythoven said, it remains to be seen if this new MOU between Montana and the Permitting Council would speed things up. He pointed to the extensive personnel and resources required to process applications.
“The scientists, the legal experts that work initially at the federal government, now perhaps the state government with this MOU, if those resources of human time, money, etc., aren’t made available to process these applications, it’ll be transparently slow.”
But for others, the partnership leaves more questions than answers. “I think there’s room for a lot of political interference, ignoring state law, and cutting the public out of the process,” said Derf Johnson, Deputy Director of the Montana Environmental Information Center. “I wonder how this MOU will conflict with Montanans’ right to know.”
Johnson supports improved transparency and said the dashboard is a useful site where the public can access information about a project. But he fears the agreement could allow projects to be prioritized based on the wishes of elected officials and political appointees rather than true merit for critical infrastructure. Montana has explicit constitutional protections for a “clean and healthy environment” and a robust state-level review process; Johnson said he hopes an agreement like this would not skirt any of the state’s own policies.
“I’m worried about projects receiving this designation in the age of corruption that we live in,” he said.
toolTips('.classtoolTips2','A group of 17 soft gray metals including lanthanides, scandium, and yttrium, so-called rare earths form key parts of the magnets in wind turbines and are used in high-tech products ranging from consumer electronics to defense satellites.');This story was originally published by Grist with the headline How Trump plans to fast-track mining in Montana on Nov 11, 2026.
Euro Tour stop #13: Fighting bureaucracy at Budapest Airport
The Stay Grounded network has launched a new project called ‘Red Lines for Airports’. It seeks to unite and support groups campaigning against airport expansion projects and build power for a reduction of air traffic. As part of it we’re running a European Tour, visiting members, and supporting with workshops and skill-shares. Here Miklos Marton explains more about the local struggle against…
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COP31 Position Paper: Advancing Climate Justice in an Age of Crises
COP31 (the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), from November 8-20, 2026 in Antalya, Turkiye) calls attention to countries’ commitments for implementing the 2015 Paris Agreement. As collapsing glaciers unleash unfathomable flooding as seen now in Nepal, and imperialist aggression accelerates the global scramble to secure supplies of energy and critical minerals (all amid AI’s hyperscaled infrastructure build-out), climate justice advocates focus on the powerful actors’ avoiding any accountability for their legal commitments while we push forward our own proposals for fairness in implementation. If Antalya is to be about implementation and delivering on countries’ commitments, then we need to see Global North governments come clean on their unfulfilled legal obligations under the Paris Agreement’s Article 9.1, in which they agreed they “shall provide financial resources to assist developing countries”.
DCJ stands in solidarity with Palestine and with the peoples across the world who have been on the receiving end of imperial wars, invasions, attacks to their sovereignty and their right to self-determination. We condemn the subjection of civilians to warfare for territory, natural resources, or religious conflict anywhere and everywhere. We stand in strong opposition to the perpetuation of human and environmental suffering across the world. We commit to a solidarity not based in words but in actions. There cannot be emancipation and liberation with ongoing imperial and colonial capitalism, which must be our first priority to dismantle.
This context matters because climate negotiations are not politically neutral spaces. They are shaped by the same global inequalities that produced the crisis. The countries and corporations most responsible for climate breakdown continue to hold disproportionate power over the terms of climate action, while the peoples and communities most affected continue to fight for their rights and justice. Every major issue on the agenda for COP31, from climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage to just transition, fossil fuel phase-out, mitigation and false solutions, reflects a broader struggle over rights, responsibility, redistribution and the future of multilateralism.
Is Nepal’s nightmare the new abnormal?We’ve been warned of Glacier Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs) rates rising in both frequency and intensity along with today’s warmer temperatures and thawing permafrost. Now almost 1,500 Nepalese were killed, over 5,000 still missing and 15,000 rescued. Nepal has suffered one of the worst disasters in its recent history. Yet as the planet continues to warm, communities across the Himalayas face the threat of even more devastating catastrophes. That is, unless we urgently end fossil fuels expansion, rapidly reduce their use and quickly adapt while transitioning to new equitable economic systems aligned with natural limits. Until then, we must build more readiness among international institutions’ to responsibly avoid such catastrophes, let alone respond to and recover from more of them.
Nepal’s disaster shows us that the Paris Agreement Finance Mechanism (including the new Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund) are currently failing front line communities and entire countries across the Global South who are at the frontline of this crisis that did not create and often pushing them further into debt.
A concept note for a project to protect communities in Nepal from GLOFs was submitted to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in February 2018. The $36 million project was approved in July 2025, only seven years later, and commenced in March 2026. While the area struck by the August 2026 disaster is not included in the project, the slow approval process raises serious questions about the capacity of international climate finance to respond quickly to known and growing risks. Frontline communities need resources, safer infrastructure and early warning systems to prepare for disaster. They need the money while there is still time to prevent the loss of lives, livelihoods, culture, ways of living, and not after the damage has been done.
Across the world, not only now in Nepal, communities are confronting escalating climate impacts alongside deepening militarisation, debt crises, economic instability, shrinking civic space, rising authoritarianism and the continued concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a small number of states, corporations and financial actors. The climate crisis is unfolding not in isolation, but resulting from a global political order structured by histories and ongoing acts of colonisation, imperialism, racial capitalism, patriarchy, extractivism and the continued sacrifice of peoples and ecosystems in the pursuit of profit for a few.
Growing Militarism vs Climate JusticeThe ongoing genocide in Palestine, carried out by Israel with the military, political and economic backing of the United States and its allies, has laid bare the brutality and hypocrisy of the present international order. The destruction of Palestinian life, land, food systems, water infrastructure, energy systems, homes, hospitals, schools and places of worship is not only a humanitarian catastrophe. It is also a profound indictment of an international system that claims to uphold human rights, international law and multilateral cooperation while enabling impunity for occupation, apartheid and genocide. For climate justice movements, this moment demands political clarity that there can be no climate justice while genocide is normalised, while occupation is greenwashed, and while current economic systems driven by militarism and fossil fueled capitalism continue to destroy both peoples and ecosystems.
The relationship between militarism and the climate crisis is not incidental. Fossil fuels remain central to modern military power, geopolitical conflicts and domination, and global economic control. Military operations depend on oil, gas and petrochemical supply chains; fossil fuel revenues and infrastructure shape conflicts and geopolitical alliances; and the military-industrial complex absorbs vast public resources that could otherwise be directed towards climate finance, adaptation, public services and just transition. At the same time, war and occupation destroy the very ecosystems that communities need to survive climate impacts: land, water, food, healthcare, housing, energy and social infrastructure.
The Global South continues to bear the brunt of this injustice. Countries and communities that contributed least to the climate crisis are facing the most severe impacts while being denied the resources necessary to respond. Many developing countries are trapped in cycles of debt servicing, austerity and extractive dependency that restrict their ability to invest in adaptation, public services, food sovereignty, energy transition and resilient development. International financial institutions, unequal trade rules, intellectual property barriers and investor protections continue to constrain the policy space required for an ambitious climate action. In this context, calls for ambition that do not address finance, debt, technology and historical responsibility only become new forms of shifting burden.
Real risks to Belem’s breakthroughsCOP30 in Belém created important openings, but it did not resolve these contradictions. The agreement to establish the Just Transition Mechanism (Belém Antalya Mechanism) represented a significant victory for developing countries, workers, Indigenous Peoples, feminist movements, youth, frontline communities and climate justice organisations. It reflected years of organising to ensure that transition is not reduced to market-led technological substitution but understood as a question of justice, rights, livelihoods and systems change. The roadmap process on transitioning away from fossil fuels also opened a political space to confront the root cause of the climate crisis. Progress on adaptation and related implementation processes created additional possibilities for advancing rights-based and peoples-centred climate action.
Yet COP30 also demonstrated the continued resistance of developed countries to fulfilling their obligations. Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, in which developed countries agreed that they “shall provide climate finance” to developing countries, continued to be contested and diluted. Adaptation and loss and damage remained underfunded. Fossil fuel interests and false solutions perpetrators continued to shape climate action. Carbon markets, offsets, carbon capture, financialised nature schemes and other mechanisms continued to be promoted as substitutes for real emissions reductions, public finance and system change.
The outcomes of Belém therefore created both opportunities and risks. COP31 in Antalya is where many of these political battles now move from recognition to operationalisation. This distinction is critical. The fight after Belém is no longer only about whether Parties acknowledge the need for climate finance, just transition, adaptation, loss and damage or fossil fuel phase-out. It is about how those commitments are interpreted, governed, financed and implemented.
Collapsing glaciers causing massive floods downstream now mark a new moment in today’s climate crisis, where treatment by international institutions of the impacted communities fighting for their own survival signals uncertain prospects for forthcoming climate finance. History shows that implementation is often where justice is diluted. Commitments secured through struggle can be narrowed through technical processes, weakened through procedural delays, captured by corporate interests or redirected towards market mechanisms. COP31 must therefore be approached as a political battleground over the future direction of climate action.
DCJ’s Topline Demands for COP31DCJ demands for COP31 are rooted in our clear understanding of climate justice:
- Developed countries must fulfil their obligations under Article 9.1 and provide public, grant-based, predictable and adequate finance to developing countries.
- Adaptation & loss and damage must be financed as matters of rights and reparative justice.
- Just Transition Mechanism (Belem-Antalya Mechanism or BAM) must be operationalised in ways that support systemic transformation across energy, food, care, labour, public services, critical minerals and development pathways.
- Transitions away from fossil fuels must be rapid, equitable, anti-extractivist and grounded in the political vision emerging from Santa Marta.
- Article 6 and other false solutions must not be allowed to delay real action or create new markets for pollution and dispossession.
- Mitigation must remain anchored in equity, CBDR-RC and means of implementation rather than becoming another tool for shifting burdens onto developing countries.
COP31 must also defend the integrity of climate multilateralism itself by:
- protecting civic space, ensuring meaningful participation of rights-holders and movements, and confronting corporate capture within the UNFCCC
- recognising that fossil fuel corporations, big polluters and actors cannot be allowed to define climate solutions or climate action;
- understanding that climate governance will lose legitimacy if it continues to treat demands of the peoples most affected as negotiable while protecting interests of people most responsible.
The climate crisis is often described as a crisis of emissions. It is that, but it is also far more. It is a crisis of colonial history, economic organisation, political power and moral accountability. Addressing it requires more than technical implementation. It requires reparations, redistribution, democratic participation, public finance, energy sovereignty, food sovereignty, gender justice, Indigenous sovereignty and the dismantling of the systems that have made both people and planet expendable.
This position paper sets out DCJ’s priorities for COP31 from that perspective. It is written in the understanding that climate justice will not be delivered through incremental adjustments to an unjust system. It will require confronting the structures that created the crisis and building pathways rooted in collective resistance and survival, feminist care, dignity and liberation. Systems change, not climate change.
Read the full position paper with detailed analysis and demands for all key negotiating topics here. You can also download it below
DCJ COP31 Position PaperDownloadThe post COP31 Position Paper: Advancing Climate Justice in an Age of Crises appeared first on Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice.
Türkiye pushes “zero waste” at COP31, but is it delivering at home?
In the shadow of Ankara’s new international football stadium, a group of visiting journalists – including Climate Home News – perched on tiny chairs watched over by mannequins dressed in old mobile phones, newspapers and bottle tops.
As they sipped Turkish tea in a room meant to educate visitors – mostly schoolchildren – about recycling, they were addressed by Ekrem Yıldırım, lead on zero waste at Türkiye’s environment ministry.
After Yıldırım spoke of Türkiye’s plans to pursue “zero waste”, one journalist asked why the sugar cubes for the tea were individually wrapped in plastic and why water had been served in single-use plastic pots.
Ekrem Yıldırım speaks to journalists about cutting waste while sugar cubes wrapped in plastic are served with tea on September 9, 2026 in Ankara (Photo: Joe Lo/Climate Home News)Yıldırım accepted that this kind of packaging is a problem and glass or porcelain is preferable. He added that legislation to ban single-use packaging has been introduced to parliament, but is not yet finalised.
