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Botany, welfare, friendships, work and housing. David Matthews picks six of the best new books for leftists

The post Book previews: autumn 2026 appeared first on Red Pepper.

England enters the pyrocene Channel News brendan 20th October 2026 Teaser Media

Residents have delivered a petition signed by over 6000 Queenslanders to MP offices across the state today, to demand the LNP government scrap proposed laws that would stop the public from having a say on mining projects.

By Aaron Mintzes, Deputy Policy Director and Senior Policy Counsel, and Allison Woolverton, Campaign Manager and Policy Advocate.

Last week, a group of key Senators published text of a long-anticipated permitting bill, S. 5653, the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA). While it includes widely supported improvements to strengthen renewable energy transmission, the bill gives industry a wide-open door to deliver widespread damage to science, waters, lands, wildlife, Tribes, and communities impacted by oil, gas, and mining, all while cutting the public out of the process. The Senate appears likely to begin voting on this bill as soon as November 9.   

Email your Senators now Does the oil, gas, or mining project receive any environmental review?

For all major federal projects – such as a new mine, a gas pipeline, or an expansion to an oil refinery –  the bill makes sweeping changes to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the key tool informing the public and allowing input on our own Government’s environmental decisions. In fact, BAAJA provides multiple ways for mining and fossil fuel projects to avoid NEPA review altogether. For example, the bill declares interstate natural gas pipelines are not major federal actions and do not qualify for NEPA review. Nor will most grants, loans, loan guarantees, and other forms of Government financial assistance to corporations seeking permits to build. This is especially troubling given this Administration’s tendency to spend taxpayer dollars on mineral projects to enrich their own family members. The bill also makes it easier for the Government to exclude certain kinds of projects from review, as when the Forest Service unlawfully allowed graphite mine exploration in the sacred Black Hills of South Dakota.

The bill provides the corporations great advantages while being incredibly disadvantageous to the public. If there is a NEPA review, BAAJA defines the “purpose and need” of the oil, gas, or mining project to narrowly meet the company’s own goals. This limits the review largely to what the company chooses. Further, the bill precludes considering alternatives that do meet the project sponsor’s own goals. Traditionally, NEPA reviews consider a range of alternative plans, including not approving the project.

Montana Resources in Butte, MT. Credit: Chris Boyer, Kestrel Aerial

And even if the oil, gas, or mining project gets reviewed, what process does it get?

Before applying for a permit, project sponsors selectively meet with interested parties such as Tribes, local governments, and community organizations to create a “record of stakeholder engagement.” The project sponsor’s prepared record includes “any ways the feedback from stakeholders were incorporated into the proposed agency action.” Project sponsors may draft NEPA documents, but the agency decides the level of review. Traditionally, large oil, gas, and mining projects might receive two or three opportunities for comment. First, to understand the project’s scope. Then, to comment on the Government’s draft study. And for those projects that the agency decides may have significant environmental impacts, another public comment opportunity.

The vote could come in less than a month, so they need to hear from us now.

TAKE ACTION NOW: Tell the Senate to put People first.

Yet, BAAJA requires only one public comment period at the beginning of permitting and only for the most harmful projects. The bill requires no public comment for any draft studies, nor for any projects with more moderate impacts. When the Government does prepare a review, it may disregard any study available afterward, effectively preventing the public and Tribes from contributing science and Indigenous Knowledge tailored to that project’s review.  BAAJA also closes the courthouse door by limiting legal challenges to those who comment and limiting their legal claims to those raised in their comments. 

Finally, if BAAJA becomes law, it would lock in all oil, gas, and mining projects already approved under this Administration’s feckless, weak, and submissive minerals policy.  Worse, the bill precludes any future President from doing anything that may “alter” or “amend” what this President has already authorized, including transferring sacred landscapes like Oak Flat to foreign mining corporations. BAAJA proponents argue this provision starts wind and solar projects this President has unlawfully halted.  Even so, it also leaves in place projects this President already unlawfully started, like Alaska’s Ambler Road through the Gates of the Arctic National Park.

Goldstrike Mine in NV. Credit: Ecoflight

Unfettered Mining of Public Lands

In addition to gutting protections for wildlife and people, BAAJA would open public lands to unchecked mining. That will cause permanent damage.

The United States’ mining law is already wildly inadequate. The 1872 Mining Law was written more than 150 years ago. Its goal was to encourage mining in the West, not to protect communities or the environment. It can seem hard to imagine how this law could be worse, but BAAJA is up to the challenge.

The damage extends beyond the mine itself to include infrastructure and dumps for toxic mining waste. BAAJA allows mining companies to claim nearly unlimited public lands for any use associated with a mine plan, including dumping waste, roads, pipelines, or power lines.  It expands mining companies’ legal right to claim public lands under the 1872 Mining Law, rather than allowing the Government to choose the number and locations of waste dumps, roads, or transmission lines.

There is good news in this bill. Currently, the hardrock abandoned mine lands fund (created in 2021’s Infrastructure Law) has no dedicated revenue, and so relies on taxpayers instead – roughly $4.8 million/yr.  BAAJA would dedicate meaningful funding sources toward this cleanup with revenue from mining “acquired lands” – lands the Government bought from states, towns, or private entities, mostly in the Midwest and East– and raising certain fees.

Case study: Desert Southwest Pipeline 

BAAJA’s devastation of environmental review can be seen in its potential impact on the proposed Desert Southwest Pipeline. The 48-inch pipeline proposed by Energy Transfer would run 522 miles carrying 2.3 billion cubic feet of fracked gas per day from the West Texas Permian Basin through southern New Mexico and Arizona. The pipeline will supply gas to large AI data centers via other pipelines as well as municipal utility grids facing increasing demand due to data center buildout. 

Land, water, Tribes, and communities along the pipeline’s route are threatened with pollution, safety risks, and harm to sacred sites and fragile ecosystems. The pipeline would run under the Rio Grande, Pecos, San Pedro, and Gila Rivers via horizontal directional drilling, a risky process using pressurized mud to tunnel under rivers. It would pass through the ecologically diverse Chihuahuan and Sonoran Deserts and the Otero Mesa, America’s wildest grassland that hosts over 1,000 native species and thousands of archaeological sites.

Yet, BAAJA would say all interstate natural gas pipelines, like Desert Southwest, are not major projects, and therefore do not receive NEPA review. The change would entirely alter the multi-step environmental review under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and crucial opportunities for public input by communities along its intended route.  

Additionally, BAAJA amends the National Historic Preservation Act to essentially make Tribal consultation discretionary. Now, Tribes and states can review water crossings and impose their own water quality standards under Sec. 401 of the Clean Water Act, BAAJA weakens that authority. The bill imposes burdens upon states and Tribes and undermines tribal and state sovereignty over a massive pipeline project cutting through their land. And Desert Southwest is just one pipeline of the hundreds of miles of pipelines the Trump Administration is poised to bring online in coming years.

Conclusion

There’s still time to tell Congress that BAAJA creates more harm than good. The bill weakens NEPA, the 1872 Mining Law, the Clean Water Act, and Tribal consultation under the National Historic Preservation Act. Overall, the bill needlessly serves extraction over the people and renewable energy. Congress should pass the bill’s renewable energy transmission provisions, strike the harmful ones, and instead preserve science, public input, consultation, and meaningful mining reforms.

The post Permitting Bill Text Would Strip Our Most Basic Federal Protections appeared first on Earthworks.

This past week, we organized a panel discussion about how ordinary people can change international systems of corporate and social injustice. Listen in: For more than forty years, Rainforest Action…

RAFI is pleased to announce its 2026 farmer grantees. This year, the program awarded $310,103 to 39 farmers across eight states, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Since 2020, RAFI has distributed $1,722,282 to 280 farmers.

The post RAFI Announces Farmer Grant Recipients appeared first on RAFI.

Location: Any SUWA Office: Salt Lake City (preferred), Moab, or Washington, DC
Department: Campaigns
Team: Communications
Reports to: Senior Communications Manager
Status, Salary & Benefits: Full-time, Non-Exempt. Benefits and salary range at suwa.org/careers.

The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), Utah’s largest conservation organization, has an immediate opening for a Writer and Communications Specialist. Interested applicants should send a cover letter, resume, three writing or content samples (links to materials online are fine) that showcase a range of writing styles, and three references to Diane Kelly, Senior Communications Manager, at jobs@suwa.org. The deadline to submit your application is Monday, November 9, 2026. Please include your name and the words “Writer and Communications Specialist” in the subject line.

Click here to download the job description as a PDF

Position Summary 

The Writer and Communications Specialist is a new role at SUWA and will serve as an in-house writer and social media manager for the organization. A member of the Communications Team (alongside two other staff members), they will work across the organization and use their skills primarily to support programmatic and campaign work (protecting the redrock wilderness). The Specialist should be a motivated communications professional with experience writing for a variety of audiences and on behalf of an organization and other staff members. Experience in advocacy, social media, and multichannel content creation as well as comfort working in what can be a fast-paced environment is ideal. Attention to detail and flexibility with evolving information and deadlines will be key.  

SUWA’s Communications Team and the larger Campaign Department (which includes both the Communications and Organizing Teams) are collaborative and value creative problem-solving. We are proactive and plan ahead when possible but remain nimble so we can seize new opportunities as they arise. The Writer and Communications Specialist will have the opportunity to work collaboratively and to create or edit a wide variety of public-facing materials, as well as information used by SUWA’s members and grassroots activists. This role presents a great opportunity to learn and grow with other communications professionals while making an impact at an effective nonprofit.  

Duties & Responsibilities Writing and Content Creation (40%) 

• Creates or edits a variety of public-facing materials (press releases, emails, advocacy actions, newsletter articles, paper alerts, fact sheets, blog posts, etc.), ensuring they meet SUWA style guide and consistency. 

• Creates or edits a variety of materials (talking points, backgrounders, educational materials, etc.) for use by SUWA staff or members. May draft materials for use by partner organizations, activists, or other individuals.  

• Works closely with the Campaigns and Communications Director during rapid response moments on SUWA’s external response and outreach.  

• Works closely with other Communications Team staff to modify the materials above for use across various SUWA platforms, especially social media.  

Social Media Management (40%) 

• Posts on SUWA’s social media accounts (Facebook, Instagram Bluesky, LinkedIn, etc.); interacts with users and responds to social media messages, inquiries, and comments with the goal of maintaining a robust online community and encouraging deeper engagement. Works with the Organizing and Stewardship Teams to identify new activists from social media and connects these activists to the appropriate team for continued engagement.  

• Develops and utilizes an editorial calendar specifically for social media, with a pool of “evergreen” content. Social media graphics will be created in coordination with other Communications Team members.  

• Creates and utilizes social listening practices to better understand the digital landscape of SUWA’s issues, online advocates, and overall brand reputation. 

