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City of Albany Passes No Coal Resolution
On October 19, 2026, the City of Albany joined Richmond, Emeryville, and Berkeley as East Bay city governments close ranks against coal transport, handling, and storage of coal in our communities. Albany’s City Council passed Resolution 2026-77 unanimously, with one councilmember absent.
A half-dozen speakers addressed the City Council in support of the resolution. The youngest speaker gave this comment:
Hi, I’m Oliver from Cornell Elementary, and I believe we should be against the coal facility because doing this will cause climate change and damage our ecosystems and our health.
Other speakers included Albany residents Ben Eichenberg on behalf of San Francisco Baykeeper, Katy Vigil-McClanahan, Allie Johnson, Tom Athanasiou, and Lucinda Young speaking on behalf of the Albany Climate Action Coalition. The speakers in favor of the resolution can be viewed on a YouTube recording of the meeting, starting at 1:36:45.
In addition to opposing “transport of coal and petcoke through the city and through nearby cities … [and] the handling and storage of coal at the proposed OBOT facility in Oakland,” Albany’s resolution “urges the Air District to adopt measures that would strengthen regulation of coal and petcoke as components of fugitive dust” and “to ensure that any air permit it issues to the OBOT facility fully protects Oakland and other Bay Area workers and residents from exposure to dangerous coal and petcoke emissions.”
Albany also threw its support behind California’s newly enacted law, AB40, that requires a “full, up-to-date Environmental Impact Report under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)” in the course of evaluating any application for an air permit for the Oakland Bulk and Oversize Terminal (OBOT).
No Coal in Oakland thanks the City of Albany for its insistence on protecting the health and safety of all residents of the East Bay; and on opposing the mining, transport, and burning of coal that would add to our planet’s ongoing climate crises.
Albany’s Resolution 2026-77 can be accessed on the City of Albany website. Image: speakers on Resolution 2026-77 at the Albany City Council meeting of 2026-10-19. Clockwise from upper-left: Lucinda Young, Ben Eichenberg, Katy Vigil-McClanahan, and Allie Johnson. Credit: Zoom screenshots.
Trump aide attempts to dodge blame for DC golf course tree cutting spree
Interior Secretary Doug Burgum’s deputy chief of staff, Gregory Wischer, told a federal judge Monday that the felling of more than 500 trees at Washington’s East Potomac Golf Links over Columbus Day weekend was not part of President Donald Trump’s plan to renovate the course.
Wischer, a political appointee who oversees many of Trump’s D.C. “beautification” projects, pinned the work on a 2019 Park Service landscape report. He also sparred with Park Service Deputy Director Frank Lands, who testified last week that Wischer directed him to proceed on October 5 and that acting director Jessica Bowron approved the plan the next day. “I never said go execute,” Wischer said Monday. “The direction came out of your mouth,” plaintiffs’ attorney Abbe Lowell shot back.
Lowell then showed photos from Trump’s June 28 tour of the course with Burgum and architect Tom Fazio, including one of Wischer carrying conceptual golf course proposals. Wischer acknowledged that Fazio’s son texted him the design Trump posted Sunday, and said he “can’t recall” contacting Tom Fazio. Judge Ana Reyes said there was “no universe” in which the timing was a coincidence.
On Sunday, Trump announced the course would close on November 15 for 15 months under a plan Interior developed “under the auspices of Secretary Doug Burgum.” That night, the Justice Department told Reyes there was “no final agency action” because the Park Service “has not completed its review.”
Quick hits 6 threats to public lands in the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act Judge halts controversial plan to build road in North Cascades riverbed Forest Service employees warned against sharing the chief’s travel plans after he visited Juneau Yellowstone receives record $105 million gift for infrastructure, conservation, access In Fairbanks, Interior Secretary Burgum touts deregulation and data centers Judge grills Trump administration over plans to overhaul Washington golf courseAssociated Press | New York Times | POLITICO
Arizona joins legal revolt over Trump’s Colorado River plan Data center project proposed on federal land gets sent back to square one Quote of the dayThe irreversible destruction these provisions would cause to treasured places like the Arctic, the Boundary Waters, Bears Ears, and Chaco is simply not a reasonable or necessary tradeoff.”
—The Wilderness Society on the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act
Picture ThisThe marbled orb weaver, aka the “pumpkin spider,” gets its seasonal nickname from its round abdomen and brilliant orange coloring.
These colorful spiders build wheel-shaped webs that are perfect for catching insects that wander into their carefully spun traps.
This one was spotted sitting on a red fall leaf at @ShenandoahNPS, looking ready for spooky season.
Photo by Alan Downie
Feature image: East Potomac Golf Course at Hain’s Point; Source: National Parks Gallery/Picryl
The post Trump aide attempts to dodge blame for DC golf course tree cutting spree appeared first on Center for Western Priorities.
No Kings Coalition Issues Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg Demanding Answers on Meta’s Censorship of Historic Early Vote Mobilization
Today, the No Kings Coalition sent an open letter to Meta Platforms, Inc. Chairman and CEO Mark Zuckerberg demanding immediate transparency and public answers regarding the sudden suspension of its official Instagram account during the nationwide No Kings: Vote Early day of action on Saturday, October 17.
On Saturday, as millions of Americans assembled across nearly 3,000 events in all 50 states and Washington, D.C., Meta unexpectedly suspended the coalition’s Instagram account at 1:30 p.m. ET, when public engagement and livestreaming were peaking. The page was completely hidden, and administrators were locked out without justification.
While Meta later admitted in an email that it had wrongly taken the account offline and restored public visibility just after 3 p.m. ET, account administrators remained locked out of the account’s backend for over four hours, preventing real-time communications from reaching millions of Americans. Public comments from representatives of Meta citing a "technical glitch" do not sufficiently explain these actions or the significant delay in restoring access. In the open letter, the coalition demands a public response to 9 detailed questions no later than 5:00 p.m. PT on Wednesday, October 21, 2026.
The questions demand transparency regarding specific policy violations, enforcement logs, potential communications between Meta and the Trump administration, internal content moderation directives, hashtag throttling, automated AI moderation protocols, emergency redress human review guarantees, and high-profile account "whitelist" practices.
"This raises serious questions among the public about why these actions were taken and the implications during the election season. Critical voter information or civic participation should not be blocked, throttled, or otherwise interfered with if Meta aspires to be a trusted actor in our democracy," the coalition writes in the letter. "The public deserves answers."
The full text of the open letter sent to Meta leadership is included below and is available online at nokings.org/metacensorship. Additionally, the No Kings Coalition is having a mass virtual call on Wednesday, October 21 at 8 p.m. ET to share updates and discuss what’s next as the coalition transitions into nonpartisan election defense.
To speak with a representative of the No Kings Coalition, email media@nokings.org.
FULL TEXT OF OPEN LETTER TO META PLATFORMS, INC.
October 19, 2026
Mark Zuckerberg
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Meta Platforms, Inc.
Attn: Diana Powell McCormick, Joel Kaplan, Adam Mosseri
1 Meta Way
Dear Mark Zuckerberg:
The No Kings Coalition writes in alarm at actions taken by Meta that resulted in removal and revocation of account administrator access to the coalition’s Instagram account during the largest single-day early vote activation in American history.
On Saturday, October 17, millions of Americans came together for No Kings: Vote Early. At the height of our national day of action around 1:30pm ET, Meta unexpectedly suspended the No Kings Coalition’s Instagram account. The page was completely hidden, and administrators were locked out for hours without any justification. Meta did not respond to our team for approximately 90 minutes.
At 3:03pm ET, only after intense public backlash, Meta restored the account to viewable status. At this time, Meta admitted in a response email that they had wrongly taken the account offline. However, administrators were still unable to access the account for more than four hours until 5:41pm ET.
Public comments from representatives of Meta do not sufficiently explain these actions or the significant delay in remedying the so-called “technical glitch.” This raises serious questions among the public about why these actions were taken and the implications during the election season. Critical voter information or civic participation should not be blocked, throttled, or otherwise interfered with if Meta aspires to be a trusted actor in our democracy.
The public deserves answers. As such, the No Kings Coalition demands public response to the following questions. Americans are voting, and the election is fast approaching. Time is of the essence. Responses to these questions should be shared publicly no later than 5:00pm Pacific Time on Wednesday, October 21st.
- What specific actions from the No Kings Coalition account were alleged to have violated Meta’s policies, and which policies were implicated? Will Meta release the enforcement logs related to this incident?
- What, if any, communication has Meta or its representatives had with the Trump administration about No Kings and other pro-democracy protests? Who were you in contact with, and what topics were discussed?
- Did Meta have any communications with the Trump administration related to the October 17th No Kings day of action, either before, during, or after the 17th?
- Did any government, political party, outside organization, or advertiser contact Meta about the account or the No Kings events in the 30 days prior to removal? If so, who and what was requested?
- Did Meta have any communications with the Trump administration about prior actions from No Kings or other pro-democracy protests?
- Has Meta had any communications with the Trump administration about voter education and mobilization or anything else related to the 2026 midterm elections?
- Does Meta have any internal directives or policies for teams managing account access or content moderation related to demonstrations of free speech, pro-democracy protests, or content critical of President Trump or the federal government?
- Why did #NoKings stop populating content on Instagram’s desktop site for a portion of the afternoon on October 17 while the official No Kings account was down? Was No Kings content, including content from other accounts, subject to any restriction, suppression, reduced distribution, or other limitation on its visibility or reach during any part of October 17?
- A Meta representative cited “automated systems” as part of the explanation for how this happened. To what extent are AI agents involved in building, monitoring, or administering these automated systems?
- Will Meta guarantee human review of all automated midterm-related content moderation actions within one hour of initial action between now and when the winners of the election are seated? What emergency redress options will you put in place to ensure voter access efforts that experience similar account disruptions can reach a human being to review their account status?
- Meta has published information on Meta’s use of various whitelist protocols that prevent automated systems from banning or removing content from certain high profile accounts. How do those systems treat President Trump and his allies? How do those systems treat No Kings or other civil society efforts to encourage voter participation?
- Will Meta guarantee that its policies and algorithms will not put a thumb on the scale for or against any candidates or parties during the 2026 midterm elections?
Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter. We look forward to your timely public response.
Sincerely,
The No Kings Coalition
No Kings events are nonpartisan and are designed to increase participation from all eligible voters. A core principle behind all No Kings events is a commitment to nonviolent action and no civil disobedience. We expect all participants to seek to de-escalate any potential confrontation with those who disagree with our values and to act lawfully at these events. Weapons of any kind, including those legally permitted, should not be brought to events.
Op-Ed | Nourishing the World: Expanding Humanity’s Ambition for Food, Health, and the Planet
Can we change the future of food and health by changing the words we use? Consider what happens when we shift our ambition from surviving to thriving. From conserving ecosystems to regenerating them. From extending lifespan to fostering healthspan. Words shape our mindsets, the stories we tell, and how we act. A single word can expand an entire ambition.
As we reflect on World Food Day and reports emerging from this year’s United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Climate Week NYC, we are witnessing an expansion of one of humanity’s greatest collective ambitions: from feeding the world to nourishing it. For generations, feeding the world has inspired food initiatives and international cooperation that have helped sustain billions of lives. With hundreds of millions still experiencing hunger and food insecurity, ensuring everyone has enough to eat remains urgent, while our ambition must evolve to meet the challenges and opportunities of today, tomorrow, and the future we are creating.
Feeding the world has long been intertwined with the challenge of a growing population. That trajectory is changing. The U.N. projects that the global population will peak later this century. Alongside these demographic transitions, rising diet-related disease, biodiversity loss, conflict, and climate risks are reshaping what we must deliver.
The call for a broader ambition has grown over the past two decades, gaining momentum with the rise of food systems approaches. In 2016, Lawrence Haddad and colleagues called for a global research agenda to shift from feeding the world to nourishing it.In 2021, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres identified Nourish All People as a priority for transforming food systems. More recently, calls for international cooperation have reinforced the urgency of healthy diets and sustainable food systems. This year’s World Food Day theme, “Innovate today. Nourish tomorrow,” recognizes the power of science, traditional knowledge, ingenuity, and cooperation to transform food systems. What makes this moment extraordinary is that advances in science are expanding what we can imagine, discover, and achieve for humanity.
Nourishing the world expands our focus beyond how much food we produce to consider its quality, the health and dignity of those who produce and eat it, and the ecosystems that sustain it. When recently asked at the SDG Media Zone at UNGA81 what I had learned from communities around the world, my answer reflected what many have understood for generations: food is nourishment. What does it mean to make nourishment the measure of our ambition?
A critical measure for advancing nourishment is food quality. Food quality goes beyond calories and nutrients to encompass the molecular composition of food and the conditions in which it is grown, produced, processed, and prepared. Together, these shape its nutrient density, molecular diversity, biological activity, safety, flavor, and other sensory qualities. By connecting agriculture, the environment, and human health, food quality offers a way to measure and improve what our food systems deliver. Nourishment is greater than any single measure. It also depends on whether food is accessible, desirable, culturally meaningful, and produced in ways that sustain people, livelihoods, and ecosystems.
Nourishing the world is not an incremental ambition. We cannot feed people first and nourish them later. We already produce enough calories globally. Our ambition must be to develop creative solutions to ensure nourishing food reaches everyone. Consider the ingenuity of Mumbai’s dabbawalas, who have delivered millions of home-cooked meals across the city for generations, a remarkable but declining tradition.
Nourishment must be cultivated from the beginning, through the incredible edible biodiversity we conserve and cultivate, the crops and livestock we breed, the health of our soils and waters, and how food is grown, processed, and distributed. It must also shape the incentives, policies, and institutions that determine whose knowledge is valued, whose livelihoods are supported, and who can access nourishing food. This includes our ability to transform raw ingredients into nutritious, delicious, and culturally meaningful meals. Nourishment begets nourishment, creating a virtuous cycle across people, communities, and ecosystems. Rooted in dignity, this transformation will look different in every place.
