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12 free reports about climate change for COP31
This article by Michael Svoboda first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Twelve recent reports cover the most pressing aspects of global climate change as negotiators meet in Antalya, Türkiye, for COP31. The reports include updates on the gap between the cuts nations promised to make and their actual climate emissions, the health and economic benefits of reducing pollution, a new analysis of options for ending fossil fuel production, and much more.
Covers, links, and blurbs for all of these reports can be found below along with those for new reports that address the world energy outlook, climate technologies, oceans, biodiversity, planetary boundaries, health, and climate mis- and disinformation.
The list ends with a guidebook for COP31 produced by the Women’s Environment and Development Organization.
As always, the descriptions of the titles are adapted from copy provided by the organizations that published them.
Limiting Overshoot: Navigating Exceedance of 1.5°C and Pathways Towards Return by UNEP Team (United Nations Environment Programme 2026, 139 pages, free download)
A new spotlight report by the UN Environment Programme finds that as global temperature rise gets set to cross 1.5°C, pushing climate risks and impacts to dangerous new heights, the world must strive to return to below 1.5°C as soon as possible and simultaneously reduce the vulnerability of societies, communities, and economies to climate impacts. The report, “Limiting Overshoot: Navigating exceedance of 1.5°C and pathways towards return,” finds that the world can achieve this goal by acting now to get on an “overshoot, peak, and decline” pathway.
Hidden Assets: The Economic and Health Case for Climate and Clean Air Action by S. Dietz et al. (United Nations Environment Programme 2026, 189 pages, free download)
Climate change and air pollution share many of the same sources, yet are almost always assessed separately. This assessment corrects that. It evaluates 25 proven solutions across energy, industry, transport, agriculture, cooking, and waste, and finds that integrated action delivers more than acting on either alone. Every dollar invested returns around $15, an internal rate of return of 60%, with market returns exceeding costs within 10 years. By 2050, the solutions could avoid 144 million premature deaths and hundreds of millions of cases of chronic disease. The chief obstacles are often neither technical nor economic but institutional. Investment in enabling conditions can bring full implementation forward by up to a decade, worth up to US$10 trillion in savings by 2040. Every region benefits. Benefit-cost ratios range from three in high-income regions to 26 in Southern Africa. Every year of delay forgoes more than US$1.5 trillion.
World Energy Transition Outlook 2026: 1.5? C Pathway by U. Collier & R. Gorini, eds. (International Renewable Energy Agency 2026, 166 pages, free download)
The global energy transition has entered a decisive new phase. Renewable energy deployment continues to break records, technology costs have fallen significantly, and electrification is advancing across transport, buildings and industry. However, this progress remains too slow and uneven. The outlook shows that there is a common goal, but no universal pathway for all countries and regions. The quality of the transition matters as much as its pace: a 1.5°C-compatible pathway could raise average global GDP by around 1.1% relative to current plans, but affordability, social protection, skills and equitable access to new economic opportunities must be built into implementation from the outset. Integrated national and regional planning will be essential to translate global ambition into pathways tailored to country and regional circumstances.
Emissions Gap Report 2026: The Point of Return – Urgent Emissions Cuts Needed to Come Back from Overshoot of 1.5°C by A. Olhoff et al. (United Nations Environment Programme 2026, 112 pages, free download)
The 2026 Emissions Gap Report lays out the cuts to emissions needed (by 2030, 2035 and 2040) to get on a return pathway — finding that the cuts needed are far above what current nationally determined contributions deliver. However, the report finds that it is possible to close this emissions gap — pointing to many successful climate policies that have already delivered real-world emissions cuts and could be scaled up globally to accelerate action.
See also The Paris Agreement Article 6 Implementation Status Report, 2026 Edition by K. Crabb et al. (Institute for Global Environmental Strategies 2026, 103 pages, free download)
Adaptation Gap Report 2026: Ready? Not. Climate Impacts Will Not Wait. Climate Finance Must Rise by H. Neufeldt et al. (United Nations Environment Programme 2026, pages, free download)
UNEP’s “2026 Adaptation Gap Report: Ready? Not” finds that adaptation finance continues to fall short of needs, implementation remains constrained by institutional barriers, and losses and damages are mounting as climate impacts intensify. The report finds that international public adaptation finance flows from developed to developing countries reached US$28.2-31.7 billion in 2024, a US$1 billion increase over the previous year. Flows to least developed countries and small island developing states rose in real terms between 2019 and 2024 but declined from a 2022 peak. Even if the COP30 aspiration to triple international public finance flows to developing countries by 2035 is achieved, this would only cover 20-29% of what is needed. More positively, tripling flows to least developed countries and small island developing states could meet 49-84 % of their needs.
End of the Pipeline: Managed vs Market-Driven Routes to Ending Fossil Fuel Production by N. Grant et al. (Climate Analytics 2026, 78 pages, free download)
As global warming approaches 1.5°C and a period of overshoot looms, the world is marching further into a crisis of our own making. The question facing the global community is not whether we transition away from fossil fuels, but how to transition quickly enough to keep peak warming as small as possible. In this report, we assess two contrasting approaches to the global transition in fossil fuel production: a market-driven world and a coordinated world. In a market-driven transition, cuts in production are determined by competition in which the cheapest producers win out. In a coordinated transition, those most ready for the transition move first, while those less ready follow soon after. We then explore the implications of these two different transitions for various producers, for the market as a whole, and for fossil fuel prices.
The Climate Technology Progress Report 2026: Navigating Ocean-Based Technologies by Copenhagen Climate Centre (United Nations Environment Programme 2026, 120 pages, free download)
The world must strengthen its understanding of the ocean’s carbon system if it is to safeguard one of the planet’s most important climate allies. The 2026 Climate Technology Progress Report highlights Ocean Carbon Intelligence, a framework that connects ocean science, monitoring technologies, data infrastructure and analytical tools to improve understanding of ocean carbon dynamics and support evidence-based climate action. As governments and markets look to ocean-based climate solutions to help address climate change, the report identifies sustained investment in ocean observation, data infrastructure, and modeling as essential for closing knowledge gaps, strengthening climate decision-making, and, highlighting both opportunities & limitations, supporting the development of ocean-based climate technologies.
See also The Ocean Protection Gap Report 2026: Assessing Progress Toward the 30 x 30 Target by N. Chia et al. (Together for the Ocean 2026, 34 pages, free download).
Restoration Progress Report: Nature's Comeback: Scaling Ecosystem Restoration for People and Planet by FAO & Secretariat of the Convention on Biodiversity (United Nations Environment Programme 2026, 116 pages, free download)
At the midpoint of the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration, this report provides the first comprehensive global assessment of progress towards restoring degraded ecosystems and achieving international restoration targets and commitments. It evaluates the extent to which restoration efforts are contributing to the goals of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. The report examines the scale and drivers of ecosystem degradation and the financing supporting implementation. Structured around two central questions, the report asks: How much progress has been made towards restoring degraded ecosystems, and what actions are needed to accelerate restoration at scale? It concludes by identifying practical solutions and strategic pathways to close gaps and to turn restoration commitments into measurable results.
State of Biodiversity Action: The Global Report on Collective Progress in the Implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework by Secretariat of the Convention on Biodiversity (United Nations Environment Programme 2026, 412 pages, free download)
“State of Biodiversity Action” provides the first comprehensive global stocktake of progress towards the 2030 targets and 2050 goal. Drawing on national reports, updated biodiversity strategies, scientific assessments and diverse sources of knowledge, it assesses progress across all 23 targets, identifying achievements, implementation gaps and barriers. The report brings together evidence from countries & stakeholders worldwide to examine where progress is advancing and where efforts must accelerate. It highlights the need for stronger implementation, coordinated action and increased ambition to translate global commitments into tangible outcomes for nature. As a key input to the Global Review at COP 17, the report provides an evidence base to guide decision-making and help Parties and stakeholders accelerate action to halt and reverse biodiversity loss.
See also The Veolia Institute Review Facts Reports 2026: Biodiversity & Health by C. Baecher et al. (Veolia Institute 2026, 106 pages, free download).
Planetary Health Check 2026: A Scientific Assessment of the State of Our Planet by Planetary Boundaries Science Lab (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research 2026, 124 pages, free download)
Human activities have pushed Earth beyond its safe operating space. The planet’s natural resilience is weakening: Global warming is accelerating, ecosystems are showing clear signs of degradation, and early warning signs of tipping points are emerging in key systems. To safeguard the Earth’s resilience and stability, we must bring the planet back into its planetary boundaries, the scientifically defined guardrails that ensure the Earth’s health. Today, seven out of nine boundaries have been transgressed. The “Planetary Health Check” is a yearly report on the state of our planet. It presents the most up-to-date assessments of the planetary boundaries, gives thorough introductions into cutting-edge science, and spotlights especially relevant aspects of our planet’s health. In this 2026 edition, we place a special focus on carbon sinks and novel entities.
Protecting Health in the Age of Climate Disinformation: Safeguarding Information Integrity in the Context of Climate Change and Health by WHO-Civil Society Working Group (Global Climate & Health Alliance 2026, 67 pages, free download)
This report is the first instance of the health community addressing how climate disinformation directly and indirectly harms human health around the world, from undermining emergency warnings and public-health guidance to delaying policies on air pollution, clean energy and fossil fuels. The report argues that the climate crisis now demands the same level of institutional seriousness that public health has brought to other major information threats. It calls for information integrity to be embedded across climate and health policy, rather than treated as the responsibility of communications teams alone. And it urges stronger climate and health education that links fossil fuel combustion, disease, and climate change, so that health professionals are equipped to communicate not only the health consequences of the climate crisis, but also its drivers.
Feminist Climate Justice: Advocacy & Action: WEDO’s COP31 Overview by WEDO’s COP31 Team (Women’s Environment and Development Organization 2026, 17 pages, free download)
As governments gather in Antalya, Türkiye, for COP31, WEDO is bringing a clear message: Implementation is a political choice. At a time of accelerating climate impacts, growing inequality, and mounting pressure on international cooperation, delivering climate justice requires more than technical solutions and new commitments. It requires political accountability, meaningful investment in people and communities, and transformation of the systems driving the climate crisis. Throughout COP31, WEDO will support feminist advocacy and strengthen women’s leadership through the Women and Gender Constituency and the Women Delegates Fund. It will also convene partners around the implementation of the Belém Gender Action Plan, bringing insights from our Global Feminist Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction into the negotiations.
//Bumper Year for Bird-Friendly Maple in Vermont
Op/Ed: Finally, a Medical Doctor Who Knows the Difference Between E-Bikes and E-Motos…and Why It Matters
Bob Mittelstaedt is a retired lawyer, avid e-biker, and co-founder of E-Bike Access which is dedicated to expanding access for legal e-bikes and combatting illegal e-motos. He consults with state and local governments, school officials and law enforcement on how to address e-bikes and e-motos. Click on his name to see more of his writing on E-Bikes for Streetsblog.
Even outside politics, Election Day, November 3, brought some welcome news: an insightful article in TIME magazine despite its dubious headline.
When I saw the headline, “E-Bike and E-Scooter Accidents Are Skyrocketing Among Children,” I feared another in the long line of stories blaming e-bikes for injuries and fatalities caused by illegal e-motos. It’s a phenomenon aptly captured by a Streetsblog headline: “Why Deadly, Illegal E-Motos Are On The Rise, And Why E-Bikes Are Being Blamed When They Crash.”
That confusion has also sent lawmakers down the wrong road. As another Streetsblog headline put it: “State Lawmakers Aim At Illegal E-Motos, But Hit E-Bikes Instead.”
But despite TIME’s misleading headline, the article itself got it right — thanks to Dr. Preeti Panda, a pediatric emergency physician at Stanford’s renowned Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital and an assistant professor at Stanford University School of Medicine.
I have the pleasure of working with Dr. Panda as a member of Stanford’s Advisory Board on E-Devices which she leads.
As Dr. Panda explained in TIME: “What many people don’t realize, however, is that what people often call ‘e-bikes’ are in fact e-motos.” Their higher speeds make them more dangerous.
In the emergency room, she sees at least one e-device injury during every shift she works. Unfortunately, that’s hardly surprising. As she reiterates, counts at local schools have found that 80–90% of the electric two-wheelers students ride are e-motos, not legal e-bikes.
To determine what her young patients were actually riding, Dr. Panda asks a simple question: How fast can your device go? The answers are often 35–45 mph — sometimes even faster.
California law limits throttle-propelled e-bikes to 20 mph. Throttle devices capable of higher speeds are not legal e-bikes and are not street legal.
If keeping their children out of Dr. Panda’s emergency room isn’t motivation enough for parents, consider another point she makes:
“If a child injures someone else or destroys property accidentally on one of these devices that are illegal, both the child and the parents can be held liable and charged criminally. So it’s a big deal,” Dr. Panda explained.
Unfortunately, not everyone at Stanford seems to appreciate the distinction yet.
The day before Election Day, two Stanford physicians, joined by colleagues from eight other hospitals across the country, published a research letter in the Journal of the American Medical Association entitled “Injuries From Electric Bicycles and Scooters Managed in Pediatric Health Systems.” Their data did not attempt to disaggregate e-bikes from e-motos, so they attributed all e-moto injuries to e-bikes. They did not betray any awareness of e-motos or the fact that their data treated e-moto crashes as e-bike ones.
Let’s hope that they take heed of Dr. Panda’s message.
This is more than a dispute over terminology. It goes to the heart of sound research, effective legislation, and public safety.
We urgently need better data. Hospitals, first responders, and law enforcement agencies should distinguish legal e-bikes from e-motos when documenting injuries and fatalities. First responders should photograph the vehicles involved whenever possible, preserving evidence that can help identify and classify them accurately.
And when physicians venture beyond treating patients into research and public policy, they should apply the same rigor to diagnosing the underlying problem that they bring to diagnosing their patients.
Diagnose before prescribing.
If we misdiagnose the problem, we’ll prescribe the wrong solution. And when it comes to powerful, illegal e-motos being ridden by children, the consequences are too serious to get it wrong.
UC doctors, nurses, and community allies rally to demand ICE out of UC hospitals
Shell’s West African Solar Reversal — A Documentary Investigation into the Daystar Power Sale and the 400 MW Ambition
AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION
By the Donovan–Shell Archive
17 November 2026
Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT.
Four years after Shell acquired a promising African solar company and publicly celebrated its potential to reduce dependence on diesel generators, the oil and gas multinational has agreed to sell the entire business to a Nigerian energy infrastructure company. The disposal covers operations in five West African countries and follows Shell’s agreement to sell much of its European onshore renewable-energy portfolio. An examination of the original 2022 acquisition announcement, Daystar Power’s current operating disclosures and Shell’s revised corporate strategy reveals a substantial change in priorities — and an unanswered question about the ambitious expansion targets originally associated with the investment.
Introduction: An African renewable-energy investment changes handsOn 17 November 2026, Shell announced that Shell Overseas Investments B.V. had signed an agreement to sell its entire interest in Daystar Power Group.
The buyer is Elektron Renewables Limited, a subsidiary of Nigerian energy infrastructure company Elektron Energy Development Strategies Limited.
Daystar provides solar and hybrid electricity solutions to commercial and industrial customers across Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo.
The transaction covers 100% of Shell’s ownership in the business.
