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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 OCTOBER 2026
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 OCTOBER 2026 SLF-2007-088 The Sakhalin Papers LXXVIII: Washington Enters the Pipeline War — US Sanctions, German Resistance and Shell’s Nord Stream 2 Exposure
Between April 2017 and February 2022, Royal Dutch Shell’s financial participation in Nord Stream 2 became entangled in an escalating confrontation between Washington, Berlin and Moscow. The United States threatened sanctions against companies supporting the Russian gas pipeline. Germany resisted what it regarded as extraterritorial interference in European energy policy. A major offshore contractor abandoned construction work, while the American government subsequently warned that even financing partners could face sanctions. The pipeline was eventually completed, but it never entered commercial service. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany halted its certification, Washington sanctioned the project company, and Shell announced its withdrawal. In May 2022, Shell recognised a $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan. Authenticated corporate announcements, American sanctions records, German government statements, European court proceedings and contemporaneous reporting reveal how a commercially ambitious energy project accumulated increasingly visible political and financial risks.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-088
Publication date: 15 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Principal authenticated records: Shell and OMV corporate announcements, 24 April 2017; German Federal Government statement, 16 June 2017; US State Department sanctions guidance, 27 December 2019 and 15 July 2020; US-German Joint Statement, 21 July 2021; Shell corporate announcement, 28 February 2022; Shell First Quarter 2022 Financial Results, 5 May 2022.
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, June 2017, December 2019 and July 2020; Associated Press, September 2021; S&P Global, September 2021 and February 2022.
Judicial and regulatory context: Court of Justice of the European Union, Nord Stream 2 AG v European Parliament and Council, Case C-348/20 P, judgment of 12 July 2022; German Federal Network Agency certification decision, 16 November 2021; German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, 22 February 2022.
Evidence standard: Corporate commitments are distinguished from actual payments and equity ownership. Sanctions threats are distinguished from sanctions imposed. Government political assessments are attributed to their authors. Judicial decisions are reported according to their actual legal effect. Financial write-downs are distinguished from proof of misconduct or negligence.
The previous instalment, The Shell Leaks Files — 14 October 2026, examined Poland’s extraordinary attempt to penalise Gazprom and five Western European energy companies over their participation in Nord Stream 2.
The Polish regulator initially imposed penalties exceeding PLN 29 billion against Gazprom and PLN 30 million against Shell.
Those principal competition penalties were subsequently overturned by the Polish courts.
But Poland was not the only government challenging Nord Stream 2.
Another confrontation was developing across the Atlantic.
Unlike Poland’s competition authority, Washington was not primarily concerned with whether the financing agreements constituted an unauthorised corporate concentration.
The United States regarded the pipeline as a strategic threat to European energy security and Ukraine’s position as a transit country for Russian natural gas.
Germany regarded the project differently.
Successive German governments argued that additional gas infrastructure could benefit European energy consumers and objected strongly to American attempts to impose sanctions on European companies undertaking lawful commercial activities.
Shell occupied an increasingly uncomfortable position between these competing interpretations.
It had entered into a substantial financing commitment with Gazprom’s pipeline company.
It was participating in a project that Germany supported but several other European governments opposed.
And it faced the prospect that the United States might extend its sanctions regime to companies financing Russian energy infrastructure.
The surviving documents establish that these risks did not emerge suddenly in February 2022.
They developed over several years.
The central question is what those documents reveal about the accumulation of risk — and what investors could reasonably have understood at the time.
1. April 2017: Shell commits up to €950 millionOn 24 April 2017, Shell joined ENGIE, OMV, Uniper and Wintershall in signing financing agreements with Nord Stream 2 AG.
Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of the pipeline company.
The five Western European participants agreed to provide financing and guarantees covering half the project’s anticipated €9.5 billion cost.
Each company committed up to €950 million.
The agreement provided for an initial long-term funding facility of €285 million per company.
Further financing and guarantees of up to €665 million depended upon subsequent project requirements and decisions.
This distinction matters.
Shell did not acquire the 10 per cent shareholding originally envisaged in September 2015.
Its participation had become a contractual financing arrangement.
Nor does the €950 million commitment establish that Shell immediately transferred that entire amount.
It represented a maximum agreed financial exposure under the financing arrangements.
The participating companies presented Nord Stream 2 as commercially necessary infrastructure.
They argued that declining European gas production would increase demand for imports and that an additional Baltic Sea pipeline would strengthen supply security.
The corporate announcement also identified the project’s intended capacity: 55 billion cubic metres of gas annually.
The planned route extended approximately 1,220 kilometres from Russia across the Baltic Sea to Germany.
Construction was expected to commence in 2018 and finish by the end of 2019.
The project was therefore presented as a substantial but commercially conventional infrastructure investment.
Within weeks, however, the American Senate had brought the arrangement into an increasingly contentious sanctions debate.
Authenticated corporate source: OMV — Nord Stream 2 AG and European Energy Companies Sign Financing Agreements, 24 April 2017. Ocean News & Technology
2. June 2017: Washington’s sanctions proposals alarm GermanyOn 15 June 2017, Reuters reported an unusually strong response from Germany and Austria to proposed American sanctions against Russia.
The US Senate had advanced measures intended to increase pressure on Moscow over its international conduct, including interference in the American electoral process and actions concerning Ukraine.
The proposed measures also created potential sanctions exposure for companies participating in certain Russian energy-export pipeline projects.
German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel and Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern publicly objected.
Their concern was not simply that Russia might face additional sanctions.
They feared that European companies financing or constructing Nord Stream 2 could become subject to American penalties.
The ministers argued that Europe should determine its own energy policy and that American sanctions should not be used to advance commercial interests in the energy sector.
That last argument was an interpretation advanced by the German and Austrian governments.
It was not an established judicial finding concerning American motives.
Nevertheless, their intervention exposed a serious disagreement within the Western alliance.
Germany and Austria regarded the proposed extraterritorial measures as a threat to European commercial sovereignty.
Washington regarded Russian energy infrastructure as a legitimate subject for national-security sanctions.
Shell and the other European financiers were directly relevant to this disagreement because they had signed their financing commitments less than two months earlier.
The possibility of American sanctions was no longer theoretical political commentary.
It had entered the legislative process.
Contemporaneous source: Reuters — US Sanctions on Russia Threaten European Energy Firms, Germany and Austria Warn, 15 June 2017.
3. The German government’s authenticated responseOn 16 June 2017, the German Federal Government published an official statement concerning the American proposals.
The statement was unusually forthright.
Government spokesperson Steffen Seibert criticised the prospect that sanctions intended to influence Russian conduct might instead penalise European businesses.
The German government reiterated its opposition to extraterritorial sanctions affecting third countries.
It also confirmed that Chancellor Angela Merkel shared the concerns expressed by Gabriel and Kern.
Foreign Office spokesperson Martin Schäfer argued that the proposed measures could allow American authorities to penalise German, Austrian and other European companies for participating in energy projects.
The German government questioned whether such measures would be compatible with international law.
That was the government’s stated legal position, not a court ruling determining that the American legislation was unlawful.
The statement demonstrates that the dispute was not confined to an individual minister’s personal opinion.
It reflected an official German government position.
The United States and Germany were already divided over the treatment of Nord Stream 2.
The German government wanted coordinated action against Russia while resisting American measures that might penalise European companies.
The American government increasingly regarded Nord Stream 2 as inconsistent with European energy security.
Those positions would remain in tension for several years.
Primary source: German Federal Government — Trade Policy Should Not Be Mixed With Sanctions, 16 June 2017.
4. August 2017: American legislation creates a new category of riskOn 2 August 2017, President Donald Trump signed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, commonly known as CAATSA.
Section 232 established discretionary sanctions authority concerning specified investments and other activities supporting Russian energy-export pipelines.
The legislation did not automatically sanction Shell.
Nor did it make participation in every Russian pipeline project unlawful.
Its importance lay in providing American authorities with a mechanism for imposing sanctions upon qualifying activities by foreign companies.
This introduced a different kind of risk from Poland’s competition proceedings.
A company could face potential American consequences for activity undertaken outside the United States.
Sanctions might affect access to American markets, financing arrangements, commercial relationships or other activities subject to US jurisdiction.
The consequences would depend upon the actual legislation, implementing guidance and any subsequent designation.
For Shell, which operated extensively in the United States and international financial markets, the emergence of this sanctions authority was a development of potential commercial significance.
But the documentary record does not establish that Shell was sanctioned under Section 232 in 2017.
The distinction between the existence of a sanctions power and its exercise is essential.
5. December 2019: Washington targets the construction vesselsThe confrontation escalated sharply in December 2019.
On 20 December, President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020.
The legislation included the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, known as PEESA.
Its provisions targeted specified vessels engaged in laying pipe for Nord Stream 2 and certain companies providing those vessels.
The legislation required identification of qualifying activities and provided sanctions mechanisms, subject to statutory conditions and wind-down provisions.
The United States was now moving beyond general opposition to Russian pipeline financing.
It was targeting the specialist contractors physically constructing the pipeline.
That change proved immediately consequential.
Allseas suspends constructionOn 21 December 2019, Swiss-Dutch offshore engineering company Allseas announced that it had suspended pipe-laying operations associated with Nord Stream 2.
Allseas operated specialist vessels capable of installing large-diameter pipelines in deep water.
Its participation was important to the project’s construction programme.
The company explained that it was suspending work in anticipation of the new American legislation and would await clarification concerning its application.
Reuters independently reported the decision.
This was one of the clearest demonstrations that American sanctions could materially disrupt the project.
The sanctions had not merely generated diplomatic protests.
A major contractor had stopped work.
Construction, previously anticipated to finish in 2019, faced substantial uncertainty.
The pipeline consortium maintained that it intended to complete the project.
But the interruption demonstrated how dependent Nord Stream 2 had become upon access to specialist Western contractors and the international services they supplied.
For Shell and the other financiers, the consequences were indirect but important.
They had financed a project whose construction schedule could now be disrupted by American legislation.
The Allseas decision did not establish that Shell had violated sanctions.
It established that sanctions pressure had produced a significant operational consequence.
Primary US record: US State Department — Fact Sheet on US Opposition to Nord Stream 2, 27 December 2019.
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters — Allseas Suspends Nord Stream 2 Work, 20–21 December 2019.
6. July 2020: Washington explicitly warns financing partnersOn 15 July 2020, the US State Department issued updated guidance concerning Section 232 of CAATSA.
This document is particularly important to the Shell archive.
The department announced that its implementation of the legislation would explicitly encompass Nord Stream 2 and the second line of TurkStream.
It also identified financing partners among the categories of participants potentially exposed to sanctions.
The official statement distinguished between activities that might become sanctionable and persons actually sanctioned.
The department expressly stated that it was not imposing sanctions under Section 232 at that time.
However, it encouraged companies involved in the projects to reassess their participation and mitigate their exposure.
The guidance was therefore a direct public warning to relevant commercial participants.
It was not a finding that Shell or any other specific financing company had breached American law.
But it removed much of the uncertainty about whether Washington intended its sanctions authority to reach financial supporters of Nord Stream 2.
The category was now explicitly identified.
Shell’s participation in the project was already documented through its 2017 agreement.
The significance for investors is straightforward.
By July 2020, the American government had publicly identified financing partners in its sanctions guidance.
The possible implications for Shell’s loan and future participation were therefore matters that could be considered using public records.
Authenticated primary source: US State Department — Updated Public Guidance for Section 232 of CAATSA, 15 July 2020.
7. The changing relationship between sanctions and contractual commitmentsThe July 2020 guidance introduced an important complication.
Earlier American guidance had treated certain pipeline projects with contracts signed before the enactment of CAATSA differently.
The updated approach broadened potential sanctions exposure.
This mattered because Shell’s Nord Stream 2 financing agreement had been signed on 24 April 2017.
That date preceded CAATSA’s enactment in August 2017.
The changing guidance therefore raised questions about activities conducted under older contractual arrangements.
However, the legal analysis requires care.
An existing financing agreement is not identical to every later transaction performed under that agreement.
The imposition of sanctions depends upon the conduct concerned, the statutory criteria and the effective implementing guidance.
The fact that Shell signed its original agreement before August 2017 does not establish that all subsequent activities were permanently exempt.
Conversely, the July 2020 guidance does not establish that Shell was automatically in violation of American law.
The surviving public record supports a narrower conclusion.
A financing structure established in 2017 had become potentially vulnerable to sanctions interpretations that changed during the life of the project.
That was a material category of regulatory uncertainty.
8. January 2021: The sanctions framework expands againFurther American legislation expanded PEESA at the beginning of 2021.
The amendments widened the categories of activities potentially subject to sanctions.
They addressed support services associated with pipe-laying vessels, including specified insurance, technical and certification activities.
The legislation also introduced additional reporting and consultation requirements.
The significance was that construction could be affected through more than the direct withdrawal of pipe-laying contractors.
Companies providing essential supporting services could also face legal and commercial uncertainty.
The State Department’s formal guidance appeared in the Federal Register in April 2021.
It identified the expanded categories of potentially sanctionable conduct and explained the applicable wind-down arrangements.
Again, this was not a judicial finding against Shell.
Nor does the existence of wider sanctions authority prove that Shell personally performed the additional activities covered by the amendments.
But it demonstrates the increasing difficulty of completing a highly specialised international infrastructure project while essential contractors and service providers faced potential American restrictions.
Official legal record: Federal Register — Updated Public Guidance for the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act, 14 April 2021.
9. March and May 2021: Biden maintains opposition but grants a waiverThe arrival of President Joe Biden did not immediately end American opposition to Nord Stream 2.
On 18 March 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned companies participating in the project that they risked American sanctions.
The administration characterised Nord Stream 2 as a Russian geopolitical project that could weaken European energy security.
The statement reflected a position shared by successive American administrations.
But a different consideration was emerging.
Washington also wanted to repair and strengthen its relationship with Germany.
In May 2021, the Biden administration announced sanctions measures affecting entities and vessels associated with construction.
At the same time, it granted national-interest waivers concerning Nord Stream 2 AG, its chief executive Matthias Warnig and specified corporate officers.
The distinction was significant.
Washington remained opposed to Nord Stream 2.
But it chose not to impose certain sanctions on the project company and its leadership at that stage.
The waiver was a foreign-policy decision.
It was not an endorsement of the pipeline.
Nor did it establish that all companies involved in financing or constructing Nord Stream 2 were immune from future sanctions.
The administration was attempting to balance opposition to Russian energy infrastructure with the preservation of relations with Germany.
For Shell, this meant that the sanctions environment remained politically contingent.
The project had encountered repeated legislative and operational obstacles, but American policy was not entirely uniform in its immediate practical effects.
Primary sources: US State Department — Nord Stream 2 and Potential Sanctionable Activity, 18 March 2021 and Nord Stream 2 and European Energy Security, 19 May 2021.
10. July 2021: Washington and Berlin negotiate a compromiseOn 21 July 2021, the United States and Germany issued a joint statement concerning Ukraine, European energy security and climate objectives.
It represented a significant diplomatic development.
The two governments committed themselves to supporting Ukraine’s energy security.
Germany undertook to use its influence to support the continuation of Russian gas transit through Ukraine beyond the existing contractual arrangements.
The agreement also addressed financial and technical support for Ukraine’s energy transition.
Importantly, the statement recognised the risk that Russia might use energy supplies as a political instrument.
Germany committed to take national action and support effective European measures if Russia engaged in further aggression against Ukraine or attempted to weaponise energy.
The document did not remove every disagreement concerning Nord Stream 2.
It represented an effort to manage those disagreements while acknowledging that the pipeline might be completed.
The compromise also illustrated the growing importance of Ukraine’s position.
For Kyiv, the pipeline presented risks extending beyond lost transit revenue.
The ability to transport Russian gas to Western Europe while bypassing Ukraine could potentially reduce the strategic importance of the Ukrainian transmission system.
That concern had been expressed for years by Ukraine and several Central and Eastern European governments.
Supporters of Nord Stream 2 continued to emphasise additional transport capacity, commercial efficiency and supply security.
The July agreement attempted to reconcile these competing interests.
Authenticated diplomatic record: German Federal Foreign Office — Joint Statement of the United States and Germany, 21 July 2021.
11. September 2021: Construction is completed — but the pipeline cannot yet operateOn 10 September 2021, Gazprom announced that construction of Nord Stream 2 had been completed.
The announcement followed extensive delays and the eventual continuation of work using Russian-controlled pipe-laying resources.
The project had survived the withdrawal of Allseas.
It had survived multiple rounds of American sanctions pressure.
And it had survived substantial political opposition within Europe.
But physical completion was not the same as legal authorisation to transport gas commercially.
The pipeline still required regulatory certification.
This distinction would prove decisive.
The completion announcement established a major engineering milestone.
It did not establish that Nord Stream 2 had entered commercial service.
Nor did it eliminate the possibility of further regulatory or political obstacles.
The original expectation that construction would be completed by the end of 2019 had already been missed by a considerable margin.
Even after construction was complete, the project remained exposed to decisions outside Gazprom’s immediate control.
Contemporaneous source: S&P Global — Russia’s Gazprom Completes Nord Stream 2 Construction, 10 September 2021.
12. November 2021: Germany suspends certificationOn 16 November 2021, Germany’s Federal Network Agency, the Bundesnetzagentur, announced that it had suspended the certification procedure for Nord Stream 2 AG.
The immediate issue concerned the legal organisation of the proposed transmission-system operator.
Nord Stream 2 AG was established in Switzerland.
The regulator determined that the German section of the pipeline required an operator organised under German law.
Nord Stream 2 AG proposed establishing a German subsidiary.
The regulator announced that certification would remain suspended until the relevant assets and personnel had been transferred and the necessary documentation examined.
This was a regulatory decision.
It was not the same as the political suspension announced by Germany in February 2022.
Nor was it a judicial finding that the project had been unlawfully financed.
Nevertheless, it demonstrated that the pipeline remained unable to begin commercial operation even after construction had been completed.
The available German regulatory record therefore supplies another important distinction.
A completed pipeline was not necessarily an operational or revenue-producing pipeline.
Primary source: Bundesnetzagentur — Certification Procedure for Nord Stream 2 Suspended, 16 November 2021.
13. The European legal challenge: Nord Stream 2 confronts EU gas rulesThe pipeline also faced a separate legal controversy concerning European gas-market legislation.
In April 2019, the European Union had adopted Directive 2019/692, extending aspects of its gas-market regulatory framework to certain pipelines connecting EU member states with third countries.
The rules addressed matters including ownership separation, third-party access and regulatory supervision.
Nord Stream 2 AG challenged the legislation.