In a Nature Food comment, my colleagues and I drew inspiration from mangroves, whose resilience depends on diverse, interconnected root systems. Food systems likewise depend on interconnected agricultural systems, economies, governance, diets, and knowledge. To change what our food systems deliver, we must transform their foundational roots: what they are designed to achieve, what they reward, and how success is measured. When we prioritize yields and nutrients, we risk overlooking the many dimensions of nourishment. What we measure shapes what we manage, and what we incentivize shapes what we produce.
Imagine agricultural landscapes where biodiversity flourishes alongside productive farms. Where agricultural success is measured not only by yield per hectare, but also by food quality and its potential to nourish people. Where farmers are rewarded for nourishing people and regenerating ecosystems. Where diverse food economies thrive, food waste declines, and innovations emerge. Where healthier diets help reduce the trillions of dollars in health and economic costs associated with poor diets, and healthier people realize their full potential. Where nourishing food is desirable, accessible, and rooted in culture and choice.
This vision must extend to every community across the planet. Nourishment is a universal ambition, and its expression must reflect the diversity of people and places. Realizing it requires cooperation across agriculture, environment, economic development, health, and education. This ambition must continue to evolve, drawing on the world’s diversity of knowledge, cultures, and capabilities. The world of 2050 will not be the world of 2100.
This World Food Day, I am honored to join global partners through The Periodic Table of Food Initiative (PTFI) in advancing the ambition to nourish the world. Our contribution to this global call is to enable a growing global ecosystem to generate, integrate, and translate standardized molecular evidence on food and health that can accelerate food systems innovation to nourish people and the planet. Together, we are expanding the extraordinary frontier of food and health discovery.
Through PTFI, we are generating evidence across a remarkable spectrum of food systems innovations, from ancient crops grown using regenerative agricultural practices to entirely new classes of food products. We are collectively advancing our understanding of what this evidence means for human health. AI-enabled molecular modeling is helping generate hypotheses about how food molecules interact with human biology. We are connecting molecular evidence with existing epidemiological studies to investigate relationships between food quality and health, while conducting experimental and clinical research to test biological significance. However, we have only begun to scratch the surface of what remains to be discovered.
The path ahead calls for greater collective effort and investment to scale this work and translate emerging evidence into new approaches for characterizing and scoring food quality, as well as evidence-based recommendations and thresholds that can strengthen national and international food and health guidelines. Equally exciting is the opportunity to create entirely new markets and inspire a new generation of innovation. Imagine the possibilities unlocked by molecular evidence on food and health: creating new nourishing products, reimagining food procurement, and transforming how we understand, value, design, manage, and reward food systems.
Along this journey, we must recognize and value traditional knowledge while upholding Indigenous Data Sovereignty, equitable data access, and principles of Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS), ensuring that innovation does not come at the expense of the communities whose knowledge and resources make it possible.
Building on The Rockefeller Foundation’s pioneering investment in PTFI, alongside investments from other philanthropic partners, we have an extraordinary opportunity to meet the moment by mobilizing new and creative forms of capital to accelerate discovery and innovation for the future we want food to make possible.
Just as words expand our ambitions, new ambitions may call for words we have yet to imagine.
From surviving to thriving. From conserving ecosystems to regenerating them. From extending lifespan to fostering healthspan. From feeding the world to nourishing it.
This essay is part of Food Tank’s Flourish Series: Food and Health from Molecules to Systems, authored by Selena Ahmed, exploring how food connects us to the living world while asking what it means to flourish. For more in the series, click here.
The post Op-Ed | Nourishing the World: Expanding Humanity’s Ambition for Food, Health, and the Planet appeared first on Food Tank.
CUANDO LAS COMUNIDADES GANAN, EL MUNDO GANA.
20 historias inspiradoras de victorias contra los incineradores de basura
20 de octubre de 2026A lo largo de los últimos 25 años de GAIA, hemos sido testigos del cierre de más de 375 incineradores en todo el mundo. En esta serie dedicada a la Semana Global de Acción contra la Incineración, destacamos más de 20 ejemplos inspiradores de comunidades que han salido victoriosas frente a incineradores y propuestas de construcción de incineradores en sus ciudades.
Desde intervenciones apasionadas e informativas en reuniones del consejo municipal, pasando por consultas técnicas con instituciones financieras internacionales, hasta campañas históricas de peticiones y la obtención de apoyo de la comunidad internacional, descubre los factores clave de las siguientes victorias contra las falsas soluciones tóxicas en todo el mundo.
.stk-md69fw0 .stk-block-heading__text{color:#952925 !important;}América Latina y el Caribe View this post on InstagramA post shared by GAIA Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (@gaia_zerowaste)
WTE ARAUCANÍA
Lautaro, región de La Araucanía, Chile
Año de cierre/suspensión: 2022
Factor clave para el éxito:
Participación pública: Más de 17.000 comentarios por escrito durante la etapa de consulta pública del proceso de evaluación ambiental.
Campaña educativa: Participación constante del público en general al poner a disposición información crítica y fácil de entender.
Coalición: Formación de una fuerte coalición entre las comunidades mapuches, el municipio y las organizaciones ambientales.
Experiencia técnica: Evidencia pericial relevante y altamente calificada en las audiencias.
Defensa consistente: Vigilancia constante y continua a lo largo de las diferentes etapas del proceso.
Visibilización del rechazo a la incineración en Europa y promoción de la estrategia Basura Cero: en paralelo con el rechazo a la incineración de basura, se promovió la implementación de la estrategia basura cero, mostrando ejemplos en el mundo. También se expuso la contaminación de incineradores en Europa.
Recursos:
Artículo relevante: https://araucaniadiario.cl/contenido/35379/rada-celebra-nuevo-rechazo-a-la-incineracion-de-basura-en-chile
Sitio web de RADA: www.radaraucania.org
Miembros que participaron en la victoria: Red de Acción por los Derechos Ambientales (RADA), Comunidades mapuches, municipio de Lautaro.
.stk-73e5lbh .stk-block-heading__text{color:#952925 !important;}Asia-Pacifico View this post on InstagramA post shared by GAIA Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (@gaia_zerowaste)
PLANTA DE PIROLISIS DE DUMAGUETE
Dumaguete, Filipinas
Año de cierre: 2025
Factor clave del éxito: El poder de la ciencia comunitaria, la experiencia sobre el terreno y el liderazgo de los miembros de las comunidades afectadas, incluidos los trabajadores del sector de residuos, las amas de casa, los residentes, los estudiantes y los maestros de Dumaguete.
Estudio de caso y recursos:
Informe «Clearing the Air»
Lee sobre la conferencia de prensa aquí: https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1253343
Miembros involucrados en la victoria: WOW, DWWA (Asociación de Trabajadores de Residuos de Dumaguete), GAIA
PROPUESTA DE PLANTAS DE CONVERSIÓN DE RESIDUOS EN ENERGÍA EN 4 CIUDADES
Gujarat, India
Año de cierre/suspensión: 2025
Factores clave del éxito:
1. El análisis del informe de EIAS y la identificación de cómo este viola las normas de desempeño del Banco Mundial
2. La difusión de las voces locales a nivel global
3. Documentación de los impactos sobre el terreno de la empresa de incineración de basura con generación de electricidad (WTE) y su análisis financiero.
Recursos: Carta al Banco Mundial, carta colectiva firmada por 174 organizaciones
Miembros involucrados en la victoria: Alianza por un Gujarat sin Incineradoras, incluyendo a CFA, IAP y las comunidades afectadas
PROPUESTA DE INCINERADORA EN VARIOS PAÍSES
Indonesia, Malasia, Filipinas, Singapur, Tailandia y Vietnam, China y Hong Kong
Año en que se cerró o detuvo el proyecto: 2024
Factor clave del éxito: Esfuerzos colectivos de campaña, incluso en espacios estratégicos como la Reunión Anual del AIIB, además de una carta técnica enviada al AIIB (Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructura) y la denuncia de la relación de la empresa de incineración con la corrupción y la contaminación
Recursos: Documento del proyecto del AIIB, artículo sobre el caso en AIIB Observer
Miembros involucrados: Miembros en Indonesia, Malasia, Filipinas, Singapur, Tailandia y Vietnam, China y Hong Kong, GAIA Asia-Pacífico
PROPUESTA DE PLANTA DE GENERACIÓN DE ENERGÍA A PARTIR DE RESIDUOS EN TE AWAMATU
Te Awamatu, Aotearoa Nueva Zelanda
Año de cierre/suspensión: 2025
Factores clave para el éxito: Oposición pública con más de 900 comentarios por escrito + sólidos testimonios de expertos en contra de la planta durante las audiencias de la Junta
Gran participación comunitaria
Excelente formación de una coalición entre la comunidad, los maoríes y las organizaciones ambientales
Pruebas periciales relevantes y altamente calificadas en las audiencias
Recursos:
Sitio web de la campaña, presentación de GAIA
Llamado a enviar observaciones al proyecto de incinerador de Te Awamatu https://zerowaste.co.nz/action-alert-make-a-submission-on-the-te-awamutu-incinerator/
Miembros que participaron en la victoria: Zero Waste Aotearoa, Regeneration Not Incineration
PROPUESTA DE LA INSTALACIÓN DE RECUPERACIÓN DE MAPO
Mapo-gu, Corea del Sur
Año de cierre/suspensión: 2026
Factores clave del éxito: Creación de una alianza para luchar contra esta propuesta de incinerador.
La determinación de los residentes y una sólida organización comunitaria: la feroz oposición y la persistencia de la comunidad fueron la fuerza impulsora que mantuvo la campaña hasta el final.
Victoria en el litigio: La comunidad ganó una demanda al revelar fallas procesales.
Amplia solidaridad de la sociedad civil: la campaña construyó una amplia coalición que se extendió más allá del grupo de residentes, reuniendo a residentes, organizaciones de la sociedad civil y la oficina del distrito local.
Recursos: La ciudad de Seúl descarta el plan de la planta incineradora de Mapo-gu https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/03/03/D2EWSGFRPVEDZH6R5PJZWZY26E/
Miembros que participaron en la victoria: Mapo Resource Circulation Network
.stk-zlr0c65 .stk-block-heading__text{color:#952925 !important;}Europa View this post on InstagramA post shared by GAIA Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (@gaia_zerowaste)
APROXIMADAMENTE 200 INCINERADORES
Varias ubicaciones, Reino Unido
Año de cierre: desde 2007
Factor clave del éxito: Los logros de los activistas pueden atribuirse a muchos factores, entre ellos:
- El uso de argumentos basados en hechos y respaldados por evidencia, incluyendo los daños causados por la incineración de residuos
- El asesoramiento, la orientación y el apoyo para establecer contactos por parte de una red sin fines de lucro consolidada: UKWIN
- Una fuerte y sostenida oposición pública que se traduce en el respaldo político de los funcionarios locales
Estudio de caso y recursos:
Act Locallyhttps://ukwin.org.uk/files/pdf/BiIG-success-for-Buttington.pdf
From concerned locals to national change: How Dovesdale Action Group built power and won Why Oppose IncinerationMiembros que participaron en el logro: UKWIN, comunidades locales, organizaciones asociadas y redes aliadas
INCINERADORA MUNICIPAL DE RESIDUOS
Skalica, Eslovaquia
Año de cierre o suspensión: 2026
Factores clave del éxito:
- Monitoreo temprano y recopilación de información: dar seguimiento a los avances en la gestión de residuos y recopilar información sobre el proyecto desde el inicio del proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA), lo que permitió a los activistas contar con tiempo suficiente para comprender la propuesta y responder de manera efectiva.
- Identificar y empoderar a los residentes locales afectados: encontrar personas activas en la comunidad que pudieran verse directamente afectadas por el proyecto, involucrarlas a través de reuniones públicas y campañas de información, y apoyarlas para que se convirtieran en defensores locales clave.
- Brindar apoyo constante por parte de las ONG y los expertos: crear un foro en el que las ONG y los expertos puedan explicar el proyecto y sus posibles impactos a los residentes, las autoridades locales y los defensores de la comunidad, al tiempo que se haga hincapié en la paciencia y la perseverancia necesarias para mantener la campaña a largo plazo.
Recursos:
Puedes encontrar más información sobre nuestra lucha conjunta aquí:
Artículos relevantes:
Spaľovne? Po skládkovaní druhé najhoršie riešenie! Spaľovanie odpadov je škodlivým prežitkomhttp://skalickyobzor.sk/cms/zo-skalickej-spalovne-je-medzinarodny-skandal/
http://skalickyobzor.sk/cms/podme-porovnat-oba-varianty-likvidacie-odpadu-ceh-zevo-kontra-mbu/
http://skalickyobzor.sk/cms/je-dokazane-uz-dnes-spalujeme-skalicky-odpad-v-cementarni-v-rohozniku/
Miembros que participaron en la victoria: la comunidad local, Priatelia Zeme – SPZ (Amigos de la Tierra – SPZ)
INCINERADORA ALIMENTADA CON RDF
Pavlikeni, Bulgaria
Año de cierre/suspensión: 2026
Factores clave del éxito:
Una comunidad local unida y el apoyo de las empresas locales: los residentes se unieron más allá de sus diferencias para proteger el ambiente limpio de la región, las tierras agrícolas fértiles y la calidad de vida, y las empresas locales también respaldaron la campaña.
Sólidos conocimientos técnicos, legales y científicos: abogados, biólogos, ecologistas y otros expertos técnicos aportaron conocimientos fundamentales, mientras que la organización ambientalista Za Zemiata apoyó la campaña con su experiencia y capacidad legal.
Una movilización pública sin precedentes y una perseverancia constante: más de 20.000 personas de la región firmaron una petición, lo que generó una gran atención mediática y demostró una fuerte oposición pública. Cuatro años de batallas legales requirieron una perseverancia constante, mientras que la demanda exitosa de Za Zemiata contra la incineradora de Sofía ayudó a mantener la esperanza de que la campaña pudiera tener éxito.
