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Laurence Tubiana is CEO of the European Climate Foundation and was formerly France’s Climate Change Ambassador and Special Representative for COP21 in Paris.

The UN has released a report this week confirming what many people have feared: the world is going to pass 1.5C of warming.

At current emissions, the remaining carbon budget will be exhausted within roughly three years. We are heading into “exceedance” of the 1.5C threshold: a sustained breach of the Paris Agreement’s primary temperature goal before any possible return below it.

1.5C is the line we should not have crossed – and, once we cross it, the line we must quickly get back below, on what the UN Environment Programme calls an “overshoot, peak and decline pathway”.

• Sep 2, 2026 News UN sets out narrow path back to 1.5C warming after inevitable overshoot Leading scientists say warming must peak at 1.8C to be able to reverse course this century, but current government climate policies are way off track Read more
• Aug 26, 2026 Oceans Battle over cleaning up shipping set to resume at London talks The US and Saudi Arabia want to scrap shipping’s Net-Zero Framework and have swung behind a far less ambitious alternative Read more

Of course, climate risk is a spectrum: 1.4C is not safe, and 1.5C is not a sudden cliff edge. But the further the world moves beyond that level, the harder it becomes for communities and economies to adapt, and the greater the risk of more abrupt or systemic changes.

The importance of 1.5C

Some will argue that exceeding 1.5C means the Paris Agreement has failed, and that it is no longer a useful threshold. I disagree.

Before Paris, the world was heading for roughly 3.5C to 4C of warming. The UN now estimates that warming will reach a lower level of around 2.6C by 2100, due to policies implemented since Paris. That is still far too dangerous, but it is not the same world we were facing in 2015.

When we negotiated the Paris Agreement, 1.5C was not an arbitrary number. It was fought for by small island states and other climate-vulnerable countries because it represented a red line for their survival. Since then, we have witnessed the stark impacts of global temperature rises even in countries that did not consider themselves vulnerable, as seen with the devastating heatwaves in Europe this summer.

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The International Court of Justice underlined this in an advisory opinion, endorsed overwhelmingly by the UN General Assembly earlier this year, recognising 1.5C as the primary temperature threshold under the Paris Agreement and affirming that states must align their commitments with it. Overshoot does not move the goalposts. 1.5C remains the benchmark we must work to return to.

Lasting consequences of overshoot

But even as we fight to get back below 1.5C as quickly as possible, we now have to reckon honestly with what overshoot means. We are entering a period for which our societies, economies and institutions are not prepared. Even if overshoot itself is temporary, many of its consequences will not be. The longer it lasts, and the higher temperatures rise, the greater the lasting damage. We therefore need to limit its duration and magnitude.

The longer warming remains above 1.5C, the greater the risk of crossing tipping points in major Earth systems such as ice sheets, the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, permafrost and tropical forests. Crossing them can trigger self-reinforcing changes that may prove irreversible even if temperatures later fall. We need to understand and monitor these systems more than ever. That requires sustained investment in climate science – just as funding is being cut in many places.

An overshoot pathway will also strain human systems. When a flood destroys a home, the damage is not undone because global temperatures later fall. Crop failures, missed schooling, debt and displacement can have lasting effects. Farms, cities, healthcare systems and insurance markets will all have to cope with risks they were not designed for, and risk facing “tipping points” of their own, such as financial panic when markets suddenly reprice risks they had underestimated. Infrastructure built today will stand for decades, so we need to design and plan for the climate risks it will actually face.  

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Our priority must be to transition away from fossil fuels and rapidly cut emissions, including short-lived climate pollutants like methane. It traps around 80 times more heat than carbon dioxide over a 20-year period, and cutting it sharply can act as an emergency brake on near-term warming. Much of the methane from fossil fuel operations can be cut with existing technologies.

We will also need sustainable carbon dioxide removal, although its role will be limited: trying to use it as a substitute for emissions cuts would be prohibitively expensive at scale.

The radical options

The major risks of overshoot have led to proposals to explore active intervention in the climate system itself. Solar radiation modification (SRM) is the best-known example: reflecting a small share of sunlight back into space to reduce warming. Other proposals would target different parts of the climate and Earth systems, such as trying to stabilise glaciers.

These responses would bring us into further uncharted territory across Earth systems and nature, diplomacy and governance, technology and societies.

Such ideas are born of genuine concern about the major risks facing vulnerable countries and communities as temperatures rise. But even under the most favourable assumptions, these are tactics for managing some of the symptoms of overshoot, not a strategy for addressing its causes. Greenhouse gases would keep accumulating, oceans would keep acidifying, and many of the social and economic impacts of overshoot would remain.

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The more we learn about the complexity of the climate and Earth systems we are disrupting and how much uncertainty there already is, the clearer it becomes that full control is likely an illusion, and new interventions bring new complex risks. SRM, for example, could change regional climates, such as rainfall patterns or agricultural production, in ways that benefit some regions and harm others, with knock-on geopolitical risks.

Governance and research needed

None of this is an argument against research into these technologies. On the contrary, the risks they’re responding to are so extreme that we must explore all the options we might have. But we need to understand the potential effects and capabilities much better and from many more angles, including the political and social implications. Serious global governance is particularly urgent, alongside transparent research that is open to scrutiny.

But the fundamental elements of a strategy to navigate overshoot are already understood. The priority is still to rapidly cut greenhouse gas emissions to limit peak warming, protect people against the warming already locked in, and ensure technological innovation aligns with the public interest.

Overshoot is not just an engineering challenge. We need a full-scale response across societies, economies and political systems to prepare to navigate a more uncertain climate.

The post Keeping to 1.5C of warming is no longer possible – but we must still limit the overshoot appeared first on Climate Home News.

Even if you’re not wearing polyester now, it’s probably sitting somewhere in your closet — after all, it is the most ubiquitous fabric for textiles on Earth. Is that bad? 

Judging by social media, the answer is solidly “yes.” Influencers want you to know it’s a form of plastic, fashioned from melted crude oil or PET bottles and extruded into threads. That disgust factor (“ugh, I’m wearing plastic?”) might help explain why “polyester” is now trending as an insult on TikTok.

“Polyester lifestyle,” says the top comment on a viral video in which an 18-year-old imagines his oddly specific dream life — wearing blue-light glasses in a coffee shop while a Claude agent does half his job during lunch break; getting a call that he has to pack for a sudden business trip to Europe while watching the sunset from the tennis court — as a 1987 composite sketch of the Unabomber gradually fades into view.

There’s just one problem with the story that “polyester” is, as Mashable put it last month, “Gen Z’s new way to call you fake”: The term has already been used this way for about half a century. The Oxford English Dictionary gives examples from 1979 (“A gleaming brazen polyester clown”) and 1987 (“Clifton wears polyester suits and a polyester smile”). 

“TikTokkers just seem to be leaning into the ‘inauthentic’ and ‘low-quality’ edge of that meaning,” said Kory Stamper, a lexicographer and author.