It remains subject to regulatory conditions and approvals. The sale has therefore been agreed but has not yet been completed.
No purchase price was disclosed in the official announcement.
Shell described the disposal as part of its continuing programme of concentrating investment in areas where it believes it possesses particular commercial advantages.
The company specifically identified asset-backed electricity trading and associated energy services.
Primary source: Shell Nigeria — Shell Signs Agreement to Sell Daystar Power Group to Elektron Energy, 17 November 2026.
Shell Nigeria
At first sight, this might appear to be another routine corporate divestment.
But the history of Daystar’s acquisition makes the announcement more consequential.
In 2022, Shell presented its investment as an important step into renewable electricity generation in emerging African markets.
The company welcomed the prospect of expanding solar power, reducing pollution and helping businesses replace expensive diesel-fired electricity.
Now Shell is preparing to transfer that business to another owner.
The transaction does not mean Daystar’s solar installations will close.
It does not establish that the investment was commercially unsuccessful.
But it provides further documentary evidence that Shell’s present investment strategy differs substantially from the renewable-generation expansion it was publicly pursuing four years ago.
1. September 2022: Shell announces its first African power acquisitionThe original announcement is worth revisiting.
On 28 September 2022, Daystar Power announced that it had agreed to be acquired by Shell.
The company’s management expected the investment to accelerate expansion across its existing markets and into other parts of Africa.
The announcement contained a particularly ambitious objective.
Daystar planned to increase installed solar capacity to 400 megawatts by 2025.
At the time, chief executive and co-founder Jasper Graf von Hardenberg described strong demand for solar electricity and said the company’s installed capacity was on course to increase substantially during 2022.
Shell was similarly enthusiastic.
Thomas Brostrøm, then Shell’s Executive Vice-President for Renewable Generation, described the acquisition as the company’s first power acquisition in Africa and an important entry into renewable electricity in emerging markets.
He emphasised the opportunity to reduce dependence on diesel generators.
This was not merely a financial investment presented without a wider strategic explanation.
Shell connected the transaction explicitly with Africa’s energy transition and the expansion of renewable generation.
The original announcement was reproduced by Invest Africa and was also discussed by the legal advisers involved in the acquisition.
Both preserved the 400 MW expansion objective.
Contemporaneous sources: Invest Africa — Daystar Power Acquisition Announcement, September 2022 and Charles Russell Speechlys — Advising Daystar Power on Its Acquisition by Shell, October 2022.
Invest Africa+1
The objective was forward-looking.
It was not a guarantee.
Nor was it a legally established obligation requiring Shell to construct 400 MW of solar generation.
Nevertheless, it formed part of the public commercial rationale for the acquisition.
Its eventual outcome is therefore a legitimate subject for scrutiny.
2. December 2022: Shell completes the takeoverOn 16 December 2022, Shell confirmed completion of the acquisition.
Its announcement stated that Daystar would remain a wholly owned subsidiary operating under its established brand within Shell’s Renewables and Energy Solutions business.
Shell described sub-Saharan Africa as a market with substantial solar potential.
The company’s existing customer relationships were expected to provide a foundation for expansion.
The announcement also placed the acquisition within Shell’s broader renewable-energy investment programme.
At the time, Shell reported more than 46 GW of renewable-generation potential across its global portfolio.
That figure included operating assets, projects under construction and a much larger development pipeline.
Those categories were not equivalent to completed electricity-generating capacity.
Nevertheless, the disclosure illustrated how Shell was presenting renewable-power generation as a significant component of its developing business.
Primary source: Shell — Completion of Acquisition of Daystar Power Group, 16 December 2022.
Shell Global
The 2022 acquisition and the newly announced sale are therefore linked by an unusually clear sequence of official statements.
Shell bought the business to participate in an expanding market for distributed renewable electricity.
It is now selling the same business to concentrate resources elsewhere.
The change deserves examination independently of whether Shell ultimately makes a profit or loss on the transaction.
3. The 400 MW question: What happened to the original ambition?One of the most interesting features of the documentary record is the difference between Daystar’s original expansion objective and its currently reported operating scale.
In September 2022, Daystar publicly targeted 400 MW of installed solar capacity by 2025.
Its current corporate website reports more than 150 MW of capacity across five countries.
It also identifies more than 400 installations.
The website describes a substantial operational business serving commercial and industrial customers.
Its client examples include Nigerian Bottling Company, Vivo Energy, Rider Steel, Ecobank and Access Bank.
Primary source: Daystar Power — Official Company Website and Current Operating Information.
Daystar Power Solutions
The figures require careful interpretation.
The original 400 MW target referred specifically to intended installed solar capacity by 2025.
The present figure describes the company’s broader solar and hybrid energy platform.
The published material examined does not provide a complete reconciliation of these measurements, including their precise definitions and the capacity installed at the end of 2025.
Consequently, it would be premature to state that Daystar definitively missed the original target by a particular amount.
It would also be inappropriate to conclude that Shell prevented the company from achieving its objectives.
The available evidence does not establish either proposition.
But the difference is sufficiently substantial to warrant further disclosure.
What installed solar capacity did Daystar actually achieve by the end of 2025?
Was the 400 MW objective formally revised?
Did the company’s geographical expansion plans change?
Were projects delayed, cancelled or transferred?
And did the eventual decision to sell the business affect its investment programme?
These are factual questions rather than accusations.
Neither the original target nor the current operating figure provides a complete explanation.
The announced disposal makes that missing information more relevant because the business is now changing ownership.
4. Why Daystar mattered in West AfricaTo understand the transaction’s broader significance, it is necessary to examine the electricity market Daystar serves.
In parts of West Africa, businesses cannot always depend upon uninterrupted electricity from the public grid.
Manufacturers, financial institutions, commercial premises and industrial facilities often require supplementary generation.
Diesel generators have traditionally provided a significant part of that backup capacity.
But diesel generation can be expensive and polluting.
Fuel costs, maintenance requirements and interruptions to supply can affect business competitiveness.
Daystar developed its business around reducing those difficulties.
Rather than relying exclusively on customers to purchase and operate their own generating equipment, the company offers solar and hybrid solutions through several commercial arrangements.
These include solar-as-a-service, power-as-a-service and lease-to-own models.
The solutions may combine solar panels with batteries and other sources of generation to improve reliability.
The potential benefits depend upon the actual equipment installed, operating conditions and displaced fuel consumption.
The company’s published examples include projects intended to reduce diesel use and electricity costs.
Its website contains customer statements describing savings, improved reliability and environmental advantages.
These are company-published testimonials, not independently audited findings for every installation.
Nevertheless, they demonstrate that Daystar operates in an economically important market.
The central purpose of the business is to provide more dependable and potentially lower-emission electricity for customers whose existing supply arrangements may be costly or unreliable.
Selling the company does not eliminate that demand.
It changes who owns the business positioned to meet it.
5. The buyer: A Nigerian infrastructure company with a different portfolioThe proposed purchaser is not an anonymous investment vehicle with no identifiable operating history.
Elektron Energy Development Strategies Limited describes itself as a Nigerian energy infrastructure company founded in 2011.
Its activities include the development, financing and operation of electricity and gas infrastructure.
The company’s own website identifies projects involving embedded generation, distribution infrastructure, gas-fired electricity and hybrid-energy systems.
One example is the Task Force Road Independent Power Project in Lagos.
Elektron describes this as an operational 10.6 MW gas-fired power plant commissioned in 2013, with a distribution network serving the Lagos State Government Secretariat.
The company has discussed plans to expand this installation and incorporate solar generation.
Another project concerns the development of embedded electricity generation and distribution infrastructure for Victoria Island in Lagos.
Elektron’s publicly described business is therefore not exclusively solar.
It combines conventional and lower-carbon energy technologies with electricity infrastructure and long-term commercial supply arrangements.
Primary sources: Elektron Energy — Official Corporate Website and Elektron — Task Force Road Power Project.
elektronenergy.com+1
That background is important when assessing the proposed acquisition.
Elektron may see Daystar’s customer relationships, operating systems and regional presence as complementary to its existing activities.
According to its announcement reported by Nigerian business media, Elektron considers the acquisition a means of accelerating the development of a diversified cleaner-energy platform.
Deen Solebo, the company’s Co-Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, welcomed the addition of Daystar’s solar and hybrid capabilities.
Contemporary reporting: Nairametrics — Elektron Energy Signs Deal to Acquire Shell-Owned Daystar Power, 17 November 2026.
Nairametrics
The buyer’s investment case is commercially understandable.
A regional electricity infrastructure company can potentially combine established renewable installations with other generation and distribution services.
But successful acquisition does not automatically guarantee further expansion.
Its eventual performance will depend upon financing, integration, management, customer relationships and market conditions.
The transaction should therefore be considered a transfer of opportunity as well as ownership.
6. The selling price: An important missing disclosureNeither Shell’s announcement nor the buyer’s published statements examined for this investigation disclosed a purchase price.
That omission limits any assessment of the transaction’s financial outcome.
Shell acquired Daystar in December 2022.
It has owned the business for less than four years.
But without the acquisition consideration, subsequent capital contributions, financing arrangements and agreed sale proceeds, it is not possible to determine whether Shell has achieved a positive or negative financial return.
There may also be contractual and accounting factors affecting the calculation.
A sale consideration does not necessarily equal an accounting gain or loss.
Nor can the business’s current generating capacity be used alone to calculate its enterprise value.
Customer contracts, debt, lease obligations, assets under development and expected future income could all affect valuation.
The available announcements do not provide sufficient information to resolve these matters.
This investigation therefore makes no claim that Shell sold Daystar at a loss.
It makes no claim that the buyer obtained the company below fair value.
And it does not assert that the business was commercially unsuccessful under Shell’s ownership.
The absence of sufficient transaction information is itself a legitimate limitation on public scrutiny.
It is particularly relevant where the original investment had been associated with a wider corporate strategy concerning lower-carbon energy.
7. Shell’s explanation: Concentrating capital where it believes it can competeShell has provided a clear explanation of the disposal.
Its 17 November statement says the company is continuing to reshape its portfolio and concentrate on power activities where it considers its capabilities to be differentiated.
The company specifically identifies asset-backed electricity trading and related services.
This explanation is consistent with Shell’s more recent investor strategy.
At its Capital Markets Day on 25 March 2025, Shell announced plans to tighten capital discipline, improve returns and concentrate growth investment in businesses where it believes it possesses particular competitive strengths.
Chief Executive Wael Sawan identified integrated gas, liquefied natural gas, energy marketing and trading as central priorities.
The company also committed to maintaining its published energy-transition targets and ambitions.
Primary source: Shell — Capital Markets Day Strategy Announcement, 25 March 2025.
Shell Global
This is an important distinction.
Shell is not formally announcing an abandonment of renewable electricity or of its wider net-zero ambition.
It is placing greater emphasis on particular activities within the electricity value chain.
Owning solar installations is one commercial activity.
Trading electricity is another.
Financing or operating flexible power generation is another.
Providing energy services to customers may involve different levels of capital commitment and commercial risk.
Shell’s position is that concentrating on activities where it possesses stronger competitive advantages should improve the company’s performance.
That is a legitimate business argument.
But it also represents a change in the practical role Shell intends to play in renewable electricity development.
Instead of owning and expanding certain generating businesses, Shell is increasingly prepared to transfer them to other operators while concentrating its capital elsewhere.
Daystar is a concrete example.
8. The European precedent: Another renewable portfolio offered for saleThe Daystar agreement did not occur in isolation.
On 3 August 2026, Shell announced a separate agreement to sell its European onshore renewables portfolio to TotalEnergies.
That transaction included operating and development-stage renewable assets in Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Shell described approximately 500 MW of renewable-generation capacity in operation or development.
TotalEnergies’ own announcement also identified a substantial additional development pipeline.
Shell explained that the transaction would allow it to recycle capital and concentrate on its preferred electricity activities.
The wording closely resembles the explanation now provided for the Daystar sale.
Both announcements emphasise portfolio management, competitive advantages and the allocation of capital.
Primary source: Shell — Agreement to Sell European Onshore Renewables Portfolio to TotalEnergies, 3 August 2026.
Shell Global
The Donovan–Shell Archive reported that European transaction on 4 August 2026.
Previous archive coverage — Shell Sells British Solar Farms to TotalEnergies in Renewables Retreat.
The Daystar sale adds an important new geographical dimension.
It demonstrates that Shell’s strategy of disposing of selected renewable-generation assets is not confined to mature European electricity markets.
It now extends to a business operating in five West African countries, where reliable distributed generation can fulfil a particularly important commercial function.
This is not proof that Shell will sell every remaining renewable-generation asset.
No such conclusion is justified.
But the pattern of disclosed transactions is clear.
Shell is reducing direct ownership of selected renewable-generation businesses while retaining an interest in other electricity-related commercial activities.
9. A revealing coincidence: New gas production announced on the same dayAnother announcement on 17 November 2026 provides useful context.
Shell confirmed that its subsidiary Sarawak Shell Berhad had started gas production from the Rosmari and Marjoram fields offshore Malaysia.
The development is located approximately 220 kilometres off the Sarawak coast.
It includes deepwater gas production, a lengthy offshore pipeline and a new onshore processing plant at Bintulu.
The processed gas will feed the PETRONAS LNG Complex.
Shell operates the project with a 71% interest.
The company’s supporting project information describes planned production capacity of approximately 800 million standard cubic feet of gas per day.
Primary sources: Shell — First Gas from Rosmari-Marjoram, 17 November 2026 and Shell — Rosmari-Marjoram Project Overview.
Shell Global+1
The two announcements concern different assets in different countries.
There is no evidence that the proceeds from the Daystar disposal are specifically financing the Malaysian development.
Nor should their coincident publication dates be interpreted as proof of a direct financial relationship.
Nevertheless, they provide a striking illustration of Shell’s stated strategic priorities.
On the same day that Shell announced the intended sale of a West African renewable-electricity business, it celebrated the start of production from a major Asian natural-gas development.
Shell argues that natural gas remains important for energy security and the energy transition.
Environmental critics question the long-term compatibility of expanding fossil-fuel production with global climate objectives.
Both positions form part of the wider debate.
For this investigation, the narrower documentary conclusion is sufficient.
Shell’s actual investment and disposal decisions are consistent with its publicly stated priority of strengthening integrated gas while selectively reducing capital committed to other activities.
10. Does selling Daystar undermine Shell’s energy-transition commitments?It would be too simplistic to answer this question solely by counting renewable-energy businesses sold.
The climate consequences of an asset sale depend partly on what happens after ownership changes.
If Elektron continues operating Daystar’s installations and expands the business, electricity generation from those assets may continue or increase.
The renewable equipment does not cease functioning because its owner changes.
Likewise, a purchaser may possess local commercial relationships and infrastructure expertise that help the business grow.
There is no evidence in today’s announcement that Daystar customers will lose access to their existing systems.
Shell explicitly states that there will be no change to Daystar’s day-to-day operations before completion.
On the other hand, the sale raises questions about Shell’s future contribution to the financing and ownership of distributed renewable electricity in West Africa.
In 2022, Shell presented its acquisition as part of helping expand access to solar power and reduce diesel dependence.
In 2026, it is preparing to relinquish that business.
Those facts establish a change in ownership strategy.
They do not, by themselves, establish that global or regional greenhouse-gas emissions will increase because of the sale.
Nor do they establish that Shell has breached an environmental commitment.