The situation symbolised what Turkish experts and environmental campaigners flag as a contradiction between the “zero waste” image that the government – represented by First Lady Emine Erdoğan – presents to the world and the reality of rising Turkish waste generation, significant climate-wrecking methane emissions from landfills and a politically influential industry producing plastics from oil and gas.
International campaign lacks domestic punchTürkiye’s Zero Waste initiative – which is a vague plan to reduce waste generation and increase recycling, rather than a specific goal to reach zero waste by any specific date – was launched in 2017.
It came at a time when the Turkish government was under fire for its coal mines, its refusal to ratify the Paris Agreement and its brutal response to protests against plans to turn Gezi Park in Istanbul into a barracks and shopping mall.
Ümit Şahin, climate lead at Sabancı University’s Istanbul Policy Center, said the Turkish government saw then, and still sees, the initiative as “a way to build its international reputation on environmental issues”.
“Recycling gives the government something visible to point to,” he said. “It can promote the campaign without taking on powerful fossil fuel interests or changing its development priorities in mining and energy.”
The campaign has been led by Emine Erdoğan, the wife of Türkiye’s long-time president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In 2022, she convinced countries at the UN General Assembly to create an annual International Day of Zero Waste on March 30.
The “zero waste” magazine with President’s wife Emine Erdoğan, pictured at the zero waste centre in Ankara on September 9, 2026 (Photo: Joe Lo/Climate Home News)COP31 President Murat Kurum has picked up on the theme, saying that zero waste is “one of the main pillars” of Türkiye’s COP31 presidency. In September, he reminisced at a press briefing in the northern city of Trabzon about old-fashioned Turkish rural life where food waste would be given to animals, ripped clothes would be mended, and new attire was only for religious festivals.
President Erdoğan told leaders at September’s UN General Assembly in New York that an “incredible desire for consumption” was fuelling a “culture of waste”. “We cannot speak of justice in a world where tonnes of food are thrown into the garbage on one side while hundreds of millions of people collect food from garbage containers on the other,” he railed.
Sedat Gündoğdu, a marine biologist and environmental researcher at Türkiye’s Çukurova University, told Climate Home News that zero waste is a worthy concept. But when it comes to putting words into action at home, he said, the government has failed. Official statistics show the amount of waste each person in Türkiye generates has remained broadly unchanged since 2010 and the total annual amount has increased by 15%.
Single-use plastics banTo help fix this, an European Union-style ban on single-use plastics – like plastic cutlery, cups and stirrers – was reported by state media in March to be working its way through parliament and expected to come into effect on September 1.
But PAGEV, a Turkish plastics industry trade association, argued that such “restrictive” policies had failed in the EU and would damage the Turkish economy and take away jobs.
Despite COP31 shining an international spotlight on the Turkish waste sector, the ban has yet to be approved by President Erdoğan. Gündoğdu and Greenpeace Türkiye campaigner Berk Butan fear that, if it is approved, it will be watered down so that Turkish companies can make single-use plastics in Türkiye even if they can no longer sell them in the country.
The latter restriction, Gündoğdu argued, would be “meaningless” because it cannot be enforced. Similar measures in Germany and Italy have failed, he said, because manufacturers just relabelled single-use products like plastic straws as multiple-use straws.
To close these loopholes, he said, strict definitions and design criteria are needed, which the Turkish legislation does not have. Butan added that single-use plastics could still be made in Türkiye, and then exported, used and dumped abroad, causing the same environmental damage somewhere else.
Plastic litters a beach in Trabzon on Türkiye’s Black Sea coast on September 11, 2026 (Photo: Joe Lo/Climate Home News)Türkiye’s other flagship waste prevention measure is a tax on plastic bags, which led to an immediate drop in usage when introduced in 2019. But, despite rampant inflation, the tax has risen from 0.25TL in 2019 to just 1TL ($0.02), meaning it’s several times less in real terms than in 2019.
“You can’t even buy chewing gum with one lira,” said Gündoğdu. “If you see one lira on the ground, you will not take it. So that’s why it’s meaningless.” Butan added that the government did not invest in creating behavioural changes among the public, such as encouraging them to shop with reusable textile tote bags. “They just put in the tax and they didn’t do the rest,” he said.
Landfills tidied up but still leaking methaneWhile the amount of waste generated keeps rising, there has been progress in dealing with the waste so that it is at least out of sight. Official statistics suggest more and more of it is being collected and, while the vast majority is still sent to landfill rather than recycled, those landfills are now covered and more advanced than they used to be.
On the outskirts of Ankara, waste management company ITC gave Climate Home News a presentation showing one such transformation. A before image shows what the nearby Mamak landfill looked like in 2006 – a huge open pile of garbage known in Türkiye as a “wild landfill”.
Another image shows what the site looks like now with the rubbish covered up with soil. ITC says that Ankara’s garbage is brought to them on trucks, and sorted into recyclables and biodegradable waste, which is then turned into compost or burned for energy. Waste heat is used to grow blueberries, tomatoes and lavender or to warm shoppers in a nearby branch of the Swedish furniture giant Ikea.
But despite this progress, satellite observations from Carbon Mapper shows the site is still leaking methane – a particularly potent greenhouse gas – into the atmosphere. Exactly how much is unclear from Carbon Mapper’s limited observations but the nearby Sincan landfill leaks about 1,200 kilogrammes of methane an hour into the atmosphere. Climate Home News analysis suggests this does similar damage to the climate as 73,000 petrol cars. ITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In October, a Guardian investigation showed these methane leaks were happening at landfills across Türkiye and are some of the worst in the world. Researchers from the University of California (UCLA) said they were “mind-boggingly large”. Aside from the climate damage, local residents near one Istanbul landfill report a smell so bad they told the Guardian they have to sleep with their windows closed even on hot summer nights.
Waste imports from EuropeDealing with its own growing waste is difficult enough, but Türkiye also imports mountains of plastic from its European neighbours too. Ever since China restricted waste imports, the European Union has exported more plastic waste to Türkiye than to any other nation by far.
Despite European Commission concerns about how well Türkiye deals with the waste, the trade is expected to grow as an EU ban on exports to non-OECD countries – a category that does not include Türkiye – comes into force on November 21.
The export of waste to Türkiye has seen European countries accused of waste imperialism. Butan and Gündoğdu said Türkiye should ban waste imports. But COP31 President and Turkish environment minister Kurum pushed back on this during a press conference in Trabzon in September.
A mannequin dressed in old electrical items at the Zero Waste Centre in Ankara (Photo: Joe Lo/Climate Home News)“You called it waste imperialism,” he said through a translator, but “nobody is forcing anyone” to import waste. He added that handling the waste creates jobs in Türkiye and that it doesn’t matter to the environment where the waste is recycled as long as it is.
But most of Türkiye’s municipal waste is currently not recycled. Turkish official Yıldırım said that the country’s recovery rate is currently around 30%. The most recent statistics available from the EU suggest Türkiye in 2020 had a recycling rate of 12%. The EU country average in 2024 was about 50%.
At the zero waste centre in Ankara, Yıldırım said Türkiye is improving its recycling rate and wants to do even more. The aim, he said, is to reach a rate of 70% by an unspecified date, up there with global frontrunners like Germany.
To achieve that, he said Türkiye is raising awareness of the importance of recycling including through cartoons for children and initiatives for football supporters to collect and redistribute unwanted toys.
A portrait made out of old buttons at the Ankara Zero Waste Centre (Photo: Joe Lo/Climate Home News)As he spoke to journalists, a portrait of the ‘Girl with a Pearl Earring’ made from buttons, a sultan made from old plastic straws and a horse and wolf made from metal cogs and screws looked on. “The world is something that has been entrusted to us, and waste is something you steal from the future,” said Yıldırım.
Climate Home News’ travel and accommodation for the trip on which much of this article was reported was funded by the Turkish government.
The post Türkiye pushes “zero waste” at COP31, but is it delivering at home? appeared first on Climate Home News.
Analysis: Climate-finance pledges fall 70% as countries meet at COP31
The amount of public funding pledged to help developing countries tackle climate change has dropped by more than 70% in 2026, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Developed countries are required under UN climate treaties to provide “climate finance” and have traditionally announced multi-year pledges to feed into their global commitments.
Most of these pledges expired in 2025 and, since then, the US has withdrawn from international climate efforts and many European aid budgets have been cut.
A civil-society tracker shows that only five nations have announced new multi-year pledges, including just one major donor – the UK.
Germany, France and Japan are among the key contributors that have so far failed to set out plans for new climate finance, while none is expected from the US.
As a result, the total amount of public climate finance pledged over the next few years amounts to just $11.7bn a year in spending, down from recent levels of around $40bn.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that global conflict, fiscal constraints and the rise of the far right are all making it harder for developed-country governments to pledge new funds.
As the COP31 summit in Turkey gets underway, developing countries are stressing their urgent need for new finance, after nations agreed to a new global target just two years ago.
Missing pledgesUnder the Paris Agreement, developed countries are obliged to provide climate finance to help developing countries cut their emissions and prepare for climate disasters.
This financial assistance can be channelled through multilateral development banks, UN climate funds and investments “mobilised” from the private sector.
But a large chunk is also expected to come directly from the public coffers of developed countries – primarily their foreign-aid budgets. This public spending has made up roughly a third of climate finance flowing to developing countries in recent years.
The EU, the US and others agreed just two years ago that they would “take the lead” on scaling up annual climate finance from $100bn in the early 2020s to $300bn by 2035.
Donor countries have traditionally supported such goals by announcing multi-year targets that indicate how much they plan to spend on climate finance.
Nearly all of these pledges expired in 2025 – and hardly any major donors have announced new ones to replace them, covering the period out to 2030.
This lack of new commitments is captured in a tracker of old and new financial commitments by climate NGOs NRDC and E3G.
Carbon Brief analysis of this data, based on an annualised breakdown of targets, shows that developed countries had previously pledged around £42bn a year in public finance.
As the chart below shows, based on current pledges, this has fallen by around 71% to £11.8bn, on average, over the remainder of the 2020s.
Not all contributors announced public climate-finance pledges in advance for the pre-2026 period. Some did not hit their stated targets, while others exceeded them.
While official data for 2025 is not yet available, bilateral public finance reached £43.9bn in 2024, broadly in line with the amount pledged by developed countries.
Big contributorsInternational climate finance has been consistently dominated by five nations – Japan, Germany, France, the US and the UK.
These countries – together with the EU – have provided around 90% of all the bilateral, public climate finance going to developing countries in recent years.
Of these key players, only the UK has announced a new pledge, committing £6bn ($8bn) of aid between 2026-27 and 2028-29, plus £6.7bn ($8.9bn) from outside its aid budget.
This accounts for half of all the annual funds pledged from 2026 onwards – averaging $5.7bn a year.
The European Commission makes up most of the remainder, with an average annual contribution of $4.5bn promised out to 2027.
Rather than a new pledge, this is due to the commission promising to spend €28bn ($31.8bn) over its 2021-2027 budget period. Its post-2027 contribution is currently being discussed as part of wider EU budget negotiations.
Canada has promised to spend CA$5.3bn ($4.1bn) by 2030, averaging $860m a year. The Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium have also pledged relatively small sums.
Overall, despite developed countries committing to scale up climate finance, these new pledges are either less ambitious – or only slightly more ambitious – than previous ones. This can be seen in the chart below.
The UK’s pledge appears more ambitious, but this is because the government has changed how it counts climate finance to include $8.9bn in “additional” public finance. When only the like-for-like aid components are compared, the new pledge amounts to a drop in ambition. (For more details, see the methodology.)
The most significant absence is the US, which committed to reaching $11.4bn in annual support by 2024 under the Biden administration.
Since president Donald Trump took power, the US has – for the second time – withdrawn from the Paris Agreement and shrunk its aid budget. It will not provide any official climate finance in the coming years.
Another notable absence is Australia, which is jointly hosting the upcoming COP31 summit, alongside Turkey. Josie Lee, policy and advocacy lead at Oxfam Australia, tells Carbon Brief:
“If Australia fails to announce a climate-finance pledge as president of negotiations, it would send a problematic message to those resisting action on climate change that might serve to embolden their agenda.”
