News Feeds

Here’s a quick update with breaking news: Prime Olympia Fields management is breaking the law — egregiously suspending nurses for organizing to protect our patients.

Trump’s repression collapses in LA, Chicago, and Minneapolis

In LA, Chicago, and Minneapolis, Trump attempted to divide and weaken the movement by securing hundreds of indictments against individual activists for interfering with an ICE agent, destroying federal property, or similar crimes.

From the beginning, the scope, size, and determination of the protests frustrated ICE’s attempt to repress them. To begin with, despite the massive deployments, ICE did not have enough agents to control the crowds, detain the immigrants, and arrest the protesters whom they claimed had violated the law. Agents, moreover, had great difficulty in identifying and recording which individual had committed which allegedly criminal act. To overcome that difficulty, the ICE agents, who were untrained, incompetent, brutal, and dishonest, arrested first and came up with charges later. Occasionally, official or cell-phone videos confirmed what the agents said, but most often they revealed that the agent had erred or lied.

The U.S. attorneys were supposed to review the charges that any officer reported, but many of those attorneys had resigned in protest. Some of the remaining U.S. attorneys dismissed dishonest or unsubstantiated charges, but under relentless pressure from above, most sought indictments from the grand juries on weak or non-existent cases. As the cases wound their way ahead, many U.S. attorneys would have been happy to proceed to trial except for the fact that the judges and, even more, the juries were increasingly skeptical of any charge that ICE had filed.

Pressure from the defendants, the defense lawyers, and the movement increased the pressure on the prosecution. Many defendants turned down plea deals despite the risk of going to trial. The defense often filed numerous motions seeking dismissal, and in many cases, members of the movement showed up in court for the crucial proceedings.

In criminal cases that do not involve ICE, 90 percent of federal indictments end up in a guilty plea or verdict. But after an extensive investigation of 400 cases in which protesters were charged with assaulting or impeding ICE agents, the New York Times found that half of those cases ended in acquittals or dismissals and that many of the others were pled down to misdemeanors. Significantly, of the 26 cases that went to trial before a jury, 22 were acquitted.

Similarly, ProPublica and Frontline reported that the federal government arrested 132 U.S. citizens in southern California for interfering with or assaulting ICE agents, but only 32 were convicted, and most of those had been convicted when they pleaded to misdemeanors. In fact, the federal defenders in Southern California won six straight acquittals—an unheard-of event—because juries simply did not believe ICE agents, including Greg Bovino. Likewise, after a jury had acquitted a professor at California State on a charge of aggravated assault against an ICE agent, the California Faculty Association reported that as of April 16, 2026, the U.S. attorney in LA had filed over a hundred charges against anti-ICE protesters and still had not convicted a single one for assaulting an ICE officer.

The same was true in Chicago. According to the same ProPublica and Frontline report, the government dropped charges in 75 of the 109 arrests of protesters against ICE.

If anything, the government did worse in Minneapolis. Early in ICE’s occupation of the city, Kristi Noem published “wanted posters” for 16 protesters who had supposedly interfered with ICE agents. But as Minnesota Public Radio reported, of the 36 protesters charged with interfering with ICE officers (including the 16 on Noem’s list), the U.S. attorney dropped 18 and offered 11 others a deal to dismiss their cases in 18 months if they had no further offenses.

While there are no official statistics, the New York Times found that of the 26 cases of ICE protesters who went to trial before a jury, the jury found 22 were not guilty.

There is also a great deal of anecdotal evidence of the juries’ opposition to ICE in the New York Times and ProPublica reports, but two cases, one from Chicago and the other from LA, express what juries thought of the ICE campaign.

In the Chicago case, a man had posted an online picture of Greg Bovino above a caption which read: “10K if U take him down.” The government charged the poster with attempted murder-for-hire and, at trial, called him “a ruthless member of the Latin Kings.” But after the jury heard the evidence, it acquitted the man. In response, Steven Miller issued a statement saying that “leftist judges and juries were empowering violent insurrection against the government,” but his racist sputtering could not reverse the verdict.

Similarly, in Los Angeles, the government charged a tow truck driver with interference with ICE officers when he mistakenly towed an ICE vehicle away from a scene where the agents were attempting to arrest an undocumented immigrant from Colombia. Once again, the jury acquitted the defendant, and once again Miller issued a public statement saying it was “another example of blatant jury nullification in a blue city.”

Even in LA, Chicago, and Minneapolis, the government obtained some convictions, although often on lesser offenses. However, even those who were ultimately exonerated suffered financial and personal harm from the prosecutions. Even so, there were so many acquittals and dismissals that the government’s prosecution of individual protesters in those cities barely made a dent in the growing movement against ICE and Trump.

Trump’s conspiracy indictments.

As stated, Bondi directed the FBI and the U.S. attorneys to consider charging anti-ICE activists with substantive offenses and conspiracy to commit those offenses because that would make it possible to prosecute those who planned the event and to double the penalties for anyone who committed an unlawful act.

From LA forward, the Justice Department was zealous in filing conspiracy charges, but almost immediately, the need to prove an “explicit or implicit” agreement to commit an unlawful act opened a weakness in those charges. If there were no electronic or other written statements suggesting such an agreement, a sympathetic jury could find defendants not guilty of the conspiracy charge if it concluded that there was either no agreement or that the agreement was limited to an agreement to carry out a lawful protest.

In the early days of the LA protests, the regime nevertheless stormed ahead with its conspiracy charges. Thus, in the first few days of the rebellion, Alex Jones (yes, that Alex Jones) provided the government with a video of a Latino man standing on the back of a truck, handing out water and face shields to crowds who had been gassed by ICE. Almost immediately, the government obtained search warrants, and ICE agents, surrounded by National Guard troops, used flash bangs to storm into his home and arrest him for conspiracy to interfere with ICE agents. When it turned out that the man was just a lone Good Samaritan, the government was forced to dismiss all charges against him and to incur months of adverse publicity

Similarly, on the first day of the occupation of LA, ICE agents arrested David Huerta, the President of California SEIU, for conspiracy to interfere with ICE agents because he had sat down by himself on a driveway outside a garment factory where ICE was conducting a raid.  Since the only agreement that he had was with himself, the government was forced to drop the conspiracy charge. Months later, it was also forced to drop the charge of interfering with an ICE officer because Huerta had not interfered with anyone.

More seriously, in Ventura County, the government brought a twelve-count conspiracy indictment against two leaders of an immigrant rights group that had allegedly built blockades on the roads leading to a marijuana farm as ICE arrested and detained 400 or so immigrants. For unstated reasons, the government later dismissed all eleven felony counts in return for the lead defendant pleading to a misdemeanor and agreeing to 24-months of probation.

In Chicago, the situation was similar. The U.S. attorney obtained an indictment against six people, most of whom were associated with the Democratic Party, who had stood in front of an ICE vehicle and banged on its hood as it attempted to leave ICE’s Broadview Detention Center just outside of Chicago. Someone broke the rear windshield wiper, and that person or someone else also inscribed the letters PIG on the side of the vehicle. Fortunately, there were no text messages or other evidence of agreement to act together, but the government claimed that by standing side by side, the protesters had reached an implicit agreement to act together.  On that basis, the government asked a grand jury to approve a two-count indictment against all six people for conspiracy to interfere with an ICE agent and conspiracy to damage federal property.1United States v. Michael Babbitt, et al., US Dist. Ct. N.D. Ill. No. 1:25-cr-00693.  A copy of the indictment and of any document filed in that case may be obtained via PACER on the website of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

Before the second Trump Administration, grand juries had almost never rejected an indictment requested by a U.S. attorney. But following in the footsteps of other grand juries that had rejected indictments requested by the Trump Administration, the first grand jury refused to approve the indictment against any of the six Broadview defendants. Undeterred, the U.S. attorney presented the same indictment to a second grand jury. As it turned out, a member of the first grand jury was also on the second, and when he saw the indictment, he told the U.S. attorney on the record that he thought that the first indictment was a “crock of shit” and that he had the same opinion about the second indictment.

The prosecutor then unlawfully excused him from the second grand jury and, after further unlawful acts, finally obtained a conspiracy indictment against the six defendants.2Hannah Meisel, “Crock of s—’: Transcripts show grand jurors dismissed for disagreeing with government’s case against ‘Broadview Six,’” Capitol News Illinois, June 10, 2026.  Months later, when Trump’s newly (and illegally) appointed Acting U.S. attorney learned what had happened, he dismissed the conspiracy charges in an attempt to prevent the release of the full grand jury transcript. When the judge ordered it released and learned what had happened, she dismissed the remaining misdemeanor charge, saying that the prosecutorial misconduct was the worst that she had ever seen. Undeterred, the U.S. attorney said that no “civilized society” should tolerate conduct like that of the defendants, but other than sputtering out racist nonsense, he could do nothing to reinstate the conspiracy charges.

Until the most recent indictment in Minneapolis, [the government] did not attempt to bring to trial a conspiracy indictment in any of the three cities where massive protests occurred.

The government obtained conspiracy indictments and convictions in a case in Spokane, Washington where a crowd attempted to prevent an ICE bus from moving undocumented immigrants3 In Spokane, local police arrested and confiscated the phones of 30 activists who had stood in front of an ICE bus.  After local police turned the phones over to the FBI, the federal authorities found electronic communications urging others to come to the station to “sit in front of the bus,” and “block the exits.” On that basis, the government obtained an indictment against nine protesters for conspiracy to interfere with ICE agents.  Six defendants pleaded guilty to the felony in return for an agreement that it would be converted to a plea to a misdemeanor in 18 months, and three other defendants were convicted at trial and await sentencing.  Aaron Glantz, “Federal Jury finds army veteran and two other ICE protesters guilty of conspiracy,” Guardian, May 29, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/28/ice-protesters-conspiracy-charges., but until the most recent indictment in Minneapolis, it did not attempt to bring to trial a conspiracy indictment in any of the three cities where massive protests occurred.

The Minneapolis indictment

On June 11, 2026, the Trump regime filed an eight-count indictment against 15 activists who had fought against ICE during its occupation of Minneapolis. Of those counts, the key one is that the activists were accused of conspiring to impede or injure ICE agents as the agents attempted to arrest immigrants and to move them to sites from which they could be deported. As this case arose in the city where the most important victory over ICE occurred, it could become the national symbol of the regime’s attempt to disband and disrupt the movement that defeated it last January.

To begin with, the Minneapolis indictment is the most dishonest and hypocritical indictment that the government has filed. For weeks, the nation saw three thousand ICE agents rampaging through the streets of Minneapolis, breaking into cars and homes, arresting anyone who “looked like” an immigrant, shooting and severely wounding Julio Cesar Sosa-Celis, and, most notoriously, shooting and killing Renee Good and Alex Pretti.  The government has investigated none of those crimes but has instead spent its time investigating the signal chats, videos, and other “evidence” of a few minor incidents where it says those named in the indictment blocked ICE vehicles or agents for short periods.

For weeks, the nation saw three thousand ICE agents rampaging through the streets of Minneapolis, breaking into cars and homes, arresting anyone who “looked like” an immigrant…

The indictment does not charge anyone affiliated with the unions, the teachers, or the neighborhood and community groups who organized the mass patrols, marches, and semi-general strike that drove ICE out of Minnesota. Instead, it charges 15 people who it says were supporters of Direct Action Minnesota (DAMN) and several smaller “direct action” organizations. The indictment says the defendants organized specific direct actions during the mass struggles, including, for example, attempts to organize “soft blockades” (i.e., pickets) or “hard blockades” (i.e., debris, trailers, etc.) around federal buildings on the day of the largest mass march and the general strike.

The indictment apparently hopes to separate “legitimate” protesters from the “troublemakers.” This is an old tactic that has long been used by governments and strike-breaking employers, but after the great mass actions in January, most of the labor and community organizations that fought ICE in the streets have rejected that tactic by joining the campaign to defend those charged in this indictment.

If this case goes as most such trials have gone, the government will call an assortment of informants, turncoats, and the like to prove its claims. In addition, however, many of the 273 paragraphs in the indictment quote from text messages, chats, Facebook posts, and other electronic communications allegedly sent by some of the defendants in which they discussed plans to take various actions. A crucial part of the defense will thus be challenging the authenticity of those messages and whether the government broke laws to obtain them.

Given all that ICE did in Minneapolis, the movement should demand that the government dismiss this indictment. If the case goes to trial, however, the government will seek, as it has in other cases, orders prohibiting defense lawyers or witnesses from saying in the trial what happened to Renee Good or Alex Pretti or what in general happened during the occupation. It will also see orders prohibiting the defense lawyers from saying or implying that the jury has the right to find the defendants not guilty because of what ICE had done in the city. If the government obtains those orders—and it has done so in other cases—it will limit the ways in which the lawyers can point out the political nature of this case in the courtroom itself.

But many of the jurors will be from Minneapolis, St. Paul, and surrounding cities, and they will know what happened. Especially with a mass defense campaign including shows of support at the court, it will be difficult for the regime to secure a conviction.

The Minneapolis trial will be a crucial battle in the fight to defend the movement and thus in the fight to stop Trump’s deportations.

If the movement can prevent a conviction on the charges in this indictment, it will be important in the region and in the country. On the other hand, even if the regime secures a conviction on one or more charges, it cannot secure Prairieland-style sentences because the charges carry far less severe penalties and the movement is much stronger. While any conviction in Minneapolis will harm the movement, it cannot disrupt or uproot the movement in Minneapolis or the region. Nevertheless, the Minneapolis trial will be a crucial battle in the fight to defend the movement and thus in the fight to stop Trump’s deportations.

The Detroit indictment

In May 2026, the government obtained an indictment charging eight people affiliated in various ways with the University of Michigan with eight counts of conspiracy to transmit threats in interstate commerce, a felony that carries a maximum sentence of five years.

In essence, the indictment alleges that in a series of separate incidents, differing combinations of the defendants spray-painted and otherwise vandalized the homes of two regents, two senior university administrators, a university police official, two businesses, and the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit. The Federation, the businesses, and the University officials had actively supported the Israeli attack on Gaza, and the spray-painted slogans included calls like “Free Palestine, “Divest Now,” “Shame, Long Live the Intifada,” and the like.  There were, however, no threats to any individual.

As in Minnesota, the Detroit indictment includes numerous seemingly incriminating statements allegedly made by defendants on Facebook pages, text messages, Signal chats, and the like. Once again, there is no reason to believe the government’s claim that the defendants made these statements or that the government obtained them by lawful means, but the fight over whether they are genuine or were lawfully obtained will be a crucial part of the defense effort.

In this case, the hypocrisy is again enormous. The U.S. supplied arms for a genocide, but instead of stopping that genocide, the Trump Administration is charging eight young people with federal felonies for alleged acts of vandalism which would have been charged, if at all, as minor misdemeanors if they had been committed during a fraternity’s pledge drive.

We must fight against this attempt to criminalize political opposition to the regime by organizing a movement to demand that these charges be dropped and that the defendants be acquitted if the case goes to trial.

Conclusion

After ten months, Trump’s campaign to “disband and uproot” the left and the movement has failed in key cities because the mass resistance in LA, Chicago, and Minneapolis and other cities sparked determined opposition among layers of the working and middle classes. In part due to the courageous defendants and an organized defense movement, that opposition reached into the court system and led to the acquittals and dismissals of hundreds of felony indictments.