The proceedings eventually reached the Court of Justice of the European Union.
On 12 July 2022, the Court delivered its judgment in Case C-348/20 P.
The judgment concerned whether Nord Stream 2 AG was entitled to challenge specified provisions of the directive.
The Court concluded that the company had standing to pursue part of its challenge and referred that part of the proceedings back to the General Court.
It did not, in that judgment, declare the entire directive invalid.
Nor did it rule that Nord Stream 2 was exempt from EU gas-market rules.
The decision is relevant because it demonstrates that the project faced legal questions extending beyond American sanctions and Polish competition proceedings.
The pipeline’s regulatory position involved several overlapping legal systems.
Those systems should not be confused.
The Polish proceedings concerned merger-control rules.
The American measures concerned sanctions.
The EU proceedings concerned gas-market legislation and the ability of the project company to challenge it.
The German certification proceedings concerned the requirements for authorising the pipeline’s operator.
Together, these records reveal a complex and increasingly uncertain legal environment.
Judicial source: Court of Justice of the European Union — Nord Stream 2 AG v Parliament and Council, Case C-348/20 P, 12 July 2022.
14. February 2022: Germany changes courseOn 21 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced recognition of the self-proclaimed separatist entities in eastern Ukraine.
The following day, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that the certification process for Nord Stream 2 would be halted.
The decision represented a fundamental change in German policy.
For years, German governments had defended the project against American objections and argued that decisions concerning European energy infrastructure should be made within Europe.
Now Germany itself was preventing the pipeline from entering service.
On 22 February, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action formally explained the administrative action.
The government withdrew its previous security-of-supply assessment.
That assessment was necessary for the German regulator to issue a favourable certification decision.
Without it, the pipeline could not be authorised to operate.
The ministry cited the deterioration of the geopolitical situation and the consequences of Russia’s conduct concerning Ukraine.
This was a political and regulatory decision taken by the German government.
It was not a court judgment finding Shell’s financing agreement unlawful.
But its commercial significance was profound.
The pipeline had been constructed.
The project company had invested heavily in the infrastructure.
European financiers had supplied substantial support.
Yet the pipeline remained unable to enter commercial service.
Authenticated primary source: German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs — Minister Habeck on the Discontinuation of Nord Stream 2 Certification, 22 February 2022.
15. February 2022: Washington sanctions the project companyOn 23 February 2022, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG and its chief executive Matthias Warnig.
The decision followed Germany’s suspension of certification.
The sanctions reversed the earlier national-interest waiver granted in May 2021.
The project company became subject to American blocking sanctions.
This was a materially different position from the earlier warnings that certain participants might face sanctions.
An identified entity was now directly sanctioned.
The distinction is essential.
The available American record establishes the designation of Nord Stream 2 AG and Warnig.
It does not establish that Shell itself was designated under the same measure.
Nevertheless, the sanctions further complicated the legal and commercial position of the project company to which Shell had provided financing.
The pipeline’s future had become dependent upon a profound change in the geopolitical and regulatory environment.
Two days later, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine had transformed that environment still further.
Official record: US State Department — Department Press Briefing, 23 February 2022.
16. Shell announces its withdrawalOn 28 February 2022, Shell announced that it intended to exit its joint ventures with Gazprom and related entities.
The announcement included the company’s interests in Sakhalin-2, Salym Petroleum Development and Gydan.
Shell also stated that it intended to end its involvement in Nord Stream 2.
Chief executive Ben van Beurden condemned Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and said the company would work through the business consequences of its withdrawal.
The statement marked an abrupt change in Shell’s relationship with major Russian energy projects.
But the different investments must be distinguished.
Shell held an equity interest in Sakhalin-2.
Its Nord Stream 2 exposure arose from financing arrangements rather than ownership of the pipeline company.
Consequently, the legal and accounting implications were different.
The announcement did not retrospectively establish that the original 2017 financing agreement had been unlawful.
It represented Shell’s decision to withdraw from the project in the circumstances then prevailing.
The company’s own statement also acknowledged that the decision would affect the carrying value of relevant assets.
An impairment was anticipated.
The financial consequence would become clear in its first-quarter results.
Authenticated corporate announcement: Shell — Intention to Exit Equity Partnerships With Gazprom Entities, 28 February 2022.
17. May 2022: Shell recognises a $1.126 billion write-downOn 5 May 2022, Shell published its first-quarter financial results.
The announcement recorded substantial charges associated with withdrawal from Russian oil and gas activities.
The total recognised pre-tax charges were approximately $4.235 billion.
Within that amount, Shell identified a $1.126 billion write-down associated with its Nord Stream 2 loan.
The company separately recorded a $1.614 billion impairment relating to Sakhalin-2.
These amounts should not be conflated.
They concerned different investments with different ownership structures and accounting treatments.
The Nord Stream 2 write-down was particularly significant because Shell’s original financing commitment had been expressed as a maximum of €950 million.
The figures are denominated in different currencies and relate to different accounting concepts.
The €950 million represented a maximum financing-and-guarantee commitment under the 2017 arrangements.
The $1.126 billion represented the carrying amount of the loan written down in Shell’s 2022 financial reporting.
The two numbers should not be presented as though they were directly interchangeable.
Nor should the accounting charge automatically be described as a regulatory fine or a payment made in 2022.
It was a financial write-down.
The company had reassessed the recoverability of its loan and recognised the loss in its accounts.
That was the documented financial consequence of its Nord Stream 2 participation.
Primary source: Shell plc — First Quarter 2022 Unaudited Results, 5 May 2022.
Documentary Findings: What the Evidence Establishes Established factsShell entered into a Nord Stream 2 financing agreement on 24 April 2017.
Its maximum commitment was €950 million in financing and guarantees.
Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2 AG.
The United States introduced sanctions legislation affecting Russian energy-export pipelines and subsequently expanded its implementation of those measures.
Germany and Austria publicly opposed American extraterritorial sanctions affecting European companies.
In December 2019, Allseas suspended pipe-laying activities following the introduction of American sanctions legislation.
In July 2020, the US State Department explicitly identified financing partners among those potentially exposed to sanctions under Section 232 of CAATSA.
The Biden administration maintained opposition to Nord Stream 2 but granted specified sanctions waivers in May 2021.
The United States and Germany reached a diplomatic agreement in July 2021.
Construction was completed in September 2021.
Germany suspended the regulatory certification process in November 2021 and halted it on geopolitical grounds in February 2022.
Washington sanctioned Nord Stream 2 AG and Matthias Warnig on 23 February 2022.
Shell announced its intention to withdraw on 28 February 2022.
In May 2022, Shell recognised a $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan.
These findings are supported by authenticated corporate announcements, official government records, contemporaneous reporting and financial disclosures.
What is not establishedThe material examined does not establish that Shell violated American sanctions.
It does not establish that Shell secretly controlled Nord Stream 2 AG.
It does not establish that Shell’s financing agreement constituted an unlawful equity investment.
It does not establish that the company’s directors knowingly concealed material information from shareholders.
It does not establish that Shell should have recognised its loan impairment before 2022.
Nor does the later financial loss prove that the original commercial decision was negligent or unlawful.
Those conclusions would require evidence beyond the public documents examined here.
The record supports a narrower but important proposition.
Shell continued to have financial exposure to Nord Stream 2 during a period in which the project faced a succession of publicly documented political, legal and sanctions-related obstacles.
COMMENTARY: The Warnings Were Public — But the Financial Outcome Was Not InevitableThe Nord Stream 2 story is particularly instructive because the eventual loss can be examined against a detailed chronology of publicly available warnings.
The original financing arrangement was signed in April 2017.
Within two months, Germany and Austria were protesting American sanctions proposals that could affect European companies supporting the project.
By December 2019, American legislation had prompted a major offshore contractor to suspend construction.
By July 2020, American guidance explicitly warned financing partners of potential sanctions exposure.
By September 2021, the pipeline had been completed, but regulatory approval remained outstanding.
By November, German certification proceedings had been suspended.
And in February 2022, the geopolitical situation changed decisively.
These events can be established without access to Shell’s confidential board papers.
They were public.
But the existence of warnings is not equivalent to proof that the ultimate loss was inevitable.
At various stages, reasonable commercial participants could have anticipated different outcomes.
The project survived Poland’s objections to the original shareholding structure.
It survived the withdrawal of Allseas.
It survived repeated American sanctions warnings.
And construction was ultimately completed.
Those facts help explain why the project’s supporters continued to believe it could enter service.
Commercial optimism and geopolitical riskShell’s commercial rationale was based upon the expected importance of natural gas to Europe.
The company and its partners anticipated additional demand for imports as domestic European production declined.
Nord Stream 2 was intended to provide additional transportation capacity.
From a narrow infrastructure perspective, that rationale was understandable.
But energy infrastructure does not operate independently of politics.
The route of Nord Stream 2 was politically significant precisely because it could transport Russian gas to Germany without passing through Ukraine or Poland.
That created consequences extending beyond transportation costs.
For Ukraine, gas transit was economically important and carried wider strategic significance.
For Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, additional dependence upon Russian gas created security concerns.
For Germany, the project was associated with access to gas supplies and commercially advantageous infrastructure.
For Washington, it became an object of sanctions policy.
Shell’s investment sat at the intersection of those competing interests.
The project was therefore not exposed merely to normal construction and commodity-price risks.
It was vulnerable to decisions taken by governments with conflicting strategic objectives.
The changing significance of Germany’s positionOne of the most striking aspects of the chronology is Germany’s transformation from opponent of American sanctions to the government that prevented Nord Stream 2 from entering service.
In June 2017, Germany objected to Washington’s interference in European energy affairs.
In July 2021, Berlin negotiated a compromise with the Biden administration.
In November 2021, its regulator suspended certification on legal and organisational grounds.
In February 2022, Chancellor Scholz halted the process in response to Russia’s conduct concerning Ukraine.
The explanation is not simply that Germany reversed a commercial decision without warning.
The geopolitical circumstances had changed dramatically.
Nevertheless, the sequence demonstrates how dependent the project had become upon German government policy.
An investment initially justified by long-term gas demand could not generate the anticipated benefits merely because the infrastructure had been completed.
The necessary political and regulatory conditions also had to exist.
What should investors have understood?The central shareholder question is not whether every investor could have predicted Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
That would impose an unrealistic standard of foresight.
The more reasonable question concerns the evaluation of identifiable risks.
By 2020, investors could see that Nord Stream 2 had become the subject of substantial sanctions controversy.
They could see that a major construction contractor had withdrawn.
They could see that Washington was willing to extend sanctions guidance to financing partners.
And they could see that European governments remained divided over the project’s strategic implications.
These were not hidden developments.
They were documented in government statements, legislation and international reporting.
Whether Shell appropriately evaluated those risks internally is a separate question.
Answering it would require the relevant board materials, risk assessments, accounting judgments and contemporaneous management records.
Those documents have not been established as part of the present source collection.
Accordingly, the archive does not assert that Shell’s management ignored warnings or failed to discharge its duties.
It records the existence of the warnings and their subsequent financial context.
That is a meaningful documentary finding in its own right.
The Sakhalin ConnectionThe original Sakhalin Papers examined Shell’s experience of managing a major Russian energy project during a period of increasing political and regulatory pressure.
Sakhalin-2 involved direct equity ownership, construction difficulties, environmental controversies, disputes with Russian authorities and the eventual emergence of Gazprom as the controlling shareholder.
Nord Stream 2 was different.
Shell’s participation was structured through financing rather than direct equity ownership.
The principal legal challenges came from Western governments and European regulatory institutions.
But the two histories contain a common issue.
Both projects demonstrate that substantial investment in Russian-linked energy infrastructure involved risks that could not be understood solely through engineering, commodity prices or conventional commercial forecasting.
Political authority mattered.
Regulatory decisions mattered.
International relations mattered.
And the legal structures through which Shell participated shaped its exposure.
In Sakhalin-2, Shell faced the consequences of negotiating with a Russian state determined to increase control over strategic energy assets.
In Nord Stream 2, Shell faced the consequences of financing Russian-controlled infrastructure that Western governments increasingly regarded as a strategic liability.
The circumstances were different.
The general lesson was similar.
A commercially attractive project could become extraordinarily difficult to complete or operate once it entered a confrontation between governments.
The archive should preserve that history without assuming that every political objection was justified or that every commercial decision was mistaken.
Conclusion: A Pipeline Completed, a Loan Written DownThe historical record establishes an extraordinary sequence.
In April 2017, Shell agreed to provide substantial financing for Nord Stream 2.
In June, Germany and Austria protested American sanctions proposals threatening European energy companies.
In December 2019, an offshore contractor withdrew from construction in response to sanctions legislation.
In July 2020, Washington expressly warned that financing partners could be exposed.
In 2021, the Biden administration combined continuing opposition with diplomatic concessions to Germany.
Construction was completed in September.
But the pipeline remained uncertified.
In February 2022, Germany halted certification, the United States sanctioned the project company, and Shell announced its withdrawal.
By May, Shell had recognised a $1.126 billion loss against its Nord Stream 2 loan.
The documentary conclusion is neither that Shell acted unlawfully nor that every warning should necessarily have caused immediate withdrawal.
It is that a series of substantial and publicly identifiable political risks accumulated around an investment that ultimately produced a major financial write-down.
The public record allows that sequence to be established.
It does not disclose every internal decision that Shell’s management made in response.
That distinction matters.
The purpose of this archive is not to replace missing evidence with confident speculation.
It is to establish what can be demonstrated, identify what remains uncertain and preserve the material through which later researchers may examine the decisions.
For Shell shareholders, Nord Stream 2 ultimately became a case study in the financial consequences of geopolitical exposure.
For European governments, it became a source of profound disagreement over energy security and relations with Russia.
For Ukraine, the project had long represented concerns about energy dependence, transit revenues and national security.
For Gazprom, the pipeline was completed but did not achieve its intended commercial operation.
And for the historical record, the most important fact may be the simplest.
The pipeline was physically completed. Its commercial purpose was not realised.
Source RecordThe following authenticated records and contemporaneous reports underpin this instalment. They are distinguished according to their evidential function.
1. Shell and OMV — 24 April 2017
Nord Stream 2 AG and European Energy Companies Sign Financing Agreements
Primary corporate announcement identifying the five European financiers, their maximum commitments, the anticipated cost of the project and Gazprom’s continued sole ownership.
2. German Federal Government — 16 June 2017
Trade Policy Should Not Be Mixed With Sanctions
Authenticated German government statement concerning American sanctions proposals, extraterritorial measures and the position of Chancellor Merkel.
3. Reuters — 15 June 2017
US Sanctions on Russia Threaten European Energy Firms
Contemporaneous independent reporting of the German and Austrian objections.
4. US State Department — 27 December 2019
Fact Sheet on US Opposition to Nord Stream 2
Official explanation of the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act and the American government’s sanctions policy.
5. Reuters — 20–21 December 2019
Allseas Suspends Nord Stream 2 Construction Activities
Contemporaneous reporting confirming the suspension of pipe-laying activities following American legislation.
6. US State Department — 15 July 2020
Updated Public Guidance for Section 232 of CAATSA
Primary evidence that the American government explicitly included Nord Stream 2 within its expanded sanctions guidance and identified financing partners among potentially affected participants.
7. US Federal Register — 14 April 2021
Updated Guidance for PEESA, as Amended
Official record explaining the expanded categories of activity potentially subject to sanctions and the relevant statutory exemptions and procedures.
8. US State Department — 19 May 2021
Nord Stream 2 and European Energy Security
Official confirmation of American sanctions measures and national-interest waivers concerning Nord Stream 2 AG and specified corporate officers.
9. German Federal Foreign Office — 21 July 2021
Joint US-German Statement on Ukraine and European Energy Security
Authenticated diplomatic agreement recording the commitments of Washington and Berlin concerning Ukraine, Russia and the pipeline.
10. S&P Global — 10 September 2021
Gazprom Completes Nord Stream 2 Construction
Independent contemporaneous confirmation that physical construction had been completed.
11. German Federal Network Agency — 16 November 2021
Certification Procedure for Nord Stream 2 Suspended
Primary regulatory announcement identifying the requirements governing the pipeline operator and the suspension of certification.
12. German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs — 22 February 2022
German Government Halts Nord Stream 2 Certification
Primary government statement establishing the withdrawal of the previous security-of-supply assessment.
13. US State Department — 23 February 2022
Department Press Briefing on Nord Stream 2 Sanctions
Official confirmation of sanctions against Nord Stream 2 AG and its corporate officers following Germany’s decision.
14. Shell plc — 28 February 2022
Shell Intends to Exit Equity Partnerships With Gazprom Entities
Authenticated corporate announcement recording Shell’s decision to end its Nord Stream 2 involvement and withdraw from other Russian energy ventures.
15. Shell plc — 5 May 2022
Shell First Quarter 2022 Unaudited Financial Results
Primary financial record confirming the $1.126 billion Nord Stream 2 loan write-down and distinguishing it from impairment charges associated with Sakhalin-2 and other Russian assets.
16. Court of Justice of the European Union — 12 July 2022
Nord Stream 2 AG v European Parliament and Council, Case C-348/20 P
Judicial record concerning the admissibility of Nord Stream 2 AG’s challenge to specified provisions of EU gas-market legislation. It is not presented as a judgment invalidating the directive or authorising the pipeline’s commercial operation.
Evidence and Attribution StatementThis instalment relies upon authenticated corporate announcements, official American and German government documents, published regulatory decisions, European judicial records, and identified contemporaneous journalism.
Shell’s financing commitment and eventual loan write-down are established through its own disclosures.
The German and Austrian objections to American sanctions are recorded as their governments’ positions. Assertions concerning the commercial motives of American sanctions policy are not treated as established facts.
The sanctions legislation and guidance are distinguished from actual sanctions designations.
The record establishes that Nord Stream 2 AG and its chief executive were sanctioned in February 2022. It does not establish that Shell was sanctioned for participating in the financing arrangements.
The EU judicial decision cited concerns procedural admissibility and does not constitute a judicial finding that Shell’s investment was unlawful.
The public record establishes the sequence of political warnings and regulatory obstacles. It does not disclose Shell’s complete internal risk assessments or justify allegations concerning the personal motives of its directors.
Editorial commentary is identified separately from documentary findings.
No allegation of secret political arrangements, concealed ownership, sanctions evasion or established unlawful conduct by Shell is made.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-089 — The Sakhalin Papers LXXIX: The Baltic Explosions — Nord Stream’s Destruction, Competing Accusations and the Search for EvidenceOn 26 September 2022, powerful underwater explosions damaged the Nord Stream pipeline system in the Baltic Sea.
The explosions triggered major gas leaks, international investigations and a succession of accusations concerning responsibility.