Japan is the largest overall contributor of public climate finance, but it has not traditionally announced targets for this type of spending. Instead, the government set out overall goals that also bundle in finance “mobilised” from the private sector.
As a result, its public-finance ambitions have not been included in this analysis.
So far, the Japanese government has not announced any new multi-year climate-finance pledges, from either the public or the private sector.
European cutsEurope provides the majority of international climate finance, but European governments have massively cut their aid spending in recent years, citing economic strain and defence spending needs.
Germany and France, the two largest European climate-finance contributors, both pledged to reach €6bn ($6.8bn) per year by 2025. Neither has committed to anything beyond that.
Both nations have slashed their aid budgets in recent years, including funding for climate programmes. Germany missed its 2025 climate-finance goal due to these cuts.
Dr Anja Carolin Gebel, a senior policy advisor at Germanwatch, tells Carbon Brief that this issue has become more politically fraught since the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) won the 2025 election and began leading a coalition government:
“The issue of climate change – and, subsequently, climate finance – has taken a back seat in the current government coalition.”
There has also been a political shift in France, Gaïa Febvre, international policy coordinator at Réseau Action Climat, tells Carbon Brief. She adds:
“The upcoming presidential election and the growing influence of the far right are likely to make new international financial commitments politically more difficult.”
Other significant European donors are also undergoing political turmoil.
Spain’s centre-left government has triggered a snap election for the end of November, making a new climate-finance pledge during COP31 less likely.
Following a narrow election win, a centre-left bloc in Sweden is still in the process of trying to form a new coalition government.
Some nations have signalled that their climate finance will continue flowing, even though they have not officially set out specific new pledges.
The Dutch government, for example, has said it will provide “at least” €300m ($334m) of specific climate funding annually out to 2031. However, it has also indicated that its total public climate finance is likely to be considerably higher in both 2026 and 2027.
To highlight the lack of new pledges, developing countries are championing a “climate-finance work programme” at COP31, which could provide a space to discuss scaling up public climate finance from developed countries.
In response, the EU has stressed that its member states are the “largest providers” of public climate finance and called on developing countries to submit overdue plans for cutting emissions. The EU and its member states provided a record €32.3bn ($40bn) in 2025.
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Against this backdrop, EU climate chief Wopke Hoekstra recently told Bloomberg that “any conversation on new fresh money is dead in the water”.
Joe Thwaites, international climate finance director at NRDC, who runs the commitment tracker, tells Carbon Brief that “developed countries would be wise to show how they are continuing to lead on climate finance”. He says:
“The lack of new announcements is making the finance negotiations tougher than they need to be. The debate around the climate-finance work programme is arising because developing countries have little clarity about how much public climate finance there will be in coming years.”
MethodologyThis analysis is based on the climate-finance commitments tracker, run by the NGOs NRDC and E3G, supplemented with additional research.
Only the 23 “developed” countries that are obliged to provide climate finance are considered in this analysis, plus the EU. This includes western Europe, the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Japan and Norway both provide substantial sums of climate finance, but have not announced specific public-finance pledges and therefore are not included.
Carbon Brief converted multi-year pledges into single years, with 2025 used as the baseline “pre-2026” year. Some countries committed to reaching a certain amount “by 2025”, in which case that value is used. Others said they would provide a total amount over several years, in which case the average value per year is used. Belgium, Switzerland and the US only set initial targets as far as 2024, so their 2024 values were used instead of 2025.
These values were compared with the average annual contribution for the remainder of the 2020s, based on the new pledges from the UK, Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Some climate finance has been committed by the Netherlands, but this is not expected to be its total contribution. The EU, Portugal and Greece have earlier pledges that extend into the latter half of the 2020s, although the latter two make very small contributions.
NRDC and E3G include all the UK’s newly pledged public finance in their tracker, including $8.9bn in “additional” public finance, which covers “equity, debt, guarantees, insurance and export credit” to mobilise private finance.
In previous Carbon Brief analysis comparing the UK’s new climate-finance target to its old one, this funding was not included. This is because the government did not previously count these funds towards its climate-finance goals, instead focusing exclusively on aid spending.
This analysis does not include pledges that some countries, including Germany and France, have made to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). However, these pledges would not substantially change the main finding, shifting the overall reduction from 71% to 70%.
related COP31: How Ed Miliband answered Carbon Brief readers’ questions 12.11.2026 COP31 Antalya Analysis: Which countries have sent the most delegates to COP31? 10.11.2026 COP31 Antalya Q&A: What is the Belém-Antalya mechanism for a ‘just transition’? 09.11.2026 COP31 Antalya Interactive: Tracking negotiating texts at the COP31 climate summit 05.11.2026 COP31 AntalyaThe post Analysis: Climate-finance pledges fall 70% as countries meet at COP31 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Nhận định Newcastle vs Arsenal 00h30 ngày 22/11/2026
Newcastle vs Arsenal gặp nhau lúc 00h30 ngày 22/11/2026, St James’ Park thử thách Pháo thủ. Khám phá cuộc chiến trung tuyến và dự báo đội giành 3 điểm.
Trận đấu Newcastle vs Arsenal tại vòng 11 Ngoại hạng Anh 2026/27 hứa hẹn mang đến màn so tài hấp dẫn giữa hai đội bóng có phong độ trái ngược.
Newcastle đang gặp khó khăn trong việc duy trì sự ổn định, trong khi Arsenal thể hiện sức mạnh với vị trí dẫn đầu bảng xếp hạng. Dù phải thi đấu trên sân khách, Pháo thủ vẫn được đánh giá cao hơn nhờ khả năng kiểm soát thế trận và hệ thống phòng ngự chắc chắn.
Tổng quan trận đấu Newcastle vs ArsenalCuộc đối đầu Newcastle vs Arsenal được tổ chức trên sân St James’ Park, thuộc vòng 11 Ngoại hạng Anh mùa giải 2026/27. Đây là trận đấu quan trọng đối với cả hai đội trong cuộc đua giành những vị trí thuận lợi.
Trước vòng đấu, Newcastle đứng thứ 12 với 12 điểm sau 10 trận. Trong khi đó, Arsenal dẫn đầu bảng xếp hạng với 27 điểm, tạo khoảng cách năm điểm so với đội xếp thứ hai Brighton.
Phong độ đội nhà NewcastleNewcastle đang trải qua giai đoạn khó khăn khi chỉ giành một chiến thắng trong năm trận gần nhất trên mọi đấu trường. Đội bóng ghi năm bàn nhưng để thủng lưới sáu lần trong khoảng thời gian này.
Tại Ngoại hạng Anh, Newcastle vừa hòa Fulham 1-1 ngày 7/11 và thất bại 0-1 trước Everton ngày 2/11. Trước đó, họ đánh bại Crystal Palace 2-0 nhưng cũng để thua Aston Villa 0-1.
Những kết quả trên cho thấy Newcastle chưa duy trì được sự ổn định trong cả tấn công lẫn phòng ngự. Đặc biệt, khả năng tận dụng cơ hội đang là vấn đề khiến đội bóng đánh rơi những điểm số quan trọng.
Phong độ đội khách ArsenalArsenal đang thể hiện phong độ ấn tượng tại Ngoại hạng Anh. Sau 10 vòng đấu, Pháo thủ giành chín chiến thắng, nhận một thất bại và chưa có trận hòa nào.
Trong những trận gần đây, Arsenal liên tiếp đánh bại Everton 2-0, Liverpool 1-0 và Hull City 1-0 tại Ngoại hạng Anh. Xen giữa là chiến thắng 2-1 trước Slavia Prague tại Champions League.
Điểm mạnh nổi bật của Arsenal nằm ở khả năng kiểm soát nhịp độ và tổ chức phòng ngự. Đội bóng không cần ghi quá nhiều bàn thắng để giành chiến thắng, bởi hệ thống phòng ngự thường xuyên hạn chế cơ hội của đối phương.t.
Lịch sử đối đầu Newcastle vs ArsenalLịch sử đối đầu Newcastle vs Arsenal chứng kiến những trận đấu khá cân bằng giữa Newcastle và Arsenal. Trong năm lần gặp nhau gần nhất trên mọi đấu trường, Arsenal giành ba chiến thắng, còn Newcastle thắng hai trận.
Đáng chú ý, Arsenal toàn thắng ba cuộc chạm trán gần nhất tại Ngoại hạng Anh. Tuy nhiên, Newcastle từng đánh bại Pháo thủ ở cả hai lượt trận bán kết Cúp Liên đoàn năm 2025.
Những kết quả này cho thấy lợi thế tâm lý đang nghiêng về Arsenal, nhưng Newcastle vẫn có khả năng gây bất ngờ khi được thi đấu trên sân nhà.
Bảng tỷ lệ kèo Newcastle vs Arsenal Dự đoán tỷ số Newcastle vs ArsenalXét về phong độ, chất lượng đội hình và khả năng phòng ngự, Arsenal đang nắm nhiều lợi thế. Pháo thủ sở hữu thành tích ấn tượng và duy trì được sự ổn định trong những trận đấu quan trọng.
Newcastle nhiều khả năng sẽ tập trung phòng ngự, tranh chấp quyết liệt ở khu vực giữa sân và tận dụng các tình huống phản công. Tuy nhiên, việc xuyên thủng hàng phòng ngự Arsenal không phải nhiệm vụ dễ dàng.
Với khả năng kiểm soát thế trận tốt hơn, đội khách được kỳ vọng tạo ra khác biệt từ những tình huống phối hợp hoặc bóng cố định.
90phut dự đoán tỷ số Newcastle vs Arsenal: 0-2 FT.
Kết luậnTrận đấu Newcastle vs Arsenal ngày 22/11/2026 được đánh giá sẽ diễn ra quyết liệt khi 2 đội đều đặt mục tiêu giành điểm. Newcastle sở hữu lợi thế sân nhà, nhưng phong độ thiếu ổn định khiến họ gặp nhiều bất lợi.
Trong khi đó, Arsenal đang dẫn đầu Ngoại hạng Anh với hàng phòng ngự chắc chắn và khả năng tận dụng cơ hội hiệu quả. Nếu tiếp tục duy trì phong độ hiện tại, Pháo thủ nhiều khả năng giành chiến thắng 2-0, qua đó củng cố vị trí số một trên bảng xếp hạng.
Nhận định Tottenham vs Ipswich 22h00 ngày 21/11/2026
Tottenham vs Ipswich vào lúc 22h00 ngày 21/11/2026 hứa hẹn khó lường. Spurs cần sắc bén khi dứt điểm, còn Ipswich trông chờ những pha bóng cố định.
Trận đấu Tottenham vs Ipswich tại vòng 11 Ngoại hạng Anh 2026/27 là màn so tài hấp dẫn giữa hai đội bóng đang tìm kiếm sự ổn định. Tottenham có lợi thế sân nhà cùng chất lượng đội hình nhỉnh hơn, trong khi Ipswich quyết tâm tạo bất ngờ để cải thiện vị trí trên bảng xếp hạng.
Tổng quan trận đấu Tottenham vs IpswichTrận Tottenham vs Ipswich diễn ra lúc 22h00 ngày 21/11/2026. Cuộc đối đầu thuộc vòng 11 Ngoại hạng Anh và được tổ chức trên sân Tottenham Hotspur Stadium. Lịch thi đấu đã được câu lạc bộ Tottenham xác nhận.
Trước trận đấu, Tottenham đứng thứ 11 với 12 điểm sau 10 vòng, trong khi Ipswich xếp thứ 14. Khoảng cách trên bảng xếp hạng không quá lớn, khiến màn so tài này có ý nghĩa quan trọng với cả hai đội.
Phong độ đội nhà TottenhamTottenham đang trải qua giai đoạn thi đấu với nhiều biến động tại Ngoại hạng Anh. Trong năm vòng gần nhất, Spurs giành ba chiến thắng, một trận hòa và nhận một thất bại.
Đội bóng London lần lượt hòa Manchester United 1-1, đánh bại Coventry City 3-1, Chelsea 2-0 và Crystal Palace 2-0. Tuy nhiên, ở trận gần nhất ngày 7/11, Tottenham bất ngờ thất bại 0-1 trước Leeds United.
