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First, the good news: The world might be a lot closer than we think to an international goal of protecting 30% of land by 2030.

The bad news: It’s probably not all the right land.

The nations of the world have placed protections on roughly 27% of the planet’s land masses, far more than the 19% previously thought, according to research recently published in Nature.  

There has been much hand wringing among conservation-minded folks that countries were woefully behind on land protection pledges made in 2022 to shield 30% of Earth’s land and 30% of the ocean from development as part of an update to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the main international agreement aimed at the current extinction crisis.

But “our analysis suggests that much more of the land is in some type of conservation area than currently recognized,” said lead author Helen O’Neill, a postdoctoral researcher at the United Kingdom’s Institute of Zoology, London.

The official tally tracking protected lands is a database at the Protected Planet website, a collaboration between the United Nations and the International Union for Conservation of Nature.

While this is the authoritative source, it’s incomplete.  Some protected land hasn’t been registered there by countries. And it doesn’t include significant acreage that falls into a kind of gray area – land that isn’t formally protected chiefly for wildlife, but where regulations provide many of the same benefits. Known as “other effective area-based conservation measures” or OECMs, this might include land protected as sacred by Indigenous groups or managed to improve water quality.

O’Neill and 35 other scientists from across the globe set out to tally this overlooked land to create a more complete picture. To reduce the massive effort required to scrutinize the status of every piece of land on the planet, the researcher selected pieces totaling 10% of all the world’s land masses. That included terrain scattered across the world and covering major types of ecosystems, from the Rocky Mountains in Montana to the Amazonian jungle to the desert of the Arabian Peninsula.

 

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For each piece of land, they added up how much was listed as protected under the global database, as well as national records and conservation areas where regulations and management practices made them good candidates for being OECMs.

The scientists used the results to create a computer model that estimated how this pattern would apply to the entire world. The result was the encouraging estimate that 26.8% of all land is protected, at least on paper.

But that doesn’t mean conservationists can cruise across the 2030 finish line with their arms raised. Because the research also revealed troubling holes in where these lands are being conserved.

Of the 173 different ecological regions scientists have mapped around the world, fewer than 100 have greater than 17% of their land protected, the scientists estimated. Regions that are primarily ice and rock – polar and alpine landscapes – are significantly overrepresented in the catalog of protected areas. That’s not a big surprise, since those regions are often less attractive for human settlement or exploitation by farming or other activities. By contrast, deserts, woodlands, grasslands and temperate forests all fall below the 30% target.

Then there is the question of whether land that’s conserved on paper is really being protected.

The new research points to the potential gains that can be made, particularly with the recognition of the conservation potential of these OECMs. But “conserving 30% of land and seas is not sufficient on its own,” said Heather Bingham, a co-author who heads the Protected Planet Initiative. “The target also calls for these areas to be managed effectively for positive biodiversity outcomes, and to be placed where they will have the greatest impact on biodiversity.”

O’Neill, et. al. “Global conservation area coverage substantially exceeds current estimates.” Nature. Oct. 14, 2026.

Image: Based on tjhunt/iStock.com. ©Anthropocene Magazine

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A surge in wholesale costs driven by expensive gas is responsible for nearly 90% of the rise in UK household electricity bills since 2020, reveals new analysis.

The figures, shared with Carbon Brief by thinktank Nesta, show that wholesale gas costs are also behind the vast majority (77%) of the increase in household gas bills.

The analysis firmly contradicts the idea, which has become embedded in UK media and political narratives, that the UK’s net-zero target is to blame for high energy bills.

Andrew Sissons, director for sustainable future at Nesta, tells Carbon Brief that net-zero is, in fact, “helping to shelter Britain from the impact of expensive gas”. He adds: 

“Rising gas prices, not net-zero, have driven most of the recent surge in Britain’s energy bills. Britain is particularly exposed, with over 80% of households connected to gas mains, while our electricity system still relies too much on gas as the marginal unit.”

The analysis comes after the UK government gave its approval for the Jackdaw gas field to be developed in the North Sea, despite stating that it “would not…affect prices”.

Another gas crisis

In January 2026, Carbon Brief reported that two-thirds of the rise in electricity bills since before the 2022 global energy crisis was due to high gas prices.

Now, amid ongoing conflict in the Middle East, wholesale gas prices are at their highest levels since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Indeed, as of 19 October, UK wholesale gas prices stood at 220p per therm (£75 per megawatt hour, MWh), above the average for 2022 of 210p/therm (£72/MWh).

The figure below shows that, after accounting for inflation, typical UK annual household electricity bills had risen £180 by the fourth quarter of 2026, relative to the same period in 2020.

Some 90% of this increase (£161) is due to wholesale costs, driven by the price of gas.

In contrast – and contrary to widespread perceptions – renewable “contracts for difference” (CfDs) are reducing electricity bills by £17 under the current price cap, according to the Nesta analysis.

In addition, the government has cut policy costs for electricity by moving 75% of legacy renewable support onto general taxation, ending the “ECO” efficiency scheme and temporarily removing VAT.

Network costs have added £72 to typical bills since 2020, according to Nesta. Most of this (£46) is for investment in the electricity transmission network, known as the “motorways” of the grid.

Only £21 of the rise in network costs relates to balancing the system, including “constraint payments” for turning off windfarms – and turning on gas plants – due to insufficient grid capacity.

Wind constraint payments regularly receive extensive news coverage, despite balancing costs – in total – making up just £35 (4%) of a typical £858 annual household electricity bill.

The Nesta figures show energy supplier operating costs have gone up by £46 since 2020. These costs are not broken down in the underlying Ofgem figures, but the increase is thought to be driven by the cost of rising household energy debt. Supplier profits are capped at 2.5% of bills.

Breaking the link

Notably, household electricity prices have increased far less rapidly since the Hormuz crisis than gas bills, with higher clean-energy generation helping break the link between the two.

Since 2020, household gas bills have increased by £368 in real terms, according to Nesta’s analysis. Some 77% of this (£283) is due to wholesale gas costs.

After accounting for inflation, total dual-fuel bills for a typical household have increased from £1,175 per year in October 2020 to £1,723 per year in October 2026, a rise of 47%.

The rise in wholesale costs driven by high gas prices accounts for £444 (81%) of this increase in real terms, as shown in the figure below.

The £127 real-terms rise in network costs includes £72 for electricity transmission, distribution and balancing, as well as £55 for investment in the gas grid.

(According to the Energy Networks Association, up to 80% of the investment in electricity grids is required to maintain existing assets, with the remainder going towards expansion for net-zero.)

In total, the cost of government social and climate policies made up £183 (16%) of typical dual-fuel bills in October 2020. This had fallen to £114 (7%) as of the current October 2026 price cap.

Wholesale costs make up the largest share of the current cap, at £757 (44%). Network costs are the second-largest component of bills, at £417 (24%), followed by operating costs at £291 (17%).

Sissons tells Carbon Brief:

“Upgrading the grid is not cost-neutral, but that price tag is dwarfed by the impact of rising gas prices. In fact, net-zero is helping to shelter Britain from the impact of expensive gas. Since the start of the Iran war, electricity bills have begun to decouple from gas bills, thanks to the UK’s increased renewable power and support from contracts for difference.”

“Going further will require British households to have clean electricity, electric vehicles and heat pumps over fossil-fuel cars and boilers. By focusing on growing electricity demand, the government can spread upgrade costs more widely. This can lock in the consistent investment in electrification that is Britain’s best path to stop global turmoil showing up on winter energy bills.”

Media reports suggest the chancellor may take steps to help households and businesses cope with rising energy bills at the upcoming budget on 28 October.

Bills are expected to rise sharply under the January 2027 price cap – potentially by as much as a quarter – in light on ongoing high gas prices.

Related UK budget 2026: Key climate and energy announcements 28.10.2026 UK policy Analysis: How the UK spent more than £11.6bn on climate aid since 2021 28.10.2026 UK policy Q&A: Why are UK energy bills so high – and how could they be lowered? 27.10.2026 Oil and gas Factcheck: UK Conservatives double the ‘cost of net-zero’ after spreadsheet blunder 09.10.2026 UK policy

The post Revealed: Expensive gas behind ‘nearly 90%’ of rise in UK electricity bills appeared first on Carbon Brief.

UltraViolet, a leading national women-led gender-justice organization responsible for numerous impactful victories against sexual predators and tech-facilitated sexual violence, issued the following statement in response to Apple updating its developer guidelines to ban AI “nudify” apps on its App Store, calling on Google to make the same changes in its Play Store immediately.

“This victory belongs to the courageous survivors of dangerous ‘nudify’ apps—especially children—and the advocates who demanded accountability. Apple’s new CEO, John Ternus, now has an opportunity to usher in a new era of leadership that puts the safety of women and children first,” said Jenna Sherman, Campaign Director at UltraViolet. “Apple's decision is an important step forward, and Google must follow suit immediately. But one policy change is not enough. Big Tech must do more to stop enabling and profiting from the creation and spread of AI-facilitated sexual abuse.”

Apple quietly made the change over the weekend amid public outcry and UltraViolet’s years-long Reclaim the Domain pressure campaign demanding that the company, alongside Google, stop the proliferation of non-consensual sexual content on the Apple App Store and Google Play Store, respectively.

In January, Elon Musk’s xAI chatbot Grok fueled a wave of nonconsensual sexual deepfake abuse on X, generating an estimated 3 million sexualized images in just 11 days, including approximately 23,000 depicting children, according to research. In response, UltraViolet delivered a sign-on letter to Apple and Google endorsed by 28 organizations calling on the companies to remove Grok, X, and all “nudify” apps from their respective marketplaces.

After the companies failed to act, UltraViolet escalated its campaign in May, bringing together more than 50 civil society organizations to send an open letter calling on state Attorneys General (AGs) to take direct legal action against Apple and Google for hosting “nudify” apps in their app stores. In June, UltraViolet and child safety organization Heat Initiative took the campaign directly to Apple's doorstep, co-hosting a demonstration at Apple Park during Apple's Worldwide Developers Conference (WWDC), calling on new CEO John Ternus to change course from the past inaction on “nudify” apps which defined Tim Cook’s tenure.

“Just as we pressured Apple into making these changes, we’ll continue fighting until Google does the same and our other demands are met,” continued Sherman. “The two companies still refuse to 1) remove Grok and X from their app stores, since Grok is a major source of mass-produced sexual deepfakes targeting women and children, 2) add a sexual violence hotline at the top of searches for ‘deepfake porn,’ while abusive sexualized deepfakes can still be found all over Google search and tutorials on how to make deepfakes with tools available on the Google Play Store and Apple Store remain monetized, and 3) remove all known child sexual abuse material (CSAM) from iCloud.”

According to a 2023 report, an estimated 98 percent of deepfake videos found online were sexually explicit, and 99 percent of those targeted in sexual deepfakes were women. UltraViolet believes the rapid expansion of AI infrastructure, including hyperscale data centers, is helping fuel this epidemic of digital abuse. That growing threat has mobilized tens of thousands of people to join UltraViolet’s Reclaim the Domain campaign. UltraViolet’s petition calling on Apple and Google to remove “nudify” apps from their app stores garnered more than 55,000 signatures.

“This win is proof that the tides are turning against these Big Tech companies, and against the ‘forced inevitability’ of AI that hurts all American people, particularly women and children. Today we celebrate this win, absolutely, but we see it as the start of a domino chain, built on the bravery of survivors, to bring down the entirety of this abusive ecosystem of sexual deepfake abuse. We are living in the greatest mass sexual abuse crisis of our time, and companies like Apple and Google have been getting rich off of it. Tech companies must for once change their tune and put people over profit—especially Google, which has no excuse to implement the same app store ban as Apple. The physical and mental well-being of every woman and child depends on it,” concluded Sherman.

Apple’s new restrictions mark the latest in a series of tech accountability victories that UltraViolet has helped secure. Recent UltraViolet wins include pressuring Google to block searches for “nudify” apps, downrank websites dedicated to platforming deepfake abuse, and to stop accepting advertising money from these apps; pushing crucial federal legislation like the DEFIANCE Act forward; and helping spur legal action from state lawmakers and AGs against Apple and Google for enabling AI-generated CSAM.

Against Tech Oligarchy: Worker Resistance in the World’s Most Powerful Industry by JS Tan & Clarissa Redwine (Haymarket Books, 2026) A firsthand account of worker...

The post REVIEW: Against Tech Oligarchy: Worker Resistance in the World’s Most Powerful Industry first appeared on Spring.

'A betrayal of all of our futures' Channel News brendan 21st October 2026 Teaser Media

When the Turkish COP31 presidency presented its priorities to international business leaders for the first time in New York in September, among those invited to give the private sector’s first response was Ali Koç, scion of one of Türkiye’s wealthiest families.

On stage, the vice chair of the board of Koç Holding said the family company, which weeks earlier had been announced as one of the top sponsors for the UN climate summit, can be seen as “quite exemplary” for its climate record.

What Koç did not mention was that the group’s biggest money-making arm – Türkiye’s largest oil refiner Tüpraş – plans to keep running its refineries “at maximum potential”. Nor did he say that, in 2025, both parent company and subsidiary cut their 2030 climate targets to a level they had already nearly achieved, as Climate Home News’ analysis of company records reveals.

The decision to hand Koç Holding a prominent role at COP31 – the company is also the summit’s “Global Business Partner” – has reignited a long-running controversy over the platforming of fossil fuel interests at the annual UN climate conference.

It has also thrown into question how COP sponsors are chosen and screened. The hosting agreement between the Turkish government and the UN climate secretariat (UNFCCC) says that a partner company’s “climate integrity” should be taken into account.

COP31 electrification pledge leaves out clean power commitment

But how that test is applied is unclear and the process for picking sponsors remains largely opaque. The Turkish COP31 presidency has not published its selection criteria, nor the financial terms of any of its partnership agreements, including Koç’s. The UNFCCC declined to clarify how it advises on such deals.

Campaigners have long argued that accepting sponsorship from polluting companies is wrong because it gives them a global stage, visibility and access to policymakers at talks that are meant to move the world away from fossil fuels, and tarnishes the reputation of the COPs.

Koç’s energy division, which is dominated by oil refiner Tüpraş, accounted for three-quarters of the parent firm’s income in the first half of 2026.

“How was Koç Holding ever chosen as a COP31 sponsor? Any corporation that makes most of its money from oil refining should not qualify as sustainable,” said Pascoe Sabido, a campaigner at Corporate Europe Observatory, which exposes company lobbying. “This is hugely embarrassing for the UNFCCC and its climate integrity check, which doesn’t appear to be worth the paper it’s written on.”

Koç Holding “is not just standing still but walking backwards”, he told Climate Home News.

Koç Holding and Tüpraş did not reply to multiple requests for comment. The UNFCCC secretariat and the Turkish COP31 presidency declined to respond to questions from Climate Home News on the sponsorship agreement.

