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Huge 195-tonne transformer arrives at big battery site after 1,300 km road trip
One of the heaviest and longest road trips ever undertaken in Australia's energy transition has been completed, with the delivery of a 195-tonne transformer for a new big battery.
The post Huge 195-tonne transformer arrives at big battery site after 1,300 km road trip appeared first on Renew Economy.
Australia is making big bets on a slow transition, but the technology S-curve tells a different story
Australia has a choice between investing in the future we can already see – or subsidising a fossil-fuel past that is rapidly losing its grip.
The post Australia is making big bets on a slow transition, but the technology S-curve tells a different story appeared first on Renew Economy.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 3 OCTOBER 2026
Archive reference: SLF-2007-076
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Form 6-K filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, December 2010; Royal Dutch Shell fourth-quarter and full-year 2010 results; Royal Dutch Shell plc Form 6-K of December 2006
Contemporaneous reporting: The Guardian; Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal reporting preserved in the Donovan archive; Bloomberg
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The 2010 protocol, its stated scope and the parties’ public statements are treated as established corporate facts. Contemporary descriptions of the 2006 Sakhalin ownership transfer as forced or Kremlin-driven remain attributed descriptions. No court identified here found that Shell entered the 2010 agreement because of coercion, a secret bargain or an earlier promise of access to Russian resources.
Four years earlier, Shell had been fighting to preserve control of Sakhalin II.
By December 2006, it had agreed to halve its interest.
Gazprom would acquire:
50 per cent plus one share.Shell would fall from:
55 per cent to 27.5 per cent.The transaction price was:
$7.45 billion.Shell would remain technical adviser, but Gazprom would become the leading shareholder. Shell’s own SEC filing recorded those terms. SEC
The political and environmental battle surrounding that transaction has occupied much of this archive.
But by late 2010 Shell’s language had changed dramatically.
It was no longer merely accommodating Gazprom inside Sakhalin II.
It was inviting Gazprom into a potentially worldwide relationship.
1. 30 November 2010: the protocol is signedThe most authoritative source is Shell’s own filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
Royal Dutch Shell furnished a Form 6-K containing the announcement:
“GAZPROM AND SHELL AGREE TO PURSUE BROADER COOPERATION”The release stated that Alexey Miller and Peter Voser had signed:
a protocol on strategic global cooperation.Shell said the agreement established “basic guidelines” for broader collaboration. SEC
That phrase matters.
This was not a Sakhalin operating note.
It was not an amendment to an LNG sales contract.
It was a framework for a much wider relationship.
2. The proposed cooperation crossed Russia from west to eastShell’s SEC filing identified one principal area of potential cooperation as:
exploration and production of hydrocarbons in:
western Siberia
and
the Russian Far East.
Those two regions represented very different opportunities.
Western Siberia was Russia’s mature hydrocarbon heartland.
The Far East included Sakhalin and the emerging Asia-Pacific export strategy.
Shell was therefore contemplating cooperation with Gazprom not around a single asset but across two enormous producing regions. SEC
3. Gazprom could also enter Shell projects outside RussiaThe second provision was even more revealing.
Shell and Gazprom would examine:
downstream oil-products cooperation in Russia and Europe
and:
Gazprom participation in Shell upstream projects outside Russia.That represented an important change in the direction of the relationship.
Until then, the public story had largely involved Shell seeking access to Russian resources.
Now Gazprom was being offered the possibility of access to Shell-controlled or Shell-participated opportunities elsewhere in the world. SEC
The partnership was explicitly becoming reciprocal.
4. Gazprom had already explained the principle of reciprocityThe day before the protocol was announced, Gazprom deputy chief executive Alexander Medvedev made the logic unusually clear.
Contemporaneous Dow Jones reporting recorded him saying that Gazprom welcomed foreign partners into Russian upstream projects:
“only if in exchange we get the access to their first class projects somewhere in the world.”He added that Gazprom knew Shell possessed assets that might interest it. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
This is one of the most revealing statements in the entire post-Sakhalin sequence.
Gazprom was not presenting access to Russian reserves as a one-way commercial opportunity.
It was describing access as something to be exchanged.
Russian resources for international assets.
5. Shell called it a “strong partnership”Peter Voser’s language was equally notable.
Shell’s SEC-filed announcement quoted him saying:
“This underscores the strong partnership our companies have built in recent years.”He continued that Russia was an important area for new energy development for Shell and would play a large role in meeting future global oil and gas demand. SEC
The expression “strong partnership” deserves to be read against the chronology.
Those “recent years” included:
the environmental confrontation of 2006;
Gazprom’s acquisition of control;
Shell’s reduction from 55 per cent to 27.5 per cent;
the 2007 completion of that transaction;
the start-up of LNG exports in 2009;
and the rapid commercial deepening described in yesterday’s file.
The company that had lost control was now formally celebrating the partnership that followed.
6. Gazprom saw “new large-scale projects”Alexey Miller was even more expansive.
Shell’s filing records Miller describing the agreement as a mutually beneficial strategic partnership between major energy companies.
He said the future held:
“new large-scale projects”and a growing joint presence in new markets. SEC
This was therefore not presented as defensive diplomacy.
Gazprom was talking about expansion.
Shell was talking about partnership.
Both sides were looking beyond Sakhalin II.
7. Joint working groups were to turn the protocol into projectsThe protocol was not itself a final investment decision.
No specific new field was awarded to Shell on 30 November.
No overseas Shell asset was transferred to Gazprom.
No new LNG train was formally approved.
The document was a framework.
Shell’s release explicitly stated that:
Shell and Gazprom would create joint working groupsto develop the opportunities further. SEC
That distinction is important.
A protocol establishes intent.
It does not prove that every contemplated project subsequently materialised.
8. Shell already had two substantial Gazprom-linked positions in RussiaThe Shell announcement itself identified the existing foundation of the relationship.
First:
Sakhalin II.Gazprom and Shell had been partners there since 2007.
Second:
Salym.Shell and Gazprom Neft were jointly developing a group of oil fields in western Siberia. SEC
That gave the new global protocol a practical base.
The parties were not strangers signing a speculative memorandum.
They were already sharing producing assets.
9. By 2010 Sakhalin II was no longer an unfinished megaprojectThe timing was commercially significant.
When the Kremlin agreement had been signed in December 2006, Sakhalin II Phase 2 was still under construction.
Shell’s 2006 SEC filing said the project was more than 80 per cent complete and that roughly $12 billion had already been invested by the end of the third quarter. SEC
By 2010, the project was operating.
Russia’s first LNG plant had opened.
LNG exports were flowing.
Sakhalin II had ramped towards full production.
The argument was no longer about whether the giant project could be completed.
It had become a valuable producing asset.
10. Shell told investors the Gazprom protocol was a material portfolio developmentThe agreement did not disappear into a public-relations archive.
When Shell announced its fourth-quarter and full-year 2010 results, it listed the Gazprom protocol among its major Upstream portfolio developments.
Shell told investors:
“In Russia, Shell signed a protocol on strategic global cooperation with Gazprom”
covering broader collaboration in both Upstream and Downstream businesses. PR Newswire
That inclusion is important.
Shell itself treated the protocol as part of its strategic portfolio story.
11. Sakhalin was already contributing to Shell’s LNG growthThe same full-year results provide the commercial background.
Shell reported LNG sales volumes of:
16.76 million tonnes in 2010,up from:
13.40 million tonnes in 2009.An increase of:
25 per cent.Shell specifically said the increase reflected, among other things, the ramp-up of Sakhalin II LNG sales. PR Newswire
This helps explain why continued cooperation was commercially attractive.
Whatever Shell thought of the events that had cost it control, Sakhalin II was now producing cash-generating LNG within a growing global gas business.
12. Contemporary journalists immediately noticed the ironyThe contrast with 2006 was not lost on observers.
The Guardian reported the agreement under the headline:
“Shell and Gazprom sign ‘global co-operation’ pact.”
Its report stressed that the deal had been signed almost four years after Shell surrendered control of Sakhalin II following intense Kremlin pressure.
Analyst Peter Hitchens of Panmure Gordon described the situation as:
“slightly ironic”.He also argued that foreign companies partnered with Gazprom appeared to fare better in Russia than those attempting to operate independently. The Guardian
That was an analyst’s interpretation.
It was not Shell’s formal explanation.
But it captured the obvious historical tension.
13. The arrangement offered something important to both sidesThe commercial exchange was relatively easy to see.
Gazprom controlled enormous Russian hydrocarbon resources.
Shell possessed:
LNG technology;
international project-management experience;
global trading operations;
access to overseas upstream positions;
downstream markets;
and capital.
Gazprom wanted international reach.
Shell wanted Russian resource access.
The 2010 protocol offered a structure through which those interests could meet.
That interpretation is supported by the explicit scope of the agreement, but the precise internal valuation placed on each component by Shell and Gazprom is not public. SEC
14. The protocol also carried a remarkable risk warningThere is an almost surreal documentary detail in Shell’s own SEC filing.
Immediately after announcing its expanded strategic partnership with Gazprom, Shell’s formal cautionary language warned investors about:
political risk;
expropriation;
and:
“renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities.”It also warned about regulatory developments, project approvals and the risks of operating internationally. SEC
These were standard Shell forward-looking-statement warnings.
They were not written specifically about Russia.
That qualification matters.
But in the context of Sakhalin II, the juxtaposition is extraordinary.
The press release celebrated deeper Russian cooperation.
Its legal boilerplate simultaneously described precisely the class of political and contractual risks that international investors associated with the Sakhalin episode.
15. Compare the two Shell filings: 2006 and 2010Placed side by side, Shell’s own SEC filings tell the transformation remarkably clearly.
December 2006Gazprom would acquire 50 per cent plus one share of Sakhalin Energy.
Shell’s holding would fall to 27.5 per cent.
Gazprom would become the leading shareholder.
Shell would remain technical adviser.
The parties would establish an Area of Mutual Interest covering future Sakhalin opportunities. SEC
November 2010Shell and Gazprom signed a protocol on:
strategic global cooperation.They would consider Russian upstream development.
They would consider European downstream cooperation.
Gazprom might participate in Shell upstream projects outside Russia.
Joint working groups would develop the opportunities. SEC
The relationship had moved from one project to a potential international alliance.
16. The 2006 Area of Mutual Interest had foreshadowed this directionThe 2006 filing contained a detail whose significance became clearer later.
Shell, Gazprom, Mitsui and Mitsubishi agreed to establish an:
Area of Mutual Interestcovering future oil and gas exploration around Sakhalin and the development of Sakhalin II as a regional oil and LNG hub. SEC
The 2010 strategic protocol did not arise from nowhere.
It enlarged a pattern already embedded in the ownership settlement.
The deal that removed Shell’s control also created mechanisms for future cooperation.
That fact should not be mistaken for proof that future access was secretly promised in return for Shell surrendering control.
The documents do not establish such a bargain.
They do establish continuity.
17. Bloomberg was already reporting possible Sakhalin expansion by the end of DecemberWithin a month of the strategic protocol, the possibility of further Sakhalin expansion was publicly circulating.
Bloomberg reported on 29 December 2010 that Gazprom and Shell might add a third LNG train at Sakhalin II or build another LNG plant.
The Sakhalin regional governor also referred to possible asset swaps involving Gazprom’s Sakhalin III interests.
Gazprom itself said it had no information to confirm the specific LNG expansion proposal at that stage, and Shell declined to comment. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
Again, this distinction matters.
Expansion was being discussed.
It was not yet approved.
18. The High Court record still imposes an evidential boundaryThe judicial context remains:
Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin).
Mr Justice Mitting’s judgment independently recorded the controversy surrounding Sakhalin II, the contemplated British export-credit support and the project’s environmental significance.
But the High Court case concerned access to environmental information.
It did not decide why Gazprom obtained control.
It did not adjudicate a secret Kremlin bargain.
It did not determine whether Shell had been unlawfully forced to sell.
And it did not consider the 2010 strategic cooperation agreement, which did not yet exist. vLex
That legal boundary remains essential.
The corporate and journalistic record may support conclusions about strategy and political context.
It cannot be converted into a judicial finding that was never made.
19. What the evidence establishesBy November 2010, several propositions are no longer matters of interpretation.
Shell had accepted minority status at Sakhalin II.
Sakhalin II was producing LNG.
Shell and Gazprom were already commercially linked in western Siberia.
Shell wanted additional Russian opportunities.
Gazprom wanted participation in international projects.
Both sides publicly described deeper cooperation as desirable.
And the relationship had advanced to a formal:
Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation.That is documentary fact.