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While it may be hard to imagine now, polyester was once sold as “miracle” fabric. Wrinkle-free, quick-drying polyester promised housewives liberation from the drudgery of ironing. The 1950s and ’60s were the era of “plastic fantastic,” when chemical companies promoted plastic and synthetic materials as convenient and durable. As polyester became less expensive, chemical companies ramped up its production, outpacing cotton starting in the ’60s.

As cheap polyester flooded the market, the novelty wore off, and it turned from “treasure to trash,” as the anthropologist Jane Schneider once wrote. The environmental movement was born on Earth Day in 1970, and awareness of pollution spread alongside a suspicion of artificial fibers. As hippie culture took off, people longed for a more authentic, “back to nature” kind of life. (It’s not a coincidence that people started using “plastic” as an adjective meaning superficial or insincere, too.)

As the ’70s came to an end, the shiny, synthetic men’s suits that once seemed modern now felt cheap and tasteless. In 1981, a John Waters film called Polyester played on the fabric’s tacky associations, starring a father in a polyester-clad suit who owns an adult movie theater. “Polyester and pornography — the fabric could hardly sink lower,” wrote Anneke Smelik, an emeritus professor of culture and history at Radboud University in the Netherlands, in a study detailing the cultural history of polyester.

That same anti-synthetic sentiment is back in force today. The vitriol isn’t exactly subtle: One TikTok influencer with a clothing brand said that polyester makes you “sweat like a dog and smell like f***ing shit.” (Those qualities were true of the polyester suits of the ’70s, but textile manufacturers worked to improve the sweat problem and polyester is widely used in athletic wear today, partly because it can be designed to wick sweat away from your skin.) Wellness influencers on both the right and the left warn about the microplastics shed by synthetic clothing; scientists are concerned about the health effects of exposure to PFAS and other toxic chemicals that are used to treat the fabric during production, in order to help it repel water and resist stains.

But the line between “synthetic” fabrics and “natural” ones like wool, silk, bamboo, and cotton is blurrier than you’d think, Smelik said. It’s not like rolls of cotton grow off the plant: The raw materials all undergo intense chemical processes in order to become the soft, huggable fabric we enjoy putting next to our skin.

There isn’t even an obvious winner from an environmental standpoint, she said. Growing natural fabrics requires resources like land and water: It can take more than 700 gallons of water to produce a single cotton shirt. The cotton industry was a major driver in drying up the Aral Sea in Central Asia, turning what was once the world’s fourth-largest lake into its largest dry lakebed. Polyester is less resource-intensive to make, but, as it’s fashioned from oil, it does generate more greenhouse gas emissions. A new report from the Apparel Impact Institute found that the global fashion industry’s emissions rose 7.5 percent in 2023 and 6.3 percent in 2024, in part because of the increased production of fiber, particularly polyester. The fabric’s durability also becomes a curse when you throw it away: Polyester breaks down very slowly, fragmenting into microplastics that persist in ecosystems for generations.

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There’s also consumer behavior to keep in mind: The perception that cotton is natural and better for the environment allows people to buy more clothes and not feel bad about it, because hey, at least I’m not buying polyester. The truth is that the most environmentally friendly solution is simply buying less and wearing the clothes you already have as long as you can. “Fast fashion remains fast fashion, and that is a huge problem,” Smelik said.

As good as the new generation of polyester insults are — including “Polyester Prince,” the new nickname for one prominent influencer who sells polyester clothes, and “polyester jester” to mock anyone wearing synthetic fast-fashion outfits — Smelik sees the current social media discussion around polyester as a regression to the 1970s. “It is so uninformed, and it leaves out all complexity,” she said. “You know, it becomes very polarized — like, ‘natural is good, and artificial is not.’”

toolTips('.classtoolTips12','An acronym for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, PFAS are a class of chemicals used in everyday items like nonstick cookware, cosmetics, and food packaging that have proven to be dangerous to human health. Also called “forever chemicals” for their inability to break down over time, PFAS can be found lingering nearly everywhere — in water, soil, air, and the blood of people and animals.
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This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Gen Z is using ‘polyester’ as an insult. It’s actually a throwback. on Sep 2, 2026.

THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 2 SEPTEMBER 2026 Shell Operated It. Nigeria’s State Oil Company Held 55%: The Forgotten Public-Sector Stake in the Niger Delta Disaster The HEDA documents expose troubling decisions inside Shell and its former Nigerian subsidiary. But there is another institutional fact that should not disappear from the record: the pipelines, wells and facilities at the centre of the controversy belonged to an unincorporated joint venture in which Nigeria’s state oil company held a 55% interest. SPDC held 30% and operated the venture. For decades, therefore, the Nigerian state was simultaneously the majority economic participant in the enterprise and the sovereign responsible for regulating it and protecting its citizens. That does not diminish Shell’s accountability. It substantially widens the accountability question.  

Much of The Shell Nigeria Files has necessarily concentrated on Shell.

The documents published by HEDA Resource Centre are Shell records. They contain Shell emails, Shell audits, Shell technical assessments, Shell management discussions and decisions taken within or concerning the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria.

HEDA says the released material includes confidential audits and exchanges between senior executives and argues that it substantiates longstanding complaints about the condition and management of infrastructure operated by SPDC. Those assertions remain disputed by Shell and several matters will be tested at the Bille factual trial expected in 2027. (HEDA Resource Centre)

But concentrating exclusively on Shell risks obscuring an extraordinary feature of the system within which those decisions were being made.

Shell did not own 100% of the SPDC joint venture.

Nigeria’s state oil company held 55%.

Shell’s SPDC held 30% and was the operator.

Total held 10%.

Agip held 5%.

The July 2026 Nigeria: Lifting the Lid report records that structure, and Shell itself confirms precisely the same percentages.

That distinction — operator versus majority economic participant — deserves examination in its own right.

This was an unincorporated joint venture, not a company 55% owned by Nigeria

Precision matters here.

It would be inaccurate to say that the Nigerian government owned 55% of Shell or even that it owned 55% of SPDC itself.

The SPDC JV was an unincorporated joint venture.

During the period covered by the disclosed documents, SPDC — then a Shell subsidiary — held a 30% participating interest and acted as operator. Nigeria’s state oil company, historically the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, held the 55% interest. (Shell)

Operating responsibility was therefore principally SPDC’s.

The HEDA documents concerning pipeline integrity, leak detection, maintenance, safety exceptions, wells, security and internal management are not transformed into NNPC documents merely because NNPC had the larger economic interest.

But neither should the state-owned majority participation be treated as an irrelevant footnote.

Shell’s own 2024 Annual Report described the governance arrangement in striking terms. Discussing the proposed transfer of SPDC to Renaissance, Shell said the joint-venture partners would “together” continue to make decisions relating to work programmes for the SPDC JV’s assets and infrastructure. (Shell)

That wording raises a legitimate historical question.

If decisions about work programmes for JV assets and infrastructure were made collectively by the partners, what did Nigeria’s 55% participant know about the condition of those assets, the maintenance backlog, exceptional operating arrangements and expenditure required to put them right?