Communications Team Projects (10%) 

• Cross-trained on production of advocacy actions and email blasts; assists Senior Communications Manager on print newsletter, mailed alerts, and any other special projects. Supports the Senior Communications Manager with ongoing website maintenance (general content, forms, blog posts, online store, etc.) and the editing, formatting, and sending of emails (as needed). 

• Analyzes and makes recommendations to improve other teams’ use of the SUWA digital engagement tools. 

• Represents Communications Team and Campaigns Department during internal meetings and in collaborations with other teams across the organization.  

Other Duties & Responsibilities (10%) 

• May assist Development Team with writing or editing copy as needed. 

• Supports organizational retreats, publications, donor and member engagement, and other special initiatives connected to campaign goals; performs other duties as assigned to advance SUWA’s mission. 

Work Environment & Travel Requirements 

• Works independently and collaboratively across teams, departments, and time zones, exercising sound judgment in dynamic political and advocacy environments. 

• Travels occasionally within the region, with national travel during urgent conservation threats or rapid-response mobilization; works evenings and weekends as campaign priorities require. 

• Assists SUWA staff with public speaking and presentation responsibilities; ability to transport outreach and event materials up to 50 lbs; work performed in office, community, travel, remote, and public settings. 

Training & Qualifications 

The requirements listed below are representative of the knowledge, skills, and/or ability required for the role — the ideal candidate will have all or some of these qualifications. If you don’t have all of them, apply anyway and tell us about your skills and experience. Reasonable accommodations may be made to enable individuals with disabilities to perform the essential functions. We strongly encourage applications from people of color, LGBTQ+ individuals, people with disabilities, veterans, and other underrepresented groups.

• 2+ years of relevant experience, or any combination of education, experience, and training which provides the desired knowledge, skills, and abilities. 

• Commitment to wilderness preservation and SUWA’s mission. The ideal candidate will have a background in, or at least a strong interest in, conservation and/or environmental issues. 

• Strong writing, communication, presentation, time management, planning, and interpersonal skills. 

• Demonstrated knowledge of social media and proficiency with major social media platforms. 

• Demonstrated experience with CMS and CRM platforms, WordPress, and online advocacy action platforms.  

• Computer literacy, including MS Office products: Word, Excel, Outlook, PowerPoint, Teams, etc.  

• Diplomacy, sound judgment, and discretion when dealing with members, potential members, and other staff. 

• High degree of energy, self-motivation, and flexibility; Strong work ethic with a positive attitude. 

• Ability to perform multiple tasks effectively with a focus on timeliness and responsiveness. 

Preferred Qualifications 

• Experience with Adobe Products (InDesign, Photoshop, Express, etc.), Canva, or other programs. 

• Experience in advocacy, campaigns, public affairs, conservation, political strategy, or coalition work; knowledge of wilderness conservation, public lands policy, or federal.
  

• Bilingual or multilingual skills; ties to Utah a plus but not required. 
  
  

The post Now Hiring: Writer and Communications Specialist appeared first on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.

This article Beating burnout in social movements requires strategy was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

I recently showed up to a protest for the first time in months, looked around, and thought: “Who the hell are all these people?” 

Friends I could once rely on running into at protests when I was younger were missing. 

The fact that I hadn’t been to a protest in months was unusual. I’d had a hard season of exhaustion and cynicism, and I felt I was falling out of the loop. In the last few years, I turned 30 and moved back to my hometown, and the once-intense focus on social movements that I had in my 20s was now jostling for attention with work and family. 

The absence of my comrades at that protest seemed to signal that others, too, had burned or faded out of organizing.

It’s a trend that Chris Dixon describes in his new book, which is about sticking around for the long haul in the fight for a better world: “In radical activist scenes especially,” he writes, “people tend to age out by their 30s, if not before.” 

When the manuscript of Dixon’s book came my way, it spoke to my fear of burning or fading out of the movements that have given my life meaning and momentum. (I sit on the editorial collective of Between The Lines Books, and helped select the book for publication; it was released in September 2026.) 

After a few recent boom-and-bust cycles of uprisings — 2020’s Black liberation uprising, the Palestine solidarity protests that kicked off in 2023 — it’s a timely and thoughtful book about building movements with care and commitment.

Dixon (who unfortunately shares a name with a far more famous American crypto bro) is an anti-authoritarian activist and a scholar of social movements. “For the Long Haul: How to Stay in the Fight for a Better World” is the latest effort in his lifelong project to understand how social movements are built and sustained.

Dixon grew up in Alaska, and the book opens by describing his decades-long friendship with Ruth Sheridan, an anarchist who was in her 70s when she first came to talk to his eighth grade labor history class. That early curiosity — about how left-wing social movements are built and sustained and the unsung activists who make it happen — showed up in his 2014 book “Another Politics: Talking Across Today’s Transformative Movements,” in which he shared lessons from almost a decade spent interviewing organizers across the U.S. and Canada. 

Now, Dixon has reached back into this same conversational archive to write “For the Long Haul.” 

We meet Bill Stivers, an elder communist Dixon befriended as a teen; Rachel Herzing, the co-founder of prison abolitionist group Critical Resistance; the political prisoner David Gilbert with whom he exchanged letters from jail, and many more. 

These lifelong leftists share their observations about what leads to burnout, the many-headed monster that has long stalked social movements. During this time of totalizing neoliberalism and weakened movement infrastructure, it’s grown especially powerful. These movement veterans counsel us to be patient, open-minded and to “practice being nobody special.” 

Dixon tells the story of Stivers who, at the age of 76, travelled from Anchorage, Alaska to the state of Chiapas in southern Mexico to attend the Zapatistas’ Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism. It was just a couple years after the militant group’s armed uprising and a young Dixon, more swayed by a European left tradition at that time, looked on with skepticism. But Stivers ended up having the more clear-eyed assessment of this new approach to anti-capitalist struggle. Stivers had cultivated the long view, which helped him avoid cynicism and dogmatism, and encouraged him to keep learning and stay open to new developments.  

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What I found most helpful about the book was Dixon’s formulation of burnout: he sees it not just as a type of overwork or exhaustion, but as a feeling of defeat that becomes more common because of a lack of strategy. Dixon introduces this idea by sharing a conversation he had with Kim Marks, a direct-action environmentalist and Indigenous solidarity organizer in Oregon: “So much of burnout is about not being effective,” she said, “and so much ineffectiveness comes from not having a plan.” 

Dixon traces the ways that people often burn out of activist groups back to this underlying lack of strategy. When a group promises sweeping change but never decides how to take the first step; when a group gets mired in discussions about internal structure or politics and stops taking outward action; when a few veteran members shoulder a huge amount of work while new ones struggle to find meaningful ways to pitch in; when a group is hastily cobbled together to address a crisis then falls apart just as quickly after an unsuccessful campaign — all of these are instances in which a lack of strategy leaves people feeling defeated, ineffective and worn-out. 

A good plan can pull groups out of these exhausting spirals. This involves mapping the current political landscape, articulating our goals, making agreements about what to do and how to support each other in doing it, and then evaluating our success and learning from our mistakes.  

Dixon writes about the importance of imbuing this strategy-setting with care and intentionality, to “help people to talk frankly about workload, make reasonable estimates of what they can do, and look out for one another’s well-being.”

Previous Coverage

Why bravery and heartbreak are essential to organizing

You can find many of these same encouragements — for rest, care and intentionality — in the pages of any self-help book. But the goal of capitalist self-help literature is to create an individual who is independent, sane and productive enough to keep cranking the handle of profit-making machines. 

Dixon’s help is different: it’s not for the individual, but for the collective. At the end of the day, “sustained involvement in movements is fundamentally a collective activity, not an individual one,” he writes. No amount of advice given to or followed by the individual can stop the pattern of burnout and disengagement that’s become endemic in leftist spaces. 

As a result, Dixon focuses on collective care rather than self-care. This can look like preparing food for the picket line, planning for childcare and legal support at the direct action, or tending to hurt feelings after the meeting. He calls care work “a crucial — and too often overlooked — foundation for the long haul.”

For Dixon, care is not just a way to make organizing more pleasant for the people doing it, or a moral imperative if the left wants to keep claiming the high ground. Instead, he sees care as a strategic imperative. When we make our political commitments with care in mind, Dixon writes, it forces us to ask ourselves and each other if what we’re committing to is reasonable and tactical. And when it is, we become more likely to stick around for the long run, and also more likely to win.

Not one of Dixon’s ideas stands without a quote from an organizer, an example from a movement or a reference to a movement scholar’s work. One of the book’s main contributions is its vast bibliography — a full third of the pages are suggested reading and endnotes. 

Dixon’s form of activist research is highly attentive to insights that are gleaned from a person’s own experiences. Like this observation by anti-authoritarian activist Helen Hudson, who draws on decades of organizing with prisoners to form her analysis of how the state uses prison to weaken movements: “Prison isolates the prisoners from support,” she told Dixon, “but also deprives younger generations of radicals from the experience of revolutionaries who have much to teach us.”  

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Dixon encourages younger readers like me to find these people in our own lives — older activists like Stivers and Sheridan who show us that it is possible and lovely to live an ordinary life of unflagging commitment to the left. 

This is not an organizing manual (though Dixon does recommend a few of those in his suggested readings). Instead, what he gives us is a deep study of left-wing dynamics and some broad strokes toward sustainability. The people likely to get the most from this book are those of us who have already gone through many cycles of boom-and-bust social movement activity, and who are looking for fuel that burns longer and cleaner. 

And it’s by paying attention to Dixon’s rigorous practices of listening and sharing that readers will get the most out of this book — leaving not just with a handful of advice, but with an initiation into a practice. 

This article Beating burnout in social movements requires strategy was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

As opposition to AI data centers mounts across the country, the Trump administration is moving full speed ahead to approve and construct them on America’s public lands, writes Center for Western Priorities Deputy Director Lauren Bogard in a new Westwise post.

The Bureau of Land Management is considering at least 35 active data center-related applications covering over 24,000 acres in six Western states, according to CWP’s new BLM Data Center Tracker. Many of the applications list no acreage, so the true footprint is likely larger.

Unlike oil, gas, wind, or solar, there is no framework for conducting environmental reviews, collecting public input, or returning revenue to taxpayers for data centers built on public lands. Additionally, data centers are not like oil, gas, or minerals, which are extracted from public lands because that’s where they exist. There are no natural resources that make it necessary to develop data centers on public lands, and there is no reason to assume data centers belong on them.

Meanwhile, opposition is building. The Wilderness Society called for a moratorium on data centers on public land earlier this month, and Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility is pressing congressional appropriators to block the projects. In a July survey for Keep It Public Wyoming, over 90 percent of likely voters said data centers are not an acceptable use of public lands. Nationally, Pew found the share of Republicans who say data centers are mostly bad for the environment jumped from 31 to 47 percent since January. Learn more in the latest Westwise post on Substack.