The victory was not total. In Prairieland, Trump’s prosecutions led to unjust convictions and life-destroying sentences. Elsewhere, others were unjustly convicted and sentenced, although none of the other sentences were remotely comparable to those handed down after the Prairieland trial. Moreover, for every defendant, including those whose charges were dismissed, the convictions and sentences were still unjust. Even those who were exonerated suffered physical, economic, and emotional damage due to unjust arrests and prosecutions.

Even acknowledging the pain inflicted by Trump’s attack on the movement, the movement defeated Trump’s attempt to “disrupt and uproot” it. Indeed, the overall movement against ICE is stronger today than it was on the day Trump signed NPSM-7, which means that the movement can continue the fight against Trump’s deportations and other attacks. The defendants who faced down the government are now seen as heroes, and large sections of the movement see more clearly the tasks ahead and the need for a militant fight against ICE and against Trump.

Obviously, much remains to be done. Above all, the regime has found new ways to increase deportations, and the movement must find new ways to stop those deportations, because, as we have seen, the overall success of the movement is the best way to defend the movement itself.

Beyond that, we need special movements to defend against the indictments in Minneapolis and Detroit, to support the appeal from the convictions and sentences in Prairieland, and to defend against any new indictments that may be filed, including those for events that have already occurred and those for acts of resistance that will occur in the future.

We must also fight for broader political demands because the public trials and the jury system cannot prevent every unjust conviction (or prosecution) and because the current wave of popular opposition, which made it possible to defeat these prosecutions, will either grow or shrink depending upon the overall development of the struggle. We must thus link the fight against these prosecutions to the overall struggle against the regime, including the fight to drive Trump from the Presidency and the fight against fascism and for demands that will eliminate the conditions that gave birth to Trump and Trumpism.

Until we can prevail in that larger political struggle, we must also take steps to protect the movement itself. To do that, we must assess the strategic and tactical lessons of the fight against Trump’s attempt to destroy the movement.

The liberals have said or will say that the defense of the anti-ICE fighters shows that the system “worked.” But while the jury system, public trials and the media are the most important checks on state repression within the capitalist legal system, they have failed too many times—including, for example, in Prairieland—in the face of the resources and the demagogy that the regime can bring to bear. Contrary to what the liberals say, the grand juries, juries, and judges who dismissed these specific indictments did so because of action by the mass movements. The dismissals and acquittals again confirmed that the most important check on repression by the capitalist state is not the checks and balances within the State, but organization and action by the working class and the oppressed.

While a mass movement sometimes needs direct action, the struggle over the last year has decisively shown that it was mass action that slowed Trump’s deportations and his attempts to prosecute the movement.

Similarly, anarchists have said and will continue to say that the leaders of the mass movements are too weak and too bureaucratic and that we need “direct actions” to stop the deportations. But while a mass movement sometimes needs direct action, the struggle over the last year has decisively shown that it was mass action that slowed Trump’s deportations and his attempts to prosecute the movement. A mass movement must be able to defend itself, but that cannot be done by building small squads of activists who are separate from and unaccountable to the movement because they cannot defeat the state and they are extremely vulnerable to state repression. Instead, the answer is to fight to build a new, militant, and democratic movement leadership,

Finally, while only a few now say that we can defeat Trump and ICE by “civil disobedience,” the sheer brutality of the regime and the success of the mass movement have shown the utter falsity of those claims.

On a tactical level, there are a few simple and clear lessons.

First, we must take steps to ensure that no member of the movement posts any electronic communication that they do not want to see as an exhibit in a federal prosecution. While we must maintain our right to use electronic means to debate general political issues and to organize many events, we should not make any comments —however innocent they may be —which suggest that any form of “violence” may or should occur at any specific event. Those comments can survive forever, and their meaning can be twisted by Trump’s henchmen.

Second, we must consider seriously every tactical decision as to when, where, and how to conduct every demonstration, picket, or other event. In most such events, there is little if any risk, but in some cases the risk is much higher, and while we must sometimes take such risks, we should not take them without carefully evaluating and discussing whether the risk is necessary.

Third, and more specifically, while we must defend the right of armed self-defense, we must carefully consider whether and how to use it at specific events because having firearms at a protest and even loose talk about using firearms in the struggle for self-defense creates great risks.

Finally, while we must fight to build a mass movement, we cannot do that without recognizing the weaknesses in the current movement. Above all, we must recognize that even though large sections of the working class and of the Black, Latinx, and other oppressed communities adamantly oppose the deportations and Trump, the active movement is dominated by the white middle class. We must take every possible step to overcome that gap because only a movement of the multi-racial and multi-gendered working class and the oppressed can defeat Trump and Trumpism.

How to do that is far beyond the scope of this article, but the fact that it can be done is confirmed by what has been described in this article.  For many reasons, those grand juries and juries whose actions were composed of citizens from the middle class and the upper levels of the working class. But if those levels of the working and middle classes were willing, as Miller said, to “nullify” Trump’s policies, that is a signal that there is even more militant opposition to Trump among the more oppressed sections of the working class. How to turn those sentiments into active support and leadership of a movement is a complicated question, but it is what must be done if we are to eliminate horrors like NSPM-7 and the ongoing nightmare of Prairieland.

Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the Tempest Collective. For more information, see “About Tempest Collective.”
Featured Image credit: U.S. Northern Command, Chad Davis, SwissAmish; modified by Tempest.

The post Trump’s legal conspiracy (part two) appeared first on Tempest.

THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 30 AUGUST 2026 Shell’s $10.9 Billion Nigeria Estimate vs Its Public Accounts: What Were Shareholders Told? An internal report sent to Shell’s CEO in early 2014 reportedly put the cost of retiring SPDC’s existing asset base at $10.9 billion. Weeks later, Royal Dutch Shell approved its 2013 Annual Report and Form 20-F. The public accounts disclosed billions in global decommissioning provisions and a strategic review of Nigerian assets — but did not separately identify the $10.9 billion Nigeria estimate. That does not establish an accounting failure. It does create a legitimate disclosure question.

The 17 August instalment of The Shell Nigeria Files examined a particular issue: whether Shell’s programme of divestment risked transferring massive decommissioning and pollution problems along with the assets. This article addresses a different question.

What did Shell’s shareholders know, from Shell’s formal financial reporting, about the scale of the Nigerian retirement problem senior management was confronting internally? (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)

That question matters because Nigeria: Lifting the Lid, published on 29 July 2026 by Amnesty International, HEDA Resource Centre and partner organisations, says an internal report sent to Shell’s then CEO in 2014 estimated that decommissioning all existing SPDC assets could take decades and cost $10.9 billion, apparently excluding the separate cost of cleaning historic pollution. (Amnesty International)

According to the court material traced in the report, the estimate appears in a 31 January 2014 communication identified as D1_00000870 (HB/970) and cited in paragraph 98 of solicitor Matthew Renshaw’s Tenth Witness Statement.

That date deserves attention.

The $10.9 billion estimate existed before Shell approved its 2013 accounts

Royal Dutch Shell plc’s 2013 Annual Report and Form 20-F was approved and authorised for issue by the Board on 12 March 2014. The Form 20-F was signed by Chief Executive Ben van Beurden and Chief Financial Officer Simon Henry. (Shell)

If the dating in the claimant material is correct, the $10.9 billion SPDC joint-venture asset-retirement estimate had therefore reached Shell’s CEO roughly six weeks before those accounts were approved.

That does not mean Shell was necessarily obliged to reproduce the $10.9 billion number in its Annual Report.

There are important accounting questions about what precisely the internal estimate represented, whether it was gross or discounted, how costs were allocated among joint-venture participants, which obligations already existed for accounting purposes, when expenditure was expected to occur and how much of the estimate was already reflected in Shell’s consolidated provisions.

The disclosed documents available publicly do not answer those questions.

But they make the chronology worth examining.

What Shell told investors about Nigeria in 2013

Shell did tell shareholders that Nigeria was a major problem.

Its 2013 Form 20-F reported that Shell’s share of Nigerian production had fallen from about 365,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day in 2012 to approximately 265,000 in 2013. It identified security problems and crude-oil theft in the Niger Delta as significant challenges and said force majeure had been declared several times because of security, sabotage and theft. (Shell)

More significantly for the present inquiry, Shell publicly disclosed that it had launched a “strategic portfolio review in Nigeria” considering a possible exit from interests in some eastern Niger Delta onshore leases. (Shell)

So there was no concealment of the fact that Shell was considering Nigerian divestments.

Nor did Shell hide the existence of substantial global asset-retirement obligations.

Its 2013 accounts recorded $18.425 billion of decommissioning and restoration provisions across the Shell Group, up from $16.071 billion a year earlier. Shell said its annual review of estimated decommissioning and restoration costs had increased the provision by $1.426 billion during 2013. (Shell)

What the public filing did not do, in the relevant sections reviewed for this article, was identify a Nigeria-specific $10.9 billion retirement estimate.

A full-text search of Shell’s 2013 Form 20-F produces no match for “Nigeria decommissioning”; appearances of “10.9” relate to unrelated data. (Shell)

That distinction is important.

Shell disclosed the existence of enormous group-wide decommissioning liabilities. It disclosed Nigerian difficulties. It disclosed the Nigerian portfolio review. What it did not separately disclose was the particular $10.9 billion Nigerian joint-venture estimate now emerging from the internal record.

Shell’s auditors were already treating decommissioning as a significant judgement

There is another reason this deserves serious scrutiny.

Decommissioning was not some obscure footnote buried beyond the attention of Shell’s directors and auditors.

PricewaterhouseCoopers identified decommissioning and restoration provisions as an area of audit focus in the 2013 report, stating that their calculation required significant judgement concerning such matters as asset lives, future costs and production estimates. PwC said it tested assumptions underpinning material provisions, performed sensitivity work and examined the discount rate. (Shell)

Again, that proves nothing improper.

It does, however, establish that the subject was recognised within Shell’s audited financial reporting as significant and judgement-intensive.

The unanswered factual question is therefore quite specific:

Was the $10.9 billion SPDC estimate considered in the preparation and audit of the consolidated decommissioning provision, and if so, how was it reflected?

The public documents examined here do not tell us.

Then came Shell’s 2014 accounts

The following year makes the picture even more interesting.

Royal Dutch Shell’s 2014 Form 20-F reported that SPDC remained operator of the onshore joint arrangement in which Shell held a 30% interest. It said SPDC was continuing its strategic review of eastern Niger Delta interests, had divested its interest in OML 24, had agreements to dispose of three further onshore interests and might make additional divestments.

Meanwhile, Shell’s global decommissioning and restoration provision increased substantially.

At 31 December 2014, it stood at $21.887 billion, compared with $18.425 billion a year earlier. Shell said annual reviews of estimated decommissioning costs and discount rates had produced a $4.827 billion increase during 2014.

That fact cuts strongly against any simplistic claim that Shell was ignoring asset-retirement liabilities in its accounts.

The public record demonstrates the opposite: Shell recognised very large decommissioning provisions and materially remeasured them.

But once again there is no publicly visible bridge between those group-wide numbers and the $10.9 billion SPDC joint-venture estimate that the newly released material says was before senior management.

A full-text search of the 2014 report likewise does not identify the $10.9 billion Nigerian estimate as such or a specific “Nigeria decommissioning” disclosure.

Do not compare $10.9 billion directly with $18.4 billion

This is where considerable care is required.

It would be tempting to say: Shell internally estimated Nigeria alone at $10.9 billion while publicly reporting a worldwide provision of $18.425 billion — therefore the accounts must have been understated.

The documents reviewed do not justify that conclusion.

The figures may not be calculated on comparable bases.

The $10.9 billion figure is described in the litigation material as the estimated asset-retirement obligation for the SPDC joint venture as a whole. Shell’s economic interest was 30%, but that does not automatically mean one can simply multiply $10.9 billion by 30% and arrive at the figure that ought to have appeared on Royal Dutch Shell plc’s balance sheet.

Shell’s accounting policy said decommissioning provisions were based on present obligations, current requirements, technology and price levels, with non-current amounts discounted over the useful economic lives of the assets. Actual future cash expenditure can therefore be very different from the carrying value of an accounting provision at a particular reporting date.

Nor should decommissioning automatically be confused with historic pollution remediation.

Shell’s 2013 accounts separately reported $1.341 billion of worldwide environmental provisions and said those related to a number of events in different locations, none individually significant. The coalition report, meanwhile, says the $10.9 billion SPDC estimate apparently excluded clean-up costs. They are therefore different categories of possible expenditure. (Shell)

That accounting distinction is essential.

It also makes the unanswered question more interesting rather than less.

Where is the accounting bridge?

If Shell’s position is that the Nigerian retirement problem was appropriately incorporated into its consolidated accounts, there should in principle have been an internal reconciliation between operational estimates and the provision recorded for financial-reporting purposes.

The public cannot see that reconciliation.

It would show, among other things, what the $10.9 billion consisted of; which assets it covered; the anticipated timing of retirement; the respective obligations of Shell and its joint-venture partners; the discount assumptions; how existing booked provisions compared with the new estimate; and whether any amount was excluded because Shell considered there was no present accounting obligation.

It might demonstrate that Shell’s accounting was entirely appropriate.

Equally, it might expose a significant discrepancy.

At present, we simply do not know.

That is exactly why allegations of misleading investors should not be stated as established fact — and why calls for scrutiny cannot simply be dismissed.

The campaigners are explicitly raising the shareholder question

The coalition behind Nigeria: Lifting the Lid has gone further than merely criticising pollution management.

It is calling for UK and Dutch authorities to investigate whether Shell misled shareholders, regulators and affected communities about the true condition of its Nigerian operations and liabilities. That is a demand for investigation by campaigning organisations; it is not a finding by any regulator or court that Shell did mislead anyone. (Amnesty International)

The distinction matters enormously.

Nothing in the material reviewed for this article establishes securities fraud, defective accounts, an IFRS breach, an SEC reporting violation or misconduct by Shell’s auditor.

What the documents establish is narrower.

There was reportedly a large internal SPDC asset-retirement estimate.

It reached Shell’s CEO before the 2013 accounts were approved.

Shell publicly disclosed substantial worldwide decommissioning provisions and Nigerian divestment plans.

The particular Nigerian estimate was not separately identified in the public filings examined.

Whether that was entirely proper depends on accounting and disclosure facts that are not presently public.

That is an investigation question, not a verdict.

Shell’s response

Shell rejects the overall portrayal advanced by Amnesty International, HEDA and their partners.

In its July 2026 response, Shell said the organisations had selectively quoted internal documents in a way that created a misleading impression and failed to give sufficient weight to the exceptionally difficult operating conditions in the Niger Delta, including organised crude-oil theft, sabotage and illegal refining. Shell said it remained committed to honesty, integrity, ethical conduct and transparency. (Amnesty International)

Shell’s current account of the Bille and Ogale litigation says the vast majority of relevant Niger Delta pollution was caused by large-scale oil theft, sabotage and illegal refining by organised criminal gangs. It says its former subsidiary worked with Nigerian authorities, the government-owned joint-venture partner and communities, and cleaned spills from joint-venture facilities regardless of cause as Nigerian law required. Shell says it strongly believes in its case and will vigorously defend the claims at the factual trial in 2027. (Shell)

That response must be included fairly.

It still leaves the narrower accounting question unanswered.