Oil refining windfall

Türkiye’s biggest industrial group, Koç Holding has stakes in several key sectors of the economy, spanning vehicle manufacturing in a joint venture with Ford to electronics, home appliances and banking.

But the conglomerate’s crown jewel is oil refiner Tüpraş, which Koç controls. Last year its four refineries turned crude oil into 26.8 million tonnes of petrol, diesel, jet fuel and other products, enough to fill about 36 Olympic swimming pools every day. 

The company plans to raise its production to 29 million tonnes in 2026 – already a bumper year so far with soaring profits, thanks to sky-rocketing refining margins driven by a crunch in global oil processing capacity caused by the Middle East crisis. 

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The oil business boom sits awkwardly with the climate and energy transition plans Koç and Tüpraş unveiled in 2021, when both pledged to become carbon neutral by 2050. Then, Tüpraş set out its aim to become “a leading carbon-neutral energy company”.

Despite these promises, in 2025, both companies lowered their targets for cutting emissions from their own operations by 2030, from 27% to 20% below 2017 levels. Tüpraş also cut its 2035 goal from 35% to 25%. The company still technically retains its long-term target of carbon neutrality by 2050, but the new plan will require much more drastic cuts after 2035. 

Lowering the climate bar

Tüpraş blamed its weakening of climate ambition on “changing market dynamics, economic conditions and technological developments”. In a presentation announcing the revision to investors, the refiner said the energy outlook had changed since 2021.

The reasons it listed included elevated geopolitical tensions, increased investment in oil and gas extraction, which it said showed refined fuels remain vital for energy security – and even the depletion of the carbon budget to keep global warming to 1.5C. 

Its parent company Koç pointed the finger at the slow pace of green hydrogen development, which the group said now had a “low feasibility” of transforming the energy sector after it had previously pinned much of its transition plan on the sustainable fuel. 

The Turkish company’s new 2030 targets are certainly within reach. Tüpraş had already cut its operational emissions by 17% from 2017 levels by 2025, with nearly all of that progress achieved before the transition plan was unveiled, while Koç had reduced them by 16%. 

Click to enlarge Click to enlarge

The softer targets also exclude the bulk of the group’s climate impact. Most of its emissions come not from its own refineries and factories but from the products it sells: petrol, diesel and jet fuel burned in the engines of cars or planes.

These so-called Scope 3 emissions make up about 97% of Koç’s carbon footprint. They rose by around a sixth between 2019 and 2024, and neither Koç nor Tüpraş has set a target to cut them.

Efe Baysal, Türkiye team lead at campaign group 350.org, said there is a “clear contradiction” between talking about climate action while weakening emission targets and seeing emissions from the use of petroleum products keep rising. 

“If the company is serious about the transition, it needs a clear plan to wind down fossil fuel operations, rather than relying on efficiency measures and technologies that let business as usual continue,” she told Climate Home News. 

‘Sustainable refining’ push

Tüpraş’s updated transition plan rules out expanding its oil refineries, but commits to “maintaining the existing capacity” and running it “at maximum potential”. Oil refining is expected to remain its main source of earnings for years to come. Koç listed “growing oil demand and diesel deficit” in Türkiye as a competitive advantage for its energy business in a pitch to investors last month.

The biggest component of the Tüpraş transition plan is what the company calls “sustainable refining”. It plans to invest $3.9 billion between 2025 and 2035 in programmes to modernise its refineries, improve their energy efficiency and bring down the direct emissions they generate. The company is also shifting some of its production to petrochemicals, which it expects to reduce its Scope 3 emissions.

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Alongside these “sustainable refining” efforts, Tüpraş is also investing in renewable power. 

Four years ago, it bought Entek, which produces electricity primarily from six hydropower plants and one gas plant. Since the acquisition, Tüpraş has started building a utility-scale solar farm in Romania and a wind power plant with storage in Türkiye, alongside smaller solar energy installations at some of its refineries. A dozen more renewable energy projects are currently in the pipeline, according to its latest annual report. 

In a self-declared bid to become “Türkiye’s leading producer of zero-carbon electricity”, Tüpraş wants to reach installed capacity of 1.6 gigawatts (GW) by 2030 – a target it raised in its updated plan – and 2.5GW by 2035. The Turkish government has committed to rolling out 120GW of wind and solar capacity nationwide by then. 

Setback for green fuels

Tüpraş plans to supply most of its low-carbon electricity to run its future production plants for green hydrogen, an alternative fuel that can replace fossil fuels in some heavy industries and long-distance transport. 

A few years ago, green hydrogen looked set to become a key pillar of the global energy transition, with companies pitching visionary projects and governments rolling out strategies for the fuel to decarbonise economies. But inflated forecasts, high costs and weak demand have led to a reality check for prospective producers like Tüpraş. 

The Turkish refiner significantly scaled back its green hydrogen plans last year. While it originally hoped to start producing the clean fuel in 2025, it now targets a first pilot project by 2030 with commercial large-scale production not expected before 2035. That’s primarily because the cost of electrolysers, the machines that split water into hydrogen and oxygen, has risen fourfold since its original projections, the company said.

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Tüpraş’s ambition to become Türkiye’s leading producer of sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) has also seen a partial rethink. The firm originally said it would convert by 2026 a unit in its sprawling oil refinery in the port city of Izmir into a plant that would produce SAF from waste cooking oil into “green” jet fuel. 

But it is now planning to build a dedicated plant which is expected to be commissioned towards the end of 2028. That means its SAF output will be added to its existing fossil fuel refining capacity rather than replacing any of it.

A Tupras refinery in Turkiye. Photo: Tüpraş A Tupras refinery in Turkiye. Photo: Tüpraş Dividends dwarf green spending

Under its updated blueprint, Tüpraş plans to invest $4.35 billion in zero-carbon power, SAF and green hydrogen by 2035. Last year, it spent $137 million on activities that qualify as green under EU rules, leaving much ground to make up in the next 10 years. Most of its green investment in 2025 went on solar and wind farms, and a quarter on a unit making propylene, a refinery by-product used to produce plastic packaging and bottle caps.

Over the same year, it paid out about five times as much – roughly $740 million – to shareholders, under a policy of distributing around 80% of its profits. About half went to Koç Holding, which in turn paid its own shareholders some $460 million. The Koç family and companies it controls hold the majority of the group.

Kelly Trout, research director at energy think-tank Oil Change International, said a company like Koç should not be the face of the COP31 climate summit as it doesn’t pass the test of “climate integrity” the UN requires of a sponsor. 

The hosting agreement struck between Türkiye and the UNFCCC says that the government has to consult the secretariat of the UN body to obtain advice on which “entities of concern” it should not conclude sponsorship or partnership agreements with. The document adds that the advice should give appropriate consideration to the partner’s climate integrity, but it does not specify how that should be judged.

‘Climate integrity’ mystery

Climate Home News asked the UNFCCC and the Turkish COP31 presidency if this process was followed for the Koç Holding sponsorship, but had not received a response at the time of publication. 

The same provision featured in the host country agreement for COP29 in Azerbaijan, according to a leaked copy published by Human Rights Watch.

COP31 attendees told not to interfere in Türkiye’s “internal affairs”

The clean energy arm of state-owned oil and gas company SOCAR was named “Energy Transition Partner” for that summit, alongside other firms which an investigation from the Organized Crime and Corruption Project (OCCRP) found were owned by the country’s ruling family or people associated with them. 

Koç is not the first fossil fuel-linked company to bankroll a UN climate summit. At COP24 in the Polish coal-mining city of Katowice in 2018, sponsors included the state coal power company PGE and the coking coal miner JSW. 

‘A real story to tell’

COP sponsors typically get the right to promote themselves inside the conference venue and appear at official events. When it unveiled the agreement, the COP31 presidency called Koç Holding a “vital partner” in its efforts to unite the public and the private sector “to demonstrate Türkiye’s unwavering commitment to global climate action”.

The presidency declined to answer Climate Home News’ questions on how Koç Holding will be involved in the summit. 

Koç itself has revealed little about its plans for the Antalya talks. When the deal was announced, the group said it would use the summit to share its experience of turning climate solutions into “concrete business results” and to forge new partnerships. 

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Speaking at a high-level roundtable on energy at UN headquarters in New York last month, Ali Koç said the industrial group has “a real story to tell”, having undertaken a “comprehensive transformation process in climate matters”. 

Campaigners, however, want companies that retain their high-emitting businesses to be excluded from the COP climate summits and have long demanded an “accountability framework” to protect the negotiations from fossil fuel influence. 

“If the UNFCCC and its secretariat wants to salvage a bit of credibility, the UNFCCC needs to urgently address conflicts of interest in the UN talks,” said Corporate Europe Observatory’s Sabido. 

The post Turkish giant sponsoring COP31 cut climate goals then cashed in on oil boom appeared first on Climate Home News.

Samadua's Nutmeg, Beutong Ateuh's Candlenut, and the Shadow of Expanding Mining Frontiers in Aceh

A campaign essay by Yayasan APEL Green Aceh

See Yayasan APEL Green Aceh's campaigns here Summary

Plans for metal mineral mining in Samadua Subdistrict, South Aceh, and Beutong Ateuh Banggalang Subdistrict, Nagan Raya, have triggered agrarian conflict in Aceh. This essay reads the two cases as manifestations of a structural problem: part of the expansion of the extractive frontier into the landscapes of smallholder spice cultivation. In Samadua, nutmeg (Myristica fragrans) has been the backbone of family economies since long before the district existed. In Beutong Ateuh, kemili (the Gayo-Acehnese name for candlenut, Aleurites moluccana) grows alongside areca nut, coffee, cacao, rice, and durian on slopes that form the headwaters of the Meureubo River and part of the Leuser–Ulu Masen Ecosystem corridor. The argument is simple. What is at stake in these mining plans is not merely a stand of forest or a plot for spice production, but the moral economy of farmer-stewards of the landscape, tested over countless generations. Once dismantled by a mining permit, that ecosystem cannot be restored by any amount of compensation.

Reading Two Subdistricts as One Event

 There is a temptation to treat Samadua and Beutong Ateuh, two subdistricts in the Indonesian province of Aceh, as separate cases. Samadua lies on Aceh’s southwest coast, where nutmeg trees descend the slopes toward the sea. Beutong Ateuh lies in Aceh’s inland highlands, where candlenut and coffee fill the gaps between mountain valleys. Yet reading them separately is a serious analytical mistake. They share at least three things: (1) remaining stands of Sumatran tropical rainforest that regulate the hydrology of the wider landscape; (2) smallholder spice-farming systems that have sustained families for decades to centuries; and (3) a new wave of metal mining business permits (IUP) issued or renewed in 2025–2026, without meaningful consultation with affected communities.

In the framework of political ecology, what we see in both areas is a local manifestation of a global process that some thinkers call accumulation by dispossession: the accumulation of capital not through productive innovation but through the seizure of living space. That living space is not empty land waiting to be priced. It is a web of local institutions, agroecological knowledge, collective memory, and spiritual relationships that make a piece of landscape irreplaceable.

The essay proceeds in four steps. First, it situates Samadua and Beutong Ateuh within the political ecology of post-conflict, post-tsunami Aceh. Second, it reads the nutmeg and candlenut economies as production systems that are more than commodities. Third, it examines the mining permit regime now operating in both areas, with particular attention to Supreme Court Decision No. 91.K/TUN/LH/2020 and how a series of new IUPs appears to circumvent it. Fourth, it reads the November 2025 Sumatra flash floods as a hydrological warning that must not be ignored in spatial planning decisions.

 

 

Beutong Ateuh agroforestry ecosystem and buffer zone to the Leuser-Ulu Masen Ecosystem, home to Sumatran tiger, Rhino, orangutan and countless other species

Samadua – A Subdistrict Built on the Scent of Nutmeg

 South Aceh is often called the heart of Indonesia’s nutmeg production. This is not rhetoric. For more than a century, household economies along the western Bukit Barisan, from Meukek, Sawang, and Samadua to Tapaktuan, have depended on nutmeg trees planted in mixed gardens alongside durian, clove, patchouli, chili, and jengkol. These gardens are not monocultures. They are agroforestry systems that ecologically mimic the structure of secondary forest, store water, protect soil from erosion, and support biodiversity that will never appear in conventional economic accounts.

The Samadua nutmeg economy is a textbook example of what the agrarian literature calls smallholder resilience. Farming families have great harvesting flexibility. Nutmeg can be picked year-round and sold as mace, seed, or fruit flesh for candied preserves; market risk is spread out; and productive assets can be passed across generations without being divided into worthless fragments. This system was not a gift from the state. Farmers built it, with knowledge handed down and renewed from one generation to the next, season after season. Even when white root rot (Rigidoporus microporus) struck nutmeg gardens in the past decade, the community’s response, supported by the Aceh Nutmeg Forum, led to the recovery of hundreds of hectares of smallholder gardens and to a more disease-resistant improved variety, “Sambutan.” This is a community able to look after itself, so long as its living space is not taken from under its feet.

This is where mining becomes dangerous. According to reporting by the Aceh Civil Society Coalition, two companies hold exploration IUPs in the Samadua area, totaling about 1,491.4 hectares: PT Bersama Sukses Mining (PT BSM) with 752.4 hectares and PT Mineral Mega Sentosa (PT MMS) with 739 hectares. The figure looks modest on paper, but projected onto maps of villages and smallholder gardens, it becomes a threat to water sources, to slope fertility, and to the ecological connection between nutmeg gardens and the forest stands on hilltops that hold back rainwater.

Even more troubling is the permitting process itself. In an open “love letter” issued by the Samadua Student Association (IMPS) on the 69th anniversary of South Aceh in November 2025, it is clear that residents experienced what is technically called procedural dispossession: their inherited land was placed on the Mining Business License Area (WIUP) map without outreach, without the knowledge of landowners, and without meaningful consultation. When the principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) is reduced to a perfunctory signature or skipped entirely, the permit that results is no longer an instrument of spatial planning. It becomes what the Aceh Civil Society Coalition called “a blank check for companies to enter and take control of people’s living space.”

On the night of Saturday, 15 August 2026, after the Isya prayer, hundreds of Samadua residents signed a petition against the mine at the Al-Munawarah Mosque in Gampong Kota Baru. A similar action had earlier been held by the Samadua South Aceh Kinship Association (IKSAS) in Subulussalam. This was not an impulsive act but a collective decision by a community that had carefully weighed how great the risk of losing water sources from the hills around their gardens would be, how long mining compensation could make up for lost in nutmeg income across generations, and how many agrarian conflicts would flare if the permits were forced through.

Samadua and its centuries old nutmeg agroforestry ecosystem

Beutong Ateuh – Candlenut, Rivers, and a Bloody History

About two hundred kilometers to the north, in the highlands of Nagan Raya, Beutong Ateuh Banggalang occupies a geographic position that may be even more ecologically strategic. The least populous subdistrict in Nagan Raya (about 2,026 people according to the latest data), it sits at roughly 556 meters above sea level, at the meeting point of two of Sumatra’s most important ecosystem landscapes: the Leuser Ecosystem (KEL) and the Ulu Masen Ecosystem. Beutong Ateuh’s forests are a living bridge, a corridor, between the two landscapes, allowing large wildlife such as orangutans, tigers, and Sumatran elephants to move, interbreed, and survive.