Quick hits Trump geothermal lease sale collides with planned Nevada solar farms

Reuters

Government watchdog finds BLM may be breaking the law by allowing foreign agents to mine on public land

Politico

Federal contract spending on public lands in Colorado dropped $189 million last year

Summit Daily

Trump outlines rapid plan to close and overhaul D.C. golf course

New York Times

Final plans for Trump’s arch appear to abandon his ‘military complex’ idea

Washington Post

Dropping Lake Powell levels reveal ‘crime against nature’

USA Today

Trump doubles down on Reflecting Pool vandalism claims without providing evidence

ABC News

Trump rule lets Alaska hunters lure bears with bacon-greased doughnuts

New York Times | Politico

Quote of the day

Baiting bears with piles of doughnuts, meat scraps, and dog food to lure them into shooting range and gun them down is indefensible and inexcusable as a federal policy decision.”

—Kitty Block, president of Humane World for Animals, New York Times

Picture This

@usinterior

Every autumn, thousands of migrating birds arrive at Bosque del Apache National Wildlife Refuge in New Mexico. Sandhill cranes, snow geese and other waterfowl fill the wetlands, creating one of the Southwest’s most spectacular wildlife displays.

Photo by Robert Dunn

Feature image: Utah Data Center located in Bluffdale, Utah and run by the National Security Agency, Source: Swilsonmc, Wikimedia Commons

The post The Trump administration is trying to build data centers on public lands appeared first on Center for Western Priorities.

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

Earlier this summer I told a journalist that it was not beyond the realm of possibility that this year’s El Niño would end up the strongest in 500 or even 1,000 years. That was a strong claim at the time, and I’ve had a few people ask how I could possibly know what El Niño was doing in the year 1200. It is a fair question, and the answer is that we know more than you might think.

This year’s El Niño event is already the strongest in the instrumental record based on Niño 3.4 region sea surface temperature anomalies. I’ve written in more detail about this year’s forecast here, and breaking the prior record over at Carbon Brief.

Daily Niño 3.4 anomalies passed the prior record (set in November 2015) on September 20th, and reached 3.4C as of this week. September as a whole had the highest Niño 3.4 temperature anomalies on record. And this year’s El Niño still has a few more months to grow; the latest runs in (from 14 seasonal forecast models) show this year’s El Niño peaking around 4C (with 80% of model runs ending up somewhere between 3.3C and 4.6C).

Multi-model median Niño 3.4 forecast from each month’s initializations, March through October 2026, compared with observed monthly values (NOAA CPC). Medians are across all ensemble members with models weighted equally; months with fewer than six models are omitted. Shading shows the 25–75% range of members for the October runs. Data from NOAA NMME and CFSv2, Copernicus C3S, ECCC CanSIPS and JAMSTEC SINTEX-F via the Climate Dashboard.

That being said, while the models underestimated the magnitude of the event earlier in the year, they have overestimated it over the past two months. However, with the first week of October already above 3C, the October forecast of 3.6C doesn’t seem outside the realm of possibility. But there remains a wide range of possible outcomes for this event across different modeling groups and ensemble members.

How far back can we look?

The figure below looks at three different lines of evidence for historical El Niño strength. The top panel shows the thermometer record, where this event has already set a record for events since 1877 and is forecast to smash it. The two lower panels show different lines of evidence from tree rings and corals as to what happened during the millennium before.

Top: peak monthly Niño 3.4 anomaly of every El Niño since 1877, each measured against its own era’s climatology (NOAA OISST from 1982, HadISST reconstruction earlier) as well as the 2026–27 forecast median and 10–90% range of member peaks. Middle: winter (December–February) Niño 3.4 reconstructed from tree rings by Cook and Cane (2024), 1100–2000, relative to 1871–2000, with instrumental winters overlaid in blue and the 2026–27 winter forecast (median and 10–90% range of members). Bottom: 20-year running variability of interannual sea surface temperature from Galápagos corals, from Figure 2 of Cole et al. (2026). Each mark is one coral record (circles: oxygen isotopes; triangles: strontium/calcium), showing the mean and range of its 20-year variability.

Before 1877 there are also written records to draw from. Quinn et al. (1987) compiled El Niño occurrences off Peru back to 1525 from ship logs, mission records and chronicles, and Gergis and Fowler (2008) combined these with tree ring, coral and ice core records into an event chronology back to the same year. Five of the nine events in their most extreme tier are from the 20th century.

But these chronologies sort events into coarse classes and miss a lot (they rate the 1997-98 event as only “weak”, for example), so are only modest evidence for how a 4C event this year would rank. The two records shown in the figure above, from tree rings and coral, reach back to the 1100s and can give us a more solid estimate of how this year’s event will stack up.

Tree rings back to 1100

Cook and Cane (2024) (middle panel of the figure above) used 544 tree-ring chronologies from places whose rainfall responds to El Niño to reconstruct winter (December to February) sea surface temperatures across the equatorial Pacific. However, only 81 of those chronologies reach all the way back to 1100s. If we look at the data since 1500 (when more tree rings are available), it tracks observed winter Niño 3.4 reasonably well, with a typical error of about 0.5C in any one winter. The one starting in 1100 is noisier, with a typical error of about 0.6C.

The largest winter either version reconstructs before 1871 is 2.1C (1746-47 in one, 1791-92 in the other), and the largest before 1500 is 2.0C (1121-22). The biggest instrumental winters (1877-78, 1982-83, 1997-98 and 2015-16) all come in between 2.3C and 2.5C on the same measure. The forecast for the coming winter is 3.9C (with 80% of model members between 2.9C and 4.6C).1

To account for the uncertainty in the tree ring dataset, I simulated the range of true values each winter before 1871 could have had, given how far off the reconstruction was in the years it was tested on.2 If models of this year’s El Niño prove accurate, the chance that this winter beats every winter since 1100 is between 91% and 95% on the standard Niño 3.4 index. On NOAA’s relative index (RONI), which subtracts the warming of the wider tropics, it falls to between 60% and 72%. Over the past 500 years, where the reconstruction is better, the odds rise to between 94% and 98% and between 69% and 85% for ONI and RONI, respectively. Cook and Cane similarly note that “The positive excursions (i.e., El Niño events) in recent decades are generally higher than at any time since 1100.”

What the corals say

The second long record came out in August of this year, when Julia Cole and colleagues published a study in Science using 28 coral records from five islands in the Galápagos. The Galápagos sit in the eastern Pacific, where El Niño events (including this year’s) are centered. Corals lay down annual bands whose chemistry tracks the temperature of the water they grew in, so a fossil coral can be used as a rough thermometer for whatever decades it was alive. The oldest of these corals grew around 1130, and together they sample about half the years of the past millennium.

Corals cannot tell you the peak of a single El Niño as reliably as a thermometer (or a tree ring) can. What they measure well is how much the sea surface temperature swung from year to year over a 20-year window. Through 1850, the year-to-year swings stay inside a relatively narrow band. They begin to rise in the late 19th century, and the corals that grew after 1984 sit mostly above the pre-industrial range. Cole and colleagues find that variability before 1850 was about 37% lower than in recent decades.3 They find the increase comes from stronger El Niño events rather than stronger La Niñas.

They also tested whether natural factors alone could produce a jump this large, using last-millennium simulations from 12 climate models driven only by volcanoes, the sun and changes in Earth’s orbit (as well as control runs with no changes). They find that the increase in variability in the modern era come close to 1-in-100 odds in climate model control runs. Other proxy work finds similar results, including studies of central Pacific corals (Grothe et al., 2020) and an earlier tree-ring reconstruction covering seven centuries (Li et al., 2013).

Putting the two records together

The tree rings and the corals are about as independent as two paleoclimate records can be. One reads El Niño’s effect on rainfall over land through tree growth, and the other reads ocean temperature directly in the eastern Pacific. They agree that the El Niños of recent decades are at or near the top of everything since the 1100s, and the 2026 forecast sits more than a degree above those recent events.

However, climate proxies are necessarily imperfect thermometers, and both types have real limits. Tree rings underestimated the 1877-78 El Niño event and come with uncertainties of more than 0.5C before 1500 (though I account for this uncertainty in my calculation of the odds!). The corals record variability over decades rather than the peak of any one event, they measure local Galápagos temperature rather than the Niño 3.4 index, and the gaps between them leave about half the years unsampled.

Even taking all those limitations into account, I think that this year’s El Niño event is likely to be the strongest in 1,000 years if the latest models of its peak prove accurate. The tree rings alone give it 91% to 95% odds on the standard index (ONI) and 60% to 72% using RONI. The coral records already show that the modern era stands outside the natural range of eastern Pacific variability, and this year will be an unambiguous record in the modern era.

As always, for daily updates on the El Niño forecast and global temperatures head over to our Climate Dashboard.

1 These numbers reflect the same winter averages used by the tree ring proxies, and are lower than the peak monthly estimates for the event as they reflect a three-month average.

2 To do this, I fit observed winter Niño 3.4 against the reconstruction over the withheld years 1871-1929 (a slope of 0.92 and residual error of 0.49C for the version from 1500, 0.75 and 0.64C for the version from 1100), resampled those years to capture uncertainty in the fit, generated plausible true values for every winter before 1871. I repeated this analysis 20,000 times, and took the largest each time.

3 Cole and colleagues measure the change relative to recent decades, so their percentage describes how much weaker pre-industrial variability was. When measured against the pre-industrial, they find that recent variability is roughly 60% higher.

A version of this piece was featured in Food Tank’s newsletter, released weekly on Thursdays. To make sure it lands straight in your inbox and to be among the first to receive it, subscribe now by clicking here.

Greetings from Des Moines, Iowa. I’m here for the World Food Prize and Borlaug Dialogues, an annual gathering of people working to address hunger and improve food and agriculture systems.

And I have a confession—I love attending the World Food Prize.

I’ve been coming since the early 2010s. For a long time, part of what made it interesting was that there weren’t many people like me here—advocates for sustainable agriculture who wanted to talk about agroecology, biodiversity, how agriculture can be part of the solution to the climate crisis, and the power of farmers.

The Dialogues bring together scientists, academics, policymakers, and plenty of representatives of Big Ag. This year’s announced speakers include leaders from ADM, John Deere, and Corteva. I used to joke that I was one of the few people who could attend the World Food Prize one week and the Organic Trade Association’s annual meeting the next. And, to the Foundation’s credit, I’ve been invited to moderate side events and emcee a plenary session.

I also have some interesting memories.

One year, I was grabbing a drink at the hotel bar when two men invited me to join them. One was a scientist at a major agrochemical company and the other led a farmers and ranchers organization.

Why not sit and have a drink, I thought.