Recursos:
<ESTUDIO DE CASO PRÓXIMAMENTE>
Miembros involucrados: Za Zemiata, comunidad afectada, red de aliados
.stk-a5efrk3 .stk-block-heading__text{color:#952925 !important;}Africa View this post on InstagramA post shared by GAIA Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (@gaia_zerowaste)
PLANTA DE INCINERACIÓN A GRAN ESCALA DE DRAKENSTEIN
Drakenstein, Sudáfrica
Año en que se detuvo el proyecto: 2016
Factor clave del éxito: Las comunidades y organizaciones locales se opusieron al proyecto de incineración a gran escala propuesto, de 25 millones de dólares, incluyendo preocupaciones en torno a la participación de empresas extranjeras y la Agencia de Comercio y Desarrollo de EE. UU.
Recursos:
Organizaciones que participaron en la victoria: Drakenstein Environmental Watch (DEW), Asociación de Wellington contra la Incineradora (WAAI), groundWork, la Asociación Sudafricana de Recicladores (SAWPA), GAIA y los residentes de la comunidad
PROYECTO DE GENERACIÓN DE ENERGÍA A PARTIR DE RESIDUOS EN MAURICIO
La Chaumière, Mauricio
Factor clave del éxito: Poner de relieve la incompatibilidad de la planta de conversión de residuos en energía Gamma Covanta, de 300.000 toneladas, en una isla donde aproximadamente el 70% de los residuos son residuos verdes y de cocina.
Recursos: https://www.lalitmauritius.org/en/newsarticle/843/the-la-chaumire-waste-to-energy-project-criticized/
Miembros que participaron en la victoria: Collectif des Opposants a l’Incineration de Déchets, DION y groundWork
PLANTA DE INCINERACIÓN A GRAN ESCALA
Johannesburgo, Sudáfrica
Año de cierre o suspensión: 2013
Factor clave del éxito: Reconocer y seguir el ejemplo de los 500 recicladores de base, poniendo sus voces y sus medios de vida en el centro de la campaña.
Recursos: Marcha contra la destrucción de empleos por la energía sucia
Miembros involucrados: SAWPA, groundWork y la Alianza Internacional de Recolectores de Residuos (IAWP)
PLANTA DE PIROLISIS DE NEUMÁTICOS DE OGIJO (ALTO PERFIL TECNOLÓGICO)
Ogijo, Nigeria
Año de cierre o suspensión: 2025
Factores clave del éxito: La ciencia ciudadana que llenó el vacío en los datos oficiales para documentar la contaminación cerca de la planta de quema de residuos.
Recursos:
Informe «Clearing the Air»
Miembros involucrados en la victoria: Comunidades afectadas, Green Knowledge Foundation
¿Te sientes inspirado para actuar en tu comunidad?Comienza con el documento «Cómo las comunidades pueden rechazar la incineración y ganar» y la guía comunitaria «Incineración de residuos: lo básico», y conoce las incineradoras que aún amenazan a las comunidades en el «Burn Book» de GAIA. Luego, únete a la Semana Global de Acción para Detener la Incineración.
The post CUANDO LAS COMUNIDADES GANAN, EL MUNDO GANA. first appeared on GAIA.
Council warned against unlawful Horse Hill approval
A legal letter from a campaigner has warned Surrey County Council that approval of drilling and production at the Horse Hill oil site would be unlawful.
Horse Hill, Surrey, January, 2026. Photo: Goldman Environmental PrizeThe site, near Redhill, was stripped of its planning permission in a landmark ruling by the Supreme Court in June 2024. The court said the original permission granted in 2019 was unlawful because it failed to assess the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the end-use of the oil.
Oil production has been suspended since October 2024.
The site operator, Horse Hill Developments Limited (HHDL), it is now seeking to reinstate the permission. If granted, this would allow the company to drill four new production wells and extract 600,000 tonnes of oil over 20 years.
Use of the oil would release about two million tonnes of greenhouse gases, HHDL has estimated in new environmental information.
Dennis May, a member of Frack Free Misson who supported the Supreme Court case by Sarah Finch and the Weald Action Group, is the latest campaigner to oppose the application. (More details here and here)
In a letter from the law firm, Leigh Day, he argues:
- The assessment of emissions from the use of the oil was “so flawed” that permission could not lawfully be granted under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regulations.
- The proposal contravened local planning policy, including the influential development plan, because it had not demonstrated the need for more drilling and production. The plans would also have “a significant adverse effect on the climate”.
- The proposal was not supported by national policy
The letter concluded:
“The Proposed Development is contrary to Development Plan policy, will have no guaranteed benefits for national energy security, receives no national policy support, and will have a major adverse impact on the climate.
“For all of these reasons permission should be refused. A decision to grant consent, on the basis of the information currently before the Council, would be unlawful, irrational and in breach of the EIA Regulations.”
Core fuelHHDL had characterised the project as a “core fuel sector” activity under the Energy Act 2023. This seeks to maintain and improve core fuel sector resilience and ensure continuity of supply in the UK.
But Mr May’s letter said projects for the commercial extraction of crude oil were not included in the statutory definition of the core fuel sector. The letter said:
“HHD issimply wrong in law in its assertion that the activity is wihtin the core fuel sector regime”.
It added:
“HHD is wrong to seek to conflate its project for the commercial extraction of crude oil with the powers of the Secretary of State to safeguard downstream core fuel supplies.”
Climate impactThe company had also argued in the new information that the emissions from use of the oil would be “not significant” for climate change and that drilling and production at Horse Hill would contribute to national energy security.
Mr May’s letter said there was “no credible basis for suggesting the impact on the climate would not be significant”.
HHDL’s assessment of the climate impacts was “deeply flawed”, the letter said. Methods used to give context to the significance of the emissions did not follow relevant guidance and/or were misleading, it said.
The letter added
“When the correct principles are applied it is absolutely obvious that the grant of permission for new oil and gas development … will have a major adverse effect on the climate.
“The applicant’s scattergun calculations may make it difficult to establish the precise magnitude of the effect with confidence, but it will self-evidently be significant in EIA terms. Any suggestion to the contrary is smoke and mirrors.”
“The FEI [further environmental information] submitted by HHD is logically unsound and legally inadequate. On that basis alone, permission for the proposed development should be refused.”
Policy supportThe letter said HHDL was wrong to argue that the application benefitted from “active national policy support” in the National Policy Statement for Energy
It said the statement did not support the argument that new oil and gas extraction should be considered as infrastructure for which there was an urgent need.
Mr May countered any argument that the application was not for new oil and gas infrastructure. He said previous lawful planning permissions at Horse Hill had been for exploration and appraisal, not production. The first permission for production had been quashed by the Supreme Court.
The revised National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) – the blueprint for decision-making – removed the previous positive weight given to the economic benefits of onshore oil and gas development, the letter added. The NPPF also removed the requirement on decision-makers to “plan positively” for onshore oil and gas.
Decision dateNo date has been confirmed for deciding the Horse Hill application.
But Surrey County Council told us today the January 2027 meeting of the planning committee was “currently looking the most likely”.
This meeting is expected to be on Wednesday 27 January 2027 at 10.30am. The committee usually meets in the council chamber at county council headquarters, Woodhatch Place, 11 Cockshot Hill, Reigate, Surrey, RH2 8EF.
energy B deal on Horse Hill
energy B has announced an agreement that would give it total control of the suspended Horse Hill oil site in Surrey.
Horse Hill oil site in Surrey. Source: Google Earth downloaded 21/7/2026In a stock market statement this morning, the company said it had agreed to buy the remaining stakes in Horse Hill, held by Arkadian Strategic Metals plc and Azzuro Resources.
The deals will cost a total of £167,748, energy B said.
In June 2026, energy B agreed to buy the majority interest in the site, near Gatwick Airport, then held by UK Oil & Gas plc (UKOG).
Today’s announcement would give energy B full ownership of the operator, Horse Hill Developments Limited (HHDL), the company said.
All three deals must be approved by the industry regulator, the North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA).
Energy B said formal application for the change of control was made to the NSTA on 30 September 2026.
DrillOrDrop recently asked NSTA whether the deal with UK Oil & Gas had been approved. The regulator said it could not comment on individual cases.
Production haltedOil production at Horse Hill has been suspended since October 2024. This followed the landmark Finch ruling by the Supreme Court, which quashed planning permission at the site.
The court ruled that the consent had been granted unlawfully in 2019. The decision-maker, Surrey County Council, had failed to assess the greenhouse gas emissions from using Horse Hill oil, known as downstream or scope 3 emissions.
HHDL submitted a new planning application in May 2026 for further drilling and long-term oil production at Horse Hill.
The application has been widely criticised by environmental campaigners, particularly over the assessment of scope 3 emissions. (Details here and here.)
Surrey County Council suggested today that a decision on the Horse Hill plans would not be made in 2026. A spokesperson said the date of the deciding planning committee meeting had not been confirmed but January 2027 was “currently looking the most likely”. More details
Neil Ritson, chief executive of energy B, said today:
“These minority interest buyout agreements are important to us as they will give us day to day control of the Gatwick energy site going forward. This will allow us to streamline our approach to the future field development and in dealing with the UK Government and regulators.
“We hope to restart production at the site early 2027 but timing depends on the discussions that are ongoing with the Surrey Country Council and the field’s planning amendments that are currently before them.”
Fundraisingenergy B also said it had received firm commitments to raise £100,000 in share issues.
These include a £50,000 conditional subscription from the company’s chair, David Lenigas.
He said today:
“Consolidating our ownership of the Gatwick energy site into one single entity under energy B paves the way to reopen the site and supply British oil and gas to the British market.
“Historically, all of the oil from Gatwick has gone to the Fawley refinery near Southampton. It is the largest refinery in the UK, and it supplies about a fifth of the nation’s refinery capacity.
“Around 85% of its products travel to five distribution terminals plus, Heathrow, Gatwick and Birmingham airports. The oil from HH-1 also goes into the mix for Fawley’s dedicated jet fuel pipelines to the major airports.
“The Gatwick energy site can again be a home-grown contributor to Britain’s energy security.”
The case for a more sustainable tire that comes apart on purpose
Researchers in Spain have shown that a modular tire in which tread and casing are designed as separate pieces stays together while in use, provided that it’s properly inflated.
“This is an encouraging step toward a more sustainable tire architecture, where the worn tread could potentially be replaced while the main tire structure is reused,” says study team member Farshad Afshari, a PhD researcher at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M) and Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM)..
A modular automobile tire could be easier to recycle compared to conventional ones, which require time- and labor-intensive separation of rubber treads and sidewalls from steel belts and bead cores. It would also use materials more efficiently, since there would be less material to replace at any given time.
A modular tire could also be better for the environment. Conventional rubber tires are a prominent source of microplastic pollution because tiny rubber particles degrade due to friction and enter the air and waterways. But the modular design could open up the possibility of making each component of the tire from safer and more easily recyclable materials.
It’s a compelling idea in theory, but would the components of a modular tire actually stay together in practice?
Afshari and his collaborators built a scaled-down prototype of their ECOTIRE modular tire concept, in which tread and casing are mechanically interlocked through a series of bumps and hollows like the two halves of a waffle iron.
They tested the tire on a custom-built rolling test rig in the lab to see how the tire would fare while varying parameters such as load, turning radius, inflation pressure, and slip. This last component is a source of mechanical stress induced by driving conditions such as braking and cornering.
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“Our research shows that a tire with a replaceable tread can maintain a stable mechanical connection during rolling, even under demanding slip conditions, without relying on adhesives or permanent bonding,” Afshari says.
“One particularly interesting observation was how strongly inflation pressure influenced the stability of the connection,” he adds. At normal inflation pressure, the tire’s components stayed together under all conditions tested. But at half the normal pressure, the tread and casing could separate, especially under a combination of high load, tight rolling radius, and greater slip conditions.
The researchers tested the tire for over 12,000 revolutions, equivalent to more than 7 kilometers. At the end of the experiment there was no indication of wear and tear on the tread or the rest of the tire—promising albeit preliminary evidence of the tire’s durability.
In the prototype, both tread and casing are made from silicone rubber, but the researchers anticipate using a different material in eventual manufactured tires.
“The next major steps include developing full-scale prototypes using materials representative of commercial tires and evaluating their performance under more realistic driving conditions,” Afshari reports. “This would involve braking and traction forces, transient maneuvers, temperature variations, road irregularities, and long-term fatigue and wear.” Head-to-head tests with conventional tires will be another key milestone further down the road.
Source: García-Pozuelo D. et al. “Measurement of rolling stability and slip angle effects on a modular ECOTIRE.” Measurement 2026.
Image: ©Anthropocene Magazine.
Horse Hill decision unlikely in 2026
The decision on plans for drilling and long-term oil production at the Horse Hill oil site in Surrey is unlikely to be made this year (2026).
DrillOrDrop asked Surrey County Council when the application was likely to be considered by its planning committee. The council told us this morning:
“The January [2027] meeting is currently looking the most likely but is still to be confirmed”.
The January 2027 meeting is likely to be on Wednesday 27 January 2027 at 10.30am. The committee usually meets in the council chamber at county council headquarters, Woodhatch Place, 11 Cockshot Hill, Reigate, Surrey, RH2 8EF.
ApplicationThe application, by the site operator, Horse Hill Developments Limited (HHDL), seeks permission to drill four new production wells and extract oil for 20 years.
A previous permission for the work, granted in 2019, was quashed by the Supreme Court in the landmark Finch Ruling in June 2024.
The court said the permission had been unlawful because Surrey County Council failed to consider the climate impact of emissions from using Horse Hill oil.
Oil production at the site has been suspended since October 2024.
HHDL submitted a new application to reinstate permission in May 2026. It was published in mid June 2026.
Since then, environmental campaigners have objected to the application, particularly its claims that there would be “no significant” impact on climate change or that it had national policy support.
The most recent criticism warned the county council that approval of the application would be unlawful. Report coming soon.
- energy B, the company which agreed to buy the majority stake in HHDL, announced today a deal to buy the remaining share. More details soon.
Correction: January meeting of Surrey’s planning meeting is on Wednesday 27 January 2027 (not 2026 as previously stated)
Is France burning down? The French revolt, rioting and the radical left
Rioting is the voice of the unheard, and is completely inevitable once a spark of revolt arrives after months and years of austerity, extreme police...