20. What the documents do not establishThe public record examined for this instalment does not establish that:
Shell was secretly promised new Russian fields in return for surrendering control of Sakhalin II;
the 2010 protocol was compensation for the 2006 transaction;
Gazprom guaranteed Shell participation in Sakhalin III, Yamal or any particular future field;
Shell privately regarded Gazprom as a trustworthy partner;
the Kremlin admitted using environmental regulation as commercial leverage;
or the 2006 transfer of control was declared unlawful by any court.
Those propositions would require evidence beyond the material presently available.
Documentary Findings EstablishedOn 30 November 2010, Alexey Miller and Peter Voser signed a Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation. SEC
The agreement contemplated further exploration and production cooperation in western Siberia and the Russian Far East.
It contemplated downstream cooperation in Russia and Europe.
It also contemplated Gazprom participation in Shell upstream projects outside Russia. SEC
Shell and Gazprom agreed to establish joint working groups.
Peter Voser publicly described the relationship as a “strong partnership.”
Alexey Miller said the companies expected new large-scale projects and participation in new markets. SEC
Shell’s fourth-quarter and full-year results later identified the Gazprom protocol as an important portfolio development. PR Newswire
Shell’s 2010 LNG sales rose by 25 per cent compared with 2009, with the Sakhalin II ramp-up contributing to that increase. PR Newswire
Established historical contextShell’s December 2006 SEC filing records Gazprom’s acquisition of 50 per cent plus one share, Shell’s reduction to 27.5 per cent and Shell’s continuing technical-adviser role. SEC
The same filing records an Area of Mutual Interest arrangement covering future Sakhalin development opportunities.
Established contemporaneous interpretationThe Guardian described Shell as having surrendered control after intense Kremlin pressure and noted the irony of the later worldwide cooperation agreement. The Guardian
Dow Jones reporting quoted Gazprom deputy chief executive Alexander Medvedev explicitly linking foreign access to Russian upstream resources with reciprocal access to international assets. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
Judicial boundaryThe High Court litigation concerning Sakhalin II dealt with environmental-information disclosure.
It did not adjudicate the motives behind Gazprom’s acquisition or the legality of the ownership transfer. vLex
Not establishedNo public document examined here establishes a secret quid pro quo between Shell’s loss of control in 2006 and subsequent Russian opportunities.
No court finding identified here establishes that Shell was unlawfully coerced into signing either the 2006 or the 2010 agreements.
The 2010 protocol itself did not guarantee that contemplated projects would proceed.
CommentaryThe remarkable feature of the 2010 protocol is not that Shell continued doing business in Russia.
Large energy companies routinely continue operating after disputes with host governments.
What is remarkable is the scale of the reconciliation.
Shell did not merely preserve its reduced Sakhalin stake.
It agreed to explore a relationship extending from Siberian upstream production to European downstream markets and potentially into Shell projects elsewhere in the world.
The company that had lost control of Sakhalin II was contemplating giving Gazprom access to its own international portfolio.
There is a hard commercial logic behind that apparent contradiction.
Shell could not manufacture another Russian resource base.
Gazprom could not instantly manufacture Shell’s international LNG expertise, markets, technology and global project portfolio.
Each possessed something the other wanted.
The imbalance exposed at Sakhalin II had therefore not destroyed the relationship.
It had redefined it.
In 2005, Shell had hoped to trade part of Sakhalin II for Russian gas reserves.
In 2006, Gazprom instead obtained control of Sakhalin II under radically different terms.
By 2010 the concept of reciprocal access had returned — but on a much larger scale.
The language was no longer merely:
Sakhalin.
It was:
strategic global cooperation.With hindsight, the phrase carries an obvious historical weight.
But the archive should resist hindsight.
In November 2010, Shell publicly regarded deeper cooperation with Gazprom as an opportunity.
Russia was part of Shell’s growth strategy.
Sakhalin II was producing valuable LNG.
Gazprom possessed resources Shell wanted.
And Shell was prepared to build upon the partnership created in the aftermath of one of the bitterest corporate confrontations it had experienced.
The Kremlin crisis had not ended the relationship.
It had changed the terms on which the relationship would continue.
Source RecordRoyal Dutch Shell plc’s Form 6-K for December 2010 contains the authenticated Shell announcement of the Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation, its proposed scope, the Miller and Voser statements, and Shell’s accompanying political-risk disclosures. SEC
US SEC — Royal Dutch Shell plc Form 6-K containing the 30 November 2010 Gazprom agreement
Royal Dutch Shell’s fourth-quarter and full-year 2010 results subsequently identified the Gazprom protocol as an Upstream portfolio development and recorded the contribution of Sakhalin II to rising LNG sales. PR Newswire
Royal Dutch Shell plc — Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2010 Results
Royal Dutch Shell’s December 2006 Form 6-K records Gazprom’s acquisition of control, Shell’s reduced shareholding, Shell’s continuing technical role and the Area of Mutual Interest arrangement. SEC
US SEC — Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi Sign Sakhalin II Protocol, December 2006
The Guardian reported contemporaneously on the historical irony of the global cooperation pact and the commercial logic seen by analysts. The Guardian
The Guardian — Shell and Gazprom sign ‘global co-operation’ pact, 30 November 2010
Contemporaneous Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal reporting preserved in the Donovan archive records Gazprom’s explicit exchange principle and Shell’s plans for broader cooperation. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com archive — Shell, Gazprom to Combine Beyond Russia, 30 November 2010
Bloomberg reporting at the end of December 2010 recorded discussion of possible Sakhalin LNG expansion and possible future asset exchanges, while noting that no such project had yet been confirmed. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com archive — Shell, Gazprom May Expand Sakhalin LNG by 2015, Governor Says
The relevant judicial background remains Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), judgment of Mr Justice Mitting dated 17 March 2008. vLex
Archive disclaimer: Statements concerning future cooperation establish what Shell and Gazprom publicly contemplated in November 2010; they do not establish that every proposed opportunity proceeded. Corporate statements, journalistic interpretation and judicial findings are kept separate. No inference of a secret quid pro quo is presented as established fact.
Site-wide disclaimer applies.
Next instalment SLF-2007-077 — The Sakhalin Papers LXVII: From Protocol to Joint Venture — Shell and Gazprom Neft Move Into Western Siberia and BeyondThe November 2010 protocol was only a framework.
Seven months later, the framework began acquiring machinery.
On 16 June 2011, Gazprom Neft and Shell signed basic terms for examining a new joint venture.
Its proposed reach was striking:
western Siberia;
other Russian regions;
and:
third countries.By September, Alexey Miller and Peter Voser were discussing implementation of the arrangement and the creation of the new venture. Contemporary Gazprom records later described the 2010 protocol as providing cooperation across exploration, production, processing and distribution in Russian and international markets. Oreanda News
The next file will examine how the grand language of “strategic global cooperation” began turning into concrete corporate structures — and whether Sakhalin II had become the template for Shell’s wider Russian strategy.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 3 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 3, 2026 at 8:33 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
New Colorado neighborhood could offer glimpse into the future of home energy use
A new residential development south of Denver is the testing ground for an unusual partnership that could transform home heating and cooling across the country.
Dandelion Energy, a geothermal startup, and Lennar, one of the nation’s largest homebuilders, recently completed construction of nearly 100 homes at the base of Colorado’s Front Range, each equipped with its own ground-source heat pump. The systems use less electricity than even the most efficient air-source heat pumps, potentially helping Colorado meet its climate goals while reducing peak energy demand and eliminating the need for new gas pipelines.
Ground-source heat pumps draw on steady temperatures belowground to help heat and cool buildings. However, the projects’ custom designs and drilling requirements—homes typically require one or more boreholes drilled several hundred feet deep—are pricey. Drilling alone often costs more than $10,000.
Dandelion, a company that got its start at X—a “moonshot” research and development subsidiary of Alphabet, Google’s parent company—says it can complete geothermal heating and cooling projects twice as fast and at half the cost of similar installations.
Geothermal startup Dandelion Energy and homebuilder Lennar recently completed nearly 100 homes with geothermal heating and cooling at the Ken Caryl Ranch housing development in Littleton, Colorado. Phil McKenna / Inside Climate NewsThe company is “taking a kind of mass market and maximally efficient lens to what has historically been a bespoke kind of custom, high-end product,” said Dan Yates, Dandelion Energy’s CEO and chairman.
Earlier this year at Lennar’s Ken Caryl Ranch development, Dandelion’s drill team demonstrated a lightweight rig designed to quickly move from lot to lot, drilling boreholes and installing polyethylene pipe across the sprawling housing development before building foundations are poured.
Each home gets a single bore between 200 and 500 feet deep, where temperatures are approximately 50 degrees Fahrenheit year-round. Water circulating through the pipe is warmed or cooled by the surrounding earth before a heat pump installed in the basement of each new home provides additional heating or cooling depending on the time of year.
Dandelion’s drilling team can complete boreholes for one or more homes per day. If they had to drill a similar installation elsewhere for a single building, they could lose an entire day simply transporting the rig to and from the site.
Geothermal startup Dandelion Energy and homebuilder Lennar recently completed nearly 100 homes with geothermal heating and cooling in Littleton. Phil McKenna / Inside Climate NewsInstalling the devices across dozens of similar new homes at once also eliminates the need for custom plans for each building and avoids potentially costly retrofits to the buildings’ heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems.
The end result is a highly efficient heating and cooling system that Dandelion says outcompetes air-source heat pumps and conventional gas heating systems. This is especially true during cold snaps, when energy demand peaks and ground-source heat pumps use a quarter as much electricity as air-source heat pumps, Yates said.
It’s “the only system that actually reduces peak demand and electrifies homes at the same time,” he said.
The Ken Caryl Ranch development is part of a larger initiative the company launched with Lennar in 2025 to install geothermal heating and cooling at more than 1,500 homes in Colorado over two years. Dandelion hopes to scale up to 10,000 homes per year nationwide in the coming years.
“Our mission at Dandelion is to mainstream geothermal, and we think that the time has finally arrived for that to happen,” Yates said.
Just over a million U.S. homes have ground-source heat pumps, with approximately 100,000 new installations each year, according to a 2025 U.S. Department of Energy report. The agency found that geothermal heating and cooling could reach 7 million homes by 2035. Doing so would reduce winter peak energy demand by more than 40 gigawatts nationwide, resulting in roughly $4 billion in annual savings in U.S. electric grid costs, according to the report.
Ground-source heat pumps currently make up just a small fraction of new home heating and cooling systems. By contrast, 3.6 million air-source heat pumps were sold in the U.S. last year, outpacing gas furnace sales for the fourth year in a row, said Yara van Ingen, an associate with BloombergNEF’s building decarbonization team.
Ground-source heat pumps are economically viable across the continental United States, according to a study published this month in the journal iScience that considered incentives, energy costs and local climate and subsurface conditions.
“It is technically possible everywhere, and there is economic potential across all states,” said Juliet Simpson, a former research engineer at the National Laboratory of the Rockies and the study’s lead author.
A primary challenge for ground-source heat pumps is their upfront cost, which averages around $25,000 for a typical new home, according to the Energy Department report. Van Ingen added that space constraints, especially in dense urban environments, as well as permitting requirements that vary across the U.S. can also complicate borehole drilling.
Dandelion and Lennar, an investor in the geothermal company, are among those working to lower costs. But incentives and policy changes also help. An energy efficiency program by Xcel Energy, Colorado’s largest gas and electric utility company, provides approximately $25,000 per home for new, high-efficiency buildings with a ground-source heat pump to offset added building and heat pump costs.
“For large neighborhoods with hundreds of homes, builders may receive seven-figure rebate amounts,” an Xcel spokesperson said in a written statement.
Geothermal pipes run through the basement of each building. Phil McKenna / Inside Climate NewsThe rebates help Xcel advance its climate goals and meet Colorado’s Clean Heat Standard requirement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 22 percent below 2015 levels by 2030.
Colorado also provides a $2,000 tax credit for ground-source heat pumps and requires homebuilders to pay for new gas service expansion pipes, costs that are not incurred if developers build all-electric homes.
Policies that incentivize high-efficiency electric heating and cooling while discouraging fossil fuel use in homes are intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from buildings, said Will Toor, executive director at the Colorado Energy Office.
Other states and utility companies also offer incentives for ground-source heat pumps, including Maryland, where Dandelion recently announced plans to install the technology in 129 new homes. In addition, commercial ground-source heat pump projects are now eligible for federal tax credits that cover 30 percent or more of total installation costs.
“The economics just look better and better,” Jessica Silber-Byrne, senior manager of thermal energy networks for the Building Decarbonization Coalition, a nonprofit organization working to eliminate the use of fossil fuels in buildings. “There is a combination of both incentives and market signals that suggest that this is about to really take off.”
toolTips('.classtoolTips4','The process of reducing the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that drive climate change, most often by deprioritizing the use of fossil fuels like oil and gas in favor of renewable sources of energy.');This story was originally published by Grist with the headline New Colorado neighborhood could offer glimpse into the future of home energy use on Oct 3, 2026.