After some very quick pleasantries, they said I was using my Twitter account to criticize their organizations. For the record, I hadn’t. When I explained that, their response was, essentially, “Well, people like you do.” And I thought to myself, what do you mean, people like me?

I tried to explain that their assessment of me—and my work—was incorrect. The conversation went in circles, and I eventually hightailed it out of there.

By the way, I’m now friendly with both of them. I even made it onto one’s Christmas card list.

That experience stayed with me because it showed me how quickly we—all of us—can decide we already understand someone else based on preconceived notions. Sustainable agriculture advocate? We know what he thinks. Corporate scientist? We know what she believes. But we often don’t.

We need more good food and agriculture advocates at events like the Borlaug Dialogues. We need food is medicine leaders, climate activists, public health advocates, young farmer organizations, Indigenous food leaders, and farmworker advocates. Their experiences can really help shape the conversations that happen there. And to be fair, more and more of these folks are coming to the Borlaug Dialogues.

And all of us—Big Ag executives and agroecology advocates included—need to spend time in rooms where people disagree with us. We need to listen long enough to understand why we are on different ends of a very broad spectrum of what it will take to nourish both people and planet.

The issues we’re working on are complicated. If we want real food and agriculture transformation, we’re going to have to get uncomfortable.

Maybe not being accosted at the hotel bar uncomfortable. But uncomfortable enough to recognize that our comfort zones aren’t getting us very far.

Which brings me back to the Prize itself.

Often described as the Nobel Prize for food and agriculture, it grew out of Norman Borlaug’s vision for recognizing people who improve the world’s food supply. Borlaug, a plant pathologist widely known as the father of the Green Revolution, helped transform wheat production and later directed the wheat program at CIMMYT, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center.

I see how the Foundation is evolving. Under the leadership of former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and Foundation CEO Tom Vilsack and President Mashal Husain, there are opportunities to broaden both the conversation and our understanding of who leads change. This year’s program includes actors Martin Sheen and Nick Offerman, as well as Nobel Peace Prize laureate and education advocate Malala Yousafzai.

People whose work I admire, including Cary Fowler, Lawrence Haddad, and Mariangela Hungria, are also recipients of the World Food Prize. Their leadership is one of the reasons I think the World Food Prize and Borlaug Dialogues are important and why I keep coming back.

But I want the conversation to keep evolving, too. We need to ask more difficult questions about what food and agricultural progress looks like, whose knowledge informs it, who benefits, who has power, and who doesn’t.

For me, a Green Evolution—a term I stole from Bram Govaerts, the current Director General of CIMMYT—would mean putting farmers’ livelihoods, healthy soils, biodiversity, and nutritious diets at the center of how we measure success. And that requires looking around the room.

How many smallholder farmers, farmworkers, and grassroots organizers have the resources to travel to Des Moines, stay in a hotel, and take several days away from their work? Being invited to speak and being able to participate are different things. Even a waived registration fee doesn’t make it easy for someone to leave their farm.

And the World Food Prize Foundation has had support from agribusiness including ADM, Cargill, Monsanto, Syngenta, and the John Deere Foundation over the years. I don’t necessarily think that is bad as long as that support doesn’t influence which conversations happen, who is in the room, and who gets to be heard.

The history of the Prize also has me scratching my head sometimes. In addition to the folks I mentioned, in 2013, it honored Robert Fraley, then Monsanto’s chief technology officer, and Mary-Dell Chilton of Syngenta, alongside Marc Van Montagu, a molecular biologist, for their contributions to modern plant biotechnology. Monsanto itself didn’t win the Prize. But scientists working at major agribusiness companies did.

That history makes it reasonable to ask what kinds of innovation receive the greatest recognition. A breakthrough in a laboratory can change lives. So can organizing farmers, protecting seed diversity, restoring degraded land, or helping women gain control over their incomes.

This year’s laureate, Dutch food safety scientist Huub Lelieveld, is doing important work. The Foundation is recognizing his efforts to prevent foodborne illness and build international cooperation around food safety. Safe food is fundamental to food security, and that contribution deserves respect.

But I hope the Prize will direct more attention and resources toward leaders whose work is too often overlooked, particularly in the Global South.

The funding and international aid context makes that urgent. According to preliminary OECD figures, official development assistance from its Development Assistance Committee members and associates fell by 23.1 percent in real terms in 2025—the largest annual decline on record. That is a broad aid figure, but it highlights the funding pressures facing work on food security, agricultural development, and global health.

A 2025 study published in The Lancet projected that continued cuts to funding for the U.S. Agency for International Development could lead to more than 14 million additional deaths by 2030, including 4.5 million children younger than five.

The hunger consequences are equally alarming. In October 2025, the World Food Program warned that funding cuts from the United States and other donors could push 13.7 million people receiving its assistance from crisis into emergency levels of hunger, one step below famine on the five-level food insecurity scale.

And this year, I think the Prize missed a particularly powerful opportunity.

The United Nations designated 2026 the International Year of the Woman Farmer. It is an opportunity to recognize women’s contributions to food and agriculture systems and confront the barriers they face in accessing resources and opportunities.

The Dialogues are recognizing that moment with a panel called “What If Her Harvest Changes Everything?” The panel brings together April Hemmes of the United States, Jana Gäbert of Germany, Nelius Kariuki of Kenya, and Josselyn Veronica Vega Rojas of Ecuador. Their work spans farming, livestock and grassland management, vineyards, and agroecological producer organizing. I’m glad these women will be on the stage.

But the panel also raises a question for me. During the International Year of the Woman Farmer, why couldn’t one of these women—or another woman farmer with a demonstrated record of improving people’s lives—be the person we gather to honor with the World Food Prize?

I don’t know whether any of these panelists were nominated or considered. My question is about how widely we look for leadership, who we’re looking at, and what we recognize as valuable.

I think about Esther Penunia, secretary general of the Asian Farmers’ Association for Sustainable Rural Development, who advocates for family farmers and stronger farmer organizations across Asia. Or Elizabeth Nsimadala, a Ugandan farmer and president of the Eastern Africa Farmers Federation, whose work helps farmers organize and advocate for themselves. Or Mariam Sow in Senegal, whose work with ENDA Pronat has helped advance agroecology and farmers’ knowledge.

These are the kinds of leaders I want us to look toward when we talk about transforming food systems. And the International Year of the Woman Farmer gives us an especially good reason to examine whether that work receives the recognition it deserves.

What would it mean for the world’s most prominent food and agriculture prize to put that kind of leadership at the center of its celebration?

That’s a conversation I want to have in Des Moines.

I’ll keep coming back to the World Food Prize because I believe conversations across differences matter. I’ve seen relationships change. I’m proud that over the years I have changed my own mind. And yes, sometimes a frustrating conversation at a hotel bar eventually leads to a Christmas card.

But I also want us to ask more of the institutions that bring us together.

Who gets invited? Who can afford to come? Whose knowledge counts? Who gets recognized? Who has the power?

I’m looking forward to listening this week. And I look forward to asking and being asked some uncomfortable questions.

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The post On the Ground with Dani Nierenberg: Rethinking Who Gets a Seat at the Table—and Who Wins the World Food Prize appeared first on Food Tank.

Rural Missouri counties are part of an emergency medical services (EMS) crisis, as decreasing populations and tax bases, combined with the closing of multiple hospitals, have caused treatment times to rise to almost double those in urban areas.

Slightly more than 24 percent of Missourians live in non-metro areas, according to a report from the state Office of Rural Health. They have only one rural emergency hospital.

Fifty rural Missouri counties lack a hospital, according to a report by the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Those counties without hospitals have an average drive of 29.4 miles to a hospital.

“Families are traveling hours for emergency care, children are growing up in counties with some of the nation’s highest poverty rates, and entire communities face the collapse of the very systems meant to sustain them,” said a recent report from the Missouri Rural Health Association.

The 2023 report by the state Department of Health and Senior Services lays out some stark realities about the condition of rural health care in Missouri:

The population in Missouri’s 99 rural counties declined by 1 percent since the last census, while the population of nonrural counties rose by 1.9 percent. Declining populations mean lower tax revenues and people available for EMS training.

Ray Locker is the executive director for Checks & Balances Project, an investigative watchdog blog holding government officials, lobbyists, and corporate management accountable to the public. Funding for C&BP is provided by Renew American Prosperity and individual donors.

 

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 19 OCTOBER 2026 SLF-2007-092 The Sakhalin Papers LXXXII: Gazprom’s Pipeline Takes Europe to Court — The Energy Charter Treaty, Secretive Arbitration and the Battle Over Billions An investment dispute begun in 2019, a European court defeat, sanctions that interrupted the arbitration itself, and an extraordinary January 2026 order questioning the European Union’s explanations

Archive reference: SLF-2007-092
Publication date: 19 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: The Shell Leaks Files — 18 October 2026
Principal evidence: Shell’s authenticated 2017 financing announcement and 2022 financial disclosures; Permanent Court of Arbitration Case No. 2020-07; Procedural Orders Nos. 18 and 19; European Union legislation; General Court judgments; and official records of subsequent legal proceedings.
Evidence classification: Authenticated corporate records, legislation and judicial decisions; documented submissions by opposing parties; independent legal reporting; and separately identified editorial analysis.

INTRODUCTION: THE PIPELINE THAT WENT FROM THE BALTIC TO THE COURTROOM

The previous instalment examined a remarkable possibility.

Four years after explosions damaged the Nord Stream pipelines, and despite the collapse of the commercial and political assumptions underpinning Nord Stream 2, influential figures were still discussing whether the infrastructure might be revived.

Shell had helped finance the project.

The company subsequently wrote off its $1.126 billion loan.

The pipeline never entered commercial operation.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine transformed Europe’s energy policies.

Sanctions created formidable obstacles to any revival.

Yet the documentary record revealed continuing commercial interest.

Today we turn to another part of the story.

While politicians, investors and governments debated whether Nord Stream might ever carry Russian gas again, the company that owned Nord Stream 2 was pursuing a different strategy.

It was taking the European Union to court.

And, in an extraordinary development, the legal proceedings themselves became entangled in European sanctions.

The consequences are preserved in two authenticated arbitration documents.

On 22 October 2025, an international tribunal suspended proceedings because it considered there was a real risk that European sanctions could affect the arbitration and its participants.

Three months later, on 24 January 2026, the same tribunal issued another order.

This time, the arbitrators criticised the European Union’s answers to their questions about how the proceedings could safely continue.

The criticism was not merely an allegation made by Gazprom’s subsidiary.

It appeared in the tribunal’s own decision.

The resulting documentary record raises questions about investment protections, European energy policy, legal certainty and the consequences of financing infrastructure that subsequently becomes politically unacceptable.

For Shell shareholders, it also illuminates a distinction sometimes lost in discussions of the company’s Russian investments.