The post Is France burning down? The French revolt, rioting and the radical left first appeared on Spring.
Climate Politics for the Age of Insecurity
After Europe’s summer heatwaves, climate salience is at its highest in years, yet it’s clear the past frameworks used to mobilise majorities are crumbling amid an ongoing cost of living crisis and energy insecurity. To penetrate politically, climate communications must fit within the material realities of voters’ lives. In other words, the key to mobilising climate action is to demonstrate that the green transition can make European countries more secure and people’s lives cheaper.
The salience of climate change has been on a downward trajectory post-2019. That year is remembered by many as the moment climate politics broke containment: Ursula von der Leyen’s newly elected European Commission mandated Net Zero by 2050 after mass mobilisations in the streets demanding climate action and a strong performance by Green parties in that year’s European elections.
The years that followed could not have been more different. Pandemic lockdowns broke the wave of climate protests, and the subsequent cost-of-living crisis forced climate down the political agenda. There, the issue languished, rarely emphasised by mainstream parties except occasionally by far-right agitators attempting to stir up “greenlash”.
Even before the cost of living crisis, climate struggled to get more than 10 per cent of European electorates ranking it among their top issues. While polling shows that people hold ambient concern for the climate crisis, it remained a second-order issue. The movement has thus existed in political purgatory: marked by high awareness and intense polarisation, yet devoid of broader electoral momentum.
The recent summer of extreme weather may have broken that impasse. New research we conducted in August at Mandate Research, a strategy consulting firm for political campaigns, shows a definite spike in voters’ climate concern during this summer’s heatwaves. Among the countries we polled,1 this effect was particularly visible in Hungary and across Southern Europe, where Spain and France in particular were hit by devastating wildfires. In Hungary, 91 per cent of voters report being worried about climate change, followed closely by Italy (81 per cent), France (80 per cent), and Spain (68 per cent).
This worry translated directly into issue salience. In Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and the UK, roughly a fifth of voters now rank the environment and climate change among their top two issues. In Hungary, salience catapulted from a spring baseline of 3 per cent to a staggering 25 per cent, making it the second most important issue in the country in August. Hungarian citizens have had a particularly shocking confrontation with energy precarity this summer. The most severe drought in over a century partially dried up the Danube, causing a temporary shutdown of the nuclear facility supplying nearly half the country’s power.
Salience numbers are famously difficult to budge. The belief that climate politics had hit a saturation point, with returns diminishing as voters grew accustomed to extreme weather rather than increasing with the severity of the climate crisis, had convinced many mainstream parties that the issue was a vote loser. However, double-digit salience increases in the span of a few months demonstrate that European voters are not yet numb to peril.
This momentum is unlikely to fully evaporate in the colder months. With El Niño intensifying towards historic peaks and European gas storage levels concerningly low ahead of the winter season, the climate conversation is poised to shift from record heatwaves to heating bills and the threat of more extreme weather events.
The failure of old storiesReclaiming a seat at the table is good news, but squandering this moment with outdated messaging would be fatal.
While rising salience presents an undeniable political opening, progressives must not misread the room. Affordability, immigration, housing, and healthcare still rank above climate in most of the countries we surveyed, and overall concern has met but not surpassed the 2019 peak.
More importantly, the world has changed significantly since then, and so have the ways people relate to the climate crisis. The failures of green policies, the rise of the far right (with its own narratives and solutions to the climate emergency) and the shifting geopolitical landscape all demand a different approach from progressives. Reclaiming a seat at the table is good news, but squandering this moment with outdated messaging would be fatal.
This risk is most visible with “Net Zero”, a 2050 target enshrined in both the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal. When asked to rank environmental policy goals from highest to lowest priority, “achieving Net Zero emissions” ranked dead last across every single country surveyed. In Germany (-37), the UK (-42), France (-35), and the US (-40), Net Zero received deeply negative net priority ratings. Voters overwhelmingly prefer tangible, immediate objectives: building clean energy, protecting nature and wildlife, and reducing energy costs.
Furthermore, the public is deeply sceptical about the feasibility of Net Zero targets. Well over half of respondents believe it is unlikely their country will make meaningful progress towards the 2050 goal. The attempt to bundle various policy aims together and rebrand it as Net Zero has clearly failed to reach voters; repetition has led to abstraction and meaninglessness.
Even more troubling is the perceived distribution of economic costs. Almost half of Europeans surveyed believe that pro-environmental policies have left ordinary people in their country worse off, including 54 per cent in the Netherlands, 46 per cent in Spain, 45 per cent in Germany, 45 per cent in France, and 42 per cent in the UK.
This perception persists despite measurable, real-world improvements in air quality, public health indicators, and biodiversity conservation across Europe. Policies that treated emissions reductions as the target and affordability as an afterthought have clearly reached their limit, and they are even less likely to succeed amid a prolonged cost of living crisis. Relentless far-right framing that depicts environmentalism as technocracy has also played its part in convincing people that green policy is synonymous with meaningless sacrifice and elite control.
Today, progressives have to contend with thin, transactional support for climate action. When asked if they would support renewable energy, people respond positively. However, when renewable investment is posited as requiring taxation or public service cuts, this support turns sharply negative across nearly all European countries.
Moralistic, future-focused arguments and lofty green targets celebrated in the Fridays for Future past have lost momentum. The timelines environmental policies require are inescapable, but so is the need to have people on board a green project. Voters want a green future, but they want a job and food on the table for their families an order of magnitude more.
Reconfiguring climate politicsWhile affordability concerns overshadow melting ice caps, they also provide an opportunity for the climate movement to execute a strategic pivot. The convergence of climate extremes, geopolitical volatility, and rising utility bills creates a narrow window to reframe clean energy as a practical, necessary alternative to fossil fuels. Low riverbeds impact the cost of transportation, hot summers make it hard to cool power plants, and a warming atmosphere yields bad harvests and increases the price of everyday goods such as olive oil, coffee, and chocolate. Framed this way, the green transition is less a matter of global leadership and blue-sky thinking than a shield against further economic insecurity.
Voters do make the connection between renewable power and structural affordability. Clear majorities across Europe agree that transitioning to renewable energy will lower energy bills and reduce dependence on volatile fossil fuel markets. In a similar vein, expanding renewable capacity is consistently ranked by voters as the single most effective action governments can take to lower energy costs.
This is reflected in message testing across Europe. Narratives focused on immediate material outcomes, such as capping household energy bills by taxing fossil fuel windfall profits, or protecting national energy security from foreign autocrats, consistently outperform abstract moral appeals.
Right-wing figures like Giorgia Meloni in Italy and Kemi Badenoch in the UK have attempted to present themselves as pragmatic leaders defending working families against “arbitrary climate targets”. Support for nuclear energy as part of the solution is often featured in this kind of discourse – and it resonates among voters, ranking as the top climate priority in Sweden and Poland, and a close second in the UK, France, and the Netherlands.
During this summer’s heatwaves, French far-right leader Marine Le Pen also tried to pitch herself as a pragmatic leader by advocating a “grand plan” for air conditioning. While this will neither solve the climate crisis nor adapt our cities to the heat, it put her opponents on the defensive.
All this shows that progressives can no longer lay exclusive claim to the climate issue. The newfound salience of the climate crisis will only translate into votes if they offer solutions to people’s material concerns. In this context, conceding the language of pragmatism to the Right would be a strategic mistake.
Voters want a green future, but they want a job and food on the table for their families an order of magnitude more.
Rebuilding majoritiesEuropeans have not abandoned the green transition. Across the continent, solid majorities recognise that drastic change is needed to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, and they believe that green investment can help make their lives easier.
However, voters are no longer responding to the argument as it has been framed and delivered over the past decade, and hoping that extreme weather will shock electorates back to reason is bad politics. Many Europeans are providing the movement an opening because of the energy and cost of living crisis and security concerns. The climate movement must take heed of this, and meet voters where they are.
Civil society and climate movements can continue to highlight immediate threats from extreme weather to maintain emotional urgency – after all, this type of messaging still proves the most effective in boosting the salience of the climate crisis. But political parties competing for government must ground their vision in tangible economic benefits. By dismantling the abstract vocabulary of Net Zero, confronting corporate profiteering, and presenting renewable energy as a tool for bill reduction and sovereign security, progressives can begin to rebuild a majority for climate action.
- Sweden, The Netherlands, the UK, Germany, Spain, Italy, France, Hungary, Poland, and the US. ︎
England enters the pyrocene
Permitting Bill Text Would Strip Our Most Basic Federal Protections
By Aaron Mintzes, Deputy Policy Director and Senior Policy Counsel, and Allison Woolverton, Campaign Manager and Policy Advocate.
Last week, a group of key Senators published text of a long-anticipated permitting bill, S. 5653, the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA). While it includes widely supported improvements to strengthen renewable energy transmission, the bill gives industry a wide-open door to deliver widespread damage to science, waters, lands, wildlife, Tribes, and communities impacted by oil, gas, and mining, all while cutting the public out of the process. The Senate appears likely to begin voting on this bill as soon as November 9.
Email your Senators now Does the oil, gas, or mining project receive any environmental review?For all major federal projects – such as a new mine, a gas pipeline, or an expansion to an oil refinery – the bill makes sweeping changes to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the key tool informing the public and allowing input on our own Government’s environmental decisions. In fact, BAAJA provides multiple ways for mining and fossil fuel projects to avoid NEPA review altogether. For example, the bill declares interstate natural gas pipelines are not major federal actions and do not qualify for NEPA review. Nor will most grants, loans, loan guarantees, and other forms of Government financial assistance to corporations seeking permits to build. This is especially troubling given this Administration’s tendency to spend taxpayer dollars on mineral projects to enrich their own family members. The bill also makes it easier for the Government to exclude certain kinds of projects from review, as when the Forest Service unlawfully allowed graphite mine exploration in the sacred Black Hills of South Dakota.
The bill provides the corporations great advantages while being incredibly disadvantageous to the public. If there is a NEPA review, BAAJA defines the “purpose and need” of the oil, gas, or mining project to narrowly meet the company’s own goals. This limits the review largely to what the company chooses. Further, the bill precludes considering alternatives that do meet the project sponsor’s own goals. Traditionally, NEPA reviews consider a range of alternative plans, including not approving the project.
Montana Resources in Butte, MT. Credit: Chris Boyer, Kestrel Aerial
And even if the oil, gas, or mining project gets reviewed, what process does it get?Before applying for a permit, project sponsors selectively meet with interested parties such as Tribes, local governments, and community organizations to create a “record of stakeholder engagement.” The project sponsor’s prepared record includes “any ways the feedback from stakeholders were incorporated into the proposed agency action.” Project sponsors may draft NEPA documents, but the agency decides the level of review. Traditionally, large oil, gas, and mining projects might receive two or three opportunities for comment. First, to understand the project’s scope. Then, to comment on the Government’s draft study. And for those projects that the agency decides may have significant environmental impacts, another public comment opportunity.
The vote could come in less than a month, so they need to hear from us now.
TAKE ACTION NOW: Tell the Senate to put People first.
Yet, BAAJA requires only one public comment period at the beginning of permitting and only for the most harmful projects. The bill requires no public comment for any draft studies, nor for any projects with more moderate impacts. When the Government does prepare a review, it may disregard any study available afterward, effectively preventing the public and Tribes from contributing science and Indigenous Knowledge tailored to that project’s review. BAAJA also closes the courthouse door by limiting legal challenges to those who comment and limiting their legal claims to those raised in their comments.
Finally, if BAAJA becomes law, it would lock in all oil, gas, and mining projects already approved under this Administration’s feckless, weak, and submissive minerals policy. Worse, the bill precludes any future President from doing anything that may “alter” or “amend” what this President has already authorized, including transferring sacred landscapes like Oak Flat to foreign mining corporations. BAAJA proponents argue this provision starts wind and solar projects this President has unlawfully halted. Even so, it also leaves in place projects this President already unlawfully started, like Alaska’s Ambler Road through the Gates of the Arctic National Park.
Goldstrike Mine in NV. Credit: Ecoflight
Unfettered Mining of Public LandsIn addition to gutting protections for wildlife and people, BAAJA would open public lands to unchecked mining. That will cause permanent damage.
The United States’ mining law is already wildly inadequate. The 1872 Mining Law was written more than 150 years ago. Its goal was to encourage mining in the West, not to protect communities or the environment. It can seem hard to imagine how this law could be worse, but BAAJA is up to the challenge.
The damage extends beyond the mine itself to include infrastructure and dumps for toxic mining waste. BAAJA allows mining companies to claim nearly unlimited public lands for any use associated with a mine plan, including dumping waste, roads, pipelines, or power lines. It expands mining companies’ legal right to claim public lands under the 1872 Mining Law, rather than allowing the Government to choose the number and locations of waste dumps, roads, or transmission lines.
There is good news in this bill. Currently, the hardrock abandoned mine lands fund (created in 2021’s Infrastructure Law) has no dedicated revenue, and so relies on taxpayers instead – roughly $4.8 million/yr. BAAJA would dedicate meaningful funding sources toward this cleanup with revenue from mining “acquired lands” – lands the Government bought from states, towns, or private entities, mostly in the Midwest and East– and raising certain fees.
Case study: Desert Southwest PipelineBAAJA’s devastation of environmental review can be seen in its potential impact on the proposed Desert Southwest Pipeline. The 48-inch pipeline proposed by Energy Transfer would run 522 miles carrying 2.3 billion cubic feet of fracked gas per day from the West Texas Permian Basin through southern New Mexico and Arizona. The pipeline will supply gas to large AI data centers via other pipelines as well as municipal utility grids facing increasing demand due to data center buildout.
Land, water, Tribes, and communities along the pipeline’s route are threatened with pollution, safety risks, and harm to sacred sites and fragile ecosystems. The pipeline would run under the Rio Grande, Pecos, San Pedro, and Gila Rivers via horizontal directional drilling, a risky process using pressurized mud to tunnel under rivers. It would pass through the ecologically diverse Chihuahuan and Sonoran Deserts and the Otero Mesa, America’s wildest grassland that hosts over 1,000 native species and thousands of archaeological sites.