Shell’s public response to the coalition, so far as the material reviewed for this article shows, does not provide a reconciliation between the $10.9 billion internal SPDC estimate and the decommissioning provisions recognised in Royal Dutch Shell’s 2013 or 2014 accounts.

This is what transparency would look like

Shell has repeatedly argued that selective extracts from historic internal documents can create a misleading picture.

There is a straightforward way to address that criticism.

Publish the relevant context.

Release the complete 31 January 2014 assurance communication, including the assumptions behind the $10.9 billion number.

Explain whether that estimate was supplied to the finance function, Audit Committee or external auditors.

Show how it reconciled with the asset-retirement provisions recorded in the consolidated accounts.

Explain what portion related economically or legally to Shell, what portion belonged to joint-venture partners, how discounting affected the booked amount, and whether remediation of historic pollution was separately provided for.

Such disclosure could vindicate Shell’s accounting treatment.

But without it, shareholders are left looking at two different records.

Inside Shell: a reported $10.9 billion estimate for retiring SPDC’s existing asset base.

Outside Shell: billions of dollars of consolidated global provisions, coupled with disclosures about Nigeria’s deteriorating operating environment and contemplated divestments, but no separately identified $10.9 billion Nigerian figure.

The difference does not prove wrongdoing.

It does justify asking how the two records fit together.

The timing makes the question impossible to dismiss

The chronology is unusually tight.

The internal assurance material is dated 31 January 2014.

On 12 March 2014, Royal Dutch Shell’s Board authorised the 2013 financial statements, and Ben van Beurden and Simon Henry signed the Form 20-F. (Shell)

At that point investors were being told that Shell had launched a strategic review that could result in exits from eastern Niger Delta onshore leases. They were also being told Shell carried $18.425 billion of worldwide decommissioning and restoration provisions. (Shell)

What they apparently were not told separately was that an internal Nigerian estimate reportedly put the cost of retiring the entire SPDC joint-venture asset base at $10.9 billion.

That may have been because separate disclosure was neither required nor useful.

It may have been because Shell considered the relevant share already adequately captured within the consolidated accounts.

There may be another perfectly legitimate explanation.

But thirteen years later, with those internal documents entering the public domain and a major Niger Delta pollution trial approaching, conjecture is unnecessary.

Shell possesses the records capable of answering the question.

It should publish them.

Because the issue raised by these documents is not whether Shell recognised that decommissioning costs money. Its public accounts prove that it did.

The issue is whether investors were given a sufficiently clear picture of how extraordinary the Nigerian retirement problem had become while Shell was simultaneously considering its exit from those assets.

That is a materially different question.

And Shell’s own records have now made it one that deserves an answer.

Documentary record and direct sources

The central $10.9 billion finding is reported in Nigeria: Lifting the Lid, published 29 July 2026 by Amnesty International, HEDA Resource Centre and partner organisations, drawing on internal Shell documents and May 2026 court material. The underlying retirement estimate is identified in the report as a 31 January 2014 communication, D1_00000870 (HB/970), cited in paragraph 98 of Matthew Renshaw’s Tenth Witness Statement. HEDA’s public summary confirms that an internal report sent to Shell’s then CEO estimated decommissioning the existing SPDC asset base at $10.9 billion and that the estimate apparently excluded clean-up costs. (Amnesty International)

Shell’s own primary financial records are its 2013 Annual Report and Form 20-F and 2014 Annual Report and Form 20-F. The 2013 report disclosed the Nigeria portfolio review and $18.425 billion of global decommissioning and restoration provisions; the 2014 report disclosed continuing Nigerian divestments and $21.887 billion of global decommissioning and restoration provisions. (Shell)

For direct inspection: Nigeria: Lifting the Lid — Amnesty International report page · HEDA Resource Centre — Shell Nigeria documents and findings · Shell Annual Reports archive · Shell’s current Bille and Ogale position

Editorial note

This article does not allege that Royal Dutch Shell plc understated its provisions, breached IFRS, violated US securities law, misled its auditor, concealed a legally required disclosure or committed accounting fraud.

The currently public evidence does not establish any of those propositions.

It establishes that an internal 2014 record reportedly estimated a $10.9 billion SPDC joint-venture asset-retirement obligation; that Shell’s 2013 and 2014 public filings recognised very substantial group-wide decommissioning provisions; that the filings disclosed Nigerian operating difficulties and divestment activity; and that the specific $10.9 billion Nigerian estimate was not separately identified in the relevant public disclosures reviewed.

The relationship between the internal estimate and Shell’s audited accounting provisions cannot be determined from the presently available material. The coalition publishers’ demand that authorities investigate whether shareholders and others were misled is an allegation requiring investigation, not a judicial or regulatory finding.

Shell disputes the publishers’ broader interpretation of the internal documents and says they have been selectively presented without sufficient recognition of the severe theft, sabotage, illegal-refining and security environment in the Niger Delta. The Bille and Ogale proceedings remain contested, with the Bille factual trial expected in 2027.

THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 30 AUGUST 2026 was first posted on August 30, 2026 at 7:15 pm.
©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

Kay’s Tribute to Pat

The community of Las Vegas celebrated the tenure of Pat Leahan at the Las Vegas Peace and Justice Center on Friday, August 28, and Robin Collier of KCEI and I went over to join in from this side of the mountain. Robin recorded the event and I listened to Pat and her comrades tell stories of the Center’s incredible history of 22 years of service to the community.

Pat Leahan

Pat first came to town 30 years ago on a serendipitous vacation trip from Minneapolis and ended up staying, easing into a job at the United World College (UWC) as Community Engagement Liaison. A perfect fit for Pat, who loves young people, she began to connect students with people and activities in the local community. A handful of these students were at the celebration and spoke about how they were encouraged  to share the community organizing skills they learned with Pat when they return home.

United World College students

The mission of the Peace and Justice Center is “Providing free services in partnership with our community in 4 overall categories: Access, Education, Advocacy and Solidarity.” In practice that means getting involved in all kinds of social and environmental justice issues: inadequate medical services; union organizing; prison reform; Integration Center; low income services; animal advocacy; voting rights; protecting the Gallinas River, ICE interventions, and oil and gas regulation.

That last item, oil and gas regulation, was a highly contentious issue that Pat, along with comrades in Mora County (Las Vegas is in San Miguel County), took on despite political pressures from the industry. La Jicarita covered much of this issue over the course of 2013 to 2015 (see La Jicarita, June 4, 2013). It all started when several oil and gas companies sought permits for exploration drilling and potential fracking in Mora and San Miguel Counties and came to a head when a legal organization from Pennsylvania, Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CDLEF) came to town and proposed that both counties adopt what they called “A Bill of Rights” that would ban oil and gas development outright. Pat and her comrades had already been organizing to educate the public, form relationships with elected officials and county staff, and partner with other county organizations that were working on the same issues or had already passed tougher regulations (e.g. Santa Fe County). The Mora County Community Water Rights and Local Self-Government Ordinance, promulgated by CDLEF as a test of local sovereignty, and opposed by those who advocated for local zoning restrictions, was found unconstitutional in district court. The two counties then went on to pass zoning ordinances to protect against oil and gas development in sensitive county locations.

Pat also ran a progressive talk show, Community Peace Radio, for youth and adults, every Saturday on KFUN (AM 1230) or KLVF (100.7 FM). Over two decades she invited everyone to speak—children, students from the World College, activists from all over, including Sophia Martinez and John Trudell, union organizers, environmentalists, government representatives—and there was music, too. Robin Collier, Paula Garcia (than a Mora County Commissioner), and I went on the radio to discuss the ramifications of the proposed “Bill of Rights.”

Robin Collier of KCEI

Pat also supervised the Masters of Social Work students from New Mexico Highlands University in their UWC-USA Social Work internships. As a woman tied to so many organizations and people in the Las Vegas community she vows to stay in touch—and keep affiliations—after she moves to Philadelphia to be closer to her family.

Pat was a true force in the community—and a devoted dog lover who’s own dogs and everyone else’s were treated with tender care. I will miss her friendship and solidarity. Vaya con Dios, Pat.

Dear friends,

As the 2026 legislative session comes to an end on August 31, we write to share some important updates. 

Last night AB/SB 113 language was released. The budget language included: 

• $75 million for projects in the Delta that improve existing levees for the purposes of flood protection and climate resiliency; 
• Of that total, $30 million is designated to the Special Projects Program and Flood Control Subventions Program.

Thanks to your calls and emails, the language did NOT include:

• Streamlining measures for any elements of CA Forever’s Shipbuilding project, OR
• Exemptions to fast-track the construction of the Delta Conveyance Project.

We applaud the legislature for pushing back on harmful trailer bills this year. 

But our fight is not over yet. 

We still need Governor Newsom to sign AB 2218 and SB 872 into law.

Support AB 2218

On February 19, 2026, Assemblymember Kalra introduced AB 2218, the Indigenous Water Rights Bill sponsored by the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians and the Karuk Tribe. 

AB 2218 would establish a clear statewide policy directive acknowledging and seeking to remedy the inequities inflicted upon Tribes in California through historical state-sanctioned acts of termination, removal, and forced assimilation.

The bill directs relevant state agencies, including the Department of Water Resources and the State Water Board, to incorporate this policy into water rights decisions, regulatory actions, permitting, and grantmaking to address identified inequities. Recognizing historic harms and directing state agencies to center Tribal equity in water policy is not simply a symbolic act; it is a pathway toward stronger relationships, more inclusive decision-making, and better outcomes for the ecosystems we all depend on.

Two Easy Ways You Can Take Action:
1. Call the Governor at (916) 445-2841 urging his signature on support AB 2218.

Please call the Governor’s Office and tell them: 

• As a constituent, I urge you to sign AB 2218 into law..
• AB 2218 supports the State’s progress towards equitable water management.
• AB 2218 is an important step toward addressing inequities affecting California Native American Tribes in state water policy and ensuring Tribal interests are meaningfully considered in decisions affecting water.

2. Alternatively, you can also write to the Governor’s Office, asking for their support on AB 2218. 

• Click this link to send a comment urging the Governor’s Signature on AB 2218.

Support SB 872

On January 6, 2026 Senator McNerney introduced SB 872, the Delta Levees and Canal Subsidence Fund. 
 
SB 872, would create a dedicated fund to address two major threats to California’s water supply: aging levees in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta and sinking State Water Project (SWP) canals. These funds would help protect our existing infrastructure from the threats from a changing climate, protecting drinking water supply, Delta ecosystems, and communities from flood risk. 

We need your help! SB 872 moves to the Governor’s desk for signature, and we need your help to move this bill into law.

Two Easy Ways You Can Take Action:
1. Call the Governor at (916) 445-2841 urging his signature on support SB 872.

Please call the Governor’s Office and tell them: 

• As a constituent, I urge you to sign SB 872 into law
• You support advancing legislation that prioritizes safeguarding California’s water supplies, protecting critical infrastructure, and preparing the state’s water system for future challenges.

2. Alternatively, you can also write to the Governor’s Office, asking for their support on SB 872. 

Click this link to send a comment urging the Governor’s Signature on SB 872.

CLICK TO CONTACT GOVERNOR NEWSOM

A listing of 29 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, August 23, 2026 thru Sat, August 29, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (8 articles)

• Climate change is unearthing new archeological discoveries, while also threating them NPR's Danielle Kurtzleben speaks with Jørgen Hollesen, a Senior Researcher at the National Museum of Denmark, about how climate change is impacting the study of archaeology. NPR, Danielle Kurtzleben, Aug 23, 2026.
• The world inches toward catastrophic climate events: ‘Bigger shocks are on the way’ Scientists have long warned that the world will experience more intense extreme weather events like heat waves, storms, floods and droughts. But what once seemed like the realm of fiction is now discussed as a possibility, even an inevitability. AP News, Peter Pringaman, Aug 24, 2026.
• Five ways Europe's heat-wave summer is hot, hot, hot Phys.org, Edward Zinin (editor), Aug 24, 2026.
• World`s oceans hit hottest temperature on record in August The new ocean heat record being set in August is especially remarkable as global sea temperatures are typically highest in March and April, after the austral summer. The Guardian, Damian Carrington, Aug 24, 2026.
• How does a collapsing glacier turn into a lethal wall of mud and water? An expert explains what happened in Nepal A collapsing glacier in Tibet led to a devastating wall of water and debris roaring through a valley in Nepal, leaving hundreds dead and many hundreds still missing. The Conversation, Stuart Dunning, Aug 27, 2026.
• Nepal`s devastating floods reveal the danger of `cascading hazards` in Himalayas How many factors driven by climate change can add up to disaster. The Conversation, Daniel Parsons, Aug 27, 2026.
• El Niño climate patterns supercharged by burning of fossil fuels, study finds ‘Godzilla’ event currently brewing could push 50 million people into acute hunger before the end of next year The Guardian, Oliver Milman, Aug 27, 2026.
• Climate crisis could be destabilising mountain areas like Nepal, experts warn Unusual heat this year may have melted ice and thawed bonds that hold glaciers in place – leading to catastrophe The Guardian, Jonathan Watts, Aug 27, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (6 articles)

• Near-real-time storyline attribution for everyday global weather An experimental reanalysis-based approach for extreme event attribution Climate Lab Book, Ed Hawkins, Aug 24, 2026.
• Climate Model Benchmarking: Building Trust and Advancing Science A critical look at how well climate models work, how to successfully use them, and the anticipated challenges for their next-generation development. Eos, Birgit Hassler, Forrest Hoffman, Ranjini Swaminathan and Beth Dingley, Aug 24, 2026.
• The biggest carbon polluters are to blame for half of U.S. western water lost, `groundbreaking` paper says Some of the largest fossil fuel companies on Earth are disproportionately responsible for the water crisis in the American West, according to a first-of-its-kind study published Tuesday. Inside Climate News, Jake Bolster, Aug 25, 2026.
• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #35 2026 Skeptical Science's weekly survey of freshly published climate research. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Aug 27, 2026.
• Climate change is strengthening El Niño, coral records suggest 1000-year archive from the Galápagos portends greater weather disruptions from the Pacific climate cycle. Science, Julia Vaz, Aug 27, 2026.
• Scientists collaborated with narwhals to study warming waters in the Arctic Scientists collaborated with narwhals for a new study to understand human-caused climate change in the Arctic and rising sea levels around the world. NPR, Rachel Carlson, Aug 28, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (5 articles)

• U.S. Cuts Colorado River Water for Arizona, California and Nevada Arizona’s share of the river will shrink by a third, likely increasing reliance on groundwater and raising pressure on agriculture. NYT, Scott Dance, Aug 21, 2026.
• Council set to axe climate emergency declaration UK political party Reform discovers that basic physics is ''woke."" BBC News, Victoria Scheer and Annaleece Longmore, Aug 22, 2026.
• Trump demands `lies` in West Point climate curriculum, professor claims in new lawsuit A tenured professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point claims he was fired after pushing back on a presidential directive to “defy science” and stop teaching cadets that climate change had “primarily human causes, something contrary to the ideology of the Commander in Chief and forbidden at West Point.” The Independent News, Justin Rohrlich, Aug 26, 2026.
• West Point Climate Professor Says He Was Fired for Refusing to `Defy Science` Dr. Adam Kalkstein is suing the U. S. Military Academy, where he was a professor of geography and the only climate scientist, after being fired. New York Times, Michael C. Bender and Greg Jaffe, Aug 26, 2026.
• ?W?hy are European leaders staying silent after our summer of climate shock? Lethal temperatures ?and wildfires have exposed a widening gulf between voters demanding ?action and politicians unwilling to confront the long-term choices global heating requires The Guardian, Jon Henley, Aug 26, 2026.