Kết quả này khiến Tottenham bỏ lỡ cơ hội cải thiện vị trí trên bảng xếp hạng. Dù vậy, ba chiến thắng liên tiếp trước đó cho thấy Spurs vẫn có khả năng tạo ra sự khác biệt khi vận hành hiệu quả hệ thống chiến thuật.
Phong độ đội khách IpswichIpswich bước vào cuộc đối đầu với phong độ chưa thực sự ổn định. Trong năm trận Ngoại hạng Anh gần nhất, đội bóng giành một chiến thắng, hai trận hòa và nhận hai thất bại.
Ipswich từng đánh bại Fulham 2-1, trước khi để thua Manchester City 2-3, hòa Nottingham Forest 1-1 và Hull City 2-2. Ở vòng đấu gần nhất ngày 8/11, họ tiếp tục thất bại 1-2 trước Bournemouth.
Những kết quả trên cho thấy Ipswich vẫn có khả năng ghi bàn trước nhiều đối thủ khác nhau. Tuy nhiên, hàng phòng ngự thường xuyên để lộ khoảng trống, đặc biệt trong những thời điểm phải chống đỡ sức ép liên tục.
Lịch sử đối đầu Tottenham vs IpswichLịch sử đối đầu Tottenham vs Ipswich cho thấy Ipswich không phải đối thủ dễ chịu đối với Tottenham. Trong sáu lần gặp nhau gần nhất tại Ngoại hạng Anh, Ipswich giành bốn chiến thắng, còn Tottenham thắng hai trận.
Đáng chú ý, Tottenham từng thất bại 1-2 ngay trên sân nhà trước Ipswich vào tháng 11/2024. Tuy nhiên, Spurs đã đáp trả bằng chiến thắng 4-1 trong lần chạm trán gần nhất vào tháng 2/2025.
Bảng tỷ lệ kèo Tottenham vs Ipswich Dự đoán tỷ số Tottenham vs IpswichXét về phong độ gần đây, chất lượng đội hình và lợi thế sân nhà, Tottenham đang có nhiều cơ sở để hướng đến chiến thắng. Spurs thắng ba trong năm trận Ngoại hạng Anh gần nhất, trong khi Ipswich chỉ giành một chiến thắng.
Tottenham nhiều khả năng sẽ chủ động kiểm soát bóng, triển khai tấn công từ hai biên và tạo sức ép lên hàng phòng ngự đối phương. Tuy nhiên, hiệu quả dứt điểm vẫn là yếu tố quyết định.
90phut dự đoán tỷ số Tottenham vs Ipswich: 2-1 FT.
Kết luậnTrận đấu Tottenham vs Ipswich ngày 21/11/2026 hứa hẹn diễn ra hấp dẫn khi cả hai đội đều quyết tâm cải thiện vị trí tại Ngoại hạng Anh. Tottenham có lợi thế sân nhà và phong độ tốt hơn, nhưng Ipswich sở hữu thành tích đối đầu đáng chú ý.
Nếu duy trì khả năng kiểm soát thế trận và cải thiện hiệu suất ghi bàn, Spurs có nhiều cơ hội giành trọn ba điểm. Dự đoán Tottenham đánh bại Ipswich với tỷ số 2-1, qua đó tạo bước đệm tích cực cho những vòng đấu tiếp theo.
Roadside and meadow wildflowers: how to identify the common ones
Every summer I pull over on the same gravel shoulder outside a small Ohio town, because a ditch that looked like plain weeds in June turns into a patchwork of blue, white, and yellow by July. For years I called most of it “pretty stuff.” Then I learned that a few simple clues sort roadside plants into recognizable groups, and the ditch started to read like a page of text. This guide covers those clues and the common species you are most likely to meet across the US.
Start with the clues, not the nameBeginners often flip through a field guide hunting for a matching photo. A better approach is to collect four or five facts first, then narrow the options.
- Flower shape. Is it a daisy-like head with a center disk, a flat or umbrella-shaped cluster, a tall spike, or a pea-like blossom?
- Color and petal count. Count petals if you can. Five, four, and “too many to count” point toward different families.
- Leaf arrangement. Are leaves paired across from each other, alternating up the stem, or in a ring (whorl)? Are the edges smooth, toothed, or lobed?
- Habitat. Dry gravel shoulder, damp ditch, mowed lawn edge, or tallgrass meadow? Plants are picky about where they live.
- Bloom time. Early summer, midsummer, and fall blooms narrow the list quickly.
The aster family is the largest group you will meet along roads, and its members share a basic design: a central disk surrounded by “petals” that are really individual ray flowers.
Black-eyed Susan and its relativesRudbeckia hirta has golden-orange rays and a dark brown dome in the middle. Stems and leaves feel bristly, almost like sandpaper. It blooms from June into September in most of the country. Coneflowers look similar, but their central cone rises higher and the petals droop.
Oxeye daisyWhite rays, a yellow center, and deeply toothed leaves that clasp the stem. It is common in sunny meadows from the Northeast to the Pacific Northwest. Compare it with Shasta daisy, a garden escapee with broader, glossier leaves.
ChicoryOne of my favorites. The sky-blue flowers sit tight against a stiff, almost leafless stem, and each ray ends in tiny teeth. Blooms open in the morning and often close by afternoon, so check early. Chicory thrives in compacted gravel where little else will grow.
Goldenrod and astersIn late summer, goldenrod’s arching plumes of tiny yellow flowers take over fields. It gets blamed for hay fever, but ragweed, which blooms at the same time with unremarkable green flowers, is the real culprit. In fall, purple New England aster joins in, with 40 or more thin rays around a yellow center.
Flat-topped clusters and the lookalike problemUmbrella-shaped flower heads (umbels) deserve extra attention, because some plants in this shape are harmless and others are dangerous.
Queen Anne’s lace (wild carrot) has a lacy white flower head, often with a single dark purple floret in the center. Its stem is hairy, and the leaves smell like carrot when crushed. Poison hemlock looks similar at a glance, but its stem is smooth, hairless, and marked with purple blotches. It grows taller and has a musty odor. Hemlock is highly toxic, so if you cannot tell them apart, do not pick either one, and wear gloves if you handle unknown umbels.
Yarrow is another flat-topped plant, but its clusters are smaller, and its feathery, fern-like leaves are the giveaway. Common milkweed has rounded pink-mauve clusters, broad opposite leaves, and milky sap. Its presence usually means monarch caterpillars are nearby.
Quick comparison of common lookalikes Plant pair Key difference Queen Anne’s lace vs. poison hemlock Hairy stem vs. smooth, purple-spotted stem Oxeye daisy vs. fleabane Few wide rays vs. many thread-like rays Dame’s rocket vs. wild phlox Four petals vs. five petals Black-eyed Susan vs. purple coneflower Flat dark dome with spreading rays vs. spiky raised cone with drooping rays Spikes, peas, and purple hazeRed clover has round pink-magenta heads and leaflets marked by a pale V-shaped chevron. White clover is its lower-growing cousin. Birdsfoot trefoil, a yellow pea-family plant, gets its name from seed pods that spread like a bird’s toes. Crown vetch and cow vetch scramble over banks with clusters of purple-pink flowers on trailing stems.
For tall spikes, look at blue vervain in damp ditches, with slender candelabra-like branches of small violet flowers. Wild bergamot (bee balm) has shaggy lavender heads and minty-smelling leaves. Joe-Pye weed towers up to seven feet in wet spots, with whorls of leaves and dusty pink flower clusters.
Habits that make identification easier- Photograph the whole plant, a close-up of the flower, the leaf attachment, and the base. Four shots usually settle a question later.
- Note what is growing around it. Plants cluster in communities.
- Use a free app such as iNaturalist or Seek as a second opinion, not the final word. Confirm with a regional field guide or a state extension service.
- Check the date. A meadow looks completely different in May than in September.
- Leave flowers where they are. Roadside plants may carry exhaust residue or herbicide, and picking removes food for pollinators. Some species are protected, and rules vary by state.
You do not need to learn fifty species in a weekend. Pick five from this list, find them on your next drive or walk, and run through the clues until the process feels automatic. Once you can sort a ditch by flower shape and leaf pattern, new plants stop being a blur and start being puzzles you can solve. A regional field guide and your local native plant society or extension office are good next steps for filling in species specific to your area.
Progressives Go to D.C. to Address Affordability, War in Iran and Weak Democratic Leadership w/ Sam Rosenthal
Home & Northwest Methane Hazards
Connect with your community and 350 Spokane, Citizens Allied for Integrity and Accountability, Dorothy Day Labor Forum, Idaho Clinicians for Climate and Health, Sierra Club Idaho Chapter, Stop Northwest Gas Expansion Coalition, Veterans for Peace Spokane Chapter 35, and Wild Idaho Rising Tide (WIRT), for a screening of a parody horror film with interviews, live panel and organizer discussions, and popcorn and snacks across Idaho and eastern Washington next week!
* Sunday, November 15, 11 am to 1 pm MST
Lost Grove Brewing, 1026 South La Pointe Street, Boise, Idaho
* Tuesday, November 17, 7 to 9 pm PST
1912 Center Arts Room, 412 East Third Street, Moscow, Idaho
* Wednesday, November 18, 7 to 9 pm PST
Magic Lantern Theatre, 25 West Main Avenue, Spokane, Washington
Co-hosting organizations plan to show The Monster in the House: Untold Dangers of Toxic Natural Gas, a short, spooky film produced by Circumpunct Studios and released before Halloween. This touring horror flick/documentary intermingles insightful interviews of environmental advocates talking about the dangers of “natural gas” (methane) in homes and offering solutions for just energy transitions.
In Boise, Moscow, and/or Spokane, we gratefully welcome six panelists:
* Shelley Brock, board of directors president of Citizens Allied for Integrity and Accountability
* David Camp, board and policy team member of 350 Spokane
* Peter Fargo, environment and energy program manager for Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon and a Stop Northwest Gas Expansion Coalition coordinator
* Ethan Sims, MD, founder and executive director of Idaho Clinicians for Climate and Health
* Helen Yost, community organizer with Wild Idaho Rising Tide
* Lisa Young, director of the Idaho Chapter of the Sierra Club
At all three gatherings, appreciated speakers and experienced activists will provide interactive discussions and question and answer sessions about the harms to health, safety, and climate caused by methane gas, Idaho campaigns against gas wells drilled next to the Payette River and in dense neighborhoods, Idaho Power applications for the Peregrine and South Hills methane power plants near the Snake River and Twin Falls, three new, proposed, Williams gas pipelines (Silver Spur from Nevada to Idaho, Rockies Columbia Connector on the north side of the Columbia River Gorge, and Trail in central Washington), and regional, artificial intelligence (AI) data center threats to shared water, air, energy, and public lands.
Come and join these informative conversations to learn more about the risks to local communities of accelerating, Northwest, gas infrastructure and data center development, and ways to prepare for and participate in upcoming resistance. Please print and post the attached flyer, visit WIRT website and facebook pages and/or contact event co-hosting organizations for further information, and watch The Monster in the House trailer on the StopGas.org coalition website. We hope to see you there!
Court’s methylene chloride decision leaves public health in danger
For decades, EPA has known that methylene chloride, a chemical used in products such as paint strippers and adhesives, can cause cancer, damage the brain, and be deadly for consumers and workers. But a federal court struck down a 2024 rule banning all consumer and most commercial uses of methylene chloride and sent EPA back to the drawing board after 12 years of work on this harmful substance.
The post Court’s methylene chloride decision leaves public health in danger appeared first on Toxic-Free Future.
Who’s Blocking Climate Finance in the Global North?
11 November, 2026
Who’s Blocking Climate Finance in the Global North?
Antalya, Turkey – The International Court of Justice in last year’s landmark Advisory Opinion on the responsibilities of States with regard to climate change, clearly called the provision of public finance to developing countries, a binding legal obligation of developed countries, including for loss and damage. Yet the countries who got rich by exploiting the people of the Global South and plundering their resources continue to fail to provide the climate finance they owe developing countries for their climate action. This includes their Nationally Determined Contributions, National Adaptation Plans and Technology Action Plans. At the same time they continue to pull every trick possible to avoid any meaningful discussion about provision of public grant based climate finance at COP31.