A company can recognise a financial loss and withdraw from a project while the wider legal consequences of that investment continue for years.

1. THE SHELL DOCUMENT THAT STARTS THE STORY

The appropriate starting point is 24 April 2017.

On that date, Shell announced that it had signed financing agreements with Nord Stream 2 AG, alongside four other European energy companies:

ENGIE, OMV, Uniper and Wintershall.

The project involved construction of a 1,220-kilometre natural gas pipeline connecting Russia to Germany beneath the Baltic Sea.

Its estimated cost was €9.5 billion.

Each of the five European companies agreed to provide financing and guarantees covering up to 10% of the project’s estimated cost.

Shell’s individual commitment could therefore reach approximately €950 million.

The financing arrangement included a €285 million long-term funding facility and up to €665 million in additional financing and guarantees, subject to the project’s requirements.

Crucially, Shell’s announcement confirmed that Gazprom remained Nord Stream 2 AG’s sole shareholder.

Shell was a financier, not a shareholder in the pipeline company.

This distinction matters when examining subsequent litigation.

The claimant in the proceedings discussed below is Nord Stream 2 AG.

It is not Shell.

Shell’s financial involvement nevertheless forms part of the investment’s documented history.

The company’s announcement provides an authenticated starting point, establishing the contractual and financial relationship before the subsequent deterioration in relations between Russia and the European Union.

Primary evidence: Shell’s 24 April 2017 announcement, preserved in its official 2017 Corporate Press Releases, page 40 of the PDF. Shell

2. THE FIRST LEGAL BATTLE: EUROPE CHANGES THE RULES

Two years after the financing agreements, a new dispute emerged.

In April 2019, the European Union adopted Directive (EU) 2019/692.

This legislation extended important European gas-market rules to pipelines connecting EU territory with countries outside the Union.

The rules concerned matters including the separation of gas production and supply from transmission activities and the provision of third-party access to pipeline infrastructure.

These requirements were intended to support competition and the functioning of the European gas market.

There was an important qualification.

Pipelines completed before 23 May 2019 could potentially benefit from a derogation from some of the requirements.

Nord Stream 2 had not been completed by that date.

The project’s operating company argued that the legislative changes unfairly disadvantaged its investment.

The issue was commercially significant.

Nord Stream 2 had been conceived as a major route for transporting Russian gas directly to Germany.

Changes to the rules governing its operation could affect the investment’s economics and the arrangements under which gas would be transported.

The dispute eventually reached the European Union courts.

But Nord Stream 2 AG also opened another legal front.

It invoked an international investment treaty.

That treaty was the Energy Charter Treaty.

3. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN INVESTMENT DISPUTE AGAINST THE EU

On 26 September 2019, Nord Stream 2 AG commenced arbitration proceedings against the European Union.

The proceedings were brought under the Energy Charter Treaty and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration, based in The Hague, was appointed to administer the case.

Its reference is:

PCA Case No. 2020-07 — Nord Stream 2 AG v. The European Union.

The Energy Charter Treaty was designed to establish a legal framework for cooperation and investment in the energy sector.

Among its provisions are protections potentially available to qualifying foreign investors.

Such protections can include safeguards against certain forms of discriminatory treatment, unfair treatment and unlawful expropriation.

Whether any particular investor is entitled to those protections depends upon the treaty’s terms, jurisdictional requirements, applicable law and the facts of the dispute.

The existence of the treaty does not automatically entitle an investor to compensation whenever legislation reduces the value of an investment.

Nor does commencement of arbitration establish that the challenged legislation is unlawful.

Those questions are for the tribunal to determine.

Nevertheless, the procedure gave Nord Stream 2 AG an opportunity to contest the legal consequences of European regulatory changes through an international arbitration mechanism.

The tribunal consists of three arbitrators:

Professor Ricardo Ramírez Hernández, presiding; Professor Philippe Sands KC; and Justice David Unterhalter SC.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration identifies the case as pending.

Authenticated source: Permanent Court of Arbitration — Nord Stream 2 AG v. European Union, Case No. 2020-07. PCA-CPA

There is an important qualification concerning the description of this arbitration as secretive.

International investment arbitrations can involve confidential submissions, procedural arrangements and commercially sensitive information.

However, this particular proceeding has a substantial public documentary record.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration makes available numerous pleadings and procedural orders.

It would therefore be misleading to characterise the entire case as secret.

The publicly available material is sufficiently extensive to reconstruct significant parts of the legal dispute.

And it contains some revealing documents.

4. NOVEMBER 2024: NORD STREAM 2 LOSES AN IMPORTANT COURT CASE

While the arbitration continued, a separate challenge to the 2019 gas-market legislation proceeded through the EU courts.

The procedural history was complicated.

In May 2020, the General Court initially dismissed Nord Stream 2 AG’s action as inadmissible.

Nord Stream 2 appealed.

On 12 July 2022, the Court of Justice partly upheld that appeal, allowing the legal challenge to proceed.

The case was returned to the General Court for consideration of its substance.

On 27 November 2024, the General Court delivered its judgment.

Nord Stream 2 lost.

The court dismissed the company’s challenge to the legislation.

Its reasoning was particularly significant.

The court concluded that Nord Stream 2 AG had continued investing during a period when it had no assurance that European gas-market rules would remain inapplicable to the pipeline.

The company could foresee the possibility of regulatory changes.

The court also found that the project’s exclusion from the derogation available to pipelines completed before May 2019 did not, in itself, prevent operation under economically viable conditions.

It rejected the relevant challenges based on legal certainty, legitimate expectations, equal treatment and proportionality.

The court’s judgment therefore supported the legality of the 2019 legislative changes.

This was a substantive judicial defeat for Nord Stream 2 AG.

It was not, however, a final determination of every legal question raised by the separate Energy Charter Treaty arbitration.

The General Court proceedings and the investment arbitration have different legal foundations.

The 2024 judgment was also appealed, with the subsequent appeal recorded as Case C-118/25 P.

Official judicial source: Court of Justice of the European Union — Press Release 195/24, 27 November 2024. curia

5. JULY 2025: SANCTIONS CREATE ANOTHER LEGAL OBSTACLE

The next development concerned European sanctions against Russia.

On 18 July 2025, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 as part of its eighteenth package of restrictive measures.

The regulation introduced Article 5af into the existing sanctions framework.

This provision restricted transactions connected with Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2, including transactions concerning completion, operation, maintenance, use and associated financing.

The objective was to prevent the infrastructure from being used in ways inconsistent with European sanctions policy.

But the legislation also contained exceptions and mechanisms through which national authorities could authorise specified transactions.

These included certain transactions connected with compensation claims, payments under existing obligations, maintenance for safety reasons and legal proceedings.

Article 5af(3)(d) expressly provided for authorisations relating to settlements and judicial or arbitration proceedings.

This detail is essential.

The regulation did not expressly declare that Nord Stream 2 AG was prohibited from pursuing arbitration.

Instead, it established a legal framework whose application to particular transactions became disputed.

The European Commission considered that the regulation did not prevent the arbitration from continuing.

Nord Stream 2 AG eventually reached a different conclusion.

And the resulting disagreement interrupted the proceedings.

Legislative source: Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, Article 5af.

6. OCTOBER 2025: THE PIPELINE COMPANY ASKS FOR ITS OWN CASE TO BE SUSPENDED

The immediate chronology is preserved in Procedural Order No. 18.

On 1 October 2025, Nord Stream 2 AG raised concerns about Article 5af with the arbitral tribunal.

Its initial submission maintained that the new regulation should not interfere with the proceedings.

On 6 October, the European Union confirmed that the Commission considered the arbitration unaffected.

But Nord Stream 2 AG reconsidered its position.

On 13 October, it applied to the EU General Court to annul the relevant sanctions provision.

The following day, it informed the arbitral tribunal of that action.

The company now argued that the legislation’s broad language created unacceptable uncertainty.

Its concern was not limited to the corporate claimant.

It suggested that people and organisations participating in the proceedings could face legal risks.

These potentially included:

• The claimant and its employees.
• Lawyers, witnesses and expert advisers.
• The arbitrators themselves.
• The Permanent Court of Arbitration and others involved in administering the proceedings.

The argument was that transactions associated with conducting the arbitration might fall within the regulation’s prohibitions.

The European Union disagreed.

Its representatives maintained that the regulation did not prevent the proceedings from continuing.

They also pointed out that there was no evidence of European authorities using the provision to obstruct the arbitration.

The Commission nevertheless acknowledged an important institutional limitation.

It could express its interpretation of EU law.

It could not provide an authoritative interpretation binding the EU courts.

Nord Stream 2 AG argued that this distinction left the participants exposed to unacceptable uncertainty.

The tribunal was therefore presented with competing positions.

One side said the arbitration could continue.

The other maintained that continuing without clarification could create legal risks.

The tribunal had to decide what to do.

7. THE AUTHENTICATED ORDER OF 22 OCTOBER 2025

Procedural Order No. 18 is the central document in this instalment.

It was issued on 22 October 2025.

The order records the parties’ submissions, reproduces the relevant sanctions provisions and explains the tribunal’s reasoning.

The tribunal acknowledged that Nord Stream 2 AG had changed its interpretation of Article 5af during the preceding weeks.

It also recognised the Commission’s position that the provision did not prevent the arbitration from proceeding.

But the tribunal considered that the Commission had not provided a sufficiently binding assurance.

This mattered because the potential consequences of an incorrect interpretation could be significant for those involved.

In paragraph 34, the tribunal concluded that there was a real risk of Article 5af being applicable to the arbitration and its participants.

The tribunal did not determine that the participants had violated sanctions.

It did not find that the European Union had unlawfully prevented access to justice.

It concluded that the uncertainty was sufficiently serious to justify suspension.

In paragraph 36, it ordered the proceedings suspended until the relevant risk could be adequately addressed.

The planned hearing on jurisdiction and merits, scheduled for 10–16 December 2025, was cancelled.

The parties were instructed to seek clarification urgently.

The tribunal also left open the possibility that the difficulty might be resolved without waiting for a final judgment from the EU General Court.

Primary document: Nord Stream 2 AG v. European Union — Procedural Order No. 18, 22 October 2025. italaw

This was already an unusual situation.

An international investment tribunal was examining a claim brought against the European Union.

A later EU sanctions regulation then created a dispute about whether the arbitration itself could lawfully proceed.

And the tribunal concluded that it could not safely resolve the uncertainty merely by accepting the Commission’s explanation.

But the story did not end there.

8. JANUARY 2026: A SECOND ORDER REVEALS THE TRIBUNAL’S FRUSTRATION

On 24 January 2026, the tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 19.

This document takes the dispute a stage further.

It records correspondence exchanged after the October suspension.

The tribunal had attempted to establish whether authorisations under Article 5af could resolve the problem.

It wanted practical answers.

Who could apply for an authorisation?