Miscellaneous (3 articles)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #34 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, August 16, 2026 thru Sat, August 22, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Aug 23, 2026.
• If all car tyres were filled with CO2, would this cut atmospheric carbon significantly? Skeptical Science would like to hear your answer to this in comments: ''If all the vehicles on the planet had their tyres pumped up with CO2, would this lock up enough carbon to lower the amount in the air significantly?'' The Guardian, Guardian Staff, Aug 23, 2026.
• Mission impossible? Quantifying military emissions Military and wartime emissions are difficult to track—but too important to ignore. Bulletin of the Atomic Scienctists, Neta C. Crawford, Aug 24, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (2 articles)

• Against the wind: despite Trump`s attacks, unions are fighting for good US clean energy jobs Since Hurricane Sandy in 2012, a growing labor movement has addressed the climate crisis and economic inequality The Guardian, Dharna Noor, Aug 23, 2026.
• Fact brief - Do wind turbines release more emissions than burning fossil fuels? No - Wind turbines generate emissions during construction and transportation, but their overall climate impact is far lower than that of fossil fuels. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, Aug 25, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 articles)

• Florida shows how to adapt as coastal cities face growing threats from sea level rise and storms With a state government locked in denial of climate change, Floridians ''DIY'' and show how to self-help as coastal cities face growing threats from sea level rise and storms. Associated Press, Dorany Pineda, Aug 22, 2026.
• Empty North Sea oil fields could store enough green hydrogen to power the country for seven years Depleted oil and gas fields that powered Britain for half a century could be refilled with hydrogen made from wind and solar power. The Conversation, Stuart Jones , Aug 24, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (2 articles)

• Climate change exposes 580 million children to 20 extra `heat-stress days` every year Carbon Brief, Ayesha Tandon, Aug 26, 2026.
• Climate Change Exposes 580 Million Children to 20 Extra "Heat-Stress Days" Every Year More than 40% of children under the age of 10 globally are already experiencing at least 20 additional “heat-stress days” due to climate change. CleanTechnica, Ayesha Tandon, Aug 28, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

• How the Black Summer fires failed to shift Australians` climate views The research, published today by the Royal Society, indicates that misinformation may have dampened the fires’ impact on the public’s perception of climate risk, as evidenced by the widespread endorsement of the false claim that arsonists caused the bushfires – a belief held by 88.89 per cent of sceptics, 56.96 per cent of fence-sitters, and 38.79 per cent of acceptors. Sydney Morning Herald, Nick O'Malley, Aug 25, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

The Food Security Leadership Council (FSLC) is calling on the United States to launch a once-in-a-generation effort to boost agricultural innovation. In a recent report, they outline a proposal for US$100 billion in new public research and development (R&D) investments over the next ten years to strengthen domestic food systems, improve farm profitability, and restore global leadership.

The call comes at a critical time for American agriculture. Farmers across the country face soil degradation, water limitations, and extreme weather driven by climate change, while the U.S. leans on concentrated foreign supply chains for critical inputs like fertilizer.

Meanwhile, domestic agricultural productivity growth has slowed. According to the report, the U.S. share of global public agricultural R&D spending fell from 20.2 percent in 1960 to 11.5 percent by 2011. It also notes that China now spends roughly double what the United States does on public agricultural research.

“I am not sure many U.S. policymakers appreciate the full nature of the importance, and cascading benefits, of agricultural innovation,” Anna Nelson, Executive Director of the Food Security Leadership Council, tells Food Tank. “Food and agricultural innovation is not only a farm issue. It matters for our entire economy through its effects on employment, producer profitability, and consumer prices… It affects our environment by shaping land use, emissions, and pollution.”

Public investments in agricultural research generate an estimated US$18 in societal benefits for every dollar spent, according to the report.

Recent data from the Economic Research Service at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) underscores the importance of technical progress. Between 1948 and 2021, U.S. farm output nearly tripled even as total input use slightly declined, demonstrating an efficient use of resources.

The report demonstrates that new innovations can support the transition toward long-term sustainability, but Nelson is careful to note that new tools require careful design with input from communities. “Agricultural production is local—so is consumption,” she tells Food Tank. “Any innovation needs to be informed by the people who will ultimately implement or benefit from it.” Small and midsize farms cannot be left out of the picture when it comes to distributing R&D investments.

Nelson also cautions against treating high-tech breakthroughs and nature-based practices as opposing forces. “I wish people did not see them as inherently at odds with each other,” she says. “Both tech-based and nature-based solutions can offer important means of accelerating sustainable productivity growth. Producers should use all the tools available to them.”

Recent investments suggest that government agencies are interested in supporting alternative approaches to industrialized agriculture. Earlier this year, the USDA, alongside the Department of Health and Human Services and the Environmental Protection Agency, announced more than US$1 billion for farm modernization and food supply security. This includes US$700 million for regenerative agriculture pilot programs.

The FSLC argues that sustained public grants remain essential to move new agricultural technologies from the lab to the field.

“The United States has the resources to make this investment if we can summon the political will to do so,” Nelson tells Food Tank. “US$100 billion over ten years is a drop in the bucket of the federal budget and would provide structural support to help transform U.S. agriculture over time.”

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Tom Fisk, Pexels

The post Growing Agricultural Research and Development Can Strengthen U.S. Food Systems appeared first on Food Tank.

The only climate scientist teaching at West Point, the U.S. Army’s military academy, was fired after he resisted an order to stop teaching about the human causes of the climate emergency, a lawsuit claims.

Dr. Adam Kalkstein, a civilian professor of geography at the New York institution, was terminated after the spring semester this year, six months after a testy meeting with Brig. Gen. Shane Reeves, then dean of West Point’s academic board, the court filing said.

According to Kalkstein, who taught Army cadets there for 17 years, he told the dean at a November 2025 meeting that an order to cut from the curriculum content about the human causes of climate change was immoral and potentially illegal.

It “would be like trying to teach the law without being able to even mention the Constitution,” he said.

Reeves responded by “storming out” of the meeting after telling Kalkstein that Donald Trump was commander in chief and set the agenda for West Point, the lawsuit alleged.

Read Next The EPA’s data on cancer risk from air pollution has gone dark Sachi Kitajima Mulkey

The developments were reported on Wednesday by Stars and Stripes and The New York Times.

Kalkstein’s lawsuit is the second legal action over the stifling of academic freedoms filed by an educator at West Point.

Tim Bakken, the academy’s longest-serving law professor, had a similarly fiery meeting with a uniformed colonel, John Gregory, last year after standing up to a new Trump administration policy ordering civilian colleagues to seek approval before publishing papers or giving speeches, The Washington Post reported in July.

According to Bakken’s lawsuit, Gregory ordered him to “stop talking and sit down” during a meeting of dozens of faculty members. “We’re a military institution. We follow orders,” Gregory is alleged to have said.

The U.S. Military Academy, West Point’s formal name, dropped its challenge to a preliminary injunction against the policy obtained by Bakken’s lawyers this month, military.com reported, and the parties have agreed “in principle” to work toward a permanent solution.

Kalkstein’s attorney, Michael Sussman, told the Times that his client was a conservative Republican who believes military students need to know the truth about the causes of the climate crisis as a matter of national security.

“He is loyal to the cadets and the academy,” he said. “And to his perspective, edicts that he can’t say what’s true in a classroom is beyond his tolerance and totally counterproductive.”

In further comments to Stars and Stripes, Sussman said Kalkstein’s position was not ideological. “There are certainly people who, anything Donald Trump does, they want to complain about it and scream and yell about it. He’s not that guy,” Sussman said.

The lawsuit alleges that Kalkstein first became aware his position was under threat in May 2025, when West Point leaders announced plans to reduce civilian staffing levels, while at the same time opening a new humanities center requiring new geography teachers.

They offered to let him stay as a “term employee,” Stars and Stripes said, and Kalkstein, fearful that colleagues would have to pick up his classes if he quit, accepted a loss of tenure and entitlement to a large severance package to stay.

The order to ban teaching about human contributions to climate change came in September, the lawsuit said, followed by the angry meeting with Reeves a month later. Reeves retired in April after a 30-year military career and is now president of the University of Wyoming’s board of trustees.

Kalkstein’s lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, accuses West Point of breaching his First Amendment rights to free speech.

In a statement to the Guardian, the academy said it was “aware of the allegations and take[s] such matters seriously,” but declined further comment citing pending litigation.

The Guardian has also approached the White House for comment.

Trump has flipped between calling the climate emergency “a hoax” or “a scam” to admitting it exists but insisting that climate scientists are politically motivated and that the climate “will change back.”

Since taking office for a second time last year he has also attempted to impose numerous cultural changes on U.S. military institutions.

In April last year, Trump’s defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, ordered the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, to purge books found to promote diversity, equity, and inclusion, resulting in almost 400 being removed after review. The books were returned a month later after the Pentagon reversed course.

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline West Point’s only climate scientist fired after continuing to teach human causes of climate change on Aug 30, 2026.

Headline News:

• “Solar Has Crossed A Critical Economic Tipping Point” • For years, the economic case for solar came with a qualification. Its installation cost a lot. That disadvantage has largely disappeared. According to an Ember analysis, a solar plant can now require less upfront investment than a coal or gas plant for the same amount of electricity delivered. [OilPrice.com]

Solar power plant in Dunhuang (ダモ リ, Unsplash)

• “COP17 In Mongolia Wraps Up With $1.3 Billion Of Green Investment Pledge” • After twelve days of negotiation and debate in Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolian, delegates of 197 parties (196 countries plus the EU) who signed the UN Convention for Combating Desertification wrapped up the Conference of Parties (COP17). The results were note-worthy. [Euronews]
• “Is Europe’s Heat Finally Giving Way? And Are Flash Floods Next?” • Europe’s blistering summer was a “grim illustration” of human-caused climate change, the European Commission said in June, There was no relief in July and much of August. Now the heat is not so great along the Mediterranean, but farther North, it is cooler, with warnings of flash floods. [Euronews]
• “Mexico’s Green Energy Push Is Finally Gaining Momentum” • After a slow start, Mexico is now well on its way to undergoing a green transition. President Claudia Sheinbaum has launched an energy reform that opens the country’s energy sector to greater private investment while focusing on expanding the Mexican renewable energy sector. [OilPrice.com]
• “Most ‘Park Outside’ Warnings Involve Vehicles With Internal Combustion Engines” • Battery fires affected only about a dozen first-generation Chevy Bolts but the fallout cost their makers over $1 billion. How is it that the public does not know about the 3 million vehicles, mostly gas-powered, that are required to be parked outside away from homes? [CleanTechnica]

For more news, please visit geoharvey – Daily News about Energy and Climate Change.

Lock the Gate Alliance is calling on the NSW government to urgently pass legislation that would protect coal workers, following revelations that the Independent Planning Commission (IPC) is seeking further information from the owners of Hunter Valley Operations coal mine about the time the operation needs for an orderly transition. 

Kilatan batu giok, perubahan warna simbol, efek pecahan cahaya, serta transisi cepat dapat membuat sebuah putaran terasa lebih penting dibanding beberapa detik sebelumnya. Pada Slot Jade Legends, unsur visual semacam ini menjadi bagian dari pengalaman permainan. Pemain Jade Legends tidak hanya memperhatikan hasil akhir, tetapi juga menerima berbagai sinyal dari animasi, suara, perubahan layar, serta respons fitur selama permainan berlangsung. Efek game tersebut dapat menciptakan sensasi bahwa momentum sedang meningkat. Namun, kesan “menang banyak” tetap perlu dipisahkan dari mekanisme matematis. Efek Jade Legends berfungsi memperkuat presentasi sebuah kejadian, bukan memberikan kepastian bahwa putaran selanjutnya menghasilkan pembayaran besar.

Efek Jade Legends Membuat Informasi Lebih Mudah Terlihat

Salah satu fungsi penting efek visual adalah membantu pemain mengenali kejadian pada layar. Bayangkan beberapa simbol muncul secara bersamaan tanpa animasi, suara, atau perubahan warna. Informasi akan terasa datar serta lebih sulit dibaca dalam waktu singkat. Efek khusus memberikan penanda visual agar pemain mengetahui adanya perubahan. Sorotan cahaya dapat menandai simbol tertentu. Animasi tambahan memberi penekanan pada kombinasi. Perubahan latar membantu memisahkan permainan reguler dari fase khusus. Dalam konteks tersebut, efek game bukan sekadar dekorasi. Ia menjadi bagian dari komunikasi antara sistem permainan dan pengguna.

Warna Jade Memberikan Identitas Visual Kuat

Nuansa jade atau batu giok memiliki karakter mudah dikenali. Hijau zamrud, turquoise, emas, serta pencahayaan transparan dapat digunakan untuk menciptakan kesan premium sekaligus mistis. Ketika palet tersebut diterapkan secara konsisten, Slot Jade Legends memperoleh identitas visual lebih kuat. Pemain dapat mengenali atmosfer permainan bahkan sebelum membaca seluruh informasi pada layar. Konsistensi ini juga berpengaruh terhadap daya ingat. Bentuk simbol, warna dominan, animasi, serta latar dapat menjadi penanda khas sebuah game.

Efek Pemain Muncul Saat Tempo Permainan Berubah

Respons pemain tidak hanya dipengaruhi warna. Tempo mempunyai peran besar. Putaran reguler biasanya memiliki ritme relatif stabil. Saat terjadi peristiwa khusus, tempo animasi dapat berubah. Musik meningkat, transisi diperpanjang, atau layar memberikan jeda singkat sebelum menampilkan hasil. Efek pemain kemudian muncul melalui perhatian lebih tinggi terhadap layar. Sebuah kejadian sederhana dapat terasa dramatis apabila presentasinya dibangun secara bertahap. Prinsip serupa digunakan pada banyak desain game digital. Informasi penting diberikan penekanan agar pengguna langsung mengetahui adanya perubahan status.

Animasi Kemenangan Membuat Hasil Terasa Lebih Besar

Efek kemenangan merupakan salah satu bagian paling mudah menarik perhatian Pemain Jade Legends. Angka pembayaran dapat diperbesar, simbol diberi cahaya, sementara suara khusus muncul bersamaan. Presentasi tersebut mempunyai dampak psikologis sederhana: semakin kuat stimulus visual dan audio, semakin mudah sebuah kejadian tersimpan dalam ingatan. Akibatnya, kemenangan tertentu dapat terasa jauh lebih menonjol dibanding rangkaian putaran biasa.

Efek Besar Tidak Selalu Berarti Nilai Besar

Di sinilah tampilan perlu dibaca secara lebih kritis di mana animasi dramatis belum tentu sebanding dengan besarnya pembayaran. Beberapa permainan menggunakan efek kuat untuk menjaga ritme pengalaman, termasuk pada hasil relatif kecil. Pemain sebaiknya melihat nilai aktual, nominal taruhan, serta informasi pembayaran daripada hanya mengandalkan intensitas animasi. Dengan cara tersebut, efek Jade Legends tetap dapat dinikmati tanpa mencampurkan presentasi visual dengan ukuran hasil sebenarnya.