On the slopes of that corridor grows what Acehnese and Gayo people call kemili, alongside Robusta coffee. According to mapping by Syiah Kuala University, the land area for both covers 4,379 hectares, more than 61% of the potential coffee plantation area of Nagan Raya Regency. Together with paddy rice, areca nut, cacao, and durian, these commodities form a livelihood system as old, and as moral, as the Samadua nutmeg system.

But this landscape carries wounds. In Aceh’s contemporary history, the name Beutong Ateuh is tied to two events that must not be overlooked. The first is the 1999 human tragedy, when armed violence took the lives of Teungku Bantaqiah and dozens of his students, an event that made this land, in collective memory, tanoh (land) of the martyrs. The second, more recent, is the flash flood and landslide of 26 November 2025, which destroyed at least 200 homes and nearly erased Kuta Teungoh Village from the map. The Meureubo River, which rises in the Leuser forest and empties into the Indian Ocean, overflowed with an intensity not recorded in even the oldest residents’ memory. Months after the disaster, residents are still living in temporary shelters, and to this day the clean water crisis has not fully recovered.

It is in this context that the metal mineral mining permit regime has been reactivated. Through Decree of the Head of the Aceh Investment and One-Stop Integrated Services Agency No. 540/DPMPTSP/05/IUP-Eks./2026, PT Alam Cempaka Wangi (ACW) obtained an Exploration IUP for metal minerals (copper) in Beutong Ateuh Banggalang covering 1,820 hectares. PT Hasil Bumi Sembada (HBS) also holds an exploration permit. Taken together, the eight companies holding IUPs in Nagan Raya, including CV Blang Leumak Raya, PT Hikmah Beutong Raya, PT Mozika Karian Meutuah, PT Nagan Mineral Murni, and two coal companies, point to one thing: the state is viewing this landscape not as an ecological buffer but as a mineral reserve waiting to be extracted.

What makes this configuration ethically and legally problematic is the existence of Supreme Court Decision No. 91.K/TUN/LH/2020. That decision revoked the permit of PT Emas Mineral Murni (PT EMM) over a 10,000-hectare concession in Beutong Ateuh, on the grounds that the concession could damage the Leuser Ecosystem and environmental functions, and that it lay in an area prone to floods, landslides, drought, and earthquakes of VII–XII on the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale. In other words, the decision is a legal instrument that positions Beutong Ateuh as an area that should be free of any extractive activity. The reappearance of new IUPs after that ruling violates the spirit of the law set by Indonesia’s highest court.

Dried Candlenuts from the agroforests of Beutong Ateuh

The Permit Regime as Structural Violence

Let us pause to reflect on what is actually happening. When a mining business permit is issued without FPIC, without meaningful consultation, and without mapping its overlap with people’s productive land, what is taking place is not mere administrative negligence but a form of structural violence: violence that works through procedure, through stamps and signatures, through maps drawn in comfortable rooms hundreds of kilometers from the gardens where nutmeg and candlenut trees grow.

This violence operates on several levels at once. At the first level, it delegitimizes people’s rights over their own land, which has been managed for generations but which, in the eyes of the permit regime, lacks a “formal certificate.” At the second level, it alters power relations within the community: some residents, promised jobs or financial rewards, support the mine, while most oppose it. This creates horizontal conflict that did not previously exist, and companies often exploit it to justify claims that “the local community supports” the project. At the third level, it hands long-term risks such as hydrological damage, heavy metal contamination, and further deforestation to the communities least able to bear them, while profits are siphoned off to centers of capital far beyond Aceh’s borders.

In contemporary political-ecological analysis, this configuration is not an anomaly but a pattern. It recurs in Halmahera, in Southeast Sulawesi, in Central Kalimantan, wherever the extractive frontier pushes into areas previously regarded as “peripheral.” What makes the Aceh case especially urgent is the Leuser Ecosystem, the only place in the world where orangutans, tigers, elephants, and Sumatran rhinos still share a single landscape, a biogeographic fact that makes any decision to allow mining in its buffer zone a decision with consequences beyond the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia.

Nutmeg from the agroforests of Samadua

The November 2025 Disaster: A Warning Not to Be Missed 

As a result of the Sumatra flash floods of 25 November 2025, around 85 percent of the villages in Beutong Ateuh were lost. Beutong Ateuh, long known as a fertile farming region, was severely damaged. A day before the flood hit Beutong Ateuh on 26 November 2025, APEL Green Aceh found about 30 cubic meters of logs piled up in an area bordering protected forest in Babah Suak Village, the link between the Leuser forest and the Ulu Masen forest in Aceh Province. Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI) recorded that Aceh Province lost around 177 thousand hectares of forest, 2.5 times the area of Singapore, in just seven years. In a single year alone, the Land of the Veranda of Mecca lost around 16 thousand hectares of natural forest.

Treating the November 2025 disaster as a lesson is a moral and scientific imperative. When upstream forests are cleared or torn open by extractive activity, the water cycle is disrupted. Extreme rainfall, whose frequency and intensity are rising with climate change, can no longer be absorbed gradually into the soil and aquifers. Water moves as surface runoff carrying mud, rocks, and tree trunks down the slopes with devastating force. If we allow mineral mining to operate on the slopes of Beutong Ateuh, just hit by flash floods, or in the hills of Samadua that feed the water sources of smallholder nutmeg gardens, we are not only defying the wisdom of spatial planning but actively preparing the next disaster.

Ecological Resistance from Below

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about these two cases is not the threat but the response. In Samadua, the protest against the mine is led not by a single figure but by a web of actors: students, community leaders, mosque imams, and mothers and fathers who sign petitions after the Isya prayer. In Beutong Ateuh, resistance continues from generation to generation, from Teungku Diwa Laksana, Abu Kamil, and the Beutong Ateuh community, who openly rejected PT EMM’s exploitation in September 2018, to today’s rejection of PT Bumi Sempada and PT Alam Cempaka Wangi. An official letter rejecting the mine was sent to the President of the Republic of Indonesia in May 2026, signed by the Pawang Uteun community, Yayasan APEL Green Aceh, and 99 local, national, and global civil society organizations.

This resistance is not merely a reaction. It is a positive statement about the kind of development people want. When Rusli, Secretary of Babah Suak Village, says “This Beutong land is not for sale,” he is articulating a political theory: that land is not a commodity, and that the value of a landscape cannot be reduced to rupiah per hectare. When a resident of Beutong Ateuh says “if it’s farming, it’s certain the residents benefit and nature is preserved,” he is advancing an entirely sensible political-economic proposition: that smallholder agriculture, which spreads benefits widely and preserves ecological function, is a more rational form of development than extractive mining that concentrates profit at the center and leaves costs on the periphery.

This resistance moves within legal, moral, and ecological frameworks at once. It reminds the state of Supreme Court Decision 91.K/TUN/LH/2020. It reminds all of us of the agrarian understanding that land is a trust across generations. It reminds science that a landscape that has shown its vulnerability to disaster must not be opened up further.

The process of drying candlenuts in Beutong Ateuh

Aceh’s Nature Is Not a Legacy to Be Used Up

When we place Samadua and Beutong Ateuh side by side, we see more than two mining conflicts. We see a historic choice facing Aceh: will this landscape be managed as an ecological buffer and a stage for a sustainable smallholder spice economy, or will it be handed over to an extractive regime that has repeatedly proven it leaves behind holes, mud, and wounds?

That choice is not hypothetical. It is being made today, through every IUP issued, every WIUP map drawn, every consultation skipped, and every resident’s voice left unheard. Yayasan APEL Green Aceh, Selamatkan Hutan Hujan, Yes to Life No to Mining, Pawang Uteun, Lanskap Hijau Sumatera, and the entire civil society network state their position clearly: (1) a comprehensive evaluation of all IUPs in Samadua and Beutong Ateuh; (2) full application of the FPIC principle; (3) public disclosure of permitting information; and (4) a halt to mining activities that could trigger agrarian conflict and environmental damage until land rights, community participation, and ecological impacts are resolved openly.

Samadua’s nutmeg has fed families for more than a hundred years. Beutong Ateuh’s candlenut has grown alongside Aceh’s long history of resistance. The rivers flowing from both areas give life to millions of people downstream. The November 2025 disaster has warned us what happens when this landscape is weakened. The 2020 Supreme Court decision has declared what legally must not be done. The voices from the villages have said plainly what they want. What remains is for the state to find the courage to listen. Aceh’s nature is not a legacy to be used up.

Yayasan APEL Green Aceh, for the forests, water, and living space of the people of Aceh.

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The post Samadua’s Nutmeg, Beutong Ateuh’s Candlenut, and the Shadow of Expanding Mining Frontiers in Aceh appeared first on Yes to Life No to Mining.

We dug through hundreds of organizational filings to find out who wanted one of America’s most important forest protections eliminated.

Montreal’s Darlington Ecological Corridor began as a tool to help urban foxes survive. Now, it's become so much more.

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A temporary breach of the 1.5C global-warming limit is now “inevitable” following “decades of insufficient climate action”, says the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).

In its “sobering” annual assessment of the global “emissions gap”, UNEP says that exceeding the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit is “imminent and unavoidable”.

This year’s report, titled “The point of return”, says the “task now” is to minimise the size and scale of a temperature “overshoot” and to “establish a credible return path to 1.5C by the end of the century”.

Even the “lowest possible” overshoot scenario for 1.5C would first see global warming peak at around 1.7-1.8C in the middle of the century before declining, says the report.

This scenario – which is “still aligned with the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement” – would require global emissions cuts of 18% by 2030 and 45% by 2035, while ramping up “removals” of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere, says UNEP.

In contrast, it notes that the current climate pledges by countries around the world – even if fully implemented – would only reduce emissions by 5-8% by 2030 and 11-15 % by 2035, relative to 2025 levels.

Nonetheless, the report identifies “ample opportunity to accelerate action”, concluding that “countries can still limit peak warming, shorten the duration of overshoot and keep the goals of the Paris Agreement within reach”.

(See Carbon Brief’s detailed coverage of previous reports in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025.)

Article Contents Expand menu

• Emissions ‘comparable’ between 2024 and 2025
• New NDCs would reduce emissions ‘far from what is needed’
• Emissions gap is ‘still large’
• Every five years of delay will add 0.1C
• ‘Uneven and insufficient’ progress towards global stocktake

Emissions ‘comparable’ between 2024 and 2025

The report says that emissions in 2025 were “comparable” to those of 2024. 

Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 totalled 58.4bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e), according to the report. This is around 0.16GtCO2e lower than 2024 levels – albeit, with high levels of uncertainty around the numbers. 

In addition, because the figures presented in the 2025 report are “provisional”, the report says, it is “not possible to conclude on the overall direction of emissions in 2025”.

The emissions growth rate has been slowing down in recent decades: the growth rate over 1990-2015 was, on average, 1.7% per year, while emissions have increased by an average of 0.8% per year since 2016.

The chart below shows the total human-driven emissions between 1990 and 2025, separated by greenhouse gas: CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion (dark grey), methane (light grey), nitrous oxide (blue), fluorinated gases (orange) and CO2 from land-use change (green).

Credit: UNEP emissions gap report (2026)

Compared to 2024, emissions from fossil fuels increased slightly, by between 0.4-1.1%, says the report. Emissions of both nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases increased by even higher rates, but since these comprise such a small part of total greenhouse gas emissions, “their contribution to the overall trend is relatively less significant”, it adds. Methane emissions remained steady over that time.

A reduction in the CO2 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) “slightly overcompensates” for the rise in emissions of fossil-fuel CO2 and other gases, according to the report. (For more on falling land-use emissions, see Carbon Brief’s explainer.)

The decrease in LULUCF emissions was “partially driven” by a decline in global wildfire emissions, particularly in Africa, South America and parts of south-east Asia. The report notes that these decreases were “likely connected to the ceasing of El Niño conditions”. The ongoing “super” El Niño is likely to cause LULUCF emissions to increase in 2026.

The report also examines countries’ contributions to the increase in greenhouse gas emissions – although here, it excludes LULUCF due to a lag in national-level emissions inventories for the sector. 

Among the top six emitters, only the US saw a notable increase in 2025, says the report, whereas emissions in China, the EU, India, Russia and Indonesia were relatively flat. Emissions in the US grew by 133m tonnes of CO2e (MtCO2e) in 2025, due to increased electricity demand and a “rebound” of coal power. This growth in US emissions is likely due to a combination of market factors, including increased heating demand due to a colder winter, higher gas prices and overall increased electricity demand.

The changes for the six largest emitters, the rest of the G20 countries, international transport and the rest of the world can be seen in the chart below.

Credit: UNEP emissions gap report (2026)

Across most sectors, progress towards decarbonisation has been “modest”, says the report. The most notable decreases have occurred in the power sector and the transport sector, due to the growth of solar power and electric vehicles. The report notes:

“There are emerging signs of transport sector electrification and decarbonisation, but at rates and levels that are not yet sufficient to drive emissions reductions at the global level.”

However, emissions from the transport sector have continued to grow, due to increased demand for international aviation and shipping. 

The report notes that while electricity demand from data centres is “projected to double” by 2030, data centres at present account for less than 1% of total emissions.

New NDCs would reduce emissions ‘far from what is needed’

All countries were meant to submit new UN climate pledges for 2035, known as the third nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement, by February 2025. However, 95% of nations missed this deadline.

Many countries came forward with their third NDCs at a UN climate summit in New York in September 2025 and at the COP30 climate summit in Brazil in November 2025.

By the end of COP30, 122 – or 63% – of countries had produced their third NDCs.

The report says that figure had risen to 124 by 1 September 2026, with pledges now covering 75% of global emissions.

This is more than double the number of third NDCs available at the time of the 2025 emissions gap report – allowing a “more robust basis for assessing collective progress and ambition toward 2035”, says the report.

Although the first global stocktake of action towards the goals of the Paris Agreement called for countries to submit targets “covering all greenhouse gases”, there has only been a “modest” increase in the number of nations to do so, according to the report.

It says that eight countries included greenhouse gas targets for the first time in their third NDCs, bringing the total number parties with such targets up to 155.

The third NDCs “increasingly use more robust and verifiable target formulations”, such as standardised baselines, says the report.

However, they have not “meaningfully broadened the scope of sectors and gases covered by the targets”, it adds.

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If the third NDCs were implemented in full, it would lower global emissions in 2035 by 3.5GtCO2e, compared to 2030 targets, says the report.

It says this is “far from the global reductions needed to get on track to achieving the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement”.

Compared to the 2025 report, the projections for global emissions in 2035 as a result the third NDCs are about 3GtCO2e higher. 