Last year at COP30 in Belem governments agreed to begin a Climate Finance Work Programme to hold rich countries accountable to their obligations. However, the Global North not only continues to block progress at COP31, but has significantly reduced their climate contributions while increasing their military budgets and subsidising fossil fuels.
Join us to hear from the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ) members as they shed light on the reality of the political forces and the key actors whose tactics are not only derailing climate talks at Antalya but also worsening the climate crisis globally.
WHEN: 11 November 2026 | 11AM Antalya Time (8AM GMT) online link
WHERE: Press Conference 2, Area D4
WHO:
- Laurie van der Burg, Oil Change International
- Leon Sealy Huggins, War on Want
- Niranjali Amerasinghe, ActionAid USA
- David Williams, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
- Victor Menotti, Moderator, Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice
For interviews and other queries:
Juliah Kibochi & Sidharth Pandey
juliah.dcj@gmail.com
sidharth.dcj@gmail.com
The post Who’s Blocking Climate Finance in the Global North? appeared first on Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice.
Civil Society Groups to House: Support Every Article of Impeachment for Hegseth
On Tuesday, a coalition of more than 40 civil society organizations sent a letter calling on all House members to vote for every article of impeachment filed against Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. On Monday, Rep. Thomas Massie filed the eight articles and the House is expected to begin voting on them Tuesday evening. In their letter, the groups called out Hegseth’s prosecution of the unauthorized Iran war, his approval of lethal military strikes on fishing boats and his unprecedented political attacks on Sen. Mark Kelly (D-AZ) as reasons to support impeachment.
The letter demands that members defend Congress’s constitutional authority consistently including in Iran, Venezuela, the boat strikes and Yemen, regardless of members’ views on the politics of any particular operation. The coalition behind the letter include Demand Progress, MoveOn, OxFam America, Public Citizen and 39 other organizations.
“Pete Hegseth’s time at the Pentagon has done grievous harm to the nation and to the Constitution,” said Demand progress Senior Policy Advisor Cavan Kharrazian. “This is a man who ignored the will of Congress to execute an illegal war in Iran, kidnapped a foreign leader for oil, restarted war on Yemen, sent missiles to kill suspected drug traffickers and weaponized the Pentagon against a political enemy. Every House member who cares about the Constitution must vote for every single article of impeachment filed against Pete Hegseth.”
“Congress never authorized the war with Iran,” stated the letter. “Secretary Hegseth directed U.S. forces into hostilities in violation of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. Both chambers went further and adopted H. Con. Res. 86, directing the President to withdraw U.S. forces from hostilities with Iran. The Pentagon continued the war anyway. A vote to impeach would affirm that a defense secretary can be held accountable for carrying on a war Congress never authorized and expressly called on the President to end.”
Alaska Wilderness League Announces 2026 Adam Kolton Alaska Storytelling Grant Recipient
Koyukon Dené storyteller and filmmaker Brittany Woods-Orrison will receive $20,000 to document the traditions, knowledge, and relationships connecting Alaska Native communities to the land and wildlife
WASHINGTON, D.C. — Alaska Wilderness League is pleased to announce Brittany Woods-Orrison as the 2026 recipient of the Adam Kolton Alaska Storytelling Grant, an annual award established in memory of AWL’s late executive director to support storytellers whose work brings Alaska’s wild lands, waters, wildlife, and communities to life.
Woods-Orrison, a Koyukon Dené storyteller, filmmaker, and photographer raised on her family’s traditional homelands of Dleł Taneets along the Yukon River, will receive a $20,000 unrestricted grant to support the production of a documentary film exploring the importance of traditional hunting, hide tanning, and the intergenerational sharing of Indigenous knowledge.
“At its heart, this is a film about a father handing down his knowledge to his daughter, and about our responsibility to the land and the animals that sustain us. I think that’s what makes this project particularly special to me,” said Sam Kolton, Adam Kolton’s son and AWL board member-elect. “So much of what I carry with me from my dad comes from the time we spent together and the things he passed down to me. And I think Brittney’s film captures just how important it is to preserve those stories and traditions for future generations. I know my dad would have loved it.”
The Adam Kolton Alaska Storytelling Grant was established in 2022 to honor the legacy of Adam Kolton, who led Alaska Wilderness League from 2017 to 2021 and dedicated his career to protecting Alaska’s wild lands and waters. A passionate advocate for Alaska’s Indigenous communities, Adam recognized the importance of elevating the voices and stories of the people whose lives and cultures are inseparable from these landscapes.
Made possible through generous contributions to the Adam Kolton Memorial Fund, the annual grant provides $20,000 in unrestricted funding to support an Alaska-based storytelling project, along with opportunities to collaborate with Alaska Wilderness League to share that work with audiences beyond the state.
“Adam understood that protecting Alaska’s wild places was ultimately about protecting the people, cultures, and communities that call them home,” said Kristen Miller, executive director of Alaska Wilderness League. “He believed deeply in the power of storytelling to build connections and inspire people to take action. Brittany’s work embodies that spirit. By sharing a story rooted in cultural knowledge, family, and an enduring relationship with the land, she is helping preserve traditions while reminding all of us why these connections matter. We’re honored to support her work and help bring this important story to a wider audience.”
As Woods-Orrison moves into production, she plans to work with a fluent Gwich’in speaker on narration and collaborate with Alaska Wilderness League on an impact campaign to bring the film to festivals, conferences, and communities. The goal is not only to preserve a family’s story, but to create opportunities for more people to understand, appreciate, and engage with the knowledge and traditions that continue to shape life in Alaska.
To learn more about the Adam Kolton Alaska Storytelling Grant and its past recipients, visit AlaskaWild.org/storytelling-grant.
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Democrats should wield their power to return agency to ordinary people
This article Democrats should wield their power to return agency to ordinary people was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
Too often, we have seen a fundamental asymmetry at work: When Democrats win power, they might pass a modest minimum wage increase. When Republicans are in power, they do things like decimate public sector unions. In the long term, this is an imbalance that leads to ruin.
Last week’s “blue tsunami” represented a resounding repudiation of the Trump agenda. While it is common that a sitting administration will lose seats in the midterm elections, swings of the magnitude that we have just witnessed are rare and important. For certain, Trump will still try to use the executive branch to wreak havoc on democracy and provide egregious giveaways for the billionaire class. However, Democratic control of the Senate and the investigatory power of its majority in the House should provide an important check on his ability to do damage.
Perhaps more importantly, progressive forces made critical gains at the state level. The Democrats won six new “trifectas”: in Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Now, if current leads in Kansas and Alaska hold, “about 75 percent of Americans will live in states with Democratic governors,” and roughly 53 percent will reside in places where Democrats control both chambers of the state legislature as well, Newsweek reports.
Of course, we should not assume that Democrats will use their newfound power effectively if left to their own devices. There are significant blocs of the Democratic Party wherein centrist politicians have made careers of “playing to the middle” and embracing pro-corporate neoliberal politics. Should this tendency prevail, the Democrats will have squandered a historic opportunity, to the detriment of social movements and the broader American public alike.
#newsletter-block_eb3a128379d8a460bc42e9c508c81dd2 { background: #ECECEC; color: #000000; } #newsletter-block_eb3a128379d8a460bc42e9c508c81dd2 #mc_embed_signup_front input#mce-EMAIL { border-color:#000000 !important; color: #000000 !important; } Sign Up for our NewsletterForging an alternative path will mean pushing newly empowered legislators to think and act differently. Passing policies that make a real difference in the lives of working people is critical; however, this is only a first step. For movements for social and economic justice to secure long-term wins, they need to be advocating for how they — and their allies in office — can pursue structural reforms.
A few years ago, after the 2022 midterms, my brother Paul and I wrote an article looking at the trifecta power that Democrats had gained in multiple states and asking, “Will they actually use it?” More specifically, it asked whether they would use their mandate “to enact changes that increase democratic participation and build progressive power” over the long haul.
When Republicans have gained majorities at the state level “they have used their power to push through reforms that weaken left-leaning constituencies and undermine the Democratic base,” we wrote at the time. “In contrast, when Democrats have been in the majority, they often have failed to reverse these changes or enact meaningful structural reforms — the kind of changes that both improve people’s lives and build power for the grassroots groups that can help them govern on an ongoing basis.”
Structural reforms can come in many varieties: labor rights, campaign finance issues, measures to encourage and expand voting, redistricting, preemption laws determining whether issues are handled at the state or local level, free speech protections, regulatory modifications that allow for community involvement, and changes to the tort system, to name just a few. More than the specific issue or need addressed by a policy, being attuned to structural reforms means paying attention to how a change gives grassroots forces greater room to maneuver and reach for more in the future.
For social movements, structural reforms are a key mechanism of inside-outside politics, through which grassroots organizations work to elect champions into office who then, in turn, use the power of government to strengthen democratic participation and boost outside campaigns for social justice. Unfortunately, the right often has a better understanding of this process than liberals do.
A dramatic example of how Republicans used statewide governing power to alter the balance of forces was how Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker, upon gaining a trifecta in 2010, sought to permanently kneecap unions. Recognizing the importance of organized labor as a foundational part of the Democratic coalition, conservatives made Wisconsin a so-called “right-to-work” state. They also passed the notorious Act 10, which severely restricted the bargaining rights of public sector unions and subjected them to an onerous series of requirements to even continue existing. As a result, these unions lost approximately 70 percent of their members by 2021.
In contrast, when it comes to fighting back, Democrats have a distressing track record of failure and self sabotage. When Iowa Gov. Chet Culver presided over a Democratic trifecta in 2008, he vetoed a bill restoring labor rights, despite having run on a promise to reverse right-to-work. In his fecklessness, he was joined by Colorado Gov. Bill Ritter, who similarly vetoed several pro-union measures, despite having heavily relied on the support of the labor movement to gain office. Both ended up being one-term governors.
In understanding the difference in outcomes, we need only consider what conservative anti-tax leader Grover Norquist chillingly wrote about the impact of Republican actions in Wisconsin: “Trump’s tweets attract attention,” he remarked. “Act 10 moves forward. Quietly. Inexorably. Changing the political landscape like a glacier.”
Previous CoverageDemocrats commonly talk about reforms that might help people in their everyday lives, like improving public education or incentivizing developers to create more affordable housing, but they don’t focus on shifting power in the long term. “Even in trifecta states, Democrats’ strategy still amounts to playing defense,” Paul and I wrote. “Going on offense would entail learning from the Right’s unashamed boldness. It would mean using Democratic majorities to build social movements and redistribute power and resources in a more durable way — putting a premium on the types of changes sometimes discussed as ‘policy feedback loops’ or theorized by socialists as ‘non-reformist reforms.’”
Which brings us to today. In the last two years, we have seen a relentless program from Trump not just to advance conservative policy objectives, but to punish social movements and shift the balance of power in favor of reactionaries. Much of this has happened at the federal level, although it has often been backed up by state-level action. The administration has continued the broader Republican strategy of systematically attacking unions, ending collective bargaining rights for over one million federal employees, and advancing a broad slate of anti-worker policies.
But while the labor movement is a critical pillar of support for the left that has been under siege, it is hardly the only one. Trump has systematically targeted social institutions perceived as refuges of progressive values, such as universities and the nonprofit sector. The administration launched an assault on large law firms that might once have filed lawsuits to help provide some accountability for administration misdeeds. He has likewise aggressively sought to restrict voting rights, encouraged Republicans to pursue new heights of gerrymandering, terrorized the immigrant community, and worked to criminalize dissent.
Each of these moves has something in common. They do not merely aim to enact conservative policies; they seek to permanently consolidate the power of right-wing groups and weaken the ability of any opposing institutions to resist.
In this election, the Republican attempts to entrench themselves failed to overcome the backlash generated by an unpopular war, high gas prices and increased cost of living, Trump’s brazen corruption, and the shocking federal occupation of major cities in the name of immigration enforcement. Movements worked hard to fuel this backlash, but we cannot count on such dramatic surges in public disgust to appear regularly. And we should not underestimate the impact of structurally minded maneuvers, which at times have protected conservatives from successful democratic challenge for decades.