Simbol Khusus Menambah Lapisan Efek Game

Desain simbol juga menentukan bagaimana sebuah permainan membangun perhatian. Simbol reguler biasanya mempunyai presentasi lebih sederhana, sementara simbol khusus mendapatkan perlakuan berbeda. Saat simbol tertentu muncul, perubahan cahaya atau suara dapat memberi petunjuk mengenai fungsinya. Pendekatan tersebut membuat pemain lebih cepat membedakan simbol biasa dari elemen penting. Apabila permainan memiliki beberapa mekanisme tambahan, efek visual juga membantu mencegah layar terasa membingungkan. Setiap respons dapat memiliki identitas sendiri. Satu efek menandai kombinasi, efek lain menunjukkan perubahan status, sedangkan animasi berbeda digunakan untuk memasuki tahap permainan berikutnya.

Efek Jade Legends Bisa Membentuk Persepsi Momentum

Serangkaian animasi dalam waktu berdekatan dapat menciptakan kesan permainan sedang memasuki fase aktif. Inilah salah satu Efek Pemain paling menarik untuk diperhatikan. Misalnya, beberapa kejadian visual muncul berurutan. Pemain mungkin mulai merasa hasil besar semakin dekat karena intensitas permainan meningkat. Persepsi tersebut tidak sama dengan perubahan probabilitas. Sistem permainan tetap mengikuti aturan matematis dan mekanisme hasil masing-masing. Efek tidak dapat digunakan sebagai bukti bahwa kemenangan berikutnya sudah dekat. Memisahkan dua konsep ini penting karena desain visual memang dibuat untuk menyampaikan emosi, sementara probabilitas bekerja berdasarkan sistem permainan.

Slot Jade Legends Mengandalkan Pengalaman Bukan Sekadar Hasil

Daya tarik Slot Jade Legends akhirnya dapat dilihat melalui hubungan antara visual, tempo, simbol, audio, serta respons pemain. Efek game membuat informasi lebih mudah dikenali sekaligus memberi identitas pada setiap momen penting. Pemain Jade Legends dapat merasakan perubahan suasana saat animasi meningkat, simbol mendapat sorotan, atau layar memasuki fase berbeda. Semua unsur tersebut membentuk pengalaman lebih hidup. Namun, efek Jade Legends bukan formula untuk menang banyak. Animasi kemenangan, cahaya jade, perubahan tempo, maupun suara dramatis hanya memperkuat cara hasil ditampilkan. Justru di situlah kekuatan desainnya. Efek pemain tercipta karena permainan mampu membuat sebuah kejadian terasa penting, mudah diingat, serta berbeda dari putaran biasa tanpa harus mengubah prinsip matematis di balik hasil permainan.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 29 AUGUST 2026 SLF-2007-041 The Sakhalin Papers XXXI: The Judicial Review That Never Reached Judgment — WWF, The Corner House and the Unanswered Legality Question In August 2007, WWF-UK and The Corner House asked the Administrative Court to examine a question created by a three-year-old ECGD letter: could Britain’s export-credit agency make a legally binding conditional commitment to support Sakhalin II contracts before completing its environmental assessment — and while the very British supplies it was supposed to “facilitate” were already being delivered? The pleadings survive. The arguments survive. The judgment does not. Sakhalin Energy withdrew its application before the case could be decided.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-041
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal legal record: R (WWF-UK and The Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform — Statement of Facts and Grounds, dated 11 August 2007
Supporting records: Royal Dutch Petroleum Company/The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company Form 6-K, May 2003; WWF and Corner House witness material; contemporaneous reporting by The Guardian; Sakhalin Energy statements reported by Interfax; Parliamentary material concerning ECGD and Sakhalin II
Evidence standard: The allegations in the judicial-review papers are identified as allegations advanced by the claimants. They are not court findings. ECGD’s responses are identified separately. Sakhalin Energy’s withdrawal of its financing application is not treated as an admission of illegality or environmental wrongdoing. No court adjudicated the merits of this judicial review.

Introduction

The previous Shell Leaks File examined a deceptively simple document.

On 4 March 2004, Britain’s Export Credits Guarantee Department sent Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd a letter headed:

“Confirmation of conditional support.”

The letter did not constitute the final approximately $650 million ECGD guarantee being contemplated for the Sakhalin II project.

But neither was it merely a casual expression of interest.

By 2007, ECGD acknowledged that the commitment was binding if the stipulated conditions were satisfied.

That left an awkward question.

What happens when a government department makes a binding conditional commitment before completing the environmental assessment upon which one of those conditions depends?

WWF-UK and The Corner House decided to ask a judge.

On 15 August 2007, they filed judicial-review proceedings challenging the legality of the March 2004 decision. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

The case potentially placed several aspects of Britain’s handling of Sakhalin II under judicial scrutiny:

the timing of ECGD’s environmental assessment;

the legal meaning of its statutory duty to facilitate British exports;

the status of its conditional commitment;

the adequacy of consultation;

and whether a support decision could still lawfully be made once much of the relevant procurement and construction had already occurred.

The court papers survive.

But the hearing never produced a judgment.

That absence is the central fact of this file.

1. The Court Papers Identified the Decision Precisely

The claimants did not simply challenge “British support for Shell” in general terms.

Their Statement of Facts and Grounds identified a specific administrative decision:

the 4 March 2004 decision by the Secretary of State, acting through ECGD, to give conditional support in relation to specified preliminary contracts for Sakhalin II.

The pleading also challenged ECGD’s continuing position, reflected in correspondence during 2007, that the March 2004 commitment remained legally binding if its conditions were fulfilled.

The relief sought was correspondingly serious.

WWF and The Corner House asked the Administrative Court either to declare that the 2004 decision had no legal effect or to quash it, and to prevent ECGD from providing support for the preliminary contracts on the basis of that decision.

These were remedies being requested.

They were never granted.

2. This Was a Case About Government Power, Not a Trial of Shell

That distinction is essential.

Judicial review examines the lawfulness of decisions made by public authorities.

WWF and The Corner House were challenging the conduct and legal powers of the British Government’s export-credit agency.

The proceeding was not a civil damages action against Shell.

It was not a prosecution.

It was not a trial to determine whether Sakhalin Energy had caused particular environmental damage.

It was not a proceeding to determine whether Shell had violated Russian environmental law.

Shell’s involvement was nevertheless central to the historical context because Sakhalin Energy was controlled by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group when the Phase 2 investment decision was made and when ECGD issued its March 2004 letter.

An authenticated Shell filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission records that, in May 2003, Sakhalin Energy was a 55 per cent Royal Dutch/Shell Group company, with Mitsui holding 25 per cent and Mitsubishi 20 per cent. (SEC)

So although the defendant in the judicial review was the British Secretary of State, the financing under examination concerned a project then controlled by Shell.

3. Shell’s Own Filing Fixes the Environmental Chronology

The May 2003 Shell regulatory filing is important for another reason.

It announced the shareholders’ positive investment decision to proceed with Sakhalin II Phase 2, then estimated at approximately $10 billion.

Shell described it as the largest single foreign direct-investment project in Russia and one of extraordinary industrial scale.

But the same Shell document also recorded that final approval stages for the project’s design and construction documentation — including what Shell described as a substantial environmental impact assessment — were still progressing. (SEC)

That chronology later became important to the judicial-review challenge.

The investment decision had been taken.

Contracting was advancing.

Construction subsequently began.

The environmental assessment and lender due diligence were still developing.

Then ECGD issued its conditional commitment.

WWF and The Corner House argued that the sequence was legally defective.

Again, that was their case.

No judge ultimately decided whether they were right.

4. The Statutory Words at the Centre of the Dispute

The claim involved an apparently innocuous phrase in the Export and Investment Guarantees Act 1991.

At the relevant time, the legislation empowered the Secretary of State to make arrangements:

“with a view to facilitating”

supplies of goods or services by UK businesses to businesses overseas.

That wording mattered.

The claimants argued that ECGD’s power was not an unrestricted authority to subsidise or insure any overseas transaction involving British suppliers.

The statutory purpose was to facilitate those supplies. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

From that proposition arose one of the most technically interesting questions in the entire Sakhalin financing story.

What happens if the goods and services have already largely been supplied before ECGD finally completes its assessment?

Can government support still be said to have facilitated something that has already happened?

5. Two Clocks Were Running

The claimants’ case effectively identified two clocks.

The first was the environmental clock.

ECGD said environmental and social impacts had to be assessed before final support was given.

That process was lengthy.

The second was the commercial clock.

Sakhalin II was already proceeding.

Contracts were being performed.

Construction was advancing.

British suppliers were doing work.

WWF and The Corner House argued that these clocks created a legal dilemma.

If ECGD waited until the environmental assessment was properly completed, some of the supplies it was supposed to facilitate might already have been delivered.

But if ECGD committed itself early enough to affect those supplies, it risked doing so before completing the environmental assessment.

Their allegation was that ECGD attempted to solve this problem in March 2004 by separating the two stages:

make the eligibility commitment now;

complete the environmental assessment later;

and make satisfaction of the environmental requirements a condition of eventual support.

The claimants argued that this solution was unlawful. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

ECGD disagreed.

6. Ground One: Had ECGD Predetermined the “Facilitation” Question?

One ground attacked the March 2004 decision as an unlawful predetermination.

The claimants argued that whether ECGD support genuinely facilitated British exports had to be assessed when the support decision was actually made.

Instead, they said, ECGD had effectively fixed that question in 2004 by making the conditional commitment, even though the financing and environmental process continued for years.

By 2007, according to the claimants, performance of the preliminary contracts had advanced to the point that the original facilitation rationale was questionable.

Their contention was therefore not merely:

the project is too far advanced.

It was more technical:

ECGD cannot preserve a statutory power indefinitely by determining years earlier that future financial support will count as facilitating supplies, regardless of what happens to those supplies in the meantime.(thecornerhouse.org.uk)

That proposition was never tested by a judgment.

7. Ground Two: Could ECGD Commit Before Completing the Environmental Assessment?

The environmental ground went to the heart of ECGD’s own procedures.

The court papers referred to international standards and ECGD’s Case Impact Analysis Process.

Sakhalin II was treated as a high-impact project requiring substantial environmental assessment.

The claimants pointed in particular to ECGD material indicating that preliminary indications of cover were normally given without commitment, with more detailed assessment required before a commitment was made.

Yet the March 2004 Sakhalin letter was different.

ECGD later accepted that it was binding if its conditions were satisfied. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

The parties were not apparently arguing about whether ECGD possessed all the environmental information necessary for a final support decision in March 2004.

It did not.

That was why the environmental condition was included.

The legal disagreement concerned what ECGD was entitled to do while that assessment remained incomplete.

WWF and The Corner House argued that the Department could not make a binding commitment first and perform the required environmental assessment afterwards.

ECGD’s position, as reproduced in the claimants’ papers, was materially different.

The Department relied upon the flexibility within its procedures and the exercise of professional judgment in the circumstances of individual cases. It did not accept that its policies created the rigid legal prohibition alleged by the claimants. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

That competing interpretation was precisely the sort of issue a judicial-review judgment might have resolved.

There was never such a judgment.

8. A Subtle but Important Point About the EIA Argument

The claimants were not simply asserting that ECGD was itself a Russian planning authority obliged by statute to conduct the project’s environmental impact assessment.

Their case was more nuanced.

ECGD had adopted environmental and social assessment procedures governing the exercise of its export-credit functions.

WWF and The Corner House argued that, once those policies were adopted, ECGD had to apply them lawfully and could not evade their purpose by making a binding commitment before the relevant assessment was complete.

ECGD disputed that interpretation of its procedures.

This distinction matters because it prevents a later historical account from exaggerating the case into something it was not.

The judicial review was fundamentally about the lawful exercise of ECGD’s own public powers and policies.

It was not an environmental-liability trial against Shell.

9. Ground Three: Was Anything Left to “Facilitate”?

A separate ground returned to the statutory language.

The claimants argued that ECGD needed evidence that its support would make some concrete difference to the supply of British goods or services.

Sakhalin Energy itself was not the British exporter.

The rationale for ECGD involvement was that UK suppliers and contractors participating in Sakhalin II would benefit from government-backed financial arrangements.

WWF and The Corner House argued that, as the relevant contracts progressed, ECGD needed to consider whether its involvement was still genuinely facilitating those supplies.

They alleged that the Department had not lawfully addressed that question. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

Again:

allegation, not finding.

10. Ground Four: Consultation

Then came consultation.

ECGD had opened a process through which environmental organisations and other interested parties could submit information and concerns concerning Sakhalin II.

The claimants argued that once a public authority undertakes consultation, it must conduct that consultation fairly.

Their case relied upon familiar public-law principles:

consultation should occur while proposals remain genuinely formative;

participants should receive sufficient information to respond intelligently;

they should have adequate time;

and their responses should be conscientiously considered before the decision is made.

WWF and The Corner House alleged that the March 2004 binding commitment undermined that process because a legally significant decision had already been taken before subsequent consultation and assessment were complete. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

ECGD did not accept that its final decision had been predetermined.

From the Department’s perspective, environmental issues remained open and no final guarantee had been issued.

11. That Produced the Central Paradox

This was the puzzle already encountered in yesterday’s Shell Leaks File.

ECGD could say:

No final decision to support the project has been made.

And simultaneously:

The March 2004 conditional commitment is binding if its conditions are met.

To campaigners, those propositions demonstrated the problem.

To ECGD, they described two different stages of the process.

The first concerned eligibility and conditional contractual support for identified contracts.

The second concerned the final substantive decision whether ECGD’s conditions had been met and whether cover should actually be issued.

The judicial-review proceedings offered the possibility that a court would determine the legal consequences of that distinction.

12. ECGD Said the Challenge Was Premature

The surviving claimants’ grounds reproduce another important part of ECGD’s response.

The Department maintained that no decision to support the project had been made and argued that environmental issues remained open.

On that basis, ECGD contended that aspects of the judicial review were premature.

It also challenged whether WWF had standing to contest what it regarded as a commercial eligibility decision distinct from the environmental questions in which WWF had an obvious interest. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

The claimants responded that this missed the central point.

Their challenge was not directed only at a hypothetical future guarantee.

They said there was already an existing legally binding commitment dating from March 2004.

In their view, that was a decision capable of judicial review then and there.

The case thus contained an unusual threshold dispute:

Had a sufficiently final decision already been made to be challenged, or had the genuinely important decision not yet occurred?

13. The Claimants Wanted the 2004 Commitment Neutralised

WWF and The Corner House were not merely seeking a declaration for historical interest.

Their pleaded remedies included an order declaring that the March 2004 decision had no legal effect or quashing that decision.

They also sought to prevent ECGD from relying upon it to provide support for the preliminary contracts. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

Had the claim proceeded and succeeded, the consequences could therefore have been practical.

But “could have” is as far as the documentary record permits us to go.

No such order was made.

14. The Case Became Public on 15 August 2007

WWF and The Corner House publicly announced the proceedings on 15 August 2007.

Their public presentation was strongly critical of ECGD and of Sakhalin II.