Yet, BAAJA would say all interstate natural gas pipelines, like Desert Southwest, are not major projects, and therefore do not receive NEPA review. The change would entirely alter the multi-step environmental review under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and crucial opportunities for public input by communities along its intended route.
Additionally, BAAJA amends the National Historic Preservation Act to essentially make Tribal consultation discretionary. Now, Tribes and states can review water crossings and impose their own water quality standards under Sec. 401 of the Clean Water Act, BAAJA weakens that authority. The bill imposes burdens upon states and Tribes and undermines tribal and state sovereignty over a massive pipeline project cutting through their land. And Desert Southwest is just one pipeline of the hundreds of miles of pipelines the Trump Administration is poised to bring online in coming years.
ConclusionThere’s still time to tell Congress that BAAJA creates more harm than good. The bill weakens NEPA, the 1872 Mining Law, the Clean Water Act, and Tribal consultation under the National Historic Preservation Act. Overall, the bill needlessly serves extraction over the people and renewable energy. Congress should pass the bill’s renewable energy transmission provisions, strike the harmful ones, and instead preserve science, public input, consultation, and meaningful mining reforms.
The post Permitting Bill Text Would Strip Our Most Basic Federal Protections appeared first on Earthworks.
RAFI Announces Farmer Grant Recipients
RAFI is pleased to announce its 2026 farmer grantees. This year, the program awarded $310,103 to 39 farmers across eight states, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Since 2020, RAFI has distributed $1,722,282 to 280 farmers.
The post RAFI Announces Farmer Grant Recipients appeared first on RAFI.
Beating burnout in social movements requires strategy
This article Beating burnout in social movements requires strategy was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
I recently showed up to a protest for the first time in months, looked around, and thought: “Who the hell are all these people?”
Friends I could once rely on running into at protests when I was younger were missing.
The fact that I hadn’t been to a protest in months was unusual. I’d had a hard season of exhaustion and cynicism, and I felt I was falling out of the loop. In the last few years, I turned 30 and moved back to my hometown, and the once-intense focus on social movements that I had in my 20s was now jostling for attention with work and family.
The absence of my comrades at that protest seemed to signal that others, too, had burned or faded out of organizing.
It’s a trend that Chris Dixon describes in his new book, which is about sticking around for the long haul in the fight for a better world: “In radical activist scenes especially,” he writes, “people tend to age out by their 30s, if not before.”
When the manuscript of Dixon’s book came my way, it spoke to my fear of burning or fading out of the movements that have given my life meaning and momentum. (I sit on the editorial collective of Between The Lines Books, and helped select the book for publication; it was released in September 2026.)
After a few recent boom-and-bust cycles of uprisings — 2020’s Black liberation uprising, the Palestine solidarity protests that kicked off in 2023 — it’s a timely and thoughtful book about building movements with care and commitment.
Dixon (who unfortunately shares a name with a far more famous American crypto bro) is an anti-authoritarian activist and a scholar of social movements. “For the Long Haul: How to Stay in the Fight for a Better World” is the latest effort in his lifelong project to understand how social movements are built and sustained.
Dixon grew up in Alaska, and the book opens by describing his decades-long friendship with Ruth Sheridan, an anarchist who was in her 70s when she first came to talk to his eighth grade labor history class. That early curiosity — about how left-wing social movements are built and sustained and the unsung activists who make it happen — showed up in his 2014 book “Another Politics: Talking Across Today’s Transformative Movements,” in which he shared lessons from almost a decade spent interviewing organizers across the U.S. and Canada.
Now, Dixon has reached back into this same conversational archive to write “For the Long Haul.”
We meet Bill Stivers, an elder communist Dixon befriended as a teen; Rachel Herzing, the co-founder of prison abolitionist group Critical Resistance; the political prisoner David Gilbert with whom he exchanged letters from jail, and many more.
These lifelong leftists share their observations about what leads to burnout, the many-headed monster that has long stalked social movements. During this time of totalizing neoliberalism and weakened movement infrastructure, it’s grown especially powerful. These movement veterans counsel us to be patient, open-minded and to “practice being nobody special.”
Dixon tells the story of Stivers who, at the age of 76, travelled from Anchorage, Alaska to the state of Chiapas in southern Mexico to attend the Zapatistas’ Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism. It was just a couple years after the militant group’s armed uprising and a young Dixon, more swayed by a European left tradition at that time, looked on with skepticism. But Stivers ended up having the more clear-eyed assessment of this new approach to anti-capitalist struggle. Stivers had cultivated the long view, which helped him avoid cynicism and dogmatism, and encouraged him to keep learning and stay open to new developments.
#newsletter-block_da317ba7a61bd5a5b96073f9d6105bca { background: #ECECEC; color: #000000; } #newsletter-block_da317ba7a61bd5a5b96073f9d6105bca #mc_embed_signup_front input#mce-EMAIL { border-color:#000000 !important; color: #000000 !important; } Sign Up for our NewsletterWhat I found most helpful about the book was Dixon’s formulation of burnout: he sees it not just as a type of overwork or exhaustion, but as a feeling of defeat that becomes more common because of a lack of strategy. Dixon introduces this idea by sharing a conversation he had with Kim Marks, a direct-action environmentalist and Indigenous solidarity organizer in Oregon: “So much of burnout is about not being effective,” she said, “and so much ineffectiveness comes from not having a plan.”
Dixon traces the ways that people often burn out of activist groups back to this underlying lack of strategy. When a group promises sweeping change but never decides how to take the first step; when a group gets mired in discussions about internal structure or politics and stops taking outward action; when a few veteran members shoulder a huge amount of work while new ones struggle to find meaningful ways to pitch in; when a group is hastily cobbled together to address a crisis then falls apart just as quickly after an unsuccessful campaign — all of these are instances in which a lack of strategy leaves people feeling defeated, ineffective and worn-out.
A good plan can pull groups out of these exhausting spirals. This involves mapping the current political landscape, articulating our goals, making agreements about what to do and how to support each other in doing it, and then evaluating our success and learning from our mistakes.
Dixon writes about the importance of imbuing this strategy-setting with care and intentionality, to “help people to talk frankly about workload, make reasonable estimates of what they can do, and look out for one another’s well-being.”
Previous CoverageYou can find many of these same encouragements — for rest, care and intentionality — in the pages of any self-help book. But the goal of capitalist self-help literature is to create an individual who is independent, sane and productive enough to keep cranking the handle of profit-making machines.
Dixon’s help is different: it’s not for the individual, but for the collective. At the end of the day, “sustained involvement in movements is fundamentally a collective activity, not an individual one,” he writes. No amount of advice given to or followed by the individual can stop the pattern of burnout and disengagement that’s become endemic in leftist spaces.
As a result, Dixon focuses on collective care rather than self-care. This can look like preparing food for the picket line, planning for childcare and legal support at the direct action, or tending to hurt feelings after the meeting. He calls care work “a crucial — and too often overlooked — foundation for the long haul.”
For Dixon, care is not just a way to make organizing more pleasant for the people doing it, or a moral imperative if the left wants to keep claiming the high ground. Instead, he sees care as a strategic imperative. When we make our political commitments with care in mind, Dixon writes, it forces us to ask ourselves and each other if what we’re committing to is reasonable and tactical. And when it is, we become more likely to stick around for the long run, and also more likely to win.
Not one of Dixon’s ideas stands without a quote from an organizer, an example from a movement or a reference to a movement scholar’s work. One of the book’s main contributions is its vast bibliography — a full third of the pages are suggested reading and endnotes.
Dixon’s form of activist research is highly attentive to insights that are gleaned from a person’s own experiences. Like this observation by anti-authoritarian activist Helen Hudson, who draws on decades of organizing with prisoners to form her analysis of how the state uses prison to weaken movements: “Prison isolates the prisoners from support,” she told Dixon, “but also deprives younger generations of radicals from the experience of revolutionaries who have much to teach us.”
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DonateDixon encourages younger readers like me to find these people in our own lives — older activists like Stivers and Sheridan who show us that it is possible and lovely to live an ordinary life of unflagging commitment to the left.
This is not an organizing manual (though Dixon does recommend a few of those in his suggested readings). Instead, what he gives us is a deep study of left-wing dynamics and some broad strokes toward sustainability. The people likely to get the most from this book are those of us who have already gone through many cycles of boom-and-bust social movement activity, and who are looking for fuel that burns longer and cleaner.
And it’s by paying attention to Dixon’s rigorous practices of listening and sharing that readers will get the most out of this book — leaving not just with a handful of advice, but with an initiation into a practice.
This article Beating burnout in social movements requires strategy was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.
The Trump administration is trying to build data centers on public lands
As opposition to AI data centers mounts across the country, the Trump administration is moving full speed ahead to approve and construct them on America’s public lands, writes Center for Western Priorities Deputy Director Lauren Bogard in a new Westwise post.
The Bureau of Land Management is considering at least 35 active data center-related applications covering over 24,000 acres in six Western states, according to CWP’s new BLM Data Center Tracker. Many of the applications list no acreage, so the true footprint is likely larger.
Unlike oil, gas, wind, or solar, there is no framework for conducting environmental reviews, collecting public input, or returning revenue to taxpayers for data centers built on public lands. Additionally, data centers are not like oil, gas, or minerals, which are extracted from public lands because that’s where they exist. There are no natural resources that make it necessary to develop data centers on public lands, and there is no reason to assume data centers belong on them.
Meanwhile, opposition is building. The Wilderness Society called for a moratorium on data centers on public land earlier this month, and Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility is pressing congressional appropriators to block the projects. In a July survey for Keep It Public Wyoming, over 90 percent of likely voters said data centers are not an acceptable use of public lands. Nationally, Pew found the share of Republicans who say data centers are mostly bad for the environment jumped from 31 to 47 percent since January. Learn more in the latest Westwise post on Substack.
Quick hits Trump geothermal lease sale collides with planned Nevada solar farms Government watchdog finds BLM may be breaking the law by allowing foreign agents to mine on public land Federal contract spending on public lands in Colorado dropped $189 million last year Trump outlines rapid plan to close and overhaul D.C. golf course Final plans for Trump’s arch appear to abandon his ‘military complex’ idea Dropping Lake Powell levels reveal ‘crime against nature’ Trump doubles down on Reflecting Pool vandalism claims without providing evidence Trump rule lets Alaska hunters lure bears with bacon-greased doughnuts Quote of the dayBaiting bears with piles of doughnuts, meat scraps, and dog food to lure them into shooting range and gun them down is indefensible and inexcusable as a federal policy decision.”
—Kitty Block, president of Humane World for Animals, New York Times
Picture ThisEvery autumn, thousands of migrating birds arrive at Bosque del Apache National Wildlife Refuge in New Mexico. Sandhill cranes, snow geese and other waterfowl fill the wetlands, creating one of the Southwest’s most spectacular wildlife displays.
Photo by Robert Dunn
Feature image: Utah Data Center located in Bluffdale, Utah and run by the National Security Agency, Source: Swilsonmc, Wikimedia Commons
The post The Trump administration is trying to build data centers on public lands appeared first on Center for Western Priorities.
The strongest El Niño in a thousand years?
This is a re-post from The Climate Brink
Earlier this summer I told a journalist that it was not beyond the realm of possibility that this year’s El Niño would end up the strongest in 500 or even 1,000 years. That was a strong claim at the time, and I’ve had a few people ask how I could possibly know what El Niño was doing in the year 1200. It is a fair question, and the answer is that we know more than you might think.
This year’s El Niño event is already the strongest in the instrumental record based on Niño 3.4 region sea surface temperature anomalies. I’ve written in more detail about this year’s forecast here, and breaking the prior record over at Carbon Brief.
Daily Niño 3.4 anomalies passed the prior record (set in November 2015) on September 20th, and reached 3.4C as of this week. September as a whole had the highest Niño 3.4 temperature anomalies on record. And this year’s El Niño still has a few more months to grow; the latest runs in (from 14 seasonal forecast models) show this year’s El Niño peaking around 4C (with 80% of model runs ending up somewhere between 3.3C and 4.6C).
Multi-model median Niño 3.4 forecast from each month’s initializations, March through October 2026, compared with observed monthly values (NOAA CPC). Medians are across all ensemble members with models weighted equally; months with fewer than six models are omitted. Shading shows the 25–75% range of members for the October runs. Data from NOAA NMME and CFSv2, Copernicus C3S, ECCC CanSIPS and JAMSTEC SINTEX-F via the Climate Dashboard.That being said, while the models underestimated the magnitude of the event earlier in the year, they have overestimated it over the past two months. However, with the first week of October already above 3C, the October forecast of 3.6C doesn’t seem outside the realm of possibility. But there remains a wide range of possible outcomes for this event across different modeling groups and ensemble members.
How far back can we look?The figure below looks at three different lines of evidence for historical El Niño strength. The top panel shows the thermometer record, where this event has already set a record for events since 1877 and is forecast to smash it. The two lower panels show different lines of evidence from tree rings and corals as to what happened during the millennium before.
Top: peak monthly Niño 3.4 anomaly of every El Niño since 1877, each measured against its own era’s climatology (NOAA OISST from 1982, HadISST reconstruction earlier) as well as the 2026–27 forecast median and 10–90% range of member peaks. Middle: winter (December–February) Niño 3.4 reconstructed from tree rings by Cook and Cane (2024), 1100–2000, relative to 1871–2000, with instrumental winters overlaid in blue and the 2026–27 winter forecast (median and 10–90% range of members). Bottom: 20-year running variability of interannual sea surface temperature from Galápagos corals, from Figure 2 of Cole et al. (2026). Each mark is one coral record (circles: oxygen isotopes; triangles: strontium/calcium), showing the mean and range of its 20-year variability.Before 1877 there are also written records to draw from. Quinn et al. (1987) compiled El Niño occurrences off Peru back to 1525 from ship logs, mission records and chronicles, and Gergis and Fowler (2008) combined these with tree ring, coral and ice core records into an event chronology back to the same year. Five of the nine events in their most extreme tier are from the 20th century.