The need for progressive movements and their elected allies to pursue structural reforms is not about tit-for-tat retaliation. There is a fundamental difference between enacting changes designed to reinforce privilege, profit, minority rule and the power of the wealthy, and those designed to expand voting rights, bolster democratic participation, and increase the ability for ordinary people to have a voice in their workplaces and in the public sphere alike. The goal of structural reforms by progressives is not to consolidate the power of a tyrant like Trump, but to increase power that is wielded democratically. Indeed, the danger is that centrist Democrats — themselves beholden to wealthy donors and often susceptible to threats of capital flight — prove unwilling to challenge fundamentally anti-democratic forces when given the opportunity.
#support-block_a53b7ac3613b8e689eac5168b8eb1f9b { background: #000000; color: #ffffff; } Support UsWaging Nonviolence depends on reader support. Make a donation today!
DonateThere have been some reasons for hope — and some examples of what the pursuit of structural changes can look like. Responding to a concerted campaign by organized labor, Michigan Democrats did, in fact, reverse their state’s “right-to-work” law in 2023, making Michigan the first to ever do so. The victories of progressives in Minnesota, who used inside-outside strategies to pass a variety of important gains, including expanded organizing and voting rights, is also a model that has become increasingly heralded in recent years.
In New York City, Mayor Zohran Mamdani has created an Office of Mass Engagement, meant to encourage people to actively involve themselves in city politics outside of elections, and an Office of Worker Power, designed to help workers exercise their rights to organize. These are important examples of how government can seek to strengthen grassroots movements, even as it delivers on issues of affordability.
Overall, the yardstick by which we measure Democratic progress should not just be whether the policies they pass provide immediate benefits, but how these initiatives serve to reduce corporate power and return political agency to ordinary people.
The damage that Trump has wrought will not be easily reversed. But if progressive movements are to revitalize democracy and reverse trends toward oligarchic rule, we must think structurally and push for the kind of reforms that build power that can last for more than one wave.
This article Democrats should wield their power to return agency to ordinary people was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
Shell’s Nigerian Gas Exit: An Independent Investigation into the Vaaris Deals, a $600 Million Financing and the Questions Left Unanswered
AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION
By the Donovan–Shell Archive
10 November 2026
Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT, using original Shell and TotalEnergies corporate announcements, Nigerian Stock Exchange regulatory disclosures, financial statements, transaction advisers’ published records, contemporaneous Nigerian reporting and historical material preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.
Shell is preparing to withdraw from a business that has connected Nigerian factories to natural gas for more than a quarter of a century. The proposed buyer is Vaaris Energy Limited. But the announcement comes amid another significant change in the country’s petroleum industry: a separately identified company, Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, has acquired interests in the former Shell-operated Niger Delta joint venture in an $800 million transaction supported by $600 million in secured borrowing facilities. The transactions concern different assets, different sellers and distinct legal entities. New regulatory documents establish some of the ownership relationships behind the larger acquisition, while leaving important questions about Shell’s own gas-network sale unanswered.
Introduction: Two transactions, one familiar corporate nameOn 13 October 2026, Shell announced that it had agreed to sell its entire interest in the Shell Nigeria Gas Group.
The proposed purchaser was Vaaris Energy Limited.
The business being sold was not an offshore oilfield, an LNG export plant or an international gas trading operation.
It was a Nigerian domestic gas distribution company.
According to Shell, the business operated approximately 170 kilometres of pipelines across Ogun, Abia and Rivers states, supplying more than 130 connected industrial and commercial customers.
For those customers, the business provides an important physical link between Nigeria’s gas supply system and the factories and commercial premises that depend upon it.
Shell said the sale would allow it to concentrate on strategic deepwater and integrated gas activities.
It also stated that the transaction remained subject to regulatory approvals.
The financial consideration was not disclosed.
Two weeks later, another major transaction attracted attention.
On 27 October, TotalEnergies announced that it had completed the sale of its 10% non-operated interest in the Renaissance joint venture, formerly known as the Shell Petroleum Development Company joint venture.
The purchaser was identified as Vaaris.
The price was $800 million.
Then, on 4 November, international law firm Bracewell disclosed that it had advised Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited on $600 million in secured borrowing-base facilities used to help finance that acquisition.
An additional document provides an important piece of the corporate picture.
Seplat Energy’s financial results, published on 29 October, identify Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited as controlled by Platform Petroleum, a shareholder of Seplat.
The same filing identifies a director serving on both the Seplat and Vaaris Resources boards.
Taken together, the documents reveal a substantial transfer of Nigerian petroleum interests from international companies to Nigerian-controlled businesses.
But they also create a danger for journalists.
Shell’s gas-network buyer and the purchaser of TotalEnergies’ oil interests must not be treated as the same legal company merely because both transactions involve the Vaaris name.
The distinction is fundamental.
And understanding it is the starting point for this investigation.
Sources: Shell Nigeria
1. What exactly is Shell selling?Shell Nigeria Gas Limited was established in 1998.
Its business is supplying natural gas to industrial and commercial customers.
It operates distribution pipelines and associated infrastructure connecting gas supplies to consumers.
This is a different activity from discovering or producing natural gas.
It is also different from liquefying gas for export.
Shell’s announcement expressly states that Shell Nigeria Gas does not operate in upstream gas production, LNG or international gas trading.
That distinction helps explain why the company can be sold while Shell continues participating in other Nigerian gas activities.
The disposal includes Shell Nigeria Gas Holding B.V., a company established in 2019.
According to Shell, the holding company owns all except one share in Shell Nigeria Gas Limited.
The transaction therefore concerns an established operating business with infrastructure and customers, rather than a proposed development awaiting construction.
Its network extends across three Nigerian states.
Ogun contains major manufacturing centres.
Rivers and Abia are also important locations for industrial and commercial gas consumption.
For connected customers, gas distribution infrastructure can provide a direct alternative to generating heat and electricity from diesel or other fuels.
Its usefulness depends upon reliable gas supply, maintained pipelines, suitable pressure and metering facilities, and the ability to deliver gas when customers require it.
A change in corporate ownership does not remove those operational requirements.
Shell’s announcement confirmed that the business would continue serving customers as usual pending completion of the sale.
That assurance is relevant.
The buyer is acquiring a business whose value depends substantially upon the continued operation of its physical network and customer relationships.
The proposed sale is therefore not merely a transfer of shares. It would transfer ownership of an established industrial energy distribution business.
Original source: Shell’s announcement of the proposed sale, 13 October 2026. Shell Nigeria
2. The price of Shell’s sale has not been disclosedOne important fact must be established before considering the other transactions.
Shell has not publicly identified the purchase price for its Nigerian gas distribution business in the original announcement examined.
Nor does the announcement disclose the purchaser’s financing arrangements.
The available documents do not establish whether the transaction will be funded through cash reserves, debt, investor contributions or some combination.
The complete sale and purchase agreement has not been obtained for this investigation.
Consequently, the public record examined does not establish the allocation of contractual risk between seller and purchaser.
It also does not establish the exact treatment of outstanding obligations, investment commitments or other commercial arrangements.
There is no basis for assigning the $800 million figure reported in the separate TotalEnergies transaction to Shell’s sale.
There is likewise no basis for assuming that the $600 million financing announced by Bracewell was raised to purchase Shell Nigeria Gas.
Those amounts belong to a different, expressly identified acquisition.
The distinction matters because the two transactions have sometimes appeared in adjacent industry coverage during a period of rapid Nigerian petroleum divestment.
The similarities in corporate naming do not establish common transaction values or identical financing arrangements.
A credible account must preserve the distinction.
PART TWO: THE OTHER VAARIS TRANSACTION 3. TotalEnergies completes an $800 million saleOn 27 October 2026, TotalEnergies announced the completion of the divestment of its 10% non-operated interest in the Renaissance joint venture.
The aggregate consideration was $800 million.
The assets involved had a long history.
They formed part of the joint venture previously operated by Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited.
That business had been central to Shell’s onshore operations in the Niger Delta.
In March 2025, Shell completed the sale of SPDC to Renaissance.
The former SPDC joint venture subsequently became known as the Renaissance joint venture.
The original ownership structure identified in TotalEnergies’ January 2026 announcement included NNPC Limited with 55%, Renaissance with 30% and operatorship, TotalEnergies EP Nigeria with 10%, and Agip with 5%.
The joint venture held interests in 18 licences.
TotalEnergies’ October announcement confirmed that its own divestment had been completed.
But the details require care.
The original January agreement distinguished 15 licences producing mainly oil from three licences producing mainly gas.
For the 15 mainly oil-producing licences, TotalEnergies agreed to transfer its participating interest and associated rights and obligations.
For the three mainly gas-producing licences, identified as OML 23, OML 28 and OML 77, TotalEnergies agreed to transfer its participating interest while retaining its full economic interest.
Those gas licences were described as accounting for approximately half of Nigeria LNG’s gas supply.
This was therefore not a straightforward transaction in which every economic interest associated with the 18 licences was transferred without qualification.
The distinction between legal participation and retained economic interests is essential.
It also demonstrates the sophistication of the underlying arrangements.
The $800 million consideration relates to the TotalEnergies transaction, not the proposed acquisition of Shell Nigeria Gas.
Sources: TotalEnergies’ original sale agreement, 14 January 2026 and TotalEnergies’ completion announcement, 27 October 2026. TotalEnergies.com
4. The $600 million financing disclosed on 4 NovemberThe next important development appeared in a statement issued by international law firm Bracewell.
On 4 November 2026, the firm announced that it had advised Vaaris Resources on the acquisition of TotalEnergies’ interest in the Renaissance joint venture.
The statement identified the financing more precisely.
Bracewell said it had advised Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited on $600 million in secured borrowing-base facilities.
The facilities involved a syndicate of lenders.
They were intended to part-finance the acquisition.
A borrowing-base facility is a form of secured financing in which lending capacity is determined by reference to an agreed asset or collateral base, subject to the relevant contractual requirements.
Such arrangements are commonly used in natural-resource financing.
The precise terms depend upon the facility documentation.
In this case, the public statement establishes the existence and announced amount of the facilities.
It does not reproduce the executed loan agreements.
Nor does it independently establish the complete allocation of security, lender participation, repayment obligations or financial covenants.
The available evidence therefore supports a clear but limited conclusion.
Vaaris Resources obtained substantial secured financing in connection with its acquisition from TotalEnergies.
The financing was not described by Bracewell as funding the purchase of Shell Nigeria Gas.
The two transactions should not be combined into one financing calculation.
Primary transaction-adviser source: Bracewell’s announcement, 4 November 2026. Chambers
PART THREE: WHAT SEPLAT’S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS REVEAL 5. The ownership disclosure that deserves attentionThe most revealing primary document in the latest reporting is contained in Seplat Energy Plc’s unaudited financial results for the nine months ended 30 September 2026.
The document was published on 29 October.
It includes a section headed Related party relationships and transactions.
Within that section, Seplat identifies Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited.
The disclosure concerns TotalEnergies’ former interest in the Renaissance joint venture.
It explains that Seplat consented, through a deed of novation, to Vaaris replacing TotalEnergies EP Nigeria under the ANOH Unitization and Unit Operating Agreement.
The relevant agreement concerned arrangements to which the Renaissance joint venture was a party.
The filing then identifies the corporate relationship.
Seplat states that Vaaris Resources is controlled by Platform Petroleum, a shareholder of Seplat.
This is not an inference based upon similar company names.
It is a statement contained in a published financial report from a listed Nigerian energy company.
The document provides meaningful evidence of the ownership relationship behind the TotalEnergies purchaser.
But it has an important limit.
It identifies Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited.
It does not, in the passages examined, establish that Platform Petroleum controls the separate company named by Shell as the purchaser of its domestic gas business, Vaaris Energy Limited.
That relationship requires separate corporate documentation.
The distinction is not a technicality that can be disregarded.
Companies within the same commercial group may have different shareholders, financing arrangements and legal obligations.
And companies using similar names are not necessarily under identical ownership.
A public filing establishing control of one company must not be extended automatically to another.