An independent assessment would require information about the projects, electricity generated, displaced fossil-fuel consumption, future investment and subsequent operating performance.
The documentary evidence currently available is sufficient to identify a strategic reversal.
It is not sufficient to calculate its environmental consequences.
11. What should Shell and Elektron now disclose?Several questions remain unanswered by the transaction announcements.
The first concerns financial transparency.
What consideration has Elektron agreed to pay, and what was Shell’s total investment in Daystar over the period of ownership?
The second concerns operational performance.
What installed solar capacity had Daystar achieved by the end of 2025, and how did that compare with the original 400 MW ambition?
The third concerns the transaction itself.
Which regulatory approvals are required, and when is completion expected?
The fourth concerns continuity.
Will Daystar retain its existing management, brand, customer agreements and geographical expansion programme after the sale?
Finally, there is the question of Shell’s future role in African renewable electricity.
Does the disposal mark the end of its direct ownership of this type of distributed commercial and industrial solar business in West Africa, or does Shell envisage participation through other structures?
These are questions that the company’s existing statements do not fully answer.
They do not imply that either party has acted improperly.
They are relevant because the transaction concerns an operating energy business whose original acquisition was promoted as part of a wider energy-transition strategy.
12. What the documentary record establishesThe investigation rests on three distinct categories of evidence.
Established facts
Shell completed the acquisition of Daystar Power in December 2022.
The original acquisition announcement associated the investment with renewable-electricity expansion and reducing dependence on diesel generation.
Daystar’s public objective in September 2022 was to reach 400 MW of installed solar capacity by 2025.
Daystar’s current website reports more than 400 installations and more than 150 MW of solar and hybrid capacity across five West African markets.
On 17 November 2026, Shell announced a signed agreement to sell its entire ownership interest to Elektron Renewables Limited.
The transaction remains subject to regulatory conditions and approvals.
Shell separately announced the proposed sale of its European onshore renewables portfolio in August 2026.
Shell also announced first gas from its Malaysian Rosmari-Marjoram project on 17 November 2026.
Company positions and forward-looking statements
Shell states that the Daystar disposal reflects its strategy of concentrating capital where it considers its commercial capabilities to be strongest.
Elektron states that the acquisition will strengthen its renewable and hybrid-energy platform.
The original 400 MW objective was an expansion target, not an achieved result.
Neither the proposed buyer’s future investment plans nor Shell’s expected financial results from the disposal can be treated as established outcomes.
Matters not established
The public material examined does not establish the sale price.
It does not provide the total acquisition and subsequent investment costs necessary to calculate Shell’s financial return.
It does not reconcile Daystar’s 2022 installed-solar target with its current solar-and-hybrid capacity figure.
It does not establish that Shell deliberately restricted Daystar’s growth.
It does not establish that the business is financially distressed.
It does not establish that the sale will increase regional carbon emissions.
And it does not establish that regulatory approval or completion is guaranteed.
Conclusion: Four years can make a considerable differenceThe history of Shell’s investment in Daystar Power illustrates how quickly corporate energy strategies can change.
In September 2022, Shell welcomed an African renewable-electricity acquisition with ambitions extending well beyond the company’s existing operations.
Daystar was expected to grow rapidly.
Its solar technology offered potential benefits for businesses struggling with unreliable electricity and the expense of diesel generation.
Shell described the transaction as a significant step into renewable electricity in emerging markets.
Four years later, the company has agreed to sell the entire business.
The buyer is another energy infrastructure company with an established presence in Nigeria and experience in both conventional and renewable electricity systems.
There is no established reason to assume that Daystar cannot prosper under its proposed new ownership.
Indeed, Elektron presents the acquisition as an opportunity for further expansion.
But the transaction reveals something important about Shell.
The company is no longer pursuing every renewable-energy opportunity that once appeared attractive.
Instead, its recent announcements demonstrate a more selective approach, concentrating on trading, flexible power, integrated gas and other activities it considers commercially advantageous.
That is Shell’s stated strategy.
The documentary significance lies in comparing the company’s earlier ambitions with its subsequent decisions.
Daystar provides an unusually clear example because the original acquisition statements, ambitious expansion objective, current operating disclosures and sale announcement are all publicly accessible.
The most interesting unanswered issue is not whether renewable electricity remains valuable in West Africa.
The need for reliable power has not disappeared.
It is whether the original vision of substantial expansion under Shell ownership was realised, modified or overtaken by a change in corporate priorities.
The current documents do not establish the answer.
They do establish that the planned ownership has changed.
Shell entered the West African solar market as an investor intending to help expand a promising renewable-electricity business. It is preparing to leave that investment less than four years later, while strengthening its positions elsewhere in the global energy industry.
That is a significant corporate development.
The full consequences for Daystar, its customers, the buyer and the region’s renewable-electricity market remain to be seen.
For the Donovan–Shell Archive, the appropriate conclusion is neither that Shell has betrayed a legally binding promise nor that the transaction is necessarily a commercial success.
It is that the documentary record reveals a substantial reversal in investment priorities — one that deserves scrutiny against the ambitions publicly expressed when the business was acquired.
Principal documentary sources1. Shell Nigeria — Agreement to Sell Daystar Power Group, 17 November 2026. Original corporate announcement establishing the seller, buyer, transaction status and Shell’s stated rationale.
2. Shell — Completion of Daystar Power Acquisition, 16 December 2022. Original corporate announcement explaining the acquisition’s strategic purpose.
3. Invest Africa — Original Daystar Acquisition Announcement, September 2022. Preserves the original acquisition announcement and Daystar’s stated 400 MW ambition.
4. Charles Russell Speechlys — Legal Advisers’ Announcement, October 2022. Independent transaction-related confirmation of the original expansion objective.
5. Daystar Power — Official Website. Current company-published operating capacity, installation figures and customer examples.
6. Elektron Energy — Official Website. Buyer background, existing energy infrastructure activities and commercial positioning.
7. Nairametrics — Elektron Energy to Acquire Shell-Owned Daystar Power, 17 November 2026. Contemporary Nigerian reporting, including statements attributed to the buyer.
8. Shell — Capital Markets Day Strategy, 25 March 2025. Primary corporate disclosure explaining revised investment and business priorities.
9. Shell — European Onshore Renewables Disposal, 3 August 2026. Original announcement establishing the earlier portfolio disposal.
10. Shell — Rosmari-Marjoram First Gas, 17 November 2026. Independent corporate confirmation of the new Malaysian gas development.
Documentary disclaimerThis article is an independent documentary investigation based on publicly accessible corporate announcements, contemporaneous transaction statements, company operating disclosures and identifiable business reporting.
Shell’s agreement to sell Daystar Power Group was announced on 17 November 2026. The transaction remains subject to regulatory conditions and approvals and must not be described as completed.
The original 400 MW objective was a forward-looking expansion target announced in September 2022. The investigation does not represent it as an enforceable promise or an achieved operating result.
Daystar’s current 150 MW-plus operating figure describes its reported solar and hybrid platform. The measurement is not necessarily directly comparable with the earlier installed-solar target. No independently audited reconciliation of these figures has been obtained.
Financial terms of the proposed disposal have not been established. Accordingly, the article makes no finding concerning profit, loss, asset valuation or investment performance.
Company statements about commercial benefits, future growth, environmental improvements and strategic objectives are attributed to the organisations making them.
No allegation is made that Shell, Daystar Power, Elektron Energy or any individual has breached the law, misled investors or deliberately obstructed renewable-energy development.
The comparison between the Daystar sale and Shell’s Malaysian gas development is an editorial examination of publicly disclosed corporate priorities. It does not suggest a directly linked financing arrangement.
The Donovan–Shell Archive welcomes factual corrections, relevant corporate documents and responses from Shell plc, Daystar Power Group, Elektron Energy Development Strategies Limited and other parties identified in this investigation.
Substantiated corrections and relevant additional evidence will be considered fairly.
This article is independent corporate and documentary analysis, not investment advice or a legal determination.
Shell’s West African Solar Reversal — A Documentary Investigation into the Daystar Power Sale and the 400 MW Ambition was first posted on November 17, 2026 at 9:40 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
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“Enough is Enough”: Hundreds of Virginians Rally at SCC as Hearings Begin on Proposed NextEra-Dominion Merger
RICHMOND, VA — As Virginia families struggle with rising electric bills, residents, ratepayers and clean energy advocates gathered today in Richmond in front of the State Corporation Commission (SCC) building for the start of evidentiary hearings on NextEra’s proposed $67-billion purchase of Dominion Energy. Approval of the acquisition would create the world’s largest regulated utility company. With no public comment scheduled during the evidentiary hearing, residents rallied outside to make their opposition visible as the regulatory proceedings begin.
“NextEra wants Virginians to be the safety net beneath its high-wire bet on data center demand,” said Abigail Van Eerden, Stop the Merger Organizer at CCAN. “Throughout the Commonwealth, students held action nights on college campuses, residents joined public comment submission parties, the Lt. Governor held a statewide hearing tour, over 2,000 Virginians signed a petition, and over 7,000 Virginians submitted public comments. Across all of these community forums and more, the response to this merger has been a resounding NO! Virginians deserve better than to be an insurance policy for NextEra’s data center expansion – with flimsy benefits stacked against major rate hikes, and no commitments to Virginia’s clean energy goals.”
Today’s demonstration builds on months of opposition from thousands of Virginians who have signed petitions and submitted hundreds of written public comments. Virginians brought those concerns directly to the SCC’s doorstep, urging commissioners to protect ratepayers, local communities and Virginia’s clean energy goals as they consider whether the deal should proceed.
“Growing up 40 minutes from the nation’s capital and an hour from the Appalachian Mountains meant my parents pushed me to educate myself on politics and civic duty, and it also enabled me to pursue my love of nature. As an environmental studies major, I learned from our history that our government must consider the cost to people and the environment, not just the price tag. NextEra has big claims of investment, development, and infrastructure. But investing in our future means investing in more than infrastructure; it means investing in our people. And our people do not want this merger,” said Shazmeen Khan, a student at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU).
As the SCC prepares to decide whether the proposed acquisition moves forward, Virginians are urging commissioners to scrutinize the deal’s potential consequences for household energy costs, utility accountability, data center infrastructure spending, local communities, and Virginia’s clean energy future. Speakers at the rally also called for transparency and scrutiny of the deal’s implications for Virginia’s climate commitments and an affordable, reliable energy system.
“Families are already struggling with electricity bills; we don’t need cuts for data centers and rate increases for families,” said Eshaan Mital, a student at Albemarle High School. “Young people in Virginia need to know what our regulators and government are doing, and we are concerned about energy affordability, political transparency, and climate change, especially in the context of the $67-billion NextEra-Dominion acquisition.”
Virginians warn that the proposed merger could put corporate priorities ahead of their needs. They are raising concerns about electric bills for families already facing rising costs; accountability under a Florida-based owner; increased political influence over the legislative process; and whether households will bear the costs of power plants and transmission lines built to serve data centers.
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Chesapeake Climate Action Network is the first grassroots organization dedicated exclusively to raising awareness about the impacts and solutions associated with global warming in the Chesapeake Bay region. Founded in 2002, CCAN has been at the center of the fight for clean energy and wise climate policy in Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC.
The post “Enough is Enough”: Hundreds of Virginians Rally at SCC as Hearings Begin on Proposed NextEra-Dominion Merger appeared first on Chesapeake Climate Action Network.
Frustration as Global North pushes for a just transition mechanism without teeth
MEDIA ADVISORY: Press Conference
17 November, 2026
Antalya, Turkey – The world urgently needs a just transition to climate justice, but Global North countries at COP31 are sabotaging any efforts to operationalise a mechanism that would make this possible. Developed countries fought off efforts to operationalise the Belem-Antalya Mechanism (BAM), blocking discussions on how it would be funded, when it would start, where it would be housed and what the role of frontline communities and other key stakeholders would be.
The transition cannot be just if it doesn’t deliver the means of implementation. It requires public, grant-based finance, not more dialogue and workshops. Instead of providing the climate finance they owe, Global North countries have proposed private finance from multilateral development banks, putting developing countries at the risk of being plunged further into debt.
Join us to hear from civil society members at the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ) press conference laying the demands for a Just Transition BAM, not a sham.
WHEN: 18 November 2026 | 11.00AM Antalya Time (8AM GMT)
WHERE: Press Conference 2, Area D4 (Live webcast link)
WHO:
- Alice Ridge, Women and Gender Coalition
- Chadli Sadorra, Demand Climate Justice
- Bryan Bixcul, Indigenous Peoples Organizations
- Ar Royyan Mas, YOUNGO
- Amiera Sawas, Climate Action Network-International
- Bert De Wel, International Trade Union Confederation
- Rachitaa Gupta, Moderator, Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice
For interviews and other queries:
Juliah Kibochi & Sidharth Pandey
juliah.dcj@gmail.com
sidharth.dcj@gmail.com
The post Frustration as Global North pushes for a just transition mechanism without teeth appeared first on Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice.
SUWA Launches “Keep Utah Monumental” Campaign to Hold Utah Politicians Accountable – 11.17.27
November 17, 2026 – FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
SUWA Launches “Keep Utah Monumental” Campaign to Hold Utah Politicians Accountable for Cutting National Monuments – 11.17.27Contacts:
Grant Stevens, Communications Director, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA); (319) 427-0260; grant@suwa.org
SALT LAKE CITY, UT — The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) today launched “Keep Utah Monumental”, a statewide campaign to restore Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments. It will also hold accountable Governor Spencer Cox and Utah’s Federal Delegation (Senators Lee and Curtis and Representatives Maloy, Kennedy, and Moore), who stood by President Trump as he cut the monuments by more than 90%.
In July, President Trump stripped protections from more than 3 million acres across the two monuments. Utah’s congressional delegation and Governor supported the cuts at a signing in the Oval Office. On September 11, those cut lands were opened to mining and drilling. As of today, 190 mining claims have been filed in the lands cut from the National Monuments.
“With the launch of Keep Utah Monumental, our campaign to restore Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments, we’re holding Governor Cox and Utah’s Federal Delegation accountable for the role they played in reducing the National Monuments by 90%. This is a paid media campaign, but it’s also a community organizing campaign,” said Scott Braden, Executive Director at the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA). “No longer will National Monuments, wilderness, or public lands in Utah be a second-tier issue to pander to the loudest anti-public lands voices. These places are too special, too central to our identities as Utahns to be treated so flippantly by our elected leaders. I hope you’ll join SUWA and the majority of Utahns who support National Monuments, as we work to Keep Utah Monumental.”
The campaign launches as Utah’s congressional delegation returns to Washington for the lame-duck session and the State Legislature prepares for January. The Keep Utah Monumental campaign elements include three digital advertising spots (see links below), billboards along the Wasatch Front and in rural communities including Kanab and Monticello, and more. To learn more, go to KeepUtahMonumental.org.
On September 2, 2026, conservation groups (including SUWA) challenged President Trump’s July 2026 unlawful decimation of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments. The groups filed suit in U.S. District Court seeking to reactivate litigation against Trump’s 2017 monument rollbacks and challenge both sets of illegal proclamations together. On Oct. 15, 2026, the cases were reopened.
Utahns can take action and request a free yard sign at KeepUtahMonumental.org.