Environmental Health & Antiracism: Change Makers, Place, and Crossroads for Health Equity
The post Environmental Health & Antiracism: Change Makers, Place, and Crossroads for Health Equity appeared first on ANHE.
October 3 Green Energy News
Headline News:
- “US Senate Proposes New Permitting Framework. Should It Become Law?” • Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island was instrumental in getting a bill before the Senate that will alter radically how permitting for energy projects in the US gets done. In this hyper-partisan era, Democrats and Republicans worked together on proposed legislation. [CleanTechnica]
Solar array (Dennis Schroeder, NREL)
- “G7 Agrees To 100 Million Barrel Emergency Oil Release Under US Pressure” • After Trump threatened a ban of diesel exports, G7 countries agreed to release up to 100 million barrels of oil from strategic reserves over four months in a coordinated effort to bring down soaring energy prices, with a particular focus on diesel. [Euronews]
- “OpenAI Reveals Another Hack Into A Government Agency In Australia” • OpenAI, a company based in California, revealed a hack into a second Australian government agency, a week after the disclosure of an initial hack fueled public backlash against the ChatGPT-maker. OpenAI issued an apology for the security breach last week. [ABC News]
- “Italy’s Firefighting Planes Return Home After Summer Of Battling Blazes All Across Europe” • After a gruelling summer skimming lakes and coastlines to dump thousands of tonnes of water on wildfires burning across a parched Europe, Italy’s fleet of bright yellow and red Canadair planes finally returned home to a base near Rome for maintenance. [Euronews]
- “Amazon To Invest $1 Billion Into Communities Amid A Backlash Against Data Center Rollouts” • Amazon is investing more than $1 billion over five years into communities where it operates data centers for education, job training, and other local priorities as it reacts to a growing backlash to the tech industry’s rollout of the massive buildings. [ABC News]
For more news, please visit geoharvey – Daily News about Energy and Climate Change.
Bird-Friendly PHX Brings People Together to Help Birds Thrive
Nature-Based Solutions Play Key Role in Improving New Mexico's Climate Resilience
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 2 OCTOBER 2026
Archive reference: SLF-2007-075
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2009; Shell SEC filings; Gazprom corporate releases of 8 April and 18 September 2009
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, Bloomberg, Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal, UPI, AFP and The Times
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The agreements, meetings, ownership interests and Shell’s description of Russia as a new “heartland” are treated as established documentary facts. Contemporary descriptions of Shell having been forced or pressured to surrender control remain attributed to journalists and other observers. No public court judgment identified here determined that Gazprom’s acquisition resulted from an unlawful bargain. Explanations of Shell’s strategic motives are commentary unless explicitly attributed to Shell.
The obvious assumption after the Sakhalin confrontation would have been retreat.
Shell had entered the crisis controlling 55 per cent of Sakhalin Energy.
It emerged with 27.5 per cent.
Gazprom held 50 per cent plus one share.
Approximately 402 million barrels of oil equivalent of proved reserves attributable to Shell shareholders had disappeared from Shell’s economic position.
The Russian state-controlled gas company was now in charge.
And yet the documentary record shows something striking.
Shell did not respond by keeping Gazprom at arm’s length.
It did the opposite.
Within months of Russia’s first LNG cargo leaving Sakhalin, Shell and Gazprom were discussing new projects.
Within weeks they signed agreements lasting until 2028.
By September they were considering expansion elsewhere around Sakhalin.
Yamal was on the table.
Sakhalin III was being discussed.
And Shell itself was describing Russia as a new strategic heartland.
The question is therefore not simply:
What did Shell lose at Sakhalin II?
It is also:
Why did Shell decide that Gazprom remained a partner it wanted? 1. 18 February 2009: Shell immediately looks beyond Sakhalin IIThe starting point is the inauguration of Russia’s first LNG plant on 18 February 2009.
That same day Reuters interviewed Shell chief executive Jeroen van der Veer.
His comments are important because they came at the symbolic moment when the project Shell had once controlled was entering commercial LNG operation under Gazprom control.
Van der Veer said Shell intended to discuss further energy projects with Gazprom in Russia’s Far East.
Gazprom deputy chief executive Alexander Medvedev said Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi were also being considered in connection with potential LNG development on the Yamal Peninsula.
Van der Veer placed the relationship in the wider context of Shell’s long experience of working with state-controlled national oil companies.
Working with state companies, he said, was normal in Shell’s experience. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
That was not the language of corporate withdrawal.
It was the language of continued access.
2. Less than two months later came a twenty-year agreementOn 8 April 2009 Alexey Miller and Jeroen van der Veer met at Gazprom headquarters in Moscow.
Gazprom’s official record says they announced a package of LNG and pipeline-gas agreements.
Shell Eastern Trading and Gazprom Global LNG would each purchase LNG from Sakhalin Energy.
Deliveries were to begin in 2009 and continue until:
2028.At plateau, each company was to purchase approximately:
one million tonnes of LNG a year.The transaction also included a twenty-year pipeline-gas arrangement under which an equivalent volume of gas would be delivered to Shell in Europe. Gazprom
This was not merely Shell retaining the shares it had been left with.
It was the creation of a new long-term commercial relationship after the ownership confrontation.
3. Sakhalin LNG was being connected to Shell’s global gas portfolioThe April transaction was geographically much broader than Sakhalin Island.
Gazprom affiliates were to take capacity that Shell held at Sempra’s Energia Costa Azul LNG import terminal in Baja California, together with associated pipeline capacity into Southern California.
Gazprom’s own explanation was that the arrangement would help it sell Sakhalin LNG into the United States and other Pacific markets.
For Shell, the linked pipeline-gas agreement strengthened the flexibility of its European supply portfolio.
A cargo produced in Russia’s Far East had therefore become part of a commercial arrangement spanning:
Russia;
Japan and the Pacific LNG market;
Mexico;
California;
and European pipeline gas.
The relationship was becoming international rather than merely Russian. Gazprom
4. Van der Veer explicitly called for further expansionGazprom’s authenticated release records Van der Veer describing the April contracts as an important milestone.
More significantly, he said Shell looked forward to expanding its relationship with Gazprom in gas and LNG activities:
“both in Russia and internationally.”
Miller and Van der Veer also discussed further LNG cooperation inside Russia. Gazprom
The wording matters.
The Shell-Gazprom relationship was no longer being confined to managing the consequences of Sakhalin II.
Both companies were publicly discussing what came next.
5. Sakhalin III appeared almost immediatelyTwo days later, AFP reported another development.
Gazprom official Stanislav Tsigankov described Shell as a strong potential partner for Sakhalin III.
According to the contemporary report, Shell had “very good chances” of participating once the relevant licence arrangements were in place.
The same report noted the obvious historical tension: cooperation between Shell and Gazprom had deteriorated severely during the Sakhalin II ownership confrontation.
Yet Gazprom was now publicly contemplating Shell’s involvement in another major Far Eastern resource project. Dawn
That is an extraordinary turnaround if the story is reduced to the proposition that Shell had simply been driven out of Russia.
It had not.
Shell had lost control of one project.
It was seeking access to others.
6. Peter Voser confirmed that Shell was looking beyond Sakhalin IIOn 29 April 2009, then chief financial officer Peter Voser told analysts that Shell and Gazprom were examining further opportunities around Sakhalin.
Contemporaneous Bloomberg reporting quoted Voser saying the partners intended to look for additional opportunities in the Sakhalin area.
The report again mentioned Gazprom’s consideration of Shell as a potential Sakhalin III participant. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
Voser would become Shell chief executive in July.
The strategic direction therefore did not disappear with Jeroen van der Veer’s retirement.
It continued under his successor.
7. June: Gazprom called Sakhalin a model for YamalThe relationship broadened again in June.
At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, Alexey Miller met Van der Veer.
A contemporaneous account of the Gazprom statement records Miller describing the Sakhalin II partnership as an example of mutually beneficial cooperation.
He then went further.
The experience gained at Sakhalin II, Miller said, could provide a basis for further LNG cooperation on the:
Yamal Peninsula.That was strategically significant.
Yamal was not an incremental addition to Sakhalin II.
It represented one of Russia’s enormous future gas provinces in the Arctic.
Gazprom was therefore pointing to Sakhalin II — including Shell’s technology and LNG experience — as a possible template for a much larger future relationship. Oreanda News
8. September: the new Shell chief executive meets MillerPeter Voser became chief executive of Royal Dutch Shell on 1 July 2009.
On 18 September, little more than two months into the job, he met Alexey Miller at the Sochi investment forum.
This time the record is particularly clear because Gazprom’s original corporate release remains available.
The companies reviewed Sakhalin II.
They noted that oil and LNG production was running ahead of the original 2009 projection.
Then the discussion moved beyond the existing project. Gazprom
9. The 2007 agreement contained a route to more Sakhalin developmentGazprom’s September statement referred to an Area of Mutual Interest Agreement dating from 2007.
That agreement had been signed alongside the restructuring through which Gazprom obtained control of Sakhalin Energy.
By September 2009, Miller and Voser were discussing the possibility of expanding activity elsewhere on the Sakhalin shelf under that framework.
They agreed to establish a working group to examine issues associated with development of Sakhalin fields. Gazprom
Contemporaneous Dow Jones reporting said the cooperation could extend to the Kirinsky block, which Gazprom held within the Sakhalin III area. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
Two years after losing control of Sakhalin II, Shell was therefore discussing how to participate in resources beyond it.
10. Gazprom was building its own Sakhalin III position at the same timeThe context is important.
On 2 July 2009 Gazprom announced the start of exploration drilling at the Kirinskoye field within Sakhalin III.
Gazprom described the development as part of Russia’s Eastern Gas Program and said the field would help supply the Sakhalin–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok gas system.
At that stage Gazprom said Kirinskoye contained tens of billions of cubic metres of gas and millions of tonnes of condensate.
It was not simply an extension of Sakhalin II.
It belonged to the next phase of Russia’s Far Eastern gas development. Gazprom
For Shell, access to such acreage would mean that the Gazprom relationship could become a route back into major Russian resource growth.
11. UPI described the September talks as expansion, not damage controlThree days after the Miller-Voser meeting, UPI reported that the companies were discussing LNG development and additional Sakhalin resources.
The report recalled the twenty-year April agreement and noted that Sakhalin II production was exceeding initial expectations.
Most importantly, it recorded the decision to move forward with a working group concerned with further Sakhalin development. UPI
The historical sequence is therefore consistent across Gazprom’s own record and independent contemporary reporting.
February:
talk of more projects.
April:
twenty-year commercial agreements.
April:
Sakhalin III discussed.
June:
Yamal cooperation raised.
September:
formal working group for additional Sakhalin opportunities.
That is not accidental continuity.
It is an expanding relationship.
12. Then came YamalLess than a week after the September Sakhalin meeting, Vladimir Putin gathered executives from major international energy companies to discuss development of the Yamal Peninsula.
Contemporaneous reporting said Peter Voser indicated Shell was prepared to undertake a feasibility study concerning an LNG plant at Yamal.
The wider significance was obvious to journalists at the time.
Russia possessed vast Arctic resources.
Gazprom possessed privileged access to them.
But international companies possessed capital, project-management capacity and specialist technologies that Russia could use. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com
Shell possessed one capability of particular value:
decades of LNG experience.
Sakhalin II had just demonstrated it on Russian territory.
13. Shell’s annual report gave the strategy a nameThe most revealing Shell document came later.
Royal Dutch Shell’s Annual Report and Form 20-F for 2009 was filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on 16 March 2010. SEC
In its Upstream strategy section, Shell listed its established production “heartlands” — countries such as Australia, Canada, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, the UK and the United States.
Then it added:
“Russia represents a new heartland”because Sakhalin II had come on stream in 2009. Shell Plc
The phrase is difficult to reconcile with any notion that Shell regarded the 2006–07 confrontation as grounds for abandoning Russia.
Quite the reverse.
Russia had moved into Shell’s strategic core.
14. The same annual report contained an extraordinary warningThe same document also provides an important counterweight.
Shell’s risk section warned investors that operating internationally exposed it to political and legal instability.
Among the possibilities Shell specifically identified were:
forced divestment of assets;
expropriation;
cancellation of contractual rights;
rewriting of leases;
changing environmental regulation;
and governmental action affecting hydrocarbon entitlements.
Shell also warned generally about the risk of renegotiation of agreements involving governmental entities. Shell Plc
This was not written specifically about Russia.
It was Shell’s global risk disclosure.
That distinction must be maintained.
But historically the juxtaposition is striking.