But these chronologies sort events into coarse classes and miss a lot (they rate the 1997-98 event as only “weak”, for example), so are only modest evidence for how a 4C event this year would rank. The two records shown in the figure above, from tree rings and coral, reach back to the 1100s and can give us a more solid estimate of how this year’s event will stack up.
Tree rings back to 1100Cook and Cane (2024) (middle panel of the figure above) used 544 tree-ring chronologies from places whose rainfall responds to El Niño to reconstruct winter (December to February) sea surface temperatures across the equatorial Pacific. However, only 81 of those chronologies reach all the way back to 1100s. If we look at the data since 1500 (when more tree rings are available), it tracks observed winter Niño 3.4 reasonably well, with a typical error of about 0.5C in any one winter. The one starting in 1100 is noisier, with a typical error of about 0.6C.
The largest winter either version reconstructs before 1871 is 2.1C (1746-47 in one, 1791-92 in the other), and the largest before 1500 is 2.0C (1121-22). The biggest instrumental winters (1877-78, 1982-83, 1997-98 and 2015-16) all come in between 2.3C and 2.5C on the same measure. The forecast for the coming winter is 3.9C (with 80% of model members between 2.9C and 4.6C).1
To account for the uncertainty in the tree ring dataset, I simulated the range of true values each winter before 1871 could have had, given how far off the reconstruction was in the years it was tested on.2 If models of this year’s El Niño prove accurate, the chance that this winter beats every winter since 1100 is between 91% and 95% on the standard Niño 3.4 index. On NOAA’s relative index (RONI), which subtracts the warming of the wider tropics, it falls to between 60% and 72%. Over the past 500 years, where the reconstruction is better, the odds rise to between 94% and 98% and between 69% and 85% for ONI and RONI, respectively. Cook and Cane similarly note that “The positive excursions (i.e., El Niño events) in recent decades are generally higher than at any time since 1100.”
What the corals sayThe second long record came out in August of this year, when Julia Cole and colleagues published a study in Science using 28 coral records from five islands in the Galápagos. The Galápagos sit in the eastern Pacific, where El Niño events (including this year’s) are centered. Corals lay down annual bands whose chemistry tracks the temperature of the water they grew in, so a fossil coral can be used as a rough thermometer for whatever decades it was alive. The oldest of these corals grew around 1130, and together they sample about half the years of the past millennium.
Corals cannot tell you the peak of a single El Niño as reliably as a thermometer (or a tree ring) can. What they measure well is how much the sea surface temperature swung from year to year over a 20-year window. Through 1850, the year-to-year swings stay inside a relatively narrow band. They begin to rise in the late 19th century, and the corals that grew after 1984 sit mostly above the pre-industrial range. Cole and colleagues find that variability before 1850 was about 37% lower than in recent decades.3 They find the increase comes from stronger El Niño events rather than stronger La Niñas.
They also tested whether natural factors alone could produce a jump this large, using last-millennium simulations from 12 climate models driven only by volcanoes, the sun and changes in Earth’s orbit (as well as control runs with no changes). They find that the increase in variability in the modern era come close to 1-in-100 odds in climate model control runs. Other proxy work finds similar results, including studies of central Pacific corals (Grothe et al., 2020) and an earlier tree-ring reconstruction covering seven centuries (Li et al., 2013).
Putting the two records togetherThe tree rings and the corals are about as independent as two paleoclimate records can be. One reads El Niño’s effect on rainfall over land through tree growth, and the other reads ocean temperature directly in the eastern Pacific. They agree that the El Niños of recent decades are at or near the top of everything since the 1100s, and the 2026 forecast sits more than a degree above those recent events.
However, climate proxies are necessarily imperfect thermometers, and both types have real limits. Tree rings underestimated the 1877-78 El Niño event and come with uncertainties of more than 0.5C before 1500 (though I account for this uncertainty in my calculation of the odds!). The corals record variability over decades rather than the peak of any one event, they measure local Galápagos temperature rather than the Niño 3.4 index, and the gaps between them leave about half the years unsampled.
Even taking all those limitations into account, I think that this year’s El Niño event is likely to be the strongest in 1,000 years if the latest models of its peak prove accurate. The tree rings alone give it 91% to 95% odds on the standard index (ONI) and 60% to 72% using RONI. The coral records already show that the modern era stands outside the natural range of eastern Pacific variability, and this year will be an unambiguous record in the modern era.
As always, for daily updates on the El Niño forecast and global temperatures head over to our Climate Dashboard.
1 These numbers reflect the same winter averages used by the tree ring proxies, and are lower than the peak monthly estimates for the event as they reflect a three-month average.
2 To do this, I fit observed winter Niño 3.4 against the reconstruction over the withheld years 1871-1929 (a slope of 0.92 and residual error of 0.49C for the version from 1500, 0.75 and 0.64C for the version from 1100), resampled those years to capture uncertainty in the fit, generated plausible true values for every winter before 1871. I repeated this analysis 20,000 times, and took the largest each time.
3 Cole and colleagues measure the change relative to recent decades, so their percentage describes how much weaker pre-industrial variability was. When measured against the pre-industrial, they find that recent variability is roughly 60% higher.
On the Ground with Dani Nierenberg: Rethinking Who Gets a Seat at the Table—and Who Wins the World Food Prize
A version of this piece was featured in Food Tank’s newsletter, released weekly on Thursdays. To make sure it lands straight in your inbox and to be among the first to receive it, subscribe now by clicking here.
Greetings from Des Moines, Iowa. I’m here for the World Food Prize and Borlaug Dialogues, an annual gathering of people working to address hunger and improve food and agriculture systems.
And I have a confession—I love attending the World Food Prize.
I’ve been coming since the early 2010s. For a long time, part of what made it interesting was that there weren’t many people like me here—advocates for sustainable agriculture who wanted to talk about agroecology, biodiversity, how agriculture can be part of the solution to the climate crisis, and the power of farmers.
The Dialogues bring together scientists, academics, policymakers, and plenty of representatives of Big Ag. This year’s announced speakers include leaders from ADM, John Deere, and Corteva. I used to joke that I was one of the few people who could attend the World Food Prize one week and the Organic Trade Association’s annual meeting the next. And, to the Foundation’s credit, I’ve been invited to moderate side events and emcee a plenary session.
I also have some interesting memories.
One year, I was grabbing a drink at the hotel bar when two men invited me to join them. One was a scientist at a major agrochemical company and the other led a farmers and ranchers organization.
Why not sit and have a drink, I thought.
After some very quick pleasantries, they said I was using my Twitter account to criticize their organizations. For the record, I hadn’t. When I explained that, their response was, essentially, “Well, people like you do.” And I thought to myself, what do you mean, people like me?
I tried to explain that their assessment of me—and my work—was incorrect. The conversation went in circles, and I eventually hightailed it out of there.
By the way, I’m now friendly with both of them. I even made it onto one’s Christmas card list.
That experience stayed with me because it showed me how quickly we—all of us—can decide we already understand someone else based on preconceived notions. Sustainable agriculture advocate? We know what he thinks. Corporate scientist? We know what she believes. But we often don’t.
We need more good food and agriculture advocates at events like the Borlaug Dialogues. We need food is medicine leaders, climate activists, public health advocates, young farmer organizations, Indigenous food leaders, and farmworker advocates. Their experiences can really help shape the conversations that happen there. And to be fair, more and more of these folks are coming to the Borlaug Dialogues.
And all of us—Big Ag executives and agroecology advocates included—need to spend time in rooms where people disagree with us. We need to listen long enough to understand why we are on different ends of a very broad spectrum of what it will take to nourish both people and planet.
The issues we’re working on are complicated. If we want real food and agriculture transformation, we’re going to have to get uncomfortable.
Maybe not being accosted at the hotel bar uncomfortable. But uncomfortable enough to recognize that our comfort zones aren’t getting us very far.
Which brings me back to the Prize itself.
Often described as the Nobel Prize for food and agriculture, it grew out of Norman Borlaug’s vision for recognizing people who improve the world’s food supply. Borlaug, a plant pathologist widely known as the father of the Green Revolution, helped transform wheat production and later directed the wheat program at CIMMYT, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center.
I see how the Foundation is evolving. Under the leadership of former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and Foundation CEO Tom Vilsack and President Mashal Husain, there are opportunities to broaden both the conversation and our understanding of who leads change. This year’s program includes actors Martin Sheen and Nick Offerman, as well as Nobel Peace Prize laureate and education advocate Malala Yousafzai.
People whose work I admire, including Cary Fowler, Lawrence Haddad, and Mariangela Hungria, are also recipients of the World Food Prize. Their leadership is one of the reasons I think the World Food Prize and Borlaug Dialogues are important and why I keep coming back.
But I want the conversation to keep evolving, too. We need to ask more difficult questions about what food and agricultural progress looks like, whose knowledge informs it, who benefits, who has power, and who doesn’t.
For me, a Green Evolution—a term I stole from Bram Govaerts, the current Director General of CIMMYT—would mean putting farmers’ livelihoods, healthy soils, biodiversity, and nutritious diets at the center of how we measure success. And that requires looking around the room.
How many smallholder farmers, farmworkers, and grassroots organizers have the resources to travel to Des Moines, stay in a hotel, and take several days away from their work? Being invited to speak and being able to participate are different things. Even a waived registration fee doesn’t make it easy for someone to leave their farm.
And the World Food Prize Foundation has had support from agribusiness including ADM, Cargill, Monsanto, Syngenta, and the John Deere Foundation over the years. I don’t necessarily think that is bad as long as that support doesn’t influence which conversations happen, who is in the room, and who gets to be heard.
The history of the Prize also has me scratching my head sometimes. In addition to the folks I mentioned, in 2013, it honored Robert Fraley, then Monsanto’s chief technology officer, and Mary-Dell Chilton of Syngenta, alongside Marc Van Montagu, a molecular biologist, for their contributions to modern plant biotechnology. Monsanto itself didn’t win the Prize. But scientists working at major agribusiness companies did.
That history makes it reasonable to ask what kinds of innovation receive the greatest recognition. A breakthrough in a laboratory can change lives. So can organizing farmers, protecting seed diversity, restoring degraded land, or helping women gain control over their incomes.
This year’s laureate, Dutch food safety scientist Huub Lelieveld, is doing important work. The Foundation is recognizing his efforts to prevent foodborne illness and build international cooperation around food safety. Safe food is fundamental to food security, and that contribution deserves respect.
But I hope the Prize will direct more attention and resources toward leaders whose work is too often overlooked, particularly in the Global South.
The funding and international aid context makes that urgent. According to preliminary OECD figures, official development assistance from its Development Assistance Committee members and associates fell by 23.1 percent in real terms in 2025—the largest annual decline on record. That is a broad aid figure, but it highlights the funding pressures facing work on food security, agricultural development, and global health.
A 2025 study published in The Lancet projected that continued cuts to funding for the U.S. Agency for International Development could lead to more than 14 million additional deaths by 2030, including 4.5 million children younger than five.
The hunger consequences are equally alarming. In October 2025, the World Food Program warned that funding cuts from the United States and other donors could push 13.7 million people receiving its assistance from crisis into emergency levels of hunger, one step below famine on the five-level food insecurity scale.
And this year, I think the Prize missed a particularly powerful opportunity.
The United Nations designated 2026 the International Year of the Woman Farmer. It is an opportunity to recognize women’s contributions to food and agriculture systems and confront the barriers they face in accessing resources and opportunities.
The Dialogues are recognizing that moment with a panel called “What If Her Harvest Changes Everything?” The panel brings together April Hemmes of the United States, Jana Gäbert of Germany, Nelius Kariuki of Kenya, and Josselyn Veronica Vega Rojas of Ecuador. Their work spans farming, livestock and grassland management, vineyards, and agroecological producer organizing. I’m glad these women will be on the stage.
But the panel also raises a question for me. During the International Year of the Woman Farmer, why couldn’t one of these women—or another woman farmer with a demonstrated record of improving people’s lives—be the person we gather to honor with the World Food Prize?
I don’t know whether any of these panelists were nominated or considered. My question is about how widely we look for leadership, who we’re looking at, and what we recognize as valuable.
I think about Esther Penunia, secretary general of the Asian Farmers’ Association for Sustainable Rural Development, who advocates for family farmers and stronger farmer organizations across Asia. Or Elizabeth Nsimadala, a Ugandan farmer and president of the Eastern Africa Farmers Federation, whose work helps farmers organize and advocate for themselves. Or Mariam Sow in Senegal, whose work with ENDA Pronat has helped advance agroecology and farmers’ knowledge.
These are the kinds of leaders I want us to look toward when we talk about transforming food systems. And the International Year of the Woman Farmer gives us an especially good reason to examine whether that work receives the recognition it deserves.
What would it mean for the world’s most prominent food and agriculture prize to put that kind of leadership at the center of its celebration?
That’s a conversation I want to have in Des Moines.
I’ll keep coming back to the World Food Prize because I believe conversations across differences matter. I’ve seen relationships change. I’m proud that over the years I have changed my own mind. And yes, sometimes a frustrating conversation at a hotel bar eventually leads to a Christmas card.
But I also want us to ask more of the institutions that bring us together.
Who gets invited? Who can afford to come? Whose knowledge counts? Who gets recognized? Who has the power?
I’m looking forward to listening this week. And I look forward to asking and being asked some uncomfortable questions.
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The post On the Ground with Dani Nierenberg: Rethinking Who Gets a Seat at the Table—and Who Wins the World Food Prize appeared first on Food Tank.
Rural Missouri counties face EMS crisis
Rural Missouri counties are part of an emergency medical services (EMS) crisis, as decreasing populations and tax bases, combined with the closing of multiple hospitals, have caused treatment times to rise to almost double those in urban areas.
Slightly more than 24 percent of Missourians live in non-metro areas, according to a report from the state Office of Rural Health. They have only one rural emergency hospital.