This is down to the formal withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement, as well as from “harmonising” the projections with the latest historical emissions data, says the report.

The global “implementation gap” for 2030 – defined as the difference between countries’ projected emissions under current policies and the emissions expected if they implemented their NDCs in full – has narrowed compared to last year, says the report.

However, this is mainly due to the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement. In other words, the narrowing of the gap is due to “policy changes, not policy progress”.

The implementation gap for both 2030 and 2035 are of a similar size – suggesting “enhanced collective ambition of 2035 NDCs is weak”, continues the report. 

Some 14 of the 17 G20 nations, counting the EU as one, have submitted new NDCs with emissions targets for 2035, says the report. 

However, the emissions trajectories of the majority of G20 nations remain “misaligned” with their net-zero targets, says the report.

The chart below shows the gap between nations’ current emission trajectories and their NDC targets for 2030 and 2035 (diamonds), along with their net-zero targets (circles).

Credit: UNEP emissions gap report (2026)

All G20 members except Japan, the EU and UK would need to “accelerate their emission reduction rates based on current policies” to achieve their net-zero targets, adds the report.

Emissions gap is ‘still large’

The report goes on to estimate the “emissions gap” – the difference between projected global emissions if all NDCs are met in full and what would be needed to achieve the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.

The report assesses a range of potential future pathways – some that have been assessed in previous reports and some new. The three core “NDC scenarios” are:

• A “current policy” scenario, which projects global greenhouse gas emissions based only on policies adopted and implemented as of November 2025.
• An “unconditional NDCs” scenario, which projects greenhouse gas emissions assuming full implementation of the most recent NDCs that do not depend on external support (with a cut-off date of 1 September 2026).
• A “conditional NDCs” scenario that further assumes that the implementation of NDCs that depend on external support, such as climate finance from wealthier countries (also with a cut-off date of 1 September 2026). 

As with the 2025 report, the authors also analyse two “scenario extensions”, which explore the implications of current policies, NDCs and net-zero pledges beyond 2035:

• A “current policies continuing” scenario, which “follows current policies to 2035 and assumes a continuation of similar efforts thereafter”.
• A “conditional NDCs plus all net-zero pledges” scenario, which is “the most optimistic scenario included”. This scenario assumes the “conditional NDC” scenario is achieved until 2035 and then all net-zero or other long-term low emissions developments strategies are followed thereafter, excluding that of the US.

In previous reports, the authors have compared all of these scenarios against pathways that hold warming below 2C and 1.8C, or against 1.5C with no more than 0.1C of “overshoot”.

(Overshoot refers to pathways where global warming first exceeds the 1.5C limit and is then brought back down through techniques that remove carbon from the atmosphere.)

These three warming pathways were drawn from the scenario database for the mitigation report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sixth assessment (AR6). 

These scenarios were developed around 2015-20 and assumed that the world would pursue immediate emissions cuts from around 2020. However, in reality, emissions have continued to rise. As a result, the report says, those temperature pathways “have become outdated”.

For example, the authors explain, emissions are currently around 80% above the level that would have been needed by 2030 to limit warming to 1.5C with no or “low” overshoot.

Therefore, as a result of “decades of insufficient emission reductions”, the possibility of limiting warming to 1.5C with limited or no overshoot “has now been lost”, say the authors.

The 2026 report instead “draws on a new generation of pathways in which ambitious mitigation action starts from 2025”. These are:

• A “below 2C” scenario, which is consistent with keeping global warming below 2C throughout the 21st century, with at least a 66% chance.
• A “lowest 1.5C overshoot” scenario, which keeps warming to 1.7-1.8C throughout the entire century (with a 66% chance) and returns it to 1.5C by 2100 (with a 50% chance). 

These updated scenarios “reflect the failure to cut global emissions to date”, note the authors.

The overshoot scenario “minimise[s] both the magnitude and duration of overshoot above 1.5C”, say the authors, while meeting a defined set of “feasibility and sustainability guardrails”. These include, for example, balancing the demands of bioenergy and large-scale carbon removals with biodiversity and food security needs.

The task to “minimise” overshoot reflects the wording of the “Global Mutirão” package of measures agreed at the COP30 climate summit in Brazil in 2025. This acknowledged – for the first time in a COP text – that there was likely to be an overshoot of 1.5C and urged that both its extent and duration needed to be “limit[ed]”.

The chart below, taken from the report, shows how the emissions pathways compare to each other, as well as historical emissions and the 1.5C pathway used in previous reports.

The right-hand section shows the “unbridgeable gap” to pathways that limit warming to 1.5C with overshoot of no more than 0.1C.

The left-hand chart shows projected emissions under the three NDC scenarios (median estimates), as well as the “below 2C” and “lowest 1.5C overshoot” scenarios (central estimates, plus the full min-max range) out to 2035. The right-hand chart shows the emissions gap in 2035 to the conditional NDCs. Credit: UNEP emissions gap report (2026)

The lowest 1.5C overshoot scenario requires “immediate, deep, rapid and sustained reductions”, says the report. Global greenhouse gas emissions would need to fall by 18% by 2030, 45% by 2035 and 69% by 2040, relative to 2025 levels. Global net-zero CO2 emissions would be reached around 2050.

These benchmarks for 1.5C effectively replace those in the IPCC’s AR6, which specified reductions of 43% by 2030 and 60% by 2035, relative to 2019 levels. These have been frequently cited in COP decisions and other declarations. 

With the ongoing uncertainty around the timeline for the IPCC’s seventh assessment reports, the benchmarks in the UNEP report provide an important update on the emissions cuts required to limit overshoot.

For the 2C scenario, global greenhouse gas emissions would need to drop by 11% by 2030, 24% by 2035 and 37% by 2040, relative to 2025 levels, the report says. 

The table below sets out the estimated emissions from the NDC scenarios and the gaps to the new “below 2C” and “lowest 1.5C overshoot” scenarios.

Credit: UNEP emissions gap report (2026)

These emissions gaps are “still large”, say the authors, with current NDCs and net-zero targets not being “enough to minimise overshoot”. 

(The report also notes that because the 1.5C and 2C scenarios have changed, the emissions gaps in 2026 are not directly comparable with previous reports.)

Putting the world on track for the lowest 1.5C scenario would require global emissions to fall by 5.7% per year over the next decade, it says.

This is “even more rapid” than the 5% annual drop that would have been required to meet the 1.5C limit without overshoot, had emissions cuts started in 2019, adds the report.

Every five years of delay will add 0.1C

To explore different future emission pathways and their impact on global temperatures, the report uses a simple climate model, or “emulator”, called FaIR. 

The report estimates that current national policies would cause 2.8C of global warming over the century, with a 66% chance. Under this scenario, there is also a 10% chance that warming would exceed 3.4C.

If unconditional NDCs are implemented, warming this century could reach 2.7C, with a 66% chance, it says.

If all NDCs are fully implemented, warming could reach 2.6C by 2100, with a 66% chance.

In the “most optimistic” scenario, where countries fully implement their NDCs and reach their net-zero targets, there is a 66% chance that warming could be limited to 2.1C by the end of this century.

These results are illustrated on the chart below, with boxes showing a 10-90% certainty range under a central estimate of future emissions and vertical lines showing the “combined uncertainty across greenhouse gas emissions projections and Earth-system response uncertainty”.

Credit: UNEP emissions gap report (2026)

Compared to last year, the central warming estimates in 2100 for the NDC scenarios are about 0.2-0.3C higher, says the report.

This is because the projected global emissions as a result of the 2035 NDCs have increased. Again, this is down to the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and higher estimates of historical emissions.

While fully implementing all NDCs and net-zero pledges could cut warming by 0.6C, this would still be 0.25C higher than the lowest 1.5C overshoot pathways, says the report.

It adds that this “highlights the need both to close the implementation gap between current policies and existing NDCs and net-zero pledges, and to strengthen NDCs or exceed existing commitments”.

As noted above, the report continues that, “with immediate, deep, rapid and sustained emission cuts”, it would still be possible to limit peak warming to 1.7-1.8C, with a 66% chance.

If these emission cuts are “combined with an ambitious and sustainable scale-up of CO2 removal”, then warming could be returned to 1.5C by the end of the century, it continues.

However, “continued delay” in reducing global emissions would “further worsen the climate outcomes still achievable”, it says, adding:

“For every five years of delay in starting to cut emissions, around another 0.1C of warming will be locked in.

“Continued insufficient emission reductions over the next decades could make warming of 2C inevitable, putting the Paris Agreement at risk of failure.”

The figure below shows the likelihood of holding warming to 1.5C, 2C and 3C under scenarios over this century where countries continue with current policies, implement unconditional NDCs, all NDCs and both NDCs and net-zero pledges. 

Credit: UNEP emissions gap report (2026) ‘Uneven and insufficient’ progress towards global stocktake

The report also looks at how the world is measuring up against the mitigation actions set out in the first “global stocktake”, which was agreed at the COP28 climate summit in Dubai, in 2023.

The global stocktake is a key part of the Paris regime that assesses progress towards meeting the goals of the agreement. After each stocktake is completed, countries are supposed to increase their ambition as needed to get on track with their collective targets.

The report looks at nine “mitigation action areas” agreed in the outcome of the first global stocktake. Overall, the report says, progress in those areas is “uneven and insufficient”.

However, it does note that there are “several remarkable examples of progress that exceeded expectations”. 

In particular, the deployment of renewable energy has increased substantially more than was expected by future projections made in 2015 using then-current policies, notes the report. The increase in overall renewable capacity was three times higher than expected under the previous projections. As a result, CO2 emissions related to energy generation increased by 40% less than was expected.

The chart below shows how key energy indicators have changed (black circles), compared to the 2015 projections (white circles).

Source: UNEP emissions gap report (2026)

According to the report, “only renewables are on track for 2030…though continued adoption and implementation of supportive policies will be required to sustain such growth”. 

The world is “lagging particularly far behind” where it needs to be to limit warming to the lowest possible overshoot of the 1.5C target in two areas: transitioning away from fossil fuels and halting deforestation, says the report. (Deforestation is the largest contributor to LULUCF emissions.) 

The report notes that the amount of energy sourced from fossil fuels “continues to rise globally, albeit at a slower rate than was projected in 2015”. Under current policies, it says, global coal usage may peak by 2030, but oil and gas use is “likely to keep increasing”. 

Furthermore, it says, global efforts to stop deforestation by 2030 “remain significantly off track”. Achieving the end-of-decade target would require accelerating the slowdown in forest loss by “more than a factor of 10”. 

The report also includes modelling that shows what level of ambition is needed to achieve the “lowest overshoot” scenario – that which will “minimise the magnitude and duration of overshoot”. This lowest overshoot scenario results in a maximum warming of around 1.7C, with the world returning below 1.5C by 2100, report authors explained in a press briefing.

(It is “no longer feasible”, the report notes, to limit global warming to a temperature rise of 1.5C with an overshoot of no more than 0.1C.)

It provides projections for the ambition needed by 2030, 2035, 2040 and 2050 to achieve this lowest overshoot scenario. For example, minimising overshoot will require reducing the amount of energy derived from coal by 15% by 2030, compared to 2025 levels. Coal energy should be reduced 55% by 2035, 75% by 2040 and 90% by 2050, shows the report.

For oil and gas, smaller reductions are needed in the short term – 5% and 0%, respectively, by 2030 – but with steep declines in the following years. By 2050, energy from oil should be reduced by 65% and energy from gas should be reduced by 75%, says the report.

The chart below shows the outcomes needed in several energy- and electricity-related areas to limit the peak and duration of overshoot. 

The black line shows the observed changes from 2020 to 2025, while the dashed black line shows 2015 projections based on then-current policies. The thick blue line shows the “minimum collective effort” needed to achieve the lowest overshoot scenario.

Source: UNEP emissions gap report (2026)

(There are a range of different ways to reach the “lowest overshoot” scenario. The “minimum collective effort” illustrates the lowest contribution from each sector or fuel that would still be compatible with reaching the “lowest overshoot” scenario overall.)

Article information

Dr Simon Evans, Carbon Brief’s deputy editor and senior policy editor, is an observer of the UNEP gap report’s steering committee.

UNEP (2026), Emissions gap report 2026: The point of return: Urgent emissions cuts needed to come back from overshoot of 1.5C, doi: https://:unep.org/en/publications/report/emissions-gap-report-2026

Related Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C 01.09.2026 Climate pollutants Why land-use emissions have fallen by a third this century – in six charts 17.08.2026 Climate pollutants Experts: Why carbon removal needs a ‘major scale up’ to return warming to 1.5C 19.06.2026 Carbon dioxide removal Analysis: What are the causes of recent record-high global temperatures? 10.12.2025 Climate pollutants

The post UNEP: Opportunity has ‘been lost’ to meet 1.5C warming limit without ‘overshoot’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

The United Nations has said the world must cut greenhouse gas emissions by nearly 6% per year to limit global warming enough to be able to return to the 1.5C goal by 2100, as decades of insufficient climate action have now made an overshoot inevitable. 

In a video message accompanying the 2026 Emissions Gap Report from the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the world could no longer avoid overshooting the 1.5C limit and that the consequences were already devastating. However, he said it was still possible to return average global temperatures to 1.5C above preindustrial times by the end of the century.

“Overshoot is not surrender,” he said, adding that the report, released on Wednesday, sets out what is needed to limit warming. That entails cutting global greenhouse gas emissions by 18% by 2030, 45% by 2035 and 69% by 2040, all compared with 2025 levels.

This implies average annual reduction rates of 5.7% for 2025-2035, higher than the pathways laid out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its last major scientific report, which required annual reduction rates of about 5%, UNEP said.

Paris Agreement committee names three countries snubbing it over NDCs

The more ambitious emissions reductions – which countries are still far off achieving – would put the world on the lowest-possible overshoot pathway, giving a 50% chance of limiting peak warming to 1.7–1.8C around mid-century before bringing global temperatures back to 1.5C or below by 2100, the report said. Reaching this scenario will also require carbon removal from the atmosphere, it added.

UNEP noted that if countries fully implement their current national climate plans (NDCs), they would only reduce emissions by 5-8% by 2030 and 11-15% by 2035, relative to 2025 levels.

UNEP Executive Director Inger Andersen said the world must not give up on the Paris Agreement’s most ambitious warming limit, adding that every additional fraction of a degree and additional year of heating above 1.5C increases climate change impacts and risks, such as the deadly floods, heatwaves and wildfires that have plagued many nations this year. 

“We must pull out all the stops to minimise peak warming and return to 1.5C by the end of the century. This is possible,” she said, adding that governments must urgently implement policies that deliver rapid and sustained emissions reductions.

Climate pledges fall short

In 2025, global greenhouse emissions reached a total of 58.4 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide (CO₂) equivalent, which is estimated to be a very slight decline from 2024 levels, but UNEP said it is too soon to conclude that global emissions are plateauing or peaking.