The media is invited to attend SUWA’s public launch celebration this evening from 6 to 8 p.m. at Red Butte Garden’s Orangerie, 300 Wakara Way. Remarks are around 7 p.m., with interview opportunities with SUWA staff, and supporters.
Additional Information:
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The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) is a nonprofit organization with members and supporters from around the country dedicated to protecting America’s redrock wilderness. From offices in Moab, Salt Lake City, and Washington, DC, our team of professionals defends the redrock, organizes support for America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act, and stewards a world-renowned landscape. Learn more at www.suwa.org.
The post SUWA Launches “Keep Utah Monumental” Campaign to Hold Utah Politicians Accountable – 11.17.27 appeared first on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 17 NOVEMBER 2026
Archive reference: SLF-2007-121
The Sakhalin Papers CXI: The R-Share Dividend Trail — How Russia’s Special Share Led to a 118.6 Billion-Rouble Compensation PaymentIn 2019, Sakhalin Energy reported paying $707 million in dividends on a single special preference share held by the Russian state. The arrangement dated back to the period following Gazprom’s acquisition of majority control in 2007, while Shell remained a substantial shareholder. Following the replacement of Sakhalin II’s operator in 2022, Russia introduced a new compensation mechanism. An original Russian Accounts Chamber audit, now examined alongside Shell-era corporate reports, reveals that the replacement operator paid 118.6 billion roubles under that mechanism in 2023 and 49.3 billion roubles in 2024. The audit confirms that the payments included historical unpaid R-share dividends — but does not identify how much of either annual total represented those dividends.
AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION
By the Donovan–Shell Archive
Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT. Based on original Sakhalin Energy corporate reports, an authenticated Shell plc filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, a Russian Accounts Chamber audit approved on 30 April 2025, and contemporaneous Russian financial and court reporting.
Publication date: 17 November 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-120 — The $100 Billion Projection
INTRODUCTION: THE SHARE THAT SURVIVED IN THE FINANCIAL RECORDIn May 2019, the Russian Federation received an extraordinary dividend.
According to reporting by RBC, the state received approximately 45.6 billion roubles from Sakhalin Energy Investment Company.
That was equivalent to approximately $700 million at the time.
The payment was associated with a single special preference share.
It was known as the R-share.
The company’s own 2019 Sustainability Report recorded $707 million in dividends paid on that share during the year.
This was not an ordinary dividend paid to Shell shareholders.
Nor was it a royalty or the Russian state’s share of profit production under the original production-sharing agreement.
It was a separate financial entitlement.
Russia had obtained the special share in 2007, following Gazprom’s entry into Sakhalin Energy as the controlling shareholder.
The original operator continued publishing financial information about the R-share during the years when Shell retained a substantial minority interest.
Those disclosures provide the first part of the documentary trail.
The second part emerged after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Shell announced its withdrawal from Russian energy interests in February 2022.
By April, according to Shell’s subsequently authenticated SEC filings, it had lost significant influence over Sakhalin Energy.
A Russian presidential decree in June 2022 provided for the transfer of the project’s operations to a replacement Russian company.
In March 2023, a new compensation agreement was concluded.
The significance of that agreement became clearer in August 2025, when Interfax reported findings from Russia’s Accounts Chamber.
The audit concerned the execution of the Russian federal budget for 2024.
Its findings identified compensation payments made by the replacement Sakhalin II operator.
They also connected those payments with dividends previously owed on the R-share.
The original Accounts Chamber report has now been located and examined directly.
It contains a financial table providing more detail than the subsequent news headline.
The compensation payments identified were substantial.
118.6 billion roubles in 2023.
49.3 billion roubles in 2024.
The difference was approximately 69.3 billion roubles.
But there is an essential qualification.
The audit does not say that the entire compensation payment consisted of unpaid R-share dividends.
It says that the payment included such dividends.
That distinction is fundamental.
The documentary question is therefore not simply why the Russian state received such large payments.
It is how an earlier shareholder entitlement became incorporated into a new financial mechanism, what that mechanism covered, and whether its various components can be independently reconciled.
PART ONE: THE ORIGINAL R-SHARE 1. What was the R-share?Sakhalin Energy’s original corporate reports provide a clear basic description.
The R-share was a special preference share carrying a right to receive dividends.
It represented an additional source of income for the Russian side.
The entitlement existed alongside other forms of public benefit under the production-sharing agreement.
These included royalties, the Russian side’s share of profit production, corporate profits tax and other mandatory payments.
Sakhalin Energy’s 2019 Sustainability Report explicitly distinguished these categories.
The company explained that the Russian side received revenue from R-share dividends in addition to other fiscal and production-sharing receipts.
This was a corporate arrangement with financial consequences.
It should not be confused with a conventional governmental tax.
Nor should it be treated as the same thing as ownership of the oil and gas resources.
The Russian state retained ownership of the underlying mineral resources under the production-sharing framework.
The R-share was a distinct corporate instrument.
Its significance lay in the dividends that could become payable under the applicable arrangements.
Primary source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2019, pages 100–101 (PDF).
Sakhalin Energy
2. The 2007 origin
The historical context is important.
In April 2007, Gazprom acquired majority control of Sakhalin Energy.
Shell’s holding was reduced from 55% to approximately 27.5%.
Gazprom obtained 50% plus one ordinary controlling share.
Mitsui and Mitsubishi retained minority interests.
The Russian state also held the separate special R-share.
In an investigation published on 19 August 2019, RBC reported that the Russian Federation had held the R-share since 2007.
RBC cited Russian Accounts Chamber material concerning the dividend received in May 2019.
The publication also referred to earlier reporting indicating that the special share had been acquired for a nominal consideration of $1.
That historical claim remains attributed to the contemporary reporting.
The complete original share-issuance documentation and constitutional provisions defining every R-share right have not been independently obtained for this instalment.
Consequently, no definitive conclusion is advanced concerning every legal right attached to the instrument.
The available evidence is nevertheless sufficient to establish its existence, its association with the Russian state and its role in generating substantial dividends.
Contemporaneous source: RBC — Russia Received $700 Million in Dividends from a Single Sakhalin Energy Share, 19 August 2019.
РБК
PART TWO: THE PAYMENTS DURING SHELL’S INVOLVEMENT 3. The 2015 record: $1.6 billion in dividends
An earlier corporate report provides an important historical checkpoint.
Sakhalin Energy’s 2015 Sustainability Report described the R-share as a special preference share entitling the Russian side to dividends.
The same financial section reported approximately $1.6 billion in dividends paid during 2015.
It also recorded approximately $434 million in the Russian side’s profit-production entitlement and approximately $409 million in royalties.
The distinctions demonstrate that dividends formed a substantial part of the wider financial arrangements.
The report identified approximately $5.2 billion in total payments and benefits provided to the Russian Federation during 2015.
These included cash and in-kind transfers.
The $1.6 billion dividend figure should not be added indiscriminately to cumulative project revenues, because the operator’s broader calculations already included different categories of financial benefit.
The report nevertheless establishes the substantial scale of dividends being paid during Shell’s participation.
RBC’s later investigation also identified 2015 as the year of an earlier large dividend payment.
It reported that subsequent dividends did not resume until 2018.
Primary source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2015, pages 55–56, Russian-language edition (PDF).
Sakhalin Energy
4. The 2018 record: $177 million
The original 2018 Sustainability Report provides an explicit R-share figure.
The operator reported that dividends paid on the R-share amounted to $177 million during 2018.
The report also recorded approximately $495 million in royalties and approximately $606 million as the Russian side’s share of profit production.
Total payments and benefits allocated to the Russian Federation during the reporting year were approximately $2.5 billion.
The R-share payment was therefore one component of a wider financial distribution.
It was not the entire amount received by Russia.
The original report makes the distinction clear.
Primary source: Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2018, Financial Benefits section (PDF).
Sakhalin Energy
5. The 2019 payment: $707 million
The following year’s report recorded a much larger R-share dividend.
Sakhalin Energy stated that $707 million had been paid on the special share during 2019.
The company’s total reported payments and benefits allocated to the Russian Federation were approximately $3.3 billion.
Other components included approximately $384 million in royalties and $512 million in profit production.
Profits tax relating to the preceding financial year was another substantial category.
The corporate report therefore establishes that the R-share was financially significant.
But the accompanying contemporaneous news reporting provides additional information.
RBC reported that the state had received approximately 45.6 billion roubles in May 2019.
According to the Accounts Chamber material cited by RBC, the payment had not been included in the original dividend receipts anticipated for the first half of that year.
RBC also reported that Rosimushchestvo, the Russian federal property-management agency, did not participate in Sakhalin Energy’s management bodies or in decisions concerning dividend declarations.
These details are important.
The dividend was a substantial public receipt.
But the available reporting also suggests that the payment’s timing was not fully anticipated in the government’s original budget forecast.
That does not establish improper conduct.
It does, however, illustrate why the timing and predictability of special-share dividends could matter to government finances.
Contemporaneous reporting: RBC, 19 August 2019.
РБК
PART THREE: A CORPORATE DIVIDEND IS NOT THE SAME AS A TAX 6. Why the distinction matters
The historical R-share payments must be distinguished from three other financial mechanisms.
Royalties arose from the terms governing the production of hydrocarbons.
Profit-production entitlements arose from the production-sharing arrangements after the applicable cost-recovery threshold had been reached.
Corporate profits tax was a separate fiscal obligation.
The R-share represented a dividend entitlement attached to a particular class of share.
These mechanisms could all generate revenues for the Russian side.
But they did not necessarily arise under identical rules.
They also had different implications for the timing and classification of payments.
This is particularly relevant to the series’ earlier examination of Sakhalin Energy’s 2012 forecast that Russian-side revenues would exceed $100 billion over the project’s lifetime.
A reliable reconstruction of those revenues requires the different payments to be identified consistently.
An R-share dividend cannot simply be counted as an additional receipt if it is already included in an aggregate total reported by the operator.
Nor should a subsequently received compensation payment automatically be added without determining whether it represents a new entitlement or the settlement of an older obligation.
The distinction becomes particularly important after 2022.
PART FOUR: SHELL’S WITHDRAWAL CHANGED THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE 7. The decisive events of 2022On 28 February 2022, Shell announced that it intended to withdraw from its Russian joint ventures following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Shell’s subsequent SEC filings establish the accounting and management consequences.
Its investment in Sakhalin Energy had been treated as an associate until 31 March 2022.
Shell reported losing significant influence from 1 April 2022.
The company attributed that loss of influence to the resignation of its executive directors and the withdrawal of managerial and technical personnel.
It also recognised an impairment charge of approximately $1.614 billion in relation to Sakhalin II.
On 30 June 2022, Russia issued a presidential decree providing for the replacement of the original operator.
The new Russian company subsequently assumed the operational role.
The restructuring represented a fundamental change in the corporate arrangements through which the project operated.
The former Bermuda-incorporated Sakhalin Energy Investment Company remained legally distinct from the replacement Russian entity.
That distinction matters directly to the R-share investigation.
The dividend entitlement had existed in the original corporate structure.
The later compensation payment was made by the replacement operator.
The documentary question is how the rights and obligations associated with the special share were treated when the operating arrangements changed.
Authenticated Shell source: Shell plc — SEC Filing, Unaudited Condensed Financial Report for 2022.
SEC
PART FIVE: THE 24 MARCH 2023 COMPENSATION AGREEMENT 8. The original Russian Accounts Chamber document
The central source for this instalment is an original document issued by the Russian Accounts Chamber.
It concerns the Ministry of Energy’s execution of the federal budget for 2024.
The report was approved by the Accounts Chamber’s Collegium on 30 April 2025.
A copy is publicly available through the Russian Federation Council’s website.
This is an original governmental audit document, not merely a news report quoting an unidentified official.
On pages 4–5, the Accounts Chamber examined federal revenues administered by the Ministry of Energy.
The document identified receipts associated with production-sharing agreements.
These concerned Sakhalin I, Sakhalin II and the Kharyaga project.
But one separate financial entry related specifically to Sakhalin II.
It concerned a compensation payment made by the replacement operator, Sakhalinskaya Energiya LLC.
The Accounts Chamber referred to an agreement dated 24 March 2023.
According to the audit, the replacement operator was required to make compensation payments for financial years beginning on 1 January 2022.
The audit also stated that the payment included dividends on the R-share that had not been paid by the branch of the former Sakhalin Energy Investment Company.
That is the documentary connection.
The earlier operator’s corporate reports had identified the special share and its dividends.
The later governmental audit identified a new payment arrangement incorporating unpaid amounts associated with that same share.
The audit does not provide the complete contractual terms of the March 2023 agreement.
Nor does it set out the precise calculation of the R-share element.
Those limitations are important.
But the existence of the compensation arrangement, its date and the inclusion of historical unpaid R-share dividends are established by the original governmental document.
Primary governmental source: Russian Accounts Chamber — Audit of the Ministry of Energy’s 2024 Budget Execution, approved 30 April 2025, pages 4–5 (PDF).
council.gov.ru
PART SIX: WHAT THE AUDIT’S FINANCIAL TABLE REVEALS 9. The 2023 compensation payment
The Accounts Chamber’s original table records a compensation payment associated specifically with Sakhalin II.
For 2023, the figure was:
118,592.8 million roubles — approximately 118.6 billion roubles.
This was the amount recorded in the relevant compensation-payment category.
It was not identified as the amount of R-share dividends alone.
That qualification is essential.
The audit states that the compensation payment included historical unpaid R-share dividends.
It does not state that every rouble received under the agreement represented dividends.
The figure therefore establishes the total amount of the relevant compensation payment in 2023.
It cannot independently establish the precise dividend arrears component.
10. The 2024 compensation paymentFor 2024, the Accounts Chamber recorded:
49,310.8 million roubles — approximately 49.3 billion roubles.
The difference was substantial.
The payment fell by approximately 69.3 billion roubles compared with 2023.
That represented a reduction of approximately 58.4%.
The original audit therefore provides a clearer picture than a general statement that Sakhalin-related federal revenues declined.
It identifies a specific payment category.
It also provides the annual amounts.
The figures demonstrate that the compensation mechanism generated significant federal revenues in both years, but at markedly different levels.
The document does not independently explain the precise components responsible for the reduction.
It identifies the lower compensation payment as a major reason for the change in overall Ministry of Energy revenues.
The amounts themselves are authenticated through the original audit.
Their complete contractual and accounting composition remains a separate question.
Primary source: Russian Accounts Chamber audit, financial table on page 4.
council.gov.ru
11. An important distinction concerning the overall budget
The Accounts Chamber also reported that total federal revenues administered by the Ministry of Energy had fallen between 2023 and 2024.
The total was approximately 177.4 billion roubles in 2023.
It declined to approximately 121.5 billion roubles in 2024.
That represented a reduction of approximately 55.9 billion roubles.
The audit attributed the fall principally to the lower Sakhalin II compensation payment.
However, the reduction in the specific compensation category was larger than the reduction in the Ministry’s total revenues.
That is not a contradiction.
Other revenue categories increased or offset part of the decline.
Indeed, the report noted that receipts from production-sharing arrangements exceeded their forecast for 2024.
This is another reason to preserve the accounting distinctions.
The fall in the Sakhalin II compensation payment was approximately 69.3 billion roubles.
The fall in total revenues administered by the Ministry was approximately 55.9 billion roubles.
Those are different measurements.