The public HEDA cache does not provide a complete answer.

The Nigerian state had an enormous financial interest

The scale of the relationship was not trivial.

Shell’s own 2013 Sustainability Report described SPDC as operator of the NNPC/SPDC joint venture and reported $44 billion in revenues from SPDC to the Nigerian government between 2009 and 2013.

Shell also said that, after costs, approximately 95% of the revenue from each barrel produced by SPDC went to the Nigerian government. Those are Shell’s figures and should be understood as Shell’s own account of its economic contribution, rather than independently verified calculations for this article. (Shell)

In June 2013, while many of the events documented in the HEDA files were unfolding, Shell announced approximately $3.9 billion of new investment by the SPDC JV in the Trans Niger Pipeline loop-line and Gbaran-Ubie Phase Two projects. Shell again expressly identified the ownership structure: NNPC 55%, SPDC 30%, Total 10%, NAOC 5%. (Shell)

The state therefore had two profoundly important interests operating simultaneously.

It wanted petroleum revenues and production.

It also had the sovereign duty to regulate the industry, protect the environment and safeguard the rights of the people living beside the oil infrastructure.

That combination does not establish corruption, regulatory capture or improper conduct.

But it creates an obvious structural tension — and African human-rights institutions were identifying the consequences of that tension decades before these Shell documents became public.

The African Commission confronted this problem in the Ogoni case

In its landmark decision in Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, Communication 155/96, decided in 2001, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights dealt directly with the Nigerian state’s dual position.

The Commission recognised that the government, through NNPC, was entitled to produce oil and use the resulting income for Nigeria’s economic and social development.

Then came the qualification:

the protective care required to safeguard the affected population “was not taken.”

The Commission said governments have obligations to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, monitor threatened environments, require and publish environmental and social impact studies, provide information to exposed communities and allow meaningful participation in decisions affecting them.

This was not simply an environmental-policy recommendation.

The Commission was interpreting Nigeria’s obligations under the African Charter.

And it addressed the relationship between government and private industry directly, saying states must protect citizens against damaging acts by private parties through legislation and effective enforcement. It concluded that the Nigerian government had failed in that responsibility and had facilitated the destruction of Ogoniland, stating that private actors — “the oil companies in particular” — had been allowed to affect the well-being of the Ogoni people disastrously.

An important qualification about that 2001 decision

The procedural history must not be hidden.

The African Commission recorded that the Nigerian government had not provided a substantive written defence to the allegations in the usual way. Its written response included what the Commission regarded as an admission of the gravamen of the complaints.

The Commission therefore said it was compelled to determine the matter on the basis of the complainants’ uncontested allegations, which it accepted.

That is relevant when assessing individual factual allegations contained in the decision.

It does not alter the formal result.

The Commission found the Federal Republic of Nigeria in violation of Articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the African Charter.

Its recommendations included investigation of officials of the security forces, NNPC and relevant agencies; compensation; comprehensive environmental cleanup; independent petroleum-industry oversight; environmental and social impact assessment; and provision of information about environmental and health risks to affected communities.

The party formally found in violation was Nigeria.

That is crucial to today’s story.

Eleven years later, the ECOWAS Court again found Nigeria wanting

The state-accountability issue did not end with the military era or the Ogoni decision.

On 14 December 2012, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice delivered judgment in SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria, ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09; ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12.

The Court found Nigeria in violation of Articles 1 and 24 of the African Charter over continuing environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. (Ghal ii)

The Court identified enforcement and accountability as central failures. It ordered Nigeria to take effective measures to restore the Niger Delta environment, prevent further environmental damage and hold those responsible for environmental harm accountable. (International Commission of Jurists)

Again, the defendant was the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

This was not a judgment imposing Shell’s civil liability for every Niger Delta spill.

But it established an important principle that predates the present English litigation:

Nigeria could not discharge its international obligations merely by having environmental laws on the statute book. It had to enforce them.

By 2012 — precisely the period from which many of the newly released Shell documents originate — the Nigerian state had therefore already been told by two regional human-rights institutions that its own environmental governance was inadequate.

That context deserves considerably more attention.

Now return to the Shell documents

Consider what has emerged from the 27 publicly released records.

Previous instalments have examined internal material concerning inadequate pipeline maintenance, clamps and overdue replacements; deficient leak-detection capability; hundreds of wells requiring attention; exceptions from Shell’s own HSSE requirements; serious security-management weaknesses; the difficulties of correctly identifying spill causes; concerns about possible employee and contractor involvement in crude theft; and management deliberations over continuing production despite anticipated further environmental damage.

HEDA identifies the underlying documents individually, including Document 8, MPR-10 HB 1248-1262, the pipeline asset-management audit; Document 13, MPR-10 HB 805-827, the pipeline-integrity support visit; Document 16, MPR-10 HB 800-804, the HSSE exception request; Document 18, MPR-10 HB 750-767, concerning significant sabotage leaks; and Document 23, MPR-10 HB 856-891, the Project Madrid material. (HEDA Resource Centre)

The disclosed material largely tells us what people within Shell and SPDC were discussing.

It tells us much less about what the other joint-venture participants were being told.

That is now a conspicuous gap.

What did the 55% partner know?

There is no responsible basis in the currently public records for asserting that NNPC approved every Shell operational decision revealed in the documents.

Nor can we assume that NNPC knew about every internal audit finding, every technical warning or every exchange between Shell executives.

But Shell’s own description of the JV confirms joint participation in decisions concerning work programmes for assets and infrastructure. (Shell)

That makes several questions unavoidable.

Were pipeline-integrity audits supplied to NNPC or discussed within joint-venture governance structures?

Were the financial implications of replacing deteriorating pipelines brought before the partners?

Were NNPC representatives informed when SPDC sought exceptions from Shell Group HSSE requirements?

Did annual joint-venture budgets provide all the funds SPDC said it required for maintenance and integrity work?

Who approved expenditure priorities?

Were Project Madrid’s choices — including possible shutdowns, repair programmes and their financial consequences — discussed with the majority participant?

Was NNPC informed of Shell’s reported multibillion-dollar estimate for eventual decommissioning of the asset base?

What information reached the Nigerian regulators separately from information reaching the Nigerian state as commercial participant?

Those are questions generated by the structure and the documents.

They are not allegations disguised as questions.

The currently public archive is insufficient to answer them.

The distinction between NNPC and the regulators also matters

Another trap should be avoided.

NNPC was the state-owned commercial participant in the joint venture. It was not synonymous with every Nigerian ministry, environmental agency, petroleum regulator, security force or successive federal administration.

Different institutions had different functions.

The problem is therefore not adequately described by saying simply that “the Nigerian government owned 55%.”

The more exact proposition is that the Nigerian state simultaneously participated economically in petroleum production through its national oil company and exercised sovereign regulatory and human-rights responsibilities through other organs of government.

It is that coexistence of interests that demands scrutiny.