Total net anthropogenic GHG emissions, 1990–2025. Source: UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2026 Total net anthropogenic GHG emissions, 1990–2025. Source: UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2026

New climate pledges since last year’s report have made a negligible difference to projected emissions and warming, UNEP said. Under current policies, the world is on course for 2.8C of warming this century, while full implementation of national climate pledges and continued similar efforts would limit warming to 2.6C, the report found.

UNEP said its projections had deteriorated, attributing this to the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement under President Donald Trump and revised estimates of historical emissions. 

Even with the most optimistic pledge-based scenario – which assumes countries deliver both their current national climate commitments and additional net-zero targets – warming would now only be limited to 2.1C this century, the report found.

IPCC scientists vow to press on with climate reports despite political deadlock

Speaking to journalists ahead of the report’s launch, co-author Anne Ohlhoff said the US exit from the Paris accord meant that its previous national climate target was no longer included in UNEP’s global projections. The country has also dropped its net-zero emissions goal, she said, affecting the outlook because the US is the world’s second-largest emitter.

She warned that there is still a large gap between countries’ emissions commitments for 2035 and the reductions needed under the report’s lowest-possible 1.5C overshoot scenario.

Every five years of CO₂ emissions at current levels pushes peak warming up by around 0.1C, she said, adding that without urgent action, it could quickly become impossible to keep peak warming below 1.7–1.8C.

Describing the emissions gap as a “leadership gap”, UN chief Guterres warned that current national climate plans and policies “fall dangerously short” of what is needed to limit warming. He urged countries to adopt credible roadmaps for transitioning away from fossil fuels, accelerate clean energy deployment and electrification, invest in electricity grids and storage, cut methane emissions and halt deforestation.

Projections of global warming under the pledge-based scenarios assessed in the report. Source: UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2026 Projections of global warming under the pledge-based scenarios assessed in the report. Source: UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2026 Carbon removal needed, but risky 

Alongside deep emissions cuts, removal of CO₂ from the atmosphere needs to be accelerated throughout the century, the report found. The world will need to remove and permanently store about 320 billion tonnes of CO₂ from the atmosphere to return global temperatures to around 1.5C by 2100.

The estimated carbon removal is equivalent to around eight years of global CO₂ emissions at 2024 levels. However, UNEP cautions that removing carbon at this scale remains uncertain because of technological and socio-economic challenges.

Keywan Riahi, a contributor to the report, said carbon could be removed through nature-based approaches, such as planting forests and improving wetland management, which help ecosystems absorb carbon emissions, as well as engineering solutions that capture emissions from energy production or remove carbon directly from the air.

A view of Brazil’s Pantanal wetland (Photo: Silas Ismael/Wetlands International Brazil office) A view of Brazil’s Pantanal wetland (Photo: Silas Ismael/Wetlands International Brazil office)

However, he warned that both nature-based and technological approaches face risks and might not deliver carbon removal at the scale needed. This is because nature solutions such as planetary sinks are weakening because of climate change while techno-fixes remain uncertain, he added.

“All of those technologies come with risks,” Riahi told reporters, adding that what the world needs is to try “to keep the overshoot as low as possible, so that we do not need to rely on these technologies to take CO₂ out of the atmosphere later on”.

Renewable energy supports emissions cuts

Despite the expected overshoot of the 1.5C warming limit, the UNEP Emissions Gap Report underscored that the rapid growth of renewable energy and the impact of climate policies so far show that deeper emissions cuts remain possible. 

It stated that since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, global renewable electricity capacity has grown three times faster than anticipated, while solar photovoltaic (PV) deployment has increased sevenfold compared with projections made a decade ago.

Maintaining the recent pace of renewable energy expansion, alongside stronger policies, could put the world on track to meet the global goal of tripling renewable energy capacity by 2030, the report said. It could also increase the share of wind and solar in electricity generation to levels consistent with the pathway that limits the overshoot of 1.5C to the lowest possible level, it added.

SE Asia speeds up plan for connected clean power grid after oil shock

Andersen said the explosion of renewable energy and slower-than-projected growth in coal energy supply showed that accelerating climate action is possible. However, she warned that progress remains insufficient, particularly in phasing down fossil fuels and halting forest loss.

“Nations must understand that the point of return begins now, not later,” she said, calling for “fast, deep and sustained emissions reductions”. She urged governments to strengthen their climate action at upcoming UN climate talks and accelerate efforts to keep the 1.5C pathway within reach.

Bill Hare, chief executive of Climate Analytics, said major fossil fuel-producing countries need to take greater responsibility for reducing their emissions, saying that big polluters such as the US and Saudi Arabia need “to stop playing politics and face the scientific reality”. 

“Right now they are looking at the fire, denying it exists and pouring more petrol on it, while their own citizens increasingly face searing heat, wildfires and other impacts,” he said. “Governments [need] to get on with enacting policies that cut fossil fuel use as soon as possible.”

The post UN sets steep emission cuts to reverse 1.5C overshoot by end of century appeared first on Climate Home News.

As the COP17 nature summit gets underway in Armenia, evidence has emerged of lobbying by a leading international pharmaceuticals group to weaken the terms of a flagship fund for nature.

Documents analysed by DeSmog show that the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) called for a “radical rethink” of the rationale for the landmark Cali Fund – the first mechanism built to take voluntary payments from large companies that profit from genetic sequence data.

The IFPMA states that the “modalities of the decision” to establish the Fund – which was ratified by 196 countries in 2024 at the COP16 summit of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity in Colombia – should be “significantly reviewed, revised and clarified”.

In the consultation submission, the trade group – which represents the pharmaceutical sector at the UN – also challenged the indicative rates at which companies were invited to contribute to the Fund, agreed at COP16 as 0.1 percent of revenue or 1 percent of profit.

The IFPMA labelled these indicative rates as “premature”, set “without any rational analysis”, and “commercially unrealistic”, suggesting instead that companies be allowed to contribute to the voluntary fund at a level of their choosing. 

Other demands from the IFPMA included a guarantee that any contribution would explicitly substitute payments for digital sequence information required under national or international laws.

Despite contributions to the Cali Fund already being voluntary, following a fierce lobbying push at the last summit, the IFPMA also seeks a guarantee they will remain so, stating that “there are elements in the decision that do not go far enough in creating a truly voluntary mechanism”.

Responses from other sectors, such as biotechnology and cosmetics – which are listed alongside pharma and artificial intelligence firms in the treaty text as industries that should contribute – echo some of the IFPMA’s objections, and appear to be reluctant to support the Fund as it is currently conceived. 

The UK Bioindustry Association (UK BIA), which has 600 biotech and life sciences companies among its members, says the CBD’s expectations for what the Fund can raise are currently set “unrealistically high”, in its consultation response dated March 2025. 

UK BIA states that “for the Fund to succeed in the long term”, questions over its design and operationalisation must be addressed, and “clear incentives” created. 

The revelations come as negotiators gather for the UN biodiversity summit in Armenia this week, with just $10,000 pledged by companies to the Cali Fund. 

It falls far short of the $1 billion to $10 billion that the UN had hoped the Fund could draw in every year, half of which is mandated to flow directly to the Indigenous and local communities that steward biodiversity.

“The tiny amounts contributed to the Cali Fund so far, combined with continued delays from industry, send a clear signal: voluntary contributions are simply not delivering,” An Lambrechts, a biodiversity politics expert at Greenpeace International, told DeSmog. 

The latest UN report shows that the world is off track on all but one of 23 targets aimed at reversing catastrophic nature loss, with the total funds raised to date from both private and public bodies falling far short of what is needed to close a $200 billion “biodiversity finance gap”.

“Big multinational corporations are turning massive profits by exploiting nature,” Lambrechts says, “while leaving people all over the world to face the impacts of the biodiversity crisis.”

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A spokesperson for the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Secretariat admits that the sums in the Fund “sit well below the scenarios that were discussed in Cali”, but puts this down to the evolving “operational infrastructure” and its low profile.

“Substantive decisions expected at COP17 are expected to give in-scope companies more solid ground to commit,” they said.

“I do believe companies have legitimate concerns, but there’s also a sense in which they don’t want to pay,” said a source close to the negotiations, who preferred to remain anonymous. “If these industries were really supportive then someone would have put the money in by now, even just as a token, a show of good faith.”

Guilherme Cintra, Director, Innovation Policy at IFPMA wrote in an email that the group had “long supported the goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity and continues to deliver against the targets set out in the Global Biodiversity Framework”.

He added: “The level of participation in the Cali Fund reflects ongoing questions about the design and implementation of the mechanism, rather than a lack of commitment to biodiversity. Governments should use COP17 to rethink the Cali Fund to attract broader participation and ensure it supports biodiversity and preserves scientific openness.” 

UK BIA declined to comment on the record. 

“It’s concerning that, nearly two years after the agreements reached at COP16 in Cali, funding for biodiversity protection remains an unfulfilled promise,” Juan Bay, leader of the indigenous Waorani nation of Ecuador told DeSmog.

“This reflects a situation we have been denouncing for years: Indigenous peoples protect some of the most biodiverse territories on the planet, yet we continue to face enormous difficulties in directly accessing the funding needed to protect them.”

History of Pushback

When the Cali Fund was launched in February last year, the UN hailed it as the beginning of “a new era for biodiversity finance”.

The new financial instrument aimed to address a new reality: that genetic data, known as digital sequence information, or DSI, is now available online. This allows companies, or researchers, to access material from plants, animals, bacteria and fungi without ever setting foot in the country of origin – and bypass rules that require payment. 

As a result, the genetic code that underpins a range of lucrative products – everything from sweeteners to the vast majority of cancer drugs – is available with few rules to limit access. 

The Cali Fund, Carbon Brief writes, was aimed at “closing this loophole”. It was agreed that 50 percent of funds would go to Indigenous communities and local communities that steward fragile ecosystems, with the rest going to Global South countries and scientific research.

At the COP16 summit where the Fund was agreed, the business lobby reached a record high, including from sectors that the mechanism was built around: pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, cosmetics, and information services associated with DSI, including artificial intelligence.

An Indigenous delegate taking part in UN talks in Colombia two years ago, when the Cali Fund was first agreed. Half of any funds raised are ear-marked for Indigenous and local communities that care for fragile ecosystems. Credit: Photographer: Fernando Vergara / Associated Press /Alamy

A Global South government push at the UN talks for the Fund to be a mandatory mechanism was defeated in the wake of a strong lobbying effort by the pharma, agritech and biotech industry, which dubbed the proposed levy a ‘global tax’.

In the lead up to the summit, UK-based pharma giant AstraZeneca, which posted $12.4 billion in profits last year, had warned the British government it “might cut jobs” if a levy were introduced, according to The Guardian. An AstraZeneca spokesperson denied the comments. 

Another pharma giant, GSK, also pushed back against the Fund, which it called “disproportionate”, telling the UK government it could “hinder the development of new medicines and vaccines”, in emails obtained by Carbon Brief.

A spokesperson from GSK told DeSmog it had set ambitious targets and was investing in nature protection. “We support the intent behind the Cali Fund and will make a decision regarding voluntary contributions when there is more information about how the Cali Fund will work alongside other national and multilateral Access and Benefit Sharing mechanisms,” they said. 

“As a company, we are committed to advancing our research and development in response to the needs of patients,” an AstraZeneca spokesperson said in an email. “An assessment of the full impact on our operations will be conducted once there is more clarity from governments on the implementation of the DSI MLM [Cali Fund].”

Since 2024, the pharmaceutical industry’s global lobby group the IFPMA appears to have continued to focus its energy on weakening the rules that were agreed in Colombia.

The COP16 agreement established key elements of the Fund: contribution rates, a list of sectors that should contribute, and set thresholds to ensure large companies were expected to give to the fund, defining qualifying entities as those that exceeded two of three financial thresholds: $20 million in assets, $50 million in sales, or $5 million in profit.

However, rates and thresholds were marked as ‘indicative’ and set to be finalised at the current talks in Armenia. 

Cali Fund Push Back 

To build on what had been agreed in Cali, Colombia, the CBD sought to engage industry over how to make the Fund operational – inviting responses on what sectors should contribute and how.

DeSmog analysed 22 responses, which were submitted by 14 groups in response to stakeholder consultations issued by the Convention of Biological Diversity secretariat, along with available public statements from industry groups that have engaged publicly with the Fund.

In their submissions, industry groups pushed back on a range of fronts. The IFPMA, which claims to represent over 90 percent of the world’s leading research-based pharmaceutical companies, emerges as the Fund’s most outspoken critic.

It called for a “radical rethink” of the Fund’s rationale, and states that the MLM (multilateral mechanism that gives rise to the Cali Fund) does not “effectively advance biodiversity goals”. 

The group criticised everything from contribution levels, a lack of clarity “on how funds will be allocated or guarantees that funds will directly support conservation efforts”, and proposed that the treaty decision text be “significantly reviewed, revised and clarified”.

’A Tax on Innovation’

The IFPMA states that the MLM “essentially imposes a financial burden on the free exchange of scientific data, which is critical for medical, environmental and other societal research”. It adds that: “by taxing DSI use, the MLM risks creating disincentives for global scientific cooperation, slowing the pace of innovation”.

The IFPMA also stated that it is “critical” that indicative contribution rates (0.1 percent of revenue or 1 percent of profit) be “reconsidered”.

“Establishing indicative contribution rates in Decision 16/2 was premature and the rates themselves are commercially unrealistic, are not based on the underlying value that DSI brings, lack scientific justification, do not take into account sector-specific differences, and serve as a disincentive to participation,” it wrote. 

The IFPMA’s view that setting indicative rates was “premature” is echoed in the submission from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 

The ICC was approached for comment. In its consultation submission, it states that the ICC is seeking “clarity, certainty and enabling conditions that are essential to incentivise businesses to actively engage”.

“Not Voluntary Enough”

The IFPMA goes on to suggest that the size of any contribution should be left to companies’ discretion, writing that “the expectation of contribution as well as the level of contribution must both be voluntary”.

While IFPMA recognises that payments into the Fund are already “voluntary in principle”, it argues that the wording of the treaty decision does “not go far enough in creating a truly voluntary mechanism” – taking issue with a clause that invites signatories to the CBD treaty to enact laws that incentivise company contributions.

The IFPMA goes on to add: “Given that the indicative rates were chosen without any rational analysis – as acknowledged by the decision itself, which calls for a study to propose replacement realistic rates – it is critical that these placeholder rates are truly indicative.”

In 2026, the UN’s CBD secretariat produced a study, in which it modelled the impact of contribution rates on the competitiveness of eligible companies, and found “the direct cost burden […] to be modest, relative to sector margins”. The IFPMA disputed these findings too, stating that “even modest reductions in expected returns can be enough to delay, scale back or halt a project”.

“Obligation Stacking”

The CBD negotiating text (Decision 16/2), which established the Fund, stated that the treaty would not override national “benefit-sharing” laws that already exist in at least 20 countries – which require companies to pay, or otherwise compensate, communities for their use of digital genetic data.