Russia blamed Western interests.
Other allegations pointed elsewhere.
Intelligence assessments, investigative journalism and official criminal inquiries would eventually produce a complicated and sometimes contradictory public record.
But which findings were authenticated?
Which accusations were supported by evidence?
And which conclusions remained speculative?
For Shell, the explosions occurred after the company had already recognised the full write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan.
The financial loss had therefore preceded the physical damage.
The next instalment will examine the documented chronology of the explosions, the official investigations, the evidence concerning possible perpetrators and the limits of what can responsibly be concluded.
It will also consider the implications for the historical record of Shell’s investment.
The distinction between evidence and allegation will be especially important.
Because few episodes in the modern history of European energy infrastructure have generated more speculation than the destruction of Nord Stream.
And speculation, however widely repeated, is not a substitute for authenticated evidence.
Historical visual references THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 15, 2026 at 7:27 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Skeptical Science New Research for Week #42 2026
Fingerprint Evidence for Human Effects on Climate: Advances After the 2009 Endangerment Finding, Santer et al., Earth s Future
Here we briefly review key advances in the field of climate fingerprinting. Fingerprint studies rely on pattern information to identify human and natural influences on Earth's climate. Our focus is on advances after 2009—the date of the finding by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that emissions of six different greenhouse gases affect Earth's climate and endanger human health and welfare. In contrast to the conclusions from a 2025 review of climate science issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), we demonstrate that post-2009 scientific advances have markedly increased confidence in the identification of significant anthropogenic contributions to global climate change. These advances were enabled by longer and improved observations of climate change, by large single-model and multi-model ensembles of simulations that yield estimates of forced climate change signals and natural variability, and by the application of climate fingerprint methods to a wide array of independently monitored variables. Increasingly, scientists are now able to quantify the impact of human-caused climate change on the probability and intensity of certain types of extreme event, particularly in the case of heat waves and the heavy rainfall in some regions. In tandem with such scientific advances, global warming has also advanced: the post-2009 period included the 10 warmest years in instrumental surface temperature records, enhancing the signal of human-caused warming relative to intrinsic variability. The evidence for pervasive human fingerprints throughout Earth's climate system is incontrovertible.
Extreme Heat and Rainfall Risk Attributed to Cumulative CO2 Emissions From Fossil Fuel Producers, Callahan, Earth s Future
Legal and political approaches to climate accountability require demonstrating that a particular emitter contributed to a climate impact, but quantitative solutions to this attribution challenge remain nascent. This study leverages the proportionality of global warming to cumulative CO2 emissions to develop statistical models that directly predict extreme climate risk from cumulative emissions. Results show that cumulative emissions from individual actors have increased the probability of extreme heat and rainfall globally; for example, emissions from the United States have increased the risk of recent extreme heat by at least 50% for one-third of the globe. Focusing on specific events demonstrates that emissions from major fossil fuel firms increased the likelihood of the 2021 Pacific Northwest heat wave by 31% and 2022 extreme rainfall in Pakistan by 7%. These results demonstrate a flexible attribution framework grounded in the proportional relationships that inform climate policy, with the potential to guide efficient climate accountability assessments.
Record-setting heavy precipitation occurrence in 2024, Thackeray et al., Science Advances
Precipitation extremes have increased globally in recent decades, consistent with a warming climate. We find that 2024 experienced a record-high frequency of heavy (≥99th percentile; FP≥99) precipitation events globally based on MSWEP (Multi-Source Weighted-Ensemble Precipitation) observations from 1979 to 2025. This extends a long-term trend of ∼0.03%/decade in FP≥99, with similar but more uncertain increases for the 99.9th percentile. Unlike prior high FP≥99 years, 2024’s record was more globally distributed and emerged from a distinct seasonal evolution. El Niño and rare concurrent multi-basin tropical ocean warmth drove elevated extremes early in the year, before lagged global tropospheric responses and long-term warming sustained and amplified extremes through boreal summer. Climate models indicate that years with 2024-level FP≥99 typically require either stronger El Niño forcing or concurrent multi-basin sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies. Diagnostic projections within constrained ensemble members suggest that ∼40% of the 2024 anomaly aligns with global mean temperatures and ∼20% with El Niño variability, with some of the remainder linked to basin-scale SST structure.
A recent doubling of global warming rate signals a 1.5 °C breach by 2028, Jin & Pu, npj Climate and Atmospheric Scienc
Timely and accurate projections of when global warming will exceed the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C threshold are essential for effective climate policy. Existing estimates place this exceedance in the early 2030 s but carry substantial uncertainty. Here we analyze the latest observational temperature records through 2025 and identify a statistically significant doubling of the global warming rate during 2011–2025 (0.40 °C per decade) compared to 1971–2025 (0.20 °C per decade). Extrapolating this accelerated rate projects a crossing of the 1.5 °C threshold by 2028, nearly a decade earlier than previous estimates. Regional analyses attribute this acceleration primarily to intensified warming over East Asia–the North Pacific, mid-latitude Eurasia, and the South Atlantic–Antarctic regions. The ensemble mean of 26 climate models fails to capture the observed doubling of the warming rate, simulating a rate of only 0.29 °C per decade. These findings suggest a narrower window remains to limit warming to 1.5 °C, underscoring the urgency for rapid and substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
Learning from young conservatives: Increasing pro-environmental behavior change and climate policy support in the United States, Caballero et al., Energy Research & Social Science
This study uses a mixed-methods (i.e., virtual focus groups with group discussion based on live polling results) approach to explore which potential interventions show the most promise for engaging conservatives on the topics of climate policy and household action, specifically among young people in the United States (U.S.). In coordination with the non-profit organization American Conservation Coalition (ACC), we held six virtual focus groups with ACC members from geographically diverse chapters. Using our mixed methods approach, we explored political efficacy, as suggested by ACC members, as well as four messaging types informed by the social psychological literature: superordinate identities, solution aversion, pluralistic ignorance, and personal responsibility. Our results suggest that young conservative study participants identified messages intended to address solution aversion and pluralistic ignorance to be most promising. Our results also suggest that although young conservative participants in the study tend to engage in incremental, convenient pro-environmental behaviors, they are optimistic about the potential for positive spillover effects. Additionally, our focus groups revealed that a promising area of future study is that young conservatives could serve as important messengers for pro-environmental individual action and support for climate and energy policies among their conservative peers. Thus, the study suggests promising topics for research on the role that young conservatives could play in supporting climate and energy-related initiatives.
From this week's government/NGO section:Spinning Renewable Success Into a Climate Conspiracy: Co-opting the climate science story of RCP8.5, Climate Action Against Disinformation
Fossil fuels cause climate change, and replacing them with renewables will keep our climate safe for human civilization and natural ecosystems. The progress we made towards a cleaner future means that the worst possible fossil fueled warming gets less and less likely. Thanks to the massive growth in renewables, we are finally winning the climate fight- so why are some people claiming exactly the opposite, that it was a hoax all along? Over the years, “Representative Concentration Pathways”, or RCP scenarios have been refined, as renewable energy has gained momentum around the world, pushing the planet away from the most-heavily-fossil-fueled future that represented the worst-case scenario of a climate crisis, and into slightly safer territory. But this good news, tempered as it is by the incredible amount of work remaining to fully decarbonize, is highly technical, scientific, and detailed. That is not, however, how it was portrayed in the fossil fueled disinformation ecosystem, that instead interpreted it as evidence confirming a climate conspiracy theory.Manufacturing Petropopulism: Exposing the secretive network of front groups shilling for Big Oil in Canada, Abde Amr and Keith Stewart, Greenpeace
The authors' investigation has identified a shadowy and coordinated network of pro–fossil fuel front groups, companies, think tanks, and charities that claim to have reached over one hundred million people. Based on materials and data from the entities involved, this investigation reveals influence efforts by the oil-linked Energy in Action (EIA) network, whose members are receiving funding and support from the Canadian Energy Prosperity (CEP) group, aiming to shape the energy conversation in Canada. Over 30 entities, targeting six different sectors, have been identified as part of a coordinated network, operating under the EIA umbrella and supported by CEP to manufacture support for the oil and gas industry and advance its' narratives. EIA appears to be linked to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), with many network entities receiving direct funding from the oil and gas sector. The network spreads its' influence across diverse sectors, including technology, grassroots advocacy, and industry trade associations, targeting specific groups including women, youth, students, and Indigenous communities among others.The AI Gas Rush: Risks and Implications of “Bring Your Own Power”, Bangsund et al., Earthjustice
The race to scale artificial intelligence is driving an unprecedented rush to build power plants solely to power data centers that are predominantly gas-powered. These power plants are evading regulations, harming communities and the climate, and are not a solution to rising energy bills. The authors explore and analyzes this trend. Policymakers across the nation are incentivizing or requiring Bring-Your-Own-Power (BYOP) in an attempt to address energy bill impacts from new AI data centers. But AI data center developers are turning to BYOP to gain access to power as quickly as possible (“speed-to-power”) — not to solve the energy bill impacts of AI. The authors find potential ratepayer benefits are not guaranteed, while harms of the massive gas BYOP buildout have been inadequately addressed. 143 articles in 58 journals by 1015 contributing authorsPhysical science of climate change, effects
A recent doubling of global warming rate signals a 1.5 °C breach by 2028, Jin & Pu, npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01561-y
Forest and bioenergy expansion amplifies climate warming by accelerating regional cloud loss, Liu et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-14133-2026
Ocean thermal inertia sustains a tropical Pacific mean state shift under net zero, Sengupta et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-04082-x
On the Changes in the Connection Between SSWs and Surface Extreme Weather in Response to an Abrupt 4xCO2 Increase, Maeseneire et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045140
Phase Transition of CO2-Driven Equatorial Pacific Warming Pattern Governed by Ocean Dynamics and Remote Forcing, Olonscheck & Kang, AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002437
Stratospheric Temperature Adjustment Robustly Damps the State Dependence of CO2 Radiative Forcing, He & Huang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123839
The Weakest Warming Rate in Spring over the Mid- to High-Latitude Land in a Warming Climate, Dong et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0222.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Temperature sensitivity of the mineral permafrost feedback at the continental scale, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adq4893 21 cites.
buffer/PWSEObservations of climate change, effects
An abrupt shift towards a hotter and drier climate regime in the Western Eurasian Steppe, Piao et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02125-8
Fingerprint Evidence for Human Effects on Climate: Advances After the 2009 Endangerment Finding, Santer et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef009129
From paper to proof: revealing Congo Basin warming through rescued climate archives, Muheki et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/esd-17-1455-2026
Global expansion of compound drought–heatwave risk, Sutanto et al., Natural hazards and earth system sciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/nhess-25-3879-2025
Record-setting heavy precipitation occurrence in 2024, Thackeray et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb1692
Satellite altimetry reveals heterogeneity in global flood peak timing and its shifts, Zhou et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04115-5
Spatiotemporal Evolution of Temperature Extremes Across India's Agro-Climatic Zones, Misra et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70621
Temperature Change in Mode Water Source Regions, Song & Forget, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0127.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Surging compound drought–heatwaves underrated in global soils, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2410294121 60 cites.
buffer/OBMEInstrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
A framework for quantifying the effects of urbanization on regional climate change in a coastal watershed Southeast China: A nonstationary grid-to-grid method, Zhang et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100590
Extreme Heat and Rainfall Risk Attributed to Cumulative CO2 Emissions From Fossil Fuel Producers, Callahan, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008278
Fingerprint Evidence for Human Effects on Climate: Advances After the 2009 Endangerment Finding, Santer et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef009129
From paper to proof: revealing Congo Basin warming through rescued climate archives, Muheki et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/esd-17-1455-2026
Global Assessment and Error Budget of EarthCARE Column Aerosol Optical Depth: Physical Limits and Quantitative Mitigation, Xiong et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd048195
Uneven attention to climate tipping points, Wang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2618666123
Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects
Arctic climate tipping points under delayed CO2 emissions mitigation, Wu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03872-7
Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation Weakening in CMIP6: Labrador Sea Surface Fluxes and Salt Transport Feedback, Lim et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0487.1
East Pacific Easterly Waves in the CESM2 Large Ensemble: Present-Day Characteristics and Projected Future Changes, Zhou & Maloney, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0132.1
Historical to future warm–dry to warm–wet transition over Mongolia and its permafrost regions (1850–2100), MA et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.014
Interpreting Air Temperature Trends Across the Antarctic Peninsula Between 1979 and 2025, Aa et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125798
No critical slowing down in the Atlantic Overturning Circulation in historical CMIP6 simulations, Ben-Yami et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000781
Structural Compactness of North Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Seeds in Historical and Projected Climates, Lu & Reed, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124707
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Customized Statistically Downscaled CMIP5 and CMIP6 Projections: Application in the Edwards Aquifer Region in South-Central Texas, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004716 10 cites.
buffer/MSWEAdvancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection
A Crucial Role of Land–Atmosphere Interactions in Shaping Subseasonal Convective Variability over the Maritime Continent in Idealized Model Simulations, Jiang & Ma, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0654.1
Evaluating Statistical Downscaling Techniques for Regional Hydroclimatic Change Projections Over CONUS, Lybarger et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046624
Global Asymmetric Temperature Responses of Soil Respiration During Warming and Cooling Phases, Feng et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gb009547
Impacts of Sea Surface Temperature Warming Pattern Biases on Tropical Cyclone Activity and Hazard, Zhuo et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124022
Resolution Dependence in a Global Atmospheric Simulation From km to 220 m Grid Spacing, Matsugishi et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124411
Resolution Dependence of the Climate Feedback Parameter in Km-Scale Climate Models, Peinado et al., MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) pmh:oai:pure.mpg.de:item_3713425
Role of Shortwave Feedback in Non-Linear Response to CO2 Forcing in GFDL CM4.0, Shrestha et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122888
Southeast Asian climate and weather extremes simulated by the nextGEMS Earth system models, Koseki et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1915833
The role of the QBO for tropical high-cloud variability in CMIP6 models and observations, Jaison et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-14403-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Selecting CMIP6 global climate models (GCMs) for Coordinated Regional Climate Downscaling Experiment (CORDEX) dynamical downscaling over Southeast Asia using a standardised benchmarking framework, Geoscientific model development, 10.5194/gmd-17-7285-2024 17 cites.
buffer/GCMACryosphere & climate change
Antarctic sea ice response to meltwater due to Antarctic ice sheet mass loss in a multi-model ensemble, Pauling et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5761-2026
On the possibility of deep seabed permafrost to occupy Ca. 7 million km2 in the Arctic Ocean, Dobi?ski & Saitô, Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-68112-6
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Environmental and societal consequences of winter ice loss from lakes, Science, 10.1126/science.adl3211 45 cites.
buffer/CRYOSea level & climate change
Contribution of the Pacific Decadal Oscillation to Global Mean Sea Level Trends: Revisited, Wang & Chen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124649
Sea-level contribution from Thwaites Glacier doubles in an observation-constrained ice-sheet model, Poinelli et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77976-1
Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
Ancient terrestrial forests reborn as modern marine ecosystems under shifting sea levels, Lebrato et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-65430-7
Antarctic sea ice over the past 130 000 years – Part 2: A review of its role in the Earth system, Chase et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-22-1881-2026
Evidence for Limited Atmospheric CO2 Rise at the Miocene Climatic Optimum, Wubben et al., Paleoceanography and Paleoclimatology Open Access 10.1029/2025pa005388
Shifts in Antarctic Intermediate Water properties coincide with atmospheric CO2 rise across the Mid-Brunhes Event, Tapia et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.ady4567
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Centennial-scale variations in the carbon cycle enhanced by high obliquity, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01556-5 7 cites.
buffer/PCIMBiology & climate change, related geochemistry
A process-based spring phenology framework for projecting climate-change constraints on Chinese hickory cultivation areas, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111506
Climate-driven adaptive microevolution in wild yeasts, Oporto et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2618715123
Climate-driven expansion and richness hotspots of forest insect pests revealed by stacked species distribution models, Zhou et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111494
Contrasting climatic controls on bimodal growth of Pinus elliottii plantations between northern and southern subtropical zones, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111526
Cumulative effects of successive marine heatwaves impair physiological resilience in the clam Ruditapes philippinarum., Lebrun et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108467
Determining soil microbial responses to climate change with multi-omics, Wu, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 10.1038/s43017-026-00845-4
Elevated CO2 amplifies contrasting cultivar-specific plant–soil feedbacks mediated by soil biota, Zhang et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1111/1365-2745.70445
Faster-and-tighter nitrogen cycle supports mature forest productivity under elevated CO2, Rumeau et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed2732
Global change threatens the biodiversity of cold regions: Current knowledge and priorities for further research, Renault et al., Ecology 10.1002/ecy.70537
Increasing Climate Constraint on Vegetation Productivity Under Rising CO2 in Northeast Asia, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124463
Local forest structure modifies realized climate vulnerability under macroclimatic forcing: Attribution from a national forest inventory, Ji et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111510
Ocean acidification pushes Mediterranean marine calcifiers toward a tipping point, Frontalini et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-70159-4
Parasitoid insects unveil complex patterns of functional change across elevational bands, Gabrieli et al., Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08816
Phenological Flexibility in Nesting Grassland Birds Over a Half Century Informs Timing of Management, Ellis et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71128
Rapid coral bleaching recovery via symbiont transfer from healthy corals, Webster, Environmental Microbiology Reports 10.1111/1758-2229.12500
Reduced size of larvae and small fish linked to warming and reduced prey density, Lindmark et al., Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08354
Safeguarding global terrestrial vertebrate species from future sea-level rise, Jiang et al., Science 10.1126/science.aed5772
Species-specific reduction of survival and predation in ladybirds exposed to prolonged and intensified heat waves, Cecchetto et al., Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecy.70529
Strengthened sink control under heatwaves contributes to changes in the phenological sequence of photosynthesis and growth, Lin et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111507
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Trajectories of Terrestrial Vegetation Productivity and Its Driving Factors in China's Drylands, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl111391 47 cites.