The same annual report that called Russia a new heartland warned shareholders that political developments could produce precisely the kinds of ownership and contractual disruptions that international oil companies fear.
15. Sakhalin II also taught Shell the value of having the state company inside the projectHere we move from documented fact to interpretation.
No internal Shell memorandum located for this instalment says:
We lost control because Gazprom was outside the project, therefore our future Russian strategy must depend upon partnering Gazprom.
That conclusion should not be presented as a discovered corporate instruction.
But contemporary observers made a closely related point.
When Shell and Gazprom eventually formalised broader cooperation in 2010, analysts noted that foreign energy companies operating with Gazprom appeared to have better prospects in Russia than those attempting to develop strategic resources independently.
That assessment cannot be converted into Shell’s private reasoning.
But it fits the public behaviour visible throughout 2009. The Guardian
Shell did not attempt to restore its old dominant position.
It attempted to make the new relationship work.
16. The economics made withdrawal unattractiveAnother part of the explanation requires no speculation.
Sakhalin II was producing.
Its LNG trains had ramped up rapidly.
Its oil and gas production was substantial.
Its LNG was sold into premium Asian markets.
Shell still owned 27.5 per cent.
It retained technical involvement.
And through the April agreements Shell was acquiring long-term LNG volumes for its global trading portfolio.
Walking away would therefore have meant abandoning a valuable producing position as well as possible access to future Russian resources.
The commercial incentive to remain engaged was substantial.
17. Gazprom also needed things Shell possessedThe relationship was not one-sided.
Gazprom possessed reserves and political access.
Shell possessed technologies, LNG operating experience, international trading capability and participation in infrastructure outside Russia.
The April 2009 transaction illustrates this exchange particularly well.
Gazprom gained access to Shell-linked terminal and pipeline capacity connected with the North American market.
Shell gained long-term LNG and pipeline-gas portfolio flexibility.
Gazprom could learn from an experienced international LNG operator.
Shell could retain a route into Russia’s resource base. Gazprom
Their interests were not identical.
They were complementary.
18. The High Court record remains a useful restraint on hindsightThe English High Court judgment delivered the previous year remains relevant because it fixes an independent point in the chronology.
Mr Justice Mitting recorded that Sakhalin II had originally been developed by a consortium in which Shell held the majority stake and that Gazprom had subsequently assumed a controlling interest.
He also recorded the proposed approximately $650 million of British export-credit support and the potentially serious environmental consequences associated with the project.
The case concerned disclosure of government environmental information.
It did not adjudicate why Gazprom obtained control.
It did not find that Russia had coerced Shell.
It did not rule that the ownership transfer was unlawful.
And it did not examine Shell’s later decision to deepen cooperation with Gazprom. vLex
That legal boundary remains important.
The chronology is powerful enough without converting interpretation into judgment.
19. What can safely be said about Shell’s strategy?The public evidence permits several conclusions.
Shell considered Russia strategically important after losing control of Sakhalin II.
Shell actively pursued further cooperation with Gazprom.
Shell entered long-duration commercial arrangements with Gazprom and Sakhalin Energy.
Shell examined additional Sakhalin opportunities.
Gazprom publicly considered Shell for Sakhalin III.
The companies discussed Yamal LNG.
Shell’s own annual report called Russia a new heartland.
Those propositions are established.
What cannot be stated as documented internal fact is the precise reasoning process inside Shell’s executive committee or board.
No document examined for this instalment records a formal calculation such as:
Accept Gazprom dominance in exchange for future Russian access.
That may be an attractive interpretation.
It remains an interpretation.
Documentary Findings EstablishedOn 18 February 2009 Jeroen van der Veer told Reuters that Shell intended to discuss further Russian projects with Gazprom after the start-up of Sakhalin II LNG. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
On 8 April 2009 Gazprom and Shell announced agreements under which Shell Eastern Trading and Gazprom Global LNG would each purchase approximately one million tonnes of Sakhalin LNG annually at plateau.
The supply arrangements were scheduled to continue until 2028.
The package also contained a twenty-year pipeline-gas arrangement benefiting Shell’s European supply portfolio and arrangements involving North American LNG import capacity. Gazprom
Gazprom subsequently identified Shell as a potential participant in Sakhalin III. Dawn
Peter Voser publicly confirmed in April that Shell and Gazprom were examining additional opportunities around Sakhalin. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
In June 2009 Alexey Miller publicly suggested Sakhalin II experience could support future Shell-Gazprom cooperation in LNG development on Yamal. Oreanda News
On 18 September 2009 Miller and Voser agreed to establish a working group to study further Sakhalin field development under the existing Area of Mutual Interest framework. Gazprom
Contemporary reporting identified the Gazprom-controlled Kirinsky block as one possible area of cooperation. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
Shell’s 2009 Annual Report described Russia as a new upstream “heartland” following Sakhalin II start-up. Shell Plc
Established risk disclosureShell’s same annual report warned generally that political and regulatory developments in countries where it operated could lead to forced divestment, expropriation, cancellation of contractual rights and other adverse changes.
That disclosure was global and was not specifically labelled as a description of Russia. Shell Plc
Established judicial contextThe High Court recorded the transition from Shell majority control to Gazprom control and the substantial environmental issues associated with Sakhalin II.
The judgment concerned environmental-information disclosure.
It did not determine the political motive for Gazprom’s acquisition. vLex
Not establishedIt is not established that Shell’s board formally adopted a policy of accepting Gazprom control in return for access to new Russian projects.
It is not established that Shell was promised Sakhalin III or Yamal participation as consideration for surrendering control of Sakhalin II.
It is not established that the Area of Mutual Interest Agreement guaranteed Shell participation in any specific future field.
It is not established that the environmental enforcement campaign of 2006 was legally improper.
It is not established that the later Shell-Gazprom cooperation erased, resolved or vindicated the environmental controversies that preceded the ownership restructuring.
CommentaryThere is a temptation to tell the Sakhalin story as though December 2006 were the ending.
Shell lost control.
Gazprom won.
The Kremlin prevailed.
Curtain.
The documents show something considerably more complicated.
For Shell, Sakhalin II did not become a reason to abandon Russia.
It became the foundation of a different Russian strategy.
The old model had been:
Shell controls the project.
The emerging model was:
Gazprom controls access to strategic Russian resources; Shell brings technology, LNG expertise, international markets and capital; both sides look for projects where those interests overlap.
Whether Shell liked the circumstances that produced that new model is a different question.
Its behaviour is less ambiguous.
Shell stayed.
Shell signed twenty-year contracts.
Shell discussed Sakhalin III.
Shell discussed Yamal.
Shell created working groups with Gazprom.
And Shell called Russia a new heartland.
There is also a deeper irony.
Shell’s own annual report warned investors about political risks including forced divestment and contractual renegotiation.
Those risks belonged to the generic vocabulary of international petroleum investment.
But Shell had just lived through a transaction in Russia in which its controlling position had been cut in half during an extraordinary period of regulatory, environmental and political pressure.
Yet rather than mark Russia as commercially untouchable, Shell elevated it into the strategic heartlands of the company.
That suggests the scale of the prize.
Russia possessed resources international oil companies could not reproduce elsewhere.
Gazprom possessed access Shell could not independently obtain.
Shell possessed technology and global LNG capabilities Gazprom wanted.
Sakhalin II had exposed the imbalance of political power between them.
It had not eliminated their commercial interdependence.
And by late 2009 both companies were already building upon it.
The confrontation had produced not divorce, but a new marriage contract.
Source RecordRoyal Dutch Shell plc’s Annual Report and Form 20-F 2009 is the principal authenticated Shell source. It describes Russia as a new upstream “heartland” following the start-up of Sakhalin II and contains Shell’s contemporaneous global disclosures concerning political, contractual and forced-divestment risks. Shell Plc
Shell-hosted Annual Report and Form 20-F 2009
The SEC filing index confirms Royal Dutch Shell’s 2009 Form 20-F was filed on 16 March 2010. SEC
US SEC — Royal Dutch Shell plc Form 20-F for 2009
Gazprom’s authenticated 8 April 2009 corporate release records the Shell and Gazprom LNG purchases, the 2028 contractual horizon, the European pipeline-gas agreement, the North American terminal arrangements and the stated intention to expand cooperation. Gazprom
Gazprom — Gazprom and Royal Dutch Shell sign LNG and natural gas contracts, 8 April 2009
Gazprom’s authenticated 18 September 2009 release records the Miller-Voser meeting, successful Sakhalin II ramp-up, the 2007 Area of Mutual Interest Agreement and creation of a working group for further Sakhalin development. Gazprom
Gazprom — Working meeting between Alexey Miller and Peter Voser, 18 September 2009
Reuters’ contemporaneous 18 February 2009 interview recorded Van der Veer’s intention to pursue further cooperation with Gazprom following Sakhalin II start-up. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
Bloomberg reporting of 29 April 2009 recorded Peter Voser saying Shell and Gazprom were examining further opportunities around Sakhalin. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
UPI’s 21 September 2009 report independently recorded the decision to pursue a working group for further Sakhalin development. UPI
The principal judicial source remains Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), judgment of Mr Justice Mitting dated 17 March 2008. vLex
High Court — ECGD v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Archive disclaimer: Corporate statements about cooperation and future projects establish what Shell and Gazprom publicly said and did. They do not establish undisclosed motives, private assurances or any political quid pro quo. Contemporary descriptions of the 2006–07 ownership restructuring as forced or coercive remain attributed descriptions rather than judicial findings.
Site-wide disclaimer applies.
Next instalment SLF-2007-076 — The Sakhalin Papers LXVI: “Strategic Global Cooperation” — Four Years After the Kremlin Crisis, Shell Signs a Worldwide Pact with GazpromThe relationship developing through 2009 did not stop at Sakhalin.
On 30 November 2010, Peter Voser and Alexey Miller signed something much more ambitious:
a Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation.Shell’s own announcement said the companies would examine joint oil and gas opportunities in western Siberia and Russia’s Far East.
Gazprom could participate in Shell upstream projects outside Russia.
The cooperation would extend into downstream markets in Russia and Europe.
Peter Voser said the agreement demonstrated the “strong partnership” the companies had built. PR Newswire
Contemporary reporting immediately noticed the irony: less than four years after Shell had lost control of Sakhalin II, it was signing a global partnership with the company that had taken control. The Guardian
The next file will examine how a bruising Russian ownership confrontation became, in Shell’s own language, a strategic global partnership — and what each side expected to obtain from the other.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 2 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 2, 2026 at 8:15 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Iran’s teachers movement perseveres against all odds
This article Iran’s teachers movement perseveres against all odds was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
Sunlight filtered through the trees separating the headquarters of the Plan and Budget Organization in Tehran as 300 teachers gathered outside to protest on Sept. 6. Their demands were simple: salaries that keep pace with inflation, fair pay scales and improved health and welfare services.
They knew they were taking an enormous risk.
For years, educators across Iran have taken to the streets to demand fair wages, better working conditions, the release of detained teachers, the constitutionally guaranteed rights to free education for all children and to peaceful assembly and association. For years, they have faced arrests, enforced disappearances, prosecutions on national security charges, dismissals, imprisonment and solitary confinement.
Teachers and teachers’ union activists played a prominent role in the January 2026 uprising, when people across the country called for freedom and an end to the Islamic Republic system of government. In response, they were heavily targeted. By July, at least 60 had been arrested, prosecuted or imprisoned. At least 14 have been killed. Still, against all odds, Iranian teachers have kept their movement alive.
#newsletter-block_387f3a103743ec0e312d1a128efa656e { background: #ECECEC; color: #000000; } #newsletter-block_387f3a103743ec0e312d1a128efa656e #mc_embed_signup_front input#mce-EMAIL { border-color:#000000 !important; color: #000000 !important; } Sign Up for our NewsletterThe Iranian teachers’ movement is not organized through a single union. Local and provincial teachers’ associations operate across the country, while an umbrella network called the Coordinating Council of Iranian Teachers’ Trade Associations, or CCITTA, links many of them. The structure allows teachers to organize locally while coordinating actions across the country.
Some of these actions, like protests and public statements, are impossible to miss. Others are less confrontational and more relational: debating movement priorities, supporting imprisoned colleagues and their families, building solidarity with other social movements, or simply getting together to hike or read or watch a film. Together, they knit together a movement that has proven resilient against virtually every form of repression, from internet shutdowns to detentions and killings, while continuing to press its demands.
‘A continuation of my responsibility as a teacher’Mohammad Habibi became a teacher in 2003. For him, it was never just a job; it felt like a social responsibility. But he soon realized that quality education for students could not be fully achieved without protecting teachers’ rights. So he joined the Iranian Teachers’ Trade Association and later took on several roles within the CCITTA. He is currently its spokesperson.