The IFPMA and BIA trade groups both expressed their concern at what they call “obligation stacking”, in consultation documents analysed by DeSmog. The IFPMA said that any payment into the Cali Fund should rule out paying governments for DSI again under any national laws, and both ask for “legal certainty”.

In response to a request for comment, Guilherme Cintra, IFPMA’s director of innovation policy, said: “The current mechanism overlaps with existing law, relies on inaccurate assumptions about how data is used in the discovery of medicines, and asks companies to hand over a share of their total revenue whether ‘digital sequence information’ was used to develop a medicine or not.”

‘Artful Arguments’

Dr Siva Thambisetty, associate professor of law at the London School of Economics (LSE), describes industry’s core arguments as “artful”.

She explains that the Fund decision to base contributions on revenue or profit, was an attempt aimed at securing “oversight and transparency” in the absence of comparable publicly available data from companies on how they use DSI.

“I think it’s interesting that the very companies that wanted a voluntary mechanism are now claiming that there is no legal certainty,” says Thambisetty. “We have to be careful that national ABS [access and benefit-sharing] laws are not damaged for a system that not many users appear to have any intention of paying into”.

She suggests that industry objections raised touch the fund’s viability and the terms already agreed, rather than how it should be rolled out. “It’s the operational clarity that the negotiations in Armenia should ideally focus on, rather than reopening the basis for the normative clarity, and multilateral will – which is clearly set out in CBD decisions,” she said.  

A paper released on the eve of the summit by the Common Initiative think tank acknowledges that the fund is empty due to structural problems, not just to low company ambition. 

It highlights a lack of consensus on how to define DSI, no clear mechanism for counting contributions, and a lack of harmonization between national governments’ implementation.

But these structural problems are not “bad luck,” they write. Rather, “it is what happens when a mechanism designed to extract money from some of the most profitable industries on earth is built on the assumption that those industries will simply volunteer to pay it.”

Indigenous Agency

Finalising the Cali Fund will be top of the agenda at the upcoming Cop17 talks in the Armenian capital Yerevan, which will run from 19-30 October. 

Parties are expected to pin down the details on disbursement of the fund between Global South countries, thresholds for company participation and fund governance, as well as measuring countries’ progress against targets to protect 30 percent of land and seas and restore the earth’s degraded ecosystems.

For June Rubis, an Indigenous representative who sits on the Cali Fund Steering Committee, the question of where money ends up has great importance. “I would like to see Indigenous communities be given meaningful agency over priorities, access and delivery,” she tells DeSmog.

The final Cali Fund text agreed at COP16 stated that half of any funds raised would go to Indigenous and local community stewards for self-defined projects that support biodiversity protection like forest restoration, or the transfer of ecological knowledge between generations.

Indigenous communities manage, or have rights over, around 37 percent of the earth’s natural areas, despite making up just 6 percent of the global population.

“What I want to avoid is a situation in which money is nominally allocated for Indigenous Peoples and local communities, but the project priorities are determined elsewhere or communities have to pass through an institution they did not identify,” says Rubis.

Rubis believes it’s important to take the time to build a financial mechanism that works for company contributors, countries, and Indigenous peoples and local communities alike. “Of course,” she adds, “for all this to apply, we also need to have the money coming in.”

More Action From States

Although businesses are expected to pay into the Cali Fund, national governments have the power to negotiate, agree and enforce decisions reached through the CBD process – and bear the responsibility to ensure funds are raised. 

To date, governments have played a mixed role. Some Global North countries, including the EU bloc and UK, appear to have lobbied alongside industry to push for the Cali Fund to be non-binding and voluntary.

However since then, through the Friends of the Cali Fund – which is chaired by the UK and Chile and includes Norway and Armenia – both the UK and the EU are now working to incentivise contributions.

Other countries such as Switzerland, where pharmaceutical companies make up 7 percent of GDP, as well as Japan and Korea, have continued to push back on key elements of the fund architecture.   

“I have been surprised to see industry arguments amplified by some Global North governments,” says Nithin Ramakrishnan from the nonprofit Third World Network,

“Including on areas – such as the relationship with national laws – that appear to go against the text that was agreed in Cali.”

For her part, Thambisetty tells DeSmog she would like to see “more coordinated action” on the part of countries where most of these large firms are situated. 

Thambisetty suggests a global push is needed to frame contributions as a moral responsibility for companies and investors: “a good public narrative about why these payments are necessary”. 

Learning By Doing

So far, the Cali Fund has raised no money from large firms. The only companies to contribute are Prozomix, a small UK-based biotech company that paid in July this year, and UK technology start-up TierraViva AI which contributed in November 2025.

The smaller outfits are encouraging others to follow suit. The first, TierraViva AI, which deposited $1,000, called on companies to embrace “learning by doing”, in an open letter penned last November. 

A second company, the biotech firm Prozomix, which handed over $5,000 in July, states on its website: “We feel companies of our size, and at any and all stages of development, should pay for the privilege of exploiting public DSI”.

Business for Nature, an alliance of more than 100 progressive businesses, has encouraged contributions from its members, pointing out they depend on healthy ecosystems to maintain their business model. It writes in an August briefing that “companies do not need to wait for the final rules to engage”.

It’s a sentiment echoed by the CBD executive secretary Schomaker, who called on companies to commit, ahead of this week’s summit. 

“Maybe if you think it’s too new for you, make a gesture and start paying, and increase over time,” she told environmental news site Mongabay.

“It’s frankly not good enough for a company to say, ‘We have many questions,’ and just sit there and wait.”

With editing by Emma Howard

The post How Big Pharma Tried to Weaken the Rules of the UN’s Nature Fund appeared first on DeSmog.

Oil and indigenous communities Channel News brendan 21st October 2026 Teaser Media

The Bay Area Is Ready: Why Rule 9-6 Must Move Forward sf-liana Tue, 2026-10-20 15:59

The Bay Area has already built much of the foundation for cleaner, safer water heating. Now we must protect that progress while ensuring an affordable and practical transition.

By Tracy Flor Figueroa

Across the region, local governments, community organizations, community choice energy aggregates, and clean-energy partners have spent years preparing for a transition to cleaner air in our homes. In 2023, the Air District passed a landmark rule that would accomplish just that. This rule, known formally as Bay Area Air District Rule 9-6, limits toxic NOx pollution emitted into our homes from gas-fired water heaters. NOx is a byproduct of burning gas, and causes xx and xx, and it increases rates of childhood asthma (or something like that). Rule 9-6 targets this pollution by implementing a zero-NOx standard, which applies only to new equipment or exhisting equipment that needs to be replaced.

When homeowners learn about this rule, they often envision having to immediately install a brand new, expensive electric water heater, requiring immense investment and financial burden. But let’s clear up the confusion:

Rule 9-6 does not require removing a working heater. Most residents may not have to make the switch for years. If your water heater breaks and is unable to be repaired starting in 2028, you (as a homeowner) or your landlord will be required to replace it with a new water heater that meets the zero-NOx standard. If your old water heater continues to work without issue, you may continue to use it, and look forward to a future of having cleaner air in your home once you are ready to replace it. And, in the meantime, clean energy partners are continuing to put pedal to the metal to find ways to make clean water heating even more affordable.

At the Bay Area Air District’s Stationary Source Committee meeting on September 9, Air District staff, Senior Building Decarbonization Coordinator at SF Environment Department, Nik Kaestner, and Energy Programs Director at BayREN, Jane Elias presented progress on implementing the region’s clean appliance standards. They described programs that support consumers, coordinate agencies, streamline permits, and prepare the workforce and market for the transition.

Nik emphasized the significant progress implementation partners have made over the past six months. Although affordability and access gaps remain. The proposed amendment would move the first compliance date to January 2028. This timeline gives the regions time to continue strengthening rebates, financing, consumer education, and support for communities that could otherwise be left behind. Together, these investments are helping create a stronger market for heat pump water heaters and other zero-NOx options. Concerns about cost and grid reliability deserve thoughtful consideration. However, these challenges are reasons to invest in implementation, not reasons to delay cleaner-air protections. The foundation is already in place!

A September 27 San Francisco Chronicle article raised legitimate affordability concerns but centered its premise on whether officials have switched their own appliances. That framing is disappointing and does little to advance the important conversation about decisions that can steer the Bay Area toward a cleaner, lower-cost, and more resilient future. Officials can evaluate evidence without personally owning the technology.

The evidence deserves attention. RMI’s analysis released late September estimates that approximately 95% of modeled Bay Area single-family homes with gas water heating would lower their energy bill by switching to heat pump water heaters, with average annual savings of about $360. These projected operating savings depend on equipment and electricity-rate assumptions. SPUR’s funding analysis identifies roughly $55 million annually for heat pump incentive across the Bay Area region, alongside growing programs offering qualifying households low-cost or no-cost retrofits. Geographic gaps and complicated applications remain. Regional coordination and proposed point-of-sale assistance could help residents access support when replacements become urgent.  

Additional delays could create uncertainty and waste valuable time and resources that should be used to make the transition work for households, renters, and property owners across the region. The proposed Rule 9-6 amendments are designed to provide more time and exemptions for households and properties facing serious barriers. Unfortunately, growing public awareness has also been accompanied by misleading claims about the rules, their costs, and their effects on consumers. Advocates must respond with accurate information while continuing to push for stronger financial assistance and equitable implementation.

The Air District is expected to release the proposed amendments and draft changes that its Board will consider. Once the language becomes available, we will share an analysis of what it means for Rule 9-6 and the region's clean-air goals.

Join us in person at the November 4 Air District meeting and urge Board members to move Rule 9-6 forward with strong clean-air standards and meaningful affordability protections. Further uncertainty could slow the mark and waste momentum that should be used to close affordability gaps. Ask Air District leaders to reduce deadly air pollution. Let’s move Rule 9-6 forward and keep the Bay Area leading toward a healthier, more equitable future.

Frequently Asked Question About Rule 9-6

Does Rule 9-6 ban gas water heaters immediately?
No. It establishes future zero-NOx standards for covered new water heaters. Existing, working water heaters do not have to be removed.

When would the zero-NOx standard begin?
The adopted first compliance date is January 2027 for small water heaters. The proposed amendments would extend it to January 2028, if approved.

Does the rule apply when my water heater is replaced?
The manufacturing standard affects covered new equipment available after compliance date. If does not force replacements before an existing unit reaches the end of its life.

How would affordability and difficult installations be addressed? 
The proposed amendments include added time and targeted exemptions for qualifying low-income properties, certain high-cost installations, space constraints, emergency replacements, and other barriers.

Why does Rule 9-6 matter for health?
NOx helps form ozone and fine particulate matter. Reducing emissions from gas appliances can improve regional air quality and reduce health harms, especially in overburdened communities. 

Resources:

Watch the Stationary Source Meeting Recording

State and Regional Efforts to Advance the Equitable Transition to Clean Appliances Presentation

Read SPUR’s Funding analysis “How Much Money Is Available to Help Bay Area Homeowners Install Heat Pumps?”

Read RMI’s analysis “How Heat Pumps Reduce Energy Bills and Air Pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area”

What to Do Next:

Reduce Deadly Air Pollution in the Bay Area!

RSVP to Press Conference: Bay Area Clean Appliance Standards

Add to Calendar November Air District Meeting: Support Zero-Emission appliances
 

The Water Report—an expert monthly publication that provides in-depth analysis and practical information across water sectors—featured Audubon’s Great Salt Lake Birds and Habitat Assessment...

2016-2026: A Ten-Year Retrospective Report

Snow fell at Standing Rock on the first day of April, covering the Plains of the Očéti Šakówiŋ with a blanket of feathery snow and frost. Beneath that stillness runs the same river that has sustained life here since time immemorial, where the waters of the Cannonball meet the Missouri as they have for generations beyond memory.

The day marked the ten-year anniversary of the founding of Sacred Stone Camp, which set in motion the #NoDAPL movement at Standing Rock and continues to inspire movements to protect the water.

Standing Rock: For the Love of Water, 2016–2026: A Ten-Year Retrospective documents the history, legal landscape, and continuing consequences of the Indigenous-led resistance to the Dakota Access Pipeline.

​

Drawing on court records, government documents, legal observation, and the lived experiences of those who were present, the report traces the events leading up to the construction of the pipeline, the emergence of the #NoDAPL movement, and the years that have followed—including the destruction of sacred sites, the criminalization of Water Protectors, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, and the growing global convergence of Indigenous resistance movements.

In the report, we identify four defining recalibrations that emerged from Standing Rock: it elevated the global importance of water under the rallying cry Mni Wiconi — Water is Life; it re-centered treaties and Indigenous sovereignty in legal and political discourse; it revealed a coordinated corporate–state counteroffensive against environmental defenders; and it catalyzed a global Indigenous-led climate resistance movement that continues today.

The report provides an in-depth examination of:

• the historical context of the Očéti Šakówiŋ and treaty lands
• the emergence of the #NoDAPL movement and the founding of Sacred Stone Camp
• environmental risks and documented harms associated with pipeline construction
• failures of tribal consultation and environmental review
• the legal landscape of Dakota Access Pipeline litigation (2016–2026)
• corporate strategies targeting environmental defenders
• international human rights documentation related to Standing Rock
• the global legacy of Indigenous-led resistance movements

The report is accompanied by appendix volumes totaling more than 1,400 pages of documentation, including legal filings, historical records, and supporting materials. Because this history belongs to the people, the digital version of the report and its supporting documentation are publicly available at no cost.

The report is dedicated to Water Protectors, past and present.

This report features photography used with special permission from Ryan Vizzions and John Willis. Their images helped document the spirit of the camps and the strength of the people who gathered there, and we are deeply grateful for their generosity in helping preserve this history.

This report is titled “For the Love of Water” for a reason. For the tens of thousands of Water Protectors who gathered at Standing Rock, the movement was ultimately—and foremost—about the water that is life. People came in prayer, in responsibility, and in defense of something fundamental: the life-giving waters that sustain all of us.

The resistance and resilience shown at Standing Rock remain deeply inspirational to this day. Yet we also hold a vision of a world where such resistance and resilience are no longer necessary—where the Earth and her waters are protected not through confrontation and sacrifice, but through a shared conviction that life itself must be safeguarded. We envision a world where corporate accountability is no longer deferred indefinitely, and where the protection of land, water, and sacred places is understood as a collective responsibility.

Resilience is sustained through a practice of hope. In the meantime, we continue the uphill work alongside Water Protectors and frontline communities of protecting the land, the water, and the sacred places for the generations yet to come.

​

Read the full report:

April 2026: Standing Rock: For the Love of Water, 2016-2026: A Ten-Year Retrospective Report

The post Transit Labor Roundtable first appeared on Labor Network for Sustainability.