buffer/BIOWGHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry
A Net CO2 Sink in the Korea Strait and East/Japan Sea Revealed by Direct Eddy Covariance Measurements, Hamzah et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2026jc024139
Active and passive satellite observations coupled with carbon–nitrogen synergy for urban fossil fuel CO2 emissions monitoring, Yi et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-8475-2026
Air–sea CO2 exchange in the Southern Adriatic Sea: assessing its role as a moderate carbon sink over the last decade (2015–2024), Dentico et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-5399-2026
An Activity-Based Inversion Framework for Estimating Sectoral Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions Using Multi-Pollutant Satellite Observations, Qu, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122365
CO2 Emissions From Rivers Draining the Tibetan Plateau Reveal Substantial Increases Over the Past 20 Years, Iwan et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb009016
Contribution of the Pacific Decadal Oscillation to Global Mean Sea Level Trends: Revisited, Wang & Chen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124649
Disproportionate Soil Inorganic Carbon Loss and Associated CO2 Emission Driven by Soil Acidification, Zhang et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008227
Drivers of 2023–2024 Atmospheric CO2 Growth: Role of Northern Mid-to-High Latitude Land Carbon Cycle, Maity et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122221
Elevated CO2 amplifies contrasting cultivar-specific plant–soil feedbacks mediated by soil biota, Zhang et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1111/1365-2745.70445
Fire-derived ozone intensifies carbon loss in Amazon forests under extreme droughts, Brown et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04047-0
Frontal Dynamics Control the Contrasting Burial of Labile Organic Carbon and Refractory Black Carbon in Surface Sediments of the Northwestern South China Sea, Lao et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jc024605
Global and National CO2 Emission from Lime Production Process and Carbonation sink from 1930 to 2024, Bing et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-6741-2026
Groundwater is an overlooked component of the global methane cycle, Li et al., Earth-Science Reviews 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105725
Herbivorous Vertebrates Decrease CO2 Sequestration Across Global Terrestrial Ecosystems, Wu et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2025gb008878
In Situ and Space-Based CO2 Observations Reveal Moisture-Induced Seasonal Compensation of the Western U.S. Carbon Cycle, Rastogi et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2026gb009121
Inferring European fossil fuel CO2 emissions using TROPOMI NO2 data and sector-based NOx : CO2 emission ratios, Schooling et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-13743-2026
Lateral Accounting of Transport in Terrestrial Ecosystems (LATTE): A High-Resolution Global Land-Atmosphere CO2 Flux Data Set From 1961 to 2022 for Atmospheric Inversions and Carbon Budgeting Studies, Ciais et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gb009142
Long-Term CO2 Emissions From Anthropogenic Sectors and Recent Climatology of India, Jayachandran et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd046124
Mapping Global Terrestrial Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Atmospheric CO2 Carbon Isoscapes for Ecological Studies, Feng et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71002
Mechanisms of air–sea CO2 exchange in the central Baltic Sea, Dong et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-5567-2026
More Frequent and Enhanced Extreme Events of Air–Sea CO2 Fluxes, Cheng et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jd044933
Observation-Constrained Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions Reveal Post-2018 Stabilization in China, Feng et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl121913
Poleward Shift of Arctic Oceanic CO2 Uptake From Asymmetric Seasonal Changes Under Climate Warming, Pan et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007550
Prescribed Fire Mitigates Climate-Driven Aboveground Carbon Losses From Wildfire in High Elevation Ecosystems of the Sierra Nevada, Cale et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009930
Probabilistic Wetland Maps for Mapping Soil Carbon Stock Distribution Across the Pacific Northwest, Stewart et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009633
Quantifying Deep Ocean Methane Along the Central Chilean Margin, Wieman et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124079
Regime shifts in South Florida groundwater: distinguishing upstream recharge from coastal sea level influences (1997–2022), Zeleke et al., Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Open Access pdf 10.1007/s10661-026-16000-x
Satellite observations reveal underestimation of CO2 emissions in Africa and the Middle East, Lin et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aee1447
Sea level-induced oyster reef accretion causes minimal net carbon burial change, Rodriguez et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02121-y
Separating Environmental Modulation From Source Intermittency in Methane Leakage From a Legacy Well in British Columbia, Pullen & Cahill, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046590
Soil Physical Properties in Estimating the CO2 Emissions in Drained Peatland Forests, Tenhovirta et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2026jg009736
Thermally driven CO2 adsorption/desorption and its effect on soil respiration, Abramova et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed9979
U.S. oil and gas methane emission intensity declined 2019–2024 with little indication of federal policy impact, Chen et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-04039-0
Using high frequency observations of δ13C-CH4 and δ2H-CH4 and uncertain regional isotopic signatures to estimate sources of UK methane emissions, Ramsden et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-11421-2026
Warming Amplifies the Variability of Methane Emissions From a Coastal Wetland, Lewis et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009973
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Soil carbon and nitrogen cycling at the atmosphere–soil interface: Quantifying the responses of biocrust–soil interactions to global change, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17519 27 cites.
buffer/GHSSCO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
Assessing the potential and cost of enhanced rock weathering in China, Wang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04136-0
Circular and athermal atmospheric CO2 capture by food waste-derived amyloid sorbents, Dong et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2535689123
Hysteresis of extreme precipitation in East Asia under various CO2 removal pathways, Lee et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78431-x
Mineral Carbonation of Mixed Industrial Residues for Enhanced CO2 Sequestration and Environmental Stabilization: The Role of Slag Composition and Industrial Symbiosis, Pietrobelli et al., Advanced Energy and Sustainability Research Open Access pdf 10.1002/aesr.70261
Strong-Acid Weathering in a Carbonate-Siliciclastic Cropland Diminishes Removal of CO2 From the Atmosphere Without Becoming a CO2 Source, Forgeng et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jg009418
Wettability and Interfacial Tension in Carbonate Rocks for CO2 Storage: A Critical Review of Trapping Mechanisms and Governing Factors, Suramairy et al., Greenhouse Gases Science and Technology 10.1002/ghg.70040
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Carbon storage in the built environment: a review, Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability, 10.1088/2634-4505/ad139f 14 cites.
buffer/CENGDecarbonization
A socio-technical analysis of the natural hydrogen hype: Network dynamics and institutional expectation governance, Zini et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104997
Impact of climate change on the photovoltaic power potential in Sweden across 21st century, Ruan et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04091-w
Modeling tensions and tradeoffs in community responses to large scale solar development in rural Georgia, Kurtz et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115660
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Exploring the cost and emissions impacts, feasibility and scalability of battery electric ships, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01655-y 73 cites.
buffer/DCRBAerosols
Effects of solar position and surface albedo on retrieved aerosol optical properties and radiative forcing effects, Ningombam et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106991
Overestimation of Cloud Sensitivity in Orographic Clouds Over the Southern Tibetan Plateau Due To Neglected Dynamical Constraints, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046935
Climate change communications & cognition
From Grand Narratives to Riverbank Realities: How Local Experience Influences Perceptions of Climate Risk and Adaptation in Rural Australian Freshwater Tourism, Downey et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0167.1
Interactions of emotion and political orientation in predicting intentional climate action, Flesch et al., Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2744713
Learning from young conservatives: Increasing pro-environmental behavior change and climate policy support in the United States, Caballero et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.105015
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The Greta Effect: Is there more public support for climate protesters who are young and female?, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103924 4 cites.
buffer/CSCCAgronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change
Compound climatic extreme events amplify food insecurity, Wang et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103248
Mapping CO2 fixation to two effective parameters: A framework toward data-informed species and model comparison, Stillits et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2609915123
Thermal Vulnerability of Reef Fish and Implications for Subsistence Fisheries Throughout the Caribbean, Cortese et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71118
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Maize breeding for smaller tassels threatens yield under a warming climate, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02161-5 23 cites.
buffer/AGCCHydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change
Assessing Probable Maximum Precipitation in the Soummam Basin (Algeria) Using Bias-Corrected Climate Projections, Taguemount et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70626
Climate warming redistributes the seasonality of inland open-water evaporation, Farooq et al., Global and Planetary Change Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105750
Hydrological Extremes Increase Water-Resource Constraints Under Climate Change, Sun et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122652
Hysteresis of extreme precipitation in East Asia under various CO2 removal pathways, Lee et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78431-x
Quantified impact of projected climate change on groundwater recharge and river discharge leveraging the use of open access geospatial data, Jimenez et al., Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/feart.2026.1857327
Record-setting heavy precipitation occurrence in 2024, Thackeray et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb1692
Regional Trends in Northern Hemisphere Summer Extratropical Cyclone Activity and Their Link to Precipitation and Temperature Trends, Baxter et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2026jd046609
Satellite altimetry reveals heterogeneity in global flood peak timing and its shifts, Zhou et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04115-5
Shifting Patterns of Precipitation Extremes in the Southeast Atlantic Basin—Brazil: From Observed Trends to Future Projections, Oliveira-Santos et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70629
Structural Compactness of North Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Seeds in Historical and Projected Climates, Lu & Reed, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124707
Uneven warming–moistening rates amplify atmospheric aridity differences between wet and dry regions, Jin et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105757
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Assessment of Meteorological Drought in a Changing Environment: An Example in the Upper Yangtze River, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd041019 4 cites.
buffer/HYCCClimate change economics
Beyond linear assumptions: neural network tracing of climate-driven financial contagion in firms, Niu et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1909195
Heterogeneous effects of climate change on real GDP per capita: evidence from selected MENA countries and Türkiye, Y?lmaz, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1930700
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: A financial disaster in the making: Temperature shocks, climate change and savings, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103782 9 cites.
buffer/ECCCClimate change mitigation public policy research
Citizens’ assemblies propose ambitious climate policy but impacts remain limited, Feldman et al., Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society Open Access pdf 10.1093/cjres/rsaf032
Climate policies neglect risks posed by legacy landfills, Zhang et al., Science 10.1126/science.aem1978
Enhancing fairness in climate action through policy packages, Vandyck et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access 10.1038/s41558-026-02751-5
Firms’ renewable energy adoption and energy taxes: How institutional quality matters, Ruberto, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115631
The embeddedness of Emissions Trading Systems, Barlaup et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2743153
The politics of baselines: A political feasibility framework for energy and climate scenarios, Fornborg, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104981
Why support for net-zero technologies can be politically vulnerable: Evidence from Celtic Sea floating offshore wind, Gregory & Thies, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.105012
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Assessing the impacts of fertility and retirement policies on China’s carbon emissions, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02162-4 29 cites.
buffer/GPCCClimate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research
Building adaptive capacity of US Gulf Coast city practitioners to extreme weather events, Wong-Parodi et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access pdf 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag330
Crossing the behavioral threshold: social amplification and climate risk management in urban flood evacuation, Tanaka et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100901
Cumulative impact of climate change and adaptation measures on Venice and its lagoon, Canu et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-73719-w
Evaluation of heat stress mitigation potentials of climate change adaptation measures in cities: Scenario analyses for technical- and nature-based solutions using 3D microclimate modelling, Eingrüber et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100894
Overcoming under-adaptive innovation and maladaptation in urban heat governance, Lao & Istrate, Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100895
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Measuring the contribution of nature-based solutions beyond climate adaptation in cities, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102939 25 cites.
buffer/CCADClimate change impacts on human health
Climate Resilience and Environmental Sustainability of Healthcare Facilities in a Rural District of Pakistan: A Mixed-Methods Assessment Using the WHO Framework, Nazir et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1002/cli2.70065
Climate-amplified wildland–urban interface disasters create persistent internal metal mixtures associated with pulmonary impairment, Maunakea et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2613208123
Compound Heatwaves and Health Inequality: A Nationwide Study on Emergency Admissions and Socioeconomic Vulnerability in South Korea, Kim et al., GeoHealth Open Access 10.1029/2026gh001920
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: On the Stationarity of the Global Spatial Dependency of Heat Risk on Drought, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl111117 6 cites.
buffer/CCHHClimate change & geopolitics
Cross border consequences of responses to climate change: Risks and opportunities, Mason et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103245
The geopoliticization of Europe's energy transition: Geopolitical risk and selective transition adjustment across EU member states, Cong et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115663
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Weaponization of climate and environment crises: Risks, realities, and consequences, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103928 12 cites.
buffer/CCGPOther
Background Atmospheric CO2 Regulates the Local and Non-Local Climate Impacts of Amazon Deforestation, Lee et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007636
Intensification of near-inertial currents in the Atlantic Ocean over the past two decades, Zheng et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78555-0
Springtime Soil Moisture Teleconnections Drive Summertime Warming in the Western United States, Zhang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0459.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Global wildfire activity re-visited, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102894 6 cites.
buffer/OTHRInformed opinion, nudges & major initiatives
Climate change reshapes the global mercury cycle, Feinberg & Saiz-Lopez, Science 10.1126/science.aeh7034
Discovery as public infrastructure: Renewing the social contract for science, Carbajo et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag312
Uneven attention to climate tipping points, Wang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2618666123
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The role of forestry sciences in combating climate change and advancing sustainable development goals, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1409667 27 cites.
Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change2026 Global Climate Investing Survey, CoreData Research, Robeco
The number of investors making climate change a strategic priority has increased slightly to 47%, rising further to 62% over the next two years. The tide is also turning in North America, where there is now growing support for climate investing, following a large backlash that began in the U.S. in 2023. Both mark a turning point after several years of declining commitments, as governments globally made net zero a lower priority – and commitment that comes back after a cycle like that is of a different quality from commitment that never had to. 75% believe that war in the Middle East, and the disruption it is causing to oil and gas markets, will moderately or significantly accelerate the transition to renewable energy. 63% think the increasing adoption of AI will have a positive effect on accelerating the development of sustainable infrastructure. 64% say the slowdown in government support for net-zero goals has not affected their commitment to net zero. 63% expect physical climate risks to have a moderate or significant effect on their organization’s strategic asset allocation over the next five years.10 New Insights in Climate Science 2026/2027, Future Earth, The Earth League, and the World Climate Research Programme, Future Earth, The Earth League, and the World Climate Research Programme
Ocean heat content keeps climbing as Earth’s energy imbalance grows. Sea level rise in a warming world: acceleration, ice mass loss, and long-term commitment. Water gaps widen as continental drying accelerates. A larger overshoot of 1.5°C increases the risk of irreversible impacts, forces greater reliance on carbon dioxide (CO?) removal, and narrows adaptation options. Bundled interventions for food system transformation can deliver major gains for human health and planetary stability. The social cost of carbon has been severely underestimated. Advances in attribution science demonstrate individual emitters’ climate effects. Climate clubs can limit carbon leakage, but fairness shapes their feasibility and effectiveness. Organized obstruction prevents effective climate policy through denial, delay, dilution and distraction. A just energy transition is threatened by geopolitical risks and fragmentation.Offshore wind a safe bet for East Asia’s future, Lu et al., Ember
The share of offshore wind in the total renewable energy pipeline across Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is 84%, compared to the global average of just 21%, totaling 82 GW. East Asia represents 8% of the global offshore wind pipeline, and 2026 policy reforms across the three markets signal the region's growth opportunity. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan aim to scale up offshore wind to more than 30 GW across the region by 2030. Market readiness is needed now to meet these goals.Western Seams Analysis, Aurora Energy Research, Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council
Modeling shows that a single, West-wide market produces the lowest total system cost because no market boundaries means a single operator can maximize efficient dispatch at lowest-cost energy resources across the entire region. Best-in-class seams management in a multi-market West can unlock up to $840 million in annual cost savings that would be lost in uncoordinated, poorly-managed seams agreements.The AI Gas Rush: Risks and Implications of “Bring Your Own Power”, Bangsund et al., Earthjustice
The race to scale artificial intelligence is driving an unprecedented rush to build power plants solely to power data centers that are predominantly gas-powered. These power plants are evading regulations, harming communities and the climate, and are not a solution to rising energy bills. The authors explore and analyzes this trend. Policymakers across the nation are incentivizing or requiring Bring-Your-Own-Power (BYOP) in an attempt to address energy bill impacts from new AI data centers. But AI data center developers are turning to BYOP to gain access to power as quickly as possible (“speed-to-power”) — not to solve the energy bill impacts of AI. The authors find potential ratepayer benefits are not guaranteed, while harms of the massive gas BYOP buildout have been inadequately addressed.Behind the Bill: What’s Driving Increases in Electricity Costs in Maine?, Heather Sanborn, Office of the Public Advocate (Maine)
A typical Central Maine Power (CMP) household’s monthly bill rose from about $91 in October 2020 to about $157 in October 2026, an increase of $66 (72%). The total price went from 16.6 to 28.6 cents per kilowatt-hour. No single cause explains it. Three parts of the bill account for about $57 of the $66; energy supply (+$30), driven mainly by New England natural gas prices; local distribution (+$18), with storm costs alone adding $12; transmission (+$9), driven by infrastructure replacement and high federally set profits. Stranded costs, mostly from Maine’s community solar program, added about $9. Focusing on that issue alone misses about $57 of the $66 increase. About $27 of the total would be expected from general inflation.Manufacturing Petropopulism: Exposing the secretive network of front groups shilling for Big Oil in Canada, Abde Amr and Keith Stewart, Greenpeace
The authors' investigation has identified a shadowy and coordinated network of pro–fossil fuel front groups, companies, think tanks, and charities that claim to have reached over one hundred million people. Based on materials and data from the entities involved, this investigation reveals influence efforts by the oil-linked Energy in Action (EIA) network, whose members are receiving funding and support from the Canadian Energy Prosperity (CEP) group, aiming to shape the energy conversation in Canada. Over 30 entities, targeting six different sectors, have been identified as part of a coordinated network, operating under the EIA umbrella and supported by CEP to manufacture support for the oil and gas industry and advance its' narratives. EIA appears to be linked to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), with many network entities receiving direct funding from the oil and gas sector. The network spreads its' influence across diverse sectors, including technology, grassroots advocacy, and industry trade associations, targeting specific groups including women, youth, students, and Indigenous communities among others.Powering Rural Prosperity: The Local Economic Impact of Utility-Scale Wind and Solar Developments, Ohler et al., University of Missouri