Primary regulatory source: Seplat Energy Plc — Unaudited Nine-Month 2026 Financial Results, 29 October 2026, page 71. Nigerian Stock Exchange
6. The disclosed directorship relationshipSeplat’s financial statements provide another relevant detail.
They identify Kazeem Raimi as a non-executive director of Seplat.
The same disclosure states that he is also a director of Vaaris Resources.
The information appears in the financial statements’ related-party section.
Seplat also reports that no transactions or outstanding balances arose from the relevant novation arrangement.
These facts should be interpreted with care.
A director serving on more than one company’s board is not, by itself, evidence of misconduct.
Corporate groups, investment companies and joint ventures frequently have overlapping directors.
The important issue is whether relevant interests are properly identified and managed under applicable governance requirements.
Seplat’s published disclosure is an example of the relevant relationships being identified in the financial statements.
It does not establish that a conflict was improperly managed.
Nor does it demonstrate that Seplat financed the Vaaris acquisition.
The filing concerns a specific relationship and contractual novation.
It should not be expanded into a broader allegation unsupported by the evidence.
What it does demonstrate is that the ownership and governance relationships associated with the TotalEnergies transaction are more complex than the simple description of a sale to an independent Nigerian company might initially suggest.
The corporate relationships are relevant to understanding the transaction.
Their existence is not evidence of wrongdoing.
Source: . Nigerian Stock Exchange
7. A historical connection preserved in the Donovan–Shell ArchiveThe name Platform Petroleum has appeared in Shell’s Nigerian divestment history before.
The Donovan–Shell Archive preserves a Dow Jones Newswires report dated 29 January 2010.
The report concerned an agreement by the then Shell-operated Nigerian joint venture to sell interests in three oil production licences.
The proposed purchasers included Platform Petroleum Limited, Shebah Petroleum Development Company and France’s Maurel & Prom.
At the time, the transaction was described as part of Shell’s portfolio management strategy.
The report also discussed Shell’s wider reassessment of its Nigerian onshore activities.
That earlier transaction provides useful historical context.
It demonstrates that Platform Petroleum was identified in contemporary reporting as a participant in Nigerian acquisitions involving Shell-operated assets more than sixteen years ago.
It does not establish that the 2010 proposed transaction and the 2026 acquisitions involved identical corporate structures.
Nor does it establish that Platform Petroleum controls Vaaris Energy Limited, the proposed buyer of Shell Nigeria Gas.
The historical continuity lies in the participation of Nigerian energy companies in acquiring interests formerly associated with international operators.
The precise legal relationships must be established separately for each transaction.
Historical source: Donovan–Shell Archive — Dow Jones Newswires Report, 29 January 2010. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
PART FOUR: SHELL’S CHANGING NIGERIAN BUSINESS 8. The March 2025 divestment was not the same transactionShell’s proposed disposal of its domestic gas business needs to be understood against its earlier exit from onshore oil operations.
On 13 March 2025, Shell completed the sale of SPDC to Renaissance.
Shell’s own completion statement distinguished the business being sold from its remaining Nigerian activities.
It specifically identified Shell Nigeria Gas as outside the scope of the SPDC transaction.
The statement also identified Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company, known as SNEPCo, and Shell’s interest in Nigeria LNG as businesses that remained within the Shell group.
This matters because Shell’s October 2026 announcement concerns an additional disposal of a business it had deliberately retained when selling SPDC.
The company is therefore continuing to reshape its Nigerian portfolio.
But describing Shell as withdrawing entirely from Nigeria would be false.
It retains significant interests.
Those include its deepwater activities and its participation in Nigeria LNG.
Shell’s own explanation is that it is concentrating investment in activities it regards as strategically competitive.
That is a corporate strategy statement.
It does not, by itself, establish whether the Nigerian gas-distribution business was profitable, underperforming or incapable of expansion.
Those questions require financial information not disclosed in the sale announcement.
Source: Shell — Completion of the SPDC Sale to Renaissance, 13 March 2025. Shell
9. Shell continues investing in deepwater productionAn important counterpoint is Shell’s acquisition of a larger interest in the Bonga deepwater field.
On 25 November 2025, Shell announced that SNEPCo had increased its interest in the OML 118 production-sharing contract.
Its stake rose from 55% to 65%.
Shell described the acquisition as part of its strategy to concentrate on competitive deepwater assets.
The transaction demonstrates the distinction between a geographical withdrawal and a portfolio restructuring.
Shell is reducing or disposing of particular Nigerian businesses while maintaining and expanding others.
The company is not abandoning Nigerian petroleum production.
Nor is it abandoning gas entirely.
Its strategy gives priority to selected deepwater and integrated gas interests.
The proposed Shell Nigeria Gas disposal is consistent with that stated direction.
The business being sold serves Nigerian industrial customers through domestic distribution infrastructure.
The interests being retained are associated with different positions in the energy value chain.
That distinction creates an important question about Shell’s changing commercial relationship with Nigeria.
The company intends to remain a major participant in Nigerian energy, but its direct ownership of the pipelines supplying domestic industrial consumers is expected to end if the sale completes.
This is not necessarily a contradiction in Shell’s strategy.
It is a choice about which businesses the company wants to own.
Whether that choice benefits Nigerian customers and the new owner will depend upon the performance of the business after the transaction.
Source: Shell — Increased Bonga Deepwater Interest, 25 November 2025. Shell
PART FIVE: THE PIPELINE PROBLEM 10. A revealing statement from Shell Nigeria GasThe latest development provides a particularly timely reason to revisit Shell’s proposed disposal.
At the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria’s Energy Security and Energy Efficiency Summit, held in Lagos on 3–4 November 2026, Shell Nigeria Gas representatives addressed the difficulties facing industrial energy consumers.
According to Nigerian reporting, the company’s managing director, Ralph Gbobo, was represented by Samuel Ojo, an asset reliability and integrity manager.
The presentation concerned the infrastructure required to supply manufacturers with gas.
Shell Nigeria Gas argued that insufficient pipeline infrastructure remained a major obstacle to connecting gas resources with industrial demand.
The company stressed the importance of reliable gas supplies and the physical infrastructure needed to deliver them.
That is directly relevant to the business Shell is proposing to sell.
A domestic gas distributor’s value depends not only upon access to gas but also upon connecting customers to that supply.
Industrial demand cannot automatically be satisfied simply because Nigeria possesses substantial natural gas resources.
Gas must be gathered, transported, distributed and delivered at the required pressure.
Factories also need equipment capable of using it.
The economics of gas therefore depend upon infrastructure.
The November presentation placed that infrastructure challenge at the centre of Nigeria’s manufacturing competitiveness.
The timing is striking: Shell Nigeria Gas was publicly emphasising the need for additional distribution infrastructure only weeks after its parent company announced plans to sell the business.
That observation is about timing and strategy.
It is not evidence that Shell acted improperly.
Source: Daily Champion — Shell Nigeria Gas Calls for Closing the Manufacturing Pipeline Gap. Daily Champion
11. The company’s cost-saving claims require qualificationThe same report attributed significant financial estimates to Shell Nigeria Gas.
It stated that Nigerian manufacturers had spent approximately ₦1.34 trillion on alternative energy in 2025.
The company also suggested that pipeline gas could reduce certain energy costs by as much as 70% compared with diesel-based self-generation.
These figures are relevant to the company’s argument.
They illustrate the potential economic importance of improved access to natural gas.
But they must be attributed correctly.
The investigation has not independently verified the underlying calculations.
The reported saving is an estimate, not a guaranteed outcome for every manufacturer.
Actual savings would depend upon gas tariffs, diesel prices, equipment efficiency, connection costs, operational requirements and the reliability of supply.
A factory located near an established pipeline may face very different costs from one requiring a major new connection.
The existence of gas reserves does not eliminate those infrastructure expenses.
Nor does the use of natural gas eliminate greenhouse-gas emissions.
Natural gas combustion produces carbon dioxide, and methane emissions associated with gas systems can affect their overall environmental performance.
The financial and environmental consequences therefore require separate assessment.
Nevertheless, the industry’s underlying infrastructure problem is real enough to warrant attention.
Nigeria’s manufacturing sector needs dependable energy.
Shell Nigeria Gas operates an existing distribution network serving industrial customers.
The proposed purchaser would inherit that business and the associated commercial opportunities and operational responsibilities.
The question is what investment and expansion programme will follow.
The currently available sale announcement does not provide a definitive answer.
PART SIX: WHAT REMAINS UNKNOWN 12. The financial terms of Shell’s saleThe first significant gap concerns the purchase consideration.
Shell has not disclosed the amount in the announcement examined.
Nor has the buyer’s published legal adviser disclosed a transaction value.
This means that the financial importance of the divestment to Shell cannot be measured precisely from the public documents.
The size of the pipeline network and the number of customers establish the business’s physical and commercial scale.
They do not establish its enterprise value.
No reliable valuation should be inferred merely by comparing the transaction with the separate $800 million TotalEnergies sale.
The assets are fundamentally different.
One transaction concerns a domestic gas distribution company.
The other concerns interests in oil and gas production licences.
Their financial structures cannot be assumed to be comparable.
13. The ownership of Vaaris Energy LimitedThe second gap concerns the proposed purchaser.
Shell identifies Vaaris Energy Limited as a Nigerian energy company with an existing operational presence.
Its legal adviser, ENR Advisory, also identifies Vaaris Energy Limited as the client in the proposed acquisition.
That provides confirmation of the buyer’s name.
But the announcements examined do not disclose the company’s complete ownership chain, ultimate beneficial owners or detailed financing arrangements.
By contrast, Seplat’s regulatory filing supplies specific ownership information about Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, the purchaser involved in the TotalEnergies transaction.
The distinction is important.
It would be inaccurate to use the information about Vaaris Resources as conclusive evidence of who owns Vaaris Energy Limited.
Further corporate registry material would be needed.
The record should not be filled with assumptions.
There may be commercial relationships between the companies.
The available primary documents examined here do not establish their complete legal structure.
That is a documentary limitation, not an allegation of concealed wrongdoing.
Sources: ENR Advisory’s announcement, 16 October 2026 and Seplat’s regulatory filing, 29 October 2026. ENR Advisory
14. Completion, investment and customer obligationsThe third gap concerns the next stage of Shell’s transaction.
Shell’s 13 October announcement expressly made completion subject to regulatory conditions and approvals.
Its published statement confirmed that the business would remain part of Shell until completion.
No independently verified announcement establishing completion of that specific sale had been identified by 10 November 2026.
It would therefore be premature to state that Vaaris Energy already owns Shell Nigeria Gas.
The transaction has been agreed.
Its completion remains a separate matter.
The full agreement has not been examined.
Consequently, the documentary record does not establish whether the purchaser has accepted specific capital expenditure commitments or expansion targets.
Nor does it establish whether customers will face changes to contractual pricing, connection terms or other commercial arrangements after completion.
There is also insufficient information to make definitive statements about the treatment of employees beyond the general assurances contained in Shell’s announcement.
Those are legitimate questions for subsequent reporting.
But they cannot be answered by inventing provisions that may or may not appear in the executed agreement.
EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 15. Nigeria’s petroleum ownership is changing — but the businesses are not all alikeThe most significant conclusion arising from these documents concerns the changing structure of Nigeria’s petroleum industry.
International companies have been selling interests in long-established onshore operations.
Nigerian-controlled investors have been acquiring some of those assets.
Shell’s former onshore subsidiary passed to Renaissance in March 2025.
TotalEnergies has now disposed of its interest in the former SPDC joint venture to Vaaris.
Shell has separately agreed to sell its domestic gas distribution business.
But treating these transactions as interchangeable would conceal their different commercial purposes.
An oil production interest carries exploration, development, production and other upstream obligations.
A gas distribution company operates infrastructure and customer-facing delivery systems.
The financing requirements can differ substantially.
So can the associated regulatory responsibilities.
The most useful analysis therefore begins with the specific assets being transferred.
Shell’s proposed transaction concerns the pipelines that deliver gas to Nigerian businesses.
That makes the sale directly relevant to the country’s industrial energy infrastructure.