And the African Commission understood the point clearly in 2001 when it expressly contrasted Nigeria’s entitlement through NNPC to produce oil with the protective care the government was nevertheless obliged to provide.

None of this provides Shell with an escape route

The Nigerian state’s failures cannot be used to erase Shell’s responsibilities.

SPDC was the operator.

Shell’s own 2024 sale announcement said SPDC implemented the technical expertise, management systems and processes used on behalf of the JV companies. (Shell)

The documents examined in this series are significant precisely because they reveal what Shell and SPDC personnel knew, discussed and sometimes recommended about assets for which SPDC had operational responsibility.

The English Bille and Ogale claims are against Shell plc and Renaissance Africa Energy Company, formerly SPDC. Shell’s current account acknowledges that Renaissance is sued as the former operator of the facilities from which spills are alleged and Shell plc as the former parent. Shell vigorously disputes liability. (Shell)

A 55% state participation in the joint venture therefore does not mean Shell had only 30% of the operator’s responsibility.

Participating interest and operational duty are different concepts.

But the reverse proposition is equally important.

Shell’s position as operator does not make the Nigerian state invisible.

Shell itself invokes the government-owned partner in its defence

There is an intriguing feature of Shell’s current public response.

Shell does not pretend the Nigerian state was absent.

Quite the opposite.

Its Bille and Ogale page, last updated 16 July 2026, says the vast majority of Niger Delta pollution resulted from large-scale oil theft, sabotage and illegal refining by organised criminal gangs. Shell says its former subsidiary worked with “Nigerian authorities, its government-owned partner and local communities” in responding to those challenges and cleaned spills from JV facilities regardless of cause as Nigerian law required. (Shell)

Shell says SPDC invested heavily in pipeline monitoring, infrastructure replacement, spill-response capability, surveillance, repairs and shut-ins, and repeatedly escalated the growing criminality to Nigerian authorities and government security forces. (Shell)

Its response to the July 2026 report makes much the same point. Shell says the publishers have selectively presented historic documents without adequately reflecting the difficult operating environment and specifically cites cooperation with Nigerian authorities and the government-owned JV partner.

That is relevant evidence in Shell’s favour and must be reported.

But it also reinforces the case for examining the public-sector records.

If cooperation with government and the government-owned majority partner is an essential part of Shell’s explanation, the records of that cooperation become essential historical evidence.

The missing archive may not all be in Shell’s files

Yesterday’s instalment established that the 27 HEDA documents constitute only a small fraction of the Shell material disclosed in the English litigation.

Today’s issue points toward another potentially important documentary universe.

NNPC records.

Joint-venture committee papers.

Approved work programmes and budgets.

Government petroleum ministry files.

Regulatory inspection and enforcement records.

Communications between SPDC and NNPC.

Communications between the operator and regulators.

Records concerning funding approvals, shutdown requests, infrastructure replacement, security arrangements and decommissioning.

Some may already be before the parties in litigation. Some may no longer exist. Some may be confidential for legitimate reasons. Some may demonstrate that the Nigerian state pressed Shell to improve matters. Others may show that Shell sought resources or action it did not receive.

We should not predict what they contain.

But an evidence-led history of the Niger Delta cannot logically stop at one participant’s correspondence when the commercial venture was majority-held by the state.

There is a particular question about money

One of the recurring themes in the Shell files is cost.

Shutdowns had enormous financial consequences.

Pipeline replacement required capital.

Maintenance competed for resources.

Security measures cost money.

Decommissioning would eventually cost billions.

That makes joint-venture budgeting especially relevant.

Shell’s public documents demonstrate that JV partners collectively had economic interests in work programmes, while Shell has described their continuing role as jointly making decisions concerning work programmes for assets and infrastructure. (Shell)

If an asset-integrity proposal was delayed because adequate funds were unavailable, it matters whether that was an operator decision, a joint-venture funding problem, a government funding problem or some combination.

If SPDC received all the resources it requested and nevertheless failed to perform required work, that points one way.

If SPDC requested expenditure for critical integrity work and the majority participant would not fund its share, that could point another.

At present we should not claim either scenario.

The documents required to tell us which is true should be found and examined.

The state’s regulatory obligation was independent of its commercial interest

This is the central point.

Even if Nigeria earned enormous revenues from the venture, the state remained obliged to protect people from pollution.

Even if criminal gangs sabotaged infrastructure, the state remained obliged to enforce criminal and environmental law.

Even if Shell operated the facilities, Nigerian regulators remained obliged to regulate them effectively.

Even if Shell breached its duties, Nigeria did not thereby cease to have duties of its own.

The African Commission made that clear more than two decades ago. The ECOWAS Court made it clear again in 2012.

Corporate accountability and state accountability are therefore not competing explanations.

They can exist simultaneously.

The 2026 report itself recognises the Nigerian government’s responsibility

Nigeria: Lifting the Lid does not confine its recommendations to Shell.

It calls on both Shell and the Nigerian government to disclose the full divestment agreement and identify transferred assets and liabilities.

It separately calls on the Nigerian government to address the transfer of legacy liabilities in divestment approvals and to require Shell and its joint-venture partners to provide adequately for cleanup, remediation and decommissioning. These are recommendations from Amnesty International, HEDA and their partner organisations; they are not court orders or established findings of legal liability.

The report also states more generally that Nigeria’s failure over decades to enforce regulations effectively and monitor oil-company operations has been extensively documented.

That part of the report should not be overlooked merely because the newly disclosed documents happen to carry Shell letterheads.

The sale to Renaissance did not make the 55% state interest disappear

Shell completed the sale of SPDC to Renaissance on 13 March 2025.

Renaissance now controls the former Shell 30% interest. Shell confirms that the JV remains an unincorporated arrangement in which the government-owned national oil company has 55%, Total 10% and Agip 5%. Renaissance, through the renamed former SPDC, continues as operator. (Shell)

Shell has therefore exited the 30% onshore participation.

The Nigerian state’s majority JV interest did not leave with Shell.

That is important when considering future remediation, decommissioning, operation and accountability.

It also reinforces why historical allocation of responsibilities cannot be reduced to a single corporate name.

This is not a case for taking the spotlight off Shell

It is a case for switching on another light.

Shell’s own internal records require serious scrutiny.

The company’s role as operator requires serious scrutiny.

The allegations against Shell plc and its former subsidiary must be decided on evidence.

But Nigeria’s own institutions cannot be relegated to the scenery.

The Nigerian state was not an uninvolved host government watching a wholly foreign enterprise operate on its territory.

Through NNPC it held the largest economic interest in the SPDC joint venture.

Through its regulators and ministries it had responsibility for enforcing Nigerian law.

Through its security apparatus it had responsibility for addressing theft and sabotage without violating human rights.

Through its international obligations it had responsibility for protecting the environment, health and livelihoods of the population.

And regional human-rights bodies found, long before publication of the HEDA documents, that Nigeria had failed badly in important aspects of those responsibilities.

The question for Nigeria is therefore as serious as the question for Shell

When Shell executives received evidence that pipelines were deteriorating, who in the 55% state participant was told?