A growing literature documents a relationship between renewable energy development and local economic outcomes. Yet, important gaps remain in understanding how these effects manifest in rural economies, across technologies, and within specific sectors. Using county-level data on U.S. energy installations between 2001-2023, the authors examine how renewable energy adoption shapes sector-specific economic activity, focusing on GDP, employment, and wages in rural counties. They extend prior work in three ways. First, they focus explicitly on rural outcomes, where utility-scale renewable development is concentrated but where economic structures may limit local benefits. Second, they incorporate solar adoption alongside wind, enabling a comparison of technology-specific impacts. Third, they move beyond aggregate measures to conduct a sectoral analysis, identifying how effects vary across industries. Wind development is associated with significant GDP gains concentrated in the utilities sector, while solar development is associated with modest wage and employment gains driven largely by utilities and construction. For very large utility-scale solar, e.g. 5MW or 20MW, agriculture, construction, and utility GDP increase with solar adoption. Neither technology is associated with detectable declines in agricultural GDP, employment, or wages, providing little evidence of substantial disruption to agricultural production or related labor markets. These findings provide a more nuanced understanding of the local economic consequences of the energy transition and highlight the importance of technology type and sectoral composition in shaping rural development outcomes.Data Center Policy in Ohio: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, Scioto Analysis
Data centers have had a major impact on Ohio's economy. Between 2013 and 2026, we estimate that Ohio data centers produced a net social benefit of $62 billion in the state. Data centers produced $77 billion in total benefits, mostly from employment: they created about 96,000 new jobs and added $75 billion in wages. They also produced $15 billion in total costs, mostly from emissions and higher utility prices. When data centers draw power from the statewide grid, electricity bills rise for Ohio ratepayers. If current policy stays the same, the authors estimate that higher electricity prices will cost Ohio ratepayers $16 billion between 2027 and 2034. As energy use rises, emissions rise as well, and the largest costs come from air pollutants that harm local public health, including nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter 2.5. Under the status quo, these pollutants account for about $41 billion of the $62 billion in total costs between 2027 and 2034, compared to $220 million from carbon, since the authors count only Ohio's share of the global cost of carbon. The data center industry is beginning to respond to some of these issues. Every company planning new data centers in Ohio has committed to closed-loop cooling, which uses zero excess water, but more electricity. Additionally, 19% of planned data center capacity in Ohio is set to use behind-the-meter generation, meaning companies will build their own power plants instead of relying on the statewide grid. This keeps new data centers from raising electricity prices for Ohio ratepayers and it is cleaner for most pollutants.Spinning Renewable Success Into a Climate Conspiracy: Co-opting the climate science story of RCP8.5, Climate Action Against Disinformation
Fossil fuels cause climate change, and replacing them with renewables will keep our climate safe for human civilization and natural ecosystems. The progress we made towards a cleaner future means that the worst possible fossil fueled warming gets less and less likely. Thanks to the massive growth in renewables, we are finally winning the climate fight- so why are some people claiming exactly the opposite, that it was a hoax all along? Over the years, “Representative Concentration Pathways”, or RCP scenarios have been refined, as renewable energy has gained momentum around the world, pushing the planet away from the most-heavily-fossil-fueled future that represented the worst-case scenario of a climate crisis, and into slightly safer territory. But this good news, tempered as it is by the incredible amount of work remaining to fully decarbonize, is highly technical, scientific, and detailed. That is not, however, how it was portrayed in the fossil fueled disinformation ecosystem, that instead interpreted it as evidence confirming a climate conspiracy theory.451,000 at Risk, Where Action Can Save Lives During the Super El Niño, Greenstone et al., Climate Impact Lab, University of Chicago
The authors project that 451,000 lives will be lost due to heat the first nine months (June-February) of El Niño, compared to a normal year. This is about 65 times larger than the 6,800 people believed to be dead or missing from the recent Nepal flash flood. In just the next 6 months, this includes 239,000 ± 11,000 deaths across the globe. With current forecasts suggesting El Niño will remain in place through spring 2027, all of these numbers likely will grow even higher, particularly as effects such as higher-than-average temperatures and heat-related deaths will linger into June and July.No Time to Recover: Compounding Crises, Depleted Fiscal Buffers, and What It Means for Developing Economies, Molina et al., United Nations Development Program
Seven months into the Middle East crisis, developing countries face compounding pressures: renewed energy price surges following the July ceasefire breakdown, a potentially record El Niño, and global benchmark interest rates at multi-decade highs. Governments have cushioned energy price increases at substantial fiscal cost, with global explicit fossil fuel subsidies potentially exceeding $1 trillion this year. Yet containment is becoming unsustainable. Across 130 countries, gasoline and diesel prices have risen by averages of 26 and 38 percent since the conflict began, with increases widening in nearly two-thirds of countries between June and September. Higher prices have contributed to protests and unrest. The authors estimate that full transmission of the energy and food price shock could push an additional 130 million people below $6.85 a day, 121 million below $3.65, and 66 million below $2.15, overwhelmingly in developing countries. These figures represent potential exposure, not observed poverty increases. Fully compensating households would cost approximately 1.1 percent of developing-country GDP; protecting only those below $6.85 would cost around 0.3 percent. However, fiscal constraints and rising debt service increasingly divert resources from long-term development.Driven by Dirty Steel: The Pollution Behind Europe's Automotive Supply Chain, Mighty Earth
The automakers analyzed in this report have set ambitious carbon-neutrality targets, yet their continued reliance on coal-based steel from ArcelorMittal, Tata Steel, and Acciaierie d’Italia undermines these commitments and perpetuates significant environmental and public-health harms. If European automakers pushed for change in European steel manufacturing, these three steel producers would be required to adjust. Without that pressure, as the authors demonstrate, these companies will remain heavily invested in aging blast furnace operations and fossil gas that generate high levels of greenhouse gases and toxic pollutants, causing elevated rates of respiratory illness, premature death, and degraded air and water quality in surrounding communities.How Spending for Flood Adaptations Affects the Federal Budget, Chad Shirley, Congressional Budget Office
Flooding is among the costliest natural disasters in the United States. Over the next few decades, damage from flooding is expected to worsen because of continued coastal development and changes in the climate. The authors examine how spending for flood adaptations today might affect the federal government’s potential costs for disaster relief later, as well as what households are likely to pay for flood insurance that is subsidized by the federal government.Beyond the Funding Gap. A Global Assessment of the Loss of USAID's Environment and Climate Programming, Monica Bansal and Hadas Kushnir, One Earth Partners
The authors document the on-the-ground consequences of the 2025 U.S. foreign assistance withdrawal on global environmental programming and identifies vulnerabilities in the funding ecosystem left behind. They begin by establishing the baseline: the distinctive role the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) played in the environmental sector, including both its strengths and structural flaws. They then presents ten major findings on the effects of the withdrawal across five focus countries, including direct impacts to policy, people, and the environment; institutional and economic impacts; and diplomatic and geopolitical effects. They close with recommendations for funders and for U.S. foreign assistance on how to stabilize and rebuild momentum going forward. The information in the report comes from on-the-ground sources and media articles.Climate adaptation’s delivery gap: Turning national plans into action, Ellena et al., Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change
The challenge is no longer recognizing the need for adaptation, but rather delivering it at scale. Adaptation gaps are already evident and are projected to widen according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whereas the U.N. Environment Program estimates that annual adaptation finance needs in developing countries could reach US$310-365 billion by 2035, compared with roughly US$26 billion in international public finance in 2023. Two recent initiatives address this bottleneck directly including the Adaptation Accelerator Hub (AAH) and the National Adaptation Plan Implementation Alliance (NIA). The authors explains how these two initiatives are complementary rather than in competition. These two initiatives are part of a single adaptation delivery chain that runs from national priorities to measurable results on the ground. The AAH operates at the country end of that chain - the “missing middle piece” between strategies and financing decisions, whereas the NIA operates at the system end, aligning the actors and the finance that surround it. Their value depends on keeping that division of roles and actions explicit and testable. The message for the next phase of cooperation is that the frontier is shifting from planning alone toward parallel delivery, even as many countries are still completing their National Adaptation Plan. About New ResearchClick here for the why and how of Skeptical Science New Research.
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2026 California Policy Roundup
Equinox Gold’s Outdated Environmental Studies Won’t Protect the California Desert
Equinox Gold’s Western Mesquite Mine in the desert of Southern California is the state’s largest producing gold mine. The company wants to expand their open pit, cyanide heap leach operation. Their first step is to test the quality of the nearby gold deposit at the Rainbow East exploration project.
SUBMIT A COMMENT The project would impact sensitive environments and Tribal cultural resourcesThe project would build and widen access roads, drill 23 holes, and disturb 2.34 acres on lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management in Imperial County. These lands are part of Desert Tortoise Critical Habitat and the Picacho Area of Critical Concern.
The project is also located within a cultural landscape that the Fort Yuma Quechan Indian Tribe seeks permanent protection for. Mineral exploration here needs careful study, public input, tribal consultation, and strong safeguards in order to protect these sensitive desert resources.
This biodiverse desert should not be sacrificed for more goldIn February, I visited the site together with local resident Gail Overton. Gail lives in the desert and cares deeply for the plants and animals who call it home. Together we walked along the proposed access roads and drill sites. Here the desert was full of life. Desert washes braid through the area, providing water to plants and wildlife. The brittlebush and ocotillo were in bloom; we saw burrows that could be used by tortoises or burrowing owls, and several lizards.
Future mining operations in this area would block this critical source of water runoff from the Chocolate Mountains to the desert floor below. An entire ecosystem of deer, coyote, tortoise, lizards, birds, and native plants should not be sacrificed to chase low-grade gold ore that only serves the profit margin of this Canadian mining outfit.
Gail Overton Trump’s tools could allow Equinox to skip environmental reviewLast year, almost 5,000 Earthworks supporters asked the BLM not to skip environmental review. Now they are doing just that, considering approving the project under a Categorical Exclusion, one of the many tools Trump is using at breakneck pace to permit irresponsible mining on public lands.
The public has a chance to weigh inLuckily, we still have a chance to weigh in. The project and its reclamation plan are being reviewed by Imperial County under the California Environmental Quality Act. However, Imperial County is considering approving the project using outdated documents from more than 20 years ago. These documents studied and approved a 2002 mine expansion within the project boundaries, but never looked at the impacts of exploration drilling in Rainbow East, which would disturb an entirely new area outside of the mine plan boundaries.
Submit a commentMake sure Imperial County doesn’t cut corners on its environmental review. Comment by October 19 to urge the planning commission for a new study.
The post Equinox Gold’s Outdated Environmental Studies Won’t Protect the California Desert appeared first on Earthworks.
17 groups sue to require Montana PSC to consider climate in utility decision making
Today, 17 organizations—including healthcare providers, youth organizations, and clean energy and climate advocates—filed a lawsuit against the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) for rejecting a 2024 petition demanding that it recognize its constitutional duty to consider climate change in the regulation of Montana gas and electric utilities. Montana courts have found that the state has an obligation to consider climate change in decision making, but the PSC has failed to protect Montanans from the climate-related costs and risks of its utility decisions.
The groups petitioned the PSC to confirm its constitutional obligation to account for climate costs and risks in its decisions in February 2024, and the PSC held a public hearing in April 2024. After nearly two and a half years, the PSC resolved the petition on September 15, 2026, refusing to recognize its constitutional obligations. Meanwhile, the Commission has continued to make consequential decisions that have increased ratepayer exposure to climate-related costs and risks, including approving NorthWestern Energy’s request to charge customers for the high construction and operation costs for the Yellowstone County Generating Station, a 175-megawatt methane gas plant in Laurel, Montana.
“Montana children are growing up with climate-related disasters that are no longer distant or abstract,” said Patricia M. Notario, MD, FAAP, president of the Montana Chapter for the American Academy of Pediatrics. “Wildfire smoke can make it difficult for a child with asthma to breathe, floods and severe weather can disrupt homes, schools and medical care, and the stress of these events can affect children’s mental health long after the immediate danger has passed. As pediatricians, we have a responsibility to prepare our patients and communities for these threats and to advocate for a healthier environment for every Montana child.”
“When the PSC fails to consider climate change in its decisions, Montanans bear the high costs and risks that come with fossil-fuel electricity, as well as the unaffordable and unconstitutional effects of a changing climate,” said Amy Cilimburg, executive director of Climate Smart Missoula. “Our longer fire and smoke seasons, hotter temperatures, and drought – all of these impacts can credibly and proportionally be attributed to the burning of fossil fuels. The health of members of our community and our ability to afford electricity is directly connected to the electricity generation and rates as determined by the Commission.”
“Young Montanans deserve a future where we can build our lives, raise families and continue to enjoy the places that make Montana home,” said Alice Boyer, executive director with Forward Montana. “Climate change threatens that future and young people will live with the consequences of the decisions being made about our energy systems today, which have real impacts on the health and affordability of our communities. When the Public Service Commission ignores the Montana Constitution and fails to account for impacts to our environment, it jeopardizes the future young Montanans deserve and the communities we call home.”
“Our kids fought for their constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment in Held v. Montana, and have been advocating for climate justice long before and ever since,” said Sarah Lundquist, executive director of Families for a Livable Climate. “Now it’s our turn. The Public Service Commission has enormous influence over Montana’s energy future, and we must ensure climate change is at the center of its decisions. It is our responsibility as adults to protect the future our kids deserve.”
“Montana’s landscapes, wildlife, rivers, and fisheries are all being affected by climate change. Hunters and anglers will suffer when the building blocks of our environment are altered,” said Gayle Joslin, board member of Helena Hunters and Anglers Association. “Functional ecosystems are not only important for fish and wildlife, but they also provide ecosystem services to Montana’s people in the form of clean water, clear air, and vibrant outdoor spaces. The Montana Public Service Commission has a constitutional duty to seek remedies that protect and improve our environment.”
“The Public Service Commission has more influence over Montana’s greenhouse gas emissions and the climate crisis than any other state agency,” said Nick Fitzmaurice, energy transition engineer for Montana Environmental Information Center. “Our Constitution is clear, and the Held v. State of Montana Supreme Court ruling reaffirmed that the state and each person must maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment, which includes a right to a stable climate. It is long overdue for the Commission to protect utility customers and their wallets by taking climate impacts into consideration in its regulation of gas and electric utilities.”
“With each passing year, the effects of greenhouse gas pollution on Montana and the region become more severe,” said Derek Goldman, Montana policy and regulatory associate with the NW Energy Coalition. “It’s time for the Commission to honor its legal obligation and nudge Montana’s utilities towards cleaner, cheaper renewable energy resources.”
Earthjustice and Western Environmental Law Center represent Climate Smart Missoula, Citizens for Clean Energy, Earthworks, Families for a Livable Climate, Forward Montana, Helena Hunters and Anglers, Helena Interfaith Climate Advocates, Montana Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, Montana Environmental Information Center, Montana Health and Climate, Montana Public Interest Research Group, Montana Renewable Energy Association, NW Energy Coalition, Park County Environmental Council, Renewable Northwest, Sierra Club Montana Chapter, and 350 Montana in the lawsuit.
Background:
The PSC is an elected body charged with ensuring that utility customers have continued access to utility services that are affordable, reliable, and in the public interest. Five commissioners represent PSC districts across the state. With broad oversight authority over Montana’s monopoly utilities, the PSC makes decisions that can either promote or discourage continued utility investment in expensive fossil-fuel infrastructure. For example, in December 2025, the PSC approved NorthWestern’s request to increase customers’ electricity bills, in part to pay for the Yellowstone County Generating Station.
In the historic youth constitutional climate trial, Held v. State of Montana, the court declared that, under Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution, Montanans “have a fundamental constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment, which includes climate as part of the environmental life-support system.” (Held Order, p. 102, ¶ 7). The court also confirmed that Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution places “an affirmative duty upon the government to take active steps to realize this right.” (Held Order, p. 96, ¶ 45) Critically, the court determined that “Montana’s climate, environment, and natural resources are unconstitutionally degraded and depleted due to the current atmospheric concentration of GHGs and climate change.” (Held Order, p. 98, ¶ 50). The district court’s decision was upheld by the Montana Supreme Court in December 2024.
While the Montana PSC has not recognized its obligation to consider climate-related costs and risks in its decisionmaking, utility commissions in other states regularly do so.
Contacts:
Melissa Hornbein, Western Environmental Law Center | 406-708-3058, hornbein@westernlaw.org
Amy Cilimburg, Climate Smart Missoula | amy@climatesmartmissoula.org
Dara Deins, Forward Montana | dara@forwardmontana.org
Nick Fitzmaurice, MEIC | (406) 443-2520 x 007, nfitzmaurice@meic.org
Perry Wheeler, Earthjustice | pwheeler@earthjustice.org
The post 17 groups sue to require Montana PSC to consider climate in utility decision making appeared first on Western Environmental Law Center.
Oakland’s New European—Built Cranes Standing Tall Thanks to Local 10 New electric cranes will be able to service world’s largest container vessels
California's 2026 Bird of the Year Winner Is...
Overwhelming Percentage of Voters Furious with Corruption in the Trump Era
A Fox News poll has revealed that corruption is a leading issue for voters ahead of the 2026 midterm elections, with a whopping 88 percent saying they are concerned about corruption, including 60 percent who say they are “extremely concerned” about it.
In response, Public Citizen co-president Lisa Gilbert issued the following statement:
“The public is furious about the corruption they see from the government. Even Fox News polling says as much. If we see a shift in power in the next Congress, the American people will expect the new holders of the gavels to deliver oversight and accountability in a strategic and disciplined way that zeroes in on the real harms that the current regime, in cahoots with corporate power, have carried out at the expense of everyday Americans.”
California Groups Call on State to Defend Fracking Ban After Tentative Court Ruling
Environmental justice, health Indigenous and climate organizations urge Gov. Newsom and CalGEM to protect frontline communities over polluters’ profits
BAKERSFIELD, Calif.— The oil industry sued to overturn California’s fracking ban, and a Kern County judge’s tentative ruling now puts one of the state’s most important environmental justice victories at risk. Chevron, Aera Energy and the Western States Petroleum Association are asking the courts to wipe out a protection that frontline communities fought for years to win. Environmental justice, health, Indigenous and climate organizations from across California are demanding that Gov. Gavin Newsom and the California Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM) defend it.
The tentative decision, issued October 8, finds that CalGEM’s 2021–2024 practice of denying every fracking permit was unlawful and that the 2024 regulation is invalid because the state’s rulemaking record did not adequately support it. If finalized, it would send denied and pending permit applications back to CalGEM for individualized review. The court did not order any permits issued and did not decide whether the state can ban fracking through a properly supported regulation.
“The fracking ban finally gave protection to the families in Kern County who have lived next to wells that for decades have poisoned our air and threatened our water,” said Cesar Aguirre, Director of Air and Climate Justice Campaign at the Central California Environmental Justice Network. “This ruling hands that protection back to the oil companies. The fracking ban was a sign showing that California was ready to stop treating our communities as sacrifice zones. The price of big oil using the Courts to undo progress is paid for with the health of our children and communities.”
The science on fracking is not in doubt. Fracking uses toxic chemicals, including benzene and formaldehyde, that are known to cause cancer, and the industry has used “trade secret” claims to hide the identities of others. It releases smog-forming pollutants, fine particles and hydrogen sulfide into the air that nearby families breathe.
In California, a 2021 study of nearly 980,000 births found that fracking within about half a mile of a mother’s home was linked to higher rates of low birth weight, preterm birth and small-for-gestational-age babies. Other research ties living near fracking to asthma attacks and hospitalizations, heart disease hospitalizations and early death among older adults. A 2022 study in Pennsylvania found a two- to three-fold increase in leukemia among children who lived near a fracking well during their mothers’ pregnancies or early in life.