Fifty rural Missouri counties lack a hospital, according to a report by the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Those counties without hospitals have an average drive of 29.4 miles to a hospital.
“Families are traveling hours for emergency care, children are growing up in counties with some of the nation’s highest poverty rates, and entire communities face the collapse of the very systems meant to sustain them,” said a recent report from the Missouri Rural Health Association.
The 2023 report by the state Department of Health and Senior Services lays out some stark realities about the condition of rural health care in Missouri:
The population in Missouri’s 99 rural counties declined by 1 percent since the last census, while the population of nonrural counties rose by 1.9 percent. Declining populations mean lower tax revenues and people available for EMS training.
Ray Locker is the executive director for Checks & Balances Project, an investigative watchdog blog holding government officials, lobbyists, and corporate management accountable to the public. Funding for C&BP is provided by Renew American Prosperity and individual donors.
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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 19 OCTOBER 2026
Archive reference: SLF-2007-092
Publication date: 19 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: The Shell Leaks Files — 18 October 2026
Principal evidence: Shell’s authenticated 2017 financing announcement and 2022 financial disclosures; Permanent Court of Arbitration Case No. 2020-07; Procedural Orders Nos. 18 and 19; European Union legislation; General Court judgments; and official records of subsequent legal proceedings.
Evidence classification: Authenticated corporate records, legislation and judicial decisions; documented submissions by opposing parties; independent legal reporting; and separately identified editorial analysis.
The previous instalment examined a remarkable possibility.
Four years after explosions damaged the Nord Stream pipelines, and despite the collapse of the commercial and political assumptions underpinning Nord Stream 2, influential figures were still discussing whether the infrastructure might be revived.
Shell had helped finance the project.
The company subsequently wrote off its $1.126 billion loan.
The pipeline never entered commercial operation.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine transformed Europe’s energy policies.
Sanctions created formidable obstacles to any revival.
Yet the documentary record revealed continuing commercial interest.
Today we turn to another part of the story.
While politicians, investors and governments debated whether Nord Stream might ever carry Russian gas again, the company that owned Nord Stream 2 was pursuing a different strategy.
It was taking the European Union to court.
And, in an extraordinary development, the legal proceedings themselves became entangled in European sanctions.
The consequences are preserved in two authenticated arbitration documents.
On 22 October 2025, an international tribunal suspended proceedings because it considered there was a real risk that European sanctions could affect the arbitration and its participants.
Three months later, on 24 January 2026, the same tribunal issued another order.
This time, the arbitrators criticised the European Union’s answers to their questions about how the proceedings could safely continue.
The criticism was not merely an allegation made by Gazprom’s subsidiary.
It appeared in the tribunal’s own decision.
The resulting documentary record raises questions about investment protections, European energy policy, legal certainty and the consequences of financing infrastructure that subsequently becomes politically unacceptable.
For Shell shareholders, it also illuminates a distinction sometimes lost in discussions of the company’s Russian investments.
A company can recognise a financial loss and withdraw from a project while the wider legal consequences of that investment continue for years.
1. THE SHELL DOCUMENT THAT STARTS THE STORYThe appropriate starting point is 24 April 2017.
On that date, Shell announced that it had signed financing agreements with Nord Stream 2 AG, alongside four other European energy companies:
ENGIE, OMV, Uniper and Wintershall.
The project involved construction of a 1,220-kilometre natural gas pipeline connecting Russia to Germany beneath the Baltic Sea.
Its estimated cost was €9.5 billion.
Each of the five European companies agreed to provide financing and guarantees covering up to 10% of the project’s estimated cost.
Shell’s individual commitment could therefore reach approximately €950 million.
The financing arrangement included a €285 million long-term funding facility and up to €665 million in additional financing and guarantees, subject to the project’s requirements.
Crucially, Shell’s announcement confirmed that Gazprom remained Nord Stream 2 AG’s sole shareholder.
Shell was a financier, not a shareholder in the pipeline company.
This distinction matters when examining subsequent litigation.
The claimant in the proceedings discussed below is Nord Stream 2 AG.
It is not Shell.
Shell’s financial involvement nevertheless forms part of the investment’s documented history.
The company’s announcement provides an authenticated starting point, establishing the contractual and financial relationship before the subsequent deterioration in relations between Russia and the European Union.
Primary evidence: Shell’s 24 April 2017 announcement, preserved in its official 2017 Corporate Press Releases, page 40 of the PDF. Shell
2. THE FIRST LEGAL BATTLE: EUROPE CHANGES THE RULESTwo years after the financing agreements, a new dispute emerged.
In April 2019, the European Union adopted Directive (EU) 2019/692.
This legislation extended important European gas-market rules to pipelines connecting EU territory with countries outside the Union.
The rules concerned matters including the separation of gas production and supply from transmission activities and the provision of third-party access to pipeline infrastructure.
These requirements were intended to support competition and the functioning of the European gas market.
There was an important qualification.
Pipelines completed before 23 May 2019 could potentially benefit from a derogation from some of the requirements.
Nord Stream 2 had not been completed by that date.
The project’s operating company argued that the legislative changes unfairly disadvantaged its investment.
The issue was commercially significant.
Nord Stream 2 had been conceived as a major route for transporting Russian gas directly to Germany.
Changes to the rules governing its operation could affect the investment’s economics and the arrangements under which gas would be transported.
The dispute eventually reached the European Union courts.
But Nord Stream 2 AG also opened another legal front.
It invoked an international investment treaty.
That treaty was the Energy Charter Treaty.
3. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN INVESTMENT DISPUTE AGAINST THE EUOn 26 September 2019, Nord Stream 2 AG commenced arbitration proceedings against the European Union.
The proceedings were brought under the Energy Charter Treaty and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration, based in The Hague, was appointed to administer the case.
Its reference is:
PCA Case No. 2020-07 — Nord Stream 2 AG v. The European Union.
The Energy Charter Treaty was designed to establish a legal framework for cooperation and investment in the energy sector.
Among its provisions are protections potentially available to qualifying foreign investors.
Such protections can include safeguards against certain forms of discriminatory treatment, unfair treatment and unlawful expropriation.
Whether any particular investor is entitled to those protections depends upon the treaty’s terms, jurisdictional requirements, applicable law and the facts of the dispute.
The existence of the treaty does not automatically entitle an investor to compensation whenever legislation reduces the value of an investment.
Nor does commencement of arbitration establish that the challenged legislation is unlawful.
Those questions are for the tribunal to determine.
Nevertheless, the procedure gave Nord Stream 2 AG an opportunity to contest the legal consequences of European regulatory changes through an international arbitration mechanism.
The tribunal consists of three arbitrators:
Professor Ricardo Ramírez Hernández, presiding; Professor Philippe Sands KC; and Justice David Unterhalter SC.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration identifies the case as pending.
Authenticated source: Permanent Court of Arbitration — Nord Stream 2 AG v. European Union, Case No. 2020-07. PCA-CPA
There is an important qualification concerning the description of this arbitration as secretive.
International investment arbitrations can involve confidential submissions, procedural arrangements and commercially sensitive information.
However, this particular proceeding has a substantial public documentary record.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration makes available numerous pleadings and procedural orders.
It would therefore be misleading to characterise the entire case as secret.
The publicly available material is sufficiently extensive to reconstruct significant parts of the legal dispute.
And it contains some revealing documents.
4. NOVEMBER 2024: NORD STREAM 2 LOSES AN IMPORTANT COURT CASEWhile the arbitration continued, a separate challenge to the 2019 gas-market legislation proceeded through the EU courts.
The procedural history was complicated.
In May 2020, the General Court initially dismissed Nord Stream 2 AG’s action as inadmissible.
Nord Stream 2 appealed.
On 12 July 2022, the Court of Justice partly upheld that appeal, allowing the legal challenge to proceed.
The case was returned to the General Court for consideration of its substance.
On 27 November 2024, the General Court delivered its judgment.
Nord Stream 2 lost.
The court dismissed the company’s challenge to the legislation.
Its reasoning was particularly significant.
The court concluded that Nord Stream 2 AG had continued investing during a period when it had no assurance that European gas-market rules would remain inapplicable to the pipeline.
The company could foresee the possibility of regulatory changes.
The court also found that the project’s exclusion from the derogation available to pipelines completed before May 2019 did not, in itself, prevent operation under economically viable conditions.
It rejected the relevant challenges based on legal certainty, legitimate expectations, equal treatment and proportionality.
The court’s judgment therefore supported the legality of the 2019 legislative changes.
This was a substantive judicial defeat for Nord Stream 2 AG.
It was not, however, a final determination of every legal question raised by the separate Energy Charter Treaty arbitration.
The General Court proceedings and the investment arbitration have different legal foundations.
The 2024 judgment was also appealed, with the subsequent appeal recorded as Case C-118/25 P.
Official judicial source: Court of Justice of the European Union — Press Release 195/24, 27 November 2024. curia
5. JULY 2025: SANCTIONS CREATE ANOTHER LEGAL OBSTACLEThe next development concerned European sanctions against Russia.
On 18 July 2025, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 as part of its eighteenth package of restrictive measures.
The regulation introduced Article 5af into the existing sanctions framework.
This provision restricted transactions connected with Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2, including transactions concerning completion, operation, maintenance, use and associated financing.
The objective was to prevent the infrastructure from being used in ways inconsistent with European sanctions policy.
But the legislation also contained exceptions and mechanisms through which national authorities could authorise specified transactions.
These included certain transactions connected with compensation claims, payments under existing obligations, maintenance for safety reasons and legal proceedings.
Article 5af(3)(d) expressly provided for authorisations relating to settlements and judicial or arbitration proceedings.
This detail is essential.
The regulation did not expressly declare that Nord Stream 2 AG was prohibited from pursuing arbitration.
Instead, it established a legal framework whose application to particular transactions became disputed.
The European Commission considered that the regulation did not prevent the arbitration from continuing.
Nord Stream 2 AG eventually reached a different conclusion.
And the resulting disagreement interrupted the proceedings.
Legislative source: Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, Article 5af.
6. OCTOBER 2025: THE PIPELINE COMPANY ASKS FOR ITS OWN CASE TO BE SUSPENDEDThe immediate chronology is preserved in Procedural Order No. 18.
On 1 October 2025, Nord Stream 2 AG raised concerns about Article 5af with the arbitral tribunal.
Its initial submission maintained that the new regulation should not interfere with the proceedings.
On 6 October, the European Union confirmed that the Commission considered the arbitration unaffected.
But Nord Stream 2 AG reconsidered its position.
On 13 October, it applied to the EU General Court to annul the relevant sanctions provision.
The following day, it informed the arbitral tribunal of that action.
The company now argued that the legislation’s broad language created unacceptable uncertainty.
Its concern was not limited to the corporate claimant.
It suggested that people and organisations participating in the proceedings could face legal risks.
These potentially included:
- The claimant and its employees.
- Lawyers, witnesses and expert advisers.
- The arbitrators themselves.
- The Permanent Court of Arbitration and others involved in administering the proceedings.
The argument was that transactions associated with conducting the arbitration might fall within the regulation’s prohibitions.
The European Union disagreed.
Its representatives maintained that the regulation did not prevent the proceedings from continuing.
They also pointed out that there was no evidence of European authorities using the provision to obstruct the arbitration.
The Commission nevertheless acknowledged an important institutional limitation.
It could express its interpretation of EU law.
It could not provide an authoritative interpretation binding the EU courts.
Nord Stream 2 AG argued that this distinction left the participants exposed to unacceptable uncertainty.
The tribunal was therefore presented with competing positions.
One side said the arbitration could continue.
The other maintained that continuing without clarification could create legal risks.
The tribunal had to decide what to do.
7. THE AUTHENTICATED ORDER OF 22 OCTOBER 2025Procedural Order No. 18 is the central document in this instalment.
It was issued on 22 October 2025.
The order records the parties’ submissions, reproduces the relevant sanctions provisions and explains the tribunal’s reasoning.
The tribunal acknowledged that Nord Stream 2 AG had changed its interpretation of Article 5af during the preceding weeks.
It also recognised the Commission’s position that the provision did not prevent the arbitration from proceeding.
But the tribunal considered that the Commission had not provided a sufficiently binding assurance.
This mattered because the potential consequences of an incorrect interpretation could be significant for those involved.
In paragraph 34, the tribunal concluded that there was a real risk of Article 5af being applicable to the arbitration and its participants.
The tribunal did not determine that the participants had violated sanctions.
It did not find that the European Union had unlawfully prevented access to justice.
It concluded that the uncertainty was sufficiently serious to justify suspension.
In paragraph 36, it ordered the proceedings suspended until the relevant risk could be adequately addressed.
The planned hearing on jurisdiction and merits, scheduled for 10–16 December 2025, was cancelled.
The parties were instructed to seek clarification urgently.
The tribunal also left open the possibility that the difficulty might be resolved without waiting for a final judgment from the EU General Court.
Primary document: Nord Stream 2 AG v. European Union — Procedural Order No. 18, 22 October 2025. italaw
This was already an unusual situation.
An international investment tribunal was examining a claim brought against the European Union.
A later EU sanctions regulation then created a dispute about whether the arbitration itself could lawfully proceed.
And the tribunal concluded that it could not safely resolve the uncertainty merely by accepting the Commission’s explanation.
But the story did not end there.
8. JANUARY 2026: A SECOND ORDER REVEALS THE TRIBUNAL’S FRUSTRATIONOn 24 January 2026, the tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 19.
This document takes the dispute a stage further.
It records correspondence exchanged after the October suspension.
The tribunal had attempted to establish whether authorisations under Article 5af could resolve the problem.
It wanted practical answers.
Who could apply for an authorisation?
Which transactions might require one?
Could the Permanent Court of Arbitration apply on behalf of the arbitrators?
Could the European Commission itself initiate the process?
Would several national authorities need to be involved?
And could the authorisations provide sufficient protection for everyone participating in the proceedings?
The European Union continued to maintain that authorisations were unnecessary because the arbitration was not prohibited.
It nevertheless explained the authorisation arrangements that might hypothetically apply.