Which transactions might require one?

Could the Permanent Court of Arbitration apply on behalf of the arbitrators?

Could the European Commission itself initiate the process?

Would several national authorities need to be involved?

And could the authorisations provide sufficient protection for everyone participating in the proceedings?

The European Union continued to maintain that authorisations were unnecessary because the arbitration was not prohibited.

It nevertheless explained the authorisation arrangements that might hypothetically apply.

Among other things, it stated that the Commission could not itself initiate the relevant national authorisation procedure in the manner suggested.

It also acknowledged that, if authorisations were necessary, more than one Member State’s authorities might have to be involved.

Nord Stream 2 AG regarded the answers as inadequate.

The tribunal’s subsequent observations are striking.

In paragraph 22, it indicated that the European Union was particularly well placed to provide guidance concerning legislation adopted by its institutions.

In paragraph 23, the tribunal observed that the Commission’s position still did not provide binding certainty.

Then, in paragraph 26, the tribunal criticised the detail of the responses.

It described the European Union’s answers as “limited and wanting.”

That is the tribunal’s own assessment.

It was not merely Nord Stream 2 AG’s characterisation of its opponent.

The arbitrators went on to identify practical questions that remained unanswered.

The tribunal reminded both parties of their duty to cooperate in progressing the arbitration.

It also drew attention to the possibility that their conduct could become relevant when costs were allocated.

Finally, the tribunal directed the European Union to provide a more detailed explanation of whether and how the Permanent Court of Arbitration could obtain sufficient authorisations to address the perceived risks.

Primary document: Procedural Order No. 19, dated 24 January 2026 — Full Eight-Page Decision. italaw

What the January order establishes

It establishes that the tribunal remained dissatisfied with the clarity of the European Union’s explanations.

It establishes that the tribunal wanted a practical mechanism through which the proceedings could resume.

It establishes that the tribunal considered further cooperation necessary.

It does not establish that the EU deliberately obstructed the proceedings.

Nor does it determine that Article 5af actually prohibited the arbitration.

The order also does not resolve the underlying investment dispute.

There is no finding in the document that Nord Stream 2 AG is entitled to compensation.

The legal proceedings remained unresolved.

As of this instalment, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s public case register continues to identify the arbitration as pending, with Procedural Order No. 19 the latest listed procedural order. PCA-CPA

9. THE DISPUTE EXPANDS INTO THREE SEPARATE EU COURT CHALLENGES

Alongside the arbitration, Nord Stream 2 AG has continued challenging European legislation before the EU courts.

The proceedings need to be distinguished carefully.

They concern related infrastructure but different legislative measures and legal questions.

The 2019 Gas Directive

The challenge to Directive (EU) 2019/692 resulted in the General Court’s judgment of 27 November 2024.

The company lost that case at the General Court.

The subsequent appeal was registered as C-118/25 P.

The 2025 Sanctions Regulation

On 13 October 2025, Nord Stream 2 AG brought proceedings challenging Article 5af of Regulation 2025/1494.

The case was registered as T-722/25.

The claimant sought annulment of the provision, or alternatively more limited relief concerning particular restrictions.

Its arguments included alleged interference with property rights and the freedom to conduct business.

Those are the claimant’s legal arguments, not findings that the legislation is invalid.

Official record: Case T-722/25 — Nord Stream 2 AG v. Council of the European Union.

The 2026 Russian Gas Import Regulation

A further challenge followed the European Union’s legislation to phase out Russian natural gas imports.

Regulation (EU) 2026/261 established new restrictions intended to end dependence on Russian gas.

On 27 April 2026, Nord Stream 2 AG brought another action.

This became Case T-264/26.

The company sought annulment of the regulation or, alternatively, particular provisions.

Its arguments included alleged breaches of proportionality, property rights and equal treatment, together with challenges to the legal basis of the measure.

The underlying allegation was that the new restrictions undermined the potential use and economic value of the pipeline.

Reuters reported the action on 23 June 2026.

The proceedings illustrate that Nord Stream 2 AG was not relying solely upon the original 2019 investment arbitration.

It was continuing to challenge subsequent European legislation.

Official judicial record: Case T-264/26 — Action Brought on 27 April 2026.

Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, 23 June 2026 — Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Owner Sues EU Over Russian Gas Ban.

The existence of multiple proceedings should not be confused with multiple successful claims.

The available records establish litigation.

They do not establish successful compensation awards.

10. THE BATTLE OVER BILLIONS — WHAT CAN ACTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED?

The financial scale of Nord Stream 2 is beyond dispute.

Shell’s authenticated 2017 announcement placed the project’s estimated cost at €9.5 billion.

Gazprom controlled the company responsible for constructing and operating the pipeline.

European energy companies supplied substantial financing.

The project was completed physically but never entered commercial service.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany suspended the certification process, while sanctions and other restrictions transformed the project’s prospects.

Shell’s financial disclosures provide a particularly clear record of the consequences for one investor.

In its 2022 accounts, Shell reported that it had fully written down its Nord Stream 2 loan.

The amount was $1.126 billion.

The company also recognised substantial separate charges associated with its withdrawal from Russian operations.

These were documented accounting consequences.

They were not hypothetical future losses.

Authenticated financial source: Shell Form 20-F 2022 — Russia Withdrawal and Nord Stream 2 Disclosures. Shell

But the scale of the original investment should not be confused with the value of any compensation claim.

The €9.5 billion project estimate is not an arbitration award.

Shell’s $1.126 billion write-down is not a damages award against the European Union.

And the existence of an Energy Charter Treaty claim does not establish that any compensation is payable.

The publicly examined procedural orders do not determine a damages amount.

We should therefore distinguish the financial scale of the underlying investment from the unresolved question of legal compensation.

The billions invested are documented. The existence of an enforceable compensation entitlement has not been established.

That distinction is essential to an accurate historical account.

11. WHY DOES THIS MATTER TO SHELL SHAREHOLDERS?

Shell is not identified as a party to the Nord Stream 2 arbitration.

The claimant is Nord Stream 2 AG.

Nothing in the documents examined establishes that Shell is directing these proceedings or participating in the reported discussions about possible pipeline revival.

Nor do the records establish that Shell would receive any financial benefit from a successful arbitration claim.

However, the wider history remains relevant to Shell shareholders.

Shell’s financing commitment was a documented commercial decision undertaken while European relations with Russia were already politically contentious.

The company committed financing to infrastructure controlled by Gazprom.

It subsequently withdrew from the project and recognised a substantial financial loss.

The pipeline operator meanwhile continued pursuing legal remedies concerning European regulatory decisions.

That sequence raises legitimate questions about geopolitical risk, investment protection and the limitations of contractual safeguards.

A company can undertake a commercially rational transaction under the assumptions prevailing at the time.

Those assumptions can subsequently change.

Political decisions, legislation and international conflict can destroy the anticipated commercial benefits.

Legal disputes may then continue long after the original participants have written down their investments.

For shareholders examining historical management decisions, the lesson is not simply that Nord Stream 2 failed.

It is that investment exposure can endure through several stages: financing, regulation, sanctions, impairment, restructuring and litigation.

The documentary record makes those stages visible.

12. DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS Established Facts

Shell entered a financing agreement with Nord Stream 2 AG on 24 April 2017 alongside four other European energy companies.

Gazprom remained the pipeline company’s sole shareholder.

Nord Stream 2 AG commenced Energy Charter Treaty arbitration against the European Union on 26 September 2019.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration administers the proceedings as Case No. 2020-07.

On 27 November 2024, the EU General Court dismissed Nord Stream 2 AG’s challenge to the 2019 gas directive.

On 18 July 2025, the European Union adopted new restrictions concerning transactions connected with Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2.

On 22 October 2025, the arbitral tribunal suspended proceedings because of unresolved concerns about the possible application of those restrictions.

On 24 January 2026, the tribunal issued a further order seeking more detailed explanations from the European Union.

Nord Stream 2 AG has also pursued separate EU court challenges concerning the 2025 sanctions regulation and the 2026 Russian gas-import legislation.

Shell’s 2022 financial disclosures confirm a $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan.

These propositions are supported by authenticated corporate, judicial and regulatory records.

Positions Advanced by the Parties

Nord Stream 2 AG argued that Article 5af created unacceptable legal uncertainty for participants in its arbitration.

It maintained that the possibility of sanctions-related consequences made suspension necessary.

The European Union maintained that the legislation did not prevent the arbitration from continuing.

It disputed the claimant’s interpretation and pointed to the absence of evidence that authorities had applied the provision to obstruct the proceedings.

The tribunal accepted that unresolved risk warranted suspension but did not determine that participating in the arbitration violated European sanctions.

The wider investment dispute remains contested.

Matters Not Established

The available documents do not establish that the European Union deliberately adopted Article 5af to prevent Nord Stream 2 AG from pursuing its arbitration.

They do not establish that Shell participated in developing or conducting the litigation.

They do not establish that the EU has been found liable to pay compensation.

They do not establish that Nord Stream 2 AG has obtained a damages award.

They do not establish that success in any court action would result in reopening the pipeline.

They do not establish that an eventual recovery by Nord Stream 2 AG would restore Shell’s previously written-down financing.

These distinctions should be preserved in any subsequent historical account.

EDITORIAL COMMENTARY: WHEN A PIPELINE BECOMES A LEGAL PROBLEM

There is a striking irony at the centre of this file.

Nord Stream 2 was conceived as physical infrastructure.

Its purpose was to move natural gas from Russia to Europe.

Its economics depended upon construction, financing, certification, access to European markets and sustained commercial demand.

The investment was substantial.

Its sponsors expected the infrastructure to operate for decades.

Instead, the pipeline became entangled in one of the most consequential geopolitical confrontations of the modern European energy industry.

The financial consequences followed.

Shell wrote down its loan.

Other participants were left facing the consequences of a stranded investment.

The company owning the pipeline pursued legal remedies.

Then came an unexpected complication.

The legislation intended to prevent commercial activity involving Nord Stream became the subject of disagreement about whether the company’s own international arbitration could safely proceed.

The tribunal asked the European Union for clarification.

The Commission said the proceedings were not prohibited.

But it could not provide the binding assurance requested.

The tribunal suspended the case.

Three months later, it was still seeking practical answers.

This is not evidence that the European Union acted unlawfully.

Nor does it vindicate Nord Stream 2 AG’s original investment claims.

It demonstrates something more specific.

The legal consequences of a major energy investment can become extraordinarily complicated when commercial expectations collide with changing geopolitical circumstances and regulatory policy.

For Shell shareholders, the most useful question may not be whether Nord Stream 2 should ever have been financed.

That is a legitimate subject for historical debate.

The more important documentary question is how the risks were assessed, how they changed and what the consequences reveal about the management of large international investments.

Those questions require evidence.