Today, Unrig the Economy and Americans for Tax Fairness released a new analysis (in English and Spanish) showing that cuts to SNAP enacted under Trump and Congressional Republicans’ tax law have disproportionately affected Latinos. Since the law passed, more than 1.5 million Latinos nationwide are estimated to have lost food assistance that helped keep food on the table. Across just seven states, roughly half of all Latinos who have lost SNAP benefits nationwide have lost access to the program since July 2025.

“The Republican Tax Law took food assistance away from more than 1.5 million Latinos to pay for tax breaks for billionaires and big corporations,” said Leor Tal, Campaign Director for Unrig Our Economy. “Families are already struggling with the high cost of groceries and gas thanks to the war in Iran and tariffs. SNAP cuts make it even harder for Latino families – who are disproportionately impacted – to put food on the table.”

“The results are in: Trump and his GOP allies in Congress cut critical nutrition assistance that helps millions of Latinos and working people across the country meet their basic needs—all to deliver historic tax giveaways to billionaires and business elites,” said Jodie Rubenstein, Executive Director of Americans for Tax Fairness. “As is so often the case, working families and communities of color bear the brunt of Trump’s economic policies. We cannot allow billionaire wealth to grow unchecked while communities go hungry.”

Read Unrig Our Economy and Americans for Tax Fairness’ new report on Latino food assistance loss in English and Spanish.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 20 OCTOBER 2026 SLF-2007-093 The Sakhalin Papers LXXXIII: The Energy Charter Treaty Trap — How a Gazprom-Owned Company Challenged the EU, and Where Shell Fits In A 2019 arbitration notice, a 192-page investment claim, the European Union’s jurisdictional objections and an extraordinary legal complication: Brussels has now withdrawn from the very treaty under which the case was brought.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-093
Publication date: 20 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: The Sakhalin Papers LXXXII, 19 October 2026
Principal sources: Shell corporate announcements and financial reports; Nord Stream 2 AG’s arbitration notice and memorial; the European Union’s September 2020 jurisdictional memorial; Permanent Court of Arbitration Procedural Order No. 4; EU judicial records; and contemporaneous Reuters reporting.
Evidence classification: Authenticated primary documents; recorded legal allegations and responses; judicial findings; and separately identified editorial commentary.

INTRODUCTION: THE TREATY THAT OUTLIVED THE INVESTMENT

There is a revealing passage in a legal document dated 26 September 2019.

The document was submitted on behalf of Nord Stream 2 AG, the Swiss-registered company responsible for constructing the controversial pipeline from Russia to Germany.

It was addressed to the European Union.

Its purpose was to commence international arbitration.

The company alleged that changes to European gas-market legislation had unlawfully damaged its investment.

It sought orders protecting its ability to operate the pipeline under the commercial arrangements originally envisaged.

And it reserved the right to seek financial compensation.

The document appeared three years before Shell wrote off its entire $1.126 billion Nord Stream 2 loan.

It also preceded Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s suspension of the pipeline’s certification process and the explosions that damaged sections of the Nord Stream infrastructure in September 2022.

The legal dispute was therefore not originally about the war.

It was about something more fundamental: whether an international investment treaty could be used to challenge the consequences of European legislation governing energy infrastructure.

Seven years later, the arbitration remains unresolved.

The previous instalment examined how European sanctions created uncertainty about whether the arbitration itself could proceed.

Today, we return to the beginning of the dispute and examine the underlying documents.

They reveal a disagreement extending beyond the commercial fate of a pipeline.

At issue are the rights of foreign investors, the regulatory powers of governments, and the circumstances in which changes to legislation can create international compensation obligations.

There is also a striking subsequent development.

The European Union withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty on 28 June 2025.

Yet that withdrawal did not simply erase the legal history of investments made while the treaty was in force.

The treaty contains a provision designed to preserve certain investment protections for another twenty years.

The potential implications are considerable.

For Shell shareholders, the documents provide an opportunity to examine the legal environment surrounding a financing decision that eventually resulted in a substantial write-down.

1. THE DOCUMENT THAT IDENTIFIES SHELL

We begin with an important primary source.

Nord Stream 2 AG’s original Notice of Arbitration, dated 26 September 2019, is publicly available through the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s transparency registry.

Page 3 of the numbered notice, corresponding to page 5 of the PDF, identifies the financing arrangements concluded in 2017.

Among the companies named is:

Shell Exploration and Production (LXXI) B.V.

This is significant because it is not simply a retrospective description of Shell’s involvement.

It is the name of a Shell entity appearing in a contemporaneous legal document submitted by the pipeline company itself.

The notice records that financing agreements were concluded with Gazprom and five European energy companies, including Shell.

It also identifies the pipeline company’s gas transportation agreement with Gazprom Export LLC, concluded on 7 March 2017.

These arrangements formed part of the commercial structure through which the project was intended to operate.

The existence of Shell’s financing commitment is independently confirmed by Shell’s own announcement of 24 April 2017.

That announcement identified ENGIE, OMV, Uniper and Wintershall alongside Shell.

Each company committed financing and guarantees covering up to 10% of the project’s estimated €9.5 billion cost.

Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2 AG.

Thus, Shell was a financier rather than an equity shareholder in the pipeline company.

This distinction is important.

The claimant in the subsequent arbitration was Nord Stream 2 AG.

Shell was not the claimant.

Nevertheless, Shell’s involvement was expressly recorded in the investment documentation underlying the dispute.

The original arbitration notice therefore provides a useful independent cross-reference to Shell’s corporate announcement. UNCITRAL

Primary documents: Nord Stream 2 AG — Notice of Arbitration, 26 September 2019 and Shell’s authenticated April 2017 financing announcement, page 40.

2. APRIL 2019: THE DISPUTE BEGINS BEFORE THE DIRECTIVE TAKES EFFECT

On 12 April 2019, Nord Stream 2 AG initiated the formal process of seeking an amicable settlement under the Energy Charter Treaty.

The date matters.

The disputed European legislation had not yet formally been adopted.

Directive (EU) 2019/692 was adopted on 17 April 2019 and entered into force on 23 May 2019.

The directive extended important EU internal gas-market requirements to transmission pipelines connecting EU Member States with third countries.

Those requirements included the separation of gas transmission from production and supply activities, third-party access provisions and tariff regulation.

Nord Stream 2 AG maintained that the new rules would seriously interfere with the project’s commercial arrangements.

The company argued that the investment had been undertaken in reliance upon a different regulatory framework.

It also contended that the legislative changes unfairly targeted Nord Stream 2.

These were allegations advanced by the pipeline company, not established findings of unlawful discrimination.

Contemporaneous reporting confirms that the dispute was already attracting attention.

On 25 April 2019, Reuters reported that Nord Stream 2 had warned the European Commission of potential legal proceedings.

The report described a letter seeking assurances that the project would be exempted from the new requirements.

The Commission’s response was uncompromising.

Its position was that the legislation had been approved through the European Union’s established procedures and would apply.

The Reuters report also identified Shell among the project’s European financial backers.

This reporting is valuable because it establishes how the dispute was understood at the time, before the subsequent invasion of Ukraine transformed its political significance. Yahoo Finance

Contemporaneous source: Reuters, 25 April 2019 — EU Says New Energy Rules Apply to Nord Stream 2.

3. SEPTEMBER 2019: THE PIPELINE COMPANY INVOKES AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY

On 26 September 2019, Nord Stream 2 AG formally commenced arbitration against the European Union.

The legal basis was Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty.

The proceedings were brought under the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration subsequently administered the case under reference PCA 2020-07.

The claimant was a company incorporated in Switzerland.

The respondent was the European Union itself.

This was an important distinction from disputes brought solely against individual European governments.

Nord Stream 2 AG relied upon Switzerland’s status as a contracting party to the Energy Charter Treaty.

It claimed to be a qualifying foreign investor with qualifying investments situated within the European Union.

Those investments included pipeline infrastructure, German landfall facilities, construction contracts and regulatory permits.

The company therefore argued that it was entitled to invoke treaty protections against conduct attributable to the European Union.

The original arbitration notice alleged breaches involving discriminatory treatment, interference with investment rights and violations of obligations to provide fair and equitable treatment.

It referred particularly to Articles 10 and 13 of the treaty.

Article 10 contains obligations concerning the treatment and protection of qualifying investments.

Article 13 addresses expropriation and measures having an equivalent effect.

But there was an important procedural question.

Had the European Union actually consented to international arbitration of this particular dispute?

That question became central to the litigation.

4. JULY 2020: THE 192-PAGE MEMORIAL REVEALS WHAT THE CLAIMANT WANTED

On 3 July 2020, Nord Stream 2 AG submitted its principal memorial.

The document runs to 192 PDF pages.

It provides a detailed reconstruction of the project’s commercial arrangements, the development of European gas legislation, the competing political interests and the alleged consequences for the investment.

The memorial was accompanied by witness statements, expert evidence and numerous documentary exhibits.

Its contents are important for understanding the claimant’s position.

Nord Stream 2 AG argued that the amended European legislation damaged the commercial structure upon which the pipeline had been financed.

In particular, it objected to the consequences of applying unbundling, third-party access and tariff regulation requirements.

The company’s case was that the pipeline had been developed around a long-term transportation agreement with Gazprom Export.

That arrangement was intended to generate a predictable revenue stream.

The new European requirements, it argued, threatened to interfere with this structure.

The company also alleged that the legislation had been deliberately designed to disadvantage Nord Stream 2.

Again, this was the claimant’s allegation.

The memorial did not itself establish that EU institutions had acted unlawfully.

Nevertheless, the submission provides a detailed record of what the pipeline company believed had gone wrong.

It also reveals an aspect of the claim that is easily overlooked.

Nord Stream 2 AG was not initially seeking only a financial damages award.

Its principal requested remedy was regulatory.

The company wanted the tribunal to order the European Union, by means of its own choosing, to remove the application of specified gas-market obligations to Nord Stream 2.

In paragraph 527 of the memorial, the company identified particular provisions of the Gas Directive.

These included Articles 9, 10 and 11, together with specified provisions of Articles 32 and 41.

In the alternative, it sought compensation in an amount to be assessed.

This distinction matters.

The primary objective was to preserve the commercial viability of the investment by obtaining relief from the regulatory consequences being challenged.

Compensation was an alternative.

The company was seeking to protect an operating business, not merely recover money from a project that had already failed.

Primary document: Nord Stream 2 AG — Claimant’s Memorial, 3 July 2020. See particularly the summary of claim and paragraphs 527–529. International Arbitration Database

5. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FIRST DEFENCE: YOU HAVE ALREADY CHOSEN A COURT

On 15 September 2020, the European Union submitted its Memorial on Jurisdiction and Request for Bifurcation.

This authenticated document is particularly revealing.

Rather than immediately concentrating upon the underlying commercial allegations, the EU advanced two objections to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

The first concerned a legal principle commonly known as a fork-in-the-road provision.

The expression describes treaty arrangements under which an investor may be required to choose between different dispute-resolution procedures.

Depending upon the precise treaty language, choosing one procedure can prevent the investor from subsequently pursuing the same dispute through another.

The European Union relied upon Article 26(3)(b)(i) and Annex ID of the Energy Charter Treaty.

It argued that its consent to international arbitration was conditional.

In particular, it maintained that an investor could not pursue the same dispute through arbitration after previously submitting it to the relevant courts or another applicable dispute-resolution procedure.

Nord Stream 2 AG had already challenged the 2019 directive before the EU General Court.

That action was filed on 25 July 2019.

The arbitration commenced two months later.

The European Union argued that the two proceedings concerned fundamentally the same dispute.

It also referred to litigation involving Germany’s energy regulator.

By September 2020, therefore, there were proceedings concerning Nord Stream 2 in several different legal forums.

The EU contended that this was precisely the situation the treaty’s restrictions were designed to prevent.

The company disagreed.

It maintained that its EU court challenge and international arbitration involved different legal rights and remedies.

The General Court action concerned the legality of the directive under European Union law.

The arbitration concerned alleged violations of international investment obligations.

Whether those distinctions were sufficient to defeat the EU’s objection was a matter for the arbitral tribunal.

Primary evidence: European Union — Memorial on Jurisdiction and Request for Bifurcation, 15 September 2020. See paragraphs 2–15. UNCITRAL

6. THE SECOND DEFENCE: WAS THE EUROPEAN UNION THE CORRECT RESPONDENT?

The European Union’s second objection concerned responsibility.

This was more technical but potentially just as important.

The disputed measure was an EU directive.

Directives generally require Member States to implement their requirements through national legal arrangements.

The EU argued that the practical effects alleged by Nord Stream 2 AG would arise from decisions taken by Member States, particularly Germany.

It maintained that national authorities retained discretion over the implementation of the relevant provisions.

Consequently, according to the EU, any alleged injury could not simply be attributed to the European Union.

In legal terminology, this was described as an objection concerning jurisdiction ratione personae.

The expression concerns whether the tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the relevant parties.

The EU’s argument was that it was not internationally responsible for the alleged consequences of discretionary national implementation measures.

Nord Stream 2 AG disagreed.

Its position was that the European Union’s adoption of the amended directive was itself capable of violating the treaty.

The company argued that the regulatory changes and their consequences could not be separated in the manner proposed by the EU.

This dispute illustrates an important difficulty in international investment arbitration.

Where legislation is adopted at one level of government and implemented at another, determining responsibility can involve complicated questions of international law.

The tribunal would need to examine the legal obligations, the measures actually taken and the causal relationship between those measures and any proven injury.

The European Union’s jurisdictional objections were therefore substantial legal arguments.

But they were not, at that stage, judicial findings. UNCITRAL

7. DECEMBER 2020: THE TRIBUNAL REFUSES TO DECIDE JURISDICTION FIRST

The European Union wanted its jurisdictional objections decided before the tribunal examined the merits of Nord Stream 2 AG’s claims.

This procedure is known as bifurcation.

If a tribunal determines that it lacks jurisdiction, there may be no need to undertake a lengthy examination of the underlying allegations.

The EU therefore requested a separate preliminary phase.

Nord Stream 2 AG opposed that proposal.

It argued that the jurisdictional questions were closely connected with the substantive issues.

On 31 December 2020, the tribunal delivered Procedural Order No. 4.

The order is an authenticated primary document.

It records the arguments advanced by both parties and explains the tribunal’s reasoning.

The tribunal considered that the jurisdictional questions could not necessarily be resolved through a straightforward comparison of the different court proceedings.

It was concerned that an insufficiently detailed examination could lead to an incorrect application of the treaty’s restrictions.

The arbitrators also recognised that their eventual interpretation could have implications beyond Nord Stream 2.

Other international investment disputes involving the European Union might be affected.

The tribunal consequently rejected the European Union’s request for a separate preliminary jurisdictional phase.

It decided that the objections should be examined together with the merits.

But an important distinction must be emphasised.

This was not a determination that the European Union’s jurisdictional objections were wrong.

The tribunal expressly stated that it had reached no conclusion on their merits.

It had decided how the case should proceed, not whether Nord Stream 2 AG was entitled to succeed.

The tribunal also envisaged a separate damages phase, if necessary.