When major integrity expenditure was needed, who funded it?

When maintenance could not be completed, what did NNPC know?

When illegal connections multiplied, what did the government do?

When SPDC escalated security concerns, how did the authorities respond?

When environmental regulators received spill reports, did they independently test them?

When joint-venture work programmes were approved, what priority was given to preventing pollution compared with maintaining production and revenue?

When decommissioning liabilities grew into the billions, what provision did the state participant make for its share?

Those questions cannot legitimately be answered by speculation.

But neither should they remain permanently unanswered.

The documentary record now points beyond Shell

This is perhaps the most important conclusion from today’s examination.

The HEDA archive started as a window into Shell.

It now points toward the governance of an entire petroleum system.

Shell’s records show the operator.

The ownership structure shows the state.

The African Commission decision shows the state’s human-rights duties.

The ECOWAS judgment shows the consequences of failing to enforce them.

And Shell’s own current defence repeatedly points to Nigerian authorities and its government-owned partner as central actors in the struggle with theft, sabotage, security and cleanup.

Put those records together and the conclusion is unavoidable:

The definitive history of Niger Delta pollution cannot be written from Shell’s files alone.

Nigeria’s files matter too.

And if the aim is genuine accountability rather than simply assigning a convenient villain, they should be subjected to the same documentary scrutiny.

Documentary record

HEDA Resource Centre hosts the public cache under “Shell Documents Released in UK Legal Proceedings”, identifying the individual internal Shell emails, audits and presentations used throughout this series. HEDA says the documents were cited in the Bille and Ogale proceedings and released after public-interest applications by campaigning organisations. (HEDA Resource Centre)

The July 2026 Nigeria: Lifting the Lid report records the historical SPDC JV structure as NNPC 55%, SPDC/Shell 30%, Total 10% and Eni/Agip 5%, with SPDC as the Shell-owned operator during the period under examination.

Shell independently confirms the structure in its sale announcements and states that the SPDC JV is an unincorporated joint venture. Its annual reporting further states that the joint-venture partners together make decisions concerning work programmes for the JV’s assets and infrastructure. (Shell)

The principal historical human-rights source is the African Commission’s SERAC and CESR v Nigeria, Communication 155/96, decided in October 2001. The Commission formally found Nigeria in violation of seven provisions of the African Charter and called for environmental protection, cleanup, compensation, independent petroleum oversight and information for affected communities.

The subsequent regional judicial authority is SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria, ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09; ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12, decided by the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice on 14 December 2012. The Court held that Nigeria violated Articles 1 and 24 of the African Charter and ordered measures to restore the Niger Delta environment, prevent further damage and hold perpetrators accountable. (Ghal ii)

For direct inspection: HEDA Resource Centre — Shell Documents Released in UK Legal Proceedings · Nigeria: Lifting the Lid — July 2026 report · African Commission — SERAC and CESR v Nigeria · Shell — completion of the SPDC sale and JV ownership structure · Shell — current position on Bille and Ogale, updated 16 July 2026

Editorial note

This article does not allege that NNPC directed the operational failures identified in Shell’s internal documents, approved any specific unsafe practice, suppressed audits, rejected particular maintenance expenditure or caused any particular spill.

The presently public records do not establish those propositions.

Nor does NNPC’s 55% participating interest mean that Nigeria owned 55% of SPDC itself or that the state oil company exercised SPDC’s day-to-day operating functions. The SPDC JV was an unincorporated joint venture and SPDC was its operator.

Conversely, SPDC’s status as operator does not remove Nigeria’s independent regulatory and human-rights responsibilities or make the state’s majority economic participation irrelevant.

The 2001 African Commission decision formally found violations by Nigeria, but the Commission expressly noted that it proceeded substantially on complainants’ allegations that were uncontested by the government. The 2012 ECOWAS Court judgment likewise imposed obligations on the Federal Republic of Nigeria, not civil liability upon Shell for every pollution event.

Shell disputes the interpretation placed on its internal documents by the publishers of Nigeria: Lifting the Lid. It says large-scale theft, sabotage and illegal refining caused the vast majority of relevant pollution and stresses that its former subsidiary worked with Nigerian authorities, its government-owned partner and communities while investing in prevention, response and cleanup. Those matters remain important and contested as the Bille factual trial approaches in 2027. (Shell)

THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 2 SEPTEMBER 2026 was first posted on September 2, 2026 at 9:28 am.
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Michigan is investing $7.5 million to research geologic hydrogen — a clean energy source buried beneath the state that experts say could help power a transition away from fossil fuels. That’s because when hydrogen fuel burns, the only byproduct is water. There are no greenhouse gases or other harmful air pollutants emitted, unlike fossil fuels.

If used as a fuel or in fuel cells, a large store of hydrogen could help clean up the state’s high-emissions industries, such as trucking and steel as well as cement manufacturing, said Kevin Mehren, director of the Michigan Infrastructure Office. Energy production, including at natural gas plants, and transportation are the top sources of greenhouse gas emissions in both Michigan and the country at large.

Geologic hydrogen “is a major decarbonization tool, I think one of the strongest that we have come across,” Mehren said. “It has massive potential across all aspects of our economy, just to fill gaps and provide a new energy source for us.”

A 2025 study from the U.S. Geological Survey mapped out areas around the country with a lot of potential for buried hydrogen, with Michigan on the higher end. The study prompted Governor Gretchen Whitmer in January to direct state resources into more research, from which the recent funding announcement stemmed. Companies in Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa — states also highlighted in the USGS survey — are currently drilling for geologic hydrogen, according to Sandia National Laboratories.

Mehren hopes this potential can translate into a new industry in Michigan, depending on what further research reveals. “The goal here really is to determine: Is it there? Can we access it? And can this be the tool that we hope it is?” he said.

A portion of this initial funding will support research in the areas that researchers think might store a lot of natural hydrogen, like around Michigan’s lower peninsula.

The state sits on top of what’s called the Midcontinent Rift. It’s where the North American continent started splitting apart more than 1 billion years ago, then stopped. That created the Michigan Basin, a geologic formation that left younger, newer rocks in the middle of the state and deeper, older material — places where hydrogen might have formed — closer to the basin’s edges, including near urban areas like Detroit and Traverse City.

Existing infrastructure for drilling in the region might also make it a good spot for research, said Brian Ellis, an associate professor at the University of Michigan and co-director of MI Hydrogen, the school’s hydrogen research program.

Wells for oil and natural gas drilling already dot northern Michigan, and the region is home to some of the most productive gas fields in the state. The existing equipment can also be used to search for geologic hydrogen.

Read Next What’s geologic hydrogen? What to know about the clean energy source buried under Michigan. Vivian La

“We haven’t typically been looking for hydrogen in the past when we’ve drilled these wells,” Ellis said. “So there’s opportunity to potentially data-mine information that we already have and see if there’s hydrogen.”

Ellis hopes that some of the initial state money can also attract federal funding in the future. The U.S. Department of Energy set aside about $20 million in 2024 for projects related to geologic hydrogen through its Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy program, and national laboratories have conducted early research in the growing field.