“California’s fracking ban is a critical public health and environmental protection grounded in years of scientific evidence,” said Gabriela Facio, Policy Strategist at Sierra Club California. “This ruling comes right after recently extended permitting for oil and gas extraction, which will have significant consequences for frontline communities. These same communities will now have to face yet another added rollback that will only put their lives at a greater risk. If this ruling is finalized, the state must take action immediately to protect communities from the dangerous and polluting oil and gas industry.”
California’s conditions make the risks worse. About three-quarters of the state’s fracking was shallow, in wells less than 2,000 feet deep, and some of it was permitted directly beneath drinking water aquifers. Fracking was concentrated in already overly impacted communities, including in Kern County.
“Permitting fracking in California’s already heavily developed oil fields would be a high-risk, low-reward proposition,” said Kyle Ferrar, Western Program Director at FracTracker Alliance. “Unlike other basins, the state’s geology simply won’t yield meaningful production gains from well stimulation. Meanwhile, the dangers of groundwater contamination and surface blowouts are already mounting due to downhole communication between wells and increasingly tight well spacing—risks that would only intensify under fracking.”
According to state estimates, the ban reduces production by only about 4% over ten years, a sliver of output weighed against harms that fall hardest on communities of color already living next to wells. This is a fight over whose health comes first: families breathing the air, or oil companies counting profits.
“Governor Newsom and CalGEM have a duty to protect California’s environmental justice communities by strengthening the administrative record with scientific evidence supporting the fracking ban,” said Wilder Zeiser, Richmond Organizer at Communities for a Better Environment. “Our communities deserve protections that can withstand oil industry legal challenges.”
The organizations are urging the Governor and CalGEM to strengthen the record with the science on fracking’s harms and to act immediately to protect communities if the ruling is finalized. The tentative ruling begins a process of additional filings leading to a final decision, which is usually issued within about 50 days of the tentative order.
Members of the Last Chance Alliance and allies said the following:
“Frontline communities across California, primarily made up of communities of color, are already bearing the brunt of adverse health effects caused by oil production,” said Tanvi Kardile, Coalition Manager at VISION. “This dangerous ruling would put our communities even more at risk for the sake of corporate interests.”
“Sacred Places Institute for Indigenous Peoples opposes Hydraulic fracturing, also known as fracking which is exactly what it sounds like: breaking through rocks and soil while contaminating water with the chemicals injected into the earth,” said Jessa Calderon, Director of Environmental Health and Creative Wellness at Sacred Places Institute for Indigenous Peoples. “This process not only disturbs and contaminates water and soil, but it also causes habitat disruption, increases the chances of earthquakes, and contributes to long-term health issues in our communities. We support ending the fossil fuel economy as it stands on our ancestral homelands.”
“If this tentative decision is finalized, it’ll put fracking pollution back on the table five years after it should’ve ended,” said Kassie Siegel, director of the Center for Biological Diversity’s Climate Law Institute. “Gov. Newsom’s fracking ban is one of the most important health and environmental achievements in California’s history and it’s backed by strong science. If the judge doesn’t change his mind, the state should immediately appeal and do everything in its power to keep protecting Californians from this dangerous, dirty business.”
“Fracking is a shameful, harmful practice that puts us at risk of toxic air and water contamination – especially those who are living near this polluting infrastructure. It has no place in California’s energy future,” said Nicole Ghio, California Director at Food & Water Watch. “Instead of allowing Big Oil to push us backwards for their financial gain we must instead invest in the future Californians want: clean air, clean energy, clean water and a livable climate.”
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LCA LAND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTWe acknowledge that Bakersfield is the traditional home of the Kitanemuk people of the Tejon Tribe. Part of our commitment to decolonizing ourselves, our language, and our organizations is a commitment to learning and better understanding the history of Indigenous Peoples of so-called California, including the history of contact, colonization and the extraction of resources from Indigenous lands which has been part of the continuation of modern colonization.
The post California Groups Call on State to Defend Fracking Ban After Tentative Court Ruling appeared first on Last Chance Alliance.
Grid Connections 2026: Who’s going where and doing what in Australia’s green energy transition
Search begins for new ARENA CEO, changes at the SEC, new CEOs for Momentum, CS Energy, CER, and moves at GenusPlus, Battery and Mobility, GHD.
The post Grid Connections 2026: Who’s going where and doing what in Australia’s green energy transition appeared first on Renew Economy.
Shaping the Future of Global Conservation at COP17
Talking Headways Podcast: The Passion Problem in Public Transit
This week on Talking Headways is Part 2 of our discussion with Reece Martin in Toronto at the Mpact Transit + Community Conference. We discuss the media picking projects apart, the gap between talent and passion in transit agencies, high speed rail and the threat of AVs to bad transit.
Listeners can hit play on the audio player embedded below, study an AI-generated transcript, or read the edited excerpt further down.
Jeff Wood: I was reading through a lot of your posts, and I came upon this idea that after we build something, the people that built it don’t wanna talk about it, or they don’t want to talk if it went over-budget, they don’t want to talk about the things that they did wrong. They want to find better ways to do it, but they don’t want to have this public inquiry about what happened. I was curious what your thoughts were on that.
Reece Martin: It’s a problem I’ve definitely identified in Toronto and it exists in the US as well, obviously. There will be a project that just gets slammed in the media for years and years, and then it’s done. It’s surprising to me, in Toronto, because we actually are pretty well-governed by North American standards, though maybe not by international standards.
But I’m a little surprised that with the Eglinton Crosstown, this tunneled light rail line that famously delayed for a very long time, there wasn’t a public inquiry. But there was an inquiry in Ottawa. Ottawa also built a light rail system and it had a bunch of problems and there was an inquiry, but you just don’t see that as much.
Look at Seattle. It’s building a lot of stuff, it’s very expensive, and a lot of projects have a lot of problems. It would be healthy to have some sort of legislated process where there is a review. I think there are a lot of reasons this stuff doesn’t happen.
Part of it, and this is sadly pretty cynical, is that in the public transit industry in North America, you’re looked upon with great skepticism if you’re very interested in it. It’s like, “Why do you care so much about this stuff? Wqhat are you doing? Why are you asking these questions? What are you, why are you…? You go to a place like Japan and they really embrace the sort of enthusiasm for public transit.
And I get it — it’s overbearing, it’s tiring. But if you’re really passionate and you’re a great engineer and you live in Austin, are you going to work on a transit project or are you going to work for Tesla? And unfortunately, I think the reality is you’re probably gonna go work for Tesla or you’re gonna go to San Francisco and work for Apple or work for Google, and help extract more dollars out of every citizen.
Whereas in China, you would probably go work at the high-speed rail authority or you’d go work at one of 50 cities building a huge subway system. Because it’s competitive — there’s so many cities doing it at once.
This is a real problem. I don’t know how to solve it. The passionate people, for example: I have basically never worked for a transit authority in my life, and I think that’s bad. You’d think, in the ideal world, someone who’s really passionate about this stuff would be brought into the tent.
And if you’re the Prime Minister of Canada, or you’re a leader of a country, and you’re looking and you think, “How do we get the people who are really invested in this going right working on this stuff?” And it doesn’t happen.
The same is true for the Marron Institute in New York City. It’s great that they’re doing that work, but shouldn’t they be working for the MTA and just solving these problems instead? It’s actually really valuable for the whole world that they’re doing the research, and I love it and I promote it a lot. But if you’re Mamdani or you’re Hochul, it’s clear that the actual best thing is for those people to be working on subway expansion so that New York isn’t ossified and stuck with the subway network they built 100 years ago.
But they’re not doing that. The institutions are not very well-equipped. They’re arrogant and they turn up their noses at people who are really passionate. Alon Levy sometimes releases articles at very odd hours of the night. It’s like people who work at Apple. A lot of those people have crazy working hours.
A lot of that is because they’re paid very highly. But a lot of it is because those people really care about their work. And transit would benefit by getting more people like that to work on transit projects. I just don’t think it exists. There isn’t a bridge.
There are a lot of passionate people in transit. I meet a lot of them. But I meet a lot more passionate people who aren’t working in it. Or I meet people who are in other industries that say, “I would love to get involved in the transit industry,” and they don’t really see a way. And I think if they got involved, they might be like, “Oh.”
A lot of people I know are really smart. They work at a transit agency, they get frustrated, and they leave and go work in private consultancy or they work in a totally different industry because they’re frustrated. And so that’s clearly part of the problem. It’s a human resources problem.
Federal judge blocks bid to relocate Forest Service HQ to Utah
A federal judge has issued a preliminary ruling blocking the Trump administration from moving the U.S. Forest Service’s headquarters from Washington, D.C., to Salt Lake City, Utah.
U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria signed an order Tuesday granting a stay on the move. “Congress did not contemplate USDA using its appropriated funds to shut down offices or relocate employees,” Chhabria wrote. “To the contrary, Congress was actively working to restrict the agency’s ability to do so.” Chhabria’s order blocks Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins and other officials from closing offices or reassigning employees to new locations outside of their areas while the lawsuit makes its way through the courts.
In March, the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced plans to move the Forest Service headquarters to Utah along with a major restructuring of the agency. The reorganization would have been the largest in Forest Service history, and called for dissolving nine regional offices across the country and closing and consolidating nearly two dozen research facilities. A group of nonprofits, local governments, and labor union organizations filed a lawsuit to block the plan, calling it an “unprecedented reorganization” that would close offices across the country and force thousands of USDA employees to “choose between their families, communities, churches, and lives they have built, and their careers.”
Report says Reflecting Pool liner repair job failed in 85 placesA 75-page “failure analysis” report finds that the blue coating applied to the bottom of the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool this summer failed in at least 85 places because of errors in the renovation. The report was commissioned by Atlantic Industrial Coatings, the contractor that did the work, and documents far more damage than previously reported. President Donald Trump and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum falsely attributed the damage to vandals, but the report makes no mention of vandalism to the liner and blames the problems on the use of improper materials and a rush to complete the job before the July 4th holiday.
Quick hits Federal judge blocks bid to relocate Forest Service HQ to UtahUtah News Dispatch | Salt Lake Tribune | WyoFile | Utah Public Radio | Fox13 News
Report says Reflecting Pool liner repair job failed in 85 places Nevada residents ‘kept in the dark’ as AI data centers are coming for public land More than a million responses called for keeping the Roadless Rule intact Tribes, advocates say California water plan threatens Klamath salmon restoration New study links national park reservations with higher income Interior blocked funding for projects in Yellowstone, Glacier national parks Opinion: What happens when you can no longer fight a wildfire? Quote of the dayWe believe that public lands are reserved for public good and should be protected and kept in trust for future generations, and the idea of using public lands for data center construction totally flies in the face of that set of values.”
—Olivia Tanager, director of the Sierra Club’s Toiyabe Chapter, Associated Press
Picture ThisSome birds sing. Others silently disapprove of your life choices.
Hawkward. Very hawkward.
Among the bird world’s most skilled pilots, Cooper’s hawks zip through cluttered tree canopies at high speed in pursuit of other birds. They’re often spotted near forest edges or open fields, flying with a few stiff wingbeats followed by a glide. But perhaps their most impressive feature is their expression. Cooper’s hawks have a famously intense, judgmental glare, as though they’ve just reviewed your life choices but just can’t look away. This is thanks to a prominent supraorbital ridge: a bony shelf above each eye that, combined with their forward-facing eyes and boxy, flat-topped heads, gives them a rather tough appearance.
It’s an excellent look for a bird that hunts at high speeds. Less ideal if you’re trying to look approachable at a dinner party.
Fun fact for dinner party conversation: the Cooper’s hawk was named after William Cooper (1798–1864), an American naturalist and collector who studied birds in the 19th century. The hawk’s scientific name, Accipiter cooperii, also honors him.
Image 1: @delwatergapnps NPS/Grismer
Image 2: @petrifiedforestnps NPS/Holgerson
Image 3: @castillonps NPS
Featured image: Pando trees in the Fishlake National Forest, Utah. Source: Forest Service photo by Tanya Flores, Flickr.
The post Federal judge blocks bid to relocate Forest Service HQ to Utah appeared first on Center for Western Priorities.
How can Ace Hardware protect the boreal forest?
SUWA Statement on Judge Chutkan Reopening National Monuments Litigation – 10.15.26
October 15, 2026 – FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
SUWA Statement on Judge Chutkan Reopening National Monuments Litigation – 10.15.26 Today’s Status Conference ordered the federal government to notify plaintiffs of on-the-ground activityContacts:
Grant Stevens, Communications Director, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA); (319) 427-0260; grant@suwa.org
Washington, DC – On Tuesday, US District Court Judge Tanya Chutkan issued an order granting SUWA and other conservation groups’ request to reopen the case and lift the stay that was in place regarding 2017 litigation over President Trumps’ illegal reductions of Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears National Monuments. Today, during a status conference, the Judge ordered the parties to agree on a briefing schedule and to confer on her current notice order requiring the federal government to give plaintiffs 48 hours advance notice of surface disturbing activities on the lands cut from the national monuments. Below is a statement from SUWA Legal Director Steve Bloch and additional information.
“President Trump’s attack on Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears National Monuments, two crown jewels of the nation’s public lands system, was illegal, plain and simple,” said Steve Bloch, Legal Director of the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA). “And because of this unlawful act, irreplaceable cultural resources and the monuments’ unique geology and flora and fauna are now at risk from activities like mining. Today’s hearing was an important step towards restoring protections for the monuments. We’re looking forward to presenting our arguments to the court and defending these remarkable landscapes.”
Additional information:
On September 2, 2026, conservation groups (including SUWA) challenged President Trump’s July 2026 unlawful decimation of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments. The groups filed suit in U.S. District Court seeking to reactivate litigation against Trump’s 2017 monument rollbacks and challenge both sets of illegal proclamations together. Conservation groups were joined by two additional coalitions of monument supporters, who also filed to renew their litigation on Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante today.
In July, President Trump illegally redrew the boundaries of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante, reducing both monuments by more than 90%. The attack was one of the largest rollbacks of public lands protections in U.S. history, cutting a million acres more than the 2017 reductions. From 2018-2021 (during the previous, illegal reduction) there were a total of 20 mining claims filed in the lands cut from Bears Ears National Monument. As of mid-October, more than triple that number – 72 claims – have been filed.
The Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizes presidents to designate national monuments, but it does not give them the power to shrink the monuments created by their predecessors or to undercut their protections. Congress’s intent was clear: the Antiquities Act must be used to protect the nation’s archaeological, cultural, and scientific wonders.
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument — home to dinosaur fossils not found anywhere else in the world — is often described as a “dinosaur Shangri-la.” It was established as a national monument in 1996, and in the two decades since it was protected, paleontologists have unearthed fossils from 21 previously undiscovered dinosaur species.
The region also holds great cultural significance to numerous Tribes. It is renowned for the remarkable geologic features for which it is named — a series of massive, stepped cliff formations that form, literally, a grand staircase. It is home to serpentine canyons that provide endless hiking adventures and streams that support diverse populations of native plant and animal life.
Bears Ears National Monument is home to cliff dwellings and other structures built by the Ancestral Puebloan people, more than 100,000 Native American cultural sites, innumerable historic landmarks, and iconic wildlife such as bears, bighorn sheep, and mountain lions. Tribes continue to visit the lands to hold ceremonies and connect with their ancestors. The 2016 monument designation included a historic plan for co-management of this unique landscape by federal agencies and five Tribes (the Bears Ears Commission) with sacred cultural interests in the lands.
National monuments provide economic benefits to local economies, creating jobs, enhancing communities and boosting local outdoor recreation economies across the country. Monuments are also incredibly popular. A 2026 State of the Rockies poll found that 91% of Western voters say existing national monument designations should be kept in place. Contrary to Trump’s statements, the monuments offer numerous opportunities for hunting, fishing, hiking, camping, and education and see over a million visitors combined annually. These activities and visitors are vital economic drivers for the rural communities that serve as gateways to the monuments.
Earthjustice represents The Wilderness Society, National Parks Conservation Association, the Sierra Club, Grand Canyon Trust, Great Old Broads for Wilderness, Western Watersheds Project, WildEarth Guardians, and the Center for Biological Diversity in the litigation. The Natural Resources Defense Council and Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) are co-plaintiffs, represented by their own counsel.
Because the existing cases are currently stayed, the plaintiffs also asked the court to reopen the cases and formally requested permission to file the updated complaints.
Photos of both national monuments are available here: https://medialibrary.earthjustice.org/share/083E8A8D-5C8A-474D-9783139D836B7ACE/
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The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) is a nonprofit organization with members and supporters from around the country dedicated to protecting America’s redrock wilderness. From offices in Moab, Salt Lake City, and Washington, DC, our team of professionals defends the redrock, organizes support for America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act, and stewards a world-renowned landscape. Learn more at www.suwa.org.
The post SUWA Statement on Judge Chutkan Reopening National Monuments Litigation – 10.15.26 appeared first on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.
Utilities can use AI to solve grid backlogs: AWS energy lead
The utilities moving first on AI-powered grid planning are delivering faster approvals, fewer outages and lower costs, writes Amazon Web Services’ head of energy and utilities, Joseph Santamaria.
Shell Seeks Dismissal of Pennsylvania Pollution Lawsuit — Are Nearly $25 Million in Environmental Settlements Enough?
15 October 2026 | RoyalDutchShellPlc.com
Shell is asking a federal court in Pennsylvania to dismiss an environmental lawsuit concerning pollution from its enormous Monaca plastics plant, arguing that state regulators have already addressed the alleged violations through two enforcement settlements worth nearly $25 million. The latest settlement, announced only six weeks ago, included Shell’s formal acknowledgement that it exceeded emissions limits and breached other environmental requirements. The company now contends that the Clean Air Council cannot pursue overlapping claims through a federal citizen lawsuit. But the environmental organisation’s action raises a significant question: when government regulators negotiate settlements with a polluter, should that prevent affected communities and campaign groups from seeking further enforcement through the courts?
A fresh legal development in Shell’s Pennsylvania pollution controversyOn 14 October 2026, energy industry publication Marcellus Drilling News reported that Shell Chemical Appalachia had asked a federal judge in Pittsburgh to dismiss a long-running environmental lawsuit.
The motion was filed on 9 October 2026.
The proceedings concern the Shell Polymers Monaca petrochemical complex in Beaver County, Pennsylvania.
The lawsuit was brought by the Clean Air Council, an environmental organisation based in Philadelphia, in May 2023.
The organisation alleges violations of environmental requirements associated with the plant’s operations, including its emissions.
Shell disputes the continuing legal basis for the lawsuit.
Its central argument is that Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has already addressed the relevant violations through two formal consent agreements.