“My trade union activism wasn’t separate from teaching,” he said. “I saw it as a continuation of my responsibility as a teacher. Teachers have a duty that goes beyond teaching textbooks. They must defend the right to education, student dignity, educational justice and freedom of thought.”
Like Habibi, the nine teachers interviewed for this story described demands that encompass both their own rights and those of their students. They want salaries and pensions that reflect the real cost of living, job security, meaningful participation in education policy, freedom of expression and association, and the release of their imprisoned colleagues.
But they’re also calling for free, high-quality and equitable public education for all children, regardless of ethnicity or gender, while opposing the privatization and commercialization of education.
For Esmaeil Abdi, the former general secretary of the Tehran Teachers’ Trade Association, who spent nearly nine years in prison for his activism, the fight against privatization is inseparable from the fight for equality. “If education becomes a commodity whose quality depends on a family’s economic ability, social inequality is reproduced from one generation to the next,” he said.
Teachers also advocate for every child’s right to receive education in their mother tongue alongside Persian, arguing that Iran’s linguistic and cultural diversity should be reflected in its schools.
Over the years, the movement has won concessions on some of these demands, like pension increases, the implementation of the Teacher Ranking Law (specifying pay tiers) and corresponding salary increases, and a voice in the management of their retirement fund. However, even when policies change, implementation may be incomplete.
“But the significance of this experience lies not only in the material results of these demands,” said Eskandar “Soran” Lotfi, a Kurdish teachers’ union activist and former CCITTA spokesperson. “It also shows that sustained and organized protests by teachers have succeeded in bringing issues that the government initially refused to accept into the sphere of public policymaking and decision-making.”
Abdi shared a similar view: “Despite repression, the teachers’ movement has succeeded in keeping issues such as free public education, teachers’ rights and educational inequality at the center of public debate.”
While maintaining its organizational independence, the movement has built solidarity with workers, students and women’s rights activists. This has happened despite what Laeya Mohammadi, a teacher activist using a pseudonym for fear of reprisal, describes as the “government’s attempts to divide teachers from other movements, including by claiming teachers hold a higher social status than [other groups], like workers.”
Much as they would later take part in the January 2026 protests, teachers participated in the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, in which hundreds of thousands protested the repressive government after the morality police killed 22-year-old Mahsa Amini. Four years later, that struggle still shapes the aspirations of teachers like Habibi, who hopes for a future in which female teachers and students are no longer compelled to obey the country’s veiling law and instead have full autonomy over choices as personal as what they wear.
Previous CoverageTeachers’ broader social commitments have also surfaced when their students are at risk. Beginning in late 2022, girls across Iran began reporting illnesses after suspected poisonings at schools, with cases eventually spreading across many cities and provinces. As the incidents continued amid conflicting official explanations and growing concern over students’ safety, the CCITTA called nationwide protests in March 2023. Teachers and parents demonstrated across the country. In some locations, security forces teargassed and arrested protesters.
Shadi Taban, a teacher who spoke under a pseudonym, was among those who participated. For her, the issue reflected a principle reaching well beyond teachers’ own working conditions.
“Our red line is the students,” she said.
That red line was crossed during the January 2026 uprisings when the government killed more than 200 schoolchildren. Teachers took it upon themselves to protest their students’ deaths and honor their memories through the “Empty Desks” campaign. Despite widespread internet shutdowns and the difficulty of accessing information, Iranian teachers were able to collect and share the names, photographs and stories of around 240 children who had lost their lives.
Abdi believes that this record-building could one day help establish truth, accountability and redress for the state-committed abuses. “We see this as an important part of a future process of transitional justice,” he said.
After the U.S. military struck a school in Minab in February 2026, killing 150 people, including 120 children, teachers launched another documentation campaign. Titled “Abandoned Backpacks,” it symbolized the children who never returned to school.
But the significance of the campaigns transcends symbolism. “For us, these were also efforts aimed at seeking justice, preserving collective memory and defending children’s right to life and education,” Lotfi said.
Social organizing and consensus-buildingOne of the movement’s most fundamental structural challenges is that independent trade unions lack legal recognition in Iran. According to Lotfi, this creates obstacles before organizing even begins. Teachers cannot openly and formally recruit members or build a stable financial structure through membership dues to support research, education and organizing. Meetings and assemblies often occur only in private spaces.
The movement is therefore forced into a permanent contradiction: Much of its organizational work must happen informally, even as its demands are voiced publicly.
When those demands do become public, their spread encounters another barrier.
Pirouz Nami, who established the Teachers’ Trade Association of Khuzestan in 2012, said state-affiliated media often suppress teachers’ actual demands while portraying their activism as the product of foreign manipulation or hostile forces. “Within Iran, if any newspaper attempts to report the truth, it faces closure or prosecution,” Mohammadi explained. International coverage, Nami added, can create a different problem: sporadic attention that captures individual protests or arrests but misses the movement’s longer-term structures, relationships and organizing work.
In the face of such expansive challenges, teachers have developed an equally expansive repertoire of strategies. But those strategies remain peaceful, despite the repression and violence they are met with.
“One cannot seek freedom, justice and human dignity through methods that violate those very values,” said Habibi, who has himself been arrested and beaten for protesting.
“Teachers have a duty that goes beyond teaching textbooks,” says Mohammad Habibi, teacher and Coordinating Council of Iranian Teachers’ Trade Associations spokesperson. (Education International)Teachers organize strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins and letter-writing campaigns; issue joint statements; document rights violations; and use social media to raise public awareness. One teacher, who requested anonymity for safety reasons, recalled more theatrical actions he had participated in. In one, teachers collectively burned payslips; in another, they built a coffin for the education system and carried it through the streets in a mock funeral procession.
The decision to take action at all is one that’s shaped collectively before anyone takes to the streets.
Several teachers described decision-making within the CCITTA as a democratic process built around discussion, consensus and majority voting. Lotfi said consensus is woven into organizing from the earliest stage. Before a demand becomes a slogan, teachers discuss, analyze and write about it. Workshops and longer discussion sessions may follow, with supporters and opponents debating the idea.
“This transforms a demand from a simple slogan into an issue that teachers … can collectively defend,” Lotfi said.
Opposition to the privatization and commodification of education, for example, was not always universally shared. But as Iran’s once all-public education system gradually shifted toward greater private-sector involvement, a small group of teacher activists began arguing that privatization was undermining the constitutional guarantee of free public education. They discussed the consequences of this trend through written materials, meetings and debate. Over time, the idea gained broader support. Today, opposition to privatization, as well as advocacy for free, public and equitable education, have become some of the movement’s central priorities. In fact, according to Habibi, “It is because of teachers’ protests that the privatization of public education has proceeded much more slowly than successive governments would have liked.”
Alongside the demonstrations and strikes visible to the public and the state, teachers continually work to strengthen relationships within the movement. “Even activities that don’t seem directly related to our demands form a part of social organizing,” Lotfi said. Teachers meet online and in person. They organize hiking groups, walking groups, cultural programs and social gatherings. That work, Abdi said, helps build a movement that “doesn’t depend on one individual and preserves and reproduces its capacity to act, even under pressure.”
The trust created through those relationships can become crucial when repression strikes.
Solidarity with detained teachersIn May 2022, Lotfi was arrested when returning to his hometown, Marivan, ahead of a planned Teachers’ Day protest there.
“My tenant had informed my family beforehand about what was happening,” he recalled. “The security forces had surrounded my home. But I went back anyway because I had spent years working to create joint action, and didn’t want to miss that moment. I was arrested almost immediately after entering the city.”
State television later portrayed him negatively, including allegations that he had ties to “hostile countries,” which he says are unfounded. Authorities pointed to a friendly meeting between Lotfi and two French teacher trade unionists as evidence of those supposed connections.
His detention activated the networks he had spent years building.
Dozens of teachers demonstrated outside education offices and other government institutions. Teachers circulated statements and written appeals demanding his release. When Lotfi began a hunger strike to protest his detention and pressure to confess to ties with the French citizens, dozens of teachers began solidarity hunger strikes of their own. He was finally released on bail in August 2022, but was rearrested in October, during the Woman, Life, Freedom protests.
The wave of support he received was not unique to him.
Several teachers described a similar response whenever a colleague is detained or imprisoned: Associations issue public statements, raise awareness through social media and news outlets, and organize gatherings outside education offices and courthouses to pressure authorities for their colleagues’ release. Teachers also provide financial and emotional assistance to detainees’ families and try to secure legal support. The movement does not act alone. Habibi said volunteer lawyers, journalists and civil society activists have repeatedly stood alongside teachers, despite the consequences that solidarity can carry.
At the same time, teachers aligned with state authorities participate in what Lotfi described as mechanisms of control and repression. “They might spread rumors about activists, like portraying them as affiliated with foreign governments,” he said. The result can be fear and mistrust, discouraging even sympathetic teachers from publicly supporting detained colleagues.
For detained teachers, repression spills into the lives of their loved ones, who are left to absorb its emotional and material costs.
A teacher who requested anonymity because he is out on bail pending trial, described his wife being arrested alongside him this past spring, amid a broader crackdown on teachers’ union activists.
“Both my wife and I were beaten,” he said. “They blindfolded and handcuffed me and put me in a vehicle.”
During the two months he spent in detention, he said, a judicial officer threatened to reopen what he called “Glass Room No. 100.” The teacher described it as a place where protesters were raped with glass bottles — a form of sexual torture Amnesty International has independently documented against other detainees in Iran.
Like the other teachers interviewed, Nami endured years of threatening phone calls, surveillance at work and in the classroom, pay cuts, arrests, torture, solitary confinement and ultimately job dismissal. Watching his family endure the consequences alongside him, he said, doubled the weight. During Nami’s detentions, his wife had to manage the household and care for their eldest son, who has a severe physical disability, entirely on her own, while also living with rheumatism and diabetes.
Mohammadi testified about her detention experience to the women’s committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. She told them that when the Ministry of Intelligence summoned her, she went without informing her family. Security agents nevertheless tracked her children through her phone, causing them severe distress. After her arrest, authorities threatened her family against reporting her imprisonment to the media.
“But on a social level, going to prison under this regime no longer carries a social stigma,” she said. “On the contrary, people wear it as a badge of honor, proud to have stood up against the state.”
Building strength under wartime conditionsChallenges intensify during internet shutdowns and periods of war, like Iran is experiencing now. Habibi said teachers struggle to communicate, share information and coordinate activities; even maintaining contact with the families of imprisoned colleagues becomes difficult.
The danger extends to communication devices themselves. Lotfi said authorities sometimes seize activists’ phones and computers during arrests and searches and later use information stored on them in judicial proceedings, making secure communication a constant concern.
Even under these conditions, public action has not disappeared entirely.
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DonateThe Sept. 6 protest was one of the movement’s most recent public demonstrations, unfolding amid a broader wave of protests across the country that included actions by railway workers, nurses, unemployed youth and retirees over grievances like unpaid wages and the mishandling of pension funds.
But wartime conditions, intense repression and the imprisonment of many active organizers have forced teachers to retreat from frequent street demonstrations.
“We are trying to preserve our relationships and collective spirit through lower-risk activities happening across the country, such as group walks, hiking trips, film screenings, book discussions, and educational and cultural gatherings,” Habibi said.
One such lower-risk activity is a screening of “When We Fight” (a documentary about the 2019 Los Angeles teachers’ strike), planned for World Teachers’ Day on Oct. 5, possibly followed by a virtual conversation between Iranian teachers and American educators featured in the film about organizing strategies and shared experiences.
The CCITTA continues to provide financial support to imprisoned teachers, who currently number 15 by Habibi’s count, although resources have been strained by the uptick in arrests since January 2026 and payments have become smaller. The fund cannot take international donations, due to the government’s sensitivity to connections outside the country, so it is financed by voluntary donations from teachers, who risk having their bank accounts frozen in retaliation. “Still, each time this happens, a new account is created, and teachers begin making donations again,” Habibi said.
The CCITTA is also continuing its Empty Desks project. And as schools reopen, teachers, including Taban, are campaigning for the reinstatement of colleagues who were dismissed for their protest activity. In late September, teachers, parents and civil society activists launched a petition demanding the reinstatement of all dismissed teachers, rallying in particular around Kurdish teacher-activists Majid Karimi and Ghias Nemati. The two had briefly returned to their classrooms after a higher administrative body overturned earlier decisions barring them from service, only for education authorities to impose new penalties that again removed them from teaching.
“Although our methods might change because of the circumstances, our commitment to defending teachers’ rights, public education and civil society remains unchanged,” Habibi said.