“That’s the kind of thing the federal government should be supporting. Those high-risk, high-reward opportunities where we really grow our knowledge base,” he said.

Despite the Trump administration’s hostility toward clean energy, experts said they’re optimistic this research matches federal priorities. President Trump has pushed for more domestic oil and gas production by expanding drilling and rolling back environmental regulations.

Mehren noted how geologic hydrogen might be a uniquely bipartisan issue.

“You are ostensibly drilling — ‘drill, baby, drill’ is the catchphrase they use — for zero-emission energy,” he said. “It’s a domestic resource, but you are providing a new clean resource that could be an economic driver, decarbonize industry, [and] help fight climate change.”

toolTips('.classtoolTips3','Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other gases that prevent heat from escaping Earth’s atmosphere. Together, they act as a blanket to keep the planet at a liveable temperature in what is known as the “greenhouse effect.” Too many of these gases, however, can cause excessive warming, disrupting fragile climates and ecosystems.'); toolTips('.classtoolTips4','The process of reducing the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that drive climate change, most often by deprioritizing the use of fossil fuels like oil and gas in favor of renewable sources of energy.');

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Michigan invests $7.5M to find out if it’s sitting on a clean energy gold mine on Sep 2, 2026.

How did humans go from living in small-scale communities where everyone knew each other to building a massive civilization filled with billions of strangers? Philosopher C. Thi Nguyen, author of "The Score," joins the odyssey to explore the strange relationship between games and large-scale society.

Marinette County could well become a model of sustainability. However, sprawling development may impede its progress as the next iteration of an economic threat to ecosystems.

In a world of AI and data centers and phones in our pockets that demand continual attention, Berry’s voice remains as important as ever.

Heat networks judicial review challenge Channel News brendan 2nd September 2026 Teaser Media

The Lock the Gate Alliance says the Queensland government could use its new state development laws to fast-track a risky gas pipeline project that could transport Beetaloo gas to the east coast, after the project was declared a ‘Coordinated Project’. 

Hunter Valley Operations mine (HVO) has refused to consider a shorter mine life in response to questions from the NSW Independent Planning Commission, insisting it must have a full 19-year extension, despite the colossal contribution it would make to worsening climate change and its impacts in the Hunter. 

By Princess Kemdi Chika-Okafor 

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I have always believed true circularity isn’t just about fixing what breaks at the end of the disposal process; it means rethinking and redesigning our systems from the start.

This was exactly what the Africa Zero Waste Academy was about: rethinking and redesigning our waste systems. As a participant in both the virtual and in-person components of the second edition of the Africa Zero Waste Academy 2026, hosted by GAIA and GAYO in Ghana, I carry away much more than technical blueprints. I am leaving with a renewed understanding of what it takes to build a waste-free continent: a strong combination of technical innovation, strategic storytelling, and grassroots climate justice.

In Kpong, in Ghana’s Eastern Region, our days flowed seamlessly from theory to hands-on practice. In one session, we upcycled discarded textiles into tote bags that served as a tangible reminder of everyday circularity, while strategic advocacy sessions encouraged us to refine our messaging for maximum policy impact.

Pitching the Century 21 Foundation’s capstone proposal to decentralise solar-hybrid cold chains across Africa demonstrated that our local solutions are ready for immediate scaling. By connecting off-grid cold storage with organic waste diversion, we can preserve fresh produce, protect farmers’ livelihoods, and build long-term climate resilience.

Back in Accra, seeing these concepts in real-world operations brought them to life. At the Kpone landfill site, we witnessed an old waste dump being transformed into a sustainable green zone using ClosureTurf technology. A later tour of the Accra Compost and Recycling Plant (ACARP) showcased how large-scale recycling drives the economy, creates green jobs, and supports circularity.

However, the most emotionally impactful moment came on July 31 with the historic launch of the Federation of Informal Sector Waste Workers Associations of Ghana (FISWWAG). Watching informal waste pickers—the unsung heroes who keep tons of waste out of landfills—unite across 16 regions for formal policy recognition was a powerful reminder that true zero waste cannot exist without social justice.

Beyond lectures and field visits, the Academy’s heart lay in the connections we built. Sharing traditional attire, local dishes, and personal stories during our cultural night revealed that, despite our regional challenges, we all share a vision for a resilient Africa. From long bus rides filled with music to intense group debates, we forged an extraordinary network of lifelong allies across the continent. Now, the focus shifts to execution.

For the Century 21 Foundation, our next phase centres on documentary-style storytelling to highlight frontline market women known as (Iya Ojas) in our local parlance, expand source-separation models, and scale our One Plate, One Nation community feeding initiative. With strategic insights, blended finance blueprints, and cross-sector partnerships, we are ready to turn our proposals into tangible impact. 

The future of Africa is green, circular, and already underway.

Writer’s Bio

Princess Kemdi Chika-Okafor is a social entrepreneur and development economist dedicated to solving Africa’s leading agricultural challenge, the dramatic rise in post-harvest food waste and nutritional poverty. As the Founder and Executive Director of the Century 21 Foundation, she is globally recognised as a pioneering thought leader in Afro-Nutrition Sovereignty, championing tech-enabled, self-sustaining circular food economies that move beyond traditional short-term charity.

The post My Chronicles of the Africa Zero Waste Academy 2026: Princess Kemdi first appeared on GAIA.

Frontier Energy says it has secured all major contracts to start construction later this month on the first stage of what will be state's largest solar and battery hybrid.

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New CEOs at CS Energy, CER, Ark Energy and Western Power; new role and hire at CEFC; new additions at AEMO, Sunshine, AEMC, and OptiGrid.

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Scrapping VNI-West and other projects designed to support renewable energy will result in "massive" electricity bill rises, says Victoria's former energy minister.

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Element Zero, the upstart Pilbara green iron contender and survivor of a legal challenge from Fortescue, has won an Arena grant to scale-up of its Perth demonstration plant.

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The New South Wales Coalition Opposition's energy and climate change spokesperson, has announced his retirement from politics just half a year out from the state election.

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Governments must slash emissions further and faster, and keep every climate promise they have made for the planet to be able to return to 1.5C of warming by the end of the century after an inevitable overshoot, a group of prominent climate scientists has said.

In a flagship new report sketching out a way not to lose the most ambitious Paris Agreement goal, the scientists said that global temperatures need to peak at no higher than 1.8C above pre-industrial levels to give the world “a fighting chance” to reverse course. They added that plans to suck carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere can only play a limited role in this effort and cannot substitute for emissions cuts. 

A return to the 1.5C warming limit will only be reached in an optimistic scenario that sees governments turn their full national climate plans – known as NDCs – into reality and meet their additional, more ambitious targets to reach net zero emissions, said the report published by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). 

Actual government policy is far off that track. Current measures to cut emissions that are funded and in force put the world on course for around 2.8C of warming by 2100, UNEP has previously found. 