16. The question for Shell shareholdersFor Shell shareholders, the proposed disposal raises a straightforward governance question.
Why is Shell selling this particular business?
Shell’s stated explanation is portfolio simplification and a concentration on deepwater and integrated gas activities.
That explanation is commercially coherent.
A multinational energy group cannot be expected to retain every business it has developed.
Divestments may release capital for activities management considers more attractive.
But assessing the transaction requires more information than the announcement provides.
The sale price remains undisclosed.
The business’s recent earnings and capital requirements are not set out in the announcement.
The expected financial effect on Shell has not been independently established.
Nor does the available evidence permit a comparison between the return Shell expected from retaining the distribution network and the return anticipated from reinvesting elsewhere.
These are matters of corporate financial analysis, not grounds for unsupported allegations.
The established fact is that Shell has agreed to sell the business.
The commercial judgement underlying that decision cannot be fully assessed from the public announcement alone.
17. The question for Nigerian manufacturersFor connected manufacturers, the central issue is different.
It concerns continuity and future access to gas.
A distribution network is valuable because it connects infrastructure to actual consumers.
Its performance matters to industrial operations.
A failure of supply may affect production schedules.
Inadequate capacity may prevent new factories from obtaining connections.
Pipeline maintenance and expansion may require substantial capital.
Those considerations remain regardless of the owner’s nationality.
Nigerian ownership may provide opportunities for local investment, management and commercial expansion.
But domestic ownership alone does not guarantee improved reliability or lower prices.
Those outcomes depend upon operational performance, financing, regulation and commercial arrangements.
The November industry summit highlights the scale of the challenge.
Shell Nigeria Gas’s representatives argued that more infrastructure is needed.
The proposed buyer would inherit a business positioned to address part of that demand.
Whether it expands the network is a question for future evidence.
18. What the Vaaris financing does — and does not — establishThe separate $600 million financing announcement provides useful evidence of the ability of Nigerian energy investors to assemble substantial acquisition financing.
It also demonstrates that major international lenders and advisers are participating in the restructuring of Nigeria’s petroleum ownership.
But the evidence must remain attached to the transaction it concerns.
The financing was disclosed in connection with Vaaris Resources’ acquisition from TotalEnergies.
It does not establish the funding available to Vaaris Energy Limited for the Shell Nigeria Gas transaction.
Nor does it establish that the latter business will benefit from the former transaction’s assets or borrowing facilities.
The same caution applies to the ownership information in Seplat’s accounts.
It identifies Platform Petroleum’s control of Vaaris Resources.
It does not conclusively identify the ownership of every other company using the Vaaris name.
The key issue is not whether the similar names invite further investigation.
They do.
The issue is whether documentary evidence supports a particular conclusion.
At present, the identified primary records support a precise account of the TotalEnergies purchaser.
They support a more limited account of Shell’s purchaser.
That distinction should remain explicit.
DOCUMENTARY FINDINGSThe investigation establishes that Shell Petroleum B.V. announced an agreement on 13 October 2026 to sell its interest in the Shell Nigeria Gas Group to Vaaris Energy Limited.
Shell Nigeria Gas is an operating domestic gas distribution business established in 1998, with approximately 170 kilometres of pipelines and more than 130 connected customers.
Shell stated that the sale was subject to regulatory approvals and that the business would remain within the Shell group until completion.
The transaction’s financial consideration was not disclosed in the original announcement.
Separately, TotalEnergies announced on 27 October 2026 that it had completed the sale of its 10% non-operated interest in the Renaissance joint venture to Vaaris for $800 million.
The TotalEnergies transaction contained specific arrangements concerning three mainly gas-producing licences in which TotalEnergies retained its economic interests.
On 4 November, Bracewell disclosed $600 million in secured borrowing-base facilities for Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited to part-finance the TotalEnergies acquisition.
Seplat Energy’s financial results published on 29 October identify Platform Petroleum as controlling Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited.
Those results also identify Kazeem Raimi as a director of both Seplat and Vaaris Resources.
The Seplat disclosure states that no transactions or outstanding balances arose from the relevant novation arrangement.
The historical Donovan–Shell Archive contains contemporary reporting identifying Platform Petroleum among participants in a proposed acquisition of Shell-operated Nigerian oil interests in 2010.
At the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria summit on 3–4 November 2026, Shell Nigeria Gas representatives emphasised the need for greater gas distribution infrastructure to support industrial consumers.
These findings are supported by corporate announcements, regulatory material and attributed contemporaneous reporting.
They do not establish that Vaaris Energy Limited and Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited have identical beneficial ownership, that the $600 million financing funds Shell’s gas business sale, or that the $800 million consideration relates to Shell Nigeria Gas.
No allegation of unlawful conduct by Shell, Vaaris, Platform Petroleum, Seplat or their directors is established by the evidence examined.
CONCLUSION: SHELL IS SELLING THE PIPELINES, NOT ITS ENTIRE NIGERIAN FUTUREThe proposed sale of Shell Nigeria Gas represents another stage in the restructuring of Shell’s Nigerian business.
The company has already transferred its former onshore operating subsidiary to Renaissance.
It has retained important deepwater and LNG interests.
It has increased its participation in the Bonga deepwater development.
Now it intends to sell an established domestic gas distribution network.
For Shell, the transaction is consistent with a strategy of concentrating on selected parts of the energy value chain.
For Nigeria, it represents the proposed transfer of another substantial business to Nigerian ownership.
For the purchaser, it offers an established network serving industrial and commercial customers.
And for those customers, the important question will be whether the business continues to operate reliably and obtains the investment required for future expansion.
The wider developments involving Vaaris Resources demonstrate that Nigerian-controlled companies are also participating in major upstream acquisitions.
The $800 million TotalEnergies transaction is substantial.
The $600 million financing is substantial.
Seplat’s regulatory filing supplies important evidence about the ownership relationships associated with that acquisition.
But those developments must remain separate from Shell’s domestic gas sale.
The financial terms of Shell’s transaction remain undisclosed.
Its completion depends upon the necessary approvals.
The complete ownership and financing arrangements of the company identified as the Shell buyer have not been independently established from the available primary documents.
That leaves legitimate questions for future documentary examination.
The most immediate concern is commercial and practical.
Shell Nigeria Gas has spent more than twenty-five years connecting Nigerian businesses to natural gas.
Its representatives have recently argued that Nigeria needs significantly more pipeline infrastructure to support manufacturing.
Shell now proposes to transfer the business to another owner.
The pipelines already exist. The customers already depend upon them. What remains to be established is how the new ownership will finance and deliver the network’s next stage of development.
For shareholders, the unresolved issue is the value and commercial rationale of the disposal.
For Nigerian manufacturers, it is the future of their energy supply.
For the public record, it is the need to distinguish clearly between two different transactions involving companies bearing the Vaaris name.
One deal concerns Shell’s industrial gas distribution network. The other concerns an $800 million acquisition of former Shell-operated oil interests. The documents support examining them together — but not confusing them.
That distinction is essential to an accurate account.
PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES- Shell Nigeria — 13 October 2026. Original announcement of the proposed sale of Shell Nigeria Gas to Vaaris Energy Limited, including the network’s scale, the identity of the purchaser and the requirement for regulatory approval. Shell Signs Agreement to Sell Nigeria Domestic Gas Business
- ENR Advisory — 16 October 2026. Announcement by the law firm advising Vaaris Energy Limited on the proposed Shell Nigeria Gas acquisition. ENR Advisory — Shell Nigeria Gas Acquisition
- TotalEnergies — 14 January 2026. Original sale agreement announcement identifying the Renaissance joint venture licences and arrangements concerning the mainly gas-producing fields. TotalEnergies Signs Agreement to Divest Renaissance Joint Venture Interest
- TotalEnergies — 27 October 2026. Original completion announcement confirming the $800 million consideration for its separate divestment to Vaaris. TotalEnergies Completes Nigerian Oil Interest Divestment
- Bracewell — 4 November 2026. Original legal-adviser announcement identifying Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited and $600 million in secured borrowing-base facilities associated with the TotalEnergies acquisition. Bracewell Advises Vaaris Resources on Acquisition and Financing
- Seplat Energy Plc — 29 October 2026. Unaudited financial results for the nine months ended 30 September 2026. Page 71 identifies Platform Petroleum’s control of Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited and the relevant directorship and contractual relationships. Seplat Energy — Original Financial Statements, PDF
- Shell plc — 13 March 2025. Confirmation that the sale of SPDC to Renaissance had completed, identifying Shell Nigeria Gas as outside the scope of that transaction. Shell Completes SPDC Sale to Renaissance
- Shell plc — 25 November 2025. Original announcement confirming SNEPCo’s increased interest in the Bonga deepwater development. Shell Increases Nigerian Deepwater Bonga Interest
- Daily Champion — November 2026. Reporting of statements made by Shell Nigeria Gas representatives at the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria summit on 3–4 November. Shell Nigeria Gas Calls for Improved Industrial Pipeline Infrastructure
- Donovan–Shell Archive — 29 January 2010. Preserved Dow Jones Newswires report concerning a proposed disposal of Shell-operated Nigerian oil interests to a consortium including Platform Petroleum. Shell Sells Three Nigerian Oil Blocks to Local Companies — Historical Archive
This investigation examines Shell’s proposed sale of its Nigerian domestic gas distribution business and separate transactions involving the acquisition of interests in the former Shell-operated Renaissance joint venture.
It draws upon original corporate announcements, regulatory disclosures, financial statements, published transaction-adviser material, contemporary reporting and historical documents preserved in the Donovan–Shell Archive.
The legal entities involved in the transactions are distinguished throughout.
Vaaris Energy Limited, identified by Shell as the proposed purchaser of Shell Nigeria Gas, is not treated as legally identical to Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, identified in documents concerning the acquisition from TotalEnergies.
The complete ownership and beneficial-control arrangements of Vaaris Energy Limited have not been independently authenticated.
Seplat Energy’s published statement that Platform Petroleum controls Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited is not represented as proof of ownership of Vaaris Energy Limited.
The $800 million consideration disclosed by TotalEnergies concerns its divestment of interests in the Renaissance joint venture.
It is not presented as the purchase price for Shell Nigeria Gas.
The $600 million secured borrowing-base facilities disclosed by Bracewell concern financing for the separate TotalEnergies acquisition.
They are not presented as financing for Shell’s proposed gas distribution disposal.
Shell’s announcement of 13 October 2026 is correctly identified as an agreement to sell, rather than a completed disposal.
The transaction remains subject to the applicable regulatory conditions and approvals.
No independently verified completion announcement for that specific sale had been identified by 10 November 2026.
The complete Shell Nigeria Gas sale and purchase agreement has not been obtained.
Accordingly, no definitive conclusions are offered concerning the purchase price, financing arrangements, allocation of liabilities, future capital expenditure obligations, customer contract terms or treatment of employees.
Statements concerning the potential financial benefits of wider industrial gas access are attributed to Shell Nigeria Gas representatives.
The reported estimates of manufacturing energy expenditure and potential savings have not been independently audited for this investigation.
The financial statements published by Seplat Energy are unaudited interim results.
The identified director relationships and contractual novation are described as disclosed.
They are not treated as evidence of improper related-party transactions or unlawful conflicts of interest.
The historical 2010 archive item is identified as contemporary reporting of a proposed transaction.
It is not treated as proof of the later legal ownership or financing of the 2026 purchasers.
No allegation is made that Shell, Vaaris Energy Limited, Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, Platform Petroleum, Seplat Energy, TotalEnergies or their directors acted unlawfully in connection with the transactions examined.
Editorial interpretation concerning corporate strategy, industrial energy security and the consequences of changing ownership is distinguished from the established documentary record.
Shell plc, Shell Nigeria Gas Limited, Vaaris Energy Limited, Vaaris Resources JVCo Limited, Platform Petroleum, Seplat Energy, TotalEnergies and other interested parties are invited to provide factual corrections, relevant primary documents or responses for consideration and publication.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
Shell’s Nigerian Gas Exit: An Independent Investigation into the Vaaris Deals, a $600 Million Financing and the Questions Left Unanswered was first posted on November 10, 2026 at 9:21 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
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