They argued that the Government had entered a binding financial commitment while continuing to tell Parliament that no final support decision had been taken. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

Their witness material set out years of engagement with ECGD and the environmental objections raised by NGOs, consultants and others concerning Sakhalin II. Nicholas Hildyard’s Corner House witness statement specifically focused on the alleged separation between environmental assessment and the Department’s binding commitment. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

Those documents are useful primary material for understanding the claimants’ case.

They should not be mistaken for independent findings of fact.

15. The Guardian Recorded ECGD’s Defence

The following day, 16 August 2007, The Guardian reported the legal action.

Its report is valuable because it did not merely reproduce the campaigners’ case.

It also recorded ECGD’s contemporary response.

The Department rejected the challenge and maintained that no final insurance cover had been given.

According to the newspaper, ECGD emphasised that no cover was in place, no premium had been received and no British taxpayer money was then at risk. (The Guardian)

That is an important part of the evidential record.

It demonstrates that ECGD was not concealing its interpretation once the dispute became public.

The parties fundamentally disagreed about the legal significance of the March 2004 commitment.

WWF and The Corner House emphasised its binding character.

ECGD emphasised the conditions still outstanding and the absence of a final guarantee.

A court was potentially going to have to decide which consequences followed from those facts.

16. By Then Shell Had Lost Control of Sakhalin Energy

There is another chronological complication.

When ECGD issued the March 2004 letter, Shell controlled Sakhalin Energy with a 55 per cent interest.

By the time the judicial review was filed in August 2007, that had changed.

Gazprom had acquired control earlier that year, reducing Shell’s interest to 27.5 per cent.

The ownership change does not retroactively alter the origin of the ECGD commitment.

The financing application and much of the environmental scrutiny arose while Sakhalin II was Shell-led.

But by the time the British court proceedings were gathering momentum, Shell was no longer the project’s controlling shareholder.

That distinction is particularly important in a historical series bearing Shell’s name.

Responsibility for events must be tied to the relevant date, not transferred indiscriminately across the entire life of the project.

17. The Hearing Never Happened

The litigation continued into 2008.

Then the underlying financing application disappeared.

On 29 February 2008, Sakhalin Energy withdrew its applications for support from ECGD and the US Export-Import Bank.

Contemporaneous Interfax reporting several days later quoted Sakhalin Energy’s Moscow representative, Igor Ignatiev, explaining that there was serious uncertainty over how long the two export-credit agencies would take to complete their consideration and reach final decisions. He rejected any suggestion of a political connection with the Russian presidential election. (Interfax.ru)

The Corner House subsequently recorded that the judicial review had been due to be heard about a month later and said the legal proceedings were among the factors contributing to financing delays. Following Sakhalin Energy’s withdrawal, WWF and The Corner House decided not to continue with the case. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

Those two sources should be read together.

Sakhalin Energy publicly emphasised uncertainty and delay in the financing timetable.

The campaigners attributed significance to the pending judicial review.

There is no judgment establishing that Sakhalin Energy withdrew because it feared losing the case.

18. Withdrawal Was Not a Legal Victory on the Merits

This is where historical retellings can easily go wrong.

WWF and The Corner House had succeeded in bringing the issue toward a hearing.

Sakhalin Energy’s withdrawal then removed the practical financing decision around which the litigation revolved.

But that does not mean the Administrative Court ruled that ECGD had acted unlawfully.

It did not.

Nor did the withdrawal constitute a judicial declaration that the campaigners’ interpretation of ECGD policy was correct.

No judge ruled upon:

whether the March 2004 commitment unlawfully predetermined the statutory facilitation question;

whether ECGD had been prohibited from giving conditional support before completing its environmental assessment;

whether the Department had failed to facilitate UK exports within the meaning of the 1991 Act;

or whether its consultation process rendered the decision unlawful.

The questions survived.

The case did not.

19. Nor Did ECGD Win

The reverse proposition is equally important.

Because the claim was discontinued after the application was withdrawn, ECGD did not obtain a judgment vindicating its interpretation either.

There was no judicial ruling that the March 2004 arrangement was lawful.

There was no judgment accepting ECGD’s contention that its procedures allowed this form of binding conditional commitment.

There was no ruling rejecting the claimants’ statutory argument.

There was no judgment deciding the standing or prematurity disputes.

Consequently, neither side can legitimately point to this judicial review as a merits judgment in its favour.

The lawfulness question remained unresolved.

20. Do Not Confuse This With the Other Sakhalin High Court Case

The distinction is particularly important because another British Sakhalin case did produce a High Court judgment.

That was the litigation concerning access to environmental information involving Friends of the Earth and ECGD.

In that separate proceeding, the Information Tribunal had ordered disclosure of interdepartmental environmental material, and Mr Justice Mitting subsequently dismissed ECGD’s appeal in March 2008.

That was an actual judicial decision.

The WWF/Corner House proceeding examined here was different.

It challenged the legality of the March 2004 conditional-support decision itself.

That case produced no merits judgment.

The existence of one Sakhalin High Court judgment must not be used to create another that never happened.

21. An Extraordinary Timing Detail

There is nevertheless a striking historical sequence.

For years, ECGD examined whether to provide hundreds of millions of dollars of support for Sakhalin II.

The environmental process generated enormous quantities of material.

Campaigners obtained the March 2004 conditional-support letter.

They challenged it.

The case moved toward hearing.

And then, before a court could determine whether the commitment had been lawful, the applicant decided it no longer required the British support.

The contemplated ECGD financing vanished.

The legal question vanished with it.

Not because a judge answered it.

Because the commercial circumstances removed the need for an answer.

22. Yet the Statutory Problem Did Not Vanish Forever

There is a final documentary twist.

The claimants’ argument concerning the meaning of “facilitating” exports may sound like an obscure technical dispute peculiar to one Russian energy project.

It was not destined to remain obscure.

In 2009, Parliament legislated to amend ECGD’s statutory powers.

The Industry and Exports (Financial Support) Bill replaced the old formulation with authority to make arrangements “in connection with” overseas supplies.

More strikingly, the legislation expressly provided that arrangements could relate to goods or services already supplied before the arrangements were made. (Parliament Publications)

That legislative change maps remarkably closely onto one of the practical problems raised in the Sakhalin pleadings.

But caution is required.

Similarity is not causation.

The existence of the Sakhalin challenge does not by itself prove that Parliament subsequently changed the law because of Sakhalin II.

That question requires its own documentary examination.

And that is where the next Shell Leaks File will go.

Documentary Findings Established

The Royal Dutch/Shell Group held 55 per cent of Sakhalin Energy when the shareholders approved Sakhalin II Phase 2 in May 2003. Shell’s SEC filing estimated the investment at approximately $10 billion and recorded that final approval work concerning project documentation, including substantial environmental-impact assessment, was still progressing. (SEC)

ECGD issued its conditional-support letter on 4 March 2004.

WWF-UK and The Corner House filed judicial-review proceedings on 15 August 2007 challenging the legality of that decision and ECGD’s continuing position that the conditional commitment was binding if its conditions were satisfied.

The judicial-review grounds raised questions concerning ECGD’s statutory export-facilitation power, the timing of environmental assessment, consultation and the legal effect of the conditional commitment. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

ECGD disputed the claimants’ interpretation and maintained that no final project-support decision had been made.

Contemporaneous reporting recorded ECGD’s position that no cover was in place, no premium had been received and no British taxpayer money was then at risk. (The Guardian)

Sakhalin Energy withdrew its ECGD and US Ex-Im applications on 29 February 2008.

Interfax reported Sakhalin Energy’s explanation that considerable uncertainty existed over the timing of final decisions by the agencies. (Interfax.ru)

Following the withdrawal, WWF and The Corner House did not pursue their judicial review to judgment. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

No merits judgment exists in this proceeding.

Alleged in the Judicial Review — Never Adjudicated

WWF and The Corner House alleged that ECGD unlawfully predetermined whether its support would facilitate British exports.

They alleged that ECGD could not lawfully enter a binding conditional commitment before completing the relevant environmental assessment.

They alleged that the Department had not properly established that the proposed support would continue to facilitate UK supplies as required by the legislation then in force.

They alleged deficiencies in consultation and disclosure surrounding the 2004 decision.

They sought to have the conditional commitment declared ineffective or quashed.

These propositions were legal arguments advanced by the claimants.

They did not become judicial findings.

ECGD’s Position

ECGD maintained that the ultimate support decision remained outstanding.

It treated environmental and social issues as matters still requiring assessment before a final guarantee could be issued.

Its position, as reflected in the claimants’ papers, relied upon flexibility and professional judgment within its environmental procedures.

It disputed the proposition that the March 2004 conditional commitment amounted to the final project-support decision.

It also raised arguments concerning the prematurity of the proceedings and the claimants’ standing in relation to aspects of the commercial eligibility decision. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

Those propositions likewise never received definitive judicial endorsement in this proceeding.

Not Established

It is not established that the Administrative Court found ECGD’s March 2004 commitment unlawful.

It is not established that the court found the commitment lawful.

It is not established that WWF or The Corner House won the case on its merits.

It is not established that ECGD won the case on its merits.

It is not established that Shell or Sakhalin Energy was found environmentally liable in this proceeding.

It is not established that ministers deliberately misled Parliament.

It is not established that Sakhalin Energy withdrew its ECGD application because it expected to lose the judicial review.

And the withdrawal itself was not an admission of wrongdoing.

Commentary

The historical importance of this case lies partly in the judgment that does not exist.

Most litigation becomes easier to describe once a judge resolves the competing legal arguments.

This one became harder.

The March 2004 document undeniably existed.

Its conditions undeniably existed.

The continuing environmental assessment undeniably existed.

ECGD’s later recognition of the conditional commitment’s binding character existed.

The claimants’ challenge existed.

ECGD’s defence existed.

The financing application then disappeared.

And with it disappeared the opportunity for a court to determine what all those facts meant in law.

That makes restraint unusually important.

It would be easy, looking backwards, to turn the sequence into a morality play in which one side was proved right and the other wrong.

The surviving record does not permit that.

What it permits is something more interesting.

It shows a British government department attempting to reconcile export promotion, environmental due diligence and a huge project whose commercial timetable was moving faster than the public financing process.

It shows campaigners identifying a potential legal collision between those objectives.

And it shows the collision reaching the doors of the Administrative Court before the underlying financing transaction was removed.

A legal issue can remain unresolved and still be historically significant.

The Sakhalin judicial review is an unusually good example.

Source Record

The principal legal source is the Statement of Facts and Grounds in R (WWF-UK and The Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, dated 11 August 2007 and filed as part of the Administrative Court challenge announced on 15 August. It identifies the March 2004 decision under challenge, the statutory and procedural grounds advanced, ECGD’s pre-action position and the remedies sought. The document is treated throughout this instalment as a pleading, not as a judgment. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

The authenticated Shell corporate record is the May 2003 Royal Dutch Petroleum Company/The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company Form 6-K filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. It confirms Shell’s 55 per cent interest, the Phase 2 investment decision, the then approximately $10 billion cost and the continuing approval work concerning environmental assessment. (SEC)

The campaigners’ contemporaneous record includes the 15 August 2007 WWF/Corner House announcement and supporting witness material, which document their reasons for bringing the proceedings and their interpretation of ECGD policy. These sources represent the claimants’ case and are labelled accordingly. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

Independent contemporaneous reporting is supplied by The Guardian, 16 August 2007, which recorded both the campaigners’ allegations and ECGD’s response that no final cover had been issued. (The Guardian)

The termination of the financing application is independently documented by Interfax on 3 March 2008, quoting Sakhalin Energy concerning uncertainty over the timetable for final ECGD and US Ex-Im decisions. (Interfax.ru)

The subsequent history of the abandoned judicial review is recorded by The Corner House, which confirms that WWF and The Corner House decided not to proceed after Sakhalin Energy withdrew its ECGD application. (thecornerhouse.org.uk)

Archive disclaimer: Judicial-review pleadings record allegations and legal arguments, not findings. The WWF/Corner House Sakhalin proceeding ended without a merits judgment after Sakhalin Energy withdrew its ECGD application. Nothing in this instalment should be read as asserting that a court found ECGD, Shell, Sakhalin Energy or any minister to have acted unlawfully where no such finding exists.

Site wide disclaimer also applies.

Next Archive File SLF-2007-042 — The Sakhalin Papers XXXII: After “Facilitating” — When Parliament Rewrote Britain’s Export-Credit Law

One of the most technical arguments in the abandoned Sakhalin judicial review concerned just three words:

“with a view to facilitating.”

WWF and The Corner House argued that ECGD could not use its statutory powers to facilitate British exports if the relevant goods and services had already largely been supplied by the time financial support was approved.

No court decided whether that interpretation was correct.

Then, in 2009, Parliament changed the law.

The replacement wording authorised ECGD support “in connection with” overseas supplies — and expressly permitted support relating to goods or services supplied before the government arrangements were made. (Parliament Publications)

The resemblance to the problem identified in the Sakhalin litigation is difficult to miss.

But resemblance is not proof of causation.

SLF-2007-042 will examine the 2009 Bill, its Parliamentary explanation and the surviving ECGD record to determine exactly why the law was changed — and whether the legal problem exposed by Sakhalin II formed part of the story.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 29 AUGUST 2026 was first posted on August 29, 2026 at 8:44 pm.
©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

Each week, Food Tank is rounding up a few news stories that inspire excitement, infuriation, or curiosity.

FEWS NET Halts Reporting on Food Insecure Countries

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) is no longer reporting on three of the countries most at risk of hunger: Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen.

For the last 40 years, the resource has provided timely, accurate information on acute food insecurity. Rajiv Shah, President of The Rockefeller Foundation, says that he has seen firsthand how the tool has been used to mobilize resources and save lives before a crisis hits. It also saves money: According to the World Food Programme, every US$1 invested in anticipatory action yields up to US$7 in avoided losses and benefits. 

In early 2025, the Trump-Vance Administration abruptly took FEWS NET offline for several months, raising alarm among international aid organizations and governments. Now, the administration is targeting the platform again. In response to questions about the change, a spokesperson from the U.S. State Department says they are “focusing on countries that align with the Secretary’s broader policy priorities.” 

But Shah points out that this data is essential for addressing food insecurity in nations deemed “hunger hotspots” by WFP. “We cannot prevent the world’s hungriest people from starving if we are flying blind,” he says.

Global Land Restoration Gains Ground

Over 124.3 million hectares of land—an area roughly twice the size of France—are under restoration, according to a new report from the International Union for Conservation of Nature.

East Asia, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa are leading efforts as countries work to revive forests; shift farming practices; and restore drylands, rangelands, and agricultural landscapes. 

“Restoring degraded ecosystems strengthens climate resilience and addresses biodiversity loss, while delivering significant economic and environmental returns on investment,” says IUCN Director General, Dr Grethel Aguilar.

Countries have pledged to restore 1.2 billion hectares as part of their national targets under four major international frameworks. Yasmin Fouad, Executive Secretary of the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification, encourages the move from commitments to implementation at scale to achieve their goals.

It May Be Getting Easier to Hold Fossil Fuel Companies Accountable

A new study in Earth’s Future suggests that it’s possible to tie emissions from particular companies to specific harms. Researchers hope this can help advocates hold fossil fuel companies responsible for climate impacts.  

The study ran over 150 simulations to show how carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere influence the odds of extreme heat and rain—and the role fossil fuel emitters played. Author Christopher Callahan says, “What this science tells us is that there is a direct relationship between how much an entity emits and…[the] extreme events that alter people’s lives.”