Comment: Keeping to 1.5C of warming is no longer possible – but we must still limit the overshoot

Joeri Rogelj, professor of climate science and policy at Imperial College London and one of the report’s authors, said it is necessary to keep the temperature peak as low as possible as there are limits to how fast the world can reverse global warming.

That is because the scale of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) interventions that can be implemented sustainably and in a just way will otherwise not be sufficient and some measures, such as tree-planting or forest management, will be less effective at higher temperatures, he added. 

Commenting on the report, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for the 1.5C overshoot to be “as small and short as possible”. This, he added, “demands an overshoot of ambition”, involving accelerating the phaseout of fossil fuels and pursuing the renewables revolution, slashing methane pollution, and protecting land, forest and oceans.

“Governments must over-deliver on national climate plans, net-zero commitments, and beyond,” he urged in a video message. “The fight for 1.5 degrees is the fight for humanity.”

Overshoot, peak and decline

The report comes out nearly a year after the UN conceded for the first time that it is inevitable that global warming will exceed 1.5C temporarily and the world should focus on making that overshoot as small and short as possible.

UNEP’s Executive Director Inger Andersen told journalists that 1.5C remains the key goal, but “we now need a different approach from above”, while stepping up efforts to adapt to a warming world. 

“A return to 1.5C is not assured,” she added. “But limiting the magnitude, duration and consequences of overshoot, while preserving the possibility of bringing temperatures back down, is the best remaining option to protect vulnerable people, reduce losses and secure a livable future for all.”

Battle over cleaning up shipping set to resume at London talks

Scientists warn in the report that warming above 1.5C should not be seen as safe or acceptable. Climate risks above that threshold intensify with every additional fraction of a degree of warming, they said. The report paints a grim picture of expected climate impacts: glaciers could lose more than a quarter of their remaining mass by 2100 and global food production could fall by as much as 14% by 2050 without effective adaptation.

Some small island developing states and low-lying coastal cities could be partially or completely submerged, while damaged ecosystems could further accelerate climate change.

To tackle these impacts, the report emphasises that adaptation and emissions-cutting measures are mutually reinforcing approaches and must advance together, while being responsive to emerging risks, which could be non-linear and arise abruptly.

“This report is a ‘fork in the road’ moment for the planet,” said Surangel Whipps, Jr., president of the Pacific island nation of Palau. “It is a further glimpse into a perilous future that has already arrived. To continue to have a fighting chance, calls for greater ambition are no longer enough – we need to see an urgent and unprecedented increase in political will and investment in a climate-safe future.” 

Cut emissions first, remove carbon after

The authors call for a three-phase approach to bringing temperatures back down: an “immediate response” of deep and rapid emissions cuts and urgent protection for the most vulnerable as warming approaches and passes 1.5C; a “coping and containment” phase focused on reaching net-zero emissions and building resilience as temperatures peak; and a “long-term resilience” phase of net-negative emissions through carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and lasting adaptation as temperatures eventually decline.

Richard Betts, who leads climate impact research at the UK Met Office, said CDR is not a “get-out-of-jail-free card” and should only be additional to emission reductions that need to be achieved with “even more urgency than before”.

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Critics of CDR have long pointed to the technology’s record of overpromising and underdelivering, and warn it has been exploited by the fossil fuel industry and some oil-producing states to try to delay the clean energy transition.

Not everyone was fully convinced by the UNEP overshoot report. Veteran climate scientist Bill Hare from Climate Analytics said it “does a good job of describing the hole we’ve dug ourselves into” but “a poor job of showing us that there is a way out”. He argued that its thin treatment of the need for a fossil fuel phase-out and ambitious mitigation pathways to cut emissions risk “turning it into a call to apathy rather than a call to arms”.

“Host of challenges” with CDR

Debra Roberts, honorary professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, told journalists that limiting global warming to around 1.8C is needed to give the world “a realistic and fighting chance” of returning to the 1.5C limit because of the “questionable” feasibility of interventions above that threshold. 

CDR comes with “a whole host of challenges”, she added, including the impacts on food and water security of rolling out large-scale programmes and the unanswered questions of whether newer technologies will work at scale and who will foot the bill. 

“It’s going to happen in a very, very complex decision-making space where the risks and impacts are dramatically becoming more complex and interrelated,” she said. “That’s why the pressure there is keep those emissions as low as possible because they give us the greatest fighting chance of the return to 1.5C in a more equitable and just way.”

The post UN sets out narrow path back to 1.5C warming after inevitable overshoot appeared first on Climate Home News.

• About three in 10 U.S. drivers think there’s nothing wrong with speeding, according to a AAA poll. The reality is, there’s plenty wrong with it, like the fact that it kills people. Nearly a third of traffic deaths involve excessive speeds. (Jalopnik)
• Miriam Pinski argues that one reason transit projects take so long and cost so much is because we ask them to do too much — beautify the neighborhood, save the environment, create jobs, etc. — when the most important thing is to create a reliable system people will choose to ride (Works in Progress). Meanwhile, Reece Martin went into even greater depth about the same topic (The Transit Brief).
• The Federal Railway Administration is loosening a lot of train safety regulations. (Trains)
• The California legislature sent Gov. Gavin Newsom a bill cutting red tape for high-speed rail. (EIN Presswire)
• Maryland’s $22 billion, six-year transportation budget includes just $100 million for Red Line planning (Daily Record). Meanwhile, an audit found that the state failed to collect more than $800 million in tolls (Maryland Matters).
• West Virginia groups asked a federal court for an injunction to stop the last phase of the Corridor H freeway project. (WDTV)
• The Southern Alliance for Clean Energy opposes Florida’s plan to use federal funds for EV chargers for flying taxis instead.
• Pittsburgh is replacing its 30-year-old light rail cars. (WTAE)
• Portland is considering offering city government employees free transit passes while Interstate 5 is closed for construction. (Willamette Week)
• Colorado has become a national leader on clean transportation, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council.
• Governing magazine honored Randy Clarke as one of its public officials of the year for revitalizing the D.C. Metro.
• Riders on Charlotte’s Gold Line now have to request a stop when they want to get off the light rail train. (Queen City News)
• The European Union wants member states to make the default urban speed limit 30 kilometers per hour, or about 20 miles per hour (Euro Cities). Birmingham, England has already beat them to the punch (BBC).
• Piggybacking on the discourse Streetsblog NYC stirred up over bike helmets, Belgium has made them mandatory for scooters that go over 20 kph. (Zag Daily)

Agriculture’s climate emissions are rising but fully funding conservation can slow them Anthony Lacey September 2, 2026 Anne Schechinger, M.S. September 2, 2026 Overview

• Agriculture produces around 10% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, and the sector’s emissions are rising.
• Under current policies, that 10% could jump to between 18% and 41% by 2050.
• The next farm bill should prioritize and fully fund regenerative agriculture practices to stop the sector from becoming the largest source of emissions.

Agriculture could become the nation’s leading producer of greenhouse gases by 2050.