And the Shell documents, court records and arbitration orders provide a substantial foundation for answering them.

SOURCE RECORD AND DOCUMENTARY PROVENANCE

Shell — 24 April 2017. The company’s original financing announcement establishes the participating companies, estimated project cost, financing limits and Gazprom’s sole ownership of Nord Stream 2 AG. Shell’s authenticated 2017 announcement archive.

Shell — 2022 financial disclosures. Shell’s Form 20-F documents its withdrawal from Russian activities and confirms the full $1.126 billion write-down of the Nord Stream 2 loan. Shell Form 20-F 2022.

Permanent Court of Arbitration — Case No. 2020-07. The official case register establishes the parties, commencement date, treaty basis, tribunal composition, procedural history and pending status. Official PCA Case Register.

Court of Justice of the European Union — 27 November 2024. The official court record confirms dismissal of Nord Stream 2 AG’s challenge to the 2019 gas-market legislation and explains the General Court’s findings on legal certainty, legitimate expectations and proportionality. Official Court Press Release 195/24.

Council of the European Union — 18 July 2025. Regulation 2025/1494 introduced Article 5af, including the relevant restrictions and authorisation provisions concerning Nord Stream transactions. Regulation 2025/1494.

Permanent Court of Arbitration — 22 October 2025. Procedural Order No. 18 records the parties’ conflicting interpretations of Article 5af, the tribunal’s assessment of risk and its decision to suspend proceedings. Full Text of Procedural Order No. 18.

Permanent Court of Arbitration — 24 January 2026. Procedural Order No. 19 records the subsequent exchanges and the tribunal’s dissatisfaction with the clarity of the European Union’s explanations. Full Text of Procedural Order No. 19.

General Court of the European Union — 2025 and 2026. The official notices concerning Cases T-722/25 and T-264/26 establish the additional challenges to the sanctions regulation and Russian gas-import legislation. Case T-722/25 and Case T-264/26.

The primary documents were produced by Shell, the European Union institutions and the arbitral tribunal. The attribution of arguments to parties is not an endorsement of their accuracy. The documentary record has been distinguished throughout from subsequent interpretation.

Archive disclaimer: This instalment examines proceedings involving Nord Stream 2 AG and the European Union. Shell’s historical financing relationship does not make Shell a party to those proceedings. No allegation is made that Shell directed the litigation, that EU officials deliberately obstructed it, or that any tribunal has established wrongdoing or compensation liability in the proceedings discussed. Pending claims remain unresolved unless and until determined by the competent court or tribunal. Editorial analysis is identified separately from authenticated documentary findings.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-093 — The Sakhalin Papers LXXXIII: The Energy Charter Treaty Trap — Nord Stream 2, Investor Rights and the Question of Compensation

The next instalment will move beyond the procedural dispute over sanctions to examine the underlying investment arbitration itself.

The central documents will be Nord Stream 2 AG’s original arbitration notice, its July 2020 memorial and the European Union’s response concerning jurisdiction.

What protections did Nord Stream 2 AG claim under the Energy Charter Treaty?

Why did the European Union contest the tribunal’s jurisdiction?

How might the distinction between ordinary regulatory changes and internationally unlawful treatment affect the claim?

And can an investment made in anticipation of long-term access to European energy markets generate compensation rights when the political, legal and commercial circumstances change so dramatically?

The documentary trail will also examine the consequences of the EU courts’ subsequent decisions for the original treaty arguments.

The question is no longer simply whether Nord Stream 2 might reopen.

It is whether the legal framework protecting international energy investments can produce an enforceable remedy for infrastructure that has become commercially stranded.

The pipeline has never delivered gas to Germany.

But the legal contest over the investment that created it is far from over.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 19 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 19, 2026 at 8:07 pm.
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ALCOVA, WYO. (October 19, 2026) — The National Audubon Society is proud to announce that Pathfinder Ensign Ranches has achieved Audubon’s Bird-Friendly Land Certification. Earned through the...

Restore the Delta and the Mormon Slough Restoration Association release cost-benefit analysis and detailed restoration plans

For Immediate Release:

October 19, 2026

Contact:
Ashley Castaneda, ashley@restorethedelta.org

STOCKTON, CA — Today, Restore the Delta and the Mormon Slough Restoration Association reached a new milestone through the release of the Mormon Slough Restoration Project Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis alongside an Art Installation Guide and Project StoryMap, unveiling clear community benefits and resources for Stockton residents to envision the future of Mormon Slough.

The groups have been working with the community since 2023 to envision the slough as a healthier, safer, and more vibrant greenway after decades of disinvestment and neglect. Pivotal to meeting this important milestone was grant funding from North Valley THRIVE’s Catalyst Fund, pushing forward the group’s hopes of reconnecting Stockton’s communities with their waterways while improving flood protection, environmental health, and creating economic opportunity. 

“The economic case for restoring Mormon Slough is clear. The project will result in nearly $430 million in net benefits to communities currently underserved by park space, create hundreds of jobs, and support future community-driven economic development,” said Michelle Mendoza, Flood and Land Restoration Program Manager at Restore the Delta. “Understanding what job opportunities become available for locals by restoring the slough is exciting.”

The cost-benefit analysis reveals that plans around the 6.3 mile waterway would create workforce development opportunities, increase property values, improve critical habitats, and activate recreational activities. The report also points to potential ecological benefits such as improved air quality, cooling, and flood control upgrades. 

“Restoration of Mormon Slough is a sound investment that will create good jobs in Stockton,” said Holly Michael, the lead economist on the report. “The value of public benefits such as recreation and flood control are 4 to 5 times higher than the estimated costs. Adding additional greenspace and parks to this underserved area will help Stockton reach the state goal of providing 3 acres of parkland for every 1,000 residents.”

Following a year of direct community outreach, the restoration team also released an Art Installation Guide to help Stockton residents envision a transformed Mormon Slough. The guide, created by HATCH Workshop, details design opportunities, creative approaches to restoration, and structural challenges that will need to be addressed as the project continues. It takes a particularly close look at two pilot sites, the Emergency Food Bank and Solari Ranch.

“This report is meant to serve as an introduction to the restoration area, as well as provide food for thought, technical recommendations, historical context, and leads for deeper independent research,” said Elazar Abraham, Co-Founder & Executive Director of HATCH Workshop. “We believe that project complexities should be shared transparently, and effective community engagement requires giving the community time and resources to learn at their own pace.”

The restoration team also released a Project StoryMap produced by the San Francisco Estuary Institute (SFEI) showcasing the slough’s history, ecology, and future potential. Through maps, photographs, and project information, the StoryMap illustrates how restoring Mormon Slough could contribute to a more resilient and connected Stockton. 

“Researching the history of the Mormon Slough revealed how important this forgotten waterway has been for supporting the people and wildlife in the area now known as Stockton. Highlighting some of this rich history through the StoryMap gives community members the knowledge of how Mormon Slough has shaped the environment and how it continues to play a role in the present-day experience of Stockton,” said Kat Palermo, GIS Specialist at the San Francisco Estuary Institute (SFEI). “From being a vital lifeline for indigenous villages, to a major industrial corridor in the 1890s, to the neglected state it is experiencing today, the Mormon Slough continues to be a connecting thread across space and time in this region.”

The project is grounded in collaboration with the Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians to ensure the restoration reflects Indigenous knowledge and priorities.

“Restoring our environment is not just a duty for the Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians; it is a testament to our shared responsibility for peace and healing. Together, we can create a future where every Tribal and non-Tribal community thrives, and the voices of marginalized individuals are heard,” said Jesse Galvan, Tribal Historic Preservation Office Coordinator.

The team behind this project has also developed conceptual designs for the two pilot sites along the lower six-mile length of the Mormon Slough, a site behind the Emergency Food Bank and a second site at Solari Ranch. These two sites are intended to serve as early project demonstrations supporting long-term restoration efforts along the slough.

The conceptual designs were informed by a technical study conducted by River Partners in 2025, along with site context, design requirements, opportunities and constraints, and high-level visioning. Community engagement also played a pivotal role in shaping the designs, with more than 80 residents reviewing the successive drafts of the concept designs and sharing valuable feedback to help inform the project’s Art Installation guide and overall direction. Copies of the conceptual designs are available upon request, and individuals interested in learning more can contact Restore the Delta.

Collectively, the cost-benefit analysis, Art Installation Guide and StoryMap offer Stockton residents a package of resources examining Mormon Slough’s past and exploring the possibilities for its future through community-informed restoration plans. 

The Mormon Slough Restoration Project Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis and Conceptual Designs are available upon request.

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Governor Abbott told TCEQ on September 21 to halt data center permits. TCEQ’s own records show it kept mailing public notices, advancing and expediting gas plant applications, issuing air certifications and approving construction stormwater coverage.

The post Texas Continued Data Center Permitting after the Governor’s Pause appeared first on FracTracker Alliance.

The work of Dunn United Ministerial Association (DUMA) can be seen throughout the community, because they are the community. DUMA is comprised of 28 affiliated local churches of different denominations, and over the years, they have proved that combining their resources and acts of service allows them to support Dunn in bigger, more holistic ways. 

The post DUMA, Serving United with Dignity appeared first on RAFI.

 

Concerned about Project Ranger?  Join State Emergency Response Commission Virtual Meeting on Thursday, October 22nd

Did you know that this week Tessa Snyder, the Hazardous Materials Coordinator, confirmed in writing that she recently met privately with Castelion Corporation about their Project Ranger, a 1,000-acre hypersonic missile motor manufacturing and static firing testing complex – the largest in the United States – on the West Mesa near Rio Rancho, New Mexico? https://www.castelion.com/project-ranger/

Snyder informed Castelion of the upcoming Thursday, October 22nd State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) meeting of the New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. https://www.dhsem.nm.gov/preparedness/hazardous-materials-program/serc/ and https://www.dhsem.nm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/August-2026-SERC-Meeting-Minutes.pdf

She also reported that Castelion has attended the Sandoval County Local Emergency Planning Committee meetings, where members of the public can ask questions. But no notifications have been provided to the community members living near the weapons complex. https://www.sandovalcountynm.gov/departments/emergency-management/

These facts raise serious questions about agency transparency, hazardous materials oversight, and the public’s right to know. https://commongroundrising.org/castelions-project-ranger-solid-rocket-motor-plant/

 

Get all the details at nuclearactive.org

Yerevan, Armenia, 19 October 2026 – A six-member delegation representing the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) has arrived in Yerevan, Armenia, to participate in the 17th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP17), taking place from 19 to 30 October 2026. The delegation joins global negotiations with a clear message: Africa’s biodiversity cannot be protected without recognising the rights, knowledge and contributions of the farmers, Indigenous Peoples and local communities who have conserved it for generations.