This article Iran’s teachers movement perseveres against all odds was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
In Case You Missed It: Governor Newsom Vetoes Key Water Bills
- Native tribes denied greater say in water decisions with Newsom veto
- Newsom Vetoes Sacred Sites and Tribal Water Bills Despite Overwhelming Votes
- Tribal advocates say Newsom apologized for state history, then vetoed their bills
- Governor Newsom Ignores Water-Sector Consensus and Fails to Make Water Affordable in California
Newsom’s final legislative session has ended with broken promises, and sweeping vetoes of critical legislation. On September 30th, Governor Newsom vetoed AB 2218, Water policy: California Native American tribes. The bill, authored by Assemblymember Ash Kalra and co-sponsored by the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok and the Karuk Tribe, passed both chambers of the California Legislature with unanimous support: 28-0 in the Senate and 56-0 in the Assembly. Despite Newsom’s work with tribes on stewardship and landback initiatives, this decision highlights the State’s inability to translate words into actionable change.
In his veto message, Governor Newsom reiterated his administration’s recognition of “the historical harms perpetrated against Native peoples and tribal governments in California.” He attempts to rationalize this veto and continuing trend of leaving tribes out of important water decisions, arguing that passing this bill would undermine water policies addressing climate change, create duplicate work, and potentially disrupt important regulations, policies, permits, and grant criteria moving forward.
Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians Vice Chair Malissa Tayaba responded directly to this decision, stating, “Newsom’s veto of AB 2218 is a backhanded betrayal of California Tribes and a direct contradiction of his apology and promises of reconciliation. For nearly 200 years, California has made decisions about our waters without us, disregarding the tribes whose cultures, communities and lifeways depend on them. Newsom had instead aligned with ‘special water interests that profit from extractive and exploitive water management.’”
The Los Angeles Times and Sacramento Bee reported on the veto, depicting the long history of exclusion in California, and the importance of AB 2218 in providing Tribes a greater role in decisions affecting California water resources. Karuk Tribe Chairman Russell “Buster” Attebery said tribes “need to be at the table when decisions are being made,” and the bill was an important step toward changing that. The article also highlights California’s troubled water history dating back to the Gold Rush, when Tribes were forcibly removed from their lands and left without meaningful rights to the water resources they depended on.
In a continuing trend of vetoing important legislation, the Community Water Center’s bill, SB 1125: Water Rate Assistance Program, was another casualty of Governor Newsom’s September 30th legislative decisions. The groundbreaking legislation would have established a statewide Low-Income Water Rate Assistance Program, the first of its kind in the nation. Authored by Senator Caroline Menjivar, the bill would have addressed water affordability and helped ensure that families across California have access to safe and affordable water.
Read more about each bill and the Governor’s vetoes below:
- Native tribes denied greater say in water decisions with Newsom veto
- Newsom Vetoes Sacred Sites and Tribal Water Bills Despite Overwhelming Votes
- Tribal advocates say Newsom apologized for state history, then vetoed their bills
- Governor Newsom Ignores Water-Sector Consensus and Fails to Make Water Affordable in California
Reabold takeover fails
Reabold Resources has announced its takeover offer for Union Jack Oil has lapsed.
At the today’s deadline, the bid was supported by holders of just over 13% of Union Jack share capital.
Reabold said in a statement this evening it had not received sufficient acceptances from Union Jack investors by 1pm.
Extract from Reabold Resources statement, issued at 5.15pm, 2 October 2026The offer was conditional on receiving acceptances from holders of at least 75% of Union Jack’s existing share capital.
Reabold said that at 1pm today (2 October 2026), it had received acceptances from about 13.02%.
The statement said:
“As such, the Acceptance Condition has not been satisfied and the Offer has now lapsed”.
It added that the offr would have addressed challenges facing Union Jack and would have allowed shareholders to “participate in a better-capitalised platform with enhanced access to funding and a wider portfolio of assets”.
Reabold said it reserved the right to make a further offer if it were recommended by the Union Jack Board or a third party announced it intended to make an offer for Union Jack.
At the time of writing, Union Jack has not made a formal statement on the outcome of the takeover bid.
The offer, first made in June 2026, was backed by Union Jack’s then executive chairman, David Bramhill, and the company’s board. They had urged Union Jack shareholders to accept the offer.
But Mr Bramhill and two other directors were removed from the board on 24 August 2026 at a special meeting of shareholders.
They were replaced by Craig Howie and John Americanos, who opposed the Reabold takeover bid.
On 11 September 2026, in a circular to investors, the new Union Jack board recommended rejection of the offer. The board described the offer as “opportunistic” and said it “significantly undervalues Union Jack’s current project portfolio”.
Union Jack has the largest individual interest (40%) in the Wressle oil field in North Lincolnshire, PEDL180 and PEDL182.
It also has a 16.665% share in the West Newton oil and gas licence, PEDL183, in East Yorkshire and interests in PEDL5, PEDL209, PEDL241 and EXL294.
Last month, there were clashes between Union Jack and Reabold over West Newton, where there are plans for lower-volume fracking before the end of the year.
Union Jack said West Newton remained “an undeveloped gas and condensate discovery that has yet to establish sustained commercial production”. It also said “the outcome of the proposed stimulation” was not known.
Reabold Resources said it “strongly rejects” the suggestion that West Newton lacked “strategic merit”, It accused the new Union Jack board of “highly selective views” on the field.
Trump Administration Sued Over Fuel Economy Rollback
A coalition of environmental and consumer protection organizations filed a lawsuit today challenging the Trump administration’s final rule rolling back federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy, or CAFE, standards, a move that will make new vehicles less fuel efficient, increase gasoline consumption, and drive up costs for American drivers already facing high gas prices.
The lawsuit challenges the administration’s attempt to weaken longstanding fuel economy requirements that have helped reduce gasoline consumption and save drivers money at the pump. The rollback comes as families are already struggling with record-high gas prices, with transportation ranking as the second-largest household expense after housing, accounting for roughly 17% of average household spending.
The existing fuel economy standards would have saved 64 billion gallons of gas. Even before the current rise in gas prices, they were set to deliver $35 billion in savings to consumers over the lifetimes of the vehicles covered. Today’s final rule weakens those standards, allowing manufacturers to produce a fleet of vehicles in model year 2031 that are less efficient than the model year 2024 vehicle fleet that is already on our roads.
The administration’s own projections show that Americans will be forced to spend over $1,600 more on fuel over the life of these life-efficient vehicles, and NHTSA estimates this final rule will result in an increase of over 121 billion gallons of fuel consumption through 2050.
“With gas prices at historic highs, Trump picked the worst possible time to roll back federal mileage standards,” said David Pettit, an attorney at the Center for Biological Diversity’s Climate Law Institute. “Oil companies will profit from less efficient cars, but drivers will take a hit to their wallets and our kids will breathe dirtier air. We’ll all pay the price for more tailpipe pollutants spewing everywhere from playgrounds to wild places. We’re asking the courts to put a stop to this callous giveaway to Big Oil and Big Auto.”
“We’re taking the Trump administration to court for this reckless rollback that prioritizes Big Oil and automaker profits over American families,” said Katherine Garcia, director of Sierra Club’s Clean Transportation for All. “It is unlawful for Trump to turn back the clock on fuel-efficient cars forcing drivers to waste more money on gas and communities to breathe toxic air. The Sierra Club is proud to stand with our coalition partners in defending our right to cleaner, more affordable vehicles.”
“The Trump administration is steering us toward cars that burn more gas to travel the same miles, draining family budgets along the way,” said James Crowley, senior attorney at Conservation Law Foundation. “As the needle drops toward empty, more grocery and rent money goes into the tank, while more pollution fills the air we breathe. We’re taking this administration to court because families can’t afford to be steered backward.”
“Consumers need more fuel efficient choices when considering new cars, and they deserve vehicles that get more miles per gallon and miles per dollar,” said Robert Weissman, co-president of Public Citizen. “Trump’s lawless push to roll back key safeguards on fuel economy will pollute our air, and line the pockets of oil and auto CEOs. We are confident of stopping Trump’s CAFE standards rollback.”
“The Trump administration’s rollback will mean wasted gas, more air pollution, and higher costs for Americans who are already struggling with high fuel prices,” said Andy Su, senior transportation attorney at Environmental Defense Fund. “We’re going to court to oppose this dangerous U-turn away from decades of successful work to make our cars more efficient and less expensive to drive.”
Silencing the Story: Surveillance and Harassment Limit Reporting on Harita’s Nickel Operations in Indonesia
In 2025, I sat locked in a room in a private home as military officials camped on the front porch. A surveillance photo of me taken that morning was circulating on WhatsApp around Kawasi Village, where I was staying on Obi Island in Indonesia. I was visiting as a representative of Earthworks, along with colleagues from Indonesian environmental NGO WALHI.
When I heard that surveillance and harassment resulted in WALHI staff and journalists abandoning their attempted reporting trip to that same village this summer, I recognized a pattern.
The North Maluku branch of the Indonesian NGO WALHI has experienced an environment of increasing hostilities and intimidation related to their work to support and advocate with mining-impacted communities on Obi Island. I saw it first hand. Now reporters had seen it too.
Nickel mining transforms a fishing villageThe story on Obi Island has global significance. Nickel mining is booming in Indonesia. The country’s annual nickel production in 2015 was 130,000 tons. In 2025, it was 2.6M tons. This island nation is now responsible for more than 60 percent of the world’s nickel production. Much of that nickel goes into batteries, including batteries for electric vehicles.
In 2010, Obi Island, known for its fishing and spice economy, became the site of a large nickel mining and processing operation owned by Harita Group. Since its opening, the operation has caused an explosion of environmental and social harms:
- environmental pollution,
- toxic and carcinogenic chemical leaks that affect drinking water,
- displacement of local residents,
- health issues,
- mine waste facilities that are at risk for catastrophic failure, and
- reports of threats and intimidation and harassment of people speaking out.
Kawasi Village residents have called for more transparency around Harita’s operations. WALHI and the Indonesian Society of Environmental Journalists (SIEJ) point out that, “there can be no environmental justice without information justice.”
A transition to cleaner transportation needs to be built with minerals that are sourced responsibly, and operations on Obi Island are raising concerns. Buyers, consumers, human rights advocates, environmentalists, and others are starting to pay attention.
Communities need to be able to tell their stories without fear, and the media must be able to report those stories to the public.
Companies and governments around the world use fear and harassment to try to silence communities that are defending their rights in the face of mining operations. But at Earthworks, we know that people who are standing up for their families and their land and water are not easy to silence, and their voices must be heard in order to find lasting solutions.
Journalists cancel visit due to intimidationMost recently, a group of journalists experienced intimidation and surveillance. Over the course of four days in June and July 2026, WALHI and SEIJ jointly organized a trip for five journalists to report about the situation on Obi Island.
The journalists who attended were from Konde, which focuses on women’s issues in Indonesia; Mongabay, an international environmental science publication; Project Multatuli, a collective focused on underreported populations and holding power accountable; Bahalo Project; and Tempo, one of the largest and best-known newspapers in Indonesia.
Obi Island is only reachable by boat, and the surveillance began while the group was on a ferry, en route to the island. Two people began following the group on board the ferry and asking questions about the purpose of their work and trip to Obi Island.
When the SIEJ and WALHI group arrived on Obi Island, the police chief said that they had entered without alerting local authorities and security officials. Residents of one of the towns on the island, Kawasi Village, had to come and help transport the group to safety.
A group from Eco Village, a village where Harita has relocated some residents impacted by their operations, also attempted to turn the reporters away at the port.
The journalists were forced to cancel their visit to the area and were unable to continue their reporting work.
Indonesian military surveillance targets Earthworks and WALHIThis is not the first time that civil society groups have faced intimidation and surveillance while visiting Obi Island for work regarding Harita Group’s operations and impacts.
In April 2025, during a visit with WALHI staff to Kawasi Village, I was surveilled and harassed by military security officials.
Within 12 hours of arriving on the ferry, my photo was circulating via WhatsApp messages. Military security contacted a colleague to let them know that they had my photo and to ask questions about the purpose and timing of my visit. Plainclothes military officials visited the home where I was staying with a local family. The officers camped out on the front porch for hours while I stayed locked away in my room.
The harassment continued while in transit leaving Obi Island. Plainclothes military officials turned up on a neighboring island as we switched boats. They began interrogating WALHI colleagues about me and our visit to Kawasi Village. I decided to spend the nearly 24-hour trip that remained inside a small cabin to avoid further harassment by the officials.
These tactics effectively limited Earthworks and WALHI’s ability to witness mining impacts on the village and surrounding areas and to speak with community members living near Harita’s operations.