The fossil fuel industry accounts for 68 percent of greenhouse gas emissions and almost 90 percent of carbon dioxide emissions globally, according to the United Nations. And food and farming systems are a part of this: Food production accounts for at least 15 percent of fossil fuels used annually. 

Many questions around climate liability linger, but some experts believe legal cases supported by this new research have the potential to “[rock] the courtroom.”

U.S. Farmers’ Struggle to Access Resources Continues

Farmers across the United States are facing as they try to access resources from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the New York Times reports.

In many parts of the country, skeleton staff remain at local offices and in some counties, there’s nobody at all. 

More than 20,000 workers out of more than 110,000 left the agency during the first half of 2025. And recent data show that the rate of departure is even higher in divisions that work directly with farmers and rural residents. Rural Development, a subagency at USDA, has lost more than a third of its staff since January of last year. 

The staffing and budget cuts leave farmers and charity organizations facing delays as they wait to receive federal funding. USDA is also approving fewer loans and grants. In the past three fiscal years, the agency made investments that total between US$24-40 billion. This fiscal year, with just a month left, the agency has approved US$15.8 in investments. 

Farmers are feeling the disappearance of expertise and institutional knowledge as well. Amanda Butterfield, a rancher in Pennsylvania, says, “We’ve completely lost a whole group of experts within our communities across the United States that can no longer help and support us.”

Water Rises in African Sahel

The African Sahel region is seeing more water than it has in decades. Wells are filling up and water tables have risen by 13 feet or more in some places. Areas that have been affected by drought for decades seem to be recovering. 

Farmers are seeing the benefits. One farmer in Chad said that in the past, there wasn’t enough water to irrigate crops, leading to small harvests, but now, he says, “Now our lives have changed.” And as producers grow crops like millet and sorghum, they’re leaving more moisture in the soil than grasses they replace. 

Shifting rainfall patterns and heavy monsoons are partially responsible for the changes, but scientists say that more is at play. They believe that practices such as traditional water harvesting methods and projects like the Great Green Wall have also helped.

Encouraged by the results, Nigeria is considering restoring an irrigation project on the shores of Lake Chad, which it was forced to abandon due to drought. It promises to improve food security and create jobs.

Articles like the one you just read are made possible through the generosity of Food Tank members. Can we please count on you to be part of our growing movement? Become a member today by clicking here.

Photo courtesy of Mihajlo Sivc, Unsplash

The post Food Tank’s Weekly News Roundup: Ecosystems Recovery, Aquifers Replenishing, and USDA’s Staffing Shortages appeared first on Food Tank.

Roughly 160 people are dead and hundreds more — including dozens of international tourists — are missing after flash floods hit a region on the mountainous border of Nepal and Tibet on Wednesday. Devastating footage posted to social media shows people fleeing a wall of water that washed away buildings and vehicles.

Initial analysis of satellite imagery and reports from the Nepalese government indicate that the flooding was likely triggered by a landslide caused after a piece of a glacier fell hundreds of feet.

As the region warms, its ice is becoming increasingly unstable, raising the risk of catastrophic flooding.

“The glaciers over there are definitely in retreat,” said Joseph Shea, an associate professor of geography at the University of Northern British Columbia. “There’s a lot of glacier mass up there, but we’re seeing thinning, we’re seeing retreating.”

Since 2000, the world’s glaciers have lost 5 percent of their ice, with much more drastic impacts in certain regions. Nepal’s glaciers lost nearly a quarter of their area between 1970 and 2010. More than 160 smaller glaciers in the country, research has found, have vanished entirely.

Read Next Scientists race to decode data from Europe’s vanishing glaciers Matt Simon

A recent study finds that 40 percent of the world’s glacial ice could disappear if the world does not keep warming under 1.5 degrees Celsius.

The impacts of warming on glaciers in Nepal can cause cascading effects. Shea pointed out that retreating glaciers can help trigger landslides as they get smaller and can no longer hold back sediment. As these glaciers retreat, many are leaving large, dammed lakes at higher elevations. “If you have a landslide suddenly into a lake, you get an overtopping of the dam, and then the whole thing can collapse catastrophically,” Shea said. Known as glacial lake outburst floods, two of these events hit Nepal last year, and research shows millions are living in harms way around the world.

Wednesday’s disaster was more likely due to a glacial collapse that fell into the valley below. Daniel Shugar, a geologist at the University of Calgary in Canada, told The New York Times that satellite imagery suggested that a 2,000-foot-wide piece of ice may have fallen almost 4,000 feet, “[pulverizing] the ice into water” with the force of its fall. And while Shugar emphasized that it was still too early to make conclusive statements about the cause of the floods, he noted to Reuters that snow that was present on the glacier earlier in the week may have melted due to warm temperatures.

The collapse and debris flow were so large and forceful, they registered as a magnitude 5.2 seismic event, according the U.S. Geological Survey.

Glaciers elsewhere have broken apart with destructive results. That includes the collapse of a Swiss glacier last year that buried a town while on a smaller scale, a glacier collapse in Italy in 2022 killed 11 mountaineers. Both were linked with rising temperatures.

There’s a lot of factors in a warming world, Shea said, that can play on each other to destabilize glaciers.

“It’s summertime,” he said. “There’s lots of warming, lots of melt happening, lots of water around. There’s also things like alpine permafrost thaws: the ground temperatures warm up, and big blocks and chunks that would have been frozen in place are now suddenly becoming mobile.”

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline How rising temperatures likely contributed to Nepal’s deadly flood on Aug 29, 2026.

Headline News:

• “State Grid Corporation Of China targets 200 GW Annually Of Renewables” • State Grid Corporation of China outlined twenty measures in seven areas to support the national 15th Five-Year Plan carbon peaking goals. The company said its operating area will add about 200 GW of energy capacity annually during the 15th Five-Year Plan period. [reNews]

Wind turbines in China (Siyuwj, CC BY-SA 4.0)

• “Is Global Warming Supercharging El Niños? Study Suggests They Are” • A study suggests that El Niños are getting stronger because of human-caused climate change. El Niños are more than 36% stronger than they were before the industrial age began in the mid 1800s, with a 16% jump in just the last forty years. This shows that the increase is accelerating. [Euronews]
• “Sierra Club Slams Trump Plan To Carve Up Yosemite For Private Developer” • The Trump administration has spent over a year quietly pressing the National Park Service to give up land inside Yosemite National Park so a private developer can build a road connecting its own property to park land, an investigation by NOTUS found. [CleanTechnica]
• “Irish Solar Capacity Passes 3 GW” • Installed solar capacity in Ireland has passed 3 GW for the first time, including installations from rooftop solar to grid-scale solar farms. The Irish Minister for Climate, Energy, and the Environment Darragh O’Brien said the milestone comes as the growth of the country’s solar capacity continues to accelerate. [reNews]
• “Trump Announces ‘Historic’ US-Venezuela Oil Deal That He Says Will Lower Gas Prices” • President Donald Trump has announced that the US and Venezuela have reached a “historic” oil deal that he said would give the US a majority control of billions of barrels of oil reserves in the Caribbean country and lower gas prices for Americans. [ABC News]

For more news, please visit geoharvey – Daily News about Energy and Climate Change.

The next materially distinct angle is internal compliance culture inside SPDC. Earlier instalments quoted the 2012 remark in passing, but none has examined it as the central documentary issue. The contrast is unusually sharp: in 2012 Shell publicly said its Business Principles were the foundation of how it worked and reported disciplinary action for Code violations worldwide; yet a Shell headquarters manager visiting Nigeria reportedly told colleagues that SPDC was afflicted by “collusion, nepotism and corruption” and that the Code of Conduct was “completely ignored.” (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)

THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 29 AUGUST 2026 Shell’s Code of Conduct “Completely Ignored”? The 2012 Warning From Inside SPDC In the same year Royal Dutch Shell told the public that all employees, contractors and operated joint ventures were expected to comply with its Business Principles, a manager from Shell headquarters reportedly returned from Nigeria with a profoundly different assessment: “collusion, nepotism and corruption” — and a Code of Conduct treated as an “inconvenience.” It was one manager’s assessment, not a judicial finding. But Shell’s own ethics system makes the unanswered question unavoidable: what happened after the warning?

There are internal Shell documents about pipelines.

There are documents about corrosion.

There are documents about crude theft, illegal connections, maintenance backlogs, security failures and whether production should continue despite predicted environmental damage.

Then there is a different kind of evidence.

Evidence about culture.

Section 4.7 of the July 2026 report Nigeria: Lifting the Lid reproduces material relied upon by the Bille and Ogale claimants concerning a Shell headquarters manager who visited Nigeria in 2012.

According to the report, after the visit the manager emailed colleagues saying his suspicions had been confirmed about “collusion, nepotism and corruption running through the veins” of SPDC.

He then delivered an even more extraordinary assessment:

“Shell’s Code of Conduct is an inconvenience here: it’s completely ignored.”

Those are not words attributed to a Niger Delta campaigner.

They are reported as the assessment of somebody working within Shell.

They do not prove that SPDC as an institution was corrupt.

They do not establish criminal conduct by any identified employee.

They have not been adopted as findings of fact by the English court.

But neither can they responsibly be dismissed as routine corporate grumbling.

Because Shell’s Code of Conduct was supposed to be one of the mechanisms preventing precisely the kind of behaviour the manager said he had encountered.

The evidential chain requires care

Unlike many documents in this series, the underlying email is not identified in Nigeria: Lifting the Lid as one of HEDA’s individually numbered downloadable Shell files.

The report attributes the material to paragraph 17.4 of the Claimants’ Supplemental Skeleton for the Case Management Conference of 18 May 2026.

That distinction matters.

We are therefore dealing with an internal Shell communication described and quoted in the claimants’ court material and reproduced by Amnesty International, HEDA and the other organisations publishing the 2026 report.

The underlying email has not, from the publicly searchable material reviewed for this instalment, been independently published in full.

Accordingly, this article does not present the manager’s assessment as an established judicial description of SPDC.

It presents it for what the published record says it is:

a highly critical internal assessment made by a Shell headquarters manager after visiting the Nigerian operation.

That is serious enough.

What Shell was telling the public in exactly the same year

The timing makes the document especially significant.

Royal Dutch Shell’s Sustainability Report 2012 described its Business Principles as fundamental to the company’s operations.

Shell said those principles governed behaviour, policies, processes and decision-making and applied to its treatment of the environment and communities.

It also said all Shell employees and contractors, together with personnel at operated joint ventures, were expected to comply with the Business Principles. (Shell)

The public message was therefore unequivocal.

This was not an optional ethical aspiration.

It was supposed to govern how Shell worked.

The report also described an anti-bribery and corruption compliance programme, mandatory procedures and training concerning such matters as conflicts of interest, political payments and gifts and hospitality. Failure to comply could result in dismissal or termination. (Shell)

Shell’s own General Business Principles similarly insist on honesty, integrity and fairness and reject bribery while requiring potential conflicts of interest to be declared. (Shell)

Against that public framework, the manager’s reported description of the Nigerian operation is extraordinary.

Shell was enforcing the Code elsewhere

There is another piece of contemporaneous evidence that makes the contrast sharper.

Shell’s 2012 Sustainability Report did not merely say a Code existed.

It reported enforcement.

Shell said 209 Code of Conduct violations had been reported during 2012 and that 93 employees and contractors were dismissed or had their contracts terminated as a consequence. (Shell)

That demonstrates that Shell possessed a functioning corporate apparatus for identifying, investigating and sanctioning misconduct.

There were reporting channels.

There were investigations.

There were disciplinary consequences.

The obvious question is therefore not whether Royal Dutch Shell had an ethics programme.

It clearly did.

The question is:

What happened when one of its own headquarters managers allegedly concluded that the system was not functioning properly inside SPDC?

Was the allegation formally investigated?

The public documents reviewed for this instalment do not tell us.

That absence matters.

Did the email trigger an investigation?

Was Shell Internal Audit informed?

Was the Ethics and Compliance organisation notified?

Was the allegation referred through the Global Helpline process?

Were particular individuals investigated?

Were contracts reviewed?

Were disciplinary proceedings commenced?

Did Shell determine that the manager had misunderstood what he encountered?

Did investigators substantiate any part of his concerns?

Was the allegation judged exaggerated?

Were remedial measures imposed?

Was the Board Audit Committee informed?

We do not know.

And because the allegation came from inside Shell rather than from an outside campaign organisation, the absence of a publicly visible follow-up trail becomes particularly important.

One angry email does not prove institutional corruption

This qualification cannot be overstated.

Employees sometimes form harsh opinions after difficult visits.

Internal emails can be written in frustration.

A manager may encounter several disturbing incidents and wrongly generalise them to an entire organisation.

A particular office, team or contractor relationship may not represent the culture of thousands of people.

Terms such as “collusion”, “nepotism” and “corruption” can also cover very different conduct, ranging from unethical favouritism to potentially criminal bribery.

The published material does not identify particular transactions, payments or individuals behind the 2012 manager’s assessment.

It does not establish what evidence the manager possessed.

It does not establish whether an investigation agreed with him.

And it does not establish that every SPDC employee disregarded Shell’s Code.

The allegation therefore must remain precisely what it is:

an internal allegation requiring explanation and corroboration.

But the proper response to an allegation from a Shell headquarters manager is investigation — not pretending the allegation never existed.

Other documents make the cultural warning harder to isolate

The significance of the 2012 email does not depend on treating other Shell Nigeria Files stories as proof that the manager was right.

They are separate evidential strands.

But they do provide context.

A 2011 security review, as reported from the claimants’ court filing, described SPDC security operations as “seriously flawed” and raised questions involving procurement due diligence and inappropriate payments. That issue has already been examined separately in this series. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)

In March 2013, senior Shell and SPDC personnel discussed alleged involvement of staff and contractors in crude-oil theft and considered using internal “traps” to determine whether insiders were helping bunkerers. Again, that has already been treated as a separate documentary issue. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)

Those records do not prove the sweeping 2012 cultural allegation.

But they mean the allegation did not arise in a documentary vacuum.

There were contemporaneous internal concerns involving security controls, contracting, payments, possible insider assistance and compliance.

Taken together, they create a legitimate governance question about whether SPDC’s internal-control environment was functioning as Shell publicly said it should.

Shell’s ethics framework depended upon people speaking up

Shell continues today to describe its Global Helpline as a mechanism through which employees, contractors and business partners can report suspected non-compliance confidentially and, if desired, anonymously.

The company says concerns are assessed and investigated and that confirmed Code breaches can result in disciplinary action. (Shell)

That makes the 2012 warning particularly relevant.

A compliance system is not tested by how attractively its Code of Conduct is written.

It is tested by what happens when somebody inside the organisation says the Code is failing.

Does management investigate?

Does it protect the person speaking up?

Does it identify root causes?

Does it discipline wrongdoing?

Does it disclose material failures upward?

Does it change incentives?

Does it follow up?

Or does the allegation disappear into email archives until litigation exposes it years later?

The public record currently does not tell us which happened here.

“Nepotism” matters in an operating company

Nepotism may sound less dramatic than a leaking pipeline.

In a major industrial operation it can become a safety and governance problem.

If hiring, promotion, contracting or procurement decisions are influenced by personal relationships rather than competence, controls weaken.

If people believe relationships matter more than rules, reporting misconduct becomes harder.