Most other sectors of the economy, especially transportation and electricity, are expected to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions dramatically in the coming decades. That decline is mostly due to voluntary industry efforts and changing technology.

Agriculture’s climate pollution is driven overwhelmingly by nitrous oxide and methane. Nitrous oxide accounts for 52% of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions, while methane accounts for another 46%. And the sector’s emissions keep rising – they’re projected to go up a quarter of a percent every year through mid-century.

That should be a wake-up call for Congress. 

Agricultural conservation practices – like riparian forest buffers, tree establishment, diversified crop rotations and nutrient management – can help reduce climate emissions or store carbon, so agriculture doesn’t become the biggest source of emissions. 

These practices also have other benefits, such as reducing air pollution and protecting waterways. 

But the billions of dollars both the House and Senate farm bills propose to cut from federal conservation programs would make it harder for farmers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 

Congress, through the farm bill, should maintain conservation program funding, and prioritize the money for regenerative practices, instead of continuing to send so much money to structural practices that bring little, if any, climate emissions reductions. 

Agriculture’s growing share of emissions

Agriculture is responsible for at least 10% of annual U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. When combined with emissions from fertilizer production, the sector’s share is even higher.

Climate models show that if the sector’s emissions increase slightly while emissions from other sectors fall, as projected, agriculture’s share of U.S. emissions will grow.

Agriculture ranks fourth among U.S. economic sectors for greenhouse gas emissions, behind transportation, industry and electricity and ahead of buildings and “other” sources.

But that ranking is unlikely to last.

Under policies in place today, agriculture’s share of emissions is expected to almost double by 2050, from 10% to 18%. Agriculture would move up to being the third largest greenhouse-gas-producing sector, after industry and transportation.

But the U.S. has previously made international climate commitments, including through the Paris Agreement, that have led to federal rules aimed at reducing greenhouse gases from most other sectors, including industry and transportation. 

Even though the Trump administration – in both the first and second terms – withdrew from the Paris climate pact, the industry and transportation sectors are still rapidly reducing their emissions.

There are no broad federal greenhouse gas rules in place to force cuts in agriculture’s emissions. As industry, transportation and other sectors lower their overall emissions, agriculture’s share rises – unless the sector also acts to cut emissions. 

Under the scenario in which the U.S. reduces total emissions to levels agreed on in the Paris Agreement, the agriculture sector would make up 41% of total U.S. emissions in 2050. In this scenario, agriculture would be the economic sector producing the most greenhouse gas emissions, because the other sectors would severely cut their emissions. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. U.S. emissions by economic sector in 2026, and predicted emissions in 2050 under two scenarios

Image

Source: EWG, using data from Energy Innovation’s Energy Policy Simulator.

Agriculture must reduce its emissions to avoid becoming the No. 1 source of U.S. climate emissions. (See Figure 2.) Scientists warn that if emissions from agriculture don’t go down, the worst impacts of the climate crisis will be inescapable.

Figure 2. If the U.S. follows its international commitments in other sectors, agriculture could top 40% of emissions by 2050

Image

Source: EWG, using data from Energy Innovation’s Energy Policy Simulator.

Nitrous oxide and methane are agriculture’s main climate emissions

Agricultural soil management is the main driver of the sector’s nitrous oxide emissions, particularly the widespread use of fertilizer on crops like corn. Microbes in soil turn nitrogen from fertilizer and manure into nitrous oxide.

Even though nitrous oxide makes up a small share of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, it is a potent greenhouse gas. Nitrous oxide stays in the atmosphere for over 100 years and has a global warming potential 273 times more powerful than carbon dioxide.

Global nitrous oxide emissions grew by 40% between 1980 and 2020, and they are expected to increase another 30% between 2020 and 2050. Corn production makes up over half of all nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture.

Nitrous oxide does not just contribute to climate change; it also depletes the ozone layer. And ammonia nitrous oxides can form with other compounds to create particulate matter, with exposure leading to premature deaths. 

Methane makes up the second largest share of greenhouse gas emissions from U.S. agriculture. Most agricultural methane emissions come from livestock. Enteric fermentation from beef and dairy cattle – their natural digestion process – accounts for about 25% of total U.S. methane emissions. 

Manure management also contributes to both methane and nitrous oxide emissions, making up 9% of total U.S. methane emissions and 4% of total nitrous oxide emissions. 

Methane does not stay in the atmosphere as long as carbon dioxide or nitrous oxide, but it has a global warming potential 28 times that of carbon dioxide over 100 years. 

Regenerative agriculture practices can reduce emissions

Conservation practices implemented on farm fields can help to lower agriculture’s greenhouse gas emissions.

A 2022 report from the Boston Consulting Group and the Walton Family Foundation found that practice changes could slash greenhouse gas emissions from farming by almost 22%. 

The report showed emissions could go down as a result of changes in fertilizer applications, tillage practices, grazing management, the use of cover crops, livestock feed additives, soil amendments and the targeted use of trees, among other practices. 

EWG found in a 2025 analysis that many conservation practices can reduce farming’s greenhouse gas emissions. Even if they are adopted on only a small number of acres, they can have a big climate impact. 

The conservation practices applied to Midwest corn acres that would most lower climate emissions are riparian forest buffers, tree or shrub establishment, hedgerow planting and windbreak establishment.

Other practices, including no-tillage, cover crops, and diversifying crops so there is a conservation crop rotation, would also reduce climate emissions. 

But federal conservation program funding needs to be prioritized for practices that help farmers reduce climate emissions and adapt to extreme weather conditions tied to intensifying climate change. 

EWG has identified a list of regenerative agriculture practices that decrease a farm’s greenhouse gas emissions and increase climate resilience. 

Farmers can receive funding to implement these regenerative practices from the Agriculture Department’s Environmental Quality Incentives Program, or EQIP, one of the largest federal conservation programs. 

But EQIP spending must be reformed. In 2025, only $660.9 million from EQIP, or 39% of all payments from the program, went to farmers for practices on EWG’s regenerative practice list. Only four of the top 10 paid practices were regenerative: cover crops, brush management, forest stand improvement, and pasture and hay planting. 

Prioritizing funding

Six of the 10 most funded practices that were not regenerative were structural, building or equipment practices, which together received $427.1 million. These are practices like irrigation pipelines and animal waste storage facilities, which rarely benefit the climate.

Farmers collected hardly any money for some of the conservation practices that are the best at reducing emissions. Two practices that would generate substantial emissions reductions on Midwest corn acres – riparian forest buffer and hedgerow planting – received only $423,000 and $735,000 from EQIP nationally in 2025, respectively. 

More conservation funding must be prioritized for regenerative practices that have climate benefits. Adoption of more of these practices could slow the growth of agriculture's greenhouse gas emissions so the sector does not produce the largest share of U.S. emissions by 2050.

The versions of the farm bill proposed by the House and Senate cut conservation spending by billions of dollars, including reducing funding for EQIP. 

If these cuts were to go into effect, they would hurt farmers and the climate. 

NSW is looking at tariff reform to encourage big gas users to switch to heat storage.

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