They should not be presented as though they represent the same financial movement.
The Accounts Chamber also stated that it had not identified facts indicating that the Ministry’s revenue reporting was unreliable.
That conclusion concerns the accuracy of the audited budget reporting.
It does not amount to an independent legal determination of every entitlement under the March 2023 compensation agreement.
PART SEVEN: WHAT THE CONTEMPORANEOUS PRESS REPORTED 12. August 2025: Interfax identifies the compensation mechanismOn 8 August 2025, Interfax reported the Accounts Chamber’s findings.
The article highlighted that federal receipts from production-sharing projects had exceeded the original forecast.
It also identified the substantial decline in revenues compared with 2023.
Most importantly, the report connected that decline with the compensation payment made by the replacement Sakhalin II operator.
Interfax quoted the audit’s explanation that the payment included unpaid historical R-share dividends.
It also identified the agreement dated 24 March 2023.
The reporting was accurate in drawing attention to the compensation mechanism.
The original audit, however, provides an additional level of detail.
Its financial table establishes the specific amounts recorded for 2023 and 2024.
This is why the primary governmental record matters.
The press report identifies the issue.
The original document permits the financial movement to be examined more precisely.
Contemporaneous source: Interfax — Production-Sharing Revenues Exceeded Forecast in 2024, 8 August 2025.
Interfax.ru
PART EIGHT: TWO DIFFERENT COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS 13. The R-share compensation should not be confused with Shell’s frozen exit proceeds
Another distinction is necessary.
Following Shell’s withdrawal, Russia established arrangements concerning the value of the former Shell interest in Sakhalin II.
That interest was subsequently associated with compensation valued at approximately 94.8 billion roubles.
The value became connected with separate legal proceedings involving Shell and Gazprom Export.
These arrangements concern Shell’s former economic interest in the project and disputed obligations arising from other commercial relationships.
They are not the same as the compensation payment identified in the Accounts Chamber audit.
The audit concerns payments made by the replacement operator under an agreement dated 24 March 2023.
It specifically identifies unpaid historical R-share dividends among the components.
Shell’s former equity compensation concerns a different financial relationship.
The two arrangements should not be combined merely because both involve Sakhalin II, compensation and large rouble amounts.
That would risk confusing a Russian state revenue mechanism with the disputed treatment of money associated with Shell’s former investment.
14. The court proceedings remain separateShell’s 2025 Annual Report and Accounts, filed with the SEC on 12 March 2026, describes Russian legal proceedings commenced on 2 October 2024.
The Russian prosecutor seeks approximately €1.5 billion from Shell Energy Europe in relation to alleged unpaid gas deliveries in 2022.
The proceedings also involve an attempt to apply approximately 94 billion roubles said to have been reserved for Shell’s Sakhalin equity compensation against the alleged debt.
Shell identifies the proceedings as ongoing.
It states that the outcome and any possible financial obligations remain uncertain.
More recent procedural reporting, dated 8 July 2026, stated that the Moscow Arbitration Court had scheduled a further hearing for 18 January 2027.
These are matters involving contested allegations.
They do not establish that Shell owes the sums claimed.
Nor do they establish that the Russian side is legally entitled to apply the reserved compensation against the alleged gas debt.
Most importantly for the present investigation, the court proceedings have not been shown to determine the rights associated with the original R-share or the detailed calculation of the March 2023 compensation payment.
The distinction must be maintained.
Authenticated Shell disclosure: Shell plc — 2025 Annual Report and Accounts, SEC Form 20-F, Note 32, Russia.
SEC
Procedural reporting: X-Compliance — Moscow Court to Continue Shell Proceedings in January 2027, 8 July 2026.
Санкции
EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 15. The special share was financially significant
The historical corporate record demonstrates that the R-share was not merely a symbolic instrument.
It generated substantial dividends.
The original reports document $1.6 billion in dividends during 2015, an explicit R-share payment of $177 million in 2018 and $707 million in 2019.
These were material amounts.
They formed part of the broader financial benefits received by the Russian side during Shell’s involvement.
The 2019 payment attracted particular attention because it represented a large receipt for the Russian federal budget.
RBC’s contemporary reporting showed that it had not been anticipated in the original first-half budget forecast.
This is evidence of the share’s financial importance.
It does not establish any impropriety in the dividend declaration or payment.
The historical significance is that a relatively little-discussed class of share generated substantial governmental revenues alongside the better-known taxes and production-sharing payments.
16. The 2023 agreement appears to have preserved a financial obligation in a different formThe Accounts Chamber’s findings create a documentary link between the earlier R-share dividends and the later replacement operator.
That link is important because the underlying corporate structure changed in 2022.
The original operator’s rights and obligations were transferred into a new Russian framework.
The historical R-share had existed within the former company’s capital structure.
The March 2023 compensation agreement provided for payments by the replacement operator.
According to the audit, those payments included historical R-share dividends that had not been paid by the former operator’s branch.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the compensation mechanism addressed at least some financial amounts associated with the former special-share arrangement.
But the evidence does not establish that the replacement agreement simply reproduced the old R-share rights in identical form.
Nor does it establish that all the former obligations were transferred without modification.
The complete agreement, supporting calculations and relevant corporate documents would be required to determine that.
The evidence establishes continuity in the financial subject matter. It does not establish complete legal continuity in the underlying corporate rights.
17. Why the 2023 payment was so much larger remains unresolvedThe original audit identifies the difference between the two years.
The compensation payment was approximately 118.6 billion roubles in 2023.
It was approximately 49.3 billion roubles in 2024.
The amount fell substantially.
The audit also states that the compensation arrangement included unpaid historical R-share dividends.
But this does not establish how much of the 2023 amount represented accumulated arrears.
It would be tempting to assume that the first year included a particularly large retrospective payment.
That is one possible explanation.
But the public material examined does not establish it.
Other factors may also have affected the amount.
The agreement could contain formulas linked to project performance, relevant financial periods or other contractual components.
The precise calculations have not been independently obtained.
Therefore, no definitive explanation is advanced for the difference between the two annual payments.
The report establishes the amounts and the existence of a mechanism.
It does not establish every factor determining them.
18. The missing documentsA complete independent reconstruction would require the original R-share issuance documentation and the company’s governing constitutional provisions.
It would also require the relevant dividend declarations, payment schedules and accounts identifying the amounts due and paid in each financial year.
For the period after 2022, the central missing document is the full compensation agreement dated 24 March 2023.
Its supporting schedules would be particularly important.
They should identify the treatment of historical unpaid dividends, any continuing annual obligations and the basis upon which the compensation was calculated.
The Accounts Chamber audit provides a strong documentary starting point.
But it is not a substitute for the underlying contract and payment schedules.
Those records would be necessary to determine whether every relevant R-share obligation was settled and whether any amounts remained outstanding.
DOCUMENTARY FINDINGSThe investigation establishes that the R-share was a special preference share carrying dividend rights. Sakhalin Energy’s original corporate reports explicitly describe the instrument.
The Russian Federation held the special share from 2007, according to contemporary reporting based upon Accounts Chamber material.
The operator reported substantial dividends during Shell’s involvement. Its original records identify $1.6 billion in dividends in 2015, $177 million explicitly paid on the R-share in 2018 and $707 million in R-share dividends in 2019.
The R-share was distinct from royalties, profits tax and profit production. The original corporate reports treated these as separate financial categories.
Russia received approximately 45.6 billion roubles in May 2019, according to RBC’s contemporary reporting of Accounts Chamber material.
Shell lost significant influence over Sakhalin Energy from 1 April 2022, according to its authenticated SEC filings.
Russia subsequently established a replacement operating company. The restructuring changed the corporate framework through which the project was managed.
A compensation agreement was concluded on 24 March 2023. The Russian Accounts Chamber’s original audit identifies the agreement.
The audit states that the payment included historical unpaid R-share dividends. The relevant unpaid amounts were associated with the branch of the former Sakhalin Energy Investment Company.
The replacement operator’s compensation payment amounted to approximately 118.6 billion roubles in 2023 and 49.3 billion roubles in 2024. These figures are recorded in the original governmental audit.
The decline was approximately 69.3 billion roubles. The audit identified the reduction as a principal reason for the fall in the Ministry of Energy’s administered federal revenues.
The audit does not identify the portion of each annual compensation payment attributable specifically to R-share dividends. It would therefore be incorrect to describe the entire amounts as unpaid dividends.
Shell’s separate equity-compensation dispute must not be confused with the R-share payment mechanism. The former concerns money associated with Shell’s investment and contested legal claims; the latter concerns payments by the replacement operator under a different agreement.
No court finding establishing fraud or a breach of R-share dividend obligations has been authenticated for this investigation.
The original March 2023 compensation agreement has not been independently examined in full. Consequently, the complete calculation and legal treatment of the historical R-share entitlement remain unresolved.
CONCLUSION: A SPECIAL SHARE WITH AN UNFINISHED FINANCIAL HISTORYThe R-share is a revealing feature of Sakhalin II’s financial history.
It was not widely discussed in the international headlines surrounding the project.
Those headlines generally concentrated on Shell’s original control, the enormous cost escalation, the confrontation with Russian regulators and Gazprom’s eventual acquisition of majority ownership.
But the original corporate reports demonstrate that the R-share was financially significant.
The Russian state received substantial dividends from the special preference share.
Those payments were separate from royalties, profit production and ordinary taxation.
They formed part of the wider financial benefits associated with the project.
The historical record becomes particularly interesting after Shell’s withdrawal.
Russia established a replacement operator in 2022.
A new compensation agreement followed in March 2023.
The Russian Accounts Chamber subsequently confirmed that the replacement operator’s compensation payment incorporated historical unpaid dividends associated with the R-share.
The original audit also provides the relevant annual amounts.
The payments were substantial.
Approximately 118.6 billion roubles in 2023.
Approximately 49.3 billion roubles in 2024.
That is a significant documentary finding.
But those amounts must not be misrepresented.
They were total compensation payments under the relevant agreement.
The audit does not establish that every rouble represented historical R-share dividends.
Nor does it disclose the precise formula used to calculate the amounts payable.
The evidence therefore supports a carefully limited conclusion.
A special shareholder entitlement created during the earlier Sakhalin Energy arrangements remained relevant to Russian federal revenues after the original operating company was replaced. The replacement operator made substantial compensation payments under a 2023 agreement that included unpaid historical R-share dividends.
That is what the original documents establish.
They do not establish wrongdoing by Shell.
They do not establish that every outstanding dividend was improperly withheld.
And they do not establish that the compensation arrangement was fraudulent or unlawful.
The remaining questions concern the underlying contracts, dividend declarations and payment calculations.
Those are proper subjects for further documentary investigation.
For the Donovan–Shell Archive, the significance lies in the continuity of the financial record.
The Sakhalin II project changed ownership.
Its operating structure changed.
Its international commercial relationships changed.
But certain historical financial entitlements continued to have consequences.
The R-share demonstrates how an apparently small element of a company’s capital structure could generate substantial payments over many years.
It also illustrates the importance of identifying exactly what a government receives, under which legal arrangement, and for which financial period.
The special share was real. The historical dividends were substantial. The later compensation payments are documented. But the complete financial reconciliation between the original R-share and the replacement operator’s obligations remains unfinished.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES1. Russian Accounts Chamber — Audit approved 30 April 2025. Original governmental report examining the Ministry of Energy’s 2024 budget execution. Pages 4–5 contain the compensation-payment figures for 2023 and 2024, the reference to the March 2023 agreement and the statement concerning unpaid R-share dividends. Original audit (PDF).
2. Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2015. Original Shell-era corporate report identifying the R-share and reporting approximately $1.6 billion in dividends during 2015. Original report, Russian-language PDF.
3. Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2018. Original report explicitly recording $177 million in R-share dividends. Original report (PDF).
4. Sakhalin Energy — Sustainable Development Report 2019. Original report identifying the special preference share and recording $707 million in R-share dividends, together with other financial benefits to the Russian side. Original report (PDF).
5. RBC — 19 August 2019. Contemporaneous investigation based upon Russian Accounts Chamber material concerning the large dividend paid on the special share. Read RBC’s original report.
6. Shell plc — SEC financial report for 2022. Authenticated corporate disclosure concerning Shell’s loss of significant influence, the impairment of its Sakhalin II investment and the restructuring of the project. Read the SEC filing.
7. Interfax — 8 August 2025. Contemporaneous reporting of the Accounts Chamber’s findings concerning production-sharing revenues and the replacement operator’s compensation payment. Read the Interfax report.
8. Shell plc — Annual Report and Accounts 2025, filed 12 March 2026. Authenticated SEC disclosure describing the separate Russian court proceedings, the contested gas claim and the approximately 94 billion roubles associated with Shell’s former Sakhalin interest. Read Shell’s SEC filing.
9. X-Compliance — 8 July 2026. Procedural reporting concerning the Moscow court proceedings and the next scheduled hearing. Read the procedural report.
10. Donovan–Shell Archive — 16 November 2026. SLF-2007-120, examining Sakhalin Energy’s $100 billion lifetime revenue projection and the subsequent record of Russian-side receipts. Read the preceding instalment.
DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMERThis investigation examines the historical R-share dividend arrangement associated with Sakhalin Energy and its possible relationship with the replacement operator’s subsequent compensation payments.
The original 2015, 2018 and 2019 Sustainability Reports are identified as corporate publications issued while Shell remained a substantial shareholder.
The figures in those reports are attributed to Sakhalin Energy.
The original share-issuance documentation and complete constitutional provisions governing the R-share have not been independently examined.
Contemporaneous reporting concerning the share’s creation, nominal consideration and historical payment arrangements is attributed to the publications concerned.
The Russian Accounts Chamber document approved on 30 April 2025 is an original governmental audit report.
Its findings are treated as official Russian budget-audit evidence, not as a judicial determination of the parties’ underlying contractual rights.
The compensation figures for 2023 and 2024 are identified as amounts paid under the relevant Sakhalin II compensation agreement.
They are not described as exclusively R-share dividends.
The audit states that the payments included historical unpaid R-share dividends.
It does not disclose the exact R-share component of each payment.
The full agreement dated 24 March 2023 and its supporting payment schedules have not been independently obtained or authenticated.
No definitive conclusion is reached concerning the calculation of individual dividend arrears, their original due dates or the complete legal treatment of the historical R-share rights following the 2022 restructuring.
Shell’s former equity-compensation arrangements are distinguished from the replacement operator’s compensation payments.
The separate Russian court proceedings are described by reference to Shell’s authenticated SEC filings and contemporary procedural reporting.
The Russian prosecutor’s allegations remain allegations.
No finding is made that Shell unlawfully abandoned Sakhalin Energy, owes the disputed gas payments or is responsible for improper non-payment of R-share dividends.
No final judgment determining the specific R-share issues has been authenticated for this investigation.
Editorial observations about the continuity of the financial arrangements and the need for fuller disclosure are distinguished from established documentary facts.
Shell plc, former Sakhalin Energy personnel, Gazprom, the replacement operator, the Russian Ministry of Energy, Rosimushchestvo and other interested parties are invited to provide relevant original documents, factual corrections and responses for fair consideration.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-122 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CXII The Missing Cost-Recovery Ledger — Who Approved Sakhalin II’s Expenditure, and What Did Russia’s Auditors Actually Challenge?In March 2012, Sakhalin Energy announced that it had recovered approximately $24.5 billion in development and operating expenditure.