Among other things, it stated that the Commission could not itself initiate the relevant national authorisation procedure in the manner suggested.
It also acknowledged that, if authorisations were necessary, more than one Member State’s authorities might have to be involved.
Nord Stream 2 AG regarded the answers as inadequate.
The tribunal’s subsequent observations are striking.
In paragraph 22, it indicated that the European Union was particularly well placed to provide guidance concerning legislation adopted by its institutions.
In paragraph 23, the tribunal observed that the Commission’s position still did not provide binding certainty.
Then, in paragraph 26, the tribunal criticised the detail of the responses.
It described the European Union’s answers as “limited and wanting.”
That is the tribunal’s own assessment.
It was not merely Nord Stream 2 AG’s characterisation of its opponent.
The arbitrators went on to identify practical questions that remained unanswered.
The tribunal reminded both parties of their duty to cooperate in progressing the arbitration.
It also drew attention to the possibility that their conduct could become relevant when costs were allocated.
Finally, the tribunal directed the European Union to provide a more detailed explanation of whether and how the Permanent Court of Arbitration could obtain sufficient authorisations to address the perceived risks.
Primary document: Procedural Order No. 19, dated 24 January 2026 — Full Eight-Page Decision. italaw
What the January order establishesIt establishes that the tribunal remained dissatisfied with the clarity of the European Union’s explanations.
It establishes that the tribunal wanted a practical mechanism through which the proceedings could resume.
It establishes that the tribunal considered further cooperation necessary.
It does not establish that the EU deliberately obstructed the proceedings.
Nor does it determine that Article 5af actually prohibited the arbitration.
The order also does not resolve the underlying investment dispute.
There is no finding in the document that Nord Stream 2 AG is entitled to compensation.
The legal proceedings remained unresolved.
As of this instalment, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s public case register continues to identify the arbitration as pending, with Procedural Order No. 19 the latest listed procedural order. PCA-CPA
9. THE DISPUTE EXPANDS INTO THREE SEPARATE EU COURT CHALLENGESAlongside the arbitration, Nord Stream 2 AG has continued challenging European legislation before the EU courts.
The proceedings need to be distinguished carefully.
They concern related infrastructure but different legislative measures and legal questions.
The 2019 Gas DirectiveThe challenge to Directive (EU) 2019/692 resulted in the General Court’s judgment of 27 November 2024.
The company lost that case at the General Court.
The subsequent appeal was registered as C-118/25 P.
The 2025 Sanctions RegulationOn 13 October 2025, Nord Stream 2 AG brought proceedings challenging Article 5af of Regulation 2025/1494.
The case was registered as T-722/25.
The claimant sought annulment of the provision, or alternatively more limited relief concerning particular restrictions.
Its arguments included alleged interference with property rights and the freedom to conduct business.
Those are the claimant’s legal arguments, not findings that the legislation is invalid.
Official record: Case T-722/25 — Nord Stream 2 AG v. Council of the European Union.
The 2026 Russian Gas Import RegulationA further challenge followed the European Union’s legislation to phase out Russian natural gas imports.
Regulation (EU) 2026/261 established new restrictions intended to end dependence on Russian gas.
On 27 April 2026, Nord Stream 2 AG brought another action.
This became Case T-264/26.
The company sought annulment of the regulation or, alternatively, particular provisions.
Its arguments included alleged breaches of proportionality, property rights and equal treatment, together with challenges to the legal basis of the measure.
The underlying allegation was that the new restrictions undermined the potential use and economic value of the pipeline.
Reuters reported the action on 23 June 2026.
The proceedings illustrate that Nord Stream 2 AG was not relying solely upon the original 2019 investment arbitration.
It was continuing to challenge subsequent European legislation.
Official judicial record: Case T-264/26 — Action Brought on 27 April 2026.
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, 23 June 2026 — Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Owner Sues EU Over Russian Gas Ban.
The existence of multiple proceedings should not be confused with multiple successful claims.
The available records establish litigation.
They do not establish successful compensation awards.
10. THE BATTLE OVER BILLIONS — WHAT CAN ACTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED?The financial scale of Nord Stream 2 is beyond dispute.
Shell’s authenticated 2017 announcement placed the project’s estimated cost at €9.5 billion.
Gazprom controlled the company responsible for constructing and operating the pipeline.
European energy companies supplied substantial financing.
The project was completed physically but never entered commercial service.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany suspended the certification process, while sanctions and other restrictions transformed the project’s prospects.
Shell’s financial disclosures provide a particularly clear record of the consequences for one investor.
In its 2022 accounts, Shell reported that it had fully written down its Nord Stream 2 loan.
The amount was $1.126 billion.
The company also recognised substantial separate charges associated with its withdrawal from Russian operations.
These were documented accounting consequences.
They were not hypothetical future losses.
Authenticated financial source: Shell Form 20-F 2022 — Russia Withdrawal and Nord Stream 2 Disclosures. Shell
But the scale of the original investment should not be confused with the value of any compensation claim.
The €9.5 billion project estimate is not an arbitration award.
Shell’s $1.126 billion write-down is not a damages award against the European Union.
And the existence of an Energy Charter Treaty claim does not establish that any compensation is payable.
The publicly examined procedural orders do not determine a damages amount.
We should therefore distinguish the financial scale of the underlying investment from the unresolved question of legal compensation.
The billions invested are documented. The existence of an enforceable compensation entitlement has not been established.
That distinction is essential to an accurate historical account.
11. WHY DOES THIS MATTER TO SHELL SHAREHOLDERS?Shell is not identified as a party to the Nord Stream 2 arbitration.
The claimant is Nord Stream 2 AG.
Nothing in the documents examined establishes that Shell is directing these proceedings or participating in the reported discussions about possible pipeline revival.
Nor do the records establish that Shell would receive any financial benefit from a successful arbitration claim.
However, the wider history remains relevant to Shell shareholders.
Shell’s financing commitment was a documented commercial decision undertaken while European relations with Russia were already politically contentious.
The company committed financing to infrastructure controlled by Gazprom.
It subsequently withdrew from the project and recognised a substantial financial loss.
The pipeline operator meanwhile continued pursuing legal remedies concerning European regulatory decisions.
That sequence raises legitimate questions about geopolitical risk, investment protection and the limitations of contractual safeguards.
A company can undertake a commercially rational transaction under the assumptions prevailing at the time.
Those assumptions can subsequently change.
Political decisions, legislation and international conflict can destroy the anticipated commercial benefits.
Legal disputes may then continue long after the original participants have written down their investments.
For shareholders examining historical management decisions, the lesson is not simply that Nord Stream 2 failed.
It is that investment exposure can endure through several stages: financing, regulation, sanctions, impairment, restructuring and litigation.
The documentary record makes those stages visible.
12. DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS Established FactsShell entered a financing agreement with Nord Stream 2 AG on 24 April 2017 alongside four other European energy companies.
Gazprom remained the pipeline company’s sole shareholder.
Nord Stream 2 AG commenced Energy Charter Treaty arbitration against the European Union on 26 September 2019.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration administers the proceedings as Case No. 2020-07.
On 27 November 2024, the EU General Court dismissed Nord Stream 2 AG’s challenge to the 2019 gas directive.
On 18 July 2025, the European Union adopted new restrictions concerning transactions connected with Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2.
On 22 October 2025, the arbitral tribunal suspended proceedings because of unresolved concerns about the possible application of those restrictions.
On 24 January 2026, the tribunal issued a further order seeking more detailed explanations from the European Union.
Nord Stream 2 AG has also pursued separate EU court challenges concerning the 2025 sanctions regulation and the 2026 Russian gas-import legislation.
Shell’s 2022 financial disclosures confirm a $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan.
These propositions are supported by authenticated corporate, judicial and regulatory records.
Positions Advanced by the PartiesNord Stream 2 AG argued that Article 5af created unacceptable legal uncertainty for participants in its arbitration.
It maintained that the possibility of sanctions-related consequences made suspension necessary.
The European Union maintained that the legislation did not prevent the arbitration from continuing.
It disputed the claimant’s interpretation and pointed to the absence of evidence that authorities had applied the provision to obstruct the proceedings.
The tribunal accepted that unresolved risk warranted suspension but did not determine that participating in the arbitration violated European sanctions.
The wider investment dispute remains contested.
Matters Not EstablishedThe available documents do not establish that the European Union deliberately adopted Article 5af to prevent Nord Stream 2 AG from pursuing its arbitration.
They do not establish that Shell participated in developing or conducting the litigation.
They do not establish that the EU has been found liable to pay compensation.
They do not establish that Nord Stream 2 AG has obtained a damages award.
They do not establish that success in any court action would result in reopening the pipeline.
They do not establish that an eventual recovery by Nord Stream 2 AG would restore Shell’s previously written-down financing.
These distinctions should be preserved in any subsequent historical account.
EDITORIAL COMMENTARY: WHEN A PIPELINE BECOMES A LEGAL PROBLEMThere is a striking irony at the centre of this file.
Nord Stream 2 was conceived as physical infrastructure.
Its purpose was to move natural gas from Russia to Europe.
Its economics depended upon construction, financing, certification, access to European markets and sustained commercial demand.
The investment was substantial.
Its sponsors expected the infrastructure to operate for decades.
Instead, the pipeline became entangled in one of the most consequential geopolitical confrontations of the modern European energy industry.
The financial consequences followed.
Shell wrote down its loan.
Other participants were left facing the consequences of a stranded investment.
The company owning the pipeline pursued legal remedies.
Then came an unexpected complication.
The legislation intended to prevent commercial activity involving Nord Stream became the subject of disagreement about whether the company’s own international arbitration could safely proceed.
The tribunal asked the European Union for clarification.
The Commission said the proceedings were not prohibited.
But it could not provide the binding assurance requested.
The tribunal suspended the case.
Three months later, it was still seeking practical answers.
This is not evidence that the European Union acted unlawfully.
Nor does it vindicate Nord Stream 2 AG’s original investment claims.
It demonstrates something more specific.
The legal consequences of a major energy investment can become extraordinarily complicated when commercial expectations collide with changing geopolitical circumstances and regulatory policy.
For Shell shareholders, the most useful question may not be whether Nord Stream 2 should ever have been financed.
That is a legitimate subject for historical debate.
The more important documentary question is how the risks were assessed, how they changed and what the consequences reveal about the management of large international investments.
Those questions require evidence.
And the Shell documents, court records and arbitration orders provide a substantial foundation for answering them.
SOURCE RECORD AND DOCUMENTARY PROVENANCEShell — 24 April 2017. The company’s original financing announcement establishes the participating companies, estimated project cost, financing limits and Gazprom’s sole ownership of Nord Stream 2 AG. Shell’s authenticated 2017 announcement archive.
Shell — 2022 financial disclosures. Shell’s Form 20-F documents its withdrawal from Russian activities and confirms the full $1.126 billion write-down of the Nord Stream 2 loan. Shell Form 20-F 2022.
Permanent Court of Arbitration — Case No. 2020-07. The official case register establishes the parties, commencement date, treaty basis, tribunal composition, procedural history and pending status. Official PCA Case Register.
Court of Justice of the European Union — 27 November 2024. The official court record confirms dismissal of Nord Stream 2 AG’s challenge to the 2019 gas-market legislation and explains the General Court’s findings on legal certainty, legitimate expectations and proportionality. Official Court Press Release 195/24.
Council of the European Union — 18 July 2025. Regulation 2025/1494 introduced Article 5af, including the relevant restrictions and authorisation provisions concerning Nord Stream transactions. Regulation 2025/1494.
Permanent Court of Arbitration — 22 October 2025. Procedural Order No. 18 records the parties’ conflicting interpretations of Article 5af, the tribunal’s assessment of risk and its decision to suspend proceedings. Full Text of Procedural Order No. 18.
Permanent Court of Arbitration — 24 January 2026. Procedural Order No. 19 records the subsequent exchanges and the tribunal’s dissatisfaction with the clarity of the European Union’s explanations. Full Text of Procedural Order No. 19.
General Court of the European Union — 2025 and 2026. The official notices concerning Cases T-722/25 and T-264/26 establish the additional challenges to the sanctions regulation and Russian gas-import legislation. Case T-722/25 and Case T-264/26.
The primary documents were produced by Shell, the European Union institutions and the arbitral tribunal. The attribution of arguments to parties is not an endorsement of their accuracy. The documentary record has been distinguished throughout from subsequent interpretation.
Archive disclaimer: This instalment examines proceedings involving Nord Stream 2 AG and the European Union. Shell’s historical financing relationship does not make Shell a party to those proceedings. No allegation is made that Shell directed the litigation, that EU officials deliberately obstructed it, or that any tribunal has established wrongdoing or compensation liability in the proceedings discussed. Pending claims remain unresolved unless and until determined by the competent court or tribunal. Editorial analysis is identified separately from authenticated documentary findings.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES SLF-2007-093 — The Sakhalin Papers LXXXIII: The Energy Charter Treaty Trap — Nord Stream 2, Investor Rights and the Question of CompensationThe next instalment will move beyond the procedural dispute over sanctions to examine the underlying investment arbitration itself.
The central documents will be Nord Stream 2 AG’s original arbitration notice, its July 2020 memorial and the European Union’s response concerning jurisdiction.
What protections did Nord Stream 2 AG claim under the Energy Charter Treaty?
Why did the European Union contest the tribunal’s jurisdiction?
How might the distinction between ordinary regulatory changes and internationally unlawful treatment affect the claim?
And can an investment made in anticipation of long-term access to European energy markets generate compensation rights when the political, legal and commercial circumstances change so dramatically?
The documentary trail will also examine the consequences of the EU courts’ subsequent decisions for the original treaty arguments.
The question is no longer simply whether Nord Stream 2 might reopen.
It is whether the legal framework protecting international energy investments can produce an enforceable remedy for infrastructure that has become commercially stranded.
The pipeline has never delivered gas to Germany.
But the legal contest over the investment that created it is far from over.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 19 OCTOBER 2026 was first posted on October 19, 2026 at 8:07 pm.©2018 "Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com". Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at john@shellnews.net
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