Those settlements involved substantial financial commitments, environmental improvement requirements and continued regulatory oversight.
Shell maintains that federal law prevents the environmental organisation from pursuing duplicative enforcement where the state has already acted.
The dispute is independently confirmed by legal publication Law360, which reported the dismissal application on 13 October.
Law360 describes Shell’s contention that two DEP agreements already address the claims advanced in the lawsuit.
The court has not yet determined whether Shell’s arguments justify dismissal.
That distinction is important.
Shell has requested dismissal. The lawsuit has not been dismissed merely because that request was filed.
Marcellus Drilling News +1The plant at the centre of the dispute
The Shell Polymers Monaca complex is one of the most significant petrochemical investments in Pennsylvania’s recent industrial history.
Situated in Potter and Center townships near the Ohio River, the facility converts ethane extracted from natural gas into ethylene.
That ethylene is subsequently used to manufacture polyethylene, a plastic widely employed in packaging, consumer products and industrial materials.
Shell announced its final investment decision in 2016.
Construction involved thousands of workers, substantial infrastructure and extensive environmental permitting.
The complex began operating in autumn 2022.
It was promoted as a major industrial development capable of creating employment and strengthening the region’s manufacturing economy.
But the facility soon became controversial because of environmental compliance problems.
The commissioning period involved repeated emissions exceedances and other incidents reported to Pennsylvania regulators.
Environmental organisations and local residents expressed concerns about the implications for air quality and surrounding communities.
The Pennsylvania DEP maintains a dedicated Shell petrochemical complex information page, providing access to inspection reports, malfunction reports, notices of violation and enforcement records.
These official documents are particularly important because they allow readers to distinguish documented regulatory violations from broader allegations concerning the plant’s environmental impact.
Commonwealth of PennsylvaniaThe first major settlement: May 2023
The first significant agreement was announced on 24 May 2023.
Pennsylvania’s DEP entered into a consent order and agreement with Shell Chemical Appalachia concerning air-quality violations during commissioning.
Shell formally acknowledged exceeding total emissions limitations for air contaminants.
The agreement required the company to undertake corrective measures intended to reduce future exceedances.
It also imposed financial obligations approaching $10 million.
These included a civil penalty of approximately $4.9 million and a commitment of $5 million for environmental projects benefiting Beaver County.
The local environmental mitigation fund was intended to support improvements associated with the environment, health and quality of life.
Projects funded through the agreement have included solar energy installations, improvements to public spaces and other community initiatives.
This was more than a warning or informal undertaking.
It was a formal regulatory settlement involving acknowledged violations and enforceable obligations.
The DEP’s official settlement documentation records the agreement and its terms.
Nevertheless, the settlement did not end every legal question surrounding the plant.
The Clean Air Council had already initiated its federal proceedings.
The organisation’s lawsuit would continue despite the state’s enforcement action.
That overlap is now central to Shell’s dismissal application.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania +1The second settlement: September 2026
On 4 September 2026, Pennsylvania’s DEP announced another major settlement with Shell.
This time, the amount was $15 million.
The agreement addressed violations occurring between 2023 and August 2026.
According to the department’s official announcement, Shell formally acknowledged that it had exceeded total emissions limitations and violated other environmental requirements.
The agreement included $7.5 million for a new Beaver County Environment and Community Fund.
Shell also committed to improvements designed to reduce the likelihood of future violations.
The requirements included submitting plans to improve the facility’s elevated flare system and completing upgrades to its wastewater treatment plant.
The company was also required to continue submitting monthly emissions reports, which the DEP would publish.
These obligations are important because the agreement was not simply a financial settlement.
It included operational changes, environmental mitigation measures and continuing regulatory reporting.
The DEP presented the agreement as evidence of its commitment to enforcing Pennsylvania’s environmental laws.
The authority also emphasised the state’s constitutional protection of clean air and pure water.
The primary source is the Pennsylvania DEP announcement of 4 September 2026.
Commonwealth of PennsylvaniaNearly $25 million — but not all of it in penalties
The two settlements together represent substantial financial commitments.
Settlement Total financial commitment May 2023 Approximately $9.9 million September 2026 $15 million Combined Approximately $24.9 millionAn important distinction must be retained.
The entire amount was not paid as regulatory fines.
The agreements include civil penalties and funds allocated to environmental and community projects.
That distinction matters because describing the settlements as $25 million in fines would misrepresent the financial arrangements.
The settlements also require corrective work beyond the monetary commitments.
Shell’s position is that these enforcement agreements address the underlying regulatory violations and provide mechanisms for preventing further non-compliance.
The Clean Air Council’s lawsuit raises the separate question of whether those state agreements legally prevent additional federal citizen enforcement.
The Clean Air Council’s lawsuitThe Clean Air Council commenced its federal proceedings in May 2023.
The action was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
The case is identified as:
Clean Air Council v. Shell Chemical Appalachia, LLC — Case No. 2:23-cv-00794.
According to the public case history, the organisation alleged that Shell’s new petrochemical facility had violated environmental requirements since operations began in late 2022.
The allegations concerned emissions and compliance with relevant permits.
Subsequent litigation involved disputes over Shell’s defences and discovery procedures.
The case therefore predates the September 2026 settlement by more than three years.
The environmental organisation initiated proceedings when the regulatory history of the plant was still developing.
Shell now argues that the subsequent state enforcement agreements have addressed the matters for which the organisation seeks relief.
This gives the legal dispute an unusual chronology.
The citizen lawsuit began in 2023.
A state settlement was completed that year.
Further violations were addressed through another settlement in 2026.
And Shell now seeks dismissal on the basis that the government’s enforcement measures have already dealt with the relevant matters.
The public case history is available through Law360’s case record.
Law360Shell’s legal argument: The state has already acted
The central issue concerns the relationship between government enforcement and private citizen lawsuits under federal environmental legislation.
The Clean Air Act permits qualifying individuals and organisations to bring civil enforcement proceedings in specified circumstances.
Such proceedings can provide an additional mechanism for ensuring compliance with environmental requirements.
However, the legislation also contains restrictions intended to prevent inappropriate duplication of government enforcement.
The precise application of those restrictions depends upon the relevant statutory provisions, the enforcement actions involved and the relief being sought.
Shell argues that the Pennsylvania DEP has already addressed the violations through its consent agreements.
According to contemporary reporting, the company maintains that further proceedings brought by the Clean Air Council would improperly duplicate the state’s enforcement.
The company also challenges whether the organisation has demonstrated the legally required injury to its members.
This second argument concerns legal standing.
Federal courts generally require plaintiffs to demonstrate an injury sufficient to establish a justiciable dispute.
Organisations may sometimes rely upon injuries allegedly suffered by their members, provided the applicable requirements are satisfied.
Shell contends that the Clean Air Council has failed to establish the necessary basis for its claims.
These are arguments advanced in Shell’s dismissal motion.
They are not findings already accepted by the court.
The court must determine whether the relevant claims are barred, whether the requirements for standing are satisfied and whether any part of the action may continue.
Can a regulatory settlement prevent further environmental litigation?The dispute raises an important question about how environmental enforcement works.
Government regulators possess statutory powers to investigate violations, impose penalties and require corrective action.
They also have discretion concerning how to allocate enforcement resources and negotiate settlements.
Citizen lawsuits serve a different, though sometimes overlapping, purpose.
They can allow individuals and organisations to pursue enforcement where statutory requirements permit.
That can provide an additional safeguard where communities believe environmental obligations have not been adequately enforced.
But it can also create potential overlap.
A company that has already entered an enforceable settlement may argue that another lawsuit concerning the same violations adds little practical benefit.
It may also contend that allowing multiple enforcement proceedings creates uncertainty and potentially duplicative liabilities.
Those concerns are not inherently unreasonable.
Equally, an environmental organisation may argue that a state settlement does not necessarily resolve every alleged violation or provide all the relief available under federal law.
A court must examine the actual agreements and claims.
A settlement covering particular violations does not automatically establish that every environmental claim involving the facility has been extinguished.
Conversely, the existence of a citizen lawsuit does not automatically entitle an organisation to pursue claims already subject to qualifying government enforcement.
The legal answer depends upon the statutory framework and specific facts.
This is the question at the heart of the Pennsylvania proceedings.
COMMENTARY: When Has a Polluter Done Enough?Shell’s latest legal argument raises a broader issue extending beyond the Monaca complex.
When a company acknowledges environmental violations, pays substantial penalties and agrees to operational improvements, how should the legal system determine whether further enforcement is justified?
There are compelling considerations on both sides.
For regulators, settlements can provide practical remedies without prolonged litigation.
They may secure corrective work, monitoring commitments and financial resources for affected communities.
For companies, the ability to resolve identified violations through enforceable agreements provides a degree of legal and commercial certainty.
Without some limits on overlapping enforcement, companies could face repeated proceedings over the same conduct.
But environmental organisations have legitimate reasons to scrutinise negotiated settlements.
A financial agreement does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of future violations.
Nor does the payment of penalties automatically establish that every environmental consequence has been adequately addressed.
The public interest requires effective compliance, not simply financial payments following breaches.
The Monaca dispute illustrates that tension.
Shell has acknowledged exceeding emissions limits.
Pennsylvania regulators have imposed substantial financial and operational requirements.
Those facts are established.
But the Clean Air Council is pursuing its own legal action.
The court must decide whether that action remains legally permissible.
Why the September settlement mattersThe second agreement is especially significant because it was announced only weeks before Shell sought dismissal.
It addressed violations extending through August 2026.
Shell can therefore point to relatively recent regulatory action covering a substantial part of the facility’s operating history.
The company’s argument is stronger than it would be if the only relevant settlement concerned violations during the original commissioning period.
But the existence of the second agreement also demonstrates that environmental compliance concerns did not end with the first settlement in 2023.
Further violations required another substantial regulatory response.
That is an important historical fact.
It does not prove that Shell is currently violating its permits.
Nor does it establish that the Clean Air Council’s lawsuit must succeed.
But it shows why the facility has remained under close environmental scrutiny.
The importance of the community fundsAnother aspect of the settlements deserves attention.
The agreements include significant funding for environmental and community improvements in Beaver County.
The first arrangement created a $5 million mitigation fund.
The second provides another $7.5 million for community environmental purposes.
These commitments can produce tangible benefits.
Local residents may benefit from improved public facilities, environmental projects and investments addressing community needs.
The DEP has already reported the allocation of funds from the original settlement to local projects.
That is relevant when assessing whether government enforcement has produced meaningful outcomes.
But community funding is not identical to preventing future emissions violations.
A successful environmental enforcement programme must achieve both meaningful remediation and sustained compliance.
The ultimate test of Shell’s performance will be whether the facility operates within its legal limits and implements the required improvements.
Why shareholders should pay attentionFor Shell shareholders, the dispute involves more than the financial value of the settlements.
The Monaca petrochemical complex represents a substantial industrial investment.
Repeated regulatory violations, litigation and operational improvement requirements create potential costs and uncertainty.
Those costs may include penalties, additional equipment, engineering work, monitoring requirements and legal expenses.
They may also affect public confidence in the company’s operations.
The legal proceedings introduce an additional question.
If Shell succeeds in dismissing the Clean Air Council lawsuit, it may reduce one category of litigation exposure.
But that would not eliminate the company’s continuing obligation to comply with environmental laws and permits.
Nor would dismissal retrospectively erase the violations acknowledged in the DEP settlements.
That distinction is essential.
Winning a procedural or statutory defence against a citizen lawsuit is not the same as proving that no environmental violations occurred.
Equally, the existence of acknowledged violations does not automatically establish that every subsequent lawsuit is legally justified.
Both propositions should be recognised.
Conclusion: Nearly $25 Million Later, the Court Must DecideShell’s Monaca petrochemical complex has now been the subject of two substantial Pennsylvania environmental enforcement settlements.
The first, in May 2023, involved approximately $9.9 million in financial commitments.
The second, announced in September 2026, added another $15 million.
Shell formally acknowledged emissions exceedances and other environmental violations.
It also agreed to undertake corrective measures and continue reporting to regulators.
Those are established facts.
The company now argues that these enforcement agreements prevent the Clean Air Council from pursuing overlapping claims in federal court.
The environmental organisation’s lawsuit began in May 2023 and remains subject to judicial proceedings.
The court has not yet ruled on Shell’s latest dismissal application.
The significance of the case extends beyond the financial amounts involved.
It concerns the relationship between public environmental regulators and private enforcement under federal law.
Government settlements can deliver penalties, corrective measures and community funding.
Citizen lawsuits can provide additional accountability where legally permitted.
But the law must establish when those mechanisms may operate together and when further proceedings are barred.
The question is not whether Shell has already paid substantial sums. It has.
The question is whether those payments and the accompanying enforcement agreements legally and adequately address the claims now before the federal court.
That decision belongs to the judiciary.
For Shell, the outcome could bring an important legal dispute closer to an end.
For environmental organisations, it may help clarify the boundaries of citizen enforcement where regulators have already negotiated substantial settlements.
And for residents near the Monaca complex, the most important measure of success will remain the same:
Whether the plant operates safely, complies with its environmental obligations and avoids further breaches.
Principal Sources1. Marcellus Drilling News — 14 October 2026
Shell Asks Court to Toss Big Green Cracker Suit: DEP Already Acted
Industry reporting identifying Shell’s 9 October dismissal motion, the reliance upon Pennsylvania’s enforcement settlements and its challenge to the Clean Air Council’s standing.
2. Law360 — Matthew Santoni, 13 October 2026
Shell Says Enviro Group’s Suit Retreads Pa. Settlements
Independent legal reporting confirming Shell’s application to dismiss the lawsuit and its reliance upon the two DEP consent agreements.
3. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection — 4 September 2026
The principal authenticated government source for the latest settlement, acknowledged violations, financial commitments and operational requirements.
4. Pennsylvania DEP — Shell Petrochemical Complex
Official Facility Information and Enforcement Records
Includes regulatory documents, the May 2023 consent agreement and other compliance material.
5. Pennsylvania DEP — Environmental Mitigation Community Fund
Community Fund Information and May 2023 Settlement Documents
Official information concerning the $5 million community fund created under the earlier enforcement agreement.
6. Law360 — Federal Court Proceedings
Clean Air Council v. Shell Chemical Appalachia, LLC — Case No. 2:23-cv-00794
Public litigation history identifying the parties, court and earlier developments in the case.
7. Pennsylvania DEP — Facility Background
Shell Chemical Appalachia Petrochemicals Complex
Official information about the plant, its operations and regulatory oversight.
Editorial and Legal DisclaimerThis article distinguishes authenticated government enforcement records, allegations made in litigation, Shell’s legal arguments, independent journalism and editorial commentary.
Shell’s acknowledgement of emissions exceedances and other environmental violations in the DEP consent agreements is an established matter of public record.
The Clean Air Council’s additional allegations remain subject to legal proceedings.
Shell’s assertion that the DEP settlements bar further citizen enforcement is a disputed legal position, not a ruling already made by the court.
The federal dismissal motion and the underlying consent agreements have not been independently examined in their entirety for this article. Details of Shell’s current arguments are attributed to the contemporary legal reporting cited above.
No conclusion is drawn that Shell has committed additional violations beyond those established in the cited regulatory documents, or that the Clean Air Council has proved its disputed claims.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
Shell Seeks Dismissal of Pennsylvania Pollution Lawsuit — Are Nearly $25 Million in Environmental Settlements Enough? was first posted on October 15, 2026 at 4:58 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
Solar imports from India, Indonesia, Laos injured US manufacturers: ITC
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Shell Shares in the Watchdog’s Boardroom — Questions Grow Over Independence of UK’s North Sea Oil Regulator
15 October 2026 | RoyalDutchShellPlc.com
Who watches the watchdog when some of its directors own shares in the companies it regulates? An investigation published today by Scottish investigative journalism organisation The Ferret reveals that two recently appointed directors of the North Sea Transition Authority hold shares in Shell and BP worth more than £77,000 combined. One is a former Shell finance executive who remains involved in the company’s UK pension arrangements. The disclosures have prompted criticism from environmental campaigners and an academic expert in regulation. The authority insists that its directors’ interests are properly declared and do not compromise independent judgment. But with Shell-linked developments including Jackdaw and Rosebank awaiting fresh regulatory decisions, the investigation raises important questions about the appearance — as well as the reality — of regulatory independence.
The investigation that raises uncomfortable questionsOn 15 October 2026, Scottish investigative journalism organisation The Ferret published an investigation by journalist Paul Dobson examining the financial interests and previous industry connections of directors at the North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA).
The NSTA is the UK body responsible for licensing and regulating offshore oil and gas activities.
Its responsibilities include decisions affecting petroleum exploration and production, the stewardship of existing fields, decommissioning and enforcement of industry obligations.
It also plays an increasingly important role in the development of offshore carbon storage and aspects of the energy transition.
The organisation must therefore balance substantial commercial, environmental and public-interest considerations.
That makes the independence of its decision-makers particularly important.
The Ferret’s investigation identifies financial interests declared in the NSTA’s latest annual report.
The relevant disclosures are publicly available.
They are not anonymous allegations or confidential information obtained through a leak.
They appear in an official document presented to Parliament.
The central question is whether disclosure and recusal arrangements provide sufficient safeguards when regulators hold financial interests in companies operating within the industries they oversee.
A former Shell executive with £58,510 in Shell sharesOne of the directors identified is Ian Chisholm.
Chisholm joined the NSTA board as a non-executive director on 7 April 2026.
He also became chair of its Audit and Risk Committee.
According to the regulator’s annual report, Chisholm declared ownership of 1,633 ordinary shares in Shell.
The holding was valued at £58,510.
His declaration was made on 16 March 2026.
Chisholm previously held several finance positions within Shell.
His continuing connections include a role with Shell Pensions Trust Limited, where the NSTA’s annual report lists him as a member of the Investment and Funding Committee and chair of its ESG Forum.
That relationship is distinct from his ownership of Shell shares.
But it demonstrates that his association with Shell extends beyond previous employment.
For a director involved in overseeing a regulator’s audit and risk arrangements, these connections raise questions worth examining.
A financial interest in a company does not automatically prevent someone from exercising independent judgment.
Nor does previous employment establish improper influence.
However, a regulatory body must consider whether such interests create actual, potential or perceived conflicts.
The distinction is especially relevant when the company concerned operates major projects subject to decisions within the regulator’s remit.
The NSTA has determined that Chisholm’s declared shareholding does not impair his independent judgment.
Critics question whether that assessment is sufficient to maintain public confidence.