That milestone triggered the commencement of profit-production sharing with the Russian side.
But the original production-sharing arrangements also gave Russia rights concerning the approval and auditing of project expenditure.
Those provisions became central to the confrontation surrounding Shell’s escalating construction costs.
In July 2005, Shell acknowledged that projected development costs had roughly doubled.
In 2006, Russia’s Accounts Chamber challenged aspects of the project’s financial arrangements.
The dispute contributed to the wider confrontation preceding Gazprom’s acquisition of majority control in April 2007.
A decade later, substantial public revenues were being reported.
The earlier cost-recovery process had apparently achieved the threshold required under the operator’s interpretation of the arrangements.
Yet important documentary questions remain.
Which expenditure categories were approved?
What records supported the recoverable-cost calculations?
Which costs were challenged by Russian auditors?
Were any disputed amounts subsequently excluded, adjusted or accepted?
And how did the cost-recovery process affect the timing of revenues received by Sakhalin Oblast?
The next investigation will examine the available original corporate disclosures, contemporaneous Accounts Chamber reporting and production-sharing documentation.
It will distinguish criticism of expenditure from an established accounting adjustment.
It will also separate project-cost forecasts from actual expenditure and the recoverable amounts determined under the production-sharing arrangements.
No allegation of fraudulent cost recovery will be advanced without supporting evidence.
The central documentary question will be:
When Sakhalin Energy announced that $24.5 billion in project costs had been recovered, what evidence established that amount — and how much of the underlying calculation can now be independently verified?
The investigation will follow the original financial records, identify unresolved audit questions and examine the significance of those costs for the public revenues eventually received by Russia and Sakhalin Oblast.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 17 NOVEMBER 2026 was first posted on November 17, 2026 at 8:15 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
The victory of student populism
The victory of the Student List in Serbia’s parliamentary elections on October 25, 2026 marks the end of fourteen years of domination by Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party. With approximately 53 percent of the vote and a projected absolute majority in parliament, the Student List achieved a result that until recently had seemed almost unimaginable. The nature of this victory, and Serbia’s political future, are difficult to understand through the conventional categories of government versus opposition, liberalism versus conservatism, or European integration versus national sovereignty.
At the center of Serbia’s political transformation was a mass student movement, while behind it lay a conflict between two elites: the political elite built by Vučić’s regime over the previous decade and a half, and an academic elite that had remained relatively independent of his system of rule. The decisive factor was the latter’s ability to forge an alliance with the student movement, which had developed a distinctive form of participatory populism. This alliance made possible the political mobilisation that brought about the change of government.
This populist movement did not emerge around demands for a radical transformation of Serbia’s economic or foreign policy. In many areas, it reproduced the existing political consensus, promising that similar policies could be pursued without corruption, organized crime, nepotism, and party based employment. The greatest challenge facing the new government will be to dismantle the previous regime’s clientelist mechanisms while demonstrating whether its relatively popular economic model can be maintained without relying on the same mechanisms of capital accumulation and political control.
A one-party system within a multiparty democracyOne of the most important features of Vučić’s political domination was the systematic weakening of the multiparty system, even as the formal institutions of parliamentary democracy remained in place. The Serbian Progressive Party sought to incorporate almost every political actor with significant electoral support. Political organizations and their leaders were offered positions within the governing coalition, often through guaranteed places on joint electoral lists, while those who refused to cooperate faced various forms of pressure, marginalisation, and political destruction.
The result was an attempt to establish a kind of one-party system within a formally multiparty democracy. Almost every significant ideological position could be found within the governing coalition, from nationalist and conservative to liberal, pro-European, and socially oriented currents. Ideological conflicts were largely transferred from electoral competition to the internal relations of the governing bloc. Elections increasingly became referendums on the exercise of power and attitudes towards Vučić’s regime rather than contests between alternative political programs. Opposition parties that remained outside this system failed to build a sufficiently broad social base or establish a different political agenda.
Vučić developed an exceptionally extensive party and electoral machine…Membership in the ruling party, or a willingness to secure votes for it, became an important prerequisite for employment, career advancement, and access to public resources. Gradually, this system extended beyond its electoral function and became a fundamental mechanism for organizing social and economic relations.At the same time, Vučić developed an exceptionally extensive party and electoral machine. Its operation depended on political loyalty, control over public-sector employment, the collection of so-called capillary votes, and various forms of pressure on voters. Membership in the ruling party, or a willingness to secure votes for it, became an important prerequisite for employment, career advancement, and access to public resources. Gradually, this system extended beyond its electoral function and became a fundamental mechanism for organizing social and economic relations.
For a teacher who had spent years on temporary contracts, a healthcare worker waiting for permanent employment, or an employee of a public enterprise, party affiliation could directly determine their professional future. Similar mechanisms spread into the private sector through networks of business connections, public procurement, and privileged access to state resources. Alongside the major financial scandals reported in the media, corruption became an everyday experience for a large part of the population. Almost anyone seeking employment, career advancement, or access to a particular entitlement could encounter the consequences of party clientelism.
Alongside systemic nepotism, the regime was marred by serious scandals that raised questions about links between state structures and organized crime. These included the Jovanjica case, involving the discovery of a large marijuana plantation allegedly protected by members of the security services, and a murder in a Belgrade restaurant, whose alleged cover- up implicated the then-head of the Belgrade police. The problem for Vučić was that, once established, the network of loyalty required the continuous protection of its members. Sanctioning individuals for criminal activity or corruption could threaten the stability of the entire system, which rested on the expectation that political loyalty would be rewarded and protected. The electoral machine thus gradually became a burden on the regime itself. The mechanisms that enabled it to remain in power simultaneously generated increasingly widespread social discontent.
The problem for Vučić was that, once established, the network of loyalty required the continuous protection of its members. Sanctioning individuals for criminal activity or corruption could threaten the stability of the entire system…The electoral machine thus gradually became a burden on the regime itself. The academic elite Vučić failed to incorporateUnlike the political and business elites, which he successfully connected through a system of mutual interests, Vučić never managed to fully incorporate Serbia’s academic elite. By academic elite, I mean a broader stratum of highly educated professionals, professional managers, economists, lawyers, intellectuals, university professors, researchers, and people working in non-governmental organisations. Their social authority rests primarily on education, professional qualifications, and experience rather than control over the party apparatus.
Throughout his rule, Vučić attempted to win over sections of this elite. Ana Brnabić’s appointment to senior government positions and the rise of Siniša Mali were important elements of this effort. Through figures such as these, individuals from business, academia, and the NGO sector were brought into the state administration and political leadership to provide the regime with professional legitimacy and an image of modernisation.
This alliance remained relatively limited and unstable. Universities, led by the University of Belgrade, never became firm strongholds of the ruling party. University teachers and researchers had long expressed dissatisfaction with the regime, although this dissatisfaction was not necessarily associated with a shared opposition ideology. Shortly before the outbreak of the student protests, the conflict intensified following announcements that foreign private universities might be granted access to public funds intended for higher education. Such a model, resembling certain systems of education vouchers, raised the possibility of diverting budgetary resources from public universities to private institutions. The academic community regarded this as a threat of further subordinating education to business interests connected with political power. The conflict between universities and the regime therefore also concerned the academic community’s immediate material interests.
When the canopy of the reconstructed railway station in Novi Sad collapsed in November 2024, killing sixteen people, this existing conflict acquired an entirely new dimension. The tragedy was widely perceived as emblematic of a system in which political loyalty, opaque management, and corrupt relationships displaced expertise and professional responsibility. Regardless of the specific technical causes of the collapse, the question arose of how a major infrastructure project, presented as a symbol of the country’s modernisation, could have been completed without adequate safety oversight.
The student rebellion that followed received broad support from university teachers. This alliance also had a very immediate foundation: students and professors already knew one another, encountered each other daily at their faculties, and shared the same institutional space. For students, the academic elite included their own professors, with whom they could communicate and cooperate directly. Despite occasional conflicts over the blockades, universities, particularly the University of Belgrade, became crucial pillars of the movement, providing institutional, moral, and practical support.
The regime responded to the rebellion by relying even more heavily on party cadres. The formation of Đuro Macut’s government, following the political crisis caused by the protests, did not bring about any meaningful reconciliation with the academic community. Figures who had failed to demonstrate sufficient party loyalty were further pushed out of government, reinforcing a system in which real political power rested within the informal party hierarchy, while ministers and other formal officeholders enjoyed limited autonomy.
Student plenums and the emergence of a populist movementThe student movement that emerged from the university blockades developed a distinctive organizational model based on direct democracy. Plenums were established at faculties, where students made decisions about demands, protests, and other activities. Participation in these plenums varied considerably, and informal hierarchies emerged over time. Working groups responsible for preparing proposals often acquired substantial autonomy, while plenums ratified decisions shaped by a relatively small number of active participants. As the movement continued, the number of students directly involved in everyday decision-making gradually declined.
Although the organizational model of the plenums had affinities with anarchist and horizontal traditions, their political content was not revolutionary…The radicalism of the student movement lay primarily in its methods of organization and its challenge to the existing government, rather than in its ideological program.Nevertheless, the plenums retained their role as the primary source of the student movement’s legitimacy. Their importance also lay in their ability to generate broad social mobilisation. Student marches between cities, multi-day walks, cycling tours, mass demonstrations, and complex logistical operations involved large numbers of young people. Many did not necessarily participate in formulating political demands, but through organizing these activities they became active members of the movement. The student movement enabled them to become part of a broader political community through collective action, without requiring them to adopt a particular political ideology beforehand.
Students carefully avoided ideological and political positions that might undermine broad social support, seeking to present themselves as a movement representing the interests of society as a whole. Although the organizational model of the plenums had affinities with anarchist and horizontal traditions, their political content was not revolutionary. Broad participation encouraged the reproduction of prevailing social attitudes, since only demands acceptable to large numbers Of participants could gain support. The radicalism of the student movement lay primarily in its methods of organization and its challenge to the existing government, rather than in its ideological program.
The alliance of populism and expertiseThe most unusual feature of the student movement was its alliance with the academic elite. In many contemporary Western societies, populist movements develop in opposition to educated elites, experts, and professional managers. Academic institutions are often portrayed as part of an alienated establishment, removed from the everyday concerns of ordinary people. In Serbia, a mass populist movement embraced the academic elite as a natural political ally. Education, expertise, professional qualifications, and cultural capital became central elements of its political identity.
This was clearly reflected in how students were presented in public. They were described as educated, decent, responsible, and capable young people: future doctors, engineers, professors, and specialists. Particular emphasis was placed on the message that they wanted to remain in Serbia and build their professional futures in their own country. This narrative corresponded directly to the experience of dissatisfaction with Vučić’s regime. In a society where employment and advancement depend on party connections, the natural alternative appears to be one in which knowledge, qualifications, and professional competence are valued.
The struggle against corruption and nepotism thus became the link between the academic elite and the populist base. This alliance also involved a certain fetishisation of expertise: the expectation that people with appropriate education and professional qualifications, free from connections to the compromised political class, would be better equipped to govern the country. Such a belief overlooks the fact that expertise in a particular field does not automatically translate into political competence, and that professional elites have their own social interests, which do not always coincide with those of the majority of the population. Nevertheless, the combination of populist mobilisation and the authority of expertise enabled the student movement to move beyond the universities and become a serious political alternative. This was also reflected in the composition of the Student List. Its candidates included university professors, economists, lawyers, specialists from various fields, and a significant number of people from non-governmental organizations.
Why the student movement did not develop a new ideologyWhen the student movement decided to stop directing demands at the existing government and instead call for parliamentary elections, it took a step that might initially have appeared to abandon its original logic of direct democracy. Yet this decision was consistent with the movement’s populist character. Although based on principles of direct democracy, the student plenums reproduced another dominant social belief: that parliamentary elections are the principal mechanism of political change.
At the same time, they maintained their distance from existing political parties. This was often explained by the organizational characteristics of the student movement. Since the plenums had no permanent representatives authorised to negotiate on behalf of the movement as a whole, cooperation with political parties was institutionally complicated. There was also a deeper ideological reason. The student movement could not easily negotiate a common program with parties holding clearly defined political positions. Cooperation with liberals, conservatives, nationalists, or social democrats would have required the movement to take positions on questions over which its own base was divided. Its political strength depended on its ability to avoid opening up these divisions.
The Student List represented what was widely perceived in society as political normality. Its fundamental demand was for a state free from corruption, institutions that function properly, and expertise to take precedence over party affiliation. The election campaign was therefore largely free of traditional ideological conflicts. Vučić attempted to portray the Student List as a political force that would change his economic and foreign policies, jeopardise relations with Russia, or call existing social benefits into question. The Student List generally responded that such changes were not its objective and that it would implement existing policies more effectively and responsibly. There was considerably more programmatic continuity between the two largest electoral lists than the intensity of their political confrontation might suggest.
The Student List represented what was widely perceived in society as political normality. Its fundamental demand was for a state free from corruption, institutions that function properly, and expertise to take precedence over party affiliation…There was considerably more programmatic continuity between the two largest electoral lists than the intensity of their political confrontation might suggest.Even when the Student List expressed opposition to the low-wage labor policy promoted by Vučić’s regime during its early years, the difference was not entirely clear. Over the preceding decade, the regime itself had attempted to move away from the image of a country attracting foreign investors exclusively through low wages, instead promoting technological development, investment in science, and more sophisticated industrial investment. There is a substantial difference between political rhetoric and actual economic outcomes, but the conflict largely concerned who was capable of realising the desired economic model.
A similar logic applied to foreign policy. Vučić’s government sought to maintain relations with the European Union, Russia, and China while avoiding complete alignment with any single international bloc. This policy enjoyed relatively broad support in society, giving the Student List little reason to challenge it radically. The central electoral choice was much simpler: the continuation of a system based on party loyalty or its replacement by one promising professional governance.
A referendum-like victory and the defeat of the political classThe election results confirmed the strength of this political mobilisation. According to preliminary data from the Republic Electoral Commission, the Student List won 52.65 percent of the vote, while the list led by Aleksandar Vučić received 39.22 percent. Turnout was approximately 69 percent, and seat projections indicated that the Student List could form a parliamentary majority on its own. Vučić’s electoral machine managed to retain a substantial part of its voter base, but could not match the exceptionally broad mobilisation of voters seeking political change.
The student movement succeeded in giving the election the character of a referendum. Voting was presented as a decision on whether the existing system of government should survive, and this atmosphere effectively eliminated the space for traditional opposition parties. Most withdrew from the electoral race, while those that remained achieved negligible results. No non-minority list other than the two dominant ones crossed the electoral threshold. The student movement thus defeated Vučić and effectively replaced the previous opposition.
This may be the most important political consequence of the election. Serbia has not acquired a new governing party representing a clearly defined ideological alternative to the previous government. A movement whose legitimacy rests on the combination of mass mobilisation, rejection of corruption, and trust in expertise has secured a parliamentary majority.
Real estate development: the drug fueling Vučić’s economic modelVučić’s regime survived thanks to its electoral machine and clientelist relationships, but its political stability also depended on its ability to deliver economic growth, relative stability in living standards, and increased purchasing power. The previous government’s economic policy was more complex than it is often portrayed in opposition circles.