Intimidation pattern raises concernsHarita Group’s operations on Obi Island are currently undergoing an audit by the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance. IRMA offers independent assessments of whether or not specific industrial mines meet standards for responsible mining. Voluntary standards like IRMA can be a powerful way to improve mining companies’ practices. Everyone involved, including communities and NGO staff, needs to be able to engage in the process without fear.
Both incidents took place around the time when IRMA auditors were expected to be visiting the area. The 2025 incident occurred just days before the onsite audit. Currently, Harita is nearing the end of its optional corrective action period as part of this audit. That means another review of the operations by the audit team will take place in the coming months.
Earthworks reported these incidents to the audit team, highlighting concerns about residents’ ability to safely participate in the audit without fear of intimidation or retaliation, as well as the pattern of military security restricting access to Kawasi Village, the community most directly affected by Harita’s operations. In its July 2026 update, Harita states that “During and beyond the CAP process, communities, and other stakeholders may raise concerns at any time through our whistleblowing and public grievance channels, which allow anonymous or non-anonymous reporting, with each matter logged, reviewed, and tracked through to resolution.”
Effective corporate grievance mechanisms like Harita’s require trust that reports will result in action to address the issue and that retaliation will not result — or they require stakeholders to carefully weigh the risks to themselves and others. Now that my experience is part of a pattern, I decided to share this story publicly.
Earthworks and Indonesian NGOs call on officials uphold human rights and transparencyWALHI and SIEJ point out that Law 40 in Indonesia protects freedom of press and freedom from interference and Law 32 and the Indonesian Constitution protect the right to a healthy environment. Attempts to silence reporting on the impacts from mining operations on Obi Island are not in the spirit of the national laws upholding democratic institutions and good governance.
Community members, NGO experts, and reporters must be able to speak about the impacts of mining without harassment and fear. Their knowledge and insights are important for buyers, policymakers, and advocates. We need truth, not silence, to build a sustainable future that works for everyone.
Earthworks joins WALHI AND SIEJ’s call for Harita Group to uphold the principles of democracy, human rights, transparency, and freedom of press.
The post Silencing the Story: Surveillance and Harassment Limit Reporting on Harita’s Nickel Operations in Indonesia appeared first on Earthworks.
As Trump Sets Largest Oil & Gas Lease Sale in Almost 20 Years, 75 Groups Urge Gov Newsom: Protect California Before You Go
Federal auction of 43 parcels, including land inside SB 1137’s health protection zones, puts California’s landmark public health law in the crosshairs of Trump’s “drill baby drill” agenda
SACRAMENTO, CA — As the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) set a Dec. 1 date to auction off oil and gas drilling rights on roughly 35,000 acres of California public land — the largest oil and gas lease sale since 2009 — 75 environmental justice, health, faith, Indigenous and conservation organizations representing millions of Californians are asking Governor Newsom to protect Californians from federal overreach.
In a letter sent to Governor Newsom, Natural Resources Secretary Wade Crowfoot, Deputy Cabinet Secretary Sarah Swig and State Oil and Gas Supervisor Douglas Ito, the coalition warns that the Trump administration has launched “an all-out attack on our state’s health and environment” by opening up acres of land for oil drilling on the state’s federal land. It urges the Newsom administration to uphold his commitment to the progress he made during his two terms by locking in the protections of SB 1137, the landmark law that prohibits oil drilling within 3,200 feet of communities, and California’s fracking ban before his term ends.
BLM announced today that it will offer 43 parcels in Kern, Kings, San Luis Obispo and Fresno counties at an online lease sale on Dec. 1, 2026. A 30-day public protest period opened today and closes Nov. 2. BLM itself notes that leasing is only the first step, and that no development can begin until an operator applies for a permit to drill, a process in which BLM coordinates with state partners, including CalGEM. That state permit is where California has the power to say no.
“In Kern County, we already live next to thousands of oil wells. BLM calls leasing ‘just the first step.’ We know where those steps lead: to more asthma, more cancer, more families breathing in someone else’s profits. The state permit is the last line of defense, and it has to hold.” said Cesar Aguirre, Director of the Air & Climate Justice Team Central California Environmental Justice Network (CCEJN).
“The federal government just put a date on the calendar to auction off drilling rights next to California homes and schools. Governor Newsom has two months to make sure that when those leases are sold, the state’s answer to new wells in our neighborhoods is already written down: no.” said Ilonka Zlatar, California Climate Justice Organizer with the Oil and Gas Action Network (OGAN).
A federal lease sale that reaches into health protection zones
In June, the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) opened more than a million acres of California public land to new oil and gas leasing, including fracking. More than 175,000 people submitted comments opposing it, but BLM made virtually no changes and continues to ignore California’s related laws. Its proposed December 2026 lease sale covers 44 parcels, roughly 36,000 acres in the Bakersfield and Central Coast regions. The sale includes:
- Nearly 3,800 acres inside SB 1137’s health protection zones, the 3,200-foot buffers that keep new wells away from homes, schools, daycares and hospitals
- Nearly 13,000 acres bordering Carrizo Plain National Monument
- More than 1,300 acres within the Lokern-Buena Vista and Chico Martinez Areas of Critical Environmental Concern & habitat for endangered species
“These public lands are precious wild spaces that belong to all Californians, not the polluting oil industry,” said Victoria Bogdan Tejeda, an attorney at the Center for Biological Diversity’s Climate Law Institute. “Trump’s nonsensical fossil fuel frenzy is no excuse to sacrifice California wildlife, communities and the climate. We won’t let this reckless land grab stand.”
BLM’s environmental assessment found “no significant impact” to the drilling expansion. It also found, preliminarily, that no historic properties would be affected, even though the land is within the ancestral homelands of the Chumash, Yokuts and Salinan peoples and near Painted Rock, one of the most significant Indigenous sacred sites in North America.
“This land holds our ancestors’ stories. This 36,000 acre oil lease is on the ancestral homelands of several Tribal Nations, including the Yokuts, Mono, Shoshone, Chumash, Kawaiisu, Tejon, Salinan, and Tübatulabal relatives. For the federal government to claim that drilling near Painted Rock would affect no historic properties shows how little regard it has for Indigenous Peoples. This affects the health of millions of community members, as well as the health of the lands, waters, and natural relatives. California must not rubber-stamp it,” said Starry Insixingmay, Sacred Places Institute for Indigenous Peoples.
The lease sale comes as the U.S. Department of Justice, representing BLM, continues its lawsuit to overturn SB 1137’s health protection zones. On March 31, 2026, a federal court refused the administration’s request to suspend the law while the case proceeds, finding that the federal government “has not demonstrated that it is likely to succeed” on the merits. The lawsuit is still ongoing.
No oil or gas well can be drilled in California, whether on federal, state or private land, without a permit from the state’s Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM). That permitting process is discretionary. The coalition is asking the Newsom administration to:
- Direct CalGEM to require full review under the California Environmental Quality Act for any permit tied to this lease sale or any future federal lease, instead of relying on BLM’s federal environmental assessment.
- Affirm that SB 1137’s health protection zones apply in full to every well permit, whether the land or mineral rights are federal, state or private.
- Confirm that the state will enforce its fracking ban on all drilling projects, including those on federal leases.
The groups ask the administration to put these directives in writing through rulemakings, policies, executive orders or guidelines, so the protections outlast the current administration.
“Frontline communities fought for years to win SB 1137. We can’t let a federal agency erase it with a ‘no significant impact’ finding. The Governor has the authority to stop this, and we’re asking him to use it before he leaves office.” said Tanvi Kardile, Coalition Manager for Voices in Solidarity Against Oil in Neighbourhoods (VISION).
The coalition points to Santa Barbara as a warning. There, the Trump administration moved to restart Sable Offshore’s long-dormant, failed pipeline over the objections of the state agencies responsible for protecting the coast. “Just as the state is fighting that action,” the letter says, “it must do everything it can to defend SB 1137 and the state’s fracking ban.California led the nation in protecting communities from the harms of oil and gas drilling,” the letter concludes. “We are asking all of you, together, to use that time and that authority now — this is your legacy to protect.”
Signers include Voices In Solidarity Against Oil in Neighborhoods (VISION), the California Environmental Justice Alliance, Communities for a Better Environment, Sierra Club California, Sacred Places Institute for Indigenous Peoples, Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles, Oil Change International, GreenLatinos and others. The full letter and list of signers are available here.
The post As Trump Sets Largest Oil & Gas Lease Sale in Almost 20 Years, 75 Groups Urge Gov Newsom: Protect California Before You Go appeared first on Last Chance Alliance.
OPL 245 Twist: Italy’s Supreme Court Says Shell-Eni Prosecutors Did Not Breach Their Legal Duties
The detailed judgment behind the acquittal of former Milan prosecutors Fabio De Pasquale and Sergio Spadaro has now been published—and it overturns the proposition that their handling of potentially favourable material in the Shell-Eni Nigeria prosecution amounted to a criminal refusal to perform their duties.
The extraordinary legal afterlife of the Shell-Eni OPL 245 affair has produced another important development.
Italy’s Court of Cassation has published the reasoning behind its decision to clear former Milan prosecutors Fabio De Pasquale and Sergio Spadaro, who had themselves been convicted after the collapse of the enormous corruption prosecution involving Shell, Eni and Nigeria’s controversial OPL 245 offshore oil licence.
The decision is significant because the two prosecutors had previously been convicted twice—at first instance and on appeal—and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment for refusing to perform official acts.
Italy’s highest court overturned those convictions on 18 June 2026.
Now we know in much greater detail why.
In judgment No. 34812/2026, whose reasons were filed on 29 September, the Court of Cassation concluded that the action the prosecutors were accused of failing to perform was not legally mandatory and involved prosecutorial discretion. It therefore did not constitute the criminal offence for which they had been convicted. Giurisprudenza Penale
That provides an important new chapter in a story that has been running for well over a decade.
The prosecution that turned on its prosecutorsThe origins lie in the notorious OPL 245 transaction.
In 2011 Shell and Eni participated in agreements involving the Nigerian government concerning rights to the enormous deep-water offshore block.
The transaction subsequently became the subject of international investigations and allegations that money paid in connection with the deal ultimately benefited Nigerian officials and other individuals.
Shell and Eni denied corruption.
Italian prosecutors eventually brought one of the largest international corporate corruption cases ever tried in Italy.
Then, on 17 March 2021, the Milan Tribunal acquitted Shell, Eni and the individual defendants. The acquittals subsequently became final after prosecutors withdrew their appeal. Shell maintains that there was never evidence of a corrupt agreement or corrupt payments. Shell
But the story did not end there.
Instead, attention turned to the conduct of the prosecutors themselves.
Accused of withholding favourable materialDe Pasquale and Spadaro were accused of failing to make available material that could have assisted the defendants.
The controversy included chats and other material originating from another investigative strand being handled by fellow prosecutor Paolo Storari.
The accusation was serious: that information potentially favourable to defendants in the OPL 245 trial had not been acquired and disclosed when it should have been.
A Brescia court convicted the prosecutors, and in October 2025 an appeals court upheld their eight-month sentences.
The Brescia appeal judgment took a particularly strong position. According to ANSA’s January 2026 report on the reasons, the appeal court characterised the failure to deposit favourable material as a conscious refusal to carry out an obligatory and urgent act. ANSA.it
The Court of Cassation has now rejected the criminal-law foundation of that conclusion.
What Italy’s highest court actually decidedThis is where the newly published judgment becomes particularly important.
The Cassation Court stressed that the case before it was not a general inquiry into whether every aspect of the prosecutors’ behaviour was correct.
Nor was it questioning the prosecutor’s obligation to act loyally and impartially.
The much narrower legal question was whether the particular conduct amounted to the specific criminal offence of refusing to perform an official act under Article 328 of the Italian Criminal Code.
The answer was no.
The court concluded that the act the prosecutors supposedly refused to perform was not a mandatory act required by the relevant provisions of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. Instead, it involved what the court described as delicate discretionary assessments belonging to the prosecutor responsible for the case. Giurisprudenza Penale
That distinction is crucial.
A prosecutor may have duties of fairness and impartiality, but according to the Cassation Court it does not follow that every disputed prosecutorial decision constitutes a criminal refusal to perform an official duty.
As the court’s reasoning makes clear, not every possible breach of professional correctness is itself a crime. Giurisprudenza Penale
The disputed chatsThe judgment goes further.
According to the published summary of the Cassation decision, the failure to acquire the chats identified by Storari did not involve decisive exculpatory evidence, and the decision not to acquire them was not improper in the criminal-law sense at issue before the court. Giurisprudenza Penale
The court also found that there had been no criminally relevant act of refusal or attributable omission by De Pasquale and Spadaro.
Their position had effectively been referred upwards to the Milan chief prosecutor and deputy chief prosecutor, who did not override it. Giurisprudenza Penale
That is a markedly different interpretation from that reached by the lower courts.