If contractors are selected without proper due diligence, security and integrity risks increase.

If employees believe influential colleagues are protected, a Code of Conduct becomes ceremonial rather than operational.

This does not mean the 2012 manager proved that any of those consequences had occurred.

It explains why the allegation merited serious escalation if made in the terms reported.

“Collusion” is potentially more serious still

The word becomes particularly sensitive given what Shell executives were discussing several months later.

In March 2013, senior personnel recorded concern about “Colluding staff and contractors” in relation to crude theft and instructed that alleged employee and contractor involvement be investigated.

One contemporaneous email warned that Shell had to proceed on the assumption that bunkerers were obtaining access to SPDC planning information. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)

Those records do not establish that the 2012 manager was referring to crude-oil theft when he used the word “collusion”.

We should not connect those dots as if the documents prove a single conspiracy.

They do not.

But the chronology makes one question entirely legitimate:

Did Shell examine whether the cultural concerns reported in 2012 had any connection to the insider-risk concerns being discussed by senior management in 2013?

Again, the public record does not provide the answer.

Shell’s Code was supposed to apply in difficult places too

Shell may reasonably respond that Nigeria presented extraordinary governance and security conditions.

That is unquestionably relevant.

The Niger Delta oil industry operated amid organised theft, sabotage, illegal refining, violence, weak institutions, political pressures and complex relationships with government agencies and contractors.

Shell has repeatedly emphasised that environment, including in its July 2026 response to Nigeria: Lifting the Lid.

But a Code of Conduct has greatest value precisely where the operating environment is difficult.

A company does not need elaborate ethics machinery merely for situations in which everybody already behaves properly.

It needs it where money, relationships, security pressures, patronage and conflicting incentives create opportunities for misconduct.

The more difficult Nigeria was, the more—not less—important the integrity framework became.

Shell says the report creates a misleading impression

Shell has responded directly to the organisations behind the July 2026 report.

In a statement dated 15 July 2026, reproduced in full in Nigeria: Lifting the Lid, Shell said the characterisation was not one it recognised.

It accused the publishers of selectively quoting documents in a way that creates a misleading impression and said their account did not adequately reflect the scale of organised oil theft, sabotage and illegal refining in the Niger Delta.

Shell also said its former Nigerian subsidiary worked with Nigerian authorities, its government-owned joint-venture partner and local communities in responding to these problems, including cleaning spills from joint-venture facilities irrespective of cause as Nigerian law required.

That response must be given proper weight.

It is also broad.

It does not specifically explain the 2012 manager’s allegation that SPDC’s Code of Conduct was being ignored.

Shell’s present position on Bille and Ogale

Shell’s current litigation page, updated 16 July 2026, says that large-scale oil theft, sabotage and illegal refining by organised criminal gangs caused the majority of pollution relevant to the Bille and Ogale proceedings.

Shell says its former subsidiary worked extensively with authorities and communities and invested in infrastructure, surveillance, repairs, shut-ins, spill response and remediation.

It maintains that neither Shell nor Renaissance should be liable for criminal acts committed by third parties and says it will vigorously defend the claims at the factual trial scheduled for 2027. (Shell)

Those are important positions.

But a Code-of-Conduct allegation concerns a different question.

Even if Shell proves that criminals caused the majority of disputed pollution, the integrity of the organisation managing the response remains relevant.

If internal controls were weak, that could affect contracting, security, maintenance, incident reporting, investigations and dealings with communities and government.

The criminality of outsiders and the conduct of insiders are not mutually exclusive issues.

Shell should publish the compliance trail

This is another area where documentary disclosure could settle rather than inflame the issue.

Shell could publish the 2012 email in full, subject to legitimate personal-data redactions.

It could identify the sender’s corporate role.

It could explain what events prompted the assessment.

It could state whether the email was escalated to Ethics and Compliance, Internal Audit, Legal or senior management.

It could disclose whether an investigation took place.

It could publish any findings in suitably redacted form.

It could disclose whether disciplinary or remedial action followed.

And it could explain what systems existed within SPDC in 2012 for employees and contractors to report nepotism, conflicts of interest, corruption or other Code violations.

If Shell investigated and found the manager’s claims unsupported, that is material context the public should know.

If it substantiated part of them and corrected the problem, that too should be disclosed.

If no investigation took place, the question becomes more serious.

The shareholder dimension

There is another reason this matters.

Shell’s public sustainability reporting was not written only for employees.

Investors, governments, civil-society organisations and communities were being asked to rely upon it.

The 2012 Sustainability Report told readers that the Business Principles governed Shell’s conduct and that compliance mechanisms existed. It also quantified Code violations and disciplinary action, demonstrating that ethics performance formed part of the company’s public accountability narrative. (Shell)

Against that background, a manager’s internal assessment that a major operating subsidiary regarded the Code as an inconvenience would have been potentially significant information.

That does not mean securities law required publication of this particular email.

The evidence reviewed here is nowhere near sufficient to reach such a legal conclusion.

Indeed, the publishers of Nigeria: Lifting the Lid themselves call for UK and Dutch authorities to investigate whether Shell made misleading statements concerning its environmental, social and governance standards; that is an advocacy demand, not a regulatory finding.

The narrower point is undeniable.

The internal assessment and the public corporate message point in opposite directions.

That discrepancy deserves explanation.

What is documented, alleged, contested and inferred

The documentary position can be stated precisely.

Documented: Shell publicly stated in 2012 that its Business Principles were foundational to how it operated, that employees and contractors were expected to comply, and that breaches could result in disciplinary action. Shell publicly reported 209 Code violations and 93 resulting employee or contractor terminations that year. (Shell)

Reported internal allegation: according to the claimants’ May 2026 court filing as reproduced in Nigeria: Lifting the Lid, a Shell headquarters manager visiting SPDC in 2012 alleged collusion, nepotism and corruption and described the Shell Code of Conduct as effectively ignored.

Not established: the public material reviewed does not establish the factual basis for every part of that manager’s allegation, identify particular individuals responsible, demonstrate criminal conduct, or show that SPDC as a whole was institutionally corrupt.

Inference: if the reported assessment was credible, it suggests a potentially serious failure of compliance culture requiring investigation and remediation. Whether Shell reached that same conclusion internally is not established by the currently public record.

Contested: Shell rejects the report publishers’ wider portrayal, says documents have been selectively presented without adequate context and emphasises the extraordinary criminal and security environment in which SPDC operated. The underlying Bille and Ogale liability disputes remain before the courts.

A Code is only as real as the organisation beneath it

Every large corporation has policies.

The difficult question is whether people believe them.

A Code of Conduct can prohibit corruption.

A helpline can receive allegations.

Employees can complete mandatory training.

The Board can receive compliance statistics.

Annual reports can publish disciplinary numbers.

All of that matters.

But culture exists below the paperwork.

It is expressed in what managers tolerate.

Which rules are enforced.

Who gets promoted.

Which contractors survive scrutiny.

Whether people can challenge powerful colleagues.

Whether misconduct has consequences.

And whether an employee who says something is badly wrong gets heard.

That is why the phrase attributed to the Shell manager is so damaging.

Not because it proves that everybody at SPDC was corrupt.

It does not.

But because it alleges that the mechanism designed to stop misconduct had lost authority inside the organisation.

“An inconvenience.”

“Completely ignored.”

Those are descriptions of a compliance system that, in the writer’s assessment, existed on paper but not sufficiently in practice.

Shell has the records that can resolve this

The public should not have to choose between two caricatures.

One caricature says SPDC was a fundamentally corrupt organisation whose rules meant nothing.

The other says every disturbing internal statement can be dismissed because Nigeria was difficult and criminals stole oil.

Neither is adequate.

The evidence permits something more precise.

A Shell headquarters manager reportedly made an exceptionally serious allegation about SPDC’s compliance culture in 2012.

Shell publicly maintained a sophisticated global ethics and compliance framework at the time.

Other disclosed material shows that senior management subsequently confronted concerns about security failures and alleged employee or contractor involvement in crude theft.

Whether those facts connect — and what Shell did about them — is a matter for documentary evidence.

Shell should release it.

Because after publishing global statistics on Code enforcement and telling the world that its Business Principles governed everyone who worked for it, the company cannot reasonably treat an internal allegation that the Code was being “completely ignored” as an irrelevant historical footnote.

The question is straightforward:

When Shell’s own manager said the ethics system had broken down in SPDC, did Shell investigate — and what did it find?

Until those records are disclosed, that question remains unanswered.

Documentary record

The central allegation appears in section 4.7, “Broken Rules,” of Nigeria: Lifting the Lid — Internal Documents Expose Shell’s Negligent Oil Operations, published on 29 July 2026 by Amnesty International, HEDA Resource Centre and partner organisations. The report attributes the 2012 material to paragraph 17.4 of the Claimants’ Supplemental Skeleton for the Case Management Conference of 18 May 2026.

The contemporaneous corporate comparison comes from Royal Dutch Shell’s Sustainability Report 2012, which described the Shell General Business Principles, anti-bribery and corruption programme, reporting mechanisms and Code-of-Conduct enforcement statistics. (Shell)

Shell’s 15 July 2026 response to the coalition is reproduced in Annex 1 of the report. Shell says the documents have been selectively quoted, that the resulting portrayal is misleading and that the severe criminal and operating conditions in the Niger Delta have not been adequately reflected.

Shell’s current account of the Bille and Ogale proceedings was updated 16 July 2026 and sets out its position on sabotage, illegal refining, spill response, liability and the factual trial scheduled for 2027. (Shell)

For direct reference: Nigeria: Lifting the Lid — full report · Shell Sustainability Report 2012 · Shell’s current Bille and Ogale position · HEDA Resource Centre — Shell documents page

Editorial note

This article does not allege that SPDC as an organisation was proven to be corrupt, that every Shell employee in Nigeria ignored the Code of Conduct, or that any named individual committed bribery, fraud or another criminal offence.

The statements concerning “collusion, nepotism and corruption” and the Code being “completely ignored” are reported as the assessment of a Shell headquarters manager following a 2012 visit to Nigeria. The material is cited by the claimants in the Bille and Ogale litigation and reproduced in the 2026 coalition report. It has not been adopted as a judicial finding.

The underlying email has not been identified in the report as one of HEDA’s numbered downloadable documents, and the publicly accessible record reviewed for this article does not disclose what investigation or remedial action, if any, followed.

Shell rejects the coalition’s wider interpretation of the documents, says selected extracts create a misleading impression without adequate recognition of organised oil theft, sabotage, illegal refining and the difficult operating environment, and continues to dispute the Bille and Ogale claims.

The factual and legal issues remain unresolved pending further proceedings.

Site wide disclaimer also applies.

THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 29 AUGUST 2026 was first posted on August 29, 2026 at 9:23 am.
©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

For farming families, we ask that relief and compensation reach tenant, landless and unregistered cultivators who hold no land papers; that seeds reach them before the winter planting; that farm loans be suspended.

The post Nepal Flash Floods: La Via Campesina Stands in Solidarity with the People of Nepal appeared first on La Via Campesina - EN.

A meaningful Woodcreek update has surfaced.

Reporting published on 28 August 2026, drawing on the JLL marketing material for Shell’s Houston campus, gives a much more precise picture of the proposed leaseback. Shell is reported to intend a 15-year lease on Buildings E and F, plus one floor of Building A, while taking only three-year leases on Buildings B, C, D and the remainder of Building A. That means the more than 700,000 sq ft Shell plans to relinquish would be released progressively over roughly three years rather than all at once. (Hoodline)

The broader terms remain unchanged: the Woodcreek campus is being marketed at about $325 million, Shell would retain a little over half of the nearly 1.5-million-sq-ft complex under the long leaseback, and there is still no identified buyer or confirmed sale price. (Houston Chronicle)

On Aberdeen, I found no meaningful new numerical disclosure. Shell still has not publicly stated how many employees will be required to move to London in 2027, and there is still no confirmed redundancy number tied to that relocation. The affected roles remain described as being in development, subsurface and wells, mostly supporting Shell’s global operations rather than the UK business. (Press and Journal)

So the new point worth recording is: Woodcreek is not simply a 15-year half-campus leaseback; Shell appears to be staging its exit from the rest of the campus over a three-year period, building by building.

A meaningful Woodcreek update has surfaced. was first posted on August 28, 2026 at 10:53 pm.
©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net

“The Hub” is a weekly round-up of transportation related news in the Philadelphia area and beyond. Check back weekly to keep up-to-date on the issues Clean Air Council’s transportation staff finds important.

As exciting events continue in Philadelphia, learn how you can get around to major summer 2026 events without a car, or being stuck in traffic with GoPhillyGo: Car-Free Routes Map!

Transit 4 All PA is hiring fellows, with two paid positions in Luzerne and Lackawanna Counties: to support transit advocates in building local demand for transit. If you live in Luzerne or Lackawanna County, and you ride transit, apply TODAY. Application closes on September 2, 2026. Learn more here. 

Image Source: Pennsylvania Capital-Star

Pennsylvania Capital-Star: Additional Amtrak passenger train service to and from Pittsburgh to begin in mid-November – A second daily passenger train will be running between Pittsburgh and New York, via Harrisburg and Philadelphia. The train will begin running in mid-November. Ridership on Pittsburgh to Philadelphia trains exceeded pre-pandemic levels for the first time in 2024, with nearly 234,000 passengers.

Image Source: The Inquirer

The Inquirer: The return of the Philadelphia Cycling Classic will close roads – This weekend the Philadelphia Cycling Classic is back, utilizing the original route of the Ben Franklin Parkway to Kelly Drive. Road closures will start on Saturday and continue into Sunday. SEPTA routes that travel through Manayunk and Roxborough or on Kelly Drive will be detoured.

Image Source: Visit Philadelphia

Metro Philadelphia: Open Streets returns to Center City for 7 Sundays of car-free fun this fall – Center City is bringing back Open Streets: West Walnut, for 7 weekends this fall. Starting September 13 through October 25, along Walnut Street between Broad and 19th Street, and 18th Street between Chestnut and Locust, will close to vehicles from 7 AM until 6 PM. Open Streets will run from 10 AM until 5 PM on Sundays.  Businesses along the closure routes reported an average 59% increase in foot traffic, and 37% increase in sales.

Other Stories

WHYY: Market Street Bridge closed to cars for a year as part of a nearly $150 million upgrade

The Inquirer: Lower Merion has issued more than 600 violations from red-light cameras since mid-July

StreetsBlog USA: Philadelphia Figured Out to Stop Double Parking — Will Other Cities Follow Suit?

The Inquirer: New trail connector lets bikers ride 70 miles from Philly to Reading. It’s ‘a really, really big deal.’

CBS Pittsburgh: Signs for upcoming PennDOT projects causing concerns for drivers, but impacts won’t be long-lasting

Philadelphia Today: Philadelphia Named Finalist to Host 2028 Democratic National Convention

On August 25th, 2026, candidates for City Council Districts 3 and 4 got on the water alongside willamette river keeper and candidates for Portland City Council Districts 3 and 4 to learn about the overwhelming danger of toxic and flammable fuels stored in aging tanks along the Willamette River. On this tour candidates learned the need for a significant CEI hub drawdown and better governmental regulation. Check out photos below!

The post Critical Energy Infrastructure Hub Paddling Tour appeared first on 350PDX: Climate Justice.