Over the preceding decade, Serbia benefited from certain advantages arising from its foreign policy position. Maintaining relations with Russia provided access to relatively affordable energy, while cooperation with China brought significant investment, particularly in industry, mining, and infrastructure. In this respect, Serbia’s economic model shared certain similarities with the policies pursued by Hungary and Slovakia. At the same time, maintaining a stable Serbian currency exchange rate against the euro was an important instrument for preserving purchasing power. For a population whose consumption depends substantially on imported goods, and for citizens with loans or other obligations denominated in euros, exchange-rate stability had immediate economic significance. The regime also sought to secure increases in pensions, public-sector wages, and various forms of social benefits. Regardless of the actual scope and distributional effects of these measures, they contributed to maintaining social support for the existing economic model.
Real estate development became one of its most important pillars. Major infrastructure projects, the development of residential and commercial complexes, the Belgrade Waterfront project, preparations for EXPO, and related urban developments sustained construction activity, created jobs, and contributed to GDP growth. The problem was the economy’s excessive reliance on large, often luxury construction projects, whose contribution to economic activity largely ended when construction was completed. Moreover, a substantial share of the work was carried out by foreign companies that brought in their own workers and departed after completing the projects, leaving limited long-term benefits for the domestic economy.
In Serbia, real estate development also had a distinctly political function. Major construction and infrastructure projects were among the key mechanisms linking political and business elites. Control over land, urban planning decisions, public procurement, and investment projects created opportunities for private capital accumulation. Real estate development thus became one of the mechanisms through which individuals connected to political power could themselves become capitalists. This model generated a powerful interdependence between political authority, investors, and the construction sector. Political control provided access to profitable projects, while those projects contributed to the economic growth on which the government based part of its legitimacy.
Real estate development thus became one of the mechanisms through which individuals connected to political power could themselves become capitalists. This model generated a powerful interdependence between political authority, investors, and the construction sector.In this sense, real estate development became a kind of drug for Vučić’s regime. It made it possible to satisfy two important demands simultaneously: continued enrichment of the politically connected business elite and the maintenance of sufficiently high levels of economic activity for living standards to rise. Every new major project prolonged the operation of this model while increasing dependence on its continued expansion.
The future of major urban development projects therefore became politically significant. The Student List’s opposition to plans for the commercial redevelopment of the General Staff complex in Belgrade, linked to the investment interests of the family of U.S. President Donald Trump, was one visible expression of the rejection of the previous approach to managing urban space and public resources. The new government will consequently face a serious problem: if it intends to dismantle the corrupt mechanisms of the previous regime, it will also have to change the way one of the economy’s important engines of growth operates.
The economic constraints facing the new governmentThe Student List presented an ambitious reform program, particularly in education, science, culture, healthcare, and social protection. This program reflects its social composition and the significant role of the academic and professional elite in shaping it. Fulfilling these promises will require substantial public resources.
One assumption underlying the new government’s optimism is that combating corruption will free up sufficient resources to finance the promised reforms. More transparent public procurement, more rational investment, and reduced misuse of public funds could certainly produce substantial savings. The question remains, however, whether they will be sufficient. Even with a significant reduction in corruption, Serbia would continue to face low productivity, limited public revenues, dependence on foreign investment, and structural weaknesses in its domestic economy.
The potential redirection of economic development presents a particularly complex challenge. If the new government sought to reduce dependence on real estate development and place greater emphasis on export-oriented production, it would encounter constraints arising from the existing monetary and economic model. Strengthening the competitiveness of domestic agriculture and certain industrial sectors, for example, could raise questions about the real value of the dinar. Depreciation of the domestic currency might improve the price competitiveness of exports, but it would also make imported goods more expensive and undermine purchasing power. Such a move would not automatically solve problems in production and could have serious social consequences. Preserving purchasing power was one of the Student List’s important promises. Its populist base does not expect an economic policy that asks citizens to accept declining living standards in the name of long-term development goals.
Similar constraints apply to the emigration of young and educated people. Over the previous two years, the student movement strongly emphasised that young people wanted to remain in Serbia and build their futures there. Yet the emigration of educated workers is not exclusively a consequence of corruption or authoritarian government. Croatia’s experience demonstrates that even EU member states can face large-scale labor emigration, while freedom of movement within the European labor market can make migration to wealthier countries easier.
The new government will therefore face a range of problems for which there are no simple technical solutions. Its response to the question of future economic development centers primarily on increasing productivity, one of the most difficult tasks of economic policy, requiring long-term structural change rather than merely replacing political personnel.
Will the populist base control the new elite?The most important question following the electoral victory concerns the relationship the new government will establish with the movement that brought it to power. Over the previous two years, student plenums had been the primary source of the movement’s legitimacy. They decided on political demands, forms of mobilisation, and ultimately the move into parliamentary politics. The process of compiling the Student List further demonstrated the movement’s insistence on controlling its representatives. Candidates underwent lengthy procedures to scrutinise their biographies and professional integrity, with the aim of preventing the nomination of individuals whose past could compromise the entire movement. This approach reflected the fundamental political message that power should be entrusted to competent and uncompromised individuals.
The entry of approximately 140 Student List representatives into parliament creates an entirely new situation. MPs will now possess formal political legitimacy, access to state institutions, and the ability to participate directly in decision-making. They will no longer be merely delegates of a protest movement, but holders of parliamentary mandates. The question is whether the new government will continue to recognise the authority of student plenums and other participatory forms of organization. The plenums themselves have already weakened considerably: their activity is declining, and fewer students are participating. If they manage to preserve their organizational structures and connections with elected representatives, they could function as a mechanism of social control over the new government, limiting the autonomy of professional administrators and their ability to pursue policies contrary to the expectations of the movement’s electoral base.
There is also the possibility that the connection with the student movement will gradually be severed. In that case, the academic elite, which already occupies a prominent position within the Student List, could become the dominant political force in the new government. Its representatives might begin to behave like professional political and managerial elites in Western societies, justifying unpopular measures through appeals to economic necessity, fiscal responsibility, or market demands.
The Student List’s MPs hold a range of political convictions. Some are closer to liberal and pro- European positions, others to conservative or nationalist ones, while some candidates are associated with socially oriented policies. As long as the main objective was to remove Vučić’s regime, these differences did not have to become politically decisive. Once the new government faces concrete questions of taxation, privatisation, public spending, labor legislation, and international relations, ideological conflicts may become unavoidable. It is easy to imagine liberal, conservative, nationalist, or left-wing groupings gradually emerging within the parliamentary majority. Such a development would mark the end of the distinctive populist unity that made electoral victory possible and could open the way to neoliberal reforms, austerity policies, or other measures that directly threaten the living standards of sections of the population.
The Student List’s MPs hold a range of political convictions…It is easy to imagine liberal, conservative, nationalist, or left-wing groupings gradually emerging within the parliamentary majority. Such a development would mark the end of the distinctive populist unity that made electoral victory possible and could open the way to neoliberal reforms, austerity policies, or other measures that directly threaten the living standards of sections of the population. Between political normalisation and a new democracyThe Student List’s victory demonstrated that even an exceptionally sophisticated party machine can be defeated through broad social mobilisation. The student movement united a large part of the population around demands to end corruption, nepotism, and party control over institutions. Its fundamental promise was one of political normalisation.
The immediate consequences of this victory are already visible. From the perspective of Radnički glas (Workers’ Voice), an organization of which I am a member and which works with trade unions in education, research, culture, and other sectors, the change in political relations was felt practically overnight. Just one day after the election, we are already observing changes in the behavior of certain directors and managers, while questions are emerging about the future of numerous proceedings initiated against employees who opposed the government. A military trade union that announced several months ago that it was ceasing its activities because of political pressure has now issued a new statement, suggesting that it may resume its work.
Party nepotism was an everyday experience for large numbers of employees. For many people, the Student List’s victory therefore brings a sense of liberation from immediate pressure. The possibility of speaking more freely at work, refusing a political instruction, or planning a professional future without dependence on party loyalty represents a tangible change. This helps explain the mass celebrations following the election.
The victory has also opened up the possibility of transforming political representation itself. Here we encounter perhaps the most interesting, and seemingly paradoxical, similarity between the Student List and Vučić’s regime. Both, in different ways, displaced the traditional multiparty system based on competition between ideologically defined parties. Vučić incorporated different political options into his governing coalition, subordinating them to the party apparatus and its hierarchy. The Student List brought together ideologically diverse representatives around a common political objective, but built their legitimacy through mass participation rather than a traditional party organization.
The absence of clearly defined party programs need not be a weakness of the new political order. Competition between political parties, in which citizens periodically choose between pre- formulated programs, is not the only possible form of democratic representation. The student movement demonstrated that enormous numbers of people who had never belonged to political parties or previously engaged in political activism could be mobilised. Their participation extended beyond protests to organizing the election campaign, protecting polling stations, and directly monitoring the electoral process. People who had previously been merely voters became active participants in political life.
The question is whether this form of participation can be sustained after the electoral victory. Student plenums have already weakened, but the social energy released by the movement need not remain tied exclusively to them. It is particularly significant that many Student List candidates are professionally established individuals with no previous political ambitions. Their willingness to accept parliamentary mandates does not necessarily imply a desire to become professional politicians. Understanding political office as a temporary social responsibility could help establish a different relationship between representatives and those they represent.
Trade unions could play an important role in this process. Unlike student plenums, whose activity is linked to the changing composition of the student population, trade unions have more durable organizational structures, direct connections with employees, and concrete demands arising from everyday employment relations. In the political space opening up after the fall of the previous regime, they could establish themselves as one of the organized voices from below. This would also entail a different relationship with parliamentary power. Trade unions would not have to confine themselves to traditional social dialogue, appeals to ministries, and occasional negotiations with government officials. They could establish lasting connections with Student List MPs, following the example of the cooperation they developed with student plenums during the protests, and use these relationships to articulate workers’ demands and exert pressure on the government. Implementing the promises made in the student program, including the expansion of labor rights, could provide a common framework for such action, while unions preserve their independence and their role as the organized voice of workers.
Such a relationship could offer a way beyond the limitations of representative parliamentary democracy. Organized social groups could participate directly in shaping political decisions and overseeing their implementation. Parliament could then become a place where the demands of the social base are articulated, rather than an institution in which professional politicians make decisions independently between electoral cycles.
The most important possibility opened up by the Student List’s victory lies in the opportunity to free political representation from its exclusive dependence on party competition and to build a more lasting connection between elected representatives and an active, organized society. The student movement has already demonstrated that mass political participation can exist outside traditional political parties. Its next challenge will be to show whether that participation can endure when representatives of the movement constitute the governing parliamentary majority.
Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the Tempest Collective. For more information, see “About Tempest Collective.”
Featured Image credit: Emilija Knezevic; modified by Tempest.
The post The victory of student populism appeared first on Tempest.
Webinar Recap: Getting Ready for the 2027 Nebraska Legislative Session
Oregon’s plan for an affordable, reliable energy future turns one. Now it’s time to deliver.
Data center slowdown would raise risks for utility investments
An estimated 191 GW of planned data center capacity faces new risk after the midterm elections, with exposure concentrated in Texas, Ohio and Georgia, according to a report from energy analytics firm Orennia.
Chemical Recycling and Plastic Pyrolysis: A False Climate Solution
Chemical “recycling” — often marketed as “advanced recycling” — uses high heat or chemicals to break plastic down into oils, gases or basic chemicals. Most of the industry relies on pyrolysis and gasification, technologies that GAIA members have documented working much like incinerators: they emit toxic pollution and greenhouse gases, they have repeatedly failed at commercial scale, and when their output is used as fuel, the plastic ends up burned anyway.
Plastic is a fossil fuel product, so this is a climate issue as much as an environmental health issue. As COP31 in Antalya puts the circular economy on the climate agenda, fuels and products made from waste are being promoted as climate solutions. At the same time, governments are trying to restart talks on a global plastics treaty after negotiations stalled in December 2024 and again in August 2025. Here’s what chemical recycling is, how it works, and why it’s a false solution for both plastic and the climate.
What is chemical recycling?Chemical recycling is an umbrella term for processes that break plastic polymers into smaller molecules, instead of melting and remolding the plastic the way mechanical recycling does. The main types are:
- Pyrolysis: heating plastic without oxygen to produce oil, gas and solid char. Plastic pyrolysis is the most common “advanced recycling” technology.
- Gasification: heating waste with a limited amount of oxygen to produce a synthetic gas (syngas), usually burned for energy.
- Plasma arc: using extremely high-temperature plasma to break waste down into gas and slag.
- Solvent-based and depolymerization processes: using chemicals to dissolve or break down specific types of plastic.
Despite the recycling label, pyrolysis, gasification and plasma arc are thermal treatment technologies. GAIA’s position is clear: incineration — including gasification, pyrolysis, and plasma arc — turns one form of pollution into another.
Chemical recycling vs. mechanical recyclingMechanical recycling keeps plastic as plastic: it’s sorted, cleaned, shredded and melted into new products. Chemical recycling breaks plastic down into raw materials through an energy-intensive process, where much of the material is lost, and what comes out is fuel rather than new plastic. The industry’s environmental claims also rest on shaky ground. A joint review of the most commonly cited life cycle assessments, Understanding the Environmental Impacts of Chemical Recycling, found major flaws in their scientific rigor, data quality, calculation methods and interpretation of results.
If plastic is turned into fuel and then burned, it hasn’t been recycled. It is merely an expensive, complicated way to burn fossil fuels.
What happens near a pyrolysis plantThe clearest evidence comes from the communities living next to these facilities. Through GAIA’s Clearing the Air project, residents used portable air quality monitors to measure pollution around three facilities sold as recycling or waste-to-energy: a pyrolysis-gasification plant, a tire pyrolysis facility and a gasification plant.
- Dumaguete City, Philippines: around the city’s pyrolysis-gasification plant, PM2.5 levels were unhealthy for part of the population on 24 of 27 days (88%) and reached up to 7 times the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline. Researchers estimated that shutting the plant could prevent up to 179 premature deaths a year. The plant was shut down in 2025.
- Ogijo, Nigeria: near a tire pyrolysis facility, daily average PM2.5 reached up to 5 times the WHO guideline and exceeded it on every monitoring day. The facility was later shut down, but has since quietly resumed operations.
- Surabaya, Indonesia: around the Benowo gasification plant, PM2.5 exceeded the WHO guideline on all 31 monitoring days, reaching roughly 8 times the guideline.
In Dumaguete, community science led directly to victory: waste workers, residents, students and teachers used the data to push for closure. It’s one of GAIA’s 20 inspiring stories of victory against incinerators. Burning plastic releases heavy metals, persistent organic pollutants and other toxics into the air and ash — read more about the toxic gases released by burning plastic.
Is plastic-to-fuel recycling?No. Plastic is made from fossil fuels, so when pyrolysis oil or syngas made from plastic is burned, it releases climate pollution just like any other fossil fuel. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, burning plastics is the worst end-of-life option for plastic from a climate perspective. Gasification, pyrolysis and plasma incinerators are also less efficient at generating electricity than mass-burn incinerators, and often need coal or other fossil fuels added to produce energy.
That’s why plastic incineration is a hidden climate polluter, and why burning plastic won’t solve the plastic crisis — whatever the technology is called.