Thus, the immediate outcome was procedural.

The arbitration could continue to examine jurisdiction and liability together, leaving damages for possible later determination.

Primary document: Procedural Order No. 4 — Decision on Request for Preliminary Phase on Jurisdiction, 31 December 2020. See paragraphs 45–54. UNCITRAL

8. NOVEMBER 2024: A COURT REACHES AN UNFAVOURABLE CONCLUSION FOR NORD STREAM 2

The separate proceedings before the EU courts continued.

On 27 November 2024, the General Court delivered an important judgment.

It dismissed Nord Stream 2 AG’s action challenging Directive 2019/692.

The judgment is particularly relevant because it examined the company’s assertions concerning regulatory expectations and the foreseeability of legal changes.

The court concluded that Nord Stream 2 AG had continued investing during a period when there was no assurance that the existing regulatory position would remain unchanged.

It considered that the company could foresee the possibility of the EU extending its gas-market requirements to pipelines entering from third countries.

The court also concluded that the company’s exclusion from the derogation available to pipelines completed before May 2019 did not establish a violation of the relevant principles of EU law.

Its conclusions addressed legal certainty, legitimate expectations, equal treatment and proportionality.

The judgment was a substantive defeat for Nord Stream 2 AG.

It supported the legality of the legislation under the EU legal standards considered by the court.

However, the ruling did not itself determine the separate Energy Charter Treaty arbitration.

The legal foundations of the two proceedings were different.

The distinction remains significant even where the underlying facts overlap.

The court’s findings may be relevant to the arguments and evidence considered by an investment tribunal.

They are not automatically a final answer to every question arising under international investment law.

There is another important qualification.

The 2024 judgment examined the regulatory situation surrounding the 2019 directive.

It did not establish that Nord Stream 2 was commercially viable under the entirely different geopolitical circumstances prevailing after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Those later developments created additional and distinct obstacles.

Official judicial source: Court of Justice of the European Union — Press Release 195/24, 27 November 2024. Jus Mundi

9. JUNE 2025: THE EUROPEAN UNION WITHDRAWS FROM THE TREATY

The next development gives this historical dispute an additional dimension.

On 28 June 2025, the European Union’s withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty became effective.

The European Commission confirms the date on its official Energy Charter information page.

The withdrawal followed increasing concern that the treaty’s investment-protection arrangements were inconsistent with European and international climate-policy objectives.

Critics had argued that treaty protections could expose governments to compensation claims when they introduced measures intended to reduce fossil-fuel dependence.

Defenders of investment treaties emphasised the importance of legal certainty and protection against arbitrary or discriminatory government action.

The European Union ultimately concluded that withdrawal was appropriate.

But Article 47 of the Energy Charter Treaty contains a provision commonly described as a sunset clause.

Under Article 47(3), treaty protections continue to apply for twenty years to certain qualifying investments made before withdrawal took effect.

For the European Union, that period would extend to June 2045, subject to the applicable treaty conditions and any relevant legal disputes over interpretation.

The precise implications depend upon the investor, the respondent, the investment and the legal issues concerned.

A distinction is necessary between disputes involving investors from EU Member States and those involving investors from outside the Union.

Nord Stream 2 AG is incorporated in Switzerland.

Its position cannot automatically be equated with that of an investor incorporated within the European Union.

Furthermore, its arbitration commenced in September 2019, long before the EU’s withdrawal took effect.

The withdrawal therefore raises questions about the continuing application of treaty protections, but it does not establish that the original arbitration has been extinguished.

The proceedings remain listed as pending.

Official sources: European Commission — Energy Charter Treaty Withdrawal and Energy Charter Treaty — Article 47, Withdrawal and Continuing Investment Protection. PCA-CPA

10. THE COMPENSATION QUESTION: WHAT WOULD HAVE TO BE PROVED?

It is tempting to examine a €9.5 billion pipeline project and assume that any successful investment claim could automatically involve billions of euros in damages.

That assumption would be unjustified.

An international investment claim generally requires the claimant to establish several distinct elements.

The tribunal must have jurisdiction.

The claimant must demonstrate that the relevant treaty protections apply.

It must establish a breach of those protections.

If compensation is sought, it must also demonstrate legally recoverable loss and the necessary causal relationship between the breach and that loss.

Additional questions may concern valuation, mitigation and the appropriate form of relief.

The fact that an investment has lost commercial value does not automatically establish that a government must compensate its owner.

Likewise, the existence of regulatory changes does not automatically constitute expropriation or unfair treatment.

Governments possess legitimate regulatory powers.

The legal difficulty lies in determining when the exercise of those powers crosses the threshold established by the applicable treaty.

Nord Stream 2 AG’s July 2020 memorial requested compensation in an amount to be assessed only as an alternative to its principal regulatory remedy.

The official Energy Charter dispute record does not identify a final compensation award.

Nor has the public arbitration record examined for this instalment established a final damages figure.

The project cost, Shell’s loan impairment and any potential compensation entitlement must therefore remain separate categories.

There is a documented investment, a documented financial write-down and an unresolved legal claim. They are not interchangeable.

11. THE SHELL CONNECTION: FROM A FINANCING AGREEMENT TO A $1.126 BILLION WRITE-DOWN

For Shell shareholders, the documents offer a clear chronology.

On 24 April 2017, Shell announced its participation in financing Nord Stream 2.

By September 2019, Nord Stream 2 AG was pursuing international arbitration over European regulatory changes.

In July 2020, the claimant submitted a detailed memorial explaining why it considered the legislation damaging to its investment.

In December 2020, the tribunal rejected the EU’s request to determine jurisdiction separately.

In February 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine fundamentally altered the project’s political and commercial environment.

Shell announced its intention to end its involvement in Nord Stream 2 and withdraw from Russian ventures.

In its 2022 Annual Report, Shell recorded that the loan had been fully written down in the first quarter of that year.

The amount was $1,126 million.

The report also confirmed that the final loan instalments had been made during the second quarter of 2020.

This provides a notable chronological detail.

Shell’s financing commitments were being completed while Nord Stream 2 AG’s dispute with the European Union was already underway.

That does not establish that Shell’s management failed to assess the regulatory risks.

Nor does it establish that the arbitration was regarded internally as financially material to Shell.

Those questions would require additional evidence concerning Shell’s internal investment assessments, contractual arrangements and management deliberations.

The publicly available documents establish the chronology, but not the confidential reasoning behind every decision.

Nevertheless, the chronology is relevant to shareholders examining how legal and geopolitical risks were managed.

There is also no basis in the material examined to conclude that Shell would automatically benefit from a successful award obtained by Nord Stream 2 AG.

Shell’s status as a financier must not be confused with ownership of the claimant company or entitlement to compensation awarded to that company.

The terms of the financing arrangements would be relevant to any separate question concerning possible recoveries.

Authenticated corporate source: Shell Annual Report and Accounts 2022 — Nord Stream 2 Disclosure, page 263. Shell Norway

12. DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS Established Facts

Shell and four other European companies entered financing agreements with Nord Stream 2 AG in April 2017.

Gazprom was the pipeline company’s sole shareholder.

The September 2019 arbitration notice specifically identified Shell Exploration and Production (LXXI) B.V. among the financing entities.

Nord Stream 2 AG commenced Energy Charter Treaty arbitration against the European Union on 26 September 2019.

Its July 2020 memorial alleged breaches of investment protections and requested regulatory relief or, alternatively, financial compensation.

The European Union contested the tribunal’s jurisdiction on two principal grounds.

On 31 December 2020, the tribunal rejected the EU’s request for a separate preliminary jurisdictional phase.

The tribunal did not determine the substantive validity of those objections in that procedural order.

On 27 November 2024, the EU General Court dismissed Nord Stream 2 AG’s challenge to the 2019 gas directive.

The European Union’s withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty became effective on 28 June 2025.

Shell’s 2022 Annual Report recorded a full $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan.

The arbitration remains identified as pending in the official public case record.

Allegations and Contested Positions

Nord Stream 2 AG alleged that EU legislative changes unfairly discriminated against its investment.

It argued that the changes interfered with legitimate investment expectations and undermined the project’s commercial arrangements.

The European Union disputed the claimant’s interpretation of the treaty and objected to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

It argued that the claimant had already pursued related proceedings before EU courts.

It also maintained that the alleged regulatory consequences would depend upon measures taken by Member States rather than conduct attributable to the EU itself.

The existence of these submissions is documented.

Their underlying allegations must not be presented as established findings.

Matters Not Established

The examined records do not establish that the European Union unlawfully expropriated Nord Stream 2.

They do not establish that the arbitral tribunal has awarded compensation.

They do not establish that Shell directed or participated in the arbitration.

They do not establish that Shell would be entitled to receive proceeds from any future award.

They do not establish that the European Union’s withdrawal from the treaty has terminated the proceedings.

They do not establish that Shell’s executives ignored legal warnings or concealed information from shareholders.

Those distinctions are essential to the accuracy of the archive.

EDITORIAL COMMENTARY: THE UNINTENDED LONG LIFE OF AN ENERGY INVESTMENT

There is a broader historical lesson in these documents.

International energy projects are frequently developed over periods measured in decades.

Their financial structures depend upon assumptions concerning political stability, market access, regulatory arrangements and long-term demand.

Those assumptions can change.

Sometimes the changes are gradual.

Sometimes they are sudden and catastrophic.

Nord Stream 2 experienced both.

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the project was already involved in a substantial legal dispute over European gas-market rules.

The proceedings concerned the rights of investors and the powers of governments.

Then came the war.

The pipeline’s commercial future changed dramatically.

Shell withdrew and recognised its financial loss.

Yet the original arbitration continued.

The fact that the European Union subsequently withdrew from the treaty under which the proceedings were commenced adds another layer of complexity.

A treaty designed to encourage long-term energy investment became controversial partly because of the protections it offered to investments that governments later considered undesirable.

That tension is not unique to Nord Stream 2.

It lies at the heart of a continuing international debate about the balance between investment protection and regulatory freedom.

Investors need predictable legal frameworks.

Governments need the ability to legislate in the public interest.

Neither proposition, standing alone, determines whether compensation is appropriate in a particular case.

The answer depends upon the applicable legal obligations and evidence.

From an archival perspective, the remarkable feature of Nord Stream 2 is how clearly its history illustrates the successive stages of international investment risk.

The financing commitments are documented.

The initial regulatory dispute is documented.

The arbitration submissions are publicly available.

The subsequent judicial decisions can be examined.

Shell’s financial write-down is recorded in its published accounts.

And the later complications arising from European sanctions have themselves generated further procedural orders.

For historians and shareholders, this creates an unusually extensive documentary trail.

The challenge is to avoid treating it as a single, uncomplicated story.

Nord Stream 2 was not one dispute. It became a sequence of commercial, legal, political and financial consequences extending across more than a decade.

The same distinction is essential when examining Shell’s historical involvement in Russia.

The company’s decision to withdraw from an investment does not necessarily close the historical record concerning how that investment was made, financed and assessed.

That record deserves careful examination.

SOURCE RECORD AND DOCUMENTARY PROVENANCE

The following primary and contemporaneous sources support this instalment.

1. Shell — 24 April 2017. The original corporate announcement confirms the financing agreements, participating companies, investment limits, project cost and Gazprom’s ownership of Nord Stream 2 AG.

Shell Corporate Press Releases 2017 — Nord Stream 2 Financing Announcement

2. Nord Stream 2 AG — 26 September 2019. The original arbitration notice identifies the claimant, respondent, legal basis, investment arrangements, alleged treaty violations and requested relief. It expressly names the Shell financing entity.

Nord Stream 2 AG — Original Notice of Arbitration

3. Reuters — 25 April 2019. Contemporaneous reporting establishes that Nord Stream 2 had warned the Commission of possible legal action before the arbitration formally commenced. It also records the Commission’s response.

Reuters — EU Says New Energy Rules Apply to Nord Stream 2

4. Nord Stream 2 AG — 3 July 2020. The claimant’s 192-page memorial sets out the allegations concerning investment protection, regulatory treatment, expropriation and the remedies requested.

Claimant’s Memorial — 3 July 2020

5. European Union — 15 September 2020. The EU’s memorial advances jurisdictional objections based upon the treaty’s dispute-resolution provisions and the attribution of alleged regulatory consequences.

EU Memorial on Jurisdiction and Request for Bifurcation

6. Permanent Court of Arbitration — 31 December 2020. Procedural Order No. 4 rejects the request for a separate preliminary jurisdictional phase without determining the substantive objections.

Procedural Order No. 4 — Full Decision

7. Court of Justice of the European Union — 27 November 2024. The official judicial announcement records the General Court’s dismissal of Nord Stream 2 AG’s challenge to Directive 2019/692.

Official Court Press Release 195/24

8. Shell — 2022 Annual Report and Accounts. Shell’s financial disclosures confirm the complete $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan.

Shell Annual Report and Accounts 2022

9. European Commission — Energy Charter Withdrawal. The Commission confirms the EU’s withdrawal from the treaty, effective 28 June 2025.

European Commission — Energy Charter

10. Energy Charter Treaty — Article 47. The treaty’s withdrawal provision establishes the framework for continuing protection of certain qualifying investments.

Energy Charter Treaty — Article 47

Archive disclaimer: This instalment draws upon authenticated corporate documents, international arbitration submissions, procedural decisions, legislation and judicial records. Allegations advanced by litigants are attributed to those parties and are not presented as findings of wrongdoing. Shell was a financier of Nord Stream 2 AG, not a claimant in the arbitration examined here. No finding is made that Shell directed the proceedings, concealed information or is entitled to any future arbitration recovery. Outstanding legal claims remain unresolved unless determined by the competent tribunal or court. Editorial commentary is distinguished from documentary findings.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-094 — The Sakhalin Papers LXXXIV: The Foreseeability Test — What Shell and Its Partners Knew Before the Nord Stream 2 Investment Was Written Off

The next instalment will examine one of the most consequential findings in the European General Court’s November 2024 judgment.

The court concluded that Nord Stream 2 AG had continued investing despite being able to foresee changes to European gas-market regulation.

That conclusion raises an important question for investors.

What information was available to Shell and the other European financiers when they entered the project in 2017?

What changed during the following three years?

And how should the regulatory dispute already underway in 2019 be understood alongside Shell’s confirmation that the final Nord Stream 2 loan instalments were made in the second quarter of 2020?

The next investigation will reconstruct the documentary chronology using Shell’s published statements, European legislative records, the claimant’s own evidence and contemporaneous reporting.

It will distinguish risks known at the time from developments that could not reasonably have been anticipated.

The objective will not be to impose hindsight upon historical investment decisions.

It will be to establish what the contemporary record actually shows.

Because there is a fundamental difference between an investment becoming unsuccessful through unforeseeable events and an investment proceeding while material risks are already apparent.

Shell’s financial loss is documented.

The precise history of the risks surrounding that investment deserves closer examination.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 20 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 20, 2026 at 9:43 pm.
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