Two convictions wiped awayThis was not a retrial producing a reduced sentence.
The Court of Cassation annulled the convictions without remitting the case for another trial, using the formula perché il fatto non sussiste—essentially, because the alleged criminal act did not exist.
The judgment therefore brought the criminal proceedings against the prosecutors to an end. Giurisprudenza Penale
Global Investigations Review now reports the decision under the succinct headline:
“Shell-Eni prosecutors didn’t breach legal duties.” globalinvestigationsreview.com
That is broadly accurate as a description of the criminal-law finding, although the judgment itself contains an important nuance: the Cassation Court deliberately distinguished the question of criminal liability from a broader assessment of prosecutorial conduct.
That distinction should not be lost.
An extraordinary reversalThe sequence is remarkable.
First, Shell, Eni and the individual defendants were prosecuted over one of the biggest alleged international corruption schemes to reach an Italian courtroom.
They were acquitted.
Then two of the prosecutors who brought the case were themselves prosecuted over their handling of potentially favourable material.
They were convicted.
Their convictions were upheld on appeal.
And now Italy’s highest court has overturned those convictions completely.
Reuters reported after the June ruling that the prosecutor-general before the Court of Cassation had himself sought the full acquittal of De Pasquale and Spadaro. Euronext
But this does not rewrite the OPL 245 recordCare is required here.
The Cassation decision does not convict Shell or Eni of anything.
Their Italian criminal acquittals remain final.
Equally, the new judgment should not be read as a judicial declaration resolving every historical controversy surrounding OPL 245.
The Court of Cassation was deciding whether De Pasquale and Spadaro committed a particular criminal offence through their handling of material during the prosecution.
It concluded they did not.
That is a much narrower proposition.
The underlying OPL 245 documentary history—including the negotiations, payment structures, internal corporate communications and differing interpretations of what participants knew—continues to exist independently of the eventual criminal outcomes.
Indeed, an extensive collection of documents from the Milan proceedings remains publicly archived by the OPL245 Papers project. OPL245 Papers
Shell and Eni are back in OPL 245There is another reason why this historical litigation remains relevant in 2026.
OPL 245 is no longer merely an old courtroom story.
Earlier this year the Nigerian government reached an agreement enabling the former OPL 245 acreage to move forward under Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Act.
The former licence has been converted into two petroleum mining leases and two petroleum prospecting licences, involving Eni as operator alongside the Nigerian national oil company and Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company.
Shell describes the licences as part of its expanding Nigerian deep-water portfolio. Shell
Thus an oil block that spent years generating investigations, criminal proceedings, civil claims and international controversy is once again part of Shell and Eni’s commercial future.
The latest chapter, not necessarily the last wordThe newly released Cassation judgment closes one remarkable subsidiary chapter of OPL 245.
Fabio De Pasquale and Sergio Spadaro stand acquitted.
Their previous convictions have been annulled.
Italy’s highest court has found that the prosecutorial decision at issue involved discretion rather than a mandatory legal act whose refusal constituted a crime. Giurisprudenza Penale
That does not reverse Shell and Eni’s acquittals.
It does something different.
It means that the prosecutors who unsuccessfully pursued Shell and Eni have now themselves emerged from the criminal justice system without convictions.
For anyone attempting to write a definitive history of OPL 245, that distinction matters.
The case has produced an extraordinary succession of allegations, investigations, trials, acquittals, prosecutions of prosecutors, convictions of those prosecutors—and finally the annulment of those convictions by Italy’s highest court.
And after all of that, Shell and Eni are once again preparing to develop the Nigerian acreage at the centre of the entire affair.
Sources: Global Investigations Review, 1 October 2026; Italian Court of Cassation, Sixth Criminal Section, Judgment No. 34812/2026, reasons filed 29 September 2026; Reuters; Giurisprudenza Penale; Shell plc; Eni; ANSA; OPL245 Papers. globalinvestigationsreview.com
OPL 245 Twist: Italy’s Supreme Court Says Shell-Eni Prosecutors Did Not Breach Their Legal Duties was first posted on October 2, 2026 at 5:41 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Chiricahua positioned to become Arizona’s newest national park
Arizona is one signature away from its fourth national park. The Senate passed a bill by unanimous consent Wednesday to redesignate Chiricahua National Monument as a national park and sent it to President Trump’s desk.
The bill was sponsored by U.S. Representative Juan Ciscomani and U.S. Senators Mark Kelly and Ruben Gallego. It leaves the monument’s roughly 12,000-acre boundaries as they are, and it requires consultation with Tribes and continued access for traditional Tribal uses.
Local officials hope the new name will bring more tourists to a site that had just over 70,000 visitors last year. Bill Wade, executive director of the Association of National Park Rangers, said Chiricahua is “certainly worthy of national park status,” but added, “Like a lot of other areas, it is most likely understaffed.”
Some of Chiricahua’s basic needs are already on hold. A new interactive map from the Center for Western Priorities shows 1,492 Park Service projects that Interior department officials classified as “low priority.” Three of them are at Chiricahua: emergency mold abatement in occupied staff housing, replacing electrical systems in historic buildings, and security upgrades. Top-priority work was fast-tracked instead, including a $16 million effort to paint the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool blue.
“These are the everyday projects that keep parks open and running: roof repairs, replacing outdated computers, even buying toilet paper and garbage bags. None of that is low priority. It’s the basic work of national parks,” said Lilly Bock-Brownstein of the Center for Western Priorities.
MLB drops proposal to host baseball game at Grand Teton National ParkMajor League Baseball has dropped its proposal to host a game in Wyoming’s Grand Teton National Park. Last weekend, the Washington Post reported that a National Park Service official scouted possible sites. Local leaders then sent letters to Interior Secretary Doug Burgum and MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred expressing “strong opposition.” In a Thursday letter, Manfred wrote that “it has become clear the local community does not want us to continue evaluating Grand Teton National Park as a potential site.”
Quick hits Interior is paying $3.4M to repair the national mall’s turf DC judge permanently dismisses case charging ex-Olympian with vandalizing Reflecting Pool The Trump admin cut funding to a conservation nonprofit. The group has no idea why South Korea contests U.S. claims of new $50 billion pipeline in Alaska MLB drops proposal to host a baseball game at Grand Teton National ParkAssociated Press | Washington Post | Jackson Hole News & Guide |
Conservation groups sue to halt expansion of Hermosa mine onto public lands in Arizona Chiricahua National Park Act headed to President Trump may create Arizona’s fourth national parkArizona’s Family | Arizona Daily Star | 13 News | KGUN | KVOA
4 more endangered California condors take flight near the Grand Canyon Quote of the dayIt’s very bewildering to see these cuts at a time when public interest and love for public lands is at an all-time high.”
—Peter Woodruff, executive director of the Great Basin Institute, SFGATE
Picture This @devilstowernpsWhile Katmai had its Fat Bear Week, here at Devils Tower we are entering our Fat Prairie Dog Week. In preparation for winter prairie dogs will also fatten up. The fatter the prairie dog the better chance it has of surviving the winter. While the prairie dogs in the park don’t hibernate, food can be scarce in the winter, so they need to pack on the pounds. Below is the fattest prairie dog we have ever seen at Devils Tower National Monument. What has been your best sighting of a plump animal? NPS/Brian C. #DevilsTower#FindYourPark
(Featured image: Chiricahua National Monument, Arizona. Photo by Ken Lund, Flickr)
The post Chiricahua positioned to become Arizona’s newest national park appeared first on Center for Western Priorities.
Big banks behind “net zero” alliance continued lending to coal firms
Several major banks that helped set up the UN’s now-defunct Net-Zero Banking Alliance (NZBA) in 2021 have since continued to lend money to coal companies, a new report has revealed.
Bank of America, Barclays, Citibank, Deutsche Bank and Santander were heavily involved in the NZBA and the associated Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) when it was launched by Mark Carney, then a UN climate envoy and now Canada’s leader, in the run-up to the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow.
Despite their involvement, data released this week shows those banks and some others did not reduce the amount of money they lent, nor the value of their underwriting, to coal activities between 2022 and 2025. Around half of the NZBA members who were engaged in coal financing over that time increased it and half cut it, according to the report by German environmental research group Urgewald.
Ana Botín, executive chair of Santander, was a member of the GFANZ CEO principals’ group and said at the time of the NZBA launch that her Spanish bank was “proud to be part of the founding members of this new alliance and to accelerate progress towards net zero”.
Since then, the report’s data documents that Santander has provided loans and underwriting worth hundreds of millions of dollars each year to coal companies, particularly American coal-power plant operators Duke Energy and the Southern Company. Santander did not respond to a request for comment.
Urgewald’s research adjusts the value of loans and underwriting provided to coal companies based on how much of a company’s revenues come from the most polluting fossil fuel. So a hypothetical $100 million loan to German utility RWE is valued at $21 million, as 21% of RWE’s revenue is from coal.
The research does not take account of whether companies are expanding their coal business or phasing it out for greener alternatives. Some banks have said their coal clients need to put in place transition plans by a certain date. Some also say that, by a certain date, they will stop lending money to clients that get more than a set percentage of their revenue from coal.
Most companies expanding coal are in Asian nations like China, India and Indonesia and are largely financed by banks from their own countries. But there are examples of NZBA founding members supporting companies that are actively prolonging the life of their coal businesses.
For example, Glencore, a Switzerland-based multinational that gets 4% of its revenue from coal, has just won preliminary regulatory approval to keep on coal mining in Australia’s Hunter Valley until 2045. Last year, the company was supported by loans and underwriting from Bank of America, Citigroup, Santander, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Standard Chartered.
Good and bad newsSome NZBA founding members like Swiss giant UBS have reduced their loans and underwriting for coal companies, the data suggests. Others – like Triodos and Kenya Commercial Bank – have provided no support for coal companies since at least 2021.
Urgewald researcher Hannah O’Neill told Climate Home News that “the banking sector is not moving in one direction. There is a growing divide between banks that are tightening their coal policies and reducing their exposure, and those where coal policies remain weak or where financing continues.”
Unlike the UN’s Race to Zero campaign, with which it partnered, the NZBA did not require its members to end financing for fossil fuels like coal, leading to accusations by climate campaigners that its rules were too weak.
Despite this, after Donald Trump’s re-election as US president in November 2024, several North American banks quit the alliance and the NZBA’s requirements were diluted in April 2025. After further withdrawals, the group shut itself down in October 2025.
Globally, the Urgewald report found that many banks in the European Union, Thailand, Malaysia, India and Taiwan have reduced their coal finance since governments agreed at COP26 to phase down coal power.
But with Chinese, American, Indonesian and South Korean banks increasing their support, total bank financing for the coal industry has remained broadly the same each year since 2022.
“Coal financing is not disappearing – but it is concentrating in banks and markets where coal policies are either missing or weak,” said Heffa Schücking, director of Urgewald.
Urgewald’s definition of coal companies includes firms and their subsidiaries that explore for, process, trade, transport and mine coal, or burn it in power plants to produce electricity, or manufacture equipment for the coal industry. It does not include companies that use coal to make cement or steel – and an adjustment is made to account for how much of the business model is coal-related.
Banks defend delaysAt the time of publication, most of the banks named in the report for increasing their coal finance had not responded to requests for comment. But a spokesperson for Deutsche Bank pointed Climate Home News to its May 2026 announcement that it was delaying its requirement for existing clients to present it with transition plans and cut their coal exposure.
Instead of having to present these plans by the end of 2025, the bank has given them until the end of 2027. They will also have to ensure that their revenue share from thermal coal falls below half by then, the bank added. New clients need energy transition plans to access finance.
Deutsche Bank said at the time it was delaying its requirements because of the “increasingly complex regulatory environment as well as differing speeds of energy transition in various regions beyond what was anticipated by Deutsche Bank in 2023”.
Big banks’ lending to coal backers undermines Indonesia’s green plans
A spokesperson for Barclays told Climate Home News: “Many companies in this report are diversified energy or mining companies. We do not provide financing to companies that generate more than 30% of revenues from thermal coal mining or power generation, and we will phase out all financing by 2035.”
The Barclays spokesperson added: “Barclays is financing an energy sector in transition, providing finance to meet current energy needs and also financing the scaling of clean energy. Over the past three years, we have facilitated more than $300 billion of sustainable and transition finance, including billions to cleaner energy projects, and invested millions into climate tech.”
The post Big banks behind “net zero” alliance continued lending to coal firms appeared first on Climate Home News.
Driving Impact and Action Together at Climate Week NYC
Four Ways North Carolina Can Meet Growing Electric Loads Without Increasing Utility Bills
The post Four Ways North Carolina Can Meet Growing Electric Loads Without Increasing Utility Bills appeared first on ACEEE | American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy.
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