Why the “recycling” label matters for policyHow a technology is labeled decides who pays for it. When pyrolysis and gasification are counted as recycling, they can qualify for recycling targets, subsidies and green finance meant for real solutions. Development finance is already flowing that way: GAIA Asia Pacific’s Citizens’ Atlas found that 42 of 59 World Bank Group projects assessed between 2015 and 2026 support waste incineration, including pyrolysis and gasification.
The same debate is shaping the plastics treaty. GAIA’s policy briefing on a plastics recycling treaty asks whether an agreement that avoids controls on plastic production — and focuses only on recycling and burning plastic — can ever end plastic pollution.
What actually stops plastic pollution- Cut plastic production, starting with unnecessary single-use plastics.
- Scale up reuse and refill systems.
- Redesign products and packaging so they can be reused or genuinely recycled.
- Build zero waste systems with source separation, mechanical recycling and composting, run with waste workers.
- Keep pyrolysis, gasification and other forms of “chemical recycling” out of recycling targets and climate finance.
Learn more about GAIA’s work on plastic, the global plastics treaty to address plastic pollution, and why to solve the climate crisis, we must solve the plastic crisis.
Frequently asked questions about chemical recycling What is chemical recycling?Chemical recycling is a group of processes, mostly pyrolysis and gasification, that use heat or chemicals to break plastic down into low-quality oil, gases or chemicals. Much of the output is used as fuel, which means the plastic is ultimately burned.
Is chemical recycling bad for the environment?Thermal chemical recycling can emit the same pollutants as mass-burn incinerators, including heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants. Communities near pyrolysis and gasification plants have measured particulate pollution up to 8 times WHO guidelines.
What is plastic pyrolysis?Plastic pyrolysis heats plastic waste without oxygen to produce pyrolysis oil, gas and char. It is the most common technology sold as “advanced recycling.”
What’s the difference between chemical and mechanical recycling?Mechanical recycling melts plastic and remakes it into new products. Chemical recycling breaks plastic down into raw materials or low-grade fuels through an energy-intensive process. While in theory, some chemicals could be used to make plastics, it hasn’t been proven at scale.
Is plastic-to-fuel recycling?No. Turning plastic into fuel that is then burned releases its fossil carbon as climate pollution. It is a form of incineration, not recycling.
Share this explainer with anyone who’s been told chemical recycling will fix plastic pollution, and sign up for GAIA’s updates to follow our work at COP31 and on the plastics treaty.
The post Chemical Recycling and Plastic Pyrolysis: A False Climate Solution first appeared on GAIA.
Chicago nurses continue their push for Cook County to divest from Palantir
AWL Opposes BAAJA Senate Motion to Proceed
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Date: November 16, 2026
Contact: Anja Semanco | anja@alaskawild.org | 724-967-2777
Washington, D.C. —Alaska Wilderness League is calling on Congress to oppose S. 5653, the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (also called BAAJA or the permitting reform bill), as it allows for significant environmental concessions that have the potential to harm iconic public lands across the country, notably in Alaska. A manager’s amendment to the bill did not sufficiently address our concerns. Last Monday, the Senate passed a motion to proceed on the bill.
Most concerning for the protection of Alaska’s federal lands: The bill would force fast project reviews with inadequate information, limit or eliminate opportunities for the public to weigh-in, erase judicial checks and balances, and lock in bad—and potentially illegal—government decisions. The result would be faster decisions that come at the expense of careful analysis, public input, and essential science. More specifically, under this presidential administration in which Alaska is under relentless attack, the proposed legislation would fast-track approvals for oil and gas and mining projects across Alaska’s most iconic public lands, while simultaneously curtailing options for a future administration to address any unlawful approvals.
In addition, American taxpayers could be on the line to pay some of the largest multinational corporations for their costs associated with project delays that result from efforts to correct unlawfully issued permits.
“We must seek essential clean energy reform that does not come at the expense of our irreplaceable wild places.” said Kristen Miller, Executive Director of Alaska Wilderness League. “As written, S. 5653 would pave the way for industry to develop some of the most controversial industrialization projects on Alaska’s public lands with limited oversight. The bill would hand corporations almost exclusive control over the fate of projects like the proposed Ambler Road and oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. We can achieve energy reform and block unchecked data center growth without forsaking biodiversity hot spots and subsistence resources that will never recover if they are sold to the highest bidder.”
Alaska’s public lands are at a precipice, and going into a new Congress is the time to renew our fierce protection of these special places for the people and wildlife who depend on it, and to help mitigate a warming planet.
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BBC accidentally shows that there really are no non-radical futures available
Photo by Kelly Sikkema on Unsplash
On Monday 9 November at 8.00pm Panorama showed a film titled Fire and Floods: Our Extreme Weather, made by Justin Rowlatt, the BBC’s Climate Editor. An entire prime time programme given over to the existential crisis of our time is long overdue and very welcome, and certainly the climate impacts depicted can’t help but drive home for the uninitiated viewer the point that the climate crisis is with us here and now. But this is the BBC, and it has become all too familiar to find in their programmes a somewhat skewed construction of reality, which they would claim without irony stems from their obligation to be ‘impartial’. Here, we identify the pros and cons.
One reaction came from the organisers of the National Emergency Briefing. The Panorama programme included contributions from two of the NEB contributors, Professors Hayley Fowler and Natalie Seddon, as well as Professor Ed Hawkins of the National Centre for Atmosphere Science, to present the climate science arguments. GJA would argue that NEB doesn’t go far enough in articulating the solutions needed, and the social transformations that would accompany them, and in particular that it doesn’t address the crucial role of workers in actually building those solutions.
Nevertheless, NEB’s critique says ‘does the episode go far enough? It does a great job of connecting the dots for people who have not yet grasped the threat posed by climate change – but some major issues are not mentioned:
- The developing El Niño, and what it could mean for harvests and food prices.
- The climate and nature risks behind official advice to keep emergency supplies of food and water at home.
- The government’s own partially-suppressed national security assessment on global ecosystems, which warns that every critical ecosystem is on a pathway to collapse, and that this threatens UK national security and prosperity.
- The possibility of transforming our economy significantly faster, as this nation has done before at times of great crisis.’
All of which we’d agree with but we would also note that point four points to exactly the debate – and struggle – that needs to be had over how this is done – solutions, false solutions, role of workers, just transition, division within TU movement, public ownership, obstacle of right-wing denialism, corporate power etc. and how far ‘the nation’ has to jettison its historical imperial baggage to be able to meet the challenge.
NEB, however, marshals its information coherently and effectively, and at a level far more impactful than the merely anecdotal. And it shows awareness of what the solutions are. By contrast, Panorama’s report almost seems to (or even, cynically, seeks to) extinguish the question ‘what are we going to do about it’ through a facile economic argument and instead presents the climate crisis as a series of dramatic future news stories to be reported on.
Before dealing with the substantive, or policy, problems, it’s worth dwelling briefly on what we might call the BBC ‘method’, a well-practiced approach to depicting ‘difficult’ issues that conspires to hide them in plain sight. The early scenes in the programme of wildfire impacts is a classic example: isolated, individualised incidents, music building tension, people facing difficult decisions, in true reality programme style, and detached from any broader context. It could be argued that they feel using these familiar tropes is how best to engage a mass audience. Yet reducing them to spectacle also serves to undermine the message of the scientists that such events are becoming more frequent and severe; the scientists’ statements are abstract words for the audience, the one event that they are watching is the thing they see.
What is going on here? Is the idea that a TV audience sensitised to tension-filled reality shows can only grasp a situation if it’s presented in those same terms, i.e. is it about relatability? If that is the intention, it backfires as it ‘fictionalises’ the real-world impact of climate change into a series of dramatic vignettes. When the programme correctly identifies fossil fuels, use of coal, oil and gas, as the source of these disasters, it doesn’t unpack this but goes back to impacts on specific people. We get another taste of this a little later (paraphrasing): ‘after Paris 2015, we quickly ramped up to 50% renewable energy, BUT (dramatic pause) then came Ukraine.’
This brings us to the three key strands around which the programme’s arguments hinge:
- That we face a ‘choice’ between climate action and alleviating the cost of living crisis.
- That ‘Net Zero by 2050’ is synonymous with climate action, i.e, they’re the same thing.
- That there are no immediate solutions available which is why we can’t take action now.
According to the programme, the supply of gas from Russia was ‘disrupted’ by the war and subsequent sanctions, without noting the role of fossil fuel corporations in massively inflating those prices off the back of the conflict in order to generate huge profits while reducing ordinary people to the ‘heating or eating’ choice that caused pain to so many. Nor was the cushioning effect of the sharp rise in renewable energy generation on fossil fuel price spikes between the start of the Ukraine war and the Iran war taken into account. Carbon Brief calculates that this has saved the UK alone £5.7Bn in displaced oil and gas imports from the closure of the Straits of Hormuz to the end of September.
Instead, we get an inexplicable leap to a ‘choice’ between climate and cost of living, and the ludicrous argument that the rise in fossil fuel prices and burning more of them will alleviate the cost of living. The argument, presented as factual and no doubt impartial, is this: after Ukraine, then Iran, energy prices spiralled upward and therefore people could no longer afford the ‘luxury’ of taking action on ‘Net Zero’. Robert Colville, of the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Centre for Policy Studiesliterally says ‘people do support Net Zero but as soon as they start feeling personal pain, as soon as their GAS bills start going up…’ (my caps).
Some very simple dots are not being joined here,
Presented as everyday fact, this could easily pass muster with the uninformed viewer, but this statement demonstrates some impressive intellectual contortions. The claim is that because of rapidly rising gas prices we have to forego expanding cheaper, renewable energy, so that we can drill for more gas, I.e. the stuff that is causing the economic crisis in the first place.
Underpinning these arguments is a completely disingenuous use of surveys. ‘One survey’ found that 60% of us want action on Net Zero but when offered a choice between action on climate and the cost of living support is at 21% and 68% respectively. But who is asking them to make that particular choice and why? This is not explained. And there are, apparently, no analogous questions applied to massive fossil fuel subsidies or increased spending on arms, upon which a reasonable comparison can be made.
In a similar vein, the programme notes that £250 of our annual energy bills goes towards ‘policy costs’, some of which helped fund transition to green energy. But the rising price of gas is shown in the same graph to account for three times as much of the rising costs. But the programme concentrates on the former and does draw out any conclusions about the latter.
Net Zero is explicitly spelled out as synonymous with climate action: at Paris in 2015, a target of less than 2oC was agreed and ‘the target became known as Net Zero’. All climate action is, for the programme, Net Zero action. At no point does the programme seek to establish the full range of climate action needed, nor that academics and activists alike view Net Zero as a commitment we should adhere to because it does at least exist, but which hardly covers the full scope of the actions required.
The programme is on far better ground when dealing with adaptation – heavy rainfall, towns flooding, the lack of reservoirs and flood defences, the impact on farmland – and this is essential. There really is a dire need for flood defences in Worcester as shown, the previous Tory government having pulled funding (not restored by Labour), and the consequence of insurance cover no longer being forthcoming. These are real problems, much like those we’ve covered previously in Lowestoft and Hull, and the point is very effectively conveyed.
But there is little-to-no focus on mitigation – do they consider this already dealt with under ‘can’t afford it’? If so the costs of adaptation surely undermine that case. Baroness Brown, Chair of the Climate Change Committee’s Adaptation Committee, notes that 7 million homes are under threat of flooding and that climate adaptation is currently costing £60Bn per annum, with the projection to 2050 estimated to be £260Bn pa. While this is presented as dramatic, there is no comment at all on those costs, let alone a connection made with the rising cost of living explored so misleadingly earlier in the programme.
The contribution of Michael Liebriech of EcoPragma, a ‘renewables investor’ (oxymoron alert), is presented as an absolute refutation of the shortcomings of the NEB event in Westminster. The following quote is frankly inane on so many levels and doesn’t bear any sort of scrutiny, yet is presented as a coup de grace to NEB’s campaign to get climate breakdown treated as the emergency it is:
‘How much resource would they like to allocate to defence, for instance? They don’t have to answer that because they’ve got a single campaign, but we’ve got to solve multiple problems at the same time. If we take these very radical cuts in emissions before we have solutions, it means a massive reduction in economic activity’.
Who knew there were no solutions around? Or that implementing those solutions would have no bearing whatsoever on anything else going on in our society. Or that these issues are not linked but entirely separate and never the twain shall meet. It was an enlightening moment for those of us who have spent years joining the dots between our multiple crises.
Similarly, and for all that Labour is currently getting wrong on climate, we had some sympathy with Miatta Fahnbulleh over the BBC’s gotcha question about meeting clean energy targets by 2030. With the interviewer completely failing to take on board Baroness Brown’s point about the costs of failing to make the transition and badgering for a yes or no answer – ‘be honest, we can’t afford the green transition’ – she rightly rejected that dichotomy, in the interview at least, if not in practice.
By way of summing up the problems with this programme, GJA’s Ellen Robottom’s provided this effective critique:
- No counter-arguments apart from a brief mention of the costs of unbridled climate change which was almost brushed over without comment,
- No mention of fairer ways of financing energy transition than levies on the bills of hard-pressed households,
- No mention of the diversion of climate finance into warfare,
- No mention at all of the kinds of climate action that are needed to reduce and electrify energy throughput and the co-benefits of doing so,
- No alternative presented, only an effective dismissal of the idea that we can move faster on phasing out fossil fuels.
It seems quite dangerous to leave the viewer with
a) an incomplete idea of how bad the situation is and
b) vague comments about expense that really amount to reinforcement of disinformation and repetition of industry talking points without any critique being offered.
It was clear the programme was pitched at viewers with a very low level of knowledge of the basics on the science side, but that also makes it all the more dangerous when the themes and conclusions are left so muddy. What exactly were the programme maker’s afraid of that they couldn’t state clearly:
- That continued dependence on fossil fuels makes us far more financially precarious,
- That there are ways of addressing the cost of living that would also help the climate enormously and cost far less than massive tax breaks on new oil and gas, paying for obscene company profits on things that should be in public ownership, subsidies for false solution technologies and of course military build-up.
- And ultimately, that a system that puts a price on survival and treats that as if it was normal is obviously deeply wrong, and it was the way the programme seemed to present “can’t afford” as if it were a natural fact rather than offering a critique of that which was so depressing.’
And this is ultimately the problem with the programme, as with much BBC reportage. Steeped in an environment of reality show logic, everything has to be reduced to dramatic tableaux and counterposed arguments, devoid of context, with the broadcaster, in the name of impartiality, as devil’s advocate to everyone, and truth teller to nobody. Contradictions inevitably abound. Fire and Floods: Our Extreme Weather will have served a useful purpose in bringing information to people who know nothing about climate, but leaves us clueless, and worse, hopelessly misled, about how we’re going to solve it.
Tahir Latif
GJA Secretary
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The Fine Print I:
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Further: the inclusion of a link on our site (other than the link to the main IWW site) does not imply endorsement by or an alliance with the IWW. These sites have been chosen by our members due to their perceived relevance to the IWW EUC and are included here for informational purposes only. If you have any suggestions or comments on any of the links included (or not included) above, please contact us.
The Fine Print II:
Fair Use Notice: The material on this site is provided for educational and informational purposes. It may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. It is being made available in an effort to advance the understanding of scientific, environmental, economic, social justice and human rights issues etc.
It is believed that this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have an interest in using the included information for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. The information on this site does not constitute legal or technical advice.