Held under the theme “Taking Action for Nature,” COP17 marks a critical moment for countries to assess progress in implementing the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and translate global commitments into meaningful action. For AFSA, this means ensuring that biodiversity policies recognise farmer-managed seed systems, safeguard Africa’s genetic resources, protect traditional knowledge and promote agroecology as a practical pathway to healthy ecosystems, resilient food systems and food sovereignty.

Across Africa, millions of smallholder farmers continue to conserve, select, exchange and improve seeds that sustain agricultural biodiversity, food cultures and livelihoods. Yet these vital contributions are often overlooked in global biodiversity policies and benefit-sharing arrangements. Building on its longstanding Seed is Life campaign and advocacy for farmer-managed seed systems, AFSA will engage governments, civil society organisations and international partners to demand stronger recognition of farmers’ rights to save, use, exchange and govern their seeds.

A central focus of AFSA’s engagement will be the growing debate over Digital Sequence Information (DSI) on genetic resources and the fair sharing of benefits arising from its use. As scientific and commercial applications of genetic information expand, AFSA is calling for safeguards that prevent the appropriation of Africa’s biological wealth and ensure that communities who conserve biodiversity receive direct, equitable and verifiable benefits. In particular, AFSA will advocate for the Cali Fund to become a genuine instrument of justice, with transparent governance, meaningful community participation and resources that directly support farmer-managed seed systems, biodiversity conservation and local livelihoods.

AFSA maintains that biodiversity justice must begin with the people who keep biodiversity alive. The success of global biodiversity agreements must therefore be measured by their ability to protect community rights, strengthen local seed systems and ensure that the benefits of conservation and scientific innovation reach those whose knowledge and practices sustain the world’s biological diversity.

AFSA Side Event on Digital Sequence Information

As part of its engagement, AFSA will host a side event titled “Digital Sequence Information (DSI): Understanding the Debate and Defining an African Civil Society Position” on 24 October 2026, from 14:00 to 15:00 (Armenia time), at the Main Stage, Green Zone, Yerevan. The discussion will bring together African civil society organisations, biodiversity advocates and partners to examine the implications of DSI for Africa’s genetic resources, community rights and food sovereignty.

The event will draw on the expertise of biodiversity and seed sovereignty advocates, including Daud Ngosengwa Manongi of the Tanzania Alliance for Biodiversity (TABIO), Lucien Omer Wendyahoda Silga of FIAN Burkina Faso, and Nithin Ramakrishnan, Senior Researcher at Third World Network. The event will be moderated by Mariann Bassey, Deputy Executive Director Environmental Rights Action/ Friends of the Earth Nigeria (ERA/FoEN) and former Chair of AFSA.

Participants will explore common principles for equitable benefit-sharing and develop priorities for a stronger, coordinated African civil society voice in global biodiversity governance.

AFSA invites its members, partners, African government delegations, civil society movements, researchers and biodiversity advocates attending COP17 to join the side event and contribute to this important conversation. Throughout the conference, AFSA will continue working with allies to ensure that Africa’s farmers, communities, women and young people are heard in decisions shaping the future of biodiversity.

Africa’s biodiversity is its living heritage. Protecting it means protecting the people, knowledge and seed systems that sustain it.

Media Contacts

Ndèye Awa GUEYE, CROPS4HD Project Officer, AFSA
awa.gueye@afsafrica.org

Indonesia is a young country — in more ways than one.

Its current democratic government dates back under three decades to 1998, after the fall of Soeharto, the military dictator who led the country for 32 years.

It’s also demographically young, with a median age of just 31. That means fewer and fewer people in Indonesia remember the time they were under Soeharto’s ‘New Order’ rule.

But despite the fading memory of Soeharto’s reign, one of the decisions he made in the later years — selecting a National Precious Bird — is outlasting his regime.

Ten days into January 1993, President Soeharto signed his fourth Presidential Decree of that year. The first three dealt with setting the domestic retail sale prices of petroleum and tariffs for electricity and public transportation. The fourth declared an until-then largely unknown bird, the Javan hawk-eagle (Nisaetus bartelsi), as Indonesia’s national bird. The United States had its bald eagle, China had its giant panda, and now Indonesia had its hawk-eagle.

Photo: Vincent Nijman

Three reasons favored giving the Javan hawk-eagle this title.

First, their appearance and prominent crest mirrors the mythical bird Garuda, which is central to Indonesia’s national coat of arms, the Garuda Pancasila.

Second, the loss of rainforest on Java — Indonesia’s most densely populated and least forested island — meant very few hawk-eagles remained, and increased attention could be beneficial to their conservation.

Third, a national bird had to be found exclusively within Indonesia, and Soeharto’s regime heavily favored Java, leading to a “Javanization” of Indonesian politics, culture, and economic development. The Javan hawk-eagle fit like a glove.

Photo: Vincent Nijman

Ornithologist Bas van Balen, one of the first people to study the species, recalls that the decree established three national “mascots” — a popular animal, a charming one, and a rare one. The animals were selected “during a workshop in 1993, attended by representatives of various governmental bodies, such as the Forest and Environmental departments, the parliament, the scientific authority, local universities, media mass, NGOs and various experts. Worries that the eagle would undergo the same fate as for instance the black-naped oriole — provincial faunal symbol of Central Java, which was much sought after for the bird trade in the years after its nomination — were discounted, as its protection was believed by the committee to be the authorities’ responsibility.”

In 1993 I was a young biologist, eager to study birds in the rainforest. The announcement of the Javan hawk-eagle as Indonesia’s national bird, and the observation by French naturalists of a juvenile on a mountain in central Java, spurred me on to make the move to Indonesia.

At the time there were no photographs of the bird — either in the wild or in captivity — and I had to rely on some 30 preserved skins in Dutch museums to get a good idea what the bird looked like. I also had the fortune to become acquainted with the then 87-year-old ornithologist Hans Bartels, the middle of the Bartels family (Max Sr, Max Jr, Hans, and Ernst) after which Javan hawk-eagles received their taxonomic name.

Javan hawk-eagles were already legally protected — all birds of prey in Indonesia were put on the county’s protected species list in 1970, signed by Soeharto’s long-trusted Minister of Agriculture, Toyib Hadiwinata — and none lived in zoos or private collections. After the national bird declaration, any individuals or institutions that wanted to keep a Javan hawk-eagle had to receive presidential permission. Only one person was granted this: Ibu Tien, Soeharto’s wife. Her Javan hawk-eagle, a juvenile bird almost certainly illegally taken from its nest, was displayed at a Jakarta zoo run and managed by one of many Soeharto family foundations.

In those first years during many of my visits, more zoo directors expressed the desire to display Javan hawk-eagles and even breed them. Of course zoos were not allowed to obtain them, but “gifts by anonymous donors” created a loophole. Two years after the declaration, three zoos on Java displayed or had displayed a total of 14 Javan hawk-eagles, six of whom died within one year.

Photo: Vincent Nijman

Zoos were not the only ones eager to own a national bird. In an Indonesian context, owning and displaying legally protected species was, and perhaps still is, seen as a sign of status, of “being untouchable” or above the law. Ibu Tien’s display of a Javan hawk-eagle could be interpreted in this context, as was the decision by a national celebrity to have himself photographed in traditional dress next to his pet Javan hawk-eagle for the women’s magazine Femina.

It was, and still is, challenging to keep a rainforest eagle in captivity, as attested by the high mortality rates in Indonesian zoos. Most of the Javan hawk-eagles I saw in zoos in the 1990s and 2000s were first-year birds — easily recognizable as such because young birds have blueish eyes that turn yellow as they get older.  This was not evidence of captive breeding but attested to them being poached from their nests.

Looking back, the decision to declare such a rare bird as a national symbol, without first putting proper protection and management in place, may not have been wise. When I started my research on Java, every large eagle regardless of species was described as a “Javan eagle,” but this changed rapidly and the Javan hawk-eagle quickly became recognized as something special. Enforcement of protected species legislation in Indonesia was and continues to be weak, and under Soeharto’s rule corruption and nepotism allowed for exceptions to be made.

Today numerous people and zoos keep Javan hawk-eagles, and young birds are frequently offered for sale. In the early years one could find them in the dark corners of one of the many bird markets that are present throughout Indonesia, but increasingly they are offered for sale on e-commerce platforms and social media sites.

But all is not negative.

At time of the declaration, very little was known about Javan hawk-eagles. Based on very limited surveys — including ones done by Bas van Balen — they were considered among the rarest birds in the world, with fewer than 60 pairs confined to five or six widely separated forest fragments and millions of people living in the areas in between. The first people who recorded the species and commented on their conservation were non-Indonesian birders, either living in Indonesia or visiting.

This has now changed. Today Javan hawk-eagles are arguably Indonesia’s most frequently studied birds, with university students’ conducting projects year after year on the eagles themselves, their habitat, and their distribution.

Meanwhile a solid group of dedicated raptor enthusiasts works to study, monitor, and protect the species. We now know more about Javan hawk-eagles than ever before, and the earlier population estimates were off by an order of magnitude.

And it turned out that the birds were not confined to the island of Java: They’ve been observed flying on neighboring Bali as well.

Trade and continuing habitat loss remain the main threats to the species, but guard nest protection programs have been very successful.

Zaini Rakhman, chairman of Raptor Indonesia, says that “between 2001 and 2021, 40 confiscated or surrendered Javan hawk-eagles were released and 27 of them survived in their new habitats.”

In 2023 two Javan hawk-eagles, captive born in an Indonesian zoo, were released into a national park in western Java — an area that might not have been protected if not for the birds.

“The presence of Javan hawk-eagles was one of the reasons why the forests on Mt. Murio in central Java were declared as a Grand Forest Park,” says Rakhman. “Increased protection of additional forest areas are currently under review.”

In the early 1990s Hans Bartels was of the opinion that the survival of the Javan hawk-eagle and its forest was fully dependent on Indonesia’s younger generation. They have taken this to heart. The eagle is now the pride of many Indonesians — and rightly so — and December 2025 saw the opening of the Bartels Javan Hawk-Eagle Conservation Museum, in a historic building that had originally been the private residence of the Bartels family.

Even President Soeharto could not have imagined this would be the cumulation of his single-handed declaration of Indonesia’s national bird.

References:

Nijman, V. 2020. Illegal trade in Indonesia’s National Rare Animal has moved online. Oryx 54(1), 12.

Nijman, V., Shepherd, C.R., Van Balen, S. 2009. Declaration of the Javan hawk eagle Spizaetus bartelsi as Indonesia’s National Rare Animal impedes conservation of the species. Oryx 43(1), 122-128.

Thiollay, J.M., Meyburg, B.U. 1988. Forest fragmentation and the conservation of raptors: a survey on the island of Java. Biological Conservation 44(4),229-250.

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The post Authoritarianism and Conservation: How a Dictator Shaped the Future of an Endangered Bird appeared first on The Revelator.