Source: NSTA Annual Report and Accounts 2025–26, Directors’ Financial Interests, page 32
A second director holds BP sharesThe Ferret also identified the interests of Rebecca Wiles, another recently appointed non-executive director.
Wiles joined the NSTA board on 1 May 2026.
She previously worked for BP for more than 30 years.
The regulator’s annual report records that she held 3,348 BP ordinary shares, valued at £19,150 on 1 May 2026.
Wiles is also a non-executive director of Tullow Oil.
Tullow has interests connected with the oil and gas industry, including decommissioning activities in the North Sea.
As with Chisholm, the declared shareholding is a matter of public record.
There is no evidence in the material examined that Wiles concealed the interest.
Nor is there evidence that she improperly influenced a regulatory decision involving BP or Tullow.
The concern is more general.
Should someone who helps oversee a regulator be permitted to retain a financial interest in a company whose commercial activities fall within the regulatory sector?
The NSTA believes its safeguards are adequate.
Campaigners and regulatory specialists have raised objections.
The disagreement goes to the heart of how independence should be understood.
Other former oil executives on the boardThe investigation extends beyond the two disclosed shareholdings.
Several other senior NSTA figures have substantial professional backgrounds in the energy industry.
Stuart Payne, the authority’s chief executive, previously held positions with Shell and Dana Petroleum.
Mitch Flegg, appointed as a non-executive director in May 2026, previously served as chief executive of Serica Energy.
He also served on the board of Offshore Energies UK, the trade association representing the offshore energy industry.
Malcolm Brown, another NSTA board member, spent approximately four decades working in the oil and gas industry and held senior positions at BG Group.
These appointments illustrate the extent to which the regulator draws upon experienced industry personnel.
That is not necessarily improper.
Regulating offshore petroleum production requires substantial knowledge of engineering, geology, finance, safety systems, commercial contracts and the management of complex industrial operations.
Experienced industry professionals may possess expertise that would be difficult to obtain elsewhere.
But the concentration of previous industry relationships can also create questions about institutional culture.
A regulator staffed by people who have spent much of their careers working within an industry must demonstrate that it can challenge that industry effectively.
Professional familiarity can help officials understand complex businesses.
It can also create the appearance of excessive closeness.
The issue is not whether former Shell or BP executives should automatically be excluded from public service.
It is whether the regulator’s governance arrangements provide adequate safeguards against conflicts and maintain public confidence.
The official disclosures confirm the figuresThe NSTA’s 2025–26 Annual Report and Accounts provides independent primary-source confirmation of the disclosed financial interests.
The relevant section records the holdings of Chisholm and Wiles.
It also identifies other directors’ declared investments.
The report explains that directors must disclose interests upon appointment and annually thereafter.
They must also declare relevant conflicts at the beginning of board meetings.
Where a conflict arises in relation to an agenda item, the director concerned is not permitted to participate in the discussion.
The NSTA’s board states that it does not regard the declared holdings as sufficiently significant to impair independent judgment.
It also maintains that its regulatory powers could not materially influence the value of the shares concerned.
These are important safeguards and explanations.
They should not be omitted from any fair account of the controversy.
But the existence of disclosure procedures does not necessarily resolve every question about perceived conflicts.
There is a difference between complying with an internal governance policy and satisfying every reasonable expectation of public impartiality.
That distinction explains the criticism now being directed at the regulator.
Why Jackdaw and Rosebank make this particularly sensitiveThe timing of The Ferret’s investigation is important.
Two major North Sea projects with Shell connections are awaiting new regulatory decisions.
They are Jackdaw and Rosebank.
Jackdaw is a gas and condensate development approximately 250 kilometres east of Aberdeen.
Shell originally developed the project, which is now associated with Adura, the joint venture combining Shell and Equinor’s UK offshore oil and gas interests.
Rosebank is a major oil and gas development west of Shetland.
It was originally associated principally with Equinor and Ithaca Energy and is now also within Adura’s portfolio.
Both projects received regulatory consent under the previous Conservative government.
Jackdaw was approved in 2022.
Rosebank received development consent in 2023.
Both subsequently became the subjects of legal challenges concerning the adequacy of their environmental assessments.
The NSTA was involved in the original consenting process.
That does not mean its board members personally approved the applications.
Regulatory decisions are made through established statutory and administrative procedures.
The distinction between institutional responsibility and an individual director’s participation is essential.
Nevertheless, the NSTA has an important role in decisions affecting these projects.
That makes questions about its independence particularly relevant.
The courts interveneIn January 2025, the Court of Session in Edinburgh ruled on challenges concerning the original consents for Jackdaw and Rosebank.
The proceedings followed the UK Supreme Court’s landmark 2024 judgment in R (Finch) v Surrey County Council.
That judgment established that environmental impact assessment must consider relevant downstream greenhouse gas emissions arising from the eventual use of extracted petroleum.
The earlier assessments for Jackdaw and Rosebank had not adequately addressed those emissions.
The Scottish court consequently ruled that the consents could not stand in their existing form.
The developers were allowed to continue certain work while fresh environmental assessment and consenting procedures were undertaken.
The judgments did not establish that the projects could never lawfully proceed.
They required the relevant environmental impacts to be reconsidered under the applicable legal framework.
Further environmental submissions were lodged in July 2026.
New decisions remain necessary.
The developers maintain that both projects can contribute to UK energy security and economic activity.
Environmental organisations argue that their climate implications and compatibility with national energy policy require careful scrutiny.
These competing positions form the background to the present governance controversy.
Project sources: Adura — Jackdaw and Adura — Rosebank.
Does holding Shell shares compromise regulatory independence?The Ferret quotes Tessa Khan, executive director of environmental campaign organisation Uplift.
Khan argues that directors who hold financial interests in companies subject to regulation create unacceptable conflicts.
She questions whether the NSTA can adequately prioritise the public interest while directors retain investments in the industry.
Uplift was involved in the legal challenges concerning North Sea developments.
Its position is therefore informed by direct participation in the controversy surrounding offshore oil and gas approvals.
But its statements remain arguments made by a campaigning organisation.
They are not judicial findings of misconduct by NSTA directors.
The distinction is important.
There is no evidence in The Ferret’s investigation that Chisholm or Wiles personally intervened improperly in the Jackdaw or Rosebank decisions.
Indeed, both joined the board in 2026, after the original approvals issued in 2022 and 2023.
They cannot reasonably be held responsible for decisions made before their appointment.
The governance question is therefore prospective as well as institutional.
What safeguards will apply when current board members hold financial interests connected with companies whose projects may require further regulatory consideration?
And how can the public establish that those safeguards are being applied consistently?
An academic warns about perceived regulatory captureThe Ferret also interviewed Andrew Watterson, an academic specialising in regulation at the University of Stirling.
Watterson expressed concern about the NSTA’s close professional and financial connections with the oil and gas industry.
He suggested that the public might perceive the organisation as having been captured by the sector it regulates.
He also argued that directors should divest themselves of oil, gas and related industry shares to reinforce confidence in impartial decision-making.
The term regulatory capture has a specific meaning in discussions of public administration and governance.
It generally refers to circumstances in which a regulator comes to serve the interests of the regulated industry rather than the wider public interest.
Capture may arise through institutional relationships, information dependence, career incentives or other mechanisms.
However, an appearance of closeness is not proof of capture.
Establishing actual regulatory capture would require evidence concerning decisions, conduct, governance practices and the exercise of regulatory authority.
The disclosed shareholdings and previous employment connections justify examination.
They do not, by themselves, establish that the NSTA has been captured.
That distinction should remain central to the discussion.
The regulator’s defence: Industry expertise is essentialThe NSTA has responded to the criticism.
It argues that the oil and gas industry is highly specialised and that direct experience within the sector is valuable when carrying out complex regulatory functions.
The authority states that its board includes professionals from a range of backgrounds.
It also points to experience gained in other industries and regulatory organisations.
The board is chaired by Liz Ditchburn, whose background includes senior public-sector responsibilities.
According to the NSTA, its conflict-of-interest procedures require directors to declare relevant interests and withdraw from affected discussions.
It maintains that the disclosed shareholdings do not materially compromise independent judgment.
The regulator also argues that none of its powers could materially affect the value of the Shell and BP shares identified.
This is an important consideration.
Shell and BP are large multinational companies with operations across numerous markets.
Their share prices are influenced by global oil and gas prices, financial results, investment decisions and wider economic conditions.
It would be difficult to establish that a particular NSTA decision would materially alter the value of either company’s shares.
But critics argue that materiality in financial terms is not the only consideration.
A conflict-of-interest framework may also need to address the appearance of divided loyalties.
That is the point at which the two sides disagree.
The NSTA emphasises disclosure, proportionate assessment and recusal.
Its critics favour stricter limits on financial holdings.
Neither position should be misrepresented.
The wider issue: Can a regulator be too close to its industry?The Ferret previously examined financial and professional connections involving the North Sea regulator.
In 2021, when the organisation was still known as the Oil and Gas Authority, the publication reported that three directors held shares linked to the fossil fuel industry worth more than £225,000.
The latest investigation therefore does not concern an entirely new governance question.
It forms part of a continuing debate about the relationship between the regulator and the sector it oversees.
The organisation was established following the Wood Review, which examined how the UK could maximise economic recovery from declining North Sea resources.
Its responsibilities have subsequently expanded to include supporting the energy transition and regulating additional activities.
This creates a complex institutional position.
The authority must oversee an industry that remains economically important.
It must seek compliance with applicable laws and standards.
It must enforce obligations concerning decommissioning and other activities.
And it must operate within national energy and climate policy.
Some of those objectives can create competing pressures.
The NSTA’s official annual report acknowledges both the importance of continued energy production and the need to accelerate emissions reductions.
The board’s composition and governance arrangements must be considered against that broader mandate.
Evidence that the regulator does take enforcement actionA fair assessment must also recognise that the NSTA has used its enforcement powers against industry operators.
In April 2026, the regulator announced its largest financial penalty to date against EnQuest.
The penalty concerned failures associated with decommissioning inactive wells.
The case involved 33 wells that had not been decommissioned within the required arrangements.
This action illustrates that the NSTA does not simply approve industry requests or refrain from imposing penalties.
It has statutory responsibilities extending beyond licensing.
It also investigates non-compliance and enforces regulatory obligations.
That enforcement record is relevant when assessing broad allegations that the authority is unwilling to challenge the industry.
But individual enforcement actions do not automatically resolve governance concerns about financial interests.
The regulator must demonstrate impartiality across its responsibilities.
The existence of both industry expertise and enforcement activity forms part of the evidence.
So do the declared financial interests.
A balanced assessment requires consideration of all three.
COMMENTARY: Independence Must Be Demonstrated, Not Merely AssertedThe most revealing feature of The Ferret’s investigation is that the central facts are not disputed.
Ian Chisholm owns Shell shares.
Rebecca Wiles owns BP shares.
Both holdings were disclosed.
Both individuals have significant professional experience within the oil and gas industry.
And both sit on the board of an organisation responsible for regulating that industry.
The dispute concerns what those facts mean.
The NSTA believes the financial interests are insufficiently significant to impair independent judgment.
Its critics believe the holdings create an unacceptable appearance of conflict.
There is no need to allege corruption to recognise the legitimacy of this question.
Public confidence in regulation depends upon more than the absence of proven wrongdoing.
It also depends upon transparent procedures and credible safeguards.
The NSTA has disclosure and recusal arrangements.
But the existence of those policies raises further practical questions.
How frequently are relevant conflicts declared?
How are potential conflicts assessed?
Who determines whether a director must withdraw from a discussion?
Are those decisions independently reviewed?
And how much information can be published without compromising legitimate confidentiality?
These are ordinary governance questions.
They apply to financial regulators, environmental authorities, competition bodies and public institutions more generally.
The North Sea regulator should not be treated as an exception.
Shell’s perspective also mattersShell is entitled to seek regulatory decisions concerning its lawful commercial activities.
The company is also entitled to benefit from the experience and expertise of former employees who subsequently enter public service.
There is nothing inherently improper about a former Shell executive becoming a regulator.
Former industry professionals can bring valuable knowledge.
But individuals moving into regulatory positions must operate under public-interest obligations distinct from those associated with their previous employment.
Those obligations include managing conflicts and maintaining institutional independence.
The same principle applies to former BP executives and personnel from other energy companies.
For Shell, the issue is not whether it has been shown to influence NSTA decisions improperly.
No such finding is established by the evidence examined here.
The issue is whether the regulator’s governance arrangements are sufficiently transparent to provide confidence in decisions affecting Shell and other major operators.
That distinction is particularly important where large infrastructure investments, environmental assessments and legal challenges are involved.
Jackdaw, Rosebank and public confidenceThe pending decisions concerning Jackdaw and Rosebank make this an especially sensitive time.
The projects have substantial commercial significance.
Their developers argue that they can contribute to domestic energy security, employment and investment.
Environmental organisations challenge their climate implications and the adequacy of previous approvals.
The courts have already required fresh consideration of downstream emissions.
Against that background, the regulator’s independence must be demonstrable.
Any future approval or refusal should rest upon the relevant evidence, statutory requirements and transparent decision-making procedures.
The existence of a director’s Shell shareholding does not mean a project will receive preferential treatment.
Nor does a previous career at Shell establish institutional bias.
But where questions arise concerning conflicts, the public should be able to understand how those questions were resolved.
That is not an unreasonable expectation.
It is an essential part of regulatory accountability.
A possible reform worth examiningThere are several ways public bodies can manage financial conflicts.
One is mandatory disclosure.
Another is recusal from affected decisions.
A stricter approach may involve limits upon directly held shares in companies subject to regulation.
Some organisations also use independently managed investment arrangements or restrictions on certain forms of financial interest.
Each approach has advantages and limitations.
A complete prohibition on all investments connected with a broad industrial sector could make recruitment more difficult.
It might also impose disproportionate restrictions on individuals holding diversified investments or pension interests.
Conversely, relying solely upon self-disclosure may be insufficient where financial interests are closely connected with regulatory responsibilities.
The appropriate framework requires consideration of the regulator’s powers, the nature of the interests and the practical ability to manage conflicts.
The Ferret’s investigation provides an opportunity to examine whether the NSTA’s existing arrangements meet that standard.
Why this belongs in the independent Shell archiveThe historical relationship between Shell and public institutions has long been a subject of interest within this archive.
The documentary record includes disputes over environmental regulation, legal proceedings, government relations and corporate influence.
Those histories warrant careful treatment.
It would be inappropriate to use earlier controversies to imply that the present NSTA directors have acted improperly.
The evidence does not support such a conclusion.
But the historical record does reinforce the value of transparency.
Public confidence is strengthened when relevant financial interests, professional relationships, decisions and safeguards can be examined independently.
The Ferret’s investigation has provided an important public service by drawing attention to disclosures contained in the regulator’s own accounts.
The NSTA has responded and explained its position.
Readers can examine the evidence and assess the competing arguments.
That is how independent scrutiny should operate.
Conclusion: The Question Is Not Whether Shell Controls the WatchdogThe disclosures concerning Ian Chisholm and Rebecca Wiles are significant because they concern the governance of an important public regulator.
They establish that members of the NSTA board hold direct financial interests in major oil and gas companies.
They also establish continuing or previous professional connections with the industry.
The NSTA maintains that these interests are properly managed.
Campaigners and regulatory specialists question whether the safeguards are sufficiently robust.
No evidence examined for this article establishes that either director has improperly influenced a regulatory decision.
Nor has it been shown that the original Jackdaw and Rosebank consents were affected by their appointments.
Both directors joined the NSTA after those original decisions.
Nevertheless, the issue deserves scrutiny.
A regulator’s credibility depends upon its ability to demonstrate independence, particularly when making decisions involving powerful companies and substantial commercial interests.
Disclosure is important.
Recusal arrangements are important.
Industry knowledge is valuable.
But transparency concerning how conflicts are managed is equally necessary.
The real question is not whether Shell or BP secretly controls the North Sea regulator. The available evidence establishes no such thing.
The question is whether a regulator can maintain sufficient public confidence when some of its directors hold personal investments in companies operating within the industry it oversees.
That is a legitimate issue for Parliament, the regulator, the industry and the public.
And it deserves to be answered through evidence rather than assumption.
Principal Sources1. The Ferret — Paul Dobson, 15 October 2026
Oil Watchdog Faces ‘Conflict of Interests’ Row Over Directors’ Shell and BP Shares
The original investigative report establishing the controversy, identifying the financial interests and recording responses from campaigners, academic experts and the NSTA.
Full credit for the original investigation belongs to Paul Dobson and The Ferret.
2. North Sea Transition Authority — Annual Report and Accounts 2025–26
Read the official NSTA annual report (PDF)
Primary-source confirmation of board appointments, declared financial holdings, outside positions and conflict-of-interest arrangements. The relevant disclosures appear in the Corporate Governance Report.
3. UK Government — 7 July 2026
NSTA Annual Report and Accounts 2025–26: Parliamentary Publication
Official government publication of the regulator’s annual accounts.
4. North Sea Transition Authority — Board of Directors and Leadership Team
NSTA Leadership and Governance
Official biographical information concerning the authority’s directors and senior executives.
5. Adura — Jackdaw Development
Jackdaw: Project Details and Environmental Documentation
Company information concerning the development, environmental assessments and fresh consenting process.
6. Adura — Rosebank Development
Rosebank: Project Details and Environmental Documentation
Company information concerning Rosebank and the environmental consultation material.
7. UK Parliament — House of Commons Library
Research on North Sea Oil and Gas Developments
Parliamentary research concerning North Sea developments, licensing, environmental assessment and the consequences of the Finch judgment.
8. UK Supreme Court — 2024
R (Finch) v Surrey County Council, [2024] UKSC 20
Judicial authority concerning consideration of downstream greenhouse gas emissions in environmental impact assessment.
Editorial and Legal DisclaimerThis article is based upon an investigation published by The Ferret, authenticated NSTA disclosures, company statements, official project records and judicial material.
The financial holdings and previous employment relationships discussed are documented facts.
Statements concerning conflicts of interest, regulatory independence and potential industry influence are attributed to the organisations or individuals making them.
No finding of corruption, improper influence, undisclosed conflict or unlawful conduct by Ian Chisholm, Rebecca Wiles, Shell, BP or the NSTA is alleged or established in the material examined.
The original Jackdaw and Rosebank consents predated the appointments of the two directors whose financial holdings form the principal subject of The Ferret’s investigation.
Editorial commentary is identified separately from the documented facts.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
Tighten the article’s repeated analysisAdd a concise fact summary table Shell Shares in the Watchdog’s Boardroom — Questions Grow Over Independence of UK’s North Sea Oil Regulator was first posted on October 15, 2026 at 4:45 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
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